

shall try to answer that question within the framework of the economic model of section 3. The first task is to describe a set of ethical norms that may be considered to be part, at least, of a socialist conception of the good society (5.1). Elsewhere I try to argue this position in detail. But in the present context, the norms will be simply put forward as binding, as soon as it has been established that they can be satisfied jointly with certain efficiency requirements. The second task is to find out whether exploitation is ruled out by the operation of these norms, or to what extent it is unavoidable (5.2). The implications of these findings, to be discussed in (5.3), will provide the answer to our question, together with some relevant qualifications.

5.1. The socialist reference state

In regard to efficiency, I pose two minimal requirements: the economy must fully utilize its capital stock and capacity growth should be non-negative. In the model of section 3, the latter is satisfied by assumption (12); the former is here stated:

$$(R37) \quad L_s \geq \bar{L} \quad (\text{full capacity utilisation})$$

The economy already satisfies the socialist norm of equal reward for equal labour, given the uniformity of labour productivity and the net wage rate ((7) and (9), respectively). This norm is best described as a proportional labour contribution principle; it allots to each worker an equal proportion of his labour product, which is always below unity. The latter ensures that part of the net social product can be distributed according to other principles, to be discussed below. Hence,

$$(R38) \quad \text{for all } i, w_i/q_i \text{ constant and below unity} \quad (\text{proportional contribution principle})$$

Next, all agents will be allowed to enter the productive process voluntarily; there is no legal coercion to perform labour:

$$(R39) \quad \text{for all } i, l_i(\text{min}) = 0 \quad (\text{formal freedom to dispose of own labour power})$$

The formal freedom to dispose of one's labour power is part of the (liberal) doctrine of self-ownership. Though not held in great sympathy by Marx, this formal freedom may be converted into a 'real freedom', in which agents may effectively dispose of their labour power, when other norms are added to the system of socialist ethics. One supportive principle is the equal right to work according to one's ability. Strongly formulated, the equal right to work requires that all are given access to the productive process -- and therefore to wage income -- as long as they choose to work. A weaker form (relevant whenever voluntary labour supply exceeds full capacity-demand) is to limit the access of each, in order to ensure that all can work who want to, by means of a rationing system for employment and/or credit. For reasons which will become clear later, I will require satisfaction of the equal right to work in the strong version:

$$(R40) \quad \text{for all } i, l_{si} = l_i \quad (\text{equal right to work, strong version})$$

Up to now (and in keeping with the labour-oriented bias of socialist ethics) individuals have been considered as workers first and foremost, workers who are granted uncoerced access to the labour process and who receive a share of the social product in proportion to their contributions. Our model, however, explicitly contains a 'disabled' section of the population, which by definition is dependent upon non-wage income. Any socialist society -- certainly the one described by Marx -- will have to satisfy a minimal norm of security, requiring that the disabled, and all those who have been unable to secure access to wage income (involuntary unemployment), receive a non-wage income sufficient to cover their subsistence needs. Let us denote N_s as the (equal) non-wage income under the security norm. The subscript s will refer to all entitled agents, i.e. the m disabled and the involuntarily unemployed, of which there may be p ($0 \leq p < n-m$) in the economy: $s = 1, \dots, m+p$. The security norm requires:

$$(R41) \quad N_s = b \quad (\text{security of disabled and involuntarily unemployed})$$

The security norm may be considered part of a wider ethic of distribution according to needs, which calls for the satisfaction of agents' basic needs regardless of their actual contributions to the social product, willingness to work or working capacities. Given assumption (14) on the uniformity of basic needs, this would imply the allotment of equal non-wage incomes to

all agents. I shall incorporate this (general) needs principle in the scheme of socialist norms, but only in the weakest possible form. The sixth, and final, norm prescribes the right of all agents to a positive universal grant, denoted by G , which replaces all private entitlements to non-wage income, with the possible exception of security transfers.

(R42) for all j , $G > 0$ (the universal grant)

Given the operation of the grant principle, the security norm acquires the status of a supplementary income, in the sense that whenever the universal grant is below subsistence level, persons entitled to security are paid a supplement $b - G$. If the grant equals, or surpasses, the subsistence income, the security norm is satisfied automatically. Requirements (41) and (42) may therefore be specified as follows:

(R43) $\Sigma N_j = \begin{cases} (m+p)b + (n-m-p)G & (0 < G < b) \\ nG & (G \geq b) \end{cases}$ (aggregate non-wage income under the security norm and grant principle)

Whereas the security norm fixes a minimum entitlement, conditional upon the agent's disability or inability to gain access to work, the universal grant, as introduced above, creates an unconditional right to income for all, but the exact size of the entitlement is not fixed in advance. In that respect the grant principle resembles the labour contribution principle (38): whereas the former in effect shares out an unspecified proportion of the subsistence income (b) to all with equal needs, the latter apportions an unspecified proportion of the unit labour product (q) to all with equal contributions. This indeterminacy in the reward structure of workers is an essential characteristic of our normative scheme. It allows for distribution policies conducive to efficiency and freedom of choice. And as we shall see in 5.2, the grant-wage ratio which is consistent with the operation of all six norms listed above will determine whether or not the economy that satisfies these norms is exploitative.

To verify the feasibility of our normative scheme in an economy with given data (technology, resources, subsistence level and work propensities) we

start out by assuming the absence of legal coercion to work (39). It is then a question of deriving the necessary and sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of requirements (37), (40) and (43), and checking whether these are compatible with (39). Now (37) and (40) hold if and only if the voluntary labour supply L_s equals the capacity demand for labour \bar{L} :

$$(T44) \quad L_s = \bar{L} \quad \text{from (37), (40)}$$

If the non-wage incomes of potential workers N_i consist exclusively of the universal grant, as (43) requires, and no involuntary unemployment exists (i.e. $p = 0$), we have:

$$(T45) \quad (n-m)l_{si} = (n-m)(k - (1-k)\frac{G}{w}) = \bar{L} \quad \text{from (17), (43), (44)}$$

and there will exist a unique grant-wage ratio (G/w), henceforth denoted by (d), at which supply and demand of labour are equal at full capacity utilisation. Writing \bar{l} for the capacity demand per potential worker ($\bar{L}/n-m$),

$$(T46) \quad d = G/w = \frac{k - \bar{l}}{1 - k} \quad \text{from (45)}$$

This grant-wage ratio may be regarded as the optimal disincentive factor on the labour supply of agents for obtaining the desired balance of the labour market. As (46) shows, its magnitude depends entirely on the data of the economy, since $\bar{l} = \bar{K}/(n-m)u$. The larger this ratio is, the more predominant the grant principle will be in the distribution of aggregate disposable income.

Requirement (43) implies that the optimal disincentive factor should be positive (for otherwise, $G \leq 0$; as $w > 0$ and $0 < k < 1$ in (46)). Hence,

$$(T47) \quad k > \bar{l} \quad \text{from (43), (46)}$$

(47) also ensures compatibility with requirement (39), since it would be necessary to obtain the full capacity supply of labour by coercive means only if the pure propensity to work were to fall short of the per capita demand for labour, i.e. if $k < \bar{l}$. This is now ruled out. Therefore, (47) is necessary for the simultaneous fulfillment of all socialist norms. But it is not

sufficient, for the disabled section of the population may not receive the income to which it is entitled, even if the grant-wage ratio is set at its optimal (and positive) value d . Sufficiency requires that the sum total of wage, grant and security claims under (43) equals the net national income minus State saving (if any). And this will be the case if and only if the wage rate and the grant are fixed as follows:

$$(T48) \quad (i) \quad G = dw$$

$$(ii) \quad w = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{Y}(1-a_1) - mb}{(n-m)(\bar{I}+d)} & \text{for } 0 < G < b, \text{ i.e. for } 0 < d < \frac{b\bar{L}}{\bar{Y}(1-a_1)-nb} \\ \frac{\bar{Y}(1-a_1)}{(n-m)\bar{I} + nd} & \text{for } G \geq b, \text{ i.e. for } d \geq \frac{b\bar{L}}{\bar{Y}(1-a_1)-nb} \end{cases}$$

from (9), (10), (43), (46), (47)

To summarize: whenever the pure propensity to work exceeds the per worker capacity-demand for labour (47), the socialist ethic described in this section can be feasibly put into operation by choosing a distribution policy (w, G) as specified in (48). That policy will generate a distribution state of the economy (w, N_h, N_i) which I shall call the (socialist) reference state.

An economy in the reference state is at least capable of sustaining that state over time, at unchanged data. As mentioned earlier, the feasibility of the socialist norms is our condition for taking those norms as binding, for the purpose of this enquiry. Thus, if we wish to know whether a socialist economy of the type under consideration is exploitative or not, all we have to do is to inspect the grant-wage combination of the reference state, at any given point in time.

5.2. Exploitation in the reference state

Does the socialist reference state rule out exploitation? Not necessarily. Depending on the data of the economy and the State savings ratio, the presence of exploited workers (and possibly even of exploiting security recipients) could be an inescapable fact. But the reference state could

also be non-exploitative. Stronger still, it may even liberate agents from the subsistence constraint altogether. In the rest of this section, I examine the causal connections between these properties of the reference state and the data that reflect the disposition of agents to work and their productivity (k and q , respectively). To simplify matters, the State savings ratio will be set equal to zero (assumption (19) revived); the other data (\bar{K} , $n-m$, v and b) are assumed to remain constant.

