

Hypothesis 1: the more difficult, contested, and also violent the change of regime (crisis, transition, and establishment), the more probable the consolidation will be.

This is so because the elite actors and, in some cases, the mass actors had to find a closer agreement to achieve a successful establishment, because more solid loyalties toward the democratic regime were built up, and also because a lower degree of continuity was inevitable.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the agreement reached (by the coalition of actors founding the regime) about the democratic procedures and about some very hot conflicts during the previous periods, the more probable the consolidation will be.

and also:

Hypothesis 2a: the broader the founding coalition in term of political resources (incumbency, influence, electoral), the easier the consolidation.

These hypotheses underline the importance of the coalition at the beginning regarding both their resources and the extent of procedural-substantial agreement reached.

Hypotheses 3: The smaller and non salient the center/periphery cleavage, the easier the consolidation.

In other words, if the system experiencing the change has not overcome the problems raised by the nation building, then one main element of complication in the politics of that country is added (regarding ethnic, language minorities see, recently, Allardt).

Now, let's try to test quickly these background hypotheses in the Italian and Spanish cases. As for the third condition, in Italy this is fully accomplished: the presence of the national unity or, at most, of irrelevant ethnic minorities eliminate an important element of complication of both the instauration and consolidation processes. Quite to the contrary, for well known traditional, historical, and more recent reasons, related to the Francoist period, the regional cleavage has to be considered the single most important factor of complication for the Spanish transition and the following consolidation. At this point one should go on - we have data for that purpose - analysing how deeply and in which way this element affects democratic establishment and their consolidation, comparing it with the Italian case and, better, with the Greek and Portuguese cases where this element is fortunately lacking.

The center/periphery cleavage reminds us of the other conflicts typical of European history (see Rokkan, Daalder). The country/town cleavage is not so salient in the cases we are scrutinizing. On the contrary the church/state cleavage is more relevant in the Italian case than in the Spanish one, also because at the moment of transition the second society is more - but not completely - secularized than the first one. However, in the Italian case the cleavage is overcome through constitutional agreement, and in a sense, paradoxically, the Catholic religion lays the bases for a stronger partisanship for Christian Democracy than for the UCD. In other words, it is transformed in a factor of higher cohesion for Christian Democrats and, from this limited point

of view, it helped the consolidation of Italian democracy. Quite to the contrary, this element is not present in the case of UCD, that again, from this restricted point of view, has not an important factor for future loyalties. In addition, Spain immediately had to cope with some problems that Italy faced three decades after its transition, such as divorce and abortion. And, although in a comparatively more secularized society, these problems affected the democracy at least in the same strong way that they affected Italy during the Seventies. Thus, the secularization was diffused enough to discard the probability of a confessional party, but not so diffused as to avoid the conflicts raised by divorce in the population (and because of the pressure applied by the Church).

Both countries solved in different ways, but, on the whole quite quickly, what I could call an institutional cleavage, i.e. the monarchy vs. republic conflict.

Thus, in the end, we are left only with the class cleavage that is salient in both cases: in Italy since that country went through a period of economic reconstruction and, by and large, underdevelopment; in Spain, since the instauration took place during a phase of economic crisis.

Therefore, hypothesis 3 has to be rephrased in this way:

Hypothesis 3: The smaller the number of cleavages present during the period of regime change, and/or the less salient they are, the easier the consolidation.

Furthermore, it should be useful also to point out if and how the mentioned cleavages, described by Rokkan, had been transformed after World War Two and if, when and how other cleavages

or more specific issues emerged during these years in the Mediterranean area.

Coming back to the first hypothesis, we have in the Italian case a more striking and dramatic change, basically dominated by the war in the process of ending or just finished. In part of I taly, there was also a civil war with the well known consequences. But, maybe more important, some anti-fascist, loosely democratic ideals shared quite consistently by the coalition founding the regime were dominant during this period.

Although this kind of transition did not bring about a complete discontinuity regarding certain administrative structures, legal norms or even state personnel, there is no doubt that it made the consolidation easier. Some loyalties were achieved for a long period given the terrible experience suffered by the population and the high degree of political mobilization and personal involvement brought about by the war.

In the Spanish case, the events ran very differently. The transition and, then, the instauration were undoubtedly easier and smoother: the so called ruptura pactada, characterized by the Moncloa pactos made it so, but also the mass mobilization was lower, the commitment toward the regime more limited and, given the high expectations, the desencanto higher, probably also in the sector of the industrial bourgeoisie that viewed the change sympathetically. From this point of view, in a society at a different stage of economic growth, and so non receptive to the apathetic views shown by the most industrialized developed democracies, the consolidation process can be paradoxically more difficult.

The requirements put forward by the second hypothesis are problematic, also from a theoretical point of view. However, basically, they are three: a) founding coalitions as large as possible; b) an agreement among the coalitional actors on democratic

procedures; and, possibly, c) some agreement also about certain salient issues. The first requirement is fulfilled by both Italy and Spain, since party and, generally speaking, political actors belonged to the founding coalition, although the Communist parties, with sharply different electoral resources, took different stands that have to be clearly stressed. In both cases also the second requirement is met. About the third one, there is some problem. To mention only one important element for each country, one should say that in Italy the state/church cleavage was virtually settled by art. 7 of the Constitutional Charter, while in Spain regional cleavage still remains troublesome, and the Constitution had it just held off and postponed. The republic/monarchy conflict was settled in both cases, but in Italy through a more suffered and complicated process. Of course, the class conflict is left unsettled in both cases.

Let's turn now to three other, more specific and central conditions. All of them are clearly connected in one way or another with the previous establishment stage, and also with the first two previous hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4: The more - and the better - the right and the center-right parties are represented, the more probable the consolidation becomes.

Hypothesis 5: The more cohesive, and lesser in number, the center parties, the more probable the consolidation.

Hypothesis 5a: The more non unidimensional the political space, the more probable the consolidation.

Hypothesis 6: The more structured and solid the party alignments and, on the whole, the political alignments, the more probable the consolidation.

Such three hypotheses are the most relevant of all for the success of consolidation. However, they should be specified and articulated better, primarily on a theoretical level.

The first of these hypotheses is immediately quite clear. It takes into account some previous historical experiences of crises that followed the democratic establishment where only leftist parties were represented and organized and, during the instauration, the rightist and center-right parties basically were not present. Put in a better way, conservative, religious interests, moderate stands or bourgeoisie and middle class interests were not organized through party structures or in any other way. They were largely absent during the instauration and did not affect - or they did it in a marginal way - the party dynamics (and also, on the whole, the political dynamics). Although the rightist parties can emerge - and they usually do - in a second stage of the change, the possibilities of consolidation remain very low. There is the simple fact that the above mentioned agreement on democratic procedures was just set up disregarding the political interests potentially most powerful in our societies. Such possibilities are even lower if there is some agreement also regarding substantial issues, to which those political interests did not participate because of their lack of representation and organization. Why these interests were not yet organized during the transitional period is another question. And to provide some answers one should go into the same previous critical period, the reasons for it, and the forms in which it took place. However, the presence of rightist and center-rightist organizations is the condicio

sine qua non for any possibility of democratic consolidation.

In both empirical cases we are considering, those organizations were present and active, and they led to the establishment of the two democracies.

The second hypothesis is more complex and troublesome. It requires: a) a central political space with little or no fragmentation; b) quite cohesive centre parties; c) a multidimensional political space. Why so much attention given to the centre? As is well known, there is a large dispute about the theorization of political space and the centre (see Duverger, Downs, Sartori, Barry, Daalder). Let me here only stress the fact that in one way or in another the central space is affected by all the strains that a party system and, by and large, a democracy have; that a political space not squeezed in one dimension only - above all if an ideological one - allows more opportunities for compromise and accommodation (I am wondering whether a theoretical refinement of this matter could also improve Sartori's model of polarized pluralism, that shows its usefulness in the case of Mediterranean party systems). But in this context let me also emphasize the necessity of pointing out the main conflicts and issues that structure the political space in these years.

The first requirement is basically fulfilled by both cases: in Spain only two large parties cover a wide space from centre-right and centre-left. In Italy, Christian Democracy and three tiny minor parties covered the same wide space. However, on the whole, the central space was more fragmented in the second case than in the first one. In both countries, there is a crucial centre party, but - and here the second requirement comes - Christian Democracy has been more cohesive than UCD is at the present time for well known reasons. Probably for Spain and, particularly, UCD; I would guess the only way out, in order to have more cohesion in that central space, is just a splitting up of UCD,

granted that such a party cannot become more cohesive than it is now because of its composition (an alliance of tiny groups). As for the third point, Italy showed a squeezing of political space along ideological issues, like communism/anticommunism. This is not the Spanish situation, where such a requirement is more satisfactorily met. Therefore, from this point of view, in Spain there should be higher opportunities for accommodation and compromise on different issues also on a parliamentary level. However, let's not forget that in Italy a quite high cohesion, also at the level of governmental coalition since 1948, allowed a relatively good performance and, in this sense, a progress in the consolidation.

The sixth hypothesis is probably a crucial proposition in sketching out the conditions, also because by itself it is one of the indicators of the same consolidation. I mean when it becomes clear that party alignments and, more generally, political alignments are settled, then the consolidation is accomplished. Thus, more exactly, when we consider it as a condition of consolidation, we should pay attention to the beginning of this process, that is when party volatility begins to fade away; at mass level, party identification becomes stronger; at elite level, connections between socio-economic groups and political groups are becoming established; at the electoral level, there has been the so called critical election, that is the election that welds the party alignments for quite a long period. If none of these phenomena shows up, then a basic condition for a consolidation of the same democratic institutions is lacking.

Along this line, I think it is especially important to pay attention to the relationships that are established - of course, not permanently, but with the possibility for change - at mass level and at elite level. That is, on the one hand, we have party identifications and forms of political mobilization and, on the

other hand, the more difficult and not completely visible connections between party élites, high civil servants and, on the whole, higher incumbent authorities and influential socio-economic groups. However, these connections, quite hard to identify and to operationalize, but particularly salient in a democracy need further exploration. Furthermore, with regard to party identification, one could compare the new party alignments with those of the previous democratic regime, if there had been one.

Coming now to our cases, here I can only say that in Italy that process of building more solid party structures and stable party alignments became clear with the critical election of 1948. In the Spanish case it is not yet evident, but we can trace back to the previous loyalties of the Second Republic (see Linz and Maravall) and discover a good extent of persistence and constituency of such loyalties. Thus, as for Spain, the overall judgement had to be held off and one should look for more and better data.

Let's go to two other final, important conditions that I could call side conditions given their placement in this general theoretical outline.

Hypothesis 7: The more disorganized or weaker the army or other coercive powers are during the change, and the more secondary their role during this change, the easier the consolidation will be.

The logic underlining this condition is that civil actors and the same civil leaders should have a free hand during the complicated and difficult period in which they are living, and they should be protected from restraints or orders possibly coming from coercive powers. Furthermore, since during the period

of regime change conflicts among different actors are usual, civil actors should not even have the possibility to go to the barracks in order to find support for their positions or stands. Since, in the last analysis, coercive resources determine the game's outcome but also lay the bases for an authoritarian rule, we can sustain the following: the weaker the organisation is, the smaller the same coercive and influence reasons are, and the lesser the role of coercive powers during the change, the better the perspectives of consolidation will be.

Concerning this hypothesis, the two cases we are taking in to consideration are on opposite sides: Italy completely met the hypothesis since the defeat in the war annihilated the army and police; Spain, on the other hand, has in the constitution in the law, and in the reality of change the acknowledgement of the importance of the army. Given also the recent events, this element throws a dark light on the consolidation process. Thus, the political puzzle for Spanish leaders is how to confine the army in the barracks, how to have them become just a neutral power. And I think the shift of government policies toward the right is not a sufficient reply, also because such a move can produce a higher fluidity in party competition and party alignments without reducing the military role, which is just what should be avoided for consolidation purposes. However the political salience of this puzzle and the difficulties in solving it are evident.

Hypothesis 8: The greater the possibility for international alliances to be exploited for domestic political gain and the clearer the watershed in this field between the founding coalition and the regime opposition, the easier the consolidation will be.

The reasoning here is that the international alliances, formed after World War Two, are often exploited for domestic politics. Now, if such alliances can be used to strengthen the governing coalition, then they are useful for consolidation purposes. On the contrary, if such international alliances are a divisive issue for the governing coalition, it cannot be employed for strengthening that coalition and so a good opportunity is missed.

In the Italian case, such an issue was exploited clearly by De Gasperi when in 1947 the Communist Party was thrown out of the government and the governing coalition became more homogeneous and cohesive. It is not possible to employ it in the Spanish case since such international alignments are not a clear watershed with the parliamentary opposition. It would have negative consequences for the dominant coalition in the Greek case given the international situation there with Nato presence and rivalry with Turkey, which is also in the Nato alliance.

Which consolidation and when

When at least a few of the above mentioned conditions are present, then the democratic consolidation is possible. Of course, the problem regarding which specific conditions must be present and which ones may or may not, is still completely open at this stage. However, eventually, it is always up to democratic leaders to drive a real successful consolidation. One has to strongly underline this uncertainty in the process, the fact that in the last analysis the consolidation has to be translated into consistent policies and also that it belongs to the domain of choices that the political leaders have.

By and large, one could affirm that consolidation is carried out when the structures of regime have achieved a good deal of institutionalization, and a high legitimacy, efficacy, and ef

fectiveness. But in this way the theoretical problem of the achieved extent of consolidation is left open as well as that of recognizing the different types of consolidation that the regime may attain. What could be regarded as healthy operational criteria to estimate the extent and types of consolidation achieved? I can think of two criteria - but probably also other ones could be devised:

- a) the probability of alternation in the governmental incumbency
- b) the attainment of persistent party alignments

The relevance, also political, of the first criterion is evident. It can give the opportunity to appreciate whether or not the democratic structure is fully legitimated, so that nobody is frightened in case coalitions in government change and all party actors can, at least potentially, enter the government. In addition, while the first criterion is easier to operationalize, the second one involves some problem: we can pick up only the electoral results (but which is the threshold of electoral change that allows us to speak of that persistence?). Furthermore, it has to be made clear that in both cases we have a sort of retrospective criteria, rather than conceptual tools well suitable for grasping the consolidation when it is beginning. However, lacking a better solution, we stay with these two criteria that allow us to sketch out four different types of consolidation: if they are fully met the democracy is consolidated (strong consolidation); if not, the consolidation did not take place (no consolidation); in the middle, there are two intermediate cases. See fig. 2, where the rotated position of the square would suggest a sort of rank order between the two criteria: the second one appears logically more salient than the first one for estimating the consolidation.




Fig. 2: Types of democratic consolidation

Which of these cells are suitable for our cases? Italian democracy probably fit the second one after 1948, and Spain is closer to the third than to the second one. Actually, at this stage, the alternation would probably raise strong reactions from all rightist actors. However we should wait for another election to find out the extent of persistence in party alignments. And so by employing those criteria, on the whole, the evaluation has to be held off. But what about France and Greece, now more interesting cases in this perspective? Are there in those two cases certain institutional arrangements that account for the alternation, so that one could conclude that, eventually, particular constitutional tools make democratic consolidation easier? Or

can the alternation be explained by the different historical period - in comparison with Italy and the French Fourth Republic during the Forties - with the leftist parties more consistently democratic and in countries where Socialists are stronger than Communists? However, given all the reasons of caution, the plain fact remains that in Greece alternation probably came without the formation of persistent alignments, and maybe even because of the lack of those. So one should take into account also the problem of relationship between the two considered criteria: eventually, is there a reverse relationship in democracies not fully consolidated?

What kind of research is open for the future?

In this paper, I made only a first attempt to sketch out the ~~subject~~ analyzed here, even in an almost impressionistic way regarding the empirical considerations put forward. The work should go much deeper into the above mentioned problems with regards to both the theoretical questions and the empirical ones. From the first point of view, several remarkable developments would be necessary in different directions. A few of these might be: a) to provide better definitions of democracy as a regime and of democratic consolidation with its main characteristics; b) to refine and specify better the various hypotheses about the conditions of a successful consolidation; c) to point out also the connections among them; d) to try to operationalize the relationship among elite actors, mass actors and civil society; e) to circumscribe better the possible types of consolidation. From an empirical point of view, the first step forward should be to include in this analysis all the cases I mentioned at the beginning; to provide more articulated and solid data in order to prove or to falsify the hypotheses by employing historical materials, electoral

returns, survey data and also by making élite interviews where data about élite behavior and connections do not exist. In this perspective the Spanish case is presently the easiest to deal with because it is the richest in terms of availability of survey and other data (see Linz et al.). Furthermore, on the whole, the countries most recently transformed are in better position as regards the empirical findings, actually or potentially available. But, in the end, we are left with an open question: are the guidelines of the research, which I have hypothesized, the best ones for approaching the problems raised here?



UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA

DEPARTAMENTO DE SOCIOLOGÍA

ACTITUDES SOCIALES EN CATALUNYA

EN EL PERIODO DE LA TRANSICION POLITICA

Marina SUBIRATS MARTORI

I. Introducción

La continuidad del sistema político democrático español se encuentra, a finales de 1981, amenazada. Este hecho resulta difícil de explicar si tenemos en cuenta los resultados electorales que se han producido desde 1977, y que han dado una mayoría parlamentaria a un partido de centro-derecha.

Resulta sin embargo más comprensible si centramos nuestro análisis en la observación de las condiciones en que se llevó a cabo el cambio político y de la evolución de las fuerzas sociales en este período. El franquismo ha marcado tan profundamente a la sociedad española que los procesos que tienen lugar en ella son muy distintos de los que podemos observar en otros países occidentales, y, por consiguiente, los resultados electorales reflejan son un indicador muy imperfecto de la situación política y social.

En efecto, las cuestiones que, desde la sociología, parecen hoy pertinentes para analizar la evolución social española son las siguientes: en primer lugar, como puede producirse la modernización política y social, y cuales son sus agentes. El bloqueo del sistema político español por el franquismo implicó una serie de disfunciones percibidas por sectores muy diversos de la sociedad, y dió origen, en un determinado periodo, a un alto nivel de movilización. Pero al mismo tiempo, no existía un sistema institucional capaz de canalizar a las fuerzas modernizadoras. La relación entre sociedad civil y instituciones políticas es, por tanto, una primera dimensión a considerar.

En segundo lugar aparece el hecho de que el cambio político implica una redistribución de poder entre los distintos sectores sociales, y esta redistribución se plantea en un periodo

de gran fragilidad de las instituciones democráticas. Hasta qué punto la movilización social puede asegurar un proceso de redistribución de poder en estas condiciones es la segunda pregunta que cabe formularse.

Y una tercera pregunta es la que se refiere a la idoneidad del sistema de representación por partidos en este tipo de proceso. La articulación entre partidos políticos y movimientos sociales es sumamente compleja, y en el caso español no parece haber sido resuelta de forma satisfactoria. Esta es la tercera dimensión que tendremos en cuenta en este análisis.

La amplitud del tema formulado exige, sin embargo, ciertas limitaciones. Así, abordaremos únicamente, en esta ponencia, el análisis de la evolución social que se ha producido en Cataluña, intentando establecer algunas de las causas que explican el que en esta zona se haya pasado de un alto nivel de movilización y de la construcción de un bloque nacional democrático a una situación de baja participación política, desmovilización e incertidumbre en relación al futuro.

Dentro del conjunto español, Cataluña es, junto con el País Vasco, una de las zonas más interesantes desde el punto de vista sociológico. En Cataluña existe un complejísimo sistema de interrelaciones entre las posiciones de las distintas clases sociales en tanto que tales y sus posiciones en relación a la cuestión nacional catalana. Esta doble línea de ordenación de las fuerzas sociales confiere a Cataluña una posición muy original en relación a otras zonas españolas, en las que la identidad nacional diferencial no existe o tiene menor arraigo.

El proceso social que se ha desarrollado en Cataluña en los últimos diez años presenta dos fases bien diferenciadas. Entre 1973 y 1977 asistimos a la formación de movimientos sociales y partidos políticos y a su lenta confluencia en la construcción de un bloque nacional catalán. A partir de 1978, en el momento en que comienzan

a configurarse los instrumentos que teóricamente deben servir de cauce político a la actuación de este bloque, se produce su paulatina desagregación, ~~xxxxxx~~ y, con ella, una creciente atomización social, que desemboca en el escepticismo político y la baja participación. Este proceso está basado, por una parte, en la confrontación entre el nivel de movilización catalán y la política estatal; pero, por otra parte, hay que buscar sus raíces en las propias características de la sociedad catalana y en las consecuencias de cuarenta años de régimen dictatorial.

II. La situación social de Cataluña entre 1970 y 1977: la construcción de un bloque nacional autonómico.

Las características de la sociedad catalana, en este período, están definidas por los hechos siguientes:

1) En 1975 vive en Cataluña un 15,7% de la población española, con un total de 5.662.791 habitantes. Ha sido, junto con el País Vasco, la región de mayor desarrollo industrial, desarrollo especialmente importante en la década de los sesenta. La distribución de la población activa catalana en 1975 nos muestra un gran predominio de la industria (51,0% del total de la población activa), un fuerte desarrollo de los servicios (42,7%) y un reducido sector de población activa agraria (6,3%). Esta configuración económica hace que Cataluña sea, en el conjunto español, la zona que más se asemeja a los países europeos avanzados.

2) El desarrollo económico de los años sesenta implicó, en España, un fuerte proceso de movilidad geográfica, con abandono de las zonas rurales y gran crecimiento de las zonas urbanas industrializadas. Cataluña ha sido el primer receptor de migrantes del sur, de modo que, en 1975, sólo un 61,9% de la población que vive en esta zona es nacida en ella, mientras el 38,1% procede de otras zonas del país. Este último porcentaje es, sin embargo, inferior al del grupo real de ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ la comunidad inmigrante: la natalidad diferencial entre las comunidades de nativos e inmigrantes es favorable

a esta última, de modo que entre los nacidos en Cataluña figuran los hijos de inmigrantes, una parte importante de los cuales no está integrada en la cultura local. La distribución según el dominio de la lengua(1) nos acerca más a la dimensión real de las dos comunidades (nativa e inmigrada): el 52% de la población residente en Cataluña es catalano-parlante; si sumamos a esta cifra un 6% de población que pueda considerarse totalmente bilingüe, obtenemos la cifra de un 58% de población residente que puede considerarse como perteneciente al ámbito de la cultura catalana, mientras el 42% restante posee un conocimiento imperfecto o nulo del catalán y pertenece a la comunidad inmigrante que, en gran parte, reproduce su cultura de origen, al existir aislamiento geográfico y social entre partes importantes de la comunidad inmigrante y la comunidad catalana.

3) La evolución económica de los años sesenta ha producido cambios importantes en la sociedad catalana: crecimiento urbano, ~~mejora~~ elevación del consumo, crecimiento de las demandas de servicios, y en especial de la educación y la sanidad, etc. Sin embargo, estos cambios no han ido acompañados de modernización política y administrativa, dado que la capacidad de reforma del régimen franquista es muy reducida. Ello produce un desajuste entre las nuevas necesidades creadas y el tipo de solución que pueden darles las instituciones políticas y administrativas. Como consecuencia de este desajuste se producen una serie de disfunciones: el crecimiento industrial y urbano no ha contado con elementos suficientes de planificación, y ha creado una situación caótica. Los servicios educativos, sanitarios, etc. son insuficientes y mal gestionados. Al mismo tiempo, los conflictos surgidos entre los distintos grupos sociales no pueden ser resueltos adecuadamente dentro del marco institucional existente, y en consecuencia, adquieren una gravedad excesiva. Es decir, el Estado no es, en esta etapa, un instrumento adecuado ~~para~~ ni para la resolución de las tensiones y conflictos sociales ni para

la ordenación y racionalización del crecimiento económico y urbano.

4) El Estado franquista se planteó, desde sus orígenes, con un carácter centralista y contrario a las diversas culturas nacionales existentes en España. La lengua y la cultura catalanas fueron objeto de represión durante largos años, después de un proceso de castellanización de la vida pública posterior a la guerra. Por consiguiente, la cuestión nacional es, para los catalanes, un elemento básico de la lucha contra el estado franquista ~~xxxx~~ en este periodo.

Las características apuntadas muestran ya una doble segmentación social. Veamos ahora cuales son las posiciones e intereses políticos de las distintas clases sociales.~~xx~~

La clase obrera industrial está formada básicamente por inmigrantes, que habitan en los cinturones industriales de Barcelona y las grandes ciudades. Este es el grupo social en el que se produce un mayor grado de movilización reivindicativa, tanto al interior de las empresas como en relación a la vivienda y a la organización de los servicios colectivos, muy deficientes en las zonas obreras. En las empresas la organización se realiza a través de Comisiones Obreras(2); en los barrios, a través de las Asociaciones de vecinos, cuyo número e influencia crece extraordinariamente en esta etapa, a pesar de las dificultades de legalización.

A lo largo de este periodo, las luchas reivindicativas van desembocando en posiciones políticas de lucha antigranquista, y van planteando la necesidad de una alternativa no sólo al franquismo, sino en la organización del Estado. Inicialmente el movimiento obrero no adopta las reivindicaciones culturales y autonomistas catalanas. Ahora bien, la referencia al socialismo es extraordinariamente vaga, puesto que no se configura como una alternativa real en las condiciones del franquismo, y, por consiguiente, existe la necesidad de construir alternativas intermedias. Así, se produce la adopción del único modelo alternativo que va tomando forma en este pe-

riodo: el de la autonomía catalana. Si para la clase obrera la cuestión nacional no es, en si misma, un objetivo, presenta sin embargo una serie de ventajas políticas: es, por una parte, la forma más concreta y elaborada que se perfila como alternativa al Estado franquista, que ha desprestigiado la opción centralista (3); y, por otra parte, la reivindicación autonómica va explícitamente unida a una redistribución del poder político, de modo tal que supone una mayor proximidad de los centros de decisión y una mayor capacidad de la población para influenciar directamente las decisiones administrativas.

Esta doble característica conduce, en la etapa que analizamos, a que los sectores más organizados del movimiento obrero adopten el objetivo de la autonomía catalana como propio, considerando que este habrá de ser el marco político del post-franquismo.

Las clases medias urbanas están formadas, fundamentalmente, por catalanes de origen, aun cuando hallamos también en ellas grupos de inmigrados. Los catalanes ocupan la mayoría de los puestos medios y altos de la industria y los servicios, pero una parte importante del funcionariado procede de la inmigración: el ejército, la policía, sectores de la administración y un sector amplio del profesorado. Ello se debe a un rasgo diferencial ya antiguo en la sociedad catalana: el mayor número de oportunidades de trabajo en la industria, la tradición industrial y el alejamiento de los centros de poder la burocracia estatal han provocado el desinterés y el desconocimiento de todo lo referente a la administración. El Estado ha sido percibido, durante siglos, como un instrumento de opresión nacional, no como un instrumento de organización colectiva; por consiguiente, existe en Cataluña una gran experiencia de organización de la sociedad civil, pero un elevado desconocimiento de los mecanismos estatales. De aquí que la administración pública haya sido dejada, en gran parte, en manos de inmigrantes.

Políticamente, las clases medias y los profesionales se enfrentan, en el periodo ~~de~~ 70-77, con la necesidad de racionalización de la

vida social y con la imposibilidad de utilizar, para ello, los instrumentos de la administración. La remodelación de la vida social no puede esperarse en absoluto del régimen franquista, que, para las generaciones nacidas después de la guerra, con un nivel de vida y unos hábitos muy semejantes a los de las clases medias europeas, no sólo aparece como reaccionario, sino como totalmente obsoleto. Pero tampoco puede esperarse de ninguna fuerza política que actúe desde el centro del país, porque Cataluña requiere soluciones específicas. Por consiguiente, la posibilidad de modernización y cambio social, es decir, de adecuar la estructura político-administrativa a la estructura económica y social catalana, pasa necesariamente por una forma de autonomía que permita utilizar las instituciones desde Cataluña, y para dar solución a sus problemas específicos.

En las clases medias es donde se configura, por tanto, el proyecto de autonomía como modelo organizativo alternativo al franquismo, y, al mismo tiempo, como vía de recuperación de la identidad nacional; los elementos culturales y simbólicos ocupan un lugar importante dentro del proyecto de autonomía, pero no agotan el campo de las reivindicaciones. Al mismo tiempo, dado que la movilización principal se produce entre la clase obrera, el proyecto autonómico que se va dibujando no es de carácter exclusivamente nacionalista, sino que abarca tanto la necesidad de modernización y racionalización de las instituciones como la necesidad de democratización.

En cuanto a la burguesía catalana, su presencia política es, en esta etapa, muy reducida. A lo largo del franquismo esta clase se ha transformado: ha perdido su anterior arraigo local, al trasladarse al área barcelonesa y vincularse de modo creciente, a partir de los años sesenta, a las empresas multinacionales. Al mismo tiempo, el franquismo no ha favorecido su organización como clase social, y, por tanto, en el momento de la transición política, no se presenta como un grupo coherente, con un modelo elaborado de modernización de la sociedad. Es una clase dividida: algunos sectores son partidarios del cambio polí-

tico que ha de permitir reajustar las diversas instituciones; otros sectores son más reacios a un sistema democrático, al haberse habituado a una situación con escasos controles y fuertes posibilidades especulativas. Así, este grupo social es el que, entre 1970 y 1977, elabora en menor medida unas plataformas políticas propias, y experimenta más tarde mayores dificultades para construir partidos propios y alcanzar una presencia específica dentro de la escena política.

El conjunto de situaciones descritas da lugar, de un modo creciente a medida que avanza esta etapa, a una ampliación de los movimientos sociales, a la creación de plataformas organizativas diversas, a la transformación de las reivindicaciones sectoriales en alternativas políticas y a la formulación de una serie de proyectos concretos tanto en relación al funcionamiento de las instituciones como a la vida social y cultural. Hay un elemento común a este tipo de proyectos, surgidos de grupos distintos: la voluntad de unir la democratización, la catalanización y la modernización de las instituciones. El tipo de proyectos elaborados apunta a un conjunto de reformas que generalmente toman como modelo el funcionamiento de las instituciones de los países europeos; es decir, un conjunto de cambios que en España no han sido realizados bajo la hegemonía de la burguesía, por la debilidad misma de esta clase social, y que en este momento se consideran ya inaplazables, y que habrían de ser llevadas a cabo por un bloque social de centro izquierda.

