

A probit analysis of provincial partisan change for this panel (Table 11) yields results that are generally similar to those for federal partisanship. Partisan consistency, strength of provincial party identification and provincial party leader preference (all measured at $t-1$) have statistically significant effects. As before, the signs on their coefficients indicate that provincial partisan change is more likely for inconsistent partisans, persons with weak party identifications and those who prefer the leader of a party other than the one with which they identified at the beginning point of the panel. Also similar to the federal results, most of social cleavage variables fail to exert a significant impact. In keeping with bivariate findings (Table 8), age does not have such an impact in the provincial case although it did have one federally. Other significant predictors at the provincial level include socioeconomic status and the Quebec region/ethnicity dummy variables. The coefficients of all three of these variables are negative, indicating that between 1979 and 1980, instability in provincial party identification was more likely among lower status persons and those residing in Ontario rather than Quebec. Again, it is possible to investigate whether partisan consistency and strength have an interaction effect on provincial partisan change. Using a difference of chi-square test, the interaction term is not significant ($X^2 = 0.03$, $df = 1$, $p = NS$).

(Table 11 about here)

As a final comment on the probit analyses, one may observe that in no case do they yield large estimated values of R^2 .¹² For the analyses of switches in federal party identification between 1974-79 and 1979-80, R^2 equals .15 and .26 respectively, while for switches in provincial party identification between 1979 and 1980, R^2 equals .18. Still, these values are

far from trivial, and undoubtedly would have been considerably larger if measures of changes in party leader images and party/issue linkages during the time intervals encompassed by the panels had been utilized as predictors. As noted earlier, such variables were not used because of ambiguities regarding the flow of causality between instability in party identification and changing feelings about leaders and issues. By relying on measures of party leader affect and party/issue linkages at the beginning of a panel, the analyses depicted in Tables 10 and 11 provide very conservative estimates of leader and issue effects on partisan instability.

Conclusion

Regional and sub-regional variations in federal and provincial election outcomes are apparent to even the most casual observer of Canadian politics. Such differences seemingly accord well with the regionally related ethno-linguistic, religious and economic divisions that characterize Canadian society. Analyses presented above, however, document that relationships between electoral results and regionally based social cleavages need to be interpreted with caution. Despite considerable aggregate stability over the period encompassed by available survey data, federal and provincial party identifications are not strongly correlated with region or other social cleavages. Moreover, at the individual level, party identification displays impressive levels of instability over even relatively brief time intervals. Such weak correlations and high levels of partisan mutability, although consonant with the dramatic reversals of party fortunes that periodically have characterized successive federal or provincial elections, suggest that the "politics of territory" in Canada are far from simple.

It is unlikely that the observed rates of partisan change can be explained in terms of either replacement or conversion effects, as these are typically presented in the literature on party identification. Rather, it seems that instability in party attachments is an ongoing phenomenon. How is it possible for partisan ties to manifest persistently high levels of instability in a polity where societal cleavages are both prominent and persistent?

Part of the answer would appear to lie with structural features of the political system, particularly federalism. By increasing the number of political arenas, federalism expands the range of partisan conflict and provides voters with opportunities to develop multiple and complex orientations toward political parties. Both social psychological and rationalist conceptions of party identification can be interpreted to imply that individual-level inconsistencies in party identification in a federal system should be associated with increased proclivities toward partisan change at both levels of government. Analyses in this paper are consonant with this hypothesis, with the relationship between federal-provincial partisan inconsistency and partisan change being sustained in the presence of controls for several other potentially relevant explanatory variables. *instability*

Among these other variables, the effects of party leader images and party/issue linkages are especially noteworthy. In Canada, voters' party leader images and issue concerns are quite volatile and, as a result, the potential for partisan change is significantly enhanced. It may be argued that this volatility in leader images and issue salience derives in large part from the tendency of Canadian parties to eschew clearly articulated and well defined policy agendas in favor of a "quick fix" style of "brokerage" politics (Clarke et al., 1984). Such a strategy entails an effort to construct broadly

based electoral coalitions that transcend regional and other societal cleavages. Parties attempt to convince voters that they are being offered an opportunity to choose a competent, or even heroic, party leader who, it is claimed, quickly will address issues that the parties themselves define as constituting pressing societal problems. By changing the definition of important issues from one election to the next, by making frequent efforts to refurbish a leader's image, and by carefully timing the selection of new leaders, parties practising this brokerage style of electioneering obfuscate politically divisive social divisions while promoting partisan instability. Since these divisions tend to be regionally related, the effect is to make territorially correlated voting patterns subject to the possibility of sharp shifts over very restricted time intervals. Whether such aggregate shifts occur depends on the outcome of partisan conflict during particular election campaigns. Moreover, because the brokerage style of Canadian parties does nothing to alter the underlying social and economic bases of regional conflict, territorial divisions are never completely absent from the electoral arena, and continue to play a central role in other aspects of Canadian political life.

In broader perspective, the present findings are consistent with arguments that the characteristics of partisan attachments are conditioned by structural features of a political system. Some critics of party identification (Budge et al., 1976), for example, have argued that the concept is useful only in polities such as the United States where a multiplicity of elective offices, a presidential system and citizen-initiated voter registration procedures combine to stimulate partisan self-images that are relatively stable and distinct from the act of voting itself. Although recent studies (e.g., LeDuc et al., 1984; Clarke and Stewart, 1984) gainsay this argument by indicating that the

concept of party identification has applicability in a variety of political milieux, these inquiries as well as present findings suggest that such critics are indeed correct to contend that properties of voters' orientations toward political parties are related to the structural properties of a polity. Unravelling these relationships is an important, if complex, topic for future cross-national research on party identification.

Table 1

Direction of Federal Party Identification in Canada,
1965-80

<u>Party Identification</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Liberal	43%	50%	49%	42%	45%
Progressive Conservative	28	25	24	29	28
NDP	12	11	11	13	15
Social Credit/Creditiste	6	5	3	3	1
No Identification	11	9	13	13	10
(N =)*	(2615)	(2706)	(2411)	(2604)	(1761)

* - missing data and "other" party identifiers removed

Table 2
Direction of Provincial Party Identification in Canada,
1965-80

<u>Provincial Party</u> <u>Identification</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Liberal	39%	42%	40%	32%	34%
Progressive Conservative	28	27	23	28	28
NDP	11	11	12	14	14
Social Credit/Creditiste	8	8	6	6	5
Union Nationale	1	3	1	1	1
Parti Quebecois	x	x	5	9	10
No Identification	12	9	13	11	9
(N =)*	(2729)	(2767)	(2404)	(2592)	(1750)

* - missing data and "other" party identifiers removed

x - party not in existence at this time

Table 3

Probit Analyses: Federal Party Identification by
Social Cleavage Variables, 1980

Social Cleavage Variables Including Ethnicity	Federal Party Identification					
	Liberal		PC		NDP	
	MLE	MLE/SE	MLE	MLE/SE	MLE	MLE/SE
Constant	-.49	-2.38*	-1.35	-6.00*	.13	0.56
Socioeconomic Status	-.00	-0.23	-.00	2.66*	-.00	-2.53*
Age	.00	0.64	.01	3.89*	-.01	-3.47*
Community Size	-.02	-1.39	.08	4.29*	-.07	-3.45
Gender	.22	3.52*	-.09	-1.37	-.06	-0.79
Region/Ethnicity: Atlantic	.19	1.59	-.13	-1.02*	-.51	-2.81*
Quebec-French	.67	7.35*	-1.18	-8.81*	-.29	-2.55*
Quebec-Non-French	.74	6.56*	-.80	-5.60*	-.51	-3.30*
Prairies	-.32	-3.41*	.28	3.04*	.15	1.42
British Columbia	-.33	-2.92*	.26	2.32*	.11	0.92
Estimated R ²	.15		.26		.09	

Social Cleavage Variables Including Religious Affiliation	Federal Party Identification					
	Liberal		PC		NDP	
	MLE	MLE/SE	MLE	MLE/SE	MLE	MLE/SE
Constant	-.99	-4.51*	-.76	-3.13*	.16	0.61
Socioeconomic Status	.00	0.84	.00	1.51	-.00	-2.57*
Age	.00	1.60	.01	2.49*	-.01	-3.31*
Community Size	-.01	-0.67	.06	3.16*	-.07	-3.44*
Gender	.23	3.63*	-.11	-1.52	-.05	-0.69
Region: Atlantic	.14	1.18	-.02	-0.19	-.53	-2.90*
Quebec	.40	4.27*	-.61	-5.08*	.38	-3.25*
Prairies	-.29	-2.99*	.27	2.83*	.14	1.30
British Columbia	-.29	-2.44*	.25	2.13*	.10	0.79
Religious Affiliation: Catholic	.59	7.11*	-.74	-8.04*	-.01	-0.14
Other	.43	3.55*	-.18	-1.45	-.41	-2.54
None	.29	1.94	-.80	-4.68*	.16	1.02
Estimated R ²	.19		.30		.10	

* - $p \leq .05$

Table 4

Stability of Federal Party Identification by Region

A. 1974-79

Federal Party Identification, 1974-79	Region					
	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	British Columbia	Canada
Stable Party Id.	66%	62%	66%	54%	60%	62%
Party Id. → No Party Id.	9	11	6	9	4	8
No Party Id. → Party Id.	7	11	9	5	6	8
No Party Id. → No Party Id.	3	7	4	7	7	5
Different Party Id.	15	10	15	26	24	16
(N =)	(120)	(359)	(472)	(207)	(142)	(1299)

$V = .05, p \leq .01$

B. 1979-80

Federal Party Identification, 1979-80	Region					
	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	British Columbia	Canada
Stable Party Id.	71%	70%	75%	74%	68%	72%
Party Id. → No Party Id.	8	6	6	4	4	6
No Party Id. → Party Id.	6	10	4	6	6	6
No Party Id. → No Party Id.	4	5	3	3	5	4
Different Party Id.	11	10	12	13	17	12
(N =)	(159)	(462)	(597)	(291)	(181)	(1690)

$V = .07, p \leq .05$

Table 5

Stability of Provincial Party Identification by Region

A. 1974-79

	<u>Region</u>					
<u>Provincial Party Identification, 1974-79</u>	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Prairies</u>	<u>British Columbia</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Stable Party Id.	66%	63%	57%	62%	59%	60%
Party Id. → No Party Id.	7	7	9	7	4	7
No Party Id. → Party Id.	5	7	13	3	7	8
No Party Id. → No Party Id.	1	3	4	4	4	3
Different Party Id.	21	21	19	25	27	21
(N =)	(117)	(354)	(466)	(203)	(142)	(1282)

V = .08, $p \leq .01$ B. 1979-80

	<u>Region</u>					
<u>Provincial Party Identification, 1979-80</u>	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Prairies</u>	<u>British Columbia</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Stable Party Id.	71%	77%	68%	80%	74%	74%
Party Id. → No Party Id.	6	5	7	3	8	6
No Party Id. → Party Id.	6	5	6	5	3	5
No Party Id. → No Party Id.	3	2	4	2	1	3
Different Party Id.	14	11	15	10	14	13
(N =)	(157)	(479)	(598)	(291)	(182)	(1707)

V = .06, $p \leq .05$

Table 6

Consistency of Federal and Provincial Party Identifications, 1974-80

<u>Patterns of Federal-Provincial Party Identification</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Same Party, Both Levels	64%	61%	61%
Different Party	17	23	25
Federal Party, No Provincial Party	6	4	4
Provincial Party, No Federal Party	7	6	5
No Party, Either Level	6	6	4
(N =)*	(2379)	(2544)	(1725)

* - missing data and "other" party identifiers removed

Table 7

**Consistency of Federal and Provincial Party Identifications
by Province, 1974-80**

<u>Province</u>	<u>1974</u>		<u>1979</u>		<u>1980</u>	
	<u>same party</u>	<u>diff. party</u>	<u>same party</u>	<u>diff. party</u>	<u>same party</u>	<u>diff. party</u>
Newfoundland	84%	6%	81%	13%	75%	14%
Prince Edward Island	83	3	85	6	81	6
Nova Scotia	81	8	76	6	74	9
New Brunswick	80	5	78	9	78	6
Quebec	58	22	50	31	51	33
Ontario	70	10	70	14	68	17
Manitoba	67	20	67	17	73	19
Saskatchewan	64	20	58	18	76	15
Alberta	61	22	73	16	72	20
British Columbia	47	33	35	51	34	54
Canada	64	17	61	23	61	25

Table 8

Stability of Federal and Provincial Party Identification,
1974-79 and 1979-80 by Age

<u>Patterns of Party Identification</u>	<u>Age Group</u>						<u>V</u>
	<u>18-22</u>	<u>23-34</u>	<u>35-46</u>	<u>47-54</u>	<u>55-64</u>	<u>65 & over</u>	
Federal Id. 1974-79	X	32 ⁺	32	27	27	19	.11*
Federal Id. 1979-80	24	24	19	17	15	15	.10*
Provincial Id. 1974-79	X	36	31	37	31	23	.11*
Provincial Id. 1979-80	22	22	17	21	16	21	.06

+ - percentage changing party identification

X - no respondents in this age group for 1974-79 panel

* - $p \leq .05$

Table 9

**Stability of Federal Party Identification By
Consistency of Federal and Provincial Party
Identification**

<u>A. 1974-79</u>	<u>Consistency of Federal-Provincial Party Identification, 1974</u>		
	<u>Same Fed./ Prov. Party Id.</u>	<u>Fed. Id./ No Prov. Id.</u>	<u>Different Fed./ Prov. Party Id.</u>
Same Party Id.	77%	65%	59%
Party Id. + No Party Id.	8	16	11
Different Party Id.	15	20	30
(N =)	(812)	(72)	(232)

$V = .13, p \leq .001$

<u>B. 1979-80</u>			
	<u>Same Fed./ Prov. Party Id.</u>	<u>Fed. Id./ No Prov. Id.</u>	<u>Different Fed./ Prov. Party Id.</u>
Same Party Id.	85%	75%	69%
Party Id. + No Party Id.	5	12	8
Different Party Id.	9	13	24
(N =)	(1030)	(72)	(409)

$V = .14, p \leq .001$

Table 10

**Probit Analyses: Stability of Federal Party Identification, 1974-79 and
1979-80 by Attitudinal and Social Cleavage
Variables**

<u>Attitudinal and Social Cleavage Variables</u>	<u>1974-79</u>		<u>1979-80</u>	
	<u>MLE</u>	<u>MLE/SE</u>	<u>MLE</u>	<u>MLE/SE</u>
Constant	.39	1.09	.41	1.30
Party Preferred, Most Important Issue (t-1)	-.16	-2.58*	-.31	-5.63*
Consistency, Fed.- Prov. Party Id. (t-1)	.19	3.73*	.24	5.04*
Strength, Fed. Party Id. (t-1)	-.23	-3.73*	-.34	-5.49*
Party Leader Preference (t-1)	-.00	-0.01	-.24	-5.06*
Political Interest Index (t)	-.12	-2.23*	-.12	-2.35*
Socioeconomic Status	-.00	-1.95	-.00	-0.37
Age	-.01	-2.52*	-.01	-2.95*
Community Size	-.00	-0.09	.02	1.05
Gender	.02	0.19	.11	1.34
Region/Ethnicity: Atlantic	.13	0.85	.04	0.25
Quebec- French	-.11	-0.92	-.21	-1.70
Quebec- Non-French	-.32	-1.91	-.22	-1.41
Prairies	.36	3.06*	.01	0.10
British Columbia	.16	1.10	.01	0.06
Estimated R ²	.15		.26	

* - $p \leq .05$

Table 11

Probit Analyses: Stability of Provincial Party Identification,
1979-80 by Attitudinal and Social Cleavage Variables

<u>Attitudinal and Social Cleavage Variables</u>	<u>1979-80</u>	
	<u>MLE</u>	<u>MLE/SE</u>
Constant	.72	2.33*
Consistency, Fed. - Prov. Party Id. (t-1)	.15	3.21*
Strength, Prov. Party Id. (t-1)	-.51	-8.76*
Party Leader Preference (t-1)	-.15	-2.71*
Political Interest (t)	-.07	-1.18
Socioeconomic Status	-.00	-2.16*
Age	-.00	-0.56
Community Size	-.01	-0.65
Gender	.12	1.53
Region/Ethnicity: Atlantic	-.06	-0.43
Quebec-French	-.41	-2.96*
Quebec-Non-French	-.63	-3.72*
Prairies	-.19	-1.59
British Columbia	-.09	-0.64
Estimated R ²	.18	

* - $p \leq .05$

Appendix A

Popular Vote by Province, 1980 and 1984 Federal Elections

Province	Party							
	Liberal		Progressive Conservative		New Democratic Party		All Others	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Newfoundland	47	36	36	58	17	6	x	x
Prince Edward Is.	47	41	46	52	7	7	x	x
Nova Scotia	40	33	39	51	21	15	x	x
New Brunswick	50	32	33	53	16	14	1	x
Quebec	68	35	13	50	9	9	10	6
Ontario	42	30	36	47	22	21	x	2
Manitoba	28	22	38	43	34	27	x	8
Saskatchewan	24	18	39	42	36	38	1	2
Alberta	21	13	66	69	10	14	3	4
British Columbia	22	17	41	46	35	35	2	2
Yukon/N.W.T.	37	25	32	47	31	28	x	x
Canada	44	28	33	50	20	19	3	3

\bar{x} % Change

1980-84, Ten
Provinces

11.2

12.4

3.3

N.C.

x - less than 0.5%

N.C. - not computed

Appendix B

Federal Party Identification by Province, 1980

<u>Province</u>	<u>Federal Party Identification</u>					<u>No. Id.</u>	<u>(N)</u>
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>PC</u>	<u>NDP</u>	<u>SC</u>			
Newfoundland	57%	23	11	0	9		(70)
Prince Edward Is.	50%	36	3	0	12		(78)
Nova Scotia	41%	33	10	0	16		(132)
New Brunswick	45%	32	9	0	15		(76)
Quebec	67%	7	11	4	11		(427)
Ontario	41%	33	16	0	10		(483)
Manitoba	35%	33	23	2	7		(88)
Saskatchewan	23%	35	35	0	6		(65)
Alberta	26%	57	9	0	8		(110)
British Columbia	29%	37	24	2	9		(179)
Canada	45%	28	15	1	10		(1761)*

* - weighted national sample

Appendix C

Provincial Party Identification by Province, 1980

<u>Provincial Party Identification</u>								
<u>Province</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>PC</u>	<u>NDP</u>	<u>SC</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>PQ</u>	<u>No. Id.</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Newfoundland	47%	37	6	0	+	+	10	(70)
Prince Edward Is.	48%	39	1	0	+	+	12	(77)
Nova Scotia	41%	38	9	0	+	+	13	(133)
New Brunswick	47%	35	10	0	+	+	8	(72)
Quebec	53%	1	0	1	2	36	7	(433)
Ontario	31%	42	15	0	+	+	12	(480)
Manitoba	19%	38	36	2	+	+	5	(89)
Saskatchewan	19%	21	57	0	+	+	3	(67)
Alberta	14%	71	7	3	+	+	6	(108)
British Columbia	6%	7	38	41	+	+	8	(152)
Canada	34%	28	14	5	1	10	9	(1750)*

+ - not applicable

* - weighted national sample

Footnotes

1. The 1974, 1979 and 1980 Canadian national election and panel studies were funded by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (principal investigators: Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon Pammett). Weighted panel N's are: 1974-79 - 1353, 1979-80 - 1770, and 1974-79-80 - 865. The weighted N's for the 1974, 1979 and 1980 cross-sectional samples are 2445, 2670 and 1786, respectively. The 1965 and 1968 national election studies were funded by the Canada Council and conducted by John Meisel and associates. Data generated by the several studies are archived with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Details concerning the design of the 1974 survey may be found in LeDuc et al. (1974). Those for the 1979 and 1980 surveys are available from the principal investigators upon request. The authors are solely responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
2. In the 1974, 1979 and 1980 surveys, the following sequence of questions was used to measure party identification at the federal level of government: (a) "Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Social Credit, or what?" (b) "How strongly [party named] do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly?" (c) [If "refused," "don't know" "independent" or "none" in (a)] "Still thinking of federal politics, do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of the parties than to the others?" [emphasis in original]. (d) [If "yes"] "Which party is that?" All respondents supplying a party label in questions (a) and (c) were considered to have some degree of party identification. Persons declining a party label in (a) but providing one in (c) were classified as "weak" identifiers. A similar set of questions was used to measure party identification at the provincial level. In the 1965 and 1968 national election surveys integrated sequences of questions were used to measure the strength and direction of federal and provincial party identification. The 1965 and 1968 question sequences are described in the ICPSR codebooks for these data sets, ICPSR study numbers 7225 and 7009 respectively.
3. Unlike the situation in the United States, the term "Independent" is seldom used in Canada.
4. For economy of presentation the provincial party identification data in Table 2 are not shown by province. Such an analysis for 1980 (Appendix C) shows that Parti Québécois identifiers constituted 36% of the Quebec electorate. On the growth of PQ identification during the 1970s see Clarke (1983).
5. For the dependent variables in these analyses identifiers with a particular party are scored 1, other respondents are scored 0. The predictor variables are measured as follows: socioeconomic status - the Blishen index of occupational prestige which ranges from 14.41 to 75.32 (Blishen and McRoberts, 1976); age in years; community size - over

500,000 = 1, 100,000-500,000 = 2, 10,000-99,999 = 3, 1,000-9,999 = 4, rural = 5; gender - men = 1, women = 2; region/ethnicity - a dummy variable as indicated in Table 3 with Ontario as the reference category; religious affiliation - a dummy variable as indicated in Table 3 with Protestant as the reference category.

6. These analyses overstate the stability of party identification by not investigating changes in strength of identification. For example, of the directionally stable identifiers in the 74-79 and 79-80 panels, only 54% and 57% respectively also maintained stability in the strength of their party ties (LeDuc et al., 1984).
7. Classic statements of cross-pressures hypotheses in the voting behavior literature include Lazarsfeld et al. (1948); Berelson (1954), and Campbell et al. (1954, 1960). For a useful conceptual and empirical critique see Sperlich (1971).
8. In the 1979 and 1980 cross-sectional surveys the correlations (r) between election interest and strength of federal party identification are .22 and .23 respectively.
9. Partisan consistency is measured as follows: same federal and provincial party identification = 1; federal party identification but no provincial party identification = 2; different federal and provincial party identification = 3. Federal nonidentifiers are excluded from the analysis.
10. These variables are measured as follows: (a) strength of party identification - very strong = 3; fairly strong = 2, weak or leaning = 1; (b) political interest - respondents stating they were "very interested" in a specific election and generally follow politics "very closely" were scored 2; those stating that they were at best "slightly interested" in the election and follow politics "not much at all" were scored 0; all others were scored 1; (c) party leader preference - assessed in terms of relative affect for party leaders, with affect being measured using 100-point thermometer scales (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 406-407, 421). Respondents preferring the leader of the party they identify with at the beginning point of a panel ($t-1$) are scored 3; respondents preferring the leader of a party other than the one identified with at $t-1$ are scored 1; other respondents are scored 2. Such comparisons made at the level of the individual respondent obviate potential measurement problems due to variations in how respondents use the thermometer "space." Re: party/issue linkages, respondents stating the party they identified with was closest to them on the most important election issue at $t-1$ were scored 1, respondents stating that a party other than the one they identified with was closest were scored -1, and all other respondents were scored 0.
11. For descriptions of how these variables are measured see note 5 above.
12. The R^2 measure used here was proposed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). For caveats re: this and analogous summary statistics for probit see Aldrich and Nelson (1984: 57-59).

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GEOGRAPHIE DES COMPORTEMENTS POLITIQUES EN SUISSE

Rencontres communes de l'ECPR

Barcelone

Groupe: Territorial Voting Patterns

Mars 1985

E P F L Département d'Architecture
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

IREC

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE SUR L'ENVIRONNEMENT CONSTRUIT

1. Introduction

Dans toute l'Europe, et les articles présentés dans ce groupe le confirmeront sans doute, on a pu observer des persistances à long terme du vote populaire. Siegfried notait déjà il y a bien longtemps: "J'ai remarqué souvent, dans les élections, que les opinions politiques sont sujettes à une répartition géographique. Chaque parti, ou plus exactement chaque tendance a son domaine; et avec un peu d'attention, l'on distingue qu'il y a des régions politiques comme il y a des régions géologiques ou économiques... J'ai remarqué aussi, malgré des apparences trompeuses, qu'il existe dans les manifestations de l'opinion une singulière continuité." (1964, p. V). C'est un tel projet que j'aimerais amorcer ici: montrer les grandes dimensions qui structurent la carte politique de la Suisse d'aujourd'hui, leurs relations et leur persistance.

D'emblée une précision s'impose: persistance des comportements politiques n'implique nullement immobilisme des structures. Beaucoup de choses ont changé: les Suisses ne votent plus sur l'interdiction de l'absinthe mais à propos des centrales nucléaires. Le mode de vie a également changé et, à un certain niveau, le développement des agglomérations n'est pas sans effet sur le comportement politique. Pourtant, au delà des variations à court terme, on retrouve des grandes tendances qui perdurent, des cartes comparables à travers le siècle.

L'idée que je voudrais défendre ici est la suivante: si les comportements politiques ont une telle pérennité, c'est aussi que les différences relatives entre les unités d'analyses, en l'occurrence les cantons suisses, dotés d'une forte existence historique, se maintiennent. En ce sens, les "explications" que l'on peut trouver dans la structure socio-économique seraient plutôt le moyen de décrire des sociétés différentes, avec leurs propres formes de sociabilité.

Il faut noter pourtant qu'une telle approche correspond à un certain niveau d'analyse. Par exemple, si l'on considère une désagrégation plus fine, comme les communes par exemple, d'autres facteurs comme le mode de vivre et d'habiter interviennent et complexifient l'analyse.¹⁾

Dans cet article, c'est à ce système de continuité et de changement, mesuré au niveau des cantons, que je vais m'intéresser. En somme il s'agit de tracer un portrait global de trois domaines:

1. Les principaux clivages socio-économiques.
2. Le système partisan
3. Le système des votations.

Les votations étant cette institution helvétique qui fait aussi le bonheur des politologues: la compétence, selon le mot de SIEGFRIED (1969) du peuple suisse de se prononcer également sur des "choses" et non seulement sur des personnes.²⁾

2. Le système de clivages en Suisse

Décrire le système de clivage en Suisse pourrait recouvrir de nombreuses dimensions.³⁾ Pourtant quelques indicateurs simples donnent déjà une bonne idée des dimensions fondamentales qui différencient les cantons. Plus particulièrement, j'ai retenu deux types d'indicateurs:

1. Deux indicateurs des traditions culturelles: la langue et la religion.
2. Les indicateurs économiques les plus simples: la structure d'emploi par secteur.

2.1 Les traditions culturelles


Langue et religion marquent depuis longtemps les différences entre les cantons. Par exemple le différent entre conservateurs et radicaux au XIX^{ème} siècle s'est très vite territorialisé en une alliance particulière de cantons catholiques: le Sonderbund. En somme, malgré les migrations et les mouvements de population, chaque canton a gardé un caractère prépondérant: catholique, protestant ou mixte.

La différenciation linguistique fonctionne aussi depuis une histoire relativement lointaine. Le principe de territorialité, déterminant la langue effectivement utilisée à un endroit donné, a permis une relative invariance de ces frontières.⁴⁾

Carte 1

La superposition des clivages: langue et religion

Alémanique et protestant
Alémanique et mixte
Alémanique et catholique
Mixte et protestant
Mixte et mixte
Mixte et catholique
Latin et protestant
Latin et mixte
Latin et catholique




Il est pourtant particulièrement important de souligner que ces clivages ne se superposent guère, à tel point que certains auteurs expliquent la stabilité de la Suisse par le "cross-cutting" des clivages. La carte 1, qui reprend ces deux variables trichotomisées, montre la complexité de cette structure: il est des cantons alémaniques et catholiques (par exemple Lucerne et la Suisse centrale) tout comme des cantons alémaniques et protestants comme Zurich ou Berne. De même la Suisse romande n'est absolument pas uniforme en matière de religion.

2.2 Les secteurs économiques

N'utiliser que cet indicateur pour rendre compte de la structure économique peut sembler a priori une simplification abusive. Pourtant des études comme celles d'HOFFERBERT (1974) par exemple, ont montré qu'un ensemble d'indicateurs s'organisait, dans les pays développés, suivant une structure bidimensionnelle: "affluence" et "industrialization", le secteur tertiaire déterminant largement la première dimension, le secondaire la deuxième. D'autres études ont d'ailleurs confirmé qu'il en était bien de même pour la Suisse⁵⁾. SCHULER et NEF (1983) classaient d'ailleurs aussi une typologie des régions helvétiques suivant un concept semblable.

Graphique 1


La structure centre-périphérie



Un problème se pose toutefois dans la mesure où les structures économiques ont connu plus de changements au cours du siècle: un secteur comme le tertiaire a en effet passé de moins d'un tiers à plus de la moitié des emplois entre 1920 et 1980. En fait il s'agit beaucoup plus d'un changement du niveau absolu que des écarts relatifs entre les cantons. On peut s'en rendre compte en effectuant une analyse en composantes principales de la proportion des emplois dans le secteur tertiaire aux divers recensements entre 1920 et 1980. On obtient alors une première composante qui, avec 93 % de la variance, reprend la composante à long terme, et une deuxième qui décrit le changement. C'est ce que montre clairement ce graphique.

Graphique 2


Saturations des deux premiers facteurs



Une telle opération, aboutissant à des résultats semblables, a été menée sur les deux autres secteurs⁶⁾. On peut alors définir une carte du secteur marquant de chaque canton⁷⁾. On retrouve l'importance du tertiaire dans les centres, Genève, Bâle, Zurich mais aussi au Tessin et dans les Grisons où il se combine avec une agriculture non négligeable. Berne⁸⁾ apparaît comme peu marqué par un secteur dominant. L'implantation de l'industrie reprend un large croissant recouvrant aussi bien l'arc jurassien que la suisse septentrionale ou orientale. Enfin bon nombre de cantons catholiques, en cela conformes à la thèse de Max Weber, ont gardé plus longtemps une importante paysannerie: région pré-alpines et alpines de Fribourg, du Valais et de la Suisse centrale.

Carte 2

Le secteur dominant



Ces quelques dimensions décrivent déjà une Suisse au visage fort diversifié. En parcourant maintenant la géographie politique de la Suisse, on va bien vite retrouver certains de ces clivages élémentaires.

3. L'implantation partisane


Pays à structure fédérale, la Suisse a un parlement bicaméral dont l'une des chambres, le Conseil National, est élue à la proportionnelle depuis 1919. Au niveau de la confédération, la règle est celle d'un multipartisme relativement stable: le graphique 2 en témoigne. Il faut toutefois mentionner l'entrée sur la scène politique de nouveaux partis ces vingt dernières années: écologistes, partis opposés à l'immigration étrangère, etc.

Géographie des comportements politiques en Suisse

Pour avoir une base de mesure commune, j'ai regroupé les partis, pour toutes ces analyses, en familles: la gauche comprend non seulement les socialistes mais aussi les petits partis communistes quand ils existent. Les radicaux et libéraux, assez proches idéologiquement parlant, ont aussi été regroupés. On arrive donc à une structure comprenant quatre grandes familles: la gauche; le parti démocrate-chrétien soit l'ancien grand parti conservateur et catholique; les radicaux et libéraux, qui furent les fondateurs de la Suisse de 1848, partis actuellement situé un peu à droite sur l'échiquier politique, représentant souvent les industriels ou les professions libérales, et l'union démocratique du centre, anciennement parti des paysans, artisans et bourgeois, scission du parti radical.

Graphique 3

Evolution de l'électorat



Des changements plus importants se sont toutefois passés au niveau de la structure partisane de chaque canton. On peut s'en rendre compte de la manière suivante: si l'on codifie les élections au conseil national par la grille que voici:

Géographie des comportements politiques en Suisse

1 Monolithique	Un parti obtient plus de 90 % des suffrages
2 Dominant	60 %
3 Majoritaire	50 %
4 Bien représenté	40 %
5 Multipartisan:	aucun parti n'a plus de 40 %

Cette analyse menée sur les familles politiques nous permet de voir une lente mais constante évolution qui peut se résumer dans les termes suivants:

Les cantons à système pluraliste le sont restés.

Les cantons à système plus monolithique ont pour la plupart évolué vers le multipartisme.

En d'autres termes, la tendance générale a été celle d'un affaiblissement de la cohérence partisane de chaque canton. Pourtant, les lieux de prédilection de chaque parti sont restés plus constants.

Géographie des comportements politiques en Suisse

Tableau 1

Type de système partisan par canton

Année	19	22	25	28	31	35	39	43	47	51	55	59	63	67	71	75	79
Canton																	
NW	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	4
UR	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	5
OW	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
AI	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
AR	2	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	4	4
VS	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	2	3	3
FR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	5
VD	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	4
ZG	2	3	4	4		1	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	5	5
LU	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	1	4	3	3
SZ	3	3	4	4	3	3	2	5	5	4	4	3	4	5	5	4	4
BL	3	3	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
GE	4	3	2	5	4	4	5	2	4	4	3	4	4	5	5	4	4
NE	4	4	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3
TI	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	5
SO	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
SG	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
BE	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
GR	4	5	5	5	5	5	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
GL	5	4	1	3	5	5	2	4	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	2	2
SH	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	5	4	4
ZH	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
AG	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
TG	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

On retrouve donc bien un aspect changement. Pourtant, dans l'implantation partisane proprement dite, on observe une grande stabilité: en termes relatifs, les cantons les plus marqués par telle ou telle famille politique y sont restés fidèles. Une analyse en composantes principales menée par parti, permet, comme pour la structure économique, de tracer les cartes de l'implantation des familles politiques. Le mode de construction de ces

cartes est tel qu'il insiste beaucoup plus sur la position relative des cantons et n'indique guère le niveau absolu. En revanche, il s'agit bien là de la distribution à long terme.

Le Parti Démocrate Chrétien est avant tout implanté en Valais, à Fribourg et dans les petits cantons de Suisse centrale⁹⁾. En fait, on retrouve quasiment ici une carte du catholicisme.

L'implantation radicale, si l'on met à part le cas particulier d'Uri, est particulièrement forte dans le canton de Vaud et à Neuchâtel. Mais elle est loin d'être négligeable à Genève ou au Tessin, par exemple.

La gauche, principalement constituée par le parti socialiste, le parti du travail n'étant guère important qu'à Genève, est avant tout distribuée dans les anciennes régions industrielles du pays: l'arc jurassien et la Suisse orientale, les valeurs les plus élevées étant atteintes à Neuchâtel, centre horloger, et à Schaffhouse, fief de grandes industries.

Enfin le dernier parti gouvernemental, l'union démocratique du centre, n'a pas une implanation nationale. Il est surtout important à Berne et en Thurgovie où il a pris la place des radicaux sur l'échiquier politique.


On reviendra bientôt sur les liens unissant ces indicateurs mais analysons d'abord le dernier terme décrivant la structure politique.



Les forces de gauche



La gauche radicale



Le parti démocrate-chrétien



Le parti radical

4. Les votations

Composante intéressante du système politique suisse, les votations ne vont pas sans poser de nombreux problèmes d'analyse. D'abord, elles sont extrêmement nombreuses: 222 votations entre 1920 et 1980, 56 entre le début de 1975 et la fin de 1979! De plus les sujets abordés sont extraordinairement divers: interdiction des casinos, de la franc-maçonnerie, limitation de l'immigration étrangère; et parfois fort complexe: régime financier de la confédération, loi sur l'agriculture, taxes douanières et j'en passe. Enfin, le citoyen ne semble pas toujours prêt à suivre les consignes de vote des partis.¹⁰⁾ Il faut alors utiliser une construction méthodologique plus complexe pour décrire ces aspects.

La première hypothèse que l'on peut pourtant poser, c'est qu'il est possible de réduire cette diversité en quelques dimensions. Frédéric Bon écrit par exemple: "La technicité croissante des problèmes qui entrent dans le champ politique avec l'extension du rôle de l'état accroît encore la difficulté d'appréhension du débat par le simple citoyen. Or la démocratie pluraliste le somme d'intervenir à certains moments privilégiés dans ce débat et d'arbitrer ces conflits. Le temps et l'investissement intellectuel qu'il peut consacrer à cette tâche sont extrêmement limités. Le seul moyen pour résoudre cette contradiction est d'opérer, à la limite du discours mythique, une réduction de cet univers à un petit nombre d'oppositions, de ramener un système de conflits multidimensionnels à quelques conflits fondamentaux." (BON, 1979, p. 112). Très vite, l'idée d'une analyse en composantes principales s'impose pour vérifier une telle proposition.

Se pose alors le problème d'une mesure de la stabilité. La solution retenue ici a été de mener une analyse à l'intérieur de périodes bien différenciées avant de comparer ces résultats. Une analyse en composantes principales¹¹⁾ a donc été faite sur les périodes suivantes:

Géographie des comportements politiques en Suisse

1920 - 1929 Les suites de la guerre et de la grève générale.
1930 - 1944 La grande crise et la tentation frontiste
1945 - 1959 L'expansion
1960 - 1974 La surchauffe
1975 - 1979 La "crise"

L'hypothèse d'un petit nombre de dimensions s'est largement trouvée confirmée si l'on regarde la distribution des valeurs propres:

Tableau 2

Pourcentage cumulé d'explication

Période	Facteur 1	Facteur 2	Facteur 3	Facteur 4
1920-29	42 %	65 %	72 %	79 %
1930-44	45 %	66 %	77 %	83 %
1945-59	39 %	61 %	74 %	80 %
1960-74	46 %	60 %	68 %	74 %
1975-79	51 %	69 %	75 %	81 %

Quatre facteurs expliquent plus des quatre cinquièmes de la variance, 2 plus des trois cinquièmes! Ce sont d'ailleurs ces deux premiers facteurs qui vont le plus retenir mon attention tant ils cumulent une part importante de la variance.

Sans entrer dans le détail de l'interprétation, le contenu des deux premiers facteurs peut se décrire ainsi:

Durant toutes les périodes, le premier facteur apparaît comme une grande dimension gauche-droite ou, plus exactement, progressisme-traditionnalisme. En effet, aux côtés des initiatives soutenus par la gauche la plus classique, comme l'initiative pour la semaine de quarante heures, on y trouve des votations écologistes comme le problème des centrales nucléaires, féministes comme la solution des délais en matière d'avortement

ou pacifistes comme la demande d'un service civil pour les objecteurs de conscience.

Le deuxième facteur a apparemment plus varié dans sa définition. Suivant les époques, on peut en effet le décrire dans les termes suivants:

1. Une opposition cantonalisme-ouverture internationale. C'est par exemple là que l'on retrouve la question de l'entrée de la Suisse dans la SDN.

2. Une distinction interventionnisme-libéralisme économique.

3. Un contenu que j'avais, avec Eugène Horber, qualifié de populisme¹²⁾ tant il recouvre un mélange d'écologie peu politisée avec des tendances xénophobes et un soutien assez général aux propositions du gouvernement. Cette composante paraît d'ailleurs fort importante si l'on examine le développement récent de "nouveaux" partis et de nouveaux mouvements sociaux.

Ainsi, le changement apparaît, partiellement tout au moins, dans la définition des facteurs. Pourtant la stabilité doit surtout se mesurer par l'implantation géographique des tendances politiques.

Une analyse en composantes principales des facteurs de chaque période m'a paru un moyen intéressant de montrer la cohérence à long terme du vote. Si les facteurs sont stables on peut en effet s'attendre à retrouver deux facteurs explicatifs. Si, au contraire, il n'y a pas de stabilité, ce sont jusqu'à dix facteurs que l'on pourra observer. En l'occurrence la démonstration est claire: 2 facteurs expliquent 92 %, soit la quasi totalité de la variance¹³⁾ si bien que l'on pourra bel et bien parler des facteurs à long terme du vote. Ils se décomposent ainsi:

Tableau 3

Coéfficients de saturations

	Facteur 1	Facteur 2	Communalité
F1P1	0.92		0.93
F1P2	0.82	0.47	0.88
F1P3	0.97		0.97
F1P4	0.95		0.97
F1P5	0.98		0.97
F2P1		0.87	0.83
F2P2	0.36	0.77	0.72
F2P3		0.94	0.91
F2P4		0.94	0.95
F2P5		0.85	0.73


Note: 1. Seuls les coéfficient supérieurs à 0.3 sont représentés
 2. F1P3 signifie le premier facteur de la troisième période

L'hypothèse d'une stabilité du vote des cantons est ainsi largement confirmée: alors même que les préoccupations et les enjeux politiques se modifiaient, malgré la diversité des sujets proposés, deux grandes dimensions permettent de rendre compte du vote.

La carte de ce premier facteur correspond largement à la répartition de la gauche. En d'autres termes, les cantons où l'agriculture joue encore un rôle important, où le parti démocrate chrétien est largement implanté ne sont guère en faveur de solutions progressistes, alors que les cantons tertiarisés comme Genève, le Tessin, ou qui connaissent une industrie importante comme Bâle ou Neuchâtel y sont beaucoup plus favorables.

Carte 7

Le premier facteur des votations




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La deuxième dimension montre un visage intéressant de la Suisse: une double dimension centre-périphérie: d'abord au niveau linguistique entre la majorité alémanique et la minorité latine; puis, à l'intérieur même de la Suisse alémanique, entre les grands cantons comme Zurich et les petits cantons de Suisse centrale.

Carte 8

Le deuxième facteur des votations



5. Synthèse

On dispose de cette manière d'un ensemble d'indicateurs des structures aussi bien sociales que politique. Leurs liens sont d'ailleurs incontestable. Une manière familière de s'en rendre compte est d'effectuer une régression multiple¹⁴⁾ et d'expliquer ainsi les facteurs issus de l'analyse des votations.

Tableau 4

Explication des facteurs votation

Premier facteur	R carré	Beta
Primaire	0.59	-0.77
Alémanique	0.87	-0.54
Deuxième facteur		
Alémanique	0.58	-0.79
Primaire	0.84	0.35
Catholique	0.87	0.24

En un sens, la distribution géographique des votations s'explique par ces quelques indicateurs. En d'autres termes deux simples variables décrivant des dimensions culturelles et économiques sont suffisantes pour rendre compte d'une part importante du comportement politique.

Pourtant, aussi paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, la plupart des modèles ont probablement une capacité d'explication aussi élevée. En effet, le comportement politique, à ce niveau d'analyse, me semble largement déterminé par un ensemble de traditions et de valeurs propres au canton¹⁵⁾ si bien que la plupart des indicateurs doit refléter ces grandes différences.


On peut le vérifier par une procédure certes compliquée mais néanmoins puissante. Le problème de départ est de comparer deux structures: structure politique et structure sociale. On est alors dans un domaine typique d'application de l'analyse en corrélation canonique. C'est ce qui a été fait en utilisant les indicateurs de langue, religion et secteurs économique comme ensemble de "gauche" et les facteurs issus de l'analyse des votations comme ensemble de "droite". On obtient alors des corrélations canoniques de 0.96 et 0.93 respectivement soit des valeurs comparables à l'analyse de la régression. L'avantage d'une telle analyse est que l'on peut calculer des scores canoniques et alors des corrélations avec des indicateurs supplémentaires. On peut ainsi se rendre compte de leurs rapports avec les variables originales. De plus, en représentant des corrélations, on peut aussi tracer des cercles représentant les pourcentages d'explication et juger immédiatement de la pertinence de ces variables.

C'est ainsi que la représentation de la page suivante a été obtenue. Des indicateurs aussi différents que l'origine de la population, la proportion de naissances illégitimes, la fécondité, l'urbanisation ont plus de 60 % de variance en commun avec cet espace! Les indicateurs permettant de décrire le comportement politique sont donc bien nombreux. En d'autres termes, les cantons semblent bien différenciés entre eux et possèdent vraisemblablement une certaine cohérence sociale qui explique cette interchangeabilité des indicateurs.

Liste des abréviations:

Cath	% catholiques	Primaire	% secteur primaire
Dep	Dépenses par habitant	PDC	% parti démocrate chrétien
Etr	% Etrangers	PS	% parti socialiste
F1	Premier facteur votation	Rad	% parti radical et libéral
F2	Deuxième facteur votation	Sec	% secteur secondaire
Germ	% alémaniques	Sui	% population d'autres cantons
Il	% naissances illégitimes	Ter	% secteur tertiaire
Nup	Nuptialité	UDC	% Union démocratique
Orig	% originaire du canton	Urb	% dans les agglomérations

Il s'agit toujours de la première composante (à long terme) de l'analyse de chaque indicateur entre 1920 et 1980



Note: Les facteurs n'ayant pas d'orientation, ils ont été répétés à chaque extrémité.

Une telle représentation montre d'abord l'importance de la dimension linguistique par rapport à la deuxième dimension des votations. On voit aussi les rapports entre cet aspect progressiste-traditionnaliste des votations et une opposition entre cantons où l'agriculture est relativement importante et les autres plus tertiarisés. Les premiers sont plus souvent catholiques, avec une fécondité plus importante, avec une part importante de la population originaire du lieu tandis que les autres sont évidemment plus urbanisés, avec une importante proportion d'étrangers.

Enfin, sur un tel graphique, on peut effectivement retrouver, comme on le supposait au départ, les grandes dimensions d'affluence et d'industrialisation d'Hofferbert.

6. Conclusion

En conclusion, il faut d'abord souligner qu'il est possible de définir une géographie politique de la Suisse, au niveau des cantons en tout cas. De plus les analyses, tant des votations que des élections, montrent que cette géographie ne s'est guère modifiée au cours du siècle. On peut d'ailleurs supposer qu'une socialisation politique restreinte à la transmission de l'affiliation partisane serait peut être capable de rendre compte de la régularité des élections mais probablement pas de celle des votations.

L'explication complète de ces distributions échappe encore mais la correspondance que l'on retrouve entre les structures sociales montre qu'il faut probablement remonter à une histoire relativement ancienne pour comprendre ces mécanismes. L'importance de la religion comme indicateur discriminant entre les cantons en est un signe supplémentaire, tout comme la cohérence des cantons qui s'explique par une longue existence.

En l'état actuel des choses, il me semble que trois paradigmes peuvent rendre compte de cette stabilité. Ces résultats sont d'ailleurs aussi un préalable à leur utilisation. Sans entrer dans les détails, on peut mentionner:

1. L'hypothèse d'un conflit générateur suggérée par Paul Bois (1969).
2. L'hypothèse génétique de la construction des Etats et des clivages de Rokkan (1975, 1983)
3. L'hypothèse anthropologique de Todd (1981, 1983)

Un programme de recherche serait nécessaire pour trancher entre ces alternatives ou les articuler de manière pertinente. De toute manière, la cohérence de l'unité d'analyse est une condition à leur utilisation.

Mais il faut aussi souligner que l'explication des comportements politiques dépend du niveau d'analyse auquel on se situe. Par exemple, une analyse se basant sur la commune doit, outre ces grandes composantes régionales que nous venons d'esquisser, prendre en compte aussi des variations locales. En somme, le modèle sous-jacent peut se décrire de la manière suivante: un résultat s'explique par la combinaison des tendances régionales, des tendances locales et d'une dernière composante spécifique à cet objet, ou, si l'on préfère, comme la combinaison d'une composante structurelle et de variations conjoncturelles.

Notes

Je voudrais remercier ici mes collègues Françoise Galley, François Hainard, André Jeannin et Martin Schuler pour leurs excellent conseils et Eugène Horber pour beaucoup de discussions utiles et un programme d'analyse idéal pour ce type de problème. Bien sûr la responsabilité de ce texte reste pleinement mienne.

1) Voir par exemple à ce sujet SCHULER et JOYE (1985)

2) Ce terme désigne en Suisse les institutions de démocratie semi-directe, soit:

1. Les initiatives, proposition de modification constitutionnelle initiée par 100'000 citoyens.

2. Les contre-projets: contre proposition du parlement à une initiative populaire. Le double oui étant actuellement interdit, un contre-projet peut aussi être une tactique pour faire échouer une initiative.

3. Les référendums obligatoires: toute modification constitutionnelle doit être approuvée par la majorité des votants, dans l'ensemble du pays et dans la majorité des cantons.

4. Les référendums facultatifs: 50'000 citoyens peuvent demander qu'une loi, acceptée par les chambres, soit soumise au vote populaire.

3) Il suffit de consulter un atlas comme, par exemple, L'atlas structurel de la Suisse, à paraître en 1985.

4) Sanguin (1984) montre très bien ce principe qui veut que chaque région linguistique, chaque endroit conserve sa langue traditionnelle comme langue officielle, indépendamment des changements qui peuvent survenir ultérieurement.

5) Cf par exemple HORBER et JOYE (1979)

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6) Pour le secteur primaire, les facteurs expliquaient respectivement 89 et 10 %; pour le secteur secondaire, 83 et 13 %.

7) Le critère utilisé en l'occurrence a été que ce canton est un score supérieur à 0.3 sur cette composante à long terme.

8) Le canton du Jura n'existe que depuis 1978. Pour la plupart de ces analyses portant sur l'ensemble du siècle, je n'ai pas détaillé et considéré un canton de Berne englobant le Jura. Que les Jurassiens m'en excusent.

9) Uri est, pour ces élections, un cas spécial: alors qu'il s'agit d'un canton à majorité démocrate-chrétienne, il pratique une forme particulière de proportionnelle: deux députés démocrate-chrétien au conseil des Etats et un radical au national. Il faudrait en fait le considérer comme les autres cantons de Suisse centrale.

10) Voir, par exemple, GRUNER ET HERTIG(1983) ou JOYE et SCHULER (1984)

11) Il s'agit d'une analyse en composantes principales de la matrice variance-covariance, les variables étant la proportion d'acceptants.

12) Cf HORBER et JOYE (1981)

13) En l'occurrence, il s'agit d'une analyse de la matrice variance-covariance, les facteurs étant proportionnels à leur valeur propre.

14) Procédure stepwise de New Regression en SPSS. Toutes les autres analyses ont été effectuées par le logiciel EDA élaboré par E. Horber de l'université de Genève.

15) Si l'on mène une analyse au niveau des districts, on obtient des valeurs expliquées du même ordre de grandeur quoique un peu plus faible. Il est pourtant particulièrement important de souligner qu'une analyse de variance menée sur les résidus par la variable canton explique entre la moitié et les trois quarts de la variance résiduelle! Le canton est donc, à un niveau assez général d'étude, une unité intéressante.

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L'ACTION DES ESPACES LEGAUX SUR LE VOTE

Annie LAURENT.

L'ACTION DES ESPACES LEGAUX SUR LE VOTE (1)

L'espace est un enjeu. A ce titre il importe de le maîtriser et de l'investir. Pour cela, la loi organise les élections au sein de territoires d'organisation relativement stables dans le temps. Paradoxalement, l'analyse qui est faite des diverses consultations s'appuie sur d'autres types de territoires correspondant à des niveaux intermédiaires d'agrégation des votes. Ces procédés contribuent au "détournement territorial" (I), à l'occultation de la multiplicité des territoires intervenant dans l'élection (II), à l'ignorance des effets territoriaux sur la formation de l'opinion électorale (III).

I. - LE TERRITOIRE, UN CONCEPT DETOURNE EN ANALYSE ELECTORALE

En analyse électorale, le territoire est une donnée omniprésente, et intervient à plusieurs titres.

Tout d'abord au niveau des enjeux ; l'espace est un enjeu politique. Il s'agit pour le pouvoir et les forces politiques de maîtriser, d'investir, de conquérir ou de garder des lieux de pouvoir organisés sur la base du découpage, du maillage territorial (2). Cette préoccupation constante quelle que soit l'époque, d'une part éclaire les politiques et pratiques en matière de découpage électoral, d'autre part permet d'analyser sous un angle différent les nombreux débats sur les modes de scrutin. Il s'agit parfois moins de défendre ou proposer un mode de scrutin en ce qu'il est plus juste (proportionnel) ou plus efficace (majoritaire), qu'en ce qu'il permet ou non de gagner une élection voire des sièges, d'enrayer un mouvement national (mouvement boulangiste en 1881) (3) ou d'en rendre plus aisé son élargissement (4).

Par ailleurs, l'espace intervient directement dans l'élection par le biais de la question ou des questions posées aux électeurs. En effet, selon le type d'élection la question posée est unique ou multiple :

unique dans le cas d'élection présidentielle, du référendum ; multiple dès lors qu'il s'agit d'élections législatives, cantonales ou municipales. Dans ces cas, à chaque découpage correspond une gamme de choix particulière (5). Agréger les résultats à un niveau intermédiaire, région ou département, c'est donc occulter une des composantes essentielle du choix électoral. C'est aussi faire disparaître les variations spatiale et temporelle de ces offres électorales. Au total, cette méthode non seulement ampute une partie de la richesse et de la complexité de la formation du vote, mais peut même tendre à fausser les conclusions.

Enfin, l'approche territoriale s'est imposée en matière d'analyse électorale. Conformément aux premières études de géographie électorale réalisées par André Siegfried, chaque consultation fait l'objet d'une analyse de la répartition territoriale des sièges et des voix et de projections cartographiques de ces résultats. Sur cette base, on distingue et on oppose les régions électoralement stables à celles connaissant des transformations brutales ou progressives. On enregistre dans des territoires, les mutations et les glissements des comportements ... (6).

Il importe néanmoins de remarquer et de souligner que les territoires communément admis et utilisés dans ce cas, sont la région et surtout le département. Or ces territoires ne sont en aucune façon, du moins sous la Vème République, des lieux intervenant de quelque façon que ce soit dans le processus électoral. Ce sont des territoires "de commodité", dont la permanence d'utilisation est liée à deux aspects essentiels - celui d'une commodité comparative : le département est une unité d'autant plus commode qu'elle est utilisée depuis longtemps ; de ce fait, il autorise les comparaisons temporelles - commodité de visualisation des résultats : visualisation d'autant plus claire que les unités ne sont pas trop atomisées.

On ne peut que s'interroger sur les effets d'une telle prise en compte de la dimension spatiale. La simple constatation de l'existence de deux types de territoires, les uns créés et maintenus par la loi dans lesquels se déroulent les élections (circonscription, canton ...) les autres créés et maintenus par les électoralistes (département, région ...) ne suffit pas. Il importe d'en analyser les effets. Observons que peu, voire aucune étude, n'étudie les espaces créés par la loi, ou espaces d'organisation des élections. Ce seul fait tend à présupposer qu'ils

n'interviennent pas dans la formation de l'opinion et attitude électorales. En revanche, les comportements sont analysés au sein de territoires de commodité. Ce procédé tend non seulement à occulter le territoire ou les territoires d'organisation mais laisse à même à penser que ces unités départementales ou régionales sont porteuses d'une vie politique spécifique. Ce fait est parfois vérifié (Sarthe, Vendée ...) (7) mais n'est nullement généralisable.

Pourtant certains indices, couramment mis en évidence dans les différentes analyses électorales, montrent bien qu'il existe des manifestations territoriales du comportement électoral : le vote en milieu rural et milieu urbain reste différent ; la taille des communes, tant au niveau des configurations électorales offertes aux citoyens qu'au niveau résultats de la participation électorale (abstentionnisme plus marqué en milieu urbain ...) en constitue un second témoignage.

Ces manifestations territoriales, souvent mises en avant, n'ont cependant pas fait l'objet d'analyse systématique ; encore moins de recherche sur "l'effet territoire". Pour cela, il importe non seulement de cerner et préciser les espaces intervenant dans la formation de l'opinion politique mais aussi et surtout de les hiérarchiser et de les articuler. Au total, de construire un ou plusieurs systèmes d'interactions spatiales.

II. - LES ESPACES LEGAUX

Depuis l'instauration du suffrage universel, des règles légales définissent les conditions du vote et de la représentation politique. Elles organisent le vote au sein d'espace légaux, qu'on peut appréhender à trois niveaux.

• au niveau de l'opération de vote,

le cadre ainsi défini peut être considéré comme "espace matériel". Selon les époques, cet espace a changé : les trois premières élections au suffrage universel et celles de 1871 ont pour espace matériel le chef-lieu de canton. Depuis, le vote s'effectue au chef-lieu de commune. L'organisation matérielle du vote, définie par le lieu de vote, constitue un

élément important dans la formation de l'espace électoral. C'est ainsi par exemple que le déplacement en groupe des électeurs vers le chef-lieu de canton facilita la diffusion du mot d'ordre : "Votons tous pour les candidats de la paix". Par ailleurs, le lieu de vote, en général la mairie, et le bureau de vote, par le biais du personnel qui le compose ne constituent pas de simples procédures techniques. Ils peuvent aussi faire évoluer la perception administrative ou organisatrice en une réalité plus sociale et politique (8).

• au niveau du cadre territorial,

les votes sont agrégés permettant de passer des choix individuels aux choix collectifs. L'espace ainsi défini sera "l'espace d'agrégation". Contrairement à l'espace matériel, commun à l'ensemble des consultations électorales, l'espace d'agrégation varie :

- selon le type d'élection : ainsi, pour les élections au conseil général, l'espace d'agrégation n'est pas le département mais le canton. C'est en effet à ce niveau que sont choisis les membres de l'assemblée départementale ...

- selon le mode de scrutin : les élections législatives ont pour espace d'agrégation le département lorsque le scrutin est de liste, l'arrondissement ou la circonscription ad-hoc lorsque le scrutin est uninominal ...

Généralement, l'espace d'agrégation des diverses élections recouvre un espace administratif et/ou social : commune, département, arrondissement. En revanche, certains découpages ne sont que politiques : canton, circonscription ad-hoc ... et sont donc susceptibles d'être plus aisément modifiés. Cependant, le maintien dans le temps et l'étroitesse des cadres peuvent en transformer le contenu. Ainsi, le canton en milieu rural tend-il à rester un espace social, d'autant qu'il fut l'espace des grandes foires (9).

Ce n'est pas la seule coïncidence entre espace social, administratif ou politique qui rend l'espace d'agrégation déterminant dans l'ensemble de l'organisation, mais aussi le fait qu'à chaque espace d'agrégation correspond une "gamme de choix" ou une offre électorale

spécifique du point de vue des candidatures. Celle-ci pouvant tendre à déplacer les enjeux de l'élection.

- au niveau des enjeux,

L'espace institutionnel domine. Plus généralement, "l'espace institutionnel" peut être défini comme étant l'espace de la compétence de l'organe élu. Ainsi, l'espace institutionnel de l'élection cantonale est le département, tandis que l'espace d'agrégation est le canton ... Alors que les élections législatives se sont successivement déroulées dans des espaces d'agrégation différents (arrondissement, département, circonscription législative), l'espace institutionnel est resté stable : c'est celui du territoire national.

La multiplicité des espaces légaux organisant le vote, leur contenu variable selon les élections et les époques, tendent à rendre ces territoires inter-dépendants. En fait, l'espace institutionnel d'une consultation n'est pas nécessairement l'espace des enjeux. Les autres espaces, d'agrégation ou matériel, peuvent rentrer en concurrence avec l'espace institutionnel, le dominer, l'occulter, tendre même à rendre certains territoires autonomes, voire acquis à son représentant. En fait, les multiples territoires s'entrechoquent, se combinent, s'emboîtent et interviennent en permanence dans les comportements électoraux.

III. - EFFETS DES INTERACTIONS SPATIALES

Pour complexes que soient les liens entre ces multiples territoires, il est cependant possible d'établir une typologie des interactions. Cette méthode, en dépit de ses effets réducteurs et simplificateurs, permet de distinguer plusieurs types de relations entre territoires.

- des territoires acquis :

Plusieurs phénomènes se cumulent pour masquer l'espace institutionnel des élections, en dépit de l'impact des enjeux nationaux. L'un d'entre eux est la permanence des découpages électoraux (10). Le maintien dans le

temps d'un même découpage, d'un même cadre d'agrégation de l'élection permet l'enracinement, l'inscription spatiale des hommes et des courants d'opinion. Il conduit à la stabilité du personnel politique, à la création de véritables fiefs électoraux. Certains élus de la région Nord - Pas-de-Calais témoignent de cette stabilité du personnel politique. Ainsi Albert Denvers est sans discontinuité le député de la 11ème circonscription du Nord (Dunkerque) depuis 1958. C'est l'un des rares députés français constamment réélus depuis le début de la 5ème République. Des situations de ce type permettent aux électeurs de territorialiser leur comportement électoral et d'être moins soumis aux influences nationales. D'autre part, la permanence d'un découpage de l'espace ne fixe pas seulement les hommes. Elle peut aussi figer les rapports de forces entre les courants politiques et maintenir les équilibres locaux en l'état, indépendamment des évolutions nationales. Le maintien de territoires géographiquement stables suscite donc des comportements électoraux d'habitude et de fidélité. Des circonscriptions législatives peuvent même devenir héréditaires. Il en existe de nombreux exemples sous la 3ème République, et quelques-uns sous la 5ème République (MM. Abelin, Barrot, Médecin, Méhaignerie). Plus la circonscription est étroite plus l'aspect héréditaire se renforce. Le phénomène de la circonscription héréditaire concerne désormais essentiellement les élections cantonales et municipales (11). La territorialisation des comportements électoraux n'est pas seulement liée à ce seul aspect du maintien des découpages électoraux, elle est aussi imputable au cumul des mandats.

- des territoires emboîtés :

Un deuxième phénomène assure la domination de l'espace d'agrégation lorsque le député détient par ailleurs un ou plusieurs mandats locaux. La pratique du cumul des mandats développe le notabilisme politique et contribue à détacher l'élection de l'espace institutionnel. Elle renforce l'impact des préoccupations locales dans la détermination des comportements électoraux ; les électeurs apprécient l'avantage que donne un élu aux relations multiples et aux pouvoirs étendus (12).

Cette pratique augmente la longévité politique de l'élus en procurant une prime à la réélection par le renforcement mutuel des positions de pouvoir. Le mandat national s'ajoute au mandat local et celui-ci

renforce à son tour les chances de réélection au mandat national. Ainsi élu à diverses consultations, un homme politique dispose de plusieurs espaces personnels qui s'articulent et s'emboîtent le plus souvent harmonieusement. L'emboîtement de ces territoires enracine encore les comportements électoraux masquant ainsi les enjeux institutionnels.

Il ne faudrait pas en conclure, qu'un mandat acquis implique systématiquement la réussite à un autre type de consultation. Il existe aussi des territoires contestés voire refusés.

- des territoires contestés ou refusés

L'importance du facteur territorial éclate dès lors que l'on s'intéresse aux attaches personnelles des candidats. Il est admis que ces attaches facilitent considérablement l'élection. Chacun met en avant les liens directs (lieu de résidence ou d'exercice de la profession) ou indirects (lieu de naissance si le candidat ne réside plus sur place ...) qu'il entretient avec l'espace convoité. De ce fait, le parachutage est une pratique peu répandue et plus souvent vouée à l'échec.