What, then, are the conditions for a (non-)exploitative reference state? To obtain an intuitive grasp of the causalities involved, let us first look at the case where agents are relieved of the necessity to work for subsistence ($G \geq b$) and are therefore non-exploited. From (19) and (48), such situations require:

$$(R49) \quad \frac{dq}{b} > \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{Y}-nb} \quad (\text{liberation from the subsistence constraint})$$

On the left-hand side of this inequality, the (positive) expression dq/b is a monotonically increasing function of the disposition to work and labour productivity, as (1) - (3) and (46) show. Also, dq/b is the ratio of two proportions mentioned earlier: the universal grant as a proportion of subsistence and the wage rate as a proportion of output per unit of labour (G/b and w/q , respectively). The higher the intrinsic attractiveness of work is to agents, and the more productive their work, the higher the ratio of these two proportions will be and the more distribution according to needs will predominate distribution according to contributions. I call this ratio the needs-contribution-ratio (relative to the baseline of subsistence income) and denote it by NC_b :

$$(D50) \quad NC_b = \frac{G/b}{w/q} = \frac{dq}{b} \quad (\text{the needs-contribution-ratio, relative to subsistence})$$

Now examine the right-hand side of equality (49). Here we have the ratio of full capacity-output \bar{Y} to the economic surplus above aggregate subsistence requirements ($\bar{Y} - nb$). This ratio, denoted by S_b , is independent of labour productivity. It measures the objective degree of scarcity in the economy

relative to the baseline of subsistence production, approaching infinity as the surplus tends to nil and unity only as output approaches infinity:

$$(D51) \quad S_b = \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{Y} - nb} \quad (\text{the scarcity ratio, relative to subsistence})$$

Thus if, due to the intrinsic attraction and productivity of labour in the reference state, the needs-contribution-ratio equals or surpasses the scarcity ratio, agents are liberated from the subsistence constraint. The economy is then said to satisfy the property of weak abundance, in the sense that it has the potential to cover the subsistence needs of all individuals unconditionally, while still producing at full capacity and without compulsory labour duties. This property is called weak abundance because of its linkage to subsistence needs. By contrast, an economy able to satisfy all needs of all agents, however costly, on an unconditional basis, would be 'fully abundant'; obviously a far more demanding criterion.

An economy may be weakly abundant even if its technology is not tremendously advanced and the resources at its disposal are modest. In such cases, the property will be due to the high average quality of jobs, the presence of an ingrained work ethic or attitudes imputing high status to productive activity. On the other hand, if workers are leisure-oriented and work is equated with drudgery, subservience and other forms of 'labour disutility', the economy will have to be very productive indeed if it is to attain weak abundance. Finally, the concept of weak abundance refers to a potentiality of the economy, to be actualized in the reference state. We therefore define:

$$(D52) \quad NC_b \geq S_b \quad (\text{weak abundance})$$

Before moving on to discuss economies that are not weakly abundant, it is necessary to verify that grant recipients are non-exploiting agents. This can be shown as follows. Given the presence of disabled agents in the economy, the capacity demand for labour \bar{L} will be strictly smaller than n , the number of agents. Given a positive disincentive factor, this implies:

$$(T53) \quad (1+d)\bar{L} < nd + \bar{L} \quad \text{from (5), (8), (46), (47)}$$

$$(T54) \quad w(1+d)\bar{L} < \bar{Y} \quad \text{from (19), (48), (53)}$$

and hence:

$$(T55) \quad N_j = G < w-q \quad \text{from (2), (43), (46), (54);}$$

which in turn implies, from (32), that grant recipients are not exploiting agents.

If weak abundance is not satisfied, the reference state will have $G < b$. Then, it will contain no exploited agents whenever $e_{di} \leq 0$. Substituting $G = dw$ (48) into equation (36), this requires:

$$(R56) \quad \frac{dq}{b} \geq \frac{q-w}{w} \quad (\text{no exploited agents})$$

And that requirement is satisfied if and only if:

$$(T57) \quad NC_b \geq S_b \cdot \frac{mb}{\bar{Y}} \quad \text{from (2), (19), (48), (50), (51), (56)}$$

Thus, in order to rule out the presence of exploited agents in the reference state, the economy must have a needs-contribution ratio which is at most smaller by a factor mb/\bar{Y} than the ratio necessary for liberating all agents from the subsistence constraint. This result shows that the liberation of workers from forced net surplus labour is feasible under conditions far less advantageous than those of weak abundance.

However, (57) is not sufficient for a non-exploitative reference state. Although it is obvious, and easily established from (32), (46) and (48), that non-exploited workers are always exploitation-neutral, the status of security recipients is less obvious. From (32) and (43), disabled agents will be neutral only if

$$(R58) \quad b \leq q-w \quad (\text{neutrality of security recipients})$$

This requirement is fulfilled if and only if:

$$(T59) \quad b(\bar{L}-m) \leq dw(n-m) \quad \text{from (2), (48), (58)}$$

For (59) to hold, $\bar{L} \leq m$ is obviously sufficient. But if the capacity demand for labour happens to exceed the number of disabled persons, a further condition must be satisfied:

$$(T60) \quad NC_b \geq \frac{\bar{Y}-mq}{(q-b)(n-m)} \quad \text{from (2), (19), (48), (50), (59)}$$

And consequently, for $\bar{L} > m$, whichever expression on the right-hand side of (57) and (60) happens to be the largest in size will form the necessary and sufficient condition for a non-exploitative reference state. Therefore, (56) and (58) jointly require:

$$(T61) \quad NC_b \geq \begin{cases} S_b \cdot \frac{mb}{\bar{Y}} \text{ and } \bar{L} \leq m \\ \max\left(S_b \cdot \frac{mb}{\bar{Y}}, \frac{\bar{Y}-mq}{(q-b)(n-m)}\right) \text{ and } \bar{L} > m \end{cases} \begin{array}{l} \text{(non-exploitative reference state)} \\ \text{from (56) - (60)} \end{array}$$

For the troublesome case where $\bar{L} > m$, one may ask whether it is possible to have a non-exploitative reference state, short of weak abundance. To show that this is indeed the case, it is verified that the (true) proposition $\bar{L} < n$ implies:

$$(T62) \quad S_b > \frac{Y-mq}{(b-q)(n-m)} \quad \text{from (2), (5), (8), (15), (51)}$$

Thus, even if $\bar{L} > m$, the reference state may be non-exploitative (i.e.: (61) may hold) without the economy having to be weakly abundant. This completes the account of exploitation in the reference state.

5.3 Should exploitation be abolished?

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the norms (37) - (40) and (43) constituting the socialist ethic are considered as binding. Consequently the question whether exploitation should be abolished -- and the connected problem of its ethical indefensibility -- is judged strictly in terms of that particular set of norms and whatever is implied by them, in combination with the properties of the economy. I shall first discuss what is involved in the attempt to eliminate exploitation from the socialist reference state and then, secondly, ask what this tells about the ethical

status of exploitative economics outside of the reference state.

As we have seen, a reference state (w, N_h, N_i) is determined by the data of the economy. Depending on the particular data set, the reference state can also be characterized by one single pair of exploitation rates (e_{bh}, e_{bi}) , with $e_{bh} \leq -1$ for $G \geq b$ and $e_{bi} \geq 0$, for $G \leq (q-w)b/q$. Whenever $e_{bi} > 0$, the reference state is exploitative (in the following, I ignore the problem of exploiting security recipients by assuming that $\bar{L} \leq m$). In the short run nothing can be done about this exploitation: any attempt to remove it would inevitably bring the economy out of the reference state and, therefore, violate at least one of the socialist norms. For example, workers could be relieved from forced surplus labour by lowering wage rates and increasing the universal grant. On our 'supply-side reasoning', this would reduce the material incentives to work, bringing down the labour supply below full capacity demand, in violation of R37. Alternatively, the exploitation of workers could be removed at the expense of the disabled, by re-distributing the 'funds for those unable to work' in favor of grants and wages, in violation of R43. In the first case, abolition of forced surplus labour would constitute an inefficiency (a reduction of income per capita); in the second, it would constitute an injustice to the disabled population.

However, from a dynamic perspective, matters are different. If we (plausibly) assume that economics in the reference state are capable not only of promoting growth, but also of increasing labour productivity through technical innovation, then, ceteris paribus, e_{bi} will steadily decline, as the needs-contribution ratio dq/b rises at a constant scarcity ratio $(\bar{K}/(\bar{K}-m\bar{v}b))$, from (1) and (51)). And the same effect will be produced, alternatively, if the economy has an endogeneous tendency to increase the disposition to work, k . Moreover, if per capita capacity growth is positive and exceeds the rate of expansion of subsistence requirements, then, at a constant capital-output ratio, the scarcity ratio will be reduced over time. Elsewhere, Van Parijs and I have studied the dynamics of reference states, (or more generally, of economies satisfying R37 - R40 and having an universal grant-system). The results show that (1) such economies allow continuous increases in the grant-wage ratio and in the level of unconditional need-satisfaction; (2) the speed of these increases depends on the assumptions about productivity growth and improvement of labour quality

and, importantly, on the particular policies adopted with respect to output growth and average labour-time. Therefore, exploitation, if it exists in the reference state at some initial period, can be done away by means of policies serving to reduce the scarcity ratio and to increase the needs-contribution ratio.