A lo largo de estos años, los distintos movimientos sociales tienden a converger en un organismo específico, la Asamblea de Cataluña, fundada clandestinamente en 1971, que reúne a miembros de partidos políticos, y a representantes de movimientos sociales y a intelectuales destacados. Esta asamblea se configura como el organismo de dirección de la lucha antifranquista en Cataluña y de unificación de las distintas fuerzas sociales. Ciertamente, ya desde 1974-75 se observan discrepancias políticas dentro del bloque nacional, que se va formando con dificultad. La visible

aceleración del final del franquismo contribuye a crear espacios para la acción política organizada, de modo que los partidos pasan a una situación de semi-clandestinidad, y pueden actuar como tales, sin tener que utilizar necesariamente la cobertura de los movimientos sociales y sus organizaciones. Así: mientras por una parte se amplía el movimiento unitario y la convergencia de fuerzas en un bloque nacional, por otra comienza a configurarse un sistema de partidos políticos con opciones específicas, que buscan su posición futura e intentan maximizar sus ventajas en el momento de llegar a ella, es decir, en el momento en que, por ejemplo, haya de plantearse la primera consulta electoral. Esta competencia de los partidos, provoca ya, incluso en la fase de construcción del bloque nacional, enfrentamientos internos que tienden a debilitarlo, pero que son percibidos como obstáculos menores, dentro del proyecto de reconstrucción nacional.

III. Instauración de la democracia y proceso de desmovilización social.

Recordemos brevemente la sucesión de consultas electorales que han marcado la transición política entre 1977 y 1981:

1977: primeras elecciones legislativas (ver resultados en el anexo)

1978: referendun sobre la Constitución

1979: Segundas elecciones legislativas

Primeras elecciones municipales

Aprobación del Estatuto de Autonomía en el País Vasco y en Cataluña

1980: Primeras elecciones al Parlamento catalán.

El resultado de las primeras legislativas, en 1977, confirma, efectivamente, la existencia de un bloque nacional catalán, representado por varios partidos de izquierda y de centro, con una voluntad autonómica común. La suma de los votos alcanzados por socialistas y comunistas alcanza el 56,6% del total; la suma de

los votos alcanzados por partidos nacionalistas -entre los que hay que incluir a los dos ya mencionados- arroja el 77,9% del total. La gran mayoría alcanzada por el senador Benet(4), presentado conjuntamente por socialistas y comunistas y caracterizado por su posición nacionalista, muestra la cohesión existente, en aquel momento, entre las izquierdas y el nacionalismo. La amplísima manifestación del 11 de septiembre, fecha nacional catalana, con más de un millón de personas, es el último signo de esta movilización que toma como objetivo la obtención del Estatuto de Autonomía. Y que se reflejará todavía en el primer gobierno de la Generalitat provisional, un gobierno de unidad en el que están representados todos los grandes partidos.

Ahora bien, a partir de 1978 y hasta la actualidad se producen los fenómenos siguientes:

1) Una fuerte disminución de intervención de la población en la actividad política, observable tanto en los procesos electorales como en la militancia en partidos.

La evolución de la participación en los procesos electorales es la siguiente:

	Participación en Cataluña
Legislativas 1977	79,3%
" 1979	68,5%
Municipales 1979	61,0%
Referendum Estatuto Autonomía 1979	60,4%
Legislativas Parlamento catalán 1980	62,1%

Las cifras son explícitas: aun excluyendo las Municipales y comparando únicamente los porcentajes de participación en las elecciones a los Parlamentos español y catalán se ha producido, en tres años, una pérdida de un 17% de los participantes. El Referendum para la aprobación del Estatuto de Autonomía es la consulta que ha arrojado una participación más baja, hecho sorprendente si tenemos en cuenta el gran número de manifestaciones que se han producido durante años y la larga lucha, durante ~~los~~

el franquismo, por la cuestión nacional. El cambio de actitud de la población es, por tanto, perfectamente visible.

En cuanto a los partidos políticos, la disminución del número de militantes y simpatizantes activos se ha producido sin excepciones. Disponemos únicamente de algunas cifras de evolución de la militancia en el PSUC, uno de los partidos más significativos en este proceso: en 1976, todavía en la clandestinidad, este partido contaba con unos 10.000 militantes. Al año siguiente se hablaba de 40.000, aun cuando la cifra más probable se sitúa en torno a 32.000. A finales de 1979 la cifra real se sitúa alrededor de los 19.000 militantes (5). No se han publicado datos posteriores, pero probablemente se han producido numerosos abandonos en estos dos últimos años, y pérdida de militantes especialmente entre los sectores más jóvenes.

En cuanto a otros partidos, disponemos únicamente de un dato: el partido socialista (PSC) da la cifra, en 1980, de unos 5.000 militantes, y Convergencia Democràtica de Catalunya, la de 20.000 militantes en 1981(6). Faltan datos anteriores para la comparación, difíciles de establecer, de todos modos, puesto que los partidos son legalizados en 1977 y ~~anteriormente~~ sólo a partir de esta fecha comienzan los recuentos sistemáticos, que tardan en normalizarse. En cualquier caso, todos los partidos pierden militantes y, sobre todo, militantes activos. Un proceso similar se observa en relación a la afiliación y participación en los sindicatos (ver anexo).

2) Se asiste, asimismo, al debilitamiento o desaparición de muchas de las instituciones y plataformas estables a través de las que actuaban los movimientos sociales, y de las instancias unitarias del periodo anterior.

El movimiento asociativo no desaparece, pero se transforma y pierde presencia en la escena política. La evolución es la siguiente: las asociaciones más activas en el periodo anterior, y

que en mayor medida se habían incorporado a un proyecto político, sufren un proceso de descomposición; paralelamente surgen asociaciones nuevas en barrios donde antes no habían sido creadas y en zonas alejadas de Barcelona. Pero estas nuevas asociaciones se orientan ~~hacia~~ hacia reivindicaciones específicas o hacia la organización de actividades colectivas de carácter local.

Entre los sectores intelectuales y profesionales disminuye también la movilización. Estos sectores, muy activos durante el periodo anterior, evolucionan hacia la afiliación a los partidos en la época en que éstos fueron legalizados, buscando las vías de intervención más eficaces para la reestructuración de las instituciones. Posteriormente se desarrollan dos tendencias: mientras algunos intelectuales y profesionales pasan a ocupar cargos políticos en el Parlamento o en los Ayuntamientos, una gran parte de ellos regresa a los ámbitos profesionales y a la privacidad, abandonando incluso, en gran parte, los Colegios profesionales y otras instituciones similares que habían servido de plataformas a su actividad política en el periodo anterior.

También los movimientos sociales más nuevos, como el feminismo o el ecologismo, experimentan una pérdida de influencia social.

Desaparece, asimismo, la ~~Sx~~ Asamblea de Cataluña, y, con las elecciones al Parlamento catalán, en 1980, el gobierno de unidad. En los Ayuntamientos se queda establecido, a partir de las municipales de 1979, el Pacto de Progreso entre socialistas y comunistas, con participación, en algunos casos, de Convergència Democràtica. Este pacto es considerado como una posibilidad para seguir llevando adelante una política de reconstrucción nacional, pero en la práctica choca con múltiples dificultades para mantenerse.

3) Los partidos políticos experimentan serias crisis internas. Los partidos de extrema izquierda o de catalanismo radical ~~separatista~~ -separatista-, han quedado, después de las elecciones, sin influencia en la sociedad, y entran en un proceso de conflictos internos y ~~crisis~~

rupturas que les conduce a una marginación casi total. Los partidos con presencia en el Parlamento adquirieron un gran protagonismo en la vida pública; a pesar de ello, sufren crisis importantes, sobre todo a partir de 1979, entre diversos sectores internos, mal cohesionados o con tendencias divergentes. La extrema derecha tiene muy escasa presencia en Cataluña, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en Madrid, y por tanto, no ha sido considerada en este análisis.

4) Aparecen conflictos entre las dos comunidades lingüísticas. Ya desde 1975 existió una fuerte movilización en torno a lo que se llamó la "normalización del catalán". Esta movilización permitió efectivamente algunos avances tanto en el uso público de la lengua como en su introducción en la enseñanza. Hemos visto como, en aquel periodo, se produjo un consenso en torno a la necesidad de la autonomía, y, por consiguiente, en torno a la importancia del uso del catalán: el catalán era incluso considerado por los inmigrantes como una lengua ^{cuyo uso} que ofrecía mayores posibilidades de trabajo y de promoción social.

A partir de 1978 van apareciendo, por una parte, conflictos generados a partir, o tomando como pretexto, el tema lingüístico, y, por otra parte, tiende a descender la presión social por ampliar la catalanización. Hay algunos signos de rechazo del catalán por parte de la comunidad inmigrante; rechazo que culmina con la publicación, en 1981, de un manifiesto firmado por un grupo numeroso de profesionales e intelectuales castellano-parlantes, que afirman que la lengua castellana es objeto de discriminación en Cataluña. Este manifiesto da lugar a tomas de posición enfrentadas, a una fuerte polémica y a una creciente crispación en sectores de ambas comunidades.

5) Cabe señalar, por último, la evolución de una serie de actitudes colectivas: el deterioro de la confianza en las instituciones democráticas, la extensión de los sentimientos de miedo e inseguridad, la pérdida de interés por la actualidad política -verificable e

través del descenso en la venta de periódicos y revistas, que ha conducido al hundimiento de algunas publicaciones-, y la generalización de lo que se ha llamado "el desencanto"(7). En el ámbito de la psicología colectiva, las posiciones y los símbolos favorables a la participación política, a la ruptura de normas conservadoras y a la importancia de la igualdad de derechos y oportunidades entre los distintos grupos sociales -valores de gran importancia en el período anterior- son paulatinamente abandonados. En su lugar, ganan terreno las posiciones críticas y escépticas respecto de la posibilidad de reorganizar la sociedad, las posiciones autoritarias y la orientación hacia los intereses particulares. Todo ello implica una pérdida de solidaridad y vínculos sociales, y, como consecuencia de ello, una mayor atomización social, de la que existe conciencia, y que es asumida no como una ventaja de la nueva situación, sino como un repliegue, e incluso como un fracaso. Ello no significa que no sigan produciéndose iniciativas encaminadas a la reestructuración de las instituciones; lo que ocurre es que tales iniciativas se producen a través de los canales profesionales o administrativos, con escasa vinculación con los sectores sociales usuarios, y, a menudo, en pugna con ellos.

El conjunto de hechos señalados -al que podríamos añadir otros de menor relieve-, confirman el retroceso de la movilización social, y ponen de manifiesto, a la vez, la fragilidad de un bloque nacional que aparecía bastante cohesionado en 1977. Este bloque parece iniciar su descomposición política antes de haber llevado a término el conjunto de cambios que constituían su objetivo, y precisamente en el momento en que Cataluña comienza a disponer de unas instituciones propias, que teóricamente habrían de facilitar la remodelación del conjunto de la sociedad.

Llegados a este punto, el problema que se plantea, desde la sociología, es el de la identificación de las causas del proceso seguido. ¿Cuales son los elementos del proceso político y social

que han provocado la desmovilización? ¿Por qué, en el momento en que la participación política es más fácil y presenta mayores probabilidades de eficacia, se produce la apatía?

IV. Las causas de la desmovilización: algunas hipótesis.

Hay que señalar, sin embargo, que al abordar el análisis de las causas del proceso de desmovilización nos movemos aun en el terreno de las hipótesis. El cambio de actitudes sociales ha sido tan rápido y tan distinto al que se podía prever que ha producido una cierta perplejidad entre los analistas sociales. A la vez, disponemos aun de pocos estudios sobre este proceso: si bien existen estudios detallados sobre los resultados electorales u otros aspectos concretos de la evolución catalana, no se ha realizado, por el momento, un diagnóstico global de los diversos factores que han influido en la sociedad en los últimos cuatro años. Por consiguiente, señalaremos aquí las causas más evidentes, pero sin que sea posible considerarlas exhaustivamente ni determinar el peso específico de cada una de ellas en el conjunto del proceso.

Entre estos elementos que han incidido sobre la evolución social catalana, unos son de origen externo, procedentes de la conjuntura económica y de la relación entre Cataluña y el resto del Estado. Estos aparecen como los elementos determinantes de la nueva situación. Otros, sin embargo, se derivan de la propia estructura de la sociedad catalana y de las características que ha adquirido a lo largo de los años del franquismo.

En relación a los elementos de carácter externo, destacan:

- 1) La diferencia de enfoques políticos que se establece, a partir de 1977, entre el conjunto del Estado español y Cataluña. Mientras en ésta surge de las primeras elecciones una mayoría perteneciente a los partidos de la izquierda, en el conjunto del Estado triunfa un partido centrista, U.C.D., formado en gran parte por

personal político procedente del franquismo, y, por tanto, con una clara tendencia a la continuidad política, a pesar de su posición reformista inicial. Con el paso del tiempo, esta tendencia continuista es cada vez más evidente, de modo que la voluntad reformista es paulatinamente abandonada.

La manera como se ha realizado la transición política explica, en gran parte, las dificultades para imponer un cambio real, dificultades que experimenta el propio partido mayoritario. En efecto, el cambio político se ha producido de forma totalmente superestructural, sin modificaciones profundas en el funcionamiento de las instituciones, excepción hecha de los aparatos políticos y sindicales. En la administración, el aparato judicial, el ejército, la policía, la enseñanza, etc. permanece el personal anterior, con las mismas rutinas e intereses corporativos creados en la etapa del franquismo. Ello crea un rápido desfase entre las directrices establecidas por la Constitución y la manera concreta en que son aplicadas. Así, si la Constitución puede considerarse como un punto representativo del equilibrio entre las distintas fuerzas políticas, no refleja la relación de fuerzas sociales, puesto que los sectores conservadores siguen teniendo un gran número de centros de poder, a través de los cuales se limita el alcance de las reformas ~~estatales~~ proyectadas. De aquí que, ya a partir de ~~xxxx~~ 1980, se observe un constante reajuste de la política de UCD, forzada a una derechización que la conduce, en 1981, a una crisis ^{interna} extremadamente grave.

En esta situación, las fuerzas sociales catalanas mayoritarias, que inicialmente eran partidarias de una ruptura política, se ven incluso imposibilitadas de realizar reformas, puesto que chocan frontalmente con el funcionamiento de las instituciones estatales, que mantienen sus pautas anteriores. Los proyectos de reorganización y racionalización de las instituciones, que en el periodo anterior actuaron como elementos cohesionantes

de los movimientos sociales, se revelan, en esta fase, inaplicables y utópicos. ~~Toda~~ Los intentos de aplicación han chocado con los límites reales del poder; por ejemplo, los cambios que se han introducido en el funcionamiento de las universidades han quedado en su mayoría frustrados, al enfrentarse con un Ministerio de Educación que seguía manteniendo el poder de decisión y aplicando los mismos mecanismos de selección y de organización vigentes durante el franquismo(8).

En estas condiciones, la existencia de una voluntad reformista desde la autonomía se ha convertido en un elemento de descomposición y desgaste de los movimientos sociales. El paulatino abandono de las alternativas de organización institucional actúa como un elemento disgregador, puesto que mientras algunos grupos aceptan el juego establecido -renunciando a oponerse a él, como hicieron en el período anterior, puesto que ahora está legitimado por un sistema democrático- otros grupos se aferran a un proyecto de cambio que es cada día más utópico, colocándose por tanto en una situación de marginalidad y de conflicto respecto de los primeros. El esquema de funcionamiento es simple: lanzados una y otra vez los movimientos sociales contra una administración inamovible, que actúa como una pared, lo que acaba produciéndose es la ruptura interna de los movimientos, y una fragmentación que dispersa a sus miembros en direcciones múltiples, que conduce a la atomización más que a la reconstitución de grupos nuevos.

2) Un segundo elemento de gran importancia ha sido la incidencia de la crisis económica y su aceleración en los dos últimos años.

Este elemento ha sido decisivo para todo el ámbito español, y constituye uno de los mayores obstáculos para la consolidación de la democracia. En efecto, la implantación del Estado democrático ha coincidido con cierres de empresas, pérdida de lugares de trabajo, descenso de la inversión, retroceso de los niveles de consumo y alta tasa de inflación. Ello agudiza, inevitablemente, las

tensiones sociales, haciendo prácticamente inviable la política de pactos que la situación requería. Al mismo tiempo, algunos sectores sociales establecen una relación causa-efecto entre crisis económicas y cambio político, hecho que ha debilitado la adhesión a los principios democráticos.

En el ámbito catalán, la incidencia de la crisis económica actúa también como elemento desmovilizador. Hemos señalado ya que los objetivos que mantenían a los sectores obreros dentro del bloque nacional no eran de carácter cultural, sino que estaban vinculados a las posibilidades que abría la autonomía en cuanto a democratización, acercamiento de las instituciones al público y mejora de la calidad de vida. Ahora bien, las instituciones autonómicas comienzan a funcionar en un periodo de penuria económica, con pocas posibilidades de inversión pública. De forma inmediata no se observan, por tanto, avances sustantivos en la calidad de la vida; antes al contrario, el paro acelera la degradación en muchos sectores sociales. Ello provoca el "desencanto" de los trabajadores en relación a las instituciones autonómicas y la pérdida de participación en las asociaciones ciudadanas. Un proceso similar tiene lugar en relación a los sindicatos: su formación coincide con un periodo de crisis que reduce su margen de juego y su presión, de modo tal que los pactos y negociaciones son a menudo interpretados como ~~re~~claudicaciones por los trabajadores, que no experimentan mejoras por la existencia de aparatos sindicales, sino que, como efecto de la coyuntura económica, se encuentran ahora en una situación de mayor precariedad que en el pasado.

3) El tercer elemento que actúa como desintegrador del bloque nacional es la utilización, por parte de diversos sectores sociales, de las diferencias ^{lingüísticas} (existentes entre las dos comunidades ^{-natives} ~~lingüísticas~~ e inmigrantes - para ~~potenciar~~ los conflictos internos.

Este elemento debe ser considerado aun como una causa externa al proceso político catalán, puesto que tiene su origen en el pa-

pel que las clases medias de las zonas sin industria han desempeñado en la sociedad española. Hemos señalado ya la mayor tendencia de estos grupos a ocupar puestos de funcionariado, en comparación con las clases medias catalanas. La escasa industrialización del centro y del sur de España ha determinado históricamente, como vía de movilidad ascendente para estos grupos, el acceso a la administración y a los cuerpos del Estado, y, a través de ellos, la ocupación de cargos en todo el país: la administración franquista aseguró perfectamente la continuidad de este mecanismo, que utiliza el centralismo como instrumento de promoción y de acceso al poder de determinados grupos sociales. Este es, en el conjunto del Estado español, uno de los mayores obstáculos a la formación de un Estado de las autonomías.

En efecto, la organización del Estado de las autonomías diseñado por la Constitución y los Estatutos vasco y catalán implica una paulatina pérdida de competencias de los organismos administrativos centrales, y favorece el acceso de los miembros de ~~los sectores~~ las zonas autonómicas a los organismos públicos. Ello genera inmediatamente el temor de los sectores de clases medias tradicionalmente proveedores de funcionariado a ver debilitadas sus oportunidades de trabajo en la administración, y, en definitiva, a perder el poder que estos puestos les conferían.

Existe, por tanto, una situación objetiva de conflicto, generada por el hecho que las autonomías implican una redistribución del poder entre los distintos grupos del estado español. Un ejemplo especialmente agudo de esta conflictividad se produce, en Cataluña, en el sector de la enseñanza: durante el franquismo, un alto porcentaje de los maestros residentes en Cataluña procedían de zonas de habla castellana. Todavía en el curso 1978-79, un 55% de los maestros de enseñanza primaria de esta zona son de habla castellana. Ahora bien, dado que una de las reivindicaciones lingüísticas más importantes es la de que el catalán debe ser aprendido en las escuelas

junto con el castellano, la autonomía implica que el profesorado que ejerza en Cataluña debe conocer esta lengua y ser capaz de enseñarla. Esta exigencia es percibida como una amenaza por parte del profesorado no catalán, que emprende una serie de acciones opuestas a la catalanización, y busca una alianza con el sector obrero, que cuenta con una mayor fuerza numérica. La cuestión se plantea de forma prioritaria en el campo de la lengua y de la cultura, pero el conflicto lingüístico no es, de hecho, más que uno de los muchos terrenos de enfrentamiento entre los grupos que tradicionalmente han casi monopolizado el poder a través de la administración y grupos que intentan acceder a él, a partir de las posibilidades abiertas por la autonomía. El traspaso de este conflicto al ámbito obrero -que por el momento se manifiesta aun muy parcialmente, aun cuando puede aumentar en importancia en el futuro- obedece únicamente a los esfuerzos de estas clases medias no catalanas por impedir la consolidación de un bloque nacional amplio y con una fuerte componente de inmigración.

Cabe considerar, a título de hipótesis, que los efectos sumados de los tres elementos descritos explican, en gran parte, los fenómenos descritos de pérdida de movilización y participación política y social. No agotan, sin embargo, la explicación de las causas, puesto que hay elementos internos a la propia sociedad catalana que hanx parecen haber jugado en la misma dirección.

1) El elemento que, desde el interior de la estructura social catalana, podemos considerar como más importante en el proceso que estamos describiendo, es la inexistencia de un sector social hegemónico, capaz de ordenar el conjunto del proceso de cambio y de cohesionar en torno a este proyecto a los distintos sectores sociales. ~~En efecto, el bloque nacional catalán que se dibujó~~
~~en 1977, pasando de una suma de sectores numéricamente prevalentes~~
~~en él la inexistencia; ideológicamente, las clases medias y sectores~~
~~que tradicionalmente han monopolizado el poder, desde la República~~

Esta característica está ya presente en el bloque nacional catalán que se perfila en 1977, y que muestra un cierto equilibrio de fuerzas: mientras numéricamente prevalece en él la clase trabajadora y sectores populares, ideológicamente son los sectores de clase media e intelectuales quienes tienen mayor peso, al ser los grupos depositarios, desde la II República, del proyecto nacionalista (9). La posterior organización en partidos políticos sigue reflejando un equilibrio de fuerzas. Tres partidos representan, fundamentalmente, a los grupos sociales interesados en el cambio social: CDC, PSC y PSUC, con un peso electoral similar entre los dos primeros ^{y inferior, pero aún} importante, en el tercero. Así, por ejemplo, CDC será el partido vencedor en el Parlamento catalán, y PSC en las elecciones municipales, lo cual muestra la inexistencia de un liderazgo ~~político~~ evidente y de unas opciones políticas claramente decantadas.

La falta de liderazgo político debe ser considerada, en este caso, como un indicador de la falta de hegemonía social, que se hace necesaria en el periodo de la transición. Aun partiendo del hecho que no existe un grupo hegemónico dentro de la sociedad catalana, en esta etapa, y que la reconstrucción nacional sólo es posible a partir de un bloque en el que participen sectores muy diversos, la continuidad de este bloque requerirá, en el momento de desarrollar una política de construcción de las instituciones, la presencia de un grupo hegemónico, que actuara como dirigente del proceso y que permitiera mantener la cohesión.

Ahora bien, por una serie de razones, ~~exige~~ este grupo no llega a configurarse: los sectores obreros y populares fueron los más movilizadas bajo el franquismo, pero dado el conjunto de la situación política española no pueden ocupar la dirección de este proceso; antes bien, sufren una progresiva marginación. Las clases medias están formadas por un conglomerado de componentes diversos; los profesionales e intelectuales pueden actuar como elementos de formalización de los procesos, pero no tienen suficien-

te peso en el conjunto de la trama social para ejercer ~~estas~~ funciones hegemónicas; la burguesía no actúa como clase organizada, ni construye un proyecto definido. Así, el bloque de fuerzas que actuó hasta 1977 tiene un carácter interclasista, y carece de una dirección política definida, lo cual ~~xxxxxx~~ tiene consecuencias negativas en el momento en que hay que pasar a ~~definiéndose~~ concretar un nuevo modelo de funcionamiento de las instituciones.

2) En segundo lugar, y en relación al tema anterior, hay que considerar los efectos de la superposición de un sistema de partidos sobre este bloque de fuerzas sociales. En efecto, el sistema de partidos que se crea en Cataluña no se deriva de la adecuación a unas fuerzas sociales perfectamente diferenciadas, sino que sigue, en gran parte, unas divisiones heredadas de la tradición política, que se ajustan difícilmente a la problemática ~~real~~ de esta zona. Al mismo tiempo, la falta de conocimiento real, por parte de una población que ha vivido mayoritariamente bajo el franquismo -es decir, sin partidos políticos legales- de lo que ~~es~~ cada partido significa, ha implicado que los sistemas de afiliación y voto no siguen pautas consolidadas, sino unas adhesiones motivadas a menudo por elementos de carácter anecdótico.

En estas condiciones, ya de por sí difíciles, los partidos políticos debían dar respuesta a una serie de problemas extraordinariamente complejos, algunos de los cuales ni siquiera podían ser abiertamente formulados: 1) debían articular los intereses de clase y la cuestión nacional, operación que, a pesar de sus dificultades objetivas, fue bastante conseguida en Cataluña; 2) debían articular y canalizar los distintos movimientos sociales, sin sustituirlos ni dividirlos, y aprovechando una movilización que era la única base política real del cambio democrático; 3) Debían lograr, cada uno de ellos, un es-

pacio propio y una posición lo más consolidada posible, como imperativo de la lógica interna, que lleva a maximizar ~~ixx~~ las cuotas de presencia y de poder. Estas dos últimas tareas se presentaban, en la práctica, como contradictorias, y dan lugar a un forcejeo constante. En casi todos los casos hay predominio del objetivo de consolidación propia por encima de la consolidación unitaria de los movimientos sociales: así, por ejemplo, los partidos han propiciado la pluralidad sindical, y con ella la división del movimiento obrero, bastante unificado en el período anterior.

La introducción del sistema de partidos políticos ha significado, por tanto, que la búsqueda de espacios políticos diferenciados ideológicamente ha ~~pxx~~ prevalecido sobre la necesidad de mantener la unidad de los movimientos sociales, que en cierto modo han sido sacrificados a la política institucional. Ahora bien, en una etapa en que las instituciones son débiles, en que la única fuerza real que puede impulsar el cambio es la movilización social, la disminución y fragmentación de ésta repercute en la capacidad de acción de las propias instituciones, que se presentan como los únicos agentes legítimos del cambio social pero que, de hecho, no cuentan con fuerza suficiente para llevarlo a término.

3) La falta de un grupo hegemónico que actúe como cohesionante del bloque nacional y la situación de competencia creada por la organización en partidos generan, a su vez, la atomización social ~~xxxx~~ y la sustitución de unos objetivos colectivos por otros de carácter individual. En el período franquista, las posibilidades de promoción individual a través de los aparatos administrativos y políticos, se ~~hallaba~~ hallaba, en Cataluña, reservadas a un grupo muy reducido, identificado con la dictadura. En la formación del bloque nacional los personalismos son escasos, dada la represión política y el tipo de ideología característica de esta fase. En el momento en que se abren ciertas

espectativas de poder, se produce, sin embargo, un efecto de competencia entre los individuos para ocupar posiciones destacadas en la sociedad. Este efecto, cuya aparición es perfectamente previsible en situaciones de estas características, hubiera podido ser disminuido si hubieran existido suficientes mecanismos de control social o de confrontación entre acción pública y proyectos colectivos. Al disminuir la movilización, y con ella la capacidad de control, la democratización se convierte en una ocasión para que determinados individuos puedan experimentar una movilidad ascendente, sobre todo en términos de aumento del poder y la influencia individuales. Y este hecho tiene a su vez nuevas consecuencias desmovilizadoras, dado que se generaliza entre la población la idea que el cambio político no ha implicado un cambio real para el conjunto de los ciudadanos, sino que ha tenido, como única consecuencia visible, un cambio de personal en el poder.

V. Conclusiones

La situación hasta aquí descrita no explica, por sí misma, la tendencia a la involución política. Esta viene dada por problemas ajenos, en gran parte, a la sociedad catalana: la debilidad de las instituciones democráticas, la falta de una clase dirigente cohesionada en el conjunto de la sociedad española, los intereses específicos de determinados grupos sociales vinculados al régimen anterior, etc. Ahora bien, si en sí misma la ~~situación~~ ~~existente~~ situación catalana no induce a la involución, tampoco parece ofrecer, en el momento actual, elementos consistentes para hacerle frente: el debilitamiento de la movilización y las actitudes colectivas de "desencanto" pueden conducir a la pasividad frente a los procesos involutivos, y, en cualquier caso, no contribuyen a frenarlos.

Ciertamente, el riesgo de involución política general es hoy la mayor amenaza para la política de reconstrucción nacional ca-

talana: es posible que, si tal riesgo no llega a materializarse, la sociedad catalana llegue a superar las crisis aparecidas en el periodo de la transición política, y consiga reagrupar a una parte importante de sus fuerzas para llevar a término un proyecto colectivo. La desmovilización no hubiera sido, en tal caso, más que la crisis producida por el choque con la realidad de las dificultades políticas, mucho más complejas que los proyectos elaborados en la clandestinidad.

Sin embargo, y sea cuál sea la evolución futura de esta sociedad, el proceso seguido hasta ahora aporta algunos elementos generales de reflexión en relación a los temas teóricos apuntados al inicio de esta ponencia. Así, a partir del análisis realizado sobre el caso catalán, podemos constatar:

- 1) La dificultad para que se produzca el cambio y la modernización de la sociedad en una situación en la que las fuerzas modernizadoras no poseen el control de las instituciones, o tienen acceso únicamente a instituciones políticas de creación reciente, no consolidadas. La complejidad de las actuales sociedades implica que la modernización y el cambio ya no pueden ser impulsados únicamente por medio de las presiones sociales, sino que requieren una serie de canales de intervención institucional, sin los cuales las acciones tendentes a la modernización se pierden en la utopía.
- 2) La redistribución de poder entre los grupos con base territorial diversa choca con el mismo tipo de dificultades: la movilización por objetivos nacionalistas no es un mecanismo suficientemente potente para asegurarla. Sólo en la medida en que esta redistribución esté fuertemente propugnada desde el Estado y se concrete en cambios del personal que ocupa las instituciones, es posible llevarla adelante. Pero ello plantea un círculo vicioso que parece irresoluble en el proceso seguido en España, basado en la idea de reformas paulatinas; de aquí que surjan actitudes de violencia -como ha ocurrido sobre todo en el País Vasco- o que puedan incrementarse, en el

futuro, los conflictos basados en el tema de la cuestión nacional.

Y 3) La organización política por medio de partidos de corte clásico responde a situaciones en las que la democracia está plenamente implantada, y las opciones sociales definidas con cierta precisión. Sin embargo, sus características no parecen perfectamente adecuadas para el tipo de transición que se ha planteado en España. En efecto, esta forma de organización obliga a la competencia entre sectores sociales que se hallan muy próximos, acentuando, en la sociedad civil, unas diferencias que son secundarias en relación al tipo de objetivos que se plantean en la transición, y que proceden menos de la lógica social que de la lógica de los aparatos políticos. En la inexistencia de un sector social dominante, la acentuación de estas diferencias conduce a la fragmentación de las fuerzas modernizadoras, a la desmovilización, y, en definitiva, a una atomización social totalmente contraria a la que requiere el propio proceso de transición.

