



Arxiu històric FUNDACIÓ JAUME BOFILL

IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism

Institut de Ciències Socials de la Diputació de Barcelona
Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer

JUNY 1987

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IPSA RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM.

Barcelona Meeting on "Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism" (25-27 June 1987).

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.

- x Prof. St. Ehrlich (Warszawa).
- x Prof. H.G. Thorburn (Kingston, Can.)
- x Prof. P. Claeys (Bruxelles)
- x Prof. L. Graziano (Milano)
- x Prof. J.-Y. Calvez (CERAS, Paris)
- Prof. A. Donneur (Montréal)
- Prof. R. Eisfeld (Osnabrück)
- x Prof. A. Korbonski (Univ. of California)
- x Prof. P. Mawhood (Birmingham)
- x Prof. L.J. Sharpe (Oxford)
- x Prof. J. Solé Tura (Barcelona)
- x Prof. G. Vlachos (Athens)
- x Prof. P. Winzorek (Warszawa)
- x Prof. Th.O. Hueglin (Wilfrid Laurier University)
- x Prof. D.L. Seiler (Lausanne)
- x Prof. J. Botella (Barcelona)
- x Prof. M. Kaplan (Mexico)
- x Prof. F.C. Bruhns (Pittsburg)
- Prof. R. García Cotarelo (Madrid)
- Prof. A. de Blas (Madrid).
- Prof. J.M. Vallés (Barcelona)
- x Prof. J. Subirats (Barcelona)
- x Prof. J. Capo (Barcelona)
- x Prof. P. Vilanova (Barcelona)
- x Prof. Tarantini
- x *Kiev*
- x *Launceston*

IPSA RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM.

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PROGRAM.

Thursday 25. 3'30-7'30 pm

Opening Session

- Prof. H.G. Thorburn(Chairman)
- Mr. Jordi Porta, Fundació Bofill Director.
- Prof. Jordi Solé Tura: "Introductory Report".
- Prof. St. Ehrlich: Report on "Regionalism and Autonomies in Western Europe".
- Discussion.

Friday 26. Morning Session. 9 am-1 pm.

- Prof. G. Vlachos: Report on "L'Etat-Nation, la Société Plurale et l'Unification Européene".
- Discussion.

- Prof. Th. O. Hueglin: Report on "Nationalism, Regionalism and Late Capitalism".
- Discussion.

- Prof. D.L. Seiler: Report on "Peripheral Nationalism between Pluralism and Monism"
- Discussion.

Friday 26. Afternoon Session, 3'30-7'30 pm.

-Prof. L.J. Sharpe: Report on "Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System".

-Discussion.

Prof. J.-Y. Calvez: Report on "Nations et Minorités dans l'enseignement recent de l'Eglise Catholique".

-Discussion.

-Prof. P.N. Mahood: Report on "Government and Pluralism in African States".

-Discussion.

Saturday 27. Morning Session, 9 am.-1 pm.

-General Meeting of the Research Committee Members

-Prof. J. Botella: Report on "Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism in Spain".

-Discussion.

Saturday 27. Afternoon Session, 3'30-7'30 pm.

--Prof. A. Korbonski: Report on "Nationalism and Pluralism in Eastern Europe".

-Discussion.

-Prof. P. Winczorek: Report on "Regional Problems in the Unitary State: the Case of Poland".

-Discussion.

--Prof. J. Solé Tura: Tentative Conclusions.

REMARKS.

- Coffee breaks will be provided in all sessions.
- Information about suitable places for lunch and dinner will be also provided by organizers.

ALL THE SESSIONS WILL BE HELD AT FUNDACIO BOFILL , c.
PROVENCA, 324, Tel. 258.87.00.

THE MEETING IS SPONSORED BY :

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INSTITUT DE CIENCIES SOCIALS DE LA DIPUTACIO DE BARCELONA

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IPSA Research Committee on Socio-political Pluralism
Barcelona 25,26,27 June 1987

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I would just like to say a few words in the name of the Jaume Bofill Foundation to welcome you to Barcelona and to the headquarters of our Foundation.

We are delighted to have you among us for two main reasons.

The first is that this Foundation is devoted primarily to the promotion of social science research. We are therefore very keen to facilitate meetings between social scientists and more especially to create opportunities for Catalan social scientists to exchange ideas and methods with academics from other (European) countries.

The second reason is that, as you already know, the topic of this particular meeting is of great concern to Catalans. The relationship between the various levels of power - ~~regions~~, nations, states, and supranational bodies - is a constant subject of debate in scientific and political circles in Catalonia. This is not merely a passing academic-"fashion": it is proof of the permanent need for Catalonia to find the most effective way of playing her rightful part in the construction of Europe. *and the international community*

It was for these two reasons that we were glad to accept the offer of *Jordi Solé Tura* to hold this meeting here. We also wish to point out that the Social Science Institute of the Province of Barcelona has cooperated in sponsoring this gathering.

Please don't hesitate to ask for our help in solving any practical problems that may arise. And now it only remains for me to wish you a pleasant and productive discussion.

Jordi Porta
25-6-87

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IPSA Research Committee on Socio-political Pluralism
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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987

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INTRODUCTORY REPORT

Jordi Solé Tura

The first question to arise is : why this specific subject of our meeting ? Which is the relationship between pluralism and national and regional diversity? And linked with this first question we find immediately another: Is it possible to identify general patterns leading to a theory of regionalism? And if not , can a sequence of case analysis give us anything more than an heterogeneous account of different situations ?

As to the first question -- the relationship between pluralism and the national and regional realities --in the first presentation of our meeting I stressed the point of Western developed countries as the main subjects for analysis because I think that here the problem reveals itself as a mostly complex one. The ancient theory of nationalities -- developed mainly in XIX Century Europe as through abrupt economic and social transformations and through increasingly bloody wars the capitalist society changed once and again the established political frontiers -- melts with the problems arised by late capitalism, that's to say, with new patterns of economic, social, cultural and political centralization and consequently with new forms of territorial marginality.

This is a process that deeply concerns the actual working of traditional state institutions -- mainly jacobin inspired institutions -- and stresses the quest for new ways of political organization and institutional working. Social and political conflicts rooted in this new realities of late capitalisme often take the form of national and regional conflicts. And they are often theorized in terms of traditional theory of nationalities or even -- as can be

seen in Spain's Basque Country -- in terms of the theory of imperialism and underdeveloped countries. I think mostly important to identify these problems and to see if nationalism and regionalism are an ideological form or even an ideological disguise of other problems arising by the logic of late capitalism development or if we are really confronted with a revival of non solved traditional problems of nationalities in developed countries.

But it is plainly evident that the problem concerns not only Western developed countries, and so the first stress of our meeting was somewhat modified. National and regional conflicts arise and develop also in Eastern European countries, which are supposed to be strongly unified by their political systems. Yugoslavian situation is paradigmatic. But we must consider new developments in the Soviet Union, in Roumania, in Poland, some of them related to the last redefinition of State frontiers after the II World War.

To focus our analysis in Europe and in other developed zones is not only a theoretical option but a challenge. It seems to me that national and regional problems in underdeveloped countries are more thoroughly known by political scientists and more easy to comprehend in a general view, as their roots are more evident -- the process of colonial emancipation -- and the patterns of their nation building processes are more uniform, notwithstanding their increasing complexity -- as Prof. Mawhood's paper shows. By contrast, the explosion of national and regional problems in developed countries is awaiting theoretical explanations, because behind it we can find two great items to be considered: first, the relationship between new economic developments and regional marginalities; second, the relationship between these new economic developments and the centralization or decentralization of political institutions and of cultural patterns (mass media,

languages, cultural values, etc.). This is a complex field because it is difficult to define it and because it is rapidly changing. Things that seemed evident ten or fifteen years ago are not so evident by now as national minorities and regional diversities are counteracted by large integration processes -- like European Economic Community -- and by the strong uniformization of cultural patterns. Explanations based only in one set of factors -- economic, political or cultural -- are no longer sufficient to cope with overall realities.

That brings me to the second question I mentioned: the relationship between case analysis and general theory. I was myself troubled with this problem when I published recently a book on "Nationalities and Nationalisms in Spain". As I was deepening my own analysis I found absolutely necessary to avoid two theoretical temptations. First, the temptation of abstract analysis, of mere conceptual discussions about the true meaning of "nation", for example. Second, the temptation to develop a general theory from the Spanish case.

It seems to me that political concepts like "nation", "region", "selfdetermination", for example, don't have the same meaning in Spain and in Central America, in Europe and in Africa. They don't have the same meaning anymore in XIX century European history and in present Europe. "Selfdetermination", for example, is a general principle established as such in United Nations declarations. But to understand its real meaning we must descend to concrete cases, because the most important problem is not "selfdetermination" itself as a juridical and political principle but to identify the specific subject to be selfdetermined.

Some months ago I was participating in Managua in a meeting on the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.

"Selfdetermination" was a most discussed item, and when someone arised the concept of "selfdetermination" as the political basis of Atlantic Coast autonomy, the answer was very clear: the subject of selfdetermination as a right was Nicaragua as a whole, as the way to national sovereignty against foreign pression.. Atlantic Coast autonomy was seen as the way tho strengthen national unity between the two actual parts of Nicaragua -- the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts --.As selfdetermination is linked with the possibility of political independence and sovereignty, selfdetermination for the Atlantic Coast could lead to the splitting of Nicaragua as a country. The problem is, then, not selfdetermination as a political or a juridical concept, but to identify its subject and that means a political decission which can be explained only through a historical and a political case analysis.

In Spain we are discussing also a lot about "selfdetermination" and the whole of nationalist parties in the Basque Country and the majority of them in Catalonia put ahead selfdetermination as a core principle of their political programs. Even more, ETA terrorism develops in the name of Basque selfdetermination. Here also the problem is not the theoretical concept nor the abstract discussion but the real meaning of selfdetermination in our historical perspective and in our constitutional system. I will insist later in this problem.

Of course I'm not against general theories. What I want to stress is my personal conviction that there is not a single explanation of national and regional realities and conflicts -- as, por example, the explanation based on economic marginality-- and that we need cross examinations of national and regionals cases. Economic marginality can explain, perhaps, regional conflicts in France's Bretagne and Corsica but not in Spain's Catalonia and Basque Country, as

the latter are the most developed zones of Spain. Economic marginality is undoubtedly one of the causes of regional conflict in North Ireland, but it seems not possible to explain it fully if religious and cultural factors are not taken into account.

Last but not least, historical perspective is absolutely necessary not only to understand the roots of every single national and regional problem but also to understand the continuity of institutions and of collective feelings. In my opinion this is mostly important. National and regional problems in Spain, for example, can only be explained in all their complexities from a historical point of view. Only through history, political and economic factors take their full shape. So let me come to the problems of nationalities and regions in Spain to explain the full meaning of this introductory words.

II.

The strongest national and regional conflicts developed in the most economic developed zones of Spain, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. Therefore, the roots of the problem were not economic marginality but political and cultural marginality. The building of the Jacobin Spanish state, through XIX and XX centuries was not the work of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, as in France, but of a ruling class formed mainly by great southern landowners, bureaucratic cliques and speculative financial groups. The Catalanian industrial bourgeoisie, based on light industry, never was a dominant part of the state ruling class, but a secondary partner. The Basque bourgeoisie, developed lately in XIX century through the boom of heavy industry -- iron, coal, steel, machinery -- and through fast accumulation of banking capital. This Basque

bourgeoisie became the core of financial Spanish capital, but not of the political ruling class. Moreover Catalonia became an economic and cultural area unified by the powerful presence of a great urban center, Barcelona. By contrast, the Basque country lacked such an unifying urban center and an industrial city like Bilbao became something like a liberal island in a sea of traditionalist peasant land. Finally, the central ruling class -- the central oligarchy as we usually say in Spain -- was able to build a jacobin state but not to unify the whole of Spanish civil society, as the French jacobin ruling class was able to do.

To develop a system of light industry like that of Catalonia -- which depended of internal Spanish market and on a very harsh protectionism -- one political condition was needed, which the Catalan bourgeoisie was never able to attain: the control of the central State. This was not exactly the problem of the Basque Country, as the Basque bourgeoisie was already controlling banking capital. Catalan nationalism was, then, the work of an industrial bourgeoisie, powerful enough to create a zone of modern capitalist economy in a mainly agrarian country, but weak enough not to seize political power. Catalan nationalism developed as a political proposal of reform and decentralization of the Spanish state system -- that's to say, of the jacobin state. Basque nationalism, by contrast, was mainly the work of peasantry and intermediate urban groups and was rooted on traditionalism and catholic integrism. It was not so much interested in leading and reforming the Spanish state, as in becoming a separate part of Spain or even a separated State.

These two different proposals were unified as a single political problem by the brutal answer of the central ruling class, which did not accept compromising and charged the Army -- an Spanish Army humiliated in the recent war against

United States for Cuba and the Philippine Islands -- to fight nationalists. The Army became then the armed depositary of the integrity of the Spanish nation and the jacobin Monarchy against all sort of internal opposants . Catalonia and the Basque Country were treated as enemies of this State and this unified Nation, their institutions ,their cultures, their languages were persecuted and all the Catalans and all the Basques, regardless of social status, were confronted with the same centralist adversary. Consequently, all political and social groups, all social classes in Catalonia and the Basque Country clashed with the same external enemy. And this clash became more and more violent and radical as the crisis of Monarchy opened the way to military dictatorships -- generals Primo de Rivera and Franco --, which have lasted 50 years of the 87 ones of present Century. I underline that the ideological basis of both military dictatorships was the same: the fight against the "reds" who wanted to destroy monarchy and the fight against the "separatists" who wanted to destroy the unity of the Spanish nation.

The clash was specially violent under general Franco's dictatortship. In Catalonia, underground fight against Franco combined the quest for democracy with the quest for political autonomy and was the work of all political groups, mainly the work of left wing parties -- socialists and communists. In the Basque country, the fight against Franco developed in a more radical nationalist way. The different roots of both problems became once again evident. In Catalonia all political groups reached substantial agreements to develop a democratic alternative. In the Basque Country, radical nationalism gave way to political movements like ETA, which developed soon as terrorist groups.

When transition to democracy began to develop after general Franco's death in 1975, the problem of Catalan and Basque autonomy was one of the main issues to solve. But the problem was not only an institutional one, that's to say, a problem of political organization, but also an ideological one, as the clash against an external enemy like franchism developed both in Catalonia and the Basque Country a very strong collective feeling of nationality that was very difficult to integrate in the wider collective feeling of the Spanish nation, specially after a so strong phase of ultrarightist Spanish nationalism under general Franco's regime.

In the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 you can find a rather odd article -- article 2 -- in which the concept of Spanish nation is defined. It is said that Spain is a true united and indivisible nation. But it is said also that this united nation is formed by "nationalities" and "regions", that both of them have a right to political autonomy which is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution itself and that the link which maintains this nation united is the rather immaterial link of "solidarity". From a theoretical point of view article 2 seems to be an odd combination of heterogeneous elements and the result is something like a "nation of nations". But article 2 is not a theoretical exercise but an attempt to find a political solution to one of the most serious and most bloody problems of Spanish political history. Consequently article 2 is the political basis of a new organization of the Spanish traditional jacobin system in a federal-like system of political autonomies.

But I want to underline here another side of the problem. The Spanish Constitution does not limit itself to open political autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque Country, but establishes political autonomies as a general system of

State organization. Here we find the other dimension of our issue, the dimension of pluralism. Political autonomies are not seen in the Spanish Constitution only as a way to pacify the historical conflict between centralism and Catalan and Basque nationalities but also as a way to open the political system to the plurality of regional realities hidden under the artificial uniformity of jacobin centralism and as a way to find a new equilibrium between developed and underdeveloped zones of Spain. Today we have 17 Autonomous Communities, each with its Parliament and its Government. Their development is unbalanced and the change from jacobin state to decentralized state is revealing itself not only very difficult but threatened even by unpredictable backward movements, specially as regards to new conditions imposed by Spain's integration in the European Economic Community. But the challenge is very clear: the Spanish system of autonomies wants to solve the problems posed by national diversities in Spain and, at the same time, to open the way to the full expression of national and regional pluralism.

III.

This short description of the Spanish case brings me back to my first introductory statements. Economic marginalities are certainly one of the roots --and so one of the theoretical explanations -- of regional and national conflicts in developed countries, but I don't think that they are by themselves the basis of a general theory of regionalism or of national plurality. Economic factors are of course basic for theoretical explanations, but they are many-sided and are to be considered in their concrete reality. Historical and political factors are mostly important, but also as concrete elements of an specific historical development and of an specific political system.

Cultural factors can develop also many-sidedly, both as a result of political conflicts and of ideological confrontations. I mean linguistic conflicts for example. But even those are to be considered in their specific realities. In the Spanish case, for example, the clash between a majority language -- Spanish -- and minorities languages -- Catalan, Basque, Galizian -- is mainly a political clash which has had a different development following the structure, the background and the strength of each language and of the national collectivity that supports it. The situation of the Catalan language is, in this sense, far better than that of the Basque language. The conflict of national symbols -- flags, anthems, etc. -- can be a very strong one, as it has been -- and still is -- in Spain due to the specific political and historical conditions of national confrontations. And, at the same time, they can become ideological weapons to nourish increasingly conflictive nationalist movements in a historical and a political context quite different from the original one.

In my opinion, that means that many-sided analysis and cross examination of concrete cases is absolutely necessary to cope with the complexity of national and regional problems. From here we can plausibly expect to reach some general conclusions through a comparative method. It seems to me that this is possibly the nearest approach to general theory in our present field.

SOME BIBLIOGRAPHY NOTES.

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POLITICAL PLURALISM OR TERRITORIAL PLURALISM?

"Old" and "New" Regions in Spain

J. Botella

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Meeting on Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism.

IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism

Barcelona, June 1987

Table 1.- Spanish Regional Governments (December 1985).

"Historical" regions

	Left	Center, Right
'Central' parties	---	1
'Regional' parties	---	2

"New " regions

	Left	Center, Right
'Central' parties	12	2
'Regional' parties	---	---

Table 2.- Regional Elections, June 1987: distribution of seats.

	<u>Reg. Left</u>	<u>IU/PCE</u>	<u>PSOE</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>AP</u>	<u>Reg. Right</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>MAJ?</u>
Asturias	---	4	20	8	13	---	---	-
Castilla/ /Mancha	---	---	25	4	18	---	---	+
Madrid	---	7	40	17	32			-
Extremadura	--	2	34	8	17	4	---	+
Murcia	---	1	25	3	16	---	---	+
Aragón	---	2	27	6	13	19	---	-
Canarias	3	2	21	13	6	11	2	-
Navarra	8	---	16	4	2	14	6	-
Valencia	---	6	41	11	25	6	---	-
Rioja	---	---	14	4	13	--	2	-
Castilla/ /León	---	---	32	18	32	--	2	-
Cantabria	---	---	25	4	18	5	--	-
Baleares	4	---	21	5	25	4	--	-

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987



A REVIEW OF THE NATION-STATE IN
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

Marcos Kaplan

A REVIEW OF THE NATION-STATE IN
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

Marcos Kaplan.

The Nation-State in the principal Latin American countries has tended more and more toward expansion, autonomy and supremacy, as an apparatus and as an institution, as the incarnation of the public élites and as society's main actor. However, the culmination of this "Creole Leviathan" now seems to coincide with its crisis, a diversity of forces and processes threatening its primacy and independence, perhaps even its mere existence. It is therefore pertinent to review the recent trends of the Nation-State, specially those related to its nature and role, its structures and fonctions, its autonomy and difficulties. This attempt involves two simplifications: the treatment of Latin America as a whole, without considering the heterogeneity of countries and regimes; the posing of the central questions in their most general terms. It also implies an effort to overcome the predominance of reductionist approaches, and to develop a new perspective. The latter allows to assert that the State's tendency toward interventionism, autonomization, and supremacy constitutes the prevailing historical reality of the main countries of the region (Kaplan, 1978, 1969a, 1969b).

The conquest and colonization undertaken and controlled by absolutist States imposed a dynamic of centralization, omnipotence, and omnipresence of the State early on. The crucial role of the State and of the public bureaucracy made the struggle for control of the political-administrative apparatus essential and contributed to the tendency for the self-sustained and self-accumulating growth of the bureaucracy itself, of its powers and spheres of action, and to the emergence of a constellation of groups and interests around it (Kaplan, 1969a, 1981a: Chapter III; Bagu, 1949, 1952; Haring, 1963; Ots Capdequi, 1941; Zavala, 1972).

The State that developed from the period of national independence and organization onward, in itself and in its ways of action, in its realizations and in its potentialities, is not reducible to a product or a reflection of the infrastructure. It cannot be defined as a mere instrument of a dominant socio-economic class, an executant of economic policies of pure liberal orthodoxy. The State and new public élites (intellectual, political, military) constituted themselves in the process of building new political systems and, through it, they built new economies and societies. The State developed as a personnel, as an apparatus and as an institution, with a reality and a logic of its own, its own principles of structuring and of determination, and a relatively autonomous public space. It

differentiated itself and imposed its tutelage over a society that had for a long time been amorphous and incapable of regulating itself, barely coextensive with the oligarchy and its subordinated periphery, alien to majorities without representation or participation in the restricted political market. The State and the public élite differentiated themselves in varying degrees from the new oligarchy; together they co-produced and co-organized it. They solved the problem of hegemony, sharing it with the dominante socioeconomic class with which they partially integrated themselves by means of the control of the public apparatus. They never completely merged with the oligarchy or the global system.

The public élite, by its own initiative and in agreement with the oligarchy, imported and adapted the model of a sovereign, centralized, republican, representative state, under the rule of law, with a division of powers and with individual rights and guarantees. This model was superimposed on a heterogeneous set of traditional powers, structures and practices that rejected or refracted and undermined it in its true functioning. External dependence, marked socioeconomic and regional inequalities, and the concentration of political power in the hands of minorities reduced or impeded the effective application of the principles and forms of State unity and supremacy, popular participation, and representative democracy. The State appeared therefore as essentially elitist and oligarchical, taking the form of a unifying autocracy, or of a democracy with limited participation, or of a combination of the two. (Kaplan, 1969a, 1969b; Furtado, 1959; Pinto Santa Cruz, 1962; Ferrer, 1963; Sodr e, 1964; Carrera Damas, 1980; Burgin, 1946; Proyecto y Construcci n de una Naci n, 1980; Cotler, 1982; Garc a, 1981; Brewer-Car as, 1975; Martins, 1976; Vega C., 1981; Jaguaribe, 1964).

Thus constituted, the State institutionalized itself and the new system of domination, creating and reinforcing the legitimacy and consensus for both. It acquired an apparatus of government and administration, of coercion and control, and organized the army, making it perform under the watchwords of professionalism, bureaucratization, loyalty and subordination to the civil power. The State assumed a crucial role in the growth and modernization of the cultural sphere; in the imposition of solutions to the problem of hegemony; in the implantation of the conditions for the development of the economy and the society; in the successful integration in the international system and in the new international division of labour.

From the outset, the liberal political model encompassed various possibilities. On the one hand, the differentiation - between the State and civil society, between the political sphere and the economic sphere of free enterprise and free market, led to the State's tendency to assume a wide range of interventions, functions, and powers, and toward political monopoly and autonomization. On the other hand, the dilemma between liberalism (economic) and democracy (political) may be reinterpreted in two ways: Toward a more effective application of the State of Law and its optimal utilization for opposing the system and the advancement of democratization, or in the so-called democratic cesarism, or unifying and civilizing autocracy (e. g. porfirismo in México, or gomecismo in Venezuela, or the Argentine roquismo (Cossio Villegas, 1972; González, 1976; Roeder, 1973; Rangel, 1975; Gallo and Cortes Conde, 1972; Valleni-lla Lanz, 1952.

These virtualities and tendencies became more pronounced during the transition phase, from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1930 (Kaplan, 1969a). Democratic, national-populist, modernizing and reformist forces and dynamics expressed themselves in parties, movements and regimes of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Peru. The State widened the social bases for its recruitment of personnel and of class and group support; it reinforced interventionism and its role as arbiter; it restricted the assumptions and methods of functioning of the liberal model. These tendencies were partially limited and modified by structural and class conditions operating at the same time over and inside parties and governments, and by the impact of international crises and the internal changes from 1930 onward.

THE STATE IN THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS

The interventionism and autonomization of the State and the public élites were on the increase after 1930, when Latin America entered a phase of permanente structural crisis. This increase was based upon not only their previous development and own logic, but also upon the effects of the modification in the mode of insertion in the changing international system and international division of labor, of growth and modernization, of social and cultural-ideological changes and conflicts, and of political crises.

The emerging international system to which the Latin American countries were adjusting was characterized by unequal interdependency, the concentration of world power in the hands of two superpowers as poles of blocs, and the new division of labor. The Latin American nations partly were drawn and partly drew themselves almost completely into the circle of United States hegemony, suffering a constellation of domination-dependency-uneven and combined development that organized and maintained them with a low capacity for autonomy with respect to the model of development, society and political system, as well as for the handling of international relations (Kaplan, 1974c, 1976c, 1984a; Chapter II; Bedjaqui, 1979; Sid-Ahmed, 1981). The new international division of labor had decisive implications for the Latin American states, particularly with regard to multinational firms; the redistribution of productive activities in a planetary perspective; the concentration of organs and instruments of power and decision-making in the centers and pinnacles of the developed countries; these countries's search for the integration of world economics and politics in terms of unequal interdependence and the demands of readjustment of the objectives of each Latin American country in order to fit into the requirements and goals of a new world model; and the forms of restrictive revision of the principle of state sovereignty (Kaplan, 1984a: Chapter II; Fröbel et al., 1981; Skliar, 1980; Frondizi, 1947).

Growth, modernization, and a flood of social and cultural-ideological changes and conflicts accompanied this international insertion, like the inside facet of reality, as a part of a project or path of peripheral neocapitalist development (Garcia, 1972; Graciarena, 1977; Comision Económica para América Latina, 1963; Prebisch, 1981; UNESCO, 1962). This project can be characterized as follows:

(1) The association of large firms (multinational and nationals) predominated in coexistence with low productivity and low-profit firms as well as with backward or archaic nuclei and areas.

(2) Conditioned by the new international division of labor, the production of raw materials and industrial goods specialized in import substitution of goods destined for the internal market's high- and middle-class urban dwellers, and in exports to developed centers.

(3) The project was designed and carried out by political, techno-bureaucratic and business élites of the State and pri-

vate sector, with the advice and financing of great powers, multinationals, and international organizations.

(4) Financing through exports and foreign loans and investments replaced the autonomous processes of capital accumulation and technological development.

(5) The use of an abundant and a submissive labor force was combined with the importation of capital-intensive technology and State protectionism.

(6) Partial and dependent growth and superficial modernization became disassociated from integral development and replaced it. The benefits of the former were monopolized by national and foreign minorities. Growth was limited and distorted; it presupposed and reinforced the regressive redistribution of income, the lowering of levels of employment, remuneration, consumption, and welfare of the majority of the population.

The population was left with its problems: the frustration of its needs and hopes of participation and the reduction of its options and possibilities for progress. The reclassifying, concentrating, and marginalizing nature of this project and path became evident in terms of countries (the widening of the gap between central and peripheral countries of the region, and among the peripheral countries themselves); between economic sectors and subsectors, urban poles and regions, classes, and groups. The project and its implementation tended to require the existence of a political order assuring the lack of participation, apathy, and submission of the majority of the population.

Growth and modernization diversified the major forces, structures, and relations of society, as well as society as a whole, and made them more complex. Neocapitalism imposed itself as the model of production, coexisting with noncapitalist or archaic capitalist forms of production, stratification, actors, and spaces. The former intertwined itself with the latter, thus subordinating and transforming them.

New social classes, groups, and sectors emerged, particularly in the cities, coexisting and crossbreeding with other traditional ones. Complex situations and dynamics, under contradictory determinants, became common. The transition from the former phase to the new one was not the result of a deliberate action by a class or group, nor by an elite group or institution exerting pressure on the State, or controlling and using it in the framework of a transforming strategy. No collective actor deliberately promoted the changes or took advantage

of them, nor was conscious of what has happening and its implications. The changes took place primarily as a result of accidental, impersonal factors (economic, political, and military crises, a new international division of labor, confrontations between superpowers and blocs), alien to the countries of the region and their decision centers, and as the involuntary and unforeseen by-products of emergency measures favoring the system and the traditional dominant groups (Kaplan, 1984a: Chapter IV; García, 1972; Graciarena, 1967; Germani, 1962; Solari et al., 1976; UNESCO, 1962; Benítez Zenteno, 1977).

Although the oligarchy suffered a weakening of its hegemony, it retained important powers and, by means of adaptive self-transformation, converted itself into a new oligarchical élite, with the flexibility to absorb elements of change and to preserve the essence of its interests and those of the system (Graciarena, 1967; Solari et al., VI-III y IV). At the other extreme, however, those classes and groups that should have been or were partially interested in growth, change, democratization, and autonomy in the handling of international affairs -namely, the national entrepreneurs (strictly speaking), middle classes, intellectuals, urban workers, marginals, peasant groups- were late in appearing on the scene, weak, and without an original project or policy. Some of these sectors became active, criticizing and challenging the traditional domination. Yet they did so without the capacity to seriously affect that domination or to impose an alternative hegemony and project. Although the state, the public élites, and the dominant socioeconomic class partially lost the capacity to rule the nation, the intermediate and dominated classes did not gain it.

In the sociopolitical sphere, the normalization of the exceptional, the permanence of the transition set in from 1930 onward. Heterogeneous historical forces and forms -elements of progress, backwardness, and regression- combined without any restructuring that would incorporate them all under the aegis of some alternative rationality.

In these circumstances, ideologies proliferate and coexist, confronting and intertwining: Traditional conservatism, liberalism, developmentalism, national populism, socialism, and neofascism. Developmentalism predominates as a diffuse ideology, permeating the others. The forms of consciousness and the patterns of social behavior are also hybrid and contradictory.

The political parties become routinized and sclerotic. They do not adjust to rapid changes and new conditions; they lose or diminish their representativity and capacity for action. Classes, groups, and institutions tend to lack cohesion, a unified conscience, efficient representation, the aptitude to formulate and impose their interests and projects, and the ability to form coalitions. The obstacles to rational forms of political action and a wide consensus abound, as do unreconcilable divergencies and situations of incoherence, stagnation, and paralysis. The clear formulation of the problems and options, the decisions and actions regarding the crises and the fundamental questions of development become difficult. A type of political crisis tends to become generalized as a result of the confluence of two major currents of the general process (Kaplan, 1977, 1984a: Chapter V; Bourricaud, 1967; Collier, 1979; Cotler, 1982; DESCO, 1977; Fernandes, 1981; Germani, 1962; Jaguaribe, 1972a, 1972b, 1972c, 1974; Lipset and Solari, 1967; Martins, 1976; Romero, 1946; Solari, 1977).

Neocapitalist growth displaces and dissolves former forms of domination and exploitation, and imposes its own. Masses of people are liberated from traditional hierarchies, restructured and mobilized, and incited to multiply their needs and demands for satisfaction and participation. On the other hand, neocapitalism deploys its marginalizing dynamic, its tendency to the creation of an increasingly redundant population, thereby increasing tensions and conflicts. The new oligarchic élite and the traditional institutional orders reserve the centers of political decision-making and action. The accumulation and profitability of the large firms necessitate the increased concentration of power and an authoritarian order.

The oligarchic élite, however, finds it increasingly more difficult to reproduce the system. It splits up into competitive factions, and it confronts popular movements, social conflicts and antagonisms that are difficult to absorb and control. It feels the threat of the system's growing entropy. This threat becomes manifest in situations of social struggle, political instability, the reduction of legitimacy and consensus, the insufficiency of normal coercion, a vacuum of power, and crises of hegemony. Its manifestations and instruments are the proliferation of ideologies and particularly of movements, parties, and regimes including democratic liberals, center-leftists, developmentalists, national-populists, Bonapartists, reformists and revolutionary leftists. At the same time, these political attempts appear as reflecting,

continuing, and striving to overcome the crisis. All of them - partly with the exception of Cuba - affect the traditional political system, but without destroying it. In fact, they partially preserve it. On the whole, these political phenomena simultaneously render the maintenance of the old oligarchical hegemony, its rebirth under new forms, bases and instruments, and a widening democratization difficult. The alliance of the oligarchic elite and the groups of the principal institutional orders (Armed Forces, Church) become aware of the contradiction between the demands of the neocapitalist, conservative, and modernizing project they identify with and the characteristics and effects of the political crisis. This reinforces the tendency to search for a definitive solution to this contradiction by means of authoritarian or neofascist regimes and processes.

INTERVENTIONISM AND AUTONOMIZATION OF THE STATE.

In this sociohistorical context, the State and the public élites unceasingly increase their interventions, functions, and spheres, their powers and instruments, and their tendencies toward political monopoly and autonomy. Both become central actors in society, decisive factors in its structuring, reproduction, and changes. Because it predated transformations and crises, the State is better prepared and qualified than any other social actor to undertake the new challenges and tasks. It becomes more interventionist and autonomous, acting as a product of, but above all, as the producer of the forces and structures, and of the situations and dynamics being deployed.

As a separate entity placed above society, free of markets, competition, and accumulation constraints, the State is able to guarantee the general conditions of implementation, and advancement of neocapitalism and the regulation of its conflicts and tendencies toward entropy; all that cannot result from a spontaneous process, self-regulated by the market and the private enterprise. The State's interventionism and autonomization are based on and occur by means of its complementarity and service with respect to the large private firm. But to the same degree or more, they are also based on the safeguarding of the rationality of the system as a whole, the accomplishment of its functions, and the dynamics of self-accumulation in the power of the public élite.

Attentive to the global rationality of the system, to the conflictual interplay of classes and groups and, above all, to its own needs and interests, the State institutionalized itself and the principal forces and relationships of society. It is a produ-

cer of legitimacy and consensus for its own power and for the system. It establishes and readjusts the legal order. It reinforces and provides with increasing strength and efficacy its apparatus of domination and its functions of coercion; it controls and arbitrates conflicts and unifies the country. It becomes increasingly a co-producer, a co-introducer, and a co-difuser of culture and ideology, of technology and science, of human resources. It is a mediator in the relationships between the nation and the world system, the internal and the external groups.

The roles and the functions.-

A.- The State assumes primary functions of collective organization and socioeconomic policies in the following fields:

- 1) regulation of the availability and use of resources, the distribution of goods, services and incomes; the establishment of priorities with respect to needs and the items needed to satisfy them; and the setting of goals and options;
- 2) creation and administration of public services, economic and social infrastructures, and basic and leading industries;
- 3) production and buying and selling of goods and services;
- 4) direct investment, and support to private investment;
- 5) maintenance of the employment, income, and consumption levels of the population (bureaucratic work, services, social transfers);
- 6) public financing of production and profitability of the large private firm by means of instruments of transfer of resources from one sector to the other, and mechanisms of risks-and-losses socialization; and,
- (7) compensatory policies and policies designed to prevent and to overcome crises, including global pilotage, anticyclical or mere growth measures, or planned development attempts (Kaplan (Kaplan, 1969b: Chap.II; Kaplan, 1980b; Kaplan, 1983b; Kaplan, 1984a: Chapter VI; Afonso and de

Souza, 1977; Ianni, 1971; Martins, 1976; Pinto, 1971; Prebisch, 1981).

B.- In carrying out their functions and in accumulating power, the State and the public élites reinforce and adjust an apparatus of domination and social coercion that expands their personnel as well as their powers, resources and spheres and makes these more complex. The set of old and new institutions combines public and entrepreneurial bureaucracies, parties and labor unions, semigovernmental or formally independent parties and labor unions, semigovernmental or formally independent administrations, forms of planning, and participation of the armed forces and the techno-bureaucracy. The State becomes more centralized as an apparatus and as an actor and power center. It redefines its nature and its functions, acquiring a diffuse manner that goes beyond its institutional formalization. Internally, it becomes more segmented and complex.

The State reinforces its monopoly of violence and control, decisions and directions of society, and regulation. A subsystem of control maintains classes and groups within the limits compatible with the system, regulating their demands by means of a combination of open coercion and induction of consensus. The State tends toward the application of an integrative control in the ideological, political, administrative, and police spheres. It intrudes into the private lives and everyday existence of its citizens, and supervises and politicizes institutions.

The centralization of State power manifests itself through the rise of the executive branch to the detriment of the other branches (legislative, judicial); the submission of the mass media and of public opinion; the increased technicality of political and administrative life; the increasing techno-bureaucratization, militarization and repression. The State tends to atomize and subordinate society to its authority; to convert it into an amorphous and inert body, lacking means of expression and participation, with few or no instruments for self-regulating and for controlling the native Leviathan.

As an arbitrating entity, the State regulates relations and conflicts between classes, groups, and institutions. It imposes compromises and provides headquarters, setting and mechanisms for the political unification of the dominant factions and for solutions to hegemony struggles. With respect to the middle and lower classes, on the one hand, the State creates and guarantees their conditions of domination and exploitation. On the other hand, faced with nationalist, populist, developmental-liberal, and socialistic pressures, the State intervenes in favor of groups from the most populous classes to achieve consensus, limited participation, and the creation of national loyalty in favor of integration and international politics and policies (Frondizi, 1955; DESCO, 1977; Germani et al., 1973; Graciarena, 1967; García, 1972; Ianni, 1971; Kaplan, 1957; Kaplan, 1977; Lowenthal, 1975; Pinto, 1971; Solari, 1977; Weffort, 1978; Fernandes, 1979; González Casanova, 1966).

C.- From and through its centers and enterprises, its formal education and its daily pedagogy, its mass media and its corporative organizations, the State has in charge a constellation of cultural and ideological functions. It becomes increasingly a producer of diversified human resources, of organizational informations (social know-how and know-why, technology and science), of generative rules (values, norms, patterns of personality and of behaviour)). The State has a decisive role in the socialization and in the integration of groups and individuals. Its logic and behavior as a State also play a crucial role in the conformation and

typology of intellectual groups (guardians of the system, servants of the public power, allied or dominated groups, bearers and vehicles of subversive projects, etc.) (Kaplan, 1984c, 1970, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c, 1983a; Lipset and Solari, 1967; Graciarena, 1977).

D.- In its international politics and policies functions, the State primarily creates the conditions of external dependence, of insertion in the new international division of labor, and of launching and advance of peripheral neocapitalism. It does not do it all however as a mere instrument of foreign groups, powers and interests. The State is the great mediator between internal and external groups, between the national society and the developed metropolis, between autonomy and dependence. Its policies divert internal forces and tendencies that would threaten the system toward the exterior. They provide national bases that can be mobilized to reinforce the maneuvering power of the government élites vis-a-vis the States and the corporations of hegemonic powers and developed countries. Nationalist claims, attempts at regional cooperation and integration projects and systems, and the demands and activities designed to restructure the international order all simultaneously seek the renegotiation of dependence, the achievement of advantages within the present world system, and the strengthening of state autonomy. The presently developing international/national crisis adds to this constellation of factors and goals a life-or-death, survival-oriented dimension (I come back to this matter later, when dealing with the limits of State intervention and autonomy) (Kaplan, 1968, 1969b, 1972, 1974c, 1976b, 1981b, 1981c, 1984b; Bedjaoui, 1979; Solari, 1976, 1977; Sid-Ahmed, 1981, Puig et al., 1973; Grabendorff et al., 1984; Wionczek, 1964; Mayobre et al., 1965; Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1966; Vacchino, 1981; Wallerstein, 1984).

E.- State interventionism and autonomization express and reinforce themselves also by and through the constitutional and legal regime. The latter must be readjusted to realities modified by economic growth, by social changes and conflicts, by the political crisis, by the primacy of the State and its changing relationships with civil society. The readjustments have seldom been accomplished as self-transformation of the same prevailing order, by and through its own premises and mechanisms (as in the case of the Mexican Constitution of 1917). In the majority of the cases, the constitutional order and the liberal-democratic legality are openly suppressed; or subordinated and distorted with apparent respect of their validity; or are modified and unbalanced by the introduction of elements discordant and incompatible with their original contents and forms (Carpizo, 1978; Fix-Zamudio, 1984; Brewer-Carías, 1975; Tapia Valdéz, 1980; Gros Espiell, 1977).

The readjustment had to face problems, to assume goals, and to fulfill tasks as the following:

- 1.- Institutionalization of an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian State power, and of the social and command-obedience relationships required by the model of society, of growth and of modernization.
- 2.- Formulation and redefinition of the basic rules of the sociopolitical game; specially the referred to the acquisition and the exercise of power; the criteria of admisibility to participation; the interest- and pressure-groups, the power factors, the corporatist tendencies and forms.
- 3.- The reorganization of the domination- and exploitation-relationships: individual and collective rights; political parties; trade-unionism; updating of repressive codes.
- 4.- The legitimation of the exceptional regimes.
The increase of the number of activities and of behaviours defined as hostile to the system, for their illegalization and repression.
- 5.- The blurring away of the frontiers between Public and Private Law, and the increase of gray zones and inter-crossings.
- 6.- The imposition of a minimal coherence for the disintegrating heterogeneity of interests, of initiatives, and of conflicts. It is so specially referred to: the structuring of roles, status, fonctions and relations between classes and groups; to the form of society as a whole; to the control of group and individual behaviours; to the guarantees of calculability and previsibility for the main units of the system.
- 7.- The reinforcement and the consecration of the breaking-up of the division and balance of powers, of the weakening and the submission of the legislative and judicial powers to the executive, or the de jure or de facto disappearance of the former.

Thus, interventionism and autonomization develop as the result of the confluence of the factors and forces, of the fonctions and processes above considered, and also of the following: .

F.- A global entity resulting from the interrelations among the forces, structures, and processes that constituted it, yet with its own characteristics and capacities, the State intervenes in and develops its own genetic conditions; constitutes meta-organizations and meta-systems that integrate and reinforce their own evolution; hypertrophies, accumulates, and centralizes new powers and resources; and increases its own interests as apparatus-institution-group.

An epicenter more than an epiphenomenon of society, the State distances itself more and more from the latter. At the same time, the State penetrates and impregnates society, establishing a network of symbiotic and parasitic relationships with it, of domination and of service.

G.- The administrative and political personnel, especially the entire civil and military techno-bureaucracy, grow and reinforce themselves. They specialize and develop their own interests and powers. They are more conditioned and determined by acting within and for the State than by any other circumstance, including class relations and kinship (of origin or of support).

This has been occurring not only in the case of high officials and political cadres, but also in the case of the administrative bureaucracy, as a specific social segment and a type of organization. This bureaucracy carries out mediatory and regulatory functions with respect to classes, groups, and institutions. It establishes power relations with these and makes them dependent upon the State and upon itself for their existence, for the satisfaction of their interests, and for the granting of privileges. Part of this bureaucracy is recruited in the nondominant sectors (middle and lower classes) that find possibilities of life, upward mobility, and participation in the civil service. Bureaucratic groups take the classes and groups of the majorities into account, organize them, and control and manipulate them as a base and as clients. Subsystems of power and constellations of interests that reinforce their autonomizing tendencies are generated within and around the bureaucracy (Brewer-Carías, 1975; Cardoso, 1972; Collier, 1979; Kaplan, 1980b, 1984a; Martins, 1976; Lipset and Solari, 1967; Smith, 1981; Stepan, 1973).

As an extreme expression of this tendency, the armed forces become politicized and assume the tutelage of the nation. They tend to convert themselves into a techno-bureaucratic élite and into armed politicians, converging with sectors of the civil techno-bureaucracy in agreements and projects as well as in government experiments (Collier, 1979; Cotler, 1982; DESCO, 1977,-1978a, 1978b; Fayt, 1971; Jaguaribe, 1974; Kaplan, 1979, 1980a, 1984b; Lowenthal, 1975; Mercier Vega, 1971; Stepan, 1971; Waldmann and Garzón Valdés, 1982; Potash, 1969, 1980).

H.- As a dynamic system in conflictive and changing societies, a mediator and an arbiter, the State is affected by classes, groups and institutions, and must therefore resort to strategies and tac-

tics that will maintain its supremacy. The State and the public élite must partly reflect its image and partly function as an autonomized entity, a supreme force vis-à-vis society and its principal components and actors.

The divisions of the dominant socioeconomic class into competitive factions and its incapacity to develop a unified class conscience and will, force it to seek out or submit to the public élites as the State's representatives and proxies in official matters. The State's personnel and apparatus finish structuring the dominant class as such; they resolve the problems of hegemony and defend it against both internal and external enemies and threats.

The power block is heterogeneous rather than monolithic, divided by contradictions between factions and institutional orders, and eroded by pressures from other classes, groups, and social movements. Different sectors and branches of the State can become seats of power or representatives of nondominant groups competing for control.

The strengthening of the State and of its autonomization implies and requires an apparent/real neutrality, efficient to the extent that public personnel think and act according to their own ideological and political categories -categories that act as mediators- and are convinced of their own neutrality.

The democratization of recruitment, by means of mechanisms of individual and group promotion, opens the doors of State organs to politicians and administrators drawn from the middle and lower levels. The competition and conflict within the dominant class favor the pressures of the subordinated and dominated classes and the achievement of measures that benefit them. The State arbitrates between the dominant groups, and between these and the middle and lower classes, particularly in those situations that threaten the system's stability.

The State's decisions are taken and its actions carried out according to an order of priority of actors, interests, and objectives that tends to favor: (1) the public élites; (2) the needs of the system, global rationality; (3) the strongest factions of the dominant class; (4) the dominant class as a whole; (5) the strongest and best organized factions and groups of the dominated classes; and (6) the scattered and marginalized factions and groups of the popular strata.

LIMITS AND CRISES OF STATE INTERVENTIONISM
AND AUTONOMIZATION.

Always present and fluctuating, capable of extreme latitude, the autonomization of the State nevertheless suffers from restrictions and must remain within certain limits (Kaplan, 1984a, 1978).

The system's boundaries and constraints, its patterns of structuring and functioning, condition and determine the State, restricting its role and its policies as well as the scope and results of its actions. On the one hand, States and multinational firms of the developed-capitalist countries, the big international financial institutions, and, to a lesser extent, in some countries of the region, the Soviet Union and other member of its bloc, act as power centers outside of Latin America. They make fundamental decisions with regard to decisive aspects and levels (commercial movements, terms of trade, capital flows, monetary reserves and fluctuations, import capacity, indebtedness, control of vital resources, accumulation- and technological-patterns, etc), thereby reducing the accumulation and productivity of Latin American economies, and their States' and societies' possibilities for autonomous development, intra- and extra-regional cooperation, and the promotion of a favorable change in the international order (Kaplan 1984a: Chapters II and VII; Sid-Ahmed, 1981; Grabendorff, 1984; Wallerstein, 1984). The continuous and ruthless deployment of the new international division of labour, of the world economic crisis, and the rigidly intransigent attitudes and behaviours of the North powers vis-a-vis the South, have been acting endlessly as powerful external constraints of the Latin American Nation-State (Kaplan, 1981c).

On the other hand, when the Latin American State promotes economic growth, and the accumulation and profitability of the large firm and the private sector, it does so in terms of its own vision, positions, and interests. Thus, it often creates limits and negative restrictions for large enterprises and groups from the dominant classes. These firms accept State interventionism in a conditional and transitory fashion; they transfer to the State all kinds of problems, tasks and conflicts, and burdens y costs of normal situations, short-term, short-term difficulties, and structural crises, while denying or retracting the resources needed for normal functioning and its capacity to reach solutions. The structural existence and worsening of the fiscal crisis, and the ambiguous attitudes of the private sector vis-a-vis the public enterprises, illustrate plentifully this type of fundamental contradiction. The private enterprises use the failures of public powers as a constant demand for reducing the latter's autonomy and interference. (Kaplan, 1984a, chapters VI, VII).

The State and public elites see their possibilities for action as limited. Both find it difficult to act outside of or against certain class and power relations that set the boundaries and restrictions of the system. They cannot dominate the social and political game in which they participate and are forced to accept many of its conditions. They must compensate for and regulate the major dynamisms, disequilibriums, and conflicts a posteriori. They are less and less in a position and with a capacity for guaranteeing mere growth, and moreover real development, and with this their authority and legitimacy are eroded and decline.

The project of development as something to be accomplished in the name, with the participation, and for the welfare of the majorities, is replaced by the evidence of a process confiscated by and for privileged élites and groups. Misery, deprivation, marginalization of the majority sectors, the stagnation of growth, the crises in the national and the international economies, lead to political instability, to the questioning and weakening of the State. It leads also to the restriction of democracy, of political participation, and to the reduction of the role, the meaning and the effectivity of parties, intermediate groups and elections (KAPLAN, 1985b).

The tendencies to social turbulence and political participation are restricted and countervailed by a convergence of factors and trends (transnationalization, monopoly capital, informal economy, criminal economy, structural and massive unemployment, general insecurity and misery, socioeconomic redundancy for whole sectors of the population). Majority groups tend to become superfluous (and therefore potentially expendable or exterminable), and to withdraw from the organized economy, the structured social life, and the normal and meaningful political life. They tend to become more and more dependent from dominant élites and groups, from their agents, and from the State and the Executive power. The State and the public élites, the institutional orders for physical and spiritual repression (Army, Church), the oligarchical groups, but also most of the oppositional parties, militate in favour of the decline of the role of middle and popular classes in politics, in the debate of policies, and in the polity as a whole. They promote the depoliticization of sociopolitical and developmental issues and processes. State centralization and coercion, authoritarian and fascist regimes, a large and energetic set of legislative and administrative instruments and mechanisms, deemed against the population, are parts of a general process of terror and intimidation, or manipulation and corruption, by the State and by private groups.

These factors and tendencies increase the weight, scope, and efficacy, inside the State, and of the latter vis-a-vis society, of the Executive power and its personal incarnation; of military-political establishment (formal-legal and clandestine-criminal); of the technobureaucrats politically minded and involved; of the information and communication experts; of the corrupted-corrupters politicians and public managers. All of them are more or less colluded with regional and local groups, with constellations of private interests (including the increasingly important economic-political maffias).

This context and this trend reproduce and reinforce different restrictions to the autonomy, the representativity and the efficacy of the State. Structural restrictions reassert themselves - against individual promotion and the effective democratization of the recruitment of political leaders and cadres. Cohesive and regulatory mechanisms operate on the governing and administrative groups: identical professional practices and conditions; means of sociability, education, information, and communications, as agents of a conservative indoctrination and the imposition of political taboos. Members of the dominant socioeconomic groups and of the political and administrative leaders, are connected by a network of ties (economic, social, familistic, recreational, corruptive, etc.). Branches and organs of the State apparatus with a key role in the decision-making system are controlled by representatives of the hegemonic factions and institutions (armed forces, church, etc.), with the capacity to dominate other parts of the State. Dominant groups produce calls to order to public personnel, in the face of what is, or is considered, an excessive tendency to autonomization and regulatory interference (withdrawal of capital, monetary and financial disequilibriums, shortages, political campaigns for destabilization, shortages, foreign support, coups d'état, etc.).

The weight of dominant groups inside the State, and as influences and controls exerted from outside, are not countervailed nor annulled by the gravitation of majority groups. The latter are marginalized and dominated, split and desarticulated, without projects of their own, threatened and hurt by the legal and de facto restrictions to participation. The weakening or the dismembering of any form of people's power and authority, of its organizations (representative, party-type, trade-unionist, socioeconomic, cultural), is permanently looked for by the State and the public élite, and by the oligarchical élites and repressive institutions.

The necessity of legitimacy and consensus maintains the call to popular participation and to developmental efforts, and with it, the common use of national-populist rhetoric, of symbolical mobilization, or the rituals or plebiscitary democracy, and of charismatic personalities and techniques. The population is called for coo-

peration , under conditions of law and order, of depolitization and passivity, of authoritarian and clientelistic manipulation, of corporativistic structuration if possible. The majority groups are warned to avoid the external enemies and dangers, as responsible of the backwardness and the dependence. They are exhorted to collaborate for development, receiving, as concession from above, immediate partial benefits, or their promised realization in some future. The priority or the exclusivity tend to be given to the establishment of direct relationships between the ones who govern and the ones who are governed, with the reduction or the suppression of intermediate groups, of secondary organizations and, in general, of everything implying autonomous organs and processes of the civil society.

In this manner, the State subsists and operates under the restriction of its interventionism and autonomization. Its policies reinforce the dominant groups, harming and marginalizing the majorities. Such policies multiply tensions and conflicts that revert back on the State, thus reducing even more its capacity for action. The intensive use of power by a State that is more and more centralized and the reinforcement of coercion and control, as opposed to persuasion and consensus, accentuate the contradiction between the concentration of powers, privileges, and benefits, in the hands of public and private minorities, and the prerequisites and components of democratic legitimacy and a consensus of the majority (Kaplan, 1984a: Chap. VII, 1980b: Chap. 1, 1969b: Chap. II).

The State becomes weakened as an agency of mere conservation, of changes inherent in the system, of growth and, above all, of development. The policies and actions for this diversity of objectives are postponed or inadequately undertaken by states that are unrepresentative, not supported by a dense fabric of innovative forces, pressured or controlled by conservative minorities whose legitimacy and consensus are on the decline, and absorbed by the difficulties of immediate survival. State interventions are undertaken in an improvised manner and under the pressure of contingencies and emergencies. They turn out to be inorganic and contradictory, receiving their own irrationality and anarchy as feedbacks.

The State uses its instruments and organs insufficiently. It abdicates on its possibilities and powers and adopts a self-limiting position with respect to its role as a minimal regulator and problem-solver (or trouble-shooter). It therefore does not provide the impulses and resources, the values and norms, and the options and actions that any project or strategy (of growth or of development) would require. Its policies fluctuate between a national-populist-statist orientation and an élitist-privatist-neocolonialist one, and their hybrids. The difficult coexistence between the public and private sectors fortifies the latter, thereby reducing the

autonomy and weight of the State.

In its interventions with respect to interests of unlikely conciliation and problems and conflicts that are difficult to settle, the state lacks effective patterns and capabilities for perceiving, evaluating and solving the principal questions of society and politics. The characteristics of the social transmitters and the receptor State contribute to this deficit.

Information on the needs, demands, problems, and conflicts of classes, groups, institutions, regions, and systems, is given in a deformed manner by an opaque and contradictory society by means of distorting mediatory circumstances, enigmatic or ambiguous messages that are difficult to decipher. Given the nature and modalities of the changes and crises, and the lack of a lasting solution to the questions of hegemony, no class or group completely and exclusively dominates the State or uses it unrestrictively in terms of its own interests and projects. A variety of forces exerts pressure on and within the State, disassociating and paralyzing it. They interwine with State factions and organs and reinforce the latter's competition and rivalries, lack of coordination, anarchy, and inefficiency.

The State's apparatus and personnel suffer from a dialectic of centralization and dispersion. The excessive accumulation of power and authority in the central government, its executive nucleus and the high-level techno-bureaucracy, weakens the legislative and judicial powers as well as public opinion, what manages to be civil society or tries to become or survive as such, and the national majorities. On the other hand, political and administrative groups abound within the State apparatus, exerting a feudal-type control over its branches, organs, and public enterprises. The linking of the groups with sectors of civil society occurs by means of a network of relations, services, and mutual support, and through specific forms of corporatization and clientelism. Excessive authoritarian centralization and feudalistic dispersion contribute to the creation or reinforcement of entities, mechanisms, and responsibilities of the State apparatus, and to the erratic search for emergency solutions and isolated reforms.

As an apparatus-institution-group, the State becomes more and more heterogeneous and contradictory. To a great degree, it defines itself, decides and acts blindly and by trial and error. With regard to its policies and activities, insufficient solutions, ambiguous results, failures, and crises occur one after another. These, in turn, reinforce the causes of the restrictive and negative effects for State interventionism and autonomization.

The "native or creole Leviathan" reaches its culmination almost simultaneously with its entrance into a strong, deep and long-lasting crisis. Diverse forces and processes both within and outside the State coerce and erode it, threaten its existence, autonomy, and supremacy, as well as the efficiency and scope of its actions. At the same time, equal or similar causes and dynamics create positive feedbacks or countertendencies of maintenance or reinforcement of the State.

The intensity, depth, and unpredictable duration of the international crisis and of the ongoing mutation, in conjunction with the unsatisfactory results and negative effects of the model of growth and of insertion in the new world division of labour, with its increasingly evident stagnation and frustration, multiply the number of problems and conflicts to which no solutions or actors capable of proposing and implementing solutions seem to be available. The State and corporations of the hegemonic power and of other developed countries, international institutions, and factions of the dominant socioeconomic classes are unable to take control of and to carry out the functions of government and administration in the Latin American nations, even in situations of catastrophic crisis and imminent national dissolution. Thus, the need for and the possibility of mediation and arbitration, of initiative and innovation, of the political power institutionalized as the State increases as the only guarantee of the conditions of recuperation or renovation of the cohesion, unity, equilibrium, and continuity of the national systems, or of their progressive transformation. As a result, the situations of and tendencies toward the autonomization and self-accumulation of powers and resources, of possibilities of action and privileges by and on behalf of the State and public élites are maintained and reinforced, with the support and in benefit of the peripheries, clientele, and sociopolitical alliances as well.

Statism as a general tendency could then manifest itself in a variety of types and ways, whose definite form would depend on a combination of dimensions such as the nature, circumstances, and outcomes of the major conflicts and crises; the alliances of élites, classes, groups and institutions; the internal impact of external factors; the redefinition of the model of development and the system; the redeployment of relations between State and civil society, between the public, private, and social sectors, between State and law (Díaz, 1977; Kaplan, 1985b); the prevalence of authoritarianism (from the Right or from the Left), or of radical and permanent democratization, and, in either case, the degree and form of each macro-alternative. To it must be added the option between self-enclosure in national autarchy, or advances toward increasingly large regional and international forms of cooperation and integration (Kaplan, 1968, 1969b, 1972, 1981c).

A possible typology of States, considering the specifications derived from the political regimes and social-historical particularities of the Latin American countries, could therefore be comprised by the following: Neofascism; National-Populist Bonapartism - (Kaplan, 1977); Authoritarian Collectivism; and the Democratic Social State of Law (Kaplan, 1974a, 1983b, 1984a; Chapter IX; 1985b).