From this perspective, the gradual removal of exploitation is a part of a process of increasing real economic freedom (i.e. the freedom to effectively dispose of one's labour power and the corresponding freedom from the subsistence constraint). This process may be divided into three stages:

Stage I : $e_{bi} > 0$. Potential workers are forced to perform net surplus labour; they are unfree to decide whether they wish to be net contributors to or net appropriators of the social product.

Stage II: $0 \geq e_{bi} > -1$; workers are not forced to perform net surplus labour, but they are not freed from the subsistence constraint ($l_{bi} > 0$).

Stage III: $e_{bi} \leq -1$; workers have economic freedom in both of the senses just distinguished ($l_{bi} = 0$).

It thus appears that in systems conforming to the socialist ethic, the abolition of exploitation is a matter of enhancing the real economic freedom of potential workers through economic progress. To the extent that this freedom is valued -- as it is most certainly in the Marxian tradition --conscious actions and policies designed to remove exploitation are unreservedly recommended. Conversely, the failure to realize the potential for economic freedom, allowing exploitation to persist in the reference state may be judged negatively. These judgements, based as they are on the joint implications of the socialist ethic and plausible assumptions on economic development, constitute a first answer to the question posed above.

Let us now consider distributive states not conforming to the economy's (non-exploitative) reference state. By definition, all such states, exploitative or not, are ethically inferior in comparison with the reference state. And although in many cases it is quite likely that the exploitative ones among these states are farther removed from the reference state than non-exploitative ones (in a sense to be made precise), there is

no guarantee that this will always be the case. This fact has certain implications for the abolition issue. Taken in its usual sense, the abolition of exploitation signifies a change of rules in the economy whereby workers are no longer forced to perform net surplus labour. But abolition in that sense is not necessarily recommended by the socialist ethic. For as we have seen, it is often possible to relieve workers from their exploited condition in ways that either harm the legitimate interests of the disabled or decrease disposable income per capita. Strictly speaking, the reduction or outright removal of exploitation is recommended if and only if the deviations of some personal rates of exploitation in the actual state of the economy from their 'correct' reference values are thereby reduced and the deviations of the others are not increased. In other words, from the static perspective, where questions of economic growth are left aside, the ethical recommendation is summed up by the following principle: reorganize the economy in such ways that increase the economic freedom of at least some workers without (1) reducing the freedom of other workers (2) creating involuntary unemployment (3) reducing the welfare of the disabled population.

Framed in these terms, the ethical analysis of standard Marxian exploitation turns out to be part of a normative theory of economic freedom, in which concerns about exploitation are not, perhaps, of central importance. For obviously, the primary aspiration implicit in such a theory is to propel the economy, and each individual in it, into stage III, where all are liberated from the constraint of subsistence. This aspiration would seem to correspond closely to Marx's characterisation of communism as "an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Abolition of exploitation, as I have defined that concept, is a less demanding objective which must be regarded as a precondition for the realisation of the primary goal, as long as the socialist ethic is a binding constraint on the development process. But precisely because it is a less demanding objective, the persistence of exploitation is ethically indefensible in economies that are close to, or have already achieved, the property of weak abundance.

To conclude, this second answer to our question may be elaborated by looking at the two main causes of exploitation suggested by our account of the socialist reference state: (1) maldistribution of non-wage income; (2) a sub-optimal grant-wage ratio.

First, there is inequality in the distribution of assets (sources of non-wage income). Here, exploitation appears as a form of injustice; the achievement of economic freedom by the rich at the expense of the (hard-working) poor. Note, however, that exploitative injustices of this type differ qualitatively from the situation where the rich appropriate and the relatively poor perform net surplus labour without either of them being forced to do so. In the former, as in the latter case, the underlying asset inequality is the cause of the unjust distribution of economic freedom (unjust, that is, by R43). But the latter injustice is by no means as offensive as the former, in which the poor are forced to contribute part of their product mainly, or even exclusively, for the benefit of the rich, who are thereby enabled to enter a privileged "realm of freedom". It is this type of exploitation, I believe, which is so uniquely capable of generating indignation, especially if -- as in the text of *Capital* -- the picture is enriched by detailed accounts of the absolute poverty, oppression and domination of the exploited workers.

However, there is another type of exploitation in which the compulsion to perform surplus labour is the result of imbalances in the average ratio of non-wage to wage income. To illustrate this "exploitation through misallocation", let us assume the economy to be in a reference state with exactly zero exploitation of workers. Now suppose that their aggregate disposable income is redistributed from grant to wage income, thus obtaining a grant-wage ratio $(G/w)_0$ below the optimal ratio d . This redistribution has two adverse effects. First, all workers will now be exploited, and at a higher degree, the larger the difference $d - (G/w)_0$ is. Secondly, it will not be possible to maintain the equal right to work in its strong version (R40). This will either create involuntary unemployment, or, if that is prevented by successful labour rationing, it will curtail the freedom of agents and create administrative problems. Certainly this second type of exploitation seems to be less offensive than the first -- it is also far less recognized. But I suspect that it is a potentially important source of deprivation from economic freedom in modern capitalist economies with rigid labour markets and high rates of (technological) unemployment.

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"MIDDLE-LEVEL ELITES IN WESTERN POLITICAL PARTIES"

Director: Prof. Karlheinz Reif

Prof. Oskar Niedermayer.

Universität Mannheim

LOS CANDIDATOS DE ALIANZA POPULAR Y DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA
DE ESPAÑA A LAS ELECCIONES GENERALES ESPAÑOLAS DE
1.977 Y 1.979.

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LOS CANDIDATOS DE ALIANZA POPULAR Y DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA
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El objeto de la presente comunicación, que forma parte de un estudio en curso sobre los candidatos a todas las elecciones generales españolas, consiste en analizar el perfil de una parte de la clase política, concretamente la de dos partidos parlamentarios, el Partido Comunista de España (P.C.E.) y Alianza Popular (A.P.), distanciados ideológicamente y que fueron el tercero y cuarto partidos en número de escaños en el Congreso de Diputados tras las dos primeras elecciones democráticas del 15 de Junio de 1977 y el 1 de Marzo de 1979.

Las fuentes utilizadas han sido los "Boletines Oficiales del Estado" del 12 de mayo de 1977 al 14 de junio del mismo año, y los del 3 de febrero al 28 de febrero de 1979, que publicaron las candidaturas presentadas a las dos elecciones, así como las retiradas y correcciones de errores, y los datos publicados por el Servicio de Procesos Electorales del Ministerio del Interior, "Candidaturas presentadas por el P.C. E. y A.P. Congreso-Senado" para 1977 y 1979. Dado el contenido de estas fuentes, las variables que hemos podido estudiar son: la edad de los candidatos, su sexo, su profesión y su vinculación con el Distrito electoral en el que eran presentados por su partido. Asimismo hemos llevado a cabo una comparación entre los candidatos de ambas formaciones políticas y por último hemos contrastado el perfil de los candidatos con el de los diputados elegidos. Recordaremos que en 1977 hubo en la Cámara Baja 16 diputados de A.P., y 20 del P.C.E., y en las elecciones de 1979 A.P. consiguió 9 escaños y el P.C.E. 23. La representación en el Senado fue nula o muy escasa, y no ha sido tomada en cuenta.

El análisis comparado entre ambos partidos ha hecho que lo que en principio eran dos comunicaciones separadas se presenten unidas en una sola, dado el interés que tal perspectiva ofrece.

Alianza Popular es un partido creado en octubre de 1976, a partir de varias asociaciones políticas preexistentes. En las Elecciones Generales de 1977 se presentó a las elecciones en todos los Distritos, con 350 candidatos al Congreso y 156 al Senado, pero como Federación de Partidos, recibiendo distintas denominaciones en algunas regiones (Convivencia Catalana, en Cataluña, Guipuzcoa Unida en Guipuzcoa y en Navarra la de Alianza Foral Navarra, etc.) .En las generales de 1979 presentó candidatos en todos los Distritos salvo en Navarra, pero esta vez como "Coalición Democrática", unida a otras formaciones, tales como la "Acción Ciudadana Liberal" y el "Partido Demócrata Progresista". Los candidatos fueron 345 al Congreso y 143 al Senado. Pese a estas diferencias entre las dos elecciones, para facilitar la lectura del texto y de los cuadros hemos utilizado para los dos momentos electorales las siglas de A.P.

El Partido Comunista de España (P.C.E.), fundado en 1921, jugó un importante papel desde la clandestinidad en la lucha antifranquista y fué legalizado, no sin problemas con el estamento militar, en abril de 1977, concurriendo en solitario a las elecciones del Congreso de junio de 1977 con 349 candidatos (no presentó en Ceuta), y en coalición con distintos partidos, en solitario, o apoyando a candidaturas del tipo "Senadores para la Democracia", según los Distritos, en las listas del Senado. Presentó no obstante 29 candidatos senatoriales propios. En las elecciones de 1979 sólo dejó de presentar candidaturas de diputados en Ceuta (344 candidatos a la Cámara Baja) y aumentó sus candidatos a la Alta hasta la cifra de 129. De 5 candidatos de Orense no tenemos datos.