Notas

- (1) El catalán es una lengua románica perfectamente diferenciada del español, y hablada también en las Baleares y parte del País Valencià. El español es frecuentemente designado en Cataluña como "castellano".
- (2) Comisiones Obreras es, en esta época, una organización unitaria y clandestina, surgida en los años sesenta. Posteriormente, a partir de 1977, se produce la pluralidad de sindicatos, y CC.OO. pasa a ser el sindicato de influencia comunista, mayoritario en el país pero seguido de cerca por U.G.T., de influencia socialista.
- (3) No hay que olvidar que una gran parte del proletariado de Cataluña procede de Andalucía y que, por consiguiente, no se identifica con un estado centralista, que recibe el apoyo de las clases altas andaluzas, pero no de los trabajadores. La Autonomía catalana no sólo ofrecía un modelo alternativo para Cataluña, sino que suponía un modelo político general, el del Estado de las Autonomías, que mejora también la situación andaluza. Este fue otro eje de identificación de la clase obrera con el proyecto autonómico.
- (4) El senador Benet es un intelectual conocido por sus posiciones nacionalistas y anti-franquistas. No pertenece a ningún partido político y ni siquiera había estado anteriormente en el área de influencia de los socialistas o comunistas. Su coincidencia con estos partidos, en este periodo, pasa precisamente por la confluencia en un proyecto político autonómico y de centro izquierda.
- (5) Citado por J. Borja, PSUC, un partido entre dos identidades, en Argumentos, año IV, número 44, 1981
- (6) Citado por J. Borja, op. cit.
- (7) ~~En algunos ámbitos administrativos han sido posibles ciertas reformas, a partir de la transferencia de competencias a las Generalitat. Ello ha dado resultados relativamente importantes,~~

- (7) La proyección de una película titulada "El desencanto" generalizó este término para describir el tipo de actitudes surgidas en la sociedad española a partir de 1977.
- (8) En algunos ámbitos administrativos han sido posibles las reformas, a partir de la transferencia de competencias a la Generalitat. Ello ha dado resultados relativamente importantes, como por ejemplo la introducción del catalán en las escuelas. Sin embargo, la propia Generalitat choca frecuentemente con el poder de los organismos centrales: algunas de las medidas tomadas por el gobierno de la Generalitat han sido ya llevadas ante el tribunal constitucional. Incluso en temas tan banales como la fijación de días festivos han existido interferencias del gobierno central.
- (9) Se trata, sin embargo, de un tema muy discutido, puesto que a lo largo del periodo franquista el PSUC y algunos grupos de orientación socialista han mantenido posiciones favorables a la cuestión nacional catalana, a diferencia de lo que ha ocurrido en el País Vasco, en el que se ha producido una neta diferencia entre los partidos de izquierda de ámbito español y los partidos nacionalistas.

Bibliografia

- Fundación Foessa. Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España, 1971/71.
- Estructura social de Catalunya, núm. 12 de la Revista Papers, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1979.
- Equip de sociologia electoral de la U.A.B., Estudios electorales, Barcelona, Fundació Bofill, 1978.
- J. Colomer et al. Els grups polítics a Catalunya. Partits i programes, Barcelona, Avance 1976.
- I. Pitarch et al. Partits i parlamentaris en la Catalunya d'avui (1977-79), Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1980.
- J. Dujol, La immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya, Ed. Nova Terra, Barcelona 1976.
- S. Giner, The social structure of Catalonia, The Anglo-catalan society, 1980
- C. Solé, La identificación de los inmigrantes con la cultura catalana, REIS, 9, 1980
- J.A. Argenté et al. Una nació sense Estat, un noble sense llengua? Els Marges, 15, 1979.
- S. Serrano, Lingüística i qüestió nacional, València, Tres i quatre, 1979.
- M. Subirats, La utilització del català, entre la precarietat i la normalització, Saber, num. 1 febrero 1980.

Anexo

CUADRO Nº 1 RESULTADOS DE LAS ELECCIONES EN CATALUNYA 1977 - 80								
TOTAL CATALUNYA POBLACIO : 5.980.170. N. REGIDORS: 7.410								
DATA		15-J-77		1-M79		3-A-79		20-M-80
Tipus consultes		Legislatives		Legislatives		Municipals		Parlament
CENS		3.912.155		4.393.489		4.293.499		4.392.298
Participació	3.101.132	79,3	3.008.198	68,5	2.679.936	61,0	2.726.706	62,1
PSUC	564.574	18,2	513.575	17,1	540.429	20,2	509.498	18,7
PSC	880.539	38,4	877.226	29,2	713.992	26,6	608.791	22,3
CDC	522.060	16,8	484.154	16,1	499.520	18,6	754.788	27,7
ERC	141.959	4,5	123.496	4,1	108.337	4,0	242.293	8,9
UCD	521.419	16,8	571.681	19,0	359.185	13,4	287.616	10,5
CD	108.677	3,5	107.812	3,6	35.422	1,3	64.170	2,3
PSA	-----	---	-----	---	-----	---	72.101	2,6
Agrup. Elect. Progresistes	-----	---	-----	---	123.787	4,6	---	---
Agrup. Elec. Continúistes	-----	---	-----	---	116.226	4,3	-----	---
Agrup. Elect. Indefinides	-----	---	-----	---	66.744	2,5	-----	---

Fuente: J. Dorja, art. cit.

Orientación política de los distintos partidos:

PSUC: Comunista, vinculado al partido comunista de España.

PSC: Socialista, vinculado al Partido Socialista Obrero Español.

CDC: Nacionalista, con posiciones de centro.

ERC: Nacionalista, con posiciones de centro pero con mayor radicalismo verbal que CDC. Fue el partido mayoritario en Cataluña en 1931.

UCD: Centro derecha, con una posición ambigua en relación a la cuestión nacional catalana. Es el partido mayoritario en España desde 1977.

CD: Derecha, en cuarto lugar en el ámbito español, favorable al centralismo.

PSA: Partido Socialista Andaluz, populista. Se presenta a las elecciones del Parlamento catalán en un intento de arrastrar votos de inmigrantes.

Joan F. Mira , Spain

CENTRAL STATE AND PERIPHERAL NATIONALISMS IN SPAIN

For a very long time Spain, as a Nation-State, has been conceived and defined by its principal and dominant part: Castile. But for non-castilians this definition ~~implies~~ means also a dilemma: how can one be a catalan or a basque, for instance, and also be a spaniard?

The problem of spanish unity is a long and never solved one: in the XVII century, the absolute monarchy was not able to build a unified State out of its different kingdoms. And presently, in the 1980s., not even the centralized organization of the Spanish Communist Party can prevent ~~spanish~~ basque communists from organizing their independent Communist Party.

Looking into History, one has to keep in mind that until the XVIII century there was not a Spanish State, not even a King of Spain. And that political unification, on castilian terms, came at a time when Castile itself was a declining power, and just when the non-castilian regions started their process of economic development and modernization.

The Castilian-Spanish State, during the XVIII, XIX and into the XXth. centuries, tried to castilianize the whole of Spain, following the french unitarian model. But it was too weak to be successful. Non-castilian regions, especially the Basque Country and Catalonia, in the same time, were ahead in economic and social development, while preserving their language and cultural ~~xxx~~ difference: hence, from culture and from economic development, basque and catalan nationalisms were born in the XIX-XX centuries. And to these, a fossilized Castilian-Spanish State was never able to give a satisfactory answer. In the past decades, Civil War and repression had the main result of leaving the situation, after Franco's death, more acute than ever.

CENTRAL STATE AND PERIPHERAL NATIONALISMS IN SPAIN

Let me begin this short essay with a personal recollection: when I was a child in elementary school, I had to recite, aloud and by heart, the following patriotic poem: "Hail to you, banner of Castile/ a stroke of blood and a stroke of sun!/ He who doesn't bend his knee to you/ doesn't deserve to be called a Spaniard!" And, by the way, we were taught that "being spanish is one of the very few serious things one can be in this world": it was one of the fundamental beliefs of the official doctrine. Needless to say that Spain was, above all, one, and there was only one way of being spanish.

Like myself, many non-castilians of my generation (and of the preceding ones) have become painfully aware of the same dilemma: if Spain is conceived as, and defined by, Castile (in terms of history, the Golden Century, the american colonization, language, culture, the so-called national character, values, purpose...:"Spain is a unity of destiny" was another point of faith), then, what are we who do not belong to this history, culture, or destiny? Are we spanish at all, besides being, for instance, catalans? And in that case, which kind of "spanish quality" do we possess? But, if the official doctrine were not accepted, and Spain is conceived as a more complex whole, of which Castile is only a declining part, which is the the nature of such a whole? What is the meaning of the terms Spain, spaniard?

Better minds than mine have approached this question (to name a few, in the XXth. century alone, Ortega, Unamuno, Américo Castro, Madariaga, Sanchez-Albornoz, Lain...), mostly with a deep trouble and anguish, and ~~also~~ mostly as a painfull search into the essence of Spain, starting of course from the firm belief that Spain exists.

But in the 1970s and 1980s, for many people in Catalonia and Valencia, in the Basque Country, in Galicia, in the Canary Islands or in Andalusia, this double question is put in very different terms: a) the essence of Spain is none of our business: let them try and define themselves, if they can, without us; our only problem, in any case, is to define (i.e. to establish limits, boundaries) what is to be a catalan, a galician, a basque; b) Spain, the Spanish State, exists, of course: it is there as a fact of life, and a worrisome one, at that: our problem is to become as free as possible from it.

Well, hardly a novelty, however: in 1894 a popular booklet (100.000 copies were easily sold) of Catalanist Doctrine, after establishing unambiguously that "Catalonia is the only Fatherland to the catalans", stated: "Which is the enemy of Catalonia, the element against the nature of her character?" Answer: "The Spanish State".

... ..

Let me proceed now to comment on two well documented historical events: one dating from the first half of the XVIIth century, the other from the last months of 1981.

A/ By 1625, the power of the Spanish monarchy (of the Castilian monarchy, we ought to say, more properly) was not any more what it used to be twenty five or fifty years earlier: it was embattled and losing ground on every external and internal field, the population of Castile --and especially in the towns and cities-- was steadily declining, and large sections of castilian society were impoverished or improductive, american gold and silver hardly covered the financing of the royal armies in the european wars, the State was more often than not deeply indebted to foreign money-lenders or in open and declared bankruptcy, the balance of european

power was already falling to the french side,...and so on. But, among so many evils and troubles ~~xxxx~~ as the Catholic Monarchy had to face, which was the deepest problem, the hardest to solve, and the key to a regain of strenght and power? For the Count-Duke of Olivares, the all-powerfull "valido" or universal minister to Philip IV, the matter was clear enough:

Your Majesty ought to be convinced that the most important matter of his monarchy is to become king of Spain. I mean by this, Sir, that Your Majesty should not be satisfied with being only King of Portugal, of Aragon, of Valencia, Count of Barcelona, but He must work and undertake, through covered and meditated means, the reduction of these kingdoms, of which Spain is composed, to the (~~xx~~ institutional) ways and laws of Castile without any difference whatsoever; because, if Your Majesty should succeed in this matter, He will be the most powerful prince on earth..."

Olivares tried in fact to implement his program of political unification and "castilianization", inspired by the french model. But certainly the results were not in the line of his expectations: first, the catalan rebellion of 1640, the proclamation of the Catalan Republic, and a long war that ended with ~~a~~ the military defeat of the catalans, but with their political victory: catalan institutional independence was confirmed and reinforced; then, the portuguese took advantage of the catalan war ~~xxx~~, rose against the castilians~~king~~, and became again a sovereign kingdom.

B/ There is a well known principle of leninist doctrine concerning the organization of communist parties: to each sovereign state must correspond only one communist party: thus, in the USSR or in Jugoslavia, there are different nationalities and ^{federated or} autonomous republics, but there is a single and common Party to all of them; and the french Communist Party did not recognize an Algerian C.P.

before independence. A partial exception was made with the Catalan United Socialist Party (communist), born independently in the course of the Spanish Civil War as a purely catalan party, but forced in the stalinist forties to a "fraternal cooperation and integration" with the Spanish C.P. Now, in 1980-1981, the Spanish C.P. is suffering a long process of internal troubles, coming from diminished political expectancies for the party, the need to define its precise role and image in spanish society, etc. But this process becomes a sudden and violent crisis when the Basque C.P. (an autonomous branch of the Spanish Party) decides to break its ties with the central organization in Madrid and to form a "New Basque Left" together with a coalition of basque marxist-nationalist forces. The Central Committee of the Spanish C.P. does not accept the independence of the basque communists nor their union ~~to~~ with nationalists. The Basque C.P. splits in two opposing parties: one independent from, one loyal to the Spanish C.P. Then a new factor intervenes: a minority in the Spanish C.P. are sympathetic with the basque "rebels",... and are immediately and ruthlessly ~~to~~ stripped from their posts in the Spanish Party, or even from the Party itself. To summarize: in 1981, not even a Communist Party, by definition a strongly centralized organization, is ~~able~~ free from the work of centrifugal forces which permeate the whole of spanish political life.

So, in the century of royal absolutism, we find a king who cannot reduce his kingdoms to a united political and institutional body; and then a Communist Party which cannot prevent the ~~existence~~ ~~of~~ "territorial independence" of one of his regional branches within the same State (can anybody imagine the independence of, let us say, a Ligurian, an Aquitanian or a ^{Thessalian} ~~Thessalian~~ Communist Party?).

... ..

Any attempt to a historical explanation will have to start ~~x~~ with the seeming paradox that Spain, in fact, constitutes one of the oldest and more stable monarchies in Europe: in the historical period when national monarchies were formed, Spain (after the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469) had indeed her medioeval kingdoms united under one king --even Portugal for a time, in the XVI and XVII centuries~~4~~. But, on the other hand, ^{more than} two hundred years after that famous marriage, the union of kingdoms was not yet a "united kingdom", let alone a "national state". Indeed, ~~ix~~ by the year 1700, when the last of the spanish Hapsburgs died heirless, there had never been a King of Spain (although foreigners perceived them as such), never a Spanish State.

Let me recall here several well established, but often missed facts which (as historical explanation, or grounds for ideology, or both) must be taken into account if we are to understand ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ the conflicting claims and strains of ~~your~~ our own time :

a) During the XVI and XVII centuries, the institutions and independence of the non-castilian kingdoms were kept intact: Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Navarre, the Basque Country (not so Galicia, absorbed already into Castile) had their own borders and border-tolls, their Constitution, legal codes, judiciary, administration, currency and fiscal system, and so on. Catalans, for instance, were absolute ^{foreigners} ~~xxxxxxx~~ in Castile, and seen as hostile foreigners, besides: they were even denied the right to establish consulates in Seville and Cadiz (the main centres of american trade), a right allowed to many non-spanish powers.

b) The european wars of the XVI and XVII cts., as well as the conquest and colonization of America, were both purely castilian affairs: never did the catalans or valencians raise an army to

fight in Flanders or in Lombardy (to the great fury of castilian kings), and never were they permitted to participate in the american colonization or trade: no ship from or to a catalan port was ~~not~~ permitted to cross the ocean. América belonged, and was incorporated to, the crown of Castile.

c) But no wonder that "Castile" and "Spain" became nearly synonymous in practice: Castile was the real centre and basis of the spanish monarchy, where its armies, ruling class and financial support came from; and besides, Castile was five times as large and more than ten times as populated (7.5 millions against 700.000) than Catalonia and Valencia together (While in 1980 the population of the catalan-speaking regions constitutes a 30% of the total spanish population).

d) At the end of the Hapsburg dynasty, after two centuries that had not modified the original model of "imperial feudalism", castilian society, and castilian State, were not in their way to become a modern society and a modern state. Hence the fact that catalans, for instance (with strong urban classes dating from their medioeval high times) were never attracted by the castilian model: they would never willingly adopt castilian institutions, customs or language.

Thus, the institutional and political unity of "Spain", the creation of a "Spanish State", was, and ~~probably~~ had to be indeed, the result of sheer force. In the international war for the succession to the spanish crown, Castile took sides with the french candidate, Aragon-Catalonia-Valencia with the austrian (with british support). So, after his final success, Philip V of Bourbon will impose --in 1707 to Aragon and Valencia, in 1716 to Catalonia-- the french model of absolute and centralized monarchy: Castile at last, thorough a french king, had it ~~imposed~~ her way.

In 1707, the new king decreed --"by the ~~xig~~ lawful right of conquest that my arms have made of these kingdoms"-- that Aragon and Valencia would have their whole political structure and institutions abolished, and ~~xxx~~ castilian ones imposed in every field and at every level, to the last detail. In 1716, the abolition comes to Catalonia: ^{according to} the Royal Council of Castile ~~xxxxxxx~~"...the laws, usages, customs and privileges which Catalonia used to have as her own, must be abolished, erased and entirely cancelled,... and the laws of Castile will be imposed..., using the castilian language, and books in catalan will not be permitted, nor to speak or write in catalan in the schools, and the christian doctrine will be taught and learned in castilian". (But this beautiful program was not applied to the Gasque Provinces and Navarre, which had remained loyal to Philip V, and so were allowed to preserve their "ancient privileges" until the XIX century and, in some aspects and instances, until the XXth.)

Instead of a process of national unity, we are here in the presence of a sudden absorption and incorporation of the non-castilian kingdoms into Castile. In other words: the newly unified Spanish State of the XVIII century, was in fact an extension of the Castilian State.

With the result that, for more than 250 years, a kind of french unitarian and centralized model has been imposed ~~upon~~ a kind of pluri-national Austrian Empire. And I say "a kind of" because:

a) the Castilian State tried to castilianize the whole of Spain at least as hard as the French State tried to frenchify --"franciser"-- ~~the~~ all regions and peoples non originally french: But there is a difference: the French state has been nearly fully successful, the Castilian State has not. b) Spain doesn't lie at the geographical

heart of all conflicting european forces, as the Austrian Empire did in the XIX century (with so many external pressures and attractions -pangermanism, panslavism, for instance-- added to internal ~~xx~~ strains). In any case, after 500 years of dynastic unity, and after more than 250 of political centralization, Spain has not become a homogeneous Nation-State,...neither has broken into pieces as the Austrian Empire ~~was~~. Such non-solution, one way or the other, is, of course, a perfect condition for conflict: a conflict which was subdued and as if suspended for more than one century, ~~which~~ ~~was~~ ^{which} was on the rise by the second half of the XIX century, growing until the Civil War, suppressed by Franco (as it is, of course, the duty of any totalitarian state with its name)..., and then has sprung up again more pressing and acute than ^{it} ever was.

As we have seen, since 1707-1716 the Castilian-Spanish State possessed all the political and institutional tools it needed to forge a single and united nation, and these tools were largely used. The problem is, why did it fail in the process? Of course, the real explanation would ~~x~~ be a very complex one, and subject to different approaches and interpretations. A possible simplified answer, only to summarize and to try and reach into the core of the question, would be the statement that, since the XVII century and well into the XXth., Castile failed to develop a strong urban network of middle classes, that castilian society did not give birth to a progressive bourgeoisie and that, of course, it missed the first industrial revolution. ~~xxxxxxxx~~ And thus, the basis of the Spanish State was in ~~x~~ fact a ruralized and impoverished society, with a royal capital, Madrid, in the middle of an economic desert.

During the XVIII century, Castile was indeed not so much a backward country as a "de-modernized" one, with its old urban and

manufacturing centres reduced to shadows: "skeletons of cities which had been populous and teeming with factories and workshops, now are only full of churches, convents and hospitals..., deprived of any commerce, sustained by (the charity of) the Church", as seen by the eyes of a contemporary british traveler. To be sure, the Government of successive Bourbon kigs, especially Charles III, tried repeatedly to stimulate agriculture, industry and trade, in the best "enlightened" fashion of the times. But only the periphery took advantage of these policies, or in any case did show a dynamism which contrasts with castilian lethargy. For ~~the~~ historians Pierre Vilar and Raymond Carr, the economic and demographic progress of ~~the~~ XVIII century Spain established between the different regions a very different balance from that prevailing in the "Golden Century": the Centre (Castile) loses its demographic and economic predominance, and peripheral Spain --especially ~~the~~ Mediterranean Spain, i.e. Catalonia-Valencia-- will again, as in ancient times, attract population, activity and production. And this unevenness in the rhythm of development will have, in the future, the deepest social and political consequences.

And the gap will be increasingly widened: ~~starting~~ in the XIX century, a real process of industrialization will take place only in two (peripheral) regions: the Basque Country and Catalonia. Thereafter, basques and catalans --at least their urban leading classes-- began to feel very distinctly that Castile was not in a position to lead the whole of Spain in the way of modernization and progress: so they began to think of themselves as superior (that is more advanced, able and progressive) to the castilians, while politically inferior and dominated. To them, the Castilian-Spanish State had become a drag, a heavy and fossilized machine increasingly hostile and remote. In the eyes of catalan and basque bourgeoisie

and urban middle classes, this State had to be either transformed from outside (i.e. with their intervention),...or ignored and abandoned. But the Castilian-Spanish State refused to be reformed, much less by outsiders! In fact, all along the XIX century the Spanish State was always dominated, in a way or the other, by the combined interests of the aristocracy, the Church, the military, ~~and~~ the bureaucrats and, above all, the castilian-andalusian landowners. And well into the XX century unitarian and centralizing laws and decrees kept pouring steadily from Madrid: after the Carlist wars, the basques too were deprived of their "exemptions and privileges", that is, of their political institutions. So, the following step was not a very difficult one to take: by the turn of the century, more and more catalans and basques (intellectuals and artists, priests and politicians, professionals and students, then employees and shopkeepers...) began to think of "Spain", or the Spanish State, not as their common State which would deserve their loyalty as citizens, much less as their common Nation or Fatherland, but as an alien~~x~~ construct imposed upon them.

Of course, regional differences in economic development and modernization were not the only grounds for the catalan or basque "question", as it was called: a catalan or basque nationalism would never have been born out of a purely economic basis. Cultural difference, language, and the new consciousness of a particular and distinctive history were used by nationalist ideology as they have been everywhere: as the substance and expression of a separate identity: of a nation with rightful claims to, at least, such a degree of self-government as would be necessary to reconstruct ~~and~~, preserve and develop its "national life". In the early 1900s, this was ~~also~~ ready one of the main ideological principles underlying the programs of catalan and basque nationalist movements or parties.

This is not the place to retrace the history of basque and catalan nationalism, starting from their beginning within rather elitist and conservative circles, to their widening influence and increasing radicalization. Let me only stress one point: that the original goal of catalan and basque nationalists was not so much independence as the negotiation of a new structure of the Spanish State, in which Euskadi or Catalonia might find a definite and comfortable place as such, as individual, non-castilian nations, not as undifferentiated parts of a common spanish nation. And this the Castilian-Spanish State (and all those who had internalized as the "official" image of a single Spanish Nation-State) could never understand, would never accept. For, along with peripheral nationalisms, there is also, of course, a strong and institutionalized Castilian-Spanish nationalism, whose first and basic belief is that "in Spain there is only one nation, and this nation is Spain"; and so any regional "difference" is either a matter of folklore or a danger for national unity: in the first case, it is irrelevant and of no political consequence, in the second, it has to be suppressed. Small wonder then that catalan and basque nationalists were pushed into the conclusion that there was no place for them within the Spanish State. A perfect theme for a civil war.

And a civil war there was. The winning side belonged, of course, to ^{the unitarian} ~~the~~ faith: "national unity" and was an obsessive line of francoist propaganda for nearly forty years. In 1936 General Franco, following a basic falangist tenet (common to the spanish rightists: namely that basque and catalan nationalists are only traitors, and "their sin the only one that cannot be forgiven"), stated: "Spain is ^{being} organized with a totalitarian conception, through national institutions that will ensure her totality, ~~her~~ ^{her} unity and

continuity. The character of each region will be respected, but not as a hindrance to national unity, which we want to be absolute, with a single language, castilian, and a single personality, the spanish one ."

After the war the power of the State grew stronger than ever, and castilianization was pushed ^{also} deeper than ever, as an essential part of repression against "red-separatists and their allies". With the obvious result that: a) the basic principles of catalan and basque nationalism (i.e. that Catalonia and Euskadi are nations and have national rights), ~~soon~~ soon were espoused not only by catalan or basque nationalists, but also by all catalan and basque democratic and anti-fascist forces; b) the Castilian-Spanish State, now a self-proclaimed totalitarian state, came to be identified by many people simply as the Francoist State, and in the eyes of catalans and basques became more hostile and remote than ever; and c) in the eyes of democratic forces in other peripheral regions, the central State lost whatever rights it might have ~~had~~ to their loyalty and respect as citizens: which, along with economic, cultural or linguistic differences, produced in turn the birth or development of other non-castilian nationalisms in Valencia, Galicia, the Canary Islands (and later to strong regionalisms, leading ~~to~~ also to self-proclaimed "nationalism"; in Andalusia and --on a lesser scale-- in Aragon, Asturias and Santander-Cantabria).

But in the late sixties and early seventies many castilian-spanish intellectuals, and ^{also} ~~most~~ a majority of castilian-spanish underground democratic organizations, had at last accepted the fact that "Spain" was a plurinational State, and that any future democratic Constitution ought to recognize and institutionalize this essential fact. Which the Constitution of 1978 did only to

a very limited point (Spain is a unitary State...that recognizes regional autonomies) and through a semantic sleight of hand (Spain is a one nation, indivisible,...* that recognizes different natio-
nalities within).

A Solomonic solution, indeed. Which leaves the problem unsolved: one side thinks of this limited recognition as too little too late, the other as already too much. And there are plenty of people on both sides.

Joan F. Mira

Valencian Institute for Sociology and
Social Anthropology

SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION
IN ITALY FROM 1970-1978

Gilberto Chilardi

1. INTRODUCTION

Internal migration in Italy has constituted the object of various studies as well as specific research directed to analyze the sociological aspects, the most of which are based on census data and on studies relative to the movements on the population register ⁽¹⁾ (Benediti 1960, Livi Bacci 1967, Federici 1970, Somogy 1970, Galeotti 1971, Golini 1974). In the bibliography about the subject-matter we cannot find a systematic examination of population mobility, in the last ten years, based on population movements caused by residence transfers according to the region of origin and destination. With this paper we intend to describe some aspects of internal migration with reference to intraregional and interregional movements of the population, understanding for intraregional movements those changes of residence that take place within a given region and for interregional movements those which take place between two regions. The interest for this subject derives, as a matter of fact, from the existence of social and economic disequili-

1) - Called in Italy "Anagrafe della popolazione".

bria among Italian regions, which surely have influence on internal migration and, in particular, on migration from the so-called agricultural areas towards the more industrialized ones in search of employment.

It is easy to understand that internal mobility is not unrelated to external migration; in this context, however, we have not considered the latter in an explicit way and we have based our study only on data concerning changes of residence between Italian comuni. In the following pages, after a brief examination of internal migration trends in the last few years, we will give the results of the application of a loglinear model, which will help us in understanding the true nature of these trends.

2. DATA FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNAL MIGRATION

Among the data that consent to obtain information about internal migration in Italy, the main source is represented by the data from the population register concerning changes of residence between the over 8000 comuni of Italian territory. About the advantages and disadvantages of this source in the study of internal mobility, several considerations have already been made (Federici 1964, Di Rienzo 1965, Golini 1974).

We will not take up this problem in a specific way, but we wish to notice that some of the causes that have limited the validity of data disappeared, for example, the non correspondence between the number of new entries and the number of cancellations in the population register, while other problems still exist, due mainly to the fact that not all migration of the population gives rise to variations

on the population register. Nevertheless the said source is surely a useful investigation tool for our topic.

The subject of our analysis are the changes of residence according to the region of origin and destination (2). The time period considered is 1970-1978; for each year the data, can be represented in a two-dimensional contingency table with k rows and k columns (Table 1), where each row refers to an emigration (or origin) region and each column refers to an immigration (or destination) one. Each frequency f_{ij} represents the number of cancellations from the population register of the comuni

Table 1 - Scheme of the changes of residence in the population register by region of origin and destination.

Origin region	Destination region						Total
	1	2	...	j	...	k	
1	f_{11}	f_{12}	...	f_{1j}	...	f_{1k}	$f_{1.}$
2	f_{21}	f_{22}	...	f_{2j}	...	f_{2k}	$f_{2.}$
.
.
i	f_{i1}	f_{i2}	...	f_{ij}	...	f_{ik}	$f_{i.}$
.
.
k	f_{k1}	f_{k2}	...	f_{kj}	...	f_{kk}	$f_{k.}$
Total	$f_{.1}$	$f_{.2}$...	$f_{.j}$...	$f_{.k}$	N

2) - The data are published by the "Central Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in the Italian Statistic year book and in the Italian Statistic Digest relative to different years; the most recent ones refer to the year 1978.

of the i region, which have given rise to new entries on the population register of the comuni of the j region. Particularly, the values that are found on the diagonal of table $(f_{ij}, \text{ for } i=j=1,2,\dots,k)$ give the number of population movements between comuni within the same region. The row total $f_{i.}$

$$f_{i.} = \sum_{j=1}^K f_{ij} \quad (i=1,2,\dots,k)$$

represents the number of people who are cancelled from the population register of comuni of the i region, without considering their destination. The column total $f_{.j}$

$$f_{.j} = \sum_{i=1}^K f_{ij} \quad (j=1,2,\dots,k)$$

gives, on the contrary, the number of persons who are registered in the population register of the comuni of j region, whatever may be their origin. The general total N ,

$$N = \sum_{i,j=1}^K f_{i,j} = \sum_{i=1}^K f_{i.} = \sum_{j=1}^K f_{.j}$$

gives, finally, the total number of population movements in a given year.

On the basis of data represented in this way and shown in detail in the Appendix, we shall describe in the next section some aspects of the internal mobility of the Italian population in the period considered.

3. SOME RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE READING OF DATA CONCERNING POPULATION MOVEMENTS.

Data represented in Table 1, and shown in detail in the Appendix, offer a first indicator of mobility, the total N, or the total number of changes of residence taking place in Italy between 1970-1978. These totals are reported in Table 2, together with an estimate for 1979 and 1980 based on provisional data.

Table 2 - Total number of changes of residence between Italian comuni from 1970-1980.

Years	Number of changes of residence (thousands)
1970	1,562
1971	1,532
1972	1,645
1973	1,518
1974	1,380
1975	1,222
1976	1,203
1977	1,206
1978	1,172
1979 (*)	1,188
1980 (*)	1,316

(*) -The number of internal changes of residence is obtained by calculating the average number of new entries and the number of cancellations in the population register for people coming from and going to other parts of the country respectively. These numbers do not coincide for various reasons.

As can be seen, internal changes of residence are in a decreasing trend. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the datum of 1972 is affected by the revision of the population register carried out in order to eliminate irregular situations ascertained from the census data of 1971.

On the other hand, for 1977 the slight increase of the changes of residence might be considered a signal of inversion of the decreasing trend, an inversion that seems confirmed by the provisional data for 1979 and 1980.