A l'inverse, les attaches locales n'impliquent pas systématiquement la réussite à un autre type d'élection locale. Ainsi, Albert Denvers, député de la 11ème circonscription du Nord depuis 1958 (Dunkerque) et maire de Gravelines, n'a jamais pu s'imposer dans la principale commune de "sa" circonscription, Dunkerque. Battu en 1971, il obtiendra en revanche la présidence de la Communauté Urbaine de Dunkerque. De fait, deux pouvoirs s'opposent : celui de la ville de Dunkerque par le biais de J. Prouvoyeur, celui de la Communauté Urbaine avec Albert Denvers.

Enfin, la rivalité territoriale peut modifier l'enjeu de la consultation ; ainsi en est-il de l'élection européenne.

- des territoires occultés

Les élections européennes fournissent un bon exemple d'occultation de l'espace des enjeux :

L'espace institutionnel de l'élection européenne est l'Europe puisque c'est au niveau européen que se situe la compétence de l'institution qu'est l'assemblée européenne. En 1979, l'enjeu institutionnel a peu joué

Il a été occulté par l'espace national, celui des rapports de forces politiques existant dans les électorsats à la date du scrutin. A cette date, on a pu dire que "l'Europe ... semblait planer dans un espace onirique tandis que les intérêts nationaux quadrillaient l'espace réel où se déroulent les luttes politiques terre à terre" (13).

Cette occultation n'était pas spécifique à la France. Dans les autres pays membres de la communauté européenne, le même phénomène s'est produit. D'ailleurs, en 1984, il s'est reproduit.

Au total, la multiplicité des espaces et leurs interactions ont contribué à les rendre en concurrence parfois en conflit. Le mode de scrutin uninominal majoritaire à deux tours a progressivement contribué à simplifier la carte politique française par la bipolarisation des forces politiques. De ce fait, l'espace institutionnel, et plus largement celui des grandes institutions nationales, tend à dominer créant de véritables territoires d'identification. Ce mouvement s'inscrit lentement, il n'exclut cependant pas des résistances locales qui renvoient à d'autres types d'explications, culture locale, tradition, évolution économique ... Tous ces éléments peuvent constituer des références suffisamment fortes pour favoriser le maintien de comportements spécifiques, d'espaces électoraux autonomes (14).

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LILLE II.

NOTES

- (1) Cette contribution reprend une partie des hypothèses développées dans ma thèse : Espace et comportement électoral ; Etude à partir des résultats des élections législatives sous la Vème République dans la Région Nord - Pas-de-Calais.
C.R.A.P.S. - Lille II - soutenue à Grenoble, Mars 1983.
Elle s'appuie aussi sur une communication faite à Grenoble au Congrès de l'Association Française de Science Politique : "Elections et Territoire", Laurent (A), Thiébault (J.L.) et Wallon-Leducq (C.M.), Grenoble, 25-28 Janvier 1984.
- (2) Cf. notamment Raffestin (Cl.) : Pour une géographie du pouvoir. Librairies Techniques, Paris 1980.
- (3) A cette date, le retour du scrutin uninominal s'explique en grande partie par la volonté de briser au sein des circonscriptions un mouvement national, cf. Laurent, A. Thèse op.cité, p. 143 et suivantes.
- (4) Le processus est inverse. Il s'agit de ne plus briser un mouvement national au sein de petites unités (circonscription, canton ...). Cf. les discours de Gambetta, de Briand, celui du Général de Gaulle en 1949 (12 novembre 1949) : Discours et messages, tome III.
- (5) Cf. sur l'unicité de la question posée : Parodi (J.L.) : "Effets et non effets de l'élection présidentielle", Pouvoirs, 1980, n° 14.
Cf. sur la gamme des choix, Charlot (J) : "La fluidité des choix électoraux", R.F.S.P., 1975, n° 100.
Cf. sur l'offre électorale, Laurent, A., Wallon-Leducq, C.M. : "Offre élections et territoire", chapitre à paraître dans l'ouvrage consacré aux élections sous la direction de Gaxie (D). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985.

- (6) Siegfried (A) : Tableau politique de la France de l'ouest sous la IIIème République. Paris, A. Colin, 1913.
Goguel (F), Grosser (A) : La politique en France, Paris, A. Colin, 1980. Les annexes cartographiques autorisent un survol très saisissant des comportements électoraux français sur la longue durée, p. 246 à 263.
- (7) Bois (P) : Paysans de l'Ouest, Paris, Flammarion, 1971, 384 p.,
Tilly (Ch) : La Vendée - Révolution et Contre-Révolution, Paris, Ed. Fayard, 1970.
Bonnet (S) : Sociologie politique et religieuse de la Lorraine Paris, A. Colin, Cahiers de la F.N.S.P., n° 181.
- (8) Cf. Charnay (J.P.) : "La nature juridique du bureau de vote" in : Le suffrage politique en France, Paris, Edition Mouton, 1965. Le bureau de vote est théoriquement un organe de nature administrative accomplissant des actes soit matériels (ouverture, fermeture du scrutin) soit juridiques (admission des électeurs, validation des suffrages). Théoriquement le maire ou les représentants de la mairie ne sont pas là en tant que représentants de la commune mais en tant qu'organismes d'un service public. En fait, ces personnalités représentent aussi un pouvoir, un prestige qui ne leur est pas retiré le temps de l'opération électorale. C'est d'ailleurs parce que la composition du bureau de vote n'est pas neutre qu'elle a changé plusieurs fois au cours du temps.
- (9) En milieu urbain le canton n'est qu'un cadre électoral à la différence des zones rurales. En fait le canton a connu de multiples transformations. Il est né à l'origine du souhait de créer des collectivités plus vastes que les collectivités communales. Jusqu'au Directoire il est relégué au rang d'une simple circonscription électorale. En l'an IX il devient une circonscription judiciaire. A de rares occasions, il acquiert un contenu administratif : chaque unité nomme un agent communal chargé des liaisons techniques entre les maires et les services techniques.

- (10) Sur les découpages électoraux et sur leur stabilité, Cf. Lancelot (M.T. et A) : Atlas des circonscriptions électorales en France depuis 1875. Cahiers de la F.N.S.P., 1970 - Cf. également Laurent (A) : "L'effet-cadre - Principes de découpages et impacts sur les comportements électoraux" in : Espace, populations et société, n° 2, 1984.

- (11) Ce phénomène concerne l'ensemble des courants politiques y compris le parti communiste. Ainsi, à la mort d'Arthur Musmeaux, député de la 19ème circonscription du Nord de 1958 à 1968, sa fille Mme Lefebvre-Musmeaux tente de leur succéder. Elle ne sera pas élue mais depuis lors restera suppléante du député communiste. En revanche, elle lui succèdera au siège de conseiller général.

- (12) Dadas (D), Le cumul des mandats politiques dans le département du Nord. Mémoire de DEA, Université de Lille II, 1983.
 Dogan (CM), "La stabilité du personnel politique sous la IIIème République" in R.F.S.P., n° 2, 1953, p. 319 à 348.
 Mabilleau (A), Les facteurs locaux de la vie politique nationale, Pedone, 1972, 411 p.
 Medard (J.F.), "La recherche du cumul des mandats par les candidats aux élections législatives sous la Vème République" in : Les facteurs locaux de la vie politique nationale sous la direction de Mabilleau (A), op.cité.
 Reydellet (M), "Le cumul des mandats" in Revue de droit public et de la science politique, 1979, p. 693 et suivantes.

- (13) Lancelot (A) : "Europe numéro zéro. Les premières élections européennes des 7 et 10 Juin 1979" in : Projet, 1979, n° 138.

- (14) Thiébault (J.L.), Wallon-Leducq (C.M.), "Trois aspects des comportements politiques septentrionaux" in : Revue du Nord, 1982, n° 253, p. 605 à 635.
 Laurent (A), Wallon-Leducq (C.M.), "Permanence et érosion d'un bastion communiste - La 20ème circonscription du Nord" in : Revue Communisme, n° 4, 1984.
 L'hypothèse d'une résistance (forme de résistance et lieux de résistance) a été avancée dans le chapitre "offre, élection et territoire", Laurent (A), Wallon-Leducq (C.M.), op.cité.

ELECTION AND REFERENDA-CLEAVAGES IN CONTEMPORARY
SWITZERLAND: HISTORICALLY FREEZED SIMPLICITY VS.
VARIABLE COMPLEXITY ?

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I Introduction *

The analysis of institutionalized political behaviour in Switzerland has to take into account the existence of two fields of political articulation:

Voting behaviour (representative-democratic articulation). National elections are realized apart from a few constituencies which keep only one seat in the representative assembly according to the principle of proportional representation 1). Constituencies are the 26 cantons which differ moreover considerably in size and therefore in the number of deputies. Because the system of proportional representation claims no fixed minimum-strength a rather big number of political groups and parties may compete for electoral strength and seats in the representative assembly. This is the case above all in the biggest constituencies where owing to the great number of seats and the broad voter-potential also minor groups and parties have the chance to get a significant electoral strength. Consequently national elections in Switzerland are quite strongly 'territorialized' by the electoral districting. This effects probably not only the nationwide political-ideological party-cleavages but also the social functions of parties and political groups in the different cantons.

Referenda behaviour (plebiscitive-democratic articulation). National referenda appeal to very different socio-political circumstances and takes place in quite a high frequency 2). One part of these referenda consists of modifications of the constitution which have been decided by the parliament and which the citizens have to approve in a plebiscite. A further part of the referenda is realized about political proposals produced by the citizens themselves, especially about the 'people's initiative'. On the whole the content-specific plebiscites are quite meaningful for the development of the policies of the federal state - probably even more important than national elections. Referenda render possible the articulation of socio-political interests in a nation-wide field - that is a field which is not 'articulate-restricted' by elements of the electoral districting. Thus socio-political interest-cleavages probably correspond to the political-ideological party-cleavages only in a rather limited manner 3).

The empirical analyses presented in this paper base primarily on data of the communal level. Thus it is possible to take into account the variation of factors which cannot be independently operationalized on the regional or cantonal level

1) For further informations see for example Gruner (1984)

2) For further informations see for example Hertig (1984)

3) It is to be noticed that referenda behaviour in Switzerland has been analysed much more often than voting behaviour.

* special thanks for comments to colleague Rolf Ritschard (Swiss Federal Office of Statistics)

II Political-ideological party-cleavages

a) Cluster of parties and main political-ideological cleavages

We have mentioned above the fact, that the Swiss system of proportional representation produces a fairly high variety of political-ideological groups. The deputies elected in 1983 for example represent 15 parties. Although the national importance of some of these parties is rather small, these groups have to be considered in a systematic analysis too, because they may be not at all unimportant in particular cantons.

We distinguish five clusters of parties⁴⁾ (in parenthesis the electoral strength of the clusters on the national level in 1983):

- The Catholics (21%); this cluster comprises the Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Social Party.
- The Bourgeoisie (38%); This cluster comprises the Radical Party, the Liberal Party and the Swiss People's Party. The Swiss People's Party (12%) represents to a great extent the farmers and the petty Bourgeoisie. The Radical and the Liberal Party form together more the platform of the entrepreneurs and the white-collars, represent so above all the middle upper Bourgeoisie. But the split between the two 'blocks' is not perfect, because the Swiss People's Party is not represented in all cantons.
- The Left (28%); this cluster comprises primarily the Socialist party, furthermore all the parties and groups on the 'left' of the Socialists, so for example the Worker's Party and the Progressive Organizations.
- The Independents (10%); this cluster comprises above all the Alliance of the Independents, furthermore the Protestant People's Party and principal parts of the 'Green Movements'. All these groups are politically situated - when we apply the classical terminology - on the left of the Right and on the right of the Left.

4) For further informations about the Swiss parties and about the historical development of the party-system in Switzerland see for example Gruner (1977).

- The New Right (5%); this cluster comprises above all the National Action and the Republican Party - two groups which have gained electoral strength first of all in the context of the discussions about the 'foreigner question' in the late sixties and early seventies.

The electoral strength of the five clusters on the national level during the periods 1971/1975/1979/1983 is largely stable. The largest variations are to be noticed in connexion with the Independents and the New Right - both fairly heterogeneous and marginal groups.

In the following we analyse the correlations between the electoral strength of the discussed political-ideological clusters on the community level⁵⁾ (see table 1):

- The cluster 'Catholics' is negatively correlated with nearly all other clusters. This indicates the existence of an important political-ideological cleavage based on the religious differentiation which represents the central conflict-axis of the outgoing 19th century in Switzerland⁶⁾.
- The two factions of the cluster 'Bourgeoisie' are with each other negatively correlated. This indicates the existence of a relevant political-ideological cleavage between the petty and the middle upper Bourgeoisie. This cleavage has been formed in this manner in the twenties and thirties of the 20th century⁷⁾.
- The cluster 'Left' is - apart from the mentioned negative correlation with the catholic cluster - not connected in a systematic manner with the other clusters. Beside the ideological differences between the Right and the Left existing in Switzerland certainly

5) The analysis is based on the 1498 communities with more than 500 inhabitants which are situated in the medium sized or big cantons (cantons with five or more seats in the representative assembly). We exclude in this manner not only the cantons with simple majority rule (only one seat) but also the small cantons (2 or 3 seats) with proportional representation. So the cantons UR, SZ, OW, NW, GL, ZG, SH, AR, AI and JU or 157 communities with more than 500 inhabitants are excluded from the analysis.

6) It remains to be mentioned at this point that the formation of the Swiss nation was characterized by heavy - even military - conflicts between catholics and protestants.

7) The reasons for this political-ideological cleavage are without doubt structural interest-differences.

Table 1 correlations between party-clusters (elections 1983, 1979, 1975, 1971)

	Catholics	middle/upper Bourgeoisie	petty Bourgeoisie	Left	Independents	New Right
Catholics	.98 ^{a)}					
middle/upper Bourgeoisie	-.17 ^{b)} -.17 ^{c)} -.16 ^{d)} -.15 ^{e)}	.91				
petty Bourgeoisie	-.53 -.54 -.54 -.53	-.55 -.53 -.51 -.51	.97			
Left	-.53 -.54 -.56 -.55	.0 .07 .17 -.11	-.03 -.08 -.10 -.07	.82		
Independents	-.52 -.44 -.39 -.36	-.16 -.16 -.21 -.26	.30 .24 .21 -.11	.05 .04 .10 .10	.73	
New Right	-.50 -.26 -.40 -.43	-.29 -.36 -.38 -.15	.40 .44 .34 .09	.15 .03 .09 .21	.53 .45 .68 -.62	.45

a) auto. correlation 1983/1971 b) 1983 c) 1979 d) 1975 e) 1971

too there is on the socioecological level no systematic political-ideological class-cleavage.

- The clusters 'New Right' and 'Independents' are with each other positively correlated but otherwise rather independent from the two factions of the cluster 'Bourgeoisie'. This is above all caused by the predominant localization of these groups in the biggest cantons: Only in this contexts there is for the minor groups owing to the great number of seats a realistic chance to get a relevant electoral success.

In so far as it is not a question of relations with minor groups the pattern is largely constant over time. This points to the fact, that the electoral dynamic during the analysed periods is probably caused chiefly by the conjuncture of the Independents and the New Right.

The preceding analysis shows the existence of political-ideological cleavages. But the distinctiveness of these cleavages seems not to be overwhelming. This may be an adequate picture of a rather diffuse elite-structure, but is possibly caused by two circumstances:

- The relationship between two clusters may be not a linear one. In this case the preceding analysis fails to detect existing cleavages.
- Existing cleavages may be 'disturbed' by underlying factors. In this case these factors have to be identified and explicitly considered in the analysis.

Both aspects are analysed now in further details.

b) Political-ideological cleavages and configurations

In the following we discuss a typology of configurations which should describe the peculiarity of the political-ideological cleavages in contemporary Switzerland more accurately. Scheme 2 (see next side) presents the accomplished typological procedure which bases on the results of foregoing cluster-analyses. The horizontal axis marks - from the left to the right - the growing electoral importance of the catholic cluster, the vertical axis - from the bottom to the top - the increasing strength of the bourgeois cluster. The varying power of the Left is comprised within the cells formed by the horizontal and the vertical axis. So 19 first-order configurations are defined from which 8 are furthermore subdivided according to the strength of

Table 2 definition of party-configurations on communal level

Catholics									
0% - 20%		20% - 35%		35% - 50%		50% - 65%		65% - 100%	
17		18		24		26		27	
19		23		25					
15/16		13/14		11/12		21		22	
9/10		7/8		5/6		3/4		1/2	
40% +		30% - 40%		20% - 30%		0% - 20%			
Left		Left		Left		Left			
0% - 35%		35% - 50%		50% - 65%		65% - 100%			
Bourgeoisie									

the petty Bourgeoisie within the bourgeois group. The typology is constructed in such a manner, that low code-values mark high strength of the Bourgeoisie whereas high code-values indicate high importance of the Catholics. High electoral power of the Left may be found around intermediate code-values.

When we survey the categorical means (see table 3) so the following regularities are noticeable:

- The strength of the bourgeois cluster varies rather continuously from low to high values. The Bourgeoisie may be marginal but hardly drops under 20% electoral strength. The two factions of the bourgeois cluster don't show the same pattern: The Swiss People's Party, the platform of the petty Bourgeoisie, gets the highest strength there, where the catholic block is weak - a fact which has been detected already in Table 1. The same is not correct in connexion with the middle upper Bourgeoisie. There exists quite a number of configuration where middle/upper Bourgeoisie and Catholics are together of some importance. This specifies the zero-correlation mentioned in the preceding analysis.
- The strength of the catholic cluster shows in broad outline a bimodal distribution, whereby very high strength may be found only in a few categories. The religious cleavage discussed above is therefore primarily caused by the high concentration of the Catholics.
- The strength of the left shows a fairly continuous distribution too, but the variation in absolute terms is fairly small - not to compare with the dispersion of the bourgeois block. This indicates, that the Left in Switzerland is considerably 'decentralized' - a fact which is without doubt a consequence of the decentralized industrialization-process in Switzerland. So the absence of a class-cleavage in the initial correlation analysis is understandable: There are different class-cleavages which extinct each other whenever settings like in table 1 are analysed.

The eta coefficients indicate a very good fit between the categorial clustering and the strengt of the groups of parties in 1983. The fit diminishes slightly, when the variables of the elections 1979, 1975 or 1971 are linked with the typology for 1983 - nevertheless the

Table 3 Means of the communal party-configurations on the party-clusters (election 1983)

code-value	N	Bourgeoisie	middle/upper Bourgeoisie	petty Bourgeoisie	Catholics	Left	Independents	New Right
1	67	75	8	68	1	13	7	4
2	28	73	63	10	5	15	5	2
3	17	69	13	56	2	23	4	2
4	36	69	58	11	2	23	5	1
5	41	58	14	44	7	14	16	5
6	34	57	45	12	9	15	14	5
7	60	57	12	45	2	25	10	6
8	69	59	50	9	5	26	8	2
9	36	55	15	40	1	35	5	4
10	51	56	48	8	3	34	6	1
11	48	45	15	30	6	22	20	7
12	73	43	28	15	10	24	17	6
13	47	43	12	31	2	35	13	7
14	64	42	30	12	8	35	11	4
15	36	42	11	31	2	45	6	3
16	62	42	31	11	4	45	6	3
17	55	28	21	7	15	47	7	3
18	57	30	23	7	20	36	9	5
19	39	30	21	10	24	26	15	5
20	43	50	39	11	28	14	6	2
21	74	43	37	6	27	28	3	0
22	89	42	38	4	41	15	2	0
23	51	30	21	9	46	16	6	1
24	73	26	20	6	42	28	3	1
25	102	28	25	3	57	12	3	0
26	38	18	14	4	56	25	1	0
27	108	15	14	1	76	8	1	0
eta		.95	.84	.91	.97	.94	.77	.68

stability is striking.

We don't discuss at this point the specificities of the particular configurations in further details; we only recapitulate briefly the central lines of the categorization: The categories 1-14 are characterized by a declining dominance of the bourgeois block first of all in favour of the Left, to some extent also for the benefit of the Independents. In the categories 15+16 the power of the Left and the Bourgeoisie ist equivalent; the Left becomes finally the dominant group in category 17. Till this point the importance of the catholic group is only a minor one. This changes with the transition to the pluralistic categories 18+19. The strength of the Catholics grows in the following first up to the bourgeois-catholic dualism (category 22), furthermore in the direction to increasing catholic dominance (23-27).

c) Political-ideological cleavages and subnational fragmentation

The typology presented above comprises the electoral strength of the distinguished party-clusters very well but gives no satisfactory answer to the question, why the correlations between the party-clusters in the initial analysis are fairly weak. The principal cause for this fact is the 'territorialization' of Switzerland in cantons with a particular, historically freezed elite-configuration respectively voting-opportunity-structure. Table 4 (see next side) presents the correlations between the four most important party-clusters on communal level within each canton. The cantons are ordered according to the strength of the Catholics on cantonal level in several groups. The quite big variation of the relation-patterns is apparent:

A high or very high electoral strength of the Catholics on the cantonal level is associated with a strong intracantonal cleavage between the Catholics and the Bourgeoisie (if present with a independent organization especially the petty Bourgeoisie). This is a relation which still marks the dominant conflict-pattern of the outgoing 19th. century, that is the situation of the so-called 'Kulturkampf'. With decreasing strength of the Catholics the cleavage bet-

Table 4 correlations between party-clusters within 15 cantons (election 1983)

groups of cantons	% Catholics on cantonal level	correlations within cantons on communal level					
		N	middle/upper Bourgeoisie	Catholics petty Bourgeoisie	Left	middle/upper Bourgeoisie	Left petty Bourgeoisie
Catholics very high	VS	58	-.85		-.50	.10	
	LU	50	-.81		-.60	.02	
	FR	46	-.58	-.57	-.28	-.31	-.06
Catholics high	SG	41	-.84		-.70	.23	
	TI	34	-.66		-.46	-.33	
	GR	33	-.76	-.86	-.68	.29	.37
Catholics medium	SO	27	-.44		-.70	-.33	
	AG	22	-.36	-.52	-.70	.21	-.03
	TG	22	-.33	-.50	-.32	.50	-.57
Catholics low	BE	2	(.21) ^{a)}	(-.39)	(.04)	.45	-.81
	ZH	9	.14	-.61	.38	-.25	-.54
	BL	11	.15	-.62	-.33	-.39	-.21
	VD	5	(-.47)	(.10)	(-.19)	-.58	(-.31)
	NE	24				-.95	
	GE	12	-.28		-.22	-.84	

a) strength of a party-cluster on cantonal level $\leq .58$

ween Catholics and middle/upper Bourgeoisie disappears - but not the cleavage between Catholics and petty Bourgeoisie (this cleavage is relevant also under the condition of catholic marginality).

The cleavage between the Catholics and the Left varies on the whole in a similar manner. But it is to be noticed, that this cleavage takes the strongest distinction where the electoral strength of the Catholics on the cantonal level is intermediate. In this field has to be observed so 'shift' from the Catholics-Bourgeoisie- to the Catholic-Left-cleavage. This occurs above all in strongly industrialized, religiously divided cantons as SG, SO and AG.

When the electoral strength of the Catholics on the cantonal level is high or very high, there is no electoral class-cleavage between the Bourgeoisie and the Left (but as mentioned: a relevant Catholics-Left cleavage). In this situation the conflict between the Bourgeoisie and the Left is very probably attenuated by the common anticlerical position. A strong Bourgeoisie-Left-cleavage on the contrary exists in the protestant cantons of the french part of Switzerland, that is within the cantons VS, NE and GE. In the intermediate range, where the Bourgeoisie is throughout divided in the two factions, there is a homogeneous electoral cleavage between the petty Bourgeoisie and the Left but not in the same manner between the Left and the middle/upper Bourgeoisie. In the latter case exists different relationships: On the one hand a weak cleavage in the cantons SO, BL and ZH; on the other hand a fairly strong coexistence in the cantons TG and BE.

The electoral cleavage-structure varies thus not at all inconsiderably between the cantons. A consequence of this fact is the following: Some aspects of the structural differentiation are in the particular cantons differently associated with the same political-ideological groups. Table 5 (see next side) presents some indications which have to be interpreted in this context:

The electoral strength of the Catholics is homogeneously (positively) associated with the proportion of catholics in the population - at least in the cantons in which the Catholics are not the 'hegemonial' group and/or in which the population is not nearly on the whole catholic. A homogeneous pattern also exists in connexion with the petty Bourgeoisie: The strength is high in communities with a tra-

Table 5 correlations between party-clusters (election 1983) and selected background-variables (1980)

groupes of cantons	cantons	N	middle/upper Bourgeoisie			petty Bourgeoisie			Left			Catholics
			RES ^{c)}	WOR ^{b)}	EMP ^{c)}	RES	WOR	EMP	RES	WOR	EMP	CAT ^{d)}
Catholics very high	VS	85	.25	-.31	-.14				-.40	.08	.47	<u>.48</u> f)
	LU	87	-.22	.27	.08				-.73	.10	.82	<u>.52</u> f)
	FR	77	.19	.04	-.21	.29	-.21	-.10	-.63	.11	.50	<u>.60</u> f)
Catholics high	SG	87	.11	-.06	-.10				-.63	.36	.56	.90
	TI	106	.02	-.17	.15				.01	.0	.0	<u>.32</u> f)
	GR	61	-.09	-.20	.30	.13	-.26	.09	-.46	.22	.39	.88
Catholics medium	SO	85	.50	-.13	-.29				-.49	.0	.41	.80
	AG	179	-.41	-.10	.41	.36	.10	-.36	-.56	.35	.16	.92
	TG	67	-.65	.50	.63	.82	-.70	-.70	-.67	.50	.66	.88
Catholics low	BE	258	-.63	.26	.59	.89	-.50	-.74	-.76	.66	.47	(.82)
	ZH	150	-.25	-.59	.72	.83	-.05	-.64	-.69	.54	.09	.68
	BL	52	-.37	-.25	.46	.79	.19	-.68	-.25	.54	-.31	.85
	VD	125	.38	-.44	.01	(.52) ^{e)}	(-.07)	(-.35)	-.61	.64	-.10	(.58)
	NE	24	.69	-.60	-.30				-.67	.69	.17	
	GE	39	.69	-.31	-.14				-.80	.51	.09	

a) proportion employees

b) proportion workers

c) proportion in work not employees or workers

d) proportion catholics

e) strength of a party-cluster on cantonal level $\chi^2/53$

f) high catholic homogeneity

ditional social structure, low on the contrary in communities with a high proportion of white-collars, that is in modern social structures.

Similarly (culturally or structurally) homogeneous pattern don't exist in connexion with the middle/upper Bourgeoisie and the Left: When the electoral strength of the Catholics on the cantonal level is high or very high (and therefore the within-situation is characterized by a strong Catholics-Bourgeoisie-cleavage) there are no systematic associations with the structural differentiation. The electoral importance of the Bourgeoisie is in this case obviously first of all (opposite to the catholic pattern) culturally determined. This changes when the electoral strength of the Catholics diminishes. In this field there are strong associations with the structural differentiation - especially positive relationships with the proportion of employees. But this takes place only under the condition, that the Bourgeoisie is splitted in the two factions. If there is not partition, the association-pattern is the same as in connexion with the petty Bourgeoisie.

Altogether strong relations with the structural differentiation are to be noticed in connexion with the electoral power of the Left. But the pattern is not a homogeneous one: Under the condition of high or very high electoral strength of the Catholics on the cantonal level the importance of the Left is big above all in the modern structures (positive relationships with the proportion of employees). The Left 'represents' in this case (as a sort of modernizing agent?) obviously the structurally central elements of the intracantonal sociooecologic system. This is not true within the canton TI, where no one party-group is in any way associated with the structural differentiation. But the pattern changes in the cantons with low electoral strength of the Catholics. In this field the electoral power of the Left is above all positively related with the proportion of workers - as it may be expected in the 'classical' perspective.

Obviously the four groups of cantons distinguished in tables 4 and 5 represent fairly important 'markers' with regard to the variation of voting-cultures on the cantonal level. Thus the association

between the configuration-typology developed above and the belonging to the four groups of cantons is fairly high (cramer's $v = .54$). But the specific elite-structure of a community is not at all a simple reflex of the electoral 'territorialization' on the cantonal level. The same configuration-types on the communal level may be observed in different groups of cantons - even if the meaning of this configuration is not always the same. Indications in this direction are given in the further analysis.

III Socio-political interest-cleavages

a) Cluster of issues and social interest-cleavages

It is a peculiarity of the Swiss system that the citizens may articulate socio-political interests on the national level not only every fourth year in elections but also - and more frequently - in referenda. Between 1971 and 1983 (four national elections) there are more than hundred nation-wide referenda. The outcomes of these referenda give a lot of informations about the specific socio-political interest of cantons, regions and communities.

The systematic analysis of the outcomes of all referenda between 1970 and 1982 on regional level detects seven 'consolidated' dimensions which may be considered as the central socio-political interest-cleavages in contemporary Switzerland⁸⁾. It is obvious, that the dimensional extension of the referenda-articulation is distinctly broader as the dimensional extension of the election-articulation. When the citizens have to decide about specific issues without restriction dues to the subnational electoral districting, then the result is a fairly broad complex interest-differentiation.

8) For more detailed informations about this type of analysis on cantonal level see Joye (1984) + Nef (1980); on regional and communal level see Nef/Ritschard (1983), Nef/Rosenmund (1984) + Nef (1985).

Table 6 (see next side) presents a cut of the factor analysis of 22 referenda on the communal level. The computation comprises issues which have been selected according to their dimensional centrality in the analysis of the complete set on the regional level. We discuss only the four dimensions which are furthermore analysed in connexion with other factors:

The first factor is constituted by the referenda 'research-promotion', 'university-subvention', 'women's suffrage', 'separation church/state' and 'equal wages man and woman'. These issues are particularly concerned with the varying importance of modern respectively traditional values. Agreement to these referenda reveals on the one hand preferences for a more egalitarian access to values, on the other hands preferences for the innovation of values and fields of activity. The first factor is interpreted as interest-cleavage about new values.

The second factor is constituted above all by the referenda 'health-insurance', 'property-tax' and 'labour-participation'. These issues are related to the classical problem of distribution, that is the different availability of existential or material goods. Agreement to these referenda reveals preferences for a more egalitarian distribution of material and social goods. The issues 'consumer-protection' is localized in this context too. A further group of issues 'prohibition export of arms', 'stop nuclear power-stations' and (with opposite loading) 'modification penal law' marks somewhat second order distribution conflict. The second factor is interpreted as interest-cleavage about social equality.

The third factor is constituted by the referenda 'regional planning' and 'tax-standardization'. These issues are related to the material exchange between the central (or federal) state on the one hand and cantons respectively communities on the other. Therewith is the exchange structure between the regions, the centre-periphery-problem raised too. Agreement to these issues reveals preferences for increasing authority of the central state regarding material regulation and intervention at the expense of cantons and communities. The third factor is interpreted as interest-cleavage about structural centralism.

Table 6 varimax rotated factor analysis of 22 nation-wide referenda - communities with population > 500 - factor loadings

year	issue-content	new values	social equality	structural centralism	•	•	•
1973	research-promotion	.84	.42	.16	.26	.52	-.41
1978	university-subvention	.83	.35	.20	.38	.46	-.47
1971	women's suffrage	.79	.54	-.06	.17	.34	-.42
1980	separation church/state	.75	.29	.47	-.22	.15	-.20
1981	equal wages man + woman	.71	.55	.31	-.06	.35	-.53
1972	association-tréaty EEC	.65	.23	.20	.37	.43	-.52
1974	health-insurance	.52	.86	.20	.18	.09	-.12
1977	property-tax	.21	.83	.40	-.18	-.08	.18
1979	labour-participation	.45	.82	.46	.18	.04	.09
1972	prohibition export of arms	.43	.71	.17	.14	.03	-.30
1979	stop nuclear power-stations	.09	.71	-.09	-.12	-.10	-.31
1981	consumer-protection	.56	.65	.64	.03	.30	-.25
1982	modification penal law	-.32	-.60	.01	-.15	.42	-.25
1976	tax-standardization	.17	.47	.80	-.18	.04	.10
1976	regional planning	.53	.15	.79	-.02	.42	-.23
1973	stop prohibition Jesuits	-.03	-.01	-.16	.93	.00	-.05
1977	purchase-tax	.31	.07	.17	.14	.78	-.15
1981	federal finances	.09	-.06	.31	-.14	.77	-.45
1976	law broadcasting + TV	.25	-.16	-.38	.22	.67	-.31
1980	provision article of food	.39	.01	.50	-.08	.62	-.32
1970	immigration-limitation	-.47	.02	-.10	-.28	-.30	.76
1982	foreigner-rights	.32	.08	-.01	.11	.38	-.84

b) Ideological party- and social interest-cleavages

The final analysis links voting and referenda behaviour. Thereby the referenda behaviour (that is the communal agreement-proportion of the above selected issues) is conceived as the dependent variable, whereas the voting behaviour (the communal party-configurations), the cantonal membership of the communities and the communal social structure are considered as independent complex. We are especially interested in the effect of the communal party-configuration, that is in the pattern of correspondence between political-ideological party-cleavages on the one hand and socio-political interest-cleavages on the other. The not at all unimportant influences of the structural factors have to be considered explicitly in the model, but are at this point not discussed in further details⁹⁾.

Worth of supplementary interest however is the effect of the cantonal membership of the communities. Beyond the religious differentiation which has been already discussed there is in Switzerland an important linguistic variety between groups of cantons too. Both aspect of cultural differentiation - combined in typologies of political cultures¹⁰⁾ - influences strongly the images which people keep about social and political processes in Switzerland¹⁰⁾ and consequently likewise articulated socio-political preferences. For the purpose of the analysis presented here we conceive the political-cultural 'territorialization' in Switzerland on the makro level as follows:

	electoral strength of the Catholics			
	very high	high	medium	low
German speaking	LU	GR SG	AG SO TG	BS BL BE ZH
French speaking	FR VS			GE NE VD
Italian speaking		TI		

9) see Nef (1985)

10) see Meier-Dallach/Rosenmund (1978) + (1982)

Former analyses of referenda behaviour in Switzerland prove fairly important effects of the intercantonal cultural differentiation. But are there still significant cultural effects of this kind if the political-ideological party-cleavages are considered in the model too?

Table 7 (see next page) presents a cut of the determination-model. There are obviously different combinations of the two at this point central variables: The interest-cleavages about new values is influenced stronger by the general political culture than by the specific communal party-configuration. General political culture and communal party-configuration show the same effects in connection with the interest-cleavage about structural centralism. Finally, the interest-cleavage about social equality is first of all influenced by the distribution of party-configurations. Thus, the general political culture of the makro-regions in Switzerland has indeed independent and with regard to the strength fairly homogeneous effects. Political-cultural differentiations are not reducible to intercommunal political-ideological party-cleavages. The effects of these party-cleavages vary in strength strongly between different types of socio-political interest-cleavages.

We now discuss briefly specific categorial deviations:

The independent effect of the party-configurations on the issue 'university-subvention' (that is the interest-cleavage about new values) is on the whole fairly weak. Nevertheless, the preferences for new values are attenuated somewhat in communities with a high (petty)Bourgeoisie-dominated party-configuration. The preferences for new values are, however, slightly raised in communities with a Left-dominated or a Bourgeoisie-Left-balanced party-configuration. The influence of the general political culture is primarily caused by the linguistic factor: The preferences for new values are attenuated in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, however strongly raised in the French- and Italian-speaking parts. This marks an important political-cultural differentiation between a value-innovative (French and Italian parts) and a rather value-

Table 7 multivariate analysis of variance on communal level - selected variables and categorial deviations from the grand mean

indep. varia.	N	code- value	label	new values	social equality	structural centralism
communal party-configurations	67	1	75/01/13 * a)	-.45	-.21	-.70
	28	2	73/05/15	-.20	-.85	-.43
	17	3	69/02/23 *	-.24	.13	-.77
	36	4	69/02/23	-.31	-.28	-.30
	.	.				
	36	9	55/01/35 *	.07	.34	-.12
	51	10	56/03/34	-.13	.15	.28
	.	.				
	36	15	42/02/45 *	-.14	.91	-.10
	62	16	42/04/45	.23	.87	.62
	55	17	28/15/47	.44	1.33	.78
	57	18	30/20/36	.14	.22	.45
	.	.				
	73	24	26/42/28	.22	.34	.20
	102	25	28/57/12	-.03	-.69	-.25
38	26	18/56/25	.06	-.26	-.09	
108	27	15/76/08	.15	-.53	-.39	
beta				.22	.55	.37
political-cultural makro regions	87	German + Cathol. very high		-.06	-.90	-.44
	148	German + Cathol. high		-.31	-.22	.24
	331	German + Cathol. medium		-.28	-.26	.08
	460	German + Cathol. low		-.29	.04	.25
	162	French + Cathol. very high		.42	.10	-.61
	204	French + Cathol. low		.57	.42	-.49
	106	Italian		.78	.71	.57
	beta				.40	.36
grand mean ^{b)}				.0	.0	.0
multiple R squared (all variables)				.76	.59	.67

a) categorial means (see table 3) %Bourgeoisie/%Catholics/%Left ; * = petty Bourgeoisie dominant within the Bourgeoisie

b) dependent variables z-standardized

new values = issue 'university-subvention

social equality = issue 'property-tax'

structural centralism = issue 'regional planning'

traditional (German part) political culture which is not reducible to political-ideological party-cleavages.

The independent effect of the party-configurations on the issue 'property-tax' (that is the interest-cleavage about social equality) is fairly strong. The preferences for social equality are attenuated above all in the communities with a high (middle/upper) Bourgeoisie-dominated party-configuration. The preferences however are strongly raised in communities with a Left-dominated or a Bourgeoisie-Left-balanced party-configuration. High electoral strength of the Catholics . . . attenuate the preferences for social equality too. Again, the effect of the general political culture is caused primarily by the linguistic differentiation: The preferences for social equality are attenuated in the German-speaking part of Switzerland however raised in the French- and Italian-speaking parts. But the pattern is not as homogeneous as observed above in connection with the interest-cleavage about new values: Obviously, the religious differentiation within the linguistic groups is fairly important, because at least a very high electoral strength of the Catholics attenuates considerably the preferences for social equality (with reference to the mean of the linguistic groups). This marks on the one hand an important political-cultural differentiation between a socio-conflictive (French and Italian parts) and a rather socio-harmonic (German part) political culture. On the other hand, the same political-cultural differentiation exists between the protestant, respectively religiously mixed, and the strongly Catholics-dominated parts of Switzerland.

The independent effect of the party-configurations on the issue 'regional planning' (that is the interest-cleavage about structural centralism) takes a medium level. The preferences for structural centralism are attenuated above all in communities with a high (petty) Bourgeoisie-dominated party-configuration. There is a such effect even in communities with a Bourgeoisie-Left-balanced party-configuration. The preferences for structural centralism reach the maximum in com-

munities with a Left-dominated configuration. A high electoral strength of the Catholics attenuates the discussed preferences too, but not to the same extent as it is the case in the 'opposite', highly petty Bourgeoisie-dominated pole. The influence of the general political culture is no longer primarily caused by the linguistic differentiation: The preferences for structural centralism are attenuated in the French-speaking but not at all in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland. Furthermore the preferences for structural centralism are raised only in the German-speaking groups of cantons which are not characterized by a very high electoral strength of the Catholics. This marks on the one hand a political-cultural differentiation between a rather centralism-oriented (majority of the German-speaking part) and a strongly federalism-oriented (French part) political culture. On the other hand there is obviously a federalism-oriented 'alliance' between the French-speaking and the very highly Catholics-dominated parts of German-speaking Switzerland.

Therewith an important effect of the party-configurations on social-political interest-cleavages may be found only in situations which are characterized politically by a strong conflict between the Left and all other groups. In such situations exists a sharp socio-political interest-cleavage which is not at all evident on the level of the general political-ideological party-cleavages (see table 1).

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La géographie des forces politiques en Grèce
depuis 1974

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I. Plusieurs scrutins, de différents types, ont eu lieu en Grèce depuis la chute de la dictature militaire en Juillet 1974. Trois élections législatives – celles de 1974, de 1977 et de 1981 –, un référendum sur la question de la monarchie, deux élections pour le Parlement Européen – en 1981 et en 1984 –, et trois élections municipales – celles de 1975, de 1978 et de 1982 – fournissent un vaste ensemble des données pour l'analyse de la géographie électorale, des ses transformations et des mutations importantes du système des partis.

La principale caractéristique qui se dégage de cette série des consultations électorales est, sans doute, les variations impressionnantes de préférences partisans. La montée irrésistible du Parti Socialiste – PASOK – de 13,58% en 1974 à 48,07% en 1981, constitue l'exemple le plus frappant, mais il faut aussi souligner les deux autres importantes mutations de cette période qui sont : le glissement de la Nouvelle Démocratie qui est tombé de 54,37% en 1974 à un niveau inférieur à 30% en 1981, à 38,10% en 1984), et la l'effacement complet de la droite centriste traditionnelle qui, après avoir constitué en 1974 la principale force de l'opposition, a été vu réduit par la suite à un pourcentage inférieur à 10% et divisé, en plus, en quatre partis.

L'aboutissement de ces mutations électorales, qui accompagnent le processus de restructuration du système des partis, a été, à partir du début des années '80, la consolidation d'un tripartisme quasi-absolu : la Nouvelle Démocratie (N.D.), à droite, le PASOK et le P.C.G. ont totalisé le 94,67% des voix aux élections de 1981 (et le 91,30% aux récentes élections européennes) et monopolisent actuellement la représentation parlementaire. Ainsi chacune de trois familles

politiques traditionnelles s' est trouvée à nouveau unifiée - d' une manière un peu forcée parfois - comme s' était le cas aussi avant la dictature. En plus le fait que la force électorale - et sa repartition géographique - des principaux partis politiques aux récentes élections ne semblent pas très éloignées de celles de leurs partis - mères respectifs à la veille de la dictature militaire montre que, malgré les transformations, existent certaines constantes électorales et politiques qui donnent aux affrontements partisans d' aujourd' hui une image déjà vieille de 20 ans.

Les racines historiques du tripartisme actuel remontent même beaucoup plus loin, c.à.d. aux deux clivages dominants de la première moitié du 20ème siècle; au Schisme National de 1915-1922 et à la Guerre Civile qui a suivi la libération du pays de l' occupation allemande et elle a duré jusqu' à 1944. c' est l' articulation de ces deux clivages qui a formé et consolidé après la Guerre le système triparti, dont l' existence est le plus souvent considérée, dans le langage politique courant, comme une presque évidence.

On pourrait certes répliquer que le tripartisme actuel est, à plusieurs points de vue, radicalement différent du tripartisme prédictatorial: les trois partis qui dominent aujourd' hui la vie politique ont été créés - ou légalisés après une longue période d' ostracisme - en septembre 1974 et ils ont, tous les trois, essayé, avec obstination, d' imposer une image politique et idéologique qui soit en plusieurs points différents de celle des partis prédictatoriaux respectifs. En plus, les trois partis actuellement dominants, ont eu à affronter chacun dans son espace politique traditionnel, des partis concurrents et leur victoire n' a été ainsi que l' aboutissement des conflits intérieurs, parfois très durs, qui ont transformé de manière plus ou

moins radicale, l' image politique de chaque parti, par rapport à son héritage prédicteurial. Enfin, et ce qui est peut-être le plus important, les clivages du passé en temps que facteurs déterminants des préférences politiques, ont perdu leur force institutionnelle et symbolique avec, d' une part, l' abolition de la monarchie et, d' autre part, la légalisation du P.C.G. et la "reconnaissance" de la Résistance.

Mais les remarques précédentes ne font que poser, avec plus d' acuité, la question de la balance entre continuité et changement - vis à vis de la période prédicteuriale - surtout au niveau de l' implantation électorale de différentes forces politiques.

11. Les deux transformations principales qui ont marqué, vis à vis de la période prédicteuriale, la gauche communiste ont été, d' une part, la légalisation du Parti Communiste et d' autre part sa scission en deux partis rivaux. La scission posait en fait, presque automatiquement, la question de la représentation politique de la gauche communiste, revendiquée par les deux partis, question qui revêtait avec intensité dès les premières élections postdictatoriales de 1974. Le P.C.G. et le P.C.G. (int.), malgré leur collaboration, sous l' étiquette de "Gauche Unifiée", ont essayé, d' une manière absolue et systématique, à mobiliser leurs forces par le biais des votes préférentiels. Le rapport des forces qui en est sorti - 5,2% pour le P.C.G., 3,3% pour le P.C.G. (int.), 1% sans préférence précisée - et qui a été dans ses grandes lignes vérifié par les élections municipales de 1975, peut être considéré comme un reflet assez fidèle de la situation qui

existait pendant les premiers mois après la chute de la dictature.

Trois ans plus tard, aux élections de 20.11.1977, ce rapport de force a été totalement différent. Le P.C.G., se présentant seul, a rassemblé 9,36% de voix, tandis que le P.C.G(int.) – en collaboration avec quatre autres petits partis – n' a recueilli que 2,72%. La première cause de ce résultat était le rassemblement par le P.C.G. de la très grande partie de l' électorat communiste traditionnel, qui en 1974, fluctuait encore entre les deux partis. Le résultat de 1977, a donc consacré l' hégémonie du P.C.G., non seulement au niveau des chiffres absolus mais aussi, et surtout, en faisant de lui le seul et unique représentant de la tradition communiste, au niveau de la base électorale. Les élections de 1981 n' ont fait que consolider et amplifier cette hégémonie.

Les conséquences de cette évolution sur le plan de la géographie électorale a été un retour du P.C.G. vers les racines profondes si éloignées dans le temps de son implantation électorale: dans les points forts de la carte électorale du P.C.G. renvoient sans difficulté, à son implantation électorale pendant l' entre-deux-guerres ou pendant les premières années après la guerre civile, on peut noter, comme signe évident de cette stabilité géographique, que le P.C.G., à part la région d' Athènes et Salonique, n' a élu des députés (aux élections de 1977 et de 1981) qu' en trois circonscriptions électorales: celles de Larissa, de Magnésie et de Lesbos, il s' agit des départements qui étaient élire des députés communistes déjà depuis la période de l' entre-deux-guerres.

Mais cette stabilité géographique impressionnante de la carte du P.C.G. ne doit pas cacher certaines mutations importantes

qu' on peut observer, surtout aux élections de 1981 et de 1984. La première remarque à faire est que l' augmentation de la force électorale de P.C.G. (en 1981 et en 1984) se situe dans les régions de sa faible implantation, tandis qu' il reste stationnaire là où il possède déjà une forte présence et où la gauche possédait, avant la dictature une forte implantation électorale. En comparant la carte électorale du P.C.G. (en 1981) et la carte électorale de la gauche avant la dictature on voit que le P.C.G. a déjà dépassé le niveau de la gauche dans les régions de sa faible implantation mais il reste à un niveau très inférieur dans les régions de forte implantation, surtout dans la région d' Athènes et dans la Grèce de Nord. Il est aussi frappant de noter qu' aux élections de 1981 le P.C.G. progresse partout - aussi bien en régions rurales qu' en régions urbaines - avec seulement une demi-douzaine d' exceptions; il s' agit des six villes à forte implantation communiste depuis longtemps et dont les trois sont même dirigées par un maire communiste depuis 1970.

Dans le même sens on peut aussi noter qu' aux récentes élections européennes, de 1984, le P.C.G. s' est montré stationnaire, et il a même reculé dans les deux grandes régions urbaines, d' Athènes et de Salonique; évolution qui contraste avec celle du reste du pays. Et ce résultat est d' autant plus significatif quand on le compare avec les résultats des élections municipales, qui, elles, répercutent beaucoup mieux la tradition électorale du P.C.G.

	Force électorale de P.C.G. dans la région d' Athènes
Législatives 1981	16,40%
Municipales 1982	(environ) 29%
Européennes 1984	15,86%

III. En ce qui concerne l' espace politique conservateur, l' apparition en 1974 d' un nouveau parti, de la Nouvelle Démocratie, a été souvent considéré comme un point de rupture radicale qui pourrait mener à la transformation de la Droite traditionnelle à un Centre-Droit beaucoup plus proche à la tradition libérale. Deux éléments essentiels, qui allaient dans cette direction, et qui se répercutaient aussi au niveau de la base électorale, étaient: a) la rupture avec la Monarchie et b) la tentation gauliste, inscrite dans le triomphe de 1974.

La rupture avec la Monarchie, scellée par le référendum de 1974, marque pour la Droite la fin d' une longue tradition politique qui remontait aux origines mêmes de sa constitution en tant que famille politique, c.à.d. au Schisme National. L' analyse des résultats du référendum montre clairement que cette rupture a été une nécessité politique pour le renouvellement et la restructuration de l' espace conservateur, car pour la majorité de la base électorale urbaine de la N.D., l' institution Monarchique ne constituait plus une référence idéologique valable.

La Monarchie condensait, en effet d' une manière particulière les deux principaux clivages qui ont marqué la vie politique du pays, et ceci s' exprimait par une différenciation géographique importante de son impact électoral. Différenciation qui suivait les deux principales lignes prédictoriales de clivage géographique, entre régions rurales et centres urbains d' une part, entre Vieille Grèce et Nouveaux Pays d' autre part:

	% pour la Monarchie
Régions rurales	36,5%
Villes petites et moyennes	25,7%
Salonique	20,0%
Athènes	21,8%

Vieille Grèce (Athènes non comprise)	37,5%
Nouveaux Pays	29,8%

Total	30,8%
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L'élargissement de la base électorale de la Droite, qui était liée à la rupture avec la Monarchie, avait pris aux premières élections, de 1974, des formes qui rappellent l'avènement du Gaullisme en France en 1958: un ras-de-marée général, mais aussi une avancée spectaculaire dans les quartiers populaires de la capitale où la force électorale de la Droite se situait toujours à des niveaux très bas.

Cette image interclassiste a reçu un premier coup trois ans plus tard, aux élections de 1977. Un mouvement très important vers le PASOK - qui peut être évalué à 10% environ de l'électorat - et l'apparition d'un pôle politique concurrent à la droite de la N.D., n'ont été que très partiellement compensés par la légère avancée de cette dernière vers l'électorat centriste traditionnel. Certes, la N.D. a réussi par la suite à récupérer ses transfuges de droite: les inconditionnels de la dictature (et/ou de la Monarchie) étaient assez peu nombreux et en même temps la N.D. n'élevait pas

des barrières très strictes envers les politiciens qui étaient moyennement (mais pas trop) compromis avec la dictature. Les élections municipales de 1978 ont fourni un premier exemple de cette stratégie politique et électorale: dans certaines villes assez importantes la N.D. a soutenu des candidats qui avaient été nommés maires pendant la dictature militaire. Et les élections de 1981 ont achevé ce processus par l'insertion d'un grand nombre de politiciens venus du parti de l'extrême Droite.

Ces développements ont évité l'apparition d'un clivage politique important séparant la Droite et l'Extrême Droite, mais ils ont conduit aussi à un repliement de la N.D. vers l'image électorale de la Droite traditionnelle. L'élargissement opposé de la N.D. vers l'espace centriste, marqué par l'adhésion massive, entre 1978 et 1981, de politiciens de l'Union du Centre, n'a eu au niveau de la base électorale que des repercussions bien localisées et circonscrites.

Il a été alors bien normal que la carte électorale de la N.D. en 1981 possédasse plusieurs points communs avec la carte prédicteuriale de la Droite. La N.D., par exemple, a dépassé en 1981 la majorité absolue dans deux circonscriptions électorales, les départements de Laconie et de Kastoria; ces deux départements étaient de même en 1984 les "meilleures" circonscriptions électorales pour la Droite qui avait aussi dépassé le 50%. Pourcentages entre 45% et 50% a obtenu la N.D. dans six autres circonscriptions électorales (Argolide, Messénie, Attica, Florina, Calcidique, Cyclades); parfaitement comparables, dans ces mêmes départements étaient les résultats de la Droite en 1964, les pourcentages de laquelle variaient entre 49% et 54%. Inversement, la N.D. n'a pas dépassé le 30% dans les quatre départements de Crète, dans la périphérie d'Athènes et dans la perithérie de Pirée, exactement comme c'était le

cas en 1964. Mais peut être l' indice le plus significatif de ce repliement de la N.D. vers l' image électorale de la Droite prédicatoriale était la grande différence de sa force électorale entre les centres urbains et les régions rurales.

Les consultations électorales qui ont eu lieu depuis - les municipales de 1982 et les européennes de 1984 - ont fait apparaître un léger redressement de la N.D., mais ils n' ont pas essentiellement changé la repartition géographique de sa force électorale. La seule transformation qui doit être notée, car elle risque à moyen terme d' avoir des repercussions importantes, est le redressement différencié de la N.D. selon la couche sociale: il est frappant d' observer que la N.D., aux récentes élections européennes, (avec 38% de voix au niveau national), a retrouvé aux quartiers bourgeois, les pourcentages qu' elle avait en 1974 (avec 54% des voix au niveau national). Ce qui est peut être un signe annonciateur de la restructuration de son implantation électorale sur la base des clivages sociaux, avec beaucoup plus d' intensité que jusqu' à maintenant. Mais cette tendance reste à vérifier.

- IV La transformation la plus radicale du paysage politique, vis à vis de la période prédicatoriale, a été, sans doute, la création du PASOK, qui, au moins dans une première période, se présentait comme un parti totalement nouveau et ne cherchant pas sa légitimation dans les clivages traditionnels de la vie politique grecque. C' est pour cette raison d' ailleurs que le PASOK était, par la plupart des observateurs (et reste encore pour certains), classé à Gauche, malgré le fait qu' il se différencie de la Gauche traditionnelle à plusieurs points de vue et surtout en ce qui concerne son implantation électorale et son personnel politique.

Le premier et principal pilier du PASOK, surtout au niveau organisationnel, fut l'aile gauche formée au sein de l'Union du Centre (et de son organisation de Jeunesse) pendant la période 1965-67. Cette aile gauche, qui conquerrait ainsi son autonomie politique, ne provenait pas de la gauche historique mais elle exprimait la radicalisation des nouvelles couches, formées après la guerre civile, et ceci indépendamment de leurs affiliations - personnelles ou familiales - relatives à la guerre civile.

Ainsi l'édification d'un parti socialiste sur les ruines du libéralisme et du républicanisme traditionnels, a été le fait d'un personnel politique extraordinairement renoué (les 2/3 du groupe parlementaire du PASOK ont moins de 50 ans) et il a pris les aspects d'un patricide politique par rapport aux représentants de l'espace centriste, qui ont été systématiquement tenus à l'écart.

Pour fonder sa légitimation, le PASOK, non seulement a écarté toute référence à la tradition vénizéliste (et par conséquent au Schisme National), mais aussi, - et ceci est une de ses originalités essentielles -, il a évité soigneusement de s'impliquer au clivage provoqué par la guerre civile. La "reconnaissance officielle" du mouvement de la Résistance, qui fut un des premiers actes de son gouvernement, ainsi que toutes les références à la Résistance, assez souvent répétées, vont exactement dans ce sens: proposer l'image, presque imaginaire, d'un mouvement de Résistance "unifié" et où chacun, sans exclusion, pourrait trouver sa place, pour enterrer les divisions de la guerre civile qui l'a suivie. L'objectif du PASOK, de transcender le clivage de la guerre civile est en conformité complète avec la composition de sa base (tout à fait à cheval par rapport à ce clivage), s'identifie aux desirs des générations qui fournissent le corps essentiel de son encadrement, et enfin, se répercute très clairement au niveau de son implantation électorale.

La carte électorale du PASOK se trouve en relation directe avec la carte prédictratoriale de l' Union du Centre - même si le coefficient de corrélation est beaucoup plus faible que les coefficients respectifs pour la N.D. et le P.C.G. Ces relations entre la carte électorale du PASOK et celle de l' Union du Centre avant la dictature étaient déjà visibles dès 1974. Mais elles s' expriment avec beaucoup plus de clarté à partir de 1981, quand le PASOK a réussi à absorber la plus grande partie de l' espace centriste traditionnel. La Crète, où le PASOK a réuni le 60,6% des voix, en fournit certes l' exemple majeur, mais existent encore beaucoup d' autres points communs tout aussi significatifs. En Macédoine, par exemple, le PASOK a obtenu la majorité absolue dans deux circonscriptions électorales seulement (Pella et Hémathie); il s' agit des deux "meilleures" circonscriptions électorales en Macédoine pour l' Union du Centre prédictratoriale, les seules où elle avait dépassé, déjà en 1963, le 45%. De même en Péloponnèse on peut distinguer deux zones, bien séparées, en ce qui concerne la force électorale du PASOK: celle du Nord et du Nord-Ouest où il a dépassé le 50% et celle du Sud et du Sud-Est où il est resté à des pourcentages inférieurs à 45%. Différenciation qui renvoie directement à la répartition géographique de la force électorale de l' Union du Centre.

Mais la continuité historique évidente ne décrit qu' un aspect seulement de l' implantation électorale du PASOK, qui se caractérise aussi par un certain nombre de traits nouveaux, dont le plus important est une homogénéisation géographique impressionnante de sa force électorale. Dans toutes les régions géographiques du pays - à l' exception de Crète - les pourcentages du PASOK aux élections de 1981 ont été absolument comparables, variant de 45,7% en Thessalie jusqu' à 50,4% en

Grèce Centrale. Le processus d'homogénéisation du vote a donc atteint avec le PASOK un degré jamais connu auparavant dans l'histoire électorale grecque et supérieur à celui observé dans la plupart des pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest.

- V. Le phénomène d'homogénéisation de l'implantation électorale ne concerne certes pas uniquement le PASOK. Il est aussi clairement perceptible - même à un degré moins intense - pour la N.D. et le P.C.G. et il s'inscrit dans une évolution générale à long terme, qui est une des tendances principales de la géographie électorale grecque de l'après-guerre. Cette évolution vers l'homogénéisation de l'implantation électorale ne constitue d'ailleurs pas un phénomène électoral isolé. Elle est relationnée à un processus plus général, caractérisé souvent comme la nationalisation du vote, qui concerne aussi: a) l'unification économique, sociale et culturelle de l'espace national, b) l'affranchissement du corps électoral par rapport aux clivages traditionnels et c) le déroulement uniforme de la campagne électorale, l'observation de courants électoraux semblables dans les différentes régions et surtout la projection et l'imposition de questions communes, pour tout l'espace national, auxquelles est censé répondre l'électeur.

Le processus de nationalisation du vote constitue bien sûr un phénomène général qu'on peut observer dans tous les pays. En se référant au modèle théorique de St. Rokkan on pourrait dire que la nationalisation du vote correspond, au passage graduel de l'axe territorial à l'axe fonctionnel, en d'autres termes à la structuration du système des partis à partir de clivages sociaux et plus particulièrement de classe. Mais ce processus n'a pas été partout le même ni du point de vue de la période

historique au cours de la quelle il se réalise, ni quant à sa durée et son résultat final. Dans la plupart des pays de l'Europe occidentale, le processus de nationalisation du vote commence avec l'apparition de partis ouvriers et socialistes et il s'estait en grande partie achevé dès avant la seconde guerre mondiale, sans pour autant faire complètement disparaître les clivages relevant de facteurs locaux, ethniques ou culturels. En Grèce, au contraire, l'évolution vers une nationalisation du vote commence beaucoup plus tard, puisque le processus d'unification nationale ne s'est achevé qu'en 1922. Mais l'homogénéisation des comportements électoraux se fait à un rythme relativement rapide qui correspond à l'édification d'un état strictement monoculturel d'où était absent ou réprimé tout élément de résistance au processus d'unification territoriale et culturelle. En conséquence, tout ce qui aurait pu nourrir ou entretenir une présence relativement autonome de la périphérie, au niveau économique ou culturel et par extension le développement des partis périphériques, à implantation territoriale - était inexistant. Ainsi l'homogénéisation des forces électorales est déjà arrivée à un degré largement supérieur à celui qu'on peut observer dans la plupart des pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest.

	Indice cumulatif d'inégalité régionale
1. Grèce (1981): PASOK	2
N.D.	7
P.C.G.	17
2. France (1973): Gaullistes	7
P.C.F.	13
Gauche socialiste	11
3. Italie (1972): D.C.	6
P.C.I	11
P.S.I.	8

cf. aussi R. Rose and D.W. Urwin, Regional Differentiation and Political Unity in Western Nations, Beverly Hills 1975, p.25-29.

Mais la tendance à l'homogénéité ne doit pas cacher l'autre face de la médaille, qui est la persistance des facteurs d'hétérogénéité, d'autant plus importants puisqu'ils s'inscrivent dans une tendance générale inverse.

Le premier facteur est, sans aucun doute, la structure sociale du vote dans les centres urbains. Ceci est vrai non seulement pour le P.C.G. et la N.D. mais aussi pour le PASOK qui, perdant son impact parmi les couches bourgeoises, tend à revêtir l'image d'un parti à base sociale de gauche. Il s'agit d'une évolution amorcée en 1977 et 1981 et qui s'est accentuée après, comme on a pu observer aux élections municipales de 1982 et européennes de 1984. Certes la balance entre interclassisme et structure sociale du vote, reste, surtout pour le PASOK, une question largement ouverte, mais on peut supposer qu'un processus de polarisation sociale a été mis en marche, ce qui constituerait un fait électoral nouveau pour la période d'après 1974.

Le deuxième facteur est la différenciation entre les régions rurales et les centres urbains, ce qui constituait le clivage principal de la géographie électorale prédictionnelle. Ce clivage reste encore valable pour la N.D. et le P.C.G. mais il n'a plus aucune pertinence pour le PASOK. Pour ce dernier un autre clivage semble apparaître, clivage qui avait déjà une importance capitale pour le développement de l'Union du Centre avant la dictature: entre les régions rurales développées, surtout la plaine, et les régions rurales retardées, surtout la montagne.

Le troisième facteur est la persistance des certaines spécificités électorales locales, surtout quand elles sont liées à d'autres réalités sociales et traditions politiques. Le

clientélisme électoral, l'implantation rurale du P.C.G., les tentatives d'apparition des partis à base régionale, sont certains de ces phénomènes qui méritent d'autant plus l'attention car ils démontrent une résistance, parfois étonnante, aux courants uniformisateurs.

VI. En terminant ce bref exposé on peut poser, même d'une manière succincte, trois questions, un peu plus générales, relativement à l'évolution et l'explication du système de partis.

La première concerne le degré de stabilité qui caractérise aujourd'hui la division tripartite en Grèce. La bipolarisation croissante du jeu électoral au niveau de la base, tend à imposer pour la première fois, une confrontation directe entre la Droite et la Gauche et ceci indépendamment de la composition partisane de chaque famille politique, de leurs différences réelles au niveau politique et idéologique et de la volatilité du corps électoral.

La deuxième question concerne les spécificités d'un processus de nationalisation du vote, effectué par l'intermédiaire des partis à caractère populiste, ce qui a été le cas aussi bien pour les partis de Droite avant la dictature que pour le PASOK actuellement.