1.- LA EDAD DE LOS CANDIDATOS

En el Cuadro nº 1 se recogen los grupos de edades de los candidatos de A.P. y del P.C.E. al Congreso de Diputados en 1977 y 1979. Los de menos de cuarenta años en 1977 suponen el 22,28% del total en A.P. y el 55,87% en el P.C.E., mientras que en 1979 esa cifra asciende al 48,12% en A.P. y al 68,6% en los comunistas.

Los candidatos aliancistas son siempre menos jóvenes que los comunistas, tomando como frontera de la juventud los cuarenta años. En 1979 todos los candidatos, tanto de A.P. como del P.C.E. son más jóvenes que los de 1977. Cabe asegurar, por tanto, que ha habido un rejuvenecimiento de los cuadros de estos partidos en los dos primeros años de democracia.

La edad media de los aspirantes a un escaño de diputado descendió de 1977 (39,9 años en el P.C.E. y 45,05 años en A.P.) a 1979 (37,4 años entre los comunistas y 40,05 años en los aliancistas), y ese rejuvenecimiento fué mayor en A.P.

Las edades de los candidatos al Senado (Cuadro nº 2) son más elevadas que las de los del Congreso, ya que el porcentaje de los que tienen menos de 40 años es en 1977 del 5,13% para A.P. y 31,03% para el P.C.E., cifra que aumenta en 1979: 18,95% en la formación conservadora y más del 52% en la comunista. Se produce también un rejuvenecimiento, aunque sigan siendo de más edad los candidatos al Senado que los de la Cámara Baja, y ello pese a que las normas electorales no establecen ninguna diferencia -ni en el sufragio activo ni en el pasivo- entre las dos Cámaras. Se sigue de facto la tradición de considerar al Senado como una Cámara gerontocrática.

EDADES MEDIAS DE LOS CANDIDATOS

| | | 1977 | 1979 |
|--------|----------|------------|------------|
| P.C.E. | Congreso | 39,9 años | 37,4 años |
| | Senado | 47,7 años | 39,9 años |
| A.P. | Congreso | 45,05 años | 40,05 años |
| | Senado | 54,03 años | 47,73 años |

2.- LAS CANDIDATAS

El número de mujeres candidatas al Congreso en ambos partidos es muy reducido en las dos elecciones, como puede observarse en el Cuadro nº 3. Para las Generales de 1977 el P.C.E. presentaba 15,18% de mujeres en sus listas, ligeramente superior al 12,57% de A.P. En esas primeras elecciones democráticas españolas, la presencia femenina total en las candidaturas de todos los partidos y coaliciones que optaban a escaño en el Congreso fué de 13,01%. Por tanto el Partido Comunista estaba por encima de la media en cuanto a presencia femenina en sus listas mientras los aliancistas quedaban ligeramente por debajo de ella. De los partidos con implantación estatal el P.C.E. fué el que presentó más mujeres, seguido del P.S.O.E. y A.P.

Dado el sistema electoral español para el Congreso de Diputados, listas cerradas y bloqueadas, el lugar en que los candidatos están colocados en la lista es determinante para las posibilidades de elección. En este sentido hemos estudiado el lugar ocupado por las candidatas en esas listas,

dividiéndolas en dos mitades (1ª y 2ª mitad), considerando también, en caso de que el número de escaños del Distrito sea impar, el lugar central de la lista. En el Cuadro nº 3 puede verse el resultado. En las dos elecciones y para las dos formaciones, más del 50% de las candidatas figuran colocadas en las segundas mitades de las listas, con escasas posibilidades de elección. En numerosos casos ocupan el último lugar

Hemos considerado también los casos en que las candidatas están ocupando el 1º y el 2º lugar de las candidaturas al Congreso: fue A.P. la formación que presentó mayor porcentaje de mujeres encabezando sus listas, seguida por el P.C.E. y el P.S.O.E., en 1977. (13,64%, 13,21% y 10,41% respectivamente). En las elecciones de 1979 ese porcentaje desciende en las dos formaciones consideradas, siendo mayor el experimentado por las candidatas aliancistas (casi seis puntos, de 13,64% a 7,84%).

La presencia femenina en las listas de la Cámara Alta es ínfima en 1977 (1,92% en A.P. y 3,57% en el P.C.E.) aunque aumentó casi duplicándose en las elecciones de 1979 (3,57% y 6,5% respectivamente). El sistema electoral del Senado, candidaturas individuales, lista abierta y sistema mayoritario con voto limitado, que personaliza la confrontación electoral, hace descender la proporción de mujeres candidatas, pues la imagen electoral de la mujer se suele considerar menos competitiva que la del hombre. No es extraño por tanto que en 1977 el total de candidatas al Senado no llegara al 4% en toda España.

3.- PROFESIONES DE LOS CANDIDATOS

Hemos tenido de agrupar el cúmulo de profesiones, uniendo en apartados amplios aquellas afines. Los resultados están reflejados en el cuadro nº 4.

En Alianza Popular, tanto en 1977 como 1979 destacan los titulados superiores (36,38% en 1977 y 36,26% en 1979, lo que supone más de la tercera parte de candidatos) así como los industriales y comerciantes (23,12% en 1977 y con un ligero descenso, 17% en 1979).

Los candidatos del P.C.E. son obreros (industriales o agrícolas) en un porcentaje importante (32,1% en 1977 y 30,66 en 1979), aunque los titulados superiores también están en número importante representados (20,96% en 1977 y 24,54% en 1979). Los obreros en cambio están muy

poco representados en las listas de A.P. (2,17% en 1977 y 1,84% en 1979) El sector de los empleados(donde hemos incluido a los del Estado, y las empresas públicas y privadas) en cambio es muy parecido en ambas formaciones Oscilan alrededor del 10% de los candidatos en los dos partidos en ambas elecciones, con un máximo de 13,11% en el P.C.E. en 1979 y un mínimo de 9,28% en A.P. en 1979.

4.- RESIDENCIA Y NACIMIENTO DE LOS CANDIDATOS

En el Cuadro N° 5 aparecen los datos acerca de la vinculación de los candidatos con el Distrito. Hemos considerado cuatro situaciones: los que sólo nacen en el Distrito sin residir en el momento de las elecciones, los que viven en el distrito y no han nacido en él, los que han nacido y viven en la circunscripción electoral y los "cuneros" que no tienen ninguna vinculación con el distrito.

La característica más importante es la vinculación por residencia (el 86,94% de A.P. y el 90,7% del P.C.E. en 1977, así como el 92,07% de A.P y el 94,92% del P.C.E. en 1979 viven en el Distrito). También hay que subrayar que la vinculación por nacimiento y residencia(Nacen y viven) es la norma en más de la mitad de los candidatos, siempre.

Los "cuneros" han aumentado entre 1977 y 1979 en las dos formaciones, aunque no superan el 7% (6,9% para el P.C.E. en 1977 , cifra que se explica por la situación de clandestinidad a que había estado sometido hasta pocos meses antes, y al "desembarco" de los líderes madrileños en puestos de cabeza de lista en provincias de pocos escaños).

5.-EL PERFIL DEL CANDIDATO Y EL PERFIL DEL ELEGIDO

Quedan recogidos en los cuadros n° 6 y n° 7. Recordamos que los elegidos en 1977 fueron 20 diputados del P.C.E. y 16 de A.P. y en 1979, 23 del P.C.E. y sólo 9 de A.P.

La edad de los elegidos es siempre mayor de la de los candidatos, 7 años superior la de los diputados de A.P. en 1977 a la de los candidatos, y hasta doce años mayores los elegidos del P.C.E. en 1979 y de A.P. en 1977 con respecto a los candidatos de las dos formaciones en esas mismas elecciones. Este resultado está estrechamente ligado a que los candidatos más jóvenes en ambos partidos no ocupan los primeros puestos de las listas.

En 1977 las candidatas elegidas diputadas de A.P. lo fueron en una proporción que representaba la mitad del porcentaje de las presentadas (6,25% de elegidas y 12,57% de presentadas), mientras que en el P.C.E. la proporción de elegidas era igual a la de presentadas (15% y 15,18%). En 1979 el porcentaje de electas es cuatro puntos inferior al de presentadas en las dos formaciones.