The historical experience of Latin America in the last decades shows that the first three alternatives, tried many times but liable to repetition, mutually different in many aspects, yet coincide in something essential. The three have revealed an incapacity of the State in relation to the overcoming of backwardness, of external dependence and of the crisis; to the attainment of growth, of welfare for the majorities, of respect for human rights, of full democratic participation, and of capacity for the design and the launching of a process of autonomous and integral development.

The Latin American experience shows also that the primacy and ruling role of the Nation-State is indispensable but insufficient. In all its varieties, the Latin American State is going through a grave crisis, but can succeed in its own recovery, through a transfiguration under the forms of a New Democratic and Social State of Law. The latter only can emerge and deploy all its potentialities inside a constellation in which, together with the public political power, must take places and play prominent roles: an alternative way/style of development; a new alliance of élites, classes, groups, social spaces and institutions; a process of permanent and radical democratization, expressed and fulfilled in new socioeconomic and political forms and structures of participation, of power and authority, of legitimation and consensus, of decisions, of relations between the State and civil society, the public, social and private sectors.

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REGIONALISM AND AUTONOMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE
SOME HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

Stanislaw Ehrlich

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Regionalism and autonomies in Western Europe

Some historical and theoretical reflections

The proliferation of regionalism and autonomous movements and their institutionalization is relatively a new phenomenon. It came to the fore after World War II. But in a broader context of political theory and political practice in Central and Eastern Europe it was an old problem. It had its roots in the famous argument between the Austromarxists and the bolsheviks. The first headed mainly by Otto Bauer put forward the following definition of the nation as "the totality of men bound through a common destiny into a community of character"¹. It is easily to note that in this definition the role of the common territory was played down. This position triggered off the criticism of the bolsheviks /Lenin, followed by Stalin/ which indicated that only territorial institutionalization of ethnic and national interests can be their proper guarantee. This meant that institutionalized territory is the very basis of national sovereignty, which could shield ~~MA~~ from inroads of hostile neighbours. Cultural autonomy, the tradition of a common destiny could not create this necessary guarantee. However, a serious misunderstanding crept into the criticism of the bolsheviks, because Otto Bauer's thesis was, that in capitalist society nothing more could be offered, whereas "socialism leads necessarily to the realization of the principle of nationality. But while socialist society gradually constructs above the national community a federal state in which the communities of the individual nations are once again incorporated, the principle of nationality changes into that of a national autonomy... Thus the socialist principle of nationality

is able to combine the advantages of both the bourgeois principle of nationality and national autonomy. By organizing the nation as a community it gives it the right to legislate and to administer itself, power to dispose over the means and the product of labour, military power"².

But I have to drop this almost forgotten controversy and state simply that the principle of territorial, national sovereignty was successfully tested in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia /the Kazachstan incident and the Kosovo riots being the very rare exceptions/.

What Otto Bauer did not foresee, however, that this principle of territorial national sovereignty and ethnic autonomy could work also in capitalist states, although under the impact of internal centrifugal tensions, both ethnic and merely decentralist, and also under the influence of Eastern socialist federations.

Different patterns of regionalism and autonomies in Western Europe.

Sketching above a kind of theoretical common denominator I had no intention to minimize the diversity of institutional solutions in Western Europe. In fact their variety is impressive. Each case should be analyzed in its peculiarity.

The first major attempt to overcome centralist uniformity was the Italian constitution passed after World War II. Two principles were in it amalgamated: mega - decentralization /the provinces got their governments with unprecedented broad powers/ combined with the safeguard on the peripheries of distinct ethnical interests of the French- and German-speaking minorities; and on the two big isles, where an acute feeling

of self-identity was an important political and social factor. In this period the Italian constitution was the most progressive in Western Europe.

The political process in Belgium seems to have now a stabilizing tendency giving to both ethnic entities the chance to remain "separate but equal" under a national roof with Brussels as the common capital. The evolution to a full-blown federation remains open but this alternative is not the matter of the nearest future. The analogy with Canada seems stretched as the preponderance of anglophone provinces in number, population and wealth over Quebec creates a completely different situation. The analogy simply boils down to the abandonment of the idea to split the federation of Canada by the secession of Quebec and in the case of Belgium of the abandonment of the idea to replace Belgium by Flemish and Wallon states...

Let us ~~have~~ a brief look on some other cases.

A ~~less~~ United Kingdom ^{//} emerged the first time when a document was published by the British Government "Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales" /September 1974/ followed by ^(α) "white book" under the title "Our Changing Democracy, Devolution to Scotland and Wales" /November 1975/. These documents were implemented in due constitutional course. Thus a deep-going reconstruction was achieved³. The ~~crux~~ of the matter consisted in the ~~acknowledgement~~ of the diversity represented by the tradition of the Scottish kingdom and Welsh history, culture and language: in the acknowledgement of their right to ethnic identity within the framework of the "basic unity". Adequate autonomous institutions were created in order to safeguard the new acquired rights. Two features seem to characterize this development: The failure of the extremist nationalist tendency

represented by the Scottish Nationalist Party which after a brilliant start lost considerably momentum. It turned out that the claim to the "Scottish shelf" was economically and politically not feasible. The Welsh Nationalists did not succeed in reviving a forgotten and very difficult language and had to abandon their ambitions. The second feature of this reform was the strengthening of the push for decentralization. And this coincidence reminds somewhat the solutions of the Italian constitution. Northern Ireland's problems have to be approached in a different way, because they ceased to be the internal problems of the United Kingdom. Probably in some distant future they will be solved on an international basis in the course of negotiations not only between the local communities but also between the governments of U.K. and Ireland, too.

These two trends: territorial autonomy of ethnic and national minorities linked to global regionalism in a given state structure are to be found also in other countries, what confirms the usefulness of the systemic approach.

A similar pattern of development may be found also in France and Spain. However, the historical antecedents in Spain /like in Italy/ conditioned incomparably deeper going structural changes than in France.

In the latter country it turned out that the drive for ethnic self-identification was rather weak and soon declining. The unrest in Brittany - some years ago - had rather economic roots, and what language and culture concerns, the desire to revive age-old Celtic traditions was not sufficiently widespread. But the Britons - like all other Frenchmen living outside Paris /la province/ - were keenly interested in the overcoming of the age-old bureaucratic centralism embodied

in the stiff prefectoral system. The population of the provinces was interested in a greater say in local matters.

The centrifugal forces were only concentrated in two regions: in the "pays des Basques" and the isle Corsica. In the first case like in other regions of France dissatisfaction of the local population was largely influenced by economic reasons not connected to political ambitions whatsoever to join across the border Great Euzcadi. In Corsica, on the contrary, the minority of the separatist movement were out with ^{the} battle-cry: secession, sovereignty. There was even a period when this trend overgrew into open terrorism. But it finally shrank to rare -although sometimes bloody - incidents, without any chance in the foreseeable future to dominate the public life of the isle.

The development in Spain from the Iberian brand of fascism to ^{an} authoritarian state /Franco in his last period/ and from the latter through peaceful revolution to a transformation into a Western-type democracy, presents ~~to~~ a foreign social and political analyst tricky problems. For a scholar coming from the East it would be even more risky to elaborate on Spanish institutions in Spain - especially in the presence of one of the Founding Fathers of the Spanish constitution and in the same time the ¹Dege of this Faculty...

So, I'll limit myself to some sketchy reflections. The complex of regional problems in Spain seems extremely diversified. There are regional units which developed an old culture and language and a strong consciousness of selfidentification like Catalu^{na} and the Basque Country, where extremist nationalists striving for secession and sovereignty don't hesitate to use the weapon of terrorism. The element of cultural and national identification plays a lesser role in other provinces but

nevertheless distinct historical destinies, economic and social interests moulded them into entities of their own. The foreign observer who would be inclined to play down these differences to the level of picturesque folklore would be seriously mistaken. In spite of essential differences the provinces of Spain have one interest in common: to limit the power of the decision making center /hence the general interest in decentralization which encompasses these regional special interests/ and to maintain the unity of the country, the strength of the whole.

Some conclusions and new vistas

In this way we approached the conclusion that the interplay of differences and the urge for unity became the universal way of overcoming an uniformist, obsolete centralism. The second conclusion which might be drawn is thus: diverse forms to institutionalize ethnic, national and religious interests are bound to have a territorial basis. It seems obvious that this is the best form to safeguard these interests and to discharge mounting tensions and to prevent a cleavage difficult to bridge. The policy of compromise proved true in some countries in others not. From the vista of the decision - center of the state these reforms may be considered as pluralist concessions. But from the point of view of centrifugal extremist tendencies they have to be rejected because they do not satisfy the desire for ethnic self-identification.

The tragic fate of Lebanon is ^acase in point, it seems to confirm the assumption of the necessity of a "territorial solution". The founders of the Lebaness democracy have brushed aside the already successfully tested principle of territorial delimitation and embraced instead the device of parity of Muslims and Christians with in the political structure. The parity-

-principle between these groups was based on an approximative demographic evaluation. Some time the system worked satisfactorily creating the image of an democratic, "Arab Switzerland". However, in the course of the demographic evolution it turned out that parity no more exists, that Muslims outnumbered substantially Christians, and that the existing system lost its justification. As Lebanon was involved in the war with Israel the imbroglio rapidly expanded, new cleavages ethnic and religious - until now hidden - emerged having all a territorial basis. Imposed, artificial uniformity collapsed definitely and degenerated into wild, terrorist anarchy. Finally Lebanese democracy based on the apparently secure principle of parity was blown to pieces.

The disregard of territorial delimitation of ethnic and religious interests had also the well-known disastrous effects in Sri-Lanka.

Regionalism and autonomies have their ramifications on the higher and more complex level ⁱⁿ federalisms and on the other side on a lower and less complex level in local self-government. The territorial principle implemented with due consequence works as well in the West as in the East, e.g. India - where the Sikh's bloody rebellion /territorially restricted/ remains an exception which does not undermine the unity of the federation, and ^{works} in the federal monarchy on Malaysia.

All these pluralist tendencies which limit the sovereign power of the political decision center are strengthened by new horizontal links. They play obviously a growing role in the European Economic Community. I have also in mind the new tendency to create direct relations between federal subunits and foreign states, overpassing the federal government; and the

activities of supranationals⁴. The economic reforms in the Socialist East generated joint-ventures; in Soviet-Polish relations spreads a new practice of direct cooperation between plants of the two countries, a cooperation which overpasses the interference of their respective ministries and state combines. All these trends - I suppose - are signs not of a decline of sovereignty but mean its rationalization.

From this viewpoint regionalism and territorial autonomics are only streams within a more powerful river of efforts aiming at the limitation of centralist bureaucracies. Ideas and theories are unpredictable travellers: although ^{the} institutions they inspired seem more solidly settled, once received they change after reception, - differing considerably from the original.

N O T E S

- 1 Otto Bauer in: T. Bottomore and P. Goode /ed./: Austromarxism, Oxford 1978, p.107. Bauers original: Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Wien 1924 /1907/.
- 2 Supra, p.116 ff. Comp. R. Schlesinger's comments on this argument: Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe, London 1945, IX, f.g.
- 3 Comp. M.G. Clarke and H.M. Drucker /ed./: Our Changing Scotland. A Yearbook of Scottish Government, 1976-1977, Edinburgh 1977.
- 4 Some details in my: Reflections on Federations and Federalism, Int. Pol. Science Review, 1984, vol.5, no 4 p.3.

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association
A.I.S.P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

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GOVERNMENTS AND PLURALISM IN AFRICAN STATES

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Governments and Pluralism in African States

by Philip Mawhood

"Most of the political problems that exist today are due to regional inequalities and imbalance, for most states were organized out of heterogeneous and smaller units"(1)

State formation is seen, in the model frequently adopted, as a process through which an ecumene(2) develops gradually and organically, until it is able to dominate the less favoured areas around it and establish control over the eventual nation-state. It usually possesses the historical centre of political power, which is extended through the network of physical communications to cover the wider area. Success in external or civil wars tends to speed up the process, but in Europe it has usually been the work of several centuries. In Africa by contrast states have been brought into existence, fully formed as to all their visible characteristics, during a short period of the mid-twentieth century. The independent governments that followed the colonial rulers are faced with the difficult task of shaping political reality until it coincides with the formal picture of statehood.

The common characteristic which distinguishes a typical African state from a European one is, above all, its newness. The area that it now occupies contained, no more than a century ago, a number of societies which differed widely in size and culture,

each with its own political system. The territorial boundary and the structures of government have not evolved gradually over a long history but have been recently and consciously imposed. The state, as a state, has had little history. This fact causes many of the present-day problems facing African governments, though it also brings certain advantages to them.

Political control over an area does not make a nation, and in Africa nation-building is still, almost everywhere, an unfinished task for completion in the future. Apart from the lack of common history, the state seldom enjoys a common language understood by all the people. The cultures, kinship myths, social and political structures of local units, form a patchwork of great variety. The central regime may have the capacity to keep order and prevent civil war, but to impose unity for the achievement of any positive purpose is a far more difficult and expensive task. It is fortunate that the obstacles to government policy are nearly always confined to those internal to the state. External threats are absent, with very few exceptions: the state is not threatened in its very existence by powerful neighbours that can absorb or dismember it. Subversion against the regime in power is another matter (and it may well be supported by outside agencies) but the state frontiers are generally regarded as sacrosanct by all governments, and reinforced by declarations of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.(3) This policy has been successfully maintained with rare exceptions: for example the frontier disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Morocco and Algeria, or Libya and Chad. However, even where

these disputes have resulted in fighting, no major re-drawing of the territorial boundaries has generally resulted. The O.A.U.'s limitations have been twofold: it did not possess an armed force of its own, and it could not control individual member states which (as with Uganda and Tanzania in 1978/79) were determined upon military action.

The difficulties facing African governments are increased because they have accepted an ideological commitment to extensive change, in addition to their problems of control. Since the date of national independence, for the majority which have recently emerged from colonial rule, the leadership has framed its concepts of welfare and economic growth by making comparisons with the industrialized countries, rather than with the less developed neighbour states. This remains true even though Development Plan targets have become more realistic since the ambitious days of the 1960s. Unusually wide and new demands are thus placed on the government, while its resources - in finance and trained personnel - are peculiarly low by world standards. The effect is circular. State revenues cannot be raised and efficiently administered on a large scale without a bureaucracy that maintains professional standards; but such a bureaucracy needs large revenues to pay for its training and remuneration. This however is only the beginning of the problem. Bureaucratic capacity has been improved slowly in many countries, and more rapidly where 'windfall' resources have come under government control such as the oil revenues in Nigeria. But the other obstacles to development have then become more prominent, and these are essentially cultural. Loyalties to the

national unit are still weak, as is seen when it comes to demanding sacrifices from an individual, comparable with the loyalties he gives to his family, clan or wider ethnic group. It is the plural elements in the society that allocate values, rather than the governing regime. This may result in weakening not only political unity in the state, but also bureaucratic effectiveness in the civil services at national and local levels.

A demand for levels of government below the national one presents itself in Africa as it does in Europe, but the problem is operationally a different one. At this stage of history the competition between groups for national power is still so intense that no regime can contemplate the installation of a regional political system within the state unit. Where regional blocs are large and deeply divided, as in Nigeria, a federal constitution becomes the only solution. The same conclusion may, before long, be recognized as the only possible way out for the Sudan. But more frequently we see a central government that is able to maintain - sometimes with evident difficulty - a unitary state. In such cases, any institution which exercises political influence at the regional level becomes an intolerable threat to the centre. The first reaction of a newly independent African government was therefore, in most cases, to centralize all administration and to reduce popular participation in decision-making.(4) But this was, as it soon became clear, a recipe for economic and social decline, since the bureaucracy fell far short of the capacity needed to operate efficient centralized structures. The problem was made worse by the strong urban bias of the educated elites: central rule ultimately meant

rule for the benefit of the towns and to the detriment of the rural producers. The primary market prices of both food and export crops were frequently fixed at a low level, and after a few years the farmers responded with perfect rationality, by marketing a lesser volume of cash crops or smuggling their produce into other countries, and by restricting food production to a level close to that of the farmers' own family needs. Since the 1970s we have seen African governments, their embarrassments increased by the world recession, making new efforts to enlist popular participation and support through decentralized decision-making. These take the form of granting powers to bodies at the district level or lower - and it is at this local level that parallels may be found to the European process of regionalization. While regional autonomy within the state is not currently a practical political issue in Africa, autonomy at the level of local district and town administration is everywhere the subject of debate and experiment.

Historical parallels

It would no doubt be possible to identify comparable stages of state formation between the African countries and various European or non-European counterparts. However the host nation of this conference offers us a particularly favourable comparison, since its own political and administrative history falls into clearly defined stages on the dimensions of centralization and regional decentralization.(5) The following table places together the events occurring in Spain and in the majority of states of tropical Africa. Apart from the

<u>Political stages</u>	<u>Spain</u>	<u>Africa</u>
1 Regional/local units of government, without a dominant central state.	Until early 18th century: territories with extensive self-government linked in a 'confederal' framework.	Until late 19th century: rule by ethnic/kinship units, modern states not yet defined.
2 Central rule imposed over the present national area.	Decrees of Philip V 1712-14, imposed after a period of civil war.	Colonial rule over present area imposed 1880-1914 with military support.
3 Non-traditional areas of field administration replace historical regions.	First half of 19th century: consolidation 1833 of provinces on Napoleonic pattern.	Early 20th century: administrative pattern influenced by Napoleonic or British-Indian style.
4 Concessions to regional/local loyalties, progressively moving towards a condition of strong autonomy.	1900 - late 1930s, concessions culminating in Catalanian and Basque Autonomy Statutes.	1919-1960: some regional organisation; patchy introduction of autonomous local government, more generally in 1950s.
5 Re-centralization of power.	1940s-1960s under Franco: suppression of regionalism.	1960s: newly independent governments committed to centralized action, regions suppressed and local government weakened or abolished.
6 Reversion to limited administrative decentralization	1970s: weak regionalism, influenced by French and Italian models.	1970s: weak autonomy allowed to local units, but under central administrative control.
7 More extensive grant of regional/local autonomy (but still weaker than Stage 4 arrangements).	1977 onwards: creation of Autonomous Communities in some regions.	Late 1970s onwards: creation of autonomous local governments in some states.

difference already indicated (that African decentralization is currently to the local not the regional level) it is striking that the process of African state formation reflects the same stages as that of older states, though telescoped together - and by the end of the story the timing of stages has merged into one.

Stage 1

While European countries experienced a long period that is usually described as feudal, with large and small autonomous kingdoms controlled through a body of royal officials, the greater part of tropical Africa was covered by 'stateless' societies. This condition was not universal: a number of large-area states did occur, such as the mediaeval Ghana, Mali and Songhai in the western Sudan, or the kingdoms of Benin and Ashanti which flowered in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively. There were other examples in southern Africa. But these states rose and declined over time; most had disappeared before the advent of colonial rule in the 19th century, and of the survivors none was able finally to maintain its independence against the colonial power. The permanent occupation of any area in pre-modern times could easily become impossible through war, disease, drought and crop failure, so that there were numerous migrations of societies from one area to another. The typical pattern throughout the tropical belt was a small-area polity (sometimes very small) organized around the family, kinship group or clan. For these peoples, the only wider area that could be recognized was a cultural/linguistic

region, lacking any political unity but significant in that safe travel and communication within it were sometimes possible for the inhabitants. Such regions did not become prominent until the modern age, when the competition for power and economic resources on a national scale first began. Class identification, even today, is weak and patchy, so that competition takes place mainly between these primary groupings which are old-established and easily understood by everyone.

Stage 2

Until the late 19th century the impact of European governments upon tropical Africa was mediated only by missionaries, explorers and traders. The areas of land occupied were small coastal strips associated with trading stations. Only in the 1880s were larger claims of sovereignty first made, but by the outbreak of world war in 1914 nearly the whole of tropical Africa was under effective European occupation. The degree of military action needed for this occupation varied but was generally very small, if only because of the crushing technical superiority of the new rulers. However the colonial states certainly relied, in the last resort, on their power to coerce. This formed the initial legitimacy of their representatives in Africa, followed only later by the legitimacy that came from establishing a stable administration. At this point the present boundaries of the African states were generally laid down. They have been criticized for their artificiality, in that they were imposed by decisions of the colonial powers and often had the effect of dividing people of similar cultures. It is true that they do

not, in general, follow cultural boundaries. Yet this is the way in which most national frontiers have always been created - by political decision from above, as a result either of military conquest or of agreements reached after hard bargaining. There are few frontiers in Europe, for example, that do not divide cultural and linguistic groups; it is a normal and not an abnormal situation.(6) The difference in Africa was that the original governing elite were alien, and a wide cultural gap separated them from the varied communities, large and small, of those who were to be governed within the new boundaries.

Stage 3

The system of regional administration created by Napoleon I in France is perhaps his most lasting memorial; it has been adopted as to its essential features in areas throughout Europe and the world. It serves as the model of local government almost everywhere except for countries falling directly in the Anglo-Saxon tradition - and for the 'deconcentrated' cadre of generalist field officers it prevails even within that tradition. Only the metropolitan United Kingdom, Ireland and U.S.A. manage without such an official. In Africa the role was transmitted directly to French-speaking countries during their period of colonial rule. For English-speaking countries it arrived from British-ruled India, where it had been naturalized during the life of the Indian Civil Service. The Napoleonic prefect has provided the archetype for Commissioners and District Officers, Prefects and District Governors (many different titles are in use) throughout tropical Africa as well

as Latin America, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East.

In Europe the areas of administration were often created artificially and without following the boundaries of older regions. This was done in order to rationalize the size of areas for the sake of efficiency, but also to discourage the habit of popular loyalty to the historical units. The French government, among others, was always sensitive to the damage that might be done to national unity by pluralistic forces. During the colonial period in Africa, the desire for 'national unity' seldom played any part in the mind of government. In early colonial days the contacts between administration and the mass of the people were minimal; it was therefore unavoidable that existing ethnic groups should be treated as the units of organization, except where they were so small or shifting as to make this impracticable. Collaboration between people who acknowledged some kinship links was easier to achieve than between strangers, and this was relevant for the cost of administration. However the colonial administrative district was often the first large area to be defined and recognized, against the background of a traditional society which had always been organized on a far smaller scale. Once in place the district boundary itself began to create a sense of identity for the inhabitants, newly evolving but otherwise similar to earlier forms of cultural identity. Ylvisaker, speaking of American society, says: "As we sometimes too painfully have experienced, loyalty is as much generated by the very creation and symbolism of boundary lines, as it is by whatever elements of likeness these lines may happen to include".(7) It is the political area

that creates the community, rather than the other way round. Where popular participation in local government is a desired aim, the 'artificial' boundary probably favours it since life within the new area stimulates bargaining among numerous different groups.

Stage 4

The latter period of colonial rule in Africa, from 1919 to its end around the year 1960, saw numerous experiments with forms of limited autonomy in local government, both traditional and modern. Their occurrence varied very much with the country and even with the controlling personalities in the shape of the colonial Governors. French governments maintained, with few exceptions, a direct administration of the metropolitan type. Little use was made of traditional African authority, and such municipalities as existed were, until a very late stage, confined to the older towns and strongly controlled from above. British dependencies were sometimes directly administered in a similar way, as in Kenya. Elsewhere and more commonly, there was considerable use of traditional chiefs as the junior partners in local government - the process known as "indirect rule" - and eventually a gradual insertion at the same level of councillors representing the population. The large and rich Emirates of northern Nigeria are well known as the first and most conspicuous example of traditional authority working with the colonial power, but they represent the extreme case. More typical in Africa was a smaller-sized chiefdom or group of chiefdoms, where the traditional leader's own survival depended

more heavily on colonial support. This made it easier for the government to exert pressure on him, as time went on, to share his power with a council - the latter at first often nominated, but to an increasing extent elected as time went on. The "indirect rule" system provided an autonomous local treasury and local courts administering customary law, all of them under the hand of the traditional authority.

These colonial forms of local administration were not created as a response to popular pressures at the local level (though in the Gold Coast at least, the chiefs laid stress on the treaties which had begun their relationship with the colonial power). They were essentially an economical style which eked out the tiny resources of expatriate administrators and yet produced public order, together with the capacity to provide the first modern services such as roads and medical treatment for the local people. This illustrates the significant difference from the European parallel: in Africa, when decision-making was decentralized, it was primarily done to small areas which could not threaten the centre. Very rarely did any pressure for regional-level autonomy arise - indeed it was the colonial government itself that sometimes promoted the formation of larger administrative units such as federations of small traditional chiefs, or the regional governments of Nigeria and Uganda. A late example was the Sukumaland Development Scheme of the 1940s and 1950s in Tanganyika: to bring together all the districts of Sukuma-speaking peoples might well increase the threat of their beginning to act as a political movement, but this was a threat that the government felt it could control

without much difficulty. The real problem of regional pressures upon the centre generally arose only in the following stage of history, after national independence.

Before the advent of independence there was one more change in local government: a network of 'modern' representative councils was established in many African countries, either alongside the traditional leaders' councils or in replacement of them. These local authorities were specifically constructed on Western concepts of popular autonomy, and had a better prospect of survival after independence since they were not linked to the chiefdoms. As town or municipal councils they often provided local services with considerable efficiency; the rural district authorities had a more uneven record, but some of them were well financed and effective bodies.

Stage 5

With the departure of colonial rulers and their replacement by new African regimes, the parameters of the political game were drastically altered, and regional agglomerations of power acquired greater significance. The centre's capacity for control through the administration had been reduced, despite its claims of popular representativeness. The African nationals who formed a new government might expect more easily to reach the ear and gain the sympathy of the population, but by comparison with the homogeneous alien administration that they followed, their action was often weak and divided. Opposition groups, from the Ashanti of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in the 1950s to

Joshua Nkomo's supporters in Zimbabwe today, have usually been based on cultural/ethnic regions within the state. Buganda, a strong traditional kingdom within Uganda, was dealt with in 1966 by removing its leader and dividing up the area into a number of parts for the purpose of civil administration. The Ibo-speaking peoples of Eastern Nigeria raised a civil war in 1967 against the Lagos government. Throughout tropical Africa there were less dramatic crises of an identical kind. It is worth stressing that cultural ties did not by themselves create a powerful pressure group; they had at least to be associated first with a geographical grouping of the people in question. Indeed an ethnic group that became divided between two districts frequently drifted into the assumption of district loyalties rather than ethnic ones. The two parts would then act independently or even come into conflict with each other.

How did the new governments react to these pluralist pressures? In nearly every case they centralized the power, so far as they were able, in the hands of a single party and suppressed regional institutions. (Nigeria here represents the outstanding exception - its cultural regions were too large and too firmly based for this solution - but a federal constitution has allowed the country to survive as a single state, at the cost of repeated governmental crises which continue to the present day). Centralization spread through the administrative apparatus, reinforced by the idea that rapid development required central planning by the government. The relatively autonomous local authorities that existed in many states at the time of independence, weakly established as they were, had lost

most of their autonomy by the end of the 1960s. The elected mayor or chairman of a local council might be replaced by either a government official or a nominated unofficial; in a one-party state he was often the chairman or secretary of the party branch appointed ex officio. Where competitive elections still existed to choose the councillors, the single party would pre-select the candidates. Economic planning had become an important theme of policy statements, but it was done at regional and local level by a separate hierarchy of planning committees under control from the centre, and not by the local authorities.

Stage 6

The centralizing wave of the 1960s brought little satisfaction, even in terms of the nation-building and rapid economic development at which it was officially aimed. Detailed control of the economy would have required a bureaucracy more effective than that possessed by any African country. Centralization of power also stimulated urbanization; the new ruling elite, as already mentioned, were overwhelmingly urban-based and the towns provided the bulk of economic as well as political opportunity. Yet the mass of the population lived in the rural areas and got their living from peasant methods of crop production. With few exceptions they gained little advantage, and in some instances saw a decline in their standard of living, in the first decade of independence. Many governments, with Ghana, Tanzania and Sudan in the forefront, turned as a result to organizing increased participation by people in the rural areas.

The formula adopted was not, however, that of classical local government. The African regimes were conscious of the inefficiency and managerial chaos that had often characterized local government in its period of decline - even though the decline had largely been caused by the central government's own neglect and withdrawal of resources from the local authorities. They set out to find a different solution which should give the benefits of popular participation without paying any substantial cost in political terms. The new local bodies were given a 'mixed' controlling council combining unofficial representatives, government officials, and Party politicians. Their funds were no longer held in a separate treasury, but fell into the government accounting system; their staff, including the chief executive, were members of the national bureaucracy and remained under direct central control. In return for this structural weakening of local autonomy, the functions of the local bodies were widened to include most of government's responsibilities at the local level. They could be given large spending and managing powers precisely because popular control over them had been severely diluted. The generalist field officer or prefect was often placed at the head of the organization, as secretary or executive chairman, and the authority became government's sole multi-purpose representative at the local level.

Considering the high hopes that had been placed in this new formula, it was striking how short a time it lasted. In Ghana, Sudan and Tanzania it had been abandoned or severely modified by 1981, within ten years of its inauguration, and in some respects (as in the Tanzanian towns) much sooner. Zambia and Kenya

installed similar systems in the early 1980s, under the respective titles of 'Decentralization' and 'District Focus', which have both come under criticism for the same reasons. The problem was generally that the mixed council operated as a form of central administration despite the inbuilt provisions for local representation. The unofficial councillors gained little influence over decision-making, because officials and Party men from the national networks possessed the bulk of the information. The local technical officers struggled between themselves for resources, and the council was not strong enough to reconcile these disputes because it had no direct power of discipline over them.(8)

Stage 7

The 1970s in Africa, like the 1960s, had brought wide evidence of popular dissatisfaction arising from the fact that power was centralized and little authority had been allowed to local bodies. Local governments existed in name, but the autonomy granted to them was very weak in practice. Even the greater economic efficiency that might have been hoped for from centralization seldom resulted. Many of the French-speaking governments had never set up autonomous local authorities but remained with a mixed or centralized system throughout - gaining from this at least the advantage of stability, in contrast with the more 'experimental' regimes. Where there was an election to the local council, it was organized on an indirect system or was subject to pre-selection of the approved candidates. A marxist-leninist bias to the national ideology, as in Guinea and Benin,

produced numerous local councils at several levels but with little formal power-sharing to them.

Since the latter part of the 1970s we have seen in Africa, as in Europe at the regional level, a number of movements favouring greater autonomy for the local authorities. Nigeria acted in this sense as early as 1975-76, having the benefit of large oil resources to finance the reforms and a single military command to push through the consultative and legislative procedures. A new single, and specifically political, level of authorities was set up for more than 300 local areas and officially defined as a "third tier of government". The experiment ran into difficulties as soon as military rule was succeeded (in 1979) by a civilian constitution: the federal states felt they were being undermined by the creation of the Local Governments, and a return to active party politics made it impossible, for the time being, to carry on fully representative local decision-making. However the country is now under a new military regime; the Local Governments are operated by appointed management committees, and questions of a more democratic system in the future are being debated.(9) In Tanzania the movement towards local political autonomy was still more dramatic, since the system inherited from colonial times had been legally abolished and replaced by a network of Development Committees at regional and local levels: an example of the 'mixed' system referred to in Stage 6 above. What was now done - beginning in 1977 for the towns, and in 1982 for the rural areas - was to re-establish essentially the same form of 'modern' style local government that had prevailed in the 1960s. The difficulties now lie, not

in any need to modify the legal structures, but in the task of making them work successfully against a background of severe economic crisis. Sudan came out of its experimental period, which had involved a proliferation of councils at all levels aimed at universal participation, and since 1981 has placed the responsibility for government activities primarily at a single 'district' level. The district has its own representative council and an administration organized on classical local government lines. As with Tanzania however, the Sudan is in economic crisis and is also threatened by a regional civil war.

Other African states have moved in similar though less dramatic ways towards the development of greater local autonomy. The economic and political difficulties mentioned in these countries do not necessarily work against the concept of local autonomy. They may indeed make it a necessary precondition for the supply of local services, since the flow of support from the centre has dwindled almost to nothing. If no money is to be had from the national treasury, the only way of spending on local welfare is to raise revenues locally. The traditional authorities often come into prominence again: when there is no finance for a programme of development and change, their talents in providing order and good administration are the more valued. The writer has suggested elsewhere(10) that successful decentralization occurs when the political weather is good (that is, the regime is strong and unchallenged) but the economic weather is bad (it suffers a painful shortage of resources).

Managing the plural state

African countries have thus generally arrived at juridical statehood through the historically unique experience of a short period of colonial rule, followed by a sudden transition to political independence. They are still, however, struggling with the problem of attaining nationhood. The prevalence and force of cultural pluralism mean that the new state is weak in relation to internal groups which compete for power and economic resources. Such groups are not - or not yet - to any large extent class-based.(11) The expression of pluralist competition is usually in terms of ethnicity or regionalism; there are numerous instances of this, ranging from small local disputes to major events such as the 'Biafran' civil war. More than 20 years ago Zolberg described as a model the party-state of West Africa, which possessed massive authority but only in a narrow sector of governmental activity. Outside that sector there was a broad residual area in which values were allocated through channels and by decisions which the state could not control.(12) It is a picture which still describes much of the reality in tropical Africa generally, and the regimes have far to go in the struggle to assert their authority over regional and ethnic groupings.

Much rhetoric has been directed in Africa to defining an ideology for each state, and the range is wide: from one of mobilization and party domination, owing much to the Soviet model, to one that favours the rule of law and a peaceful climate for economic growth in collaboration with foreign

capital. Beneath these, however, is a political ideology which is common to every state, stressing order and effectiveness as the essential legitimacy of the government in office. This is neither a strange nor a reprehensible fact, since it simply expresses the weakness of all regimes in the face of plural forces. It has the consequence, however, that political opposition is seen by a government as illegitimate, as a rival which must be put down with whatever weapons are available. Even the degree of external collaboration or dependence of the state is little related to whether its declared ideology is more capitalist or more marxist. Both types of regime have asked for and accepted external support, and on the other hand both types have been found to act in ways which were unwelcome to their external backers.(13)

Despite the efforts to achieve greater centralization of authority that have been made since national independence, varying in character with the time and place, political decentralization is an empirical reality in every African state. This may be seen merely as a re-statement of the obvious fact of cultural pluralism, but it carries significance for governments which have to decide how to manage that pluralism. Even in a centralized administration, 'ethnic arithmetic' has been used since the earliest days of independence to share out posts of influence between competing groups. But some form of structural decentralization in government is also a method frequently used to bring the formal pattern of authority into closer conformity with the empirical pattern. Traditional heads exist for many African communities, from the level of a small

village up to the large emirates and chiefdoms. Governments and their field officials repeatedly strike implicit bargains with these traditional authorities, granting them recognition and financial support in return for their assistance. To set up a new administrative headquarters, with newly defined boundaries, may be the means of fragmenting an opposition group, or alternatively of co-opting its allegiance. As in 19th century France or Italy, the political generalist in the field - prefect or district officer - serves as government's agent for manoeuvres of this kind, alongside the local officers of the ruling party. Once again, the ideological colour of the regime makes little difference to the pattern of behaviour.

When ethnic or regional affiliations are handled directly, as questions of policy, there is often the same distinction between ideology and practice. We should set aside Nigeria, where the differences between large regions are so entrenched that only a federal constitution can hold the state together. In most other African states it is customary to treat 'tribalism' in public statements as an unmitigated evil. Concrete reality can be very different. As David Brown has demonstrated, "there have been numerous occasions on which governments, instead of seeking to reduce communal tensions, depoliticise them, and promote social harmony, have apparently gone out of their way to manipulate and exaggerate particular communal rivalries, and to promote distrust of particular groups".(14) Ethnic and regional loyalties are, in practice, used by governments just as by opposition groups when this can bring any advantage to them.

Generally speaking, because of the factors that have been discussed, African regimes are unable to treat cultural pluralism separately from political pluralism. In the United Kingdom or the USSR by contrast, the expression of regional cultures can be permitted or even encouraged officially, because the central state is not ultimately challenged by them. African governments, like those in other parts of the world, can allow themselves a degree of romanticism in their ideologies, because it is combined with tough pragmatism in the application of policy. When questions of political autonomy arise for sub-national regions, however, it is the pragmatism that will dictate the response. Decentralized government there must be since the attempts to administer centrally are ineffective, given the continuing extreme shortages in finance and qualified staff. But it has to be arranged in such a way as to minimize the opportunity for recruiting stronger opposition groups and giving them a platform. This is one important reason why decentralization occurs not to the regions, but to smaller areas in the form of representative and local government bodies. It is, for the national governments, a relatively 'safe' response to increasing political socialization, and Africa is currently in a phase where this response is being increasingly used.

Footnotes

- (1) P. Buckholts, Political Geography (New York: Ronald, 1966) 470.
- (2) An ecumene is defined as that region "that possesses the most favourable combination of population, resources, technology, transportation, and location". Ibid. 464.
- (3) O.A.U. states resolved at their Cairo meeting in 1964 "to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence".
- (4) See N. Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena (University of California Press, 1976).
- (5) I have relied on the sketch provided by Professor Tamames to supplement my own ignorance of Spanish history - see "Spain: Regional Autonomy and the democratic transition" in M. Hebbert and H. Machin, Regionalisation in France, Italy and Spain (ICERD, London School of Economics, 1984) and the conference paper on which it was based.
- (6) I.W. Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies 3.2 (1965) 155-175, argues that the present national boundaries are actually beneficial because of the social and economic diversity contained within each of the new states.
- (7) In A. Maass, Area and Power (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959) 37.
- (8) The mixed system of local administration has been dealt with in a wider context in P. Mawhood, "Decentralization and the Third World in the 1980s", Planning and Administration 14.1 (Spring 1987) 10-22.
- (9) It should not be seen as a paradox when local government in Africa is more democratic under a military regime or one-party government than in a condition of pluralist party politics. National regimes which feel secure and unchallenged in their power are more likely to experiment with decentralized government, and this tends to be the dominant factor.
- (10) See P. Mawhood, op.cit. 21-22.
- (11) C Chapman, "Comparing African States", Political Studies XXXIV (1986) 649: "The African state itself cannot easily or plausibly be presented as the outcome of class forces or the expression of class interests, except for the interests of that 'class' which controls the state itself". See also R. Charlton and R. May, "State Weakness in Africa: a Critique", Politics 6.2 (October 1986) 25-32.

- (12) A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) 131-134.
- (13) W. Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1984) 272-275.
- (14) D. Brown, "Sieges and Scapegoats: the politics of pluralism in Ghana and Togo", Civilisations XXXIII.2 (1983) 71-109.

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987



POSITION PAPER ON THE STUDY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM

Jean Tournon

cerat

politique-administration-territoire

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June 1987

POSITION PAPER ON THE STUDY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM

In order to launch a common reflection on the future orientations of our Committee, I find it useful (and not very original) to distinguish between three categories of endeavour : ideological, theoretical and empirical.

My idea is not to disavow one or two of them (I like the probable victims too much...) but to suggest that only through deliberate rapprochement of at least two approaches, and possibly their bonding, can the work of our Committee become purposeful and cumulative, even though it will deal with only a tiny part of this "pluralistic universe" each time.

I - PLURALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

A/ The belief in ontological pluralism : nature is plural, society is plural ; hence, any attempt to suppress or repress this plural character is : a/ against nature, thus costly and cruel, b/ eventually bound to failure.

B/ The preference for pluralism :

a/ Diversity vs. uniformity ; the pluralist stance is self interest (and may be hypocrisy) when you are underdog claiming that the other must recognize your right to exist, it is virtue (or prudence ?) for the top dog benevolently recognizing a right which may reduce its possibility of exerting its strength and of developing its self.

b/ Pluralism vs. monocacy ; postulate that the possibility of dissent, of heterodoxy, of separate organization is eventually not only less disturbing but more fruitful than censorship, forced alignment and conspiracy.

C/ Conservative pluralism vs. mobile pluralism :

a/ While the conservative posture is generally found among the privileged, whose interest is to keep the status quo, the case is not so clear with pluralism because the weak and/or threatened may feel they can be protected only through a general respect for the existing diversity ; a slightly different stream of thought, in modern times, advocates conservative pluralism : the treasures of diversity inherited from the past are supposedly in danger, among living animals and plants as well as among cultures, thus a kind of "museum pluralism" or a scientific demand for not narrowing the spectrum of possibilities is expressed in conservative (conservationist...) terms.

Christian Bay (1979) noticed the conservative side of pluralism in his definition of legal pluralism as a "view that the State must protect indefinitely the currently established rights of ownership, free speech and privacy for all associations and corporations (...)".

b/ Mobile (or evolutive) pluralism opts for the free play and fight of today elements, even through some will probably be destroyed in the process.

This attitude, congruent with the refusal (cf IBb) of an imposed order (which would require still more violence) has to be linked somehow with ontological pluralism (cf. IA) in order to optimistically hold that evolution is not toward less and less pluralism, and that the conflicts of today are not engineering domination or monopoly.

Evolutive pluralism is the ideology of the strong (or of the still weak who know that time is working for them) and of the optimist, just like conservative pluralism is that of the weak or of the pessimist.

D/ Pluralism vs. the Good and the True

Is the pluralist ideology always relativist ? Is it the unique ideology which would refrain from asserting and propagandizing its superiority ?

Limits of toleration vis-à-vis the extent of diversity.
Limits of rationality in the proliferation of autonomies.

Difference between tolerating pluralism and fostering it.

II - PLURALISM IN THEORY

A/ The study of unity and tensions within the person, within the social group, within the nation and the state, within civil society, within culture(s), within the market (economic competition as a pluralistic device destructive of pluralism).

B/ Antagonistic orientations :

a/ In a system, the striving of any element for its realization, its originality and genuineness is a requisite for pluralism and, at the same time, a threat to pluralism as it is likely to encroach on other elements' personality and realization ;

b/ Within associations, organizations and societies, recurrent conflict between centralization and general participation. This tension is fundamental in S. Ehrlich's definition of socio-political pluralism as opposed to "the uniformisation of public life", to "the monopolization of social initiative" (1982).

C/ Pluralism in scientific research and, much less easily accepted, pluralism in scientific knowledge.

D/ History of pluralism in political philosophy and in political science.

Pluralism as a mode of analysis looking for the distribution of power and influence, not only in the Nation-State but from geo-politics to the face-to-face group, without neglecting the inter-relatedness, potential or real, of all distributions.

III - EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PLURALISM IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

A/ Analysis of pluralism in society :

- Ethnic, religious, local groups, social classes, any kind of social fragmentation or marginalization ;

- Associative activity : economic, cultural, etc... ;

- Patterns of work, division of labor, employment ;
- Public philosophy and ideology concerning solidarity, unity, cohesion, centralization and autonomy, diversity, dissent ;
- Pluralism in the educational system ;
- Pluralism in the publishing business and in the mass media.

B/ Analysis of pluralism in the political system :

- In established institutions :
 - a/ separation and cooperation of powers ("branches") ;
 - b/ bi-cameralism, multi-cameralism ;
 - c/ varieties of ministries, departments and agencies ;
 - d/ territorial subdivisions of the State.
- In the interest group system, functional representation, the corporate State ;
- In the political party system and other political groupings.

C/ The linkage between A and B, in parts or global.

D/ Comparative approach of A and/or B and/or C.

Pluralism "always means some kind of functional federalism based upon a variety of existing human association (...). For Americans it was a benevolent interpretation of the bargaining process of pressure politics (...) whereas Europeans took it for the constitutional ideal of a corporate State" (Breitling, 1978).

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L'ETAT-NATION LE PLURALISME ET L'EUROPE

Georges G. Vlachos

Il nous a paru utile de centrer, ici, notre attention sur quelques aspects évolutifs du pluralisme, politique et social, tels qu'ils se présentent en particulier dans le cadre de la société européenne et notamment dans cette partie de l'Europe démocratique qui est actuellement engagée dans le procès d'unification que l'on connaît; procès dont on ignore peut-être encore les aboutissements, mais qui engendre déjà des conséquences de plus importantes quant à l'avenir de la démocratie pluraliste dans cette partie du monde.

L'affirmation précédente, jointe au fait que les Etats européens envisagés ont connu par le passé des stades de développement convergents ou parallèles sous le couvert d'une pédagogie historique commune, justifie amplement, à ce qui nous semble, la localisation du problème : "La Nation, le Pluralisme et la Région" dans le cadre géographique et géopolitique ainsi défini.

Afin d'éviter des développements excessifs, nous avons voulu attirer l'intérêt sur certains indices seulement de ce mouvement d'ensemble. Nous avons pensé, en effet, que le caractère synoptique d'une telle démarche aurait probablement l'avantage de nous conduire rapidement à l'essentiel de notre recherche, qui est certainement la discussion d'un problème d'actualité brûlante, quoique l'histoire soit ici, à notre sens, un guide et un conseiller sûr.

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I) La société européenne s'est développée, on le sait, depuis le quinzième siècle, sous le signe de deux concepts dominants : celui d'individu et celui de souveraineté. En apparence opposés mais en fait complémentaires, ces concepts ont servi de base à une politique et à une culture dont on trouve difficilement l'équivalent en d'autres lieux et en d'autres périodes de l'histoire. Jean Bodin en a certainement eu l'intuition profonde. Mais c'est surtout chez Thomas Hobbes et Baruch Spinoza, éclairés par l'évolution générale des sociétés avancées de leur temps, que l'on trouve la formulation scientifique la plus concise et la plus systématique de cette nouvelle expérience humaine.

Nous pouvons faire abstraction, ici, des variantes secondaires de ces systèmes, notamment en ce qui concerne les formes de gouvernement, et ne retenir que ce qui constitue l'idée de derrière la tête qui les domine de toutes parts. Je me permets d'en rappeler, très succinctement, l'essentiel.

Aux dires de ces grands penseurs, l'histoire humaine nous dévoile en tout temps le fait d'une légalité naturelle stricte, qui fait rattacher invariablement chaque individu à la conservation de son être(1). Pour expliquer le fait de la société, de la société civile en particulier, on est amené, dès lors, à conclure à la né-

cessité d'une force supérieure et synthétique dont le rôle serait de faire échec à l'anéantissement réciproque des individus, en les englobant, par des voies que trace la Raison, dans une totalité qualifiée de souveraine. L'idée de souveraineté, idée diffuse depuis l'Antiquité la plus reculée (2), mais rattachée le plus souvent à un monarque, à une dynastie ou à une puissance extérieure à la société et à la nature, revêt désormais une signification parfaitement originale. Construite à partir de forces de résistance individuelles, la souveraineté embrasse les individus associés en tant qu'êtres séparés et distincts, établis sur un territoire dégagé de ses propriétés économiques et utilitaires et identifié à l'espace abstrait à l'intérieur duquel la légalité naturelle se convertit en légitimité humaine. Légitimité qui consiste, précisément, à rattacher directement, c'est-à-dire sans l'entremise de pouvoirs sociaux intermédiaires, les individus à la totalité, incarnée par le pouvoir souverain, l'Etat ainsi rendu indivisible.

Le sens profond de cette construction intellectuelle est singulièrement clair : c'est toujours l'individu -et non pas le groupe, ethnique, socio-économique ou culturel, qui figure dorenavant comme l'élément structurel de base à l'institutionnalisation du pouvoir d'Etat. Mieux encore; la légalité légitime dont le pouvoir est le garant y apparaît moins comme ce qui est donné une fois pour toutes dans les faits accomplis de l'histoire événementielle que ce qui naît perpétuellement de l'interaction des unités individuelles mises en valeur dans le cadre de la souveraineté une et indivisible.

Concept dynamique et souple, l'Etat souverain ainsi conçu par le rationalisme géométrique servira à partir de cette date de modèle à toutes les constructions politologiques des dix septième et dix huitième siècles. On lui donnera plus tard le nom d'Etat-nation(3). Ses survivances s'étendront jusqu'à notre siècle, à travers une série de métamorphoses, ainsi que nous pourrons bientôt le constater.

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Ce que nous devons, toutefois, souligner dès à présent, c'est que l'Etat-nation n'est point, dans sa conception première, national ou nationaliste alors même qu'il puisse y aboutir. Son critère, ainsi que nous l'avons noté, est la souveraineté dégagée de toute coloration éthique d'essence historiciste ou idéologique. Dans sa conception géométrique pure, l'Etat-nation est une monade fermée enveloppant une société entièrement atomisée, exclusive de toute idée d'autonomie de groupe, de région ou d'ethnie. Lorsque cet Etat aura plus ou moins été constitué dans les faits de l'histoire, un auteur politique aussi fortement imprégné d'esprit libéral et aussi respectueux de la tradition comme Montesquieu s'abstiendra scrupuleusement de parler d'autonomie au sens sus-indiqué, et n'invoquera que -selon un clivage toutefois bien déterminé- des "pouvoirs subordonnés et dépendants" (4). A son ultime aboutissement, sous la plume de J.-J. Rousseau(5), la technique du contrat social ne trouvera d'autre mode pour s'exprimer que la dialectique de la Volonté de Tous (ut singuli) et de la Volonté Générale, volonté aussi impersonnelle et globale que celle qui avait été déduite, un siècle plus tôt, par Hobbes et par Spinoza.

II) Il en a existé, certes, notamment au cours du dix huitième siècle, des théoriciens de l'Etat et des philosophes enclins à attri-

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buer aux phénomènes collectifs une importance complémentaire ou parallèle à celle qui avait été reconnue aux individus par les adeptes du rationalisme. Et l'on parlait déjà à l'époque de "caractères nationaux" (6). John Locke avait donné, par ailleurs, dans l'inter-valle, une interprétation bien plus souple de la socialité naturelle, ainsi que des rapports entre la société et le pouvoir d'Etat. Mais en fait, le modèle de l'Etat-nation élaboré au cours du Grand Siècle n'avait pas été entamé de façon substantielle lorsque la Révolution Américaine et la Révolution Française sont venues proposer au monde une nouvelle manière de penser la société politique.

Tout compte fait, les deux Révolutions libérales du dix huitième siècle n'ont visé qu'à un réaménagement, idéologique et institutionnel, de l'Etat-nation plutôt qu'à l'élaboration d'un type d'Etat absolument nouveau et original. En incorporant d'emblée les droits individuels naturels dans le corps de l'institution étatique, en faisant de tels droits les limites objectives de l'action du pouvoir, les révolutions libérales apportaient, certes, des précisions utiles sur un point capital de la doctrine laissé quelque peu obscur dans la tradition du rationalisme (7) et rapidement dévoilé par les libéraux. L'essence de l'Etat n'en demeurait pas moins celle qui avait été présentée par Hobbes et par Spinoza, à savoir une relation directe, par le truchement de la loi-règle générale et impersonnelle, entre l'homme individuel et le pouvoir d'Etat; relation directe et sans référence aucune à des hiérarchies intermédiaires, dont on sait que la Révolution Française en particulier vint interdire formellement l'existence; et ce non seulement pour ce qui était des prérogatives de la noblesse mais aussi au sujet des relations du travail (8). Si bien que, en définitive, quand les hommes de la Révolution voulurent poser les limites institutionnelles au nouveau pouvoir d'Etat, ils songèrent moins ou pas du tout aux composantes, géographiques et sociales, du peuplement et s'attachèrent exclusivement à la séparation des fonctions et des organes du pouvoir lui-même, en suivant, avec plus ou moins de bonheur, le modèle jadis élaboré par Montesquieu au sujet de la Constitution d'Angleterre (9). De fait, ainsi que l'article 16 de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen le rappelle (10), la séparation des pouvoirs figure, aux côtés des droits de l'homme, comme le complément nécessaire de la conception fondamentale selon laquelle le lien étatique s'analyse invariablement en un rapport direct - à présent constitutionnellement garanti - entre le jus suum de l'individu-citoyen et le pouvoir d'Etat. Dans un Pays comme la France où le modèle de l'Etat-nation s'était déjà plus ou moins imposé dans les faits depuis fort longtemps, on pense, en effet, bien moins aux collectivités partielles formées historiquement et on met uniquement en avant les valeurs universelles de l'homme libre et du citoyen. La géographie humaine, sociale, ethnique ou territoriale, se plie à nouveau devant la majesté de la souveraineté une et indivisible. Le centralisme démocratique se succède sans encombre au centralisme monarchique et en parachève les structures, tout en modifiant profondément le contenu idéologique. La nation révolutionnaire ne fait que revigorer et rendre plus conséquent le modèle individualiste de l'Etat-nation forgé par le rationalisme.

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Il est vrai, certes, que, quand on aura à se confronter, durant cette même période de l'histoire, à des situations historiques plus complexes ou plus confuses on s'apercevra qu'il convient de tenir aussi compte de faits et de données objectives qui ne se prêtent que très difficilement aux idées a-historiques ou super-historiques de l'Etat centraliste. On n'en maintiendra pas moins l'idée que l'essence de l'Etat s'analyse en un rapport reliant entr'eux des individus placés sous le même pouvoir souverain. Quand le célèbre révolutionnaire grec Rigas Phéréos rédigea, en 1797 ou 1798 (peu avant son exécution capitale), sa Déclaration des Droits et son Projet de Constitution (11), il fera appel à tous les peuples des Balkans et de l'Asie Mineure : les Bulgares, les Grecs, les Valaques, les Turcs, les Arméniens sont conviés à s'unir, sans perdre par là leur identité, sous la même autorité souveraine, démocratique et laïque; étant admis que l'Etat nouveau s'établira sur la base de lois égales reliant les individus de toutes les catégories du peuplement. Et lorsque, peu d'années plus tard, J.-G. Fichte, se dressant contre les appels contre-révolutionnaires de l'Ecole Historicienne, en même temps que contre les visées expansionnistes de Napoléon, aura invoqué une idée de nation allemande historique, il en déduira lui aussi la substance de ce que cette idée contient de fidélité à l'idéal révolutionnaire de l'homme libre et du citoyen éclairé (12). Pour le philosophe allemand, également, la Nation s'étend aussi loin que fleurit la liberté de l'individu sous l'écran protecteur de la souveraineté une et indivisible (13).

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Les guerres napoléoniennes, suivies des proclamations et des pratiques de la Sainte-Alliance et du Concert Européen, ont conduit cependant à de nouveaux et importants changements de la forme et du contenu de l'Etat-nation. A la conception plus ou moins teintée de cosmopolitisme du "national" pendant la période révolutionnaire, se substitue peu à peu en Europe le nouveau principe des nationalités. Sans cesser d'être, sous un certain clivage, "sociales", les révolutions du dix-neuvième siècle, ainsi que du vingtième, deviennent authentiquement "nationales", en ce sens que les individus qui sont appelés désormais à composer les nouveaux Etats-nation sont réputés être liés préalablement par un contrat invisible attesté - ainsi qu'Edmond Burke l'avait suggéré - par les actes de l'histoire, et confirmé par des caractères actuels multiples : communauté des coutumes et des moeurs, de la religion et de la langue aussi, éventuellement. Le "vouloir vivre ensemble" mis en exergue plus tard par Ernest Renan pour caractériser la communauté politique nationale paraît, d'ores et déjà, irréductible à l'hypothèse de rapports inter-individuels de même nature et générateurs de droits et obligations valables pour tous les hommes. Le prius est à présent le "national". L'Etat-nation se convertit en conséquence en authentique Etat National, destiné à mettre en valeur les vertus propres à telle ou telle nation particulière, réputée vraie historiquement et ayant une existence antérieure à l'Etat. Or, du fait que la Nation a une existence indépendante de l'Etat et peut déborder les frontières de celui-ci, il en résulte des conflits et des tensions de plus en plus tenaces entre Etats, conflits et tensions qui rendant encore plus rigoureuses les structures centralistes du pouvoir d'Etat. Sous la poussée des nationalismes et des irrédentismes de toutes sortes, le droit cosmopolitique de l'individu - droit inhérent à l'essence même de l'Etat-nation converti en Etat National - est destiné, dès lors, à s'amenuiser de plus en plus. A partir de la Charte de 1814 et en progression jusqu'à la veille de la première guerre mondiale, les droits individuels naturels se transforment en "droits publics subjectifs" et ils sont réservés, en principe, au "national", en exclusion de l'"étranger" (14).

III) Il n'en demeure pas moins que cet Etat National ethnocentrique continue à fonctionner selon les caractéristiques principales de l'Etat-nation, tel que celui-ci avait été conçu, trois siècles plus tôt, par les adeptes de la philosophie géométrique. Et il trouve encore un appui de plus solides dans cette conception monadologique de la société internationale et du droit international qui avait redoublé, depuis le temps de la Renaissance les ordres juridiques individualistes et centralistes des sociétés étatisées. Or, il est évident que ces sociétés, ainsi que le droit normatif international qui avait assuré leur légitimité externe, se trouvent être aujourd'hui fort éloignés du modèle qui en avait servi de base lors de leur naissance ou dans la suite de leur développement. Et l'on peut parler à présent, pour la première fois au cours de ces trois derniers siècles d'histoire européenne de changement de structure vrai et profond aussi bien au niveau de l'Etat qu'à celui de la société internationale et inter-étatique.

Avant de préciser ce que signifie pour nous un tel changement, il nous semble utile de nous rapporter brièvement aux facteurs principaux qui ont permis à l'Etat-nation de se perpétuer à travers les métamorphoses idéologiques et institutionnelles que nous avons notées précédemment.

Ces facteurs, on les devine déjà en scrutant un peu plus profondément la philosophie sociale des grands rationalistes(15). Il faudra, toutefois, attendre le dix huitième siècle pour que leur action remonte au grand jour. A ses débuts, on le sait, l'Etat-nation n'a pas été conçu comme un Etat faible. Son avènement a coïncidé avec le mercantilisme et le capitalisme d'Etat, et il a visé surtout à l'essor et à la consolidation de tels régimes socio-économiques. Néanmoins, à partir d'une certaine date, qui coïncide avec la diffusion des idées physiocratiques en économie, l'Etat-nation s'est confondu peu à peu avec la doctrine de l'Etat "veilleur de nuit", c'est-à-dire de l'Etat qui garantit et surveille le fonctionnement correct de la société économique privée, société qui est régie, aux dires de ses adeptes, par des lois naturelles génératrices d'automatismes bienfaisants. A l'idée d'unité conceptuelle de la société politique étatisée postulée au départ par le rationalisme est venu, en effet, se greffer le postulat d'unité et d'autonomie du marché. Superposé à la société économique reconnue autonome, l'Etat-nation -révolutionnaire et cosmopolite ou national au sens traditionaliste et historique- se donne maintenant comme emblème l'abstention de toute immixtion dans les affaires de la société, de la société économique plus particulièrement. L'on ignore, en conséquence, ou on interdit formellement, ainsi que nous l'avons attesté plus haut, toute velléité d'ordre corporatif, régionaliste ou ethnique tendant à fausser le rapport établi entre la collectivité globale incarnée par l'Etat et ses membres individuels. La peur du collectif et du plural, en politique comme en économie, va jusqu'à réserver une existence occulte aux partis politiques, dont on hésite encore jusqu'à une date récente à reconnaître la réalité constitutionnelle. Rien d'étonnant, dès lors, si les divisions administratives territoriales se modèlent de plus en plus conformément à des schémas tendant invariablement à l'uniformité à partir de hiérarchies fortement centralisées. Les collectivités historiques locales, créations le plus souvent spontanées de l'histoire s'intègrent elles-mêmes, de façons diverses, dans les divisions

administratives superposées(16). Suivant le sort de la corporation ou de la commune, la Région se perd à son tour et se confond dans l'unité idéologique postulée à partir de l'Etat-nation parvenu à son apogée sous l'empire de l'individualisme libéral et physiocratique.