La troisième question, enfin, concerne le champ de validité du modèle explicatif de Stein Rokkan, qui a été initialement conçu spécialement pour les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest, ou plus exactement pour les pays relevant de l'Eglise européenne occidentale. Or ce modèle comporte des éléments tellement généraux, qu'il peut fournir des clefs explicatives même en

dehors de son champ d' application initial, mais ceci impose un travail comparatif, pour la spécification des clivages pertinants, qui reste à faire.

TABLE 1 : Resultats des élections législatives de 1974, 1977 et 1981

Partis	Elections 1974		Elections 1974		Elections 1974	
	%voix	sièges	%voix	sièges	%voix	sièges
1. Extrême Droite	1,08	—	6,82	5	1,68	—
2. Nouvelle Démocratie (N.D.)	54,37	219	41,84	171	35,87	115
3. Divers Droite	—	—	1,08	2	—	—
4. Union du Centre	20,42	60	11,95	16	—	—
5. Divers Centre	—	—	—	—	1,61	—
6. PASOK	13,58	13	25,34	93	48,07	172
7. Gauche unifiée	9,47	8	—	—	—	—
8. Parti Communiste (P.C.G.)	—	—	9,36	11	10,93	13
9. Parti Communiste (int.)	—	—	2,72	2	1,34	—
10. Extrême gauche	0,03	—	0,46	—	0,21	—
11. Divers	1,09	—	0,44	—	0,22	—

TABLE 2: Résultats des élections pour le
Parlement Européen, 1981 et 1984


Partis	Elections 1981 %	Elections 1984 %
1. Extrême Droite	2,82	2,55
2. Nouvelle Démocratie	31,34	38,10
3. Divers Centre	7,55	1,87
4. PASOK	40,12	41,58
5. Parti Communiste (P.C.G.)	12,84	11,63
6. Parti Communiste (int.)	5,29	3,40
7. Extrême Gauche	—	0,41
8. Divers	—	0,46

TABLE 3: Les resultats électoraux (1974-1981)


dans les régions rurales et les centres urbains (en %)

Partis	Elections 1974			Elections 1974			Elections 1981		
	Urban	Rural	Diff.	Urban	Rural	Diff.	Urban	Rural	Diff.
Extreme Droite	1,0	1,1	+0,1	5,5	7,8	+2,3	1,5	1,8	+0,3
Nouvelle Democratie	50,1	57,5	+7,4	40,5	44,7	+4,2	30,9	39,5	+8,6
Centre	21,6	20,8	-0,8	10,3	13,1	+2,8	1,8	1,3	-0,5
PASOK	12,9	14,1	+1,2	24,7	25,8	+1,1	48,2	48,0	-0,2
P.C.G. (int.)				4,7	1,3	-3,4	2,2	0,7	-1,5
P.C.G.	14,7	5,9	-8,8	13,2	6,6	-6,6	14,6	8,3	-6,3

Elections 1936: répartition des circonscriptions
électorales




Elections 1936




circonscriptions très proches de la moyenne nationale
circonscriptions assez proches de la moyenne nationale
circonscriptions éloignées de la moyenne nationale

Elections 1963: répartition des circonscriptions
électorales





Elections 1963



circonscriptions très proches de la moyenne nationale
circonscriptions assez proches de la moyenne nationale
circonscriptions éloignées de la moyenne nationale

Electons 1981: repartition des circonscriptions electorales





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"1936 - 1977: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN ELECTORAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE PROVINCE OF LLEIDA"

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1936-1977: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE PROVINCE OF LERIDA

This paper aims to make a modest contribution to the study of the factors involved in the long-range effects of change and continuity on electoral behavior. The example taken here is the province of Lerida and we examine it within the specific context of Spanish and Catalan history.

At Spanish level,
Several studies have noted - at first, with a certain amount of surprise - that ~~the general ideological tendencies~~ *the* general ideological tendencies (Left/Right) revealed in recent elections remain unchanged since the time of the Spanish Republic, i.e. after a 40 year hiatus in the democratic process (1).

The of
~~monodimensional~~ study of this phenomenon ~~can~~ *must be placed*
in the framework where
~~the political attitudes~~ the political attitudes of today's voters are shaped. The Spanish Civil War is a political fact (directly experienced by about 30% of today's voters and recounted by them to the remaining 70%) that has played a key role in shaping these attitudes (2).

Not only is there a geographic correlation between electoral behavior in 1936 and 1977 (3), but there is also a close relationship between the "historical stance" (personal or *familiar*) in favor of Republicans or Francoists during the

Civil War and the vote currently cast in favor of PSOE-PCE (Socialists and Communists) or UCD-AP (Conservatives and ultra-Conservatives) (4).

The Civil War and the subsequent period of repression created a cleavage in Spanish society that goes far deeper than the simple differences that exist between political parties in a democracy with a solid base.

The authoritarian regime attempted to impose its model of socialization on the country, but failed in its basic objective: legitimizing the regime (5). As a result, the family became more important as a socializing agent (6) and was more influential in shaping attitudes, creating individual identities, etc. In Catalonia, the family's role became even stronger because of the cultural repression that restricted the native language and traditional customs to the family circle, creating a situation in which the difference between "official", imposed socialization and natural, family-style socialization was abundantly clear.

This combination of factors went a long way towards assuring that basic attitudes and loyalties would remain unchanged and be transmitted from one generation to the next (through both the family and the community (7)). Thus, it is by no means surprising

that the Franco/anti-Franco axis continued to be clearly reflected in the elections of 1977 and 1979 (8).

We must not forget, however, that Spanish society underwent a series of changes between 1937 and 1977 that radically altered the socioeconomic conditions on which political alignments had been based. Both industrialization and the attendant increase in the number of salaried employees, and urban development and immigration to urban centers no doubt contributed greatly towards shaping democratic, anti-Franco attitudes in the most dynamic geographical areas and social sectors.

Thus, the socializing efforts of the Franco regime, family and community transmission of "historic loyalties" and the process of socioeconomic transformation ^{are the three poles that in their} complex interrelationship ~~constitute a triangle~~ constitute a triangle upon which current political alignments are based.

Any changes and continuities observed in electoral behavior in the province of Lerida must be considered within this context.

Furthermore, there are two major factors which condition this comparative study:

1) Not only have almost all the individual voters changed, ^{-at ecological level-} but the territorial distribution and the sociological make-up of the population has changed as well (9). As a result, the municipal map

has also changed and there have been many more aggregations of towns in the mountain areas, Segarra county and in the northern part of Noguera county.

At political level,
2) It is extremely difficult to make political comparisons too. Although in Spain as a whole the positions held during the Republic period and the Civil War, transmitted through ~~and~~ the Franco/anti-Franco cleavage, remained unchanged and were reflected in the 1977 elections in the Right (AP, UCD) / Left (PSOE, PCE) axis, the situation was different in Catalonia. There were two basic reasons for this, and they are both particularly relevant in the province of Lerida.

a) In 1977 a strong Catalan center-left ~~center-left~~ party -PDC - appeared on the scene. Furthermore, the Unió Democràtica de Catalunya ((center tendency)) also registered good results in the elections. These parties made a good enough showing that the "bi-polar" model revealed in the rest of the country can't be applied ~~can't be applied~~ here (10).

b) ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) was during the IInd Republic hegemonical in the left. Actually, ~~the~~ ~~option~~ ~~it had become a marginal force.~~ In 1977, and even more so as of 1979, ERC's former role was taken over by PSC (the Catalan socialist party) and, to a lesser extent, by PSUC (the Catalan communist party). I shall not attempt to analyze this turn of events here but it can be explained as much by historical-

political reasons as by socioeconomic changes. The fact that the change did take place and that ERC, an interclass, reformist party that embraced a broad ideological spectrum was replaced by working class socialist parties like PSC and PSUC (even before the election, which simply ratified the change), strikes me as being particularly significant when parties offering similar options during the Republican years had enjoyed far less acceptance (11). This change certainly contributed greatly, although not entirely, to the fact that, as will be seen from numerical comparison, the Left lost votes in almost the entire province, but particularly in the mountain towns. This impression is born out by the fact that, generally speaking, leftist parties (PSC and PSUC) obtained far better results in towns where BOC (The Workers' and Farmers' Block)(12), an openly Marxist party, had had the most followers in the pre-Franco years.

~~_____~~

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~~_____~~

However, geographically speaking, two particular aspects of electoral behavior reveal a clearcut pattern of continuity:

- 1) Participation/abstention: Inhabitants of the southern part of the province (particularly the

"irrigated plane", the Vall d'Aran and the mountain towns with the best communications) displayed a greater tendency to vote in the elections. The rate of abstention was far higher in the more isolated mountain towns, on the "dry plane" in the south of Solsona county, the county of Segarra and the northern part of Noguera county.

Although some of the conditions that historically determined the territorial patterns of participation or abstention (13) have changed, the general lines of electoral behavior outlined here remained the same as they were during the pre-Franco years. Thus, it would seem evident that the remain of the territorial differences in electoral participation/abstention is based in the remain of territorial differences at socio-economic and living conditions level.

2) A second striking example of continuity is to be found in the voting tendencies: just as in the Republic years, the area consisting of Solsona and Segarra counties and the towns in northwestern Noguera county and the south of Alt Urgell continued to be bastions of conservatism (14), with leftist options receiving only a limited number of votes (15). Leftist parties continued to register the highest rate of acceptance in the south of the province.

Although these characteristics are most noteworthy

in larger areas, we can also observe that electoral behavior in individual towns often varies greatly, even when the towns are physically adjacent and identical in structure. There is no explanation for this other than that there exists a certain "voting tradition" and certain "active" elements - i.e. core groups of militants or sympathizers with a particular political party (most of whom have historical reasons for their party loyalty which is based on personal, family or community experience). These core groups are not only a result of a voting tradition but also serve to maintain it.

The situation in the mountain area is, however, different: here the leftist options have lost a great deal of strength while the more conservative parties have gained considerable ground. Furthermore, this shift is not homogenous in character. In fact, the electoral map in this zone has changed radically since the Republican years.

"Historical continuity" in electoral behavior is evident in: 1) the areas of the "irrigated plane" (the most dynamic part of the province) which traditionally tended to vote for the Left; 2) Solsona County and the "dry plane" (Segarra county, the southern part of Urgell county, the outer rim of Garrigues county), which were generally backward and reserved areas which traditionally voted

conservative.

On the other hand, the mountain region, which historically tended to be leftist (with the sole exception of Alt Urgell where left/right inclinations were fairly well balanced but there was a slight tilt to the right) has been ravaged by depopulation, economic depression and social isolation and its electoral behavior has radically changed. Although there were certain precedents for this change because political parties were less developed in the mountain region and political "bossism" was more firmly implanted, I feel that the factor which really determined the change in electoral behavior in the mountains of Lerida is the radical socio-economic change which took place during the "interim" of the dictatorship.

The depopulation of the mountain towns essentially involved the younger, more restless, more dynamic inhabitants. Those who remained behind were the more passive citizens, who stayed in an area which became increasingly more depopulated, more isolated and socially and geographically less integrated with the rest of the province. This state of affairs - and the consequent defenselessness and lack of information it produces - is still further

aggravated by the fact that communications networks (at economic, political and social level) are dominated from "outside".

~~This control favors the external influence that usually is made by:~~ 1) ~~official or quasi-~~

official channels, left over from the Franco regime (16); 2) ^(local) networks of ^(bosses) political ~~bosses~~; 3) the Catholic Church organization

X If we add to the effects of depression and rural depopulation a solid tradition of conservatism and a process whereby property, particularly in Segarra county, is concentrated in the hands of land-owners with large and medium-sized holdings, we can understand how electoral behavior on the "dry plane" has evolved as it has.

The south of the province is a different matter. The economy is fairly buoyant (in terms not only of agriculture but also industry and services); there has been far less depopulation than in the mountain region (only in certain towns in Garrigues county does depopulation approach the level of that of the mountain area); the percentage of the population steadily employed in industry and the service sector has increased, not only in the county seats but also in other smaller towns which are either industrial sites or residential areas for people employed in the nearby county seat; there are better communications and the territory is

compact, which makes for a more closely integrated society with a better capacity to "defend" itself. An example of this integration is the existence of a sizeable and continuous network of cooperative organizations ^{in the zone,} ~~in the zone,~~

~~and~~ and where the relatively high acceptance of the Unió de Pagesos (The Farmers' Union) provides a link to the historic Unió de Rabassaires (Tenant Farmers' Union) (17). (as a renewal of the agrarian syndicalism tradition.) Taken together, all this creates a climate conducive to maintaining and transmitting "historical loyalties" which survived the Franco regime's efforts to implant an authoritarian process of socialization.

Thus, if there is to be historic continuity in electoral behavior after a hiatus of so many years, the socioeconomic evolution must provide favorable conditions for this continuity.

A preliminary analysis of the elements of change/continuity in the electoral behavior in the province of Lerida permits us to make this modest contribution to the study of how the socializing process and socioeconomic evolution interact to condition current voting behavior (as expressed by the major ideological tendencies). These findings must all be considered in the light

of the conditioning factors mentioned herein and the limitations of this paper's scope.

Francesc Pallarés i Porta

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(Complementary information about this question and the others concerning electoral behavior in the province of Lleida 1977-83, can be reached in my research: "El comportament electoral a la circumscripció de Lleida 1977-1983". Tèsi Doctoral. Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques de la Universitat de Barcelona. Febrer 1985.)

NOTES

(1) A. de Miquel - J. Martín Moreno: ("Memoria histórica e inteligencia sociológica en las elecciones españolas.

de 1977") Estudis Electorals -1, Fundació Jaume Bofill Barcelona 1978, pàgs. 37-47.)

J.M. Vallès : ("Les eleccions del 1977 a Espanya" Estudis Electorals Barcelona 1981, Fundació Jaume Bofill Ed., pag. 56.)

J.M. Maravall: ("Transición a la democracia, alineamientos políticos y elecciones en España" Sistema nº 36, 1980, pag. 87.)

J.J. Linz and others : ("Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España 1975-81". Fundación FOESSA. Madrid 1981. Pags. 595-597, 602-606.)

R.Virós - R.M. Canals : ("L'evolució del comportament electoral a Catalunya" in Atlas Sòcio-Econòmic de Catalunya (1.09.01), Ed. by Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya-Ahorrobank-Banco Urquijo).

(2) R. López Pintor: ("El estado de la opinión pública en España" Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, nº 13-1981, pág. 11.)

(3) J.M. Maravall ("Transición..." op.cit. pág. 87) find this correlations: CEDA - UCD = 0,46; Popular Front - PSOE-PCE = 0,65; PSOE36 - PSOE77 = 0,54.

(4) J.J. Linz and others ("Informe..." op.cit. págs.595-606.)

(6) F. Murillo: ("La familia y el proceso de socialización".
Anales de Moral Social y Económica, vol.14, Madrid
1969, págs.160-161)

(5) Linz, J. et al ("Informe....." op. cit., p. 598).

The authors not only note this as a fact in the case of Spain but also observe that in the case of Italy and Germany economic development has served to accredit the democratic system.

(7) Maravall, J.M. ("La transición....", op. cit, p.87.)

The author uses the CIS survey which clearly reveals the similarity in the ideological stances of parents and their children.

(8) The survey used by J.J. Linz et al. ("Informe..." op. cit., pages 595-597 and 606-606) reveals that AP and UCD voters are much more kindly disposed towards Francoism while PSOE and PCE voters are definitely anti-Franco.

(9) Economic changes have caused serious depopulation of many rural towns (some of which, particularly in the mountains, have been completely deserted). The demographic "clout" of the main urban centers has increased considerably, not only due to the number of inhabitants who have come from nearby rural areas but also to contingents of immigrants from other parts of Spain, generally far distant from Catalonia. This simultaneously implies a change in the social make-up of the electorate:

the number of salaried employees in industry and the service sector has increased while the number of small landowners has registered a corresponding decrease. Furthermore, the average age of the remaining rural population tends to be considerably older than before.

- (10) This is not surprising even from an historical point of view, if we consider the specific positions of the leading parties in Catalonia as regards the Civil War and its outbreak. Thus, the Lliga, which occupied a more moderate position than CEDA, had a policy of civil coexistence with ERC which differed from the Spanish socialists in that it was an inter-class, reformist party and had absolute hegemony of Catalonia's Left. Mention must also be made of a moderate party, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, which steadfastly maintained that the Republic was legal. UDC is noteworthy not so much for its acceptance prior to the Civil War as for its reappearance in 1977 - and its special strength in Lerida).

For further information about these parties, see I. Molas' excellent synthesis in "El Sistema de partits politics a Catalunya: 1931-1936", Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1973.

It is also quite significant that the survey used by J.J. Linz et al. in "Informe...", op. cit., page 557, revealed that the people who voted for CDC in

1978 were not aligned "either personally or through their families" with either the Republican or the Franco sides and their position was ambiguous. Furthermore, the percentage of people who "did not reply" to this question was highest among CDC voters.

	<u>PSUC</u>	<u>PSC</u>	<u>ERC</u>	<u>CDC</u>	<u>UCD</u>	<u>AP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<i>Frente Nacional</i>	6	7	3	5	23	48	12
<i>Frente Popular</i>	47	23	44	3	13	13	24
Both	10	9	4	24	13	9	10
Neither	9	12	-	10	12	2	11
Did not reply	<u>28</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>42</u>
	100%	100	100	100	100	100	100%
	(290)	(475)	(18)	(72)	(327)	(59)	(1509)

(14) UCD was absolutely dominant until 1979. As of 1980, CiU began to make inroads, but with less success than in other places.

(15) All the statistics on historical electoral behavior in the province of Lerida which are used in this comparative study were taken from C. Mir, Doctoral Thesis, op. cit., Vol. II.

(16) It scarcely seems the result of chance that the electorate in these areas voted almost overwhelmingly for UCD (the governing party) in the nationwide elections of 1977 and 1979 or that CiU, which,

following the general tendency in Catalonia, began to take over from UCD with the 1980 elections has enjoyed increasing popularity in these areas ever since it became the governing party in Catalonia to such an extent that it won even more votes in the 1982 elections (despite the fact that they were for the national legislature) and still more votes in the 1984 Catalan elections.

- (17) The Unió de Pagesos (a progressive farmers' union) has made its statistical breakdown of membership by towns available to me - with the request that it not be published. Although there is no strict relationship between towns where the Unió has a high rate of acceptance and those where the leftist parties receive most votes, there is a certain geographic correlation between membership in the UP and more leftist voting tendencies. Thus, UP barely exists in the mountains and in Solsona county, has very few members in Segarra county and the outer rim and southern part of Urgell. On the other hand, UP has many more members in towns on the irrigated plane and in a good part of the arable lands in Garrigues county.

- (13) C.Mir: ("Evolució del comportament electoral a la província de Lleida 1890-1936". Tèsi Doctoral, Facultat d'Història de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Barcelona 1982. vol.II.

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL STABILITY OF VOTING PATTERNS REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE OF SPAIN

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Phenomenon.

1. INTRODUCTION

The present workshop was preceded by a planning session in which the long-term stability of territorial voting patterns and the re-emergence of these after periods of dictatorship were studied and analysed.

Its final aim was to verify if periods of dictatorship had the capacity to cause deep structural changes in the aggregate results; in other words, if they had the power to bring about a loss of the "historical memory". What also had to be considered was the influence which the length of the dictatorship could have on the eventual changes.

The analysis of these particular cases was meant as another contribution to an all-important subject in the field of political sociology: that of determining key factors in electoral behaviour which might help in the construction of an overall theory which would encompass all the numerous and scattered partial findings. The final aim of the construction of this theoretical model would be to predict results on the basis not of voting intention surveys, but of structural models which would imply deep understanding of social cleavages and tensions, either latent or explicit, in a given society (1).

From the cases analysed in the aforementioned planning session, it was found that the stability of aggregate results was to a certain extent maintained independently of the political regime. Even in cases of long duration, it seemed that there was little to add to the above statement.

Within this context the case of Spain could be taken as paradigmatic. A civil war which lasted over three years, followed by forty years of dictatorship, the first years of which were characterised by a systematic and brutal repression of any attempt to return to the previous republican period, was a unique opportunity to wipe out the past and remodel the country from the political, cultural, economic and social points of view. The banning of trade unions and political parties of press censorship, and the repression of cultural manifestations not specifically under the auspices of or approved by the regime -particularly of those which attempted to reaffirm ethnic differences, which went against the fascist

notion of the unity of the fatherland- could have varied completely the basic territorial cleavages. And even more so if we add to all this, the industrialisation process which changed the appearance of many Spanish regions and caused massive migrations from the country to the cities.

2. SPECIFICITY OF THE SPANISH CASE



2.1. Ecological Consistency. Possible explanations.

Reflections around the Spanish case are based on the surprise caused by the first democratic elections of 1977: the results showed an ecological consistency among structural and political variables that 40 years of political repression and aculturalisation may have put in doubt (See Map 1). The correspondence between structural and electoral variables is clear in certain studies which used different unities of aggregation (2). In those which used quantitative statistical techniques, a left-right ideological axis, strongly associated with variables indicative of social status, showed a very high percentage of variance. The second axis did not allow for an interpretation which could be so generalised at all levels of aggregation, and varied according to the areas which were the objects of study. In studies of the state as a whole, the territorial component appeared as a secondary factor.


This consistency suggested that many theories relative to the voting phenomenon were inapplicable to the Spanish case. Party identification was weak, because political parties had been legalised only at the beginning of the same year, 1977. In the four months that passed between then and June 15 they had not had time to set up a solid organisational structure capable of carrying out a nationwide election campaign. Apart from the communist party, which from clandestinity had managed to gain a certain support in working-class circles, no party could count on support based on its activities in previous years.

Organisation, in the majority of cases, was nil. The winning coalition, Unión del Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre), which obtained about 7.000.000 votes, had just emerged as a loose conglomeration

MAP 1



PSOE 1977



LEGA
RELLA



Medio: 261

of parties under a leader -Adolfo Suárez- whom the king had nominated shortly before to guide the transition process. Its weakness as a party organisation became clear three years later when it practically disappeared from the political map during the 1982 election, even though it had held power until that moment.

On the other hand, the political leaders were for the most part practically unknown, with the exception of those who had occupied public office during the Franco regime, such as Suárez himself or the leader of Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance), the party that presented itself as the continuer, but modernised version, of the Franco ideology.

The electoral issues did not have a particularly controversial content either. Given the fact that little was known about the electorate, no party tackled genuinely conflictive issues. The main ones centred on declarations in favour of democracy and shaking off the Franco regime on the part of some, and on declaring themselves continuers of the regime on the part of others.

It is in the last point that perhaps the key to the first election results is to be found: the electorate knew intuitively that what had to be decided was, above all, whether to vote for a continuation of the former regime or to vote for the options that could begin a process of reform of the regime, since fear of possible social instability ruled out for the majority the option of total rupture advocated by a few political parties.

We lack, however, empirical studies like that of P. Bois (3) who, following on from Siegfried, sought to explain voting motivations in terms of basic economic and sociological conflicts. Neither have Tood's anthropological or Rokkan's wide scope approaches had any echo so far in this country (4).

2.2. Historical Continuity

The other trait which many of the multiple studies that followed the 1977 elections discovered was the historical continuity of the vote. This is difficult to explain in statistical, and even ideological, terms, given the frequent interruptions in democratic life the country has suffered.

Obviously the question arises as to what "continuity" means, and how it can be stated to exist in geographical or ideological terms when one re-discovers parties which are quite different with regard to the period before and/or with other leaders, in a society that has undergone profound changes at all levels.

It must be pointed out, moreover, that practically all the comparative electoral studies go back at most only as far as the republican period of 1931-39. Important reasons for this are, in the first place, the difficulties in finding facts about previous periods and, in the second place, doubts about the reliability of these facts. The political system, until well into the twentieth century, has always been conditioned by the practices of petty tyrants, ("caciques") particularly in rural areas. Elections, rather than a reflection of the will of the people, became a reflection of their inability to express themselves freely.

Thus we lack studies that could help us determine how far back go the similarities detected between the republican period and post-Franquismo. It would be logical to suppose that during a period so short as 1931-36 no new cleavages were created; what took place was a re-emergence of those that existed before, 1923.

The studies that have collected electoral data concerning the most recent period have concentrated on situating, in general terms, the political framework of the election contest and the most important issues, noting the emergence and/or disappearance of political parties and the results in terms of deputies elected (5).

Table I shows the main political parties that obtained seats between 1907 and 1923, in order to be able to see to what extent the system allowed the appearance and consolidation of new parties.

3. The Electoral History of an Industrial Area, Barcelona 1901 - 1982. Evolution of the Principal Rifts

The possibility of offering long electoral series nationwide is thus denied us, and for these reasons we have limited the scope of this paper to a reduced area, the city of Barcelona, which, on the other hand, has a longer list of reliable results, which help towards a better understanding of the current electoral situation. Thanks to its characteristics as an industrial city, it overtook most areas in the rest of Spain, rural for the most part, in the fight against "caciquismo". The political life of the city, besides offering greater richness and complexity, also had the attraction of being the centre of the political and cultural life of Catalonia which, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has reaffirmed its will to mark differences with respect to the central authorities, and to struggle in defence of its claims to autonomy. This gave an added dimension to the city's political scenario.

Catalonia has traditionally been an economic centre historically relegated to the position of political periphery, dependent on a central and centralist power unwilling to meet the demands for autonomy of the regions comprising the Spanish state. This historical frustration has been a constant point of friction with the Madrid government, varying in intensity according to the characteristics of different historical periods. At the heart of Catalan society itself there has always been an important source of conflict: class tensions and the centralist-regionalist/nacionalist cleavage, which can be identified to that of centre-periphery, have been two key axes in Catalan political life which overlapped, confronted each other, or coincided, according to the political moment.

The political game centred on these dimensions, to which should be added the background of the military, clerical, and monarchist issues.

TABLE I. MAIN PARTIES HAVING WON SEATS

	1907	1910	1914	1916	1918	1919	1923	1931
Socialistes (PSOE)	--	1	1	--	--	--	7	PSOE 113
Republicans	17	37	16	20	--	15	11	Republicans d'Es-
Republicans Radicals	--	--	6	--	15	--	--	querra
Republicans Reformistes	--	--	11	11	8	10	--	(Federalists, Radi-
Republicans Socialistes	--	--	1	--	7	4	--	cals, Socialistes) 96
Demòcrates	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Liberals	69	219	121	230	163	103	223	Republicans de
								Centre (Liberals,
								Demòcrates, Libe-
								rals) 116
Conservadors	252	102	214	113	155	232	SG.81 Man.11 108 Cien.16	Republicans de Dreta 27
Regionalistes	41	8	13	14	32	19	22	Republicans Nacio-
								nalistes (ERC, ga-
								lleguistes,...) 55
Carlistes. Integ. catòlics	11	10	--	--	--	--	--	
Altres	5	11	11	6	15	11	13	Dreta (Lliga,PNV, Taditionalistes.) 51
Jainmistes i Integristes	--	--	7	10	13	8	6	

Population: 1910: 19.927.150 / 1930: 24.026.571

Registered votes: 1906: 4.578.834 / 1930: 5.440.103.

Source: 1907-1923: Martínez Cuadrado, op.cit. / 1931: Tusell, Javier "Las Constituyentes de 1931. Unas elecciones de transición". Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid, 1982.

The results we offer in maps (1) to (7) allow for an initial view of the electoral evolution in the city districts. By and large we can see geographical areas which bear a certain similarity to those we shall find 50 years later, despite the changes in district boundaries, their social and demographical composition, and in the names of the parties.

3.1. The Electoral Periods

Generally speaking the following divisions could be made in the period between 1901 and 1923 (6), the year in which General Primo de Rivera took over power, with the connivance of the Monarchy, which he held until April 1931, when the first municipal elections gave an overall victory to the republican parties and forced King Alphonso XIII into exile:

a) 1901-1915. The Establishment of Regionalism.

1901 saw the beginning of a new era in that for the first time the sway of the dynastic parties following the model imposed in 1875 by the head of the conservative government. Cánovas was broken; according to this model, two parties, conservative and liberal, were to succeed each other in power, thanks to elections "arranged" by the government to guarantee that parties would be elected alternately. That year the "Catalanista" coalition and that of the republicans relegated the monarchist coalition to third place in most districts of the city.

The Catalan bourgeoisie began to shake off the shackles of the centralist parties and to consolidate its own party (Lliga Regionalista) which based its programme on the fight against "caciquismo" without, however, questioning the monarchy.

Republicanism appeared divided into multiple initials that often did not provide clearly defined alternatives. However, a popular republican movement began to gather force (a few years later it was to become the Partit Republicà Radical) which sought the vote of immigrant workers by confronting them with the indigenous population, which was simplistically classed as "the bourgeoisie".

In 1903 a republican candidature was finally set up as a political party which assumed the leadership of Catalan political forces. This party channelled both anti-monarchist feelings and class sentiments (the republicans had been on the workers' side during the strike against the 1902 wage decree). With much higher participation than in the previous elections, Catalonia, and especially Barcelona, broke away from the pattern of the rest of Spain by giving many seats to the opposition to the dynasty.

The 1906 Law of Jurisdictions which gave a preponderant role to the military tribunals was decreed in response to the incidents that took place after a Catalan weekly was raided by the military, who had been offended by a joke alluding to their recent defeat in Morocco. The Catalan parties joined forces around a single candidature, Solidaritat Catalana, of which, however, the pro-Spanish republican faction--which would later become the radical party--refused to form part. The Solidaritat candidature represented a genuine upheaval which went far beyond any predictions, provoked an anti-Catalan feeling outside Catalonia, and led to the forming of the radical republican party on a nationwide scale.

Once the euphoria of Solidaritat had passed, having brought to the political foreground the grievances of Catalonia against the central government, the elections of 1910 were marked by incidents which resituated class confrontation as the main rift: the Setmana Tràgica (Tragic Week), an anticlerical and anti-militarist revolt that erupted as a result of the sending of reserve troops to Morocco, affected the Spanish and Catalan political scenes. The two-party system gave way to four options: the right-wing coalition; the Lliga Regionalista which proclaimed itself the continuer of the spirit of Solidaritat; the radical republicans, sworn enemies of any claims of Catalanism, for them the bourgeoisie incarnate; and finally the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana which presented itself as the left-wing alternative to the conservatism of the Lliga, while also being anti-centralist and a defender of the rights of Catalonia. For these reasons the radicals were its worst enemies.

The republicans--regionalists and centralists--won an indisputable victory in the elections of 1910 and obtained absolute majority of votes

in all districts of Barcelona. The Lliga Regionalista managed to estrange itself from most of the electorate by condemning the anticlerical Tragic Week riots. On the other hand, its conservative nature left it no other alternative.

In successive elections, the Lliga Regionalista took over the lead from the republicans. The radicals' prestige was affected by scandals and corruption in which their leaders were implicated; the republican nationalists lost ground progressively due to their inability to mobilise the working classes in favour of a Left-wing nationalism.

In order to put a brake on the growing influence of the Lliga Regionalista, the antimonarchist parties, the radicals, and the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana forgot their former antagonism over the question of nationalism and decided to form a united front for the next elections, despite the protests of their sympathisers. This agreement causes disillusionment among the electorate and a corresponding increase in abstention, principally in the workingclass districts where these parties had most support.

The 1914 elections reaffirmed the hegemony of the Lliga in Catalan politics. The passing of the Llei de Mancomunitats (Commonwealth Law) by the conservative government in Madrid allowed the party to stand as the defender of the order and interests of Catalonia, and increasingly to bring together the bourgeois issue and that of Catalanism.

On the threshold of the First World War, which was to have serious repercussions in the economic, political, and social life of Catalonia and of the rest of Spain, and which led to a considerable worsening in class conflicts, Catalan politics were still in a consolidation phase. The working class could not count on a prestigious and well-organised political force capable of defending its interests: the PSOE was merely a token group; the Radical Republican party, which attempted to stand as the champion of the proletarian cause, had been discredited on the one hand by some of its leaders' involvement in financial scandals, while on the other hand it had shown early on that its verbal radicalism had little to do with its actions.

The Catalanism-Centralism conflict, deepened by the parties that called themselves defenders of the working class, had contributed to the division of the class itself, since at the beginning of the century its members were both immigrants and native Catalans. No party had managed to put the question of territorial origin in second place, possibly because of its strong emotional content: it was often felt that the arrival of workers from other parts of the Peninsula was a threat to the inflexible workforce.

The bourgeoisie, for its part, was caught between its declared Catalanism and its interest in forming part of the Madrid government in order thus to influence economic decisions in its favour. This would later lead to accusations of having made pacts with and sold out to centralism.

Greatly simplifying the political panorama in order to make it more understandable, the following diagram attempts to show where the main cleavages lay:

	Regionalist/ Catalanist	pro-Spanish/ centralist
Monarchist (conservative)	Lliga Regionalista	Coalició Monàrquica
Republican (progressive)	Coalició Solidari- tat Catalana	Radical Republicans

Subordinate to these two basic trends were others which we have already mentioned, such as "caciquismo", clericalism, or pro-militarist sympathies, normally associated with centralist and conservative parties and rarely found in regionalist parties.

b) 1916-1923. The Context of the First World War.

The European war deeply affected Spanish society. Public opinion was divided into Germanophiles and allies supporters. Feverish export activity to the conflict zones enriched the industrial and mercantile bourgeoisie, but also caused an increase in the price of essential commodities that made the situation of the working class progressively worse. There were frequent violent demonstrations and bakeries and markets were raided.

In the province of Barcelona constitutional rights were suspended and a state of war was declared.

The conservative Madrid government's refusal to declare neutral zones, which the bourgeoisie had advocated as a means to stimulate economic expansion, led to a split between the government and not only the Lliga but also the rest of the opposition parties. The liberal cabinet that emerged from the crisis gave priority to reinforcing the parliamentary sway of its party. To this end it undertook a campaign of indiscriminate support to any party that opposed the Lliga, which they considered the main obstacle to the reestablishing of the pure two-party system of liberals and conservatives.

This initiative did not, however, manage to weaken the regionalist party; on the contrary the Lliga took the opportunity of denouncing such an initiative as yet another attack against the Catalans. The 1916 elections once again confirmed the party's supremacy; a supremacy which the republicans were too weak and too disorganised to question.

In May 1918 the Cortes were adjourned. Civilian power, both the government and the king, had to bow to the demands of the army, which had become master of the situation. One month later, the conservative government resumed power with the Cortes closed and, amid general protest, suspended constitutional rights.

The Lliga Regionalista assumed the role of leader of the Parliamentary assembly, which functioned as a parallel Cortes, and as such became not only the mouthpiece for Catalan bourgeois interests, but for those of the industrial bourgeoisie all over the State.

The remaining Catalan political forces did not at any time question the supremacy of conservative regionalism. In Catalonia a new republican party (Partit Republicà Català) participated actively in the revolutionary climate of 1917 launching furious attacks from its newspaper against the monarchy and the army, and collaborating with the anarchists of the CNT in the preparation of armed insurrection. The military's assassination attempt against its leader gave the party prestige in working-class circles.

In order to find a way out of the crisis, a government comprising all political forces was planned, but the left refused to collaborate when the army imposed the condition of itself appointing the minister of defense. The Lliga, on the other hand, agreed to participate in the belief that the Catalanista battle had to be fought in Madrid. This decision caused a split in the reformist front. For the first time since 1899 there were two Catalan ministers in the government.

The elections of 1918 reflected the polarisation of the social climate: two coalitions stood, the Lliga in conjunction with the Carlists, and a left-wing coalition composed of socialists (PSOE), radicals, and Catalanist republicans. It was the first time that the socialists appeared in the left-wing lists.

The result of the elections showed that regionalism had reaped the benefits of its role in the crisis of 1917; the well-to-do classes gathered around it in an attempt to ward off the threat of revolution. Participation increased spectacularly in upper-class districts and some support was won in working-class districts.

In the three elections that followed, until the coup d'etat of 1923, no significant changes occurred in the Catalan political scene. Social unrest increased, with far-reaching strikes, such as that of the electrical company "La Canadenca", followed by the Barcelona general strike, the declaration of the state of war and the adjournment of the Cortes. The anarchist union CNT dominated the leadership of the working class. The employers refused to yield to the demands of the proletariat. A lockout which lasted two months and which affected 200,000 workers resulted in the fall of the government which came to power after the 1919 elections and which had attempted to form a national coalition.

The new monarchical coalition increased the repression. 1920 saw the beginning of a biennial of violent repression against the CNT. Confrontation between union members and hired gunmen of both sides were frequent.

In 1920, the murder of Layret, a celebrated lawyer and union leader who had planned a trades union candidature in an attempt to capture votes

from an increasingly disillusioned working class, baulked any project for a left-wing Catalanism (7).

In the 1920 elections participation fell to below 30%, and was only 18% in working-class districts.

The assassination of the head of government, in 1921, and the spectacular defeat in Morocco in the same year, were the final prelude to the coup d'etat in 1923. The impossibility of smothering public opinion and of stopping the parliamentary debates about the military disaster, the blame for which was laid in a celebrated report, on the high military command, led General Primo de Rivera to take over power, with the king's acquiescence.

At the end of the period the political system had still not achieved any kind of consolidation. Apart from the bourgeoisie, other social sectors had not found parties capable of finding a compromise between as con flictive as monarchy or republic, the regional question, military and cle rical intervention in public life, etc.

On the other hand, there was increasing disillusionment as to the possibility of a democratic system. The Lliga itself had finally adopted positions which contrasted radically with those it had defended at first: it collaborated with the central government in 1921 in exchange for the concessions of a protective tariff: that same year it oposed the resta tion of constitutional guarantees in Barcelona, to the point that when the government finally decided to restore them, the minister of justice, who was affiliated to the party, resigned. It finally took part in an electoral fraud in order to take votes from a rival party, having previously been an outright defender of clarity and fair play at the polls. It was even in favour of the coup d'etat of 1923 as the only means of putting an end to social unrest.

It was only the decline of the dynastic and republican forces that managed to cover up the fall of the Lliga. There were signs, also, that its position would soon be menaced by Acció Catalana, whose head of the list was a man of prestige.

At the end of the period the party system had still not become consolidated. Apart from the bourgeoisie, the other social sectors had not found the party to channel their aspirations. The type of political regime -monarchy or republic, the national question, the intervention of the military in public life, all continued to be conflictive issues. And once again a military coup put an end to hopes for further social advances for a long time to come.



c) 1931-36. The Second Republic.



Primo de Rivera's economic policy favoured the monopolies, and his main slogan was "peace and prosperity". The economy of the country benefited, in any case, from the favourable international situation of the 'twenties.



He made no attempt to modify the Spanish social structure, however, and tried to smother social problems and tensions by the use of repression. The CNT, Catalanism, and the intellectuals were his principal targets.

His fall was favoured by the world economic recession, signs of which first appeared in 1927. The growing opposition of intellectuals, students, and public opinion, the organisation of the opposition and Primo de Rivera's own confrontations, even with the army, forced him to resign in 1930. After a brief transition period, municipal elections were called; the election campaign centred upon one basic issue: republic or monarchy. The latter had lost much support for having tolerated a dictatorship. The results of April 1931 showed how the antimonarchist cleavage had deepened: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), a party created in 1931, won an outstanding victory, gaining over 60.000 more votes than the Lliga, the dominant party of the previous period.



The legislative elections of 1931 confirmed these results. The immaturity of Spanish society became apparent in the next years. The initial euphoria in favour of the republican regime soon waned, Political evolution led to a basic polarisation of the electorate towards the leftright issue. In the last elections before General Franco's coup d'etat two big electoral blocs confronted each other: the popular front which comprised













Maps of the Electoral Results 1901-1923 (4)




Maps of the Electoral Results 1901-1923 (5)









E.R.C. The left



Lliga Catalana The right




Partit Republicà Radical The Center



0-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70-80
80-90
90-100

Front d'Esquerra

The left




Parties includes:

- Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
- Acció Catalana Republicana
- P. Republicà d'Esquerra
- Unió Socialista de Catalunya
- Partit Català Proletari
- Partit Comunista de Catalunya
- P. Obrer d'Unificació Marxista


Front Català d'Ordre

The right



Parties included:

- Lliga Catalana
- Acció Popular Catalana
- P. Republicà Radical



Catalanist and working-class parties -the communist party appeared for the first time and the socialists were stronger; and the right-wing bloc of conservative and centralist parties, joined now by the Lliga regionalista and the radicals, both having forgotten their pasts, the first Catalanist, the second in favour of the working classes.

The triumph of the popular front and once again a social situation of great tension and conflict were the prelude to General Franco's coup d'etat in July, 1936.

d) 1977-1982. Towards Normalisation of Democracy.


On the death of General Franco, in 1975, a process of democratic transition was begun with the support of King Juan Carlos, who in 1948 been allowed to return from exile and receive his education in Spain, and carried out by the same ruling class that emerged from Franquismo. The political reform law approved by referendum in 1976 allowed for the gradual transformation of Franquista institutions into democratic ones.

The first democratic elections were held on June 15 1977. The relative abundance of candidatures and 40 years without voting rights did not seem to confuse the electorate too much (8). Participation was high (around 75%) and votes were concentrated on two main parties: the socialists (PSOE) and the centrists (UCD), a conglomeration of parties ranging from reformist Franquismo to Christian democracy which gathered the fruits of the skill of its leader, A. Suárez, in carrying out the process of political transition. The communists, the only party to have kept a minimal organisation under Franco, was relegated to fourth place, (5% of the votes), behind AP (10%), the moderate Franquista right.

Catalonia and the Basque Country were confirmed as "special cases" in that the parties claiming for a moderate nationalism had a certain success. In Catalonia the party with most votes was the PSOE, followed by the communists. The moderate nationalist coalition and UCD were slightly outrun.


The city of Barcelona appeared to be further to the right, giving priority to centrists over communists. The historical parties, Lliga de

P S C 1982





Socialists

C i U 1982



EC 1977

ERC 1982



Center-left nationalist party

Catalunya and Esquerra de Catalunya, reappeared, but they gained very few votes.

Among the parties that stood for election there was a spirit of "wiping the slate clean" with regard to the situation before Franco. New electoral forces with their European counterparts had appeared on the scene and the electorate had proven its capacity to orientate itself consistently. However, the right-left and regionalist-centralist axes persisted as before.

The elections that have been held since 1977 (2 legislative, 2 municipal, and 2 for home-rule) have confirmed the situation of 1977, except that the number of options nationwide have been reduced, with the disappearance of UCD, the weakening of the communist party, and the capture of the right-wing vote by AP.

In the diagrams 1 to 3 we show the results of an analysis of correspondences applied to the city of Barcelona (9). In 1 we show the evolution of the main political parties as regards the two aforementioned axes: left-right and Catalanism-centralism; in 2 their position referred to the axes, as a mean of the three elections; in 3 the situation of both economic and socio-demographic variables.

The evolution of the parties shows a certain tendency towards the centre. The greater concentration of votes in fewer options cannot, it seems, be defined in terms of polarisation, as it has been in the past, but quite the contrary, as a struggle to occupy the space in the middle. The most obvious case in this sense is AP, which has become progressively less radical, both in its right-wing declarations, and in its vejection of Catalanism.

4. CONCLUSIONS

There are serious difficulties involved in following territorial patterns of vote in Spain, due to the long interruptions in the country's democratic life. The existence of petty tyrannies in wide areas of the country until well into the twentieth century invalidates, besides, the

Diagram 1

Anàlisi de correspondències. Resultats als barris de Barcelona.

Evolució dels partits: 1977, 1979 i 1982

Parties: Ext. Esquerra (grouping the extreme left parties)

PSUC. Communists


PSC. Socialists

CiU. Centre-right nationalist

UCD. Center right

AP. Right


Ext. Dr. Extreme right



Anàlisi de correspondències. Resultats als barris de Barcelona.

Posició mitjana dels partits a les eleccions de 1977, 1979 i 1982

Parties: see diagram 1



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
Diagram 3

Anàlisi de correspondències. Resultats als barris de Barcelona.

Posició de variables electorals i socio-demogràfiques per 1977

Parties: see diagram 1

Most important socio-demographic variables: Age groups: 0-19 (19); +64. Born: València, Castilla, Catalonia Arrived in Barcelona: before 1941; 1960-70. Occupational groups: industrial workers (indust), service workers (serv), clerks (empl), middle management (gr.mitj.), management (prop), professions (liber)



comparative analysis of results for periods before 1930. We have concentrated, therefore, on an industrial city, Barcelona, leader in the fight against "caciquismo", while making frequent reference to the Spanish context as a whole.

Throughout the three periods analysed, 1901-1923, 1936-1939, and 1977-1982, important changes took place in the parties occupying the political scene. Both their names and their political offers varied, adapting themselves to the historical moment and the demands of the society into which they were trying to enter.

Nevertheless, it is possible to follow the continuity of certain fundamental cleavages with their corresponding territories, since certain areas have tended to remain faithful to particular issues.

On the maps of Barcelona, despite changes in district boundaries, one can clearly see areas differentiated by their political preferences. Between 1901 and 1923, republicanism -popular and often pro-Spanish in nature, and regionalism -slightly more conservative and moderately pro-monarchy, confronted each other territorially and ideologically, although brusque changes in the political scene did produce momentary migrations of votes with far reaching effects, such as the one that occurred in 1907 with the Solidaritat candidature.

During the republican period, 1931-36, republicanism and Catalanism joined forces and obtained a "punishment vote" in the face of those parties that had not opposed the coup d'etat in 1923. Its territory comprised a wide belt on the edge of Barcelona, in opposition to the central districts.

The period that began in 1977 has kept the same territorial divisions, alongside issues and parties with their counterparts in the rest of Europe. The issue concerning republicanism-monarchy has been replaced by that of socialism-no socialism, the latter represented in Catalonia by a moderate nationalist formation with liberal traits (the case of the Basque Country has certain similarities to the Catalan case), and in the rest of Spain by a right-wing party advocating in a way a somewhat modernised version of Franquismo.

We are, however, far from being able to establish structural models that would allow us to make predictions about the evolution of the Spanish -or Catalan- political system and, therefore, about future election results.

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Les Pays-Bas de 1925 à 1939:
Une stabilité électorale à toute épreuve.

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Institut Catolic d'estudis socials,
Barcelona, 25-30 March 1985 (Workshop -
"Territorial Voting Patterns as a
lasting Phenomenon")

1. Introduction

Pendant longtemps, les Pays-Bas ont connu une stabilité électorale exceptionnelle. Jusque dans les années soixante, le système politique néerlandais a été un beau spécimen pour qui voulait prouver la validité de la fameuse thèse de Stein Rokkan: les clivages politiques européens se sont figés au début de l'ère de la participation électorale des masses. Pourtant cette stabilité ne fut jamais absolue et il est donc loisible de soutenir que, faute de critères explicites, la notion de stabilité électorale reste équivoque. Ces critères peuvent être de trois sortes:

- (i) Par rapport à une période antérieure ou postérieure: on peut dire que le système électoral néerlandais était plus stable dans les années trente que dans les années soixante.
- (ii) Par rapport à d'autres systèmes politiques et, par conséquent, électoraux: les Pays-Bas étaient de ce point de vue plus stables que la France ou la République de Weimar. Il est intéressant de noter que la Belgique de l'entre-deux-guerres était au moins aussi stable que son voisin du Nord sur le plan électoral, mais non point sur le plan gouvernemental.
- (iii) Par rapport à un seuil bien défini, déterminé par une théorie de stabilité électorale et politique. Bien sûr, une telle théorie n'existe pas mais, comme souvent en sciences sociales, on est tenté de faire semblant et de considérer que des variations de 10 ou 15 pour cent ne fount pas preuve d'instabilité.

Avant de procéder à l'analyse empirique il est nécessaire d'élucider le concept de stabilité électorale.

En premier lieu, un système politique (ou électoral) peut être considéré comme stable entre deux ou plusieurs élections quand le rapport des forces politiques, défini par les proportions de vote pour les principaux partis, est resté inchangé pendant cette période. Sur le plan empirique cela se traduit par une constance des résultats électoraux de tous les partis politiques concernés. Puisque le présent article traite de la politique néerlandaise entre 1925 et 1939, il convient de donner l'exemple suivant. Pendant cette période, il y a eu quatre élections pour le parlement national, en 1925, 1929, 1933

et 1939. Tableau 1 présente les résultats électoraux des partis politiques qui ont obtenu au moins deux sièges parlementaires pendant cette période. Quelle conclusion peut-on tirer de ce tableau quant à la stabilité électorale des Pays-Bas? Evidemment, la réponse qu'on donne à cette question dépendra du critère employé. Par rapport à d'autres pays européens de la même époque, l'ampleur des variations est minime. Mais sur le plan national, les élections de 1933 (en pleine crise économique) marquent un net recul des partis traditionnels (RKSP, ARP, CHU, VDB, LSP, SDAP) par rapport à 1929.

Quand on ne se limite pas au niveau d'agrégation le plus élevé, c'est-à-dire le système politique national, une autre forme de stabilité électorale peut être définie. On se pose alors la question suivante: pour les communes (ou provinces), y a-t-il covariation entre les résultats électoraux en comparant deux ou plusieurs élections? Figure 1 présente un exemple de cette approche, en montrant les résultats électoraux obtenus par le parti social-démocrate (SDAP) dans les 11 provinces du royaume au cours des élections de 1925 à 1939. Le concept de stabilité revêt ici le degré de parallélisme des lignes droites que lient les paires d'observation. Le coefficient de corrélation nous permet d'attacher des valeurs numériques à ces différents degrés de parallélisme. Par exemple, la figure 1 donne lieu à la matrice de corrélations suivante (pour 11 observations):

	1925	1929	1933	1937
1925	1,00			
1929	0,967	1,00		
1933	0,972	0,969	1,00	
1937	0,927	0,926	0,983	1,00

Quand un tel coefficient de corrélation a une valeur proche de l'unité, cela veut dire que l'une des trois situations suivantes est observée.

1. Les droites sont parallèles et ascendantes: le parti politique gagne des voix, et de façon uniforme à travers les unités géographiques (en anglais: "across the board change").
2. Les droites sont parallèles et horizontales: dans chaque unité géographique, le parti a obtenu le même nombre de voix dans les deux élections.

3. Les droites sont parallèles et descendantes: le parti perd des voix, et de façon uniforme à travers les unités géographiques.

A partir de cette énumération, qui se limite au cas où le chercheur n'a pas de données individuelles à sa disposition, l'on pourrait mettre au point une typologie de stabilité ou d'instabilité électorale. A un extrême de cette classification se trouve la deuxième situation décrite ci-dessus: une parfaite stabilité au niveau des unités composantes, et donc aussi au niveau national. A l'autre extrême se trouve la situation où la corrélation entre les deux élections considérées est (presque) nulle et où il y a en même temps, sur le niveau national, un changement appréciable dans le nombre de voix qu'obtient le parti considéré.

Avant de présenter quelques résultats d'analyse il est nécessaire de décrire brièvement quelques caractéristiques des données qui seront employées. Il s'agit de données au niveau communal, rassemblées de sources très variées pour la période 1925-1939 dans les quatre provinces nordiques des Pays-Bas, c'est-à-dire Groningue, Frise, Drenthe et Overijssel. En total, 187 communes composent ces provinces à l'époque étudiée. Globalement, les données se répartissent ainsi:

1. Les résultats électoraux des différents partis, et le nombre d'inscrits pour les élections parlementaires de 1925, 1929, 1933 et 1937, ainsi que pour les élections provinciales de 1931, 1935 et 1939.
(Dans le reste de cet article, celles-là seront indiquées par le sigle TK, celles-ci par PS, par ex. 1933TK et 1935PS)
2. Des indicateurs démographiques. Dans l'analyse suivante, un seul indice sera employé: pour chaque commune un "taux de déménagement" est calculé, défini comme le rapport entre le nombre de partants et d'arrivants et la population totale dans une année de base (1930). Cette variable (symbole: DYNA) peut avoir un impact direct sur l'instabilité électorale, par le changement physique de l'électorat, mais elle peut aussi être le signe d'une ouverture vers l'extérieur et, par ce biais, d'une possibilité de changement.

3. Des indicateurs confessionnels. Par commune, les proportions de calvinistes, de catholiques et d'incroyants (selon le recensement national de 1930) sont calculées, ainsi que des indices qui mesurent le développement dans le temps de ces proportions. Symboliquement: CALV30, CATH30, INCR30 et puis CALV30/47, CATH30/47, INCR30/47, qui reflètent les changements survenus entre 1930 et 1947.
4. Un indicateur (FACMOD) qui est supposé de mesurer la modernité de la commune. Cette variable est le résultat (score) d'une analyse factorielle en composantes principales sur les cinq indices suivants:
 - le nombre de voitures par foyer (en 1939)
 - la proportion de foyers connectés au réseau électrique (en 1925)
 - idem en 1934
 - le nombre de postes de radio par foyer (1935)
 - le nombre de téléphones par foyer (1936)
5. Un indicateur (FACRIC) qui est supposé de mesurer la richesse moyenne de la commune. Cette variable est le résultat d'une analyse factorielle en composantes principales sur les deux indices suivants:
 - la proportion d'habitants sujets à l'impôt sur le revenu
 - le revenu moyen (en florins) des personnes sujettes à l'impôt sur le revenu.
6. Des indicateurs qui reflètent la structure socio-économique de la commune :
 - la proportion de la population active (masculine et féminine) qui, en 1930, travaille dans l'agriculture (AGRIC30)
 - idem pour l'industrie (INDUS30)
 - Le développement de l'industrialisation entre 1930 et 1947, mesuré par l'indice suivant:

$$INDUS30/47 = (INDUS47 - INDUS30) + (AGRIC30 - AGRIC47)$$
 (Il est intéressant de noter que beaucoup de communes se sont désindustrialisées entre 1930 et 1947, comme en témoignent un grand nombre de valeurs négatives de cet indice. La crise économique et la guerre de 1940 à 1945 ont probablement fait revenir nombre de gens à l'agriculture).

2. La méthode employée: une variante de l'analyse par projection du vote normal.

Dans un article devenu célèbre, Philip Converse a introduit la notion du "vote normal" dans la science politique. Le rudiment de cette méthode est très simple: quand on connaît

- (i) La division de l'électorat en groupes sociaux qui sont politiquement spécifiques (aux Etats-Unis: la division en adhérents aux partis républicain et démocrate)
- (ii) Les taux d'abstention différentiels de ces groupes

on est à même de calculer une estimation du résultat électoral. La différence entre ce résultat projeté et le résultat obtenu doit être attribuée, selon Converse, à des facteurs qui ont agi à court terme.

Cette technique d'estimation a surtout été appliquée à l'aide de données individuelles, provenant de sondages. Mais à défaut de ces beaux cadeaux pour le politologue que sont les données individuelles, l'on peut encore suivre l'idée de base de Converse: calculer le résultat électoral le plus probable, profitant de toute information disponible et, ensuite, analyser l'écart entre ces projections et les vrais résultats.

Pour les raisons suivantes, cette méthode me semble prometteuse pour une analyse de la politique néerlandaise de l'entre-deux-guerres:

- * La structuration du système politique était si rigide (phénomène de la verzuiling), qu'il est, dans un certain sens, "trop facile" d'expliquer les résultats électoraux par les pourcentages de catholiques, de calvinistes etc. Les grands courants de la politique néerlandaise ne sortaient jamais de leur lit: aussi faut-il employer une méthode qui profite de cette stabilité et qui permette en même temps d'en scruter les limites.
- ** Pour calculer les résultats projetés, la méthode nous permet d'utiliser une variété d'informations hétéroclites, pourvu qu'elles servent à une estimation efficace. Pour le chercheur qui ne dispose que de données historiques et agrégées, et qui n'est donc pas capable d'étendre sa base d'information, ce caractère "fourre-tout" est un avantage.

Avant de décrire comment il faut opérer pour appliquer cette technique il est nécessaire de formuler les questions auxquelles s'attaque ce papier. Elles sont deux:

1. En 1933 les Pays-Bas traversaient une grave crise économique, comme indiqué par le tableau suivant:

Année	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
chômeurs (x1000)	50	100	138	271	323	333	385	415

Pour les électeurs néerlandais, les élections parlementaires de 1933 étaient la première occasion de montrer leur attitude devant la politique économique traditionnelle (maintien de l'étalon-or, volonté gouvernementale affichée de réduire les dépenses publiques) menée par la coalition au pouvoir. A l'époque, celle-ci comportait les partis confessionnels RKSP, ARP et CHU. Les questions qui se posent sont les suivantes. En premier lieu: comment les partis confessionnels et traditionnels¹ supportaient-ils la crise sur le plan électoral?

Et deuxièmement: en quelles circonstances les partis extrémistes, de gauche et de droite, avaient-ils une chance d'ébranler les piliers politiques traditionnels?

2. En 1935, lors des élections pour les Etats Provinciaux, un phénomène nouveau se produisit sur la scène politique néerlandaise: le Mouvement National-Socialiste (NSB) de Mussert s'attaquait au système en présentant, après une phase d'organisation et de préparation assez longue, pour la première fois ses candidats aux électeurs. Quelles sont les caractéristiques des communes dans lesquelles ce nouveau venu avait du succès? Comment la clientèle des autres partis se comportait-elle devant ce concurrent nouveau?


¹ Dans le reste de cet article, les partis seront classifiés comme suit: Partis confessionnels: RKSP, ARP, CHU.

Partis traditionnels (qui n'avaient pas pour but d'aller au-delà du système politique parlementaire): RKSP, ARP, CHU, LSP, VDB, SDAP. Radicaux de gauche: CPN, OSP, RS(A)P, SP, RAC.

Radicaux de droite: NSB, ACTU, BEZ, NAT, NMP, PB(B), VAD, FV, NBTB, VVN, VNH, NBTM, NEUT, RENV.

En bref, nous allons analyser les conséquences de la crise économique sur les élections de 1933 et de l'arrivée du parti national-socialiste sur celles de 1935.

Pour calculer le "vote normal" en 1933 pour les 187 communes, il suffit de regarder de plus près ce qui s'est passé lors des élections précédentes, 1925TK, 1929TK et 1931PS. On peut s'attendre à ce que, faute de circonstances ou d'événements particuliers à l'année 1933, les électeurs fassent le même choix qu'auparavant. Pour chaque parti et pour chaque commune il s'agit donc de faire une extrapolation à partir des résultats obtenus en 1925, 1929 et 1931. La figure ci-dessous, que contient des données pour un parti et une commune fictifs, sert à éclairer ce problème.



Pour estimer l'inconnue (\hat{V}_{33}), la meilleure méthode est de calculer la droite qui passe "le plus près" de V_{25} , V_{29} et V_{31} . Appliquant le critère des moindres carrés, il est évident que cette droite n'est rien d'autre que l'équation de régression linéaire basée sur trois observations: (1925, V_{25}), (1929, V_{29}), (1931, V_{31}).

Partant de la formule bien connue:

$$Y = a + b X \text{ avec } b = \frac{\sum xy}{\sum x^2}$$

$$a = \bar{Y} - b\bar{X}$$

L'on arrive à une expression adaptée au problème spécifique:

$$V = a + b E \quad (V: \text{vote}, E: \text{élection})$$

$$\text{avec } b = \frac{\sum_i (E_i - \bar{E})(V_i - \bar{V})}{\sum_i (E_i - \bar{E})^2} \quad (i=25, 29, 31)$$

$$E_i \stackrel{d}{=} 1900 + i$$

$$a = \bar{V} - b \bar{E}$$

Ces coefficients a et b serviront, après avoir été évalués numériquement, à estimer l'inconnue \hat{V}_{33} à l'aide de

$$\hat{V}_{33} = a + b E_{33}$$

Et quelques manipulations algébriques simples nous mènent au résultat que voici:

$$\hat{V}_{33} = -0,5 V_{25} + 0,5 V_{29} + V_{31} \quad (1)$$

Le pourcentage estimé (\hat{V}_{33}) est une moyenne pondérée des pourcentages pour les années 1925, 1929 et 1931.

De façon analogue l'on arrive à l'expression pour l'autre pourcentage à estimer, c'est-à-dire la projection pour 1935PS à partir des résultats obtenus en 1925TK, 1929TK, 1931PS et 1933TK:

$$\hat{V}_{33} = -0,4571 V_{25} + 0,1714 V_{29} + 0,4857 V_{31} + 0,8000 V_{33} \quad (2)$$

La méthode du "vote normal" peut être décrite de façon plus précise. Il s'agit de calculer les écarts (ou résidus) entre V_{33} et \hat{V}_{33} ou entre V_{35} et \hat{V}_{35} et d'interpréter ces écarts en termes relatifs à la situation politique en 1933 ou en 1935. Il est très important de noter que ces écarts ne peuvent jamais être expliqués a priori par les facteurs qui déterminent avant tout le vote pour le parti concerné. Par exemple, si l'on constate une grande différence entre V_{33} et \hat{V}_{33} pour le parti catholique, il n'est nullement évident que cet écart doive être attribué au nombre relatif de catholiques dans les 187 communes. La raison en est très simple: ce nombre a déjà influé sur les résultats obtenus en 1925, 1929 et 1931. Bien sûr, un changement, survenu entre 1925 et 1933, de la proportion des catholiques dans les communes pourrait bien expliquer le décalage. Ces remarques soulignent ce qui a été constaté ci-dessus, que la méthode du "vote normal" nous rend capable de tirer profit de l'histoire des résultats électoraux d'avant l'élection analysée. Cette histoire comporte aussi bien des données

structurelles, telles que la composition religieuse ou socio-professionnelle des communes, que des facteurs qui sont idiosyncratiques pour une commune.

La méthode employée doit être distinguée d'une analyse de régression ordinaire. Dans les deux cas, des résidus sont obtenus, mais ils proviennent de deux sources très différentes. Avec une analyse de régression, on évalue une seule droite et l'on calcule les écarts (appelés "résidus") entre les valeurs observées et les valeurs prédites par cette unique droite. Dans notre cas nous définissent, pour une élection, 187 lignes droites qui servent à extrapoler jusqu'à l'élection suivante.

3. Analyse

Avant de commencer l'analyse proprement dite, il est intéressant de regarder de plus près les données descriptives qui sont décrites dans le tableau 2. Pour chaque parti ou combinaison de partis, ce tableau comporte quatre lignes.

La première ligne, notée A, donne les résultats électoraux nationaux (en pourcentages du vote national valable pour les 11 provinces réunies).

La stabilité des partis qui formaient la clé de voûte du système politique néerlandais (RKSP, ARP et CHU) saute aux yeux. Par contre, les résultats d'un parti traditionnel tel que le VDB (libéraux de gauche, comparables à l'actuel parti D'66), sont beaucoup moins stables. Aussi ce parti n'avait-il pas de clientèle "gagnée d'avance". Le changement le plus important qu'on observe sur toute cette période est la montée des partis d'extrême droite, en fait du Mouvement National-Socialiste NSB, en 1935. Ce seul parti obtint 7,94 pour cent des voix en 1935: peu d'observateurs avertis pouvaient s'imaginer que cela représentait un succès éphémère, et non pas un avertissement de raz de marée ultérieurs.

La deuxième ligne, B, donne les résultats électoraux pur les quatre provinces nordiques qui sont étudiées de plus près dans cet article. Quand on compare les lignes A en B, on constate que le parti catholique RKSP est beaucoup moins important dans ces provinces qu'à l'échelle nationale. Par contre, les partis confessionnels protestants ARP et CHU et le parti social-démocrate SDAP sont plus

forts dans le Nord que dans le reste du pays.