Considering now the number of new entries in the population register of comuni by region, i.e. the column total $f_{.j}$ ($j=1,2,\dots,k$) of the tables in the Appendix, it is easy to notice that it has decreased everywhere. If we relate the data to depure population of each region (Table 10 of the Appendix) we obtain crude rates of mobility allowing comparisons. The rates in question (Table 3) permit us to classify the regions according to the level of mobility as well as to their time trend. In 1970 the eight regions with higher mobility were: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Liguria, Veneto and Friuli. This fact is, as we shall see better below, obviously imputable to the large internal mobility of these regions and to the attraction that they exercised on immigrants from others regions. In 1978 the situation seems partially changed; in fact the first eight regions are: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Sardegna, Campania, Veneto and Friuli. Therefore while in 1970 only the northern and central regions were at the top of the list, in 1978 there were also a few southern and insular regions. As can be easily guessed, even this circumstance also is imputable either to a changed internal mobility, or to changes that took place in the in-

Table 3 - Number of new entries in the population register for changes of residence per 1000 residents in the Italian regions from 1970-78.

Regions	Years									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	
1 PIEMONTE	44.0	44.6	44.0	37.6	33.9	24.2	29.0	27.4	27.4	
2 VALLE D'AOSTA	39.5	41.2	45.4	35.3	31.4	27.3	28.9	24.3	27.0	
3 LOMBARDO	37.3	35.8	37.7	31.2	31.0	25.7	25.5	27.3	24.4	
4 TRENTO A. S. ALTA	24.1	25.5	24.5	23.9	22.7	19.7	19.3	19.0	17.8	
5 VENETO	29.5	29.0	29.8	27.9	26.4	21.7	20.9	21.1	20.6	
6 FRIULI V. GIULIA	29.4	23.0	31.1	24.8	26.2	23.1	22.8	22.3	20.5	
7 LIGURIA	29.2	29.2	30.9	31.8	24.6	21.1	20.3	19.3	19.4	
8 EM. ROM. DEL N.	31.4	29.1	30.0	28.2	25.5	22.0	20.8	21.3	21.3	
9 TOSCANA	31.1	29.9	29.9	26.8	25.0	20.3	20.5	20.1	19.6	
10 UMBRIA	21.2	20.7	22.1	23.2	19.6	16.5	16.4	15.8	14.1	
11 MARCHE	28.4	25.9	28.0	25.5	22.7	19.5	18.8	19.6	19.0	
12 LAZIO	24.8	24.2	24.3	23.6	23.1	20.0	18.5	17.7	17.9	
13 ABRUZZO	24.3	25.5	31.3	28.5	23.9	22.3	22.0	21.0	20.3	
14 MOLISE	24.0	21.7	23.2	33.5	23.8	19.6	19.5	19.6	20.1	
15 CAMPANIA	24.3	25.4	27.3	27.0	23.5	22.1	21.3	20.7	20.7	
16 ABRUZZO	19.4	10.5	23.2	22.4	17.4	17.3	17.0	15.9	15.2	
17 BASILIC.	19.3	20.9	27.2	23.5	19.1	18.1	17.9	17.1	15.2	
18 CALABRIA	18.5	20.1	22.4	23.2	14.5	16.9	19.5	18.7	17.4	
19 SICILIA	19.0	21.4	24.8	24.4	20.7	19.3	18.4	18.4	18.7	
20 SARDEGNA	25.1	24.8	31.2	27.5	25.5	22.7	23.0	22.5	21.2	

Table 4 - Number of cancellations from population register for changes of residence per 1000 residents in the Italian regions from 1970-78.

Regions	Years									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	
1 PIEMONTE	34.4	37.7	39.4	34.9	32.3	28.2	28.4	27.7	27.4	
2 VALLE D'AOSTA	33.0	35.2	42.0	31.1	26.2	24.2	25.4	24.7	25.5	
3 LOMBARDO	31.0	27.9	32.0	29.5	27.9	24.3	24.8	25.4	24.0	
4 TRENTO A. S. ALTA	27.1	26.3	29.7	25.0	23.8	19.8	19.5	19.4	18.4	
5 VENETO	28.2	27.9	29.0	26.4	23.1	20.6	19.9	20.1	19.5	
6 FRIULI V. GIULIA	26.8	27.1	29.3	25.4	23.5	21.2	21.6	21.3	18.8	
7 LIGURIA	24.7	25.3	27.7	25.8	22.8	19.4	18.3	19.1	18.3	
8 EM. ROM. DEL N.	28.5	24.3	28.0	25.4	22.6	19.4	18.3	18.6	18.4	
9 TOSCANA	27.2	27.0	26.4	23.9	21.5	18.2	17.7	17.4	17.1	
10 UMBRIA	25.2	23.9	23.8	22.9	18.6	15.1	14.4	14.2	14.1	
11 MARCHE	29.7	27.5	30.3	26.6	22.5	16.9	17.5	18.0	17.3	
12 LAZIO	20.4	20.1	21.9	19.5	21.1	18.5	17.7	16.1	16.4	
13 ABRUZZO	28.2	28.5	33.0	30.4	25.9	23.2	22.0	21.1	20.9	
14 MOLISE	29.8	27.5	29.0	32.1	27.5	23.5	22.7	22.2	21.8	
15 CAMPANIA	31.0	31.3	35.4	32.6	28.3	24.8	23.9	23.4	23.0	
16 ABRUZZO	25.4	25.5	27.3	26.2	21.2	19.1	18.3	18.5	17.6	
17 BASILIC.	36.5	34.3	37.1	33.1	27.2	24.1	24.0	24.1	22.3	
18 CALABRIA	31.3	31.1	33.3	31.5	25.6	24.0	24.0	24.3	22.5	
19 SICILIA	27.5	29.0	30.5	29.8	24.1	22.2	20.7	21.1	20.5	
20 SARDEGNA	31.0	31.0	34.1	30.0	27.5	23.8	24.0	23.9	23.0	

terregional migrating flows between the Italian regions.

As to the trend of the internal mobility over the nine years considered, its course is different in the various regions, even if a general decrease is registered everywhere. Nevertheless it is necessary to point out that during the last three years there was a slackening of this decreasing trend and, in certain cases (Emilia Romagna, Molise and Sicilia), a trend recovery can be noted.

A further observation to be made is the one referring to the variability of the mobility rates of the various regions. In 1970 the range of values had a width of 27.6 points (from 18.4 to 46.0 per thousand inhabitants). In 1978 the range is only of 12 points (from 15.8 to 27.8). Therefore we might state that, beside the decrease in mobility, a levelling off took place with smaller differences between the various regions, as a consequence of the fall in the highest rates.

We shall now consider the emigration rate (total number of cancellations from the population register per 1000 inhabitants), drawing the numerator from the row total $f_{i.}$ ($i=1,2,\dots,k$) of the tables of migrating flows. The highest values of the rate refer to the same regions (Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria and Sardegna) in 1970 and in 1978, even if their ranking in these two years is not exactly alike. Emigration rates are higher, on average, in the Southern regions, but the phenomenon reduced in intensity over time, since the number of the cancellations per thousand inhabitants of the various regions underwent a substantial reduction during the period considered. The range of the rates in 1970 and 1978 vary, respectively from 20.4 to 36.6 and from 14.1 to 27.4 points, and its width comes down only about three points. As happens for new entries, cancellations

rates also register a substantial decrease in the higher values, nevertheless the range is almost unchanged, because the factors that caused the said decrease have operated uniformly enough even over the lower values of the rates.

From what has been said above it is easy to realize that the regional mobility of the population in Italy is differentiated enough and it is subject to changes that are of a wide interest as they reflect the general social and economic situation of the country and of the particular situations of the various regions. In fact the reduction of population movements over these nine years is imputable to various causes, partly, as we said above, connected with the economic situation.

Both the absolute and the relative (per thousand residents) numbers of new entries and cancellations give some indications about the consistency, the structure and the trend during the period of population mobility. In the next section we shall try to get more specific data with regards to population movements, by discriminating the transfers between comuni of the same region from the ones that take place between comuni of two different regions.

4. THE INTRAREGIONAL AND INTERREGIONAL MOBILITY OF THE POPULATION

In order to have more exact data with regards to the intraregional and interregional transfers of the population it is necessary to discriminate the cancellations from the population register which give rise to new entries in the cancellation region, from those which give rise to new

entries in other regions.

For a correct interpretation of the data we have to notice that the various regions and comuni have a different demographic size and geographical dimensions and this fact influences the level of mobility. Indeed, the larger a territorial area is, the lower will be the probability that a change of residence will give rise to out-migration from this area.

If we consider the changes of residence that occur within the regions and the ones between two regions, we have an idea of the intraregional and interregional mobility of the population. As we said above, in the period of time considered the number of population movements per thousand inhabitants in the various regions suffered a drastic reduction with a slackening of the decreasing trend after 1976. Intraregional mobility follows the same trend of general mobility (Table 5). In 1970 the crude rate of intraregional migration was around 10% for Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia and Lazio and it reached 24% for Piemonte and Lombardia. In 1978 the range of values is between 8 and 18%. The smallest values are those of Basilicata, Umbria, Puglia, Liguria, Lazio and Calabria; the highest values are found again in Piemonte and Lombardia. As to the trend of rates, we notice that it decreases with different intensity according to the region. Nevertheless in 1976-78 there was a quite evident slackening of the downward trend and a recovery in Molise, Sicilia, Emilia Romagna and Liguria. Therefore the intraregional mobility in Italy is higher in the Northern regions than in the Southern ones. In 1978 regional differentials are lower than in 1970 and intraregional mobility seems to have reached the lowest values, giving rise in the more recent years to a recovery prompted, perhaps, by a renewal of

Table 5 - Number of population movements for changes of residence within the region per 1000 residents in the Italian regions from 1970-78.

Regions	Years								
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
1 PIEMONTE	24.8	25.4	26.7	22.1	20.9	17.9	18.7	19.0	18.1
2 VALLE D'	17.3	20.1	25.5	16.2	14.7	13.4	14.0	13.9	14.0
3 LOMBARDO	23.1	22.1	23.8	20.3	20.3	17.5	18.0	18.7	17.6
4 TRENT. A	19.4	19.2	20.7	16.6	15.4	13.8	14.0	13.6	13.2
5 VENETO	21.1	21.4	22.3	20.5	18.0	18.1	15.5	15.8	15.5
6 FRIULI	17.5	18.4	19.8	16.7	16.1	14.7	14.7	14.0	13.1
7 LIGURIA	12.5	13.8	14.7	15.0	11.5	9.9	9.6	9.7	9.9
8 EM. ROM.	21.5	19.5	20.8	19.1	17.0	14.6	13.1	13.9	14.0
9 TOSCANA	20.5	20.4	19.8	17.5	15.4	13.0	13.0	12.8	12.6
10 UMBRIA	13.0	12.2	12.5	13.0	10.1	8.5	8.5	8.2	8.4
11 MARCHE	20.5	19.5	19.7	17.8	15.4	13.2	12.3	13.0	12.6
12 LAZIO	11.5	11.6	12.8	11.8	12.2	10.5	10.3	9.7	10.0
13 ABRUZZI	15.8	15.5	20.4	18.7	15.2	14.0	13.7	13.2	13.0
14 MOLISE	12.8	11.3	11.4	15.8	11.9	9.7	9.4	9.7	10.0
15 CAMPANIA	18.4	19.2	21.3	20.9	17.4	16.2	15.6	15.7	15.5
16 PUGLIA	11.3	11.7	14.5	14.0	10.5	10.3	10.1	9.9	9.8
17 BASILIC.	7.4	10.2	13.9	11.8	8.9	8.1	8.2	8.5	7.7
18 CALABRIA	11.3	12.0	13.8	14.2	10.3	10.7	11.2	11.1	10.1
19 SICILIA	14.0	14.9	18.2	17.3	13.8	13.7	12.8	13.1	13.2
20 SARDEGNA	17.5	18.4	21.6	19.8	17.1	15.2	15.3	16.0	15.6

Table 6 - Number of population movements for changes of residence outside of the region per 1000 residents in Italian regions from 1970-78.

Regions	Years								
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
1 PIEMONTE	11.4	12.3	12.7	12.9	11.5	10.2	9.7	9.7	9.3
2 VALLE D'	13.7	14.1	17.4	15.0	11.5	10.8	11.5	10.8	11.3
3 LOMBARDO	7.9	7.9	8.2	8.2	7.6	6.7	6.8	6.7	6.6
4 TRENT. A	9.7	8.5	9.0	8.4	7.0	6.0	5.6	5.8	5.2
5 VENETO	7.1	6.5	6.7	5.9	5.1	4.5	4.2	4.2	3.9
6 FRIULI	9.2	8.3	9.5	8.7	7.5	6.5	6.9	7.1	5.7
7 LIGURIA	12.2	11.5	12.8	11.8	11.2	9.5	9.2	9.4	8.5
8 EM. ROM.	7.0	6.9	7.2	6.3	5.7	4.7	4.5	4.7	4.4
9 TOSCANA	6.7	6.6	6.9	6.4	5.8	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.5
10 UMBRIA	12.2	11.6	11.3	10.0	8.5	6.7	5.9	6.0	5.7
11 MARCHE	9.2	9.1	10.6	8.8	7.1	5.8	5.4	5.0	4.7
12 LAZIO	9.9	8.5	9.2	7.7	8.9	8.0	7.4	6.3	6.4
13 ABRUZZI	12.4	12.0	12.6	11.7	10.7	9.2	8.2	7.9	7.8
14 MOLISE	16.9	16.2	17.6	16.3	15.7	13.6	13.3	12.6	11.9
15 CAMPANIA	12.6	12.2	12.0	11.7	10.9	8.7	8.3	8.2	7.4
16 PUGLIA	14.3	13.9	12.8	12.2	10.6	8.8	8.2	8.5	7.8
17 BASILIC.	26.9	24.6	23.2	21.3	18.3	15.9	15.2	15.6	14.6
18 CALABRIA	20.0	19.2	19.5	17.5	15.2	13.3	12.8	13.2	12.3
19 SICILIA	13.5	13.1	12.4	11.5	10.3	8.5	7.8	7.9	7.4
20 SARDEGNA	13.5	12.5	12.5	11.2	10.4	8.5	8.2	7.9	7.4

economic activity⁽³⁾.

After the intraregional movements we shall consider the interregional ones, through the number of cancellations from the population register⁽⁴⁾ that have taken place in a region giving rise to transfers outside of the region (Table 6). In 1970 the regional rates per thousand were comprised between 7 and 27 points, with a difference of 20; this is considerably larger than the difference seen for the residence changes within the regions and is a sign of the existence of quite different territorially social and economical conditions. In 1978 the limits of the range were respectively 3.9 and 14.6, i.e. considerably close and smaller. In general, intraregional mobility has decreased less than interregional mobility, although both have contributed to a general decrease in mobility. The lower decrease in intraregional mobility can be interpreted both as a consequence of a lower propensity to accept the hardships implied by long range migration and as to a decrease in the space dimensions of the labour market.

In order to point out the changes that took place in the relation between the intraregional and interregional mobility, a better indicator than the previous ones is given by the ratio between the number of cancellations from the population register of a region that gave rise to new entries in the comuni of the same region and the total number of cancellations (Ta-

- (3) - A pertinent indicator to our problem of the said renewal is represented by the trend in the labour market, which registered a positive phase in 1977 and 1978.
- (4) - For simplicity, in this case as in others, we took as reference for our considerations the number of cancellations, even if it would be possible to refer to the number of new entries coming to conclusions substantially equal.

ble 7). This ratio represents an indicator of the propensity of the residents who move to remain within a region. The more this ratio increases, the lower is the proportion, relatively, of the total number of cancellations directed to other regions, indicating that intraregional mobility increases its importance over interregional mobility. The data point out that the decrease of the ratio takes place only in a few regions. In fact, Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia and Toscana only register a very small decrease in the ratio with reference to the whole

Table 7 - Ratio by region of the number of population movements for residence changes within the region to the total number of residents moving from 1970-78.

Regions	Years									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	
1 PIEMONTE	.68	.67	.68	.63	.60	.64	.66	.65	.66	
2 VALLE D'A.	.59	.59	.59	.52	.56	.55	.53	.56	.55	
3 LOMBARDIA	.74	.74	.74	.71	.73	.72	.72	.74	.72	
4 TRENTO A.	.68	.68	.70	.66	.69	.70	.71	.70	.72	
5 VENETO	.75	.77	.77	.78	.78	.78	.79	.79	.80	
6 EMILIA	.66	.68	.68	.66	.66	.69	.66	.66	.70	
7 LIGURIA	.51	.54	.54	.54	.51	.51	.51	.51	.54	
8 EM. ROM.	.75	.74	.74	.75	.75	.76	.75	.75	.76	
9 TOSCANA	.75	.75	.75	.73	.73	.72	.73	.74	.74	
10 UMBRIA	.51	.51	.52	.57	.54	.56	.59	.59	.59	
11 MARCHE	.69	.67	.69	.67	.68	.70	.69	.72	.73	
12 LAZIO	.57	.58	.58	.60	.58	.57	.58	.60	.61	
13 ABRUZZO	.56	.56	.62	.62	.59	.60	.63	.63	.62	
14 MOLISE	.43	.41	.39	.40	.43	.41	.41	.43	.46	
15 CAMPANIA	.59	.61	.64	.64	.62	.65	.65	.66	.68	
16 APULIA	.44	.46	.53	.54	.50	.54	.55	.54	.56	
17 BASILIC.	.26	.29	.37	.36	.33	.34	.34	.35	.34	
18 CALABRIA	.38	.38	.41	.40	.40	.45	.47	.46	.45	
19 SICILIA	.51	.53	.50	.60	.57	.62	.62	.62	.64	
20 SARDEGNA	.56	.59	.63	.63	.62	.64	.66	.67	.68	

period of time. This fact is probably due to the returns to the regions of origin of people who had previously immigrated, whose number is a part of the number in the denominator of the ratio. For all the remaining regions the values increased from 1970 to 1978, particularly for the traditional regions of emigra-

tion, where it varies from 0.26 to 0.34 (Basilicata), from 0.36 to 0.45 (Calabria), from 0.44 to 0.56 (Puglia), and from 0.56 to 0.68 (Sardegna). Among the reasons that caused the situation described, the slackening of economic activity that characterized the period of time considered, has certainly had an important role; while it is difficult to ascertain if there was any influence of the levelling off of the social and economic conditions in the various regions. Moreover, it is to be supposed that the recovery of mobility or, as we said above, the decline in its decrease in the last years, is mainly due to intraregional mobility, while the transfers between different regions feel the effect of the new situation to a smaller degree. Summarizing what we said above, the hypothesis can be made that the trend of interregional migrations is immediately influenced by the negative effects of a situation of economic crisis and it is only slowly affected by the positive effects of a recovery.

In the previous pages we did not take into account the directions of migrating flows among regions taken two by two and, particularly, the possible attraction that each of them has on the remaining ones. The following part of our work is devoted to the examination of this problem.

5. INTERREGIONAL ATTRACTION AND INTERREGIONAL MOBILITY.

In the previous section we pointed out some general characteristics of population mobility. Another interesting aspect of the problem can be studied through a more specific examination of migration flows from one region to another, in order to carry out the analysis of interregional migration.

As we have noted, the size of each migrating flow depends on various factors, among which are the socio-economic characteristics of the emigration and immigration regions, as well as their demographic size. We may therefore say that the size and structure of migrating flows between two regions in a certain period is the result of the mutual attraction generated by push-pull factors. It is therefore very useful to have an indicator which can tell us if the population movement in question is higher, equal or less than that we would expect if the changes of residence were spread equally among all regions.

As we can understand, the solution of our problem involves the determination of the theoretical number of transfers in the hypothetical situation in which the push-pull factors act uniformly. In fact if we calculate the ratio between the empirical and theoretical migrating flow, this will result greater, equal or less than one, and will allow us to point out if the population movement between the two regions considered is greater, equal or less than the movement expected in the hypothetical situation. Obviously, this procedure would be quite simple, if the only elements to be taken into account in determining every theoretical flow were the row and column totals in the tables reporting the changes of residence by region. In order to eliminate the disturbing factor constituted by the intraregional movements, it is enough to disregard the diagonal of the matrices, which reports the changes of residence that take place inside the same region. These are not only irrelevant for our purpose, but could also cause a distortion in our results, depending, as they do, on the demographical and territorial size of the regions and of their comuni and reflecting the influence of the congiuntural trends connected with the economic situation, generally in a different way with respect to the in-

terregional residence transfers. In other words, in order to compare the reciprocal attraction of two regions, it seems proper to eliminate the influence of the different amount of their total flows of new entries and cancellations from the population register and, besides, to neglect the residence changes that are made among comuni of the same region (the intraregional transfers), since, as we said previously, it is probable that a residence change cause a cancellation from the population register more easily the narrower the comunal territory is.

Consider the matrix F

$$F = \begin{bmatrix} - & f_{12} & f_{13} & \dots & f_{1j} & \dots & f_{1k} \\ f_{21} & - & f_{23} & \dots & f_{2j} & \dots & f_{2k} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{i1} & f_{i2} & f_{i3} & \dots & f_{ij} & \dots & f_{ik} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{k1} & f_{k2} & f_{k3} & \dots & f_{kj} & \dots & - \end{bmatrix}$$

that is obtained from Table 1, neglecting the values that are found on its diagonal; if we make the hypothesis that there is an equal attraction among the various regions, then to the matrix F we can associate a matrix F*

$$F^* = \begin{bmatrix} - & f_{12}^* & f_{13}^* & \dots & f_{1j}^* & \dots & f_{1k}^* \\ f_{21}^* & - & f_{23}^* & \dots & f_{2j}^* & \dots & f_{2k}^* \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{i1}^* & f_{i2}^* & f_{i3}^* & \dots & f_{ij}^* & \dots & f_{ik}^* \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{k1}^* & f_{k2}^* & f_{k3}^* & \dots & f_{kj}^* & \dots & - \end{bmatrix}$$

of the theoretical flows among the same regions, by applying the loglinear model that has been proposed in case of "quasi-indipendence" (BISHOP, FIENBERG and HOLLAND 1975). In this way beside the empirical flow f_{ij} of the i region towards the j region, is calculated the theoretical one f_{ij}^* , obtained supposing that the existing differences in the data of the matrix depend only on the totals of row and column neglecting the datum of the mevements that took place within regions⁽⁵⁾. In said conditions the ratio

$$a_{ij} = \frac{f_{ij}}{f_{ij}^*} \quad (i \neq j = 1, 2, \dots, k)$$

(5) - The loglinear model allows an analysis of two-way contingency tables relative to two categorical variables A and B, by interpolating the function

$$\log f_{ij}^* = \mu + \mu_i^A + \mu_j^B + \mu_{ij}^{AB}$$

in which the value of the logarithm of the teorical frequency f_{ij}^* , is a linear combination of four terms.

The first of them depends on the number N of the units contained in the table, the second represents the effect of the i category of A, the third the effect of the j category of B, and the fourth the combined effect of the two categories. In the case we considered, the contingency table has empty cells on its diagonal and it is not possible to refer to the concept of independence between the two categorical variables. Therefore we have interpolated the reduced loglinear model

$$\log f_{ij}^* = \mu + \mu_i^A + \mu_j^B$$

in order to calculate the theoretical frequency f_{ij}^* in a hypothetic-situation, which is said of "quasi independence" between the two categorical variables.

of the matrix A

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} - & a_{12} & a_{13} & \dots & a_{1j} & \dots & a_{1k} \\ a_{21} & - & a_{23} & \dots & a_{2j} & \dots & a_{2k} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{i1} & a_{i2} & a_{i3} & \dots & a_{ij} & \dots & a_{ik} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{k1} & a_{k2} & a_{k3} & \dots & a_{kj} & \dots & - \end{bmatrix}$$

gives a measure of the flow f_{ij} relative to the amount of the theoretical one f_{ij}^* , obtained in case of equal attraction among the regions⁽⁶⁾. Generally, when the ratio is greater than one, this will show that in a certain period there is a preference of the people cancelled from the population register of the i region for the j region; on the other hand, if it is less than one, it will show that there is a trend to prefer other regions. Therefore the matrix A supplies a measure of reciprocal attraction between the various regions in a fixed period of time. The results obtained with this approach are reported in Table 8. Three periods of time have been considered: 1970-73, 1974-76 and 1977-78. In each cell of the table the first datum refers to 1970-73, the second to 1974-76, the third to 1977-78. All three values give a relative measure, as before specified of the attraction of each destination region on the ori-

(6) - The procedure followed is the same as the one proposed by TUGAULT (1970) to analyze origin-destination tables; it was afterwards considered again by RIVA (1978) for an application based on the census data of the population classified for birth region and residence region.

Table 8 - Population movements by region of origin and destination: ratios between empirical and theoretical data (in case of "quasi-independence") in the three periods 1970-73, 1974-76, 1977-78.

Origin region	Destination region																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 Piemonte	3.76	.61	.55	1.02	.72	1.94	.51	.52	.48	.58	.47	.63	1.08	1.30	1.77	1.39	1.86	2.01	2.03	
	3.84	.64	.48	.93	.70	1.80	.54	.50	.49	.51	.46	.55	1.11	1.17	1.66	1.57	1.95	1.90	2.05	
	3.45	.62	.62	.53	.90	.69	1.86	.59	.54	.53	.59	.50	.61	1.19	1.65	1.57	2.01	1.91	1.92	
2 Valle d'A	3.13	.74	1.58	1.06	.86	.86	1.25	.45	.53	.33	.71	.40	.83	.56	.46	.42	.17	2.04	.52	
	3.26	.54	1.39	.81	.47	1.27	.38	.75	.53	.81	.48	.71	.51	.47	.51	.43	2.54	.52	1.22	
	3.73	.54	1.21	.97	.78	1.02	1.02	.54	.59	.62	.54	.44	.26	.46	.46	.35	1.94	.43	.84	
3 Lombardia	.60	.53	.39	1.68	1.04	1.12	1.39	.65	.55	.89	.56	.68	.55	1.14	1.39	.91	1.31	1.57	1.18	
	.68	.52	.32	1.50	.93	1.07	1.29	.67	.55	.88	.53	.69	.60	1.08	1.34	.90	1.32	1.53	1.16	
	.66	.58	1.40	1.44	.92	1.06	1.20	.65	.61	.90	.55	.82	.64	1.07	1.38	.94	1.31	1.53	1.17	
4 Trentino A.A.	.38	1.65	1.02	5.32	2.56	.62	1.03	.69	.76	.83	.75	.61	.36	.62	.49	.42	.61	.55	.75	
	.44	1.63	1.11	5.10	2.18	.63	1.10	.71	.48	.78	.75	.35	.35	.43	.35	.35	.56	.52	.59	
	.41	.94	1.03	5.45	1.90	.59	1.06	.64	.55	.94	.72	.71	.34	.65	.46	.29	.34	.75	.58	
5 Veneto	.72	.81	1.18	5.45	.51	6.51	.53	1.77	.64	.49	.79	.71	.55	.40	.52	.54	.26	.36	.55	
	.62	.81	1.19	5.48	.57	6.28	.57	1.82	.68	.40	.92	.70	.63	.45	.52	.58	.19	.40	.66	
	.58	.62	1.12	5.40	.61	6.24	.61	1.66	.74	.45	.94	.71	.70	.30	.62	.70	.22	.43	.59	
6 Friuli	.47	.73	.74	2.62	6.00	.65	.84	.67	.84	.67	.82	.83	.90	.62	.43	.73	.76	.30	.56	
	.51	.49	.72	2.62	5.64	.67	.81	.66	.52	.83	.93	.66	.50	.80	.75	.33	.51	.71	.76	
	.44	.68	.65	2.39	5.78	.58	.68	.71	.66	.88	1.01	.62	.58	.83	.86	.34	.49	.76	1.04	
7 Liguria	1.42	1.40	.84	.67	.59	.74	.95	1.78	.57	.67	.69	.94	.29	.76	.77	.42	1.48	1.29	2.16	
	1.68	1.42	.84	.67	.59	.74	.93	1.77	.58	.58	.69	.72	.28	.74	.66	.51	1.31	1.15	1.97	
	1.74	1.35	.86	.67	.55	.67	.85	1.73	.46	.57	.70	.77	.28	.66	.56	.49	1.38	1.17	2.21	
8 Emilia Rom.	.46	.47	1.16	1.30	1.84	.87	1.07	.53	.89	3.11	.68	1.11	.75	.93	.80	.74	.59	.88	1.01	
	.42	.52	1.19	1.20	1.87	.80	.99	.53	.89	3.02	.68	1.08	.60	.64	.67	.67	.81	.87	1.05	
	.40	.34	1.13	1.24	1.77	.79	.86	.32	1.06	3.07	.68	1.16	.84	1.10	.88	.70	.53	.90	.92	
9 Toscana	.47	.67	.60	.72	.71	.71	.84	1.50	1.37	3.27	.99	1.55	.73	.41	1.44	.79	1.02	.62	1.57	
	.44	.55	.63	.78	.73	.60	1.91	1.37	1.37	3.37	1.16	1.42	.74	.55	1.38	.73	.89	.62	1.45	
	.43	.50	.62	.59	.71	.59	2.17	1.20	1.20	3.27	.99	1.55	.73	.41	1.44	.79	1.02	.62	1.56	
10 Umbria	.36	.35	.44	.56	.55	.44	.37	1.04	3.15	3.43	3.54	1.45	.42	.46	.36	.35	.28	.31	.80	
	.32	.23	.44	.56	.55	.50	.45	.36	.67	2.65	2.65	1.44	.56	.53	.42	.35	.22	.32	.83	
	.29	.47	.45	.55	.50	.45	.36	.47	2.97	1.06	3.90	1.22	.38	.69	.44	.24	.44	.35	.77	
11 Marche	.43	.49	.63	.81	.83	.67	.47	2.97	1.06	3.90	1.22	.38	1.22	4.66	1.22	.38	.69	.44	.77	
	.39	.48	.48	.80	.86	1.00	.60	.73	1.50	4.58	2.26	3.46	1.86	2.12	1.10	.70	1.26	1.13	1.97	
	.41	.51	.40	.80	.78	1.04	.65	.70	1.40	3.90	2.25	3.29	1.87	1.92	.91	.71	1.03	.92	1.77	
12 Lazio	.43	.48	.51	.84	.76	.92	.59	.64	1.37	4.27	2.20	3.29	1.87	1.92	.91	.71	1.03	.92	1.77	
13 Abruzzi	.43	.53	.62	.69	.62	.70	.59	.53	1.17	.76	1.31	4.12	2.95	.42	.72	.87	.37	.35	.34	
	.47	.62	.69	.62	.70	.59	.53	1.17	.76	1.31	4.12	2.95	.42	.72	.87	.37	.35	.34	.32	
	.49	.27	.65	.79	.70	.64	.46	1.22	.75	1.05	4.01	3.15	5.00	.64	.87	.25	.30	.35	.42	
14 Molise	.60	.28	.67	.36	.34	.36	.27	1.09	.70	.52	1.40	1.93	7.30	2.11	1.58	.80	.50	.25	.35	
	.56	.08	.64	.47	.34	.51	.27	1.02	.66	.61	.93	1.91	6.19	1.99	1.93	.52	.33	.22	.37	
	.64	.40	.64	.38	.29	.48	.30	1.17	.64	.48	1.04	2.00	6.20	2.18	1.31	.50	.38	.23	.30	
15 Campania	1.09	.35	1.11	.63	.49	.63	.60	1.04	1.39	.40	.41	1.61	.62	1.87	.91	1.50	.80	.40	.55	
	1.04	.35	1.11	.63	.55	.81	.65	1.15	1.38	.49	.38	1.68	.65	2.03	.92	1.42	.75	.45	.50	
	1.03	.43	1.10	.61	.59	.84	.63	1.24	1.40	.44	.42	1.67	.63	2.25	.84	1.47	.79	.40	.65	
16 Puglia	1.49	.31	1.47	.43	.53	.63	.49	.74	.64	.32	.63	.80	.91	1.82	.87	2.76	.71	.49	.36	
	1.47	.44	1.45	.53	.66	.78	.57	.82	.71	.42	.75	.91	.87	1.50	.92	2.97	.67	.52	.42	
	1.43	.37	1.45	.51	.64	.88	.51	.97	.80	.46	.85	.87	.89	1.94	.86	2.71	.64	.47	.38	
17 Basilicata	1.49	.10	1.13	.24	.19	.25	.53	.77	1.09	.22	.32	.64	.38	.45	1.71	2.66	.24	.15	.15	
	1.44	.29	1.13	.28	.24	.30	.44	.84	1.23	.30	.30	.67	.38	.36	1.62	2.82	.27	.18	.18	
	1.44	.35	1.09	.23	.28	.35	.48	1.01	1.31	.29	.67	.38	.41	1.50	2.90	2.41	.24	.16	.16	
18 Calabria	1.73	2.99	1.37	.49	.33	.32	1.22	.54	.64	.33	.22	.90	.24	.64	.62	1.26	.26	.91	.18	
	1.90	2.23	1.42	.64	.36	.38	1.18	.68	.71	.33	.26	.97	.31	.31	.70	.63	1.24	.1.00	.22	
	1.91	2.56	1.42	.59	.40	.39	1.15	.74	.74	.31	.28	1.02	.23	.23	.60	1.12	.89	.89	.22	
19 Sicilia	1.64	.44	1.44	.42	.50	.53	1.03	.74	1.14	.29	.33	.76	.30	.18	.48	.48	.34	1.02	.52	
	1.76	.38	1.46	.60	.66	.61	1.06	.70	1.22	.32	.31	.86	.32	.24	.46	.52	.23	1.04	.54	
	1.73	.54	1.50	.53	.66	.69	1.02	.75	1.24	.31	.40	.77	.32	.25	.46	.59	.29	.91	.48	
20 Sardegna	1.42	.55	1.02	.61	.58	.69	1.56	.85	1.23	.87	.75	1.58	.44	.44	.44	.29	.32	.61	.61	
	1.35	.67	1.06	.67	.66	.70	1.82	.80	1.29	.77	.73	1.64	.46	.37	.65	.56	.31	.30	.63	
	1.47	.77	1.13	.46	.66	.74	1.81	.85	1.50	.77	.61	1.66	.42	.45	.54	.54	.12	.26	.58	

gin region. It is easy to notice that for each of the considered periods the matrix indicated as matrix A, is not a symmetrical matrix; it has to be added that the matrices of the migrating flows are also asymmetrical. This was to be expected, since the attraction of the i region on the emigrants from the j region will be different from the attraction that the j region exercise on the emigrants from the i region. In the end, we notice that, for each column, the indicators are a measure of the attraction of the destination region on the origin regions, while for each row, they measure the propensity of each origin region towards destination regions.