IV) Ce sont encore des facteurs économiques puissants qui ont contribué, de façon prioritaire, à ébranler au cours de notre siècle les structures sociales et idéologiques correspondantes de l'Etat-nation.

Il ne serait pas nécessaire, certes, d'insister longuement, ici, sur les transformations que la société européenne a subies à partir de la concentration industrielle. Ce qui est certain, c'est que nous vivons actuellement à peu près partout en Europe sous l'empire d'idées, de faits et d'institutions qui ne cadrent réellement ni avec la conception initiale de l'individualisme ni avec ses transformations ultérieures sous la pression des idées physiocratiques et du nationalisme. Il suffirait de rappeler à cet égard, que si l'individu continue encore à figurer sur ce tableau comme le destinataire principal de droits constitutionnellement garantis, il est aussi présentement porteur d'obligations multiples résultant de son insertion nécessaire dans des réseaux de relations groupales complexes, génératrices de droits et de devoirs sociaux et culturels, droits et devoirs dont le seul énoncé se suffit pour bouleverser de fond en comble les rapports négatifs jadis établis entre l'Etat et la société privées. L'Etat "veilleur de nuit" est mort dans les bras de l'Etat administratif et social et aucune force n'est plus capable de le ressusciter.

Rien d'étonnant, dès lors, si nous avons été amenés jusqu'à réviser la notion cardinale qui avait servi de base à l'édification de l'Etat-nation : nous parlons aujourd'hui moins d'individu porteur de droits naturels que d'individu-personne, en soulignant par là que le social précède et accompagne tout rapport établi ou à établir entre l'homme individuel et le collectif des individus réunis sous la même autorité. A dire vrai, la mission fondamentale de ce que l'on peut encore appeler un Etat souverain consiste maintenant moins à faire insérer les individus dans la collectivité globale uniforme que de coordonner des activités émanant de centres de décision divers et multiformes, centres de décision dont le pouvoir d'Etat contrôle imparfaitement l'action, tandis qu'il en subit en permanence la pression. Il est patent que nous ne sommes plus à l'époque de l'abstentionnisme ni à celle de l'interventionisme fragmentaire et occasionnel. Plus que jamais, la société, organisée à sa manière selon les possibilités que lui offrent la science et la technologie, remonte sans cesse vers les sommets du pouvoir; et le pouvoir se voit obligé de partager jusqu'aux plus viles besognes de la société. L'Etat-nation individualiste et abstentionniste n'existe aujourd'hui nulle part. Encore moins dans notre Europe pluraliste et démocratique.

Cependant il importe de noter, que tous ces changements profonds dans les rapports entre la société et l'Etat sont consécutifs, également, ou parallèles, de modifications de structure intervenues dans le domaine de la société internationale. Ces modifications ne datent, certes, d'hier. Elles ont été préparées par des faits tels

que la mondialisation du commerce, les dépendances coloniales et la décolonisation, les antagonismes économiques et militaires. Jointe aux bouleversements consécutifs aux progrès technologiques, ces faits n'ont pas été sans entraîner des conséquences négatives et positives importantes non seulement sur le tracé des frontières, mais aussi et surtout sur les évolutions internes de chaque Etat-nation.

Conséquences négatives, d'abord, puisque les tensions et les conflits internationaux consécutifs à l'émergence des nationalismes ont contribué, ainsi que nous l'avons rappelé plus haut, à rendre, en Europe, plus rigides les structures centralistes de l'Etat-nation. Pis encore; en certains cas (17), l'idée nationale a pu être considérée comme étant incompatible avec tout mélange ou cohabitation, culturelle ou ethnique. Elle a donné lieu à des échanges de populations et à des massacres rappelant les pires moments des empires Babylonien et Assyrien de la Haute Antiquité. Cependant, conséquences positives aussi, par le fait que le commerce international rendait désormais perceptible la nécessité de réformes institutionnelles adéquates, afin de maîtriser une économie et une société de plus en plus dynamique et expansive. A peu près au même moment, les sciences de l'homme, devenant de plus en plus ouvertes et comparatives étaient à même de montrer les faiblesses et les déficiences d'un système de gouvernement, national et international, qui avait donné tout ce qu'on aurait pu attendre de lui. Un système qui attendait déjà depuis plusieurs décennies à être remplacé par quelque chose de nouveau et de meilleur. On parlait déjà, en effet, chez les constitutionnalistes des années '20 de "crise de l'Etat" et de "crise du système international", juste à la veille du jour où la crise économique mondiale des années '30 allait donner le signal à des bouleversements encore plus redoutables.

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Les évolutions précédentes ont été particulièrement sensibles, ainsi qu'il a été rappelé plus haut, dans les Pays européens, qui ont, de plus, souffert des massacres et des destructions matérielles pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale; mais dont une partie seulement ont été en mesure d'en tirer jusqu'ici les conclusions qui s'imposent. Des expériences neuves et originales ont vu le jour depuis lors dans cette partie de notre Continent. Tout nous incite à penser qu'il serait désormais impossible d'affronter, pour ce qui est de l'Europe démocratique et pluraliste, les problèmes relevant du complexe des rapports entre la Nation, le Pluralisme et la Région sans tenir compte de ces expériences.

Ce qui a suscité et soutenu le mouvement européen actuel, n'est pas, certes, uniquement la conscience d'une commune appartenance culturelle ou encore un simple réflexe de défense vis-à-vis de périls extérieurs. C'est aussi et surtout la conscience de plus en plus nette de l'impossibilité à laquelle se sont acculés à peu près tous les Etats du Continent de résoudre dans l'isolement et par leurs propres moyens d'Etat-nation indépendants les problèmes avec lesquels se sont confrontés dans le nouveau clivage des relations économiques, technologiques et militaires. Vu sous cet angle, le mouvement d'unification européenne paraît indubitablement s'insérer dans le contexte des évolutions historiques qui ont débouché, au début de ce siècle, à la crise de l'Etat-nation et aux conflits mondiaux consécutifs.

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Il convient, à cet égard, de tenir également compte du fait que l'Etat-nation, grand ou petit, démocratique, oligarchique ou monarchique, en fondant lors de sa constitution ses espoirs sur l'idée d'unité et d'uniformité des structures de base à partir du schéma initial : individu - pouvoir souverain, avait compté aussi sur un minimum d'autarchie vitale, tantôt fondée sur la puissance, économique et militaire, de son territoire et de son peuplement, et tantôt appuyée sur la vigueur du sentiment national de ses citoyens. Or, une telle autarchie s'est avérée précisément inopérante de nos jours, sous le poids de pressions internes et externes, auxquelles chaque Etat se doit inéluctablement de faire face. Tout comte fait, le passage de la société individualiste à la société solidariste, démocratique et plurale, de l'Etat centralisateur au régionalisme, du droit à l'égalité abstraite et impersonnelle au personnalisme et au droit à la différence, de la quantité du profit, individuel ou collectif, à la qualité de la vie, du productivisme sans bornes au respect de la nature et de l'héritage culturel -, un tel passage constitue visiblement à présent une tâche qui dépasse largement le potentiel de l'Etat-nation européen le mieux pourvu par la nature ou par la culture. L'élaboration d'un cadre de vie plus large, plus complexe assurément, mais aussi mieux adapté aux impératifs du temps présent, serait de nature, de l'avis unanime de tous ceux qui ont œuvré pour une patrie européenne commune, à modifier profondément le sens et la portée des problèmes qui ont pesé jusqu'ici sur chaque Etat-nation pris séparément.

Il ne nous paraît pas nécessaire d'insister, ici, sur les diverses façons selon lesquelles le fait européen actuel offre déjà toutes faites ou prépare seulement des réponses à ces différents problèmes. Il paraît accomplir plus ou moins automatiquement cette mission quand il affirme la primauté de l'ordre communautaire sur la législation de chaque Etat-membre(18). Ou encore, lorsqu'il donne une nouvelle dimension à l'électorat national, en en faisant le co-auteur d'une souveraineté plus large en voie de gestation. Il le fait aussi en établissant des standards dans le domaine des droits et libertés, des libertés collectives en particulier, ainsi qu'en matière de protection des minorités, de sauvegarde de la nature et de l'héritage culturel. Il semble accomplir cette tâche plus concrètement, lorsqu'il devient générateur de mesures positives tendant à faire disparaître les déséquilibres régionaux ou quand il offre son soutien en vue de la solution de problèmes économiques et sociaux intéressant tel ou tel Pays particulier. Il saute aux yeux, que si cette évolution devait se prolonger encore quelque temps nous serions amenés à des situations irréversibles, susceptibles de modifier de fond en comble, en même temps que le concept de l'Etat-nation, les rapports possibles entre l'idée nationale et le régionalisme.

Il paraît en tout état de cause certain, d'ores et déjà, que des mesures de celles que nous venons de mentionner sont en elles-mêmes de nature à atténuer grandement les tensions rendues inévitables dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation centraliste et individualiste, entre l'idéologie nationale et le pluralisme géographique, culturel ou ethnique.

Atténuer les tensions, faire disparaître les disparités, écarter les antagonismes stériles ne signifie pas, toutefois, enlever à l'Europe Unie sa variété, qui est sa principale richesse. Un tel danger n'existe, d'ailleurs, pas réellement.

Il convient de penser, en premier lieu, que les nations européennes, alors même qu'elles fussent largement façonnées par l'idéologie et les techniques de l'Etat-nation n'en sont pas moins des productions en quelque sorte spontanées de l'histoire; elles sont alimentées par des sources intarissables de mémoire collective aussi bien que par mille motifs d'intérêts actuels bien compris. Il paraît peu probable, d'autre part, que l'atténuation des déséquilibres régionaux à la suite des interventions communautaires soit de nature à faire éclipser automatiquement les idéologies régionalistes, qui sont, le plus souvent, elles aussi, produits authentiques de la géographie ou de l'histoire. Et de toutes façons, dans l'un comme dans l'autre des cas précités, les présuppositions socio-économiques, intellectuelles et culturelles qui ont conduit récemment au déclenchement du procès de fédéralisation européenne n'ont rien de comparable avec celles qui avait fait naître, quelques siècles auparavant, l'Etat-nation individualiste et centralisateur. L'Europe n'est une, en fait, que par la qualité des différences qui la composent à plus d'un niveau, étant admis que ses composantes : entités nationales, groupes d'idées et d'intérêts, partis politiques et régions, individus possèdent néanmoins suffisamment d'éléments convergents ou similaires, susceptibles d'engendrer et de maintenir l'unité sans supprimer la différence. C'est en fait par un jeu complexe, parfois subtile, de la solidarité par similitudes et par la division du travail que les antinomies historiques de l'Etat-nation pourraient finalement être levées.

La mise en oeuvre d'une idéologie européenne de cette envergure suppose, évidemment, en dehors de mesures pratiques diverses (19), la prise de conscience de plus en plus large du commun destin que l'histoire réserve désormais aux nations, aux ethnies, aux régions et aux individus inclus dans l'espace européen. Et il va sans dire qu'une évolution idéologique de cette nature ne saurait vraiment s'accomplir que dans la mesure où l'Europe Unie revêtirait un caractère de plus en plus organique, en se dotant de procédures administratives et juridictionnelles mieux élaborées (20) et en assurant au Parlement Européen à la fois une meilleure représentativité et un pouvoir de décision et de contrôle plus efficace.

Pareille évolution serait, pourtant, encore insuffisante pour forger une authentique identité européenne, si des mesures parallèles n'étaient pas prises en même temps dans chaque Etat particulier pour briser le centralisme hérité de l'Etat-nation et pour assurer la démocratie à tous les niveaux de la vie politique et administrative. C'est dire aussi que le système représentatif, tel qu'il a été conçu et pratiqué dans le cadre historique de l'Etat-nation devrait éventuellement être révisé pour être mis au diapason des exigences d'une Europe authentiquement démocratique et pluraliste.

Bien que ce dernier aspect du problème déborde ostensiblement le cadre assigné à cet exposé, il convient de rappeler, néanmoins, qu'à peu près partout dans l'Europe démocratique actuelle la démocratie représentative se confond, plus ou moins, avec ce qu'on a nommé la "république des partis". Or, les partis politiques ont été modélés généralement dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation, et ont servi à consolider,

avec le concours des administrations centrales, son centralisme viscéral; tout en édifiant, souvent, leur organisation interne et leurs méthodes d'action sur une base tout aussi centraliste que l'Etat lui-même. Ils peuvent constituer, en arborant le drapeau d'un nationalisme réinventé aux fins de propagande électorale, un obstacle sérieux aux progrès de la cause européenne. Il devient visible, sous cet angle, que la démocratisation des partis politiques et l'application d'une déontologie républicaine dans les pratiques électorales pourraient constituer des tâches incombant, aussi, aux organes de la Communauté.

Je me permets de conclure par quelques mots seulement.

L'ère de l'Etat-nation paraît être révolue à jamais pour les Pays de l'Europe démocratique; mais les nations européennes ne sont pas prêtes à disparaître, en tant que telles, dans une Europe politiquement, socialement et culturellement unifiée.

Leurs problèmes de structure et d'action majeurs ne sauraient, toutefois, être résolu valablement, que dans la mesure où leur intégration serait de plus en plus poussée dans le cadre institutionnel et idéologique de la patrie européenne commune.

Un tel cadre élargi s'avère aujourd'hui comme l'unique moyen propice pour assurer le fonctionnement effectif du pluralisme, aussi bien horizontal que vertical, en faisant notamment du droit à la différence le complément indispensable de l'identité européenne.

L'accomplissement de ces tâches suppose un effort, conjoint ou parallèle, de réformes institutionnelles tant sur le plan de la Communauté Européenne que sur celui des Pays membres; réformes dont l'accomplissement devrait être effectué avec la célérité qu'exigent les conditions de vie présente des sociétés humaines, mais aussi avec la prudence qu'impose le fait indéniable que l'unification européenne se déroule dans un monde périlleux sinon résolument hostile.

NOTES

1. Voir la Première Partie de l'ouvrage de Hobbes Leviathan. Cf. ib. 2e Partie, Chap. XVII. Pour Spinoza, v. Traité Théologico-politique, Oeuvres, Paris, 1928, t. II, chap. XVI, p. 294 et s., Ethique, IV, Sch. 2.

2. On en trouve les traces en Chine Impériale, dans les Empires du Moyen Orient, dans la société mycénienne. Pour cette dernière, v. notre ouvrage : Les sociétés politiques homériques, Paris, PUF, 1974.

3. Voir J.-M. Leclercq, La Nation et son idéologie, éd. Anthropos, Paris, 1979.

4. De l'Esprit des Lois, L. XXVIII-XXX.

5. V. Georges Vlachos, "En marge du Contrat Social", in Mélanges Alexandre Svoboda, Athènes, 1961, p. 161 et s.

6. Voir notre Essai sur la Politique de Hume, Paris, Domat-Monchrestien, 1955, p. 115 et s.

7. La politique de Spinoza était, pourtant, partiellement du moins, exempte de ce reproche, dans la mesure notamment où elle inclinait fortement vers les idées de la démocratie libérale.

8. L'on sait que la Loi Le Chapelier avait interdit, pendant la Révolution, l'exercice du droit de coalition.

9. De l'Esprit des Lois, L. XI, chap. VI, L. XIX, chap. XXVII.

10. "Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n'a point de constitution".

11. Textes inspirés des Constitutions et Déclarations de la Grande Révolution et réadaptés pour servir aux peuples vivant dans l'enceinte de l'Empire Othoman.

12. Voir nos commentaires dans Fédéralisme et Raison d'Etat dans la pensée internationale de Fichte, Paris, Pédone, 1948.

13. Voir notamment ses Discours à la Nation Allemande (1807).

14. Dans la plupart des Constitutions précédant la première guerre mondiale, il n'était plus question de "droits de l'homme" mais de "droits publics" des Français, des Turcs, des Grecs, etc.

15. Aussi bien chez Hobbes que dans les oeuvres de Spinoza, l'économie joue un rôle décisif dans l'aménagement de l'Etat et de ses rapports avec la société.

16. Cette intégration est particulièrement sensible, en Grèce, où, après la formation de l'Etat néo-hellénique, en 1830, les communes locales, dont les origines remontaient à l'époque byzantine et qui avaient survécu sous l'Empire Othoman, ont été pratiquement éliminées pendant un siècle environ.

17. Tel a été le cas, notamment, des populations vivant dans l'Empire Othoman après la Révolution nationaliste des Jeunes Turcs, en 1908 et dans les années suivantes (massacre des Arméniens, des Grecs, etc.).

18. La mise en oeuvre de cette idée est facilitée par l'adoption, dans l'ordre légal intra-étatique, de dispositions comme celles de l'article 28 de la Constitution hellénique du 11 Juin 1975 : § 2 "Afin de servir un intérêt national important et de promouvoir la collaboration avec les autres Etats, il est permis d'attribuer, par voie de traité ou d'accord international, des compétences prévues par la Constitution aux organes d'organisations internationales..."; et, au § 3 : "La Grèce procède librement, par une loi votée à la majorité absolue du nombre total des députés, à des restrictions de l'exercice de la souveraineté nationale, dans la mesure où ces restrictions sont imposées par un intérêt national important, ne lèsent pas les droits de l'homme et les fondements du régime démocratique et sont effectuées sur la base du principe de l'égalité et sous la condition de réciprocité".

19. Institutionnalisation de la double nationalité, politique extérieure commune, etc.

20. Il est évident que, sous un certain rapport, l'intégration européenne devrait précéder ou, du moins, être concomitante avec l'institutionnalisation du pluralisme ethnique et régional. La revendication de l'autonomie par certains groupes sociaux pourrait, en effet, être fomentée ou exploitée du dehors et susciter, aussi longtemps que l'Europe n'est pas parvenue à son unification politique, des troubles et des conflits, internes et internationaux. Des conséquences de cette nature pourraient être engendrées par les procédures plus ou moins incohérentes selon lesquelles la CEE, en collaboration avec le Conseil de l'Europe, procède actuellement à une enquête en vue de dresser la carte ethnographique et linguistique de l'Europe.

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NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

IN EASTERN EUROPE

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NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN EASTERN EUROPE

Concepts and Definitions

A social scientist trying to examine a relationship between two or more concepts or variables is usually faced at the outset with a problem of definitions. At times it is a relatively simple task; on this occasion, however, the two concepts to be discussed - nationalism and pluralism - defy easy generalizations and require a careful definition. It is a truism, of course, that the way concepts are defined determines the breadth and depth of the question to be investigated: the definition not only establishes certain analytical boundaries but also dictates or at least suggests an approach or a method to be used in postulating and testing a given hypothesis. The importance of clear and unambiguous definitions is not better illustrated than in this particular case.

The study of nationalism in Eastern Europe, especially in the interwar period, used to be one of the favorite occupations not only of historians and political scientists but also of politicians of all hues, and by now the literature on the subject is not inconsiderable although its quality is uneven.¹ While nationalism in the region in the post-World War II period has received less attention, the box is not entirely empty and it may be speculated that a revival of scholarly interest in this phenomenon is bound to come sooner rather than later.² However, thus far, at least, the research on the subject of East European nationalism has focused primarily on either the question of nation-building, economic nationalism, or on purely political process in the various countries, and its results appear to be of limited utility for our purposes.

It is clear that the concept of nationalism shares with many others the dubious distinction of being "an elusive phenomenon that defies exact description."³ Although, thanks mostly to the works of such scholars as Karl Deutsch, a good deal of the confusion surrounding the meaning of nationalism had been eliminated and the concept itself has not only acquired a definite scholarly respectability but had also become more or less operationalized,⁴ for the purpose of this investigation the concept of nationalism is too broad and needs to be narrowed.

Thus, I propose to equate nationalism with the concept of national identity and discuss the latter in the East European context. The ambiguities which still surround the latter term are reflected in the literature dealing with it. One approach is to treat national identity as being akin to the notion of national character, which is said to embrace "the enduring personality characteristics and unique life styles found among the populations of particular national states," and which assumes that "there are elements held in common by members of a particular state that can be traced in some manner to the relatively enduring formative influences of the cultural character of that state on malleable human nature."⁵ While this description may be said to come close to defining national identity, one has to agree with Lucian Pye, who argues that "in the past the concept of national character, in becoming a residual category used to 'explain' all the differences that could not be otherwise accounted for by objective analysis, tended to be biased toward emphasizing the importance of the unconscious to the point of discounting almost entirely the place of reason in human affairs."⁶

In his well-known study of political modernization, Dankwart Rustow devoted considerable attention to the problem of national identity which he analyzed in terms of four factors: geography, history, language, and popular will.⁷ He concluded that none of them provided unambiguous determinants of a nation's

identity, which in a broader sense could be seen as representing a synthesis of political, cultural and psychological variables. The inclusion of the political factor makes Rustow's concept of national identity clearly relevant for our analysis since it was intended primarily as a tool in his analysis of political development which is also our goal. However, another definition of national identity appears even better suited for the study of political development.

I have in mind here the notion of national identity as developed by Sidney Verba, who views it as one of the dimensions of a nation's political culture or, in other words, as one of the "general political beliefs...[which] are usually mixtures of cognitions about politics as well as standards of evaluation."⁸ Verba considers national identity as the "most crucial political belief," whose existence is the necessary condition for the formation of a political culture which he describes in turn as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."⁹

If we accept Pye's view that "a political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system,"¹⁰ then Verba's notion of national identity becomes even more significant. If we think of national identity, again in Verba's terms, as consisting of two forms of identification - vertical, reflecting a sense of an individual's belonging to a particular nation and/or state, and horizontal, signifying some attachment to other members of a given collectivity,¹¹ then we may perhaps go as far as to suggest that the concept of national identity closely approximates that of national political culture.

Ordinarily I would argue that equating these two notions would result in a very narrow interpretation of the concept of national identity and, ipso facto,

nationalism. However, I am prepared to argue that in the context of our analysis of Communist systems, the above approximation violates neither the generally accepted definitions nor common sense. Thus, I believe that in the final analysis all that happens in Communist societies is essentially political and that regardless of some recent developments in the individual East European countries, there is no basic separation between politics and society. This does not mean, of course, that the political systems has been able to penetrate every corner of East European societies - after all, even Stalin did not succeed in this - but simply that all activity - individual or collective, economic or social - tends to be heavily politicized and to carry significant political implications. To conclude, for the purpose of this discussion, I shall treat nationalism as a form of national political culture or as a wet of national "attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior."¹²

The concept of pluralism is no less difficult to define in an unambiguous fashion than that of nationalism. In this context, pluralism will be viewed as referring to both "specific institutional arrangements for distributing and sharing governmental power," and to an "approach to understanding political behavior."¹³ To put it differently, I shall view a pluralist society as one composed of various reasonably independent and voluntary associations or groups, each representing a specific interest and each insisting on being consulted, if not formally included, in the decision-making process. Ideally, the advocates of the so-called "group analysis" approach see the role of the government as basically that of a more or less passive arbiter or broker, trying to achieve a workable compromise by conciliating divergent group interests.

The application of group analysis for the study of Communist societies was the outcome of two parallel developments in the field of Communist political studies:

the growing dissatisfaction with the relevance of the totalitarian paradigm and the increasing awareness of the socio-economic transformation of several Communist societies in the wake of the industrial revolution which has taken place, especially in Eastern Europe, in the forties and fifties.¹⁴ The resulting economic and social differentiation and stratification has been widely discussed in the literature and there is no need to recapitulate it here. Suffice it to say that the emergence of conflicting interests has by now been formally recognized even by the ruling elites in several Communist states which thus acknowledged the bankruptcy of the concept of "solidary society" which has for a long time provided the philosophical underpinning of Communist politics.¹⁵

Despite the surging popularity of the group approach, the question still remains whether the approach has any validity for the analysis of the East European political systems. As with most of the other analytical frameworks the answer is both yes and no. The arguments in favor of the approach are well known and will not be restated here: there seems to be a significant degree of consensus that pluralistic tendencies are nowadays part and parcel of Communist systems, and the only disagreement concerns the meaning of the term.¹⁶

The critics of the group theory approach feel that incipient pluralism easily observed in several East European states is largely meaningless as a researchable category, and that the approach, developed as it were, for the study of genuinely pluralistic societies, has little or no validity for the study of Communist political systems.¹⁷ From a rigorous point of view, the critics are undoubtedly right, and in the strictly formal sense pluralism has no place in Communist societies. It can be argued, however, that the above view is too restrictive to be of much value for research purposes and that a compulsive adherence to rigidly defined categories may prevent us from gaining

useful insights into the working of the East European systems. To quote a suggestion, "in order to push on with serious studies of interest group politics in the Soviet Union we must first rid ourselves of the constricting belief that group theory applies only to groups that operate openly and straightforwardly within a political culture which not only tolerates, but celebrates pluralism."¹⁸ What is true for the USSR is obviously even truer for the majority of East European countries. Enough empirical evidence has been accumulated over the years to indicate that there is considerable group activity going on in Communist societies and that interest articulation has become (or is in the process of becoming) legitimized by the ruling party.

Judging by the amount of discussion it has stimulated, the group approach filled a void in research strategy. Perhaps one of its greatest attractions lay in its responding to an easily observable phenomenon which could not be readily explained by any of the hitherto accepted analytical frameworks. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the approach raised almost as many questions as it answered.¹⁹ It was one thing to study pluralistic tendencies in Communist societies and another to disregard, explicitly or implicitly, the fact that these societies were, after all, Communist and hence non-democratic. So far at least, there has not been any evidence of the complete disappearance of either Marxist-Leninist ideology or the ruling parties, both of which still continue to make Communist systems somewhat different not only from the democratic but also from other authoritarian systems. Thus one has to conclude that while the group approach is highly useful as an analytical tool in studying certain discrete phenomena, it is much less valuable for the examination of total processes or systems. To put it differently, I agree with Gordon Skilling that "the group approach could, and indeed must, be combined with other approaches in the effort to explain the working of the [Communist] system as a whole."²⁰

Finally, in examining the process of political development in Eastern Europe I utilized the existing analytical frameworks developed primarily by Gabriel Almond and Samuel Huntington.²¹ I did so for two reasons: first, because I found them eminently suitable for the purpose of investigating the process of political development in that part of the world, and second, because to the best of my knowledge, there have been few if any attempts to test the applicability of these frameworks to Communist systems. In other words, I agreed with Huntington that Almond's framework was "precisely designed to deal with the problem of change and it was clearly independent of any particular historical context... It could be applied to a primitive stateless tribe, a classical Greek city-state, or to a modern-nation-state."²²

The framework also avoids another problem faced by some of the other analytical approaches utilized for the study of Communist systems. Thus, the totalitarian and bureaucratic politics models were "invented" by and large exclusively for the study of non-democratic societies. Other approaches, such as the configurative and group conflict, claimed to be of a more generalized nature but that claim has been under considerable criticism by those who felt that Communist systems are different from all other political systems. Similar criticism can be directed against John Kautsky's ideas which, according to some, may have gone too far in their neglect of ideology as a systemic variable.²³ I am prepared to argue that none of these criticisms apply to Almond's approach.

Does it mean that the latter is totally free of drawbacks and disadvantages? Obviously not. The criticism can be essentially divided into two parts: that dealing with the theoretical underpinning of the approach - system theory and structural functionalism - and that concerned specifically with the applicability of the model to the analysis of Communist systems. The former criticism is quite

familiar and needs not be elaborated here; the latter is of greater interest and should be faced squarely. Thus it appears that the various critics castigate the approach for neglecting the importance of personality and leadership and for not paying sufficient attention to the influence of exogenous factors, such as the Soviet Union,²⁴ for being culture-bound,²⁵ as well as for generating an "unduly optimistic general theory of political development."²⁶

The first two points are well taken. However, as with the number of other factors, the importance of leadership and personality should not be exaggerated. It was obviously greater in the early stages of the East European political development but its role today is not easily ascertained. The same applies to the influence of the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe which was clearly overwhelming and rigid during the Stalinist period and which has become much more flexible and unpredictable under Gorbachev. In the final analysis, the impact of leadership and international environment depends on the perception of the researcher. On the one hand there is always the temptation to explain nearly everything that has been happening in Eastern Europe with reference to either the personality of the current leaders or to the influence of the USSR, or both. As suggested earlier, while actually valid at a certain period of recent East European history, this assumption ignored many interesting internal socio-economic developments occurring spontaneously and autonomously in various countries. Probably the best way out of the dilemma is to focus on those developmental variables that can be empirically tested while suggesting one or more additional variants mirroring change in the two independent variables, those of leadership and international environment.²⁷

Is the Almondian framework culture-bound and does it reflect an over-optimistic theory of political development? Here again, the character and value

of a given model lies in the eye of the beholder and whether a theory is optimistic or pessimistic, ethnocentric or value-neutral, depends on one's perception, training and ultimate research objective. Ultimately, it is largely the matter of what one is trying to show and/or prove. If, for example, it can be shown that some of the recent developments in Eastern Europe resemble those that have occurred in Western Europe several generations ago, an optimist may conclude that the former is on the road to establishing a genuine pluralist society, whereas a pessimist is likely to point to the continuing presence of Soviet troops in some of the countries and to the omnipresent role of the party as a proof that nothing has changed. Hence, while for one observer the glass may be half-full, for another it is half-empty.

The process of political development in the selected East European countries²⁸ will then be examined with the help of Almond's framework that focuses on five critical areas: identity, penetration, participation, distribution and legitimacy.²⁹ Each country undergoing a process of socio-political development is likely, sooner or later, to encounter a series of systemic crises or challenges in these five areas. The various crises are not independent of each other and do not arise in any particular sequence; in fact, they are closely correlated. They rarely appear alone but primarily as a combination of two or more. The linkages between the presence of the different developmental crises and challenges in the various countries will be examined with the help of the five systemic components, suggested by Huntington: culture, structure, groups, leadership, and policies. These components are also interrelated, which means that a change in any of them is likely to induce changes in one or more of the others. The process of political development is ultimately strongly influenced by the interplay among those components, their type and rate of change, and the combinations in which they occur.³⁰

Since, as mentioned at the outset, my interest is in examining the interaction between nationalism conceptualized as national political culture, pluralism identified with the presence of groups, and the process of political development, I shall focus especially on two of the components - culture and groups.

Political Development in Eastern Europe

In discussing the process of political development in Eastern Europe, I concluded some seven years ago that "on the eve of the 1980s, all the East European countries, with the exception of Hungary, have been facing a series of developmental crises which, when aggregated, range from a highly intensive one in Poland to moderate ones in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia,"³¹ with Romania straddling the middle.

What follows is a brief examination of the changes that have occurred in the individual East European countries in the 1980s and of the impact of these changes on the situation in the various countries with special emphasis on the role played in that process by the respective national political cultures and interest or pressure groups.

(1) Identity

The crisis of identity or national integration, which is related to an incomplete or unsuccessful process of nation-building, has been described as a situation in which significant national groups within a given polity either do not consider themselves as falling within the decision-making domain of the government, or deny some other group or groups within the system the same rights which they have enjoyed.³²

There is no doubt that in the post-World War II years Eastern Europe as a whole as well as the individual countries have been experiencing much less of an

identity crisis than during the interwar period. At that time, nearly all of the countries were multinational or multi-ethnic states whose political systems had to deal with the presence of several minorities which tended to exhibit powerful nationalist tendencies, threatening to undermine the laborious process of nation-building, initiated after World War I, and to destroy the fabric of the respective societies. The result was a gradual demise of the embattled democratic governments and their replacement by autocratic regimes of various hues.

The downfall of democracy in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, had one additional important consequence. It either destroyed or slowed down the emerging pluralistic tendencies in the various countries. Although the latter were at a lower level of political development than their counterparts in Western Europe, most of them began to experience incipient pluralism based on political, socio-economic and religious differences. Even though relatively few of the existing groups became politically relevant by developing institutional structures capable of articulating their particularistic interests, the process of political development and modernization was making progress despite the presence of governmental systems essentially hostile to the idea of politically meaningful pluralism.

To sum up, during the interwar period the causal chain ran from the growth of nationalist tendencies among the minorities, which were suppressed by increasingly non-democratic regimes which, in turn, were resisting pluralistic tendencies that began to emerge at the same time. The parallel growth of nationalism and pluralism was interrupted first by World War II and subsequently by the Communist takeover of the region. What followed was, in a sense, a reversal of the process of causation outlined above.

The attitude of the new Communist regimes toward nationalism was, to say the

least, ambivalent. To some extent, the task of the new ruling elites was made easier by several developments outside their immediate control such as the destruction of the East European Jewry, the expulsion of ethnic Germans and the population transfers due to boundary changes involving the USSR and some of its neighbors. As a result, at least one multinational state in the area, Poland, became a highly homogenous political entity.

Just as the prewar governments tended sharply to suppress nationalist tendencies exhibited by minorities throughout the region, in contrast, their postwar equivalents assumed initially a rather benign attitude: while they did not, except in unusual circumstances, encourage the resurgence of nationalism among minorities, they did not oppose it either, at least initially, as shown by the experiences of several of the countries in the region.

In the mid-1980s, the crisis of identity has manifested itself most sharply in Yugoslavia, for reasons that are obvious and need no further elaboration. The example of violent protests by the Albanian minority in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 and thereafter, strongly suggests that the process of nation-building in Yugoslavia is far from a successful completion. This means that the identity crisis, reflected in recurrent waves of ethnic-nationalist dissent, is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

The rationale for the far-reaching political and economic decentralization introduced in the 1960s was to satisfy the demands of national identity on the part of the various republics. The dilemma faced by the Yugoslav leadership stemmed not only from the multinational character of the country but was also due to the presence of sharp regional differences in the respective levels of socio-economic development. The major problem with decentralization was that it perpetuated, if not increased, the regional economic differentiation by

making the rich republics richer and the poor ones poorer, raising the level of national antagonism and escalating popular discontent articulated by increasingly vocal interest groups representing a variety of concerns. This created demands for greater centralization, thus closing the vicious circle. What appeared as a rational policy to the elites and nonelites of Croatia and Slovenia was clearly seen as irrational and unjust by the rulers and masses of Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. So far it has proved impossible to reconcile both sets of demands: those presented by nationalities and those articulated by groups - and the future seems uncertain.

The situation in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s resembled that in Yugoslavia, reflecting considerable dissatisfaction in Slovakia with the existing state of affairs. Although the latter made considerable progress in the post-World War II period, its economy was still less developed than its Czech counterpart, and Slovakia was hardly able to satisfy all of its capital requirements without help from the Czech lands. Under the centralized economic system, a major effort was made to close the gap between Slovakia and the rest of the country, with the former receiving preferential treatment. For that reason, the economic reforms promulgated in the mid-1960s which aimed at reducing the degree of central planning, were not overwhelmingly supported by the Bratislava nationalists, who were caught on the horns of a dilemma reflecting the conflict between their national aspirations and their desire for the continuation of economic support from Prague.

As is well known, the failure of the Novotny regime to deal in a satisfactory fashion with Slovak nationalist dissent was one of the major causes of the striking political changes in Czechoslovakia beginning in January 1968 and culminating in the "Prague Spring" and its consequences. One of the important results of

that was the creation of a Czechoslovak Federation in January 1969. While it may be assumed that the new constitutional arrangement did not fully satisfy the Slovak nationalist demands, it did go a long way toward defusing Slovak dissent.³³

Another country that has been faced increasingly with the crisis of national integration and identity has been Romania. The neo-Stalinist regime in Bucharest has tried to suppress the nationalist dissent and has steadfastly denied the existence of discriminatory treatment of Hungarian and German national minorities. The fact remains, however, that particularly the Hungarian dissent has been growing in recent years and that neither the declining Ersatz charisma of President Ceausescu nor the regular invocations of the Soviet threat has succeeded in either creating a sense of a Romanian national identity or in defusing nationalist centrifugal tendencies.³⁴ Bulgaria, which until relatively recently appeared to have achieved a sense of nationalist identity, began to some extent to imitate Romania's policy, by exerting strong pressure against its Turkish minority. The reasons behind Sofia's discriminatory policy are not clear but the harshness of anti-Turkish policies took the rest of the region by surprise.³⁵

What about East Germany? The evidence here is inconclusive. One could easily argue that, at least until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the country which by that time was formally only twelve years old, was faced with an almost insurmountable task of creating a separate and distinct nation-state, thus destroying all traditional links not only with West Germany but also with the idea of Grossdeutsches Reich. On the basis of purely impressionistic evidence, I would be prepared to argue that the process of East German nation-building has been relatively successful and that it has resulted in the emergence of a significant degree of loyalty and commitment to the notion of a DDR-nationhood.

Neither Hungary or Poland experienced identity crises and because of that their respective governments utilized the existing powerful nationalisms for their own purposes. This was particularly true for the Warsaw regime which mobilized strong anti-German feelings in support of Poland's postwar Western boundaries and, indirectly, in its own support as the guarantor of the status quo. Periodically also, the latent anti-Semitism would also be aroused for specific purposes, as was the case in 1956, 1968 and 1980-81. The official encouragement of nationalist feelings had a double-edged sword: while it worked reasonably well in some cases, its by-product was, of course, the maintenance of anti-Soviet feelings which continued unabated throughout the period.

The most powerful outburst of Hungarian nationalism occurred during the revolution of October-November 1956 and because of that the Hungarian leadership has tried to downplay it for the next twenty five years or so. However, the recent official attacks on Romania's treatment of Hungarian minority suggest that for reasons that are not entirely clear, Budapest feels no longer constrained to keep a lid on traditional anti-Romanian feelings.

(2) Penetration

The concept of penetration refers to the ability of the government to establish an effective and efficient control over the society. To quote Joseph La Palombara, "in its broadest sense penetration means conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority" and for any political elite "penetration refers to whether they can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power."³⁶ The crisis of penetration then reflects the inability of the existing regime to make authoritative decisions that are obeyed and followed by the population.

Until relatively recently, it was a conventional wisdom to assert that while Communist governments in Eastern Europe had to engage in the management of some developmental crises - be it participation or distribution - the one crisis they did not have to face was that of penetration. In contrast to other developing countries around the world, the East European regimes, taking a leaf from Soviet experience, have embarked from their very beginning on a massive institution-building program which was intended to carry the government writ into the farthest corners of the polity. Having destroyed the existing structures, they proceeded, first, to atomize the society and, second, to erect a new institutional edifice that would permit the ruling elite to penetrate and control the society. Next to the conventional institutions of the party (or parties), the secret police network and the military, the new structures included a whole array of the so-called "transmission belts" - unions, youth organizations, professional associations - which provided an impressive pluralistic facade. Following the death of Stalin, some of these instruments of penetration were either downgraded (i.e. the secret police) or transformed. The question is whether the post-Stalinist control network has performed satisfactorily or whether it failed to avoid generating a penetration crisis.

It may be argued that in the past thirty years the East European regimes, with two significant exceptions, seemingly succeeded in achieving a high degree of penetration. For example, despite the presence of a small albeit vocal domestic opposition, the Czechoslovak government has been able to "get what [it wanted] from people over whom [it] sought to exercise power." Space does not permit a fuller discussion of the reasons for the post-1968 government's success in re-establishing and maintaining tight control over its people. In trying to answer this question one would most likely seek an answer in the Czechoslovak political

culture as well as in the pattern of the country's historical development.

If we follow Huntington in defining culture as "the values, attitudes, orientations, myths and beliefs relevant to politics and dominant in society,"³⁷ we may hypothesize that the dominant national politico-cultural orientation of the great majority of the Czechoslovak people was a participatory-subject culture, which implied that "ordinary citizens must be obedient to their rulers' demands and must also display both enthusiasm and initiative in complying with their leaders' instructions."³⁸ Were we to eliminate the word "enthusiasm," the preceding appears as an apt description of both elite and mass national political culture in Czechoslovakia and as an explanation of the absence of a penetration crisis.

There is also no evidence of major penetration crises in East Germany, Hungary and Romania. It appears that in the former country, the institutionalization proved remarkably successful, displaying congruence with the traditional German national political culture which, as in Czechoslovakia, could be described as participatory-subject, with the accent on the subject. Hence, except for sporadic manifestations of latent discontent, dissent in East Germany seems to be restricted to a handful of artists and intellectuals without mass following.

The situation in Hungary has been both similar and different. All evidence suggests that the political system since the early 1960s has been performing relatively well in satisfying popular demands, both political and economic, and that the ruling party, recreated after the collapse of its predecessor in 1956, has learned its lesson and has proved highly responsive to popular aspirations, being also able to extract an impressive degree of popular compliance with its decisions. The presence of remarkably little overt dissent in Hungary, probably less than anywhere else in Eastern Europe, is a good testimony to the government's

skill in penetrating the Hungarian society and polity.

Romania in the second half of the 1980s is by far the best example of total penetration by the state. While I would hesitate to call Romania totalitarian, it certainly comes close to the traditional Stalinist model with all its ramifications. To be sure, it is a rather unique type of a highly personalistic regime and this raises the question of its ability to survive its creator, but the fact remains that for the time being President Ceausescu succeeded in establishing total control over his people.

The two countries which did not avoid a penetration crisis were Yugoslavia and Poland. Yugoslavia presented a complex case. Among the various institutions that were intended to penetrate the polity, only the army qualified as a truly national organization, committed to the preservation of Yugoslav unity and the maintenance of Communist rule. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia has long been fragmented along republican lines and could not be relied upon as an instrument of control. The same was true for another important institution, the workers' councils, which were primarily concerned with their own particular interests, now and then in outright opposition to the government.

Without a doubt, Poland represented the most flagrant example of an acute penetration crisis. The existing major institutions - the Party, unions, and other "transmission belts" - have proved increasingly impotent in ensuring obedience and fulfillment of governmental objectives. Here the reasons were complex and stemmed from a combination of historical and cultural factors.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the national cultural variable in Poland has been the remarkable persistence of traditional values and attitudes, despite the massive socialization and resocialization campaigns conducted by successive

regimes since the beginning of Communist rule. Moreover, the rather striking changes in the Polish social and political environment, represented, for example, by the gradual narrowing of persistently deep cleavages and the muting of traditional conflicts between various segments of Polish society, have greatly impaired the ability of the regime to exercise its authority and to impose conformity. The long-run implications of this reversal of alliances cannot be exaggerated as witnessed by the events in Poland since July 1980.

The weakness of the Polish regime was further underscored by the fact that it has had to contend for decades with a powerful competing institution, largely absent elsewhere in the region: the Catholic Church. If anything, the Church proved more successful than the government in penetrating Polish society and if the political system managed to perform at all, it was because of the Church's tacit support.

(3) Participation

As pointed out by Myron Weiner, "one of the most disruptive crises in modern times has been caused by the efforts of those not in power to gain access to power or to influence decisions made by governing elites."³⁹

Any discussion of political participation in Communist systems has to resolve a number of problems.⁴⁰ Perhaps the most important one deals with the character and form of participation. For example, the question has to be raised as to what constitutes a political rather than non-political participation. Secondly, participation implies voluntary action on the part of those interested in influencing governmental decisions and thirdly, a conventional definition of participation suggests that citizens have a choice in the way they intend to take part in decision-making.⁴¹

In light of the above, is it proper to talk about political participation in Eastern Europe today? My answer is both yes and no. There is evidence that in some countries a genuine effort has been made to ensure a wider access to decision-making on the part of selected groups of individuals which have been, and continue to be, influential in arriving at certain decisions. Although these decisions have been mostly concerned with fairly narrowly defined technical issues, we could talk here about authentic rather than totally manufactured participation. On the opposite side, some East European regimes have so far refused to allow even a modicum of popular participation.

There is little doubt that the crisis of participation in the region has been largely due to the emergence of the classic Huntingtonian syndrome of mass mobilization unaccompanied by institutionalization.⁴² Having succeeded in the early "revolutionary" period in harnessing the population to accomplish a variety of tasks associated with the process of building the foundations of the socialist order, the Communist regimes failed, by and large, to provide adequate outlets for the mobilized masses to express their preferences and articulate their demands.

Although, as suggested earlier, the Communist rulers have engaged in considerable institution building during the first two decades or so of their rule, there are indications that with few exceptions these institutions - the interest groups of various hues - played a one-sided role of serving as instruments for generating support rather than for articulating their own demands.

As in the case of penetration, Poland again provides a good example of the crisis of participation. As mentioned above, the existing formal institutions, and especially the groups, have failed rather dismally in serving as channels of communication and instruments of participation, leaving large segments of the

population, especially the workers and peasants, without adequate voice in governmental decision-making. This failure was particularly striking with regard to specialized interest groups which, in contrast to such countries as Hungary and Yugoslavia, did not manage to make much of an imprint even in highly technical matters as economic or educational reforms. Consequently, social frustration was vented through such otherwise illegitimate institutions as the Church or "Solidarity", or through strikes and riots.

In comparison, Hungary and Yugoslavia have been able to ensure at least some meaningful participation via the existing institutions. In the former case, both the party and pressure groups such as the labor unions, professional organizations and collective farm associations, served as articulators of support and demands, and participated in the formulation of major decisions, such as, for example, the economic reforms. In the case of Yugoslavia, the workers councils and the unions played a similar role on both the local and federal levels.

Not much can be said about the remaining countries in the area. In Czechoslovakia and Romania, the existing oppressive regimes do not provide any meaningful popular access to decision-making which is clearly reserved for selected members of the ruling elite or family, with the existing institutions continuing to perform the traditional function of "transmission belts." Insofar as East Germany is concerned, there is some evidence that the DDR regime has been willing to grant some voice in decision-making to the "experts" but the degree of participation does not appear to be widespread.

(4) Distribution

Of all the critical areas, that of distribution appears to be the easiest to define and measure in an unambiguous fashion. To put it simply, the notion

of distribution denotes the ability of the government to allocate material and other benefits among members of society.

It can be taken for granted that rapid economic development has been the primary objective of all Communist regimes, including those in Eastern Europe. It is also a truism that in the early stages of their rule, the East European governments tended to emulate the so-called Stalinist model of forced-draft industrialization which emphasized investment at the expense of consumption. It was only since the mi-1960s that some of the individual countries began to adjust their priorities and to allocate a larger share of available resources to public and private consumption. This was due to the emergence of several other developmental crises, mostly those of participation and legitimacy.

The major reason for the crisis of confidence in the existing governments was their inability to deliver the promised material and other benefits. The rapidly growing expectational gap threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the regimes and forced them to close or narrow the gap by reducing investment, expanding consumption and raising the overall standard of living of the population. At the same time, the crisis of participation, reflected in growing popular demand for access to decision-making, focused ultimately on the question of economic welfare that, after all, formed part and parcel of the official ideology.

As a result, the East European governments responded to the crises by embarking on major institutional reforms of their economies which also included an attempt at introducing economic rationalization and modernization, often with Western help. The outcome of these reforms varied from country to country as did their ability to deal with the crisis of distribution.

Clearly, it was Hungary which appeared most successful in dealing with the distribution crisis by reforming its economy and raising the welfare standard of its people through the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism. Although Hungary's economic growth and progress have been negatively affected in recent years, there is little doubt that on balance the performance of the Hungarian economy and of the Hungarian regime must receive fairly high marks.

Both Czechoslovakia and East Germany actually started reforming their economies ahead of Hungary but their progress was soon halted: in Czechoslovakia by the 1968 Soviet intervention and in East Germany by the regime's unwillingness or inability to make a radical break with past practices. Nevertheless, in neither case were the reforms totally abandoned or abolished and even in their partial form they managed to contribute to the improvement in economic performance. Moreover, the persistence of some traditional national values and attitudes in both countries also helped in that process which succeeded, by and large, in alleviating the distribution crisis.

The situation in Yugoslavia was less clearcut. In contrast to the other countries, Yugoslavia jettisoned the Stalinist system relatively early and proceeded to reform its economy by decentralizing decision-making, by creating the system of worker councils, by exporting its unemployment, and by opening its economy to foreign influences. The results of this policy turned out to be mixed: on the one hand, there is no doubt that economic well-being has shown signs of major improvement but on the other hand, the liberal policy has also resulted in sharp inflationary pressure and in the opening of a gap between the more and less developed regions which, in turn, added fuel to the already simmering identity crisis.

Poland has been going through a distribution crisis for close to two decades. The crisis, manifested in a long-standing popular dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policy, came to a boil at least three times since 1970, representing a major challenge to the legitimacy of Communist rule. For reasons which cannot be discussed in full here, the Polish leadership has been congenitally unable to solve the problem of distribution despite the fact that the country was the first one in the region to experiment with economic reforms and, in addition, it was better endowed with natural resources than most countries in the area.

In recent years Romania has also begun to face a very serious distribution crisis. For various reasons, the country's regime refused to engage in economic reform-making and essentially adhered to the Stalinist policy of emphasizing investment over consumption. Moreover, for reasons that cannot be explained rationally, President Ceausescu decided to repay Romania's large hard currency debt by expanding exports, which in turn reduced the standard of living of the population to subsistence level.

Thus far I discussed only the problem of allocating material values among the citizens. As mentioned earlier, however, the notion of welfare includes also the distribution of non-material benefits such as full employment, free education and health services, as well as various other emoluments generating psychic income, such as social advancement. Until recently, the horizontal and particularly vertical mobility tended to moderate the distribution crisis (as well as some of the other crises) but there are now clear signs that the era of dynamic economic growth accompanied by rapid social mobility has been coming to an end, accentuating the trend of more intensive and deeper crises.

(5) Legitimacy

The notion of legitimacy is closely related to those of identity, penetration,

participation, and distribution. It is also a difficult concept to define unambiguously. A government may be viewed as legitimate if its decisions are accepted by the majority of a population because of its belief in the "correctness" or "goodness" of the way in which these decisions were arrived at, and because they fulfilled popular expectations. The fact remains, however, that a crisis in any of the problem areas mentioned above was bound to raise the specter of a legitimacy crisis.

As pointed out by Pye, one should distinguish between two types of legitimacy crises: a "fundamental" legitimacy crisis, caused by such things as conflicting or insufficient bases for claiming authority, faulty ideological and pragmatic claims to authority, and incomplete and inappropriate socialization of the citizenry,⁴³ and a "derivative" legitimacy crisis, caused by crises in the other problem areas discussed earlier. If we accept the above definitions, it becomes clear that every East European country has experienced a legitimacy crisis to a greater or less degree. Since each of the countries has been subjected over the years to one or more of the developmental crises, it follows that at different points in time the legitimacy of their political systems - their basis of authority and their political formula - has been questioned.

It is clear that Poland today represents the most extreme case of both "fundamental" and "derivative" legitimacy crises. Although, to be sure, the Communist government in that country has not collapsed, in the past 17 years there have been four distinct cases of a breakdown or near-breakdown of governmental authority and/or performance: the ouster of Gomulka in December 1970; the surrender of Gierek to worker demands in June 1976; the birth of "Solidarity" in August 1980; and the imposition of martial law in December 1981. This is not the place to analyze each case in detail but all of them did represent a major

challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.

The situation in the rest of the region was much less critical. In at least two countries - Romania and Yugoslavia - the presence of an authentic (Yugoslavia) and engineered (Romania) charismatic leadership did go a long way in defusing a possible legitimacy crisis. Although the death of Tito removed a powerful instrument of legitimacy, the Yugoslav party could lay a claim to genuine legitimacy based on its mode of seizing power after World War II. There are signs that in Romania the pseudo-charismatic leadership of President Ceausescu might be showing signs of wear and tear but, at least for the time being, he has been largely able to cope with challenges to his authority.

One may hypothesize that both East Germany and Hungary have managed to avoid a serious legitimacy crisis. Both regimes succeeded rather impressively in dealing with possible causes of the crisis: they tended to be pragmatic rather than dogmatic in their policies; they avoided possible disruption of their performance by minimizing and controlling the struggle for power at the top; and they were also successful in their socialization endeavors. Moreover, both countries were fortunate in being ruled by skillful leaders who were clearly aware of the complexities of their task and who did not create undue expectations among their respective populations.

A good case can be made for suggesting that the remaining country in the region, Czechoslovakia, has faced a serious legitimacy crisis and was able to overcome it. Here, in contrast to some of the other states, the underlying causes of the crisis were not so much unfulfilled expectations or incomplete socialization as a fundamental change in the character of the government and an equally basic change in the source of authority claimed by the government, both resulting from the Soviet intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent demise of the Dubcek

government which, according to all indications, enjoyed broad legitimacy. Although Dubcek's successor, Husak, did not prove as skillful as Hungary's Kadar in overcoming the ill-effects of a Soviet invasion, he still managed to re-establish his authority without resorting to extreme measures.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that of the six East European countries considered, only Hungary succeeded reasonably well in its task of crisis management and that it has undergone some degree of political development. While Czechoslovakia and East Germany have been stagnating, Romania and Yugoslavia, but especially Poland, have been undergoing a process of political decay.

At this stage, a question ought to be raised as to what were the causes of uneven political development in the individual East European countries or why was the outcome of the process different in different countries.

One can answer this question in various ways. My own preference is to answer it by focusing on the two variables which were discussed at some length at the beginning of this essay: national political culture and groups.

After years of neglect, the problem of political culture in the Communist context began recently to regain the attention it rightly deserved. In the developmental context its importance cannot be exaggerated as it has affected in one way or another almost all the critical problem areas. National political cultures, whether viewed in terms of national identity or national character, played a major role in the crises of national integration and legitimacy and also contributed to the crises of penetration, participation and even distribution.

The same is largely true for the second systemic variable, the groups.

The presence of groups also played a role in generating crises of participation, distribution and penetration, and, by definition, legitimacy. As was the case with the influence of national identity, the impact of pluralistic tendencies varied from country to country, but its critical importance was unmistakable.

What about the future? One of the interesting conclusions emerging from the above discussion is that the various crises do induce important changes in the two variables discussed throughout this paper. For example, Poland, the country that has been undergoing every crisis imaginable, has had a long tradition of powerful nationalism but practically no experience of genuine interest groups. It may be argued that this is no longer true today. As a result of coping with the various crises, the country has witnessed the emergence of truly powerful and genuine institutional interest groups, the Catholic Church and overt or covert "Solidarity" which are likely to remain important components of Polish political landscape for many years to come. More than that: the birth of genuine interest groups forced even the old "transmission belts" to abandon their subservice to the Communist masters and to adopt a more independent policy. As a result, Poland in 1987 is beginning to acquire features of a genuine pluralist society.

While the remaining countries, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, still appear a long way from resembling Poland, there is evidence of a slow movement in that direction, especially in Hungary but also in East Germany and even Czechoslovakia. Only Romania shows no signs of emulating the example of the other countries but what is likely to happen after Ceausescu's death is anybody's guess.

The future of nationalism in Eastern Europe is much harder to predict.

I would argue that a good deal will depend on the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. It is a well known fact that in the past 40 years or so this relationship has oscillated between two extremes - tight control and more-or-less benign neglect. The former was characterized as a rule by suppression of nationalist tendencies, the latter by resurrecting traditional nationalist feelings, not only vis-à-vis the Soviet hegemon but also with regard to one's neighbors.

While today it is rather difficult to define, more or less accurately, the relationship between the USSR and the East European countries, there are indications that the current leader in the Kremlin has other things on his mind than maintaining tight control over his East European empire. If that is the case then one may anticipate still another revival of nationalism in the region. This time, however, the national antagonisms may be directed less at the Soviet Union and more against the traditional enemies in the region. That these antagonisms do exist closely under the surface has been amply demonstrated during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 and is currently reflected in the Hungarian-Romanian and Bulgarian-Turkish conflicts. If they are allowed to continue, they may well weaken the fabric of Soviet controls over the region, and that is why I believe that the answer to the question of the future of East European nationalism can be found in the Kremlin.

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive study, see Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969).
2. One of the very few scholars interested in the question of nationalism in Eastern Europe after World War II has been Paul Shoup. See his "Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II," The American Political Science Review, vol. lvi, no. 4, December 1962, pp. 886-898, and "The National Question and the Political Systems of Eastern Europe," in Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak and Peter C. Ludz, eds., Eastern Europe in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 121-170.
3. Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism...", p. 886.
4. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), passim.
5. George A. DeVos, "National Character," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 14-15.
6. Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 10.

7. Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 35-71.
8. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, op. cit., p. 527.
9. Ibid., p. 513.
10. Pye, "Political Culture," p. 8.
11. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," pp. 529-537.
12. Pye, "Political Culture," p. 7.
13. Henry S. Kariel, "Pluralism" in Sills, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, p. 164.
14. The scholar who first recognized the emergence of pluralistic tendencies in Eastern Europe was, of course, H. Gordon Skilling. See his pathbreaking article, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, vol. xviii, no. 3, 1966, pp. 435-451.
15. The concept of "solidary society" was first discussed by Gregory Grossman in his "The Solidary Society: A Philosophical Issue in Communist Economic Reforms," in Gregory Grossman, ed., Essays in Socialism and Planning in Honor of Carl Landauer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 148-211.
16. See, for example, the discussion "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Is the Emperor Naked?" in Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. xii, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-38.

17. Probably the most telling criticism of the application of group approach to the analysis of Communist societies is that of Andrew Janos in his "Group Politics in Communist in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York and London: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 437-450.
18. David E. Langsam and David W. Paul, "Soviet Politics and the Group Approach: A Conceptual Note," Slavic Review, vol. xxxi, no. 1, 1972, pp. 136-137.
19. H. Gordon Skilling, "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Straw Men and Red Herrings," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1980, pp. 82-88, and "Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited," World Politics, vol. xxxvi, no. 1, 1983, pp. 1-27.
20. Skilling, "Pluralism in Communist Societies," p. 84.
21. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, vol. 3, no. 3, 1971, p. 320.
22. Huntington, "The Change to Change," p. 320.
23. John Kautsky, "Comparative Communism Versus Comparative Politics," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. vi, nos. 1-2, 1973, pp. 135-170.