Sur la troisième ligne, C, figurent les résultats électoraux calculés par commune pour les quatre provinces du Nord. Par conséquent, ces chiffres sont le résultat d'une description de données agrégées.

Puisque chaque commune est pondérée d'un poids égal, ces résultats sont biaisés en faveur des partis qui ont leurs fiefs dans les petites communes. Par exemple, en comparant les lignes B et C pour les partis calviniste ARP et social-démocrate SDAP, l'on constate que, de façon relative, celui-là est plus populaire dans les villages et celui-ci dans les villes.

Aussi bien que la ligne C, la ligne D décrit des résultats obtenus au niveau agrégé. Mais cette fois-ci il s'agit d'une série de paramètres bidimensionnels: des coefficients de corrélation linéaire. Pour chaque élection, la valeur de la corrélation entre d'une part les résultats communaux de cette élection et, d'autre part, les résultats de 1933TK, est indiquée. Les élections de 1933 sont prises comme point de repère, puisque cette année se trouve à mi-chemin entre 1925 et 1939. Ces lignes D sont analogues à la troisième ligne de la matrice de corrélations décrite ci-dessus (en page 2): la seule différence c'est que celle-ci comporte des résultats pour 11 provinces, tandis que celles-là sont calculées sur les 187 communes des provinces du Nord. Une fois encore, la stabilité des partis confessionnels s'avère inébranlable. Surtout les corrélations du parti catholique RKSP démontrent, quand on voit en même temps que les résultats varient très peu d'une élection à l'autre (voir les lignes A, B et C), que pour les catholiques les scrutins de l'entre-deux-guerres ressemblaient à des recensements de religion.

Les partis d'extrême gauche paraissent très stables aussi sur le plan des corrélations, à l'exception de l'année 1929 quand le PC néerlandais se présentait aux urnes divisé en deux tendances qui se faisaient une farouche opposition. Le succès de 1933 (de 2.8 à 5.7 pour cent dans les provinces du Nord) semble bien être basé sur les mêmes points faibles et forts que les résultats de 1931, comme en témoigne le coefficient de corrélation 0,913 entre 1931PS et 1933TK. Il s'agit donc clairement d'un changement qui fut géographiquement uniforme ("across the board change"). Les partis d'extrême droite, par contre, font preuve d'une répartition géographique beaucoup moins stable. Cela est surtout manifeste quand on compare les

coefficients de 1931PS à 1939PS, qui varient entre 0,490 et 0,766. Ce phénomène reflète probablement à la fois la composition électorale hétéroclite de ces partis d'une élection à l'autre et les avatars idéologiques du parti national-socialiste NSB. En effet, celui-ci s'est transformé entre 1935 et 1939 d'un parti qui parut à un assez grand nombre d'électeurs comme un parti propageant un retour aux bonnes traditions hollandaises en un parti ouvertement nazi.

Après ce sommaire chiffré d'histoire électorale, il faut tenter d'expliquer certains développements à l'aide de l'instrument analytique décrit ci-dessus. Il me semble clair qu'il est inutile de procéder à une analyse des partis confessionnels dont les résultats électoraux varient si peu d'une élection à l'autre et qui sont géographiquement si uniformes.

Il ressort du tableau 2 que le système politique néerlandais a été mis à l'épreuve en 1933 et en 1935. En 1933, les partis d'extrême gauche avaient progressé d'une façon considérable (tout cela à l'échelle néerlandaise) et la cote des partis traditionnels avait baissé de 90.3 à 84.0 pour cent. En 1935, l'attaque venait de droite et la popularité des partis traditionnels descendait jusqu'à 79.8 pour cent. Il convient donc d'analyser ces deux phénomènes: la montée des partis d'extrême gauche en 1933 et celle des extrémistes de droite en 1935.

A l'aide de l'équation (1), le vote normal (ou: vote attendu) des partis d'extrême gauche est calculé pour l'année 1933. Sur les 187 communes, la projection moyenne (\bar{V}_{33}) égale 2,2 pour cent, avec pour projections minimale et maximale -0,4 et 37,0. Bien sûr, aucun parti s'attend à un résultat électoral négatif, quoiqu'une projection négative soit numériquement possible quand les résultats aux élections précédentes étaient en baisse. Pour cette raison, les projections négatives, peu nombreuses d'ailleurs, ont été redéfinies sur une valeur minimale de 0,5 pour cent des voix. En 1933, le résultat moyen obtenu (\bar{V}_{33}) était 3.8 pour cent. L'écart entre les projections et les résultats réels est alors calculé en définissant le pourcentage $RES_{EG33} = 100 * V_{33} / \bar{V}_{33}$. Par exemple, si dans une commune le pourcentage estimé est 2.0 et le pourcentage obtenu 3.0, cette commune obtient $RES_{EG33} = 150$. Cette indice peut être interprété comme un indicateur de succès:

RES > 100 : le parti obtient plus de votes qu'attendus
 RES = 100 : le parti obtient le nombre de votes attendu
 RES < 100 : le parti obtient moins de votes qu'attendus

Maintenant il s'agit d'expliquer la variation de cet indice (sur les 187 communes) à l'aide de variables explicatives. La méthode employée sera celle de la régression multiple par étapes¹⁾ ("stepwise regression"). Avant d'effectuer cette analyse, la variable dépendante (RES_{EG33}) est soumise à une transformation logarithmique (¹⁰LOG) afin de la linéariser.

Voici les résultats de cette analyse:

<u>Variable dépendante</u>	<u>Variables indépendantes</u>		
	Incluses	Coefficients Standardisés (β)	Excluses
RES _{EG33}	INCR30	-.84	INDUS30
	FACMOD	.28	INDUS30/47
	CALV30	-.58	CATH30/47
	AGRIC30	-.47	INCR30/47
	CATH30	-.37	DYNA
	CALV30/47	-.28	FABRIC

Coefficient de détermination corrigé: $\bar{R}^2 = .64$

Ce résultat n'est pas mauvais du point de vue statistique: 64% de la variation de la variable dépendante est "expliquée" par les six variables indépendantes.

De prime abord, l'interprétation historique semble plus difficile: pourquoi les trois facteurs religieux (proportion d'incroyants, de calvinistes et de catholiques) vont-ils dans le même sens? Sans doute

¹⁾ En SPSS, paramètres: n=12, F=2.0, t=0,4.

puisque un quatrième facteur religieux, la proportion de réformés (Nederlands-Hervormden) n'est pas inclus dans l'analyse. En effet, celui-ci est lié de façon négative aux trois autres et il semble qu'en 1933 les partis d'extrême gauche aient eu du succès dans les communes où l'Eglise Réformée Néerlandaise comptait beaucoup de membres. Il faut savoir que cette église comptait (et compte encore) beaucoup de personnes parmi ses membres qui n'étaient point pratiquants. C'était et c'est la dénomination confessionnelle la plus floue. Ces trois coefficients de l'équation peuvent alors se comprendre en considérant que

- les communes qui comptaient beaucoup d'incroyants votaient déjà à gauche avant 1933
- les communes avec beaucoup de calvinistes ou de catholiques ne votaient pas pour les partis d'extrême gauche
- en 1933, les partis d'extrême gauche ont surtout progressé dans les communes à forte tendance réformée (le pilier le plus faible du système politique néerlandais)

La modernité de la commune a été un facteur favorable au succès des partis d'extrême gauche, mais le caractère agricole un facteur défavorable.

Pour les élections de 1935, une analyse analogue a été effectuée sur les résidus des partis d'extrême droite.

Voici les résultats de l'analyse de régression:

Variable dépendante	Variables indépendantes		
	Incluses	Coefficient Standardisé (s)	Excluses
RES _{35EG}	AGRIC30	-.52	CALV30 INCR30 CATH30 INDUS30 CALV30/47 CATH30/47 INCR30/47 DYNA INDUS FACRIC FACMOD

Coefficient de détermination corrigé:

$$\bar{R}^2 = .25$$

Statistiquement, ce résultat est beaucoup moins net que l'analyse précédente. Malgré cela, une interprétation historique peut être tentée. En 1935, le succès du Mouvement National-Socialiste NSB (près de 8 pour cent du vote) n'était presque pas lié aux caractéristiques confessionnelles et socio-économiques des communes. Que ce succès ait un rapport négatif avec la proportion d'agriculteurs dans les communes s'explique peut-être par le fait qu'en 1935 le NSB faisait appel à toutes les catégories socio-professionnelles, tandis qu'en 1925, 1929, 1931 et 1933 les partis groupés ici sous l'appellation "extrême droite" s'adressaient surtout aux agriculteurs. En 1935, l'extrême droite a obtenu un succès électoral, et en même temps elle a réussi à sortir de la sphère agricole.

Tableau 1: Résultats électoraux des principaux partis politiques*
néerlandais de 1925 à 1939.

Parti	Pourcentage du vote national valable à l'occasion des élections parlementaires de:			
	<u>1925</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1937</u>
RKSP (catholiques)	29	30	28	29
ARP (calvinistes)	12	12	13	16
CHU (réformateurs)	10	10	9	7
SDAP (socialistes)	23	24	21	22
VDB (libéraux de gauche)	6	6	5	6
LSP (libéraux de droite)	9	7	7	4
CPN (communistes)	1	2	3	3
SGP (calvinistes de stricte obédience)	2	2	3	2
NSB (national-socialistes)	-	-	-	4

*) C'est-à-dire les partis qui ont obtenu au moins deux sièges parlementaires au cours de cette période.

Figure 1: Résultats électoraux du parti social-démocrate (SDAP)
dans les 11 provinces des Pays-Bas de 1925 à 1937




Tableau 2: Aperçu des résultats électoraux aux Pays-Bas entre 1925 et 1939

		1925 TK	1929 TK	1931 PS	1933 TK	1935 PS	1937 TK	1939 PS
RKSP (catholiques)	A	28.6	29.6	29.6	27.9	27.8	28.8	29.9
	B	11.3	11.9	12.4	11.4	11.4	12.3	12.4
	C	9.9	10.5	10.4	9.7	9.6	10.2	10.2
	D	.997	.996	.997	1.000	.997	.996	.996
ARP (calvinistes)	A	12.2	11.6	12.4	13.4	11.3	16.4	12.6
	B	18.8	18.3	19.2	19.9	17.5	20.6	18.0
	C	21.6	21.2	21.6	22.7	20.0	23.1	20.5
	D	.975	.972	.988	1.000	.985	.978	.982
CHU (réformateurs)	A	9.9	10.5	10.8	9.1	9.3	7.5	9.9
	B	14.0	14.8	14.8	13.2	12.9	11.2	13.3
	C	15.3	16.0	15.9	14.4	14.6	12.6	15.0
	D	.946	.929	.973	1.000	.974	.974	.972
SDAP (socialistes)	A	22.9	23.8	22.2	21.5	21.1	22.0	21.4
	B	27.4	29.1	26.2	24.2	23.3	23.5	22.4
	C	25.2	27.5	24.0	22.3	21.2	20.8	20.3
	D	.915	.911	.962	1.000	.970	.973	.918
VDB (libéraux de gauche)	A	6.1	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.2	5.9	6.8
	B	8.6	9.4	9.7	8.8	8.4	10.3	10.3
	C	6.7	7.0	9.7	8.9	8.5	10.9	10.4
	D	.648	.829	.764	1.000	.860	.889	.813
LSP (libéraux de droite)	A	8.7	7.4	9.8	7.0	6.1	4.0	6.1
	B	7.6	6.5	10.0	6.3	5.6	3.9	6.5
	C	8.5	7.9	12.0	7.5	7.0	5.0	8.2
	D	.623	.551	.827	1.000	.702	.832	.742
Partis d'Extrême Gauche	A	2.0	2.6	2.9	5.2	4.8	4.2	4.1
	B	2.2	2.5	2.8	5.7	4.9	4.3	3.9
	C	1.4	1.8	2.0	3.8	3.4	3.0	2.7
	D	.933	.622	.913	1.000	.976	.970	.952
Partis d'Extrême Droite	A	3.4	1.9	1.0	2.2	8.4	4.8	3.9
	B	5.7	3.2	1.7	2.9	8.4	4.3	4.4
	C	7.7	4.5	1.9	3.7	8.5	4.5	4.2
	D	.821	.767	.568	1.000	.766	.662	.490
Partis Traditionnels	A	88.4	89.1	90.3	84.0	79.8	84.6	86.7
	B	87.7	90.0	92.3	83.8	79.1	81.8	82.9
	C	87.1	90.0	93.6	85.5	80.7	82.6	84.6
	D	.733	.722	.717	1.000	.784	.710	.599

A: Pourcentages du vote total valable (totalité du pays)

B: Pourcentages du vote total valable (les quatre provinces du Nord réunies)

C: Moyennes des pourcentages communaux (les 187 communes des quatre provinces du Nord)

D: Coefficients de corrélation linéaire avec 1933 TK comme résultats électoraux de base (nombre d'observations: 187)

"TWO NATIONS: CLASS AND PERIPHERY
IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN, 1885-1910

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'TWO NATIONS': CLASS AND PERIPHERY
IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN, 1885-1910

ABSTRACT

Structural equation modeling techniques test a series of hypotheses on the mobilization of class voting in late Victorian Britain. The enfranchisement of the working class triggers an organizational proliferation as parties seek to mobilize the new citizenry as well as counter-mobilization of religious and territorial cleavages which divide the working class vote along pre-industrial cleavage lines. Class voting appeared as early as the 1895 election as the newly enfranchised voters of 1884 support the Labour and Lib-Lab parties. During the period the Liberals become increasingly isolated with their middle class, Nonconformist base as organized labor in particular moves to Labour and Lib-Labs. Conservative support appears stable among middle class and Catholic voters. Models of regional politics show Central England to evolve quite differently with class voting less important than the remainder of the country. In the periphery the Liberals appeal to the Celtic Fringe while Labour garners the working class vote. The mobilization of the lower strata, which might have united class against class, generated a counter-mobilization which divided the periphery against the center.

'TWO NATIONS': CLASS AND PERIPHERY
IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN. 1885-1910

Two nations, between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy: who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings as if they were dwellers in different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws...the rich and the poor.

-Benjamin Disraeli
Sybil. 1845

The latter half of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth witnessed a movement toward the full incorporation of Europe's working classes into political life. This development took place on two broad fronts: the gradual removal of institutional barriers to full citizenship, and the emergence of new organizational forms aimed at mobilizing the new citizenry. The politicization of the lower strata created the potential for extreme class polarization within societies as well as cross-national working class solidarity. However, the mobilization of class increasingly became embedded in, as well as brought forth a counter-mobilization of, the pre-existing cleavage structures, so that by the end of the period class mobilization had taken on a distinctive national character. The final outcome was a fracturing of European working class politics along national lines and the shattering of hopes for cross-national class solidarity at onset of the great war.

The following analysis employs a unique data base and a promising new data analytic technique to explore three concerns at the nexus of the study of class politics: the formal incorporation of working class, the salience of past territorial and ethnic struggles in conditioning class conflict and the partisan mobilization and counter-mobilization of the polity. The research demonstrates the past

conceptualization and measurement of these concerns have seriously limited their findings and offers an alternative analysis showing the peripheralization of class politics in Britain. such that while politics became more similar across the periphery. it became more distinct from the center.

The formal incorporation of the working classes involved a redefinition of the relationship of the individual and his economic status to the state. while at the same time expanding the state's role in citizen formation. Political elites evolved complex suffrage schemes and social legislation designed to win the loyalties of the newly enfranchised classes. By isolating the worker from his peers and placing more of his social welfare and education in the hands of state institutions. the propensities for class solidarities could be dampened (Rokkan. 1962). In Germany. Bismark hoped to domesticate the working class through a combination of coercion and paternalism linked to a franchise scheme which disadvantaged the working class movements. In Britain Disraeli pursued a strategy of electoral and social reform coupled to appeals the "one nation" ideal to win elements of the working class to Conservatism. Equally imaginative schemes were devised throughout Europe (Rokkan. 1970: 147-68). The openness of the politically dominant strata to the demands of the newly enfranchised influenced their responses and these. in turn. the effectiveness of their incorporating strategies. For a recent restatement of this theme see Lipset. 1983.

The mobilization of working classes. however. took place against the backdrop of prior ethnic. religious and territorial struggles for unification. It was thus inevitable that some features of the previous cleavages would find expression in the class struggles of the

period. Rokkan (1970: 100) notes that the "politics of cultural defense" in the periphery blunted the hard edges of class conflict in the South and West of Norway as well as the Celtic Fringe of Britain. Where in addition political elites could strike a responsive cord among pre-industrial cleavages, they could divide the working class. In Germany the mobilization of cross-cutting cleavages proved both effective and enduring (Claggett, et.al. 1982; Urwin and Aarebrot. 1981; Urwin. 1982^a). The more salient the prior cleavages became the less the likelihood of class solidarity and the greater the possibilities that class struggle would turn to secessionist solutions (Linz. 1973).

In addition to the redefining the individual's relationship to the state and the historical legacy of past conflicts, the ability of elites to muster a counter-mobilization of the middle classes through the elaboration of mass party organization proved consequential (Lipset and Rokkan. 1967: 51; Weber. 1969: 105). In Scandinavia following the democratization of the institutions, political elites evolved organizational strategies to mobilize the citizenry in order win control of the state (Svasand. 1980).

Late Victorian Britain provides an excellent setting to examine these dynamics. The reforms of 1883-85 sustained the movement begun with the 1867 reform bill toward the incorporation and mobilization of the inarticulate strata into electoral politics. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 removed the most blatant means by which the economically dependent strata were manipulated by their superiors (O'Leary. 1962: 159-78). The expansion of the franchise in 1884 and the redistribution of the seats in 1885 increased the electorate by 80% and brought greater balance between the counties and the boroughs. Inequities and

anomalies of the previous reforms persisted however: plural voting, over-representation of rural districts, and difficult registration procedures. However, the reform marked a major step toward universal franchise and "one adult, one value, one vote", enlarging the electorate to include two-thirds of the adult males in England and Wales and three-fifths in Scotland. The reforms provided the opportunity for greater expression of class voting by reducing bribery and setting maximum electoral expenses, lowering thresholds to participation among householders and increasing the seats allocated to such industrial cities as Liverpool, Birmingham, and Glasgow (Blewett, 1965; Jones, 1966; Butler and Cornford, 1969: 333-4; Matthew, McKibben and Kay, 1976; Seymour, 1915: 456-518).

Expansion of the electorate also endangered organizational responses from political parties seeking to mobilize the newly enfranchised as well as to counter similar attempts by their rivals. By the late 1870's the Conservative party organization, built by Disraeli in response to the previous franchise reform of 1867, had fallen on hard times. Under the guidance of Lord Randolph Churchill, a central organization and a system of electoral agents was instituted. The Conservative reorganization in part sought to imitate the success of the Liberal organizational challenge which many scholars have pointed to the prototype for all party apparatus: Chamberlain's Birmingham caucus initiated in 1868 (Ostrogorski, 1964; Cornford, 1963-64; Tholfsen, 1959). In addition to the major parties, the Labour movement began to elaborate organizational strategies for the mobilization of the working class (Chamberlain, 1973; Moorehouse, 1973; Cole, 1950: 138-87).

Popular politics in late Victorian Britain evidenced the stresses

between social cleavages harkening back to the pre-industrial struggles over national unification and the emerging class divisions. These tensions reflect the processes of nation-formation and state-building and maybe conceptualized as a center-periphery conflict dimension (Hechter, 1975; Urwin, 1980, 1982; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). Such analysis concentrates on the territorial expansion and cultural domination of the center (England) over the Celtic Fringe (Scotland, Wales, Ireland and Cornwall) in British national development. The resulting cleavages emerge along economic, cultural, political and territorial lines: economically advantaged and disadvantaged regions; language, religion and ethnicity; political over or under representation, and boundary questions. Economic conflicts appear between agricultural and industrial interests, but also between workers and capitalists. Cultural cleavages are among established (Church of England) and non-established (Roman Catholic and Nonconformist) religions, as well as among language minorities (Gaelic speakers) and English speakers. The distribution of seats in parliament and the differential size of district electorates form aspects of the political cleavage. All these features may be territorially based, but in addition territorial boundaries form another source of tension (Rokkan, 1971; Torsvik, 1981; see Urwin, 1980, 1982b for a discussion of British development from this perspective).

Center-periphery tensions are very much in evidence in late Victorian Britain. Religious, regional and ethnic issues found their expression in the Home Rule debates, particularly the Irish question. The Catholic population of Britain, particularly the Irish migrant, was attracted by the Conservative support for religious education, but

the party's stance on Home Rule and established church repelled both the Catholics and Nonconformists. The Liberal support for Home Rule appealed to the Celtic Fringe in general and the Irish in particular, but opposition to religious education and support for temperance alienated the Catholics, while gaining support among Nonconformists. Labour appeals to class struck a responsive cord among the growing industrial working class, but the party's stance on Home Rule and general antagonism to organized religion met resistance among more religious Catholics and Nonconformists alike. On the other hand English Anglicans felt most comfortable with the Conservatives. Accentuated by the educational financing act of 1870, the Irish question dominated much of British politics in the late Victorian era. In the early part of the period, when the Irish question was perceived as a religious division of established and non-established church, it found sympathy in Scotland and Wales, lending support to the Liberal Party's Home Rule appeal. Later as the Irish question became transformed into a religious division of Catholic versus Protestant, Welsh and Scottish home rule demands decreased. Until Irish independence, however, issues of religion, region and language remained at the center of politics (Urwin, 1980, 1982^b; Wald, 1983: 162-201).

This tenacity of nation-formation and state-building questions muted the expression of class voting (Wald, 1978, 1982: 76; Clarke, 1971, 1974, 1977; Butler and Stokes, 1976: 112-3). Thus despite the rise of class voting and the weakening of the religious base of political life (Glazer, 1958: 363), the pertinacity of Home Rule issues in general, and the Irish problem in particular, beclouded the political consequences of the enfeebling of the Nonconformist base of

Liberalism.

Three interpretations exist on the consequences of the rise of class politics for the continuance of territorial, ethnic and religious identifications (Radin, 1979: 620-3; Leifer, 1981: 24-30): Developmental, Reactive Ethnicity and Ethnic Competition Arguments. The former would see the rise of class politics efface the territorial, ethnic and religious identifications which underpinned nineteenth century political life rendering, in its extreme, Disraeli's two nations or Marx's classes (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 19-21; Blondel, 1967; Pulzer, 1967: 46, 98; Pellino, 1968: 120; Cornford, 1963-64: 64-5; Butler and Stokes, 1976: 109-21, 138; Alford, 1963). The reactive ethnicity argument stresses the impact of uneven class development combined with the continuance of territorial, ethnic and religious identifications engendering a "cultural division of labor" (Hechter, 1975: 30) and a peripheralization of the Celtic Fringe, leading to "reactive ethnic cleavages" (Gellner, 1964: 147-78; Radin, 1977; Hechter, 1975: 15-46). The result is heightened ethnic consciousness among peripheral working class where economic inequalities, intra-collectivity communication and intergroup differences of culture are greater (Hechter, 1975: 43). The ethnic competition argument holds economic development and inequalities will generate political cohesiveness across classes within ethnic groups as these groups become aware of their economic subordination to the center (Deutsch, 1953; Hannan, 1979; Wallerstein, 1974: 353).

Late Victorian Britain is a period of transformation from a society predominantly based on cultural, territorial and religious cleavages to one based on class divisions. The full expression of class politics, of course, was not articulated until the inter-war

period when, following a further expansion of the franchise in 1918 and the removal of the "Irish Problem", Disraeli's second nation was fully incorporated into the political community and the dominant issues of the late Victorian period receded. The 1885-1910 period, however, introduced institutional changes which incorporated significant portions of the politically inarticulate strata, thus providing opportunities for the mobilization of the previously disenfranchised, an opportunity which generated new forms of political organization. These developments set the stage for full mobilization following the war.

Previous examinations of late Victorian Britain yielded conflicting or incomplete analyses of the persistence of pre-industrial cleavages and the salience of class conflict. Table 1 summarizes the principal features of the major empirical research on this problem. Five studies are of particular interest when discussing electoral politics of the late Victorian era: Hechter, 1975; Ragin, 1977; Leifer, 1981, and Wald, 1982, 1983. All deal with pre-World War I period, all use systematic data for statistical analysis, all approach the problem of shifting cleavage structures, and all conclude that pre-industrial cleavages co-existed to some degree with the emerging class politics of the period. The studies differ in their analysis of the regional responses to class mobilization. All agree on the presence of anti-Conservatism outside England, but disagree on the social base and vehicles of its expression.

All the studies, however, suffer flaws of conceptualization, measurement, design and data analysis which limit their understanding of class and center-periphery conflicts. The major flaw shared by all the studies is the conceptualization and measurement of the dependent

variable as single dimension of Conservatism/ Anti-Conservatism. Employing this dimension has two major deficiencies: It suggests the Conservatives were the nationalizing party primarily based on appeals to class. Second, it collapses class and center-periphery conflict into a single dimension and does not permit a distinction between them. Therefore, it biases the results in favor of the Reactive Ethnicity Argument since either differential class or reactive ethnicity voting could produce regional differences interpreted as anti-Conservatism. The analysis, therefore, not only develops a faulty test between the Developmentalist and Reactive Ethnicity Arguments, but can not test the Ethnic Competition Argument which suggests class unity within ethnic groups is problematic. The difficulty is overcome by including all parties, particularly the Lib-Lab and nascent Labour votes. Minor parties and factions of the Liberals were regional or local and thus are better indicators regionalism: while Lib-Lab and Labour are better indicators of class voting by the working class.

None of the studies can analyze the incorporation and mobilization of the working classes or the counter-mobilization middle classes and pre-industrial cleavages because they exclude enfranchisement and non-voters. Since voter enfranchisement and participation varied across time, space and social class, analyzing differential mobilization is crucial, yet only Wald mentions this variable, but he does not include it in his equations. Hechter seriously mismeasures this variable (compare Hechter, 1975: 221 and Wald, 1983: 209). Enfranchisement could form a crucial barrier to the expression of both class and center-periphery conflict since registration discriminated against key groups, e.g. unskilled working

class and Catholics.

Similar problems are posed by the independent variables. Hechter and Leifer mix class and economic marginality by using industrialization as a surrogate measure of both. Ragin and Wald overcome some of these flaws by using occupational groupings, but only Wald uses trade unionism as key expression of class. All employ religious and language variables as measures of peripheralism. However, only Wald has access to multiple indicators, but not the data analytic techniques to fully exploit them. Thus, all the studies assume the observed variables are isomorphic with the concepts they are thought to measure (Bentler, 1980: 434; see also appendix.)

Three of the studies-- Hechter, Ragin and Leifer-- employ county level data aggregated to correspond to parliamentary districts. The difficulties are several (Page, 1978; Steed, 1979), including changing boundaries, large heterogeneous units and barriers to cross-time analysis. Wald's data are richer and based on constant units of analysis across time, but he does not use cross-time dynamic techniques. Hechter, Ragin and Wald employ regression analysis, usually stepwise, while Leifer uses discriminant analysis (see appendix for a discussion of the limits of regression analysis, also see Franklin and Mughan, 1978 on the limits of discriminant analysis). All compare coefficients across elections, thus none can distinguish between trends and fluctuations in voter mobilizations and alignments across time.

[Table 1 about here]

This analysis differs from the above studies in the following respects: the inclusion of minor parties, abstentions and enfranchisement, the introduction of cross-time dynamic and the use of

a new data analytic technique able to make maximum use of multiple indicators to develop structural equation models of the electoral dynamics of the period. Latent Variable Path Analysis (LVPA) fully exploits multiple indicators by developing latent variables which are more valid, reliable and closer to the concepts they seek to measure. The introduction of cross-time dynamic analysis enables the model to account for both stability and change across elections. The logic is similar to the introduction of lagged endogenous variables for the elections of 1895, 1906 and 1910: The path coefficient between the lagged variable and its counter part represents the variance accounted for by the previous election, thus the remaining variance represents change from the preceeding election some of which is accounted for by the religious and class latent variables.

These features enable the analysis to go well beyond the previous research which concluded only the existence of anti-Conservatism in the periphery. Anti-Conservatism will show itself to have two faces: a working class vote for Labour and Lib-Lab, and religious vote for the Liberals. Moreover, working class voting is stronger in the periphery than in the center, dividing the periphery against the center and making politics more similar across the periphery as becomes more distinct from the center. Mobilization and counter-mobilization play crucial roles in emergence of class voting, particularly in the periphery, but also in the continued success of the Conservatives in Central England.

HYPOTHESES

The reforms of 1883-85 generated a reservoir of potential new supporters which appear in the early years of the period as non-voters: over time, however, the partisan mobilization incorporates non-voters into party alignments. At the beginning of the period religious and ethnic variables are better predictors of party vote. By the end of the period class variables increase their predictive capabilities. Working class association with Liberal party declines, while increasing with the Labour and Lib-Lab parties. The mobilization of the working classes gives rise to a counter-mobilization of the middle classes and pre-industrial cleavages.

A comparative analysis of the regional political dynamics in association with the changing social base of politics yields evidence to support one of several hypotheses: If class is a cross-regional binding force, then regional differences in partisan politics diminish over time as class becomes more important than religious and ethnic ties (Developmental Argument). If working class grievances combine with ethnic consciousness enhancing regional distinctiveness and class consciousness (Cultural Division of Labor Argument), then class stratification does not generate political homogenization and regional peripheralization of the working class results (Reactive Ethnicity Argument). If religious and ethnic loyalties unite social classes to enhance regional distinctiveness, then an alternative form of peripheralization results (Ethnic Competition Argument). The Reactive Ethnicity and Ethnic Competition arguments differ on the hypothesized relations across classes within ethnic groups: the former hypothesizes class divisions within ethnic groups, the latter across-class cohesion within ethnic groups. Both suggest increasing distinctiveness of the

periphery as a consequence of class mobilization. Finally, if class politics does not emerge while religious and ethnic ties remain strong and regional distinctiveness persists, then traditional politics prevail (Null Hypothesis).

CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND DATA

The focus of the analysis now becomes the concepts of class, religion, stable and unstable partisan voting alignments across time and territory, the latter capturing the center-periphery dimension. Religion and class form the independent variables in the analysis. Religion signifies more than religious affiliation, however, religion and its association with ethnicity, territoriality and language formed the social base of political life in late Victorian Britain finding its expression in the Home Rule issues of the period. The concept of class, of course, has been subject to multiple interpretations and measurement (Wald, 1982). In contrast to Miller (1977) and Butler and Stokes (1976) who use a bi-class measures and Wald (1983) and Radin (1977) who use discrete occupational categories, this analysis employs occupational and religious measures [1] to construct class and religious latent variables. The relationship of religion and class to the stability and variability of partisan alignments across time is the centerpiece of the analysis. Party vote and abstentions construct latent variables of stable and variable partisan alignments. Models are constructed and tested using Latent Variable Path Analysis.

Latent Variable Path Analysis (LVPA) is a general class of data analytic techniques combining path analysis with the use of latent variables. The technique employed here is Latent Variable Path Analysis with Partial Least Squares (LVPLS). Latent variables (LVs) are theoretical constructs which can not be observed directly but

which are measured by observed or manifest variables (MVs). In this sense the conceptualization is similar to factor analysis. Each manifest variable consists of a unique as well as a common variance with other manifest variables thought to underlie the theoretical or latent variable. The first task is then to construct models of the latent variables and test their reliability on the observed or manifest variables [2] (Bentler, 1980; McArdle and McDonald, 1981; Lohmoeller, 1982a). See appendix for a discussion of this technique.

Table 2 presents the symbols used in Figures 1 and 2 to represent the socio-economic and religious variables. The final two digit number in each variable indicates the year of observation.

[Table 2 here]

Figures 1 and 2 follow the notational convention for Latent Variable Path Analysis: Manifest Variables are represented by squares. Latent Variables by circles, directionality by straight arrows, undirected covariance by curved arrows and unexplained variance by the smaller circles on the manifest or latent variables.

Figure 1 presents the LVPLS estimates for the manifest to latent variable parameters for religion and class. The lowest loading is between the manifest variable, Church of England Sunday School attendance per capita, 1851 (CESSPCT51), and the latent variable, Church of England (C of E) with a value of .446. The manifest variable proportion of Scottish born males in 1891 does not load positively and is dropped from the model.

[Figure 1 about here]

SHIFTING VOTER ALIGNMENTS. 1885-1910

Figure 2 presents the results of the LVPLS algorithm for the entire polity between 1885 and 1910; regional differences are not included and the full model is used as a backdrop against which regional variations are highlighted. Even without regional variations this initial model provides much information on the dynamics of incorporation, mobilization and the social base of political life.

The figure presents all paths in the model having an absolute value of .2 or greater. Although presented in four parts, the model must be conceptualized in its entirety as a single statement on the dynamics of voter alignments. All parameters in the model are generated by an integrated, iterative procedure in which the algorithm seeks a partial least squares solution according to two criteria: (1) the LVs must be good predictors, or if targets, predictable; and (2) if outward directed relationships are specified, the LVs must be good predictors of the MVs. In Figure 2 the LVs on the left side are outward directed, generated by principal components analysis and constrained to fit their specified position in the inner or path model. The LVs on the right side are inward directed, generated by canonical correlation and the weights are the best standardized linear combination of scores to fit the relationships specified by the path model.

[Figure 2 about here]

The model rejects the Null Hypothesis since working class voting finds expression outside traditional partisan alignments, however, additional models are necessary to discriminate among the remaining hypotheses. The salient findings rejecting the Null Hypothesis may be summarized as follows: The incorporation and mobilization of the

working class into partisan alignments as well as the counter-mobilization of religious cleavages engenders three partisan groupings: the Conservatives appealing to religion and class, the Liberals benefiting from Nonconformist and Labour-Lib-Lab gaining from the working class vote, particularly organized labor. Thus, nascent class divisions cross-cut religious cleavages functioning to further divide the polity to the disadvantage of the Liberals. Supportive evidence from the model includes: First, the political incorporation of the newly enfranchised as gradual process evidenced by the decline in the coefficient associated with the Non-Voters MV. Second, the partisan incorporation of the newly enfranchised indicated by the decline in the coefficients for minor and "other" parties and the emergence of three partisan groupings-- Conservatives, Liberals and Lib-Lab-Labour. Independent Liberals, Independent Conservatives, Liberal-Unionists and "other" parties diminish across the four elections. Third, the level of enfranchisement has no effect on the parties' electoral fortunes, although rural and Nonconformist voters are over represented (see Butler, 1968: 5). Fourth, class voting appears, but not to the exclusion of religious influences. The Conservatives retain the support of the middle classes and gain from the shift in the Catholic vote; the Liberals lose the support of the working class, particularly organized labor and rural workers, but gain from Nonconformist, while Labour-Lib-Lab gain from working class voting, particularly organized labor [3].

The LVPLS algorithm generates a robust least squares solution close to the data, but does not provide goodness-of-fit statistics. The stability and statistical significance of the least squares solution can be tested with maximum likelihood (ML) techniques [4].

The results of these tests confirm the LVPLS solution. The model is stable and the coefficients analyzed above are significant.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN VOTER ALIGNMENTS. 1885-1910

Figure 2 presents the electoral dynamics at the national level. but does not permit direct analysis of the impact of class mobilization on the center-periphery dimension. The hypotheses concerning the interplay of pre-industrial and class cleavages can be tested by comparing regional models of the processes in Figure 2. Best fitting models are constructed for subsets of the data using a "jack-knife" technique: then results of each models is used to predict all other models [5].

The differences across the models are summarized in Table 3 which presents goodness-of-fit statistical indices generated by maximum likelihood methods when the path model of one sub-set is used to predict another [6]. The question asked is: How accurately can the path model derived from one sub-set of the data reproduce the inner or path model of another sub-set (James, Mulaik and Brett, 1982: 83-90)? The results might suggest several possible outcomes: If there are insignificant differences across the models, then regional variations are unimportant and the dynamics of Figure 2 represent the addition of class divisions to existing cleavages and the nationalization of politics along those cleavage lines. The finding would discount regional differences at the same time it would modify traditional politics. The result would suggest a variation of the Developmental argument with the persistence of pre-industrial cleavages with the addition of class divisions. Second, if each peripheral region becomes more distinct from the others as well as the center, then regional peripheralization results. Further examination of the dynamics within

each region would confirm or disconfirm the Reactive Ethnicity or Ethnic Competition hypotheses depending on the presence or absence of cross-class alliances within regions. Third, if politics becomes more similar across the periphery at the same time it becomes more distinct from the center, then cross-regional peripheralization results. Examination of within center and periphery models would evaluate the Reactive Ethnicity and Ethnic Competition hypotheses.

[Table 3 here]

The results in Table 3 clearly reject the Developmental Hypothesis, even in its modified form: regional differences remain major distinguishing features of politics in late Victorian Britain. The best predictor of the full model in Figure 2 is Non-Central England. Within the periphery, however, the removal of Scotland provides the next best prediction to both the full model and to the Non-Central England model. In other words the deepest cleavage lies between the Central England the remainder of the country. Central England is the most distinctive regional polity while Scotland is the most distinctive regional polity within the periphery. Further support for this interpretation is provided by the worst fitting predictions between Central England to Non-Peripheral England and between Central England and Peripheral England. These findings suggest that emerging class politics in late Victorian Britain united the population across the peripheries at the same time it heightened the division between center and periphery. The results indicate the cross-regional peripheralization of politics.

The focus of the analysis now becomes within center and periphery dynamics to distinguish between the two remaining hypotheses-- Reactive Ethnicity and Ethnic Competition-- yielding insights into the

dynamics of both the center-periphery and class mobilizations. The Non-Central England model is a caricature of the full model: The Liberal party becomes increasingly dependent on Nonconformist as it loses support of organized labor, agricultural labor and Roman Catholicism which shift to the Lib-Lab and Labor. The Conservatives retain support from Catholicism and middle class. These findings support the Reactive Ethnicity argument but not that offered by Hechter, Leifer or Wald. While all four authors found anti-Conservatism in the periphery, only two offered further interpretations: Hechter (1975: 272-3) hypothesized the cultural division of labor to unite working class grievances with ethnic consciousness to enhance regional distinctiveness finding its expression in the Labour movement. Radin (1977: 449) speculated that reactive ethnicity to develop in the dominant strata while the working class demonstrates class voting. Neither author tested these propositions for the late Victorian period. This analysis shows working class consciousness functioned to unite the working class across the periphery finding its expression in class voting for the Labour-Lib-Labs, while at the same time dividing it from the enhanced ethnicity of the middle classes which found its expression in the reactive ethnicity vote for the Liberals. Radin's untested speculations are supported. In sum, the mobilization of the periphery has two faces: a reactive ethnicity vote for the Liberals and a working class vote for Labour-Lib-Lab. Reactive ethnicity does not appear among class conscious lower strata voters, but among middle strata religious and ethnic voters. The Liberal party took up the politics of cultural defense in its home rule appeals, but Labour-Lib-Lab directed its appeal to class politics (Cole, 1950:

129-31: Emv. 1973: 68-71: Hanham. 1969: 91-96: Gredorv. 1968: 20-1: Pelling. 1968: 100-21) which at times functioned to divide the working class (for example. see Clarke. 1971: 40-45. 253-55).

The findings so far reject the Null Hypothesis and the Developmental Hypothesis for the entire polity and the Ethnic Competition hypothesis in the periphery: Hechter's previously untested Reactive Ethnicity hypothesis is not supported. while Radin's similarly untested hypothesis is supported. The focus of the analysis now turns to examining the dynamics of the center where Hechter (1975: 333-9). Leifer (1981: 39) and Wald (1983: 141-61) proffer that class voting is stronger in the center than in the periphery. The results of this analysis reject both this and the Reactive Ethnicity hypothesis and support the Ethnic Competition argument. Two broadly based party groupings appear: Conservative-Liberal Unionist and Liberal-Lib-Lab. both drawing on a mix of class and religious support. The Labour movement, the clearest expression of working class vote. is weak. Socio-economic partisan alignments are more fluid and the class mobilization of the early elections is blurred by a counter-mobilization of religion in 1906 (Clarke. 1971: 257-8: Emv. 1973: 140-41: Thompson. 1967: 168-9: Blumer-Thomas. 1965: 169-79).

The models offer support for the Reactive Ethnicity hypothesis in the periphery and the Ethnic Competition hypothesis in the center. The dynamics of the period function to divide the center from the periphery: While the periphery develops a pattern of working class solidarity for Labour and the religious cleavage divides the middle class vote between the Conservatives and Liberals: in the center class voting is less salient for all groups. and parties are broad based religious and class coalitions. In the periphery working class

mobilization is initially high but fragmented, but the newly enfranchised are quickly incorporated into the Lib-Lab and Labour vote. In the center high initial working class mobilization is followed demobilization and then by partisan remobilization into the Liberal and Lib-Lib vote. However, the working class mobilization is accompanied by a middle class and religious counter-mobilization which diffuses partisan class alliances. Most notably the Labour party, which is arguably the best articulator of working class interests, does not appear in the center as a significant outlet for these dynamics.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis examined the inter-play of emerging class divisions with pre-industrial cleavages in late Victorian Britain. Previous research offered conflicting or incomplete analyses but could be formulated into four hypotheses-- Developmental, Reactive Ethnicity, Ethnic Competition and Null Hypotheses-- which facilitated the examination of three processes in late Victorian British politics: the incorporation and mobilization of the working class, the persistence of pre-industrial cleavage structures and the response of parties to mobilization. While the analysis did not explicitly examine the behavior of elites, it implied their efforts at mobilization, counter-mobilization and structuring electoral choices is consequential. The congruence between the electoral issues emphasized by elites and the models of aggregate electoral behavior indicate this assumption is not unwarranted (Claddett, et.al. 1982; Zuckerman, 1975, 1982): historians' and participants' accounts of the period supply supporting evidence.

These results go considerably beyond previous research which is severely limited by conceptual and measurement difficulties. The processes of incorporation, mobilization and counter-mobilization evidence center-periphery differences with the center showing a more rapid working class mobilization but also a stronger middle class and religious counter-mobilization functioning to diffuse class voting, findings which support the Ethnic Competition argument. Meanwhile, the mobilization of the periphery manifests two faces: a working class vote for Labour and a religious and ethnic vote for the Liberals dividing the periphery against the center, findings which support the Reactive Ethnicity argument.

Throughout Western Europe in the late nineteenth century the expansion of franchise and mobilization of class challenged the existing cleavage structures. The resulting potential for class polarization and cross-national working class unity remained unrealized as a counter-mobilization of pre-industrial cleavages muted the articulation of class conflict, fragmented the new citizenry across several parties and delayed the expression of class voting. The consequences were enormously important for dampening political expressions of class and generating the politics of cultural defense, the latter at times finding expression in counter-cultural and counter-center extremist movements during the inter-war period. This research extends and refines these arguments for late Victorian Britain where the clearest evidence of class is found in the periphery increasing its distinctiveness from the center and thus diminishing over-all class solidarity. The mobilization of the lower strata, which might have united class against class, instead generated a counter-mobilization which divided the periphery against the center:

the result might be termed the peripheralization of class in late Victorian Britain. Even following the further expansion of franchise and class mobilization of the inter-war period regional distinctiveness persisted as the peripheral polities divided between class and more traditional ethnic and religious loyalties. while in Central England the Conservatives expanded their appeals to "Englishness" (Ramsden, 1978: 188-215). This persistence of pre-existing cleavages and their influence on the expression of newer cleavages in the polity helps to explain the uneven progress toward, as well as the limits of, class politics.

NOTES

1. Data consist of 115 surrogate constituencies for the eight general elections between 1885 and December, 1910 constructed by matching the parliamentary constituencies to census units for 1891. Multiple indicators for religion and ethnicity derive from the 1851 census, while occupational indicators derive from the 1891 census. Trade union density is calculated for 1898, 1901 and 1910. Electoral data consist of the vote for all major and minor parties as well as non-voters. Because of a paucity of Labour candidates, "Labour" in the data includes the Independent Labour Party, Labour Representation Committee, and other Labour affiliated groups. Wald used the Lib-Lab designation for Liberal candidates with trade union background who had no affiliation with Labour groups. Finally, Labour candidates running with Liberal candidates in two member districts were classified as Labour. This analysis uses only the elections of 1885, 1895, 1906 and January, 1910. More or less regularly timed elections facilitated the across-time analysis. The January, 1910 election was more typical of the period and less representative of the crisis of Peers vs. People of the December, 1910 contest. A fuller description of the data and its construction is found in Wald, 1983: 74-88.

The 1851 and 1891 censuses provide the manifest variables for constructing the latent variables for religion. For the three major religious groupings of Church of England (C of E), Non-Conformism (NON) and Roman Catholic (RC) the 1891 census provides clergy per capita; the 1851 census generates the maximum attendance at the best-attended service per capita (MAX); number of persons attending day school per capita (DSPCT); number of persons attending Sunday school per capita (SSPCT). Manifest variables for ethnicity are Welsh (WAL), Scottish (SCOT) and Irish (IRE) born males per capita. Class measures include: CL2--proportion of the 1891 economically active population in Class 2 of the 1951 occupational grading scheme; SKILL11--proportion of the economically active male population engaged in skilled occupations defined by the 1911 Registrar General's scheme; MANLAB--proportion of the economically active population classified as manual laborers, 1891; INDLAB--proportion of the economically active population classified as industrial or mining, 1891; TUDEN, 88, 01, 10--proportion of the major occupational sectors--transport, printing, building, textiles, wood, clothing, mining and metal--organized in trade associations in 1888, 1901 and 1910; NAGLAB--all forms of general unskilled labor in non-agricultural employment, 1891; AGRLAB--general unskilled agricultural labor, 1891.

2. The estimation algorithm is Latent Variable Path Analysis with Partial Least-Squares (LVPLS) (Lohmöller, 1981). LVPLS has several advantages for social science research: It is statistically robust, yet less knowledge sensitive than some alternative methods. The technique allows for two methods of estimating relationships between the manifest variables (MVs) and latent variables (LVs): Inward and Outward Directed. If the researcher believes the manifest variables are common measures of

an underlying theoretical construct, outward directedness is appropriate and the coefficients are constructed by principal components factor analysis. On the other hand, if the researcher believes the manifest variables have no known relationship to a latent variable, inward directedness is assumed and the coefficients are calculated by canonical correlation. The analysis constructs LVs for class and religious as well as Stable and Unstable Vote variables. The latter are in accordance with the conceptual definition of realignment as shift in voting patterns from stable to unstable and a return to stable patterns. LVs have several advantages over the use of MVs or observed variables. No information is discarded nor is any new information created by the use of LVs, however LVs include distinct advantages over observed or manifest variables: LVs with multiple indicators are more reliable drawing upon the common variance of the MVs. Second, LVs are likely to be closer to the theoretical concepts they seek to measure. Third, LVs permit the distinction among common variances, unique variances and error terms, the constituent parts of observed variance. Thus information is not discarded but reallocated to more theoretically meaningful categories.

Construction of the class and religious latent variables proceeded by the following steps: First, a principal components factor analysis defined the manifest variables into latent variables within the religious and class groupings. Second, outward directedness was assumed in the parameter estimation in the LVPLS model. The assumption is that the observables are reflective of underlying or theoretical dimensions of religion or class.

Latent variable construction for party voting followed these steps: First, a single principal component factor was constructed of the percentage party vote and non-voters across time: high loadings across time indicated stability, low loadings indicated instability. In other words, each of the vote variables was correlated with itself in each of the elections: high loadings (defined as greater than .6) indicated that the percentage vote remained stable for that party across time and that the party vote in the first election was a good predictor of the same party vote in the second. These loadings were the selection criterion for the latent variable blocks in the LVPLS model. Voting blocks form a dimension of choice available to the citizenry, one of which is abstention. Crewe (1974) notes the importance of including non-voters in the analysis of electoral change. Therefore the MV-LV parameters are inward directed and the LVPLS factor weights are the estimates. Conservative and Liberal parties load highly on the Stable Vote Latent Variable (STV-LV); all other party vote and non-voters load on the Unstable Vote Latent Variable (UNSTV-LV). The inward directed parameter estimates may be thought of as scores of predictability: the higher the score the greater the predictability. If two scores are high, but of the opposite sign, they indicate a dimensionality anchored by the parties as competitors. Changes in the values and signs across time indicate shifting voter alignments according to the paths coming from the religious, class and preceding vote latent variables.

3. The model is, of course, ecological. Care is necessary not to commit the ecological fallacy by inferring individual behavior from psephology. A second limitation is the possibility of contextual effects on the model's relationships, i.e., it is not Catholics voting Conservative, but non-Catholics reacting to Catholics. The limit could be compounded by the impact of suffrage restrictions. The latter difficulty is overcome by use of the franchise variable which shows no discriminatory effect for Catholics. The contextual problem is lessened because LVPLS partials out the effects of other variables: At all levels of Catholicism, Catholicism is associated with Conservative vote. Moreover, the model in Figure 2 is based on 79 observations for which there is complete data. The number of observations and the number of parameters raise questions stability and reliability of the estimates. This problem is mitigated by several features of the research. LVPLS works with a smaller number of zero inter-correlation assumptions between the residuals and the variables consistent with its exploratory techniques and the theoretical underpinnings of this research. Second, when the LVPLS models are tested with ML techniques additional parameters are freed and tested. Third, these latter tests take account of the varying degrees of freedom in the chi square/degrees of freedom ratio as a measure of goodness-of-fit. Finally, since the total observations are 115, it is desirable to know how well the model in Figure 2 could reproduce an identical model using pair-wise deletion of missing values. The means available to calculate goodness-of-fit statistics are discussed below. Although the substantive results of the models are quite similar, these tests show a poor fit between the two models expressed by a chi-square/degrees-of-freedom ratio of 2.63 and Z-value of 6.75. Caution requires that the model not be generalized to the entire polity. Since most of the missing data occurs because minor parties are not present, the units used in the models are the more dynamic ones and thus may over represent political change. Urwin (1982: 41) suggests higher party competition is a measure of the nationalization of British politics during this period; therefore, the model would tend to underestimate the persistence of traditional politics.
4. Whereas LVPLS is conservative by constraining its solutions close to the data, ML solutions assume the model is valid and provide a goodness-of-fit statistics of the model to the covariance matrix of the MVs. In addition ML solutions generate standard errors for the coefficients. The results obtained by the ML solution here are best thought of as restricted regression solutions in that the variances and covariances of the LVs on the left side of the model are fixed at their LVPLS values while the path values and the covariances on the right hand side are started at their LVPLS values and permitted to change. In the following test only the inner or path model is examined, in other words, the loadings and weights of the MVs on the LVs are also fixed at their LVPLS values. The testing procedure is to fix various parameters with high estimates at zero and examine the changing values of the residuals, the standard errors of the coefficients and the chi square/degrees of freedom ratio. The second test fixes

parameters estimated to be near zero at zero and tests for the same goodness-of-fit statistics (James, Mulaik and Brett, 1982: 91-5). The results confirm the LVPLS solutions: The fixing of near-zero coefficients at zero does not cause a deterioration of the fit of the model. The fixing of a high coefficient at zero, however, does cause a deterioration of the fit. Moreover, it is not possible to force the explained variance of high parameters into low parameter estimates: Some key parameters could not be increased in value. For example, the near-zero path between Stable Vote LVs in 1895 and 1906 was not increased by altering the values of other coefficients, lending greater confidence to the statement that a realignment occurred between those two elections. All coefficients analyzed above remained stable and are statistically significant.

5. The first step is the generation of regional data sets. However, since each region of the United Kingdom does not possess adequate cases to provide stable estimates of coefficients, a version of the "jackknife" technique generates sub-sets of the data by the removal of one region from each sub-set. The result is the full data set modeled in Figure 2 (N=79), as well sub-sets of Non-Central England (N=51), Non-Scotland (N=71), Non-Peripheral England (N=48), and Non-Wales (N=67). Two regions, Central England (N=25) and Peripheral England (N=31), provide marginally adequate case numbers for stable estimates. See Wald, 1983: 143, for constituent units of the regions.

The second step is the construction of the best fitting LVPLS model for each sub-set. Each step in the model construction described for Figures 1 and 2 is repeated for each sub-set. The results for the latent variable construction indicated some immediate support for the homogenization hypothesis: The MV-LV relationships for the class LVs are consistent across sub-sets while the religion and ethnic variables are not. However, the construction of the Stable and Unstable Vote LVs for Central England produce markedly different patterns than in the other regions. In Central England the principal component factor analysis assigns Conservative and Liberal-Unionist vote to the Stable LV. The Liberal-Unionists split with the Liberals over the Irish Home Rule policy of Gladstone in 1885 when Chamberlain rejected Parnell's demand for an Irish parliament (Blumer-Thomas, 1965: 133-41). The best fitting model for Central England has Conservative and Liberal-Unionist vote MVs loading on the Stable Vote LV and all other MVs loading on the Unstable Vote LV.

6. The logic of the tests employed here is to examine how closely one model could reproduce another. The models are comparable in the number of variables and the path structure among the variables. The models are then used to predict one another generating a series of goodness-of-fit measures (see James, et.al., 1982: 63-95 for a explication of the logic). Table 3 is read as column input to rows, i.e., the model for the sub-set in the column is used to predict the model for the sub-set in the row. The predictions are generated in both directions so that each model predicts each other model. Each off-diagonal cell contains two entries: McDonald's (1975) Chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio and Bishop, et al. (1975) Z-value. The results of

the technique would be biased by the group means of each subset. therefore, the statistical tests are computed with and without group means. Table 2 in the text includes group means, but similar results are achieved after removing group means. The over-all fit of the models deteriorates with the removal of the group means, but the ordering of the relative fits remains similar across the models. All statistical measures of goodness-of-fit have their limitations, including those reproduced in Table 2. The chi-square measure is sensitive to sample size which with small samples leads to the acceptance of the model to the data (James, et.al., 1982: 151-3). In the current analysis this is an obvious limitation, thus the chi-square/ degrees-of-freedom ratio provides only relative fit of the models to each other. The Z-value is independent of sample size employing the degrees of freedom in a effort to reduce influence of sample size. A fuller discussion of these tests can be found in Horn and McArdle, 1980; Tucker and Lewis, 1973.

APPENDIX: THE MODELING TECHNIQUE

In recent years social science analysis has benefited from the the development of data analytic techniques which mark a significant advancement over most commonly used forms of regression and factor analysis as well as earlier forms of path analysis. These newer structural equation modeling algorithms generally have several common features: the specification of directed relationships among a set of variables and a series of goodness-of-fit statistics to evaluate the explanatory power of the model by comparing the researcher's specification to the data. More recent innovations incorporate the principals of factor analysis or other data reduction techniques into a class of models called Latent Variable Path Analysis (LVPA). These models formulate theoretical or latent variables (LVs) from observed or manifest variables (MVs).

The advantages over more common data analytic techniques are several. Allowing the researcher to specify relationships among the variables not only permits, but demands, a more refined theoretical statement. Theoretically justified relationships must be postulated between MVs and LVs as well as between LVs. This procedure reduces two forms of spurious explanation: mere chance and unspecified variance which appears to explain the dependent variables but to which the researcher is untuned. In LVPA additional advantages are present. Like factor analysis or canonical correlation these techniques allow for data reduction without which the usual regression techniques would be overwhelmed. However, unlike factor analysis or canonical correlation LVPA models permit the researcher to specify independent and dependent variables. The researcher thus obtains the advantages of both data reduction and path analysis. A further advantage accrues to

LVPA techniques: the more accurate representation of the processes under investigation. Since observed variables only rarely are isomorphic to the theoretical constructs of interest to the researcher, models which include only observed variables, typically regression analysis as well as path analysis without latent variables, incorporate measurement error into the model. Therefore, conclusions about a MV model are biased and unreliable. In contrast, LVPA modeling techniques can separate error from theoretically meaningful effects (Bentler, 1980: 434). LVPA models have obvious advantages, particularly in cross-group comparisons where the researcher can confidently construct theoretically similar latent variables from group specific manifest variables.

A number of algorithms exist for Latent Variable Path Analysis. The first estimation algorithm employed Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation methods as seen in LISREL techniques (Joreskog, 1973; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1981). Other estimation techniques have been developed by Bentler and Weeks (1980) employing generalized least squares (GLS). These techniques achieve the advantages stated above, but at the cost of rigorous theoretical and statistical assumptions. Since LISREL primarily tests the model specified by the researcher's starting values against the covariance matrix, it is parameter-oriented; however, the level of theoretical knowledge necessary to achieve consistent starting values is rarely available in social science research. Secondly, LISREL assumes both linearity and multinormality, assumptions difficult to meet in most social science data.

Latent Variable Path Analysis with Partial Least Squares (LVPLS) has decided theoretical and methodological advantages over more common

regression analysis as well as over similar LVPA techniques. It is particularly appropriate for research problems characterized by low information and high complexity. Developed by Lohmoeller (1981) LVPLS marks an attempt to overcome some of the limitations of LISREL and other forms of Latent Variable Path Analysis while retaining its chief advantages. LVPLS achieves its advantages by flexibility in three areas: model testing when theoretical knowledge is scarce, the choice of statistical techniques befitting the researcher's assumptions on the relationships among the MVs constituting a LV, and more relaxed distributional assumptions. LVPLS relaxes the theoretical knowledge necessary by working with a smaller number of zero intercorrelation assumptions between the residuals and the variables (Wold, 1980: 70). The researcher is not required to have the profound knowledge of proposed model as would be expected in LISREL with the consequence that LVPLS solutions are closer to the given observations. In contrast to LISREL which is parameter-oriented and seeks to reproduce the covariance matrix of the MVs, LVPLS is prediction-oriented and seeks to reconstruct the data matrix (Wold, 1973: 384; Lohmoeller, 1982a: 1-2; Falk and Stuber, 1984: for examples of the application to a range of social science problems, see Wold, 1979: 50-2; Nonnan and Wold, 1977: 42-3; Lohmoeller, 1982b: 13-14).

The second flexible advantage of LVPLS is the option to use principal component factor analysis or canonical correlation to estimate the parameters between the MVs and the LVs depending on the theoretical assumptions made about the relationships among the MVs. If the researcher assumes the MVs have a common variance underlying a theoretical construct, principal component factor analysis is used. If the MVs are a construct designed as a categorization or measurement

grouping, then canonical correlation is appropriate (Lohmoeller, 1981: P 2.2). The third advantage of LVPLS over techniques such as LISREL lies in its distributional assumptions. Whereas LISREL assumes linearity and multinormality in the observations, LVPLS assumes only linearity.

The distinctive features of this "soft modeling" technique are summarized by Lohmoeller (1982b: 12): (1) "No assumptions are made about residual covariances": (2) "the distributional assumption is relatively soft: Only linearity, no multinormality": (3) only residual variances and not residual covariances are minimized: (4) "as a result, the measured data points are reconstructed as well as possible" and the solution is closer to the data than ML techniques.

LVPLS gains from relaxing certain assumptions at little cost to precision. The differences in the parameter estimates between LISREL and LVPLS are negligible (Lohmoeller, 1982b: 3; McArdle, 1982). However, the researcher should view LVPLS and LISREL as complimentary rather than competitive. This is particularly so since the two techniques may be employed in a complimentary fashion by using LVPLS estimates as starting values in a ML solution such as LISREL. The procedure has a second advantage of markedly reducing LISREL computation time.

The attractions of LVPLS to the attendant research problem should be obvious. Latent Variable Path Analytic techniques obtain marked advantages over the usual regression analysis: The resulting models are likely to be more precise, since the techniques reduce capitalization on chance and demand a more thorough theoretical statement before data analysis. Second, the results are more accurate and reliable since measurement error is reduced by using LVs rather

than only MVs common to regression and path analysis. Third, the LVPLS solution is more valid since the distributional assumptions are closer to the real data. Finally we gain the advantages of ML techniques in final analysis by testing the LVPLS models with ML methods.

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TABLE 1
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL AND
REGIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN

Study	Time Period	Data	Ind. Var.	Dep. Var.	Design	Results
Butler Stokes, 1974	Pre-1918 to 1966	Survey	Religion, Non-man, region	Major party vote	CS/cohort	variations on a theme of class (p. 84)
Hechter, 1975	1885-1966	E counties	Non-Conf. Indust.	Conserv. Party	CS	persistence of sectionalism (264)
Ragin, 1977	1885-1966	"	Non-Conf. occupation, region	"	"	peripheral anti-Consv., but Labour not an outlet for sectionalism (448)
Miller, 1977	1918-1974	E CUA	Religion, non-man, region	Conserv. Liberal Labour vote	"	Labour and Liberals expressions of peripheral status, Conserv. center (222)
Leifer, 1981	1885-1966	E counties	Religion, Language, Eco Devel	Conserv. Liberal vote	"	class more important in dominant regions (39); no support for reactive ethnic model (41)
Wald, 1982	1885-1910	E CUA	Religion, occupation, trade unionism	Liberal and/or Labour vote	"	"highly organized trades had a significant, positive effect on the left vote" (76)
Wald, 1983	"	"	Religion, occupation, trade unionism	Conserv-Unionist vote	"	"anti-Conserv. sentiment outside England" (p. 154)

Key: E = Ecological
CUA = Constant Units of Analysis
CS = Cross Sectional Design
Non-man = Non-manual workers
Non-Conf = Non-conformism

TABLE 2
SYMBOLS USED IN FIGURES 1 AND 2
MANIFEST VARIABLES

Symbol	Variable Description
ANG91	Anglican priests per capita
ANGMAX51	Maximum Anglican Church Attendance per capita, 1851
ANGDSPCT51	Anglican Dayschool Attendance per capita, 1851
ANGSSPCT51	Anglican Sunday School Attendance per capita, 1851
NON91	Non-Conformist clergy per capita, 1891
NONMAX51	Maximum Non-Conformist Church Attendance per capita, 1851
NONSSPCT51	Non-Conformist Sunday School Attendance per capita, 1851
WAL91	Welsh born males per capita, 1891
RC91	Roman Catholic priests per capita, 1891
RCMAX51	Maximum Roman Catholic Church Attendance per capita, 1851
RCSSPCT51	Roman Catholic Sunday School Attendance per capita, 1851
RCDSPCT51	Roman Catholic Day School Attendance per capita, 1851
IRE91	Irish born males per capita, 1891
CL291	Proportion of the 1891 economically active population in Class 2 of the 1951 occupational grading scheme

SKILL11	Proportion of the economically active males in skilled occupations defined by Registrar Generals scheme. 1911
MANLAB91	Proportion of the economically active population classified as manual laborers. 1891
INDLAB91	Proportion of the economically active population classified as industrial laborers. 1891
TU88,01,10	Proportion of the major occupational sectors--transport, printing, building, textiles, wood, clothing, mining and metal--organized in trade associations. 1888, 1901, 1910
NAGLAB91	Proportion of all forms of general, unskilled labor in non-agricultural employment in the economically active population. 1891
AGR91	Proportion of the general unskilled agricultural labor in the economically active population. 1891

PARTY AND ELECTORAL SYMBOLS USED IN FIGURE 2

MANIFEST VARIABLES

NV	Non-voters
CON	Official Conservative
CEN	Liberal Unionist
LIB	Liberal
LAB	Labour, including LRC, ILP, SDF
LLAB	Lib-Lab
ICON	Unofficial Conservative
ILIB	Unofficial Liberals
OTH	Other
ENFR91	Estimated proportion of the male population 21+ years on the electoral register. 1891

LATENT VARIABLES

C of E
NON
RC
ORGLAB

Church of England
Non-Conformism
Roman Catholic
Organized Labor

STB
UNSTB

Stable Vote
Unstable Vote

* Figure 1: LVPLS principal component factor loadings of MVs to LVs for religion-ethnicity and class (N= 79).