After this methodological outline, we shall now read the matrices of the indicators of attraction among the various regions, observing the period 1970-73, represented in every cell of Table 8 by the first of the three values reported. The most immediate observation refers to the highest values, i.e. the ordered pair of regions for which the second one shows a strong attraction on the emigrants from the first one; looking at the values above the diagonal of the table they are the pairs Veneto-Friuli, Trentino A.A. - Veneto, Abruzzi-Molise, Marche-Abruzzi, Piemonte-Valle d'Aosta, Toscana-Umbria, Umbria-Lazio, Lazio-Abruzzi, Umbria-Marche and Emilia Romagna-Marche. As was to be expected, they are contiguous regions for which it is understandable that frequent interregional residence transfers take place. For each pair indicated, the indicators of the attraction of the first region on the second (corresponding values below the diagonal) are also among the highest ones. As is easy to imagine, probably a part of these changes of residence is closely connected with labour demand. Of greater importance are

the migrating flows between non contiguous regions since their flows are probably determined by the push-pull action of the labour market. We remember that the said indicators are a measure of the attraction that a given region exercise on the emigrants from another, supposing that these have the same migration flows and neglecting the intraregional transfers. Therefore their values point out that in 1970-1973 Piemonte exercised a quite a substantial relative attraction on the emigrants from the regions of Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. The same can be said with regards to Lombardia, even if the values appear lower than these found in Piemonte, above all in the case of Sardegna. Besides the emigration from the Southern Italy regions to the Northern ones, characterized by considerable industrial development, our indicators show also the existence of other propensities; the propensity of emigrants from Calabria and Sardegna towards Liguria; the propensity of the emigrants from Abruzzi, Molise and Campania towards Emilia Romagna; that of emigrants from Campania, Basilicata, Sicilia and Sardegna towards Toscana. We notice that, again, high values of attraction indicators of an immigration region towards an emigration region often correspond to high values of the attraction indicators of the latter one on the former. This may be due to returns of previously emigrated population, which are probably of some importance because they come from regions with short emigration and because they are directed to regions with low level immigration flow..

As to the relationship between the values taken on by indicators in the other periods considered, we observe that it is substantially unchanged; in fact the higher values are always found in correspondence with the migrating flows

of the southern regions towards the central and northern ones. On the whole, the values of the indicators in question show a quite different trend according to regions, nevertheless it is interesting to notice that, while as we said above the migrating flows are in a decreasing trend, such values show no systematic variations. The facts we think right to point out are two: the former consists of the increasing attraction that Lombardia and Piemonte seem to exercise over the emigrants from the regions Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna; the same can be said of the increasing attraction that Toscana had for emigrants from Basilicata, Sicilia and Sardegna. Therefore it would be logical to think that if the slackening of economic activity has caused a decrease in intraregional and interregional mobility, in relative terms it has not changed the relationship among the different regions with reference to interregional mobility. In fact, while beside the decrease of the total mobility we could have expected the migrating flow to spread uniformly over the territory, in certain cases our results show a polarization of the flows.

The formulation of a specific explanatory hypothesis of the results contained in Table 8, presupposes, obviously, a quite detailed knowledge of the situation in the single region. In this context we have not thought it necessary to face such a problem and we have limited ourselves to a fairly superficial analysis, since the method used requires further study and experience.

6. CONCLUSIONS

To make a consideration of a general nature, in principle we can accept the idea that population mobility is imputable to two kinds of causes.

The first refers to a dynamic characteristic typical of every social structure, the second is relative to the existence of disequilibria, which, although they too are partially inevitable in a vital organism, should be reduced and brought down within acceptable limits in a context of social justice. A substantial aspect of the population's mobility is constituted by the internal migrations, the effect of which are differentiated and sometimes contrasting (SALVEMINI 1960, DE VERGOTTINI 1970, FEDERICI-GOLINI 1972). In fact these can allow a more adequate employment of the labour force if the phenomenon is contained within determined functional limits, or increase the regional disequilibria if the emigration is selective and compromises the development perspective of emigration areas through an impoverishment of the most skilled labour. From the above an interest derives for the study of such migration through proper indicators able to analyze the phenomenon quantitatively.

In the previous pages we have tried to give a description of the characteristics of population mobility in Italy between 1970-78, taking as a basis the data on changes of residence in the population register. The results partially confirm the conclusions which other students have reached starting with different data (GOLINI 1978, CENSIS 1980, CENTRO STATISTICA AZIENDALE 1980), as to the reduction in population mobility. Nevertheless the data allow us to point out also a certain decrease in this trend and, in some cases, a recovery which could be imputable to a recovery in economic activity that came about in 1977-78. The observation concern both intraregional and interregional mobility, particularly, the reduction in interregional mobility is more stressed. Again the recovery of mobility seems

to act first. on intraregional movements and afterwards on interregional ones. Finally, as to the relations that exist between the various regions in terms of interregional mobility, the reduction in mobility does not seem to have produced substantial changes such as to decrease the existing territorial disequilibrium; on the contrary some regions that have a shortage of labour seem to have strengthened their attraction for the same regions, that over the last few years have satisfied to an important extent the labour demand coming from the labour market.

Gilberto GHILARDI

Dipartimento Statistico

Florence University

REFERENCES

- BENEDETTI C. (1960). Uno schema interpretativo delle migrazioni interne stagionali. "Atti della XXXIII sett. soc. dei catt. d'Italia", Reggio Calabria, pp.309-316.
- BISHOP Y.M.M., FIENBERG S.E., HOLLAND P.W. (1975). Discrete multivariate analysis: theory and practice, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- CENSIS (1980). Rapporto sull'emigrazione italiana nel 1979. Anno XVI, n. 345-346, Roma.
- CENTRO STATISTICA AZIENDALE (1980). Mobilità, distribuzione della popolazione e società. "Lettere d'affari", 406-407, Sett.-Ott., Firenze.
- DE VERGOTTINI M. (1970). Sugli effetti socio-economici delle migrazioni interne. "Riv. di economia, demografia e statistica". Vol. XXIV, n. 3-4, pp. 11-32.
- DI RIENZO P. (1965). Movimento migratorio interno in base alle iscrizioni e cancellazioni anagrafiche per trasferimento di residenza. "Annali di statistica". S.VIII, vol. 17, Roma, pp. 669-685.
- FEDERICI N. (1964). La rilevazione statistica delle migrazioni: problemi e proposte. "Statistica". Anno XXIV, n. 3, pp. 405-421.
- FEDERICI N. (1965). Lezioni di demografia, De Sanctis, Roma.
- FEDERICI N. (1970). Funzioni delle migrazioni nella trasformazione rurale-urbana. "Riv. italiana di econ., dem. e stat.", Anno XXIV, n. 3-4, pp. 33-49.
- FEDERICI N., GOLINI A. (1972). Les migrations entre les grands régions des Six Pays du Marché Commun. "Genus", Anno XXVIII, n. 1-4, pp. 27-68.
- GALEOTTI G. (1972). I movimenti migratori interni in Italia. Analisi statistica e programmi di politica, Cacucci, Bari.
- GOLINI A. (1974). Distribuzione della popolazione, migrazioni interne e urbanizzazione in Italia. Fac. di Sc. Stat. Dem. ed Att., Roma.

- GOLINI A. (1978). Le tendenze recenti nelle migrazioni interne. "Studi e ricerche". Anno XVI, n. 54, pp. 401-403.
- LIVI BACCI M. (1967) (A cura di). Le migrazioni interne in Italia. Scuola di Statistica, Firenze.
- RIVA L. (1978). Analisi delle tabelle origine-destinazione delle migrazioni interne in Italia. Fac. di Ec. e Comm. Parma.
- SALVEMINI T. (1960). I trasferimenti interregionali. "Atti della XXXIII sett. soc. dei catt. d'Italia, Reggio Calabria, pp. 282-291.
- SOMOGY G. (1970). Le migrazioni interne nel processo di sviluppo economico dell'Italia. "Riv. it. di econ., dem. e stat.". Anno XXIV, n. 3-4, pp. 75-133.
- TUGAULT Y. (1970). Méthode d'analyse d'un tableau "Origine-destination" de migrations. "Population", A. 25, n.1, pp. 61-68.

SUMMARY

SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN ITALY

Italy is a country with considerable socioeconomic regional disparities, which effect internal migration and labour migration in particular. Therefore it is not surprising that there is considerable interest in this process of population redistribution. The main source on internal migration in Italy is constituted by the statistics collected by ISTAT on changes of residence between comuni disaggregated by origin and destination. The purpose of this study is to analyze such data, in order to throw a light on some aspects of internal migration at the regional level. First, we take into consideration the evolution of the phenomenon in the last 10 years, then we attempt to measure the attraction from one region to another in terms of migration movements, using the loglinear model in the case of "quasi-independence". The obtained results show several characteristics of the internal migration at regional level and the evolution trend over the chosen period.

A P P E N D I X

Table A.1 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1970.

Origin region	Destination region																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 EMILIA-R.	13 97	333	6 515	3 447	3 477	9 976	6 295	2 030	1 912	3 178	6 337	2 939	5 96	2 36	4 264	5 170	8 13	2 737	6 815	2 375
2 VALLE D'	647	2 105	141	36	37	43	105	32	73	11	28	57	18	2	42	26	0	84	33	70
3 LOMBARDI	8 329	151	19 762	12 13	7 152	18 52	4 194	7 604	3 304	5 60	1 362	5 164	10 9	3 62	5 032	5 515	7 23	2 904	6 798	1 792
4 TRENTO - A	908	53	1 368	1 544	1 899	3 31	2 62	4 64	3 06	67	1 11	6 90	1 06	24	3 09	1 76	3 6	1 23	2 51	91
5 VENETO	3 794	88	7 773	1 570	8 634	4 240	7 77	3 301	1 151	143	3 72	2 181	2 87	69	8 00	7 00	69	3 06	7 74	3 75
6 FRIULI	5 664	46	1 176	243	3 003	2 159	3 03	5 93	4 83	65	1 69	1 107	1 13	43	5 40	3 76	33	1 31	4 36	1 97
7 LIGURIA	5 064	140	3 11	2 64	6 50	4 19	2 352	1 448	2 426	1 67	2 42	1 894	4 16	69	10 23	7 94	1 14	9 69	1 710	1 001
8 EM. ROM.	2 573	52	7 263	4 05	2 661	4 79	1 500	9 237	2 697	7 55	1 645	2 022	5 75	1 68	13 50	10 99	1 96	4 73	1 236	5 66
9 TUSCANA	1 782	69	3 333	1 72	945	3 94	2 319	2 234	7 085	8 06	5 46	5 06	4 19	1 47	1 803	8 14	2 52	5 09	1 633	7 37
10 ABRUZIA	5 96	12	7 59	39	1 87	96	2 12	6 31	1 549	10 174	5 62	3 552	2 11	35	2 42	1 58	37	64	1 33	1 47
11 MARCHE	6 75	24	1 682	1 05	6 92	1 39	2 56	2 405	7 91	4 96	2 795	2 450	1 005	1 14	2 37	3 86	5 0	64	2 54	1 62
12 LAZIO	2 908	90	4 990	4 66	2 318	10 32	1 573	2 075	3 942	2 184	1 807	5 344	2 728	5 51	5 470	2 384	3 73	1 623	7 76	1 877
13 ABRUZZI	1 171	23	2 901	1 04	4 72	1 64	4 79	1 195	6 52	2 74	1 112	4 942	1 897	6 13	5 74	6 27	5 1	1 36	2 97	1 17
14 UMBRIA	7 99	5	6 92	26	1 01	35	86	3 91	2 38	32	1 40	1 552	6 35	4 272	6 04	3 04	5 4	7 9	66	34
15 CAMPANIA	12 364	85	1 676	4 12	1 583	9 21	2 086	4 487	5 769	2 87	5 31	1 121	6 13	7 91	9 485	2 568	1 013	1 425	1 653	7 30
16 PUGLIA	1 290	69	1 751	3 11	1 264	7 02	1 287	2 652	2 077	1 23	5 59	4 484	8 03	5 43	2 413	4 102	1 377	5 51	1 269	3 39
17 BASILIC.	3 774	11	4 669	5 8	1 55	80	4 94	8 94	1 190	3 6	7 6	9 82	9 6	4 4	1 627	1 895	6 010	5 48	1 32	4 9
18 CALABRIA	1 146	3 16	1 2 945	5 43	5 92	2 69	2 941	1 361	1 657	1 47	1 39	3 775	1 42	5 7	1 470	9 91	5 52	2 319	1 925	1 35
19 SICILIA	1 744	95	2 159	2 71	1 505	6 81	3 646	3 195	4 736	1 67	3 50	5 276	3 38	7 7	1 845	1 323	2 37	1 701	6 833	6 70
20 SARDEGNA	4 762	33	4 351	1 19	5 81	3 34	1 600	1 089	1 562	2 04	2 64	3 219	1 31	6 3	6 91	3 76	4 5	1 64	6 65	2 610
TOTALE	201 707	4 300	31 537	21 886	11 745	34 871	54 633	12 948	10 750	1 620	3 671	11 496	2 238	8 280	12 536	4 663	12 603	3 109	9 156	37 911

Table A.2 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1971.

Origin region	Destination region																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 PIEMONTE	111 526	8 20	6 505	3 05	3 399	10 16	6 103	1 823	1 806	3 19	5 91	2 771	5 78	1 85	5 153	6 133	1 907	3 932	7 790	2 658
2 VALLE D'	7 39	2 169	1 53	1 9	42	29	91	40	35	6	18	69	24	4	42	30	4	83	36	31
3 LOMBARDI	1 672	1 54	1 86 450	1 137	7 534	1 933	4 534	6 483	3 067	5 91	12 39	5 153	10 34	2 66	5 809	5 920	9 19	3 299	7 412	2 087
4 TRENTO - A	4 29	44	1 724	1 525	2 053	3 71	2 26	4 19	3 25	64	1 20	7 62	60	23	2 24	1 43	3 4	1 15	1 93	9 9
5 VENETO	3 084	64	7 058	1 629	8 733	3 865	7 12	2 760	9 92	1 48	3 69	2 744	2 60	7 5	8 27	7 09	7 7	2 03	9 12	4 11
6 FRIULI	7 90	20	1 646	3 32	3 488	2 233	3 98	5 80	3 99	7 6	1 11	1 616	1 12	23	4 47	3 62	4 2	1 49	4 76	1 31
7 LIGURIA	4 768	88	3 574	1 74	7 93	3 01	2 502	1 174	2 289	1 29	2 77	1 656	4 32	3 3	10 35	8 62	9 5	6 95	1 545	1 466
8 EM. ROM.	1 715	51	6 33	3 11	2 660	5 46	1 445	7 460	2 502	2 45	1 446	2 026	5 62	1 39	15 46	11 27	2 48	4 43	1 449	5 77
9 TUSCANA	1 913	6 8	3 34	1 72	6 71	4 28	2 094	2 306	7 056	1 023	5 26	3 741	3 01	9 7	1 842	1 127	2 98	4 90	1 769	4 35
10 ABRUZIA	9 82	2 7	1 33	91	2 54	69	1 30	5 55	1 127	9 77	5 75	3 37	3 0	3 0	2 91	1 35	3 4	7 6	1 87	1 00
11 MARCHE	9 09	24	1 678	64	5 47	1 95	3 18	2 725	7 56	5 19	2 975	2 689	1 094	6 1	2 64	3 86	5 3	9 4	3 01	1 66
12 LAZIO	2 663	73	4 531	4 23	2 064	9 62	1 288	1 899	3 61	2 297	1 563	5 375	2 777	5 27	5 556	2 611	1 87	1 709	2 731	1 426
13 ABRUZZI	1 379	42	1 893	67	7 73	1 40	4 53	1 031	5 72	2 56	1 165	3 747	1 499	3 52	5 35	5 93	6 2	1 21	4 99	1 35
14 UMBRIA	6 57	6	1 62	20	1 10	43	65	2 21	1 96	3 5	1 26	1 095	6 28	3 652	6 92	4 05	4 5	6 8	7 1	3 2
15 CAMPANIA	11 025	94	1 6 299	4 47	1 762	8 38	1 642	3 750	5 077	3 19	3 60	10 493	7 62	8 05	9 6 672	2 735	1 77	1 383	1 913	1 86
16 PUGLIA	12 091	42	1 736 9	2 67	1 503	7 36	1 231	2 074	1 792	1 51	5 38	4 546	1 787	4 69	2 2 84	4 153	1 477	1 911	1 935	5 98
17 BASILIC.	3 697	5	3 757	24	1 59	71	3 71	5 73	6 71	5 1	6 1	1 951	1 24	5 2	1 382	1 220	2 199	6 11	1 87	6 1
18 CALABRIA	1 974	4 85	13 560	1 33	7 63	2 89	2 88	1 597	1 909	1 53	1 77	3 713	1 00	1 57	1 350	1 163	1 25	2 334	1 940	1 61
19 SICILIA	1 616	1 16	2 96 0	3 99	1 345	6 95	3 331	2 704	4 109	2 12	4 00	5 127	3 29	9 4	1 675	1 462	3 1	1 670	6 993	6 25
20 SARDEGNA	4 104	5 6	5 030	1 21	5 5	947	1 352	9 63	1 282	1 73	2 97	3 68	1 73	6 1	6 11	7 93	5 3	1 69	6 85	2 795
TOTALE	1 996 1	9 540	1 02 29	21 304	11 061	39 431	53 889	10 756	10 314	1 606	3 512	11 397	7 973	7 601	1 24 346	5 975	12 267	4 073	10 136	39 013

Table A.1 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1970.

Origin Region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1	11126	11126	6215	376	3567	976	6285	2010	1912	178	637	609	596	236	4264	5170	873	2717	6913	7294	160279
2	667	2100	161	36	37	53	105	32	73	11	29	57	18	2	42	26	9	35	35	20	357
3	6129	151	19762	1213	1772	1852	4394	7634	3304	960	1362	5165	1009	262	5032	5215	723	3054	6809	1022	251667
4	3779	3779	88	1773	1970	86399	4280	777	3301	1151	372	2181	287	24	307	176	26	123	231	91	22737
5	180	140	14	243	3013	21594	307	593	463	65	149	1107	113	43	640	700	67	306	725	375	115353
6	223	52	7263	405	549	23527	1448	2426	2697	265	1685	2322	575	69	1023	794	115	969	1710	197	32908
7	1782	69	3333	172	945	374	2319	2734	70868	886	566	5466	619	147	1863	814	222	569	1633	500	107277
8	576	12	358	37	187	96	611	1585	10174	10174	27951	3252	211	35	242	158	37	65	133	737	93953
9	2888	90	6996	566	2713	1032	1573	2075	3942	2184	1807	5314	2758	114	237	366	50	273	273	152	69518
10	1171	23	2091	104	572	164	479	1195	652	274	1107	5752	1967	551	5670	2384	373	1623	2775	1077	88508
11	5	5	692	26	101	35	86	212	238	32	140	1252	635	423	684	304	56	73	237	117	33931
12	85	16766	412	1583	921	2086	4687	5763	2077	123	559	4484	613	791	94854	2568	1913	1625	1653	730	100058
13	1204	69	17913	311	1266	62	1287	2652	2077	123	559	4484	613	543	2513	51925	1377	951	1259	339	93086
14	3775	11	6499	94	154	80	694	894	1190	36	75	782	96	54	1627	1095	6019	643	133	56	27571
15	11667	316	12955	543	592	209	2941	1361	1657	147	139	3775	152	57	1470	971	552	23193	1925	135	64115
16	17563	95	21598	211	1505	601	3046	3195	4736	107	350	5276	338	77	1845	1323	237	1701	63334	670	133977
17	4762	33	4351	119	581	334	1600	1089	1562	204	254	3217	131	23	671	376	52	180	465	26105	86358
Total	201139	4360	317375	21636	116745	35071	54633	120409	107501	16608	36713	116952	27258	8400	125368	66638	12963	13109	97106	375911	622138

Table A.2 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1971.

Origin Region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1	11126	11126	6215	376	3567	976	6285	2010	1912	178	637	609	596	236	4264	5170	873	2717	6913	7294	160279
2	667	2100	161	36	37	53	105	32	73	11	29	57	18	2	42	26	9	35	35	20	357
3	6129	151	19762	1213	1772	1852	4394	7634	3304	960	1362	5165	1009	262	5032	5215	723	3054	6809	1022	251667
4	3779	3779	88	1773	1970	86399	4280	777	3301	1151	372	2181	287	24	307	176	26	123	231	91	22737
5	180	140	14	243	3013	21594	307	593	463	65	149	1107	113	43	640	700	67	306	725	375	115353
6	223	52	7263	405	549	23527	1448	2426	2697	265	1685	2322	575	69	1023	794	115	969	1710	197	32908
7	1782	69	3333	172	945	374	2319	2734	70868	886	566	5466	619	147	1863	814	222	569	1633	500	107277
8	576	12	358	37	187	96	611	1585	10174	10174	27951	3252	211	35	242	158	37	65	133	737	93953
9	2888	90	6996	566	2713	1032	1573	2075	3942	2184	1807	5314	2758	114	237	366	50	273	273	152	69518
10	1171	23	2091	104	572	164	479	1195	652	274	1107	5752	1967	551	5670	2384	373	1623	2775	1077	88508
11	5	5	692	26	101	35	86	212	238	32	140	1252	635	423	684	304	56	73	237	117	33931
12	85	16766	412	1583	921	2086	4687	5763	2077	123	559	4484	613	791	94854	2568	1913	1625	1653	730	100058
13	1204	69	17913	311	1266	62	1287	2652	2077	123	559	4484	613	543	2513	51925	1377	951	1259	339	93086
14	3775	11	6499	94	154	80	694	894	1190	36	75	782	96	54	1627	1095	6019	643	133	56	27571
15	11667	316	12955	543	592	209	2941	1361	1657	147	139	3775	152	57	1470	971	552	23193	1925	135	64115
16	17563	95	21598	211	1505	601	3046	3195	4736	107	350	5276	338	77	1845	1323	237	1701	63334	670	133977
17	4762	33	4351	119	581	334	1600	1089	1562	204	254	3217	131	23	671	376	52	180	465	26105	86358
Total	201139	4360	317375	21636	116745	35071	54633	120409	107501	16608	36713	116952	27258	8400	125368	66638	12963	13109	97106	375911	622138

Table A.3 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1972.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1 PUGLIA	119184	712	3991	419	3268	986	6284	1969	2003	339	710	3279	1054	283	5186	5845	1177	3639	6977	3028	17669
2 VALLE D'A.	297	2789	171	31	95	29	64	40	63	7	23	71	50	12	40	55	7	27	57	43	4639
3 LUCANIA	7805	173	23314	1296	7519	2093	5109	7601	4935	539	1413	4531	1191	305	6236	6664	984	3332	7829	2326	22593
4 BRUNICO A.	532	178	176	17419	2377	468	215	452	269	60	105	500	97	15	270	222	59	173	262	156	2953
5 ABRUZZO	2795	64	7114	1742	91952	4212	735	3037	1053	192	439	1789	317	96	899	664	108	283	81	471	11962
6 FRIULI	805	31	2227	333	3539	24082	384	565	476	113	291	919	166	39	460	505	36	198	191	263	5621
7 EMILIA	5145	105	5249	217	877	306	27589	1418	2535	150	272	1959	454	47	1076	1117	140	1609	1657	1209	5127
8 LIGURIA	1763	53	7254	386	2414	569	1632	80192	2453	319	1591	1991	630	112	1576	1296	324	533	1367	733	1772
9 TOSCANA	1575	60	3031	176	976	394	2345	2174	68758	1104	579	3332	500	105	2123	1035	285	533	193	965	9289
10 CAMPANIA	543	7	907	46	171	71	179	655	1682	9699	525	2875	292	123	224	183	50	123	253	13697	
11 SARDEGNA	903	21	2220	133	671	223	354	2469	890	745	26810	2971	1386	106	301	620	109	93	299	374	41241
12 CALABRIA	2570	54	5050	451	2247	1105	1341	2110	4371	2545	1981	59328	3223	561	5614	2801	406	1687	2698	2959	162671
13 APULIA	1500	21	2149	92	417	151	455	1059	725	263	1361	4421	23819	524	719	719	90	263	2698	122	33693
14 BASILICATA	425	7	918	15	107	34	72	417	241	30	159	939	265	3661	637	514	53	103	73	52	9283
15 CAMPANIA	9342	65	16082	455	1643	974	1935	3684	5103	293	509	10272	867	876	100662	3447	1264	1952	1973	676	16997
16 UMBRIA	9667	53	15376	189	1411	767	1279	2053	1744	209	560	3962	836	600	2759	51935	1821	1030	1650	421	28071
17 BASILICATA	2925	14	3561	53	137	93	357	637	824	26	99	961	119	52	1419	1994	8387	506	194	39	27395
18 CALABRIA	10926	352	12294	173	737	299	2531	1191	1394	149	133	3254	226	75	1560	1490	718	27457	2922	162	66233
19 SICILIA	13996	54	19515	266	1735	745	3107	2671	4176	204	372	4446	403	83	1765	1663	291	1479	45965	718	152899
20 SARDEGNA	3046	2	4659	106	538	226	1434	943	1410	191	213	2039	137	68	669	430	92	194	584	31731	5034
TOTALE	195137	4923	322678	23969	122952	37777	57401	115325	103740	17117	38994	114287	36532	7687	141534	83349	16415	46659	119826	459901	653392

Table A.4 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1973.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1 PUGLIA	25762	897	7511	364	3550	931	6763	2143	1994	422	679	3203	780	1235	4670	6048	1048	3872	7797	2955	15958
2 VALLE D'A.	671	1738	150	22	101	22	161	58	30	2	14	77	30	8	53	29	2	135	22	26	391
3 LUCANIA	6889	178	175594	1372	7728	2018	5327	7286	3133	633	1469	4753	1177	392	5766	6470	1049	3331	8356	2552	26605
4 BRUNICO A.	297	24	1403	14106	2154	413	236	497	285	72	100	527	75	12	249	204	44	163	339	123	212
5 ABRUZZO	2375	69	5755	1475	5569	3644	856	3033	992	173	423	1333	277	79	804	854	67	313	967	917	10993
6 FRIULI	548	21	1654	278	3358	20493	421	542	506	76	162	1074	131	39	441	573	94	206	659	171	3113
7 EMILIA	4691	140	3362	155	789	369	27959	1407	2478	187	281	1476	398	43	1008	930	163	1130	1917	1987	4359
8 CAMPANIA	1486	36	5342	406	2635	512	1489	73977	2233	453	1433	1763	543	169	1544	1532	173	493	1532	529	92203
9 CALABRIA	1356	36	2594	204	1113	282	2417	2114	61489	1228	563	3679	509	102	1970	952	234	513	1831	714	4473
10 SARDEGNA	375	3	643	23	191	79	155	421	143	10130	509	5223	308	13	231	176	29	69	133	75	1759
11 CAMPANIA	650	16	1449	113	432	198	328	2262	772	633	2439	1195	145	155	263	521	54	53	253	176	3699
12 UMBRIA	2023	70	3659	329	1714	740	1273	1763	3570	2632	1693	2569	1736	677	5191	2356	327	1559	2774	1687	42461
13 BASILICATA	695	24	1679	85	424	199	415	1035	607	221	1211	4952	2236	535	666	676	50	192	317	153	6992
14 CALABRIA	375	6	967	19	74	59	83	342	212	36	149	991	73	5039	743	641	60	37	117	92	1694
15 CAMPANIA	9225	64	17957	394	1620	865	2221	4534	9293	369	477	13743	855	968	106934	3335	1169	1626	1566	875	166656
16 UMBRIA	9536	59	16670	264	1350	608	1282	2216	1874	243	594	3097	1035	918	2652	50394	1779	1174	1925	562	99005
17 BASILICATA	2525	9	2514	42	124	72	368	472	674	98	95	274	98	90	1453	2253	7137	684	243	63	5987
18 SARDEGNA	3046	2	4659	106	538	226	1434	943	1410	191	213	2039	137	68	669	430	92	194	584	31731	5034
TOTALE	167942	3906	260075	20270	116171	32744	59254	109352	93713	14177	54937	131777	36617	10768	130320	31183	14237	46619	119741	416614	653392