24. Gabriel A. Almond, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. iv, no. 2, 1971, pp. 76-77.
25. Charles A. Powell, "Structural-Functionalism and the Study of Comparative Communist Systems: Some Caveats," ibid., vol. 4, nos. 3-4, 1971, pp. 58-62.
26. William E. Griffith, "The Pitfalls of the Theory of Modernization," Slavic Review, vol. xxxiii, no. 2, 1974, p. 247.
27. See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 1-42.
28. The six countries to be considered are Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.
29. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 63-66.
30. Huntington, "The Change to Change," p. 316.
31. Andrzej Korbonski, "Political Development and Political Decay: The Case of Eastern Europe," (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1980), p. 19.
32. Lucian W. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 114.

33. Vladimir V. Kusin, From Dubcek to Charter 77 (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), pp.119-23.
34. For recent examples, see New York Times, 4 April and 21 May 1987.
35. New York Times, 20 April 1986 and 15 February 1987.
36. Joseph La Palombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Government Capacity," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, pp. 208-209.
37. Huntington, "Change to Change," p. 316.
38. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 14.
39. Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 159.
40. See, Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Floron, Jr., ed., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 244-253.
41. Weiner, "Political Participation," pp. 163-164.
42. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 54-55.
43. Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 136.

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REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE UNITARY STATE:

THE CASE OF POLAND

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Regional problems and the unitary state:

the case of Poland

The origins of the Polish state date back to over one thousand years ago. It was then, in the middle of the 10th century, following the rise of a powerful line of princes ruling over the basin of the River Warta, and able to unite the dispersed West Slavonic peoples living in the area bounded by the rivers Bug and Odra, the Baltic Sea coast and the range of the Western Carpathians, that Poland first entered the stage of European history as an organized political entity.

The major factors contributing to the unification and consolidation of that conglomeration of tribes, which varied strongly in the degree of their civilizational advancement, were Christianity /from 966/ and a centralized monarchy, with King /from 1025/ Boleslaus of the Piast Family as the most outstanding of its early founders. Christianity, in its Latin version, was to link Poland with Western civilization. Only the Eastern margins of the newly formed state were in the orbit of the Byzantine-Orthodox civilization.

The first centuries of Polish statehood were marked by a relatively high degree of political and cultural centralization. However, like many other European states of that period, Poland did not manage to avoid the feudal division. This came along with the death of King Casimir II /1138/, when the country was split up between his sons. The origin of this division lay not only in dynastic disputes, but also in the still existing differences between the various regions, differences which grew even more conspicuous in the following centuries.

as, for instance, in the disputes between the provinces of Wielkopolska /Western Poland/ and Małopolska /Southern Poland/.

One of the most serious consequences of the division was that Poland's position in international relations was greatly weakened, and her lands along the River Odra and the coast of the Baltic Sea were being broken up into ever smaller pieces. These lands, ruled over for a long time to come by descendants of the Polish Piast dynasty, were also coming more and more deeply within the sphere of influence of the neighbouring powers. As they lost their independence, the Polish population was forced into the loss of its national identity. This process continued until the middle of the present, twentieth, century.

The Polish state reappeared as united kingdom at the beginning of the 14th century, and covered some of the ethnic Polish lands in the basins of the Warta, Upper and Middle Vistula and the Bug. Until the middle of the 20th century, almost all of Silesia and Western Pomerania, and, for a period of time /until 1525/, also the province of Mazovia /Mazowsze/, remained outside the territory of the Polish state.

The 14th century also the beginning of Poland's expansion beyond its ethnic boundaries. The Kingdom came to include some Ruthenian lands with their capital at Lwów. However, the really great increase in Polish political influence in the East followed the accession to the throne of Cracow of the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Ladislaus Jagiełło. From 1385 Poland and Lithuania were bound by personal union, and the Jagiełło dynasty /1386-1572/ became one of the finest ruling families in Europe.

The union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania survived the death in 1572 of the last member of the last member of the Jagiełło dynasty, as in 1569 it was transformed

from a personal into a permanent real union by the Union of Lublin act. The state constituted by Poland and Lithuania, as well as Ruthenia, which was an area of Polish-Lithuanian rivalry, was one of the largest in Europe at that time.

There was a great deal of diversity within that state. It was inhabited by peoples of different ethnic origins, of different languages, cultures and religions. The levels of economic development varied greatly from one region to another. On the one hand, there were the aristocratic latifundia in the East with primitive agriculture based on the exploitation of peasants who did not belong to the Polish stock, and on the other, there were the prosperous towns of western Poland, some of which belonged to the Hanseatic League of northern Europe.

The Poland of the 16th and 17th centuries was thus a country of significant internal differentiation, mainly along the regional lines: the distinctive ethnic, religious, cultural and economic, and to a certain extent also political, characteristics tended to occur jointly in definite, though not infrequently extensive, geographical areas. In the 16th and at the beginning of the 17th century, this internal diversity was reflected in and accompanied by a multiplicity of well-functioning institutions of the state system. The multinational and multidenominational Polish state was therefore able to avoid the religious wars which at that time were ravaging the countries of Western Europe, and especially Germany.

From the middle of the 17th century and throughout the 18th century, the strength and integrity of the Polish-Lithuanian state was gradually eroding. This was due not so much to ethno-cultural or regional irredenta, but rather the result of deep economic stagnation, political anarchization, and the decline in the authority of public

institutions - the monarchy, the Sejm /which was the chief legislature/, and the law. An infamous role in weakening the Polish state was played by the by then already assimilated, aristocratic families of Lithuania and Ruthenia.

The internal decline of the state was exploited by Poland's ascendant and ever more powerful neighbours - Prussia, Russia and Austria. In 1772 and 1793 they annexed vast areas of adjoining Polish lands, and in 1795 they partitioned Poland altogether. Thus Poland lost its independent statehood for a period of 123 years.

The Polish lands annexed by the partitioning powers were, from their point of view, of peripheral nature. The main concern of Berlin, St.Petersburg and Vienna was to integrate the annexed lands with their own states and to preserve the continuing ownership of those lands. Hence, the policies conducted for many years, especially by the Prussian and Russian governments, of ridding the Polish lands of their original ethnic character, and of consolidating the economic, political and cultural domination of the German and Great Russian ethnic elements. Only the authorities in Vienna pursued /from the middle of the 19th century/ a more liberal policy in this respect.

The partition of Poland into three parts belonging to various states imprinted a strong mark in many areas of public life. By the end of foreign rule, the three parts had come to differ in levels of economic development, in models of political life, and also in the mental attitudes of their Polish inhabitants. The forces that bound the Polish people of the three partition zones together were the unshaken unity of their culture, the basic unity of their language, the sharing of a fervent Catholic faith, a sense of historical tradition and the awareness of national humiliation. These were also the stimuli that kindled Polish aspirations of

regaining national independence.

Meanwhile, in the 19th and 20th centuries, some new factors emerged in Poland's former eastern lands which precluded the return of an independent Polish state to its original, pre-partition borders when the chance to reconstruct such a state materialized in 1918. These factors included the national rebirth of the Lithuanians, and the emergence of the two modern nations of Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Those nations also wanted to establish or re-establish their own statehood and these aspirations came into conflict with the Polish plans for independence. On the other hand, the western part of the country /Silesia, Pomerania, Wielkopolska/ saw a continuous struggle between the Poles and the pressures of German colonization.

Faced with a new balance of national power in Central and Eastern Europe, Polish politicians put forward two conceptions for the reconstruction of the Polish state. The National camp /with its leader Roman Dmowski/ proposed a unitary state based on the Polish ethnic element, which would pursue an active policy of integrating non-Polish ethnic minorities. The grouping known as the Independence camp /under Józef Piłsudski/ opted for the creation in Central and Eastern Europe of a federation of nation-states /including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and the Ukraine/ to be headed by Poles. In the final count, the conception actually implemented in the years between 1918 and 1939 was that of Dmowski, although for the most part of that period /since 1926/ it was the supporters of Piłsudski who held the power.

The interwar Republic of Poland was a unitary multinational state. The rural areas east of the River Bug were populated mainly by Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians. The cities and towns were inhabited by

Poles or Jews. The Jewish population was also dispersed throughout central and south-eastern Poland. Silesia and Pomerania had economically powerful concentrations of German population. In all, about one third of the country's population was made up by ethnic /national/ minorities.

However, none of the regions with a non-Polish majority had any regional autonomy. The only region to enjoy such autonomy was the province of Silesia /voivodship of Silesia/ with its capital at Katowice. The reason for the autonomy of Upper Silesia was not to be found in the considerable, one must admit, cultural and economic distinctiveness of the region, but rather in Poland's international obligations stemming from the Treaty of Versailles and the new European order it had introduced. Autonomy was a compromise solution which the Polish state had to accept in order to safeguard national interests and satisfy the desires of the Polish majority in Upper Silesia in settling the violent dispute /1918-1921/ between Poland and Germany for the control of that richly endowed region.

The Poland of the interwar years was a country in which civilizational development varied greatly from one region to another; and the regional differences were compounded by strong and not fully resolved ethnic tensions. Despite this the Polish state did manage to achieve an advanced degree of unification of the former partition areas. Public administration was unified, and much progress was made in making uniform the legal and economic systems; the differences in mentality and custom were also gradually disappearing.

The years of the Second World War /1939-1945/ and the period of revolution which followed immediately afterwards, resulted in enormous political and social transformations. These involved above all:

- the reconstruction of the state according to the ideological principles of communism,
- major territorial shifts, which meant that the centre of the state moved to the area bounded by the Odra and Vistula rivers, and the Baltic Sea, whereas for centuries it had been east of the River Vistula,
- the ethno-cultural unification of the population inhabiting the Polish state due to large-scale territorial shifts, emigration and resettlement, as well as, in the case of the Jewish population, due to extermination by the Nazi occupiers.

Within a relatively short period the lands of Silesia, Pomerania and the former Ost-Preussen were closely integrated with the rest of Poland. Today, not only are they not an area of ethno-culturally or economically based irredentism, but they exhibit a particularly strong commitment to Poland and Polishness, to national culture, tradition and custom. Ethnic minorities /Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Jews, Germans, Greeks and Gypsies/ amount together to no more than 2-3 per cent of the whole population. They are, apart from a few enclaves, distributed all over the country.

The remarks about the past, which I have made above, though of necessity presenting a simplified picture of actual reality, stem from the conviction that regionalism in present-day Europe is largely a legacy of the past. It would thus be appropriate to ask whether such historical considerations play any part in the case of Poland, especially if we bear in mind that for many centuries Poland was a country of great diversity and of contrasting or conflicting cultures, religions and customs, and that historical elements are deeply rooted in Polish political thinking of the present day?

The geographical and economic basis for regionalism in Poland is not too strongly developed. Although a number of regions of distinct topography, settlement pattern, and economy can be discerned within the country, the cohesion of the territory and the lack of major natural divides have caused the separate regions to form a closely interlinked geographical system.

The main centres of industrial activity are situated in the belt of southern provinces /especially in Silesia/, but important manufacturing centres are to be found in central and northern Poland as well. The level of economic development measured by the value of manufactured production per capita oscillated in 1985 from 1 in the poorest region to 6-7 in the wealthiest ones. This is a significant difference. The wealthiest regions would be able to prosper on their own, but the poorer ones, in case of the autarkic tendencies strengthening, would be forced into permanent civilizational backwardness. This situation acts to prevent regional separatism, which usually meet with public criticism in the spirit of egalitarianism and national solidarity.

Cultural and everyday-life differences, contributing at one time to the existence of distinct regional identity and folklore, have now largely withered away. The pluralism of local cultures has been undermined by the after-war industrialization and urbanization, the development of a uniform educational system, the vast waves of internal migration, and the influence of mass culture based on Western models. The unification of culture at the national level is also aided by the almost complete ethnic and religious uniformity of society. Attempts to liven up regional and local cultural initiatives which make use of the native set of aesthetic and cultural values usually fail to arouse wider public interest. The few remaining enclaves of local culture include the working-class urban culture of Upper Silesia, the folk culture of the Opole and

and Cieszyn regions of Central and Upper Silesia, the folklore of the Kaszuby and Warmia regions in northern Poland, the Tatra highlanders' folklore in southern Poland.

The homogenization of Polish culture is viewed by many people involved with the humanities as a process detrimental to its value and development. It is often stressed in this connection that it is thanks to its diversity and the contrasting influences that Polish culture has been able to reach its high level of development and to become a factor favouring the assimilation of alien immigrants.

The system of territorial and economic administration that developed in Poland after the war, as well as the actual practice of management, were directed towards implementing a model of strictly centralized and concentrated decision-making. This was basically in line with the statist model of bureaucratic centralism, which only in recent years has begun to show some signs of erosion as a result of reforms of the system embarked on in Poland. Centralized structures formed the framework for the activities of local and regional pressure groups, most often linked with new enterprises and new industries. Those groups were able to adjust to the rules of the game and to use them for their own ends thus undermining the coherence of the system.

In the middle of the 1970s a major reform of territorial administration and of the administrative division of the country was introduced. The reform was planned as a deliberate attempt to centralize power and to reduce the strength of local power elites. The reform consisted in reducing from 3 to 2 the number of levels of territorial administration, and in increasing the number of provincial /voivodship/ administrative units from 22 to 49. We are now witnessing a reemergence of local power elites within the new administrative units.

Unlike in many countries of Western Europe, the idea of regionalization has not been very popular in Polish political thought in the last two centuries. A unitary nation-state is generally regarded as the basic point of reference in seeking cultural identity. In the opinion of most Poles the hierarchy of symbols of identification is as follows: nation or state, often treated as one, fatherland, family, Catholic faith. It is only lower down on the scale that the notions of region, city or neighbourhood appear.

Irrespective of ideological orientation and the attitude towards the existing system, no social force in Poland rejects the idea of statehood. The idea of Europe as a federation of regions does not find much favourable reception in Poland. It is highly probable that the Poles' commitment to a sovereign and indivisible nation-state stems from the fact that long periods in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries their state was either nonexistent or very weak.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of state centralization are seen with more and more clarity, and it is more and more often that one hears voices demanding territorial decentralization and local self-government. Local self-government is seen as a means of dynamizing social forces and of liberating the nation's energy. Perhaps it is only in the more distant future that one should expect the emergence in Poland of a more lively interest in the region as a substitute for the nation-state and a link in the chain of European structures of economic and political integration.

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BETTER SMALL AND BEAUTIFUL THAN BIG AND UGLY?
REGIONALISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE POSTINDUSTRIAL STATE

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In this context regionalism appears in a different light. Far from being a postmaterialist revival of folklore in the name of small-is-beautiful, it seems to be part of a much wider phenomenon, possibly a rejection of the false consciousness of consensus provided by nation-state politics. In late capitalist societies this consciousness is nurtured by the assumption that the interventionist state seeks and secures wide-spread national prosperity via international competitiveness. Under the conditions of an interdependent world economy with highly saturated markets and new competitors, however, such international competitiveness requires a national agenda of aggressive economic restructuring which in reality aims at national resources mobilization at the expense of wide-spread prosperity. Undermining the domestic consensus of the welfare state and substituting it by a new public philosophy of disciplinarian austerity, nation-state politics gears up to reclaim lost ground in the global economy arena by getting tough with trade partners, ideological enemies, and Third World debtors alike. As all industrialized states try to do the same, the presumption of national pre-eminence via domestic austerity and foreign policy toughness becomes a "dangerous conceit", (4) and the management/governability crises of national/international politics far more than just a dilemma of overload and complexity. No longer capable of providing consensus, the obsolescent nation-state may be gearing up for a final showdown of its destructive powers. As Adolf Hitler said at the end of his sinister career that if Germany was not able to survive with him, she was unworthy of surviving at all, so might the world go under with the nation-state system rather than getting rid of it.

Throughout the postwar period the nation-state's pre-eminence has been challenged from above and from below. While attempts to shatter its mythical strength from above, through systems of regional or even global integration, have mostly failed (the stagnating success of European economic integration notwithstanding), regional protest from below has been successful in challenging the national ideology of political centrality, even though the earlier momentum of peripheral muscle-flexing may have subsided temporarily. Aiming at the federalization of national political centrality, the regionalist politics of territory appears not only as a symptom of the ailing world of centralized statehood, but also as its possible cure. The hypothesis is bold: If the modern nation-state (the Jacobin institutions of which are some two hundred years old) can no longer cope with the political conflicts and challenges of the twenty-first century, and regionalism (which is usually regarded as a fallback to the primordial values of the past) is an authentic political response to that deficiency, then it could be that it is the territorial nation-state which is primordial while regionalism turns out to be the real symptom of modernization. The decentralizing tendencies recorded everywhere in the industrialized world (5) would appear to be the nation-state's last stand, an attempt of dinosaurs to regain flexibility, while

The visibility of the state's regulatory hand naturally made it the focus of critique and continuing discontent, especially when the fiscal limits of such intervention became apparent with the decline of economic growth during the 1970s, and the notion of universality gradually came to be replaced by selectivity. It is important to note, however, that regionalism and other new social movements began to gain momentum before the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s had really set in. The most widely accepted explanation for this phenomenon has been provided by Inglehart's analysis and theory of postmaterialist value change.(8) According to this theory, it was the abundance of means and resources of the affluent years which spawned the desire for a new 'quality of life' aiming at non-materialist values. Regionalism, in this context, came to be interpreted as a fallback to the romantic notions of localism and pride-of-place. It was denounced as an obstacle to necessary further modernization, as the anti-industrial attitude of a new middle-class spoiled and bored by the easy availability of material acquisition in the consumerist age. While the phenomenon of postmaterialism has undeniably played a major role in the formation of protest politics, its monocausal focus on the irrevocability of generational value change neglected another periodicity: political and socioeconomic change which occurred during the same period of time. As a consequence of this negligence, the neoconservative theorists of overload and ungovernability could advocate a policy of belt-tightening and moral reeducation while the incongruence between expectations and the state's fiscal capacities were already beginning to show in the wake of a deepening economic crisis.

In the case of regionalism, three phases ought to be distinguished: During the 1960s the experience of unprecedented economic growth surely fostered postmaterialist attitudes. At the same time, however, peripheral modernization, the spreading of industrialization and the administrative state, brought know-how, expertise and ambition to the regions. During the 1970s, when the tremors of economic crisis began to be felt, regional discontent not only resulted from the persistence of postmaterialist attitudes, but were also a consequence of this existence of a new peripheral elite which possessed the expertise and administrative skills to fight for the retention of the achieved level of material well-being. Regionalism had become an attitudinal and acquisitive issue. In the 1980s, and especially after the traumatic experience of the 1981/82 recession, the regionalist thrust seems to have subsided. The picture is misleading, though. While neoconservative governments succeeded in containing regionalist and other forms of mobilization by proclaiming national economic recovery as a bread-and-butter issue cutting across regional interests, the potential failure of such recovery may well lead to a new and nastier round of regional conflict. The peripheries of postindustrial societies find themselves in a situation which is largely determined by grievance and opportunity.

organizational resources. The strong industrial base of Catalonia was the material base on which regionalism could survive.(12) Where this material and sociopolitical opportunity was lacking, regionalism either remained a sociocultural movement among an intellectual or literary elite (as in Galicia until its movement was propelled forward by the success of other regions in Spain, or as in Occitania, that southern French region which miraculously revived an almost extinct language), or it turned to violent forms of protest (as in the Basque country where nationalism clashed with an industrial bourgeoisie which was Madrid-centred and unsupportive). (13)

There are several explanations for the apparent decline of regionalist activism in the 1980s. Scotland did not get its oil, and the separatism of the Scottish National Party did not find a majority among a population basically seeking improved opportunity structures through home rule. The decline of the Parti Quebecois, on the other hand, may well be explained by the success of its earlier achievements: socioeconomic modernization, sociocultural stabilization and dramatically increased political co-determination. When all this appeared to be possible within the opportunity structure of Canadian federalism, separation no longer seemed desirable. And in the case of post-Franco Spain, political democratization became synonymous with regionalization. The reasons for the current decline of regionalist aspirations then are many. In some cases opportunities did not materialize, or waned under the impact of economic and fiscal constraints. In other cases the nation-state successfully contained regionalism by granting various degrees of decentralization. And in some cases regionalism obviously achieved impressive successes. The question remains, however, why such a massive wave of regionalism would erupt at the same time out of so many different and seemingly unrelated situations. The only obvious common denominator is the existence of the modern industrial nation-state and the regionalist opposition to its centrality.

Anticentralism and New Marginality

It is ironic that those same theorists of postmaterialist overload who advocate a spiritual revival of family- and group-oriented attitudes in order to relieve the burden of overloaded governments, at the same time see the retention of regionalist aspirations as a fallback to anachronistic values and threat to the efficiency of national economic recovery.(14)

On the one hand, they overlook that it is the very business ethic they want to revitalize which is responsible for the deterioration of organic family and group life in the first place. As Alan Wolfe pointed out sarcastically, it is symbolic of this contradiction that one of the leading financiers of the new moral revival movement would have been Ray Kroc, who "invented the MacDonald's hamburger chain, which has done more to destroy

fomented the formation of cultural and political protest, or they argue that peripheral betterment can only come from centrally induced growth poles which would first require a national strategy of economic recovery, whereas regionalist resistance to such a strategy would be a cure worse than the disease. And indeed the old parameters of industrial centrality and underdeveloped peripheral backwardness seem no longer adequate. Centre-periphery relations in highly industrialised territorial states can no longer be defined simply as a dynamic of centralized industrial production and the peripheral exploitation of resources. The age of mass transportation and electronic communication has allowed a hitherto unknown degree of productive mobility. While the Canadian automotive industry would still remain concentrated close to central markets, for example, this must not necessarily be so in the case of microelectronics, baseballs, or government services.

However, these possibilities of structural flexibility have not changed the basic fact and requirement of capitalist centrality. As Rokkan and Urwin redefined it, centrality is today based on a new 'quaternary' sector of the economy which encompasses "all the agencies responsible for the registration, handling and diffusion of decisions, orders, instructions and information across a wide territory." With regard to this new central sector of information and communication, peripherality has remained and deepened as a syndrome of "distance, difference and dependence." Distance from central information will lead to the retention of some sociocultural difference, and will at the same time result in continued dependence upon central decision-making, the standardization of social life, and the central allocation of crucial economic and financial resources.(18)

It is this perception of peripherality as an objective condition, of the contradictions of distance and standardization, modernization and dependence, which points to anticaltralisim as the most important subjective common denominator of regionalist aspirations. The retention or revival of sociocultural identities, the socioeconomic quest for self-sufficiency, and the entrenchment of political resistance are mutually reinforcing factors of this anticaltralist dynamic. Depending on which of these factors is the predominant grievance, each of them can be the starting point from where the regionalist drive begins to gain momentum. Given the prevalent opportunity structures which are most likely determined economically, regionalism may typically follow the path of 'Buddenbrook dynamics' (in his novel Thomas Mann describes the rise of the Buddenbrook family which seeks money in the first generation, power and influence in the second, and cultural sophistication in the third). However, regionalism may also enfold as a Buddenbrook dynamic in reverse:

With the dramatic change of policy making from affluence and universal distribution to scarcity and selective redistribution came a new awareness and assertion of centre-periphery polarization. Wall Street economist Melvyn Krauss has dismissed regional policy altogether as nationally inefficient, suggesting that peripheral workers should migrate and "go to the work" instead of expecting that the work would come to them (21). From the periphery comes a different assessment. As Dennis Kucinich, former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, summed it up: "There are increasingly two Americas, ... the America of multinationals dictating decisions in Washington, and the America of neighbourhoods and rural areas, who feel left out." (22)

When the feeling of being left out sinks in, and peripheries can no longer expect the undisputed continuation of central handouts, the self-perception of regional marginality begins to change. As long as the belief in universal prosperity was unshattered, the aspirations of regional peripheries alongside with other marginal segments of modern societies aimed at acculturation and integration. The unemployed wanted to be reemployed, the American blacks wanted to be part of American mainstream culture, and the European regions wanted to become a modernized part of the whole. Now, some unemployed groups have begun to form alternative cooperative networks, a black elite has promoted Afro-cultural consciousness, and regionalist movements have propagated a new perception of marginality which no longer tries to copy the achievements of the centre, but emphasizes a new anticentralist collective identity.

Only when the traditional belief in economic growth and universal modernization remains unbroken can this new marginality be interpreted as a conservative backlash to values of the past. Given the incompatibility and contradiction of capitalist modernization and regional development, it seems that the current neoconservative attempts to promote "economic growth now" and "to provide for redistributive and environmental purposes later" (23) have to be considered as the backlash, while resistance against this myth of centralized efficiency appears to be the more progressive step ahead. When Seymour Martin Lipset wonders, for example, why what he sees as the new 'backlash' movements is so weak in comparison to interwar fascism, (24) one answer would be that fascism aimed at capturing the centre, while many of the new movements (in contrast to the 'friendly fascism' of the new moral majority) do not. (25) But this seeming weakness may turn out as decisive strength. Should the conservative modernization thrust fail, those who have developed a new sense of marginality may be in a better position to adapt and survive (if the central forces of socioeconomic and military modernization do not succeed in destroying the world altogether, that is).

In terms of regionalist aspirations to gain greater control over resources and chances of indigenous development, the exit option obviously covers a wide range of possible action: from a refusal to meet the centrally imposed conditions for certain types of grants, to opting-out strategies with regard to entire policy fields, and finally to passive and/or active strategies of resistance including the promotion of outright separatism as the most drastic step. Any of these strategies means the partial or complete uncoupling from the national 'market'. In order to free themselves from the unsatisfactory dependency on central (and centrally allocated) capital and resources, regions and communities would have to mobilize local resources, gear production to the demands of local consumption, and develop a local sense of community independent from achievements, life styles and ambitions elsewhere. This would not necessarily have to mean the inevitable reduction of the regional standard of living. On the one hand, as regional disparity often results from central exploitation and inadequate central development strategies, a substantial improvement of the peripheral socioeconomic structure through local resources mobilization might more than off-set the loss of transfers and low-wage dependency incomes. On the other hand, the development of a local pride-of-place might lead to a different value system: the supply of a more limited range of local goods and services might become more appreciated than the onslaught of a centralized mass culture. As know-how and means of production travel light and fast in the electronic age, exit from central premises of production no longer have to result in a fallback to premodern life.

However, while small may indeed often mean beautiful, the realization of regional self-sufficiency in a world of global interdependence must almost seem utopian, especially when the starting point comes at the end of a long history of peripheral exploitation, when socioeconomic and political resources are lacking, in other words, when regional dependency is already a deeply entrenched fact and experience. This is when voice may appear as the only realistic chance of betterment. As a strategy of defending regional interests within the national system, voice means participation in that system under status quo conditions. The centralizing premises of capitalist national economies are accepted instead of contested, and in return transfers, development programs and a general commitment to equalization can be demanded. Where political structures such as federalism or regional bodies of government and administration exist, they can be utilized for the formation of collective regionalist pressures. Otherwise the only remaining transmission belt for regional demands is the national electoral system: fearing peripheral defeat, the politicians of the central system will make concessions to the organized voices of regional discontent. However, the price to pay is the perpetuation of regional dependency on the centre which will demand loyalty in return for its handouts. Moreover, this transfer dependency will retard or

General suggestions as to the overall nature of regionalism have been offered only very reluctantly because the phenomenon is so multi-faceted and diverse.(32) However, the same could be said of the 'state' or of 'class' (leave alone neoclassical 'economics'), where a similar degree of reluctance is seldom exercised. In other words, what we urgently need, is a general theory of regionalism. I would suggest that such a theory must be part of an even more general theory of fragmentation (33) in the advanced industrial world. Given the globalization of the capitalist mode of production in an interdependent world economy, such a theory might well be capable of including ethnic/regional conflict in developing countries as well. Rather than fashionably 'bringing the state back in', it would have to constitute nothing less than a full-fledged critique of the theory of state, very much in the same sense as class theory constitutes a critique of the theory of liberal democracy. As a matter of fact, it might replace or at least complement class theory in several important ways, pointing out a new type of fundamental societal conflict which cuts across the traditional class structure and consciousness of capitalist systems.

Capitalism is an essentially centralizing force which is diametrically opposed to the egalitarian and participatory claims of democracy. It must therefore be legitimized by perpetual redistributive and equilibrating state intervention. The capitalist state becomes the ubiquitous guarantor=mediator of a largely fictitious market place. It becomes overburdened, unmanageable and delegitimized when its mediating and organizing capacities are exhausted by economic and fiscal constraints. Ironically, its efforts of re-establishing a profitable regime of accumulation (commodification) in fact require permanent increases in non-market institutions and regulations (decommodification). In analogy to the economic law of diminishing returns, these institutions and regulations undermine the steadfastness of the accumulation process. Contrary to the advice of neoclassical economists, however, they cannot simply be nullified (to remain in the picture: the individual farmer can reduce the counterproductive number of farm-hands, but the system as a whole has to take care of them somehow). This is the crisis and contradiction of late capitalism.(34)

The point to be made here is that the conflicts arising from this contradiction are no longer congruent with class conflict. Contrary to the earlier regime of organized growth capitalism, the restructuring process in late capitalist societies is sector-rather than class-specific. The dividing line no longer runs between capitalists and workers, but between sectors of growth and decline, and, according to the spatial division of labour, centres in control of the accumulation process and marginalized peripheries. Class consciousness between the 'left' and 'right' becomes substituted by a new conflict consciousness between 'ins' and 'outs'. This is not to say that class divisions would no longer exist. But they become less relevant for several reasons.

revolution would have to take place before the material conditions of life can be changed: not socialism first, and then wither away of the state, but dissolve political centrality first and then wither away of capitalism.

13) see Cesar Diaz Lopez, "The Politicization of Galician Cleavages", in Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (eds.) The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982), 389-424; Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, Economy Territory Identity (London: Sage, 1983), 96-98; and Marianne Heiberg, "Urban Politics and Rural Culture: Basque Nationalism", in Rokkan and Urwin, The Politics of Territorial Identity, 355-87.

14) for example: Amitai Etzioni An Immodest Agenda (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 3-25, 342-71.

15) Alan Wolfe, "Sociology, Liberalism, and the Radical Right", New Left Review 128 (1981), 23.

16) *ibid.*

17) see Thomas O. Hueglin, "The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity", Canadian Journal of Political Science 20, 2 (1987).

18) see Rokkan and Urwin, Economy Territory Identity, 3-8.

19) see critically: Ralph Matthews The Creation of Regional Dependency (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

20) Fred Hirsch Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 102-7.

21) Melvyn Krauss, "'Europeanizing' the U.S. Economy: The Enduring Appeal of the Corporatist State", in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 82.

22) Dennis Kucinich quoted in: Peter N. Carroll It Seems Like Nothing Happened (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 348.

23) Aaron Wildavsky, "Squaring the Political Circle: Industrial Policies and the American Dream", in Johnson The Industrial Policy Debate, 42.

24) Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Revolt Against Modernity", in Per Torsvik (ed.) Mobilization: Centre-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), 491.

25) see Thomas O. Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe" Comparative Politics July (1986), 439-58.

26) see Juergen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns II (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 512-81.

27) Albert O. Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association
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NATIONS ET MINORITÉS DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT RÉCENT
DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE

Jean-Yves Calvez

*Donner à la
la Ligue
de l'Europe*

Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism, Barcelona

Nations et minorités dans l'enseignement récent

de l'Eglise catholique

par Jean-Yves Calvez, Paris

Le problème des nations comme celui des minorités ont une longue histoire dans l'enseignement de l'Eglise catholique. Les nationalismes polonais et irlandais par exemple interrogèrent beaucoup l'Eglise catholique au XIXe siècle. L'Eglise s'est alors montrée plutôt réticente devant les nationalismes qui défaisaient les royaumes et les empires plurinationaux... Cette histoire n'est toutefois pas l'objet du présent rapport. Il abordera la seule période récente. Caractérisée tout spécialement par les prises de positions originales de Jean-Paul II depuis son arrivée au Souverain Pontificat en 1978. Il fera état cependant aussi, en guise d'arrière-plan, des positions "classiques" affirmées par Jean XXIII, Paul VI et le Concile Vatican II.

Les dangers du nationalisme. Des minorités peuvent
abuser de leur situation.

Il faut ainsi d'abord relever la mise en garde contre le nationalisme qu'on trouve sous la plume de Paul VI, pape de 1963 à 1978, dans son encyclique *Populorum progressio*, sur le Développement des peuples, en 1967. "Il est naturel, disait-il, que des communautés récemment parvenues à leur indépendance politique soient jalouses d'une unité nationale encore fragile et s'efforcent de la protéger. Il est normal aussi que des nations de vieille culture soient fières du patrimoine que leur a livré l'histoire. Mais ces sentiments légitimes doivent être sublimés par la charité universelle qui englobe tous les membres de la famille humaine. Le nationalisme isole les peuples contre leur bien véritable. Il serait particulièrement nuisible là où la faiblesse des économies nationales exige au contraire la mise en commun des efforts, des connaissances et des moyens financiers, pour réaliser les programmes de développement et accroître les échanges commerciaux et culturels" (1). Si Paul VI fait preuve de compréhension pour le sentiment national, il est sans hésitation sévère pour le nationalisme, il le considère comme particulièrement néfaste par rapport aux besoins de coopération économique du monde moderne.

Au Concile Vatican II ,en 1965, on avait entendu, dans une déclaration plus brève , tout à fait le même ton : de mise en garde contre la fermeture nationaliste, et d'appel pressant à tous ceux qui ont des responsabilités pour qu'ils "renoncent à l'égoïsme national" (2).

Quelques années auparavant d'autre part, Jean XXIII, pape de 1958 à 1963, avait abordé, à côté du problème des nations, celui des "minorités". D'une manière à nouveau fort significative.

Le contexte est celui de l'obligation de respect des divers droits dans la communauté internationale. "Il peut arriver, et de fait il arrive, dit Jean XXIII, que les communautés politiques entrent en rivalité d'intérêts; ces conflits ne peuvent pourtant se régler ni par la force des armes, ni par la fraude ou la tromperie, mais comme il convient à des hommes, grâce à la compréhension mutuelle, par une estimation objective des données et moyennant un compromis équitable"(3). Dans ce contexte, la considération des minorités vient comme celle d'un des lieux principaux de litiges épineux au sein des Etats comme entre les nations, litiges qui précisément doivent trouver leur solution par la compréhension mutuelle et l'objectivité.

"Pour divers motifs, il n'est pas toujours possible de faire coïncider les frontières géographiques et ethniques; d'où le phénomène des minorités et les problèmes si difficiles qu'elles soulèvent"(4). Jean XXIII commence alors par demander le respect des minorités, et de leurs droits et caractéristiques

propres, de tout ce qui leur assure vitalité. Même au plan économique, il faut avoir égard aux minorités, à leur personnalité. "Nous devons déclarer de la façon la plus explicite, dit-il, que toute politique tendant à contrarier la vitalité et l'expansion des minorités constitue une faute grave contre la justice, plus grave encore quand ces manoeuvres visent à les faire disparaître. Par contre rien de plus conforme à la justice que l'action menée par les pouvoirs publics pour améliorer les conditions de vie des minorités ethniques, notamment en ce qui concerne leur langue, leur culture, leurs coutumes, leurs ressources et leurs entreprises économiques" (5).

La pointe du texte se trouve cependant ailleurs. Dans ce qui suit: "On observera pourtant, dit Jean XXIII, que ces minorités, soit par réaction contre la situation pénible qui leur est imposée, soit en raison des vicissitudes de leur passé, sont assez souvent portées à exagérer l'importance de leurs particularités, au point même de les faire passer avant les valeurs humaines universelles, comme si le bien de toute la famille humaine devait être subordonné aux intérêts de leur propre nation. Il serait normal, au contraire, que les intéressés prennent également conscience des avantages de leur condition: le contact quotidien avec des hommes dotés d'une culture ou d'une civilisation différente les enrichit spirituellement et intellectuellement et leur offre la possibilité d'assimiler progressivement les valeurs propres au milieu dans lequel ils se trouvent implantés. Cela se réalisera s'ils constituent comme un pont qui facilite la circulation de la

vie, sous ses formes diverses, et non pas une zone de friction, cause de dommages sans nombre et obstacle à tout progrès et à toute évolution" (6).

Le propos a donc pour finalité principale de demander aux minorités une contrepartie au respect revendiqué en leur faveur, et de lutter contre la crispation à laquelle elles sont souvent tentées de céder. Jean XXIII a en effet une vue large de la communauté des nations, et il est très persuadé de la nécessité d'un progrès dans l'organisation de cette communauté, comme du besoin d'une autorité politique mondiale à la mesure des problèmes internationaux, de sécurité et de coopération économique, que les Etats particuliers n'arrivent plus à résoudre par les formes ordinaires de leur coopération.

Dans cette perspective, les nations ne sont nullement appelées à disparaître. Et Jean XXIII spécifie que dans les rapports de l'autorité mondiale avec les gouvernements des Etats, le principe de subsidiarité doit toujours s'appliquer: "Le rôle de cette autorité universelle est d'examiner et de résoudre les problèmes que pose le bien commun universel en matière économique, sociale, politique et culturelle. C'est la complexité, l'ampleur et l'urgence de ces problèmes qui ne permettent pas aux gouvernements nationaux de les résoudre à souhait. Il n'appartiendra pas à l'autorité de la communauté mondiale de limiter l'action que les Etats exercent dans leur sphère propre, ni de se substituer à eux. Elle doit au contraire tâcher de susciter dans tous les pays du monde des conditions qui facilitent non seulement aux gouvernements mais aussi aux

individus et aux corps intermédiaires l'accomplissement de leurs fonctions, l'observation de leurs devoirs et l'usage de leurs droits dans des conditions de plus grande sécurité"(7).

Néanmoins, et très clairement, les nations seront amenées, selon Jean XXIII, à consentir des sacrifices. Jusque de quelque chose de leur souveraineté. A plus forte raison, les minorités doivent-elles en bien des cas savoir consentir des sacrifices pour tirer bénéfice de l'avantage que constituent les plus vastes ensembles politiques.

II

La nation et la culture. Souveraineté de la nation parce que l'homme, qui s'y exprime par la culture, est souverain.

Cette position n'a pas été annulée, elle est cependant ou a pu être bousculée par les prises de position de Jean-Paul II sur la question des nations, et aussi des minorités. Ce sont ces prises de position qu'il convient maintenant d'examiner. Sous leur forme la plus caractéristique, on les trouve au début du pontificat, durant le premier voyage que Jean-Paul II fit en Pologne comme pape, en 1979, puis dans son discours à l'UNESCO en 1980.

D'autres prises de position intéressantes apparaissent cependant aussi depuis, surtout dans la rencontre par le pape des problèmes des populations autochtones ou aborigènes du Canada, de plusieurs pays latino-américains, d'Australie : nous les examinerons également.

Le point essentiel à relever, dans les premières prises de position de Jean-Paul II, c'est qu'il fait grand cas de la nation parce qu'il fait grand cas de la culture. "La culture, déclare-t-il devant des jeunes Polonais à Gniezno le 3 juin 1979, est l'expression de l'homme, c'est la confirmation de l'humanité. L'homme la crée et, par elle, l'homme se crée lui-même. Il se crée lui-même par l'effort intérieur de l'esprit, de la pensée, de la volonté, du cœur. Et, en même temps, il crée la culture en communion avec les autres. La culture est l'expression de la communication, de la pensée commune et de la collaboration mutuelle des hommes. Elle naît du service du bien commun et devient un bien essentiel des communautés humaines"(8). Deux affirmations surtout sont ici à souligner : la culture est oeuvre et expression de l'homme ; c'est une expression de l'homme en rapport avec l'autre homme - les autres hommes - , c'est une oeuvre commune.

"La culture est un bien commun de la nation", ajoute Jean-Paul II. On voit mieux ce qu'il veut dire en le suivant dans les précisions apportées par lui sur le cas polonais : "La culture polonaise est un bien sur lequel s'appuie la vie spirituelle des Polonais. Elle nous distingue comme nation. Elle décide de nous tout au long de l'histoire, elle est plus décisive encore que la force matérielle. Et même plus encore que les frontières

politiques. On sait que la nation polonaise est passée par la dure épreuve de la perte de l'indépendance pendant plus de cent ans. Et au milieu de cette épreuve, elle est restée toujours elle-même. Elle est restée spirituellement indépendante parce qu'elle a eu sa propre culture" (9).

La culture fait en somme la nation. Elle peut permettre à une nation de persister même quand est annulée son expression politique - comme Etat -. Remarquons en même temps le " elle décide de nous", qui semble donner une priorité à quelque chose de collectif sur le personnel. Il n'est toutefois possible d'interpréter cette formule que dans le contexte général du personnalisme social qui domine toute la pensée de Jean-Paul II.

La culture polonaise, dit-il d'autre part, est marquée d'une manière très forte par le christianisme. "Depuis les débuts", dit-il. Et quelques jours après, il précisait devant les évêques de Pologne réunis à Jasna Gora : "Lorsque les structures de la nation et de l'Etat ont fait défaut; la société, catholique pour sa plus grande partie, a trouvé l'appui de l'organisation hiérarchique de l'Eglise, qui l'a aidée aussi à surmonter les temps de la partition du pays et de l'occupation..." (10). On pouvait, écoutant Jean-Paul II, percevoir ici une allusion à d'autres temps d'éclipse ou presque de l'expression publique de la nation polonaise.

En s'adressant, un peu plus tôt, aux autorités politiques, Jean-Paul II n'avait pas introduit son propos sur la relation entre culture et nation, mais il avait clairement souligné l'importance de la nation elle-même. "De la société, de

la nation, de la patrie", avait-il dit. Il n'avait pas opposé nation et Etat. Cependant il avait clairement présenté le droit de la nation "à être sujet socio-politique". Il avait ajouté qu'elle a "le droit aussi à la formation de sa propre culture et de sa propre civilisation", ce qui veut dire que l'Etat par exemple ne peut pas lui imposer une autre culture que celle qui lui est "propre", sous-entendu peut-on dire, celle qui la constitue.

A l'UNESCO, un an plus tard, l'idée fondamentale que Jean-Paul II met en avant est celle de "souveraineté fondamentale" de la nation "en vertu de sa propre culture". Cette souveraineté de la nation en raison de la culture est souveraineté de l'homme même, qui s'exprime justement par la culture. "Il existe, dit Jean-Paul II, une souveraineté fondamentale de la société qui se manifeste dans la culture de la nation. Il s'agit de la souveraineté par laquelle, en même temps, l'homme est suprêmement souverain" (11).

Jean-Paul II ajoute qu'il s'agit de faire en sorte que "l'homme compte ...comme sujet de sa propre existence humaine". Au lieu d'être un "objet de domination" pour quelque totalitarisme, impérialisme ou hégémonie.

"La nation, a-t-il dit précédemment, est la grande^e communauté des hommes qui sont unis par des liens divers mais surtout, précisément, par la culture. La nation existe par la culture et pour la culture, et elle est donc la grande éducatrice des hommes pour qu'ils puissent "être davantage" dans la communauté. Elle est cette communauté qui possède une histoire

dépassant l'histoire de l'individu et de la famille"(12). Histoire où l'individu ne s'aliène pourtant pas puisque, comme nous l'avons vu, c'est justement par la culture que l'homme est sujet. A condition certes que la culture elle-même ne soit jamais présumée aux hommes concrets qui en vivent et qui la renouvellent (aujourd'hui même) .

Dans cette perspective de la nation-culture, Jean-Paul II témoigne ainsi devant l'UNESCO : "La nation polonaise a conservé son identité, et elle a conservé, malgré les partitions et les occupations étrangères, sa souveraineté nationale, non en s'appuyant sur les ressources de la force physique, mais uniquement sur sa culture..."(13).

Ensuite, assurément, Jean-Paul II se défend expressément de faire du "nationalisme" . Il affirme vouloir seulement mettre en relief "un élément stable de l'expérience humaine et des perspectives humanistes du développement de l'homme" (14). Encore une fois, il y va de la souveraineté de l'homme même. Jean-Paul II évoque donc aussi avec sympathie et chaleur les jeunes nations en train de naître, déjà en possession cependant d'une identité, qu'il est question de "maintenir". Il écrit: "Je pense avec admiration aux cultures des nouvelles sociétés, de celles qui s'éveillent à la vie dans la communauté de la propre nation - tout comme ma nation s'est éveillée à la vie il y a dix siècles - et qui luttent pour maintenir leur propre identité et leurs propres valeurs contre les influences et les pressions de modèles proposés de l'extérieur"(15).

La portée du discours pour aujourd'hui est, enfin, surtout dans cette phrase : "N'y a-t-il pas, sur la carte de l'Europe et du monde, des nations qui ont une merveilleuse souveraineté historique provenant de leur culture, et qui sont pourtant en même temps privées de leur pleine souveraineté? N'est-ce pas un point important pour l'avenir de la culture humaine, important surtout à notre époque, quand il est tellement urgent d'éliminer les restes du colonialisme?"(16).

III

Questions suscitées par les prises de position de Jean-Paul II

Jean-Paul II n'a jamais fait à nouveau par la suite un exposé complet de sa conception de la nation et de l'enracinement de celle-ci dans la culture. Il reste cependant, à n'en pas douter, tout à fait fidèle à cette conception. Durant son second voyage comme pape en Pologne en 1983, il a exalté la signification de Jasna Gora quant à "la liberté de la nation", quant à "la patrie libre qui a recouvré la dignité d'Etat souverain". Il poursuivait: "La nation est vraiment libre quand elle peut prendre la figure d'une communauté déterminée par l'unité de culture, de langue et d'histoire. L'Etat, lui, est affermi dans sa souveraineté lorsqu'il gouverne la société et qu'en même temps il sert le bien commun de la société et permet à la nation de se réaliser dans sa personnalité, dans son identité. Cela comporte entre autres la création de conditions opportunes de développement dans le domaine de la culture, de l'économie, et en d'autres secteurs de vie de la communauté sociale. La

souveraineté de l'Etat est profondément liée à sa capacité de promouvoir la liberté de la nation, c'est-à-dire de développer les conditions qui permettent à celle-ci d'exprimer son identité particulière, sur le plan historique et culturel, autrement dit d'être souveraine par le moyen de l'Etat" (17).

Cette année encore, d'autre part, dans son allocution de début d'année au corps diplomatique accrédité auprès du Saint Siège, Jean-Paul II, qui parlait des droits de l'homme, a ajouté tout aussitôt : "Il ne faut pas oublier non plus les droits des nations à conserver et à défendre leur indépendance, leur identité culturelle, la possibilité de s'organiser socialement, de gérer leurs affaires et de conduire leur destinée librement, sans être à la merci, directement ou indirectement, de puissances étrangères . Vous connaissez comme moi les cas où ce droit est violé" (18).

On perçoit en fait aisément l'intérêt de cet enseignement. D'abord, de l'affirmation de la souveraineté de l'homme lui-même - équivalentement, de sa qualité de "sujet", d'être qui ne peut jamais être traité comme simple objet. Puis de l'affirmation d'un lien étroit entre l'homme et la culture et, par voie de conséquence, de l'idée de la souveraineté des communautés de culture - des nations comme communautés de culture.

Divers commentateurs ne s'en sont pas moins posé aussi certaines questions devant la pensée de Jean-Paul II . Dans un éditorial de la revue *Projet* en 1980, par exemple, Philippe Laurent écrivait : " Ces vues, fortes et originales, ne

s'appliquent pas aussi facilement aux grandes nations modernes. Certaines ont trouvé leur unité dans une diversité culturelle, parfois avec des heurts. Si les Etats-Unis ont forgé leur unité à partir de peuples aux cultures diverses mais assez proches quand même, il existe en cette nation des minorités raciales - noire, en particulier - d'origines culturelles fort éloignées. A l'intérieur d'une même nation, toute minorité culturelle a droit à une expression propre ; peut-elle pour autant revendiquer une existence nationale distincte? Que l'on songe à la culture berbère en Afrique du nord. Les Kurdes, qui ont une culture propre, se trouvent répartis, contre leur gré, en plusieurs nations différentes; peuvent-ils longtemps exister dans une telle situation? Il y a aussi les Arméniens, et bien d'autres... Par ailleurs, une même culture, islamique par exemple, soutient plusieurs nations qui se veulent distinctes, chacune souveraine. Nation et culture propre ne se recouvrent pas nécessairement" (19).

Seconde question ensuite: Jean-Paul II donnerait l'impression que les cultures nationales, une fois nées, persévèrent nécessairement dans leur être, sans plus se fondre ou se mélanger. "Aujourd'hui, notait Ph. Laurent, à propos de culture on parle à la fois d'identité, de respect de la différence, d'une pluralité légitime. Mais une question majeure demeure : les cultures, même traditionnelles, ont évolué, lentement certes, et évoluent encore, précisément au contact des autres cultures. Ces transformations sont-elles nécessairement mauvaises? Un conservatisme culturel ne serait-il pas lui-même dangereux, sorte d'isolat dans un monde toujours plus intercommunicant, culturellement d'abord?" (20).

En dernier lieu, selon Ph. Laurent, n'y a-t-il pas aujourd'hui des développements culturels entraînant universalisation, plutôt que particularisation . " L'ère des civilisations agraires est en voie de dépassement, avec l'avènement de l'homme technicien et aussi de l'homme urbain. Et la technique ne se juge pas seulement à ses produits et à leur utilisation. Elle représente une démarche de l'esprit, suscite des comportements originaux et donne naissance à une culture dont nous sommes tous plus ou moins imprégnés, ne serait-ce que par l'usage quotidien des objets techniques et par la diffusion des informations par les médias. Elle tend à s'universaliser. Fruit partiel, certes, mais significatif de l'intelligence et de l'agir de l'homme, la technique est une culture particulière, à vocation transnationale. Elle ne se situe pas du simple côté de l'"avoir", elle est une forme d'être, de penser, de travailler, de se relier, de dépasser ses limites. Faut-il s'en défendre alors qu'elle est déjà installée? " (21)

Dans un article , également de *Projet*, en 1981, sous le titre "Les droits de l'homme selon Jean-Paul II", Paul Valadier croit, quant à lui, pouvoir signaler une caractéristique méfiance de Jean-Paul II envers les Etats, en raison de la multiplication des mises en garde à leur endroit. "En aucun cas le pouvoir ne peut se permettre de violer les droits fondamentaux de l'homme", dit par exemple Jean-Paul II devant le corps diplomatique à Brasilia en 1980 : ne soupçonne-t-il pas spontanément le pouvoir de l'Etat?

De même ,dès sa première encyclique , Redemptor hominis, en 1979, il a dit : " Le sens fondamental de l'Etat comme communauté politique consiste en ce que la société qui le compose, le peuple, est maître de son destin" (22). Et il revient,selon lui, au peuple lui-même, et non pas à " un pouvoir imposé par un groupe déterminé à tous les autres membres de la société" - l'Etat? certains Etats? -, de faire respecter les droits de l'homme. Le numéro 17 de Redemptor hominis où l'on peut lire ce point de vue révélerait , selon Paul Valadier, un changement par rapport à l'enseignement de Paul VI.

Paul Valadier pense certes que le changement peut s'expliquer: "Trop d'Etats totalitaires se sont montrés les ennemis des droits de l'homme pour qu'on puisse attendre d'eux le respect et la mise en oeuvre de ces mêmes droits, ou encore trop d'Etats ne sont que la propriété privée d'un parti pour que le peuple puisse se reconnaître et y forger son destin"(23). Paul Valadier s'interroge, cependant, ainsi : "Ce débordement de la structure étatique par appel direct à la conscience ne va pas sans problème : en effet lorsque les droits de l'homme ne sont pas aussi ceux du citoyen, c'est-à-dire garantis par une constitution et un ensemble de lois ou de mesures sociales sur lesquelles urger, ou faire appel, on ne voit pas bien la portée concrète de ces droits" (24). Assurément, la méfiance de l'Etat est corrélative chez Jean-Paul II de sa confiance dans les nations et dans leur identité culturelle, qui est pour lui la vraie garantie de l'homme. Des problèmes n'en demeurent pas moins sans doute.

Dans le même sens, plus récemment, Marcel Merle a publié une intéressante étude "Droits de l'Etat, droits de l'homme, droits des peuples, droits des nations?" (25), où il exprime son impression d'un certain danger de la multiplication des affirmations sur les droits de l'homme, les droits des peuples, les droits des nations, et, corrélativement, d'un certain mutisme sur les droits des Etats : " Si, dit-il, le contrôle de la situation échappe aux Etats très souvent aujourd'hui, cela tient à de multiples raisons : montée de l'interdépendance et de la compétition économique, apparition sur la scène internationale de nouveaux acteurs internationaux et supranationaux; mais cela tient aussi aux résistances que l'action du pouvoir central rencontre de la part des minorités ethniques, linguistiques, confessionnelles ou idéologiques. Le phénomène touche en premier lieu les jeunes Etats (qui sont aussi les plus nombreux) à la recherche d'une identité souvent problématique; mais il n'épargne pas non plus les vieux Etats, comme le prouve la poussée des micronationalismes et la multiplication des actes de terrorisme. Rares sont aujourd'hui les pays à l'abri des menées séparatistes ou irrédentistes... Dans ces conditions, l'accent mis sur les "droits des nations" ou sur le "droit des peuples" ne risque-t-il pas d'aggraver l'aspect chaotique de la société internationale?" (26).

Marcel Merle constate certes ensuite que fort heureusement l'Eglise hiérarchise peuples, nations, Etats et organisations internationales. Il s'inquiète néanmoins du fait que l'anthropologie chrétienne sous-jacente n'est pas forcément ni facilement partagée par les non-chrétiens (27). Ce qui est dit risque donc d'être mal compris . Le discours de l'Eglise, de

plus, " sous-estime le caractère conflictuel de la société internationale". Alors, dit-il, " entre la défense et l'illustration du status quo, qui couvre parfois beaucoup d'injustices, et l'encouragement donné aux forces de "libération", dont l'action risque d'entraîner une série incontrôlable d'explosions en chaîne, l'hésitation est permise" (28).

Je dirais, pour ma part, qu'au total il n'y a pas de véritable contradiction entre l'enseignement de Jean-Paul II et celui de ses prédécesseurs. Jean-Paul II est sensible comme ils l'étaient au besoin d'institutionnalisation de la société internationale et au besoin d'une vraie autorité dans cette société . Ecrivant, par exemple, récemment : "Les valeurs de solidarité et de dialogue demandent à prendre une dimension institutionnelle sous la forme d'organismes spécialisés de la communauté mondiale veillant au bien commun de tous les peuples" (29).

Avec Jean-Paul II cependant la dimension respect des nations a repris de l'importance. Ce qu'il faut bien remarquer - est-ce toujours perçu? - , c'est que sa pensée n'est pas une valorisation de la particularité et de l'intérêt propre pour eux-mêmes, c'est une valorisation de ce qui est libre expression de l'homme, ou d'un groupe d'hommes, donc de la culture . De cela seulement. Entre la nation dont il parle et le nationalisme il y a donc loin, très loin même.

Reste assurément qu'entre la nation à laquelle doit correspondre un Etat et les minorités, les peuples auxquels ne doit pas nécessairement correspondre un Etat, il est souvent difficile de discriminer. C'est la question délicate, inéluctablement posée pourtant, que le propos de Jean-Paul II laisse derrière lui. En fait la société internationale doit avoir un rôle pour en décider. Ce n'est toutefois pas explicité.

IV

Le droit des peuples autochtones

Quoi qu'il en soit de ce problème laissé pendant, il est clair qu'au sein d'une doctrine catholique complexe, qui insiste fortement sur la réalité de la communauté mondiale et le besoin, en elle, d'autorités neuves à la mesure des problèmes qui s'y rencontrent désormais, mais qui connaît aussi le droit des personnes, des cultures, des nations, le pôle du respect dû aux entités qui sourdent de la création culturelle des hommes est particulièrement en vue pour l'instant. Un dernier trait intéressant est d'ailleurs propre à corroborer cette notation : c'est le fait de l'intérêt très grand que Jean-Paul II démontre depuis quelque temps pour les droits et les revendications des peuples autochtones. En prenant leur parti, en épousant leur cause, il ne veut pas donner l'impression que les gouvernements seraient insensibles, il manifeste au contraire qu'il s'appuie sur leur bonne volonté. Il s'engage cependant, en termes exprès, dans l'affirmation de la nécessité de redresser les torts qui ont

été faits à ces peuples, devenus souvent les plus pauvres parmi les peuples pauvres. Relevons quelques exemples de cet engagement.

En 1984, d'abord, à Sainte Anne de Beaupré au Canada, Jean-Paul II rencontre des Indiens et des Inuit. Il leur déclare : "Avec raison vous voulez contrôler votre avenir, préserver vos caractéristiques essentielles, mettre en place un système scolaire qui respecte vos langues propres". Il poursuit, assurément, en invitant en même temps à la réconciliation, à l'apaisement, et à la " recherche d'une bonne compréhension entre les habitants de ce pays" (30) .

Quelques jours plus tard, dans un discours pour des autochtones du Nord-ouest canadien qu'il ne peut prononcer mais néanmoins publie, Jean-Paul II rappelle les siècles d'injustice, il se réjouit ensuite qu'"heureusement la situation a changé dans une très large mesure", puis néanmoins il ajoute: "Aujourd'hui, je veux proclamer cette liberté qui est requise pour une juste et véritable mesure d'autodétermination dans votre vie de peuples autochtones. Avec l'appui de toute l'Eglise, je proclame vos droits et les obligations qui en découlent. Et aussi je condamne l'oppression physique, culturelle et religieuse, et tout ce qui vous priverait, vous ou tout autre peuple, de ce qui lui appartient en droit".

Il poursuit - non sans l'aveu du gouvernement canadien, on peut le supposer, mais ce n'est pas moins significatif - :
 Pour vous , une base territoriale dotée de ressources suffisantes

est nécessaire, afin de développer une économie viable pour les générations présentes et futures... Je sais que des pourparlers sont en cours et que les parties en cause ont fait preuve de beaucoup de bonne volonté. C'est mon espoir et ma prière que des résultats satisfaisants puissent être obtenus" (31). A ces autochtones Jean-Paul II a dit aussi auparavant : "Lorsqu'ils vous prêchent l'Évangile, les missionnaires veulent rester à vos côtés dans vos épreuves et vos problèmes, et dans votre juste combat".