Figure 2: Latent Variable Partial Least Squares Path Model for Religious, Ethnicity and Class Latent Variables to Voting Latent Variables, 1885-1910 (N= 79). Presented in four separate diagrams, one for each election. Note: Only paths with absolute values of .2 or greater are shown.










TABLE 3

GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES ACROSS REGIONAL POLITY MODELS

	FULL	NCENG	NWAL	NPENG	NSCOT	FENG	CENG
FULL	--	1.6 a 3.1 b	69.1 54.7	54.2 49.1	4.0 10.4	15.4 26.3	110.5 67.0
NCENG	2.5 6.4	--	44.4 44.8	55.0 49.5	7.0 16.2	63.3 52.7	108.0 66.3
NWAL	81.7 58.9	33.7 39.3	--	98.9 63.9	78.2 57.8	36.1 40.7	85.9 60.2
NPENG	90.0 61.4	58.6 50.9	138.9 73.7	--	72.9 56.0	58.0 50.7	250.9 78.1
NSCOT	4.5 11.4	5.0 12.6	73.7 56.3	48.9 46.9	--	12.1 22.9	111.9 67.3
FENG	40.2 42.8	24.5 33.5	79.5 58.2	91.0 61.7	28.2 36.0	--	125.7 70.7
CENG	101.0 64.5	61.0 51.8	96.7 63.3	136.5 61.0	102.9 65.0	60.6 51.6	--

SYMBOLS IN TABLE 3

FULL = Full Data Model
 NWAL = Non-Wales
 NSCOT = Non-Scotland
 CENG = Central England

NCENG = Non-Central England
 NPENG = Non-Peripheral England
 FENG = Peripheral England

a = Chi-square/degrees-of-freedom ratio (McDonald, 1975)

b = Z-Value (Bishop, et.al., 1975)

DEMASSIFIED MASS PARTIES OR OVERLOADED CADRE PARTIES?

The impact of parties on territorial voting

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1. Introduction

Electoral studies in general are focused on which variables determine the voters party choice. Briefly these determinants can be grouped in socio-economical, cultural, and territorial factors. The importance of each set of variables varies between countries. According to Richard Rose the voting behavior in the Scandinavian countries is mainly explained by socio-economical variables such as occupation. In many other West European countries, specially in the south, cultural factors such as religion are more important. To a lesser extent the territorial factors also affect the voter (Rose 1974: 16-20). Very often, however, there is overlapping and many variables coincide in affecting the voters. Furthermore, the concept of territory is seldom distinct because it usually covers both socio-economical and cultural factors.

The variables discussed above have a high explanatory effect in static multi party systems, as the basic cleavage structures are reflected in party systems. This at least has been the case for cleavages which were prominent during the time when universal suffrage was introduced (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 50-56). In most countries today's cleavage structures differ clearly from the past, though the old party systems still persist. The latest electoral studies show new trends in the voting behavior. The common feature is that electoral volatility has increased. This new trend has been the base for Mogens Pedersen's studies. His main argument stresses the fact that electoral volatility is not only caused by changes in factors discussed above, it is also connected with changes in the number of parties and in the changing campaign styles of the parties (Pedersen 1983: 29-65 and Pedersen 1979: 1-24). Pedersen also mentions other factors that are related to the electoral system, but the main determinants affecting the voters choice can be found from these elements. An explanation of electoral behavior is very complex to achieve even though party choice can be a most simple matter for the

voter himself. This paradox is at least to some degree related to the obvious lack of information of how much significance the voters give to parliamentary elections. The voter turnout gives only brief information of the electorate and therefore the students of political science has a number of interpretation models to choose between. To be sure, however, elections have much more impact on the competitive parties than on the electorate. Moreover, a multiparty system and a parliamentary democracy can not exist without elections but the reverse is definitely not valid for common people.

2. Electoral behavior and the parties

In this paper the discussion will not cover the total complexity of electoral behavior, the argumentation will rather emphasize the meaning of parties on the electoral outcome. According to comparative measures made by Kenneth Janda variations in party organization have a substantial effect on electoral success. He concludes that almost 30 per cent of the variance in electoral success could be attributed to party complexity, centralization, and involvement (Janda 1983: 319-330). These findings presume that there is free competition between parties on the electoral arena. To be more distinct we could use the definition of political parties developed by Giovanni Sartori which states that: "A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (Sartori 1976: 64). Hence, following these conditions we can assume that parties without voters can not exist, and therefore they are forced to gain electoral success by appealing to the voters.

In trying to reach the potential voters the parties have many possibilities. This paper, however, will examine the well known and essential relationship between party members and their impact of electoral success. As Joseph Schumpeter has emphasized "A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (Schumpeter 1957: 283). In this statement there is an underlying assumption that party

members are politically active and have therefore an important function in the electoral party competition. Furthermore, we can assume that the party members are generally more active than the voters. But we must also take in consideration that the impact of party membership varies both within parties and between parties.

Maurice Duverger has in his classical work "Political Parties" stressed the concept of membership in different party types. He makes the important distinction between mass parties and cadre parties. The main difference between these two types can be found in the internal party structure. For the mass parties recruiting of members is one of the most fundamental activities, both for political and economical reasons. According to Duverger an essential point for the mass parties is to educate the working class to be prepared for taking over the government and the administration of the country. Without members Duverger states that "the party would be like a teacher without pupils" (Duverger 1978: 63). Furthermore, the party is financially dependent on the subscriptions paid by its members.

The conception is different in the cadre parties. Duverger points out that the party members are less important in these types of parties. The party activity is generally concentrated on preparations for elections. In the mass parties this activity is achieved by the well organized members whereas in the cadre parties the same activity is achieved by: "Influential persons, in the first place, whose name prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts, in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a campaign; last of all financiers, who bring the sinews of war" (Duverger 1978: 64). According to this argumentation cadre parties have no real members. Hence the cadre parties have much weaker organization than the mass parties. They are decentralized and weakly knit whereas the organization of mass parties is centralized and hierarchical.

These party types discussed here are the pure forms, but Duverger also underlines that mixed forms exist which ^{makes} the distinctions

less clear. However he does not find any reason for creating a new concept of party type. About 15 years later Otto Kirchheimer argued, in a frequently quoted article, that the structural changes in the post-war European societies have caused a process of uniformity among western party alignments toward the catch-all type. This change implies above all for the well organized mass parties a "Downgrading of the role of the individual party member" (Kirchheimer 1966: 190). In Steven Wolinetz' more recent study there is some evidence that supports the statement of changes in party alignments. In terms of Wolinetz the catch-all scenario has its greatest validity for changes in party style, strategy, and functions (Wolinetz 1979: 4-26).

From the discussion above we can now formulate the following hypothesis:

1. The difference between mass and cadre parties exist by tradition in party alignments, but their internal organizations have changed according to the catch-all model.

Following the catch-all assumption that party organizations have become more uniform we can hypothetically take findings from studies of mass parties to be valid for cadre parties as well. This decision is based on the fact that there is much less available research made on cadre parties than of mass parties. One crucial result of studies made on mass parties is the positive relationship between party membership and other forms of political participation. Palle Svensson is one of those who have studied this in his research on the Danish Social Democratic party during the period 1924-1939. Moreover, he has also hypothetically discussed the possibility that a mass party could regulate its membership support when the voting support is declining or threatened (Svensson 1974: 127-144). Stefano Bartolini used this hypothetical approach in a comparative research, but the result was not too impressive (Bartolini 1983: 196-198). The idea pursued by Svensson may, however, be quite useful. His hypothesis could tentatively be extended not only to cover electoral outcomes, but also to include preceding changes in in the social bases of the parties. The following hypothesis

can now be formulated:

2. Parties attempt to extend and intensify the membership support as a response to threats, caused by changes in their social bases or their declining electoral success.

The hypotheses presented here will form the leading theme for the empirical discussion in this paper. But before we can proceed to the examination, the data must be presented.

3. The data examined

When discussing the results of this paper it is important to note that the data covers only parties in the Finnish political system. But the party system in Finland is not exceptional. According to Giovanni Sartori's definition the party systems in Finland as well as in Weimer Germany, Italy, France fourth and fifth Republic, Chile to 1973, and the Spanish Republic 1931-1936 represented a polarized pluralism with a high degree of fragmentation (Sartori 1976: 131-173). This party fragmentation can easily be exemplified in Finland where the voters are represented by 8 to 10 parties in parliament at the moment (the number varies depending on how parties are counted).

All the parties that are represented in parliament are, however, not included in this examination. Three of the four biggest parties have been chosen. The Communist party is excluded much because of the deep conflict situation within the party, which makes data collection for purposes like this difficult. The socialist parties are represented by the Social Democratic party and the non-socialist parties by the Center party (the former Agrarian Union) and the conservative National Coalition party. All of these three parties are old and established. The Social Democratic party was founded in 1899, the National Coalition party's predecessor in the late nineteenth century, and the Agrarian Union (from now the Center party) in 1906, the same year when universal suffrage was introduced in the constitution. All sufficient data has been gathered from the party archives. The access to historical data is without doubt best in the Social Democratic party, but the more closer we come to present

times the better the access to valid data from the non-socialist parties becomes. However, it is quite complicated to compare data between the parties. What data is systematically found in one party is not necessarily available in an other party's documents. Briefly speaking the same problems of comparability have occurred in this study as in that made by Stefano Bartolini, except for the first one on his list (Bartolini 1983: 177-178). All members of the Social Democratic party are individual and not collective members. But whether to include women's party units, youth organizations, mutualities and so forth is a problem. If it possible a thumb rule has been applied that all organizations which are represented in party congresses are included. A stricter application would in this case have been impossible. Last, the accountancy methods vary between the parties, as within parties during longer time periods, which utterly aggravates the interpretations.

4. Cleavages in party alignments

A common feature of fragmented and polarized party systems is that cleavage structures are organized and politized. According to Giovanni Sartori's argumentations each ideological fraction is inversely related to the number of parties in a system of polarized pluralism. Therefore, if there are enough parties to accommodate the ideologies, then the fractional divisions will tend to coincide with the party division (Sartori 1976: 102-103). This statement can easily be applied in Finland, where the number of parties is high and the electoral thresholds is low for new parties entering the electoral arena.

The three parties discussed explicitly here, traditionally represent the working class (SDP), the farmers (Center Party), and the upper-class (National Coalition). This party division covers the major cleavages in the Finnish society; that between classes and that between rural and urban areas. The cleavage structure is also displayed in the composition of cabinets. According to Sartori's arguments on polarized pluralism, governing is concentrated to the political center whereas the

opposition is bilateral (Sartori 1976: 132-145). Most cabinets during the after world war period in Finland have been composed of parties from the center (mostly the Center party) in coalition with the Social Democratic party. The opposition has in general been represented by the Communist party on the left and the National Coalition on the right. In general the formation of cabinets is complicated and governance is instable, which can be exemplified by the fact that the country has been governed by approximately forty different cabinets during the after world war period.

The cleavage structure, party system and government instability all indicate that there is a strong division between party alignments. But on the contrary, there is also tendencies that are reverse to those discussed. Since the late 1960s the notion of consensus has been a more common label for government politics in Finland. The coalition parties have found a new neutral government ideology to achieve in the welfare policy (Heiskanen 1977: 44-77). In addition, it is not only the coalition parties who have embraced the welfare policy program, the same is valid for most other parties. An other neutral issue is the official foreign policy. All parties declare officially, both in programs and policy making, loyalty to the established foreign policy program, and all parties with influence want to improve the Finnish-Soviet treaty of friendship.

Before we can draw any conclusions about differences in party alignments between cadre and mass parties, the significance of changes in conflict patterns must be examined. As Gunnar Sjöblom puts it, a conflict pattern can be changed when a party decides to politicize a particular question. Sjöblom explains this phenomenon by dividing the conflict patterns in manifest and latent cleavages. The manifest cleavages are politicized by their current actuality, whereas the latent cleavages have lost their topicality and can therefore be regarded as depoliticized, at least for a limited time period. However, Sjöblom points out that issues which have earlier been matters of conflict between parties, but have later been depoliticized, can continue to play a role in the voters "party images" and also serve as

general characteristics of the various parties (Sjöblom 1968: 180-182).

The notion of consensus on welfare policy can quite easily be applied to the model of changing conflict patterns. This is possible since the Social Democratic party politicized the issue of social security and social welfare already in its first party programs. During the whole century up to late 1960s this question has been a main issue for the Social Democratic party, and likewise a source of conflict with other parties. Notwithstanding the fact that the welfare policy issue has been depoliticized, the Social Democrats have not lost their traditional image, as the conservative National Coalition also maintains the image of restraint against social reforms.

The question of foreign policy, on the other hand, is more complicated to apply on these two party types. Until the beginning of 1960s both the Social Democratic party and the National Coalition were restrictive and even critical to the official friendship policy towards Soviet-Union. This policy was led and developed by the Center party with the support of the Communist party. The National Coalition may still have some anti-Soviet image in parliament. But the conservative party leaders have gone so far that they have established connections with the Soviet Communist party in order to change that image, and the voters seem to have approved this new party strategy.

All in all, the polarized party system which is strongly affected by the cleavage structure is still prevailing, even though the recent political integration has moderated the party differentiation. This consensus may, however, only be temporal or specified to delicate policy issues, for example. Contrary, it is also important to emphasize the existence of visible and invisible politics, i.e., the difference between public and private politics. In Sartori's argumentation this divergence grows greater the more a polity "abandons itself to outbidding, to irresponsible opposition, and to ideological setting" (Sartori 1976: 143). Referring to the argumentation above the consensus issue can also be interpreted from that point of view. This is specially valid in more detailed questions and in the field of foreign

policy just below the presidential level.


5. Contagion from right or from left

According to the arguments of Maurice Duverger the concept of membership in mass parties has been imitated by other parties. The well organized mass parties have served as a model for the cadre parties, which indicates that there has been a wide contagion from the left (Duverger 1978:62-132). But in terms of Leon Epstein nobody really needs the mass membership parties in a modern society. The modern parties of today do not have to fulfill the functions of education, information of political events, and social events; and the membership subscriptions account only for a minor part of the parties total expenditures. These functions are now attended to more effectively by the all encompassing educational systems in welfare states, the social activities are sponsored by commercial interests, and the parties get financial aid from taxpayers, companies and other external sources (Epstein 1967: 257ff).

If we in retrospect look at studies that cover comparable data on membership development, there is at least slight evidence for the arguments put forward by Epstein (Bartolini 1983: 182-191 and Berglund & Pesonen 1981: 116-119). But the available data is limited to mass parties examined, so we have no valid information on the cadre parties, i.e., is there any significant tendencies for a contagion from the left? To pursue this question the following figures compare the three parties already discussed.

Membership data from the pre war period is best available for the Social Democratic party. In fact no valid and continuous data can be presented of the non-socialist parties from that period. The mapping of membership figures begins from 1899, when Social Democratic party was founded. Valid figures for the Center party begins in 1945 and for National Coalition in 1947. In the pre-war period it was only the Social Democratic party who had a strong organization on mass basis. This does not, however,


Figure 1. Membership figures of Social Democratic party, Center party, and National Coalition



Source: Available data gathered from respective party archives

imply that the other parties were totally unorganized. As we can see in Figure 2 a local organizational network existed, but the lack of membership data indicates that the local associations were weakly knit. In fact, these pre-world war organizations corresponds closely to Duverger's notion of cadre and mass parties. The non-socialist parties were predominantly organized

Figure 2. The local association figures of Social Democratic party, Center party, and National Coalition.



Source: Punnonen 1978, Hølttä 1982, and available party data


and activated to prepare for elections, whereas the Social Democratic party had much more functions to perform within the organizational network. The organizational activity grew rapidly before the break through of universal suffrage in 1906 and the civil war of 1918, or rather class war according to the contemporary Social Democratic conception...

In summation, there is no evidence that would indicate a contagion from left nor from right. But the finding discussed covers only the pre-world period, hence, can the same conclusions be drawn for the after world war period also? There is no doubt that the answer is no, but such an answer is too unambiguous, since the figures displayed can not be interpreted without a comprehensive analysis. Let us therefore start with a discussion of differentiations in the organizational build-up, and then the disparate meanings of membership in local party associations.

The second world war was an adversity for most parties and their local associations, but for the Center party the war was close to a catastrophe. The constituency of east Viborg, which was the most powerful organizational stronghold of the Center party, was lost to the Russians, and the evacuated party supporters were scattered all over the country. Thus, the Center party had to be reorganized to reach all the voters, and moreover, the party had to maximize its votes in order to stay in government office. The most comprehensive organizational enlargement of the Center party started in the early fifties, as a leading component in the presidential campaign to get Urho Kekkonen elected (Virkkunen 1976: 62-71). The organizational extension work proved to be efficacious, Kekkonen won the election in 1956 and all other presidential elections too until he retired in 1981.

This contagion from the left also influenced the conservative National Coalition, as the party was reorganized in 1950. Local women and youth associations were equalized with the local party organisations. Each of these associations had now an equal right to send representatives to party congresses. This criterion had also been applied in the definition of membership for the other parties in the previous figures. But the National Coalition was first to grant full membership to these associated groups. The Center party did not achieve this reform until 1975, and in the Social Democratic party only a part of these local organizations are represented in party congresses. Thus, the membership criterion is somewhat more narrow in the Social Democratic party.

Figure 3. Membership of Social Democratic party, Center party, and National Coalition as a percentage of their votes



Source: Party data and Official Statistics of Finland XXIX A

The organizational reform in the National Coalition party resulted in a statistical fallacy in the common occurrence of multiple membership. It was not until 1973 that this fallacy was removed at least partly, because of the computerization of the membership registers. In general the non-socialist membership registers lag behind the factual basis, whereas the Social Democratic registers since 1974 are more accurate (year of computerization). During the period from early 1950s to 1973 the lack of statistical data in the Social Democratic party is striking, specially

concerning local associations and their members. As well before as after this period such data is most carefully documented. Why this inconsistency? The simple answer is that within the time period described the party suffered two organizational splits. First, the exit of the communists which was strongest during the socialist boom directly after the second world war. Then a more serious split in the fifties when a new Social Democratic party was created. It was not until the early seventies that the party was reunited. During the years of internal division membership and local association figures were concealed from publicity on propagandic grounds.

If we summarize the findings concerning the absolute membership and associational development with membership as a percentage of electoral outcome, we can learn what the effects of organizations on party voting are. In fact, it seems quite obvious that the impressive non-socialist organizational build-up in the beginning of the period, did not have immediate effects on the electorate. But the work was not in vain, even though the effects on the electoral outcome were delayed. This was especially valid for the National Coalition, which gained a rising electoral support after a preceeding period of intensive organizational build-up. In that respect the process corresponds with the Social Democratic debate on the electoral arena in 1907.

The development is, however, quite different in the Center party. The organizational growth has continued and the members now compose 58 per cent of the party votes. No other party can display corresponding figures, the Swedish Peoples party comes closest with a 40 per cent membership of their votes (Sundberg 1985: ff). In that respect it seems the Center party has developed in a reverse direction than the competing parties. But an attentive reader may immediately raise the question, whether the notion of membership in the Center party is equivalent to the other parties?

Maurice Duverger has made an important concept when he emphasized the difference in participation between memberships in three distinct party types. The links of participation are interpreted

by applying the Ferdinand Tönnies classification of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* to parties. In terms of Duverger the social links can be grouped in following three types:

"For some members, governed by tradition, class necessity, family, local or professional habits, the party is a Community. For others, who are attracted by possible material advantages, by the desire for political action, by a moral or idealistic impulse, the party is an Association. For still others, who are driven by enthusiasm, passion, or the desire for communion the party is an Order: this is often the case for young or the intellectual"(Duverger 1978: 127-128).

A party is considered a Community when the *Gemeinschaft* link predominate and an Association when the *Gesellschaft* link is predominant. The conception of Order, on the other hand, is more typical for totalitarian parties. As Duverger correctly points out the types are not distinct, since the methods of participation coincide. Nevertheless, the conception of Order, which usually is amalgamated with Community, corresponds only to the Communist party as has explicitly been discussed by Erik Allardt(Allardt 1970: 45-57). In our three party examples we can therefore exclude the Order type of parties. What remains is the conception of Community and that of Association.

In Duverger's examples the socialist parties correspond to the Community type, since they - at least traditionally - are typical class parties. It is, however, apparent that the agrarian Center party is better fitted to the Community type. In terms of my arguments it is the only way to really understand the large membership figures. The members are often farmers, and people living in rural areas in the periphery. By their work as cultivators and landowners, the class position is well maintained. Moreover, the life in remote rural areas is more traditional, and the pressure toward uniformity is higher than in urban areas. These party members are in Duverger's words born into the Community or belong to it automatically without consideration (Duverger 1978: 124-132).

In order to give this statement more empirical evidence, these membership figures of 1983 given by the parties themselves are related to Gallup data from 1984.

Table 1. Party membership as a percentage of votes: recorded party data from 1983 compared to Gallup data from 1984

	1983 Party data %	1984 Gallup data %
Center party	58	23
National Coalition	12	15
Social Democratic party	12	15

The Gallup sample covers 883 valid replies on this issue, of which 186 have stated to vote on National Coalition, 150 on Center party, and 239 on Social Democratic party.

Even though the Gallup sample is small, it is striking how the party data of the National Coalition and the Social Democratic party correspond to the Gallup data. It can therefore be concluded that the recorded party data from these two parties is valid. But what can be concluded about the membership data emphasized by the Center party? First, it must be underscored that the recorded membership data is as well listed in the Center party as in other non-socialist parties. The difference is - however - that the Center party members do not always regard themselves as members or even not know about their membership in the local association. This controversy hinges crucially on Duverger's notion of Community, since a rural village often almost totally supports the agrarian Center party, or alternatively not at all. The difference between a supporter and a party member is floating; usually when one family member is engaged in the local party association, the rest of the family are also involved as more or less active members.

Both the conservative National Coalition and the socialist Social Democratic party can rather be classified as representing the Association type than the Community type. This does not always imply that the Community type is totally eroded as a variable in explaining the links of participation, at least not on the local level. But the main feature is that these two parties try to attract voters by offering material advantages. These advantages are, however, not necessarily class advantages, since class politics has lost much of its actuality in the prevailing welfare society.


6. Variations in membership support

The variations in membership support in the figures that are displayed in Figure 1 can only to a limited extent be related to a threat of declining electoral success. This is the unambiguous conclusion if we confine us to examine only official electoral statistics. However, according to my argumentation the idea is good but the method must be improved. Then, what is the point of confusion? A simple answer would be that the figures of electoral outcome which are related to membership data, both constitute a dependent and an independent variable. In our example occupation is the variable with the highest explanatory value in determining electoral outcome. All changes in the occupational structure therefore affect the ways people decide to vote. The party vote is in that respect a dependent variable. But in the example above it serves as an independent variable, which consequently reduces its informative value.

Figure 4 serves as an example where the Center party experiences the threat of a coming declining electoral success. However, if we study the electoral outcome from the election of 1919 onwards approximately every tenth year, the evidence can hardly be found to indicate any threat of electoral loss. In fact, the elections have proved to be an occasion where the voters time after time have showed their loyalty to the party. Therefore the electoral stability has been very high and the volatile voters relatively few. But the figures give a false sense of safety if we do not consider the effects of the change in the sector of agriculture.

In 1919 the gap between the percentage of votes for the Center party and the percentage of population working in the agricultural sector was as high as 50 per cent. Since then, the gap has been narrowed continuously and very rapidly after the second world war. In the 1970s the development led to the final point where the Center party line of electoral support crossed and exceeded the line of population in the agricultural sector. What causal inferences can be drawn this development? First,

Figure 4. Percentages of total votes casted for Center party compared to the economically active population in agriculture and forestry



Source: Population by industry in 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980. Year of election 1919, 1930, 1939, 1951, 1962, 1970, and 1979. Central Statistical Office of Finland.

in the pre war period the party had an almost limitless market of potential voters in the agrarian dominated society. Then there was no need for a strong party organization, since the socio-economic structure and the predominant agrarian culture were in favour of the party. In addition, no other competing party in the non-socialist block constituted a real threat; their weak party organizations were not even prepared to compete

but rather to cooperate in order to restore the national unity after the civil war in 1918.

Second, in the after world war period the situation changed radically. The Center party had strong intentions to stay in government and to extend its political influence even though the traditional social bases of vote recruiting were rapidly declining. The party responded with a strong organizational build-up as we have learned from the pervious figures. Moreover, this build-up proved to have impressive effects on the electoral outcome, and totally new groups of voters were included to the multitude of party loyalists. The process can only be understood against the background of a coming electoral threat. In that respect the agrarians behaved in a similar way as the Swedish-Finns had when their ethnicity and political influence were threatened by the Finns. The stronger the threat the more important the ethnic organizations and the stronger the loyalty to them (Sundberg 1985: ff and briefly in Sundberg 1984: 91-108).

In the following table Gallup data from 1948 and onwards has been used to exemplify changes in the social bases of the voters.

Table 2. Party voting and changing occupational structure

		SDP	Center Party	National Coalition		SDP	Center Party	National Coalition
Managers, owners of enterprises, higher white collar employees	1948	3	1	22	Lower white collar em- ployees	7	2	26
	1958	3	1	29		8	3	29
	1966	3	4	35		16	6	33
	1974	4	4	24		23	8	40
	1984	13	10	44		26	16	26
Workers	1948	76	16	25	Farmers	14	81	27
	1958	84	11	23		5	86	19
	1966	74	18	20		7	72	12
	1974	69	23	27		4	65	9
	1984	56	29	19		3	34	9

Source: Reports from the Finnish Gallup and computer runs made at the Department of Political Science University of Helsinki

Even though it is quite appareant that the occupational classifications include, at least to some degree overlappings, the table fullfils its function. To be sure on the safe side though, it is better to talk about trends rather than exact percentage figures. Nevertheless, we can make the unambiguous conclusion

that the rapid decline in the agricultural sector has been compensated with votes from the working class, and in a lesser extent from the lower and higher white collars. Conversely, the Social Democratic party has lost support in the working class, and competes strongly with the conservative National Coalition of votes from the lower white collars. The National Coalition has also lost support from the farmers but these votes has been compensated with an expanding success among the higher and lower white collars.

Summing the findings we can conclude, that a threat of a coming electoral decline according to the hypothesis, can only be applied to the Center party. But does this imply that the National Coalition and the Social Democratic party were not exposed to this threat? Well if we look at the after world war development the National Coalition has gained a steady electoral success, and in the elections of 1983 the party won 22 per cent of the total votes cast. The development of the electoral success has been less smooth for the Social Democratic party, much depending on organizational splits in the party. Nevertheless, with an electoral outcome of 27 per cent in the election of 1983, the party is the biggest on the electoral arena.

The main determinant of an occurring or a not existing threat is connected to the electoral market. As we have learned from the Center party the rate of threat grew in analogous proportions to the shrinking of the traditional supporters on the electoral market. But the declining sector of of agriculture and forestry was not a catastrophe for the conservatives or the socialists. On the contrary, the market was expanding with the rapid decline of the primary sector, since the decline enabled a corresponding growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors. The organizational growth in these parties must necessarily be combined with the urbanization process. In short, the parties and their organizations followed the wave of migration and moved into the towns, which they already controlled. To exemplify in numbers: in 1945 the Social Democrats got 65 per cent of their votes from rural areas, whereas the figures for the Communists were 66 and for

the National Coalition 52. In 1970 the corresponding figures were 33, 44, and 32 percentages respectively.

But how about the Center party? In 1945 as much as 82 per cent of its votes came from the rural areas, and in 1970 the figure was 84 per cent. Of these figures we can conclude that the Center party has been and still is a rural party. To put it in an other way, when other parties moved into towns the Center party utilized the empty space by recruiting new members and supporters not only from farmers but from all categories of employees and employers that stayed behind in the countryside. After this alteration the Center party is the superciliously biggest party in the rural areas. Since 1970 the changes are small and depending on the many municipality amalgamations during the 1970s, it is more complicated to differ between rural and urban areas.

7. The impact of parties: a concluding discussion

From the previous discussion we can make the important conclusion that the impact of parties on territorial voting is a core variable that often has been neglected. However, it is likewise important to underscore that the impact of this variable varies, depending on differences in party types and in disparate market prospects between competing parties. The following discussion will briefly evaluate the findings made in this paper and connect them to some general observations made in this field, in order to provoke new attempts of research on political parties.

If we restrict our party comparison only to include figures of membership and the network of local associations, there is no doubt about an existing contagion from the left. This does not, however, imply that the former cadre parties now have developed into genuine mass parties. Based upon the same assumptions we can also conclude that the mass parties have been exposed to a contagion from the right. Well then, is the outcome a catch-all party? Firstly, in terms stressed by Otto Kirchheimer the catch-all parties have reduced their ideological baggage. Our findings are somewhat contrary on this point. The polarized party system gives space to deep conflicts in party

alignments. But there is also tendencies towards conformity and consensus. The answer may be that the concept of consensus is only temporal or that the party system really undergoes a transition. In short, we can neither confirm nor reject the statement, since there is not enough of necessary empirical evidence.

Secondly, Kirchheimer emphasizes that the leadership groups have been strengthened at the top of the parties, which reduces their identification with the goals of their own party organization. In addition, the role of the individual party member has also been downgraded. Corresponding findings have also been made in Finland. Göran Djupsund has stressed that there is a growing gap between party members. The expansion of the party organizations have created an elite that is highly skilled and specialized to deal with issues concerning most different sectors of society, and which is capable of handling the internal party affairs of preparation, planning, implementing etc (Djupsund 1979: 145-161). Moreover this elite is less dependent on the common party members since the subscription pays cover only a minimal part of the party expenditures. An overwhelming part of the budgets are composed of official financing (Rantala 1982: 46-48). In that respect the party top is more independent of their members, but conversely the financial aid has increased their dependence on the state authorities of which they tend to be a part.

On the basis of this paper it is quite difficult to draw any conclusions concerning an eventual differentiation within parties. But as the society in general has become more specialized and skilled, it would be surprising if the parties are rendered untouched. Furthermore, the most recent Gallup data indicates that the difference between party members and voters is not wide either concerning social class or type of occupation. Johan P. Olsen has made similar observations in Norway, and he goes further by demonstrating how the socio-economical gap is wider between the participants in "grass root" citizens' initiatives and common voters than between party members and voters (Olsen 1983:

19-38). But how can this be connected to the discussion of party elitism and downgrading of individual party members?

According to my arguments the likelihood for elitism is much greater within parties which are not at all or very weakly organized outside the party top, whereas the tendency is reverse in parties which are organized on mass basis. This implies that these parties discussed here are quite well controlled by their members. But conversely new and very successful parties tend to be much more elitist. Hence, in respect to ordinary party members the leadership has weakened in comprehensive organizations but their connection to the voters has grown wider. Thus quite opposite to Kirchheimer's arguments the role of the individual party member has rather been upgrading than downgrading.

This tendency is even more pronounced in Finland where the municipal democracy needs people i.e. party members, to achieve governing in the municipal assemblies and explicitly in the multitude of municipal boards. Finland is divided in 461 municipalities of which most are very small. To really understand the importance of local democracy for the party organizations it can be exemplified by the fact, that in the very smallest municipalities the entire population would be not enough if all seats of government would be filled with different people. However, the rule is that the rate of seats decrease in proportion to the growing size of the municipalities (Pystynen 1965: 50-317). Moreover, each representative has his or her personal deputy. In practice all these representatives and deputies are party members. This is one of the main reasons why parties need so much members, otherwise they have no chance of achieving power. The second reason is economical: The municipalities pay remunerations to participants in the sessions, of which they pay between 10 to 30 percentages to their local party association. The amount varies depending of which party they belong to and how the party finances are achieved.

Thirdly, Kirchheimer stresses that there is a tendency of de-emphasising the social class base of the party or the denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among population at large. Due to my my conceptions the statement can not be

testified without connecting it to the question of market and territory. The case of the Center party serves as a good example, where the electoral market is threatened by a rapid decrease in the sector of agriculture and forestry. But instead of yielding, the party achieved to keep its territorial strength by encompassing voters from all social classes. The party had transformed from a typical agrarian party to a party of rural defence for all those rural residents who felt disregarded in the tremendous urbanization that took place during the after world war period.

The best example, however, to suit Kirchheimer's statement are the new protest parties who are often led by charismatic leaders that have a strong appeal to various kinds of dissatisfied people. As in the temporal case of the Center party, the protest parties are constantly threatened by a coming electoral defeat. The market views are different for the National Coalition and the Social Democratic party, since the social bases of their electoral success have been steadily growing. Hence, the need to appeal to other social classes for electoral support is less pronounced.

Fourthly, and the last point in Kirchheimer's list, is a tendency to secure access to a variety of interest groups. The reason could be financial but mostly the aim is to secure electoral support via interest group intercession. In the case of Finland there is much evidence to the parties close connections to the interest organizations. Traditionally this link exists between the socialist parties and the workers trade unions. But there is also a close connection between the Center party and their farmers producer's co-operation. Also the other trade unions are more or less politized, though not dominated by one party. All in all, the Finnish society is very highly politized, and party members are elected in a network of different co-operations. Party members are also employed on political reasons to the service of the state and the municipalities. By doing so the party members get publicity and their parties gain more visibility which is a necessity for electoral success.

In sum, Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all model can not without modification be applied to the parties in Finland. On the other

hand, it is apparent that the parties here studied have developed both their organizations and their activities towards higher uniformity. More clearly, the socialist mass party has to some extent been demassified, whereas the traditional non-socialist cadre parties have overloaded their formerly weak organizational structures. However, there is still differences in their internal organizations which can not be discussed here. Much of the activity of the party members is though very similar for all members, since a considerable part of these activities are performed outside parties. In that respect both the parliamentary democracy and above all the local democracy have affected the parties development towards uniformity. But this does not necessarily imply that their politics stand generally on a more conform level today than before.

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TERRITORIAL VOTING PATTERNS AS A LASTING PHENOMENON

Einar Berntzen and Eugènia Salvador

The aim of the workshop was to analyse the patterns of evolution of various western political systems, putting special stress on hypotheses referring to the variation and/or stability of particular geographical voting configurations, with a view to establishing a generic frame of reference for cross-national comparison.

The following papers were presented:

E. Spencer Wellhofer: Two Nations: Class and Periphery
in Late Victorian Britain. 1885-1910.

The paper tests a series of hypotheses on the mobilization of class voting in late Victorian Britain. This contribution is clearly the result of thorough data-gathering and applies a very sophisticated technique of analysis, viz. soft path modelling as developed by Herman Wold and his associates. The discussion centered on the relationship between the verbal conclusions and the parameters in the quantitatively evaluated model. Some raised doubts about the advantages of using such a sophisticated estimating technique without showing beforehand that more simple methods will not do the job equally as well.

Jan Sundberg: Demassified Mass Parties Or Overloaded Cadre Parties? The impact of parties on territorial voting.

Sundberg's paper "opens up the door" to a much needed rethinking of the concept of party organization. The paper says very little about the persistence of territorial voting patterns per se in a general sense, but shows by example how parties can attempt to maintain a territorial base while altering their appeal(e.g. the Finnish Centre Party).

David Broughton: Territorial Voting Patterns and Federal Political Systems: A Comparison of the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada, 1955-1985.

According to Broughton the German federal political system is strongly integrated. This fact is reflected in the voting pattern where there is only a slight difference between the electoral outcome on the provincial level compared to the federal level. The situation is quite different in Canada. The provinces are loosely tied to the federal government, and the electoral outcome on the provincial and federal levels clearly reflects this situation. Broughton made an interesting point by emphasizing that the division between the province of Quebec and the rest of Canada cannot be dicotomized without considering that the rest of the Canadian provinces also are very differentiated. Therefore, the parties do not reflect the prevailing class or other cross-cutting cleavages but rather interests that are based on the concept of territory. Moreover, the electoral laws of Canada support such a development whereas this is not the case in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Otto Schmitt: Stabilité du comportement électoral aux Pays-Bas de 1912 à 1939: un essai de géographie politique.

The paper describes the extraordinary stability of the Dutch territorial voting patterns during this period. The analysis pertains to only a part of the country, since comparative electoral statistics were not available for the entire national territory.

Annie Laurent: L'Action des Espaces Légaux sur le Vote.

The paper analyses the impact of different spatial frames of reference on territorial voting patterns. Since the introduction of universal suffrage legal rules define the conditions of the vote and of political representation. These rules organize the legal spaces which can be ascertained at three levels: material space (where the voting act takes place), aggregate space (administrative divisions, constituencies and institutional space (the spatial frame of reference of the competence area of the elected organ or institution)).

Rolf Nef: Election and Referenda-Cleavages in Contemporary Switzerland: Historically Frozen Simplicity Vs. Variable Complexity?

The paper brought forth discussion of theory and method of cleavage/party alignments and the measurement of change in these dimensions. Of particular interest would be across-time analysis of the decay of partisan voter alignments influenced by changing values expressed on the referenda. Discussion of methodological and measurement issues focused upon questions of ecological fallacies, construction of the value factor scores and the aggregates of unweighted units of analysis. The paper and the ensuing discussion provided an excellent focus on the endurance of territorial dimensions of social cleavage.

Ingemar Wörlund: Party Organization As A Determinant Of
Regional Voting Patterns.

Ingemar Wörlund(Umeå) presented a paper co-written with Sten Berglund(Helsinki) which looked at the impact of party organization as a determinant of voting patterns for the Social Democrats and the Liberals in two regions in the north of Sweden(Norrbotten and Västerbotten). The analysis attempted to use ecological data to explain voting behaviour in the two areas by constructing a model which included commonly used socio-economic indicators as well as a measurement of party organisation in terms of party membership. The subsequent discussion focused on the need to develop the operationalization of the concept of party organisation beyond reliance purely on membership figures to encompass other potentially relevant factors. The consequences for parties of attempting to expand their appeal beyond their "core" areas of electoral strength and the need to take account of social changes in each area were also debated.

Dominique Joye: Géographie des Comportements Politiques
en Suisse.

This paper sets out to show the main dimensions that constitute the political map of present day Switzerland. The paper concludes that the Swiss political geography has hardly changed over the past century. The author suggests that explanations of this stability must be sought by combining different levels of analysis.

Harold D. Clarke: Partisan Inconsistency and Partisan Change in Federal States: The Case of Canada.

The paper investigates the extent to which inconsistent partisan attachments across different levels of the Canadian federal system establish conditions which facilitate relatively rapid change in seemingly well established territorially differentiated voting patterns. The data sets used in the analyses are based on surveys (panels) with national samples of the Canadian electorate conducted immediately after the 1974, 1979, and 1980 federal elections. The paper concludes that despite considerable aggregate stability over the period encompassed by available survey data, federal and provincial party identifications are not strongly correlated with region or other social cleavages. Moreover, at the individual level, party identification displays impressive levels of instability over even relatively brief time intervals.

Eugènia Salvador: The Geographical Stability of Voting Patterns. Reflections on the Case of Spain.

There are serious difficulties involved for the study of territorial voting patterns in Spain, due to several long interruptions in the country's democratic development. The existence of "Caciquismo" (political bossism) in wide areas of the country well into the twentieth century invalidates comparative electoral analyses before 1930. The paper thus concentrates on the city of Barcelona, while making references to Spain as a whole.

Throughout the three periods analysed, 1901-23, 1936-39, and 1977-82, important changes took place in the parties occupying the political scene. Nevertheless, it is possible to follow the persistence of certain fundamental cleavages

with their corresponding territorial fiefs.
However, as the ensuing discussion showed, there is a need for a structural model that would allow us to make predictions about the evolution of future Spanish, or Catalan, voting patterns.

Francesc Pallarés i Porta: 1936-1977: Change and Continuity
in Electoral Behaviour in the
Province of Lleida.

The paper sets out to demonstrate that the socializing effects of the Franco regime, family and community transmission of "historical loyalties" and the process of socio-economic transformation constitute the three poles around which current political alignments in Lleida are based. The discussion centered around the problems of level of analysis and the operationalization of the dependent variables. Despite the forty year interruption of the democratic process, there is a high degree of continuity in terms of broad political "tendencies" (left, right and centre). Political party organizations change but territorial voting patterns persist.

Ilias Nicolacopoulos: La Géographie des Forces Politiques
en Grèce depuis 1974.

The paper describes Greek territorial voting patterns since the restoration of democracy in 1974. At the level of political "families" (left, right and centre) there has been great stability in Greek politics. With regard to the territorial distribution of the vote, there has been a tendency towards a nationalization of the vote.

EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH.

Barcelona, March 25 to 30, 1985

Caja 4

- Draft European Charter of Local Self-Government Preamble
- - ERNST BUSCHOR : Local Government Reforms and Metropolitan Government in Europe. (Switzerland)
- - NIKO VAN ECK : Rotterdam.
- - PROF. C. LEE : Comparative Relexions on Local Government and Politics in England and the United States.
- x - MIKE GOLDSMITH AND HAL WOLMAN : Changes in Grant and Their Consequences for Metropolitan Areas - A Comparative Analysis.
- x - M. BASSAND and DOMINIQUE JOYE : Tendances Récentes de l'Urbanisation : Mouvements Sociaux et Gestion Urbaine.
- - B. ROLD ANDERSEN : The Case of the City of Rotterdam.
- - RITA HALE : Developments in the System of Local Government Finance in England since 1979 and their Impact.
- x - J. SHARPE : The Abolition of the Greater London Council.
- - MONTSE CUCHILLO : The Role of the Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona.
- x - NEIL COLLINS : Dublin
- x - EINAR BRANDSDAL : Inter-Municipal Cooperation - Norway.
- x - BRUNO DENTE : Metropolitan Policy-Making Structures and Processes in Milano.
- v - KENNETH HANF : The Rijnmond Public Authority's Search for Identity - Holland.
- x - HELGE O. LARSEN : Mayoral Leadership and Problems of Urban Governance. Norway
- v - C. RALLINGS and M. THRASHER : Size and Democracy in British Local Gvernment.
- x - Mme. VIGNERON-ZWETKOFF : Le Référendum Local : Autre droit de Cité... Belgique

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME

(The session of Tuesday March 26 starts at 9.30 a.m. Other sessions at 10.00 a.m.)
(Lunch may be one hour later than stated in the General Programme)

Tuesday March 26

Meeting at 9.30 a.m.

Opening address by Mayor Maragall

Presentation by E. Buschor

Presentation by J. Anglet and L. Carreno

Lunch

Presentation by K. Coombs

Presentation by N. van Eck

Wednesday March 27

Presentation by B. Rold Andersen

Presentation by R. Hale

Paper by K. Young

(discussant: Wollmann)

Lunch

Paper by J. Sharpe

(discussant: Bransdal)

Thursday March 28

Paper by E. Lee

(discussant: Rallings/Trasher)

Paper by M. Goldsmith/H. Wolman

(discussant: Dente)

Paper by M. Bassand/D. Joye

(discussant: Vigneron-Zweltkoff)

Lunch

Excursions

Friday March 29

Paper by Cuchillo

(discussant: Bassand/Joye)

Paper by Collins

(discussant: Sharpe)

Paper by Bransdal

((discussant: Goldsmith/Wolman)

Paper by Dente

(discussant: Young)

Lunch

Paper by Hanf

(discussant: Lee)

Paper by Larsen

(discussant: Collins)

Saturday March 30

Paper by Rallings/Krasher

(discussant: Larsen)

Paper by Zweltkoff

(discussant: Cuchillo)

Paper by Wollman

(discussant: Hanf)

End of Workshop

Workshop Secretary: Helge Larsen

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BARCELONA 1985 + address of Editor of 'Cities'*

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Crossing Administrative Boundaries:
Intermunicipal cooperation as a strategy
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Metropolitan Government and Environmental
Control

The Concept of Metropolitan Government
Reconsidered

Local Referendum: another right for the
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Policy Research and Metropolitan
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DRAFT EUROPEAN CHARTER OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT PREAMBULE (1)

THE SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS, MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,

CONSIDERING THAT THE AIM OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IS TO ACHIEVE A GREATER UNITY BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING AND REALISING THE IDEALS AND PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE THEIR COMMON HERITAGE,

CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE METHODS BY WHICH THIS AIM IS TO BE ACHIEVED IS THROUGH AGREEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE FIELD,

CONSIDERING THAT THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE ONE OF THE AIM FOUNDATIONS OF ANY DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REGIME,

CONSIDERING THAT THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IS ONE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES THAT ARE SHARED BY ALL THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,

CONVINCED THAT IT IS AT LOCAL LEVEL THAT THIS RIGHT CAN BE MOST DIRECTLY EXERCISED,

CONVINCED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES WITH REAL RESPONSIBILITIES CAN PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS BOTH EFFECTIVE AND CLOSE TO THE CITIZEN,

AWARE THAT THE SAFEGUARDING AND REINFORCEMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DECENTRALISATION OF POWER,

ASSERTING THAT THIS ENTAILS THE EXISTENCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES ENDOWED WITH DEMOCRATICALLY CONSTITUTED DECISION-MAKING BODIES AND POSSESSING A WIDE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WITH REGARD TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, THE WAYS AND MEANS BY WHICH THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE EXERCISED AND THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THEIR FULFILMENT,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :

PART I

THE CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES BOUND BY THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES IN THE MANNER AND TO THE EXTENT PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 11 OF THIS CHARTER (2).

ARTICLE 1 : LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT SHALL BE RECOGNISED IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, AND WHERE PRACTICABLE IN THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 2 : CONCEPT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

1. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT DENOTES THE RIGHT AND THE ABILITY OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW, TO REGULATE AND MANAGE A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNDER THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION.

2. THIS RIGHT SHALL BE EXERCISED BY COUNCILS OR ASSEMBLIES COMPOSED OF MEMBERS FREELY ELECTED BY SECRET BALLOT ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT, EQUAL, UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, WHICH MAY POSSESS EXECUTIVE ORGANS RESPONSIBLE TO THEM. THIS PROVISION SHALL IN NO WAY AFFECT RECOURSE TO ASSEMBLIES OF CITIZENS, REFERENDUMS OR ANY OTHER FORM OF DIRECT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION WHERE IT IS PERMITTED BY STATUTE.

ARTICLE 3 : SCOPE OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

1. THE BASIC POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION OR BY STATUTE. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION SHALL NOT PREVENT THE ATTRIBUTION TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
2. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW, HAVE FULL DISCRETION TO EXERCISE THEIR INITIATIVE WITH REGARD TO ANY MATTER WHICH IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM THEIR COMPETENCE NOR ASSIGNED TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY.
3. PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES SHALL GENERALLY BE EXERCISED BY PREFERENCE BY THOSE AUTHORITIES WHICH ARE CLOSEST TO THE CITIZEN. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ANOTHER AUTHORITY SHOULD WEIGH UP THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE TASK AND REQUIREMENTS OF EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.
4. POWERS GIVEN TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL NORMALLY BE FULL AND EXCLUSIVE. THEY MAY NOT BE UNDERMINED OR LIMITED BY ANOTHER, CENTRAL OR REGIONAL, AUTHORITY EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE LAW.
5. WHERE POWERS ARE DELEGATED TO THEM BY A CENTRAL OR REGIONAL AUTHORITY, LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL, IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, BE ALLOWED DISCRETION IN ADAPTING THE EXERCISE OF THEM TO LOCAL CONDITIONS.
6. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE CONSULTED, IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, IN DUE TIME AND IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY IN THE PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES FOR ALL MATTERS WHICH CONCERN THEM DIRECTLY.

ARTICLE 4 : PROTECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY BOUNDARIES

CHANGES IN LOCAL AUTHORITY BOUNDARIES SHALL NOT BE MADE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES CONCERNED, POSSIBLY BY MEANS OF A REFERENDUM WHERE THIS IS PERMITTED BY STATUTE.

ARTICLE 5 : ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES AND RESOURCES FOR THE TASKS OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

1. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO MORE GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST BE ABLE THEMSELVES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES IN ORDER TO ADAPT THEM TO LOCAL NEEDS AND ENSURE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.
2. THE CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MUST BE SUCH AS TO PERMIT THE RECRUITMENT OF HIGH QUALITY STAFF ON THE BASIS OF MERIT AND COMPETENCE, THIS TO END ADEQUATE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, REMUNERATION AND CAREER PROSPECTS MUST BE PROVIDED.

ARTICLE 6 : CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESPONSIBILITIES AT LOCAL LEVEL ARE EXERCISED

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1. THE CONDITIONS OF OFFICE OF LOCAL ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES SHALL PROVIDE FOR FREE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS.
2. THEY MUST ALLOW FOR APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE OFFICE IN QUESTION AS WELL AS PROVISION, WHERE APPROPRIATE, OF COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF EARNINGS OR REMUNERATION FOR WORK DONE AND CORRESPONDING SOCIAL WELFARE PROTECTION.

3. ANY FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DEEMED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE HOLDING OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY STATUTE OR FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

ARTICLE 7 : ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES' ACTIVITIES

1. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED ACCORDING TO SUCH PROCEDURES AND IN SUCH CASES AS ARE PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION OR BY STATUTE.
2. ANY ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL NORMALLY AIM ONLY AT ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW AND WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION MAY HOWEVER BE EXERCISED WITH REGARD TO EXPEDIENCY BY HIGHER LEVEL AUTHORITIES IN RESPECT OF TASKS THE EXECUTION OF WHICH IS DELEGATED TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE EXERCISED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERVENTION OF THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IS KEPT IN PROPORTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERESTS WHICH IT IS INTENDED TO PROTECT.

ARTICLE 8 : FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

1. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE ENTITLED, WITHIN NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, TO ADEQUATE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THEIR OWN OF WHICH THEY MAY DISPOSE FREELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR POWERS.
2. LOCAL AUTHORITIES' FINANCIAL RESOURCES SHALL BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW.
3. PART AT LEAST OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL DERIVE FROM LOCAL TAXES AND CHARGES OF WHICH, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF STATUTE, THEY HAVE THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE RATE.
4. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ON WHICH RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE BASED SHALL BE OF A SUFFICIENTLY DIVERSIFIED AND BUOYANT NATURE TO ENABLE THEM TO KEEP PACE AS FAR AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE WITH THE REAL EVOLUTION OF THE COST OF CARRYING OUT THEIR TASKS.
5. THE PROTECTION OF FINANCIALLY WEAKER LOCAL AUTHORITIES CALLS FOR THE INSTITUTION OF FINANCIAL EQUALISATION PROCEDURES OR EQUIVALENT MEASURES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FINANCE AND OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN THEY MUST SUPPORT. SUCH PROCEDURES OR MEASURES SHALL NOT DIMINISH THE DISCRETION LOCAL AUTHORITIES MAY EXERCISE WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITY.
6. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE CONSULTED, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, ON THE WAY IN WHICH REDISTRIBUTED RESOURCES ARE TO BE ALLOCATED TO THEM.
7. AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, GRANTS TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL NOT BE EARMARKED FOR THE FINANCING OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS. THE PROVISION OF GRANT SHOULD NOT REMOVE THE BASIC FREEDOM OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO EXERCISE POLICY DISCRETION WITHIN THEIR OWN JURISDICTION.
8. FOR THE PURPOSE OF BORROWING FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT, LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO NATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW.

ARTICLE 9 : LOCAL AUTHORITIES' RIGHTS TO ASSOCIATE

1. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE ENTITLED, IN EXERCISING THEIR POWERS, TO CO-OPERATE AND, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAW, TO FORM CONSORTIA WITH OTHER LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT TASKS OF COMMON INTEREST.

2. THE ENTITLEMENT OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO BELONG TO ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THEIR COMMON INTERESTS AND TO BELONG TO AN INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE RECOGNISED IN EACH STATE.

3. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL BE ENTITLED, UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED FOR BY THE LAW, TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

ARTICLE 10 : LEGAL PROTECTION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO A JUDICIAL REMEDY WHICH WOULD SECURE FREE EXERCISE OF THEIR POWERS AND RESPECT FOR SUCH PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AS ARE ENSHRINED IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION OR THE CONSTITUTION.

(1) THIS DRAFT PREAMBLE COULD ALSO SERVE FOR A RECOMMENDATION WITH THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS :

REPLACE 1ST SENTENCE BY : THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 15 (8) OF THE STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

REPLACE FINAL SENTENCE BY : RECOMMENDS THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES TO BE GUIDED IN THEIR LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE BY THE PRINCIPLES ANNEXED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION.

(2) IN THE EVENT OF THE CHARTER BEING ADOPTED AS A RECOMMENDATION, RATHER THAN A CONVENTION, THESE THREE LINES WOULD BE DELETED.

Metropolitan Government

Director: Finn Bruun

The workshop was organised as a collaborate arrangement in conjunction with the Corporacion Metropolitana de Barcelona and the Mayor of Barcelona and involved representatives from Barcelona as well as four invited practitioners from other European countries and 17 academics. Altogether the participants represented 10 countries and presented 17 papers dealing with 11 countries.

The purpose of the workshop was to explore the consequences of major demographic, socio-economic and political-administrative changes as well as experiences of success and failure in the attempts to overcome the problems of overloaded governments in big urban settlements.

Although several papers covered more than one topic the main themes which the papers and the discussions concentrated on can be listed as follows:

- relations between cities and suburban and rural areas
- intergovernmental relations
- organisation and leadership
- citizen involvement
- size and democracy

In the opening address Mayor Pascal Maragall addressed the theme of Metropolitan Government also in his capacity as an urban economist and strongly emphasized the need for several models which could cope with the rather different socio-economic characteristics and notions of local government in Southern and Northern Europe.

The papers presented supported this distinction. Although the question of coordination and conflict resolution came out strongly also in the presentation of Rotterdam (van Eck; Hanf) and London the financial squeeze and the center-functions were underlined in the presentations of London (Sharpe) and Copenhagen (Rold Andersen). Bransdals game-theoretical founded analysis of cooperation between cities and neighbouring municipalities in Norway even questioned some classical wisdom as regards the coordination between uneven partners. In Norway cooperation often seems to occur even when a municipality may be in a looser's position.

As regards Southern Europe with its weak tradition for local government a relatively better financial position for some of the big cities and often strong regional conflicts the struggle for power and authority was demonstrated in the

presentations on Milan (Dente), and Barcelona (Cuchillo). All the cases presented bore witness to a general statement on the state of the European reform movement, namely that the period of amalgamations and creations of super-structures have come to a halt. Similarly, the move towards greater financial autonomy and service-delivery through the allocation of blockgrants have come to a standstill. While the divergencies between suburbs, rural areas and cities may not only be attributed to the well-known resistance from smaller entities towards incorporations, but also from cities relying on grants as the mean to uphold their independence (Buschor), regional and national resistance towards big powerful entities was stressed by Cuchillo and Rold-Andersen.

The combination of regional and party political conflicts in especially Britain and the resulting instability and centralisation was underlined by Sharpe and Lee. The complexity of the recent financial reforms in Britain was further illustrated in a comparison of the consequences of the changes of the grant systems in Britain and the USA which shows the effect to be amongst others, a tendency for central areas to spend more than suburbs. The impact has, however, not been uniform in all economic identical categories (Goldsmith and Wolman). An analysis of local finance in Britain even demonstrated that apart from not meeting the targets of central government policies, some conservative authorities may conclude that the conservative government is rewarding labour controlled governments at their expense (Hale).

While the presentations and discussions of intergovernmental relations all bore witness to the unlikelihood of sweeping metropolitan reforms on the grand scale some papers strongly argued the merits of strong urban leadership and the need to recognize real-policy in any reform attempts (Collins on Dublin; Hanf on Rotterdam; Larsen on mayors' roles; Dente on Milan). The question of leadership was also raised in a presentation of local referendum in Liege, which argues the merits of referendums as a means of legitimisation although citizens' possibilities for exercising real influence is questioned (Vigneron-Zwettkoff). The issue of citizens influence was also raised in relation to the new social movements. Tied to an ecological analysis from Genova it was thus argued that the new social movements may have considerable influence although via the parties (Joye and Bassand).

The fundamental question of size and democracy was finally discussed in relation to British experience. Based on an analysis of party contests and electoral turnout Rallings and Trasher conclude that the electorate show a greater interest in community than in policies which at the contrary carries weight in parties and amongst politicians.

The conflicts between technically rational problem-solving devices, party political aspirations and electoral preferences thus came out clearly during this workshop, which enjoyed the unquestionable benefits of presentations by and discussions with experienced practitioners and on top of that the kind and generous hospitality of the CMB.

Finn Bruun

Comparative Reflections on Local Government and Politics in England and
the United States

by

Professor Eugene C. Lee*

Prepared for the Workshop on "Metropolitan Government" of the European
Consortium of Political Research

Barcelona: 25-30 March 1985

PRELIMINARY DRAFT: COMMENTS INVITED

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When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean -
neither more nor less. (Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll,
Through the Looking Glass.)

Introduction

The student of comparative local government faces a formidable challenge. Even within a single country the vocabulary of politics is ambiguous. Terminology and concepts that appear similar at first reading take on different meanings as one becomes familiar with the political and governmental landscape. Attempts at cross-national analysis confront an even greater barrier of custom and practice.

All these problems are obvious as one attempts to translate from one language to another. But the difficulties are no less great - although perhaps even harder to discern - when comparing Great Britain and America, despite their common linguistic heritage. The following comments may make this all too clear. The writer has been an observer of the British scene for approximately the last 200 days, not all of which has been spent in the study of English local politics, despite their frequent appearance on the front page and the television newscast. To be sure, rate-capping and the abolition of the Greater London Council and the six Metropolitan Counties - the objects of this media attention - have their American counterparts - for example, California's Proposition 13 and the constant change in local government boundaries that typifies local government in the United States. But nothing could be more dissimilar than the context in which such issues have emerged and are dealt with in the two nations.

What follows then are the preliminary and tentative reflections of a long-time student of the American - and more particularly the California - scene about some critical differences between the two nations in local politics and central-local government relationships. No sophisticated comparisons or judgements on the relative merits of the two systems are attempted. Indeed, these reflections might more accurately be described as a research agenda, designed to address David Gelfand's "...scepticism about unsystematic comparisons and transplantations of political institutions and processes. Casual comparisons, he suggests, can be misleading and self-serving at best and dangerous at worst" (Gelfand 2). Nevertheless, there is value in sharing new impressions in the pursuit of valid comparative insights.

The Federal-Unitary Dimension

There are many differences, of course, in intergovernmental relationships in federal and unitary states. For example, in attempting to assess the extent of local government autonomy, the following might be sketched:

		<u>Form of Government</u>	
		<u>Unitary</u>	<u>Federal</u>
Relative Status of Local Gov't) Autonomous	A	C
) Dependent	B	D

Because of the differences among American states in their relationship to local authorities, particular American cities might be located in either "C" or "D".

The issue was real and required consideration. That it was being discussed on the floor of the House of Commons suggested the extent to which Parliament - and thus the Government - may choose to concern itself with details of local life and its ultimate responsibility for them (Page: 33).

In contrast, many American cities draw their basic authority, not from their state legislature but directly from the state constitution. The latter derives its authority directly from the people and may be amended only by them. In California, for example, large cities have jurisdiction over "municipal affairs" - language specifically set forth in the state constitution - which authority is superior to actions of the state legislature. However, the definition of the constitutional language requires constant legal interpretation by the courts: Is the action of the city (for example, the imposition of a local income tax) a "municipal affair" or a matter of statewide concern?

Courts in both countries are involved in cases involving the meaning of legislative language. However, the additional constitutional role of American courts has forced them into a more active role in interpreting the relative responsibilities of state and local governments than is the case in the British parliamentary system. Paradoxically, popular sovereignty as expressed in state constitutions has in this instance increased the power of the courts, the institution least subject to popular control.

Comparisons of relative autonomy of local government in Britain and the United States must, then, take into account not only the superior parliamentary/ministerial role in the former but the enhanced place of the courts in the latter.

The "Constitution" - Written or Unwritten

The position of the courts relates directly, of course, to the role indicated above - the interpretation of a written constitution. In a federal system, this interpretation involves not only the state courts and state constitutions but the national courts, required to interpret the meaning of the United States Constitution, as well as the intentions of Congress.

In this role, the Supreme Court of the United States can impinge directly upon the authority - and even the structure - of local governments, regardless of the absence of any mention of them in the U.S. Constitution. In recent years, for example, in cases brought by black citizens in southern communities, the Court has required cities to alter their local elections from an at-large system in which all candidates run city-wide, to a ward system of single-member districts. In another case in February 1985, the Court (in a 5-4 decision) ruled, in effect, that Congress may - under its power over interstate commerce - regulate the wages and hours of state and local employees. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun said that states are protected against federal intrusions only to the degree that they can use the "political process" to protect themselves (Greenhouse; see also The Economist 2 March 1985: 25).

National party labels are not irrelevant in American local politics. Indeed, party primaries and fierce partisan battles still feature in the elections of many (largely eastern and mid-western) cities. But in these, as well as in the more prevalent non-partisan elections (with no party label on the ballot), national party considerations loom far less than local issues and personalities, a reflection of the generally weaker position of the political party in the United States.

"Nationalised" v. Localised National Politics

These relative differences between the two countries are complemented by a parallel contrast between electoral politics for state and national legislative office in the United States and for Parliamentary office in England. To over-generalise, local issues are far more important in state and national politics in the United States than they are in England. From the standpoint of developing coherent national party positions, the fragmented politics of the U.S. are an immense handicap. But they also provide great opportunities for reflecting local interests and needs. The existence of the primary election as the basis for congressional and state legislative party nominations is a constant reminder to distant legislators not to forget their local roots and constituents.

Local considerations are not absent in the selection and (for the Labour Party) re-selection of Parliamentary candidates in Britain. But, compared with the United States, Members of Parliament concern themselves far less in advocating the cause of the local authority in central government, especially if that cause might run afoul of Government or party policy. Page notes, "The British system of government offers far fewer routine opportunities for groups such as local authorities or professional associations of local authority officers to propose, amend or defeat legislation than a system such as that in the United States" (Page 1982: 20). Reflecting this, "British MPs rarely perceive themselves to be major defenders of the interests of their locality and any individual contact between central government and a single local authority generally takes place via the local government officials rather than local publications" (Page 1985: 58).