En cuanto a la vinculación al Distrito, pese a que la mayoría de los diputados elegidos está ligados por nacimiento y residencia a la circunscripción, hay que resaltar que el tener las dos condiciones de haber nacido y residir en el Distrito no supone ninguna garantía de salir elegido: en los dos partidos analizados y en las dos elecciones, el porcentaje de elegidos que "nacen y viven en la provincia" es inferior al de candidatos que cumplen los dos requisitos (1977, A.P. 43,75% y 63,04%, P.C.E., 40% y 53,58% y en 1979, A.P. 55,56% y 61,06%, P.C.E. 39,13% y 59,96% respectivamente)

No hay que desdeñar el éxito electoral de los "cuneros", en los que la relación entre porcentaje de candidatos y de elegidos es inversa. En 1977, para A.P., el 3,36% de candidatos que eran "cuneros" ocuparon en Congreso el 12,5% de los escaños aliancistas. El P.C.E. en esa misma elección tuvo un 15% de diputados "cuneros", cuando sólo presentó 6,9% de candidatos sin vinculación al Distrito. Para 1979 A.P., que redujo considerablemente su representación parlamentaria, no tuvo ningún diputado "cunero", mientras el P.C.E., que presentó sólo el 3,81% de candidatos de esta categoría, veía cómo conseguían el 17,39% de los escaños comunistas.

Las profesiones más repetidas entre los diputados suelen ser las más frecuentes entre los candidatos, con algunas excepciones. Así, en 1977 y en 1979 en A.P. los candidatos de los Altos Cuerpos de Funcionarios de la Administración, que tan sólo suponían el 7,33% y el 2,46% obtuvieron el 37,5% y 44,44% de los escaños del partido en las dos elecciones. El mismo fenómeno ocurre con los Catedráticos (1977, 4,35% de candidatos y 12,5% de escaños y en 1979, 2,46% de candidatos y 11,11% de escaños).

En el P.C.E. en 1977 los elegidos resultan ser más fiel reflejo de los candidatos en lo que respecta a las profesiones. Resultaron elegidos un 25% de licenciados, con un 20,9% de candidatos de esa categoría profesional, y un 30% de obreros con 25,2% de candidatos trabajadores industriales.

Los candidatos Catedráticos del P.C.E., que suponían un 3,18% en 1977 y un 1,46% en 1979 obtuvieron el 10% de escaños en 1977 y el 8,7% en 1979. Los Técnicos Medios del P.C.E. también ocupaban lugares privilegiados en las listas comunistas, pues si bien sólo representaban el 6,34% de los candidatos en 1979, consiguieron el 21,74% de los escaños en el Congreso.

Madrid, febrero 1985

CUADRO Nº 1.-

GRUPOS DE EDADES DE LOS CANDIDATOS DE A.P. y P.C.E.
EN LAS ELECCIONES GENERALES DE 1977 y 1979: CONGRESO.

| G. Edad | 1977 | | | | 1979 | | | |
|-----------|------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|--------|-------|
| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
| | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % |
| Hasta 24 | 4 | 1,14 | 12 | 3,44 | 20 | 5,80 | 16 | 4,65 |
| 25--29 | 13 | 3,71 | 51 | 14,61 | 31 | 8,99 | 71 | 20,64 |
| 30--34 | 31 | 8,86 | 80 | 22,92 | 59 | 17,10 | 89 | 25,87 |
| 35--39 | 30 | 8,57 | 52 | 14,90 | 56 | 16,23 | 60 | 17,44 |
| 40--44 | 72 | 20,57 | 41 | 11,75 | 46 | 13,33 | 33 | 9,59 |
| 45--49 | 78 | 22,29 | 37 | 10,60 | 57 | 16,52 | 28 | 8,14 |
| 50--54 | 71 | 20,29 | 15 | 4,30 | 30 | 8,70 | 7 | 2,03 |
| 55--59 | 33 | 9,43 | 17 | 4,87 | 23 | 6,67 | 10 | 2,91 |
| 60--64 | 10 | 2,86 | 22 | 6,30 | 7 | 2,03 | 9 | 2,62 |
| 65 y mas | 8 | 2,29 | 12 | 3,44 | 4 | 0,01 | 13 | 3,78 |
| Sin datos | - | ---- | 10 | 2,86 | 12 | 3,48 | 8 | 2,33 |
| Total | 350 | (100) | 349 | (100) | 345 | (100) | 344 | (100) |

CUADRO Nº 2.-

GRUPOS DE EDADES DE LOS CANDIDATOS AL SENADO DE
A.P. Y P.C.E. EN LAS ELECCIONES GENERALES 1977 Y 1979

| G. Edad | 1977 | | | | 1979 | | | |
|-----------|------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|--------|-------|
| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
| | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % |
| Hasta 24 | -- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 0,07 | 4 | 3,10 |
| 25-- 29 | --- | ----- | 2 | 6,90 | 5 | 3,50 | 16 | 12,40 |
| 30-- 34 | --- | --- | 3 | 10,34 | 8 | 5,59 | 33 | 25,58 |
| 35-- 39 | 8 | 5,13 | 4 | 13,79 | 14 | 9,79 | 16 | 12,40 |
| 40-- 44 | 17 | 10,90 | 3 | 10,34 | 21 | 13,99 | 17 | 13,18 |
| 45-- 49 | 26 | 16,67 | 5 | 17,24 | 28 | 19,58 | 12 | 9,30 |
| 50-- 54 | 30 | 19,23 | 4 | 13,79 | 27 | 18,88 | 9 | 6,98 |
| 55-- 59 | 23 | 14,74 | 2 | 6,90 | 16 | 11,19 | 7 | 5,43 |
| 60--64 | 19 | 12,18 | 1 | 3,44 | 6 | 4,20 | 10 | 7,75 |
| 65 y más | 19 | 12,18 | 3 | 10,34 | 6 | 4,20 | 3 | 2,33 |
| Sin datos | 14 | 8,97 | 2 | 6,90 | 11 | 7,69 | 2 | 1,55 |
| Total | 156 | (100) | 29 | (100) | 143 | (100) | 129 | (100) |

CUADRO Nº 3.-

NUMERO DE CANDIDATAS DE A.P. Y P.C.E. AL CONGRESO Y AL
SENADO Y LUGAR DE COLOCACION EN LAS LISTAS A LA CAMARA
BAJA : 1977-1979.

| 1977 | | | | | 1979 | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-------|
| A.P. | | | P.C.E. | | A.P. | | | P.C.E. | |
| C.D. | | Send. | C.D. | Send. | C.D. | | Send. | C.D. | Send. |
| Nº y % | 44 12,57% | 3 1,92% | 53 15,18% | 1 3,57% | 51 14,74% | 5 3,49% | 44 12,80% | 8 6,50% | |
| <u>Colocación.</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1ª mitad | 13 29,54% | | 19 35,84% | | 14 27,45% | | 16 36,36% | | |
| Medio | 9 16,66% | | 4 7,54% | | 7 13,72% | | 3 6,81% | | |
| 2ª mitad | 22 50,00% | | 30 56,60% | | 30 52,82% | | 25 56,81% | | |
| Candidatas colocadas en 1º y 2º lugar de la lista | | | | | | | | | |
| | 6 13,64% | | 7 13,21% | | 4 7,84% | | 5 11,36% | | |

CUADRO Nº 4.-

PROFESIONES DE LOS CANDIDATOS AL CONGRESO Y AL SENADO DE

A.P. Y P.C.E. EN LAS ELECCIONES GENERALES DE 1977 y 1979 .

| | 1977 | | | | 1979 | | | |
|------------------|------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|--------|-------|
| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
| ALTOS CUERPOS | 37 | 7,31 | --- | ---- | 12 | 2,46 | 1 | 0,02 |
| ABOGADOS | 111 | 21,94 | 27 | 7,16 | 90 | 18,44 | 37 | 7,82 |
| MEDICOS | 31 | 6,13 | 12 | 3,18 | 28 | 5,74 | 16 | 3,39 |
| ECONOMISTAS | 5 | 0,99 | 11 | 2,92 | 6 | 1,23 | 16 | 3,39 |
| ING. Y ARQUIT. | 14 | 2,77 | 7 | 1,86 | 24 | 4,92 | 16 | 3,39 |
| PERIODISTAS | 9 | 1,78 | 6 | 1,59 | 9 | 1,84 | 8 | 1,70 |
| OTROS TIT. Sup. | 23 | 4,55 | 22 | 5,84 | 29 | 5,94 | 31 | 6,55 |
| MAESTROS | 10 | 1,98 | 19 | 5,04 | 14 | 2,87 | 3 | 0,06 |
| CATEDRATICOS | 22 | 4,35 | 12 | 3,18 | 12 | 2,46 | 7 | 1,48 |
| PROFESORES | 3 | 0,59 | 17 | 4,51 | 5 | 1,02 | 47 | 9,94 |
| TITULADOS MEDIOS | 22 | 4,35 | 31 | 8,20 | 43 | 8,81 | 30 | 6,34 |
| ESTUDIANTES | 3 | 0,59 | 5 | 1,33 | 32 | 6,56 | 12 | 2,54 |
| EMPLEADOS | 61 | 12,06 | 35 | 9,28 | 56 | 11,48 | 62 | 13,11 |
| INDUSTRIALES | 109 | 21,54 | 10 | 2,65 | 76 | 15,57 | 6 | 1,28 |
| COMERCIANTES | 8 | 1,58 | 15 | 3,98 | 7 | 1,43 | 18 | 3,81 |
| ARTISTAS | -- | ---- | 17 | 4,51 | - | --- | 3 | 0,60 |
| OBREROS | 8 | 1,58 | 95 | 25,20 | 9 | 1,84 | 117 | 24,74 |
| OBREROS CAMPO | 3 | 0,59 | 26 | 6,90 | 1 | --- | 28 | 5,92 |
| MILITARES | -- | ---- | --- | ---- | 3 | 0,61 | --- | ---- |
| SUS LABORES | 11 | 2,17 | 6 | 1,59 | 18 | 3,69 | 11 | 2,33 |
| JUBILADOS | -- | --- | -- | --- | -- | ---- | 5 | 1,18 |
| SIN DATOS | 16 | 3,16 | 4 | 1,06 | 15 | 3,07 | 1 | 0,02 |
| Total | 506 | (100) | 377 | (100) | 488 | (100) | 473 | (100) |