Jean-Paul II a usé du même ton, ensuite, auprès des Indiens, en Equateur et au Pérou, en 1985. A Latacunga (Equateur), au Cuzco (Pérou). Mais surtout à Iquitos, en Amazonie péruvienne. Il y a quelque 250.000 Indiens dans cette région. "Je sais, leur a déclaré Jean-Paul II, que vous avez des occasions de souffrir parce que, alors que vous êtes les possesseurs pacifiques depuis un temps immémorial de ces forêts et de ces pampas, vous voyez très souvent s'éveiller la cupidité de ceux qui y sont arrivés récemment, qui menacent vos réserves, sachant que, pour beaucoup d'entre vous, vous n'avez pas de titres de propriété écrits en faveur de vos communautés, qui garantissent légalement vos terres".

Puis d'ajouter : "Conformément aux lois du Pérou et à vos droits ancestraux, je fais mien, moi aussi, l'appel de vos évêques de la Selva pour que l'on vous octroie - sans charges ni délais injustifiés - les titres qui vous reviennent". En même temps, certes : "Vous ne pouvez pas vous fermer aux autres. Ouvrez les portes à ceux qui viennent à vous avec un message de paix et les mains disposées à vous aider" (32).

Le contexte est semblable, enfin, en Australie, où le pape s'est rendu en 1986. Et devant les aborigènes rencontrés par lui, sa réaction est la même. Il prend leur parti. "Beaucoup d'entre vous, dit-il, ont été dépossédés de leurs territoires et séparés de leurs coutumes tribales... La discrimination causée par le racisme est une expérience quotidienne".

Jean-Paul II rappelle ensuite ce trait de l'histoire de l'Eglise catholique en Australie: " Dès le début, des hommes comme Monseigneur Polding, (le premier) archevêque de Sydney, s'opposa à la fiction légale adoptée par les colons européens, selon laquelle cette terre était terra nullius, le pays de personne". Il s'engage alors lui-même, ainsi: " L'Eglise, aujourd'hui encore, continue de vous soutenir".

On ne récrit certes pas l'histoire, de l'avis de Jean-Paul II: "A coup sûr, dit-il, ce qui a été fait ne peut être défait". Cependant, poursuit-il, " ce qui peut être fait maintenant pour remédier aux actes du passé, ne peut être remis à demain" (33).

Quelle insistance au total! Non pas dans une volonté de provoquer des revendications désordonnées. Encore moins, de déstabiliser des Etats. D'encourager à la fragmentation des grandes entités politiques. Mais dans la conviction qu'il y a urgence de mieux respecter les droits de ces populations autochtones. Dans la conviction, aussi, qu'on a trop tergiversé et qu'on s'est trop facilement trouvé des excuses pour retarder

le redressement des injustices . Bref, dans le cadre d' une doctrine de la nation et des minorités dont l'ensemble est inchangé, il y a un déplacement aujourd'hui en direction du respect scrupuleux des droits des nations, minorités et peuples particuliers. Et ceci en vue de toujours et partout respecter la culture , cette réalité en laquelle s'exprime si caractéristiquement l'homme.

Notes

- (1) Populorum progressio, n. 62
- (2) Gaudium et spes, n. 82, 2.
- (3) Pacem in terris, n.93
- (4) Pacem in terris, n.94
- (5) Pacem in terris, n. 95-96.
- (6) Pacem in terris, n. 97.
- (7) Pacem in terris, n. 140-141 ;
- (8) Documentation catholique, 1979, p. 613
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Documentation catholique, 1980, p. 606.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) Ibid.
- (15) Documentation catholique, 1980, p. 607.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) Documentation catholique, 1983, p. 789.
- (18) Documentation catholique, 1987, p. 187.
- (19) Projet, 1980, p. 775.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Ibid.
- (22) Redemptor hominis (1979), n. 17.
- (23) Projet, 1981, p. 76.
- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Pro fide et iustitia, Festschrift für Agostino Kardinal Casaroli zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg von Herbert Schambeck, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1984.
- (26) opcit., p. 774.
- (27) opcit.: p. 779.
- (28) op.cit. , p. 780.
- (29) Documentation catholique, 1986, p. 3.
- (30) Documentation catholique, 1984, p. 942.
- (31) Documentation catholique, 1984, p. 969.
- (32) Documentation catholique, 1985, p. 352.



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Figures of Catalonia

1985/86

TERRITORY	1975	1980	1985	% Cat/Spain
Surface (km²)			31 895	6,3
Arable land	10 378	10 359	10 435 ⁽¹⁾	5,1 ⁽¹⁾
Meadow and pastureland	2 807	3 177	3 062 ⁽¹⁾	4,8 ⁽¹⁾
Forest land	13 808	13 205	13 133 ⁽¹⁾	8,4 ⁽¹⁾
Other surfaces	4 937	5 191	5 302 ⁽¹⁾	6,8 ⁽¹⁾
Coast length (km)			580	14,9
Beach length (km)			270	
Number of municipalities	938	935	940	11,6

DEMOGRAPHY	1970	1981	1985	% Cat/Spain ⁽²⁾
Density (Inh/km ²)	160	187	191	75
Inhabitants (thousands)	5 108	5 956	6 105	15,8
Men	2 487	2 920	2 995	15,8
Women	2 621	3 036	3 110	15,8
Pop. up to 14	1 309	1 482	1 512 ⁽³⁾	15,3
Pop. from 15 to 39	1 834	2 144	2 193 ⁽³⁾	15,9
Pop. from 40 to 64	1 460	1 660	1 702 ⁽³⁾	16,1
Pop. over 65	505	670	671 ⁽³⁾	15,7
Birth rate ‰	19,4	11,4	10,0 ⁽⁴⁾	12,4 ⁽¹⁾
Death rate ‰	8,4	6,7	7,2 ⁽⁴⁾	7,7 ⁽¹⁾
Marriage rate ‰	7,4	4,2	4,1 ⁽⁴⁾	4,8 ⁽¹⁾
Divorce rate ‰		0,4	0,7 ⁽⁴⁾	0,5 ⁽⁴⁾
Natural growth	11,0	4,7	2,8 ⁽⁴⁾	4,7 ⁽¹⁾
Most populated towns (thous.)	1970	1981	1985	% Catalonia
Badalona	163	230	231	3,8
Barcelona	1 742	1 753	1 769	29,0
Girona	48	87	68	1,1
L'Hospitalet de Llobregat	241	295	288	4,7
Lleida	89	107	111	1,8
Sabadell	158	196	190	3,1
Santa Coloma de Gramenet	106	141	141	2,3
Tarragona	77	109	114	1,9
Terrassa	137	156	166	2,7
Barcelona Metropolitan Area	2 706	3 097	3 126	51,2

LABOUR FORCE	1970	1980	1985	% Cat/Spain
Active population (thousands)	1 975	2 249	2 324	17,4
Agriculture and fishing	168	134	122	6,1
Industry	857	857	810	26,6
Building	215	219	171	15,0
Services	702	941	1 010	16,9
Non classifiable	35	98	211	18,0
Unemployed (thousands)	15	240	462	16,9
Unemployed rate		13,8	22,4	22,0

Italic figures refer to Spain.

- (1) 1983.
(2) Density and % of Spain 1981.
(3) 1984 Estimated data.
(4) 1984.

TRANSPORT & COMUNIC.		1970	1980	1985	% Cat. Spain
Motorways and highways (km)		130	579	599	23,8 ⁽¹⁵⁾
Roads (km)		10 105	10 507	10 571	7,1 ⁽¹⁵⁾
Vehicles per 1 000 inh.		185	370	384 ⁽¹⁶⁾	292 ⁽¹⁶⁾
Vehicles per 10 km		1 748	3 362	3 320 ⁽¹⁶⁾	1 397 ⁽¹⁶⁾
Railways					
Passengers (thousands)			57 749	55 763 ⁽¹⁶⁾	
Goods (thousands Tn.)			5 449	5 049 ⁽¹⁶⁾	
Catalonia ports					
Movement of:					
Merchant vessel		11 528	10 764	9 449	11,1 ⁽¹⁷⁾
Goods (thousands Tn.)		13 073	39 531	40 888	21,4 ⁽¹⁷⁾
Catalonia airports					
Movement of:					
Aircraft		66 546	85 808	77 659	14,7
Passengers (thousands)		3 557	6 553	6 128	12,2
Telephones per 1 000 inh.		201	444	481 ⁽¹⁶⁾	345 ⁽¹⁷⁾

EXTERNAL TRADE		1971	1980	1983 ⁽¹⁸⁾	% Cat. Spain
Imports per sectors (millions pts.)					
Food			656 022	1 102 018	26,4
Raw mater. and semimanuf.			90 306	165 271	31,6
Equipment goods			392 086	638 374	24,7
Manufact. consumer goods			119 625	176 451	24,3
			54 005	121 922	35,2
Imports per country (Mill. pts.)					
U.S.A.			101 203	141 169	28,5
German Federal Republic			84 385	138 331	37,8
France			51 062	83 657	24,9
Italy			59 974	80 979	44,8
Others			359 398	657 882	23,6
Exports per sectors (millions pts.)					
Food	45 978	344 862	763 641 ⁽¹⁸⁾		20,1
Raw mater. and semimanuf.	6 895	26 666	7 634 ⁽¹⁶⁾		13,2
Equipment goods	15 192	164 807	400 733 ⁽¹⁶⁾		24,4
Manufact. consumer goods	8 350	57 442	112 532 ⁽¹⁶⁾		16,5
Technology	16 741	95 947	172 576 ⁽¹⁶⁾		20,0
			1 436 ⁽¹⁶⁾		6,3
Exports per country (Mill. pts.)					
France				621 394	21,8
German Federal Republic	5 182	44 187	82 480		18,5
Italy	4 808	31 971	55 172		21,3
Saudi Arabia	3 233	50 770	47 273		31,4
Others	231	11 331	32 014		38,8
	32 524	206 803	404 455		21,2

(15) 1982.

(16) 1984.

(17) 1983.

(18) The export figures are not comparable with other years figures.

AGRIC., LIVEST. & FISH.	1970	1980	1984	% Cat/Spain
Production (thousands Tn.)				
Cereals	829	1 089	798 ⁽¹⁹⁾	5,8
Fodder	2 978	4 014	3 912 ⁽¹⁹⁾	12,1
Fruit trees	403	731	958 ⁽¹⁹⁾	29,0
Vines	444	410	411 ⁽¹⁹⁾	8,0
Olive trees	145	51	65 ⁽¹⁹⁾	4,9
Heads (thousands)				
Cows	238	325	401	8,1
Sheeps	693	715	735	4,3
Goats	43	32	43	3,4
Pigs	1 512	2 863	3 156	26,4
Fish catches (thousands Tn.)	24	66	50	4,7 ⁽¹⁹⁾

INDUSTRY	1978	1982	% Cat/Spain
Added value (millions pts.)	771 805	1 146 305	23,3
Energy and water	47 502	118 002	15,7
Non energetic minery	55 855	70 654	11,1
Chemical industry	96 675	163 586	40,4
Mechanical transformations	242 586	346 121	24,7
Manufacturing industries	203 025	286 363	20,5
Textile and clothing	126 162	163 579	48,4

	1970	1980	1984
Industrial invest. (millions pts.)	9 365	17 078	26 042
Chemistry	905	2 218	2 703
Iron and steel	2 847	5 435	2 940
Food products	735	722	2 369
Textiles	1 564	836	6 283
Paper and graphic arts	660	1 503	1 561
Building	399	2 162	703
Others	2 255	4 202	9 503

HOUSING	1970	1980	1985	% Cat/Spain ⁽²⁰⁾
Finished per year (thousands)	39	49	31	14,5

JUSTICE	1985	% Cat/Spain
Courts and tribunals	264	14,1

(19) 1983.
(20) 1984.

GENERALITAT BUDGET		1986
Income (millions pts.)		
Chapter 1. Direct taxation		12 800
Chapter 2. Indirect taxation		23 900
Chapter 3. Taxes and other income		22 275
Chapter 4. Transfers ord. budget		314 345
Chapter 5. Patrimonial income		1 010
Chapter 6. Alienation of real investments		10
Chapter 7. Capital transfers		26 217
Chapter 8. Variation on financial assets		
Chapter 9. Variation on financial liabilities		26 964
Total		429 523

Expenditure (Mill. pts.)	Ordinary Operations	Capital Operations	Financial Operations	Total
Parliament	1 207	107		1 314
National Audit Office	175	9		184
Government				
Presidency	9 441	2 458	1	11 901
Home office	5 840	2 419		8 259
Economics and Finance	2 043	650	†	2 694
Education	117 115	7 368		124 483
Culture	4 519	1 086		5 605
Health and Social Serv.	195 629	6 112	10	201 752
Territ. Policy and Public Works	10 034	25 585	82	35 702
Agric., Livest. and Fish.	3 920	2 603		6 524
Labour	2 110	4 278		6 389
Justice	5 318	705		6 023
Industry and Energy	2 107	852	235	3 195
Trade and Tourism	1 204	2 260		3 465
Pensions	35			35
Public Debt	10 020		1 899	11 919
Consultative Council	71			72
Total	370 796	56 497	2 228	429 523

GATALONIAN PARLIAMENT		1980	1984			
Electors		4 436 459	4 501 851			
Voters		2 725 558	2 892 987			
% Participation		61,4	64,3			
	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%
CIU (nationalist, center)	43	754 448	27,7	72	1 346 917	46,6
PSC-PSOE (socialist)	33	608 689	22,3	41	866 425	30,0
AP (right)				11	221 605	7,7
PSUC (communist)	25	509 014	18,7	6	160 629	5,6
ERC (republican)	14	241 711	8,9	5	126 971	4,4
CC-UCD (center)	18	287 610	10,6			
PSA (andalusian socialist)	2	72 071	2,6			
Others		220 443	8,1		141 151	4,9

INCOMES	1971	1981	1983	Index
				Cat/Spain
Per capita (pts.)	86 467	502 368	639 745	125
				% Cat/Spain
Gross Ind. Prod. (millions pts.)	553 692	3 327 963	4 412 113	19,8
Annual G.I.P. growth rate	1973/71	1981/79	1983/81	1983/81
(in real terms)	8,8	0,6	1,1	1,5

PRICES & CONSUMPTION	1970	1980	1985	% Cat/Spain
Consumer price index				
Spain % annual variation	5,7	15,5	8,1	
Vehicle registration (thousands)				
Private cars	93	112	100 ⁽¹²⁾	19,1
Lorries and buses	15	19	19 ⁽¹²⁾	18,0
Motorcycles	4	16	10 ⁽¹²⁾	30,7
Energy (thousands TEP)				
Primary	6 895	14 106	14 078 ⁽¹³⁾	19,1
Final:	4 780	8 243	7 840 ⁽¹³⁾	17,6
Industry		3 931	3 683 ⁽¹³⁾	21,8
Transport		2 536	2 272 ⁽¹³⁾	16,8
Others		1 776	1 885 ⁽¹³⁾	15,8
Electr. energ./inh. (Kw/h)	1 637	2 909	3 105 ⁽¹³⁾	2 473 ⁽¹⁴⁾
Cement (thousands Tn.)	2 704	2 334	1 865	11,8

FINANCE	1970	1980	1984	% Cat/Spain
Branches:				
Bank	662	2 667	3 113	18,9
Savings banks	667	1 724	2 698	22,2
Deposits: (millions pts.)				
Bank	233 910	1 444 224	2 231 687	19,1
Savings banks	172 958	1 028 793	1 592 313	23,2
Stock exch. of Barcelona (Mill. pts.)				
Nominal value	6 342	27 484	154 560	25,5
Real value	13 389	24 899	143 604	22,6
% $\frac{\text{real value}}{\text{nominal value}}$	211,1	90,6	92,9	104,6

TOURISM	1970	1980	1984	% Cat/Spain
Hotel capacity (thousands)	129	168	168	20,1
Camping site capacity (thous.)	106	153	169	47,5
Foreign visitors (thousands)	8 340	11 830	12 539	29,2
By rail	539	809	969	36,9
By road	6 706	10 031	10 309	40,5
By ship	229	128	98	7,0
By air	866	862	1 164	8,7

(12) 1984.

(13) 1983.

(14) 1982.

HEALTH	1970	1980	1984	Spain
Total beds per 1 000 inh. ⁽⁵⁾	5,3	5,3	4,8	4,9 ⁽⁶⁾
Short-stay beds per 1 000inh. ⁽⁵⁾	3,1	3,8	3,5	3,7 ⁽⁶⁾
Inhabitants per doctor	658	398	294	327
Inhabitants per nurse		242	237	278
Inhabitants per pharmacist	2 606	2 318	2 227 ⁽⁷⁾	2 263 ⁽⁷⁾
Infant mortality rate ‰	20,3	11,3	9,2 ⁽⁸⁾	9,6 ⁽⁸⁾
Main causes of death %	1975	1979	1984	Spain ⁽⁹⁾
Cardiovascular diseases	45,2	46,6	44,0	46,2
Cancer	19,3	22,3	25,1	19,7
Respiratory diseases	11,4	8,1	7,3	8,6
Stomach diseases	5,8	6,0	6,8	5,5
External causes	4,9	4,9	5,2	5,5

EDUCATION	1975/76	1980/81	1984/85	% Cat/Spain ⁽¹⁰⁾
Pre-school (3-5 years)				
Teachers public sector	1 126	3 256	(11)	15,9
Teachers private sector	3 927	3 690	(11)	24,5
Students public sector	57 002	102 508	100 014	15,7
Students private sector	143 510	119 037	91 366	22,4
EGB (Primary Sch., 6-13 years)				
Teachers public sector	10 655	14 329	22 968	11,8
Teachers private sector	12 961	14 349	19 256	21,6
Students public sector	364 800	421 079	457 294	11,9
Students private sector	443 939	421 878	399 232	20,5
BUP-COU (High Sch., 14-17 years)				
Teachers public sector	2 638	5 257	6 893	12,7
Teachers private sector	4 519	5 192	4 856	21,0
Students public sector	71 436	88 101	109 143	12,3
Students private sector	47 635	72 374	71 020	19,4
FP (Tech. college, 14-18 years)				
Teachers public sector	1 038	2 492	5 338	12,7
Teachers private sector	4 124	4 450	4 149	26,3
Students public sector	14 545	44 009	68 623	14,6
Students private sector	35 867	63 749	71 372	24,8
Total students	1 178 734	1 332 736	1 368 064	18,8
University (enrol. studs.)				
Univ. Central de Barcelona	54 902	57 455	66 551	
Univ. Autòn. de Barcelona	17 326	22 251	25 467	
Univ. Politèc. de Catalonia	13 815	16 492	16 076	

(5) 1970-1980: placed beds
1984: disposable beds

(6) 1982.

(7) 1983.

(8) Estimated data.

(9) 1979.

(10) Academic year 1980/81.

(11) They are included in EGB's.

Catalonia is a nation whose origins go back to the Middle Ages. It has its own language and its own singular traditions in culture, politics and law.

The history of Catalonia's political institutions began towards the end of the VIIIth century.

Its origins lay in the old Carolingian "Marca Hispanica", which progressively became a sovereign state with its capital in the city of Barcelona. The holding from the XIth century onwards of the "Assemblees de Pau i Treva" (Peace and Truce Assembly) was the embryo of the Catalan "Corts" (Parliament). From the XIIth century onwards these "Corts" represented the townspeople, the clergy and the nobility in the decision and making processes. Thus Catalonia was the pioneer of the movement towards the parliamentary system and was well ahead of the other Mediaeval Kingdoms in that respect. In 1359 the Corts set up a delegated power named Generalitat, which progressively assumed more and more legal and political powers. This institution was abolished by Philip V, king of Spain, after the defeated the Catalans in 1714. It was re-established in the year 1931 only to be abolished again by Franco in 1939 and finally reestablished in the year 1977.

Today Catalonia is governed by an Autonomy Statute ratified in a referendum by the Catalan people in 1979. It consists of an autonomous political power. In some matters Catalonia has an exclusive devolved jurisdiction of its own, in some others shares it with the central government. Catalonia has a President, a Parliament and a Government of its own, a High Court and an "Ombudsman".

Catalonia is situated in the northeastern corner of the Iberian peninsula. It is a country traditionally open to the Mediterranean and to the rest of Europe. It is also characterised by its ability to adapt itself to new currents and trends, and to integrate new comers into its own stream of life. It is also noted for its industriousness (Europe's tenth industrial region) and by its artistic avant-garde. Catalonia is furthermore Europe's first touristic region.

March 1986


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BARCELONA

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Cover photo: "The Goddess" by J. Clarà (Catalunya Square)

THE CITY AND ITS HISTORY

WELCOME TO BARCELONA, capital of Catalonia, a modern cosmopolitan city which is, at the same time, both traditional and popular. For the people of the South, Barcelona is representative of the North, whereas for Northerners it represents the South. The majority of Europeans and North Americans find Barcelona to be a meridional Mediterranean city with all its accompanying characteristics: sun, the joy of life, an open and spontaneous personality, and a certain carefree attitude. To the rest of Spain and to other Mediterranean countries, Barcelona is a serious, hard-working, industrial, well-organized and commercially minded city.

To the people of Barcelona, the city is their home. Political as well as natural capital of the autonomous community of Catalonia, it has a population of over 3 million. Barcelona is one of the busiest ports in the Mediterranean, whose history, language and culture date back to ancient times. Among many other attractions, Barcelona boasts 70 museums, 3 universities and 16 parks, as well as having a very full intellectual, artistic, commercial and festive life.

Our purpose is to show visitors the hospitality for which the people of Barcelona are renowned, and help them discover the numerous sights and other aspects of this great city.

We hope that this small guide will contribute towards achieving this aim.

URBAN STRUCTURE

The urban structure of Barcelona is the result of distinctive stages in its development of which the three most important are easily distinguishable.

The **ORIGINAL NUCLEUS** built on Mount Taber and enclosed within its Roman walls, some of which can still be seen in several places. Its centre is Plaça Sant Jaume where the Town hall and the Generalitat Palace are located. This area is the Gothic Quarter (Barri Gòtic), with its wonderful selection of museums and places of artistic and historic interest, and that special atmosphere of a commercial district full of antique dealers, second-hand bookshops and small craft workshops.

The **MEDIEVAL ENCLOSURE** which includes the ruins of the old city, walled in until 1854 when the walls were knocked down to allow the city to expand. This area stretched to what are now the Rondas of San Pau, Sant Antoni, Sant Pere and Universitat (the name "Ronda" or "Round" deriving the sentry patrols round the walls), the Paral·lel and Passeig Lluís Companys. Here, as well as churches like those of Santa Maria del Mar and San Pedro de la Puellas, museums such as the Picasso and the Atarazanas (shipyard) museums, and open spaces like the Ciutadella Park and the Zoo, there is the world famous Rambla Avenue - a true expression of the spirit of Barcelona and an unusual combination of promenade, market and open air lounge.

The "EIXAMPLE". Built from the plans of the architect Cerdá (1859), it consists of more than 100 metres rectangular groups of houses and streets. There is a further uniformity in the actual design of the buildings, most of which were built between 1850 and 1930. Some of the outstanding parts in this area are its main boulevard, Passeig de Gràcia and other bordering avenues such as Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes and the Diagonal.

From then on Barcelona has continued to grow outwards, on the one hand towards Montjuïc, which, today, can be said to be "the great lungs" of the city, and which houses the "Pueblo Español" (Spanish Village), as well as gardens, fairgrounds, museums and a large Exhibition Complex. On the other hand Barcelona has also grown upwards, towards the Tibidabo mountain, which looks out onto and dominates the city, and at whose feet new residential areas have sprung. A must for any visitor.

HISTORY

The history of this densely populated urban conglomerate is said to go back 2,000 years, although, in fact, Barcelona is "a little" older. The first traces of human settlement in what is now Barcelona correspond to the Neolithic period (2000 to 2500 B.C.). After the Greeks had settled on the coast near the present French border (middle of the VI century B.C.) the Layetanos (indigenous Iberian tribes) established their territory here. The first vestiges of the Roman occupation date back to 218 B.C. The prosperity of the town, however, began in the II century when there was already a population of 5,000. After the fall of the Roman Empire in 415 A.D. the Visigoth King Ataulfo settled in Barcelona. There then followed the Islamic and Carolingian rule (717-985) which was brought to an end by the devastating invasion of Almanzor. Later, in 1035, and during the reign of Ramón Berenguer I, Barcelona began a new period of recovery. In the XIII century the city became the seat of government, a decisive element in state activities and international relations. Maritime Institutions in particular achieved great importance. The application of the maritime code of practice "Usos y costumbres del mar" (Uses and customs of the sea) dates back to at least 1232 and was the basis for the later book "Libro del Consulado del Mar". During the XIV century Barcelona was the centre of a Mediterranean power. This situation was interrupted by another great crisis in the late Middle Ages. At the beginning of modern times (1472-1530) great changes took place in the city, culminating in the beginning of a new period of economic expansion. Other great moments in the difficult history of Barcelona followed during the XVII and XVIII centuries until, at the turn of the XIX century and to quote the historian Vicens Vives, the city "drowning in sweet mediocrity" was awakened in unison by the arrival of the steam engine and Romanticism and began moulding in the middle of the industrial revolution its current status of an industrial and commercial city. Around the year 1900 "Modernism" emerged in Barcelona - a style of art which reached its zenith in Catalonia, coinciding with the great period of expansion of the Catalan bourgeoisie.

Today, Barcelona, as well as being a base for so many excursions into its fascinating and varied hinterland, is a diverse and unique city which knows how to combine its conservative tradition with its avant-garde leanings. Barcelona has delights to offer even the most fleeting visitor, but the possibilities open to those who have several days available to tour the city are endless.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

CITY BUS SERVICES

Buses run from between 5.30 to 6.00 am (in some cases 4.30 am) and 9.30 to 10.30 pm. Some services operate all night. All bus stops have notice boards indicating which buses stop there and their routes and timetables. The bus fare —any distances— is 40 pesetas on week-days and 45 ptas. on Sundays. Multi-trip Cards are also available and are cheaper. For further information ask for a Transport Guide "Guia del Transporte".

TAXIS

All taxis are and yellow in colour. There are taxis-ranks at many street corners as well as at stations, the airport, hotels, outside places of entertainment and at the docks. In Barcelona there are, in addition, 4 Radio-taxi firms. Their telephone numbers are: 386 50 00; 330 08 04; 321 88 33 and 300 38 11.

THE UNDERGROUND

There are 5 underground railway lines in Barcelona. In the hall of each "Metro" station maps of the city are displayed showing subway lines, stations and connections. Trains run from 5.00 am to 11.00 pm (until 1.00 am on Saturdays, Sundays and Public Holidays). The fare is 35 ptas. on week-days and 40 ptas. on Sundays and Public holidays. For further information see Transport Guide.

OTHER PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Funicular Railway. From the Avda. del Paral·lel (subway line 3) to the Miramar Amusement Park on Montjuïc (underground line 3). Timetable: From 9.30 am to 9.30 pm. Fares: Weekdays - Single 35 ptas., Return 70 ptas. Sundays - 40 and 80 ptas. respectively.

Cable Car. From the Amusement Park to Montjuïc Castle. Timetable: 9.30 am to 9.30 pm. Fares: Weekdays and holidays - Single 75 ptas., Return 140 ptas.

Cable Car (crossing over the Harbour). From Miramar to the Torre de Jaume I and the Torre de Sant Sebastià (Towers of James I and St. Sebastian). Timetable: 11.30 am to 9.30 pm. Fares: Single 90 ptas., Return 140 ptas.

Passenger Boats "Golondrinas". From the Porta de la Pau (Monument to Christopher Columbus) to the breakwater. Timetable: 9.00 am to 9.30 pm. Group fares 40 ptas. normal fare 80 ptas.

Tibidabo Funicular Railway. From the plaça del Funicular to the summit of the Tibidabo mountain and its Fairground. 535 mm above sea level. Timetable: 6.50 am to 8.40 pm. Fares: Return 80 ptas.

AIR TRANSPORT

Airport. Barcelona International Airport is located in El Prat de Llobregat, about 14 kms. from the city centre, and there is a direct road link via the Castelldefels highway.

Useful telephone numbers at the Airport:

Tourist Information Office: 325 58 29 (from 9.00 am to 8.30 pm).

Customs: 379 54 92.

Chamber of Commerce: 321 03 17.

"Duty Free Shop": 379 52 95.

Airport-City Train: (14 kms.) To and from Barcelona (Central Station, with connections with several Underground lines). Daily service from 6.30 to 11.15. Departures every 20 minutes and the trip lasts 14 minutes.

IBERIA, Airlines of Spain

Terminal in Plaça d'Espanya. Tel. 325 73 58.

Bookings. Tel. 325 60 00.

General Information. Tel. 325 43 04.

Airport Office. Tel. 370 10 11.



RAILWAYS AND RAILWAY LINES

Central-Sants Station: Plaça Països Catalans (Junction Infanta Carlota-Numància). Telephone 322 41 42. National and International lines.

Terminus Station: Avda. Marquès d'Argentera.

Tel. 319 32 00. Some National and International lines.

Apeadero de Gràcia Station: Junction Passeig de Gràcia-

Aragó. Tel. 319 32 00. National and International lines.

Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat Station: Plaça d'Espanya.

Tel. 223 02 82. Local services.

Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat Station: Plaça de Catalunya.

Tel. 302 48 16. Local services.

Enquiries about Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat: Tel. 205 15 15.

RENFE. Spanish Railways. Tel. 310 72 00. Enquire in any Renfe office or Travel Agency about discounts available for your trips. There are special rates for groups, conferences, trade fairs. Senior citizens, car transport. "Blue Days" (special days on which travel is cheaper), etc.

International Lines

"Talgo"-Trains direct from Barcelona to Geneva and from Barcelona to Paris. Daily service.

ROAD CONNECTIONS

149 km. from the Spanish-French border at La Jonquera/Le Perthus and linked to the European Motorway Network, Barcelona is ideally located to channel, as it does, a large part of the road traffic to and from the rest of Europe.

MOTORWAYS FROM BARCELONA

To the North: The A-19 to Mataró, which joins the coastal road, and the A-7 to La Jonquera (France).

To the South: The A-7 to Tarragona, Valencia and Alicante.

To the interior: The A-2 to Zaragoza, Pamplona and Bilbao.

Maps of each Motorway and its connections are available at all toll-points.

MARITIME TRANSPORT

Barcelona lives up to its reputation as one of the most important ports of the Mediterranean.

This maritime city offers 12 ferry services a week to Mallorca (8 hour crossing), and 6 weekly services to Ibiza

and Menorca from June to September (10 and 9 hour crossing respectively). Prices vary according to whether travelling is on deck or in a cabin. For further information and bookings: Trasmediterrànea. Via Laietana, 2. Tel. 319 96 12, or at any travel agency.

Linea Canguro (Kangaroo Line). Barcelona also has a ferry service to and from Genoa. There are about 3 return trips a week. Bookings and enquiries: Mc.Andrews. Plaza Duque de Medinaceli, 5. Tel. 318 05 43 / 318 06 35.


SOME CITY SIGHT-SEEING TOURS

1 — THE GOTHIC QUARTER

(Route covered on foot). Approximate time required: 3 hours.

The Gothic Quarter consists of what was known in ancient times as the "The District of the Cathedral". Here we can see the great Gothic buildings which mark the era of the city and its culture at their height during the Middle Ages. The ruins of ancient Roman buildings such as the Temple of Augustus and the Walls have also been preserved. The Town Hall and the Generalitat Palace were built during the reign of Peter III the Ceremonious.

Our itinerary begins in Plaça Nova.



- 1 **Towers of the Roman Wall.**- Plaça Nova.
- 2 **The Episcopal Palace.**- Carrer del Bisbe Irurita (Bishop Irurita St.).
- 3 **The Archdeacon's House.**- Carrer de Santa Lluçia. Ancient home of the Archdeacon of the Cathedral, rebuilt at the beginning of the 16th century. Today it houses the Municipal Institute of History. It has a noteworthy patio with central Gothic fountain.
- 4 **Puerta de la Capilla de Santa Lucía.**- (Gate of the Chapel of St. Lucia). 13th century. Romanesque style.
- 5 **Cathedral Cloisters.**- Magnificent garden with palm trees and magnolias in the centre. Interesting wrought iron railings. Chapel and small Temple containing a relief dedicated to St. George. The Cathedral museum is located in this precinct. (see museums).
- 6 **Interior of Cathedral.**- 14th century. Three transept (intersecting) naves and 29 lateral chapels, one of which is dedicated to Christ of Lepanto. The choir stalls —of medieval and Renaissance wood carvings—, the main altar, and Sta. Eulalia's Crypt (the patron of the city) are really beautiful and worth seeing.
- 7 **Puerta de Santa Eulalia.**- 15th century.
- 8 **Puerta de la Piedad.**- Acces to the Cathedral Cloister. A wood carving of the Virgin, of the Flemish School, stands out over the gate in the Tympanum.
- 9 **Casa de los Canónigos.**- (Canon's House). Gothic building from the 16th century. Has been restored. An overhead passage crosses Bisbe Irurita street.
- 10 **Centro Excursionista de Cataluña.**- (Excursion Centre). The pillars from the Roman Temple dedicated to Augustus are preserved inside this building.
- 11 **Palacio de la Generalitat de Cataluña.**- Gothic building from the 15th century. Connected to the Canon's House by the overhead passage mentioned in 9. Contains an orange tree patio and Chapel of St. George. At present it is the Seat of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia. Visits: Sunday mornings from 10 am to 2 pm.
- 12 **Casa de la Ciutat o Ayuntamiento.**- (Town Hall). Next to the Neo-classical façade (19th century) there is a lateral Gothic Façade (14th century) and a beautiful flight of steps. Contains the Chronicles room, with paintings by José M^a Sert, and the historical Room of the Hundred (Salon de Ciento).
- 13 **Iglesia de los Santos Justo y Pastor.**- (Church of Saints Justo and Pastor). The King's Parish until the 15th century.
- 14 **Plaça del Rei.**- (King's square). Enclousure surrounded by Gothic buildings. The Royal palace façade, with its high bay-window, crowns the buildings, an authentic 16th century "Sky-scraper".
- 15 **Palacio Clariana-Padellàs.**- Houses the City History Museum (see Museums).
- 16 **Capilla de Santa Agueda.**- 14th century Gothic temple which forms part of the Palacio Real Mayor (Main Royal Palace).
- 17 **Salón del Tinell.**- 14th century with 13th century Romanesque windows.
- 18 **Palacio del Lugarteniente.**- (Lieutenant's Palace). Now Archives of the crown of Aragon. Late Gothic building with renaissance sections. The workmanship of the staircase is noteworthy.
- 19 **Puerta de San Ivo de la Catedral.**
- 20 **Lugar de acceso a las excavaciones romanas.** Acces point to Roman excavations.
- 21 **"Federico Marés" Museum.**- (see Museums).

- 22 **Casa de la Pía Almoína o de la Canonja.**- Ancient headquarters of a charity foundation created in the 11th century.
- 23 **Torre de la Muralla Romana.**- Backs onto the Casa de la Pía Almonia.
- 24 **Plaza de Ramón Berenguer el Gran.**- Equestrian statue of bronze, the work of José Limona.

2 — THE “EIXAMPLE”

Route covered on foot. Approximate time required: 2 hours.

Cerdà's "Eixample" or "Ensanche" was conceived as a series of streets which run parallel to the sea and others which cut across them perpendicularly. The project was carried out during the great Modernist period with all the wealth and imagination which this style could offer, and where the artists that stood out were not only the architects, but also the interior decorators, the painters and sculptors, the glaziers and the craftsmen.

The "Eixample" is divided into two sections by the Rambla de Catalunya. The right-hand section has the largest selection of Modernist examples and reveals the "Eixample" at its best, and this is where our tour will be concentrated. The left-hand side contains the large Public Service buildings such as the Hospital Clínico, the University, the Fire Station, etc.

Our itinerary begins in Plaça Catalunya.



- 1 **Plaça de Catalunya.**- Similar in size to the Vatican Square and the Etoile de Paris Square. Contains two fountains and several sculptures, among which the "Goddess" by Clará stands out. Plenty of space in the centre with bordering lawns and benches.
- 2 **Passeig de Gràcia.**- This was the great avenue of the bourgeoisie at the beginning of the century. The wrought iron street lamps are beautiful, the work of P. Falqués.
- 3 **Passatge Permanyer.**- One of the pearls of the "Eixample". Post-Romantic houses with front gardens.
- 4 **Passatge Méndez Vigo.**
- 5 **Mercado e Iglesia de la Concepción.**- (Market and Church of the Conception). The market building has an interesting architectural structure. The church adjoining it is Gothic, with a marvellous XIV century cloister.


- 6 **Escuela de Música.** (School of Music). Bruch Street at the junction with València Street. The work of A. de Falguera.
- 7 **Casa Elizalde.** València Street, 302. Houses the centre for the diffusion of the Eixample. There are periodical exhibitions held here and information can be obtained about this district.
- 8 **Casa Montaner.** Mallorca Street, 278 at the junction with Roger de Llúria. The work of Domènech i Montaner. Charming polychrome ceramic façade. Seat of the provincial government.
- 9 **Palacio Casades.** Mallorca Street, 283. Small palace of Pompeian style. Houses the College of Barristers.
- 10 **Casa Thomas.** Mallorca Street, 291. Work of Domènech i Montaner. Although it is now occupied by a firm of designers, the interior of this building can be visited.
- 11 **Casa Terrades or "Casa de les Punxes".** Diagonal, 416. This avenue obtains its name from the fact that it cuts across the Ensanche diagonally. This building is the work of Puig i Cadafalch. It is Modernist with a medieval air, making abundant use of brick.
- 12 **Edificio Vidal-Quadras.** (Vidal-Quadras Building). Diagonal, 373. Work of Puig i Cadafalch. Houses the Museum of Music. (see Museums).
- 13 **Casa Milá or "La Pedrera".** Passeig de Gràcia, 82, at the junction with Provença Street. The work of Antonio Gaudí. Regarded as the best example of the Modernist Art with its impressive façade of curving stonework and wrought-iron balconies. The unusual interior patios and impressive terrace are also worth visiting, but prior permission must be obtained.
- 14 **Editorial Montaner y Simón.** Aragó, 255. Work of Domènech i Montaner and built in 1880, this was the first building of Catalan Modernist style.
- 15 **Casa Batlló.** Passeig de Gràcia, 43. Work of Gaudí. Mosaic façade and ceramic roof.
- 16 **Casa Amatller.** Passeig de Gràcia, 41. Work of Puig i Cadafalch. Neo-Gothic style.
- 17 **Casa Lleó Morera.** Passeig de Gràcia, 35, at the junction with Consejo de Ciento. Work of Domènech i Montaner. Modernist floral style.
- 18 **Rambla Catalunya.** This boulevard is, perhaps, the most delightful in the whole "Eixample". It has a double row of lime trees along the central avenue, where cafés and "horchaterías" (small bars specialising in almond-based milk drinks) have their terraces.
- 19 **Universidad.** (University). Plaça Universitat. Work of Elies Rogent. Built towards the end of the XIX century. Neo-Romanesque-Catalan style. Houses the faculties of Sciences and Arts. Beautiful interior courtyards.

3 — RAMBLA AND HARBOUR

Route covered on foot. Approximate time required: 3½ hours.

The Rambla, which stretches from Plaça Catalunya to the harbour, was for centuries the heart of the city, and even today, in spite of the urban expansion during the last hundred years, it continues to be the most representative, the most popular and the most cosmopolitan thoroughfare in the city. The central promenade, meeting place at all hours of the day and night for people from all walks of life, is sprinkled with newspaper stands and flower and pet stalls, adding even more colour and life to this unique and world-famous avenue.

This itinerary begins at the head of the Rambla, where it opens out onto the Plaça Catalunya.



- 1 **Fuente de Canaletas.**- (Canaletas fountain) 19th century iron fountain. One of the symbols associated with the city, it lends its name to the section of the Rambla nearest Plaça Catalunya.
- 2 **Iglesia de Belén.**- (Church of Bethlehem) at the junction with Carme Street. Ancient Jesuit church. Catalan Gothic style interior. During the Christmas season there is an unusual exhibition of Nativity scenes and cribs.
- 3 **Palacio Moia.**- Situated in front of the church of Bethlehem. Stately home dating back to the beginning of the 18th century. Has been restored.
- 4 **Palacio de la Virreina.**- One of the most sumptuous buildings in the Rambla. This palace houses the Museums of Decorative Arts, the Postal Museum and the Cambó collection of paintings (see museums). It also contains the Numismatic Museum of Cataluña and municipal exhibition rooms.
- 5 **Mercado de San José o de "la Boqueria".**- Iron building which houses one of the most typical and traditional food markets in the city.
- 6 **Llano de la Boqueria.**- Named after the area between Hospital Street and Boqueria Street. Has a paving by Joan Miró.
- 7 **Gran Teatro del Liceo.**- Behind a discreet façade is hidden one of the largest and most majestic auditoriums in the world. Opera season from November to March and Ballet season in Autumn. May be visited on Mondays and Fridays at 11.30 and at 12.15.

- 8 **Palacio Güell.**- Calle Nou de la Rambla, 3. Work of Antonio Gaudí, it houses the Museum of Drama (Theatre). (see museums).
- 9 **Plaça Reial.**- Square with numerous porches and uniform buildings. Iron fountain in the centre. The lamps are the work of Gaudí in his youth.
- 10 **Llano del Teatro.**- Monument dedicated to Frederic Soler, better known as "Pitarra", founder of the modern Catalan theatre.
- 11 **Palacio March.**- 18th century neo-classical façade. Exhibition hall inside.
- 12 **Museo de Cera.**- (Wax museum). Rambla de Santa Mònica, 4 (see Museums).
- 13 **Reales Atarazanas.**- (Royal Shipyard). The largest and most complete medieval shipyard known is preserved at the end of the Rambla. There are seven parallel workshops from the 14th century. A further three were added in the 17th century on the side of the Rambla. On the southern side, in Avda. Paral·lel, there are the ruins of a section of the ancient city walls. The building houses the Maritime museum (see museums).
- 14 **Monumento a Colón.**- (Christopher Columbus statue). Located in Porta de la Pau, in front of the shipyard. The statue of the man who discovered America stands on an iron column 50 metres high. Work of the architect Gaietà Buigas, it was built for the Universal Exhibition of 1888. There is a lift to the upper platform. Exceptional aerial view of Barcelona. There is a tourist information office in the base of the column. Visiting times: Daily (except Mondays) from 9.30 am to 1.30 pm and from 4.30 pm to 8.30 pm.
- 15 **Carabela Santa Maria.**- (The ship "Santa Maria"). Replica of the flagship on which Columbus made his first trip to America.
- 16 **Golondrinas.**- A trip in the harbour in one of these boats completes our itinerary through the Rambla and its sea-front. Timetable: daily from 9.30 am to 9.30 pm.




4 — MONTJUÏC

We would recommend the use of a car or public transport (Funicular train and cable car, or bus) to tour the whole mountain. It is possible to make partial tours on foot. Approximate time required: from 2 to 5 hours according to choice of places which are visited.

Montjuïc means "mountain of the Jews" (In former times there was a large Jewish cemetery there). The Montjuïc mountain —altitude 173 metres— has an area of 218.8 hectares of gardens. The first project for its urbanization dates back to 1894 and was the work of the architect José Amargós. Twenty years later the city council approved the plan for Montjuïc Park. The landscaping of the garden was designed by the frenchman Jean-Claude Forestier and the work carried out by the catalan Rubió i Tuduri. A large part of the mountain was developed for the 1929 International Exhibition when palaces and sports installations were built. This mountain of great scenic and artistic attractions was further improved in 1975 with the building of the Miró Foundation, the work of José Luis Sert.

Our itinerary begins in Plaça d'Espanya.



- 1 **Torres de la Exposición.**- (Exhibition Towers). These towers, 47 metres high, mark out Avda. M^a Cristina.
- 2 **Feria de Barcelona.**- (Barcelona Trade Fair complex). Occupies 250.000 m² and contains various palaces which house, year after year, the numerous national and international fairs and conferences.
- 3 **Fuentes luminosas.**- (Illuminated Fountains). Masterpiece of the engineer Carlos Buigas, which is capable of producing over 50 different combinations of water jets and coloured lights. Operating times. In Summer on Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays from 9 pm to midnight. (from 10 to 11 with music). In Winter on Saturdays and Sundays from 8 pm to 11 pm (from 9 to 10 with Music).
- 4 **Pueblo Español.**- (Spanish Village). Magnificent enclosure which gathers under one roof —so to speak— the most characteristic aspects of architecture from the whole of Spain. The front of the buildings, faithfully reproduced, are grouped according to the ancient divisions in the

- geography of the peninsula. Glaseworks, ceramic and printing workshops, etc. Inside the enclosure there are also shops and restaurants as well as the museums of Graphic Arts and Popular Industries and Traditions. (see museums). Visiting hours: Daily from 9 am to 7 pm.
- 5 **Estatua de San Jorge.**- (Statue of St. George). The work of Josep Llimona, it is at the centre of the lookout point over the Llobregat.
 - 6 **Estadio de la Fuxarda.**- Rugby ground. In Summer, the Mounted "Guardia Urbana" performs its horse tattoo. Performances on Thursdays at 11 pm.
 - 7 **Piscinas Bernardo Picornell.**- (Bernardo Picornell Swimming-pool). Olympic size swimming-pool named after a pioneer of Catalan swimming. The 1970 European championship took place here. Open from 9 am to 4 pm.
 - 8 **Jardin Botánico.**- (Botanic Gardens). Transferred to Montjuïc from the Ciutadella Park in 1931. Visiting times: From 9 am to 1.30 pm and from 4 pm to 6.30 pm daily except Sundays and public holidays.
 - 9 **Palacio Nacional.**- A building representative of the 1929 exhibition. It houses the Museums of Catalan Art and Ceramics (see museums).
 - 10 **Palacete Albéniz.**- Former Royal Pavilion of the exhibition. It is used as a Royal residence and is the venue for the city council's gala receptions.
 - 11 **Jardines "Joan Maragall".**- Gardens of the Palacete Albéniz. There is an open air theatre and sculptures by various artists. Open to the public on Sundays.
 - 12 **Estadio.**- Inaugurated in 1929, it can accommodate 72.000 spectators. The Stadium forms part of the project "Olympic Ring" which will be built in the event that Barcelona stages the 1992 Olympic Games.
 - 13 **Fundación Miró.**- This building, white and brilliant, is the work of José Luis Sert. It houses the Centre of Studies of Contemporary Art and a permanent exhibition of Miró's work. (see museums).
 - 14 **Museo Etnológico.**- Passeig de Santa Madrona (no street number) (see Museums).
 - 15 **Font del Gat.**- Going down Passeig de Santa Madrona and taking the stairs on the right. This fountain was a regular Sunday visiting place in former times. Today there is turn of the century restaurant, the work of Puig i Cadafalch.
 - 16 **Teatre Grec.**- A replica of an ancient Greek theatre with seating for 2,000 people. The rocky wall of an old quarry forms the background to the stage. It is surrounded by beautiful gardens. Theatre performances in Summer.
 - 17 **Museo de Arqueologia.**- (Archeological Museum). Located in the old Graphic Arts Palace from the 1929 exhibition. (see museums).
 - 18 **Palacio Municipal de Deportes.**- (Municipal Sports Complex). Will accommodate 12,000 people and is also used as a concert and festival hall.

From here we return to our point of departure via Avda. Rius i Taulet which leads onto Avda. Maria Cristina and takes us back to Plaça d'Espanya.

MUSEUMS

MEDIEVAL ART

* **Catalonian Art Museum**

Contains collections of Catalan Gothic and Romanesque Art: mural paintings - perhaps the best collection in the world - altarpieces and carvings. Spanish and European Baroque is also represented here. Palácio Nacional de Montjuic. Tel. 223 18 24. Open from 9 am to 2 pm (except Mondays). Admission 175 ptas.

* **"Federico Marés" Museum**

XII to XVIII sculptures. Medieval images. Comtes de Barcelona Street, 10. Tel. 310 58 00. Open daily (except Mondays) from 8 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 7 pm. Holidays from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission 80 ptas.

Cathedral Museum

Here there are altarpieces and paintings of the Catalan Gothic School. The painting "Piedad del Arcediano Desplá" de Bartolomé Bermejo hangs in the Cathedral Cloister. The Cathedral Museum is open daily from 11 am to 1 pm. Tel. 315 15 54.

* **Pedralbes Monastery Museum**

Magnificent collection of murals by Ferrer Bassa (1346). Important examples of the influence of the Siennese School on Catalan art. Located at the end of Passeig de la Reina Elisenda. Tel. 203 92 82. Open daily (except Mondays) from 9 am to 2 pm.

HISTORY

* **City History Museum**

Ruins of the ancient buildings of Roman Barcelona can be seen in the cellars. Local history is evidenced through many of the items on the three floors of the building (institutions, customs, famous persons, phases of urban development, etc.). Open from 9 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 8,30 pm, except Mondays. Holidays from 9 am to 2 pm. There are many documents, engravings, paintings, sculptures and ceramics. Casa Clariana Padellás. Plaça del Rei. Tel. 315 11 11. Open daily from 9 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 8.30 (except Mondays). Holidays, from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission 80 ptas. Second Sunday of each month visit to the Antonio Maura excavations. Third Sunday of each month - visit to gallery of Distinguished Catalans.

Museum of Archeology

Several objects from Prehistoric times to the VII century. Interesting rooms with finds from Empúries and Balearic culture. Magnificent collection of Roman mosaics. Montjuic Park. Passeig Santa Madrona. Tel. 223 21 49. Open daily from 10 am to 2 pm and from 5 pm to 7 pm (except Mondays). Public holidays, from 10 am to 2 pm.

SCIENCE

Science Museum

Teodoro Roviralta, 55 (Tibidabo underground station). Tel. 212 60 50. Open daily from 10 am to 8 pm except Mondays. Planetarium sessions: weekdays at 1 pm and 6 pm. Saturdays and public holidays, every half hour. (Children under 4 are not admitted). Scientific film sessions: Saturdays and public holidays, morning and afternoon.

Admission: 200 ptas. (children under 7, free). Students and pensioners: 75 ptas. Planetarium sessions: 125 ptas., 4 years and over.

* **"Mentora Alsina" Experimental Physics Laboratory**
Tibidabo Park. Tel. 247 57 34. Open daily, except Sundays and Mondays, from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission free. (Guided tours can be arranged by telephone).

Museum of Medicine
Passatge Mercader, 11. Tel. 216 05 00. Open Thursdays from 10 am to 1 pm. Admission free.

* **"Martorell" Museum of Geology**
Collections of Petrography, mineralogy and paleontology. Ciutadella Park. Passeig Tilers. Tel. 319 68 95. Open daily from 9 am to 2 pm (except Mondays). Admission 70 ptas.

* **Natural History Museum**
Ciutadella Park. Tel. 319 69 12. Open from 9 am to 2 pm (except Mondays). Admission 60 ptas.

* **Zoology Museum**
Exhibition of stuffed animals and other important collections of animal studies. Ciutadella Park. Tel. 318 68 93. Open daily (except Mondays) from 10 am to 2 pm. Admission 80 ptas. Public holidays - admission free.

BARCELONA AND THE SEA

Maritime Museum
Located in the medieval building of the Royal Shipyards. Porta de la Pau. Tel. 301 64 25. Many items and documents recording the complete history of navigation. Outstanding among these is the "Libro del Consulado del Mar", the oldest known code of maritime law. The map and miniature ship sections are specially interesting. Open daily (except Mondays) from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 7 pm. Holidays from 10 am to 2 pm. Admission 100 ptas (museum) and 100 ptas. "Santa María" ship.

Aquarium of the Institute of Fishing Research
Containing 44 tanks (300.000 litres of water), this is the finest aquarium in Spain and one of the best in Europe. Passeig Nacional de la Barceloneta. Tel. 310 65 62. Open from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 8 pm.

CONTEMPORARY ART

* **Picasso Museum**
The most important monographic museum in the world, containing an extraordinary collection of works by the great master. Montcada, 15. Tel. 319 63 10. Open weekdays from 9 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 8.30 pm (except Mondays - from 4 pm to 8.30 pm). Sundays from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission 175 ptas.

* **Museum of Modern Art**
Collection of paintings and sculptures from the end of the XVIII century to the present time. Paintings by Fortuny, Russinyol, Casas, Nonell, Regoyos, Zuloaga, Sunyer, Sotomayor and Solana. Picassos's "Arlequin". Sculptures by Llimona, Gargallo, Hugué, Clará and Rebull. Ciutadella Park. Plaça d'Armes. Tel. 319 57 28. Open from 9 am to 2 pm. Mondays from 2 pm to 7.30 pm. Admission 70 ptas.

Miró Foundation (Contemporary Art Study Centre)
This is a private cultural foundation, created by the painter Joan Miró. It houses exhibition halls with auditorium, library, engravings, archives and areas suitable for

organising artistic events and a variety of shows. It has three patios, gardens and rooftop terraces for open air exhibitions. The "Miró Foundation" is really outstanding in that a considerable number of Miró's own works are hung there. The building, white and gleaming, is the work of the architect José Luís Sert.

The Foundation is located on Montjuïc Mountain, Passeig Miramar. Tel. 329 19 08. Open daily from 11 am to 8 pm. Holidays: from 11 am to 2.30 pm. The bookshop inside the building is closed between 2 pm and 4 pm. Admission: 150 ptas.

*** Clará Museum**

Collection of sculptures - the work of Clará. Calatrava, 27. Tel. 203 40 58. Open daily (except Mondays) from 9.30 am to 1.30 pm. Admission: 80 ptas.

MISCELLANEOUS

*** Museum of Decorative Arts - Cambó Collection**

Furniture, upholstery, ceramics, glass, fabrics, enamels, ivories, etc. Paintings by the great masters. Palacio de la Virreina. Rambla, 99. Tel. 301 77 75. Open daily (except Mondays) from 9 am to 2 pm and 4 pm to 8 pm. Admission free.

Gaudi's House and Museum

This is the house where Gaudi lived. Parque Güell, next to the Carretera del Carmelo. Tel. 204 52 50. Open Sundays and public holidays from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 7 pm.

**** Pedralbes Palace Museum**

Valuable collection of tapestries and other works of art. Avda. Diagonal, 686. Tel. 203 75 01. Open daily (except Mondays) from 10 am to 1 pm and from 4 pm to 6 pm. Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays from 10 am to 2 pm. Admission: 60 ptas. (Visits to Palace only: 45 ptas.)

*** Museum of Arts, Industries and Popular Traditions**

Spanish Village at Montjuïc. Tel. 223 69 54. XVIII century Apothecary's shop and Pallaresa house (reproduction of a turn of the century Pyrenean farmhouse). Open daily (except Mondays) from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission 70 ptas.

Barcelona Football Club Museum

Avda. Aristides Mallol. (Stadium). Tel. 330 94 11. Open Monday to Friday from 10 am to 1 pm and from 4 pm to 6 pm. Saturdays and Sundays from 10 am to 1 pm. (Closed on match days). Admission: 150 ptas. Children under 14 admitted free. Special group rates.

Gallery of Distinguished Catalans

Collection of portraits of the great men and women of Catalan history. Bisbe Cassador Street, 3. Palacio Requesens. Tel. 315 00 10. Open daily (except Mondays) from 8.30 am to 2.30 pm.


Bullfighting Museum

Comprises two rooms exhibiting the brands and branding irons of famous cattle breeders, heads of famous bulls, a collection of posters of all types and periods, old entrance tickets, costumes of famous bullfighters, photographs, documents, library, etc. Located in the enclosure of the Plaza de Toros Monumental (the Monumental Bull Ring). Tel. 245 58 03. Open from 10 am to 1 pm and from 3.30 pm to 7 pm (during bullfighting season), and on bullfight days from 10 to 1 pm. Admission 100 ptas.

Footwear Museum

Plaça de Sant Felip Neri. Tel. 200 29 45. Open daily (except Mondays) from 11 am to 2 pm. Admission: 10 ptas.





*** Book and Graphic Arts Museums**

Exhibition of all graphic art techniques. Pueblo Español (Spanish Village). Tel. 432 19 99. Open weekdays from 10 am to 3 pm.

*** Ethnological Museum**

Objects from American, pre-Columbian, Philippine, Asian and African civilizations. Montjuïc. Avda. Santa Madrona. "La Rosaleda". Tel. 224 68 07. Open daily from 9 am to 8.30 pm. Mondays from 4 pm to 8.30 pm and public holidays from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission 80 ptas.

Montjuïc Castle and Military Museum

Valuable collection of weapons and historical documents. Montjuïc Castle. Tel. 329 86 13. Winter opening times: daily from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 7 pm. Public holidays from 10 am to 7 pm. Summer opening times: daily from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 8 pm. Public holidays from 10 am to 7 pm. Admission 50 ptas.

*** Museum of Music**

String, wind and other instruments. Spanish and exotic folklore. Manuscripts and mementoes of great musicians. Avda. Diagonal, 373. Tel. 217 11 57. Open daily (except Mondays) from 10 am to 2 pm. Admission 80 ptas.

Theatrical Museum

Located in Güell Palace, the work of Gaudí. Nou de la Rambla, 3. Tel. 317 51 98. Open weekdays (except Mondays) from 10 am to 1 pm and from 5 pm to 7 pm. Public holidays from 11 am to 2 pm. Admission 100 ptas.

*** Postal Museum**

Virreina Palace. Rambla, 99. Tel. 301 77 75. Open weekdays (except Mondays) from 9.30 am to 1.30 pm and from 4.30 pm to 8.30 pm. Admission free.

*** Lace Museum**

Montcada, 12. Tel. 315 43 59. Open weekdays (except Mondays) from 9.30 am to 1.30 pm and from 4.30 pm to 7 pm. Public holidays from 10 am to 2 pm. Admission free.