In short, both because of the nature of federalism and the relative weakness of the national parties, local government has an impact and influence, not only on but within the state and national legislatures in the United States lacking in relative terms to its counterparts in England. By the same token, national and state political leaders have a far more difficult task in imposing their priorities upon American cities, counties, and districts.

Internal Partisanship and Political Leadership

The relative influence of the national parties in local electoral politics in England is matched by a parallel internal partisanship. The duplication of parliamentary-like institutions at the local council level - party leader, caucus, politically-appointed committees and chairmen - stand in sharp contrast to the typical American city council of five to ten members, a directly-elected mayor, and a professional city manager.

The Local Authority Agenda

Partisan or nonpartisan in style, the political process must deal with the substantive agenda and range of responsibilities of the local authority. At least two distinctive activities dominate British local budgets and programmes which are - in the United States - handled differently, in the first instance, or do not appear at all, in the second.

The first of these functions is public education. In the U.S., elementary and secondary education and junior or community colleges are governed, with exceptions, by separately-elected boards, distinct from the city and county governments within which the schools are located and often comprising different territorial areas. In England, in contrast, education up to the university level is the responsibility of local authorities, all of which (with the possible exception of the relatively autonomous Inner London Educational Authority) have responsibility for other major public services.

To understand the full implications of the inclusion of education as a responsibility of English local authorities would require detailed analysis, but two facts stand out. First, education is the largest element in total local government expenditure - representing 40 per cent of current and 10 per cent of capital expenditure in 1980/81 and, of course, a much larger share of the budgets of those local authorities with this responsibility (CIPFA: 11).

Equally important from a political standpoint has been the controversy in Britain over the nature of secondary education - comprehensive or selective - and the extent to which communities should be able to decide for themselves the mixture of these two contrasting philosophies.

Whatever the case, those English local authorities with responsibility for education are confronted with a range of policy and resource allocation issues that - in the United States - are removed from the local council agenda by the very fragmented nature of the local government system. The comparison is complicated by the fact that virtually all local government collective bargaining over wages and benefits is conducted at a national level in Britain, in contrast to a localised bargaining structure in much of the United States. ⁴ Nevertheless, major decisions of expenditure priorities between education and all other local activities in America are often decided at the state level. And, within the community, the policy issues of public education are resolved in an autonomous political and governmental arena, with a life of its own.

The second activity distinguishing local authorities in the two countries is housing. Simply stated, there is no American counterpart for the policy, practices, and magnitude of British "council housing". In the United States, public housing projects, a heritage of the New Deal of the 1930s designed to provide shelter for the poor, have been largely discredited. Indeed, as of the middle 1960s the programmes had actually torn down more housing than they had constructed, and only a small fraction of Americans live in publicly-owned projects. Current government efforts focus on a rent supplement program, heavily supported by federal funds (Harrigan: 374-375).

⁴ The difference between the two countries in public sector collective bargaining is a major topic in and of itself. In England, "nationalised negotiations" take place over salaries and wages (which comprise over half of current expenses), with the local government associations representing the local authorities as employers collectively. This has removed from the direct authority of the local councils an important issue of resource

The policy of the Thatcher government in pushing the sale of public housing units to tenants has reduced this investment but, in so doing, has resulted in the accumulation of huge cash balances by the local authorities. "The amounts involved dwarf the proceeds so far from the flotation of nationalized industries. In the three financial years since 1981-82, sales of land and dwellings brought in more than three billion pounds" (Sbragia: 15).

Whether in terms of the investment of these balances or in the support of the existing housing stock, the magnitude of these programs brings into sharp focus the contrasting place of capital markets in shaping central-local relationships in Britain and the United States.

The Two Treasuries, Wall Street, and the City

The political and managerial issues involved in the financing of the tens of billions of dollars and pounds of local government capital expenditure - for streets, schools, housing, and all of what is now called the urban infrastructure - are relatively unstudied and little understood. However, the critical importance of the difference in capital markets to intergovernmental relationships and relative local government autonomy has recently been described in a remarkably insightful paper by Alberta Sbragia of the University of Pittsburgh, the source of the following quotations in this section.

In sum, Professor Sbragia notes that, deriving largely from the federal nature of the American system:

State and local capital expenditure (and the borrowing which finances much of it) ... is seen as separate from federal expenditure. [In contrast, in Britain] local government finance, and capital expenditure in particular, has long been seen as an important part of public sector finance and as something to be coordinated, at least over the medium and long term, with the centre's macroeconomic objectives. The degree of coordination within the British public sector in the area of borrowing and capital expenditure is so great that one is tempted to argue that the public sector is integrated rather than coordinated In the United States, by contrast, the notion of public sector finance does not exist to any significant degree and policy mechanisms for controlling local borrowing and capital expenditure are relatively undeveloped.

More specifically, Professor Sbragia notes that the capital market in the United States has been "shaped, created in fact" by the American doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation - the doctrine that various levels of government cannot tax each other. As an extension of this doctrine, "investors who lend to state and local governments by buying their securities do not pay federal income taxes on the interest state and local borrowers pay them."⁵ As a result:

American subnational governments borrow in a financial market distinctly separate from those markets in which the U.S. Treasury and private firms borrow ... Essentially, the Treasury and local authorities in the United States are not in direct competition for funds from investors ... the Treasury largely ignores state and local borrowing and certainly does not see it as an integral part of the borrowing requirements of the public sector.... Conversely, the British Treasury and authorities do, at least potentially, directly compete with each other in the

However, the issue goes beyond a concern for the overall public sector budget to the spending plans of local authorities, regardless of the source of revenue. For example, in the name of "managing the economy", the Thatcher government has chosen to implement rate-capping, a limitation on property taxes of those local authorities the Government considers to have spent beyond approved targets. In so doing, the Government has been forced to deal with a volume of detail of individual local authority expenditures and to defend its actions before Parliament, the courts, and an insistent press, as well as an angry local government constituency.

Accepting this responsibility poses immense technical and political burdens on civil servants and Ministers. One wonders, in fact, whether - even accepting the widely disputed allegation that the level of rates is an essential element of economic management - central Government has not allowed itself to be "captured" by concern for local authorities to the exclusion of other higher priority items. Like the banker who cannot afford to let a major debtor go under, it may be questioned who is really setting the public agenda.

American state governments are also involved with local expenditure because, as in Britain, an important share of state taxes are transferred to local government. States are also concerned about their general economic climate and the taxing and spending policies of the local governments within their borders. Indeed, many American local governments may be more restricted when it comes to raising and spending money than are British authorities (Wolman: 174-178). But the interest of the states is not one of macro-economic management, a matter clearly beyond their authority or capability. Nor, as Sbragia notes, is there any feeling that state/local finances should be more closely coordinated with federal finance (Sbragia: 9). Harold Wolman summarizes:

In the United States concern about the noncongruence of local authority expenditure levels and total public sector spending targets does not exist ... Thus, the assertion of the Labour government's 1977 Green Paper that 'because of their responsibilities for the management of the economy central government must concern themselves with total local government expenditure and taxation' would be quite foreign to the United States policy debate (Wolman: 178).

And even more "foreign" would be the high level of current Government concern in Britain over the specific local rates of individual local authorities.

The "Missing Bark" - Direct Democracy

"Listen, Watson".

"I hear nothing, Holmes".

"Precisely!"

Like Sherlock Holmes' missing bark of the dog, the final element discussed here that distinguishes Britain from much of America is what you do not see at the local level - "direct democracy". To a Californian, the initiative, referendum and recall are not only guaranteed by the state constitution but possess many of the symbolic features of Britain's unwritten constitution, alluded to above. To much of western America (and in many other parts of the country as well) the right of the citizen to put legislation directly on the ballot by petition, or to hold referendums on local measures passed by the

How the United States and Britain will deal with this ambiguous, confused, and complex state of affairs in the 21st Century cannot be predicted in 1985. It is certain, however, that both nations have a great deal to learn from each other. Comparative political scientists have a rare opportunity, perhaps even a responsibility, to contribute to this process.

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PAPER FOR BARCELONA CONFERENCEINTRODUCTION

- 1.0 This paper focusses on developments in the system of local government finance in England since the 1979 general election and their impact on London and metropolitan areas outside London.
- 1.1 One of the main planks of the British Government's economic policy is the reduction of public expenditure in general and local government spending in particular. Over the six year period since the change of Government in 1979 there has been a succession of initiatives on local government finance, in addition to the normal cycle of negotiations on spending and grant, which have tended to increase central control over local authorities. The main initiatives are summarised in the following table:-

Date	Initiative
November 1980	Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 receives Royal Assent - introduction of Block Grant system.
January 1981	Announcement of individual spending targets for local authorities with grant penalties for overspending.
November 1981	Introduction of Local Government Finance Bill - which included a provision for referenda on rates but was lost in the House of Commons.
December 1981	Green Paper 'Alternatives to Domestic Rates' - Cmd 8449 - considered options such as Sales Tax and Local Income Tax, but so far no action has been taken. It now seems unlikely that domestic rates will disappear.
July 1982	Local Government Finance Act 1982 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - abolition of local authority powers to levy a supplementary rate - provided legal basis for grant penalty system announced in January 1981.

Date	Initiative
August 1983	White Paper "Rates" Cmnd 9008 outlining proposals for rating reform and rate limitation.
August 1984	Local Government Act 1984 - includes provision for Secretary of State for the Environment to set limits on the rate levies of selected local authorities.
October 1984	- Announcement of ministerial review of system of local government finance.
1985	Use of rate limitation powers in relation to 18 local authorities.

1.2 The principal characteristics of Central Government policy in relation to local government over the period have been:-

- * proposals to reduce the total level of local government spending;
- * the use of the grant system as a lever to secure reductions in spending and changes in the distribution of spending as between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas;
- * the introduction of more detailed controls over the decisions of individual local authorities.

This paper looks at each of these in turn.

PROPOSALS TO REDUCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

2.0 The first full Public Expenditure White Paper published after the change of Government - Cmnd 7841, March 1980 - set out the Government's broad aims which were summarised in the White Paper as being:-

- * to reduce total public expenditure progressively in volume terms over the next four years, to a level in 1983-84 about 4 per cent lower than in 1979-80

- * to reduce expenditure in 1982-83, the last year covered by the previous Government's plans published in Cmd 7439, to a level 11.5 per cent (nearly £9 billion in 1979 survey prices) lower than in those plans
- * to secure further reductions in expenditure in 1980-81 below the level set out in the short White Paper published in November 1979, principally in housing
- * to increase expenditure on defence, law and order, health and social security rises over the survey period. The plans for the industry, energy, trade and employment programme, housing, education and nationalised industries' borrowing are substantially reduced over the survey period.

2.1 There was little detail in the White Paper for the forecast period - 1980-81 to 1983-84 - but there was a sharp contrast between the general aim of reducing total public expenditure by 4% in real terms over the plan period and by just 0.5% in the first year and the specific objective set for local authorities in England and Wales of:-

- * reducing current expenditure by 4% in real terms in a single year - between 1979-80 and 1980-81; and
- * reducing capital expenditure by 16% in real terms in a single year - again between 1979-80 and 1980-81.

But the stance adopted by the new Conservative administration in its first Public Expenditure White Paper set the tone for what was to follow:-

- * continuing demands for greater cuts from local government than from central government; and
- * emphasis on Britain as a unitary state with Central Government entitled to determine the level of local government spending.

2.2 Against this background it is interesting to examine what has happened to both local government spending in England and Central Government's spending plans since 1979.

2.3 First of all how has local authority current expenditure changed since 1979.

Table 1 sets out local authority current expenditure in cash terms for England taken from Grnd 9428 for the period 1979-80 - 1985-86. Table 2 sets out the same figures in constant price terms at 1976-77 out-turn prices (O/T) together with the real terms change over the period.

Table 1: LA Current Expenditure 1979-80 - 1985-86 in cash

£m

Grnd 9428 England	-----Out-turn-----				Est. out- turn 83-84	budgets 84-85	plans 85-86
	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83			
Ag, Fish & Food	71	83	93	99	111	110	111
Industry, Energy, Trade and Employment	81	101	115	128	140	152	138
Transport	1087	1335	1543	1751	1861	1943	1544
Housing	425	548	527	550	650	631	425
LES	1626	1883	2054	2219	2420	2523	2420
Law, Order and Protective Services	1823	2173	2595	2875	3150	3378	3410
Education, Science, Arts and Librs.	7387	8960	9928	10566	11194	11544	11260
Health & PSS	1307	1619	1795	1969	2145	2282	2330
Social Security	248	331	486	879	2214	2425	2520
Unallocated Margin							590
Total: Source T2.18	14055	17033	19136	21036	23885	24988	24780

Table 2: LA Current Expenditure at 1976-77 O/T

£m

Grnd 9428 Prices England	-----Out-turn-----				Est. Out- turn 83-84	Budgets 84-85	Govt. Plan 85-86	79-80: 85-86
	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83				
Ag, Fish & Food	53.46	51.40	51.24	50.78	54.18	51.59	52.08	-2.58
Industry, Energy, Trade and Employment	60.99	62.55	63.36	65.65	68.34	71.29	62.50	2.47
Transport	740.31	755.01	770.23	814.84	825.90	825.23	630.54	-14.83
Housing	320.01	339.38	290.37	281.11	317.29	295.94	194.28	-39.29
LES	1151.56	1103.75	1080.94	1087.27	1128.31	1132.05	1052.97	-8.56
Law, Order and Protective Services	1220.46	1224.16	1276.50	1296.86	1343.80	1377.31	1344.47	10.16
Education, Science, Arts & Libraries	5011.87	5115.62	4946.69	4826.64	4835.21	4765.72	4492.42	-10.36
Health & PSS	933.30	961.46	948.58	971.00	1006.19	1034.40	1023.48	9.66
Social Security	186.73	204.99	267.78	450.86	1080.74	1137.32	1143.52	512.38
Unallocated Margin							594.45 245	-
Total	9678.69	9818.32	9695.69	9845.01	10659.96	10690.85	10241.71	+5.82

2.5 The main points to emerge from the tables are that:-

- * local government current expenditure rose by almost 1.5% in real terms between O/T for 1979-80 and O/T for 1980-81 - against Government's objective of a 4% real terms cut;
- * local government current expenditure rose by some 10.5% in real terms over the period 1979-80 to 1984-85;
- * there has been a marked change in the distribution of spending on traditional local government services - such as education, transport, law and order and social services - but spending on these services in total is at about the same level in real terms in 1984-85 as it was in 1979-80;
- * the growth in local government current expenditure over the period comes from the massive increase in the social security element - that is rent subsidies to council tenants with low incomes - which is largely outside the control of local authorities;
- * Central Government is once again looking for a 4% cut in real terms in a single year - between local authority budgets for 1984-85 and its (Central Governments) planned level of spending for 1985-86.

2.6 So if one ignores the social security element of spending which is largely outside the control of individual local authorities, it could be argued that although Government has failed to secure the reduction in local government current expenditure which it sought, it has succeeded in stabilising the underlying level of expenditure over a six year period. However, even if local authorities do reduce their current expenditure to the level now being sought by Central Government for 1985-86, the total level will still be some 10% or more than £2bn (at 1985-86 prices) higher than the level Government had originally sought to achieve in 1980-81.

2.7 Indeed, if one looks at what has happened to the plan figures for a single year over a series of White Papers this supports the view that plan figures have tended to increase to bring them closer to reality - rather than that spending has fallen in accordance with plans.

2.8 Table 3 shows what has happened to planned current expenditure* relevant for grant for English local authorities in three successive White Papers in both cash and constant price terms and also shows the level at which local authorities budgetted in 1983-84 and 1984-85.

* This definition of spending is narrower than that used for Tables 1 and 2, but it is the only one for which information for a single plan year is available from a series of White Papers.

Table 3: Comparison of planned current expenditure relevant for grant
1983-84 to 1987-88

£m

SOURCE	Cash spending levels					At estimated 1985-86 out-turn prices				
	83-84	84-85	85-86	86-87	87-88	83-84	84-85	85-86	86-87	87-88
Grnd 8789	23557	23780	24932	-	-	25577	24850	25170	-	-
Grnd 9143	-	24379	24927	25362	-	-	25476	25165	27753	-
Grnd 9428	-	-	25497	26033	26301	-	-	25740	25629	24727
1983-84 budget figure	24623	-	-	-	-	26734	26734	26734	26734	26734
1984-85 budget figure	-	25598	-	-	-	-	26750	26750	26750	26750

2.9 The figures in Table 3 show very clearly that Government has continued to seek reductions in spending:-

- * the difference between Grnd 8789 figures for 1983-84 and Grnd 9428 for 1987-88 imply a 3.3% cut in real terms over the 5 year/3 plan period; and
- * the Grnd 9428 figure for 1987-88 would require a cut of some 7.9% in real terms from the local authority budgetted level of spending for 1983-84 and 1984-85.

2.10 But although Government has sought real cuts spending plans have nevertheless edged upwards closer to actual spending levels - as the figures for 1985-86 taken from Grnds 8789, 9143 and 9428 show:

- * spending plans for 1985-86 have increased by slightly more than 2% in real terms or £0.5bn in cash terms over the 3 plan period.

The end result is confusion and uncertainty about future spending levels.

2.11 Turning briefly to capital expenditure, Table 4 shows net capital expenditure by local authorities in England over the period since 1979 together with Government's plan figure for 1985-86 in cash and constant price terms.

Table 4

Net Capital Expenditure by Local Authorities in England 1979-80 - 1984-85

	-----Out-turn-----				Estimated Out-turn 1982-83	Budget 1984-85	Plan 1985-86
	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83			
Net capital spending in cash terms	3646	3511	2539	2779	3184	3108	2213
Net capital spending at 1985-86 prices	5795	4945	3092*	3175	3485	3245	2213

Source: Grnd 9428 Table 4 repriced using CSO material and GDP deflators

2.12 It is clear from Table 4 that net capital investment by English local authorities has declined dramatically over the period. Net spending for 1985-86 is planned to be some 60% of the cash figure for 1979-80 - in real terms this represents net investment at about 40% of the 1979-80 level. In service terms the area most affected by the reduction is investment in local authority housing which has been cut back to about 20% of the 1979-80 level.

2.13 In summary, Central Government has had limited success in constraining the level of local government current expenditure over the six year period but, because of the greater degree of control it has over capital investment, it has substantially reduced the level of capital expenditure. However, taking current and capital expenditure together the planned level of expenditure for 1985-86 is more than 5%, or about £1.5bn in 1985-86 prices, above the plan level for 1980-81 set out in Grnd 7841 in March 1980.

THE USE OF THE GRANT MECHANISM AS A LEVER


3.1 Section 2 focussed on the totality of local government current and capital expenditure in England. This section examines:

- * the way in which the level of central government grant has been used to influence spending levels;
- * the changing level and distribution of the grant related expenditure assessments (GRES) underlying the Block Grant System and of the individual spending targets superimposed on to the grant system;
- * the changing level and distribution of local government spending; and
- * the changing pattern of Block Grant distribution over the period.

Changes in Central Government Grant Levels

3.2 One of the ways in which Government has sought to influence the level of local government spending has been by:-

- * reducing the level of Central Government grant to local authorities; and
- * shifting the distribution of those grants from general grants to specific grants.



- 3.3 Graph 1 shows how the aggregate level of Exchequer support has fallen from 61% of relevant expenditure in 1979-80 to 48.7% of relevant expenditure for 1985-86. The effect in cash terms is significant - for example if grant had remained at the 1979-80 level then the total of Exchequer assistance to local authorities in 1985-86 would be some £3bn higher than that announced in the 1985-86 grant settlement, that is it would be £14.7bn as against £11.7bn.
- 3.4 In addition to the substantial cut in the total amount of grant in real terms there has also been a marked shift away from general grant towards specific grants - ie a shift of Government resources towards services over which they (Government) have a greater degree of influence such as the police service. For example:
- * the needs and resources elements of Rate Support Grant (the forerunner of Block Grant) consumed 76.3% of total Exchequer assistance in 1979-80;
 - * Block Grant is planned to consume 72.1% of total Exchequer assistance in 1985-86.
- 3.5 The percentage reduction may not appear substantial but:
- * if Block Grant had maintained the 1979-80 share of total Exchequer assistance, the Block Grant for 1985-86 would be some £9bn instead of £8.5bn; and
 - * if both the 1979-80 level of Exchequer assistance and the 1979-80 allocation as between general and specific grants had been continued into 1985-86, then the Block Grant for 1985-86 would have been some £11.2bn instead of the planned level of £8.5bn.
- 3.6 The extent of the shift from general grant to specific grants since the introduction of the Block Grant system is shown in Table 5, which sets out the amount available for Block Grant and specific grants at settlement stage over the period 1981-82 to 1985-86 in both cash and constant price terms.

Table 5: Block Grant and Specific, Supplementary and Other Grants at Settlement Stage 1981-82 to 1985-86 in cash and constant prices

YEAR	Block Grant		Specific, Supplementary and other grants	
	Cash	1985-86 O/T Prices	Cash	1985-86 O/T Prices
1981-82	8364	10119	2531	3062
1982-83	8682	9898	2802	3194
1983-84	8730	9479	3052	3314
1984-85	8631	9020	3241	3387
1985-86	8489	8489	3275	3275

3.7 The main points to emerge from Table 5 is the contrast between the treatment of Block Grant and all other grants:-

- * the block grant total is only some 1.5% higher in cash terms in 1985-86 than it was in 1981-82 - a real terms cut of some 16% over the period;
- * specific and supplementary grants have increased by 29% in cash terms over the period, or some 7.5 % in real terms, despite the shift of funding of some activities in 1985-86 from specific grants to Block Grant which leads to the understatement of the growth of these grants.

3.8 So the obvious squeezes have been on the total level of Exchequer assistance and the distribution of that grant between general and specific grants. There has also been a 'hidden' squeeze. As was shown in Section 2, Government's spending plans tend to understate the actual level of local government spending. So, even without the operation of grant penalties for 'overspending', the effective level of grant tends to be lower than that announced by Government. For example, taking 1984-85 budgets as a basis for comparison, the effective level of Exchequer assistance was just 50.0% as against the 51.9% announced at the time of the grant settlement. The final level may well be lower when penalties for 'overspending' have been taken into account.

Changes in the Grant System

3.9 A new grant system - the Block Grant system - was introduced in 1981-82. Government sought to use the new grant system to secure a number of objectives in addition to the distribution of grant as between local authorities. Those objectives included:-

- * reducing the overall level of local government spending; and
- * discouraging further spending by "high-spending" authorities.

3.10 Block Grant is a general grant in aid of local government services and despite the shift from general to specific grants in recent years it is the biggest of the grants available to local authorities in England and is planned to total £8.5bn in 1985-86. In theory it (Block Grant) is intended to equalise in rate poundage terms for differences as between local authorities in both need to spend (based upon Central Government assessments) and available resources (measured in rateable value terms) - although those equalisation objectives were lost when a series of grant penalties for failure to meet individual spending targets were grafted onto the Block Grant system. Five years into the operation of the new grant system it is interesting to see what changes have occurred.

- 3.11 Table 6 provides a starting point by comparing the distribution of local government budgeted rate and grant borne expenditure in England in 1979-80 (the year in which legislation on the new grant system was introduced) with the distribution of Government's expenditure assessments (GRES) for 1981-82 (the first year of the new grant system).

Table 6: Comparison of Distribution of Budgetted Spending 1979-80 with Distribution of GRES 1981-82

Local Authority Groupings	Spending 1979-80		GRE's 1981-82	
	£m	%	£m	%
London	3229.4	21.4	3163.2	18.6
Metropolitan	3894.2	25.8	4275.3	25.2
Non-metropolitan	7960.9	52.8	9542.5	56.2
Total	15084.5	100.0	16981.0	100.0


- 3.12 Given the starting point set out in Table 6 it is probably reasonable to assume that Government was seeking:

- * not only to reduce the totality of local authority spending as discussed in Section 2;
- * but also to change the distribution of expenditure across the country.

More simply - the bulk of the spending cuts were intended to come from London and, to a lesser extent, from the Metropolitan areas: the areas perceived to be "highspenders" by the new Government.

- 3.13 Government took the view, even before the Block Grant system came into operation, that the new system would not deliver the spending cuts it was seeking so it superimposed a system of individual spending targets and grant penalties for failure to achieve those targets on to the Block Grant system.

3.14 Graph 2 shows how the expenditure assessments (GRES) and targets have changed over the period since 1981-82 by local authority groups.



3.15 No targets are shown on the graph for 1981-82 because the targets set for that year were not in form consistent with GRE's - that is in cash at estimated out-turn prices. The main points to emerge from the graph are that:-

- * GREs (Government's assessment of spending need) for non-metropolitan areas have always exceeded their spending targets and, although the gap narrowed in 1983-84 it has widened substantially in the last two years;
- * targets for the metropolitan areas exceed their GREs, but the gap in 1985-86 is about the same as it was in 1982-83;
- * targets for London - the area where Government most wanted to see spending cuts - have always increased at a faster rate than GREs and are consistently above GREs.

3.16 The differences between GREs and targets highlight the real difficulty facing Government. Although Government wants local government spending to fall in total and in particular in London, once it decided to set individual spending targets for local authorities those targets had to be close enough to existing spending patterns to be capable of achievement. But despite:

- * general reductions in the level of Exchequer assistance; and
 - * the introduction of grant penalties for 'overspending' targets;
- spending in London has not fallen in real terms since the introduction of the new grant system, as Table 7 shows.

Table 7: Comparison of budgetted current expenditure 1981-82 and 1984-85

Local Authority Groupings	1981-82		1984-85	Real Term Change
	Nov. 1980 Prices	Nov. 1983 Prices	Nov. 1983 Prices	
London	3429.1	4215.9	4620.7	+9.6
Metropolitan	4225.5	5178.8	5249.6	+1.4
Non-metropolitan	8619.0	10511.8	10686.6	+1.7
Total	16273.6	19906.5	20556.9	+3.2

- 3.17 Indeed in current expenditure terms - that is spending on staff, goods and services - budgetted spending in London has increased by almost 10% in real terms over the period as compared with an overall increase of just over 3% for the Country as a whole, and increases of 1% - 2% in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Not surprisingly shares of total spending have also run counter to Government's objectives as Table 8 shows:

Table 8: Comparison of shares of budgetted total rate and grant borne expenditure 1979-80, 1981-82 and 1984-85

Local Authority Grouping	Shares of total rate and grant borne expenditure		
	1979-80	1981-82	1984-85
London	21.4	21.6	23.4
Metropolitan	25.8	26.2	25.4
Non-metropolitan	52.8	52.2	51.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

- 3.18 It is because of the growth in spending in London that the conflict between GREs and spending targets has become so marked - because as spending in London has increased, targets have also increased to make them realistic; ie capable of attainment. But the total of targets is cash-limited so targets for other areas, and non-metropolitan counties in particular, have been depressed, with the resulting gaps between GRE's and targets as Table 8 shows.

Table 9: Comparison of shares of GRE and shares of Target 1985-86

Local Authority Groupings	GRE 1985-86		Target 1985-86	
	Cash	Share	Cash	Share
	£m	%	£m	%
London	3942.3	18.6	4863.2	22.3
Metropolitan	5372.3	25.3	5512.7	25.3
Non-metropolitan	11906.3	56.1	11439.4	52.4
Total	21220.9	100.0	21815.3	100.0

3.19 It is clear from Table 9 that the total of GREs differs from the total of targets - this is because GRE's reflect what Central Government wants local government to spend and targets reflect what is considered to be possible, but the end result is:-

- * confusion - local authorities view GRE's and targets as contradictory indicators of suggested spending levels;
- * worsening central/local relationships - non-metropolitan authorities in particular feel badly treated because if they spend at their assessed spending level they would incur massive grant penalties;
- * London's share of expenditure targets is now slightly higher (at 22.3% for 1985-85) than was its share of spending in 1979-80 (21.4%) when the debate started; and
- * increasing central control over the actions of individual local authorities.

4.0 Because the combination of a new grant system together with a series of individual spending targets and grant penalties failed to deliver Government's expenditure objectives, Government introduced legislation to enable Parliament to determine the maximum rate which selected high-spending local authorities may levy.

4.1 The Local Government Act 1984 came into operation on 1 April 1985 and eighteen authorities have been selected for rate limitation in 1985-86:

- * The Greater London Council
- * The Inner London Education Authority
- * 7 Inner London Boroughs
- * 2 Outer London Boroughs
- * 2 Metropolitan County Councils
- * 1 Metropolitan District Council
- * 4 Non-Metropolitan District Councils.

Three of the eighteen are faced with abolition on 31 March 1986 if Government's Abolition Bill receives the Royal Assent.

4.2 Rate limitation - or rate capping - is fraught with difficulties:

- * it impinges on the rights that English local authorities have always enjoyed to determine their own local tax rates;
- * Central Government does not have sufficient detailed information to be able to determine spending and rate levels for individual local authorities with any certainty that they will be workable;
- * Central Government is forced to manipulate the grant system in such a way that sufficient grant flows in to rate-capped authorities to enable rates to be held or reduced in most of those areas; and
- * some of the rate limits set for 1985-86 - particularly where they allow for substantial increases over the rates set for 1984-85 look implausible.

- 4.3 To pursue just two of the difficulties, Table 10 sets out how the grant distribution is likely to change between 1984-85 and 1985-86 and Table 11 sets out the rate limits for 1985-86 for the rate-capped authorities and the implied changes from 1984-85 rate levels.

Table 10: Comparison of budget and grant for 1984-85 with target/ expenditure limits and grant for 1985-86

Local Authority Groupings	1984-85			1985-86		
	Budget	Grant		Grant		Target/Limit
	£m	£m	%	£m	%	£m
London*	4997.4	1120.3	13.7	1269.7	15.0	4873.2
Metropolitan	5356.6	2562.0	31.3	2730.7	32.2	5519.9
Non-Metropolitan	11055.9	4496.7	54.9	4476.6	52.8	11440.2
Total	21409.9	8179.0		8477.0	100.0	21833.4

- 4.4 It can be seen from Table 10 that London's share of Block Grant is likely to increase because of higher targets and rate capping - in cash terms the increased grant share is worth more than £100m. Not surprisingly, non-metropolitan areas - where spending has increased far less in real terms since 1981-82 - see this as a reward for high-spending, perceive this as the direct opposite of what they and expected from Government policy, and take the view that a Conservative Government is rewarding what are mainly Labour controlled local authorities at the expense of the largely Conservative controlled shire counties.

- 4.5 So far as the effects on ratepayers of rate capping are concerned Table 11 sets out the rate limits set by Parliament for the rate capped authorities for 1985-86.

Note* London's target/expenditure limits for 1985/86 are some £200m lower than they would have been because of the transfer of responsibility for London Transport to the Department of Transport with effect from 1 April 1985.


Note* London's target/expenditure limits for 1985/86 are some £200m lower than they would have been because of the transfer of responsibility for London Transport to the Department of Transport with effect from 1 April 1985.

Table 11: Rate Limits 1985/86

Authority	Local rate 1984/85	Rate Limit 1985/86	Rate Increase implied by Rate Limit
	p	p	£
Basildon	42.80	50.33	17.59
Brent	193.42	196.42	1.55
Camden	91.94	92.02	.09
GLC	36.55	36.52	-.08
Greenwich	118.91	96.42	-18.91
Hackney	119.30	147.18	+23.36
Haringey	229.16	268.50	+17.16
ILEA	80.00	77.25	-3.43
Islington	122.74	112.07	-8.69
Lambeth	122.34	107.57	-12.07
Leicester	37.50	25.22	-32.75
Lewisham	115.74	99.66	-13.89
Merseyside	65.00	80.86	27.48
Portsmouth	27.20	26.22	-1.18
Sheffield	208.24	207.07	-.56
Southwark	149.74	112.69	-24.74
South Yorkshire	93.30	81.33	-2.08
Thamesdown	54.19	57.22	5.59

Again there are problems because the rate limits imply increases of 27% for Merseyside 23% for Hackney and 17% for Haringey - it is difficult to present increases of this magnitude as successes for rate capping.

- 4.6 In summary, Central Government's policy in relation to local government finance over the past six years has had very limited success, led to a worsening of central/local relationships and produced a more complex and volatile system of local government finance than the one which was in place in 1979. It remains to be seen whether the ministerial review of the system of local government finance which is now underway will result in a workable system for the 1990's.



Rotterdam

Some remarkable recent developments in the relationship between big cities and central and provincial government in the Netherlands

Ladies and gentlemen,

Introduction

Before I start I would like to point out that when I speak of big cities this should of course be understood in the Dutch context. Judged by European and world standards our 'big cities', such as Rotterdam and Amsterdam, are somewhat on the small side. Rotterdam proper, for example, has 570,000 inhabitants, and Amsterdam proper 670,000. The Greater Rotterdam agglomeration has 1.1 million inhabitants.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you have already learned from the workshop description given by director Finn Bruun, the problems of big cities are manifold, and can be approached from several different angles. There is the internal organization of the political executive; the problem of increasing bureaucratization; growing specialization and departmentalization, with their complex attendant problems of synchronization and integration; the nature and size of the problems of the big cities themselves, and the bottlenecks which occur in the various policy areas.

I could also mention the involvement of private citizens in the decision-making process, new administrative and organizational structures such as suburbs, borough councils, and so on and so on.

Although there have been interesting developments in these areas in the Netherlands, and in Rotterdam in particular (I trust you will forgive me for taking my own city as an example), I would today like to concentrate on two other aspects. They are:

1. The relationship between the big city and other authorities, with particular reference to the tasks and responsibilities of each; and
2. Regional problems.

With regard to the latter aspect, I would like to consider the administrative and organizational construction which has recently been put forward as a way of solving the problems related to the regions, as well as touching on the underlying motives and considerations which led to the proposal.

Before going into these two topics I will first give a brief outline of the basic structure of the Dutch state in order to give you a better understanding of the subjects in hand.

The general structure of the Dutch state

From the constitutional point of view the Netherlands can be described as a decentralized unitary state.

That union is expressed in a single constitution covering the institution of governmental organs and their powers.

In other words, the Netherlands is not a federal state. In principle the higher authorities can arrogate the powers of lower authorities.

There are two forms of decentralization in the Netherlands - territorial and functional.

In this context decentralization is the delegation or granting of supervisory or administrative powers to lower authorities.

The emphasis in the Netherlands is on territorial decentralization. Here we can distinguish three operational levels, namely the state, the province and the municipality.

The territory of the Netherlands is divided into 11 provinces, and within those provinces there are currently 741 municipalities. It is intended to reduce that number by amalgamation, with the lower limit set at 10,000 inhabitants.

In addition to these three levels, one occasionally finds a fourth territorial unit lying between a municipality and a province. Experience with this fourth level has been rather disappointing. There are major problems in the field of administrative relations, one being rivalry with the central municipality.

In addition to this territorial devolution there is functional decentralization.

Municipalities, and provinces as well, have the option of working together on specific tasks. This is known as intermunicipal cooperation, and might involve a joint fire brigade, or a joint representation of interests for a recreational area extending over the territory of several municipalities. This form of cooperation is carried out by a specially created intermunicipal public body.

Another example of functional decentralization, and one which is typical of the Netherlands, is the water authority, which is responsible for the dikes, canals, bridges and roads in its own administrative area.

Functional decentralization is a very important issue in the Netherlands at the moment. This is because the Dutch government advocates a policy of solving regional problems by means of functional decentralization. I shall be returning to this point later.

I hope this gives you a picture, however sketchy, of the Dutch administrative system. I would now like to discuss the inter-relationships between the state, the provinces and the big cities, and the attempts which are being made to improve those relations. The following is the view as seen through the eyes of the big city.

Relationship between state, province and municipality

As regards the allocation of powers and responsibilities between the state, the province and the municipalities, the general rule is that the municipalities, in principle, have all those powers and responsibilities which are not exercised by the superior territorial bodies. However, as I will be explaining later, this does not amount to very much. Another general but characteristic element of the Dutch administrative system is that, as a result of the Municipal Act of 1851 (which is due for revision fairly soon), no distinction is made between small and large municipalities.

In principle a municipality with a population of only 3,000 has the same powers as a city of over 500,000 inhabitants. This uniformity of powers and responsibilities also applies to the provincial authorities.

I will later be discussing the undesirability of this principle of uniformity, particularly as it affects the administration of larger cities.

The relationship between the municipality and the province is not nearly as important as that between the municipality and the state. The role of the provincial authority vis à vis the municipality is by and large restricted to supervision, particularly in the areas of finance (municipal budgets have to be approved by the province), physical planning and the environment. The relationship between the state and the municipality is a very different matter, and the key word here is centralism. Municipalities and the big cities are largely dependent on central government in the policy sphere, particularly as regards funding. 'Tied' policy areas include public transport, the police, education, urban renewal, economic development and employment, health care, welfare, art and culture, the environment, traffic, etc. etc.

I should add, though, that this does not mean that municipal executives are merely agents carrying out the policy laid down by central government without any freedom of action at all. The situation is not as clear-cut as that.

However, that does not alter the fact that the policy content in the major policy areas is determined by the state. Moreover, central government generally keeps a very tight rein on the way municipalities carry out that policy, and you can imagine the kind of bureaucratic complexity that creates.

Dependence on the state is most marked in the field of finance. Less than 10% of a municipality's income comes from its own internal sources (chiefly local

taxes, led by property tax). They receive 35% of their income from the so-called municipalities fund (an objective-related system of payments). In principle municipalities are reasonably free to spend this money as they wish. At least 55% of municipal income comes from the various government departments in the form of specific payments whose allocation is tightly controlled. In 1982 there were no fewer than 540 of these payments.

These sums have to be used for a specific purpose, even if the municipality believes that there are other areas which are in far greater need.

In the past few years the big cities in the Netherlands have been bringing increasing pressure to bear on the over-centralization of the central government. Their main complaints are that it weakens local government, and does not permit enough freedom of policy-making and resource allocation to enable the big cities to tackle their sp
unnecessarily weighty bureaucracy, an inefficient use of resources, friction between civil servants, corrosion of local democracy, etc.

All this is taking place against a background of economic recession and budgetary stringency, and at a time when social problems in the big cities are growing. Examples include the population decline (as a result of suburbanization), problems relating to minority groups, an unbalanced population structure, street violence, ageing of the population, vandalism, prostitution and drugs.

A few years ago central government bowed to the pressure of the big cities, and 'big city policy' is now official government policy, and is on the government's political agenda three times a year. Parliament, too, is devoting attention to this area. Official project structures have been created involving a joint effort by the state and the big cities to keep the process moving, and there are twice-yearly consultations between the big cities and the government.

One of the planks in the government's policy is to bring about a drastic reduction in the number of specific payments in order to give the municipalities greater freedom in the allocation of their resources. Steps are also being taken to decentralize tasks and powers, streamline procedures, reorganize supervisory structures, and eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy.

In fact, throughout the Netherlands there has been a rediscovery of the belief that if the big cities are to carry out their traditional role as powerhouses of the national economy and seedbeds for new developments, they once again have to become centres where people can live, work and relax. On top of that, they have to be given the tools to enable them to carry out policies which they believe to be relevant to local conditions.

This process of reducing state centralism is known as the 'schuyt' process after the old Dutch barge which was rowed against the current. It is certainly a laborious process, and the specialist government departments are very grudging with their assistance. They provide the current we are rowing against. The big cities have made repeated attempts to inject new life into the process by altering the basic strategy.

They recently adopted an approach whereby the accent is less on decentralization and more on the inter-relationship between the problems in the big cities themselves. The underlying principle is a selective, spearhead attack on specific problems, such as the economy, unemployment, finance, public safety, welfare, health care and urban renewal. Experience with processes of this kind has taught us that selectivity ultimately yields the best results.

Specifically, advances have been made in the areas of urban renewal (a large degree of freedom in allocating central government funds) and welfare.

It is also intended to bring about legislative changes in the principle of uniformity I mentioned earlier. This would be a breakthrough in the Dutch constitutional system.

There will be legal recognition of the fact that there are differences between small and large municipalities and that, as a result, tasks and powers may also differ. When new legislation is framed there will be an obligation to consider which would be the best administrative level to carry out a specific task.

This introduction of the principle of differentiation will also apply to the provinces. A clause will be incorporated in the Provincial Act enabling the province to delegate provincial responsibilities and powers to the big cities.

Another interesting development of the past few months concerns the distribution of powers between the big cities and the provincial authorities. The provinces with the four largest Dutch cities have agreed to examine each policy area and see whether they too could enhance the administrative powers of the cities, simplify regulations and reduce bureaucracy.

Official working groups have been formed to consider the areas of physical planning, housing, economic affairs, environment, welfare and public health, and to see how provincial interference in the affairs of the big cities could be reduced.

On the strategic level there are two points which deserve mention. Since it is feared that, as in the case of central government, provincial departments will not be over-enthusiastic over this delegation of powers, the big cities insisted that the process be launched with an administrative agreement between the cities and the provinces containing a statement in principle of those areas which lend themselves to decentralization.

The provincial departments will be bound by this agreement.

A second important strategic point is the principle of the so-called reverse burden of proof. Under this system the onus is on the provincial authorities to demonstrate why a particular matter should not be decentralized, and not on the big cities to prove that it should.

To date there are few tangible results to report; in fact the detailed process has yet to start. However, it can be said that the operation has run into considerable opposition from smaller municipalities in the neighbourhood of the big cities, which fear that they will be overshadowed.

Leaving this area on a problematical note, I will now turn to the question of the regions.

The regional question

For the past twenty years there has been a heated political discussion on the administrative organization of the Netherlands. The basic premise is that there is supposedly a kind of regional 'black hole' consisting of a group of tasks floating in a limbo between the municipal and provincial authorities about which neither is concerned. This is associated with several major social developments which took place after the Second World War. The first was the fairly sharp population rise, secondly there was increased mobility, and thirdly a fairly turbulent period of economic growth. Between them these factors placed a heavy burden on the cities, which began to burst at the seams. The result was that large numbers of people left the cities for the suburbs.

There was also an exodus of industrial plants and transport activities, and the urban population began to discover the attractions of the surrounding region for recreation and other pursuits.

The key words here are scale enlargement, the big city's urge to expand, and the greater interdependence of the city and the regional municipalities.

There was a growing realization in the 1960s that there was not enough administrative control over this kind of development. There was no regional authority to moderate urban expansionism and channel the development in the proper direction. The provinces were unable to do anything about it. I might add that the Dutch have always been very anxious to prevent the provinces from becoming too powerful and to avoid a recurrence of the situation in the 17th-century republic, with its seven autonomous provinces. This also explains the 'hour-glass' structure of our constitution.

Successive governments have come up with different models, ranging from strengthening the provinces to increasing their number, and from splitting up the big cities into sub-municipalities to expanding the so-called regional authorities.

Quite apart from the interests of local democracy, I believe that none of these variants does sufficient justice to the specific nature of the big city. They certainly do not provide the freedom of policy which would encourage effective government. It is an extremely complex problem, and it is my experience that discussions on the subject very soon degenerate into an exercise in abstract thinking.

It is an area rife with theoretical concepts, with little attempt being made to relate them to the real problems. In my view it is of paramount importance that problems such as these be removed from the realm of abstract discussion. The actual administrative problems should be the central issue, and they should be thoroughly analyzed first. Experience has taught me that if that is not done the problems are rarely solved, and merely become a political football.

Another of the dangers of abstraction is that people rapidly opt for a uniform model, whereas the reality of the situation usually demands differentiation. I have learned that the disadvantages of differentiation, well known to us from the literature, such as:

- the structure of the executive becomes amorphous;
 - private citizens are no longer able to understand the administrative structure;
 - problems crop up in financial relationships;
- soon tend to dominate all other considerations if the discussion becomes abstract.

Speaking from the point of view of the big city, I believe that the discussion of the regional question in the Netherlands has for too long taken place on an abstract plane, with uniformity the watchword.

Less than two years ago one could detect a certain change of attitude, prompted, I believe, by purely financial considerations. The government has now dropped the idea of creating new regional provinces armed with far-reaching powers.

It has been decided that the present administrative set-up will remain unchanged. The government's objection to change, quite apart from the high cost of reorganization, is that the creation of regional provinces would undermine the position of the municipalities. This is considered to be contrary to the principle that as many powers as possible should be vested in bodies in close contact with the general public.

The Dutch government feels that the main thrust for solving regional problems should come from the municipalities, where necessary in the form of intermunicipal cooperation. Through functional decentralization, in other words. The government is only prepared to grant the provincial authorities a supervisory role in dealing with the regional question.

The government lists the possibility of differentiation as a major advantage of allowing the municipalities to solve regional problems. So here too differentiation is the key word. The advantage lies in the fact that, depending on the nature of the problem, there will be an opportunity for municipalities to establish close or loose forms of cooperation.

The municipalities, and in particular the big cities, have given this development a very warm welcome.

The main reason why earlier reorganization plans have been abandoned is, I believe, the decline of the regional issue itself. The region is a concept with no clear-cut content. Scale enlargement has not led to the creation of an obvious cohesion, a recognizable entity, or a community context such as the municipality is (or perhaps, was).

Moreover, the developments which were responsible for the creation of the regional question, or the regional 'black hole', no longer have the weight they once had.


Population growth has slowed, increased mobility has stabilized, and vigorous economic growth is now but a fond memory. Dutch urbanization policy is no longer characterized by the unbridled expansion of the cities. Quite the reverse, the accent is now on expansion within the city, i.e. no new suburbs. Nor is there any question of expansion in Rotterdam's port and industrial region. Restructuring and growth are taking place chiefly on existing sites.

It is particularly significant that the provinces have been stirred to greater activity in the past few decades. They have been given a mass of new tasks (environmental protection, to name just one), and have thus become responsible for the administrative supervision of regional processes.

There is no room left for a new governmental layer between the municipality and the province. Our country is simply too small for it.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this workshop, and would like to thank you for your interest and attention.

Nico van Eck
13 March 1985
Rotterdam



THE ROLE OF THE CORPORACION METROPOLITANA DE BARCELONA

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INTRODUCTION

Barcelona's metropolitan area is governed by an institution which was set up in 1974 as a joint municipality, unique in Spain. The metropolitan institution is constituted by 27 municipalities with a total population of over three million, out of which one and three quarter million live in the municipality of Barcelona. It covers an area of 500 km within the province of Barcelona (15 times as large) and the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (64 times as large).

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The provisions granting autonomy to regions, provinces and communes constitute one of the most important innovations introduced by the Spanish Constitution which was promulgated in December 1978. These provisions include, on the one hand, devolution of political powers and administrative functions to newly created regional bodies called "Autonomous Communities" —Comunidades Autónomas—. On the other hand, the transfer of administrative functions to the traditional levels of local government: provinces and municipalities.

The regional and local government bodies are constitutionally defined as the institutional expression of the existence of different "communities" within the country. These communities are recognised to have distinctive interests, differing in a number of ways from the interests of the national community. Accordingly, schedule 137 of the Constitution states that regional and local bodies "are granted autonomous powers in order to provide for the specific interests of their communities".

The institution governing the metropolitan area was set up in 1974 as a joint municipality. Having the legal condition of a local authority, the CMB is recognised to have, in the new constitutional context, autonomous powers in order to express and provide for the interests of the "metropolitan community of Barcelona".

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The CMB is also an specific local authority because of its features and because of the functions assigned to it. Spanish local government abides by the continental model. According to this model, local authorities are empowered by a general competence clause "to do anything which in their opinion is in the interests of their communities".

The Statutory Instruments regulating the CMB include such a clause, but a number of factors concurring in the framing of the CMB modulate the actual impact of the general competence clause. These factors are mainly: a) the preservation of the municipalities constituting the CMB, which are legally defined as "the primary units of local government"; b) the indirectly representative character of the CMB; and c) The establishment of the CMB as, first and foremost, a body for metropolitan-wide use land planning.

The influence of the above mentioned factors can be traced in the statutes regulating the functions allocated to the CMB. Thus, the planning functions are defined as compulsory for the CMB, while functions concerning metropolitan services are defined as optional for the metropolitan institution. However, the CMB has gradually expanded its field of action. The functions initially designed as fundamental have fallen back into a second plan, while planning, co-ordination and even direct delivery of metropolitan services has become more relevant as far as the overall activity of the CMB is concerned. And furthermore, the CMB has started to take responsibility for and to participate in areas —exercising the powers granted by the general competence clause— which are not spelt out or itemised by the law, such as acquisition and development of industrial building sites, caravan sites, Barcelona's port, etc.

The development in the sense of assuming more and more of the functions and services which, in the terminology of the law are called "services having a metropolitan interest", is due to a number of reasons. Among them the following should be mentioned:

- the impact of the economic crisis in the building sector, one of the most relevant sectors in Barcelona's metropolitan area during the sixties and early seventies, which has brought with it a sharp decrease in the planning activities;
- the lack of resources of many of the municipalities which constitute the CMB in order to provide for services directly and specifically attributed to them by local government legislation, such as housing, sewage, cemeteries and crematoria, slaughterhouses and markets, environmental health, etc.;
- the dramatic increase in the need for services which benefit from unitary planning and delivery or which greatly demand co-ordination, such as public transport and highways, water, gas and electricity supply, fire prevention, coast protection, waste disposal, tourism, etc.
- the growing feeling that there exists a "metropolitan interest" which is different from the sum of the individual interests of the communities constituting the CMB. And this even though most of the municipalities belonging to the CMB have both, a strong sense of identity and a deep resentment at the pre-eminence given to Barcelona and at the influence accorded to the province.

The Statutory Instruments regulating the CMB itemise its powers and functions as follows:

— Planning Functions

1. Drawing up, reviewing and modifying metropolitan planning
2. Approval of metropolitan development plans
3. Requesting Central Departments to draft their schemes of action in the CMB's area
4. Reporting of the Provincial Plan

5. Final reports on plans, projects and ordinances drawn up by the municipalities for the implementation of the Metropolitan Plan
6. Setting complementary and subsidiary regulations for planning and drafting of organisation programmes and specific planning projects when municipalities belonging to the CMB fail to fulfil their duties and when they request the CMB to intervene.

In the enforcement of planning provisions, the CMB is empowered to:

- a. Exercise the authority to expropriate land
- b. Constitute a patrimony of metropolitan land
- c. Supervise and oversee approval and implementation of planning provisions
- d. Subrogate in the resolution of planning applications when municipal Councils fail to fulfil or perform their duties within the period set by the law

— Metropolitan Services

The CMB is responsible for the drafting and approval of a Co-ordinate Plan for the Establishment and Provision of Services covering all or part of the metropolitan area and having the condition of "services of metropolitan interest".

1. Public Transport and goods transport
2. Water, gas and electricity supply
3. Sewage and refuse disposal and treatment
4. Housing
5. Cemeteries and Crematoria
6. Fire prevention
7. Slaughterhouses and markets
8. Any other services which can be considered by the CMB as having a metropolitan character and, therefore, as being of "metropolitan interest"

In the enforcement of the Co-ordinate Plan for the Establishment and Provision of Metropolitan Services, the CMB is empowered:

- a. To assume the organisation and direct provision of metropolitan services
- b. To promote the establishment of joint boards among and between municipalities
- c. To set up management bodies, together with the municipalities belonging to the CMB, for the development of certain activities and the delivery of certain services
- d. To establish consortia with the central administration, with the local authorities belonging to the CMB and/or with other public bodies, for the delivery and/or the development of metropolitan services and functions

Other Environmental Services

Water, gas & electricity Supply (CMB)
 Land Drainage (CMB)
 Refuse Collection & Disposal (CMB)
 Litter (CMB)
 Coast Protection (CMB)
 Clean Air (CMB)
 Building Regulations (CMB)
 Street Cleansing (CMB)
 Nuisances (CMB)
 Cemeteries & Crematoria (CMB)
 Markets & Slaughterhouses (CMB)
 Offensive Trades (CMB)
 Health Education

Social ServicesPolice & Fire

Urban & Rural Police
 Fire Prevention (CMB)

Health Services

Hospitals
 Adoption Societies

Recreation & Tourism

Swimming Baths
 Parks & Open Spaces (CMB)
 Publicity for Tourism (CMB)
 Physical Training & Recreation

Licensing & Registration Functions

Births, Deaths & Marriages
 Electoral Census

Other Services

Entertainment
 Aerodromes & Ports (CMB)
 Natural Emergencies (CMB)
 Charities & Savings Banks

Other Environmental Services

In all these services, provinces are meant to provide technical & financial aid to communes and to assume direct performance or delivery when the services are not discharged or are improperly discharged by communes.

Social Services

(technical & financial aid to communes)

Police & Fire

Rural Police
 " (Technical & financial aid to communes)

Health Services

Hospitals
 Adoption Societies

Recreation & Tourism

"
 "
 "
 "

Licensing & Registration Functions

" (technical & financial aid to communes)
 " (" " " " " "

Other Services

"
 "
 "

Charities & Provincial Savings Banks

RELATIONAL MECHANISMS

— Current Legislation

Relational mechanisms are quite ill-defined by current legislation. The provisions now in force point out that the CMB is empowered to promote collaboration among municipalities by encouraging or stimulating the establishment of Joint Committees —Mancomunidades de Municipios—; to create, together with municipalities, Joint Boards to administer specific services over a defined local area; and to constitute consortia for the same purposes, either with one or more of the municipalities belonging to the CMB or with any other public body, be it the provincial tier or a central department.

These provisions give the initiative to the CMB and, in different ways, ensure that the metropolitan institution has a basic role in fostering collaboration among tiers of government in the metropolitan area. Nonetheless, the relational mechanisms suggested by the legislation are all based on consensus or agreement between the authorities involved. No formal powers of planning, co-ordination and final decision on conflictive issues are granted to the CMB regarding the organisation, planning and actual delivery of metropolitan services. Therefore, there are no means of ensuring that in cases of discrepancy about the policies to be followed in relation to a function or service, some kind of compromise among the tiers involved shall be arrived at.

When the conflict is open and overt, the procedure is clear: a judicial action against the authority or authorities —"locus standi" for litigation being recognised for all tiers of government— refusing to act or to arrive at an agreement, based on infringement of legal provisions on the allocation of functions. But as local government legislation includes general competence clauses which apply to all local authorities, it always proves difficult to demonstrate —except in relation to planning functions— that a legal provision has been transgressed or breached.

— Future Legislation

The Local Government Bill now being discussed in the Upper Chamber specifies a new relational mechanism: the so-called inter-administrative contracts. This is again a contractual figure, based on previous understanding among the authorities involved. It does not solve then, the question of how to operate when no consensus is arrived at about the course of action to be taken in relation to a function or service of "metropolitan interest".

— Some Conclusions on Relational Mechanisms

The fact that no powers of decision are granted to the CMB may have a positive effect in two aspects. First, it may stimulate authorities to search for ways of arriving at some kind of compromise, on the certainty that otherwise no common course of action will be taken and that municipal and metropolitan services, or municipal, provincial and metropolitan services and functions will suffer from lack of co-ordination or will not even be performed or delivered, and that financial resources shall be wasted. Second, it may assuage the resentment felt by municipalities concerning the pre-eminence given to the municipality of Barcelona as well as the influence accorded to the province, thus promoting collaboration and compensating for the inequalities derived from membership and internal organisation regulations of the CMB.

On the other hand, however, negative outcomes also result from the lack of decision-making powers in cases of conflicting views and interests. These could be synthesized in inactivity, unco-ordinate action, inefficiency and waste of resources as well as the impossibility for the CMB, to fulfil its role as an authority which looks after the needs and interests of the metropolitan community of Barcelona.

CO-ORDINATIVE DEVICES

It has already been mentioned that in Barcelona's metropolitan area the system of government is constituted by five different tiers, all of which have some kind of local government powers and functions. The Local Government Bill greatly stresses the need for constant collaboration, co-ordination and communication between the tiers of government. It then goes into setting the authorities which will be mainly responsible for ensuring co-ordination, collaboration and communication between the levels of government.

— Authorities Responsible at a Local Level

Schedules 30 and 35 of the Bill set up Provincial Councils as the authorities responsible for co-ordinating municipal authorities with regional and central authorities and for the actual co-ordination of municipal functions and services. Their intervention is meant to guarantee the efficient and adequate planning, performance and delivery of municipal functions and services and to enable municipal action to follow the general guidelines set out by the regional and central authorities.

In fulfilling this role, Provincial Councils are entitled:

1. To draw up a Plan of co-operation towards municipal functions and services. A Plan sorting out aims and priorities and providing for the distribution of the grants accorded to such functions by the provincial, regional and central tiers of government.
2. To make sure that minimum standards are arrived at in the performance and in the delivery of municipal functions and services. Towards that end, Provincial Councils are empowered to establish any collaborative formulae with Municipal Councils they think fit.

— Authorities Responsible at Regional and Central Level

Schedule 55 of the Local Government Bill declares that powers will be granted to regional and central departments in order to provide for the co-ordination of the activities developed by municipal and provincial authorities.

Co-ordination to that end will entail their setting up, by means of sectorial plans, the aims and priorities in relation with a subject matter, function or service. All local authorities will have to abide by such plans, and indeed Provincial Plans for co-operation towards municipal functions and services will also have to submit to the aims and priorities formulated by them. The Bill goes on to state that future national and regional legislation will regulate the precise extent and conditions of exercise of the co-ordinative powers granted to central and regional departments. And, at the same time, it indicates that powers of control will rest with the national and regional Parliaments in order to ensure that, by exercising these powers, central and regional departments do not unduly encroach on the duties of provinces and communes and that they do not impinge on the right of local authorities to manage and conduct autonomously local affairs.

— Some Conclusions on Co-ordinative Devices

1. The provisions of the Local Government Bill do not mention what shall be the position of metropolitan institutions in relation to the authorities set up as co-ordinative authorities.

In the past, the CMB has abided by the plans for co-operation in municipal works and services —Plan Provincial de Obras y Servicios— drawn up by Barcelona's Provincial Council —Diputación de Barcelona—. Membership of the CMB has nonetheless ensured that, in drafting such plans, notice is taken by the Provincial Council of metropolitan needs and interests and that substantial financial aid is granted to metropolitan programmes and schemes.

It should be considered, however, that Barcelona's metropolitan area has specific needs and that the CMB is empowered by legislation to draw up a Plan for Metropolitan functions and services. In order to ensure and guarantee efficiency and co-ordination of administrative action in areas surrounding the CMB, heavily dependent upon functions and services performed and delivered by the CMB, institutional participation should be granted to the CMB in the drafting of Barcelona's Provincial Plan.

Such a measure would guarantee that the aims and priorities set up by the Provincial and by the Metropolitan Plans do not differ in substantial aspects. Such a measure would moreover contribute to provide for participation, even if somewhat indirectly, of metropolitan communes in the drafting of the Provincial Plan, thus promoting a deeper municipal involvement in observance of its guidelines.

As regards National and Regional Sectorial Plans, no provision whatsoever is made for metropolitan participation. It should be considered that the CMB is allowed, by current legislation, to ask central departments to draw up programmes or schemes of action concerning public works and services which may have an impact on metropolitan planning. When disparity arises between a central department and the CMB the final decision is left with the Cabinet. Moreover, no major work or service undertaken by a central department, liable to affect metropolitan planning, can be launched without a previous favourable report of the CMB or, in case of disagreement or conflict, without a favourable report by the Cabinet.

The National and Regional Sectorial Plans set forth by the Local Government Bill may have a repercussion upon or significance for metropolitan functions and services even greater than the programmes and schemes established by current legislation. It therefore seems quite clear that future legislation should prescribe direct participation of the CMB in the drafting of such Plans. Thus

ensuring that, at least, the CMB will be able to put forward the interests of the metropolitan community and the aims and priorities which would best fit governmental needs in the metropolitan area.

2. The fact that the CMB has to abide by the Plans written out by three tiers of government has a double impact on the CMB. First, it curtails the CMB's autonomy in conducting and managing metropolitan affairs. Second, it does not fully guarantee efficiency and co-ordination of administrative action in the metropolitan area.

The National and Regional Sectorial Plans are not only meant to set out priorities regarding public functions and services. They are also meant to distribute the financial resources assigned to them by the central and regional governments. The CMB has no direct precepting powers and is heavily dependent —the financial resources coming from metropolitan communes amounting to a very small percentage of the total resources of the CMB— on National, Regional and Provincial grants.

National and Regional Sectorial Plans —as well as Provincial Plans which do not differ substantially from the ones regulated by the legislation currently in force— are justified by the Bill by the need for co-ordination of administrative action and are reputed not to encroach on the right of municipal and metropolitan authorities to conduct autonomously their own affairs. However, these devices make it extremely difficult for these authorities, and for the reasons which have just been mentioned, to set out their own policies when these policies do not exactly coincide with those of the National, Regional and Provincial tiers of government.

The co-ordinative devices set forth by the Local Government Bill do not fully guarantee efficient and co-ordinate administrative action in the metropolitan area. Unless the different Plans foreseen by the Bill are effectively designed as a series of legal provisions hierarchically linked, there is no means of

ensuring that these Plans will adjust to common criteria and guidelines. The wording of the Bill is implicitly based on the assumption that a hierarchical line will run from National down to Provincial Plans.

However, as has already been mentioned, the Spanish Constitution recognises the right of regional and local authorities to exercise autonomously the powers granted to them by legislation, so that hierarchical relationships among territorial governmental institutions are formally excluded by current legislation. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional national and regional statutes encroaching on regional and local rights to autonomy.

Nevertheless, the national government insists on drafting Bills which, on grounds of efficiency and co-ordination, fail to recognise that a system of autonomous pluralism based on territorial representative bodies was set up by the Constitution. Three factors might be referred to as contributing to that attitude towards regional and local autonomy. First, the imprecision of the constitutional provisions stating regional and local government powers and functions. Second, the reluctance of the national government to lose control of relevant executive functions. Third, the acute difficulties deriving from wholesale reform of the administrative structures.

It must also be mentioned that some regional governments, and more specifically the Catalan government, have adhered to the central government's attitude towards authorities belonging to inferior levels of government. It is thus highly predictable that the three categories of Plans affecting the CMB will all tend to curtail the CMB's decision-making powers regarding metropolitan affairs.

It seems then, that the co-ordinative devices set forth by the Local Government Bill may restrain the CMB's ability to act as an autonomous governmental institution looking after the needs of the metropolitan community without solving the

problems arising from the existence of five tiers of government in Barcelona's metropolitan area with overlapping powers and functions. Unless a serious effort is made to clearly define the competences of different authorities there seems to be no way, in today's constitutional context, of respecting the right of regional and local institutions to provide for the distinctive interests of their communities and at the same time, allow for co-ordination and efficiency of administrative action. Otherwise, conflict will continue to arise as it has done up to the present date, with appeals against statutes regulating regional and local government being systematically lodged with the Constitutional Court.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CMB'S ROLE AND ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BARCELONA

1.- The CMB, like most metropolitan institutions which do not result in or imply administrative annexation of the constituent municipalities, has a variety of functions and has assumed over the years a variety of roles, depending on the needs of the moment and on its possibilities to act.