CUADRO Nº 5.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Y DE RESIDENCIA DE LOS CANDIDATOS AL
CONGRESO Y AL SENADO DE A.P. Y P.C.E. EN LAS ELECCIONES
GENERALES DE 1977 y 1979.

| | <u>1977</u> | | | | <u>1979</u> | | | |
|-------------------|-------------|--------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|------------|--------------|
| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
| | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % | Nº | % |
| Nacen en distrito | 41 | 8,10 | 7 | 1,86 | 14 | 2,87 | 4 | 0,80 |
| Viven en distrito | 121 | 23,90 | 140 | 37,13 | 151 | 31,01 | 165 | 34,96 |
| Nacen y viven | 319 | 63,04 | 202 | 53,58 | 298 | 61,06 | 283 | 59,96 |
| Queros | 17 | 3,36 | 26 | 6,90 | 12 | 2,50 | 18 | 3,81 |
| Sin datos | 8 | 1,58 | 1 | 0,03 | 13 | 2,66 | 2 | 0,04 |
| Total | 586 | (100) | 377 | (100) | 488 | (100) | 472 | (100) |

CUADRO Nº 6.-

EL PERFIL DEL CANDIDATO Y EL PERFIL DEL ELEGIDO DE A.P.
Y DEL P.C.E. EN LOS COMICIOS DE 1977.

CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS

| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
|------------------------------|------------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Candidatos | Electos | Candidatos | Electos |
| Mujeres | 12,57% | 6,25% | 15,18% | 15% |
| Edad media | 45,05 | 52,94 | 39,90 | 51,60 |
| <u>Vinculacion dist. (*)</u> | | | | |
| Nacen | 8,1% | 18,75% | 1,86% | 5 % |
| Viven | 23,9% | 25,00% | 37,13% | 40 % |
| Nacen y viven | 63,04% | 43,75% | 53,58% | 40% |
| Cuneros | 3,36% | 12,50% | 6,90% | 15% |
| <u>Profesiones (*)</u> | | | | |
| Licenciados | 36,38% | 37,50% | 20,96% | 25% |
| Periodistas | 1,78% | 6,25% | 1,59% | 5% |
| Catedraticos | 4,35% | 12,50% | 3,18% | 10% |
| Altos cuerpos | 7,31% | 37,50% | ---- | ---- |
| Técnicos medios | 4,35% | 6,25% | 8,20% | 5% |
| Empleados | 12,06% | ---- | 9,28% | 10% |
| Obreros | 1,58% | ---- | 25,20% | 30% |

(*) Los datos de vinculación al distrito y de profesiones de los candidatos, incluye a los candidatos al Senado, mientras que para los elegidos solo se tiene en cuenta los diputados, dada la baja o nula representación de estas formaciones en la Cámara Alta.

CUADRO Nº 7.-

EL PERFIL DEL CANDIDATO Y EL PERFIL DEL ELEGIDO DE A.P. Y P.C.E. EN LOS COMICIOS DE 1979 .

CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS

| | A.P. | | P.C.E. | |
|-------------------------------|------------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Candidatos | Electos | Candidatos | Electos |
| Mujeres | 14,74% | 11,00% | 12,80% | 8,69% |
| Edad Media | 45,05 | 57,11 | 40,05 | 49,65 |
| <u>Vinculación disto. (*)</u> | | | | |
| Nacen | 2,87% | 11,11% | 0,8% | — |
| Viven | 31,01% | 33,30% | 34,96% | 43,48% |
| Nacen y viven | 61,06% | 55,56% | 59,96% | 39,13% |
| Cuneros | 2,5% | ----- | 3,81% | 17,39% |
| <u>Profesiones (*)</u> | | | | |
| Licenciados | 36,27% | 22,20% | 24,54% | 30,43% |
| Periodistas | 1,84% | 11,11% | 1,70% | 4,35% |
| Catedraticos | 2,46% | 11,11% | 1,46% | 8,70% |
| Altos cuerpos | 2,46% | 44,44% | 0,02% | ---- |
| Maestros | 2,87% | ---- | 0,06% | 4,35% |
| Industriales | 15,57% | 11,11% | 1,28% | ----- |
| Técnicos medios | 8,81% | ----- | 6,34% | 21,74% |
| Obreros | 1,84% | ----- | 24,74% | 21,74% |
| Obreros campo | ----- | ----- | 5,92% | 4,35% |

(*) Los datos de vinculación al distrito y de profesiones de los candidatos incluye a los del Senado, mientras que para los elegidos solo se tiene en cuenta los diputados, dada la nula o escasa representación de estas formaciones en la Cámara Alta.

STATE, UNIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN SPAIN, 1977-1985

(a summary)

by FAUSTINO MIGUELEZ

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Caja 19

STATE, UNIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN SPAIN, 1977-1985

(Summary) by Fautino Miguelez.

The non democratic political context that existed in Spain until not long ago, has implied the non existence of really autonomous industrial relations as it is understood in democratic countries. The model of worker's organization in such context has influenced the industrial relations not only during Francoism, but also in the subsequent period. This fundamentally different political context that precedes the period that we are going to analyze should not be neglected if we compare Spain with other countries of Central and Northern Europe.

The corporatist model

Our starting point will be the following question: Can the corporatist model be used to explain the industrial relations in the period we are analysing? I shall refer to the model used by most of the authors of the work edited by S. Gerger Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics. Corporatism is described there as a limited political structure within a liberal democratic state in advanced capitalism. This means that the shaping and putting into practice of some economical and social policies is left to organizations of interests, particularly those organizations dealing with division of work: unions and employer's associations. Such theory that could be defined as "a middle range theory" does neither leave out explanations of capitalist relations, nor those related to political structure of the democratic liberal state; on the contrary it takes into account the the three levels indicated.

In the second place we have to refer to the corporatist model in a period of economical crisis, which would be different from the context of development to which the classic corporatist model was applied. The state acts in two different possible ways. As the crisis has become longer and the keynesian policies have been abandoned in favour of those policies of control of money supply and public budget, the state has demanded wages moderation and control of social conflict in exchange for possible future employment and an institutionalization of unions; such things happen when pro-labour or at least not anti-labour governments are in charge. On the contrary, when anti-labour governments are in charge, they have avoided compromise, and have replaced it with more or less authoritarian statutory interventions. In some cases there is a strategy which combines both government attitudes.

On the other hand, the unions have found it difficult to unite the interests workers in such a segmented labour market: workers[→] those that fight for the defense of their salaries, those who want a job, and those who are fighting for social improvement. This complexity can also be found within the organization with strategies to face the crisis that may be different and even contradictory. Three different strategies appear together in Spanish unionism: the corporatist

strategy, a radical anti-capitalist strategy, a strategy of subordination to actors that are external to the unions. The role played by the state and the workers' organizations, the lack of sindical unity have determined the actual strategy in different occasions.

Social context of state-unions relations

From my point of view there are three main traits that define the context of relations between the state and the unions in Spain: the political transition, the economical crisis and lack of sindical unity. If we do not define such context appropriately, we risk undue generalizations or we may even transfer an analysis which could be valid in other countries, but would just be too abstract in ours.

My hypothesis will be that unions have accepted and assumed the responsibility of consolidating the democratic political regime and that subsequently the economical policy and the industrial relations they conceive are influenced by such an attitude. Nevertheless the unions have been influenced by other social actors in this political attitude. Finally, they have tended to support the political system as the only mean to guarantee their own existence.

The aims the unions had when they planned their policy to face the crisis were the following: to avoid social disgregation, to reorganize and consolidate industrial relations, to consolidate their own structure. The crisis is threatening life conditions of many workes, but, in the same time, it is also threatening the unions with the loss of their traditional membership.

The unions have not only pursued their objectives through different ways, but also under the spell of lack of sindical unity and weak membership. In Spain, this fact questions the very "monopoly" of intermediation that the corporatist model attributes to the organizations.

Compromises and subordination: a first corporatist attempt?

The "Pactos de la Moncloa", signed on the 8th October 1977, have been considered by some authors as the starting point of corporatism in Spain. Nevertheless, although their contents and aims are apparently corporatist (measures to control inflation, to reorganize the economical policy, and control of social conflict) their protagonists are not those described by the classic model; neither the unions nor the employers associations sign the "Pactos", although some of them will later become their most passionate supporters; they are signed by politicians, but outside parliament, a sort of second cabinet. The "Pactos" have two parts: a programme of economical reform and improvement (many sections within the programme will not even be developed); and a programme for political reform. Some of the themes included in the latter will later appear quite naturally in the Constitution. The consensus reached by the Constitution can only be explained by the Pactos de la Moncloa and by the political practice that takes place in the months that follow their

signature.