*** Textile and Costume Museum**

Palacio del Marqués de Llió. Rocamora Collection. Montcada, 12. Tel. 310 45 16. Open weekdays (except Mondays) from 9 am to 2 pm and from 4.30 pm to 7 pm. Public holidays from 9 am to 2 pm. Admission: 80 ptas;

Verdaguer Museum

Vallvidrera, Vilajoana state. Tel. 204 78 05. Residence of the famous Catalan poet, Mossèn Cinto Verdaguer. Open daily from 10 am to 1 pm. Admission free.

*** Ceramics Museum**

Noteworthy collection of Spanish and foreign pottery. Palacio Nacional at Montjuïc. Open daily (except Mondays) from 9 am to 2 pm. The admission price is included in the entrance fee to the Art Museum of Catalonia.

Hearse Museum

Almogàvares, 99. Tel. 300 50 61. Open daily (except public holidays) from 9 am to 1 pm.

"Miguel Soldevilla" Museum

Located in a hall of the Massana School. Hospital, 56. Tel. 242 20 00. Not open to the public. Visits by appointment only.

Mechanical Doll Museum

Located inside the amusement park on the Tibidabo mountain. Unusual collection of mechanical dolls from the

beginning of the century. Tel. 211 79 42. Open weekdays (except Mondays and Tuesdays from 12 noon to 2 pm and from 3 pm to 5.45 pm. Saturdays and public holidays from 12 noon to 3 pm and from 4 pm to 8.45 pm. Admission: 90 ptas.

Wax Museum

Houses a collection of wax figures of famous personalities from the world of arts, science, history, etc. Passatge de la Banca, 7 (at the end of the Rambla). Tel. 317 51 98. Open daily from 11 am to 1.30 pm and from 4 pm to 7.30 pm. Public holidays from 11 am to 1.30 pm and from 4 pm to 8 pm. Admission: 150 ptas. Special rates for groups of 25 or over.

Planetarium Barcelona


Modern projection techniques on a dome to discover the world of the stars. Escoles Pies, 103. Tel. 211 64 16. Visits by appointment.

* Free entrance on Sundays and public holidays.

PARKS AND GARDENS

MONTJUIC PARK

(See itinerary 4 — Montjuïc). The development of Montjuïc came about as a result of the International Exhibition of 1929. Visitors today can enjoy its splendid landscape gardens which, in addition to their diverse natural attractions, house a number of cultural centres such as the Miró Foundation, various museums, etc. Three more gardens were inaugurated in 1970: Mossèn Cinto Verdaguer, located next to the amusement park; Mossèn Costa i Llobera (one of the finest cactus gardens in the world). The entrance to which is in Miramar; and Joan Maragall, which are the gardens belonging to the Palacete Albéniz. The outstanding amusement park located on Montjuïc can be reached by way of the funicular which leaves from the Paralelo underground station (line 3). From the amusement park, one can continue by cable car to Montjuïc castle,



which dates from the XVIII century and was a military barracks in use up to the year 1960. A splendid panoramic view of the city is to be had from this location. Bus routes 101 and 61, departing from the Plaça d'Espanya, cover the inner circle of Montjuïc.

TIBIDABO PARK

A panoramic view of the city and its suburbs is offered from the Tibidabo Mountain (535 metres high). The Church of the Sacred Heart and a second amusement park are housed at the summit. This was the first funfair the city ever had and is mainly for children. The curious "Mechanical Doll Museum" is to be found within the amusement park (see museums). Tibidabo is accessible via the "Rabassada" road and by the "Sarrià" road to Vallvidrera, or alternatively one may take the funicular which leaves from the Plaza del Funicular station (FF.CC. of the Generalitat to Sabadell and Terrassa). A further possibility is the "Tramvia blau" or "blue tram" which departs from the foot of the Avenida Tibidabo.

CIUTADELLA PARK

Inaugurated as a result of the Universal Exhibition of 1888, the park covers an area of 31 hectares and is still considered to be the finest park in Barcelona. It was built on land which was left vacant following the demolition of a military barracks housed there. More than a third of the park is taken up by the Zoo and the remainder is for recreational and other diverse activities. Noteworthy among the various buildings and centres of interest which are to be found here are: the cascade and sculptured ensemble of Aurora's Chariot, which the then young architect Antonio Gaudí helped to design; a boating lake; the Parliament of Catalonia and the Museum of Modern Art in the old "plaça d'Armes", in the centre of which is a magnificent statue by Llimona called "El Desconsol". The Zoo itself deserves a special mention, one of this most unusual attractions being the famous albino gorilla "Copito de Nieve" (Snowflake) - the only one of its kind in captivity in the world today, the killer whale and the dolphinarium. The Zoo can be visited every day from 09.30 to 19.30. The main entrances to Ciutadella Park are via the Passeig Pujadas and Passeig Picasso. Buses: 29, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 51. Underground: Arc de Triomf (line 1) and Ciutadella (line 4).

PARQUE GÜELL

(See "The works of Gaudí"). Inaugurated in the Spring of 1926, precisely at the same time when its creator, Gaudí, died. The park was declared by UNESCO to be of world interest. The main entrance is from Olot Street.

Other parks and gardens dispersed about the city:

Parque del Laberinto

Adjoining the Horta Municipal Cycling Stadium in the Passeig del Valle de Hebrón. A turn of the century maze and recreation ground. Buses: 26, 27 and 73.

Turó de la Peira

The entrance to the park is at the top of Passeig Fabra i Puig, where it converges with calle Vall d'Ordesa. Bus: 45. Underground: Vilapiscina and Horta (line 5).

Parc de les Aigües

Former property of the Water Board. Entrance by Plaza de Alfonso X el Sabio. Buses: 55, 21, 31, 32 and 39. Underground: Alfonso X (line 4).

Parque de la Guineueta

Children's playground and pond. Main entrance by Plaza de Lluçmajor. Buses: 11, 12, 31, 32, 47, 50, 73, 76 and 77. Underground: Lluçmajor (line 4).

Castell de l'Oreneta

Castle in ruins overgrown with thick vegetation. Main entrance by Calle Montevideo, at the end of Avda. Espasa. Buses: 22, 64, 66 and 94. Train: FF.CC. of the Generalitat, Reina Elisenda station.

Turó Park

Various monuments and statues. (Pau Casals). In Spring there are theatrical performances for children on Sundays and public holidays. Entrance by Avda. Pau Casals. Buses: 78, 66, 14, 6 and 34.

Parque Cervantes

Magnificent rose garden. Main entrance in Avda. Diagonal, next to Abogado Balibé Street. Buses: 75 and 7. Underground: Zona Universitaria (line 3).

Parque del Guinardó

Children's playground and sports ground. Main entrance in Bruselas Street. Buses: 55, 21, 32 and 39. Underground: Guinardó (line 4).

Parque del Escorxador

Site of the monumental sculpture by Joan Miró entitled "Dona i ocell" (Lady and Bird). It is located on the land once occupied by the Municipal Abattoir, between the following streets: Aragó, Tarragona, Diputació and Vilamari. Underground: Plaça Espanya (line 1) and Tarragona (line 3).

Further information on parks and gardens can be obtained from: Servei Municipal de Parcs i Jardins - address: Avda. Marqués de Comillas (no street number), Montjuïc. Tel. 224 38 09.

THE WORK OF GAUDI

Barcelona has one of the greatest selections of Modernist works in Europe and, as such, can rightly be considered as one of the richest European cities in this style of Art.

Catalan Modernism emerged around the year 1900 and immediately flourished in an extraordinary way, coinciding with the great moment of expansion and consolidation of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Modernism, however, was not a form of art exclusive to this rising social class - on the contrary it found a place in the working class sector of the community, as seen in the large number of minor works of undoubted Modernist style (Houses, shops, etc.).

Barcelona is the home of the greatest and most original work of the brilliant Catalan architect **Antonio Gaudí** (1852-1926). His works, which combine stonework, ironwork and ceramics in a most masterful way, have been included in the list of World Trust Properties protected by UNESCO. Gaudí's works:

Sagrada Família. (Church of the Holy Family). This is undoubtedly the most famous Modernist building in the world designed large-scale project comprising three magnificent façades of which only one, that of "the Birth" (el Nacimiento) was finished (1900). Construction work on the four towers (more than 100 metres in height) which make up the façade, took from 1903 to 1926, the year in

which the architect died. Gaudí's idea was to build a symbolic church comprised of three façades dedicated to the Birth, the Passion and Death, and to the Glory of Christ, and four towers for each façade to represent the twelve apostles. One single tower dominating the complex would symbolize the Saviour, surrounded by four more towers dedicated to the Evangelists.

A further tower was to be constructed above the apse in honour of the Virgin Mary.

Following the death of Gaudí, the actual building of this great work has continued at a somewhat erratic pace, as well as becoming a subject of controversy. The Church Museum is well worth a visit and houses plans and photographs of the varying stages of construction.

The Church is located in the block marked out by Mallorca Street, Cerdanya Street and Sicilia Street. Open daily from 9 to 6 pm and in Summer from 8 am to 8 pm. Buses: 34, 19, 20, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51 and 54. Underground: Sagrada Família (line 5).

Parque Güell. (Güell Park). Situated at the northern point of the district of Gracia, on the slopes of the Carmelo mountain. The plan, originally commissioned to Gaudí by the financier Eusebio Güell, was carried out between 1910 and 1914.

The most outstanding feature of this park is unquestionably the large set of Dorian columns which support the upper square. The surrounding wall of this square is shaped in the form of a bench and is of an undulating pattern, paved with pieces of pottery taken from diverse sources, i.e. plates, tiles, etc., forming chromatic combinations which produce surprising effects. Gaudí's home was converted into a museum which is open to the public on Sundays and public holidays. This Modernist building, where the master architect lived for twenty years, dates back to 1911 and is the work of Francisco Berenguer, a disciple and associate of Gaudí.

The main entrance to Güell Park is in Olot Street. Buses: 10, 24, 25 and 28.

Other works by Gaudí to be found in Barcelona are:

PALACIO GÜELL. Nou de la Rambla, 3 (see Itinerary "Rambla and Harbour").

CASA MILA or "La Pedrera". Passeig de Gràcia, 92 (see itinerary The "Eixample").

CASA BATLLO. Passeig de Gràcia, 43 (see itinerary The "Eixample").

CASA CALVET. Casp, 48.

CASA VICENS. Carolines, 24.

FINCA GÜELL. Avda. Pedralbes, 7.

CASA FIGUERAS. Bellesguard Street.

COLEGIO TERESIANAS. Ganduxer, 87.

Friends of Gaudí: Avda. Pedralbes, 7. Tel. 204 52 50.

TRADITIONAL "FIESTAS"

(Feast Days and Festivities)

Like all Mediterranean cities, Barcelona knows how to make the most of its festivities, which are deeply rooted in history and popular traditions.

At Christmas and the New Year, the city is decorated with lights and stalls are set up, selling models of the Nativity and other typical Christmas articles (Santa Lucia fair in the Cathedral square and at the Church of the Holy Family). On the eve of January 6th, the Procession of the Three Kings is a major event in the city centre, filling the children with wonder and admiration.

Towards the end of Winter and with Spring fast approaching, the people of Barcelona put on their fancy dresses in ready to welcome "Carnestoltes" - the King of the carnival celebrations. This is followed shortly afterwards by Easter Week in all its religious splendour. The week immediately prior to Palm Sunday sets the scene for setting up the market stalls which specialize in selling highly decorative palm leaves, an essential part of the Palm Sunday celebrations.

April 23rd is the Feast of St. George, the patron saint of Catalonia. On this day, Barcelona also celebrates the "Día del libro y de la rosa" (day of the book and the rose) which the people often exchange as gifts.

On May 11th, the Feast of Saint Pongç, there is the traditional market of aromatic and medicinal herbs, honey and other natural foodstuffs, which is set up in Calle Hospital, close to the Ramba.

On St. John's Eve (June 23rd) the whole of Barcelona becomes alive with light, fireworks and bonfires in an all-night celebration which lasts through until the dawn of Midsummer's Day. Large bonfires are lit in the streets and squares of the city and the celebrations are highlighted by endless displays of fireworks and rockets.

On September 11th, Catalonia celebrates its "Diada" or "National Day" and towards the end of the same month the city immerses itself in preparations for the festivities of the "Big week", commemorating the Feast of the Virgin of Mercy - Patron Saint of Barcelona. For this special occasion the people of the city dress up in eagerness to join in the countless traditional, cultural and artistic events organized by the Town Council.

Finally, the traditional "Sardana" merits a special mention. This folk dance of the people of Catalonia is accompanied by the music of the "Cobla", an instrumental band made up of diverse wind instruments and a double-bass. The "Sardana" - even today - allows the dancers to experience the joy and brotherly spirit of a feast in which, holding hands and forming a circle, the people perform an intricate series of steps. The "Sardana" can be danced in the Cathedral Square on Saturdays at 6.30 pm and on Sundays at 12 noon, and also in the Plaça Sant Jaume on Sundays at 7 pm.

Public holidays in Barcelona:

January 1st - New Year's Day; January 6th - Feast of the Three Kings (Epiphany); Good Thursday; Good Friday; Easter Monday; May 1st - Labour Day; Whit Monday; June 24th - Feast of St. John; August 15th - Feast of the

Assumption of Our Lady; September 11th - National Day of Catalonia; September 24th - Feast of Our Lady of Mercy; October 12th - Feast of Our Lady of Pilar and Columbus Day; November 1st - All Saints; December 25th - Christmas Day; December 26th - Boxing Day (Feast of St. Stephen).

ENTERTAINMENT AND ATTRACTIONS

For those seeking entertainment, the city of Barcelona has a wealth of possibilities to choose from. There is an endless number of bars and cafes of very type, where one can enjoy live music, art exhibitions or simply relax in a pleasant atmosphere. The city has a number of theatres and a great many cinemas.


Every Summer, the "Grec" season brings samples of the finest cultural events in theatre, music and cinema, which take place in the open-air Greek Theatre or "Teatre Grec" from which the season takes its name, as well as in various other places around the city.

Over the last few years many new dance-halls have sprung up, ranging from the most ultra-modern and sophisticated discos to dance-halls with live orchestras or groups - not only in the city itself but in the furthest suburbs outside the city centre. One example, "La Paloma", is highly popular with people from all walks of life, while others are more suitable for those seeking a rather more sophisticated atmosphere.

The centre for light comedy and music hall is "El Paralelo" - a street lined with theatres, among which "El Molino" has become something of an institution, because it carries on the tradition of the early twentieth century Barcelona Music Hall, and is a continuous attraction for the very widest variety of public. The "Belle Epoque" and "Arnau" are other similar examples of this choice of entertainment.

The "Bodega Bohemia" is a rather curiously decorated café and music hall, where it is not uncommon for the singers to be joined by members of the audience.

A big tourist attraction which deserves a special mention are the flamenco show such as "Los Tarantos", the "Patio Andaluz" and the "Cordobés", upholding the tradition that of all Spanish cities outside the Andalusian region,



Barcelona is the one which has always understood best the music, dance and song of the flamenco.

The most important centres for lovers of classical music are "Palau de la Música Catalana", with a number of concert seasons among with the October International Music Festival is a truly outstanding event, the "Gran Teatro del Liceo" - one of the finest theatres in the world - with opera, ballet and concert seasons, and the Conservatory of Music, whose most outstanding pupils put on regular performances for the public.

The "Zelete" club, on the other hand, is a pioneer of its style in our city, offering performances of both classical music and modern music in the most varied forms, such as jazz or rock. Food jazz can also be heard in other clubs such as the "Cova del Drac", formerly the centre for modern Catalan folk music ("La Nova Cançó"). A popular place with rock fans is "Karma", among other places.

Other theatre clubs such as the "Cúpula Venus", "Llantiol" and "L'Angelot" enjoy considerable popularity and are a cultural alternative to variety halls. Performances vary from cabaret and music hall to mime, magic and conjuring. There are bars and night-clubs which have a piano available to the public and others where folk singers - especially Latin-Americans - are invited to perform.

Finally we come to the star of Barcelona night-life: the **Scala Barcelona**. This restaurant and night-club is the place where haute cuisine and the thrill of fabulous musical shows go hand in hand. For those who like gambling and top quality cuisine in a select, refined atmosphere, the "**Gran Casino de Barcelona**" is the place to go. The Casino is situated in the village of Sant Pere de Ribes, close to the town of Sitges.

An entertainment guide can be found in the "Gula del Ocio" (published weekly) and in daily newspapers and magazines.

SHOPPING

Shopping in Barcelona is both easy and interesting. Easy, because of the large number of shops available, and interesting because there is a plentiful range of high-quality articles to choose from. Shoppers in Barcelona will find not only attractive window displays to catch their eye - Barcelona is reputed to have the best shop window displays in Europe - but also the friendly, helpful assistance of sales staff who make a special effort in the service they provide to visitors.

For those interested in knitwear, "prêt-à-porter", clothing and accessories in general, with a special recommendation for footwear and leather articles, there are a large number of elegant shops and boutiques in Diagonal, Passeig de Gràcia and the area of the "Eixample", not to mention the large department stores, all of which provide such a selection that the shopper is spoilt for choice! If one is looking for handicrafts (pottery, glass, wrought iron, silverware, fine lace, engravings, wood carvings and many, many more) there are specialized shops in all the commercial areas of the city, as well as a number of typical craft workshops in the "Pueblo Español" (Spanish Village). Shopping for antiques in Barcelona is worthy of a special mention. In Palla, Pi, Banys Nous and Amigó Street and in a considerable number of shops in the Gothic Quarter it is still possible to find very interesting pieces from different

periods and from many parts of Spain. There is an Antique Market which opens every Thursday from 10 am to 8 pm in Plaça Nova (opposite the Cathedral).

El Corte Inglés (Department Store)
Plaça de Catalunya. 14. Tel. 302 12 12
Avda Diagonal. 617. Tel. 259 14 49.
Open Monday to Saturday: 10 am - 8 pm.

HOTELS AND OTHER ACCOMMODATION

The large network of hotels in Barcelona, which welcomes thousands of visitors every year, covers the complete range of categories and prices.

There is an abundance of hotels, hostals and lodgings in the old quarter of the city, but the majority of the best hotels are to be found in the "Eixample" and residencial areas.

The hotel capacity of the city totals 13,936 beds, as follows: 6 five-star hotels (luxury class), with a total of 2,949 beds; 19 four-star hotels with 4,463 beds; 28 three-star hotels with 3,995 beds; 10 two-star hotels with 1,139 beds and 14 one-star hotels with 1,390 beds.

For further information on hotels, contact: **Gremio de Hoteles de Barcelona**. (Hotel Guild). Via Laietana, 45. Tel. 301 62 40.

In addition to the city's hotels, it should be noted that there are over 5,000 beds available through other types of accommodation, i.e. there are apartments of all categories providing a wide range of different services for hire to visitors. Reservations may be made either direct or through travel agencies or state agents.

Camping sites. There is accommodation available for more than 38,000 campers in Barcelona and its province. Almost all coastal towns and some inland areas have camping sites of various categories.

Information on camping sites is available through the **Barcelona Camping Association** (Asociación de Campings de Barcelona). Diputació Street. 279. Tel. 317 44 16.

GASTRONOMY

Barcelona is a city of "good living" where one can eat plenty and well. Catalan cuisine is traditionally and justly famous. Choosing "a dish" is no easy task, but we can recommend any of the following:

Catalan Specialities

"Paella a la Parellada" with rice, fish, shell-fish, poultry and meat. "Zarzuela" with its mixture of fish and shell-fish in a rich sauce. Variations on the latter are "Suquet de peix" or "Caldereta Marinera". "Escudella i Carn d'olla" is the local variety of an international dish consisting of chick peas or beans stewed with different kinds of sausage, meat balls, chicken and vegetables. "Peus de porc" are pig's trotters cooked in a rich sauce. Broad beans ("Faves") stewed with a tasty variety of local sausage ("Butifarra"), is another popular dish. There are, in fact, many kinds of cured

sausage and salami to choose from. Confectionery includes "Tortells" or "Roscones de Reyes" - traditional ring-shaped cakes for the Feast of the Three Kings and the Feast of Sant Antón. During Lent, the "Bunyols de Vent" and at Easter time, "les Mones", (elaborate figures sculpted in chocolate). For the Feast of San Juan, one eats the typical "coques" made with crystallized fruits, aniseed and pine nuts. For All Saints, "panellets" made with marzipan and pine nuts. Another favourite sweet are the "xuxos" - a kind of long doughnut filled with cream.

International Specialities

Barcelona also has a wide selection of establishments specializing in certain types of international cuisine. There are restaurants specializing in game, roast dishes and meats, in cheeses, in fish and shell-fish, etc. and others offering a selection of regional cuisine from other parts of Spain such as the Basque Country, Galicia or Aragon. There are also restaurants offering specialities from countries such as China, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Korea, Argentina, the Arab countries, Mexico, Japan, Indonesia, etc., not forgetting those specializing in vegetarian foods and "Nouvelle cuisine". One can also find dozens of establishments providing "fast-food" - snack and sandwich bars, "creperies" (specializing in sweet and savoury pancakes) and other local bars all over the city which offer a selection of popular tasty snacks known as "tapas" which are a must for every visitor!

Wines

Catalonia has always produced excellent wines, owing to its geographical situation and climate. Catalan wines are outstanding both in quality and variety. Their "appellation d'origine" are as follows: Empordà/Costa Brava, 11°/14°; Alella, 11,5°/13°; Penedés, 9°/13°; Tarragona, 11°/13,5°; Priorat, 13,5°/18°; Conca de Barberá, 9°/12°; Terra Alta, 13°/15°; Special areas; La Noguera and Raimat.

On the subject of wines, the "cavas" deserve a special mention. This name is given to sparkling wines produced using the "méthode champenoise". The unchallenged capital of "cava" wines is Sant Sadurní d'Anoia, only 40 kilometers south of Barcelona, where visitors are invited to see the production and maturing processes of the wines and, naturally, to sample their varied specialities. The Wine Museum ("Museo del Vino") is situated in Vilafranca del Penedés, Plaça Jaume I, Tel. 890 05 82. Open daily (except Mondays) from 10 am to 2 pm and from 4 pm to 7 pm.

Information on restaurants is obtainable from the **Barcelona Restaurant Guild** ("Gremio de Restaurantes de Barcelona"), Passeig de Gràcia, 11. Tel. 301 67 40.

SPORTS

Sport plays an important part in Catalan and Barcelona life, as can be seen by the existence of more than 50 sports federations.

The list of facilities and places where sport can be played in the area of Barcelona and its surroundings is extensive and exhaustive: 26 nautical clubs to go in for sailings; 8 golf courses; 3 flying clubs; numerous ski-resorts, hunting and fishing zones, not forgetting the traditions of hiking and mountaineering with the possibility of pot-holing and

mountain climbing. Tennis, squash, cycling, hockey, ice-skating, show jumping, are some of the sports which can be enjoyed.

Barcelona has deservedly won its fame as a sports loving city. Two important football clubs are starts of spectator sports: Real Club Deportivo Español and Fútbol Club Barcelona ("Barça"), the latter having more than 100.000 members and one of the biggest stadiums in the world, with a capacity of 120.000.

Every year, tennis fans have the opportunity to attend the Godó Trophy and the Davis Cup. Barcelona has been host to important sports events and international championships, and its long sporting tradition has encouraged it to apply to be the seat of 1992 Olympic Games here.

Information on sports:

Direcció General d'Esports. Avda. Països Catalans, 12. Espluges de Llobregat. Tel. 371 90 11.


Area d'Esports de l'Ajuntament. Avda. Estadi, 2. Montjuïc. Tel. 325 43 62.

EXCURSIONS FROM BARCELONA

SEASIDE RESORTS

NEARBY RESORTS. a) **Resorts along the northeastern coast.** The stretch of the northern coast close to Barcelona is called El Maresme, the most important towns of which are Masnou, Premià de Mar, Arenys de Mar, Sant Pol and Calella.

b) **Resorts along the southern coast.** Beyond the wide mouth of the River Llobregat the beach of Castelldefels is to be found. Continuing southwards is the rugged coastline of the Garraf, also known as the Playa Dorada, and the beautiful village of Sitges. It is here where the famous museums Cau Ferrat, Maricel, Rusiñol and Romántico deserve to be visited. The Gran Casino of Barcelona is some 10 km. from Sitges and is located in the village of Sant Pere de Ribes.



THE COSTA BRAVA. This stretches from the mouth of the Tordera to the French border. The most important towns on the Costa Brava are: Blanes, Lloret, Tossa, Sant Feliu de Guixols, S'Agaró, Palamós, Palafrugell (coves of Caiella, Llafranc and Tamariu), Bagur, Empúries (Greek ruins), Roses and Cadaqués.

MONASTERIES

SANT CUGAT DEL VALLES. The town of Sant Cugat lies about 10 miles from Barcelona on the Valles plain. It may be reached by road, which is outstanding because of its magnificent viewpoints, or by means of the FF.CC. de Catalunya which depart from Plaça de Catalunya every half hour. Sant Cugat has a good golf course. Worthy of note is the former Benedictine Monastery, the church of which is today a Parish church. Magnificent Romanesque style cloisters (1013).

MONTSERRAT. This is the preferred excursion of the Catalan region. It is the Holy mountain of the region and offers an extremely original panorama. The means of transport are good and accommodation in the surroundings of the Sanctuary is comfortable and pleasant.
Communications: By road (private car or coach which leave daily from Plaça de la Universitat) one follows the main road to Lleida and Madrid as far as the junction with the road to Monistrol (26 miles from Barcelona). From Monistrol the winding road climbs 11 miles to the Monastery. Two railway lines lead to Montserrat: the FF.CC. Catalanes (Plaza de España) connecting with cable car, and the Northern line (Plaça de Catalunya) which has some trains connecting in Monistrol with a regular coach service.



MONASTERY OF POBLET. 90 miles from Barcelona and 30 from Tarragona. Railway station at Esplugas de Francolí from where cars belonging to the hotels located in the surroundings of the monastery depart. Travel agencies organize frequent and comfortable excursions to Poblet and Santes Creus.
The monastery of Poblet is one of the main monasteries of the Cistercian Order and was founded in the 12th century. Its grandeur and magnificence make Poblet one of the most recommended excursions of the region.

MONASTERY OF SANTES CREUS. 61 miles from Barcelona and 42 miles from Tarragona. The railway station is a good distance from Santes Creus and the excursion has to be made by coach or private car.

The Monastery of Santes Creus also belonged to the Cistercian Order and its foundation dates from the 12th century. It reached its maximum splendor in the 13th and 14th centuries. While not as great as the Monastery of Poblet, it nevertheless has attractions which make the excursion fully worthwhile.

There are also many other places within easy reach of Barcelona that are well worth visiting. Of these, we would especially like to mention:

Girona. The cathedral has a single interior nave, dating back to the Gothic period, which is the largest of its kind in Europe. Also to be found in Girona are the remains of the ancient Jewish district or "Call".

Tarragona. Known as Tarraco during the period of the Roman Empire, the city has preserved a great many monuments from that period which are well worth visiting.

The Ebro Delta. Where the Costa Dorada ends, this is an extensive stretch of land and water which is regarded as one of the finest nature reserves in Europe.

Figueres. Home of the famous "Dali Museum".

Andorra. The tiny Pyrenean Principality straddling the French-Spanish border is famous for its duty-free shopping facilities and its magnificent views.

No excursion to the Catalan Pyrenees would be complete without a visit to the National Parks of **Sant Maurici** and **Aigües Tortes**.

Further information:
Direcció General de Turisme (Generalitat de Catalunya),
Passeig de Gràcia, 105. Tel. 237 90 45.

GENERAL INFORMATION AND USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

National Police.....	091
Municipal Police.....	092
Fire Brigade.....	080
Directory Enquiries.....	003
Lost Property (Town Hall).....	301 39 23
Motorway Information.....	204 22 47
Town Hall.....	302 42 00
Generalitat (Autonomous Govt.).....	302 47 00
City tourist information.....	318 25 25
Magistrates Court (24 hr.).....	309 91 46
Telegram by telephone.....	322 20 00
Central Post Office.....	318 38 31

MEDICAL SERVICES AND HOSPITALS

Ambulance (24 hr. service).....	300 04 22
Red Cross.....	235 93 00
"Hospital Clínico" - Hospital.....	254 25 80
"Santa Cruz and San Pablo" hospital.....	235 55 55
Health Service information (Town Hall).....	310 50 50
Doctors on emergency duty.....	212 85 85
Chemists - 24 hr. service - (see daily newspapers)	

RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Mass in English:

The Church of Santa María de la Bonanova. Sundays at 12:00.
Cathedral. Third Sunday of each month at 10:30.

Mass in French:

French Chapel. Anglí, 15. Saturdays at 7:00 pm. and Sundays
at 12:00.

OTHER RELIGIONS:

Church of Seventh Day Christian Adventist.
Urgell, 133. Tel. 253 31 36.

Christian Evangelical Church.
Tallers, 26. Tel. 301 89 38.

Spanish Reformed Church.
Marqués de Sentmenat, 61. Tel. 321 41 34.

Swiss Reformed Church.
Aragó, 51. Tel. 224 05 29.

Mormon Community.
Angel Guimerà, 33. Tel. 204 21 29.

Presbyterian Reformed Church.
Sant Salvador, 98. Tel. 219 21 29.

Jehova's Witnesses.
Pardo, 65. Tel. 349 13 16.

Jewish Community (Synagogue).
Porvenir, 24. Tel. 200 61 48.

TRADE FAIRS AND CONGRESSES

Palacio de Congresos (Congress Hall)

Avda. M.^a Cristina, s/n. Tel. 223 31 01

Barcelona Convention Bureau

Avda. Paral·lel, 202. Tel. 224 42 06.

YOUTH

Direcció General de la Joventut

San Honorat, 11. Tel. 301 92 49.

Municipal Youth Council

Avinyó, 7. Tel. 318 83 49.

YOUTH HOSTALS

Municipal Youth Hostel

Pujades, 29. Tel. 300 31 04.

"Pere Tarrés" Youth Hostel

Numància, 149. Tel. 230 16 06.

"Verge de Montserrat" Youth Hostel

Ntra. Sra. del Coll, 41-45. Tel. 213 86 33.

SIGHTSEEING TOURS AND EXCURSIONS

Ronda Universitat, 5. Tel. 217 64 54.

Gran Via, 635. Tel. 218 02 41.

FOREIGN TOURIST OFFICES

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Patronat Municipal de Turisme

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CATALUNYA

Benvinguts
Bienvenidos
Bienvenus
Welcome
Willkommen



Us donem
la més cordial
benvinguda
a Catalunya

Le damos
la más cordial
bienvenida
a Cataluña

Nous vous donnons
notre plus cordiale
bienvenue
en Catalogne

We wish you
a very friendly
welcome
to Catalonia

Seien Sie
herzlich
willkommen
in Katalonien

Catalunya és un país petit de 6 milions d'habitants, amb més de mil anys d'història i una cultura i una llengua pròpies que han anat configurant la seva personalitat.

Ara, Catalunya és una comunitat autònoma dins d'Espanya i ocupa una superfície de 31.930 Km².

Els catalans hem estat sempre oberts a tothom. Ens agrada rebre els forasters i mostrar-los la nostra terra. I ens satisfà que s'hi trobin bé, com a casa. Per això potser som un poble turístic per naturalesa.

Cada any milions de turistes es concentren al litoral català, sense adonar-se que a l'interior, molt a prop d'aquest mar Mediterrani tan lluminós, hi ha altres llocs d'interès artístic, monumental o paisatgístic que també mereixen ser visitats.

Amb aquestes pàgines ens proposem presentar-vos, en trets generals, tots aquells aspectes que poden ajudar-vos a ampliar i a fer més rica la vostra visita a Catalunya.

Tant de bo us sigui útil i que tingueu una feliç estada entre nosaltres!

Cataluña es un país pequeño, de 6 millones de habitantes, con más de mil años de historia, y una cultura y una lengua propias que han ido forjando su personalidad.

Ahora Cataluña es una comunidad autónoma dentro de España y ocupa una superficie de 31.930 Km².

Los catalanes hemos estado siempre abiertos a todo el mundo. Nos agrada recibir a los forasteros y enseñarles nuestra tierra. Y nos complace que se encuentren bien en ella, como en su casa. Quizás por esto somos un pueblo turístico por naturaleza.

Cada año, millones de turistas se concentran en el litoral catalán sin darse cuenta de que en el interior, muy cerca de este mar Mediterráneo tan luminoso, hay otros lugares de interés artístico, monumental o paisajístico que también merecen ser visitados. En estas páginas nos proponemos presentarle, en términos generales, todos aquellos aspectos que pueden ayudarle a ampliar y a hacer más rica su visita a Cataluña.

¡Ojalá le sean útiles y que disfrute de una feliz estancia entre nosotros!

La Catalogne est un petit pays de 6 millions d'habitants, avec un passé vieux de plus de mille ans et dont la culture et la langue ont forgé la personnalité.

La Catalogne est à l'heure actuelle une communauté autonome au sein de l'Espagne; sa surface occupe 31.930 Km².

Les catalans sont un peuple accueillant. Nous avons plaisir à recevoir les visiteurs, à leur montrer notre terre et nous nous sentons très heureux quand ils s'y sentent bien, comme chez eux. C'est sans doute pour cela que nous sommes un pays si touristique.

Chaque année, des millions de touristes envahissent le littoral catalan mais sans découvrir pour autant que l'arrière-pays, tout près de cette Méditerranée si lumineuse, foisonne en sites dont l'art, les monuments ou le paysage présentent un grand intérêt et méritent bien une visite.

Dans ces quelques pages, nous aimerions vous présenter, en termes généraux, certains aspects de notre pays qui vous aideront peut-être à élargir et à enrichir votre connaissance de la Catalogne.

Nous espérons de tout coeur qu'elles vous seront utiles et que vous passerez un agréable séjour parmi nous!

Catalonia is a small land of six million inhabitants but it has more than a thousand years of history and a culture and language which have forged a character all its own.

Today, Catalonia is an Autonomous Community within Spain and occupies an area of 31,930 square kilometres.

We Catalans have always been open to the outside world. We love to welcome foreigners and show them our homeland. And we like them to feel comfortable here as if they were at home. Perhaps for this reason we are a people with an innate flair for tourism. Every year millions of tourists concentrate on the Catalan coast without realizing that away from the beaches, yet still close to our splendid Mediterranean, there exist many places of artistic interest, historic sites, and scenery which also are well worth visiting. In this folder we set out a number of things which may help to broaden your visit to Catalonia and make it all the more worthwhile.

We hope you find it useful and we wish you an enjoyable stay.

Katalonien ist eines der kleineren Länder, mit 6 Millionen Einwohner, einer über 1000-jährigen Geschichte, mit eigener Kultur und Sprache, die es zu einem Land unverwechselbaren Charakters haben werden lassen.

Katalonien ist heute innerhalb Spaniens eine autonome Gemeinschaft mit einer Fläche von 31.930 Km². Wir Katalanen waren immer aufgeschlossen der ganzen Welt gegenüber. Wir freuen uns, Fremde bei uns begrüßen zu dürfen und ihnen unser Land zu zeigen. Wenn sie sich dann bei uns so wohl wie bei sich zu Hause fühlen, sind wir glücklich. Wir sind eben ein Touristenland von Natur aus.

Jedes Jahr zieht es Millionen von Touristen an die Küsten Kataloniens; wissen Sie eigentlich auch, dass es ganz nahe diesem so sonnenverwöhnten Mittelmeer, ein Stück landeinwärts nur, kunsthistorische Sehenswürdigkeiten und Landschaften gibt, die auch sehr wohl Ihren Besuch verdienen?

Im folgenden wollen wir Ihnen ganz allgemein mit ein paar Anregungen, Vorschlägen und Hinweisen zum vollen Gelingen Ihres Besuches in Katalonien beitragen.

Wir wünschen Ihnen einen sehr angenehmen Aufenthalt und gute Erholung!

Català

A Catalunya podreu fruitir d'una gran diversitat de paisatges

Si recorreu Catalunya trobareu totes les varietats de paisatges i de vegetació europees. Us agraden els paisatges d'alta muntanya? Heu de fer alguna excursió a les valls dels Pirineus voltades pels alts cims, amb prats alpins, els boscos d'avets i els estanys d'aigües cristal·lines. I si hi aneu a l'hivern, podreu gaudir també de les instal·lacions esportives i turístiques de les estacions d'esquí. Entre altres itineraris que us recomanarem més endavant, podríeu conèixer la bellesa del Parc Nacional de Sant Maurici i d'Aiguestortes.

Les vostres preferències us porten cap a paratges de mitjana altura? Podeu escollir entre la regió del Pre-Pirineu, presidida per la Serra del Cadí, o bé la muntanya de Montserrat, que és una meravella de formació geològica amb roques de formes capricioses i inversemblants, o la regió d'Olot, on veureu els volcans extingits coberts de vegetació i grederes multicolors. O també podeu arribar-vos a la muntanya del Montseny, prop de Barcelona, que per la riquesa de la vegetació ha estat declarada per la UNESCO zona de reserva de la biosfera. En tots aquests paisatges els faigs, les alzines, els roures i els pins us saludaran i veureu la varietat de conreus a les zones que l'home ha explotat, sense trencar l'equilibri entre la riquesa natural i la riquesa agrícola. Fixeu-vos en les masies, la casa tradicional de camp que ha constituït un petit món agrícola, i noteu com els pagesos han sabut renovar les tècniques agràries sense perdre el sabor de la tradició. Us adonareu que el paisatge humanitzat és una de les característiques de Catalunya.

El paisatge de les muntanyes a les comarques meridionals, prop de la Costa Daurada, és aspre i la roca nua i la terra grisa i rogenca creen un ambient molt suggeridor. Allà veureu créixer el margalí, l'única palmera autòctona d'Europa, al costat d'altres espècies pròpies d'un clima càlid. Els vostres gustos us porten arran de mar? També Catalunya us ofereix uns paisatges mariners ben variats. Si recorreu la Costa Brava, des del Cap de

Creus a Blanes, per força us sorprendran els roquissers arran de l'aigua, les cales tancades per roques i illots on els pins amb les arrels pugneri per esgarrapar un lloc on créixer a frec de la mar. Més al sud, a la Costa del Maresme i a la Costa Daurada, fruitireu de platges llargues i assolades. Les cases blanques dels pescadors us donaran la benvinguda en aquest ambient tan propi de la Mediterrània, de la ribera d'un mar que és amable i ben conegut des d'antic.

Seria interessant que conegués un altre tipus de paisatge: l'extensa plana de terra i aigua del delta del riu Ebre. Els aiguamolls i els joncs són l'ambient idoni per a la reserva d'ocells migratoris, una de les més importants d'Europa.

Més endavant us suggerim alguns itineraris però estem segurs que la bellesa del país us incitarà a la descoberta personal de molts d'altres. I sempre podreu canviar, en poques hores, de paisatge i ambient natural. En la transició de l'alta muntanya a la costa veureu, a l'interior del país, l'abundor dels bladers, les vinyes i les oliveres al costat de les noves extensions de fruiters o d'hortes excel·lents. En acabar la vostra estada a Catalunya ens agradaria que hagués pogut copsar totes les varietats que us ofereix el seu paisatge, que pot ser el primer pas per apreciar la nostra personalitat.

Castellano

En Cataluña podrá disfrutar de una gran variedad de paisajes

Si recorre Catalunya encontrará toda la variedad de paisajes y de vegetación europeas... ¿Le gusta la alta montaña? Pues ha de hacer una excursión a los valles pirenaicos, rodeados de altos picos, con prados alpinos, bosques de abetos y lagos de aguas cristalinas. Y si va en invierno, podrá disfrutar de las instalaciones deportivas de las estaciones de esquí. Entre los itinerarios ofrecidos en la página 8 hay uno que incluye el espléndido Parque Nacional de Sant Maurici y de Aiguestortes.



Pirineus

Si prefiere parajes de mediana altura, puede escoger entre la zona prepirenaica presidida por la Sierra del Cadí, o la montaña de Montserrat —una maravillosa formación geológica de rocas de formas caprichosas e insospechadas—, o la región de Olot con sus volcanes extinguidos cubiertos de vegetación y sus grederas multicolors. O también puede llegarse al Montseny, cercano a Barcelona, que por la riqueza de su vegetación ha sido declarado zona de reserva de la biosfera por la UNESCO. En todos estos lugares abundan las hayas, las encinas, los robles y los pinos, así como gran variedad de cultivos que la mano del hombre cuida sin romper el equilibrio entre la riqueza natural y la agrícola.

Observe las masías, la casa de campo tradicional que constituye en sí misma un pequeño mundo, donde los payeses han sabido renovar las técnicas agrícolas y conservar la tradición. Se dará cuenta que el paisaje humanizado es una de las características de Cataluña.

El paisaje de las montañas en las comarcas meridionales cerca de la Costa Daurada es aspero, rocoso y la tierra gris o rojiza crea un ambiente muy sugestivo. Aquí crece la palma, la única palmera autóctona de Europa, junto a otras especies propias de un clima cálido.

Si sus gustos le llevan junto al mar, Cataluña le ofrece gran variedad de paisajes marinos. La Costa Brava, desde el Cap de Creus hasta Blanes, le sorprenderá con sus roquedales, sus calas escondidas, donde los pinos se aferran con sus raíces en las rocas batidas por las olas. Más al Sur, en la Costa del Maresme y en la Costa Dorada disfrutará de largas y soleadas playas. Las blancas casas de los pescadores le darán la bienvenida en este ambiente Mediterráneo, un mar amable y conocido de antiguo.

Seguro que le subyugará conocer otro tipo de paisaje: la extensa llanura de tierra y agua del delta del río Ebro. Allí, entre los juncos, una de las reservas más importantes de Europa, anidan multitud de aves migratorias. En la página 8 le sugerimos algunos itinerarios, pero estamos seguros que la belleza del país le incitará a descubrir personalmente muchos otros. Siempre, en pocas horas, podrá cambiar de paisaje y de ambiente natural. Y en la transición de la montaña a la costa se le ofrecerá la abundancia de los trigales, de las viñas y los olivos, de los frutales y las fértiles huertas.


Y al finalizar su estancia en Cataluña, nos complacería que hubiese podido llegar a captar todas las variedades de su paisaje, quizá el primer paso para conocer nuestra personalidad.

Français

La Catalogne vous offre les paysages les plus variés

En parcourant la Catalogne, vous découvrirez les paysages les plus variés et les végétations européennes les plus diverses... Vous aimez la haute montagne? Alors n'hésitez pas à faire une excursion dans les vallées des Pyrénées où se succèdent les pics élevés, les prairies alpines, les bois de sapins et les lacs aux eaux cristallines. Si vous y venez en hiver, vous pourrez profiter tout à loisir des installations sportives de ses stations de ski. Parmi les itinéraires que nous vous proposons à la page 8, l'un d'eux comprend une excursion au merveilleux Parc National de Sant Maurici et de Aiguestortes.

Mais si vos préférences vont à des montagnes moins imposantes, vous choisirez entre la région pyrénéenne dominée par la Cordillère du Cadí, ou la montagne de Montserrat —une extraordinaire formation



Banyoles

géologique dont les rochers adoptent les formes les plus capricieuses et les plus inattendues— ou la région d'Olot avec ses volcanes éteints recouverts de végétation et de terre glaise aux couleurs les plus variées. Vous pourrez aussi visiter le Montseny, près de Barcelone, que l'UNESCO, grâce à la richesse de sa végétation, a déclaré zone de réserve de la biosphère. Dans toutes ces régions, les forêts peuplées de hêtres, de chênes verts, de chênes et de pins alternent avec une grande variété de cultures nées de la main de l'homme, sans que soit rompu cependant l'équilibre entre la richesse naturelle et la richesse agricole.

Observez les «masies», ces fermes traditionnelles qui constituent en soi tout un monde et où les paysans, tout en s'adaptant aux nouvelles techniques agricoles, ont su préserver leurs



Delta de l'Ebre

rouge, lui donne un caractère spécial. Le palmier nain, le seul palmier autochtone de toute l'Europe, côtoie d'autres espèces caractéristiques des climats chauds.

Si vous préférez la mer, vous n'aurez que l'embarras du choix. La Costa Brava, du Cap de Creus jusqu'à Blanes, vous charmera avec ses sols rocaillieux, ses cales secrètes où les pins, de leurs racines, s'agrippent aux rochers battus par les flots. Plus au sud, la côte du Maresme et la Costa Dorada vous offriront leurs plages immenses et ensoleillées. Les maisons blanchies à la chaux des pêcheurs vous accueilleront dans une ambiance typiquement méditerranéenne, cette Méditerranée aimable et éternelle.

Un autre paysage tout à fait différent attirera probablement votre attention: la vaste étendue de terre et d'eau qui forme le delta du fleuve Ebre. Vous y découvrirez, parmi les roseaux, l'une des réserves naturelles les plus importantes d'Europe, avec ses espèces innombrables d'oiseaux migrateurs.

A la page 8, nous vous proposons quelques itinéraires mais nous ne doutons pas que la beauté de notre pays vous encouragera à en imaginer vous-même beaucoup d'autres. En quelques heures, vous pourrez changer de paysage et d'ambiance. En descendant de la montagne vers la mer, vous traverserez les champs de blé, les vignobles, les bois d'oliviers, les vergers et les potagers.

A la fin de votre séjour en Catalogne, nous nous sentirions très heureux si vous avez pu saisir toutes les nuances qu'offre le paysage car c'est sans doute le premier pas qu'il faut franchir pour connaître notre personnalité.

and multicoloured patches of clay. Or you can go to the mountain of Montseny, near Barcelona, which because of the variety of its vegetation has been declared a conservation area by UNESCO. In all these places, you will also see a great variety in those areas which have been cultivated without destroying the equilibrium between natural resource and agriculture.

Be sure to take note of the «masies», the traditional farm-houses which enclose their own compact world, and of how the country folk have changed their agricultural methods without losing their sense of tradition. Here you will see that the carefully tended countryside is one of the characteristics of Catalonia.

The mountain scenery in the southern regions, near the Costa Dorada (the Gold Coast), is rugged and bare and the grey and red earth capture the imagination. Here you find the dwarf palm, the only palm tree native to Europe, alongside other vegetation common to a warm climate.

Do your tastes draw you to the sea? Catalonia also offers a great range of coastal scenery. If you travel along the Costa Brava (the Rugged Coast) from Cape Creus to Blanes you will certainly be fascinated by the rocky coastline, by the small coves enclosed by sheer cliffs and little islands where pines and roots struggle to find a

place to grow right by the sea. Farther south, on the Costa del Maresme and the Costa Dorada, long sun-drenched beaches await you. White fishermen's cottages welcome you to an environment which is completely Mediterranean, a friendly seashore that has been known and enjoyed from ancient times.

But you should not miss getting to know another kind of scenery — the vast stretch of flat land and marsh forming the delta of the Ebre river. The marshes and reeds create an ideal environment for the conservation of migratory birds, one of the most important in Europe.

Later on we suggest a few itineraries but we are sure that the beauty of the country will invite you to discover many other for yourself. And in just a few hours you can always find a change of scenery and natural environment. As you go from high mountain to coast you will see in the interior of the country wheatfields, vineyards and olive groves in abundance side by side with new stretches of fruit trees and neat market gardens.

When you come to the end of your stay in Catalonia we hope you will have been able to take advantage of all the variety the landscape offers. This, perhaps, is a first step in getting to know us.

Deutsch

Kataloniens faszinierende Verschiedenartigkeit der Landschaften

Katalonien ist ein wunderschönes Land. Alle in Europa anzutreffenden Landschaften finden Sie hier vereint. Gefallen Ihnen Hochgebirgslandschaften? Machen Sie doch einige Ausflüge in die von hohen Bergen umgebenen Pyrenäentäler mit Almen, Tannenwäldern und kristallklaren Bergseen. Zur Winterzeit erwarten Sie dort Wintersportgebiete. Zu empfehlen wäre auch der Nationalpark Sant Maurici und Aigüestortes; aber darüber mehr etwas weiter unten.

Oder: Wie wär's mit einer Mittelgebirgslandschaft? Sie können da wählen zwischen dem Vorpyrenäen-Gebiet mit dem Cadí-Gebirgszug als hervorstechendste Erhebung, oder dem Montserrat, einem wahren Wunder geologischen kapriziösen Naturschauspiels, einem gewaltigen unwahrscheinlichen Felsmassiv; oder vielleicht dem Gebiet um Olot, mit seinen erloschenen Vulkanen, längst überzogen von einer vielfarbigen Flora und von Kreideablagerungen. Oder aber Sie erkunden das Montseny-Massiv, nahe bei Barcelona gelegen, das wegen seines einmaligen Naturreichtums von der UNESCO zum Naturschutzgebiet erklärt wurde. Auf allen diesen Wegen begleiten Sie Buchen-, Eichen- und Kiefernwälder aller Arten und Sie beobachten die Vielfalt der Felderbestellung, bei der man immer bestrebt ist, das Gleichgewicht von Naturreichtum und landwirtschaftlichem Ertragsstreben zu erhalten.

Achten Sie bitte auf die «masies», d.h. die traditionellen Bauernhöfe; die Bauern dort haben es verstanden, ihre kleine landwirtschaftliche Welt ohne Einbusen ihrer jahrhundertelangen Tradition den modernen Erfordernissen anzupassen. Unschwer bemerken Sie auch das Humane als eine der Charakteristiken der Landschaften Kataloniens.

Die Gebirgslandschaften in den südlichen Comarques (so heissen die historischen Landesteile Kataloniens), nahe der Costa Daurada, sind ziemlich rau, mit nackten Felsen un mit einer grau-rötlichen Erde, wirken aber sehr suggestiv. Dort ist auch die un-



Montserrat

ter vielen für ein heisses Klima charakteristischen Palmarten einzige Palme Europas, die Zwergpalme beheimatet.

Zieht es Sie zum Meer hin? Auch hier bietet Ihnen Katalonien sehr abwechslungsreiche Küstenlandschaften. So hat z.B. die Costa Brava vom Cap de Creus bis Blanes mit einigen Überraschungen aufzuwarten: enorme vom Meer umspülte Felsen, felsgeschützte Buchten und kleine Inselchen, wo die Kiefern — schon beinahe das Meer berühend — mit ihren Wurzeln nach einem Stückchen Erde greifen. Weiter nach Süden, an der Maresme-Küste und der Daurada-Küste laden langhingelegene Sonnenstrände zum Verweilen ein. Die weissen Fischerhäuser verbreiten eine dem Mittelmeer so eigene Atmosphäre; eine von alters her bekannt fremdenfreundliche Atmosphäre.

Und da ist noch eine Landschaft, die kennenzulernen sich lohnt: das ausgedehnte Mündungsgebiet des Ebras. Die seichten Wasser mit den vielen Wasserpflanzen sind für die Wandervögel ein idealer Brut- und Aufenthaltsort, einer der bedeutendsten Europas.

Bei weiteren Hinweisen dieser Broschüre gehen wir noch auf andere Routen und Plätze ein; viele von Ihnen jedoch — und davon sind wir überzeugt — werden sich von der Schönheit des Landes zu eigenen Entdeckungstouren verleiten lassen. Immer jedenfalls können Sie in wenigen Stunden die Landschaft und damit auch die Naturgegebenheiten wechseln. So beobachten Sie zum Beispiel beim Übergang vom Hochgebirge zur Küste im Landesinneren ausgedehnte Weizenfelder, Weinberge und Olivenhaine neben dem Obst- und Gemüseanbau.

Katalonien hat eine eigene unverwechselbare Persönlichkeit. Ein erster Zugang zu ihr führt über die Vielfalt seiner Landschaften. Am Ende Ihres Aufenthaltes unter uns wünschen wir, dass Sie möglichst viel davon gesehen hätten.

English

Catalonia offers a wide variety of scenery


As you travel around Catalonia you will discover every kind of European vegetation and landscape. Do you like high mountain scenery? Then you must take a trip to the valleys of the Pyrenees surrounded by high peaks with alpine meadows, fir forests, and crystal clear lakes. And if you come in winter you can take advantage of all the sports and tourist facilities available in the ski resorts. Within the itineraries we suggest below you will discover the exquisite beauty of the Sant Maurici i Aigüestortes National Park. Do your preferences lead you to mountain places of more modest heights? Then you can choose between the pre-Pyrenees region domi-



Pirineus



Terra Alta



Costa del Maresme



Costa Daurada



Uns quants museus que caldria visitar.

Algunos museos que merecen una visita.

Quelques musées qu'il faut visiter.

Some museums you may wish to visit.

Einige besonders empfehlenswerte Museen.



Barcelona. Fundació Joan Miró

- Arqueologia.
- Arqueología.
- Archeologie.
- Archeological.
- Archäologie.

- Barcelona G-7
- Museu Arqueològic
- Constantí-Centelles (Tarragona) D-8
- Mausoleu Constantinià
- Lleida B-6
- Museu Arqueològic de l'Institut d'Estudis Ilerdenses
- Tarragona D-8
- Museu Arqueològic Nacional
- Necròpolis i Museu Paleocristià

- Arts plàstiques.
- Artes plásticas.
- Arts plastiques.
- Plastic arts.
- Bildende Kunst.

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- Museu d'Art de Catalunya.
- Museu Picasso.
- Museu d'Art Modern.
- Museu Marés.
- Fundació Joan Miró
- Figueres I-3
- Teatre-Museu Dalí.
- Museu d'Art de l'Empordà
- Girona H-4/5
- Museu Capitular de la Catedral
- Lleida B-6
- Museu Diocesà
- Montserrat F-6
- Museu del Monestir de Montserrat
- Olot G-4
- Museu d'Art Modern
- La Seu d'Urgell D-3
- Museu Diocesà d'Urgell
- Sitges E-7
- Museu Cau Ferrat
- Museu Maricel de Mar
- Solsona E-4
- Museu Diocesà
- Vic G-5
- Museu Episcopal

- Art popular i oficis artesanans.
- Arte popular y oficios artesanos.
- Art populaire et artisanat.
- Folk art and crafts.
- Volkskunst und Kunsthandwerk.

- Capellades E-6
- Museu Molí Paperer
- Cervera D-6
- Museu del Blat i la PAGESIA
- Igualada E-6
- Museu de la Pell
- Ripoll F/G-4
- Museu Arxiu Folkloric
- Vilafranca del Penedès E-7
- Museu del Vi.

- Ceràmica, terrissa.
- Cerámica, alfarería.
- Céramique, poterie.
- Ceramics, pottery.
- Keramik, Töpferei.

- Argenton G-6
- Museu Municipal del Càntir Joan Rectorat i Rigola
- Barcelona G-7
- Museu de Ceràmica
- Martorell F-6
- Memorial-Museu Vicenç Ros.
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- Museu Provincial Santacana «L'Enrajolada».

- Música.
- Música.
- Musique.
- Music.
- Musik.

- Barcelona G-7
- Museu de la Música.
- Sant Salvador (El Vendrell) E-8
- Casa-Museu Pau Casals.

- Figures automàtes.
- Figuras automatas.
- Automates.
- Automaton figures.
- Automatische Figuren.

- Barcelona G-7
- Museu de les Màquines Automàtiques.

- Tèxtils, indumentària, puntes.
- Textiles, indumentaria, puntillas.
- Textiles, histoire du costume, dentelles.
- Appareil.
- Textilien, Trachten, Spitzen.

- Arenys de Mar H-6
- Museu de Punes i Blondes
- Barcelona 6-7
- Museu d'Indumentària.
- Col·lecció Rocamora
- Terrassa F-6
- Museu Provincial Tèxtil.

- Mansions del segle XIX.
- Mansiones del siglo XIX.
- Demeures du XIX^{ème} Siècle.
- Mansions of the 19th Century.
- Wohnungseinrichtungen aus dem 19. Jahrhundert.

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- Museu Romàntic Casa Llopis
- Vilanova i la Geltrú E-7
- Museu Romàntic Provincial.

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- Automóviles.
- Automobiles.
- Automobile.
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- Sitges H-5
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- Ciencias.
- Sciences.
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- Banyoles H-4
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- Museu Etnològic
- Museu de Geologia (Museu Martorell).
- Museu Geològic del Seminari.
- Sabadell F-6
- Museu de l'Institut de Paleontologia.

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- Principales monumentos.
- Principaux monuments.
- Buildings of historic interest.
- Die wichtigsten kulturhistorischen Denkmäler.

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- Monestir de Sant Joan de les Abadesses G-4
- Cartoixa d'Escaladei C-7
- Claustre de l'Estany F-5
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- Catedral de la Seu d'Urgell D-3
- Temple de Sant Martí Sarròca E-7
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- Temple de Sant Quirze de Pedret F-4
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 - Sant Climent de Taüll C-2
 - Erill-la-Vall C-2
 - Santa Maria de Taüll C-2
- Monestir de Sant Benet de Bages F-5
- Monestir de Sant Pere de Casserres G-4
- Claustre de Lluçà F-4
- Castell de Palafròls H-6
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- Esglésies de la Vall d'Aran C-2
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- Temple i castell de Mur C-4
- Institut Pere Mata de Reus C-8
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- Conjunts o poblacions monumentals més importants.
- Conjuntos o poblaciones monumentales más importantes.
- Ensembles ou villes artistiques les plus importantes.
- Most important historic sites or towns.
- Die bedeutendsten kulturhistorischen Orte.

- Girona H-4/5
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- Peratlalada I-4/5

- Conjunts o poblacions típiques o pintoresques.
- Algunas poblaciones típicas o pintorescas.
- Villages typiques ou pittoresques.
- Typical or picturesque towns.
- Typische oder malerische Ortschaften.

- Guimerà D-6
- Rupit G-4
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- Prades C-7
- Santa Pau H-4
- Horta de Sant Joan A-8
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- Massís del Montseny G-5
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- Sant Maurici i Encantats C-2
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- Congost de Collegats C-3
- Congost de Mont-rebel B-4
- Clot de Vilamala E-4
- Gorges de Sant Aniol H-3
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- Ports esportius.
- Puertos deportivos.
- Ports de plaisance.
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- Wassersporthäfen.

- Portbou I-3
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- Llançà I-3
- Port de la Selva I-3
- Roses I-3
- Santa Margarida (Roses) I-3
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- L'Escala I-4
- L'Estartit I-4
- Aiguablava I-5
- Llafranc I-5
- Palamós I-5
- Port d'Aro (Castell d'Aro) I-5
- Sant Feliu de Guixòs I-5
- Cala Canyelles (Lloret) H-6
- Blanes H-6
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- El Balís (Sant Andreu de Llavaneres) G-6
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- Aiguadolç (Sitges) E-7
- Vilanova i la Geltrú E-7
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- Tarragona D-8
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- Aeropuertos.
- Airports.
- Flughäfen.