Table A.5 Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1974.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1 - Valle del Cauca	94091	601	7554	311	3244	1029	5035	2084	1768	392	568	2906	708	659	4630	5408	1074	3016	6919	2066	145854
2 - Antioquia	461	1645	156	18	53	14	80	42	46	10	33	58	21	7	32	16	1	146	38	50	2927
3 - Bolivar	6852	174	177180	1216	6914	1851	4500	7070	3560	654	1206	4908	1091	325	5666	5916	912	3338	7422	2323	243078
4 - Cesar	304	28	1323	13480	1686	315	166	396	276	33	91	465	96	19	250	123	20	117	203	91	19482
5 - Cordoba	1735	66	5240	1443	75782	3314	556	2594	1023	194	430	1767	260	52	717	646	39	272	794	378	97302
6 - Cundinamarca	551	10	1370	304	2979	19901	258	472	398	63	155	924	87	33	470	395	29	154	400	159	29112
7 - Guajaria	4206	104	3638	172	739	436	21580	1321	2315	167	242	1585	362	48	1062	793	127	1020	1639	972	42528
8 - Huila	1188	29	5622	298	2435	466	1087	66114	2110	305	1356	1710	685	94	1421	1002	186	494	1192	597	20191
9 - Magdalena	1114	47	2744	200	915	297	1870	1975	55708	1117	490	3376	295	97	1949	874	253	442	1672	714	76147
10 - Meta	257	6	640	45	234	62	133	409	1113	7927	476	2404	226	21	178	136	17	82	142	122	14640
11 - Nariño	474	11	1604	73	460	154	193	1708	598	529	21195	1952	851	43	346	343	52	74	225	131	31016
12 - Quindío	2411	93	4909	460	2034	1145	1549	2213	4286	2558	1940	58717	3081	639	6050	2591	332	1703	4885	2036	101632
13 - Risaralda	701	26	1659	90	474	174	311	939	616	237	1081	4033	18081	410	708	592	43	151	248	83	30857
14 - Santander	345	2	629	19	109	65	35	345	220	39	110	1050	648	3672	619	650	43	63	72	55	3939
15 - Tolima	7905	59	13439	380	1689	997	1928	4539	4978	410	459	10216	774	810	90354	2794	1011	1400	1652	813	146657
16 - Valle del Cauca	7689	71	12074	235	1421	706	1006	2196	1675	219	533	3770	704	415	2425	38735	1347	364	1349	401	77835
17 - Cauca	1979	11	2633	34	152	83	267	606	823	26	102	734	101	19	1254	1619	5421	465	188	43	16581
18 - Chocó	7000	233	8917	187	661	290	1678	1334	1429	143	183	3171	175	63	1392	1125	502	20774	1934	185	51376
19 - Cauca	11012	63	15090	290	1856	751	2437	2638	3890	223	340	4475	338	102	1572	1268	184	1722	65887	787	114933
20 - Cauca	2552	30	3381	131	542	261	1376	817	1226	181	275	2750	139	50	706	472	60	160	595	25925	41625
TOTAL	152837	3509	270002	19385	104379	32311	46045	99812	88066	15427	31265	110971	28523	7778	121801	65498	11653	37258	95456	387311	380767

Table A.6 Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1975.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20		
1 - Valle del Cauca	41335	677	5752	219	2424	745	4302	1804	1555	346	493	2637	612	361	4479	5419	1056	3789	6902	2998	127177	
2 - Antioquia	449	1513	110	23	57	12	64	44	44	14	6	97	25	7	37	51	17	96	45	33	2728	
3 - Bolivar	5221	123	153976	1005	5757	1566	3491	5872	2554	516	1231	4116	1094	311	5759	5794	995	3693	7421	2347	213231	
4 - Cesar	276	30	11888	1425	281	156	383	202	29	43	481	84	13	198	152	34	34	205	74	17074		
5 - Cordoba	1576	30	4391	1204	68277	2829	564	2388	754	154	367	1429	283	69	805	696	45	273	905	360	87366	
6 - Cundinamarca	423	10	1121	239	2627	18209	221	429	302	74	113	935	113	23	405	324	38	190	410	162	26327	
7 - Guajaria	637	55	2363	119	572	299	18523	1129	1942	119	214	1420	278	32	921	734	132	895	1391	383	35133	
8 - Huila	702	52	4395	252	1937	365	369	57385	1552	235	1198	1444	446	100	1562	965	160	433	1176	543	70999	
9 - Magdalena	1017	37	2106	169	499	301	1728	1684	46302	795	414	2931	281	66	2048	802	245	448	1659	751	66495	
10 - Meta	191	8	417	14	147	74	98	274	856	6699	399	1945	190	26	174	117	17	67	134	37	11971	
11 - Nariño	343	5	1039	66	350	127	196	1541	457	389	18230	1553	901	50	188	330	18	93	193	127	26269	
12 - Quindío	2136	74	3628	402	1833	1023	1351	2109	3504	2315	1933	51507	3090	454	5879	2438	369	1613	5031	1800	99306	
13 - Risaralda	636	24	1391	73	461	140	270	806	465	200	831	3528	16824	431	596	521	26	143	295	137	27893	
14 - Santander	233	1	537	31	72	48	62	270	193	31	65	710	643	3190	638	485	25	62	71	485	33	7117
15 - Tolima	5537	58	9892	339	1573	931	1419	3489	4935	367	334	9029	672	681	34634	2671	914	1375	1562	572	120915	
16 - Valle del Cauca	9543	57	9191	197	1102	536	786	1955	1491	240	560	3963	603	389	2241	38254	1301	926	1241	576	70973	
17 - Cauca	1617	9	2025	32	120	71	192	552	723	61	27	742	79	52	1139	1415	5226	664	148	51	16788	
18 - Cauca	587	220	7219	215	475	209	1634	1744	1105	144	146	2935	151	75	1505	988	440	21665	1038	156	43433	
19 - Cauca	8737	72	11715	317	1417	639	2147	7197	3078	207	237	4217	366	89	1496	1433	178	1715	6025	577	101427	
TOTAL	128097	3189	245090	15976	92071	28643	39398	85245	72103	13038	27073	10612	26745	6637	115437	69759	11045	3111	6649	33	353127771	

Table A.7 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1976.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1 PIRAMIDE	45307	7118	5871	232	2391	795	4161	1718	1576	356	521	2239	516	278	4131	6743	1092	3952	6149	2652	
2 VALLE D.	550	1538	122	16	54	15	51	7	54	4	21	34	12	0	58	46	3	117	47	33	
3 LOMBARDI	5859	122	159137	1016	5672	1464	3355	5997	3080	592	14871	3647	1143	365	5709	6137	950	3919	7424	2253	
4 EMILIA A	252	36	1028	12105	1313	213	152	313	215	46	74	368	78	9	264	120	18	129	139	66	
5 VENETI	1237	33	4190	1011	66465	2793	511	4288	787	156	311	1309	294	83	734	742	67	362	905	296	
6 FRIULI	600	26	1094	205	2514	18284	347	483	363	55	185	610	173	40	557	439	43	151	420	181	
7 LIGURIA	3607	135	2621	133	539	251	17914	1077	2012	118	206	1229	241	29	1061	717	124	863	1360	871	
8 F. R.M.	984	35	3926	261	1896	309	918	54125	1573	233	1133	1305	521	78	1378	941	162	543	1166	494	
9 TOSCANA	934	32	2059	129	703	223	1653	1546	46273	867	433	2494	357	73	1776	651	170	441	1516	679	
10 ABRUZZO	175	0	321	42	113	63	84	291	791	6798	396	1641	165	11	156	113	2	56	135	82	
11 MARCHE	367	4	1032	91	387	122	121	1502	440	382	16926	1341	829	44	194	340	25	56	140	92	
12 EMILIA	1839	72	3297	276	1671	977	1101	1672	3424	2301	1915	50514	2896	612	5638	2387	365	1718	2543	1673	
13 ABRUZZO	551	26	1221	66	398	150	269	795	502	192	863	3082	16554	392	477	569	53	109	172	106	
14 ABRUZZO	305	1	520	23	40	51	83	314	152	51	81	363	569	3160	676	554	25	45	135	61	
15 CAMPANIA	5593	77	8975	345	1354	968	1359	3586	4037	283	379	8197	725	613	82215	2931	911	1492	1323	594	
16 ABRUZZO	5443	42	8359	187	1275	670	894	1765	1537	181	510	3010	658	381	2435	37909	1336	844	1076	226	
17 BASILICATA	1003	12	1888	26	120	50	177	527	743	41	55	698	70	19	1137	1863	5018	456	179	42	
18 CALABRIA	6238	234	6734	199	536	254	1431	1202	106	106	119	2683	239	59	1403	1060	432	2748	1773	137	
19 SARDEGNA	8304	51	10477	276	1391	509	2142	1907	3115	172	265	3714	303	52	1415	1436	123	1732	62442	516	
20 SARDINIA	2102	37	2512	71	165	224	1099	673	1123	135	160	2078	157	39	628	424	56	163	896	24531	
TOTAL	131556	3281	225405	16711	89207	29416	37842	82006	73040	13070	26090	91241	26630	6477	112235	64232	10975	39797	89545	3568420	

Table A.8 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1977.

Origin region	Destination region																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1 PIEMONTE	81687	564	6282	297	2373	950	3914	1989	1546	355	654	2590	640	164	4182	4507	927	3672	6298	2332	
2 VALLE D.	546	1563	112	22	61	21	62	55	44	0	4	69	6	1	29	34	13	164	30	25	
3 LOMBARDI	5718	117	165355	1133	5983	1610	3167	4218	2904	665	1369	4043	1357	363	5392	5559	881	3645	7393	2108	
4 EMILIA A	234	14	1051	11819	1439	218	127	391	163	43	103	325	64	9	266	124	15	87	263	87	
5 VENETI	1224	39	4308	1045	68067	2661	489	2178	910	131	336	1388	311	47	349	782	50	301	898	333	
6 FRIULI	441	26	1277	218	2525	17479	235	485	439	90	177	918	152	41	521	661	44	167	525	133	
7 LIGURIA	3604	74	3190	151	521	323	18009	974	1879	120	233	1402	331	46	330	585	115	878	1456	213	
8 F. R.M.	859	23	4675	262	1853	389	788	54649	1585	280	1271	1293	479	163	1525	896	161	429	1021	463	
9 TOSCANA	894	31	2243	168	645	273	1593	1486	45748	799	345	2377	270	55	1772	760	201	460	1594	587	
10 ABRUZZO	167	11	479	35	142	39	68	269	772	6556	355	1600	138	17	191	163	17	69	97	116	
11 MARCHE	254	16	994	49	287	111	103	1299	498	390	18212	1427	757	57	230	321	31	93	163	117	
12 EMILIA	1639	60	3651	304	1494	776	825	1480	2928	2054	1558	5143	2481	503	4872	1825	313	1331	2167	1413	
13 ABRUZZO	465	8	1297	91	366	164	227	827	474	166	422	2883	16115	370	569	469	29	140	257	97	
14 ABRUZZO	261	5	614	25	56	61	59	334	163	34	63	789	594	3197	763	312	37	53	68	54	
15 CAMPANIA	5604	55	10410	274	1531	948	1238	4038	3879	277	422	1521	693	696	4336	2446	839	1279	1313	490	
16 ABRUZZO	5606	39	10438	187	1039	731	742	2972	1570	209	534	2127	674	542	2115	3720	1156	569	1063	276	
17 BASILICATA	1575	9	2121	19	154	74	191	539	415	37	64	683	87	21	1807	1662	506	339	126	60	
18 CALABRIA	6145	216	7429	164	505	291	1369	1362	1295	100	172	2755	111	59	1638	958	399	1596	2797	163	
19 SARDEGNA	8958	82	12655	285	1499	692	1785	2916	3199	178	373	1660	132	53	1333	1136	137	1341	64279	280	
TOTAL	126852	3632	242057	16544	70746	27794	35905	83980	71998	12594	27396	97411	25563	6889	111976	60871	15777	38093	91214	3533212	

Table A.9 - Population movements by region of origin and destination in 1978.

Origin region	Destination region																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 PIEMONTE	42173	556	5250	229	2281	677	3073	1698	1640	372	552	2196	644	280	4040	4654	772	3027	6374	1973
2 VALLE D'AOSTA	539	1603	148	9	69	24	47	40	47	22	25	64	18	4	54	25	1	64	45	73
3 LIGURIA	5331	108	155141	943	5314	1455	3395	6008	2866	594	1412	3908	1233	361	5792	5960	831	3693	7900	1792
4 TRENTINO S. ALTA	223	18	862	11480	1373	201	115	320	216	32	68	360	65	16	161	129	20	64	233	51
5 VENETO	1647	37	3637	940	67404	2588	465	2082	745	105	399	1170	253	39	776	698	59	311	1019	276
6 EMILIA ROM. (N. S. O.)	375	11	744	176	2469	16335	162	285	317	62	125	691	67	31	424	359	25	137	621	166
7 LIGURIA	3330	42	2516	86	486	206	18367	1063	1776	103	187	1106	248	29	758	516	97	962	1315	761
8 EMILIA ROM. (S. O.)	212	20	3671	200	1742	297	771	55862	1509	297	1216	1274	483	82	1553	1039	171	498	1260	301
9 TOSCANA	932	34	1880	100	650	190	1617	1388	45253	801	379	2536	280	54	1779	810	237	457	1640	637
10 ABRUZZO	145	4	351	13	113	50	79	236	762	6739	343	1796	158	24	160	121	24	37	110	63
11 APULIA	239	11	723	68	292	80	124	1231	346	454	17733	1381	703	32	262	304	31	90	156	63
12 SARDEGNA	164	53	5147	293	1384	676	925	1611	2922	2170	1667	50023	2522	507	4913	1810	307	1425	2255	74
13 BASILICATA	636	10	1150	67	353	121	156	835	424	124	739	3195	15998	507	503	504	37	89	217	1396
14 CAMPANIA	5273	74	8578	260	1266	775	1099	3726	3789	275	382	7181	624	862	8340	2067	25	65	67	72
15 PUGLIA	9270	44	7984	156	1182	631	699	2491	1646	226	608	2956	646	447	1964	37932	1072	1469	1153	430
16 CALABRIA	1558	13	1817	25	158	76	191	781	686	44	65	629	51	39	926	1409	4731	401	1058	293
17 CALABRIA	5024	248	6895	160	649	287	1299	1439	1148	44	65	629	51	39	926	1409	4731	401	1058	293
18 SICILIA	8019	63	10530	227	1451	627	1698	2611	2868	176	331	3046	220	86	1294	1115	156	20817	1628	117
19 SARDEGNA	2029	33	2389	59	462	179	884	777	1047	134	169	2087	115	49	435	292	21	71	461	433
20 TIVOLE	126182	3088	217304	15502	89179	25491	36031	84421	70140	12487	26669	89219	24976	6684	111133	60937	10066	36519	92144	33596

Table A.10 - Population resident in the Italian regions in 1970-1978 (thousands).

Region	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
1 PIEMONTE	4381	4389	4433	4463	4512	4536	4541	4543	4541
2 VALLE D'AOSTA	109	108	109	111	112	113	114	114	114
3 LIGURIA	6332	8442	8582	8631	8712	8787	8838	8866	8910
4 TRENTINO S. ALTA	840	937	942	849	855	862	866	869	872
5 VENETO	4088	4091	4129	4168	4210	4249	4278	4301	4321
6 EMILIA ROM. (N. S. O.)	1229	1215	1214	1224	1232	1240	1245	1244	1244
7 LIGURIA	1673	1845	1855	1863	1869	1874	1877	1865	1859
8 EMILIA ROM. (S. O.)	3836	3836	3849	3873	3899	3936	3947	3947	3950
9 TOSCANA	3450	3449	3474	3502	3527	3552	3567	3579	3587
10 ABRUZZO	793	774	776	781	786	791	795	799	802
11 APULIA	1364	1355	1361	1367	1375	1383	1390	1397	1404
12 SARDEGNA	4636	4628	4694	4740	4811	4872	4922	4959	4997
13 BASILICATA	1202	1171	1167	1180	1192	1202	1211	1221	1224
14 CAMPANIA	332	323	320	322	325	328	330	331	332
15 PUGLIA	5159	5042	5066	5114	5178	5251	5280	5335	5379
16 CALABRIA	3629	3576	3587	3629	3675	3722	3771	3819	3866
17 CALABRIA	626	607	603	607	609	611	614	617	619
18 SICILIA	2057	1998	1989	1977	1970	1963	1954	1944	1934
19 SARDEGNA	4977	4670	4682	4726	4774	4861	4902	4962	5008
20 TIVOLE	1492	1467	1476	1476	1476	1436	1553	1569	1582
TOTALE	54302	54177	54066	54066	54180	54645	56014	56123	56279

LABOR RELATIONS
DURING
THE SPANISH TRANSITION PERIOD
(1975 - 1981)

By

Manuel Ludevid

Southern European Fellowship Conference
Castel Gandolfo, March 25-27, 1982

1. THE LEGACY OF THE FRANCO YEARS

The dictatorship of General Franco was not just a matter of suppressing the basic freedoms. It also amounted to a kind of uneasy pact with the working class (particularly from the 1960's on) whereby the regime tried to compensate for the lack of freedom to organize and strike by giving the workers special job protection, considerable social benefits (financed by spectacular increases in Social Security rates) and providing State intervention of the most protective sort. The "official" labor organization, in which membership was compulsory, even permitted token worker representation in the individual company as a sop to employees' possible aspirations to organize (1).

No analysis of the Spanish labor scene during the transition period would be complete without taking into consideration the populist aspect of the Franco regime. Without these populist touches the long-lived dictatorship would be even more inexplicable than it is. In Franco's Spain people worked long hours (many of them moonlighting to supplement their income); up until the end of the Sixties salaries were considerably lower than in the rest of Europe, but a worker's job was relatively secure, social security payments provided numerous safety nets and the State protected the worker (acting as a substitute for the outlawed democratic trade unions).

This then is a legacy of the Franco years; a legacy which conditioned the thinking of all employees and was marked by a philosophy of individualism, corporatism, the perpetual possibility of submitting to State protectionism, and a remarkable degree of corruption.

But this was not the sole legacy of the Franco years. Post-Franco Spain was left with an army which had infiltrated the country's social structures and an extreme right wing movement which was firmly ensconced

in its political life and actively and directly influenced the government of the country. The public administration was inefficient, corrupt and jealously guarded its own interests. The police force and the Civil Guard were thoroughly infiltrated by members of the extreme right; they were inefficient and undisciplined, and had almost no contact at all with the civilian world. The judicial branch of the government had no power independent of the executive branch and its members tended to be extraordinarily conservative. Public education was mired in academic incompetence and teachers could advance only if favored by the semi-feudal promotion system. News reported in the mass media (State-run radio, television and press) was consistently manipulated by the Government. In short, the Spanish State apparatus was conceived for dictatorship and after Franco's death was handed down almost intact to a country trying to build up a democracy.

The economic heritage was no less of a burden. Not only did the transition period have the misfortune to coincide with the serious world recession of the mid-Seventies, but in addition the Franco regime had left Spain with an industrial structure based largely on those sectors most prone to crisis (the metal, textile, automotive industries, etc.) (2) ; badly organized, over-staffed and under-productive companies; an exceedingly low capacity for technological innovation; a public sector in shambles, and employers who heralded the end of State interventionism and the liberalization of the economic system while simultaneously demanding that the Government maintain a policy of industrial aid and subsidies which was downright protectionist in nature.

This was the general picture in Spain at the time of Franco's death. This was the dictator's legacy to the architects of change.

But we must ask ourselves this: who were those architects of change? How did they plan to change the

country? How quickly were they going to change it and what was their final goal?

2. FOUR PHASES OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD

A. The Arias Navarro Government: (December 5, 1975 - July 1, 1976). The Arias Navarro Government was

typified by its attempt to maintain "the Franco regime without Franco" , offering a sort of controlled democracy manipulated exclusively by the political groups of the ruling classes.

B. The Constitutional Phase: The Suárez Government - Stage One: (July 1, 1976 - December 6, 1978).

During the first year of this phase the Government and the Opposition bargained to establish minimum conditions for the first free general elections. The period from the June 1977 elections until the Constitutional referendum in December 1978 was characterized by Parliament's search for terms of agreement which would make it possible to draft a democratic Constitution which would be acceptable to the great majority of Spanish citizens.

C. The Suárez Government - Stage Two: (December 6, 1978 - February 23, 1981). When the period of "government

by consensus" came to an end the various political parties and social forces began recovering their individual identities and the available political and economic alternatives became more clearly defined. During this time labor relations went through two different stages. After six months of outright confrontation (Government /CEOE (the Employers' Association) vs. the labor organizations) , a limited consensus was reached when UGT and CEOE signed the Inter-Confederation Framework Agreement.

D. The Calvo Sotelo Government: (February 23, 1981 to

the present). February 23's attempted military coup changed a lot of things. Although Calvo Sotelo's Government swung sharply to the right it has nonetheless been obliged to compromise with the Opposition on some specific matters.

Let us now examine each one of these three phases in greater detail.

A. The Arias Navarro Government (December 1975-July 1976): The Franco regime without Franco.

The first government of the monarchy was confided to Carlos Arias Navarro who had been Franco's righthand man during the last months of the dictator's life. The aim of the Arias government was to offer restricted or controlled democracy, similar to what appears to be goal of some members of Chile's Pinochet regime today (3). In other words, a few changes would be made for the sake of appearance, but the Franco system would remain generally intact. It would be a "restricted democracy" in the hands of two or three parties representing the leading families of the ruling classes (Falangists/populists, ultra-conservative Catholics, authoritarian technocrats, etc.). It would be a "controlled democracy" ruled by the iron hand of Home Minister Fraga. While a limited amount of freedom of association and expression would be permitted in selected sectors, mobilization of the working class would be rigorously repressed and would culminate in police killings of striking workers in Vitoria.

On the economic scene continuity was also the name of the game. The interests of the major metal and power companies and the leading banks were staunchly defended. The big news on the labor front was the announcement that the 1975 wage freeze would remain in force throughout 1976.


During this time there were no major changes in labor legislation. The most important law

passed during this period was the Labor Relations Act of April 8, 1976, and it was no more than a rehash of the labor legislation of the Franco years or, to put it more elegantly, a sort of Last Will and Testament of the Franco regime.

(4). The only really new measure introduced had to do with unfair firing practices: it was established that an employee judged to have been unfairly fired must be readmitted to his job. The widespread practice of "buying" an employee's resignation with cash indemnization became illegal. The new law did not last long: five months later that clause was changed once more and it again became possible to fire employees at will, providing they received a pay-off from their employer (5). In any case, the April attempt at pro-labor legislation only serves to confirm that the Franco idea of labor relations contained some populist notions which favored job protection.

This period also saw the first attempts at "union reform", i.e. of making orderly change from within the compulsory trade union (O.S.E.) (6). The then Minister of Trade Union Relations, Martín Villa, proposed that the union be redistributed so that the top O.S.E. posts (held by Government faithfuls) would remain intact while the lower echelons would be divided into one branch for employees and another for employers. He further proposed that a certain degree of union plurality be permitted at company level among the rank-and-file. However, no recognition was made of the fact that the O.S.E. could hardly be said to be representative of the employees, particularly outside the individual company.

The following organization chart was proposed:



This was defined by Martín Villa as "combining top-level union monopoly with a certain plurality of opinion among employees in individual companies, and is somehow reminiscent of some aspects of Pinochet's Chilean Labor Plan. This system had the dubious distinction of suffering all the defects of monopoly as well as all the defects of plurality. In fact, monopoly was imposed and controlled by the same people who had controlled the labor scene throughout the dictatorship, and plurality did not permit free expression of all labor tendencies. What it really amounted to was that the puppetmasters of the official union would loosen the strings to suit their own purposes, permitting certain sectors to enjoy occasional moments of freedom of action and expression.

Martín Villa had intended to launch this reform at an O.S.E. Trade Union Congress where a review of trade union representation in the institutions of the "organic democracy" was scheduled as was a review of the role of the Minister of Trade Union Relations

as chief executive of the O.S.E. However, long before that social pressures had unseated the entire Arias government.

And here we arrive at a major revelation of this period: the unexpected strength of mobilized labor. In the first three months of 1976, workers replied to government wage freezes with an unprecedented number of strikes (101,714,555 working hours were lost due to labor conflicts - an increase of ten times over 1975) and the number of striking workers increased from 556,371 in 1975 to 3,500,000.

Obviously the strikes were not solely to protest the wage freeze but were also a political protest against the Arias government and in favor of democracy. It is clearly impossible to determine where economic protest ended and political protest began.

It was precisely at this time that several political coordinating organizations were born. First came the Democratic Board, which embraced everyone from P.C.E, communists to the Opus Dei's financial wizard, Calvo Serer. A year later the Democratic Convergence Platform made its appearance as an umbrella organization whose ideas ranged from P.S.O.E. socialism to the more progressive Christian Democracy of Rufz Giménez.

Following Franco's death both organizations issued a general call to action advocating a democratic break with the dictatorship, refusing to recognize the monarchy and demanding a provisional government and a constituent period. Three months later the two organizations merged to form Democratic Coordination, and just after the first Suárez cabinet was sworn in in July 1976, Democratic Coordination openly announced its desire to negotiate with the Government.

Thus, in just a few months the Opposition had gone from total rejection of the monarchy and outright insistence on a break with the status quo to pragmatic

negotiations with the ruling powers. Furthermore, at the height of the wave of strikes that was sweeping the entire country, the leading workers' parties, mainly the Communists, suddenly switched tactics. Where they had previously been advocating widespread strikes and demanding general negotiations on myriad labor and political matters, they now did an almost complete about-face and began recommending that strikes be kept to a minimum and trying to settle conflicts by applying economic solutions negotiated on a company-by-company basis.

What was it then that happened between December and March of 1976? A logical assumption is that the Opposition realized that while it could effectively block Arias' continuist policies the Opposition alternative (a constituent process headed by the genuinely democratic, anti-Franco forces) was not the ideal solution at this time and that between the two alternatives there lay a third choice: negotiations between the democratic parties and the most reform-minded of Franco's heirs (the Suárez contingent). And this was the path that was chosen, a choice which put the democratic Opposition (particularly the Left) in a delicate position. They had to continually pressure the Suárez reformers to move ahead without delaying or renegeing on reforms, but they could not rely too much on mobilizing the masses as this could provoke an attempted coup by the Army and the far Right, both of which were comfortably ensconced in powerful positions which had remained virtually intact after Franco's death. By choosing this middle-of-the-road alternative the Opposition not only elected to play second fiddle to the reform-minded Franco faithful, but also to play a role that was tremendously difficult to perform well.

While all these events combined to form the frame-

9.

work for the decisive battle for power in Spain, important things were happening within the labor movement as well. Unions like the Socialist UGT and the anarchist CNT which had been all but eliminated during the Franco years began showing new signs of life. A gap opened between USO and CC.OO. and the latter found it increasingly difficult to advocate a loose association of labor unions as a means of throwing off the shackles of the dictatorship.

B. The Constitutional Phase (July 1, 1976 to December 6, 1978)

B.1. Defining the rules of the game

The Arias government was toppled by public pressure in favor of democracy. The entire first year of the Suárez government revolved around a single question: how could the first free general elections since the Civil War be held? The experience of the Arias government had made one thing very clear: no democratic change was possible without a popular vote. The Opposition could no longer be ignored and it was imperative that negotiations get underway in order to establish some minimum conditions.

This posed new problems for both the Government and the Opposition. It was more than a question of just getting some new faces in the Government: it was a matter of finding a way by which such anti-democratic institutions as the "organic" Cortes (Parliament) could trigger the move to democracy. To this end Suárez proposed a dignified sort of hara-kiri: the Political Reform Bill. On September 18, 1976 the Francoist Parliament calmly voted (425 in favor, 59 against, 13 null) to put an end to the system which had brought them all

to power. On December 15th a popular referendum ratified the Bill (94% of the votes cast favored reform). In their refusal to recognize the referendum the democratic forces offered a first show of their strength: an absentee rate of 22.5%. (7)

Suárez now began the slow, painful process of trying to get hardline Franco supporters to accept the democratic process. But even before this the new President had taken his own precautions: prior to submitting the Political Reform Bill to Parliament he called together the high commanders of the Armed Forces and presented his government's program. However, he apparently neglected to reveal to them the full extent of his intended liberalization program. When the Spanish Communist Party was legalized the following spring it came as quite a shock to the military forces.

On November 28, 1976 the Opposition announced seven basic terms for assuring legitimate elections: recognition of all political parties and trade unions; recognition and protection of political and trade union freedom; abolishment of the single official party (the "Movement"); establishment of a neutral Administration; amnesty; equal access to State-owned communications media; and the need to grant formal political autonomy to the various regions and "nationalities" of Spain.^{x)} The first Government-Opposition meeting took place in December 1976, immediately after the referendum on political reform.

Spain was now definitely on the road towards free elections and even the "tension tactics" of the

x)

The Spanish Constitution uses the term "nationalities" to define those groups which comprise a historic, linguistic, cultural and/or geographic unit, i.e. the Basque Country, Catalonia, etc.

extreme Right (which reached their peak with the murder of 5 Communist-sympathizing labor lawyers in January 1977) could not change its course. On December 30, 1976 a decree was issued abolishing the Courts which had formerly sat in judgement of "political crimes" (8). In March 1977 an amnesty was proclaimed and a month later the General Secretariat of the "Movement" was ruled out of existence.

Although political advances were being made and it seemed increasingly likely that general elections would be held things had not changed much on the economic front. Collective bargaining practices had suffered a serious setback with the Decree of October 8, 1976 which imposed a "freeze" on working hours (reduction of the working day was prohibited) and set the following wage ceilings:

<u>Wage scale</u>	<u>% of increase</u>
Up to 350,000 ptas. per yr.	1976 Consumer Price Index plus 2 points
350,000-750,000 ptas. per yr.	1976 Consumer Price Index
Over 750,000 ptas. per yr.	No increase

Workers responded to this measure with mass strikes which resulted in the loss of 109 million working hours in 1977 (as opposed to 106 million the previous year) and affected 2,348,000 workers (as opposed to 2,463,500 in 1976). Naturally the 1977 figures reflect the impact of such political manifestations as the demonstration protesting the slaughter of the labor lawyers. However, 1976 figures had been considerably influenced by the general strike held on November 12, 1976 to protest the economic measures of the Suárez government).