2.- As a result of the ability of the CMB to adapt to different needs and situations, its relations with the municipalities within it are fairly varied and flexible. Overlapping of powers and functions is quite wide, but open conflict as a result of it does not seem to be the general rule. A great deal of collaboration takes place in relation to certain functions and services. In other fields, the CMB has assumed direct responsibility for functions and services which, according to the legislation, could and should be undertaken and delivered by communes. Where municipalities have been able to discharge their duties, the CMB has tended to refrain from intervening. Finally, in some sectors, the CMB has taken initiatives which are not favourably viewed by communes or are even resented by them, considering metropolitan intervention unnecessarily or unduly restricts their possibilities of exclusive influence and action.

3.- Inter-governmental relational mechanisms are quite precisely defined as far as the resolution of open conflict is concerned, resolution lying directly with the Courts of justice. As far as relations for everyday conduct of affairs are concerned, the line being followed is on collaboration and co-ordination. But no precise definition of how these should be achieved has been established by legislation. The Local Government Bill greatly stresses the need for collaboration, co-ordination and communication between tiers of government but does not really set out new relational mechanisms capable of settling conflict and disagreement when no consensual course of action is defined by the CMB and its constituent municipalities.

4.- The role of the provincial tier in the metropolitan institution is not clearly defined in the legislation regulating the organisation, powers and functions of the CMB. In the light of the future legislation on local government it seems that a more specific role is attributed to the Diputación. The provincial level would assume direct responsibility for acting as a unit for co-ordination, collaboration and communication, both between the CMB and its surrounding municipalities —closely related with the CMB and highly dependent on certain metropolitan services— and between the CMB and the central and regional administrative apparatuses which are responsible for a number of areas related with local government. The fact that no specific mention is made by the Bill of the metropolitan authorities should not be understood, in my opinion, as meaning that Barcelona's provincial authority will be responsible, as outside the metropolitan area, for the efficient and adequate planning, performance and delivery of municipal functions and services by the municipalities belonging to the CMB.

5.- The relationship between the Generalitat and the CMB is still very vague and unsettled. From reasons deriving from the balance of power between the regional, provincial and metropolitan tiers since the re-establishment of democracy —the

regional government being controlled by the nationalist Catalan party and the provincial and metropolitan governments being controlled by the socialist party—the regional and metropolitan tiers have been going their own ways without either much interference and conflict or collaboration and co-ordination. After the passing of the Local Government Bill a much closer relationship should develop because the Generalitat has assumed, within the basic legislative framework set out by the national Parliament, legislative and executive powers regarding local government. If the balance of power does not substantially change in the near future, implementation of regional legislation regulating the CMB's organisation, powers and functions might prove to be quite divisive. Up to the present no regional statutes having an immediate impact on the CMB have been passed yet, but some of the policy decisions which in the past have affected the CMB do seem to indicate that the regional government's attitude towards metropolitan government will not tend to expand and foster metropolitan autonomy.

Local Government Reforms and Metropolitan Government in Europe

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1. Introduction

European society as well as local government has had a considerable evolution in the postwar period. Some reasons of these developments are common: relatively high increase of real income, demand for more and better public services or increased sensitivity against different standards of public services. It is, therefore, not astonishing that local government reforms in western Europe had - at least to a certain degree - similar problems and tendencies.

These explanations base particularly on the work of the Steering Committee for Regional and Municipal Matters and the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Both are institutions of the Council of Europe that are occupied with local government. The Conference of local and regional Authorities is composed with local elected people, the Steering Committee with senior officials of usually national level.

The studies and activities of these organs demonstrate the usefulness of cooperation in these matters. It is uncontested that national history and political tradition dominate regional and municipal matters. But the studies shows however, that there are much more common problems and perhaps even solutions than people believes. However, serious studies in the field of local government demand considerable efforts and comprehensive knowledge on the situation of other countries. I am therefore happy that the European Consortium of Political Research occupies with this difficult matter in a very competent and meritfull form. I thank as well the authorities of Barcelona for this metropolitan workshop. I am convinced that our discussions can contribute to the resolution of your problems.

2. Evolution of local government finance

Local government expenditure was increasing very rapidly in most countries of western Europe in the period 1960 to the mid 1970's. In many countries was the rate of growth in this period considerably higher than this of gross national product and of central government expenditure. The main reasons were the labor-intensity of local government tasks (education, social services, public transport and so on), the requirements of more and better services and the growing capital costs (land prices and interests for borrowed money).

After the economic crise of the mid 70's this tendency changed. In several European countries the rate of growth of local government expenditure declined in real terms and by comparison with central government (for instance United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden). In some countries local authority expenditure as a proportion of total public expenditure or GNP remained relatively constant (Ireland, Luxemburg, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland for instance). Only in few countries the expansion of local government expenditure continued in the last ten years (Portugal or Greece for example). It seems that there is a declining trend of local authority expenditure particularly in the northern Europe.

It appears that a major cause of the declining trend in expenditure is the significant reduction of capital expenditure. This may be caused by the fact that it is easier to cut investment programmes than to reduce current expenditure or even the level of services.

The income from local taxation sources increased in general in both mentioned periods at a lower rate of growth than local government expenditure. The main reason is the unboyant character of most local taxes. Exeptions of this evolution are to a certain degree the countries where local authorities levy income taxes (Switzerland and Scandinavian countries). In most countries central government increased financial assistance in their forms of grants to local authorities, at least until the mid 70's. At the

same time specific grants were more or less substituted in many countries by non affected or block grants and detailed control over the activities of local authorities reduced.

Since the mid 70's, it apperas that there has been a tendency in several countries for the reduction of grants to local authorities (for instance United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries, Switzerland). In United Kingdom, indicators for allocating grants to local authorities have been converted into targets for expenditure of individual local authorities. The lower growth or even contraction in European countries was followed in general by a reduction of grants and attempts of central governments and local authorities to reduce government expenditure.

3. Objectifs of local governments reforms

An early and important reform of local government was made in Sweden. A main objectif was to make economically and administratively more efficient authorities. The reform was, therefore, in principal a reform of rural areas. The result was a considerable reduction of local authorities from 2500 to 279 through amalgamations of local authorities by central government. The main population per autoritiy increased from 2 000 on 30 000.

In Denmark, the boundary reform leaded to reduction of local authorities from 1 388 to 275. As in Sweden, the requirement for larger rural municipalities initiated the reform process. But in Denmark the need to reduce externalities of urban areas was as well important: One urban area should, therefore, become one municipality. Increased demands upon local administration from decentralisation and the public should be enshroued through this reform. The economically and administratively better balanced municipalities allowed at same time the substitution of more than a hundred special grants through a general (or block) grant system with a special subsidy for weaker municipalities.

In Norway, the reforms were - compared with Sweden and Denmark - rather modest. The number of municipalities has been reduced through amalgamations from 744 to 451, and the average number of

inhabitants in the communes doubled from 4 400 to 9 000. The preoccupation was the redefinition of the tasks or functions of the various government levels.

In United Kingdom, the reform of local authorities was determined particularly by convenient arrangements from the point of view of the central government on an efficient relationship with local authorities. In several steps since the world war the detailed and inflexible system of specific grants for particular services was changed toward general or block grants. The specific grants were substituted gradually by the rate support grant system covering now about 60 % of local revenue. The importance of the local real estate tax on property, the rates has diminished.

The local government structure has been developed to a two-tier system with counties and districts. This restructuring brought a drastic simplification. The ordinary counties are much more comparable with regional than local entities. They control about 3/4 of local government expenditure. However, in urban areas the district council retains tasks like education and social services which fall in the other districts into the county-level. With this reform the more than 2 000 units of local government were reduced to about 500.

In the Federal Republic of Germany the competence for the reform of local government belongs to the Laender. Each Land developed their own model. But there were common reasons for the reform. Like in the Scandinavian countries, one objective was the creation to provide on their own responsibility in one place close to the citizen their tasks. Furthermore multivarious overlappings between urban centers and suburban areas should be managed in a more efficient way. Three models have been developed:

- New forms of intermunicipal cooperation within communes
- Integration of the central town and the suburban communes under the district control
- Creation of one authority covering the town and the suburban area.

In France, the direction of reforms was not an amalgamation of the 36 000 communes but the reenforcement of the municipal co-operation through joint boards or associations of municipalities (syndicats intercommunaux) for one or several purposes. Such associations cooperate on the executive or administrative level. They have been criticized for their lack of democratic control. A new form of cooperation has been provided in 1966 with the urban communities. They are administered by a council whose members are elected by the municipalities (deliberative assembly). They deal mainly with planning and investment matters of common importance.

In countries like the Netherlands or Switzerland the situation is in so far comparable, that the cooperation bases on associations of municipalities and the structure of communes remains unchanged. In both countries the lack of democratic control of such associations is partly criticized.

In the Mediterranean countries local government is rather in development. The preoccupation of central government in Spain as well as in Italy was rather the creation of regions as a political instrument to balance cultural and historical identities by decentralising functions. Regional and municipal reforms have occurred never simultaneously therefore. With exception of Portugal the municipalities particularly in rural regions seem to have serious problems concerning their administrative and financial capacity. At the same time there exists a trend toward the centralisation of public finance and the need of increased transfers of central government to local authorities. These evolutions seem to be in so far contradictory, that the centralisations of taxes is compensated by rather detailed and restrictive transfers for particular purposes, which limit considerably the substance of regional and local authority's political and administrative autonomy.

4. Local authorities within the objectives of efficiency, autonomy and democratic participation

If we compare the main objectives of local government reform, the increase of efficiency, autonomy and democratic participation are

predominant. The controversial question is, how far these objectives have been achieved. The answer is difficult because of the relatively long reform-periods, in which conditions would have changed even without the considered reforms. A reply is almost impossible if we compare reforms of different countries because of the differences in the four main reform concepts

- territorial reforms (amalgamations of local authorities)
- functional reforms (new repartitions of public tasks or functions)
- organisational reforms (cooperations within a government level)
- financial reform (new repartition of taxes and new grant systems)

As far as efficiency in Sweden is concerned, F. Kjellberg concludes "the results of the reform seems to have been more positive, albeit not altogether satisfactory" (p. 140 f). Johnson concedes for British case, that "a rationalisation and simplification of the local government structure has been achieved" (p. 170). The effect of rationalisation cannot be established with precision. Local authorities have been stimulated to use modern planning and management techniques. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany it is rather controversial whether efficiency has been increased.

Concerning the democratic participation the consensus is quite clear: the amalgamation of local authorities led to considerable reduction of the number of locally elected politicians and to reduced possibilities for influencing local decisions through personal contacts. This seems to have a rather negative impact on the citizens' political activity in Sweden (p. 140). In United Kingdom and in Germany the participation on elections did not significantly change. "The balance in respect of the political effects of reforms shows a somewhat negative result ... It might, however, be held that the relative political weakness of local government stems from other factors, and notably from the increasing range of central government control. Far from leading to more decentralisation, it might be argued that the reforms have been followed by more centralisation" (Johnson p. 172). Johnson argues that the conversion of grant criteria into expenditure targets led to stronger overall controls and nullified at least partly any political revitalisation of local government.

But intensified cooperations between local authorities through associations is as well criticised because of the lack of democratic participation. Such institutions are usually controlled by the executive bodies. In several countries without an important territorial reform their number is even higher than this of local authorities.

An other difficult point is the effect on the right, to regulate and manage local affairs under own responsibility (local self government or autonomy). Local autonomy depends not only from the degree of government control, but as well on the forms of financial dependance on central state. The crucial question is the importance of the right of local authorities, to levy taxes and to fix their rates. The cuts of grants and the expenditure targets of central governments for local authorities may have influenced the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities to call upon national governments on their 14th session in 1979:

- to provide local and regional authorities with sufficiently buoyant and flexible taxes that can be localised on their territory and of which they have the power to determine the rate
- to not over-dependent on taxes of an assessed nature on property or other specific goods
- to levy or (at least) to receive a guaranteed share of income tax

Even if judgments on reforms are divided, the reforms are in so far accepted that the "way back" is not seriously asked. In a very general tendancy the important reforms in Europe tend toward a two-tier model of bigger, strong local and regional authorities with concentrated responsibilities.

An important controverse question is the use of voluntary and compulsory cooperation of local authorities. Voluntary cooperation can work satisfactorily when the interests of the concerned authorities coincide. It has the advantage of a positive attitude of the members. The disadvantage ist that serious conflicts, like

they exist namely in the city-suburb-relations, cannot be resolved. Compulsory cooperation is therefor unavoidable in order to master regional problems in particular between central and surrounding authorities.

5. The metropolitan government problem

In the history of reforms of local authorities the metropolitan government problem has become growing importance. At least in the first postwar-period the problem of rural areas was predominant. This is in so far astonishing as about half the population of western Europe is living in local authorities with more than 10 000 inhabitants. But this population comprises only about 5 % local authorities!

The comparisons per capita expenditure of local authorities with central cities in Switzerland is not representative but typical. Per capita expenditure of central cities are almost 50 % higher than in rural or suburban communes. From the main functions only primary education expenditure per capita is lower. Social welfare and health expenditure are more than three times higher. Younger Families tend to live rather in the suburban area, so that the urban population has much higher share of older people (health and social welfare). In many cases increased responsibilities for handicapped, drug addicts, immigrants, juvenile delinquents and so on falls on cities. This is the same for special or higher education, environmental measures, housing, culture and leisure facilities, police, fire protection, parks, open spaces and so on.

During a long period the Swiss central towns were able to furnish these supplementary services and to discharge indirectly suburban communes and the regional authority (canton). The loss of resident population and the lower income of corporations since the mid 70's created, inspite of growing employment places, serious financial problems. But it was not possible to balance the externalities within the local level. A cantonal law with the objectif to balance the externalities in favour of the central city of Zurich passed the referendum hardly: In the central city there were 60 000 votes for and 30 000 votes against the law (it was

contested by the left hand parties of the central city). From the other (suburban) municipal voters 85 000 voted for and 130 000 against the law, so that the central city over compensated the referendum by 5 000 votes. The voters participation was 40 %.

In a rather generalised form it is not exaggerated to say that central cities have actually - compared with other and namely suburban authorities - more problems to balance their books. In principle, there exist the following possibilities:

1. Internalisation through amalgamation with suburban authorities
2. Transfer of externalities to the regional level
3. Increased government grants for central cities
4. Higher taxes, fees and charges
5. Reducing expenditure

It seems that today suburban municipalities are less willing to amalgamate with the central city. Such amalgamations are, therefore, not possible, at least not on a voluntary basis. If the regional level (and in several countries the central State) accepts, it is easier to transfer externalities to the regional authority. The increase of grants in order to compensate through the regional (or national) level externalities leads to intransparent forms of dual (or triple) responsibilities which should rather be eliminated. However, in order to keep their competences, central cities seem to prefer this way.

Higher taxes, fees and charges are not popular. Whereas right hand parties are against higher taxes but usually for higher fees and charges, left hand parties are for the contrary.

The reduction of expenditure in a periode of scarce revenues an unavoidable instrument of balancing the account. Rationalisation or reprivatisation of services are key-words on the political scene; it is easier said than realised. Main obstacles are the inflexibility of the officials' status and the limited possibilities to purchase goods and services. Reprivatisation could only have considerable economic effects if it is provided for major services like education, public sanitation or public transport.

It is astonishing that the experiment for education vouchers in Kent, realised in 1978, did not have more public attention. A comparison of private and public schools in Switzerland explained the difference of nearly 50 % lower costs of private schools with a better motivation of teachers and students as well lower salaries of teachers per school-hour and different organisation. If we consider that about 2/3 of local government expenditure are salaries, a scarcer use of manpower and a more flexible status of officials need further examination. In this field we can learn perhaps from the system in the United States.

A similar crucial problem is the purchase of goods and services of local authorities. Apart from inefficiency in planning, organizing and providing services it exists the danger of favorising local enterprises with or without corruption.

6. Perspectives of local government

The actual time seems less to favorise "big local government reforms". The public as well as the central states are preoccupied with the problems of unemployment, inflation, growth and environment protection. The competitiveness of European economies has become a dominant problem. These questions have to be dealt primarily on national level; but local government can contribute as well to their solution. The economical competitiveness can increase if local government rationalizes his services in order to reduce taxes, fees and charges. This increases the cash flow for necessary investments of the private sector.

The need for a more flexible status of officials can facilitate similar evolutions in the private sector. The factual or formal election of officials for lifetime with guaranteed and growing salaries does not correspond to the needs of an open economy. Furthermore, deregulation (which is rather necessary in central government) should be ~~needs~~ promoted as well on local level (for instance in the field of physical planning). Deregulation seems to become a key-word for all government levels.

Local authorities have important responsibilities in the field of environment. It is even mainly a local task, as far as the protection of nature and monuments is concerned. The general regulations in the competence of central governments and the particular and regional protection of the population as well of the natural and the historical heritage need not only a national, but even a European cooperation.

A main advantage of local government is, that it is closed to the citizen. A mean to enshure close contacts with the citizens is the local referendum. Citizens participate directly on particular decisions of common interest. The right of referendum is most developed in Switzerland. This is probably a main reason of the relatively high popularity of local government. But referenda exist as well in other countries. In France it is possible in the case of certain amalgamations of local authorities, in Denmark for closures of schools, in Italy for the amalgamation of regions or in Norway for the sale of alcohol. In United Kingdom it is discussed for the tax increase of rates.

It is not asthoning, that the idea of a charter on the principles of local self-government has been developed in the last years and will be submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in next time. This charter contains 16 articels and defines local self-government in a comprehensive manner. "Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsability and in the interests of the local population." The following 9 paragraphs describe the conditions of the free and independant self-government. Not all government are happy with this charter because it is considered as an instrument of intervention in internal affairs of each country. From the Conference of Local Authorities it is considered as a supplementary and main pillar of the council of Europe's philosophy, the principles of democracy, human and social rights. Indead, a human society needs democracy. But a society cannot be democratic without strong and efficient local authorities.

The text bases namely on the following publications of the Council of Europe:

- The reforms of local and regional authorities in Europe: Theory, practice and critical appraisal, Study series local and regional authorities in Europe, vol. 28, Strasbourg 1983
- Local autonomy: Legislation, practice, prospects, report for the Conference of European Ministers responsible for Local Government, Lugano 1982
- Methods of consulting citizens on municipal affairs, Study series local and regional authorities in Europe, vol. 18, Strasbourg 1979

11th March, 1985/BRA/jr
KE.6.6.102.

Workshop on "Metropolitan Government". Barcelona. March 25-28. 1985.

The Vicious Circle of Migration, Health, Housing
Employment and Financial Squeeze
The Case of the City of Copenhagen

by Bent Rold Andersen¹⁾

The story

This is a story about Copenhagen, a city which is regarded as wonderful by foreign tourists and domestic visitors, by young students and others looking for educational facilities, but not by the strong and wealthy Danes who are at the peak of their performance and professional carrier, looking for modern comfortable housing, recreational environment and tax deductions. It is a story about a metropolitan area where the strong, healthy and wealthy part of the population in the middle ages is increasingly separating itself from their own young children, their old parents and their weaker brothers and sisters. Consequently it is also the story of a borderline between municipal units being at the same time the borderline which separates wealthy and strong persons from the poorer and weaker persons.

Metropolitan Growth and Migration

The metropolitan region of Copenhagen is traditionally defined as the city of Copenhagen plus 49 other municipal units. One of these (city of Frederiksberg) being totally encompassed by the city of Copenhagen, the others forming a thick

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frame of suburbs and metropolitan backland, surrounding the city.

Since the beginning of the century the population of the total metropolitan region has grown fastly from a little less than 700.000 to a little more than 1.700.000 persons. The growth, however, is unevenly distributed between the city of Copenhagen¹⁾ and the municipal units in the suburbs and backland. Until 1950 the city grew as well as the rest of the region, although the growth rate was decreasing in the city and increasing in the suburbs and backland. But after 1950 the city of Copenhagen stopped receiving its part of the inflow to the metropolitan region from the rest of Denmark, and the net inflow turned into a flow out of Copenhagen, primarily to the suburbs and backland. Until 1970 the rest of the region received a net inflow from the city of Copenhagen as well as other parts of the country. After 1970 there has been a substantial migration from the city of Copenhagen to the rest of the metropolitan region and a slight migration from the whole region to other parts of Denmark.

Table 1

Development of the Population of the Metropolitan Region of Copenhagen

Year	City of Copenhagen	Rest of Metropolitan Region ¹⁾	Total Metropolitan Region ¹⁾
1900	400.000	274.000	674.000
1930	617.000	440.000	1.057.582
1950	768.000	670.000	1.438.000
1970	622.000	1.131.000	1.753.000
1981	493.000	1.246.000	1.739.000

1) The areas which is to-day included in the region.

1) The municipality of Frederiksberg has had a development of population parallel to Copenhagen. The economic and social consequences, however, have not been the same. This special topic is left out here.

For the city of Copenhagen the net result has been a decrease in the number of inhabitants by almost 300.000 since 1950, which corresponds to a decrease by 37 percent over a period of 33 years.

The adaptation of municipal activities to such a decrease in the population over a relatively short span of years, certainly puts pressure upon the economy and administrative efficiency of the city. Not least, of course, in a Scandinavian welfare state, where the provision of health, educational and social services are largely the responsibility of the local government.

In Denmark the provision of Hospitals and other health services is the responsibility of the country counties. These services are generally free of charge.

Primary education and social services are also free of charge or at low charges. They are run and financed by the local authorities. The city council of Copenhagen serves at the same time as a county council and as a local authority.

The essence of the financial and administrative challenges, however, did not come up to be the adaptation to decreasing needs and incomes, but the adaptation to increasing needs and decreasing municipal incomes.

The reason for this was that the composition of the population changed radically as a result of the migration patterns.

In order to understand what happened, one has to observe 3 characteristic of the pattern of migration:

1. The net decrease of 300.000 was the result of much bigger inflows and outflows of the city. Since 1950 about 700.000 persons have moved into the city, and about 1 million have left the city. Only one third of the population of the city are actually born there.

2. The group of persons who moved into the city was different from those who lived there already. Among the immigrants there were exceptionally many youngsters coming for education, many unmarried persons in all age groups, many of whom being economically dependant, and - although the statistical evidence is insufficient - presumably many mentally ill and abusers of drugs and alcohol.
3. In the same way those who left the city had another composition than those who remained. It was preferably those in the age groups from 30 to 60 who left the city. Even among these age groups a selection took place, the well educated, economically independant and healthy being over-represented among those who moved from the city to the suburbs, to the backland and, later on even to other parts of the country.

As mentioned, the statistical evidence is not complete since we do not have detailed information on the economic, social, and health characteristics of those who move. Nevertheless the consequences can be easily observed in the characteristics of the remaining population.

The Causes of Migration

We have not been able to ask the 700.000 persons who moved into Copenhagen City between 1950 and 1983 why they did so. Neither have we been able to ask the one million who left the city about their motives. So we cannot dig deeply into the individual causes behind the migration. But we know what the city can offer and what it cannot.

No doubt the City of Copenhagen can offer two important features with many attract immigrants from other parts of the country. Its wide variety of educational facilities, and its cheap flats.

Certainly wonderful Copenhagen has many other industrial, cul-

tural, recreational and environmental assets to offer. But the point is that you need not to live within the borders of the city government to enjoy these. So these are not strong motives for migration into the city.

The cheap flats, on the contrary, are strong magnets, indeed. Not only to students who look for cheap lodging as close as possible to the educational centers, but also to other people, the circumstances of who require cheap rents without to much regard to the quality of the flat.

Table 2

Housing in Copenhagen 1981

	City of Copenhagen	Metropolitan Region less the City	Denmark less the Metropoli- tan Region
Number of Dwellings thousands	283	507	1.371
One-family houses. Pct.	7	52	69
Flats. Pct.	93	48	31
Old, with inadequate sanitary equipment. Pct.	20	2	6
Less than 3 rooms. Pct.	52	22	19

We also know what the city of Copenhagen cannot offer. It is of extreme importance that there has been only little area left after 1950 for residential building, especially of one-family houses.

This has been a factor of paramount importance since the prosperous economic development during these decades in Denmark as elsewhere created a irresistible demand among prosperous people for their own house. Not only as a comfortable frame of their family life, but also as an insurance of their assets against the accelerating inflation and - not least - as the most important means of reducing their personal income taxes which rose steeply after 1950.

One cannot wonder that many left the city because it could not offer to them the object which they desired more than anything else: A house of their own to live in, and interest payments to deduct from their taxable income. These motives were particularly strong for the well educated, newly married couples with high taxable incomes and marginal tax rates from 50 to 80 percent. Under these conditions the migration patterns could not avoid having substantial impact upon the composition of the population of the city of Copenhagen.

Social Consequences of the Migration

As mentioned above this selection process cannot be measured in detail by direct statistical observation. It has to be measured by its consequences on the remaining population.

A couple of month ago a statistical analysis on this matter was published¹⁾.

Some of the consequences can be easily observed in the age distribution of the city of Copenhagen.

Tabel 3

Distribution of age. Indexation in Relation to the Total Danish Population

Age	City of Copenhagen	Metropolitan Area less City of Copen- hagen	Metropolitan Area including the City of Copenhagen
0-6	70,9	95,3	88,5
7-17	53,7	104,6	90,3
18-19	77,6	102,8	95,7
20-29	134,0	92,4	104,1
30-49	86,0	111,9	103,9
50-59	95,8	104,2	104,6
60-66	126,6	94,1	101,8
67-69	145,8	86,1	103,2
70-79	160,4	79,1	102,8
80-	169,5	75,1	101,5

1) Bent Rold Andersen, Birgit Hjermov, Peter Brix Kjølgaard, Palle Mikkelsen, Jesper Schou Nielsen, Karen Margrethe Ol-

It is evident that the metropolitan area has an age distribution which comes rather close to that of the total Danish population. But the distribution of age groups within the metropolitan area is abnormal. The middle aged and the children living preferably in the suburbs and the backland, whereas the youngsters and the pensioners are overrepresented in the city. The best taxpayers on one side of the municipal borderline. The major consumers of educational, social and not least health services on the other.

Marital status also differ. Even beyond what follows from the age distribution. Only 39 percent of the adult Copenhageners are married, against 55 in the suburbs and backland and against 56 percent in the rest of the country.

Thus there is a high proportion of pensioners, more students and single persons in the remaining population of the city than in the rest of the country.

The selection goes even deeper. There is clear evidence that the health status of the population in the city is much lower than in the rest of the country. Above all, this can be observed in the mortality rate. Mortality rates which have been standardized for differences in age distribution have been calculated.

Table 4

Index of Mortality rates, standardized for age, 1971-79.
Whole country = 100

	Men	Women
City of Copenhagen	123	106
Metropolitan Region less City	100	100
Denmark less Metropolitan Region	95	98

The mortality rate for men is significantly higher than in the rest of the country in all age groups from 20 and upwards. We find the same tendency for women, although remarkably enough less extremely. The explanation may be that the selection, which is imbedded in the migration process, is stronger for males than for females, because families tend to move in accordance with the needs and desires of the breadwinners, who are normally men. And perhaps also because single men are more mobile than single women.

Anyway it is a remarkable fact, that the excessive mortality rate of the city of Copenhagen is not due to any single or even a few causes of death. It can not be attributed to respiratory illnesses (which could be explained by inferior housing conditions), neither to suicide (which could be explained by the number of single persons or the stress in the big city) nor to any other single cause or diagnosis. We find excessive mortality rates for cancer, for heart and vascular diseases, for accident and suicide, for liver cirrhosis etc.

This seems to indicate that the excess mortality rate should rather be explained by characteristics in the populations than as a result of some negative external or environmental factors like housing, pollution or stress. The population of Copenhagen is in average less healthy and has a lower capacity of resistance towards negative external factors than other Danes in the same age groups.

This observation is remarkably enough confirmed by an excessive prevalence of mental diseases. After standardization for differences of age, we find that the proportion of Copenhageners who are in a hospital because of mental disease, is 3 times as high as that of the rest of the country. The difference is mainly due to severe diagnoses such as schizophrenia and organic brain diseases. Also severe conditions following abuse of drugs, alcohol or narcotics have a higher hospitalization rate in the city of Copenhagen than outside, whereas

there is much less difference when we look upon neurosis and other so called "reactive" mental diseases. It is reconfirmed that it is a matter of selection rather than one of negative external factors.

On this background one can only expect that the demand for hospital treatment and other medical services be higher in proportion to the population than in the rest of Denmark. Actually the consumption of somatic hospital services after standardization for age is 28 percent above the average in Denmark.

A statistical regression analysis has been made, showing that there is a systematic correlation between regional mortality rates and the consumption of hospital services. The excess consumption in the city of Copenhagen is in accordance with this correlation, and thus it can be explained by the high mortality rate in the city¹).

This picture is confirmed and elaborated by several observations of the situation of elderly persons in the city of Copenhagen. The number of old persons is high in the city.

Table 5

Persons over 62 as a percentage of the total Population

City of Copenhagen	21.3
Metropolitan area less City of Copenhagen	16.6
Denmark less the Metropolitan areas	17,3

- 1) In the regression analysis also urbanization comes up with a significant additional explanatory contribution. Degree of explanation of hospital expenditures with both factors included is 83 percent. The result however is much influenced by the excessive mortality rates of the cities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg.

Thus, for demographic reasons, the need for care and services for the elderly is higher in the city of Copenhagen than elsewhere. But here again, we can observe a need beyond that factor.

60 percent of the elderly in the city of Copenhagen live alone, against 45 percent in the rest of the country. Out of those who live alone, 26 percent have only rarely contact with their close family¹⁾, against 19 percent in the rest of the country. These figures clearly reflect the separation between the generations in the Copenhagen metropolitan area.

It is also shown that more old people in the city of Copenhagen are physically incapacitated than elderly outside. According to an objective scale, 22 percent of the elderly people in Copenhagen has severe functional handicaps. Against 14 percent outside the city.

It was also shown that the housing conditions of the old people are extremely worse in the city. One out of four old persons in Copenhagen can only get out of his dwelling if helped by other people.

Thus the health conditions as well as the social circumstances is inferior in the city of Copenhagen than typically elsewhere. From these observations it is calculated, that the provision of homehelp and institutional facilities per old should be 23 percent higher in Copenhagen than in the rest of the country, if the standard should be equal.

On the background of the lower average health status of the Copenhageners compared to the rest of the Danes, one might expect that proportionately big part of the labour force in Copenhagen is "marginal" - i.e. with low-paid jobs, low status

1) Observations based on interviews. The figures show the percentage who have not seen any relatives in the week preceding the interview.

and frequent unemployment periods. Those persons who get hired last and fired first.

This expectation is confirmed in many ways. 55 percent of the persons in the labour force in Copenhagen have got no formal vocational training, against 41 percent in the rest of the country. The rate of unemployment in Copenhagen is at the same level as that of the rest of the country. But outside Copenhagen the overwhelming majority of the unemployed are entitled to unemployment allowances from the unemployment insurance. Only one out of nine is not, against one out of four unemployed persons in the city of Copenhagen. Normally those who are entitled to unemployment benefits belong to the core of the labour force, whereas the others belong to the margin.

This distinction does not only tell a story about a high frequency of vocationally weak persons in the city of Copenhagen. It also reveals an extra financial burden on the city administration, since the unemployment allowances are financed by the state, whereas those persons who are not entitled to these, normally have to live by means-tested welfare benefits, the financing of which is shared equally between the state and the local authority.

The number of recipients of welfare benefits in Copenhagen city thus exceeds that of the rest of the country by a considerable amount. During the year of 1983, 14,3% of the Copenhageners received welfare benefits for a shorter or longer period, against 7,3% in the rest of the country. Our statistical analysis shows that this difference can be almost fully explained by the number of non insured unemployed persons, by the high frequency of cheap flats in poor repair (which attract poor people), by the rate of urbanization (which by experience is also related to a high number of economically dependant persons), and by a high number of single breadwinners in Copenhagen.

It is also interesting to note that the prevalence of welfare recipients is higher among those who move into the city than among those who move out. This means that the migration tends to raise the proportion of welfare recipients even in the present situation where there is a balance between migration into the city and migration out. In 1983 for instance the pattern of migration alone increased the number of welfare recipients in Copenhagen by about 900.

When the situation of health, housing, employment and economic circumstances for the parents is bad, the conditions of growth for the children deteriorate as well. Statistically we found a close correlation between these factors and the extent of intervention by child welfare authorities¹⁾. This explains an extreme high rate of intervention (e.g. institutionalizing of children) in the city of Copenhagen.

The same factors explain why the consumption of resources in the general school system is 10 percent higher per pupil in the city of Copenhagen than in the rest of the country.

Thus, as a result of the process of migration during the last 30 years, The city of Copenhagen has an extremely vulnerable population with a very high need of services within health, social welfare and education.

If the standard of services should be the same per sick person, per old person etc. in Copenhagen as in the rest of the country, the city administration has to spend 1.2 billions of Danish Crowns more than the expense which corresponds to the average per inhabitant in the country. This excess need corresponds to 100 millions US\$, or about 5 percent of the total budget of the city administration.

1) Regression analysis based on 275 local authorities. Further explanatory factors were the number of single breadwinners and the participation of women in the labour force.

The basis for financing this extra burden, however, is rather poor. The average income of the Copenhagen taxpayers is 8 percent lower than the average in the country - and 21 percent lower than the average income in the surrounding metropolitan area. The average taxable income, however, is higher in the city than the average for the country, although still lower than in the metropolitan area. The reason for this is that relatively few of the inhabitants of the city own their own house. The consequence of which is that they cannot deduct payment of interest to the same amount as others.

Therefore the tax pressure on the city population is extraordinarily high for 3 reasons. Firstly they have to finance excess needs. Secondly the income basis is low. And thirdly they have only small deductions in taxable income, which also has the effect that the payment of taxes to the state in relations to earned incomes, is particularly high in the city.

Measured against the taxable incomes, the local authority tax is only a little higher in Copenhagen than in the rest of the country. The rates being 29.1 versus 27.4 in 1985. But if measured against total earned incomes - i.e. disregarding deductions for interest etc. - the difference becomes much bigger. The rates then being 25.8 percent in Copenhagen against 20.9 percent.

The incomes from taxes are supplemented by the block grants from the state and also by some transfers among local authorities, the purpose of which is to equalize to some degree differences among municipalities in need and basis of taxation. The city of Copenhagen, however, does not receive very much from these payments, above all because those transfers which aim to equalizing the basis of taxation, are calculated on incomes after deductions. The result being that the city of Copenhagen in this respect becomes a net contributor to the rest of the country.

Thus in the present situation, the city council has the difficult choice between lower standards of services than in the rest of the country, or higher tax pressure. It can also choose a combination: Somewhat lower standards and somewhat higher tax pressure.

In fact the high tax pressure in the city will further stimulate the strong and wealthy part of the inhabitants to migrate to the tax-shelters outside. This will further increase the financial troubles and thus create a vicious circle.

Solutions?

If the metropolitan region had constituted one, and only one, municipal unit, the problem would hardly exist. In that case the demand for expenditures would probably still be somewhat higher than in the rest of the country, but the capacity to finance the expenses would be more than sufficient, since the unit would include some of the best earning taxpayers in the country. Economically the unit would be in a nice balance.

But as mentioned before, the region is in fact divided into 50 units, each of which having a high degree of autonomy. There are not many of these local authorities who are eager to provide cheap housing in order to attract the old, sick, uneducated marginal labour force; the bad taxpayers and high service consumers of Copenhagen.

And politically it is not realistic to imagine a big fusion of 50 units with their city halls, their mayors, their institutions, their staffs into one big metropolitan unit. There will always be the fear that such a concentration of power might be a garden, where bureaucracy, rigidity and inefficiency will flourish. Far too remote from the individual citizen and his control.

So we have come back to the classical problems of the big cities. We have to maintain some division of administrative

units. But if these are granted complete autonomy and full responsibility for the provision of their own financial means, there will be no possibility of stopping the vicious circle. And the city of Copenhagen will develop into a ghetto of misery.

The only one who can stop this process is the central government. The short term means being infusion of some state money into the city. But the long term strategy must combine the strengthening of the equalizing system of transfers between local governments within the metropolitan region with restrictions on the local autonomy within the field of housing and construction. The first part of the strategy is necessary to bring the tax burdens in the city closer to that of the rest of the metropolitan area, and thereby to reduce the emigration of wealthy people. The other part is necessary to provide cheap houses outside the city of Copenhagen and thus to make the suburbs take their share of the weaker part of the metropolitan population.

I doubt, however, that any final solutions can be found, unless it includes a radical change in the rules of taxation which allow deductions of interests in taxable income. With marginal tax rates which amount to 75 percent, these rules provide a substantial indirect subsidizing of one-family owner-houses at the expense of flats for hire. As long as this unbalance exists, it will be difficult to make Copenhagen with its many flats for hire, as attractive as the suburbs with their many subsidized one-family houses.

This, however, also illustrates, that the vicious circle of Copenhagen can hardly be separated from other, highly controversial political issues. Therefore proper analysis and good planning techniques will not be sufficient. A genuine solution can only be obtained if political statesmanship of high quality is involved.

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INTER-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION -
a game between urban municipalities and
their neighbouring municipalities?

by

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This approach is of course only one of many which can help us to understand the inter-municipal phenomena. In this paper we will try to give a brief review of one challenge to our approach; game theory, and also try to give an introductory discussion of how useful it may be as an alternative perspective in explaining the creation and function of inter-municipal arrangements.

Boundary problems and Norwegian cities

Central place theory has attracted considerable interest among researchers on urban finances in recent years. On the basis of this theory they have developed models aimed at studying the effects which the externally generated demand for local public services may have on local expenditures and finances (Aiken and Dubré, 1981) Newton, 1981, 1982; Hansen, 1982, 1983).

We find the central place theory very useful as a tool for analysis of urban development and urban systems. But for the political scientist the central place theory will not add much if it is not seen in relation to the administrative and political jurisdictions in the urban area. It is the fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions among numerous units of government that are the fundamental sources of institutional failure in the government of urban areas. Both the urban region and its core city will vary in size and extent. To measure the regional effects on the city government we therefore need a definition of "the boundary problem"

In table 1 we have given some characteristics of Norwegian cities and towns ranked by "commuting rate", our measure of "boundary problem" in this paper.*

* Number of employees working in the urban municipality as a proportion of number of employees who live and work within the municipal boundaries.

In Tønsberg, Sarpsborg and Larvik the number of people who work in the city is more than twice the number of employees who live and work inside the municipal boundaries. The metropolitan dilemma in these urban areas is not only the existence of many local authorities within a common economic and social framework, and hence the lack of responsible authority for the whole area; the problem may be defined as a free-rider problem, as well. The central place function is to produce collective goods for the whole urban area, but the surrounding municipalities can in the case of pure public good avoid paying anything for the services.

It is easy to document that the municipalities with narrow boundaries have considerable problems. Table 1 shows that the number of inhabitants per km² are large. Most of these towns have a shortage of vacant land. If they want to build something new, they have to tear down older property. The vicious circle in these urban regions goes like this: Because of child-hostile environments and a demand for better or new dwellings the younger generation leaves the centre commune, take up residence in the neighbouring communes, but keep their jobs in the centre. New trespassers are created, and a still larger proportion of the population in the core city is in need of social services. Some of the results of these urban processes are summed up in table 2.

The relations between the urban and suburban municipalities are captured by the Mancur Olson-(1965, 1969) logic.

In Norway the tax-system is an illustration of lack of "fiscal equivalence". The wage-earners pay incometax to the municipality where they live. Taxation on the enterprises is of little importance for the municipalities (an anarchy of deduction items makes it easy to spirit away profit). The municipalities may voluntarily levy a property tax, but today this taxation is so low that it amounts to little.

Property taxes are also a double-edged sword: If the central commune has a property tax and the neighbouring communes do not have, large property owners may vote by their feet, choose an exit strategy and leave town. (Hirshman, 1970; Tibout, 1972).

The conflict structure and interest constellations in these urban areas with boundary problems lend themselves to a game theoretical analysis of the relations between the municipalities.

Game theory covers a multiplicity of situations (C.f. Rapoport, 1960). One that may resemble the conflict/interest structure between the central city and the surrounding municipalities is a two-person non-zero-sum game. The municipalities are both dependent on each other and mutual independent at the same time. The well-known "Prisoner's Dilemma" is a game of this type.

One criteria must be fulfilled if we are to be able to use this game in an analysis of inter-municipal cooperation between urban municipalities and its suburban neighbours:

Selgård and Sørensen (1983) have used this perspective in an analysis of public budgets in Norwegian cities and their surrounding municipalities. Their main hypothesis is that the smaller parties, such as suburban municipalities tend to "exploit" the big actors, in this case the larger cities. The empirical test indicates that the urban municipalities have a higher level of expenditure for collective services than their neighbouring communes. This is the case particularly in policy areas like culture and construction. They explain this relatively high proportion by the strategic interaction between the local governments involved.

If we return to table 2, we find that this is also the case when we compare the expenditures in the urban municipalities to their largest neighbouring municipality. If we leave Oslo out of our account - Oslo is also county-commune - we find that total expenditure per capita in 7 out of 10 instances are larger in the urban municipalities than in the suburban municipalities. In "culture" and "construction", which Selgård/Sørensen define as "free-rider sectors", this is the case in 9 out of 10 instances; and we can also conclude that the differences between the expenditures of the municipalities are much larger on these policy areas compared to the total expenditures. So far we may conclude that the Selgård/Sørensen hypothesis is strongly supported.

Table 3: Expenditures per capita in the urban municipalities 1980 by level of boundary problem. Norwegian kroner.

Rank order boundary problem	Expenditures per capita (rank)				
	Total	Education	Social	Culture	Construction
Tønsberg 1	10959(1)	1525(6)	2428(2)	761(3)	2854(1)
Sarpsborg 2	6703(9)	1269(9)	1169(8)	602(4)	2044(6)
Larvik 3	8510(4)	1665(4)	1663(4)	914(2)	1583(9)
Arendal 4	7849(7)	1425(8)	1707(3)	497(7)	2316(4)
Hamar 5	8377(5)	1746(2)	1332(7)	1321(1)	2456(3)
Fredrikstad 6	7080(8)	1568(5)	1275(6)	558(6)	2066(5)
Oslo 7					
Horten 8	8276(6)	1835(1)	2749(1)	476(9)	1514(10)
Porsgrunn 9	6419(10)	1673(3)	1024(10)	492(8)	1856(7)
Drammen 10	8596(2)	1013(10)	1077(9)	466(10)	2404(2)
Stavanger 11	8588(3)	1512(7)	1500()	588(5)	1811(8)
Rank correlation	.02	-.04	.35	.56	.27

Results

In our analysis we want to look at the number of arrangements, areas of cooperation, formal status and who has taken the initiative. It is possible to develop hypotheses based on our game theoretical foundation for all these aspects.

Number of arrangements

The main hypothesis regarding the number of arrangements is as follows: The more serious the boundary problem, the more difficulties the city commune will face in creating inter-municipal arrangements.

Epirically we may specify this in two ways.

Hypothesis 1: The number of inter-municipal arrangements where an urban municipality is a participant will decrease with increasing boundary problems.

The rank correlation coefficient is + .45. Our hypothesis is not supported. The urban communes' participation increase with the seriousness of their boundary problems.

Hypothesis 2: The more serious the boundary problem, the lower the proportion of the arrangements (in the region) in which the urban municipality takes part.

This assumption rest on the idea that the suburban municipalities tend to cooperate among themselves and neglect or boycott the urban municipality.

The correlation coefficient(+.28) - is too low to say that the opposite is the case, but high enough to falsify our hypothesis. In 8 out of 11 instances the

urban urban municipalities participate in more than 60 pct of the total number of arrangements in the urban region. Most of the central towns may be said to dominate the inter-municipal cooperation. The exceptions, however, are interesting.

The word "boycott" is only applicable or relevant for the largest cities. Oslo participates in only 34 pct. of the arrangements in the region, Stavanger in 41 pct, and Drammen in 47 pct.

Policy areas

We have already used the notion "free rider sector", which means policy areas where it is difficult for the core-city to reserve the right of public services to its own inhabitants. According to reseachers on urban finances culture and construction are the typical policy areas where we find "free riders.

We find that most of the issues covered by the culture-label can be regarded as "free-rider issues" (e.g. parks, subsidised theatres and concerts, libraries, sport centres and swimming halls). Construction, however, covers a lot of issues where the interests of the two parties coincide. Arguments of economy of scale and efficiency state that water supply, removal of refuse, sewage and electricity are areas where all participants have something to gain from cooperation. Expenses for roads, streets and car parks will, however, be areas where it is more difficult to exclude the nieghbouring communes fram free use of these facilities.

All in all, there are a lot of issuses in "the constrution area" where it ought to be easy to create inter-municipal arrangements. We therefore mainly look at this policy area as a "non-free-rider sector", and base some of our hypotheses on this assumption.

Hypothesis 5: The more serious the boundary problem, the more difficult it will be to create inter-municipal arrangements in free rider issues (total numbers).

Hypothesis 6: The more serious the boundary problem the less the proportion of inter-municipal arrangements will be on free rider issues (relative numbers)

To test these hypotheses I have selected "free rider issues" in the construction sector - e.g. cooperation on housing and streets - and added this to arrangements in the culture area.

The correlation coefficient concerning hypothesis 5 is -.07 and concerning hypothesis -.28. Both correlations are rather low, but they are in the expected direction.

Initiative

Our last hypothesis concerns initiatives to establish cooperating arrangements. These initiatives may come from the communes, the county commune, the prefect and the central government. When the relations among the municipalities are suffering from large boundary problems and other conflicts, a mediator may be needed to reconcile the parties. In Norway cooperative arrangements may be made compulsory by the central government. We may, however, see an interesting paradox in the role of the central government in such urban areas. As Leemans (1970) says:

"Central governments are obviously faced with a rather paradoxical situation due to the mixed attitudes and feelings among communes. On the one hand, the more acceptable advanced cooperation becomes for local governments circles in general, the easier it is to introduce and apply compulsory legal provisions; but it becomes less necessary to do so because communes will be more inclined to enter into cooperative arrangements voluntarily. On the other hand, the less communes are prepared to cooperate, the more urgent is the need for compulsion, but the greater is the resistance to it".
(Leemans, 1970: 150).

Using our game-theoretical basis the following hypothesis seems plausible:

Hypothesis 8: The more serious the boundary problems, the larger the proportion of the initiative is taken by an instance outside the municipalities.

A correlation coefficient of $-.40$ tells us that the opposite is the case. A larger proportion of the arrangements is taken on the municipalities own initiative in areas with boundary problems.

It is also reasonable to question how unitary a municipality is as an actor.*

To discuss all these weaknesses of game theory will fall outside the framework of this article. But we cannot end the paper before a kind of answer to the following question is given: Why do the urban municipalities that have most problems with their neighbours cooperate more than other municipalities? We will try to explain this by giving some answers from organization theory. These answers do in some ways "tear down" our game theoretical foundation so far. Our answers are organized in four paragraphs.

1. Organizations develop strategies and structures to solve their larger problems before their smaller ones.

This statement seems obvious. A quick glance at the most familiar textbooks in organization theory tells us, however, that this is not always the case. Organizations are boundary-protecting systems; they suffer from trained incapacity, love standard procedures, and do not find that variety is the spice of life (Cf Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon 1958, Thompson, 1967; Hall, 1974). Organizations are structured to solve the problems of yesterday. In a changing world and with ambiguous technologies and environments (March and Olsen, 1976) it is rather difficult to fulfill a norm of rationality.

* Because of "the ideology" of self government and self containment a municipality can be regarded as a remarkably unitary actor in its relation to other municipalities (but not in relation to central government).

By using the notions "free-rider sectors" and "free-rider issues" we have taken for granted that the world is not as simple as that. Most "public goods" are semi-public, and have a defined clientele and a price. Looking at the ways municipalities divide the expences for the inter-municipal cooperation, we also find a lot of "legitimate" intermunicipal agreements in areas which in principle should lead to conflicts:

Matrix 2: Legitimate ways to pay for joint services:

		Consumption	
		Collective	Individual
Type of policy	Distribution	I Number of inhabitants	II Individual use and fees
	Redistribution	III How to estimate cost/benefit? Conflicts	IV Number of actual or potential clients.

In square II the costs are payed by users fees or actual consumption.

In square IV the municipalities pay for actual or potential clients who belong to their communes, but use services in the neighbouring commune (e.g. no. of pupils, handicapped or old age pensioners).

In square I it is difficult to exclude other parties from use of services. We find, however, a lot of inter-municipal arrangements which belong to this type of public good. The expences in this square are generally distributed by number of inhabitants. Most of the joint investments are paid in this way even if the use is individual.

The least expensive alternative for the neighbouring municipalities is often to use the service-institutions in the core city that have capacity for it. The urban municipality can ask " a little extra" for these services, or can force the other party to cooperate in other areas by saying: "You may use our sewage purification system our fire service or our schools on the condition that you pay a fair part of the concert-hall or our new swimminghall". In such exchanges the urban-municipalities are the strongest parties in the power/dependency relationship.*

4. The value of neighbourliness.

Besides that one in many game theoretical assumptions forgets that the players can learn by experience ("You never catch a fox twice in the same snare - criticism"), one forgets what a social system is, too. As a player you are an egoist, as a member of a social system your egoism is at least tamed a little by norms and role expectations. This criticism is well known. We will only mention that in the inter-municipal cooperation there are rules of the game saying that you need a good excuse to refuse an invitation from your neighbour when he asks you to cooperate.

There is a snowball-effect in the inter-municipal cooperation. Cooperation in one policy area tend to create new arrangements in the same area. The actual consequences of communication are consensus-increasing and recognition of new areas for cooperation. As Hawley says:

"The fundamental contribution of communication
to the integrative process is that through the

* Threats are rather unusual in such exchanges.

Conclusion:

Game theory may be useful in understanding what does not happen in metropolitan areas. We find it necessary to use other perspectives in explaining the creation of inter-municipal arrangements.

Mostly the game theory has been used in "the why does nothing happen way." (Dye et al., 1972; Long, 1962 a,b; Dye, 1962; Freiesman, 1966). The main question has been: Why is there so little overt conflict between local government-units in fragmented metropolitan areas? Any discussion of the absence of conflict or other social phenomena, raises questions about how to deal with things that do not happen. Not all of the literature in the metropolitan dilemma tradition are convincing on this point. As Newton (1978:77) says:

"Besides, explanations of both conflict and its absence are ultimately dependent upon purely conjectural arguments involving counter-factuals: statements about why conflict breaks out are bound up with notions about the conditions in which it does not break out; statements about why it does not break out are bound up with notions about why it does."

Some of our game theoretical arguments in this paper may be included in this statement.

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APPENDIX

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Urban regions - problems and processes of coordination:
Presentation and summary of a project under the Research
Programme on Cities, The Council for Research for Social
Planning (RFSP).

The amalgamation of municipal units in the sixties created administrative boundaries which for most of the Norwegian cities and towns covered the socially and economically intergrated urban area. Some towns were forgotten. Other urban municipalities got narrow boundaries because of the urbanization in the seventies. As urban life spilled beyond city boundaries, no adjustments in these boundaries have taken place.

Today, the following urban communes have narrow boundaries: Sarpsborg, Larvik, Arendal, Hamar, Frederikstad, Oslo and Horten. Porsgrunn, Drammen and Stavanger may be included in the list.

But also cities with relatively wide boundaries like Bergen and Trondheim experience similar problems - problems that can only be solved through coordination of policies across the boundaries of municipalities.

In our project we have described some obvious effects for the city-municipalities and city-regions caused by the regional processes. Our main goal has however been to describe and analyse how coordinating arrangements have worked out in the urban areas.

Results

Several of the Norwegian urban regions consist of 10 to 20 individual municipalities, and some of the urban regions cross county boundaries.

The general picture is that regional development and administrative fragmentation have caused problems for the central municipalities.

They are central places for the hinterland. This role leads to an extra pressure on municipal development. Many of the urban municipalities lack building land. At the same time, most of these cities have a decreasing population, while neighbouring municipalities are expanding. People move into the suburban communes, and this movement is selective. Families with children and the good taxpayers are the ones moving out. Some towns may be called towns for old-age pensioners because of their demographic structure. The regional processes also lead to an accumulation of other persons in need of social services.

The effects of a combination of lack of building areas and a declining population in the centre, while the urban area itself expands, have brought on several unfortunate consequences.

The Municipal Department and the political leaders at the national level claim to understand the problems of the urban municipalities, but have so far not tried to handle the local conflicts. They sit on the fence waiting for better political weather.

In our project we have documented that, at least for the smaller towns, an amalgamation is natural solution. In the larger cities this solution, however, may create communes too large and specialized in a period when decentralization is a value of high priority.

In theory, the central government, the local state agencies and the county communes have a coordinating function towards the municipalities.

But the central authorities with their highly functional organization both on the central and local level suffer from territorial blindness. The various departments are not especially good at coordinating their activities towards administratively fragmented urban regions.

The central authorities have not used the means they possess to create more comprehensive and coordinated policies on the local level. The master plans of the suburban municipalities are approved by the Ministry with a note that they ought to be adjusted to the general development in the urban area. The central government has never forced municipalities to cooperate on problems which cross boundaries.

This cooperation goes on largely without conflicts. Nevertheless, it suffers from three clear weaknesses.

First, cooperation is sectorized and generally takes place in areas where all parties involved may benefit from it. Water supply and sewage disposal are the most typical areas of intermunicipal cooperation. There is, however, a lack of coordinating bodies that could make comprehensive and binding decisions for the entire urban region in question, which e.g. involve disposition of land and economic development. Since policies in these areas often lead to redistribution of resources among municipalities, it is difficult to make such a planning organ function on a voluntary basis.

The urban-municipalities feel that there is a need to develop political bodies which legitimately and bindingly can make such decisions. Few municipalities express a need for more inter-municipal cooperation within the various sectors.

Second, the forms of organization developed for the inter-municipal bodies have no set standard and are in many ways unconnected to the ordinary decision-making system within the municipalities.

The members of the intermunicipal committees have little contact with the aldermen and the rest of the councillors. For the individual municipality, this leads to problems of control and few opportunities for making an integrated intermunicipal policy. The inter-municipal bodies live their own life without

Models like two-tier systems, unions of municipalities, or special purpose districts ought to be considered. Such new models ought to deviate from the typical Norwegian tidiness, which demands that a municipality or county ought to be built up in the same way all over the country. The maxim of reformers should be that special local conditions demand special forms of organization.

A more limited suggestion is that the county council is allowed to have a stronger coordinating function than the case is today. Planning ought to be based on the fact that the county as a unit is a collection of more or less integrated regions ---- regions that also cross county boundaries. The condition necessary to make such planning work is that the municipalities of the region are allowed to participate in the planning process.

In the region of Oslo and Akershus a larger county is a solution near at hand. The Stockholm region may serve as a model here. The regional functions (health, transport, housing and planning) are located at the county level. Other functions are delegated to individual municipalities or areas within them. Regional levelling of taxation based on objective criteria of need is also a natural solution in this and some other regions. Within the regions of Stockholm and Copenhagen such a system of tax-levelling has been used with good effect.

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European Consortium for Political Research

"Metropolitan Government in Ireland"

Paper for 1985 ECPR Conference, Barcelona

NEIL COLLINS
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

Draft

Not for Quotation

"In the past twenty-five years Ireland has undergone a radical social and economic transformation... From its position with one of Europe's oldest populations in the 1950's, Ireland now has the youngest and fastest growing population in Western Europe as over half the population are 25 years of age or less. During this same period Ireland has been transformed from a rural and agriculturally dependent country to a rapidly urbanising industrial and service economy. Ireland has moved swiftly from the agricultural to the information age. The conservative social order of the emigration-dominated 1950s yielded to a more mobile, socially open, better educated and more demanding and participatory society of the 1980s."⁽¹⁾

Dublin is the only large city in the Republic of Ireland. The local government structure of Dublin is currently the subject of reform proposals along lines outlined below. Before briefly examining these proposals, however, the paper will assess the problems which they seek to address.

Local government in Ireland is based upon nineteenth century British legislation which basically provided for single-tier urban and two-tier rural government. Since Independence in 1922 important changes have been made to the organisation, powers and responsibilities of local authorities, but in broad terms the British structure remains. (See Map 1) In the greater Dublin area, there are three main local authorities Dublin City (pop.525,882), Dublin County (pop.1,003,164) and Dun Laoghaire (pop.54,496). This last authority was created in the 1920s when most institutional reforms in local government were initiated. Dun Laoghaire, despite its size, has the many of the same legal powers as the City and County, especially in relation to housing, roads, water and planning. All three authorities have separate councils and, for the most part, separate staff except at the level of chief executive, or, in Irish terms, manager.


The institution of city or county manager is the most distinctive feature of Irish local government. Broadly the manager replaced the executive committees of the British system. He "reports" his decisions to the council; their ability to overturn them is limited but, as will be shown below, controversial. The

1. M.Bannon, "Development Planning", Administration, vol.31, no.2, p114.

IRELAND

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNTIES

MAP 1



management system was constructed by the revolutionary elite after Independence in order to bring about efficient and honest local administration. The last of that elite to lead a government, Sean Lemass, recognised that by the 1960s local authorities had an expanded role to play in national development. He talked of local authorities as "development corporations" and most have sought to fulfill this role despite legal and financial restrictions. If local government has made a wider contribution then it is because the managers have offered leadership in policy innovation, formulation and direction. The contribution of elected politicians has been to legitimise that leadership and to facilitate the execution of policy by intervening on behalf of aggrieved citizens.

The management system has in the past been judged most creditable by Irish and foreign observers alike.

"None of the objections to the system.... compared with the obvious merits. The undeniable fact is that Ireland, having sought for an answer to the problem of reconciling ultimate democratic control with prompt discharge of duties, has found a solution which under Irish conditions is working well."(1)

Yet important questions arise about the kind of leadership that managers are able to offer as Ireland experiences more rapid economic changes, increased expectations by citizens of the state, less consensus on broad social values and the tensions of seemingly inexorable urbanisation. In many respects Irish problems are similar to those faced by other systems of local government. In Ireland, however, local government lacks a stable constitutional base or wide public prestige. In addition, there are important ambiguities in central/local government relations which currently inhibit managerial policy initiatives and may become even more restricting especially in Dublin. Irish civil servants and ministers talk of local democracy but in practice have sought to hold a tight rein on local authorities. This tendency is accentuated by the current economic and fiscal crises.

1. (A H Marshal) Committee on the Management of Local Government, Management of Local Government, vol.4, Local Government Administration Abroad, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1967, p.24.

Governments have sought recently to increase the amount of locally raised revenue. Local government finances, particularly the rating system, had been a recurrent minor electoral theme for some years. The proportion of GNP accounted for by local spending had risen by the late 1970s to 17% compared to 10% of a much smaller GNP in 1939. In 1977, the Fianna Fail election manifesto 'Action Plan for National Reconstruction' addressed the subject of public expenditure and made a promise to abolish domestic rates. This pledge was a major part of the party's election strategy. The Coalition Government's programme contained a similar proposal but the abolition was to be phased over four years. Fianna Fail offered to end this unpopular tax as from January 1978. The rates promise was fulfilled after Jack Lynch's landslide victory by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 1978. Thus, central government undertook to reimburse local authorities for the loss of rate income on dwellings and certain other properties including secondary schools and community halls.

The loss of the rates as a truly independent local tax had a particularly marked affect on the morale of the managers and councils. The rates reform was followed by a control over the maximum level of rates which each authority could set. The most visible symbol of local autonomy, setting the rate level, was thus removed. The increased dependency of local authorities on the state for revenue income from 1978 onwards is shown by Table One.

Between 1977 and 1978, the state grant increased by nearly 60% while rate income fell by 25%. The Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act 1978 guaranteed 100% recoupment of lost rate income for local authorities. City and county councils retained the power to set the rate level. In practice, however, the minister has controlled the situation by determining the maximum level of rate. Thus, the financial independence of local government has been drastically curtailed. The rate level has become an instrument of central government economic management, and consequently has been held well below inflation, as Table Two shows.

TABLE ONELocal Authority Finance 1970-83

	IR£m.			
	Revenue	Capital	Total	Rates as % of Revenue
1970	158	37	195	32
1972	131	50	181	46
1977	317	145	462	35
1982	803	415	1,218	15
1983	900	450	1,350	11

Source: P Dowd, Financing the Local Authority, Irish Planning Institute, 1983, p.7.

TABLE TWO
Rate Level Increases as Compared to Inflation
1978 to 1982 in Percentages

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Simple Total
Rate Limit	11	10	10	12	15	58
Average Inflation	7.6	13.2	18.2	20.4	17.4	77

Source: Dowd, Financing the Local Authority p.21.

The aims of central government in relation to fiscal and monetary policies have little to do with individual local authority needs. Nevertheless, having found itself in a fiscal crisis in the 1980s as a result of its narrow basis of direct taxation and high foreign debt repayments, the central government has sought to shift a greater proportion of its burden onto local government by departing from the principle of 100% recoupment. Central fundings now falls short of local authority spendings, even at agreed levels, so charges for local services have to make up the difference. Thus, the local authorities are in effect acting as tax gatherers for central government - incurring the odium of the public but unable to improve their overall income despite imposing more extensive charges for services. In particular, urban authorities such as Dublin City can now levy water rates, as is already the case in the counties, and local government generally is required to introduce charges for services. Central government has, therefore, used local government as a means of deflecting criticism raising finance and reducing public expenditure. Its function has been to control not develop local initiative.

The local politician's role is clear - he offers himself as an intermediary between constituents and the broad range of state bureaucracy of which local government is only one. For the most part, Irish politicians are 'local politicians' however high they climb in the elected hierarchy. Very few deputies (TDs), except ministers and their shadows, ever have to broaden their consideration of the purposes of local authorities beyond that of sources of brokerage and electoral advantage. When they do they confine their remarks to the health of the "formal legal model" which asserts the primacy of politicians. In practice, the current modus operandi, under which policy initiatives remain with the manager, suits the politicians. Too close an association with controversial general policies would endanger their brokerage power base. Thus, local government in Ireland generally is in a crisis caused by the general economic pressure and some of the specific political features outlined. In the rest of the paper the focus is primarily on Dublin.

The County Management Act 1940 specified that the offices of Dublin city and county manager would be held by the same person. The manager of Dun Laoghaire is an assistant Dublin city/county manager and an important member of the Dublin management team. The management team of nine, including all the assistant managers, has the city and county manager as its head. It meets weekly but its members are in daily contact. This managerial co-ordination has contrasted to that at political level where councillors often see themselves as rivals to their counterparts in neighbouring authorities. Some of this rivalry reflects the pressures of development.

"Dublin is now a sprawling mass of over one million people ruled by a Victorian local government system which is so archaic that it is of very limited benefit to the people it is supposed to be serving. It makes it a nightmare for the politicians and administrators who try to operate it."(1)

Much of the expansion of the Dublin area has been the result of the difficulty of making a living in rural Ireland, the growth of public sector and service employment and the allure of the city. Irish society in general has become more urban and economically has moved away from its agrarian and peasant base. The trend towards urbanisation has been accompanied by an eastward shift, with the greater Dublin area now containing about one third of the population. (See Table Three). Many of the political and social attitudes of Dubliners however are either still predominantly rural or shared with the provinces. Nevertheless, the relatively static country environment with its strong family solidarity and close intra-family cooperation contrasts with the vast and more impersonal urban surroundings. Dublin has a more mobile and complex class structure than other parts of Ireland and the needs of its inhabitants are likely to become more distinctive.