- Barcelona F-7
- Girona H-5
- La Seu d'Urgell DE-3
- Reus CD-8
- La Cerdanya F-3

- Camps de golf.
- Campos de golf.
- Terrains de golf.
- Golf courses.
- Golfplätze.


- Sant Cugat del Vallès F-6
- Sitges E-7
- Vallromanes G-6
- Sant Andreu de Llavaneres G-6
- El Prat de Llobregat F-7
- Pals I-4/5
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
- Casinos de joc.
- Casinos de juego.
- Casinos.
- Kasinos.

- Sant Pere de Ribes (Sitges) E-7
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Per manca d'espai ens és impossible donar la relació completa dels paisatges, monuments i museus de Catalunya. Igualment, els itineraris que proposem a la pàgina 8 són només un petit exemple de la gran varietat de recorreguts que es poden fer.

Por falta de espacio nos es imposible dar la relación completa de los paisajes, monumentos y museos de Cataluña. Igualmente, los itinerarios que le proponemos en la página 8 son sólo un pequeño ejemplo de la gran variedad de recorridos interesantes que puede realizar.

Par manque d'espace, il nous est impossible de fournir la liste complète des sites, des monuments et des musées de Catalogne. D'autre part, les itinéraires que nous vous proposons à la page 8 ne sont que quelques exemples parmi la grande variété de parcours intéressants qu'il vous est possible de réaliser.

Because of space it is impossible to list all the scenic spots, historic sites, and museums of Catalonia. For the same reason, the itineraries we suggest on page 8 are only a sample of the wide variety of interesting trips you can make.

Der begrenzte Umfang dieser Mitteilungen erlaubt keine vollständige Zusammenstellung der kunsthistorischen Sehenswürdigkeiten und der verschiedenen Landschaften Kataloniens. Bei den auf Seite 8 vorgeschlagenen Reise-routen handelt es sich natürlich nur um eine kleine Anregung aus einer Viel-zahl von interessanten Vorschlägen.

Català

Les pedres parlen

Quan viatgeu per Catalunya, no tingueu pressa. Un passat de més de dos mil anys bé s'ho mereix, oi? A Empúries, a la Costa Brava, reviu la permanència dels grecs d'època clàssica a la costa del país. La colònia grega, poblada més tard també pels romans, ha legat un conjunt d'escultures i ceràmica molt valuoses. I des d'allà no us costarà gens d'arribar-vos al poblat ibèric d'Ullastret i passejar-vos a l'ombra de les imponents muralles. A la Costa Daurada caldrà que visiteu la ciutat imperial de Tarraco, avui Tarragona, que conserva un tresor de monuments romans.

Voleu sentir-vos immersos en l'ambient medieval i passejar-vos acompanyats en el record pels savis monjos, pels valents cavallers i pels arriscats comerciants? Heu encertat en la vostra visita a Catalunya perquè a l'Edat Mitjana es formà la personalitat històrica del país. Per això els monuments d'art pre-romànic, romànic i gòtic, que daten dels segles IX al XIV, s'escampen per les planes i muntanyes de Catalunya. Entre d'altres, hauríeu d'admirar el monestir de Sant Pere de Roda que domina el mar, a la Costa Brava, i, a l'interior, el de Santa Maria de Ripoll i els tres monestirs cisterciencs de Santa Maria de Poblet, Santes Creus i Vallbona de les Monges, importants centres de cultura i art a l'Edat Mitjana. A les ciutats de Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Tortosa i Lleida heu d'admirar les catedrals, entre les quals la de Girona és famosa per la seva única nau interior, la més ampla de tot el gòtic europeu. Trobareu també els edificis medievals que acollien o que acullen encara les institucions de govern, entre d'altres, la Paeria a Lleida i el Palau de la Generalitat a Barcelona, seu del govern de la Comunitat Autònoma de Catalunya. Aquestes pedres us parlaran dels temps en que els mercaders catalans navegaven per tot el Mediterrani i els homes d'armes senyorejaven força indrets de les ribes d'aquest mar.

Us cridarà l'atenció la bellesa de formes i l'originalitat dels monuments del segle XIX-XX d'estil modernista quan aquest corrent europeu adquirí uns caràcters propis a Catalunya. No us sembla curiós que els cellers de vi, anomenats literàriament «catedrals de vi», a les zones rurals adoptessin sovint un estil modernista? I que succeís el mateix en algunes fàbriques símbol de l'activitat catalana al segle passat quan el país va viure la Revolució Industrial? Barcelona és la ciutat del món que compta amb més edificis d'estil modernista... Per alguna cosa Antoni Gaudí era català. La tradició innovadora de l'arquitectura catalana continua vigent en les realitzacions actuals.

Castellano

Piedras que hablan

Cuando viaje por Cataluña, no tenga prisa. Piense que un pasado de dos mil años bien se lo merece.

En Empúries, Costa Brava, revivirá la permanencia de los griegos clásicos. La colonia griega, poblada más tarde también por los romanos, ha legado un valioso conjunto de esculturas y cerámicas. Y desde Empúries, lléguese al cercano poblado ibérico de Ullastret, donde podrá pasearse bajo las imponentes muralles. En la Costa Dorada, debe visitar la ciudad imperial de Tarraco, hoy Tarragona, que conserva un tesoro monumental romano.

¿Le agradecería sentirse inmerso en un ambiente medieval, acompañado en el recuerdo por sabios monjes, valientes caballeros y arriesgados comerciantes? Ha acertado en su visita a Cataluña porque precisamente en la Edad Media se formó la personalidad histórica de este país. Por ello, los monumentos de arte pre-románico, románico y gótico, entre los siglos IX y XIV, se extienden por los llanos y montañas de Cataluña. Entre tantos, no debería dejar de visitar el monasterio de Sant Pere de Roda, que domina el mar en la Costa Brava, en el interior, el de Santa María de Ripoll, y los tres monasterios cisterciencs de Poblet, Santes Creus y Vallbona de les Monges, importantes centros de cultura y arte. En las ciudades de Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Tortosa y Lleida ha de admirar las catedrales, entre las cuales la de Girona es famosa por su única nave interior, la más ancha de todo el gótico europeo. Encontrará también los edificios medievales que albergaban o albergan todavía hoy las instituciones de gobierno, entre otros, la Paeria de Lleida y el Palau de la Generalitat de Barcelona, sede del gobierno de la Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña.

Estas piedras le hablarán de los tiempos en que los mercaderes catalanes navegaban por el Mediterráneo y los hombres de armas dominaban muchas tierras ribereñas. Le llamará la atención la belleza y originalidad de formas de los monumentos del s. XIX-XX, de estilo modernista que adquirió en Cataluña caracteres propios. Le sorprenderá que las bodegas, llamadas literariamente «Catedrales del vino», adoptasen a menudo en las zonas vinícolas el estilo modernista. Y que lo mismo sucediera con algunas fábricas, símbolo de la actividad catalana, cuando el país vivió su revolución industrial en el siglo pasado. Barcelona es la ciudad del mundo que cuenta con más edificios de estilo modernista... por algo Antoni Gaudí era catalán. Y la tradición innovadora de la arquitectura catalana sigue vigente en las realizaciones actuales.



Ripoll

Français

Des pierres d'où suinte l'Histoire

Si vous parcourez la Catalogne, ne vous hâtez surtout pas: son passé, vieux de deux mille ans, vous en sera gré.

A Empúries, sur la Costa Brava, vous retrouverez la présence de la Grèce classique. La colonie grecque, qui abrita plus tard les romains, nous a légué une collection importante de sculptures et de céramiques. Tout près d'Empúries, visitez le village ibérique d'Ullastret et promenez-vous à l'ombre de ses remparts imposants. Sur la Costa Dorada, une visite s'impose à la ville impériale de Tarraco, l'actuelle Tarragone, et à ses monuments romains.

Vous aimeriez retrouver le Moyen-Âge, ses moines savants, ses preux chevaliers, ses ingénieux commerçants? Alors la Catalogne est pour vous car c'est précisément du Moyen-Âge que date la personnalité historique de ce pays. Sur votre chemin, au hasard des plaines et des montagnes, vous découvrirez l'art pré-romain, le roman et le gothique compris entre le IX^{ème} et le XIV^{ème} siècle. Citons notamment le Monastère de Sant Pere de Roda qui surplombe la mer de la Costa Brava et, à l'intérieur, celui de Santa Maria de Ripoll, et les trois monastères cisterciens de Poblet, Santes Creus et Vallbona de les Monges qui furent jadis et sont encore des centres culturels et artistiques importants. Dans les villes de Barcelone, de Tarragone, de Tortosa et de Lleida, admirez les cathédrales et parmi elles, la plus célèbre, celle de Girona dont la nef unique est la plus vaste de tout le gothique européen. Découvrez les édifices médiévaux qui étaient et sont encore parfois, le siège du Gouvernement comme la Paeria de Lleida et le Palau de la Generalitat de Barcelone, siège actuel du Gouvernement de la Communauté Autonome

de la Catalogne. Ces pierres vous parleront du temps où les marchands catalans parcouraient les ports de la Méditerranée et où ses soldats dominaient les terres riveraines.

Vous serez émerveillés par la beauté et l'originalité des monuments du XIX^{ème} et du XX^{ème} siècle, de style art-déco, ce style qui a fleuri en Catalogne comme nul part ailleurs. Vous serez surpris de constater que les caves, ces véritables «Cathédrales du vin», adoptent elles aussi, dans les régions vinicoles, le style art-déco; et même ses usines parfois, symbole de la prospérité catalane, à l'époque de la révolution industrielle du XIX^{ème} siècle. Barcelone est la ville la plus riche du monde en édifices de style art déco... ce n'est pas par hasard en effet qu'Antoni Gaudí était catalan! La tradition innovatrice de l'architecture catalane persiste toujours dans les réalisations actuelles de ses architectes.

English

The stones speak

When you travel in Catalonia, take your time. With more than 2,000 years of history, it's worth your while. In Empúries, on the Costa Brava, you can relive the time of the Greeks in the Classical Period on our shores. The Greek colony, also populated later on by the Romans, has left behind a valuable collection of sculpture and ceramics. From here it's only a short trip to the Iberian settlement of Ullastret where you can walk in the shadow of its imposing walls. On the Costa Dorada, you must pay a visit to the Roman city of Tarraco, now called Tarragona, with its wealth of Roman remains.

Would you like to feel as if you were in a medieval atmosphere and walk accompanied by learned monks, brave knights and venturesome merchants? During your visit to Catalonia you will get some of this feeling because the historic personality of our land was formed in the Middle Ages. Because of this, the pre-Romanesque remains as well as the Romanesque and the Gothic, which date from the 9th-14th Centuries are spread across the plains and mountains of Catalonia. To mention just a few, you should not miss the monastery of Sant Pere de Roda overlooking the sea on the Costa Brava and farther inland the monastery of Santa Maria de Ripoll as well as the three Cistercian monasteries of Santa Maria de Poblet, Santes Creus and Vallbona de les Monges, all important centres of culture and art in the Middle Ages.

In the cities of Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Tortosa and Lleida you should visit the cathedrals. The cathedral of Girona is famous for its single interior nave, the widest in all of European Gothic. You will also find medieval buildings which used to house, or still house, various institutions of government, such as La Paeria in Lleida and the Palace of the Generalitat in Barcelona, the seat of government for the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. These stones will speak to you of the days when Catalan merchants sailed throughout the Mediterranean

mode acquired a number of characteristics peculiar to Catalonia. Isn't it fascinating how many wine cellars, often called wine «cathedrals», in the rural areas adopted an Art Nouveau style? Or that the same thing happened in some factories which were the pride of Catalan industry when country went through the Industrial Revolution? Barcelona has more Art Nouveau buildings than any other city in the world. Let's not forget that Antoni Gaudí was a Catalan. Today, the innovative tradition of Catalan architecture remains very much alive.

Deutsch


Die Steine erzählen wirklich

Beim Reisen durch Katalonien sollte man keine Eile haben. Eine zweitausendjährige Vergangenheit verdient das einfach nicht.

In Empúries, an der Costa Brava, erlebt man die Zeit des klassischen Hellas an unserer Küste. Diese griechische Kolonie, später von den Römern besiedelt, hat uns einen grossen Reichtum an Skulpturen und Keramik hinterlassen. Von hier aus ist es nicht weit zu dem iberischen Siedlungsgebiet Ullastret und einem Spaziergang im Schatten der eindrucksvollen massigen Mauern. An der Costa Daurada besuchen Sie natürlich das alte kaiserliche Tarraco, das heutige Tarragona mit seinen römischen Kunstschätzen.

Wollen Sie sich in die mittelalterliche Welt versetzen und in Gedanken etwa in Begleitung der weisen Mönche spazieren gehen, oder mit den tapferen Rittern oder mit den wegehaisigen Kaufleuten? Dann war Ihre Entscheidung, Katalonien zu besuchen, genau richtig: im Mittelalter nämlich kam es zur Herausbildung der historischen Persönlichkeit unseres Landes. Deswegen auch sind die Monumente präromanischer, romanischer und gotischer Kunst aus dem 9. bis zum 14. Jahrhundert über das ganze Land zerstreut. Um nur ein paar von dem grossen Kunstreichtum zu nennen: das Kloster Sankt Pere de Roda, in meerbeherrschender Lage an der Costa Brava; im Landesinnern Sankta Maria de Ripoll und auch die drei Zisterzienserklöster Sankta Maria de Poblet, Santes Creus und Vallbona de les Monges, alle bedeutende Kulturzentren und Mittelpunkte künstlerischen Schaffens im Mittelalter. In Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Tortosa und Lleida sollten Sie die Kathedralen bewundern; die von Girona ganz besonders, schon wegen ihrer einschiffigen gotischen Gewölbekonstruktion, der weitesten aller in ganz Europa. Dann die herrlichen mittelalterlichen Gebäude, in denen traditionell die Regierungsinstitutionen untergebracht waren und teilweise heute wieder untergebracht sind, wie la Paeria in Lleida und der Palau der Generalitat in Barcelona, der Regierungssitz der autonomen Regierung von Katalonien. Alle diese Steine erzählen Ihnen auch von Zeiten, in denen die katalanischen Kaufleute mit ihren Schiffen das Mittelmeer befuhren und die Truppen der Grafen-Könige Teile des Mittelmeerraums beherrschten.

Und dann wird Ihre Aufmerksamkeit bestimmt auf die Schönheit der Formgebung und die Einmaligkeit der Bauwerke aus dem 19. und 20. Jahrhundert gelenkt: es ist der europäische Jugendstil mit seiner speziell katalanischen Variante, dem Modernisme. Interessant ist doch auch, dass ausgerechnet die Weinkeller in den Weingebieten in der Literatur als «Kathedralen des Weins» genannt, sehr oft im Jugendstil gebaut sind. Und dann auch Fabriken, Ausdruck katalanischen Schaffens im vergangenen Jahrhundert schlechthin, im Jugendstil, im Modernisme. Von allen Städten der Welt beherrscht Barcelona die



Empúries



Poblet



Lleida



Català

Heu de conèixer la riquesa dels museus

Voleu saber una dada sorprenent referida a un país petit com Catalunya? Tenim més de tres cents museus oberts al públic; alguns d'ells guarden col·leccions molt valuoses d'interès universal.

A Barcelona, al Parc de la muntanya de Montjuïc, podeu visitar el Museu d'Art de Catalunya amb la millor col·lecció mundial de pintura d'estil romànic sobre mur o sobre taules de fusta. I ja que sou a Montjuïc arribeu-vos, en la mateixa muntanya, a la Fundació Miró. El singular edifici de l'arquitecte català Josep Lluís Sert que aprofita al màxim la llum i l'espai, ofereix les mostres de l'art més actual i guarda una bona col·lecció de les obres del català universal Joan Miró. Tornem al romànic, però, si us mervella el simbolisme i la religiositat d'aquest estil, heu de visitar els museus episcopals de Vic i de Girona i els diocesans de Solsona i la Seu d'Urgell.

A Barcelona i en un ambient diferent, en un palau gòtic molt ben restaurat hi ha el museu Picasso on veureu una mostra ben representativa de l'obra llegada a Barcelona per l'artista que tant va estimar Catalunya.

Únic i insòlit pel seu contingut és el museu creat pel pintor Salvador Dalí a la seva vila natal de Figueres, que us farà comprendre les seves inquietuts surrealistes.

En moltes poblacions catalanes trobareu petits museus amb col·leccions ben interessants de les especialitats més diverses i sorprenents per la seva originalitat. En la impossibilitat de citar-los tots, recordem el museu del Vi, a Vilafranca del Penedès, el de la Pella, a Igualada, el del Paper, a Capellades, el del Càntir, a Argentona, el de Pintes, a Arenys de Mar, el de cotxes antics de Sils, les col·leccions dels Museus Romàntic, Maricel i Cau Ferrat de Sitges i l'únic existent al món dedicat a les figures automàtiques, a la muntanya del Tibidabo de Barcelona. A Catalunya, ens esforcem perquè els museus siguin quelcom viu. Per això, al compàs del temps actual podeu visitar el Museu de la Ciència i el Planetarium a Barcelona. I és possible que en la visita a algun museu coincideu amb grups d'escolars que s'eduquen en la curiositat científica i en el respecte a les obres d'art.

Castellano

Conozca la riqueza de los museos

¿Sabe que en Cataluña, un país pequeño, tenemos más de trescientos museos abiertos al público, alguno de los cuales guardan valiosas colecciones de interés mundial?

En Barcelona, en el Parque de la montaña de Montjuïc, se encuentra el Museo d'Art de Catalunya con la mejor colección del mundo de pintura románica, mural o en retablos. Y, muy cerca, la Fundació Miró en un singular edificio del arquitecto catalán Josep Lluís Sert que aprovecha al máximo la luz y el espacio y que guarda una buena colección del artista catalán Joan Miró junto a otras obras de arte contemporáneo. Pero si se siente atraído por el simbolismo y religiosidad del estilo románico debe visitar también los museos episcopales de Vic y de Girona y los diocesanos de Solsona y la Seu d'Urgell.

En Barcelona y en un ambiente distinto, en un palacio gótico muy bien restaurado, está instalado el Museo

hará comprender el genio surrealista de este pintor.

En muchas poblaciones catalanas se encontrará con pequeños e interesantes museos de las más diversas especialidades y sorprendentes por su originalidad. A título de ejemplo, podemos mencionarle el Museo del Vino en Vilafranca del Penedès, el de la Piel en Igualada, el del Papel en Capellades, el del Botijo en Argentona, el de Encajes en Arenys de Mar, el de Coches antiguos en Sils, las colecciones de los Museos Romántico, Maricel y Cau Ferrat de Sitges y el único del mundo dedicado a los muñecos automáticos en el Tibidabo de Barcelona.

Los catalanes nos esforzamos en que los museos sean algo vivo. Por ello, al compás de los tiempos actuales, puede visitar también el Museo de la Ciencia y el Planetarium en Barcelona. Y es posible que en su visita a algún museo coincida con grupos de escolares que se educan en la curiosidad científica y en el respeto de las obras de arte.

Français

Découvrez la richesse des musées

Savez-vous que la Catalogne, ce petit pays, possède plus de trois-cents musées ouverts au public dont certains abritent des collections rares d'un intérêt mondial?

A Barcelone, dans le Parc de la Colline de Montjuïc, se trouve le Musée d'Art de Catalogne qui comprend la meilleure collection du monde de peinture romane, murale ou sur rétables. Tout près de là, se dresse la Fundació Miró, un édifice original où l'architecte catalan Josep Lluís Sert a utilisé au maximum la lumière et l'espace; elle abrite une partie importante de l'oeuvre de l'artiste catalan Joan Miró ainsi que d'autres oeuvres de l'art contemporain. Mais si c'est le symbolisme et la religiosité de l'art roman qui vous attirent, visitez les musées épiscopaux de Vic et de Girona et les musées diocésains de Solsona et de la Seu d'Urgell.

A Barcelone, et dans un tout autre ordre de choses, vous trouverez, installé dans un palais gothique fort bien restauré, le Musée Picasso. Vous pourrez y admirer les tableaux les plus représentatifs de ses diverses époques, légués à Barcelone par ce peintre génial qui aime tant la Catalogne. Le Musée créé par le peintre Salvador Dalí dans sa ville natale de Figueres est unique et quelque peu insolite. Les dessins et peintures qu'il abrite nous prouvent une fois de plus le gé-



Vic. Museu Episcopal

nie surréaliste de l'artiste.

Dans la plupart des villages catalans, vous découvrirez toutes sortes de musées consacrés aux spécialités les plus diverses et les plus inattendues. Citons par exemple, le Musée du Vin à Vilafranca del Penedès, celui du Cuir à Igualada, celui du Papier de Capellades, celui de la Cruche à Argentona, celui de la Dentelle à Arenys de Mar, celui des Voitures Anciennes de Sils, les Collections des Musées Romantique, Maricel et Cau Ferrat de Sitges et le seul musée au monde consacré aux automates, sur le Tibidabo, à Barcelone.

Les catalans mettent tout en oeuvre pour que leurs musées demeurent vivants. Vous pourrez visiter ainsi à Barcelone, et plus en accord avec les temps modernes, le Musée de la Science et le Planetarium. Vous rencontrerez sans doute, au cours d'une de vos visites à nos musées, des groupes d'écoliers à qui l'on s'efforce d'inculquer la curiosité scientifique et l'amour de l'art.

English

Our museums — a treasure to discover

A surprising fact about Catalonia, small as it is: there are more than 300 museums open to the public, some with valuable collections of world interest.

In Barcelona, in Mountain of Montjuïc Park, you can visit the Museum of Catalan Art which contains the world's

best collection of Romanesque painting done on walls or wood panels. And while you are at Montjuïc, on the same mountain, you will find the Miró Foundation. The outstanding building by Catalan architect Josep Lluís Sert which takes maximum advantage of light and space offers examples of contemporary art and houses a fine collection of works by the Catalan artist Joan Miró, of worldwide fame. Coming back to Romanesque art, if you are enchanted by the symbolism and religiosity of this style, you must visit the episcopal museums of Vic and Girona and the diocesan museums of Solsona and la Seu d'Urgell. Turning to Barcelona and an atmosphere of a different kind, the Picasso Museum makes its home in a finely restored Gothic palace. Here you can see a broad sample of the works left to Barcelona by Picasso who greatly loved Catalonia.

For something unique and totally refreshing in content, visit the museum created by the painter Salvador Dalí in Figueres, his native town. It will help you to understand the unrest of this master of Surrealism.

In many towns of Catalonia you will discover small museums with quite interesting special collections, very broad in range and surprising in their originality. It's impossible to mention all but a few — the Wine Museum at Vilafranca del Penedès, the Leather Museum at Igualada, the Paper Museum at Capellades, the Jug Museum at Argentona, the Lace Museum at Arenys de Mar, the Antique Car Museum at Sils, the collections of the Romantic, Maricel, and Cau Ferrat Museums in Sitges, and the world's only museum devoted to automatons on Barcelona's Tibidabo Mountain.

In Catalonia, we are trying to make our museums places that are alive. In keeping with the times, we now have a Science Museum and Planetarium

in Barcelona. And often when you visit a museum you will bump into groups of students discovering scientific curiosity and learning a respect for works of art.

Deutsch

Der Reichtum seiner Museen

Mehr als 300 — dreihundert! — Museen wollen mit ihren sehr kostbaren Sammlungen den Besuchern das kulturelle Leben Kataloniens, seine viele Jahrhunderte alte Kultur zeigen. In Barcelona, auf dem Montjuïc, befindet sich im Museu d'Art de Catalunya, dem Katalanischen Kunstmuseum, die weltbeste Sammlung romanischer Freskenmalereien und Malereien auf Holz. Und wenn Sie schon dort oben sind, gehen Sie auch zu der unweit davon gelegenen Fundació Miró, der Miró-Stiftung. Der eindrucksvolle, unverwechselbare Gebäudekomplex des katalanischen Architekten Josep Lluís Sert bietet, bei größter Ausnutzung von Licht und Raum, Beispiele moderner Kunst und natürlich auch eine reiche Auswahl der Werke des berühmten Katalanen Joan Miró. Zurück zur Romanik: Für die Liebhaber des Symbolismus und der Religiosität dieser Kunst halten die Episkopalmuseen von Vic und Girona und die Diözesanmuseen von Solsona und la Seu d'Urgell viele Überraschungen bereit.

In Barcelona und in anderem Ambiente, in einem bemerkenswert gut restaurierten gotischen Herrschaftshaus, ist das Picasso-Museum untergebracht; die vom Künstler der Stadt Barcelona und seinem geliebten Katalonien vermachten Werke geben Ihnen einen recht guten Überblick über sein Gesamtwerk.

Einmalig und aussergewöhnlich seiner Werke wegen ist das Museum des Malers Salvador Dalí in seiner Geburtsstadt Figueres. Dort bekommen Sie einen Einblick in sein surrealistisches Schaffen.

In vielen katalanischen Ortschaften finden Sie kleinere Museen mit recht interessanten, ganz verschiedenartigen, oft wegen ihrer Einmaligkeit überraschenden Sammlungen. Sie alle hier aufzuführen müssen wir uns natürlich versagen; es sollen genügen: das Weimuseum in Vilafranca del Penedès, das für Leder in Igualada, ein Museum für Papier in Capellades, eins für Krüge und Trinkgefäße in Argentona, für Spitzenarbeiten in Arenys de Mar, für Veteranenautos in Sils; die Museen Romàntic, Maricel und Cau Ferrat in Sitges und das in der ganzen Welt einmalige Museum für automatische Figuren auf dem Tibidabo in Barcelona.

Dabei setzen wir alles daran, damit Kataloniens Museen Bestandteil des tagtäglichen Lebens der Menschen sind. Im Museum für Wissenschaften und im Planetarium der Stad Barce-



Sitges. Maricel



Barcelona. Museu d'Automates



Alguns itineraris interessants

- * Panoràmiques
- * Llocs pintorescos
- * Monuments
- * Hotels-Restaurants

Algunos itinerarios interesantes

- * Panorámicas
- * Lugares pintorescos
- * Monumentos
- * Hoteles-Restaurantes

Quelques itinéraires intéressants

- * Panorama
- * Endroits pittoresques
- * Monuments
- * Hôtels-Restaurants











Some interesting itineraries

- * Panorama
- * Picturesque places
- * Monuments
- * Hotels-Restaurants

Einige interessante Routen

- * Panorama
- * Malerische Orte
- * Monumente
- * Hotels-Restaurants

- * Museus
- * Esquí
- * Casino
- * Museus
- * Esquí
- * Casinos
- * Musées
- * Ski
- * Casinos
- * Museen
- * Ski
- * Kasinos



Català

El bullici i l'alegria de les festes populars

A Catalunya cada poble i ciutat tenen cada any uns dies de Festa Major. L'alegria es desborda i tothom obre els braços als forasters. Moltes localitats conserven costums tradicionals d'origen ben antic. Així, a les comarques de Tarragona podreu admirar l'agilitat i la força dels «castellers», que alcen torres humanes espectaculars. Si voleu córrer esquivant el foc i els petards que escupen el drac, l'àliga i encenen els «dimonis», haureu d'anar per Corpus a la Patum de Berga. Aquesta és una festa inoblidable on es barregen arrels paganes i cristianes que es trameten de pares a fills. Un caràcter netament cristià té la Dansa de la Mort que recorre els carrers del poble de Verges el Dijous Sant en record de les terribles epidèmies medievals.

La nit anterior al dia de Sant Joan (24 Juny) veureu encendre grans fogueres per les places i carrers de pobles i ciutats. A la revetlla, enmig de coets i focs d'artifici i tot menjant la tradicional coca, els catalans celebren tota la nit el solstici d'estiu. A les Festes Majors i altres celebracions, veureu passejar i ballar els Gegants rodejats dels satírics cap-grossos.

Una manera de celebrar el goig i la germanor de les festes és encara una ballada de sardanes. Aquesta dansa tradicional pròpia de Catalunya es balla al so de la cobla, conjunt d'instruments de vent i un contrabaix, i els balladors es donen les mans mentre fan i desfan els passos i contrapassos. Intenteu de participar-hi en qualsevol plaça, és una experiència que us aconsellem!

De temps antics, els mercats i les fires també han estat un motiu de trobada i de festa per a aquells que saben combinar la tasca amb l'esbargiment. En molts pobles encara podreu veure un mercat setmanal. I fins i tot diari, com el peculiar mercat del peix als ports de pescadors i al peu de les barques.

Com a arreu, a Catalunya se celebra també el Carnaval; són especialment alegres i multicolors els de Solsona, Sitges i Vilanova i la Geltrú.

Uniu-vos a l'alegria popular d'una festa i coneixereu el nostre caràcter, que pot semblar una mica reservat en aparença, però que en realitat és amable, alegre i acollidor, com correspon a un poble mediterrani.

le y baile de gigantes rodeados de los satíricos cabezudos.

Baillando la sardana, los catalanes vivimos todavía hoy la alegría y el espíritu de hermandad de una fiesta. Esta danza tradicional propia de Cataluña se baila al son de la «cobla», conjunto instrumental de viento y un contrabajo, y en ella, los bailadores, en círculo y con las manos unidas, hacen y deshacen pasos y contrapasos. Intente participar en una sardana en cualquier plaza. Es una experiencia que le aconsejamos.

También en Cataluña se celebra el Carnaval y son especialmente alegres y multicolores los de Solsona, Sitges y Vilanova i la Geltrú.

Unase a la alegría popular de una fiesta y así conocerá nuestro carácter, en apariencia un poco reservado, pero en realidad amable, alegre y acogedor como corresponde a un pueblo mediterráneo.

Français

L'animation et la joie des fêtes populaires

En Catalogne, tout au cours de l'année, des fêtes populaires ont lieu dans chaque ville et dans chaque village. Une gaieté débordante et contagieuse envahit les rues et tous s'empressent pour recevoir les visiteurs. Bon nombre de villes et de villages conservent encore des coutumes traditionnelles d'origine ancestrale. Ainsi, dans la région de Tarragone, vous pourrez admirer l'agilité et la force avec lesquelles les «castellers» dressent leurs spectaculaires tours humaines. Si l'envie vous prend de courir en esquivant le feu et les pétards que crachent le dragon et l'aigle ou que lancent les démons, allez à «la Patum» de Berga pour la Fête-Dieu. Vous assisterez à une fête inoubliable dont les origines, chrétiennes et païennes à la fois, se transmettent de père en fils. Plus chrétienne par contre est la Danse de la Mort qui parcourt les rues du village de Verges pendant le Jeudi Saint, en souvenir des terribles épidémies médiévales.

C'est pendant la nuit de la Saint-Jean (24 juin) que vous verrez les bûchers s'allumer dans les rues et sur les places de villes et villages. La fête a lieu au milieu du fracas des pétards et des feux d'artifices, tandis que les catalans, tout en dégustant la «coca» traditionnelle, célèbrent jusqu'à l'aube le solstice d'été. Pur la fête du village, au cours des réjouissances populaires, vous pourrez admirer les défilés et les bals des géants entourés de masques à grosses têtes.

La sardane est pour les catalans symbole de joie et de fraternité. Cette danse traditionnelle, typiquement catalane, se danse au son des fanfares composées d'instruments à vent et d'une contrebasse, «la cobla»; les danseurs forment un cercle en se te-



Berga. La Patum

nant par la main tandis qu'ils marquent les pas en cadence. N'hésitez pas à vous joindre à eux sur la grand place d'un village, c'est une expérience inoubliable.

La Catalogne célèbre aussi le Carnaval; parmi les plus gais, les plus hauts en couleur, citons notamment les Carnavals de Solsona, de Sitges et de Vilanova i la Geltrú. Participez à la gaieté des fêtes populaires pour mieux connaître notre caractère qui, bien qu'il puisse, à première vue, paraître un peu réservé, est en réalité aimable, joyeux et accueillant comme celui de tous les peuples de la Méditerranée.

English

The fun and bustle of popular festivals

Each year in Catalonia, every town and city has its Grand Festival. Fun is in the order of the day and everyone makes a stranger welcome. Many places keep up traditional customs of very ancient origin. In the region of Tarragona you can wonder at the agility and strength of the «castellers» as they build their spectacular human towers. If you'd like to be scared by a fire-breathing dragon with fireworks lit

up by «demons» and a huge dancing eagle don't miss going to the Patum of Berga at Corpus Christi. This is an unforgettable festival with both pagan and Christian origins handed down from generation to generation. The Dance of Death which is enacted in the streets of the town of Verges on Holy Thursday has a purely Christian character. It recounts the terrible plagues of the Middle Ages.

The night before the Feast of Saint John (24th June) you will see great bonfires in the squares and streets of both town and city. On this eve far into the night, in the midst of rockets and fireworks, with everyone eating «coca» — the traditional pastry — we Catalans celebrate the summer solstice. At the Grand Festivals and other celebrations you will see giant figures — «gegants» — parading and dancing. Usually they're accompanied by satirical «capgrossos» or big-heads. One way we still like to celebrate the spirit of joy and friendship at our festivals is the sardana, our national dance. This traditional dance belonging to Catalonia is danced to the sound of the «cobla», a group of wind instruments accompanied by a bass. The dancers join hands while they carefully pace and retrace the steps. Try to take part in it sometime in one of our squares. It's an experience we can recommend. From ancient times markets and fairs also have been a good reason for gatherings and festivities for those who know how to combine work and pleasure. In many towns you can still find weekly markets with some even on a daily basis such as local fish markets right beside boats tied up in the fishing ports.

As in many other places, Carnival is also celebrated in Catalonia. In Solsona, Sitges and Vilanova i la Geltrú, this festival is especially lively and colorful.

Join in the popular fun of one of our festivals and you will get to know more about us. Perhaps on the outside we seem a little reserved in our character but deep down we're friendly, we like to have our fun and we make our visitors welcome — as befits a Mediterranean people.

mit offenen Armen aufgenommen. In vielen Orten leben dann alte und uralte Sitten und Überlieferungen auf. «Castellers», das sind die sog. Menschenpyramiden akrobatischen Charakters, können Sie in den Comarques von Tarragona bewundern. Wenn Sie sich vor einem Feuer — und feuerwerkspehenden Drachen und Adler und ihren Helfershelfer, den Teufeln, fluchtartig in Sicherheit bringen wollen, dann besuchen Sie in der Fronleichnamswache Berga und sein Patum. Heidnisches ist mit christlicher Überlieferung vermischt und wird von Generation zu Generation überliefert. Rein christlichen Charakters ist der Dansa de la Mort (Todestanz) von Verges an jedem Gründonnerstag im Gedenken an die schrecklichen Epidemien im Mittelalter.

Am 24. Juni ist der Festtag zu Ehren des Hl. Johannes und aus Anlass der Sonnenwende. In der Nacht davor sind Sie dabei, wenn auf den Plätzen und Strassen der Ortschaften und Städten Freudenfeuer angezündet werden, mitten unter dem ohrenbetäubenden Lärm von Feuerwerken. Die traditionelle «coca», eine Art Kuchen, darf dabei natürlich nicht fehlen. Sei es eine Kirmes oder ein Heimatfest zu Ehren der/des Schutzheiligen: oft ziehen Riesenfiguren — meistens Paare — gefolgt von einer Art satyrischen «Dickköpfeten» das Interesse der Zuschauer auf sich.

Zu jedem Fest in Katalonien gehört der Tanz der Sardana. Aber nicht nur auf Festen: bei vielen anderen Gelegenheiten finden wir Katalanen uns in Grossstädten und Dörfern zu diesem unserem Nationaltanz zusammen. Die Musik dazu spielt eine «cobla», ein Orchester für Blasinstrumente und ein Kontrabass. Die Tänzer/innen halten sich an den Händen und bewegen sich im Kreis zu einem steten Wechsel von Dreiviertel — und Sechsstichtakt. Fühlen Sie sich angesprochen? Dann versuchen Sie's doch mal. Wir reichen Ihnen gern die Hand. Immer schon waren die Märkte und Messen Anlass sich zu treffen und Feste zu feiern; warum auch nicht die Pflicht mit etwas Angenehmen verbinden. So finden Sie in vielen Orten immer noch die Wochenmärkte und auch täglich stattfindende Märkte, wie die sehr typischen Fischmärkte in den Fischerhäfen, direkt an den Booten. Wie anderswo so feiert man auch in Katalonien Karneval. Der in Solsona oder der in Sitges und in Vilanova i la Geltrú sind besonders ausgelassen und farbenprächtig.

Den Charakter eines Volkes kann man auch an seinen Festen erkennen. Eine gewisse Reserviertheit wird uns manchmal nachgesagt. Zu Unrecht.

Castellano

El bullicio y la alegría de las fiestas populares

En Cataluña cada pueblo y ciudad tiene durante el año unos días de Fiesta Mayor. La alegría se desborda por las calles y todos se aprestan a recibir a los forasteros. Muchas localidades guardan costumbres tradicionales de origen ancestral. Así, en las comarcas de Tarragona podrá admirar la agilidad y la fuerza con que los «castellers» alzan espectaculares torres humanas. Si quiere correr esquivando el fuego y los petardos escupidos por el dragón y el águila o arrojados por los demonios, ha de ir a «la Patum» de Berga, por Corpus. Esta es una fiesta inolvidable con raíces paganas y cristianas transmitida de padres a hijos. De carácter netamente cristiano es la Danza de la Muerte que recorre las calles del pueblo de Verges el Jueves Santo, en memoria de las terribles epidemias medievals.

La noche de San Juan (24 junio) verá que se encienden grandes fogatas por las calles y plazas de pueblos y ciudades. La verbena transcurre entre



Castellers



Vic. Mercat del Ram



Deutsch

Feste mit Ausgelassenheit und Freude



Els Comediants

Català



Teatre Lliure


temos, entre muchos, a «Els Comediants» y «Els Joglars» cuyas actuaciones han traspasado fronteras. O, también, el esfuerzo innovador del «Teatre Lliure» de Barcelona. Por otra parte, no hay que olvidar las representaciones teatrales al aire libre, como las temporadas estivales del Teatre Grec de Barcelona.

Si es aficionado a la ópera, en Barcelona hallará el único teatro de España dedicado permanentemente a este género. El Gran Teatre del Liceu, desde 1847, abre sus puertas cada temporada a interpretaciones de ópera y ballet de gran calidad artística. Entre los grandes intérpretes que suelen actuar citemos a Montserrat Caballé, Josep Carreras o Jaume Aragall, cantantes catalanes que han paseado su arte por todo el mundo.

La música sinfónica y de concierto ha contado con autores e intérpretes catalanes de categoría mundial, por ejemplo, los compositores Enric Granados e Isaac Albéniz que dieron a conocer la música española de raíz popular, o Robert Gerhard, que se sirvió del lenguaje dodecafónico. Capítulo aparte merece Pau Casals, el compositor y violoncelista catalán de una sensibilidad y perfección técnicas no igualadas. En el Palau de la Música Catalana, una sala de sorprendente estilo modernista, se celebran interesantes temporadas de conciertos, con los mejores intérpretes mundiales, solistas, orquestas o coros. El canto coral posee una gran tradición en Cataluña que cuenta con multitud de agrupaciones corales.

En verano y en bastantes poblaciones podrá asistir a conciertos y festivales musicales en recintos monumentales o parajes de interés artístico. Así, por ejemplo, el Festival Internacional de Cadaqués (Costa Brava), o el Festival Brudieu de la Seu d'Urgell.

La canción moderna catalana, que a menudo ha bebido en las fuentes populares o en los escritores clásicos catalanes, ha jugado y juega un importante papel en la vida cultural.



Barcelona. Gran Teatre del Liceu

Francès

Le Théâtre et la Musique

Le théâtre possède en Catalogne une tradition qui date du Moyen-Âge. De grands auteurs et de prestigieux acteurs en langue catalane ont fait la réputation des théâtres de Barcelone et d'ailleurs, devant un public aussi exigeant que communicatif.

Dans le domaine du théâtre, la Catalogne a été la première à tenter des expériences renouvelées. En effet, de jeunes troupes pleines d'enthousiasme, à la recherche d'un contact plus direct et plus vivant avec leur public, emplissent de gaieté les places et les rues du pays. Citons notamment «Els Comediants» et «Els Joglars» dont la réputation a franchi les frontières. Rappelons également les efforts de renouvellement du «Teatre Lliure» de Barcelone ou bien les représentations en plein air comme celles du Théâtre Grec de Barcelone durant l'été.

Mais si c'est l'Opéra qui vous intéresse, vous trouverez à Barcelone le seul théâtre d'Espagne qui s'y consacre d'une manière permanente. Depuis 1847 et à chaque saison, le «Gran Teatre del Liceu» ouvre ses portes à des opéras et à des ballets d'une qualité artistique incontestable. Parmi les grands interprètes de l'Opéra de Barcelone, citons Montserrat Caballé, Josep Carreras ou Jaume Aragall, ces chanteurs catalans qui ont fait applaudir leur art dans le monde entier.

La grande musique a donné des auteurs et des interprètes catalans de catégorie mondiale, les compositeurs Enric Granados et Isaac Albéniz, par exemple, qui firent connaître et apprécier la musique espagnole d'origine populaire ou bien Robert Gerhard qui employa le langage dodecaphonique. Quant à Pau Casals, l'inoubliable compositeur et violoncelliste catalan dont la sensibilité et la perfection technique demeurent sans égal, c'est un chapitre à part qu'il mérite-

rait. Dans le «Palau de la Música Catalana», à la salle au surprenant style art-déco, ont lieu d'intéressantes saisons de concerts où rivalisent les meilleurs interprètes mondiaux, les plus grands solistes, les plus prestigieux orchestres ou les chœurs. Le chant choral possède une longue tradition en Catalogne et l'on y trouve de nombreux groupes choraux.

En été, vous pourrez assister aux concerts et aux festivals musicaux qui ont lieu dans des édifices ou des sites d'intérêt artistique. Deux des plus importants sont sans doute le Festival International de Cadaqués (Costa Brava) ou celui de Brudieu, à la Seu d'Urgell.

La chanson moderne catalane d'origine populaire ou bien inspirée par les grands écrivains classiques catalans, a joué et joue encore un rôle important dans la vie culturelle.

English

Theatre and music

Theatrical activities in Catalonia have a tradition which goes to the Middle Ages. Great playwrights and actors in the Catalan language have brought honour to theatre and stage in Barcelona and other important centres which attract a keen but demanding public.

Catalonia has been a pioneer in experimental theatre and in the rediscovery of theatrical life. Many groups looking for a more direct and lively contact with the public brighten many of our squares and streets. Among others we could mention Els Comediants and Els Joglars, who both have taken productions abroad, or the innovative energy of the Teatre Lliure of Barcelona. In addition, some theatrical events are staged in the open air such as the summer season of Barcelona's Theatre Grec.

If you are an opera-lover, Barcelona has the only stage in Spain permanently devoted to this genre. Established in 1847, the Gran Teatre del Liceu opens its doors each season to delight you with the finest interpretations of opera and ballet of world calibre. Among the top artists who often perform there are Montserrat Caballé, Josep Carreras and Jaume Aragall, Catalan performers who have taken their artistry around the world. Catalan symphonic and concert music have produced composers and interpreters of world class, such as Enric Granados and Isaac Albéniz

who made Spanish music based on folk themes widely known. The composer Robert Gerhard stands among the vanguard in twelvetone musical language. Pau Casals deserves special mention. Here was a Catalan composer and cellist with a sensitivity and technical perfection unsurpassed. In the Palau de la Música Catalana, an astonishing concert hall of Art Nouveau architecture, important concert seasons take place with some of the world's best performers, soloists, orchestras and choirs. Choral singing also has a great tradition here and Catalonia has a large number of choral groups.

In many centres during the summer, you can go to concerts and musical festivals set among historic buildings and other places of special artistic interest in an ideal fusion of cultural statement. Examples include the International Festival of Cadaqués (Costa Brava) and the Festival Brudieu of La Seu d'Urgell.

Modern Catalan song, which often has found inspiration in folk sources or in classical Catalan writers, has played and continues to play a very important role in cultural life.

Deutsch

Theater und Musik


Das Theater unseres Landes hat eine auf das Mittelalter zurückgehende Tradition. Bekannte Theaterautoren und Schauspieler katalanischer Sprache haben dem Theater und den Theaterbühnen in Barcelona und in anderen Städten Rang und Namen und ein anspruchsvolles und engagiertes Theaterpublikum gesichert.

Katalonien ist beim experimentellen Theater und bei der Suche nach neuen Ausdrucksformen immer schon führend gewesen. So trifft man immer wieder auf Schauspielerguppen, die die enge und lebendige Berührung mit dem Publikum suchen und mit ihrem direkten Theater großen Zulauf haben. Da sind zum Beispiel «Els Comediants» und «Els Joglars», die auch im Ausland gut bekannt sind, oder das «Teatre Lliure» in Barcelona mit seinem Bestreben nach neuen Mittelungsformen. Abgesehen davon finden in der Sommersaison im Teatre Grec in Barcelona Freiluftaufführungen statt.

Sind Sie vielleicht ein Opernfreund, dann finden Sie in Barcelona die einzige, das ganze Jahr über diesem Genre gewidmete Theater Spaniens: das Gran Teatre del Liceu. Seit 1847 bietet es in jeder Theatersaison hervorragende Opern- und Ballettaufführungen aus der ganzen Welt. Um nur ein paar Namen der regelmässig hier auftretenden Opernsänger/innen zu nennen: Montserrat Caballé, Josep Carreras, Jaume Aragall; alles weltbekannte katalanische Künstler.

Die Symphonie — und Konzertmusik zählt zu ihren katalanischen Interpreten und Komponisten mit Weltruf u.a. Enric Granados und Isaac Albéniz, die die im Volk verwurzelte spanische Musik bekannt machten, oder Robert Gerhard, der mit der Zwölftonmusik experimentiert hat. Pau Casals, dem berühmten katalanischen Komponisten und Violoncellisten mit einer bis heute nie wieder erreichten Sensibilität und technischen Perfektion, müsste man eigentlich einen ganzen Abschnitt widmen. Im Palau de la Música Catalana, Barcelonas Konzerthalle im Jugendstil, finden interessante Konzert-Saisonen statt, an denen der Welt bester Interpreten, Solisten, Orchester und Chöre teilnehmen. Der Chorgesang wird seit alters in Katalonien in unzählbaren Chorgruppen gepflegt.

Im Sommer finden in vielen historisch interessanten Orten in angemessenem architektonisch-künstlerischem Ambiente (wie zum Beispiel das Festival Internacional de Cadaqués an der Costa Brava oder das Festival Brudieu in la Seu d'Urgell) Konzerte und Musikfestspiele statt: ein unvergesslicher Einblick in die Kultur unseres Landes.



El teatre i la música

Les manifestacions teatrals al país tenen una tradició que arrenca de l'Edat Mitjana. Grans autors i actors teatrals en llengua catalana han prestigiat el teatre i els escenaris, a Barcelona i a les poblacions d'importància, els quals atrauen un públic exigent i participatiu.

Catalunya ha estat pionera en l'experimentació i la renovació de les manifestacions teatrals. Així, els grups que cerquen un contacte més directe i viu amb el públic alegren les places i els carrers del país. Citem, entre d'altres, Els Comediants i Els Joglars que han mostrat fora del país les seves representacions o bé, l'esforç innovador del Teatre Lliure de Barcelona. D'altra banda, algunes vegades els espectacles teatrals són a l'aire lliure, com les temporades estivals del Teatre Grec de Barcelona.

Si sou afeccionats a l'òpera, a Barcelona hi ha l'únic escenari d'Espanya dedicat permanentment a aquest gènere. El Gran Teatre del Liceu, des del 1847, obre les portes cada temporada perquè us delecteu amb les millors interpretacions de les òperes i ballets universals. Entre els grans intèrprets que hi solen actuar citem Montserrat Caballé, Josep Carreras, Jaume Aragall, artistes catalans que han mostrat el seu art arreu del món.

La música simfònica i de concert ha comptat amb autors i intèrprets catalans de la categoria mundial com foren entre d'altres, Enric Granados i Isaac Albéniz, que donaren a conèixer la música espanyola d'arrel popular, o el compositor Robert Gerhard, experimentador del llenguatge musical dodecafònic. Capítol singular mereix Pau Casals, el compositor i violoncellista català d'una sensibilitat i perfecció tècnica no igualades. Al Palau de la Música Catalana, a la sala d'estil modernista sorprenent, se celebren interessants temporades de concerts amb els millors intèrprets mundials, solistes, orquestres o cors. El cant coral té també una gran tradició a Catalunya on existeixen multitud d'agrupacions corals.

A l'estiu podreu assistir, en moltes poblacions, a concerts i festivals musicals en recintes monumentals o en paratges d'especial interès artístic, en una síntesi perfecta de manifestacions culturals. Així, per exemple, el Festival Internacional de Cadaqués (Costa Brava) o el Festival Brudieu de la Seu d'Urgell.

La cançó moderna catalana, que sovint s'ha inspirat de les fonts populars o dels escriptors clàssics catalans, ha jugat i juga un paper molt important a la vida cultural.

Castellano

El teatro y la música

Las manifestaciones teatrales en Cataluña poseen una tradición que se remonta a la Edad Media. Grandes autores y actores teatrales en lengua catalana han prestigiado los escenarios de Barcelona y de otras poblaciones ante un público exigente y participativo.



Català

L'art de ben menjar...

La gastronomia catalana arrenca, com tants altres aspectes, de la saviesa i la tradició popular. El tractament d'uns elements senzills aconseguix meravelles que el paladar sap agrair. En aquest sentit, heu de tastar l'humil pa sucat amb tomàquet i ben amanit amb oli i sal i veureu que combina a la perfecció amb les anxo-ves salades o la varietat d'embotits fabricats al país. Nogensmenys, la cuina catalana arriba a uns graus d'intel·ligent elaboració i originalitat dignes de les millors cuines. Proveu, si més no, el pollastre amb llagosta, el llobarro a la flor de farigola i carabassons rostits, perdiu amb raïm o conill amb ametlles, el suquet de peix o el fricandó. Cada comarca catalana, sigui a l'interior o vora el mar, té les seves especialitats. Deixeu-vos aconsellar i descobriu-les!

No cal pas que us diguem que el complement d'un bon àpat és un bon vi. Els vins catalans us ofereixen una varietat i una qualitat que ve garantida per les seves denominacions d'origen. Així, podreu saborejar des dels vins blancs i rosats de suau paladar, fins als vins negres d'alta graduació i de tast fort. Els vins escumosos de cava, que requereixen una saviesa de cultiu i envelliment, han adquirit carta de naturalesa a Catalunya i, per la seva qualitat, es compten entre els primers productes d'exportació del país. Si sou afeccionats als licors per cloure un bon àpat, també en trobareu gran varietat i fruireu d'una elaboració quasi artesanal.

... i de gaudir d'una nit alegre

A Barcelona la nit té mil colors i formes diferents tal com s'escau a una ciutat cosmopolita, malgrat que a l'estiu algunes poblacions turístiques ofereixen tantes possibilitats de diversió o més encara. Trobareu espectacles que van des del flamenc més autèntic als dels «night clubs», d'acord amb les línies més atrevides i lliures de l'actualitat sense oblidar les discoteques o les caves de jazz. La nit barcelonesa compta amb establiments insòlits, ben característics: la sala de ball «La Paloma», de decoració i ambient del segle passat, i el «music hall» «El Molino», els quals tenen una personalitat que no trobareu enlloc més. O també podeu temptar la sort en algun dels tres Casinos de Joc oberts a Catalunya, un d'ells, el de Peralada, instal·lat en un castell antic ple d'obres d'art.



Castellano

El arte del buen comer...

La gastronomía catalana proviene, como tantos otros aspectos, de la sabiduría y tradición popular. El tratamiento de productos sencillos consigue maravillas que el paladar agradece. Así, ha de probar el humilde pan untado con tomate, aliñado con aceite y sal, y comprobará que combina a la perfección con anchoas o con la rica variedad de embutidos del país. Pero, por otro lado, los platos catalanes llegan a un grado de inteligente elaboración y originalidad digno de las mejores cocinas. Pruebe si no el pollo con langosta, la lubina a la flor de tomillo y calabacines asados, la perdiz con uvas o el conejo con almendras, el «suquet de peix» o el «fricandó». Cada comarca catalana, en el interior o junto al mar, tiene sus especialidades. ¡Déjese aconsejar y descubralas!

No es necesario decir que el complemento de una buena comida es un buen vino. Los excelentes vinos catalanes le ofrecen una variedad y calidad garantizadas por sus denominaciones de origen. Podrá saborear desde vinos blancos y rosados de suave paladar, hasta los vinos tintos de alta graduación y fuerte paladar. Los vinos espumosos de cava, de sabio cultivo y envejecimiento, han adquirido carta de naturaleza en Cataluña y, por su calidad, figuran entre los primeros productos de la exportación catalana. Y si es aficionado a los licores para finalizar una buena comida, también encontrará gran variedad de ellos, de elaboración casi artesanal.

...y de pasar una noche divertida

En Barcelona la noche tiene mil colores y formas distintas, como corresponde a una ciudad cosmopolita. No obstante, en verano, algunas poblaciones turísticas ofrecen tantas o más posibilidades de diversión. Encontrará espectáculos de todo tipo, desde el más puro flamenco, a los clubs nocturnos de línea más atrevida, sin olvidar las discotecas o las caves de jazz. La noche barcelonesa cuenta con locales insólitos y de gran interés: la sala de baile «La Paloma», con una decoración del siglo pasado y el «music hall» «El Molino», ambos con una personalidad única en su género. Si lo desea, puede probar suerte en alguno de los tres casinos de juego, uno de ellos, el de Peralada, instalado en un antiguo castillo con valiosas obras de arte.



Français

L'art de la bonne cuisine...

Comme à bien d'autres niveaux de la vie catalane, la gastronomie puise ses sources dans la sagesse et la tradition populaires. Les produits les plus simples sont accommodés avec art. Goûtez donc une simple tartine frottée de tomate, arrosée de quelques gouttes d'huile d'olive et saupoudrée d'un peu de sel, délicieuse avec des anchois ou avec l'une parmi la grande variété des charcuteries du pays. La cuisine catalane, d'autre part, élabore ses mets avec une ingéniosité et une originalité dignes des plus grandes cuisines. Pour vous en convaincre, dégustez le poulet à la langouste, le loup au thym et aux courgettes grillées, la perdrix au raisin ou le lapin aux amandes, le «suquet de peix» ou le «fricandó». Dans l'arrière-pays ou au bord de la mer, chaque région catalane possède ses spécialités. Faites-vous aider et découvrez-les!

Et pour accompagner un bon repas, rien de mieux, bien sûr, qu'un bon vin. Les excellents vins catalans vous offrent une variété et une qualité garanties par leur appellation contrôlée. Dégustez les vins blancs ou rosés, doux au palais, ou bien les vins rouges et corsés. Les vins mousseux de cave, élaborés et vieillis avec art, sont célèbres en Catalogne et, grâce à leur exceptionnelle qualité, ils figurent parmi les premières exportations catalanes. Si une liqueur vous tente en fin de repas, vous aurez le plus grand choix parmi nos alcools dont l'élaboration est encore presque artisanale.

...et des diversions nocturnes

Comme il se doit dans toute ville cosmopolite, Barcelone se pare la nuit de mille couleurs et de formes différentes. Pendant l'été, néanmoins, certaines villes touristiques offrent autant ou davantage de possibilités de diversion. Vous aurez le choix entre les spectacles les plus variés, du plus pur flamenco aux clubs nocturnes les plus osés en passant par les discothèques ou les caves de jazz. La nuit barcelonaise foisonne en endroits insolites et amusants: le dancing «La Paloma», avec son décor du siècle dernier et le music-hall «El Molino», deux locaux uniques en leur genre. Mais vous pouvez aussi tenter votre chance dans l'un des trois Casinos de Catalogne dont celui de Peralada, installé dans un ancien château rempli d'oeuvres d'art.



English

The art of eating well...

Catalan cuisine, as so many other aspects of our culture, finds its roots in popular lore and tradition. The manipulation of a few simple elements can result in wonders to delight the taste. For example, you must taste our very humble bread spread with tomato and well garnished with olive oil and salt. It goes perfectly with salted anchovies or any number of sausages made in great variety in our country. On the other hand, Catalan cuisine reaches levels of brilliant preparation and originality worthy of the world's finest. You must at least try chicken with lobster, bass garnished with thyme and served with baked squash, partridge prepared with grapes, rabbit with almonds, fish «suquet» or fricandó. Every region of Catalonia, either inland or by the sea, has its own specialties. Ask for help if you need it and discover new delights.

We don't need to tell you that good wine goes with good food. Catalan wines come in great variety and their quality is assured by the regional label. You can savour wines ranging from delicate whites and roses to strong, robust reds. The cellared sparkling wines which require a special knowledge for their cultivation and maturing, have acquired their «naturalization papers» in Catalonia and because of their very quality make up one of our most important exports. If you like to finish off a good meal with a fine liqueur you will also find these in great variety and many have the touch of the master bottler.

...and if you want to enjoy a night of fun

In Barcelona, the night has many different shapes and colours as can be expected in a cosmopolitan city, although in summer some tourist centres offer just as many possibilities for entertainment, or even more. You can find shows which range from authentic flamenco to those of the night-clubs, including some of the most daring and open-minded to be found anywhere, not to mention the discotheques and the jazz cellars. A night in Barcelona offers some unusual spots very special to the city such as «La Paloma» dance hall with décor and atmosphere of the last century, and «El Molino» music-hall. Both have a personality you won't find any-



Deutsch

Die Kunst der guten Küche


Wie so vieles im Leben schöpft auch die katalanische Küche aus der in Jahrhunderten gesammelten Erfahrung und Überlieferung. Einfache Grundnahrungsmittel werden danach in Gaumenfreuden verwandelt. Sie brauchen nur mal das bescheidene pa amb tomàquet (Weissbrot mit Tomaten eingerieben und mit etwas Olivenöl darüber) und das dann zusammen mit salzigen Anchovis oder mit verschiedenen im Land hergestellten Wurstarten. Aber auch die elaborierte echt katalanische Küche kann mit hervorragenden Speisen aufwarten. Probieren Sie einfach mal Hähnchen mit Languste, oder llobarro a la flor de farigola i carabassons rostits (Meerbarsch in Thymianblüten und gebratener Kürbis), Rebhuhn mit Rosinen, (perdiu amb raïm) oder conill amb ametlles (Hase mit Mandeln), el suquet de peix (verschiedene Fische in einer köstlichen Sauce) oder el fricandó (gebackenes Fleisch in Pilzsosse). Jede Gegend hat seine eigenen Spezialgerichte. Lassen Sie sich beraten und gehen Sie auf kulinarische Entdeckungsreise!