During this period there were two landmarks in the field of labor legislation: the second attempt at union reform and the first hesitant steps towards revising the traditional Franco labor philosophy: the

Decree 17/1977 on labor relations.

Mr. de la Mata, the new Minister of Trade Union Relations, was fully aware that Martín Villa's idea of reforming labor unions from within the old O.S.E. was out of the question. It was imperative that the existing democratic trade unions be given some sort of recognition. The question then was: what sort of recognition to give them? Should all trade unions be recognized or only a selected few? What should be the powers of the legally recognized unions? Should the old official union be completely abolished or should it continue as a State agency, offering free services? What should be done with O.S.E.'s accumulated assets (the result of compulsory union dues collected throughout the Franco years)? These were only some of the labor-related questions facing the Government at this time.

De la Mata started a series of talks with representatives of CC.OO., UGT and U.S.O. and proposed a kind of social pact, the terms of which were as follows: in exchange for a reduction in strikes the Government would promise to take steps to legalize unions. The Administration would be in charge of the legalization process and the Government would reserve the right to decide which unions met the conditions of legality and which did not. The democratic unions flatly rejected his proposal and demanded complete freedom for trade unions, with no exceptions and with no government controls.

Ignoring this rejection, the Government decided to once again use the moribund Francoist Parliament to commit a sort of legal hara-kiri: this time in the form of the Trade Union Bill, the terms of which were identical to the proposal just turned down by the unions. This Bill became law on April 1, 1977 and three weeks later a Registry was opened where unions aspiring to legal recognition could deposit copies of their Statutes for Government review. Despite their opposition, the

democratic unions stifled their objections to the law and opted to register en masse at the State offices in the hopes of overwhelming the legal limitations to their existence. On April 28, CC.OO., UGT, U.S.O. and ELA-STV officially registered their Statutes and shortly afterwards were officially recognized.

This put an end to a period in which the government "administered" trade union freedom more or less at will. During this time the Government had authorized the first legal UGT Congress since the Civil War but two months later refused the same permission to CC.OO. The Communist union held its Congress anyway, meeting secretly in Barcelona.

Even with legalization of the major trade unions the State continued to intervene in the labor movement.

Another offshoot of this second - and only partly successful - attempt at trade union reform was the creation of AISS (The Institutional Administration of Socio-Professional Services). Created in 1976 this new State agency embraced most of the 32,000 civil service employees formerly attached to the official trade union and was assigned 40,000 million pesetas in former O.S.E. assets. Its purpose was defined as that of "directing and managing those socio-professional welfare and assistance services which are confided to its jurisdiction". In fact, the real aim of this organization was not only to delay return of the democratic trade unions' rightful assets, but also to somehow prolong the State's protectionist intervention in labor matters. Thus, while usurping counselling and welfare powers which rightfully pertained to the unions, the U.C.D. government also maintained an agency which enabled it to hand out considerable political favors. Furthermore, creation of AISS made it possible to postpone a decision about the future of the 32,000 employees of the former official trade union. Compulsory union dues (now

known as a "surtax") continued to be collected in order to provide funds for the new organization.

AISS struggled to remain alive until June 2, 1977 when compulsory union affiliation was outlawed by decree and guidelines were set for converting this public agency. Conversion, however, proved to be synonymous with elimination. Officials were gradually transferred to various Ministries and the agency's assets were frozen by the Government until such time as an acceptable solution could be found for their distribution or use. This decree also ended the governing party's chances to use O.S.E. as a tool and obliged the Government to devise new ways to become involved in the union movement.

The second piece of landmark legislation was the March 4, 1977 Decree-Law 17/77 on Labor Relations - the first Spanish law ever to deal with legal strikes. The law was highly restrictive and based on the existing lack of union freedom (thus making it impossible to establish, for example, who was legally authorized to represent workers in applying for permission to strike). Furthermore, it effectively put an end to disputes over firing practices caused by the Labor Relations Act of 1976: the victim of unfair firing practices did not necessarily have to be given back his job; he could instead be "paid off" by his employer. The trade unions were highly critical of this law and largely ignored it when declaring strikes (particularly industrial strikes not limited to a specific company).

I have already mentioned the mass demonstration to protest the Government's economic policy. The 1977 strike protesting the murder of the CC.OO. lawyers also proved that mobilized workers could influence the political life of the country. While their power might not have been as great as the P.C.E. had predicted in certain manifestos distributed during the Franco years, it was by no means negligible. Strike

activity in 1977 was marked by the construction workers walkout which lasted throughout the entire year and affected 22 provinces and 475,000 workers.

This same period saw the birth and premature death of the Trade Union Coordinating Organization (C.O.S.) which made a short-lived (July 1976-March 1977) attempt to coordinate the actions of CC.OO., UGT and USO. Throughout its 8 month existence, C.O.S. was responsible for some of the major worker demonstrations of the transition period and its demise more or less signalled the death of all hopes for trade union monopoly.

To conclude my review of this period I should mention that it was during this time that the first steps were taken to organize a single association of employers. On March 11, 1977 the Spanish Confederation of Employers reported on its preliminary efforts in this direction and at the end of July the CEOE was born.

B.2. Drafting the Constitution (June 15, 1977 - December 6, 1978)

The first general elections marked the beginning of a period in which the Government concentrated mainly on trying to reach a consensus or basic agreement among the leading parties represented in Parliament in order to draft a Constitution which would be acceptable to the majority and could serve as a point of reference for the entire process of reforming Spain's political and social institutions.

The goal was epitomized by the famous Moncloa Pacts (1977) and by Government action which attempted to insure that insofar as possible important decisions would be adopted by substantial majorities.

An additional aim of the U.C.D. government at this time was to weaken its leading opponent, the Socialist Party. This led to an UCD flirtation with the Communist

Party over some specific points.

The aforementioned Moncloa Pacts were highly atypical in that they were not signed by representatives of business and labor (Government-labor negotiations had broken down 15 days earlier), but by representatives of the leading Parliamentary parties and the government. They were also atypical in content: along with income policy guidelines (such as a 22% ceiling on wage increases) political concessions were made (the apparatus of the Franco regime would be dismantled, a democratic Constitution would be drafted) as were promises of certain socio-economic changes (tax and Social Security reforms, a plan for housing and school construction, etc.).

They were atypical pacts for atypical times: in 1977 inflation reached a record high of 30%; the government was faced with the prodigious task of dismantling the Franco State in the face of great reluctance on the part of the "de facto" powers (particularly some sectors of the Armed Forces). It was a once-in-a-lifetime, never-to-be-repeated pact.

After the Moncloa Pacts had been in effect for one year the situation was thus: wage controls had been observed practically across the board (although they marked the introduction in Spain of the practice of calculating wage increases on the basis of anticipated future inflation rates rather than on past ones); the political changes were more or less translated into the draft of the Constitution and it remained only to further develop them, but most of the promised socio-economic changes had not taken place. Inflation had dropped considerably (from 30% to 16%), but the number of employed had shot upward (see Appendix).

The major trade unions reacted differently to these pacts. They all protested at not having been included in the negotiations, but then CC.OO. basically

accepted the content of the pacts and in the face of serious resistance from its rank-and-file members preached the importance of accepting the pacts in order to consolidate the fledgling democracy. UGT remained somewhat more distant and critical, objecting to several specific points of the pacts as, for example, the clause permitting employers to fire 5% of their staff if wage ceilings were exceeded. CEOE openly opposed the form and content of the pacts and began a conscious-raising campaign aimed at increasing its membership of employers.

In addition to the labor norms contained in the Moncloa Pacts, two other important pieces of labor legislation were passed during this period. The first of them defined the norms for the first free trade union elections and the second involved a lengthy debate on the In-Company Union Action Bill. These were two major matters which had to be settled in order to fill the vacuum left by the now definite disappearance of the O.S.E. and its successors.

Two alternatives were proposed for Works Council elections. CC.OO. advocated "open" lists whereby votes would be cast for the individual rather than the union and UGT favored "closed" lists whereby votes were cast for a group of persons running for office under the aegis of the union. The Government compromised by decreeing that the open list system be used in companies with less than 250 employees and closed lists in companies with more than 250 employees (Real Decree 3149/1977, December 6, 1977).

As far as legislation on union action was concerned the Government had to contend with some manoeuvring from the Left. The aforementioned Decree of December 6th made it possible to hold the first Works Council elections, but failed to specify just what the functions and powers of the Councils would be and what guarantees and facilities

they would be given in order to perform their duties. It was not clear whether or not these representatives would inherit the powers and facilities which the former "Company Representatives" of the old-style, now-extinct O.S.E. had enjoyed. PSOE and PCE both presented Bills on In-Company Union Action. The Government rejected both of them and made its own proposal. However, so many conservative members of Parliament were absent from the proceedings that the Socialists and Communists were able to completely change the wording of the Draft and push through their ideas on the subject (9). Thus, the draft of the Bill included a clause which proposed that Works Council duties would include rights of co-decision on matters related to job organization and working hours. CEOE was irritated by the fact that UCD and Alianza Popular had been playing hooky from their Parliamentary duties and began lobbying against the Left's manoeuver. Their efforts met with success: the next time around the Conservatives' automatic majority was in its place and Congress voted down the text proposed by the Left, restoring the original spirit of the Government proposal. Later the Government shelved this law until the beginning of 1980 when the Statute of Workers' Rights was passed. All this Parliamentary manoeuvring made several things quite clear: certain of the political parties in the fledgling democracy were very amateur indeed, and CEOE was now a force to be reckoned with. At this point one could begin to share the opinion of Fernando Suárez (10) who said that the Government's labor policy (and particularly its legislative changes) was marked by "indecision, very short-term objectives, and a definite state of ambiguity or lack of any firm commitment".

And this was due both to the restrictions of the "consensus" which prevented the UCD government from acting as a clearly defined right-wing party, and to the populist

leanings of some sectors of the governing party (the Social Democratic and Suárez contingents).

Despite this, the Spanish Constitution, ratified by popular referendum on December 8, 1980, managed to establish the basic doctrines which would inspire the model for labor relations reform in Spain. A model which, according to the Preamble of the Constitution, would rest upon "three basic cornerstones: the conflict of interests in the labor world, the collective autonomy of both business and labor and the granting to the State of the pertinent powers to establish labor norms". The Preamble later goes on to state that "such a model must be devised within a legal framework which duly recognizes the roles of labor unions and employers' associations largely through collective contracting, complemented by the workers' recognized right to strike in defense of their interests", and that these measures "are key aspects of this new historic step which differs substantially from the previous phase in which the State largely assumed the defense of the interests of both employees and employers".

Thus, at the end of this phase the Constitution contained a general pronouncement relative to the liberalization of labor relations in Spain. Furthermore, the end of the "constitutional consensus" should, in theory, have made it easier for trade unions and employers' associations to take over the role previously played by the State, should have made it possible to use manpower more flexibly, to correlate wages with productivity and to establish a model for worker participation in the company. However, two things made this liberalization difficult: the populist sectors of UCD (the Social Democrats and the Suárez faction) which opposed it for reasons of political favors owed in certain quarters, and CC.OO. and the Spanish Communists which felt that the proposed changes would make the worker more defenseless than he had been during the Franco years. Nonetheless, the challenge

to liberalize had been issued.

We have now briefly reviewed the policies of the government and the leaders of political parties, trade unions and employers' associations. But how did the rank-and-file workers react to these policies? The truth is that, although the Moncloa Pacts were certainly atypical, they did play a decisive role in drastically reducing labor conflicts. According to statistics from the Ministry of Labor, the number of 8 hour working days lost per 1000 workers had dropped from 1901 in the first four months of 1977 to 1240 in the equivalent period in 1978. Thus, the impact of the consensus was obvious (See Appendix 2).

Furthermore, this period saw the first free Work Council Elections which gave a preliminary idea of the breakdown of the Spanish labor scene. CC.OO. received 34.5% of the votes cast, UGT 21.7% and USO 3.8%. Thus, it was evident that CC.OO. was the leading union force and that the Spanish labor scene would largely be in the hands of two unions: UGT and CC.OO. Another interesting fact was revealed: "independent" groups and new unions formed by ex-leaders of the O.S.E., all of which enjoyed some extent of employer backing, met with resounding failure at the polls.

Lastly, during this period CEOE really took shape and defined its ideology. It embarked upon a relatively successful lobbying campaign aimed at assuring Constitutional recognition of the free market economy. It began representing collectives of employers in bargaining sessions and developed a policy of trade union relations which indiscriminately opposed the two major labor organizations (CC.OO. and UGT) while maintaining a wait-and-see attitude towards the trade union phenomenon.

C. THE STATUTE OF WORKERS' RIGHTS. THE SUAREZ GOVERNMENT: STAGE TWO (December 6, 1978 - February 23, 1981)

C.1. Open confrontation (December 6, 1978-July 10, 1979)

Once the Constitution had been approved by Parliament and by the people, the political parties began redefining their identities. The consensus period was over and there were persistent rumors of early elections in which the government party would be able to capitalize on its success with the Constitution. One of UCD's prime objectives was to patch up its relationship with its natural supporters and, particularly, with the employers' association, CEOE.

This was the background to the "reflection period" which got the Government, CEOE, UGT and CC.OO. together on September 28, 1978 in order to determine if it would be possible to reach a collective bargaining agreement for 1979 now that the Moncloa Pacts were no longer in effect. It was this background which no doubt contributed greatly to the failure of these exploratory sessions and to the Government's final decision, expressed in the Decree of December 26, 1978, to unilaterally impose a "wage band" which would restrict salary increases for 1979 to between 11-14%. (The 1978 Consumer Price Index had increased by 16.5% and the Government predicted that 1979 inflation would be 13%.)

The workers responded to the wage freeze with a spectacular increase in strike activity, which was higher than it had been since the Civil War in 1939 (See Appendix No. 2). This outbreak of strikes is explained not only by opposition to the Government's unilateral wage freeze but also by the right to strike which had been first won by the unions in the spring of 1977 (the Moncloa Pacts had dampened strike activity).

This increase in labor conflicts is also partly explained by the fact that CC.OO. and UGT joined forces to oppose the decree. They united to demand wage increases of 16% and to announce their opinion of the Statute of Workers' Rights soon to be discussed in Parliament.

However, all this pressure was to practically no avail. The unions did not achieve their primary (and almost exclusive aim) of lifting the Government wage ceiling. Wages rose on an average of 12.5%. It is important to recognize this first symptom of union weakness in order to understand later events.

One of the reasons for the relative failure of union attempts to lift the wage ceiling was the firm stance of the employers who, for the first time, followed CEOE's recommendations on collective bargaining. The majority of employers followed these recommendations to the letter.

However, CEOE leaders were not content with their success. They were concerned with the high cost of working hours lost in strikes and worried about the coming Parliamentary debate on the Statute of Workers' Rights, and these factors caused them to begin thinking about changing their labor strategy.

C.2. The CEOE-UGT Rapprochement (July 10, 1979 - February 23, 1981)

The results of the March 1979 general elections made it logical to change Government labor strategy. UCD once again merged victorious at the polls. The appointment of Rodriguez Sahagún, former Vice President of CEOE, to the new Cabinet was a significant event. This initiated a new phase of détente between the employers' association and the Government and provided CEOE a position of relative strength from which to change its strategy.

The new strategy consisted largely of giving preference to bargaining sessions with UGT. The Socialist union was going through a difficult period. The common front with CC.OO. seemed to have benefited the Communists rather than UGT, perhaps due to CC.OO.'s better organization. Furthermore, UGT was affected by a crisis within the ranks of the

Socialist party, which was split between Marxist radicals and moderate Social Democrats. CEOE judged the moment ripe to come to an agreement with UGT, smash the trade unions' common front and set the stage for a UCD-PSOE pact on the basic text of the Statute of Workers' Rights.

There were three milestones in the CEOE-UGT rapprochement: the agreement of July 1979, the aforementioned Statute of Workers' Rights (passed at the end of 1980), and the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement (guidelines for 1980 and 1981 collective bargaining sessions).

Among the issues on which CEOE-UGT reached agreements were the following:

1. Definite steps would be taken to abolish the type of labor relations which had been practiced during the Franco years (based on interventionalism and State protectionism) and to institute autonomy of action for both trade unions and the employers' association.
2. There would be a change in wage-setting policies. Instead of calculating wage increases on the basis of experienced inflation (the Consumer Price Index of the previous year), wage increases would now be calculated on the basis of predicted inflation (index of consumer prices for the following year). This broke with the system which had been in force until 1977.
3. New ways would be found to achieve greater flexibility of manpower. This would include part-time contracting, job shifting, and application of "crisis status" (a compulsory administrative procedure which must be undergone before a company in economic difficulties can lay off workers or suspend employment contracts).
4. A new collective bargaining strategy would be proposed. It would be based on greater centralization of labor pacts in order to eliminate unnecessarily fragmented negotiations and reduce potentially conflictive situations.

5. UGT and CEOE announced their intent to reduce labor conflict, considered by both parties to be a negative factor.

With this policy CEOE managed to break through the common union front and obtain a Statute acceptable to employers. UGT managed to regain its own distinctive image and devised a trade union model which differentiated it clearly from CC.OO.

The UGT-CEOE pacts were tremendously influential. They affected the whole spirit of the Statute of Workers' Rights and served as an orientation for the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement which was successfully applied in collective bargaining sessions in 1980 and 1981.

CC.OO. immediately protested this strategy and publicized its own stand on the aforementioned issues:

1. CC.OO. proposed a less radical elimination of the Francoist labor relations mode. The Communist union favored non-intervention of the State in pacts and conflicts, but opposed elimination of measures designed to protect jobs and other individual employee rights.
2. CC.OO. advocated a wage-setting policy which would continue to calculate increases on the basis of experienced inflation (According to CC.OO. this would be the only way to maintain employees' purchasing power).
3. CC.OO. resisted attempts to institute more flexible hiring practices, alleging that the unions might be left defenseless and these new practices could result in increased unemployment.
4. CC.OO. favored a more decentralized bargaining strategy in which the Works Council of the individual company would play a more important role.
5. CC.OO. refused to renounce strike activity, maintaining that labor conflicts are not always necessarily a negative factor.

With this stance CC.OO. opposed the July 1979 agreement, fought the Statute of Workers' Rights in Parliament (through the Communist party) and, after some discussion, refused to sign the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement. But CC.OO. was unable to prevent the Statute from being passed into law (thanks to the UCD-PSOE pact) or to keep the great majority of 1980 and 81 labor pacts from complying with the guidelines of the Framework Agreement.

CC.OO.'s relative failure triggered an internal crisis in the union. This crisis was further aggravated by the 1980 union elections in which UGT showed considerable gains while CC.OO. registered a decline in votes. This crisis, which began in 1980, has not yet been resolved and the union has had to alter its previous strategy. The change in strategy is clearly illustrated by the fact that CC.OO. - still Spain's leading union - signed the National Employment Agreement of June 1981.

The specific content of the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement consists largely of a Business-Labor pact on wage policy. Wage increase limits of 13-16% were established for 1980 and of 11-15% for 1981. In both cases provisions were made for semi-annual reviews should the Consumer Price Index exceed this amount during the first six months of the year. Together with these wage limits (based on predicted inflation), there was a slight reduction in the number of working hours; a new, more liberal definition of the trade union activity permitted within the company (for the first time, unions whose members number over 15% of the employees are permitted to have Union Delegates in companies with staffs of more than 250).

The Statute of Workers' Rights legislates individual workers' rights, collective bargaining and in-company union activity. The first section is dedicated to individual rights and differs from former laws only in that it contains timid steps towards reducing the cost of laying off or firing employees; introduces the concept of part-time employment

contracts; facilitates job shifting, and streamlines the process of applying for "crisis status".

The section devoted to collective bargaining contains substantial changes: it almost completely eliminates State interventionalism and establishes "autonomy of the parties concerned".

Lastly, the section devoted to union activity recognizes Work Councils as sources of information and consultation and leaves the door open to a possible future recognition of in-company union cells.

The Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement had a spectacular influence on labor conflicts. The number of hours lost in strikes dropped from 171 million in 1979 to 108 million in 1980. The number of workers affected by strikes dropped from 5,752,304 in 1979 to 2,461,061 in 1980. Indications are that strike figures for 1981 will be still lower. CC.OO.'s attempt to mobilize workers against the Framework Agreement met with little response.

This period can be summed up as follows: both CEOE and UGT have achieved certain of their goals. CC.OO. is alone in its opposition in Parliament, at the bargaining tables and even in the streets, and is continually losing influence.

The government is using all the means at its disposal to foster the UGT-CEOE pact because its income policy coincides with the government drive against inflation and because the CEOE-UGT draft of the Statute is compatible with what the governing party (UCD), which has no clearly defined labor relations' model, is willing to accept. The government is thus content to sit back and take second place on the labor scene while the UGT-CEOE pact remains in effect.

D. IN THE SHADOW OF THE ATTEMPTED COUP: THE CALVO SOTELO GOVERNMENT (February 23, 1981 to present)

At the time Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero attempted to take the Spanish Congress by force in an abortive military coup on February 23, 1981, pressures from various quarters had already managed to oust Mr. Suárez from the Presidency. Most of the pressure came from the liberal and Christian Democratic factions within his own party, but he was also pressured by the world of high finance and perhaps even by the Armed Forces. These "de facto" powers did not forgive Suárez his populist attitudes or his foreign policy's forays into third world politics. They wanted a NATO-oriented, outspokenly right-wing president.

Calvo Sotelo fit the bill. However, his term of office could scarcely have gotten off to a worse start. The very day he was being sworn into office, Tejero made the attempted coup, backed by restless factions of the extreme right who were not content with the "soft" coup that had ousted Suárez from power.

Calvo Sotelo found himself in an extremely delicate position. Although his background was decidedly conservative and his orientation pro-NATO, the new President could not afford to completely alienate the Government from the other political and social powers in the country without running the risk of a new Fascist intent to seize power. As far as social issues were concerned, the need for some kind of consensus was particularly evident: this inspired the Government to pledge that a Government-Business-Labor pact would be concluded within a matter of months.

This pact was baptized with the name National Employment Agreement (NEA), and was signed by the Government, CEOE and the trade unions UGT and CC.OO.

in June 1981. It is difficult to explain the NEA without referring to the attempted coup and the imperative need Spaniards felt to consolidate their

fledgling democracy.

NEA also marks a major change in the philosophy hitherto contained in labor pacts. It introduces three principal innovations:

1. Increase in the number of parties involved. This is no longer a Business-Labor agreement, but also actively and directly includes the government. Furthermore, after two years of opposition to the Framework Agreement, CC.OO. has finally joined the signatories of the new agreement.
2. Inclusion of more issues. While preliminary discussions centered almost exclusively on wage policy issues, other issues are now included. Among them are employment policy, Social Security reform and Business and Labor participation in State institutions.
3. Reestablishment of joint action on the part of UGT and CC.OO. The unions have obtained broader rights of participation in certain public agencies, thus somewhat advancing in their drive to consolidate trade unionism in Spain.

This change in philosophy by no means eliminated all doubts pertaining to the Framework Agreement, but it did permit CC.OO. to justify its signing of the new agreement. At the same time it triggered notable resistance from Business. Indeed, CEOE did not hide its disappointment over the new type of pact and has frequently reiterated its preference for pacts similar to the 1980 and 1981 Framework Agreements, i.e. bi-lateral Business-Labor agreements with no government participation and which concentrate on wage policy. CEOE considers that important issues of overall economic policy should be the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament. However, CEOE's most immediate concern is the fact that CC.OO. is recovering its incentive, that labor unity is being reestablished and that the unions are beginning to be

admitted to State agencies.

Thus, there is a constant tug-of-war over the application of the NEA, and the Agreement was on the point of failing, largely due to Business' opposition to its terms. Furthermore, the future of this sort of pact is uncertain. It is possible that once Spain has recovered from the shock of last February 23's attempted coup, the system of bi-lateral economic and wage pacts will go back into effect.

It is obvious that behind this transitional period, behind this series of widely varied social "experiments" (during the past five years Spain has resembled nothing so much as a laboratory for labor relations theories), there lie various strategic plans devised by each one of the leading social forces. In the following pages we will examine these different strategies.

3. THE EXTENT OF THE CHANGE

Having briefly summarized the transition period, we may now ask ourselves what is the real extent of the changes that have taken place? The most striking feature of the change is, obviously, that neither the unions nor the employers nor even the Spanish State are the same as they were in 1975.

A. FRAGILE TRADE UNIONISM

The most noteworthy characteristic of today's trade union movement in Spain is its extreme fragility. The number of union members is among the lowest in all of Western Europe and does not include even 20% of salaried, non-agricultural workers. More serious still is the fact that membership figures are constantly declining. After a slight boom at the beginning of the transition period, membership has dropped steadily. According to a recent study by Alvira and García López (11) in which the heads of 1200 Spanish families were surveyed, union membership dropped from an average of 37% in 1979 to 24% in 1980. Another study, which Professor Pérez Díaz (12) carried out in the six industrial areas with the highest rates of union membership, estimates 1978 membership figures at 56.3% as opposed to 33.8% for 1980.

This weakness is aggravated by the deep schism which exists in the Spanish labor movement. This is clearly reflected in the unions' lack of organization and services as well as in their technical problems in devising viable economic alternatives for each industrial sector.

A second noteworthy feature is the constant change in the Spanish union scene. When analyzing the strength of the various unions, one is struck by the extent of the changes that have taken place in the two years between the first Works Council elections of 1978 and the second

elections held in 1980 (See Appendix 1). The Socialist UGT shows an 8 point rise and its Communist counterpart, CC.OO., is almost on the verge of slipping from first place. The third nationwide union, USO, won a remarkable 9% of the votes in the last elections (as opposed to 3% in the earlier ones). In some regions, such as Galicia or the Basque Country, local unions such as the Galician National Confederation or Basque Workers' Solidarity have noted a spectacular increase in votes. The trade union scene remains in a state of flux and there is no reason to believe that changes will not continue to take place. In fact, there may well be a great many changes within a short period of time.

The third, and most important, feature of the trade unions is the change in Spanish union strategy and action. When Franco died there was a single labor movement which resisted the dictatorship and in which all members were quite involved in the decision-making process. Six years later the union model is quite distinct. Although UGT might be considered the backbone of the movement, it is by no means the only labor organization in operation.

During the Franco era the labor movement was unified, based on direct representation (one member-one vote) and reluctant to delegate powers to union bosses. The repressive tone of the dictatorship and the lack of trade union freedom made this style of union feasible and simultaneously managed to concentrate most union activity in the individual companies. It was also a resistance movement, strongly committed to action, and to maintaining the purchasing power of wages at all costs. It was naturally reluctant to bargain over such issues as improvement in productivity or flexible hiring practices. Quite the contrary, in fact. The labor movement of those years burned up a good deal of its energy in fighting to maintain and even extend legal job protection (a good example of

this was the campaign against unfair firing practices (13).

While CC.OO. has tried to adapt this type of unionism to the new circumstances, UGT underwent radical changes after the disappearance of the Franco regime and now offers a very different union alternative. This alternative is based on a plurality of unions (this may be translated as fierce opposition to any plan for labor unity and great emphasis on establishing a clear division between the various unions), on reducing the role of general participation (Assemblies, Works Councils) and replacing it with union organizations at every level, and on a platform advocating compromise rather than systematic opposition. The radical change in UGT's stance on wages and employment has its origins here as does its willingness to negotiate such issues as new bases for productivity. This is also the reason for the change in UGT's strategy for in-company union action and its proposal that collective bargaining be more centralized and devoted more to labor-economic conditions than to socio-political issues.

It was not easy for UGT to put these ideas into practice. Among the main obstacles to be overcome were the workers' deep-rooted inertia towards changing the union style that existed during the years of resistance to Franco; the almost total absence of UGT from the labor movement during this time; and the absolute dominance of CC.OO. throughout this entire period.

Despite these obstacles and in the face of CC.OO.'s active opposition, UGT has managed to make some progress in putting its union model into practice. In the field of legislation, the Statute of Workers' Rights and the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement are examples of this. Various factors combined to make this progress

possible. First and foremost is the support of the Socialist party, which is the leading Opposition party and has impressive strength in Parliament.

The second factor is the attitude of CEOE which, since spring of 1979, has given preference to bargaining sessions with UGT. This gives the Socialist union and its labor model tremendous clout. Last, but by no means least, is the internal crisis and the changes which have taken place in CC.OO. The crisis was triggered by the contrast between the planned union alternatives and a reality which did not fit this alternative. It was further aggravated by clashes between the pro-Soviet and Euro-Communist factions within the Communist party. The situation degenerated still further when CC.OO.'s resistance to the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement failed and the union was ultimately forced to change some aspects of its strategy. This makes it possible to understand how in exchange for inclusion in the NEA of a principle well-beloved by CC.OO. (tri-lateral negotiation on employment and politico-economic issues), the Communist union tacitly accepted clauses on individual wages, part-time hiring, and bargaining on productivity which it was bitterly criticizing only two short years ago.

But there is more to the Spanish labor scene than just the battle between UGT and CC.OO. Another force to reckon with is the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), an originally Christian union which first went through a stage of "independent socialism" and now seems to have a certain degree of influence as the only union capable of attracting the "non-Marxist" labor factions. Though backed to a large extent by UCD, USO's labor alternative does not differ enough from that of UGT to constitute a direct challenge to the Socialist union.

The second force to reckon with is the boom in "nationalist" labor unions such as INGA in Galicia,

ELA-STV in the Basque Country and, curiously enough, CC.OO. in Catalonia (the fact that the Communist union has played this "nationalist" role in Catalonia explains why it is so much stronger than UGT in this region). But the popularity of these options is not only due to the rise in nationalist feelings. It may also be that workers in these regions feel a certain resentment towards the growing trend to centralize bargaining sessions throughout the country. These nationalist unions may represent a chance to bring decision-making close to the rank-and-file. However, only the future will tell if this is a valid hypothesis.

This is the Spanish union scene today, and it is a far cry from the unitarian ideas that prevailed during the Franco years and - particularly - from the idea of Spanish unions that existed abroad. Spanish trade unionism today is fragile and moderate. Some people feel that it is increasingly fragile because it is increasingly moderate. Others feel that just the opposite is true: that the moderation is only a realistic response to objectively caused weaknesses such as 1981's 13% rate of unemployment.

In any case, times have changed. The figures shown in Appendix 3 clearly demonstrate that the Spanish labor movement, whether united or divided, was not only unable to avoid losing ground in terms of job protection (as opposed to the labor legislation of the Franco era) but, much more serious, has witnessed a constant decline in the purchasing power of wages. In fact, the unions have already accepted this in writing for 1982: under the terms of the National Employment Agreement they accept wage increases which are two points under the predicted rate of inflation.