When the unions become involved in the "Pactos" they do not even formally sign them; they just contribute to "sanear la economía y consolidar la democracia" (ameliorate economy and consolidate democracy). The "Pactos" are successful from the political from the political point of view, they help the development of the Constitution and other political aspects by consensus rather than by confrontation. The great social conflicts of 1976 and 1977 had proved that the best guarantee for political consensus was social consensus that social powers, particularly unions, could guarantee from "outside" the "Pactos" and their own institutions.

The subordinate position of unions- we could say "imperfect corporatism"- is a fundamental point in the "Pactos de la Moncloa" that will help us understand the strategy of the unions in the subsequent period. This strategy is profoundly influenced by the political context; it penetrates from above a sindical movement that had a powerful, although short, tradition and a clear will of "policy-making" rooted at the very bases of the union. At the end of 1978 there is no new pact since the unions, willing to become direct protagonists, do not reach an agreement on whether the political parties ought to sign the pacts or not. This fact illustrates my point, that is that unions try to present external political pressure as sindical strategy.

To sum up, economical policy, its organization and the role of the unions in it, is subordinated to the requirements of the direct political context.

The new strategy towards social stability

After the elections on March 1979 a new period begins; the victory of the party in power is partially due to the strong campaign of the CEDE, the new powerful employers' association.

In this period economical policy will be subordinated to the creation of a new legal context for industrial relations, that is El Estatuto de los Trabajadores; in this new period the CEDE will try to impose their point of view.

The social actors take a different position in the situation. The CEDE wants a reform of the framework for industrial relations to allow for an increased control of the the productive process (productivity, absenteeism, flexibility of labour force); to hinder the consolidation of sindical structures within the workplace and diminish the interference of the state in industrial relations.

UGT seeks a legal framework to give a more active role to the unions as institutions while CCOO and other unions emphasize more direct participation of workers in industrial relations. This was the fundamental disagreement between the two unions. CCOO emphasized the role of workers' representation in the workplace, (committee) as a means for unity and participation of all the workers through their delegates. UGT will favour the union's section within the firm as the main motor of industrial relations, ^{even though} both unions also somehow accepted the other

union's position in this respect.

The Governemet had not succeeded in their "sindical reform" wich consisted of creating a "conferederation of independent unions" and transforming the "Unión Sindical Obrera" into an associate union. This explains why the governiemet will try defend their political interest in the debate on the "Estatuto de los Trabajadores"; they will favour the CEDE in some respect, in others UGT and in others CCDO. In this way they will consolidate sindical disunion in the first place to garantee their control of the political changes ; on the other hand, they will, nevertheless, be legitimated in sindical milieu; this is the reason why they do not accept all the proposals by the CEDE.

In this context CEDE and UGT sign the agreements of July 1979, which put pressure on the new law, later they they will sign the Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal which aims at directing the negotiation in 1980; in a first instance also CCDO participates but does not sign because they sustain that the final text of the agreement reduces the purchase capacity of wages and diminishes the sindical rights of the workers and causes the workers to pay for the crisis.

Without a doubt, the AMI introduces a moderation in salary increase as it proposes a negotiation framework that could make the wages rise below the inflation rate; but the first step had been taken by the Factor de la Moncloa; there, there was an attempt to control wages in order to control inflation, although it was planned that salaries could rise as much as the price index. The next agreement of 1981, the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo (ANE), also accepted wages moderation, but obtained a promise by the governemet of creation of new employment. The thesis that wages moderation can help control inflation and create employment is accepted by many unionists; it is also accepted by CCO, although with more reluctance. There were, and still are, different points of view between the two unions in this respect, particularly as far as productivity is concerned. But the theme in which disagreement between the two unions was deeper was the organization of the union within the firm; it was a matter that would profoundly affect sindical hegemony. It does not seem adventurous to state that the most important outcome resulting from this period is the loss of power of the union within the workplace; the causes are legislation, sindical disunion and the transfer of polity-making to the summit of organizations.

The year 1981 represents a turning point in Spanish politics; industrial relations and State-Unions confrontation take a new style. The compromise signed on 9th June 1981 to last till 31st December 1982, the "Acuerdo Nacional del Empleo (ANE)", has the purest corporatist appearance in its way of dealing with the crisis. It is signed by the Governemet, the "Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales" (employers' organization CEDE) and the two most representative unions, CCOO and UGT; the implementation of a policy to create new jobs is its fundamental aim. Wages increase is limited to from 9 to 10% below the index of price increase (12%). In exchange for that there is a promise of creation of new employment; there are

also a series of proposals to improve the situation of unemployed and others that can create new employment (retirement before the due age and suppression in part of the possibility to have more than one job at a time); also the institutionalization of unions is reinforced (sindical training, payment of membership tax, presence of unions in the institutes of the Seguridad Social, etc).

But again we should not neglect the importance of context. The first meetings before the ANE, take place after an attempt of coup d'état -parliament was actually attacked and occupied-, under such a strong political pressure. The negotiations that UGT and CEDE were having to extend the effects of the agreement signed the previous year. But external political pressure does not explain everything; the party in power, very weakened, tries to gain support of public opinion for the following elections; They see that a tripartite agreement can help them regain the lost confidence of the electorate. CC.OO manages to come out of the isolation to which the relations between the UGT and CEDE had left it; for both UGT and CEDE this kind of agreement was not ideal, but the political situation was more important.

The ANE can be seen as a typical agreement in a crisis. For the first time the Unions accept the purchase power of their salaries to be reduced, even if they knew that creation of new employment was mostly in the hands of the employers who were not willing to carry it on. But the agreement is not respected. But the great economic issues are left out with the exception of the Seguridad Social, and even the few agreements on this respect will never be respected; no mention is made of public investment, deficit, budget, monetary policy, taxation. The only topic dealt with is salary increase; economical policy is transferred to the firm where the unions are extremely weak.

Both unions, but especially CC.OO, have to make great efforts to convince their members to accept such an "even exchange"; they have to call to solidarity and identity. It is doubtful that the ANE was ever seen by the other participants as an instrument for economical policy; the CEDE rejects it as soon as they are able to do so and the government uses it for political purposes.

Because of what is said above and because of the contents of the pact, the unions are again left out of all economical policy decisions. The only visible result of the ANE is that the country as a whole became conscious of the need to fight against unemployment; the reduction of the rate of unemployment in months that follow is not as big as in the 18 months that precede the ANE; most probably this not due to the effect the ANE had but to the fact that the most drastic loss of employment had already taken place before the ANE was signed.

Social compromise and pro-labor government

The new period begins with the victory of the socialist party at the elections of 28th October 1982, the new government becomes the protagonist of the social pact. This is so because the political programme the socialist present is based

essentially on the ways to overcome the crisis. Also they have 10 million votes (more than 40% of the electorate) and they have an ASSO Union, the UGT. The new model the government creates is the following: they plan their economical policy, make proposals and recommendations to actors of the negotiation, and implement legal reform; social organizations, on the other hand, subscribe an autonomous agreement of collective bargaining. In this way the Acuerdo Interconfederal is reached in 1983; CC.OO. does not agree, ^{plus} they want a global pact like the ANE, ^{but} the guarantee that a pro-labor government in power can offer. This model which bears some similarity to the model of other countries of Northern and Central Europe, works ^{when} the proposals of the government are not restrictive, but it does not work in other contexts. This is precisely what happens in 1984, when the government suggests a salary increase below the inflation rate expected. The Unions and the employers' organizations do not reach an agreement: the former do not accept the suggestion. The government then try to impose their criteria by limiting the salary increases of the public sector.

The final outcome of this strategy is definitely positive in relation to inflation and to the balance of trade, but it does not solve problems of great importance for a pro-labor government and, obviously, for the workers. Unemployment rates rise, after a moderate improvement in the first trimester of 1983; the loss of employments in 1984 is higher even than in 1981; but also social conflict increases in relation to previous years.

We have to bear in mind all that to understand the change of strategy by the government and subsequently of negotiation model. At the beginning of the summer 1984 negotiations for a new pact start. The pact will be tripartite, like the ANE: the Government, the Employers' Associations and the Unions will negotiate. In October 1984 a new pact for the period 1985-86 is signed by all but CC.OO who do not accept the contents of the agreement. The new pact, the AES, is limited in its economical and social aims; it introduces some economical themes: salary policy, fiscal incentive for investment, some changes in the labour market; but does not deal with: restructuring, taxation reform, monetary policy, conditions for entering the Common Market.

It is doubtful whether the pact will have enough force to be effective as far as economic policy and social conflict is concerned, because of the absence of one of the unions. Moreover, there is some evidence to let us suppose that the government is not actually discussing the main aspects of its economic policy in such a negotiation. For example all the restructuring has taken place and is taking place outside the agreement, even if the essential plans for change of the structure of production consist precisely of plans for restructure; also the main changes in relation to the Seguridad Social seem to have been decided long ago by the government; in what concerns the market labour, there are some decisions taken unilaterally and others that are announced-for example the compromise with the employers' organizations to make dismissals more flexible- and that tend towards a flexibilization of labour market.

In practice unions are again left out and in a subordinate position.