The demands on the local government system are greater in scale, and, the organisational responses more complex. (See Table Four) In Dublin pressure group activities are more relevant than in rural areas, as are problems of traffic, urban

1. Frank Kilfeather "Greater Dublin Nightmare", Irish Times, 23rd October 1980

TABLE THREEDistribution of Urban and Rural Population 1956, 1971 and 1981.

Population	1956	1971	1981
%Rural	48.2	41.3	36.6
%All Urban*	51.8	58.7	63.4
%Dublin Only**		28.6	29.1

*Towns over 200 persons

**City and county

Sources: D A Gillmor, Irish Resources and Land Use, IPA, Dublin, 1979, p.255 and J Blackwell and F J Convery, Promise and Performance: Irish Environmental Policies Analysed, Resource and Environmental Policy Centre, University College Dublin, 1983, p.267.


decay, and the economic and social decline of large communities. A city councillor listed his clients' complaints in order as

"One, housing transfers; two, housing repairs; three, appeals on the waiting list; and, four, miscellaneous matters such as health card applications, apprenticeships at AnCO, and broken marriages."

Dublin councillors are in constant touch with their authority. Members of Dublin authorities tend to have less direct contact with the manager and more with section heads than in other areas. This reflects the greater administrative deconcentration of Dublin. Yet while the Dublin city managers and politicians have developed a "Dublin style" of politics, this is not radically different from the general pattern. The electoral pressures of Ireland's STV system, their involvement in the brokerage system and the heavy demands on their time and energy involved in protecting their bailwick are pertinent to all councillors. The managers in all authorities respond to the demands of councillors in a similar way, namely they facilitate individual requests from politicians but resist challenges to general policy. This accommodation of the short-term imperatives of councillors with the leadership and continuity of the bureaucracy is under strain in Dublin especially.

TABLE FOUR

Dublin Corporation: Organisational Structure.



Planning & Building Bye Laws

Sanitary Services, Roads, Traffic and Development

Housing Construction Programme

Housing Administration and Community & Environment

"The officials administering the three areas are, in many cases, the same, but they have to tread a perilous line in trying to cater for three different local authorities which have conflicting views on some very important matters. For instance the city manager is also manager of the county council and of Dun Laoghaire Corporation and his assistant managers also have jurisdiction over the whole region. They walk the tightrope with considerable skill - they have to be seen to be all things to all three councils."(1)

While members of the Dublin management team play down the friction between councils, other officers do see conflicts of interest between the core city and its neighbours in housing, planning and transport. The organisational structure, in particular the overlapping responsibilities of the manager and some of his assistants, is designed to alleviate conflicts of interests and to achieved greater co-ordination of policy. The Dublin managers, however, do have a difficult task in policy formulation because of the need on many issues to persuade more than one body of councillors.

Dublin's scale and its status as the national capital does give rise to a relevant difference for manager/councillor relations because of the pattern of media coverage. Ironically, given that Dublin is the centre of the national media network, both managers and councillors are less subject to press attention than elsewhere. A lower proportion of their activities are reported in the media generally and Dubliners are less attentive to purely local news. The figures for newspaper readership seem to back this observation, see Table Five.

"The local papers cover political events in their own districts and any national political news that has local significance... They feature reports on the proceedings of local authorities, health boards, and other public bodies. Such a focus might well reinforce the strong local orientation of many country people..."(2)

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1. F Kilfeather "Greater Dublin Nightmare" Irish Times 23 October 1980
 2. B Chubb The Government and Politics of Ireland, 2nd ed., Longman, London, 1982, p.66

In Dublin the national news is "local". Thus for Dublin politicians the need to engage in strenuous local self publicising is greater than elsewhere. Their energies are even more taxed by electoral considerations .

TABLE TWO

Variations in adult readership of local newspapers.

	Read Any Local newspaper %
Dublin	9
Rest of Leinster	89
Munster	69
Connacht and Ulster	94

Source: B Chubb Government and Politics 2nd ed., p.67

Another organisational difference is that the Dublin councillor meets members of the management team and other senior officers often at committee or working-party meetings, of which there are many more than in other authorities.

"In Dublin County Council.... a councillor can expect to attend one meeting a month of the full council, which will last from about 2.00pm to 9.00pm and meetings of whichever one of the four district committees covers his electoral area. These district committees generally meet twice a month and deal with finance and general purposes, planning and housing. Each committee meeting will take about 3 hours to complete its business. The councillor will also serve on a number of other committees (of which there are 20 with sub-committee plus 4 major regional committees)... Membership of a body such as the vocational education committee. . can also involve. a number of its sub-committees."(1)

The operations of these committees has itself caused some concern in Dublin. There are perisistent suggestions of malpractice in relation to planning decisions.

1. M Tierney, The Parish Pump: A Study of Democracy and Local Government in Ireland, Able Press, Dublin, 1982, p.35.

Two issues particularly raised are the spectacular profits made by individuals from development control decisions and the involvement of councillors in overturning the advice of officials.

"When it is all boiled down, a planning permission, whether it is for an individual or a company, means money - big money. Planning permission can quadruple the value of a bit of bog or rock in the Dublin mountains or in the fields of Tallaght. That is what it is all about."⁽¹⁾

The planning process is, critics maintain, being abused.

"To watch planners and engineers outline the dangers of rezonings to the councillors and then see the councillors ignore them can be a disturbing experience. To watch them do it regularly over a long period can be really worrying."⁽²⁾

The Irish system of local government operates on a very tightly drawn legal distinction between the responsibilities of the council and the manager. In practice the manager makes decision on individual cases of service provision, such as tenancies. The councillors ratify general policy statements which the managers draws up in their name and with a knowledge of their general views. Councillors only infrequently caucus to impose a party line on council policy and each manager tries to avoid public disagreements with his councillors by tempering his proposals to their known or anticipated views. Chubb accurately summarises the position:

"...the elected member is a consumer representative.... the manager tends to be the architect of community services"⁽¹⁾

The only major exceptions to the established understanding between politicians and bureaucrat arises in relation to development control items where councillors in some authorities make regular use of their residual power to overturn a manager's decision as it applies to a particular individual. This power is generally

1 Irish Times 11 Febuary 1981.

2 Irish Times 15 November 1982

3. B Chubb The Government and Politics of Ireland London: Longman 1982, p.305.

described with reference to its statutory basis in "Section Four" of the County Management Act 1955.

A "section four" motion allows a council to direct the manager to act in a specific instance in a particular way, typically to allow planning permission to an individual where general criteria would indicate refusal. Often such cases concern individual houses being allowed outside the general terms of the development plan for the authority. Section Fours are not common in Dublin compared with some western counties.

The other major display of councillor power, which is usually associated with the Dublin, comes with the adoption and adaptation of the development plan. Each major council is the planning authority for its area and as such is legally obliged to draw up a development plan indicating the pattern of land use for its area. Thus, the development plan divides the county or city into zones in which residential, agricultural, industrial or other activities will predominate. Planning application will be allowed or refused with reference to the development plan. In Dublin the pressure on land for house building is such that the difference between the value of land zoned for housing or industry and agriculture is vast. The pressure on politicians to assert their ability to deliver to their clients by use of their legal rights can be very great even though doing so contradicts the intention of the legislation or general planning criteria.

"...the rezonings are being pushed through by a coalition of.. councillors..
All rezoning are opposed by the professional and technical staff of the Council.
Vast profits are being made out of the rezoning by very few people."(2)

Lee Komito, in a study of Dublin, suggests that Irish politicians are forced into controversial planning decisions by the pressures of voter expectation and electoral competition.

-
1. In Dublin, 24 June 1982.
 2. L. Komito "Development Plan Rezoning: The Political Pressures" in J. Blackwell and F.J. Convery Promise and Performance: Irish Environmental Policy Analysed, Dublin: University College, 1983, p.293.

"Councillors are making dubious decisions, professional planners are being overruled, the public is being ignored, and individuals are making personal profit from state planning decisions. Planning has been an issue in some constituencies during recent elections, and some politicians have suffered loss of reputation, votes, and even elected office. Yet this is not the first time that planning has aroused controversy. The first County Dublin Development Plan caused disquiet and police investigation."⁽¹⁾

The public disquiet about councillors' behaviour in Dublin may be out of proportion to amount of malpractice. Nevertheless the national party leaders have been embarrassed by the publicity and have sought to reduce their councillors' discretion. The public have also been confirmed in their cynicism about councillors' motives. These factors have further diminished the leadership that councils are able to offer. The problems of development in Ireland are likely to increase in the near future for very predictable reasons - the demographic and geographic imbalance of population and economic underachievement relative to its European partners and emergent Third World competitors. Already, Dublin's development problems are mirrored by typical indicators of social malaise such as drug abuse and crime. National government's response until 1985 has been pragmatic and piecemeal, reflecting no fresh thoughts on the institutional framework. Thus, for example, in Dublin traffic is a 'problem' so a special agency is established. Similarly with inner city development, drugs and factory closures the politicians' reaction is to set up a task force. There seems to have been little appreciation that social and economic problems are interrelated; that, for instance, traffic problems in Dublin simply reflect the geographical distribution of workplaces and homes. There exists a potentially comprehensive and responsive authority equipped to develop plans, to relate infra-structural investment to a co-ordinated pattern of industrial, commercial and residential land-use. Local authorities, however, have not been strengthened. National politicians have

1.L. Komito op.cit, p.293.

not wished to be associated with broad and almost certainly controversial plans. In these circumstances, the managers have not been able to fill the void completely because their need to act tentatively, quietly and consensually is heightened where controversial, non-routine decisions are concerned. The Irish case has, in this respect, developed along similar lines to the original American city manager model: "... although a responsible democrat, the city manager is often a weak political executive"(1)

To improve the potential performance of local government requires sustained effort over a reasonably long period of time. A start has recently been made with the announcement of a new structure for local government in metropolitan Dublin. The Government's new design for local government in Dublin call for four conventional local authorities operating in the area instead of the present three. In addition, there will be a largely non-executive Dublin Metropolitan Council which have a co-ordinating role. The members of the new authority will be drawn from the constituent councils. The four conventional authorities, which will have the status of counties or county boroughs, will be:

- 1 Dublin corporation which will administer roughly the same area as at present; and,
- 2 Three county councils covering the areas shown in Map B

Both the corporation's area and that of the three county councils will be further divided into districts - six for the corporation and two each for the county councils. The Government propose that these districts will be allowed to run certain services as agents of their local main authority.

1. Ronald O Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1971, p.164.

- County boundary
--- County Borough boundary
..... Proposed New Local Authority boundary

MAP 2



These new arrangements for Dublin will require an increase of about one-third in the overall number of councillors representing the area. In this way the ratio of members to population will be brought more into line with rural patterns (see Table Six).

TABLE SIX

Ratio of Councillors to Population and Area in Selected Local Authorities

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Area</u>
Dublin CC	1:10,690	1:8.4 sq mls
Dublin CB	1:12,102	1:1.1 sq mls
Cork CC	1:5,605	1:62.5 sq mls
Cork CB	1:4,460	1:0.5 sq mls
Limerick CC	1:3,578	1:38.4 sq mls
Limerick CB	1:3,575	1:0.4 sq mls
Waterford CC	1:2,376	1:30.9 sq mls
Waterford CB	1:2,174	1:0.2 sq mls
Mayo CC	1:3,678	1:69.6 sq mls
Leitrim CC	1:1,265	1:27.9 sq mls
Wexford CC	1:4,192	1:39.5 sq mls
Monaghan CC	1:2,518	1:25.0 sq mls

Source: IPA yearbook and Webster's New Geographical Dictionary,
Springfield, Mass., 1972.

The division of the greater Dublin area into separate county/county borough authorities marks the end to a debate stretching back to the 1920s about the amalgamation of existing structures into one greater Dublin authority. This idea was last put forward by the Government in a discussion paper in 1971 but it

engendered strong opposition. Nevertheless, the Corporation has been responsible and for developing new town developments in the Dublin county area to relieve the burden of inner city over-crowding. It is these new town developments which now constitute the core of the two more westerly proposed counties.

The most pressing local government problem in Ireland lies in the government of Dublin. Although this city is the fastest growing area in Western Europe, its single tier all purpose local authority is ill-equipped to respond to the ensuring problems. The Government has accepted the increasing demands for a metropolitan authority with control for planning and infrastructural development to cover the greater Dublin area. This will take some of the burden off the existing councils. Certainly it is unfair to expect the 45 members of the city council to represent adequately some one third of the country's population especially in the absence of a complementary parish or neighbourhood structure. Furthermore city, county and Dun Laoghaire councillors do find it difficult to reconcile some of their differences of policy in relation to planning within the existing structure. The question of tiers of government can be considered, however, only if there is a clear understanding of the allocation of functions and a knowledge of the available resources of personnel and finance. A new structure of local government in Dublin is not going to alter the imperatives of national and local elected politicians. Ministers and their shadows will always be reluctant to surrender authority to local government particularly to a powerful metropolitan council. Neither can local politicians in a higher tier be expected to eschew clientilist advantages to potential rivals on the basis that their attention should be reserved for wider concerns. The public may be reluctant to confer enormous power to local councillors in relation to planning given the current atmosphere of controversy about development control decisions in Dublin.

The details of the new local authorities are not yet clear it may not be too late, therefore, to offer a suggestion for change. The most effective reforms may be those which seem least threatening. While ministers and their shadows will always be reluctant to surrender authority to a large new local bodies, they may allow the development of existing and respected institutions. As the 1972 White Paper⁽¹⁾ pointed out:

"....really drastic overnight changes in the existing structure with its in-built loyalties and established place in the lives of local communities, could lead to a serious diminution in the status of local government even a rejection of new structures and institutions".

One way towards an adequate system of government for Dublin, therefore, would be to enhance the roles both of the mayor and the manager.

In some respects the American experience which was so influential in the 1920's may well be instructive again. American city management was the product of small and medium size cities. Now, however, the flight from the metropolitan areas has meant that the management system is in use in many of the recently enlarged cities of California, Florida and Texas. The American city managers "occupy a position in transition; from being expert housekeepers... (to) would-be community leaders".⁽²⁾ The problems associated with management in large cities, where strong elected political figures may vie for power, have been tackled in half the council-manager cities by having a directly elected mayor. The mayor may clash with the manager over innovation and policy leadership. The range of issues on which conflict will occur is likely to be small, however, as the major interests of manager and mayor are at the same time divergent and complimentary. An elected politician with a city wide constituency is less open to localist pressures and more resistant to higher-level government encroachment on local powers.

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1. Local Government Reorganisation, Stationery Office, Dublin, 1971, p.16.
 2. Loveridge, City Managers, p164.

Such an innovation applied to Irish cities, particularly Dublin, might help overcome the difficulties inherent in having a bureaucrat advancing radical or controversial proposals. The mayor could provide the clear political leadership and legitimacy currently lacking in Irish local government.

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**METROPOLITAN POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURES
AND PROCESSES IN MILANO**

RESEARCH STILL IN PROGRESS: not to quote or reproduce

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Sessions of Workshops, Barcelona, 25/30 March 1985

1. The problems of metropolitan governance have been on the public agenda in Italy for more than 20 years. Among both politicians and scholars it is generally accepted - even if with substantial differences when one looks at the actual content of the different reform proposals - that the traditional formal uniformity of Italian local government structure must be broken and some special institutional machinery for metropolitan areas created.

The basic assumption was that special situations - and metropolitan areas are special situations - ask for special institutions, able to cope with the bigger size and complexity of the problems.

The political and scientific debate was therefore looking for the "right institution" able to maximize the desired values: effectiveness and efficiency defined as the ability to solve metropolitan scale problems with less resources possible. The general idea was to create some kind of more powerful institution, possibly through the consolidation of the existing ones, with legal powers, financial resources and political legitimacy. There were different formulas in the Italian debate (metropolitan municipality, metropolitan province, etc.) but the basic idea was always the same, albeit the variations in legal competences and/or political legitimacy were sometimes important. Two different considerations - however - make necessary a rethinking of the problem. The first is the simple fact that all these proposals were never able to raise a sufficient consensus to become laws and decisions. The debate is very much at the same point since a long time.

most actors agree that an institutional reform is needed, but they fail to reach an agreement over the proposal to accept. Even if the meetings and debates go on following the traditional framework, it seems sensible to doubt whether one is not asking the impossible, that is a collective suicide of the existing institutions in favour of a new one where the distribution of administrative and political power is very difficult to forecast. The conclusion would therefore be that in a fragmented political and administrative system like Italy, to abolish existing institutions is virtually impossible. If nothing happened in 20 years may be it is time to work out some different approach.

The second element is more scientific. It is in fact well known how the idea that powerful authorities are more efficient (because of the internalization of externalities and because of the scale economies) has quite recently been widely discussed. Some authors - like Ostrom and Bish - have on the contrary argued that, on the one hand, scale economies are highly unlikely to occur in labour intensive services, and, on the other hand big organizations are in general less efficient than small ones. All in all, therefore, the technocratic reform trying to build up powerful metropolitan authorities cannot solve the problems it was supposed to, and even runs the risk of worsening them.

There are many different aspects of the debate well worth of rethinking. Let only point out one: the different problems implied in reaching metropolitan scale decisions in a fragmented institutional setting and in running efficiently public services. Not necessarily, one could argue, these two objectives must be unified in the same institution. It would be well possible either a centralized metropolitan government providing services through a number of

different agencies, either many different political bodies buying services from an unified producer. This point means that, insofar decision-making and not service provision is concerned, the scale argument does not apply.

This short discussion has only the aim to show which kind of problems one has to face when involved in an exercise focussed on the institutional needs of the Milano metropolitan. The overall goal was to provide a tentative answer to the generally shared dissatisfaction with the existing institutional setting, at the same time avoiding the problems of non implementability as well as the doubts raised by a single-minded reorganization (a powerful metropolitan authority).

Hence the need for a research strategy able to test empirically the different factors able to predict a "good" governance. It is, I must emphasize, an exercise in applied social research and not simply a retrospective macronegative analysis (i.e. identifying the general reasons why things went badly). The emphasis, on the contrary, is micropositive (i.e. looking for the very special conditions under which something good might happen).

Our choice has been to concentrate over metropolitan decision-making processes, trying to identify the actors, their patterns of interactions, the different stakes of the games, and the final outcome. The first question was if institutions made a difference in explaining the different degree of success of various decision-making processes in a given area with given actors. The second question was which characteristics of the process were able to predict success or failure. The third question was whether a proposal can be worked out meeting at the same time the conditions of political feasibility and

those of successful decision-making.

2. The four investigated processes were quite different from each other. Most of them were still in progress at the moment of the research and their outcome - in terms of success/failure - is mixed enough.

The first one refers to the enlargement of the Malpensa intercontinental airport - the second in Italy. It begins in 1965 and is still in progress albeit a provisional equilibrium has been reached. The main focus is the period 1970/1984 during which a harsh conflict developed around the proposal of building up a third runway as a necessary step towards the growth of a more important role of the airport. The outcome of the process has been a compromise. A bigger role for Malpensa has been accepted: a new arrival and departure terminal, new services, better links with Milano, more landings and take offs. But the third runway has been abandoned. Obviously there was a conflict between the surrounding municipalities and the Milano municipal company managing the airports. The agreement has been reached through the mediating role of the regional government, supported by the mobilization of trade unions and political parties.

The second case concerns the project of transforming the Milano railways system. Presently all the different railways stations are terminal, so that most trains either start from or have their last stop at Milano. The system is based on an highly congested ring around Milano in which all trains from the external lines and for any Milano station arrive. In 1967 a first proposal emerged of a "through" line able to transform the whole system, connecting the different Milano

stations, so that trains coming from north could directly go south. The main focus is a tunnel under the town of Milano in which normal trains could pass at fixed intervals so that it could serve at the same time both the medium distance commuters and the urban transportation. The proposal, presented by the metropolitan land use planning agency (PIM), was accepted by the Municipality (because it made useless a fourth underground line) and flatly rejected by the national railways authority (because they refused to play any role at all in urban transportation). The process was long and complex, involving the Regional government, and the provisional outcome reached so far is the acceptance of the through underground line, with the understanding that no urban service - i.e. no fixed cadenced trains - will be provided.

The third case study is more straightforward and concerns the building up of a new Stock Exchange Building, asked by a majority of the stockbrokers because of the lack of space in the old one. The process included the Chamber of Commerce, the Municipality and the brokers themselves and concerned two alternative proposals (a new building a different part of the town - favoured by the Municipality - or the restructuring of the existing building - favoured by the brokers and the Chamber of Commerce). Here too the starting point is about 1967/68, but in this case a decision has not been reached so far because of the disagreements among participants coupled with the financial problems.

The fourth and last case is the proposal of building up a public information system, pooling the data of the municipality of Milano with other three medium-sized municipalities of the metropolitan area. The process started in 1977/78 and has been officially abandoned in 1984, because of the disagreements of the participants.

3. The bulk of the research work carried out has been the reconstruction of the processes in an historical way. The extensive chronological accounts thus provided informations about the actors of the game, their interactive patterns and the stakes of the game as perceived by them. Assuming that the four investigated processes were a significant sample of what can be labelled a "metropolitan problem" - but the research is still in progress and other cases will be investigated next year - the reconstruction of the actors, their rationalities, their operational style and their relevance in the process should provide a basic information for any reorganization project.

In this paragraph, therefore, I will very briefly present the characters of the metropolitan drama as they emerge from the research, providing at the same time some information about their mutual relationship.

The "pole position" in the decisional system is certainly occupied by the Milano municipality. Its size - 1.6 millions people, i.e. the 40% of the whole metropolitan area - accounts for it, being by far the biggest administrative authority involved - much bigger, in financial and organizational terms, of the regional government itself. The first important finding is that it seems very difficult to solve any metropolitan problem without the consent of the central municipality. But one specific feature emerging from the research allows a further insight: in all the four investigated processes, the Milano municipality was involved at the level of the Mayor and of the mayoral offices. Obviously also the functional departments and their political

and administrative heads had their say, but the municipal decision making system emerging from the research is strongly centralized. This came partly as a surprise, because the previous research work on municipal decision making in metropolitan municipalities had emphasized the fragmentation of the system and the autonomous status of the functional departments. A possible explanation reconciling those contradictory findings is that what is centralized are the "external contacts" of the administration, i.e. the intergovernmental or interorganizational issues. All metropolitan problems being of this nature, it is not strange to find the central role of the mayor and his staff. But it seems possible to proceed further: in fact it is reasonable to argue that the main reason for this mayoral centrality lies in his big political legitimacy. Italian Mayors are the most important political figures within their cities, and a metropolitan Mayor is a big national figure - much bigger in terms of visibility than most national ministers. Therefore it is natural to assume that a very important resource spent in the processes was the political one. In other words it seems possible to hypothesize that no successful decisional process can be carried out without some sort of political legitimacy. I shall come back to this point later.

Another important feature of the municipal intervention in the investigated metropolitan processes can be roughly summarized in a sentence stating that, although the municipality tends to assert its central role in the form of veto power, it has also an increasing tendency to mind its own business. In order to understand this point one has to recall how during the Fifties and the Sixties most metropolitan services were decided and financed by Milano alone,

irrespective of the positive external effects over the surrounding metropolitan area. In order to assert its central role Milano accepted to carry the whole financial and organizational burden of many metropolitan services (transportation and airports are two good examples). The fiscal stringencies of the Seventies and of the Eighties, together with a different attitude in the surrounding municipalities, altered this situation and now it seems that the Mayor will provide the Milano's consent - still essential to reach any result - only if there is a clear benefit for the central city. This contradictory position represents a major problem in making the cooperation quite difficult, the central municipality being strong enough to defeat any attempt to reduce its weight through a strong decentralization or even - as proposed - a splitting in several different authorities.

A second important institutional actor is the regional government. Unlike the municipality, it is not present in all processes. Moreover it is quite clear that the regional government has many good reasons for not entering conflicts with its powerful neighbour, the Milano municipality, and a common joke is to label Lombardia as a region with an hole in the middle, meaning that regional policies are often not intended to apply in Milano (health reorganization is the biggest example). A second distinctive feature of regional intervention is its departmentalized character: the President and its staff play a much less important role compared to the Milano Mayor. However this does not mean that the intervention is technical in nature: in fact the role played by the political heads of the relevant regional departments is by all means central. Thirdly, it seems possible to cautiously conclude

that regional intervention is positively correlated with decisional success. The sample is far too little to reach any firm conclusion, but it is a fact that the two more successful projects saw an important regional role, while there was no intervention at all in the clear failure of the metropolitan information system. The following question concerns the reasons why this has occurred, i.e. the enabling factors brought about by regional intervention. Analyzing the processes three elements emerge:

- in the first place the regional intervention created a neutral ground for the interaction between the major policy stakeholders; the interested parties agreed to meet at the regional level because of the apparent lack of direct interest of the regional administration towards any specific solution to the problem; one could say that the regional intervention created the bargaining arena;

- in the second place regional actors acted in both instances as mediators or fixers between the interested parties; from this point of view the regional role has been mainly political;

- in the third place regional intervention was able to raise additional financial resources, transforming zero sum games in positive sum ones; this aspect is essential: from some point of view one could also say that the Region payed its ticket to assert his right to sit at the bargaining table in an important position.

These three aspects - the neutral arena, the fixer role, and the additional resources - are certainly important features for any successful decisional process. However one cannot conclude that the regional intervention is the answer to the problem of metropolitan governance. At least two points must be emphasized:

- the first concerns the likelihood of the interested parties - and Milano in the first place - accepting a regional mediating role; this seems largely correlated with the novelty of regional intervention in metropolitan problems and its lack of firm priorities about the specific solutions to adopt; in so far the Region is proceeding in establishing itself in the political administrative system, the arena becomes less and less neutral, and the intervention style will probably be much more similar to other interested parties rather than a mediating one;

- the second connected aspect is the regional concern for metropolitan problems and the amount of resources devoted to their solution; the regional political system is structurally inclined to give a relatively bigger importance to the claims of regional periphery rather than center (the patterns of political representation account for this feature); this means that the financial resources devoted to the solution of metropolitan problems are deemed to be a marginal amount of global regional funds; unless the trend towards a reduction of regional money is reversed, the ability of the regional administration to provide additional money will probably be seriously hampered.

The third class of relevant actors is formed by a number of autonomous and semi-autonomous public agencies sharing some common characteristics: a less direct relation to the political system (top decision-makers are not elected but sometimes appointed on party lines) and mainly the existence of a skilled technical bureaucracy. In this class we can certainly include the various transport authorities, the airport company, but also the Chamber of Commerce, an intermunicipal

land use planning agency and the Statistical Service (a municipal functional department enjoying a relevant degree of autonomy).

The role of these actors in the investigated processes is quite clear: they are the initiators of the process itself and they are responsible for the different solutions submitted to the discussion at the different phases of the process itself. With one exception (the Stock Exchange building where the proposal came from the stockbrokers), the various issues were put on the public agenda by the first technical proposal, stemming from these agencies. In all cases the decisional process at the political level was made possible by the supply of different solutions by the technical bureaucracies.

The fact of being a necessary element for every problem to emerge - let alone to be successfully solved - does not mean that the existence of technical bureaucracies is also a sufficient one. When political (as in the case of the airport), or intergovernmental (as in the other cases) conflicts emerge, the agencies seem to disappear or at least lose the central role played in the more peaceful phases. But is their role in the initiative that seems worth stressing: even in overpolitized Italy innovations are brought about in the first place by bureaucracies, whose way of structuring problems often remains unchallenged during all the process.

These three actors - Milano municipality, Lombardia regional government and the technical agencies - are therefore the necessary ingredients for every successful innovation. But there are other public authorities whose presence in the game means trouble.

This is certainly true for the many other municipalities of the metropolitan area (about 100), far smaller than Milano itself (the

biggest one has a population of 120,000) and therefore far less powerful in financial or organizational terms. This different dimension makes obvious a self-centered rationality: they enter a metropolitan game if and only if they are directly affected - both positively and negatively - by the debated issue. Furthermore they are clearly suspicious that the advantages coming to the central area are bigger than those coming in the periphery. Therefore they often denied their agreement whenever they felt not being "guaranteed" enough against milanese imperialism. On the other hand, not being able to forecast the external effects of central municipality decisions, they often do not intervene in processes actually full of consequences for the whole metropolitan area. All in all their presence in the decision making process demonstrates how is very difficult to achieve cooperation between unequal partners, and how it is almost impossible to pool resources when contributions are uneven and benefits not clearly foreseeable.

A second class of authorities whose presence makes things worse are national government agencies. And this is a very negative feature insofar the high fragmentation of legal competences characteristic of the intergovernmental game in Italy, makes the presence of some national agency very likely to occur in virtually all metropolitan problems. The reasons for this negative role of central departments are several: a much more formalistic approach to problem solving makes national agencies very tough customers in any bargaining. Furthermore the distributional priorities at the national level tend to underestimate metropolitan needs - equated to extravagancies that a still very unbalanced country cannot afford. The latter trend is

reinforced by the privileged access that the periphery gains at central level (a good example is the explanation given to the deny of national financial support to the building of a new Stock Exchange, i.e. the fact that the project took little account of the other financial markets in Italy: the point is that Milano Stock Exchange absorbs 94% of all Italian transactions and therefore the other stock exchanges hardly exist at all, but there are 10 of them and Milano is only one!). The latter feature boils down to the fact that thinking of solving milanese metropolitan problems through nationalization is hardly likely to get any result at all, as it is the attempt to solve them through intermunicipal cooperation.

The last class of actors one has to take into account includes non-institutional figures, like political parties, trade unions, interest groups, voluntary organizations, social movements or interested firms and individuals. As a general rule one can say that they played a rather marginal role in the investigated processes. Of course some evidence of political interventions can be detected, but it seems strictly dependent upon the institutional rationalities above sketched and not autonomous from them. Social movements and trade unions played some role in the most conflicting processes - like the case of the intercontinental airport - but here too they were able to reach some result only when they were able to involve public institutions. Private interests and voluntary organizations (with the already mentioned exception of stockbrokers) were totally out of the picture. In other cases they certainly do play a role but it seems likely that the metropolitan dimension is one at which aggregating interests is more difficult, thus explaining the lack of their

intervention.

Even if it is partly surprising the relatively low importance of party politics in metropolitan decision making, all in all one can say that the picture emerging from the research confirms the central importance of institutional setting in solving metropolitan problems. Therefore any attempt to improve the decisional efficiency must start from and come back to the institutional setting, proposing reforms consistent with the existing trends and politically feasible. In the next paragraph an exercise in this direction will be made in order to fulfill the character of applied social research of the whole study.

4. Which kind of conclusions can be drawn from the above sketched reconstruction? Having in mind that our concern was on the institutional aspects of decisional efficiency, the following points can be emphasized.

1. The intergovernmental nature of metropolitan problems and decisional networks: the processes showed municipal, regional and national interventions, excluding that any metropolitan problem could be treated strictly within the metropolitan area.

2. The impossibility to nationalize metropolitan governance: given the lack of sensitivity at the national level any proposal trying to enlarge the national government role in metropolitan governance risks to leave the problems unsolved.

3. The complexity of intermunicipal cooperation: given the unbalance between the central city and the surrounding authorities and the present fiscal stringency, any attempt to develop cooperation is likely to fail.

4. The need for political legitimacy: metropolitan problems being politically important problems, any merely technical solution is likely to fail. Political resources must be available in the game.

5. The need for neutral arenas: the intergovernmental character of metropolitan decision-making brings about bargaining as the main pattern of interaction. And setting up

the bargaining table on a neutral ground seems an important condition for successful outcomes.

6. The need for mediating roles in the decision-making process: the existence of some actor acting as a fixer, that is someone interested in a successful decision but not in any specific solution, seems another important enabling factor.

7. The need for technical expertise in the initiative phase: innovations are stimulated by technical proposals and not by public demand or political intervention. The creation of a technical bureaucracy specialized in metropolitan problems seems therefore an important condition for success.

8. The need for additional resources: zero-sum games being much more difficult to solve than positive sum games, the availability of additional resources seems an important enabling factor.

I am not claiming that those points are original at all. Most of them are merely reinstating the results of research done in different metropolitan settings or in decision-making systems. However it is interesting that empirical research has once more emphasized those simple truths, hence showing that they apply even in Milano.

In fact they are not without consequences on the possible solutions. First of all they exclude nationalization as a viable proposal: even if it was politically feasible - and it is not - it would not work.

In the second place they exclude also the more feasible solution: an institutionalization of intermunicipal cooperation: such a body exists since a long time but it has not been able to solve the problems of metropolitan governance. And the proposal of a general reorganization of municipal governments in order to create more balanced districts - consolidating the smaller ones and splitting the central area - seems politically unfeasible.

In the third place they also tend to exclude the most popular answer to metropolitan ingovernability: the creation of a powerful metropolitan

authority through the consolidation of existing municipalities and county-level authorities. Firstly it must be emphasized that the Provincial Administration never emerged in our reconstruction as an important actor. This could depend from the choice of the sample, but at the same time means that its consolidation with, say, the central municipality, would not have improved the decisional efficiency. Also the surrounding municipalities were not always present, and in any case one has to recall the feasibility constraint already mentioned, which prevents such a global approach. Furthermore it is very dubious that it such a reorganization would solve the problems: certainly a metropolitan authority could meet the conditions 2,3,4,7 and possibly 8 of the above list. But it would not meet condition 1: metropolitan decision-making would remain an intergovernmental exercise, full of interactions with the national government, the regional governments and the non metropolitan local governments. Of the four investigated processes only the public information system would be greatly favoured by such authority, while the remaining three would maintain all their difficulties. Therefore the need for solutions openly recognizing the bargaining intergovernmental character of metropolitan decision making, and hence meeting conditions 5 and 6.

5. The conclusion of this paper, consistently with the applied nature of the research, must engage in drawing a viable proposal, able to meet the constraints of political feasibility as well as the conditions of decisional efficiency sketched above.

In the first place, therefore, the institutional change proposed cannot involve consolidations or the dissolution of any existing body.

Moreover any major redistribution of legal competences, and/or financial resources is out of question. This can be an overestimation of political constraints but past experience has shown how the biggest danger lies in underestimating this problem and therefore is safer to assume the lack of political determination to run against vested institutional interests. This means that any change must be incremental in nature: a new institution is needed.

The main tasks of such an institution should be:

- to provide the technical expertise needed in order to boost innovation;
- to create a neutral arena for intergovernmental bargaining;
- to act as a fixer between the interested public and private actors.

In order to accomplish such tasks this institution must have:

- a strong political legitimacy, and
- the command of additional financial resources.

The problem is partly simplified in the Milano case because of the existence of a metropolitan land-use planning agency (PIM), a sort of research institute, created some 20 years ago in order to foster intermunicipal cooperation. This stress over intermunicipal cooperation, together with its lack of political legitimacy and financial resources, certainly prevented its development into a powerful actor. In fact it acted as a technical bureaucracy, able to propose innovations and draw technical projects. Albeit not completely successful it has accumulated a big expertise and its staff (some 30 people) is certainly qualified in several fields of metropolitan interest.

But even without this important starting point it seems sensible to

predict that the creation of a technical bureaucracy will not be the most difficult aspect. If there are financial resources, to create a technical expertise is only a matter of time.

The most intriguing problem is political legitimacy: PIM is a private association formed by 99 municipalities and by the provincial administration. The governing bodies are the assembly of the Mayors, a small board and a president elected by them. Until recently the president was the Mayor of Milano. The finance comes for 1/3 from the participants, for 1/3 from the regional government and from 1/3 from the research contracts with public institutions. Clearly there is a need for maintaining some sort of relation with the existing institutions, at the same time developing an autonomous political status. Only developing political legitimacy, in fact, it will be possible to create a bargaining arena as well as an effective "fixer". Finally the total lack of finance, apart from mere running expenditures, makes impossible for the PIM to mobilize additional resources.

The existence of PIM, therefore only provides a starting point for the needed reform. However it is worth noting that similar experiences exist in other Italian metropolitan areas.

A reform of some general significance in any case, will need a national legislation, creating in metropolitan areas a public body with the following characteristics:

- no legal competences, in the form of authoritative powers and/or responsibility for specific services;
- a directly elected President with substantial powers;
- a council elected by the body of municipal and neighborhood

councillors in the metropolitan area; the electors being some hundreds, the council must be kept the smaller is possible (max 40 councillors; the size must be decided in order to allow the participation of smaller political parties, thus avoiding political vetoes);

- an important technical bureaucracy skilled in all metropolitan problems (transportation, land use planning, environment, amenities, infrastructures, but also cultural services, higher education, etc.);

- a special national fund for metropolitan areas from which the different metropolitan bodies can draw matching money for metropolitan projects.

The first condition is intended to assert the neutral character of the new actor in the intergovernmental game: not having responsibilities for direct provision of services or for regulating individual or collective behaviour should prove useful in guaranteeing the other participants against any loss of power.

The second condition is meant to create a strong political legitimacy of the new body: the president should therefore represent a wide section of the political spectrum and, being directly elected, an exception in the Italian parliamentary system, it will acquire a big political visibility.

The council, on the other hand, has the meaning of providing a permanent link between the existing institutions and the new body. Its mode of election should avoid large representative bodies, in favour of a smaller and more compact council. Furthermore it should overrepresent smaller municipalities, thus compensating for the bigger administrative strength of the central city.

The existence of a strong, albeit not necessarily enormous, technical

bureaucracy, on one hand could favour the initiative role of the new body and on the other hand can be seen by other actors as a source of technical advice and support.

Finally the existence of a national special fund for metropolitan areas will provide the new body with the amount of money needed for transforming zero-sum games in positive sum ones. However the provision that it must be used only for matching the ordinary local, regional and national finance, should preserve the incentive character of these sums.

This tentative proposal is obviously very imperfect: many points should be clarified and specifications added. Moreover it presupposes that regional government will develop its own priorities over the metropolitan area, thus entering fully the intergovernmental game and leaving open the mediating role occupied so far.

However it has two main advantages worth discussing:

- the first is the fact that it stems out of an analysis of the existing decisional network - furtherly confirming the findings of other research and theory;
- the second that it makes possible to escape the pitfalls of a traditional approach, only able to provide optimal answers failing to meet the requirements of political feasibility.

On the latter point it can be added that the "optimal" character of the traditional wisdom, has been discussed and widely criticized in the last years. Given this perplexity of the scholars, it seems far safer to observe the existing decisional trends and try to enhance the factors favouring a better, albeit probably non optimal, decisional efficiency.

NOTE

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The research project from which this paper has been originated was conducted in 1983/84 in Milano. It was originated within the so-called Progetto Milano, a big exercise about the economy, the finance, the social structure and the political and institutional characters of the metropolitan area. It has been financed and coordinated by IRER, the regional research institute, under the supervision of its president, avv.P.G.Torrani, and the general direction of prof.G.Mazzocchi. The sub-project on Metropolitan Institutions is directed by prof.G.Pastori, Catholic University, Milano. The section on decision-making processes was directed by myself and the research work was conducted by dr.Maria Weber (Bocconi University, Milano) and dr.L.Lanzalaco (EUI, Florence) for the public information system, dr.M.Ferrera (University of Pavia) for the stock exchange building, dr.S.Balducci (Milano Politechnic) for the intercontinental airport) and dr.P.Fareri (Milano Politechnic) for the metropolitan railways system. Prof.P.L.Crosta (Milano Politechnic) acted as advisor in the two latter processes. The research being still in progress, the conclusions reached in this paper, are provisional and tentative and do not engage the research group, let alone IRER or any other institution. I am indebted to all the named friends and colleagues for their different contributions, but the responsibility for any misunderstanding or misjudgement is entirely mine.

CHANGES IN GRANT AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS - A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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This paper is very much a work in progress paper and as such is not for
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CHANGES IN GRANT AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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This paper reports on work in progress on the consequences of grant changes for metropolitan governments in Britain and the U.S.A. Over the last ten years, both countries have seen the introduction and continuation of a policy by central government designed to reduce the level of national grant to local authorities in both country. In addition in Britain there has been determination on the part of central government to reduce the amount of public expenditure undertaken by municipalities. In more recent years, this policy has been adopted and strengthened by more right-wing governments under Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan. Mrs. Thatcher, through her various local government Ministers, has undertaken something like a crusade against local government, whilst President Reagan has been very concerned to reduce federal government involvement in the cities especially and to introduce what some commentators have called the 'new Federalism'.

Given that these policies of expenditure reduction and lower involvement have now run for almost ten years, it seems appropriate to attempt some sort of evaluation of their consequences for local governments and the services they provide. We have chosen to concentrate on metropolitan authorities for three reasons. First, since most people in Britain and America live in metropolitan areas, the impact of expenditure reductions will be seen and felt most strongly in metropolitan rather than non-metropolitan areas. Second, there is a strong possibility of intra-metropolitan variations existing in terms of the consequences of expenditure reductions: given the right-wing nature of the central governments involved, we might expect some redistribution of resources away from central or inner-city areas to suburban or outer city authorities. Third, concentration on metropolitan areas has the added advantage that the data are both more readily available and more manageable.¹

ENGLAND

1. TRENDS

Since the mid-seventies, the amount of local government expenditure met by grant from central government to local authorities in Britain has declined from over 40% to around 35% between 1977 and 1984. At the same time, there has been an increase in the amount of total grant which is comprised of specific grants, whilst there has been a decline in the amount available as a general unhyphenated grant. Though this latter change has not yet reached significant proportions, it differs from the American experience and is one which can be expected to continue whilst the present Conservative government is in power.

Central government introduced a policy of expenditure cutbacks when Labour were in control during the mid-seventies, following the financial crisis Britain faced in 1976. Though the Callaghan government essentially accepted monetarist guidelines as part of its economic policy, its main weapons in reducing local government expenditure were controls on capital expenditure and artificially low cash limits designed to restrict severely the amount of additional aid the centre was required to give local authorities to compensate for increased costs in any one year. As Greenwood (1981) has shown, these controls worked reasonably well in the period up until 1979, when local government expenditure as a whole was more or less on target. The new Conservative government under Mrs. Thatcher was more radical in its approach than its predecessor, both in its enthusiasm for monetarist doctrines and their implication for public expenditure and in its desire to cut back the public sector as a whole. Since local government accounted for a substantial proportion of both, clearly its activities would be at the centre of any attempt to reduce both the level of public expenditure and the size of the public sector. Foremost amongst the central government's weapons was a new grant system, introduced in 1981 largely at the behest of the Department of the Environment with Treasury backing, with Ministers believing that the new grant system would have the effect of reducing local government expenditure quickly and efficiently. When it failed noticeably to do so, the system was backed up with an elaborate series of expenditure targets and sanctions for overspending (loss of grant) for each local authority. When this system of expenditure controls proved less than satisfactory, the government introduced rate- (tax) capping powers, under which those authorities it considered to be the worst overspenders would have their tax raising powers restricted. This legislation comes into force this financial year, with some seventeen authorities being ratecapped, 16 Labour and 1 Conservative controlled.²

What have been the consequences of these changes for metropolitan authorities in England? We have considered these under three headings: changes in grant per head; changes in rates (taxes) levied, and changes in total expenditure per head, all for the period 1977-1983. The data are presented in Tables 1 - 6 in the Appendix.

1. CHANGES IN GRANT

Changes in grant have been considered for the period: 1977/8 to 1982/83, during which the new block grant system came into operation. Looking at London first, we see that for the first period grants continued to rise in money terms, but rose less quickly for the more deprived (i.e. higher need) inner city authorities than it did for either the inner suburbs (who did particularly well) or for the outer suburbs. But in real terms all London authorities lost grant per head, which is in line with the government's intentions of reducing the amount of grant given to authorities. But there are again main marked differences in the treatment of the different categories of authorities and within categories. On balance, then, we see that inner city authorities lost more grant per head than did either inner or outer suburbs. In part this is because the inner city authorities contain some of the highest overspending authorities, such as Camden, Hackney and Southwark, all Labour controlled and committed to maintaining services and jobs, and suffering considerable loss of grant as a consequence. But there are some spectacular losses amongst the inner suburbs, notably Westminster, but including Greenwich and Hounslow, whilst amongst the less deprived outer suburbs Barking, Hillingdon and Richmond lost grant heavily. Those authorities who gained grant most heavily are Newham and Waltham Forest, both heavily deprived inner suburb.

The pattern is less clear when we turn to the other metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, in real terms most metropolitan authorities continued to receive more grant during this period. West and South Yorkshire and Greater Manchester gained most as a whole, and only West Midlands lost a small amount of grant overall. Within these areas, however, experience is mixed. For example, in the West Midlands, two of the more deprived areas (Birmingham and Sandwell) lost grant quite noticeably, but so did the well off area of Solihull. In Tyne and Wear and South Yorkshire, both the main cities (Newcastle quite markedly and Sheffield only slightly) lost grant, again reflecting the fact that authorities like these are Labour controlled overspenders suffering grant penalties. In both Greater Manchester and Merseyside, the picture is confused. The inner city area of Liverpool, for example, shows a medium loss of grant, whilst the suburban area of Wirral shows a slight gain, whilst Manchester shows a heavy loss of grant (another Labour overspender), but so does the wealthy suburb of Trafford, which records the heaviest loss of grant for all the non-London metropolitan areas. It is perhaps interesting to reflect that areas like the West Midlands remain politically volatile in terms of their electoral support, as do parts of West Yorkshire, and that the inner city authorities remain Labour strongholds, though as far as the authors are aware there are no overtly partisan variables included in the grant equations.

TAX CHANGES:

How have the London and other metropolitan authorities reacted to the changing grant situation, and particularly to the loss of grant which many have suffered since 1979? As Table 3 shows, taxes in London have risen markedly in real terms since 1977, and particularly in the years since 1979 when the Conservative Government came to power. It appears generally true that all the inner London authorities have compensated for falling grants to

some extent by raising taxes. The tendency is most marked in the more highly deprived inner authorities; then in the inner suburbs. In the outer areas, most authorities record a reduction of tax rates in real terms.

Increases are particularly marked in the Labour-controlled overspenders, such as Hackney, Hammersmith/Fulham and Southwark. The one exception amongst these authorities is Wandsworth, a Conservative-controlled borough which often features at the forefront of local authorities seeking to implement Conservative government preferred policies. Amongst the inner suburbs, it is again the Labour-controlled areas like Brent and Haringey which have the largest tax increases, as again they seek to compensate for loss of grant and imposition of sanctions by raising rates. By contrast, many of the outer or richer areas were able to reduce taxes, with Conservative controlled Bromley recording a reduction in taxes of almost 10% in real terms.

Turning to the other metropolitan authorities in the rest of England, all record rate increases which on average exceed those for London as a whole. They are led by South Yorkshire, where Sheffield, long-time Labour opponent of the Conservative Government's policy of cutback, records the largest percentage increase in rates outside of London for the period under review. Tyne and Wear follows suit, with Newcastle also an authority with a heavy rates increase over the years: again another Labour authority seeking to oppose the cutback policies of the centre. By contrast, the increase in Greater Manchester, Merseyside and the West Midlands are moderate, though still exceeding 10% in real terms. Interestingly, Greater Manchester records the only authorities which managed to reduce taxes in real terms, Conservative controlled Stockport and Oldham, whilst the Labour controlled inner city area of Salford barely raised taxes at all. In the West Midlands, Labour controlled Walsall raised taxes by over a third in real terms, even though it appears not to be a very deprived area in relative terms. It is also interesting to note that many of the richer, generally more suburban areas record tax increases which are generally below 10% in real terms for the period under consideration: the one exception is North Tyne, where rates rose by almost a quarter.

Summarising these two sections, then, there has been a tendency, especially since 1979, for the more heavily deprived areas to lose grant more heavily than the less deprived authorities. As a consequence, they have sought to compensate for loss of grant by increasing local rates, raising rates by more than the average for their areas. This trend is most marked in London, but is also followed in most of the other metropolitan areas. It is largely to be explained by the fact that many of these authorities have been Labour controlled throughout the period, frequently in opposition to the Conservative Government's cutback policies. Hardly surprisingly, both suffering penalties for overspending and having above average tax increases, such authorities find themselves on the government's list of ratecapped municipalities. Such a result is hardly surprising in the light of the political and ideological nature of the struggle involved between the two sides: perhaps what is surprising is the way in which the supposedly neutral new block grant system, designed as it supposedly was to reflect a better central assessment of local government's needs for expenditure, has in fact directed resources away from those most in need in the metropolitan areas and that those in the outer areas have suffered less severely in the period of cutback.

LOCAL EXPENDITURE

What have been the consequences of the changes in grants and taxes for local expenditure between and within London and the other metropolitan areas? If we look at London first, we find that overall expenditure per head in real terms rose by just over 2.5%. But within London there are marked differences between the inner and outer areas. The outer suburbs record a reduction in expenditure per head of over 8.5%, whilst the inner suburbs record a rise of 3%, and the inner areas one of 13.5%. Within each of these areas, however, there are marked differences. In the inner areas, Labour-controlled boroughs such as Lambeth and Hammersmith/Fulham record increases in expenditure per head of over 30%, whilst Tory-controlled Wandsworth shows a reduction of almost 20%. In the inner suburbs, areas like Haringey and Brent record very large increases in expenditure per head, whilst Waltham Forest shows a drop of around 8%. Of the outer suburbs, only Richmond shows any marked increase in expenditure per head (less than 10%), whereas most record reductions of up to 21% (Kingston)..

Turning to the metropolitan areas outside London, we again find very varied experience. Taking all the areas together, they record a reduction in expenditure per head of just over 2% in real terms. Again there is a large range: Wigan in Greater Manchester shows an increase of just over 9.5%, whilst Wakefield in West Yorkshire shows a drop of over 14%. Within the West Midlands, Labour-controlled Walsall increased expenditure per head by nearly 8% in real terms, whilst Birmingham under the Tories for much of this period reduced expenditure by over 12%. During this period, Birmingham's grant fell by just over 18% in real terms; rates increased by just below the average for the West Midlands (13% as against 15%), so the city was one relatively deprived area which chose to cut services rather than raise taxes to meet the apparent need for services. Walsall by contrast was relatively better off, yet compensated for its 14% loss of grant by a mammoth 35% in taxes in real terms, resulting in an 8% increase in expenditure per head in real terms.

To take another example from West Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear, Bradford received a 30% increase in grant; increased taxes by 13% in real terms, yet reduced expenditure per head by 2.5% in real terms. South Tyne, with only a 13% increase in grant; a 10% increase in taxes, was forced to reduce expenditure per head by 11% over the same period. Both districts are the most heavily deprived in their respective metropolitan areas. Or we can compare the experience of Sheffield (Red bastion of South Yorkshire, but not a markedly deprived area) with that of Manchester (old guard Left Until 1984, but a heavily deprived area). Manchester's grant fell by 16% in real terms; taxes were increased by roughly the same amount (15%) and expenditure per head fell by little more than 1%. Sheffield by contrast lost less than 1% of its grant, increased taxes by a staggering 46% in real terms, and as a result was able to raise expenditure per head by 8%.

But one can find similar apparently illogical changes amongst the suburban, better-off areas. Compare for example the experience of solidly Tory Trafford in Greater Manchester with that of equally solid Tory Sefton in Merseyside. Trafford loses 30% of its grant in real terms; raises taxes by 8% and reduces expenditure per head by 5%. Sefton lost 8% of its grant; increased taxes by 3% and also reduced expenditure by 5% in real terms. A

similar area, Solihull in the West Midlands, had its grant increased by 5% per head and increased taxes by 7%, with the result that expenditure per head fell by just over 2%.

What these examples demonstrate for the metropolitan areas outside London is the range of possibilities which are open to local authorities who are faced with the uncertainty of rapidly changing grant and threat of sanctions for overspending. Some may opt for large increases in taxes: others prefer to introduce expenditure cuts in order to balance their books. Many authorities have also used existing balances or creative accountancy techniques to maintain services. The result is a pattern which is less clear than was the case with London (where we also found variation in behaviour).

To what extent are the trends outlined in the case of London and other British metropolitan areas repeated in the United States? Has the reduction in grant which has characterised Britain and many other Western nations during the past few years placed disproportionate burdens on those parts of metropolitan areas least able to bear them? In the United States such areas are nearly always central cities which have lower per capita incomes and higher service needs than do most of their suburbs.

AMERICA

1. Trends

Federal grants to state and local governments reached their high water mark in 1978 and have declined since then. Between 1970-1978 federal grants rose at an annual rate of 7.6% in real terms (from \$37.5 billion to \$67.7 billion in 1976 dollars). However, between 1978-1983 federal grants declined by 4.2% annually, falling to \$54.3 billion by 1983³ (see Table 7).

It is impossible to calculate the exact impact of changes in federal aid on local governments in metropolitan areas because while some federal aid goes directly to local governments, most goes to state governments which in turn pass a portion of this aid on to local governments, frequently through distributional mechanism of their own devising. In terms of assessing the impact of grant changes on local governments in a federal system, it is the combined effect of changes in federal and state aid which is most relevant. Total federal and state aid to all local governments (municipalities, counties, school districts etc.) fell by only 1.27% between 1978-1982, indicating increased state aid to local governments made up for most of the decline in federal aid. However, if we focus solely on large cities (population of 500,000 or more) and on their general purpose municipal

government, the impact of aid change is much more serious: total federal and state grant to large city municipal governments fell by 17.6% in real terms between 1978-1983. Direct federal aid to large cities fell by 26.9%, while state aid (including federal aid to state passed through to these cities) fell by 12.4% (see Table 8).⁴

In addition to changes in amount of grant, there have been substantial changes in grant structure, which have also affected the relative distribution of grant to cities and their suburbs. First, President Reagan has reduced the number of federal programs providing grant directly to local governments and has increased the proportion of federal aid sent to state governments. This has been accomplished partly through elimination of direct federal-urban aid programs such as the CETA public service employment program and anti-recessionary fiscal assistance (eliminated during the Carter Administration), but mostly through consolidation of nearly 80 categorical programs into 9 block grants in areas such as social services, elementary and secondary education and preventive health care.

Whilst some of the categorical programs consolidated had previously been provided directly to local governments, all of the new block grants are provided to state governments which are free to devise their own mechanisms for distributing funds to their localities. State governments have thus become a more important in distributing federal aid to local governments. Preliminary research strongly suggests the result has been a "spreading" effect, sending funds to a larger number of local governments rather than focusing them on the most needy. This trend would clearly favor suburbs at the expense of central cities.

In addition, the Reagan Administration has concentrated particularly on reducing the number of discretionary project grants (grants provided for a specific competitive application and the amount of grant discretionary) in favour of automatic formula grants. Project grants had been received disproportionately by larger central cities because of their superior "need" (or, as some have argued, grantsmanship ability), while formula grants spread and move broadly on the basis of objective criteria. The number of federal project grant programs has been reduced during President Reagan's first term from 320 programs allocating \$17.0 billion annually in 1980 to 210 programs allocating \$11.7 billion annually in 1983. By contrast the number of formula grants fell from 93 to 92, but funding actually increased from \$54.4 billion annually in 1980 to \$58.9 billion in 1983. (Peterson, in The Reagan Record, p.230).

2. Changes in Aid to Central Cities and Their Suburbs

How have these changes in the amount and structure of grant differentially affected central city and suburban governments? In order to examine this question we selected a sample of 20 large metropolitan areas (SMSAs) from the data set provided by the U.S. Census Bureau in their annual publication "Local Government Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties". SMSAs are composed of a central city (or cities) of at least 50,000 residents, the county of which the central city is a part, and surrounding counties which are functionally integrated with the core county. The Census Bureau publication does not, unfortunately, provide data for the central city or for other municipal jurisdictions; instead, it provides data, on a county by county basis, for each of the 75 largest SMSAs.

The finances for all governmental units within the county are aggregated, so that, for example, federal grant to the county will include grant received not only by the county government, but also all grant received by other governmental units geographically contained within the county such as municipal governments, school districts and various special districts. As a consequence, differences in the allocation of functional responsibility among units of governments within counties in different states are largely controlled for.

Since our objective was to compare central city to suburban fiscal behaviour, but this data was presented only in county form, we chose a sample of SMSAs for which the core county and the city were either completely congruent (13 cases) or in which the city population comprised at least 70% of the population of the core county (7 cases). We then compared per capita data for each of the 20 core "central city" counties with per capita data for the remaining "suburban" counties in each SMSA.

By this methodology, we calculate that from 1978-1983 federal and state aid to central cities declined by \$29 per capita in real terms (-7.0%), compared to a \$10 per capita decline in aid for suburban areas (-4.2%). The decline for central cities was due entirely to reductions in federal aid which fell by \$40 per capita in real terms (-25.9%), to \$8 per capita for suburbs (-21.4%). Thus, while the reduction in federal aid per capita was predictably greater in absolute terms for cities compared to suburbs (since cities started a much higher per capita base), the rate of decline was also steeper. (See Tables 7-9)

As a consequence of these trends, the per capita federal and state aid fell from being 78.7% greater in cities than in their suburbs in 1978 to 74.3% greater in 1983, while per capita direct federal aid to cities declined from being 332.1% greater in cities to 308.3%. It is clear that changes in the level and structure of grant during this period disadvantaged cities more than suburbs: Atlanta, Kansas City and New Orleans are all good examples.

3. Central City and Suburban Expenditure and Own-Source Revenue

Central city per capita spending was higher than suburban per capita spending in all 20 metropolitan areas in 1978 and on average city per capita spending was 42% higher per capita than in suburbs. However, between 1978-83, per capita current expenditure for the average central city fell by 0.8% in real terms, compared to a 6.7% increase for suburbs.

Central city per capita own-source revenue levels are also substantially greater than in suburbs. In 1978 the average central city raised 51% more revenue per capita than its suburbs. During the 1978-1983 period, both central city and suburb increased own-source revenue in real terms in an effort to compensate for grant reductions. Central city per capita revenue increased by 8.3% compared to 8.9% for suburbs. By 1983 central cities were raising, on average, 49% more per capita in own-source revenues than were suburbs. However, this change over the 1978-1983 period suggests a substantially greater increase in tax burdens for central city residents than for suburban residents, since central city per capita incomes are, on average, 89% those of suburban areas and since the central city increase occurred on top of a larger base. Again Atlanta, Kansas City and New Orleans

provide examples. Thus, while per capita own source revenues rose slightly faster in suburbs than in central cities, the tax burden increase on residents was 1.58 times greater on city residents.

To summarise, the data indicate that, while imposing greater tax burdens on themselves to compensate for greater relative losses in grant, central cities nonetheless were forced to reduce current spending in real terms, while suburban areas were able to achieve modest increases.

5. Accounting for Differences in City and Suburban Expenditures:

We now turn from an examination of differences in rates of change over time, between cities and their suburbs to differences in expenditure levels, asking, in particular, what accounts for these differences.

A. Regional Differences:

In both countries, there are clearly regional differences in expenditure per head between needy central areas and relatively well off suburbs. In Britain, the London case is relatively clear cut: more deprived inner areas lose grant, raise taxes and maintain or increase expenditure per head. By contrast, the outer suburbs all tend to reduce expenditure per head in the light of changing circumstances. Outside London, there are differences between the six areas, and differences between relatively deprived and relatively wealthy areas are not always clear cut. In the United States, the difference between city and suburban per capita expenditures was much lower in Western SMSAs than in other regions of the country.⁵ However, this regional variation can be explained largely by differences in needs and by changing populations within metropolitan areas.

B. Variations in Needs and Population:

In this respect there is some variation between the two countries. In London, the most heavily deprived inner city areas, though they have increased expenditure per head to a level above that of the outer suburbs over the period under review, still spent less than those authorities slightly less deprived and classified as inner suburbs. But the inner areas have been losing population rapidly, unlike some of the inner suburbs. The outer suburbs have adopted an almost uniform policy of reducing expenditure per head in the face of changing financial circumstances. Elsewhere, as we have noted, the pattern is far from clear, though the inner areas have all shown a marked tendency to lose population rapidly in recent years. Turning to the United States, differences in per capita expenditure between city and suburb appear inversely related to differences in per capita income between city and suburb, and also appear inversely related to the central city's share of the SMSA's population (i.e. high central city:suburban per capita expenditure ratios are associated with a low central city share of the SMSA population.)

Metropolitan areas in which the ratio of central city to suburban per capita income is low are likely to have high ratios of central city to suburban per capita expenditures. Thus when the central city has a disproportionate share of the low-income population, it is likely to spend more per capita to meet their, presumably greater, needs. Those metropolitan areas in which the central city : suburban per capita income ratio was below the median for

the sample had per capita city spending 1.427 times that of their suburb compared to 1.278 times for metropolitan areas with city : suburban per capita income ratios above the median. This relationship appeared to hold when region was controlled for as well. Thus, within the Northeast and Midwestern regions those metropolitan areas below the median in city : suburban per capita income ratios has per capita city spending 1.419 times that of their suburbs, compared to 1.3212 time for metropolitan areas above the median.

Differences in per capita expenditure between city and suburbs also appear inversely related to the central city's share of the SMSAs population. Those SMSAs in which the central city had a share of the SMSA population below the median for the sample had per capita spending 1.426 times that of their suburbs, compared with 1.287 times for those with city shares of the SMSA population above the median. But the impact of the central city's share of the population may also be due to income differences, as we noted above. A low city share of SMSA population, given U.S. residential patterns, probably means a high proportion of the area's low income residents within the city's boundaries, and thus a higher per capita need for services.

C. Differences in Party Control:

One major explanation for the variations found in Britain particularly lies in the nature of political control within the authority, but even this may be complex. Not only is it a case of knowing which party is in control, but whether it is essentially an old style pattern of control or more modern one, for this may also reflect different preferences about service provision.. Most suburban authorities are Conservative controlled, more willing to accept the central government's expenditure guidelines. Most of the central areas are Labour controlled, often violently opposed to the policies of expenditure reduction and service cutback which the central government seeks to impose upon them. But this distinction is too simple: one still needs to know whether one is dealing with an old style pattern of control or a more modern one. New Left authorities, like their New Right counterparts, may well adopt radically different expenditure policies from Old Left and Old Right ones. New Left authorities may well seek to maintain if not increase expenditure on services, whilst Old Right authorities may be unwilling to make the kind of expenditure cuts which new grant circumstances suggest. On the other hand, Old Left authorities may well feel that they are unable to raise taxes to the extent which is necessary to maintain expenditure levels, so make cuts instead, whilst New Right authorities both minimise tax increases (if not reduce taxes) and make significant cuts in service expenditures.

Such a clear impact of party difference is not so clear cut from the American experience: one can only suspect its impact. Central cities, after all, tend to be controlled by the Democrats: suburbs by Republicans.

D. Differences in Demand for and Supply of Public Goods:

At this point, we have to depart from our data and enter a more speculative world. It seems possible that the demand for public goods, as expressed by per capita expenditure, is likely to be higher in central areas than in suburbs and that service expectations may be higher. Sharpe and Newton (1983) have argued that different types of locality in Britain generate