B. SPANISH BUSINESS: THE POUJADE ¹⁾ SYNDROME

Spanish business is a late arrival to democracy. Most Spanish businessmen had set their stakes on the dictatorship and the change caught them off guard, with no organizational alternative at the ready. The trade unions definitely had a headstart on them.

Nonetheless employers reacted quickly and effectively. Starting with a fragmented Business community which was barely organized for the new order of things, they developed CEOE, currently Spain's leading pressure group.

During these past six years, the CEOE team, headed by Mr. Ferrer Salat has raised the Business world's collective consciousness, founded an organization, devised an ideology and successfully effected numerous political and labor actions.

CEOE has steadily fought for a free market economy as the basis for Spain's democratic society. They lobbied hard for this and managed to get the principle of free market economy included in Article 38 of the new Constitution. However, they were unable to prevent the final draft of the Article from indirectly referring to a planned economy as well.

On the labor front CEOE is mainly concerned with making employment practices more flexible; reducing the cost of lay-offs and firings, facilitating job shifting and part-time hiring, and streamlining the procedures for obtaining crisis status. Their secondary aims include changing the wage system. In addition to guaranteeing a non-inflationist system (like that contained in the Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement and the National Employment Act), CEOE wants to closely link wage and

1) Poujade, Pierre (Saint-Céré, 1920). French politician. His links with the "petit bourgeoisie" led him to form the Union for the Defense of French Trades- and Craftsmen (UDCA, 1954) which opposed the government's tax policy. Small businessmen were galvanized by the populist, radical tendencies of the movement.

productivity increases; maintaining (or increasing) the wage differences between different categories and positions in the company hierarchy, and calculating as "working hours" only the time actually spent "at the machine". Finally, the Spanish Employers' Association wants to cut down on the number of in-company assemblies, opposes powers of co-decision for Works' Councils and is reluctant to recognize in-company union cells (although under the terms of the Framework Agreement CEOE is obliged to recognize UGT's Trade Union Delegate).

Furthermore, and as previously mentioned, CEOE does not want to see the Government involved in top level "framework" bargaining sessions nor do they want these sessions to cover subjects other than wages and labor productivity.

To what extent has CEOE succeeded in carrying out its strategy during the almost five years of its existence?

I would say that CEOE has managed to get the Government to accept the essential features of its program as a guideline for changing Spanish labor relations. It now remains to plan the timing of the reform. Spanish business is demanding some sudden changes which clash with the ideas of certain sectors of the governing party and with sectors of the Administration which fear that these changes might result in a loss of the political favors they can currently obtain through a more protective State. This is the reason the Statute of Workers' Rights contains few changes regarding job protection (and the few changes made do, in fact, reflect the general lines of CEOE's platform). This is also why the Government has hesitated to put some of these changes (such as part-time labor contracts) into practice. Still, CEOE may be said to have won a considerable victory.

Like the unions, CEOE has progressed beyond strict labor issues and entered the political arena through specific political parties. CEOE's attitude seems increasingly to reflect a "Poujade syndrome". The latest example of this is the pressure it has put on

UCD to remove the "populist" (Mr. Suárez) and Social Democratic factions from power and channel Calvo Sotelo's government into an increasingly conservative course. CEOE has become a major source of funds for candidates of the right-wing AP and, to a somewhat lesser extent, UCD. This contributed greatly to the surprising success of AP in the recent elections in Galicia.

But CEOE is playing a dangerous game. Some employers are concerned over this excessive involvement in politics and feel that it could tarnish CEOE's image as the representative of the entire Business community. Other, more liberal, sectors of the community are concerned over CEOE's reluctance to see Spain enter the Common Market.

Both these concerns are linked to the basic contradiction displayed by a considerable number - perhaps the majority - of Spanish employers: on the one hand they want the system to be liberalized (the public sector reduced, Social Security made private, tax pressures to be differentiated), but on the other they continue favoring State protection (subsidies for specific industrial sectors and firms, protection against foreign competition, State intervention in labor conflicts, etc.). In short, the average Spanish employer is a long way from being an American-type businessman with all the attendant aggressiveness, innovative skills and risk-taking that implies. It promises to be a long time before a new breed of businessman emerges in Spain.

C. A BUREAUCRATIC, INEFFICIENT STATE

The Spanish State has fallen heir to a tradition of systematic intervention in labor issues. Despite Constitutional clauses to the contrary, there is no indication that things are going to change.

Here we must identify two types of intervention:

1. State intervention in collective bargaining and labor conflicts, and
2. Administrative protection of employees.

Following ratification of the Constitution and the Statute of Workers' Rights, the State's role in collective

bargaining and labor conflicts has become much less important, although some contradictions are still in evidence. An example of this is compulsory State arbitration (the "laudo"). Formally eliminated by the Statute of Workers' Rights in the clause on collective bargaining, this type of arbitration enjoyed "de facto" existence until April 4, 1981 when the Constitutional Court abolished all non-democratic legislation pertaining to labor conflicts. Today the State has finally lost its old power to dictate the beginning and end of collective bargaining sessions and to replace these sessions with compulsory arbitration.

The decrease in State protectionism towards employees is much less evident. The State still possesses a powerful administrative bureaucracy which deals with almost all issues relating to employment and changes in working conditions. Dealings with this bureaucratic system are almost compulsory whether it is a matter of rescinding or suspending labor contracts because of economic crisis or whether it is simply a matter of changing an employee's working hours or shifting him from one job category to another. CEOE's sharpest criticism of the Government is aimed at this bureaucratic protectionism. Employers argue that not only is the State taking few steps to achieve greater labor flexibility but it is doing nothing at all to remove administrative obstacles which prevent such flexibility from being achieved. As we have seen before, union feelings on this are somewhat different. Still, it is hard to imagine that the unions will completely renounce this administrative protectionism unless they are repaid by being given greater powers as well as jurisdiction over some of the matters which are currently the province of the State. Above and beyond this problem is the general problem of an inefficient, corrupt and bureaucratic State that few people believe in, but everyone tries to exploit.

D. A NEW LABOR RELATIONS MODEL

Given the current state of affairs, it is too soon to guess what the final Spanish labor relations model will be. During the past six years the country has resembled nothing so much as a laboratory for experiments with all possible types of social pacts. The situation remains highly fluid and fairly unsettled on both the labor and political fronts.

Without hazarding a guess as to which social forces will play more or less important roles in the future, it can still be said that a substantial change is taking place in top level labor negotiations. From labor relations which were largely based on the individual company and with wages as the sole variable, Spain is progressing towards State-wide labor relations based on bargaining sessions in which the major social organizations negotiate increasing reforms in the welfare system. In any case, there is not much margin nowadays for negotiating wages: employers are not interested in holding the wage level too far down because they realize how much their companies depend upon domestic consumption to survive. The labor unions know how powerless they are to even maintain the purchasing power of today's wages (they are also increasingly aware of the impact of wages on inflation and of inflation on unemployment figures).

Thus it appears increasingly clear that this Gordian knot can be loosed only by a sweeping reform of the Social Security system, by unemployment benefits, public companies, State investment, Labor and Business participation in State institutions, and a far-reaching tax reform. These issues will be - and, to some extent, already are - the main bones of contention in coming years and will serve to measure the relative power of Business, Labor and Government.

It is evident that this new framework for negotiations

presupposes the existence of a general feeling of solidarity throughout the country. This is clearly reflected in the National Employment Act, and in numerous statements from union officials, government spokesmen and employers. Despite optimistic statements, we cannot help but wonder just how great a feeling of solidarity can exist in a society which is trapped in the inertia, the egoism, the closed ranks syndrome and the corruption described at the beginning of this paper.

Thus, it is by no means clear whether Spain will emerge from the crisis thanks to its efforts to achieve and maintain solidarity or whether social splits and institutional spinelessness will lead to its rapid decay.

The answer will not be long in coming.

MANUEL LUDEVID

Professor of Labor Relations
Escuela Superior de Administración y Dirección de Empresas
(ESADE)

Barcelona, January 1982

REFERENCES

- (1) LUDEVID, Manuel. Cuarenta años de sindicato vertical. Editorial Laia. Barcelona, 1976.
- (2) See the OECD report on Spain's economic situation from 1976-1980.
- (3) See the Plan Laboral issued by the Chilean Government.
- (4) MARZAL, Antonio. La ley de relaciones laborales, which appeared in the journal "Sal Terrae", December 1978.
- (5) There was heated discussion about unfair firing practices during the last years of the Franco era. The labor movement opposed Article 103 of the old Labor Practices Act which permitted employers to pay off an employee judged to have been unfairly fired rather than readmitting him to his job. The Decree on Economic Measures (October 1976) suspended the aforementioned article and kept the workers satisfied for five months until the Article was definitely revoked by the Decree-Law of March 4, 1977 on labor relations: the freedom to get rid of unwanted employees by paying them off no longer existed.
- (6) LUDEVID, Manuel. La libertad sindical, plataforma para el cambio, which appeared in the magazine Meridiano Dos Mil, Volume 2, Number 13, April 1976, Pages 6-13.
- (7) This indicates just how far Suárez reformism had gone towards becoming the only realistic alternative to the Opposition's increasingly rhetorical demands for a clean break.
- (8) The Tribune for Public Order which condemned all opponents of the dictatorship to long prison sentences.
- (9) This "Parliamentary absenteeism" took place in a Congressional working session where a small nucleus of members report on the various Bills before Parliament.
- (10) SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Fernando. Las nuevas relaciones laborales y la ley del estatuto de los trabajadores. Círculo de Empresarios. Ediciones Pirámide. Madrid, September 1980.

- (11) ALVIRA, Francisco; GARCIA LOPEZ, Jose. Las Relaciones Laborales: un problema a la paz laboral. "Papeles de economía española", no. 4. Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros. Madrid, 1980.
- (12) PEREZ DIAZ, Victor. Los obreros ante el sindicato y la acción colectiva en 1980. "Papeles de economía española", no. 6. Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros. Madrid, 1980.
- (13) See no. (5) above regarding the workers' campaign against Article 103 of the Francoist law on Labor Practices.

APPENDIX NO. 1

RESULTS OF THE WORKS COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1978-1980

	<u>Results</u> <u>1980 (1)</u>	<u>Results</u> <u>1978 (2)</u>	<u>%</u> <u>variation</u>
CC.OO.....	30.8	34.5	-107.0
UGT.....	29.3	21.7	35.0
USO.....	9.1	3.8	139.5
ELA-STV.....	2.6	1.0	160.0
INGA.....	1.1	-	-
CSUT.....	0.5	2.9	- 82.7
SU.....	0.7	1.7	- 58.8
Other unions.....	8.8	4.0	120.0
Non-affiliates.....	17.2	30.4	- 43.4
	<u>(100)</u>	<u>(100)</u>	

(1) Source: Preliminary data from IMAC

(2) Source: Ministry of Labor

The results of the nationalist unions in their specific regions (the Basque Country and Galicia) are as follows:

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1978</u>
ELA-STV.....	25.5%	11.7%
INGA.....	17.9%	-

In Catalonia the results of the 1980 elections were as follows:
(figures are given only for the two leading trade unions);

	<u>No. of Delegates</u>	<u>% of total delegates elected</u>
UGT.....	7,551	25.99
CC.OO.....	10,507	36.17
Total.....	29,044	100

APPENDIX 2

LABOR CONFLICT (x)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Conflicts</u>	<u>Number of Workers Affected</u>	<u>Working Hours Lost</u>
1975 (1)	1,049	1,088,503	42,119,046
1976 (1)	1,917	3,617,137	149,067,142
1977 (1)	1,269	2,469,589	109,516,868
1978 (1)	1,114	2,678,936	76,646,226
1979 (2)	1,789	5,752,304	171,067,049
1980 (2)	1,669	2,461,061	108,625,662

(1) Statistics based on figures provided by the Department of Labor

(2) Statistics provided by CEOE.

(x) APIL 80 (Asociación de Periodistas de Información Laboral. Anuario 1980), page 29.

SUMMARY OF THE LAWS AND PACTS
OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD

Year	Government Order	Pact	Wage increase established in pact/order	Other Orders	Average wage increase set by agreements	Increase in consumer price
1976	Wage freeze ordered by Villar Mir	-	C.P.I. of past yr. plus 3 points: 17% + 3 = 20%	-	19.6%	14.9%
1977	Govt. wage controls passed	-	Up to 350,000 ptas p.a. = CPI 2 points (17.6+2 = 19.6% 350,000 ptas. - 750,000 ptas p.a. = CPI = 17.6% Over 750,000 ptas. p.a. = No increase	Working hour cuts prohibited in pacts	25.2%	24.5%
1978	-	Moncloa Pacts (Govt. - AP-UCD-PSOE-PNV-CDC)	20-22%	- Tax and Social Security reform - Building programs: housing & schools - Reform public companies - Democratization of State machinery	20.4%	19.8%
1979	Wage policy decree (Sr. Abril Martorell)	-	11-14% (13% average)	-	13.8% (3)	15.7%
1980	-	Interconfederate Framework Agreement: UGT-CEOE	13-16%	- Working hours: reduced by 26 in 1980 (1980 hours p.a.) to reach 1880 hrs/yr. by 1982	15.6% (4)	-

APPENDIX 3 (cont'd)

Year	Government Order	Pact	Wage increase established in pact/order	Other orders	Average Wage increase set by agreements	Increase in consumer price
1980 (cont'd)				Recognition of UGT Delegate in companies with over 250 employees & 15% affiliation		
1981	-	Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement: UGT-CEOE	11-15%	- New definition of productivity in company	-	-
1982	-	National Employment Act: Govt-CEOE-UGT-CC.OO.	9-11%	- Increase in unemployment benefits - Agreement to create 350.000 new jobs - Business & Labor participation in State labour agencies - Social Security reform	-	-

(1) Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Survey on wages. 2.9 million salaried, non-agricultural workers out of a total of 6.7 employees in the private sector. The figures from 1976 on have been revised to eliminate the impact of the extra salaries paid in July and December of each year and the reduction of hours worked in August.

(2) INE. Average of the figures for the first three quarters

(3) January-June

(4) In-company pacts.

APPENDIX 4

EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR MARKET (1)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<u>In thousands</u>					
Active pop. (2)	13,091	13,041 ⁽³⁾	13,055	13,062	12,991
Employed (2)	12,577	12,359 ⁽³⁾	12,306	12,071	11,786
Unemployed	514	682 ⁽³⁾	749	991	1,205
<u>Percentages</u>					
<u>Activity rate</u>					
Total	50.3%	49.6%	49.0%	48.5%	47.8%
Males	75.9	75.2	74.1	72.9	71.9
Female	27.5	26.7	26.5	26.4	26.2
<u>Unemployment rate</u>					
Total	3.8%	5.2%	5.7%	7.6%	9.3%
Males	3.9	5.0	5.5	7.0	8.7
Females	3.6	5.8	6.4	8.9	10.7
<u>Percentage variations over preceding year</u>					
<u>Employment per sector (3)</u>					
Agriculture	-6.9%	-6.1	-7.3	-3.5	-6.3
Industry	0.4	0.5	0.8	-2.1	-3.2
Construction	-2.3	-1.1	1.3	-3.5	-5.6
Services	0.4	0.3	1.0	-9.6	0.8

(1) These figures refer to annual averages

(2) Includes career military personnel but not recruits or marginal employee

(3) Inasmuch as complete statistics are not available for the third quarter of 1976, the figures given here are based on the average for the second quarter.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Survey on the Active Population.

APPENDIX 5

ABBREVIATIONS MOST COMMONLY USED

- A.I.S.S. Administración Institucional de Servicios Socio-profesionales (the short-lived Government agency which replaced the "vertical" trade union of the Franco years).
- A.M.I. Aguerdo Marco Interconfederal (Inter-Confederate Framework Agreement), signed by CEOE and UGT for 1980 and 1981. USO later became a party to the Agreement.
- A.N.E. Acuerdo Nacional sobre el Empleo (National Employment Act), signed by the Government, CEOE, UGT and CC.OO. for 1982.
- A.P. Alianza Popular, Right-wing Conservative party, led by Manuel Fraga Iribarne.
- C.D.C. Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, moderate nationalist Catalan party, led by Jordi Pujol.
- C.E.O.E. Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (Employers' Association)
- CC.OO. Comisiones Obreras. Communist-influenced union.
- C.N.T. Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, anarcho-syndicalist labor organization.
- C.O.S. Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sindicales (CC.OO., UGT and USO).
- C.S.U.T. Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores, labor organization linked to the Marxist Partido de Trabajo, which no longer exists.
- I.N.G.A. Intersindical Nacional Gallega, nationalist Galician labor organization.
- I.P.C. Indice de Precios al Consumo (Consumer Price Index), published annually by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
- O.S.E. Organización Sindical Española (Compulsory "vertical" union of the Franco years.
- P.C.E. Partido Comunista de España, led by Santiago Carrillo
- P.N.V. Partido Nacionalista Vasco, led by Carlos Garaicoetxea
- P.S.O.E. Partido Socialista Obrero Español, led by Felipe González
- S.T.V. Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos, moderate Basque labor organization whose aims are similar to those of P.N.V.

- S.U. Sindicato Unitario, labor organization linked to the Maoist party, Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores.
- U.C.D. Unión de Centro Democrático, center-Right party, formerly led by Adolfo Suárez.
- U.G.T. Unión General de Trabajadores, Socialist-influenced labor organization
- U.S.O. Unión Sindical Obrera, non-Marxist union which is theoretically independent but, in practice, is fairly closely linked to U.C.D.

HEALTH CARE CHANGE IN CATALUNYA: THE ALTEBRAT PROGRAM

Lluís Bohigas
Director Programa ALTEBRAT
Departament de Sanitat i
Seguretat Social
Generalitat de Catalunya.

(Paper presented at the Southern European Fellowship Conference. Castel Gandolfo, March 25-27, 1982)

The Spanish Democracy, that began with the elections of 1977, has a special feature: its aim to build a state based on autonomous regional governments. In this way, the long standing cultural differences among regions will be recognised, especially in the cases of the Catalan and Basque regions.

One of the main attributes of the autonomous governments is health services; the Catalan government already has full responsibilities over health matters within its boundaries, but not pharmaceutical regulation or foreign health matters.

Although autonomous governments will not be allowed to change the main framework of health services in Spain, health management will probably be closer to problems and more sensitive to regional priorities, and therefore more efficient.

The Catalan Health Department has started several pilot projects in order to learn about -and- experiment with the changes that can be implemented to achieve better planning and management of health services.

The ALTEBRAT Program is one of such projects, where a planning effort is concentrated on a rural area formed by three counties: "la Ribera d'Ebre", "la Terra Alta" and "el Priorat", that contain a population of 50,000. This area has

a 19% population over 65 years old due to larger emigrations of younger people to the main towns. At the present time this area does not have either a hospital or diagnostic services, further the distance to the nearest health center is about 60 Km. The construction phase of the Program will consist of a 100-bed hospital and six rural health centers, and the Program has as objectives to implement the concept of area management of health services, to create services purposely planned for a population, and to integrate health care with health promotion and prevention.

Important aspects of the Program are the integration of the new services into the area, and how the population and health professionals (G.P.'s, nurses and pharmacists) will accept these new services. This paper will focus on one aspect of the ALTEBRAT Program: the planning and implementation of health care changes.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PROGRAM.

The ALTEBRAT Program will build and put into work a health services network for its three county service area, and will implement some changes in the usual delivery of health services in Spain. This chapter will analyse attitudes of the various types of people involved in the Program, both in favor of and against these changes in health services:

- Doctors
- Nurses
- Pharmacists
- Local politicians
- Population

Doctors

The area is now served by 47 doctors, with an average of 1,064 population per doctor. This number varies within the three counties, with a highest 1,398 population per doctor in "la Terra Alta" to a lowest 686 population per doctor in "el Priorat". The situation is slightly better than the average 1,392 population per doctor in rural areas of Catalonia, but much worse than the average rate of 644 population per doctor in Catalonia.

Some characteristics of the doctors in the three counties were analysed in the Health Services Study. Twenty percent of the doctors are women, a much higher percentage of women doctors than in the rest of Catalonia. Half of the total number of doctors are younger than 30 years old, while 20% are older than fifty. Many of these physicians are young graduates who could not find work in urban hospitals. Many plan to seek employment in urban settings in the coming years. A number of the older group of physicians in the area

have not kept a breast of changes in modern medicine. Most of them have a position of importance in their communities, although this is rapidly changing.

The financial situation of these doctors is very comfortable. Most of them are civil servants, performing public health duties in rural communities. All of them are contracted with the Social Security to care for those among their assigned population who are ill. Most of them get a fixed monthly payment from each family in the community, called a "conducta". This "conducta" was used in the old times to pay the doctor, when the Social Security did not exist. Now most families prefer to keep this old tradition, and doctors agree, in order to get personal care and better response from doctors to night calls. Besides this income, some doctors have private practices and are employed by insurance companies, factories, schools, etc. The average income of a physician in this area is \$24,500 per year.

All doctors working in this area were interviewed personally at the beginning of the ALTEBRAT Program in order to collect data for the "Health Care Study", and their attitude was cooperative, although slightly suspicious. The attitude of the two doctors in Móra d'Ebre, where the hospital will be built, was more aggressive. They felt that a new hospital would bring in specialists, who would lessen their prestige -and their income- in the community. They, nevertheless, wanted an opportunity to work in the hospital.

Doctors' attitudes regarding the Program are important in two ways: first, in the attitudes towards the Program they help to develop in the population, and second in their own way of working in the new system. As the prestige of physicians in rural communities is important, the reputation of the hospital and specialists in the community will depend largely upon the opinions of local doctors.

The new system will foresee a great change in the doctors' activities. The Program will strive foster primary health care in the area, by enhancing the public health aspects of the work of the doctors, their collaboration with other health care personnel, and their coordination with the specialised and hospital care.

Presently, time spent, by doctors surveyed, in public health activities, is minimal, in some cases and non existent in others, under the program physicians should develop a wide range of public health activities.

There is little sharing of work between doctors, nurses and pharmacists, each concentrating on their own area.

Collaboration with other level of health services includes a system of medical records, that should be coordinated among the different levels. At present, half of the doctors do not have any written system of medical information about the patient. Two of them answered the question by saying that they did not need medical records since they know personally all the inhabitants of the village.

The ALTEBRAT Program will bring hospital and specialist care to the area, and therefore it will allow local physicians to communicate better with these professionals. Doctors' attitudes regarding this matter are mixed; while some see this new development as a positive factor that will improve their working environment, others see it as a threat to their prestige in the community, and to their present incomes.

Nurses

Only twenty five nurses work in the three counties, with a ratio of 2,000 population per nurse. This low rate is a consequence of the high number of small communities. Each commu-

nity or group of communities has a doctor post, and in very small communities, the doctors performs nursing duties, as well as their own traditional work. One third of the nurses are younger than 25, and 70% are women. Most of them reported that they give injections and dressings and one third also extract blood for tests and take blood pressure. Only three nurses interviewed participate in health education.

The ALTEBRAT Program will affect nurses' work in a different way than doctors'. Nursing in primary health care is planned to developed towards higher professional autonomy, work in health centers, and community nursing. One aim of the ALTEBRAT Program is to take fuller advantage of nurses' professional capabilities, allowing them greater participation in patient care and in public health activities.

Two important difficulties have to be overcome in order to allow this change: first of all, doctors' attitudes towards nurses have to be changed, and second absolute numbers of nurses in the area has to be increased.

Pharmacists

Twenty one pharmacists work in these counties, nineteen owning a pharmacy and the other two work exclusively in clinical analyses. There are 2,632 inhabitants per pharmacy in the ALTEBRAT area.

Pharmacists, as public servants, have to perform several public health activities in addition to dispensing drugs in their shops. Most of them have equipment to perform clinical analyses.

Pharmacists' average age is 40 years old and their stability in the area is much greater than the other professionals, because the large investments they have made in their pharmacies.

Although they were all interviewed in the course of the Program and their answers recorded in the "Health Care Study", no special attention was devoted to pharmacists in the planning proposals. The pharmacists resented this and as a result wrote a collective document seeking an effective participation of pharmacists in the new health care services.

The attitude of the pharmacists has been the most positive of the health professionals, and part of their recommendations follow the guidelines of the Program. However, the main request of pharmacists was not within the scope of the Program: to contract clinical analyses with Social Security. Presently patients of the area have to travel to the towns of Reus and Tortosa, to have a clinical analysis performed by Social Security professionals, and this incur time and travel expenditures. Most of the local patients prefer, instead, pay for this clinical tests in the nearest pharmacy.

The ALTEBRAT Program plans to use the new health centers as points where blood and other biological specimens will be collected and sent to the hospital, where they will be analysed, and the results sent back to the health centers. Patients' travel costs will be greatly reduced, and costs of tests will be very low in an automatic centralised laboratory.

Costs of pharmaceuticals paid by Social Security in the ALTEBRAT area are as high as 3,692 pts (\$37) per area resident in the year 1980. One of the aims of the Program's policy in the future is to decrease pharmaceutical costs, which will lessen pharmacists' income.

Pharmacists are a more cohesive group than other professionals, and are more positive about the Programs' change in the local health care structure; their participation in public health activities will be easily attained. The Program

has vested two objectives of health policy, that will threaten the present income of pharmacists: the centralization of pathological work, and decreases in drugs consumption. Communication is maintained with pharmacists and it is not clear what their final position towards the Program will be.

Local politicians

Local politicians have often decried the poor economic situation of these counties, and have requested special attention from the Catalan Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) towards them. A health care program in this region has been viewed by the population as an important investment by the Generalitat, and therefore the ALTEBRAT Program has been received with considerable satisfaction.

The physical situation of the health facilities has been a difficult point in the Program. Several villages competed for the location of the ALTEBRAT hospital.

The geographical situation of Móra d'Ebre (pop. 4,300), in the middle of the service area, as well as its position as the county seat determined the placement of the hospital in Móra. The capital villages of the other two counties, Falset (2,000) and Gandesa (2,800), accepted decision of the location of the hospital, but requested some part in the new health system. Health centers will be built in these villages, and will satisfy local politicians.

Flix, most populated village in the three counties (5,000), showed a great interest in having the hospital; unfortunately, its bad geographical position eliminated it as hospital site. Instead, a health center will serve Flix and neighboring communities.

Local citizens requested a bigger health center than any of the others. Two other villages have special features: Móra la Nova (3,100), and Batea (2,000). Móra la Nova is situated

two kilometers from Móra d'Ebre, and was historically a part of it. Móra la Nova requested to be the site of the hospital, claiming to be just as central as Móra d'Ebre, and pointing out that resources should be spread to areas other than the county seat. Móra la Nova hardly accepted the designation of Móra d'Ebre as hospital site, and only surrendered to the decision with the promise of its own health center.

Batea is a village of 2,000 in the county of the Terra Alta, Gandesa being the county seat. Due to local rivalry and discord between Batea and Gandesa, citizens of Batea refuse to be treated in the Gandesa health center. In order to overcome this difficulty, a health center will be constructed in Batea.

In general, local politicians have been in favor of the Program, especially for the investment it brings to the area, although some problems have arisen from local disputes about the sites of the health facilities. These disputes have a background of local jealousies as well as economic interests. All the regional politicians are well aware of the economic consequences of the placing of health facilities, and they defended the interests of their respective communities in the negotiations.

Population

Local residents are strongly in favor of the ALTEBRAT Program; they currently suffer from the travel long distances to health care facilities as well as a feeling of neglect of their health needs.

Residents are unsatisfied about the relatively low number of general practitioners, because they lack the equipment to perform complicated technological procedures, and

because they have high expectations of specialised medicine, that is difficult to provide in rural settings.

Hospital and specialists' care will be brought to the area by the Program and local attitudes are highly favorable to it. Nevertheless, these same attitudes complicate the implementation of one of the main changes planned in the Program, to foster primary health care. Faith in sophisticated medicine, and lack of confidence in general practitioners leads to primary demand for specialized tertiary medicine, bypassing levels of care.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

Attitudes developed toward the Program by those affected by it have been discussed in the previous chapter. Some of these attitudes will favor the development of the Program, while others will work against it as a whole or against some important features of the proposed changes.

Local resistences to the ALTEBRAT Program are being lessened by its advance in spite of opposition. The Program is being accepted more and more as the proposals and plans become projects and realities. The major decisions have been made in the past, and these decisions are in the process of being accepted.

Enthousiasm, support and collaboration are more difficult to obtain. They are attitudes that will only truly be achieved when the Program is under way, and its positive effects can be experienced firsthand. The groundwork must be laid now to prepare the new system; the most important thing that can be done to facilitate the implementation of the new health care services is careful planning. Further, several other strategies are being implemented now to facilitate the future sucess of the operation:

- Information
- Health promotion
- Continuing education of health professionals
- Governing body development

Information

Information in itself is not sufficient to change attitudes, but it is a necessary step in securing enthusiasm and collaboration in the project. Written and spoken information

has been produced concerning the ALTEBRAT Program. Mass media has been used to publicise the Program. No local news paper exists, although the village of Móra d'Ebre produces a bulletin that has been extensively used, as has been local radio broadcast. Special communication material has been produced for the Program, a booklet with a general description of the Program being the starting point. Introduced this booklet was the name "ALTEBRAT", that combines the names of the three counties.

A bulletin for the Program has been produced, with three issues in 1981.

In addition to the bulletin, the publication of a book containing all of the documents of the first year of the Program, and a mobile exhibition, constitute the three features of the communication Program of 1982.

Promotion of health

Public health activities are considered a main objective of the Program, together with their integration in the health services. One of the dangers inherent in the Program is introducing a demand for a highly sophisticated level of care, because of its relative availability, negating health promotion and prevention. The strategy to reduce this danger is to initiate a pilot program of promotion of health, that includes both health promotion and prevention. This program will take advantage of the higher awareness of health matters by the community, health professionals and local politicians created by the existence of the Program. The promotion of health program is due to operate for two full years before health facilities doors are due to open to the public.

Continuing education of health professionals

Doctors interviewed in the survey resented lack of continuing education opportunities. These courses and seminars are always held in major towns, and access is difficult because of distances. There is an additional problem of finding a physician substitute during the absence of these rural practitioners.

One of the aims of the Program is that continuing education activities for medical personnel implemented in the service area when all facilities are in full operation.

Some educational activities are included in the health promotion program as a part of the training of personnel.

The Program is now planning a full range of continuing education activities focusing on three broad fields: clinical topics, public health matters and organizational aspects. The aim of these educational programs is to fill a real and current need and to introduce new approaches to primary health care.

Governing body

Another new experience in this Program is the management of services on an area basis. Area management will be achieved through a governing body of the new health care services that cover the whole ALTEBRAT area. The local politicians will participate in this entity, although it has not been decided in what way. Present studies indicate a need for participation from towns where a facility is built as well as a representation from other towns.

The participation of governing body in the running of the ALTEBRAT Program has to initiated during the construction of the facilities in order to assure that the community understands and accepts the features of the Program. Sharing the responsibilities of running the health care services will require locals politicians' awareness of the aims of the Program, especially its new slant in the delivery of health services in the ALTEBRAT area.