Zu einem guten Essen gehört natürlich ein guter Wein. Bei den katalanischen Weinen können Sie auswählen unter einer grossen Anzahl verschiedenartiger Weine mit Qualitätsmerkmalen, die durch ihre Herkunftsbezeichnungen garantiert sind. Die Skala reicht von den milden Weissweinen und Rosés bis zu den schwereren, herben und hochgradigen Rotweinen. Die Schaumweine «cava», deren Herstellung und Lagerung eine ganze Wissenschaft für sich sind, haben in Katalonien eine lange Tradition. Ihrer hervorragenden Qualität wegen zählen sie zu den wichtigsten Exportgütern des Landes. Oder halten Sie's vielleicht mit einem Likör am Ende eines festlichen Essens, dann finden Sie auch hier eine grosse Auswahl davon; oft hergestellt auf kunsthandwerkliche traditionelle Art und Weise.

...und vom Leben zum Erleben — mal in der Nacht

Tausendfarbig ist die Nacht in Barcelona und so abwechslungsreich, wie es sich für eine Weltstadt gehört. Im Sommer allerdings machen selbst einige Touristenorte der Metropole Konkurrenz, was die nächtlichen Vergnügungen anbetrifft. Von der Schau unverfälschten Flamencos über Diskotheken und Jazz-Keller, bis zu den «night clubs» mit ihren supermodernen Shows finden Sie so ziemlich alles. Barcelona bei Nacht, das bedeutet auch so charakteristische wie einmalige Einrichtungen wie der Tanzsaal «La Paloma» mit aus dem vorigen Jahrhundert stammenden Dekorationen und Ambiente; und die «music hall» «El Molino», deren unverwechselbare «Persönlichkeit» Sie sonst nirgendwo finden werden.





Monument a Colón

Català

Conèixer Barcelona

La ciutat de Barcelona ha estat i és la capital de Catalunya, sense desmerèixer la importància històrica, econòmica i artística d'altres ciutats senyeres al país: Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, Vic, Manresa, Tortosa, Figueres, Reus...

Si voleu conèixer els primers temps de Barcino amb dos mil anys d'antiguitat, heu de passejar per les excavacions arqueològiques de la ciutat romana i podreu admirar la solució tècnica que fa transcórrer el passeig per sota dels carrers i monuments medievals.

Si us perdeu pel Barri Gòtic podreu reviure l'ambient de la Barcelona medieval, al voltant de la catedral, del Palau Reial i dels edificis que encara són avui seu de les institucions de govern, l'Ajuntament de Barcelona i el Palau de la Generalitat de Catalunya (Govern autònom de Catalunya). D'aquí us podeu arribar al proper barri de la Ribera, on trobareu el Museu Picasso i la meravellosa església gòtica de Santa Maria del Mar. I al mateix barri, el Parc de la Ciutadella, amb el Zoològic, Museus i el Parlament de Catalunya. Seguint prop del mar, arribeu-vos a la Barceloneta, un barri del segle XVIII, el més mariner de la ciutat, amb bons restaurants on podreu menjar especialitats marineres.

No penseu passejar per les Rambles presidides pel Gran Teatre del Liceu? Admireu les parades d'ocells, el mercat permanent de flors i els quioscs de diaris, revistes i llibres. De dia i de nit les Rambles conserven un ambient únic i, si teniu temps, veureu com la gent que hi passeja és diferent d'hora en hora... Rambles avall i pels carrers laterals trobareu tota classe d'establiments per menjar i beure.

El segle XIX, la ciutat va viure una etapa de creixement, fruit de la naixent industrialització. Els pobles de les rodalies van ser units pel pla d'urbanisme modèlic d'Ildelfons Cerdà que es coneix amb el nom de l'«Eixample», ara ple de botigues i galeries d'art. Val la pena que passegeu pel lluminós boulevard del Passeig de Gràcia, on admirareu les cases modernistes de la cruïlla del carrer Aragó i la «Pedrera», la casa de façana ondulant construïda per Gaudí. I Eixample enllà arribeu a la Sagrada Família, el gran i insòlit temple del mateix arquitecte, Antoni Gaudí, i al Parc Güell, una altra obra seva que no podeu deixar de visitar.

Els barris senyorials com el de Pedralbes, on s'alça un monestir gòtic tancat per una petita muralla, s'enfilen al peu de la serra de Collserola, cap el Tibidabo on hi ha un Parc d'Attraccions, muntanya a la qual podeu accedir amb el Tramvia Blau, relíquia del passat, i un funicular. A l'altra muntanya de Barcelona arran del mar, Montjuïc, trobareu entre jardins museus interessants com la Fundació Miró i el Museu d'Art de Catalunya, un Parc d'Attraccions i el Poble Espanyol, una reproducció fidel d'esglésies, cases i carrers notables de tot Espanya on els artesans us oferiran obres acurades i tradicionals del treball de la ceràmica, el vidre, les puntes de coixí, el cuir, etc.

A qualsevol època de l'any Barcelona és una ciutat d'intensa activitat cultural, comercial i esportiva i sempre plena de vida: concerts i òpera, teatre, exposicions, bons restaurants, fires internacionals, botigues i galeries d'art. És una ciutat oberta i liberal que invita a passejar i a fruit del contacte humà en els seus carrers i places. Barcelona, una de les grans ciutats europees, mereix ser visitada detingudament i, un cop la conegueu bé, segur que no deixareu de tornar-hi.

Castellano

Conocer Barcelona

La ciudad de Barcelona ha sido y es la capital de Cataluña, sin menoscabo de la importancia histórica, económica y artística de otras ciudades tales como Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, Vic, Manresa, Tortosa, Figueres, Reus...

Si le interesa conocer los orígenes de Barcino, hace dos mil años, ha de pasear por las excavaciones arqueológicas de la ciudad romana y admirará la solución técnica que permite hacer el recorrido bajo las calles y monumentos medievales.

Para revivir el ambiente de la Barcelona medieval, ha de deambular por el barrio gótico, donde se halla la catedral, el Palacio Real, y los antiguos edificios que albergan todavía hoy el Ayuntamiento y el Palau de la Generalitat (gobierno autónomo de Cataluña). Desde aquí, puede seguir al cercano barrio de la Ribera, con el Museo Picasso y la maravillosa iglesia gótica de Santa María del Mar. Y un poco más allá, el Parque de la Ciutadella, con el Zoológico, Museos y el

Parlamento de Cataluña. Y si continúa, bordeando el puerto, llegará a la Barceloneta, un barrio del s. XVIII, el más mariner de la ciudad, que cuenta con buenos restaurantes para degustar especialidades de pescado.

Es obligado un paseo por la Rambla, presidida por el Gran Teatre del Liceu. Podrá recrearse en las paradas de pájaros, en el mercado de flores y en los quioscos de diaris, revistas y libros. De día y de noche la Rambla tiene un ambiente único y la gente que pasea por ella es distinta de hora en hora. Rambla abajo y en las calles laterales hallará toda clase de establecimientos para comer y beber.

La ciudad vivió en el s. XIX una etapa de crecimiento, fruto de la industrialización. Las poblaciones cercanas fueron anexionadas al centro por el plan de urbanismo modélico de Ildelfons Cerdà, que creó el «Eixample» (el Ensanche), hoy lleno de comercios y Galerías de Arte. Vale la pena pasear por el luminoso boulevard del Paseo de Gracia que conserva bellas casas modernistas como las del cruce con la calle de Aragón y la «Pedrera» de Gaudí. En un extremo de «Eixample» se encuentra la Sagrada Família, el insólito templo de Antoni Gaudí y, de este mismo arquitecto, el Parque Güell que también merece ser visitado.

Los barrios señoriales, como el de Pedralbes en el que se alza un monasterio gótico rodeado de una pequeña muralla, se encaraman por las laderas de la Sierra de Collserola, hacia el Tibidabo. A la cumbre de esta montaña, en la que hay un Parque de Atracciones, se puede acceder con el Tranvía Azul, relíquia del pasado, y un funicular. La otra montaña de Barcelona, junto al mar, es la de Montjuïc.

Entre bellos jardines, se hallan interesantes museos como la Fundación Miró y el Museu d'Art de Catalunya, un Parque de Atracciones y el Poble Español, fiel reproducción de iglesias, casas y calles notables de toda España, en la que los artesanos le ofrecerán sus tradicionales obras de cerámica, vidrio, encajes, cuero... etcétera.

En todas las épocas del año, Barcelona es una ciudad de intensa actividad cultural, comercial y deportiva, y siempre llena de vida: conciertos y ópera, teatro, exposiciones, buenos restaurantes, ferias internacionales, comercios y galerías de arte. Es una ciudad abierta y liberal, que invita a pasear y a disfrutar del contacto humano en sus calles y plazas. Barcelona, una de las grandes ciudades europeas, merece ser visitada detenidamente y, una vez bien conocida, seguro que no dejará de volver.

Français

Connaître Barcelone

La ville de Barcelone est depuis toujours la capitale de la Catalogne sans que cela diminue pour autant le prestige et l'importance historique, économique et artistique d'autres villes comme Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, Vic, Manresa, Tortosa, Figueres, Reus...

Si les origines de «Barcino», il y a deux mille ans, vous intéressent, visitez les fouilles archéologiques de la ville romaine; le parcours s'effectue dans un souterrain qui a permis de conserver intacts les rues et les monuments médiévaux.


Pour revivre l'ambiance de la Barcelone médiévale, promenez-vous dans son quartier gothique où se trouvent situés la cathédrale, le Palais Royal, et les anciens édifices qui abritent encore aujourd'hui la Mairie et le «Palau de la Generalitat» (le siège du gouvernement autonome de la Catalogne). Continuez vers le quartier voisin de la Ribera et admirez le Musée Picasso et la splendide église gothique de Santa Maria del Mar. Un peu plus loin le Parc de la «Ciutadella», avec le Zoo, quelques musées et le Parlement de Catalogne. En longeant le port, vous atteindrez la «Barceloneta», le quartier du XVIII^{ème} siècle le plus maritime de la ville où les nombreux restaurants vous offriront leurs spécialités de poissons.


Vous ne pouvez manquer une promenade sur la Rambla où trône son célèbre «Gran Teatre del Liceu». Flânez à son marché aux oiseaux, son marché aux fleurs ou ses kiosques débordants de journaux, de revues et de livres. De jour comme de nuit, l'ambiance que l'on respire sur la Rambla est unique et ses promeneurs changent d'heure en heure. Tout au bas de la Rambla et dans ses rues adjacentes, vous découvrirez tout un choix de bistrotts et de restaurants.

L'essor industriel du XIX^{ème} siècle a été le facteur principal de la prospérité et de l'agrandissement de la ville. Les villages des alentours furent englobés dans le plan modéle d'urbanisme d'Ildelfons Cerdà qui créa «l'Eixample», l'actuel centre de Barcelone où abondent magasins et galeries d'art. Promenez-vous sur le boulevard inondé de lumière du Passeig de Gràcia et admirez ses superbes maisons art-déco comme celles qui sont situées à la hauteur du «carrer d'Aragó» ou bien «la Pedrera» de Gaudí. A une extrémité de «l'Eixample», vous découvrirez la «Sagrada Família», cette église insolite et inachevée, oeuvre du grand architecte catalan Antoni Gaudí; de ce même architecte, le Parc Güell vous émerveillera.

Les quartiers résidentiels, celui de Pedralbes par exemple, avec son monastère gothique entouré d'une muraille, se juchent sur les flancs de la «Serra de Collserola», vers le Tibidabo. Un tramway bleu (le seul qui fonctionne encore dans toute la ville) et un funiculaire vous conduiront au sommet de la colline du Tibidabo où se trouve installé un Parc d'Attractions. L'autre colline de Barcelone, Montjuïc, surplombe la mer. Elle est couverte d'admirables jardins parmi lesquels vous découvrirez d'intéressants musées comme la Fundació Miró et le Musée d'Art de Catalogne, un Parc d'Attractions et le «Pueblo Español», reproduction exacte des villages typiques des différentes provinces d'Espagne où les artisans vous offriront leurs travaux de poterie, de verrerie, de dentelle, de cuir...

Tout au long de l'année, Barcelone possède une intense activité culturelle, commerciale et sportive: concerts et opéras, théâtre, expositions, bons restaurants, foires et salons internationaux, magasins et galeries d'art. Ville accueillante et libérale, elle invite aux promenades et aux rencontres. Barcelone, l'une des plus grandes villes européennes, mérite d'être visitée en détail et quand vous la connaîtrez vraiment, nous sommes sûrs que vous aurez envie d'y revenir.






Sagrada Família (Gaudí)



Barri Gòtic



Passeig de Gràcia

English

Getting to know Barcelona

The city of Barcelona has long been the capital of Catalonia, which doesn't mean to take away from the historic, economic and artistic importance of other key cities such as Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, Vic, Manresa, Tortosa, Figueras and Reus. If you would like to learn about the early days of «Barcino» dating back two thousand years, you should wander through the excavations of the Roman city. Here, too, you can marvel at the technical solution which provides a passage below the streets and buildings of the Middle Ages.

If you venture into the Gothic Quarter you can relive the atmosphere of medieval Barcelona around the cathedral, the Royal Palace, and the buildings which today house the seats of government — the Barcelona City Hall and the Palace of the Generalitat (the Autonomous Government of Catalonia). From here you can reach the Ribera neighbourhood where the Picasso Museum is located and the splendid Gothic church of Santa Maria del Mar. In the same area you'll find the Park of the Ciutadella with its Zoo, Museums and the House of Parliament of Catalonia.

Staying near the sea, you come to Barceloneta, the most maritime quarter of the city dating back to the 18th Century, with many fine restaurants where you can eat the best in sea-food specialities.

No doubt you'll be taking a walk along the Rambla where you can see the Gran Teatre del Liceu. You'll love

the stands selling birds, the flower market, the kiosks where you can buy newspapers, magazines and books.

Day or night, the Rambla maintains its unique atmosphere and if you have time you can see how the people who wander by change from one hour to the next. Down the Rambla and on the side streets you will come across every kind of place to eat and drink.

In the 19th Century the city lived a period of great expansion as a result of growing industrialization. The nearby towns were fused within the model city plan drawn up by Ildefons Cerdà known as the «Eixample», today full of boutiques and art galleries. It's worthwhile taking a walk along the grand boulevard of the Passeig de Gràcia where you can admire the Art Nouveau houses at the intersection with Carrer Aragó, and the «Pedrera», the building with the undulating facade built by Antoni Gaudí. A little way off, you come to the Sagrada Família, the vast and unbelievable church also designed by Gaudí, and Güell Park another of his great works which you must not miss visiting.

The elegant residential districts like Pedralbes, with its Gothic monastery, are strung along the foot of the Collserola Range toward the Tibidabo which has an amusement park. You can reach the Tibidabo by the «Blue» tramcar, a charming relic of the past, and a funicular. On Montjuïc, Barcelona's other mountain at the sea's edge, in a fine garden setting you can visit museums such as the Miró Foundation and the Museum of Catalan Art, an amusement park, and the Poble Espanyol (Spanish Village) — a faithful reproduction of notable churches, houses and streets from all over Spain where craftsmen carefully follow the traditions of their trade in ceramics, glass-making, lace, leather, etc.

At any time of the year, Barcelona is a city of intense activity — in culture, commerce and sports — and it's always full of life with concerts, opera and theatre, exhibitions, fine restaurants, international fairs, art galleries and good shopping. Here is a city which is open and liberal minded where you can enjoy walking and the human contact of its streets and squares. One of the great cities of Europe, Barcelona deserves an unrushed visit and once you know it well you certainly will return.

Deutsch

Ein Besuch in Barcelona

Die Stadt Barcelona ist —und ist immer gewesen— die Hauptstadt von Katalonien, ohne damit an der historischen, wirtschaftlichen und künstlerischen Bedeutung anderer einflussreicher Städte des Landes wie: Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, Vic, Manresa, Tortosa, Figueres, Reus... irgendwelche Abstriche machen zu wollen. Wenn Sie ihre Anfänge vor zweitausend Jahren kennenlernen wollen, das damalige «Barcino», dann schauen Sie sich mal die archäologischen Ausgrabungen der römischen Stadt an. Achten Sie dort auch auf die technische Lösung von römischen Strassenanlagen unter den mittelalterlichen mit ihren Denkmälern.

Um die Kathedrale herum ist der Barri Gòtic, das gotische Stadtviertel. Bummeln Sie ein bisschen, scheinbar verloren, von da aus zum Meer hin. Sie erleben auf Schritt und Tritt das mittelalterliche Barcelona. Da ist der Palau Reial, der Königspalast, und da sind die Gebäude, heute noch Sitz der katalanischen Regierungsinstitutionen, das Rathaus, der Palau de la Generalitat de Catalunya (Sitz der autonomen Regierung Kataloniens). In unmittelbarer Nähe sind Sie schon im Barcelonetaer Stadtteil Ribera, wo das Picasso Museum liegt und die herrliche gotische Kirche Santa Maria del Mar. In demselben Stadtteil liegt auch der Ciutadella —Park mit dem Zoologischen Garten, einige Museen und das Parlament von Katalonien. Weiter zum Meer hin kommen Sie nach Barceloneta, ein Stadtteil aus dem 18. Jahrhundert. Hier berührt Barcelona das Meer. Sie bemerken das auch an den guten Restaurants mit ihrer grossen Auswahl an Fischgerichten.

Zurück auf den Rambles (die zum Hafen führende Allee) bemerken Sie auf halber Höhe das Gran Teatre del Liceu. Die Verkaufsstände für Blumen und Vögel und dazwischen die Zeitungskioske verbreiten eine ganz eigene Atmosphäre. Das Ambiente auf den Rambles ist einmalig und wenn Sie ein bisschen dort verweilen, können Sie beobachten, wie die dort vorbeiziehenden Menschen von Stunde zu Stunde, Tag und Nacht sich wesentlich voneinander unterscheiden. In den Seitenstrassen der Rambles finden Sie unter den Speiselokalen bis zu erstklassigen Restaurants bestimmt das was Sie suchten.


Im 19. Jahrhundert brachte die beginnende Industrialisierung der Stadt einen Wachstumsboom. Die Sied-

lungsgebiete am damaligen Stadtrand wurden auf der Basis eines vorbildlichen Planes von Ildefons Cerdà unter dem Namen «Eixample» (Stadterweiterung) an den Stadtkern angeschlossen. Heute findet man in diesen Wohnvierteln viele Geschäfte und Kunstgalerien. Bummeln Sie doch den Passeig de Gràcia rauf und runter und achten Sie dabei auf die Häuser im Jugendstil an der Kreuzung mit der Aragó-Strasse; schauen Sie sich la «Pedrera» an, das von Gaudí gebaute Wohnhaus mit den geschwungenen Fassaden. Etwas weiter östlich davon steht das auf der ganzen Welt bekannte Werk desselben Architekten Antoni Gaudí, die Kirche der Sagrada Família. Der Parc Güell in Nordosten der Stadt ist ein weiteres Beispiel Gaudís Erfindungsreichtums.

Die feinen Wohngebiete, wie das in Pedralbes mit seinem gotischen, von einer Mauer eingeschlossenen Kloster, ziehen sich vom Fuss des Collserola zum Tibidabo hinauf, dem vielbesuchten Ausblicksberg mit seinem Vergnügungspark, zu dem man ausser mit dem Auto auch mit der «Blauen Strassenbahn», einer an die gute alte Zeit erinnernden Veteranin und der Zahnradbahn hochfährt. Auf dem anderen Barcelona überragenden Berg, dem Montjuïc, ganz nah am Meer gelegen, finden Sie zwischen Parkanlagen und Gärten interessante Museen wie die Fundació Miró und das Museu d'Art de Catalunya; auch einen Vergnügungspark und dann das Poble Espanyol, das Spanische Dorf, eine naturgetreue Nachbildung bemerkenswerter Kirchen, Häuser und Strassen von ganz Spanien; hier bieten auch Kunsthandwerker traditionelle Arbeiten zum Verkauf an: Keramik- und Glasarbeiten, Stickereien und Klöppelarbeiten, Lederwaren und anderes mehr.

Das ganze Jahr über ist Barcelona eine Stadt mit intensivem kulturellem Leben, mit regem Handel und spannenden sportlichen Ereignissen, eine Stadt, in der menschliches Schaffen vibrieren lässt: Konzerte un Opern, Theater, Ausstellungen jeder Art, vorzügliche Restaurants, internationale Messen, elegante Geschäfte und viele Kunstgalerien. Barcelona ist eine liberale, aufgeschlossene Stadt; hier muss man einfach spaziergehen und mit den Menschen auf Strassen und Plätzen ins Gespräch kommen.

Barcelona als eine der grossen europäischen Städte verdient eigentlich einen etwas verhaltenen Besuch, ein Verweilen. Wer Barcelona wirklich kennengelernt hat, war ganz bestimmt nicht zum letztenmal hier.



Català

La vida esportiva

La pràctica esportiva és intensa a Catalunya on existeixen Federacions de més de 50 especialitats. Hi ha tot tipus d'instal·lacions, des dels trenta-quatre ports esportius per als afeccionats a la navegació als vuit camps de golf, prop de la costa o a l'interior del país. No podem pas oblidar els tres aeroclubs i, a l'hivern, les dotze estacions d'esquí proveïdes de tots els serveis per fer fructifera la vostra estada tant des del punt de vista esportiu com turístic. Si sou afeccionats a la pesca fluvial, els rius de muntanya us brindaran l'ocasió d'obtenir excel·lents i abundants peces. I si és la caça major la vostra activitat preferida també podreu provar la vostra destresa sobre els isards i els senglars o la cabra hispànica.

Per als esports de pràctica més freqüent, cada poble de Catalunya amb una certa entitat d'habitants compta amb pistes de tennis, un camp de futbol i una pista poliesportiva on els joves fan esport amb el somni d'arribar a sobresortir a nivell internacional. Volem destacar entre la completa gamma d'esports practicats, l'hoquei, modalitat on els equips catalans han aconseguit i aconsegueixen èxits mundials. Cal citar la llarga tradició de l'esport del muntanyisme amb les variants d'escalada i espeleologia.



Pel que fa a l'esport espectacle, la ciutat de Barcelona compta amb dos grans equips de futbol coneguts arreu del món: el Reial Club Esportiu Espanyol i el Futbol Club Barcelona, el Barça. Aquest darrer té més de 100.000 socis i un dels més grans estadis del món amb capacitat per 120.000 espectadors i la seva història arrenca de finals del segle passat.

La tradició esportiva catalana fa que la ciutat de Barcelona hagi presentat la seva candidatura per a esdevenir la seu de l'Olimpíada de 1992. Si aquesta aspiració es confirma, esperem retrobar-vos a casa nostra.

Castellano

La vida deportiva

La pràctica deportiva es intensa en Cataluña, donde existen Federaciones de más de 50 especialidades. Hay todo tipo de instalaciones: treinta y cuatro puertos deportivos para los aficionados a la navegación, ocho campos de golf, tres aeroclubs, doce estaciones de esquí provistas de todos los servicios para hacer más agradable la estancia desde el punto de vista deportivo y turístico. Si es aficionado a la pesca fluvial, los ríos de montaña le brindan la ocasión de practicarla, y si es la caza mayor, el jabalí, el rebeco o la cabra hispánica le aguardan



durante las temporadas permitidas en las reservas de caza.

Muchas poblaciones de Cataluña cuentan con instalaciones para los deportes de práctica más frecuente: pistas de tenis, campo de fútbol o poli-deportivo, donde los jóvenes hacen deporte con la ilusión de sobresalir internacionalmente. Entre las especialidades practicadas, podemos destacar el hockey, modalidad en la que los equipos catalanes han conseguido triunfos mundiales. Merece citarse la gran tradición que el deporte del montañismo tiene en Cataluña, junto con las modalidades de escalada y espeleología.

En el deporte espectáculo, la ciudad de Barcelona cuenta con dos grandes equipos de fútbol bien conocidos, el «Real Club Deportivo Español» y el «Fútbol Club Barcelona», el Barça. Este tiene más de 100.000 socios y uno de los mayores estadios del mundo, con una capacidad de 120.000 espectadores. Fue creado a finales del pasado siglo.

La tradición deportiva catalana ha llevado a la ciudad de Barcelona a presentar su candidatura para los Juegos Olímpicos de 1992. Si esta aspiración se confirma, esperamos verle de nuevo entre nosotros.

Français

La vie sportive

La pratique du sport est très répandue en Catalogne et ses Fédérations sportives abritent plus de cinquante spécialités. La Catalogne possède des installations de toutes sortes: trente-quatre ports de plaisance pour les amateurs de navigation, huit terrains de golf, trois aéroclubs, douze stations de ski équipées de tous les services nécessaires pour rendre votre séjour sportif et touristique, plus agréable. Si vous aimez la pêche, il vous sera facile de la pratiquer dans nos rivières de montagne mais si vous préférez la chasse de gros gibier, le sanglier, le chamois et la chèvre hispanique vous attendent pendant les périodes de chasse autorisées.

La plupart des villes de Catalogne disposent d'installations pour la pratique des sports les plus courants: courts de tennis, terrains de football ou d'autres sports où s'entraînent nos futurs champions, notre équipe de hockey, par exemple, qui a déjà obtenu plusieurs victoires internationales. L'alpinisme possède en Catalogne une longue tradition ainsi que l'escalade et la spéléologie.

Quant au sport-spectacle, la ville de Barcelone possède deux grandes équipes de football bien connues, le «Reial Club Esportiu Espanyol» et le «Futbol Club Barcelona», le «Barça». Ce dernier comprend plus de 100.000 membres et possède l'un des plus grands stades du monde, avec une capacité de 120.000 spectateurs. Il a été créé à la fin du siècle dernier.

Encouragée par la tradition sportive catalane, la ville de Barcelone a présenté sa candidature pour les Jeux Olympiques de 1992. Si cette candidature se confirme, nous espérons vous voir à nouveau parmi nous.

English

The sports scene

In Catalonia, sport holds an important place, a fact confirmed by the existence of more than 50 specialized sports federations. All types of facilities are available, from 34 marinas for sailing the coast, others inland. Let's not overlook the three aeroclubs and in winter the dozen ski resorts equipped with every facility to make your stay worthwhile not only from a skier's point of view but also that from of a tourist. If you like sport fishing the mountain rivers offer excellent opportunities for a fine catch. If hunting is your preferred pastime you can try your skill on chamois, wild boar or mountain goat.

For most popular sports every town in Catalonia of any size has its tennis courts, its football field, and its athletics track where youngsters can practise with dreams of excelling at the international level. Among the wide range of sports practised in Catalonia we should mention hockey, a sport in which our teams have won and continue to win world successes. We must not forget Catalonia's long tradition in mountaineering with its variants of rock climbing and speleology, or cave exploring.

As far as spectator sports are concerned, the city of Barcelona has two great football teams known around

with a capacity of 120,000 spectators. The «Barça» has a history going back to the turn of the century. Catalonia's sporting tradition has led the City of Barcelona to present its candidature to become the seat of the 1992 Olympics. If we win this goal, we hope to welcome you here again...

Deutsch

Sport

In Katalonien wird mit grosser Begeisterung Sport getrieben. Das kann man auch schon an den Sportverbänden für über 50 Disziplinen erkennen. Es gibt jede Art von Sportanlagen, von den vierunddreissig Sporthäfen für die Segel — und Motorbootsportler bis zu den acht Golfplätzen nahe der Küste und auch im Landesinneren gelegen. Nicht zu vergessen die drei Sportflugplätze mit ihren Aeroclubs; und im Winter stehen zwölf Wintersportgebiete mit allen erforderlichen technischen Einrichtungen zur Verfügung, um Ihnen Ihren Aufenthalt in jeder Hinsicht so angenehm wie möglich zu machen. Den Angelsportlern bieten die Bergflüsse reichlich Möglichkeiten; sollten Sie zu den Jägern gehören, dann könnten Sie in der Jagdsaison die kleine Bergziege, den Wildschwein oder der capra hispànica nachstellen.

Für die üblichen Sportarten verfügt jede grössere Ortschaft Kataloniens über Tennisplatzanlagen, einen Fussballplatz und eine Mehrzweck-Sportanlage, wo die Jugend Sport treibt, in der Hoffnung, einmal internationales Niveau zu erreichen. Beim Hockey zum Beispiel ist es Ihnen auch schon gelungen. Bergwandern, Bergsteigen und Höhlenwandern haben eine lange Tradition in Katalonien. Zwei grosse und in der ganzen Welt bekannte Fussballvereine Barcelonas — der «Reial Club Esportiu Espanyol» und der «Futbol Club Barcelona» ziehen grosse Anhänger an. Allein der Barça, der Ende des vergangenen Jahrhunderts gegründet wurde, hat heute weit über 100 000 Mitglieder, die in seinem Stadion für 120 000 Zuschauer leicht Platz finden.

Die Stadt Barcelona will Austragungsort der Olympischen Spiele 1992 wer-



Català

Castellano

Français

English

Deutsch

La llengua catalana

El català és la llengua pròpia de Catalunya i és oficial igual que el castellà. Deriva del llatí com el castellà i altres llengües europees, i és una llengua ben viva emprada arreu de Catalunya. Els catalans ens sentim orgullosos de la nostra llengua perquè el català ha estat i és expressió d'una cultura pròpia que molt sovint ha traspassat l'àmbit de Catalunya. A continuació us oferim un breu vocabulari per si desitgeu utilitzar-lo:

La lengua catalana

El catalán es la lengua propia de Cataluña y es oficial igual que el castellano. Deriva del latín, como el castellano y otras lenguas europeas, y es una lengua viva utilizada en toda Cataluña. Los catalanes nos sentimos orgullosos de nuestra lengua, porque el catalán ha sido y es expresión de una cultura propia que a menudo ha traspasado el ámbito de Cataluña. A continuación, le ofrecemos un breve vocabulario por si desea utilizarlo:

La langue catalane

Le catalan, la langue de la Catalogne, est la langue officielle du pays au même que l'espagnol. Elle vient du latin comme l'espagnol et d'autres langues européennes et c'est une langue vivante qui se parle dans toute la Catalogne. Les catalans se sentent fiers de leur langue car le catalan a toujours été le reflet d'une culture qui leur est propre et qui, bien souvent, a franchi les frontières de la Catalogne. Nous vous offrons ci-dessous un vocabulaire succinct vous désirerez peut-être utiliser:

The Catalan language

Catalan is the language of Catalonia and has official language status as does Castilian (Spanish). Derived from Latin, like a number of other European tongues, Catalan is a living language used throughout Catalonia. We Catalans are proud of our language because it always has been and continues to be an expression of our own culture which often has reached far beyond the boundaries of Catalonia. We have prepared the following brief vocabulary which you may wish to try out:

Die katalanische Sprache

Das Katalanisch ist die Sprache Kataloniens, den offiziellen Status teilt es mit dem Kastilisch (Spanisch). Das Katalanisch kommt vom Latein, genauso wie das Kastilisch und andere europäische Sprachen. Wir Katalanen sind stolz auf unsere Sprache, weil in und mit ihr eine eigene Kultur ausgedrückt worden ist und wird, eine oft über das katalanische Kernland hinausstrahlende Kultur. Es folgt ein kleines Vokabular; vielleicht versuchen Sie, es da und dort anzuwenden:

dilluns _____
dimarts _____
dimecres _____
dijous _____
divendres _____
dissabte _____
diumenge _____

lunes _____
martes _____
miércoles _____
jueves _____
viernes _____
sábado _____
domingo _____

lundi _____
mardi _____
mercredi _____
jeudi _____
vendredi _____
samedi _____
dimanche _____

Monday _____
Tuesday _____
Wednesday _____
Thursday _____
Friday _____
Saturday _____
Sunday _____

Montag _____
Dienstag _____
Mittwoch _____
Donnerstag _____
Freitag _____
Samstag _____
Sonntag _____

ahir _____
avui _____
demà _____

ayer _____
hoy _____
mañana _____

hier _____
aujourd'hui _____
demain _____

yesterday _____
today _____
tomorrow _____

gestern _____
heute _____
morgen _____

u, un, una _____
dos, dues _____
tres _____
quatre _____
cinc _____
sis _____
set _____
vuit _____
nou _____
deu _____

un, uno, una _____
dos _____
tres _____
cuatro _____
cinco _____
seis _____
siete _____
ocho _____
nueve _____
diez _____

un, une _____
deux _____
trois _____
quatre _____
cinq _____
six _____
sept _____
huit _____
neuf _____
dix _____

one _____
two _____
three _____
four _____
five _____
six _____
seven _____
eight _____
nine _____
ten _____

ein, eine _____
zwei _____
drei _____
vier _____
fünf _____
sechs _____
sieben _____
acht _____
neun _____
zehn _____

si/no _____

sí/no _____

oui/non _____

yes/no _____

ja/nein _____

(moltes) gràcies _____

(muchas) gracias _____

merci (beaucoup) _____

(many) thanks _____

(vielen)/Dank _____

bon dia _____
bona tarda _____
bona nit _____

buenos días _____
buenas tardes _____
buenas noches _____

bonjour _____
bonsoir _____
bonne nuit _____

good morning/day _____
good evening _____
good night _____

guten Morgen/Tag _____
guten Abend _____
gute Nacht _____

Parleu castellà/
francès/anglès/alemany? _____

¿Habla castellano/
francés/inglés/alemán? _____

Parlez-vous espagnol/
français/anglais/allemand? _____

Do you speak Castilian (Spanish)/
French/English/German? _____

Sprechen Sie Spanisch/
Französisch/Englisch/Deutsch? _____

Com es diu això en català? _____

¿Cómo se llama esto en catalán? _____

Comment dit-on cela en catalan? _____

How do you say that in Catalan? _____

Wie heisst das auf Katalanisch? _____

Parleu una mica més a poc a poc,
si us plau _____

Hable más lento,
por favor _____

Parlez plus lentement
s'il vous plaît _____

Speak a little more slowly,
please _____

Sprechen Sie etwas langsamer,
bitte _____

On és ...? _____
Cerco ... _____
Voldria ... _____
Necessito ... _____

¿Dónde está ...? _____
Busco ... _____
Quisiera ... _____
Necesito ... _____

Où est ...? _____
Je cherche ... _____
Je voudrais ... _____
J'ai besoin de ... _____

Where is ...? _____
I am looking for ... _____
I should like ... _____
I need ... _____

Wo ist ...? _____
Ich suche ... _____
Ich hätte gern ... _____
Ich brauche ... _____

Com us dieu? _____
Com te dius? _____
Em dic ... _____

¿Cómo se llama usted? _____
¿Cómo te llamas? _____
Me llamo ... _____

Comment vous appelez-vous? _____
Comment t'appelles-tu? _____
Je m'appelle ... _____

What is your name? _____
What is your name? (Familiar) _____
My name is ... _____

Wie heissen Sie? _____
Wie heisst du? _____
Ich heisse ... _____

Per anar a ...? _____
És lluny/a prop? _____

¿Para ir a ...? _____
¿Está lejos/cerca? _____

Pour aller à ... _____
C'est loin/près? _____

How do I get to ...? _____
Is it far/close? _____

Nach ... _____
Ist es weit? nahe? _____

On és la pròxima
gasolinera/el pròxim taller
de reparació _____

¿Dónde se encuentra la próxima
gasolinera/el próximo taller
de reparación? _____

Où est la station-service
la plus proche/le garage
le plus proche _____

Where is the next gas
(petrol) station/the closest
motor mechanic? _____

Wo ist die nächste Tankstelle?
Wo ist die nächste
Reparaturwerkstatt? _____

Ompliu el dipòsit, si us plau _____

Llene el depósito, por favor _____

Le plein, s'il vous plaît _____

Fill the tank, please _____

Voiltanken, bitte _____

Quant val? _____

¿Cuánto cuesta? _____

Ça vaut combien? _____

How much? _____

Wieviel kostet das? _____

És car _____

Es caro _____

C'est cher _____

It is expensive _____

Es ist teuer _____

En té de més bon preu/
més gran/més petit/
un altre color? _____

¿Tiene algo más barato/
más grande/más pequeño/
de otro color? _____

Y-a-t-il quelque chose de moins cher/
plus grand/plus petit/
d'une autre couleur? _____

Do you have a cheaper one/
a larger one/a smaller one/
another colour? _____

Haben Sie davon etwas
Preiswerteres? etwas grösser/
etwas kleiner/eine andere Farbe _____

Té alguna habitació lliure?
Per una nit/per a dues persones _____

¿Tiene alguna habitación libre?
Para una noche/para dos personas _____

Avez-vous une chambre libre?
Pour une nuit/pour deux personnes _____

Do you have an empty room?
For one night/for two people _____

Haben Sie ein freies Zimmer?
Für eine Nacht/Für zwei Personen _____

A quina hora es pot esmorzar/
dinar/sopar? _____

¿A qué hora se puede desayunar/
comer, cenar? _____

A quelle heure peut-on déjeuner/
diner? _____

At what time do you serve breakfast/
lunch/dinner? _____

Wann ist das Frühstück/
Mittagessen/Abendessen? _____

Adéu/a reveure _____

Adiós/hasta la vista _____

Au revoir _____

Goodbye, see you again _____

Auf Wiedersehn _____

• Si esteu interessats en la llengua catalana, trobareu a les llibreries diccionaris catalans de castellà, francès, anglès, alemany, italià, portuguès.


• Si está interesado en la lengua catalana, encontrará en las librerías diccionarios catalanes de castellano, francés, inglés, alemán, italiano, portugués.

• Si la langue catalane vous intéresse, vous trouverez dans les librairies des dictionnaires catalan-espagnol, français, anglais, allemand, italien, portugais.

• If you are interested in the Catalan language, you will find Catalan dictionaries for Castilian, French, English, German, Italian and Portuguese in most bookstores.

• Wenn Sie Interesse haben an der katalanischen Sprache, dann finden Sie in den Buchhandlungen Wörterbücher für Katalanisch-Spanisch, Französisch, Englisch, Deutsch, Italienisch, Portugiesisch.





Català

Esperem que mitjançant aquest full haguem aconseguit desvetllar el vostre interès per Catalunya i els seus atractius. Les Oficines d'Informació Turística us poden donar tota mena d'informació. N'hi ha 80 arreu de Catalunya disposades a ajudar-vos. Les poblacions següents en tenen:

Oficines d'Informació Turística a Catalunya.

- L'AMETLLA DE MAR**
• Av. Amistat Hispano-italiana
- ARBÚCIES**
• Camprodon, 47
Tel. (972) 86 02 27
• Carrer Major, 2
Tel. (972) 86 00 01
- ARENYS DE MAR**
• Passeig Xifré.
Tel. (93) 792 15 37
- BARCELONA**
• Pl. Neruda, s/n.
(Diagonal/Aragó).
Tel. (93) 245 76 21
• Estació de França.
Tel. (93) 319 27 91
• Pl. de Sant Jaume.
Tel. (93) 318 25 25
• Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, núm. 658. Tel. (93) 301 74 43
• Estació de Sants
Tel. (93) 250 25 94
- BARRUERA**
• Ajuntament. Tel. (973) 69 60 29

Castellano

Esperamos que mediante este folleto hayamos conseguido desvelar su interés por Cataluña y sus atractivos. Las Oficinas de Información Turística le pueden dar toda clase de información. Existen 80 en toda Cataluña dispuestas a ayudarle, en las siguientes poblaciones:

Oficinas de Información Turística en Cataluña.

- BEGUR**
• Plaça de l'Església, 1.
Tel. (972) 62 21 21
- BELLVER DE CERDANYA**
• Àrea del Cadí
Tel. (973) 51 02 23
• Plaça Sant Roc, 9.
- BELLMUNT DEL PRIORAT**
• Carrer Major, 49.
Tel. (977) 83 03 79
- BERGA**
• Carrer dels Àngels, 7.
Tel. (93) 821 03 04
- BESALÚ**
• Plaça de la Llibertat, 1.
Tel. (972) 59 02 25
- BLANES**
• Passeig de Dintre.
Tel. (972) 33 03 48
- BOSSOST**
• Passeig de Bossost
- CADAQUÈS**
• Cotxe 2-A. Tel. (972) 25 83 15

Français

Nous espérons que grâce à cette brochure, nous aurons réussi à éveiller votre intérêt pour la Catalogne et ses multiples attraits. Nos Offices d'Information Touristique vous fourniront tous les renseignements nécessaires. Il en existe 80, à votre disposition dans toute la Catalogne et dans les villes suivantes:

Offices d'Information Touristique en Catalogne.

- CALAFELL**
• Vilamar, 1. Tel. (977) 69 17 59
- CALDES D'ESTRAC**
• Baixada de l'Estació, 3.
Tel. (93) 791 02 89
- CALELLA**
• Sant Jaume. Tel. (93) 769 05 59
- CAMBRILS**
• Plaça Creu de la Missió, s/n.
Tel. (977) 36 11 59
- CAMPRODON**
• Ajuntament. Tel. (972) 74 00 10
- CANET DE MAR**
• Riera Gabarra, 15.
Tel. (93) 794 01 01
- CARDONA**
• Plaça de la Fira, 1.
- CASTELLDEFELS**
• Pl. Rosa dels Vents, s/n. Apartat de Correus 66.
Tel. (93) 664 23 01
- CASTELLÓ D'EMPÚRIES**
• Carretera de Besalú a Roses
- CERVERA**
• Passeig Balmes, 4.
Tel. (973) 53 13 50
- L'ESCALA**
• Plaça de les Escoles, 1.
Tel. (972) 77 06 03
- L'ESPLUGA DE FRANCOLÍ**
• Torres Jordi, 16.
Tel. (977) 87 04 54
- L'ESTARIT**
• Roca Maura, 29.
Tel. (972) 75 89 10
• Eivissa, 12, baixos.
Tel. (972) 75 79 01
- FIGUERES**
• Plaça del Sol.
Tel. (972) 50 31 55
- GIRONA**
• Plaça del Vi, 1.
Tel. (972) 20 26 79
• Estació Renfe.
Tel. (972) 21 62 96
• Ciutadans, 12.
Tel. (972) 20 16 94
- LA JONQUERA**
• Autopista A-17 (Zona 14).
Tel. (972) 54 06 42
- LLANÇÀ**
• Av. d'Europa.
Tel. (972) 38 08 55
- LLEIDA**
• Av. de Madrid, s/n.
Tel. (973) 27 20 85
- LLORET DE MAR**
• Plaça de la Vila.
Tel. (972) 36 47 35
• Terminal d'autobusos a la Ctra. de Blanes. Tel. (972) 38 08 55
- MALGRAT DE MAR**
• Carme, 30. Tel. (93) 761 00 82
- MANRESA**
• Plaça Major, 1.
Tel. (93) 872 53 78
- MATARÓ**
• Carrer de la Riera, 27.
Tel. (93) 796 08 08
- MONTBLANC**
• Plaça Ajuntament, 1.
Tel. (977) 86 00 09
- OLOT**
• Mulleres, s/n. (Edifici Plaça del Mercat). Tel. (972) 26 01 41
- PALAFRUGELL**
• Carrilet, 2.

English

We hope that this brochure has helped to stimulate your interest in Catalonia and its attractions. The Offices of Tourism can give you information of all kinds. Some 80 Tourist Information Offices throughout Catalonia are ready to help you. You'll find them in the following towns:

Tourist Information Offices in Catalonia.

- PALAMÓS**
• Passeig del Mar, 8.
Tel. (972) 31 43 90
- PALS**
• Plaça d'Espanya, 5.
Tel. (972) 30 17 09
- PINEDA DE MAR**
• Ctra. Nacional II.
Tel. (93) 762 34 90
- PLATJA D'ARO**
• Carrer Verdaguier, 11.
Tel. (972) 81 71 79
- LA POBLA DE SEGUR**
• Av. Verdaguier, 12.
Tel. (973) 68 02 57
- PORTBOU**
• Passeig de la Sardana, 11.
Tel. (972) 39 02 84
• Estació RENFE.
Tel. (972) 39 05 07
- EL PRAT DE LLOBREGAT**
• Aeroport de Barcelona.
Tel. (93) 325 58 29
- PUIGCERDA**
• Querol (baixos Ajuntament).
Tel. (972) 88 05 42
- REUS**
• Sant Joan, 36.
Tel. (977) 31 00 61
- RIPOLL**
• Plaça Abad Oliba, s/n.
Tel. (972) 70 11 09
- ROSES**
• Av. de Rhode, s/n.
Tel. (972) 25 73 31
- SALOU**
• Espigó del Moll
Tel. (977) 38 02 33
- SANT ANTONI DE CALONGE**
• Av. Catalunya, s/n.
Tel. (972) 31 55 56
- SANT CARLES DE LA RÀPITA**
• Plaça Carles III.
Tel. (977) 74 07 17
- SANT CELONI**
• Plaça de la Vila, s/n.
Tel. (93) 867 04 25
- SANT CUGAT DEL VALLÈS**
• Plaça de Barcelona, 17
Tel. (93) 674 09 50
- SANT FELIU DE GUÍXOLS**
• Plaça d'Espanya, 1.
Tel. (972) 32 03 80
- SANT JOAN DE LES ABADESSES**
• Comte Guifré i Beat Miró, 8.
Tel. (972) 72 00 92
- SANT LLORENÇ DE MORUNYS**
• Ajuntament.
Tel. (93) 821 09 12
- SANTA COLOMA DE QUERALT**
• Pati d'Arnes del Castell, s/n.
- SEGUR DE CALAFELL**
• Vistula, 1.
Tel. (977) 69 13 13

Deutsch

Vielleicht sind die Hinweise in dieser Broschüre Anlass, sich für Katalonien und seine Schönheiten zu interessieren. Die Fremdenverkehrsbüros helfen Ihnen gern weiter. In ganz Katalonien gibt es 80 Fremdenverkehrsbüros und zwar in folgenden Orten:

Fremdenverkehrsbüros in Katalonien.

- LA SEU D'URGELL**
• Passeig Brodieur, s/n.
Tel. (973) 35 09 91
- SITGES**
• Plaça d'Eduard Maristany.
Tel. (93) 894 12 30
- SOLSONA**
• Castell, 20. Tel. (973) 811 00 50
- TARRAGONA**
• Passeig de les Palmeres, 1.
Tel. (977) 23 89 22
• Rambla Nova, 46.
Tel. (977) 23 34 15
- TÀRREGA**
• Les Piques, 1.
Tel. (973) 31 07 31
- TORREDEMBARRA**
• Av. de Pompeu Fabra, 3.
Tel. (977) 64 03 31
- TORROELLA DE MONTGRÍ**
• Av. Lluís Companys (local de la Policia Municipal).
Tel. (972) 75 89 10
- TORTOSA**
• Pl. d'Espanya, s/n.
Tel. (977) 44 00 00
- TOSSA DE MAR**
• Ctra. de Lloret «Terminal»
Tel. (972) 34 01 08
- VALLS**
• Plaça del Blat, 1.
Tel. (977) 60 10 43
- EL VENDRELL**
• Doctor Robert, 18.
Tel. (977) 66 02 92
- VIC**
• Ciutat, 1. Tel. (93) 886 20 91
- VIELLA**
• Sarríulera, 6. Tel. (973) 64 09 79
- VILAFRANCA DEL PENEDÈS**
• Cort, 14.
Tel. (93) 892 03 58
- VILANOVA I LA GELTRÚ.**
• Plaça de la Vila, 8.
Tel. (93) 893 00 00
• La torre de Ribes Roges (plataja).
Tel. (93) 893 59 57

Català

A totes aquestes Oficines podeu sol·licitar les publicacions gratuïtes de la Direcció General de Turisme del Departament de Comerç, Consum i Turisme de la Generalitat de Catalunya:

Castellano

En todas estas Oficinas puede solicitar las publicaciones gratuitas de la Dirección General de Turismo del Departamento de Comercio, Consumo i Turismo de la Generalitat de Catalunya:

Français

Dans tous ces Offices vous pouvez demander les publications gratuites de la Direction General de Tourisme del Departament de Comerç, Consum i Turisme de la Generalitat de Catalunya:

English

You may ask for free publications of the Direcció General de Turisme, Departament de Comerç, Consum i Turisme, Generalitat de Catalunya at the following offices:

Deutsch

In allen nachstehenden Büros erhalten Sie auf Wunsch und kostenlos die Veröffentlichungen der Direcció General de Turisme del Departament de Comerç, Consum i Turisme de la Generalitat de Catalunya:

- Catalunya Turística (Information générale/General Information/Allgemeine Information/Informazione generale).
- Catalunya Càmpings.
- Catalunya Guia Turística (català/castellano; français/english; deutsch/dutch; italiano/svenska).
- Comarques de Catalunya (català; castellano; français/english/deutsch).
- Ruta del Vi, D.O. Priorat (català; castellano; français/english/deutsch).
- La neu a Catalunya. La nieve en Cataluña. La neige en Catalogne. Snow in Catalonia.

I a les llibreries:

Y en las librerías:

Et dans les librairies:

And available at bookstores:

Und in den Buchhandlungen:

- Catalunya (català) 94 Pàgines, 82 Fotos, 800,— Pessetes.
- Cataluña (castellano) 94 Pàgines, 82 Fotos, 800,— Pessetes.
- Catalonia (english) 94 Pàgines, 82 Fotos, 800,— Pessetes.
- Catalogne (français) 94 Pàgines, 82 Fotos, 800,— Pessetes.
- Katalonien (deutsch) 94 Pàgines, 82 Fotos, 800,— Pessetes.

- Cuina i Vins de Catalunya. Recull de Restaurants, Fondes i Cases de Menjar. 192 Pàgines, 700,— Pessetes. (català/castellano)
- Catalunya Hotels. 250,— Pessetes. (català/castellano/français/english/deutsch).

Direcció General de Turisme.
Passeig de Gràcia, 105. 08008 BARCELONA. Tel. (93) 237 90 45



Serveis Territorials de Turisme de Barcelona:
Diagonal, 431 bis, 5è. 08036 BARCELONA. Tel. (93) 209 51 00

Serveis Territorials de Turisme de Girona:
Joan Maragall, 35 GIRONA Tel. (972) 20 17 67

Serveis Territorials de Turisme de Lleida:
Avinguda Blondel, 1 LLEIDA Tel. (973) 22 07 79

Serveis Territorials de Turisme de Tarragona:
Rambla Nova, 25 TARRAGONA Tel. (977) 20 16 62





Metro
de Barcelona

TELEFONO DE
MONTAÑO

LÍNEA I
LÍNEA II
LÍNEA III
LÍNEA IV
LÍNEA V

LÍNEA DE
CORRESPONDENCIA
RENFE

P.F. GENERALITAT

INFORMACION TURISTICA
INFORMATION TOURISTIQUE
TOURIST INFORMATION

A - Placa Sant Jaume. Tel. 318 25 25
B - Estació de França. Tel. 317 27 81
C - Placa Poble Nou. Tel. 245 75 21
D - Estació Central Santa. Tel. 25052 24
E - Monument a Colón. Tel. 302 25 24
F - Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes. Tel. 301 74 43
G - Ajuntament de l'Eixample. Tel. 376 88 29
H - BARCELONA CONVENTION BUREAU
Auda. Parafel. 202. Tel. 224 42 04
I - PATRONAT MUNICIPAL DE TURISME
Auda. Parafel. 202. Tel. 223 24 29

- | CENTROS DE INTERES
ARTISTICO-TURISTICO | CENTRES D'INTERET
ARTISTIQUE-TOURISTIQUE | ARTISTIC AND TOURISTICAL
CENTRES OF INTEREST |
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| 1. Palacio Episcopal | 1. Palau Episcopal | 1. Episcopal Palace |
| 2. Casa del Arcediano | 2. Casa del Arcediano | 2. Archbishop's House |
| 3. Calleja Claustra (callejón muerta) | 3. Carrerons (Closes, Chapeles, Doors) | 3. Carrerons (Closes, Chapeles, Doors) |
| 4. Casa "D'los Carrerons" | 4. Maison "D'los Carrerons" | 4. Carrerons House |
| 5. Palau de la Generalitat | 5. Palais de la Généralité | 5. Generalitat House |
| 6. Casa de la Vila (Ayuntamiento) | 6. Hôtel de Ville | 6. City House |
| 7. Museo de Historia Natural | 7. Museo de Historia Natural | 7. Federico Maysa Museum |
| 8. Casa de la Pla Almogà | 8. Maison des de la "Pla Almogà" | 8. Almogà House |
| 9. Colección de pinturas de Picasso, del Vendido | 9. Rue Montcada (Museum Picasso de Villaverde de Osona (Sabarís)) | 9. Montcada street (Picasso Museum, Villaverde de Osona (Sabarís)) |
| 10. Palacio de la Virreina (Museo de Arte Decorativo, Artes y Oficios) | 10. Palais de la Vice-Reine (Musée des Arts Décoratifs, Arts et Métiers) | 10. Virreina Palace (Museum of Decorative Art, Crafts and Trades) |
| 11. Antigua Hospital de la Santa Cruz | 11. Ancien Hôpital de la Sainte-Croix | 11. Hospital de la Santa Cruz |
| 12. Teatro del Liceo | 12. Théâtre du Liceo | 12. Liceo Theatre |
| 13. Palau Güel (Arquitecto Güel) | 13. Palais Güel (Architecte Güel) | 13. Güel Palace (By Architect Güel) |
| 14. Palau de la Música Catalana | 14. Palau de la Música Catalana | 14. Palau de la Música Catalana |
| 15. Rovira Altomirans (Misión Marforn) | 15. Rovira Altomirans (Misión Marforn) | 15. Rovira Altomirans (Misión Marforn) |
| 16. La Lonja del Mar | 16. La Lonja del Mar | 16. Lonja de Mar |
| 17. Museo de San Medem | 17. Musée de San Medem | 17. Museum of San Medem |
| 18. Parc de la Ciutadella (Zoo) | 18. Parc de la Ciutadella (Zoo) | 18. Ciutadella Park (Zoo) |
| 19. Plaça de Jaume I | 19. Place de Jaume I | 19. Court of Jaume I |
| 20. Edifici romànic de Sant Pau | 20. Edifice romane de Saint-Paul | 20. Romanesque Church of Saint Paul |
| 21. Edifici romànic de Santa Anna | 21. Edifice romane de Sainte-Anne | 21. Romanesque Church of Sainte Anne |
| 22. Edifici "La Pedrera" (Arquitecto Güel) | 22. Immeuble "La Pedrera" (Architecte Güel) | 22. "La Pedrera" (By Architect Güel) |
| 23. Terraza de la Sagrada Família (Arquitecto Güel) | 23. Terrasse de la Sagrada Familla (Architecte Güel) | 23. "Sagrada Família" Cathedral (By Architect Güel) |
| 24. Hospital de la Santa Cruz y de San Pau | 24. Hôpital de la Sainte-Croix et de Saint-Paul | 24. Hospital of the Sainte-Croix and of Saint Paul |
| 25. Parc Güel (Arquitecto Güel) | 25. Parc Güel (Architecte Güel) | 25. Güel Park (House/Museum Architect Güel) |
| 26. Teatro | 26. Théâtre | 26. Theatre |
| 27. Palacio Real de Pedralbes (Museo) | 27. Palais Royal de Pedralbes (Musée) | 27. Pedralbes Royal Palace (Museum) |
| 28. Monasterio de Pedralbes | 28. Monastère de Pedralbes | 28. Pedralbes Monastery |
| 29. Panteón Español (Museo de Artes Populares) | 29. Panteón Espagnol (Musée des Arts Populaires) | 29. Spanish Town (Popular Art Museum) |
| 30. Museo de Artes y Oficios | 30. Musée des Arts et Métiers | 30. Crafts Museum |
| 31. Teatro Góngora | 31. Théâtre Góngora | 31. Góngora Theatre |
| 32. Museo de Mariposas (Museo Militar) | 32. Musée de Papillons (Musée Militaire) | 32. Butterfly Museum |
| 33. Plaza de Toros Monumental (Museo Taurino) | 33. Plaza de Toros Monumental (Musée Taurin) | 33. Monumental Bullring (Bullfight Museum) |
| 34. Plaza de Toros Las Arenas | 34. Arènes Les Arenes | 34. Las Arenas Bullring |
| 35. Museo Municipal de la Música | 35. Musée Municipal de la Musique | 35. Municipal Music Museum |
| 36. Museo Arqueológico | 36. Musée Archéologique | 36. Archaeological Museum |
| 37. Museo de Historia Natural | 37. Musée d'histoire Naturelle | 37. Natural History Museum |
| 38. Museo Etnológico y Colonial | 38. Musée Ethnologique et Colonial | 38. Colonial and Ethnological Museum |
| 39. Museo Clara | 39. Musée Clara | 39. Clara Museum |
| 40. Museo de la Barceloneta | 40. Musée de la Barcelonnette | 40. Barceloneta Museum |
| 41. Arc de Triunfo | 41. Arc de Triomphe | 41. Arc de Triunfo |
| 42. Universidad Central | 42. Université Centrale | 42. Central University |
| 43. Universidad Industrial | 43. Université Industrielle | 43. Industrial School |
| 44. Puente de la Misericordia | 44. Pont de la Miséricorde | 44. Misericordia Bridge |
| 45. Iglesia de Santa María del Mar | 45. Église de Sainte-Marie de la Mer | 45. Santa Maria del Mar church |
| 46. Fontana de la Fontana | 46. Fontaine de la Fontaine | 46. Fontana Fountain |
| 47. Edificio de Congrésos | 47. Bâtiment des Congrès | 47. Congress Building |
| 48. Casa Móra | 48. Casa Móra | 48. Móra House |
| 49. Colegio Teresianas | 49. Collège Teresianas | 49. Teresianas School |
| 50. Puerta principal Inca Miralles | 50. Porte principale Inca Miralles | 50. Main Entrance of the Miralles Property |
| 51. Puerta y Estación de la Masana Güel | 51. Porte et Station de la Masana Güel | 51. Gate and Station of the Masana Güel |