The AES seems to have *rather* political aims: to distract public opinion from the evident failure of the governments' policy to create new employment, convincing the public that it is just acceptable that a lot of people should be underemployed or insecure in their jobs; and reducing social conflict and creating a new atmosphere of political confidence.

Imperfect Corporatism or subordinated concertation?

The present situation cannot in any respect be defined as advanced corporatism, although we still have to wait as the experiment has not yet been concluded. Up to now, neither has it reached the participation of Unions in the planning and control of economy, nor has it reached social stability by increasing the rate of employment and stopping the loss of availability of employment. On the other hand, control of inflation could be very directly related to the international economic context.

One of the reasons which could explain the absence of consolidated corporatism might be the lack of consensus between unions' rank and file; some social reform might have made moderation in wages increase acceptable, but none of it has been accomplished. Workers have demonstrated their non acceptance through a very radical social conflict and have defended their jobs rather than their wages; the corporatist *of employment* strategy is simply offering just vague promises in exchange for moderation in wages.

Furthermore the persistence of strong differences in the Spanish social structure makes things more difficult. There are not simply economical differences; some workers are threatened with the loss of their jobs and the economical crisis is stronger in some regions than it is in others.

We have mentioned that different strategical points of view persist within the unions themselves; in some periods-f.i. 1981-1982- corporatist strategies within the union were actually quite powerful but the collapse of pacts and "the failure to accomplish social compromises" have given rise to more radical strategical positions. The existence of different strategies within the unions have made the corporatist model even more difficult to apply.

With or without corporatist strategies, unions had an already weak influence in economical policy. The weakness of unions' and the fact that the unions are left out of important economical decisions, define best the relations State-Unions during the last years.

ECPR Joint Sessions ,Barcelona 1985

Workshop: Corporatism in Mediterranean Europe

Workshop Director: Dr. Carlota Solé

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GENERAL PROGRAMME FOR THE BARCELONA JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS. 25-30 March 1985

| Monday 25th | Tuesday 26th | Wednesday 27th | Thursday 28th | Friday 29th | Saturday 30th | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--|
| REGISTRATION OF PARTICIPANTS ICESB, C/Enric Granados, 2, Barcelona. | workshops | workshops | workshops | workshops | workshops | |
| | LUNCH | LUNCH | LUNCH | LUNCH | LUNCH | |
| | workshops | workshops | 15,30 Tours of the city Tour 1 - Picasso Museum, Ribera Quart, Sta. Maria del Mar and Gothic Quarter Tour 2 - Gaudi, Parc Guell and Sagrada Familia Church Tour 3 - Montjuic, the Spanish Villa- ge and Maritime Museum Point of departure: ICESB, C. Enric Granados, 2. Price per person: 1.000 h Organised by the CIUT Travel Agency, Passag de Gracia, 11. Tel.301.65.00 | workshops | workshops | |
| | 19,30 Opening Ceremony at the Central University. Paraninf de la Universitat (main auditorium) Plaça Universitat | 17,30 Scalin Robean Memorial Lecture in the University. Paraninf de la Universitat (main auditorium), Plaça Universitat | 18,30 Reception in the Gothic Hall of the Barcelona Stock Exchange offered by the Catalan Wine Institute (DCAWT), Passag d'Isabel II | 19,30 Reception offered by the President of the Catalan Government at the Palau de la Generalitat, Plaça de Sant Jaume | | |
| | | 20,00 Reception at Barcelona City Hall offered by the mayor. Plaça de Sant Jaume | | | | |

20,00

13,00

15,00

18,00

21,00

Organisational meetings

EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH
JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS. BARCELONA, 1985
Organising Committee/Comissió Organitzadora/Comissió Organitzadora

PROGRAM

Workshop on : "Corporatism in Mediterranean Europe"- Dr. Carlota Solé
EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH
JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS, Barcelona 25-30th. March 1985

Monday, 25, 1985

Registration

Tuesday, 26, 1985

10:00a.m.-13:00 a.m. - Session I : Corporatism in France

Presentation of the Workshop Sessions by Carlota Solé

~~Michael Rose: "Economic nationalism" in French unions approach to State and relations with employers"~~

John Loughlin: "The processes of mediation between the local society and the State: the dynamics of the Corsican clan system"

15:00p.m.- 18:00p.m. - Session II: Interest-groups in Turkey and Greece

Ural Ayberk: "Le groupes d'intérêt turc d'après le retour de la démocratie"

George Th. Mavrogradatos: "Interest groups in Greece"

Constantin Tsoukalas: "Formes corporatistes et structure de l'Etat en Grèce"

Wednesday, 27, 1985

10:00a.m. - 13:00 a.m. - Session III : Corporatist trends in Spain

Joe Foweraker : "Franco's corporatist strategy and its implication for corporate interest representation in Spain today"

Robert Robinson: " Trends towards neocorporatism in Spain"

Werner Lang: "Between the need of modernization and the promise of occupation: the case of socialist Spain"

15:00 p.m.- 18:00 p.m. - Session IV : Interest groups in Spain and Portugal

Carlota Solé: "Industrial sectors in crisis: neocorporatist arrangements"

Fausto Miguélez: "State, trade unions and social conflict. Spain:1977-1983"

José Barroso: "Les modes d'action des groupes d'intérêt au Portugal"

Thursday, 28, 1985

10:00 a.m.- 13:00 a.m. - Session V: Concertation and corporatism in Italy

Marino Regini: "The recent attempts at concertation in Italy and the reasons for their failure"

Salvatore Pitruzzello: "Industrial Policy in Southern Italy"

Michael Rose: "Economic nationalism." in French unions approach to State and relations with employers"

15:00 p.m.- 18:00 p.m.- (Free)

Friday, 29, 1985

10:00 a.m. - 13:00 a.m. - Session VI: Comparative Studies on Corporatism

Adriano Pappalardo: "Neocorporatist incomes policies in France, Italy and Spain: An empirical assessment"

K. Nüssli and E. Rüegg: "The logic of liberal democracies and neocorporatism.

R. Nilssen: "Interest-groups in Norway. Comparative analysis"

15:00 p.m. - 18:00 p.m. - Session VII : Comparative perspectives on Neocorporatism in Mediterranean Europe

Philippe Schmitter : "Neo-corporatism and the State: Reflections on Recent Experience in Southern Europe"

ECPR Workshop on: "Corporatism in Mediterranean Europe"

Director: Carlota Solé

The workshop was meant to tackle one of the most challenging political practices of political practices of policy making decisions in advanced societies, that is, the way capital, labour and state interests interlock and come to tripartite arrangements. Business and labour organizations operate as interests intermediation associations and relate with the state in policy making practices. From a comparative perspective, the workshop dealt with the description and explanation of these practices in countries like France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, where concertation or some sort of organized collective action has taken place in the last decade.

Paper givers and participants discussed the success or failure of such measures. A historical account was generally combined with a sociological and political perspective. Such was the case in the discussion of the trends towards corporatism in Spain. Three papers were centered on the historical aspects, those given by Joe Foweraker, Robert Robinson and Werner Lang and two referred to present problems in the transitional period Spain is developing her democracy. Four papers were presented and one, that of W. Lang, was sent beforehand, so that comments and criticisms on them and other general issues made the discussion extremely lively. Italy provided a very useful example of difficulties in a corporatist project for other Mediterranean countries. Marino Regini presented a very good paper and made a brilliant presentation of it. Papers on interest groups in France, Greece and Turkey

were discussed the first and third day of the Workshop sessions. A comparative view on the problem of corporatist trends and the question of the State were tackled by K. Nüsali and E. Rüegg and by Ph. Schmitter. This last paper gave all participants full information on the last research work done on the issue. Other papers presented a comparative view of countries where autonomous interests organizations have traditionally coexisted with formal parliamentary representation.

INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN CRISIS: THE SPANISH CASE

by

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ECPR Joint-Sessions. Workshop on "Corporatism in Mediterranean Europe." Barcelona, 25-30th. March. 1985

INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN CRISIS: THE SPANISH CASE

By Carlota Solé

1.- The Reconversion and Reindustrialization Act.

On November 30, 1983 the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the Reconversion and Reindustrialization Act which aims to promote technological innovation in order to make Spanish industry more competitive abroad.

Submitted by the Ministry of Industry, the Act is an attempt to turn the tide of the industrial crisis which struck in mid-1974. The theory is that unless Spanish industry changes radically and becomes involved in new industrial and/or service operations, the country's economy will degenerate even faster and the consequences will be far more serious than they are now, ten years after the onset of the crisis.

The Act is specifically concerned with matters of taxation, financing and labour. It aims to reduce the current production capacity of some specific sectors rather than all industrial sub-sectors. According to the Ministry of Industry, the idea is to adjust production capacity to the existing demand and the demand to actual production. As a consequence there will be no foreseeable loss of jobs beyond those which would have been lost anyway had the Act not been approved. The labour unions totally disagree

and maintain that production cuts in basic sectors will be to blame if jobs are subsequently lost in auxiliary sectors.

The Reindustrialization Act consists of a 4-year plan to convert steelmills, large and small shipyards, manufacturers of special steels and home appliances (refrigerators, washing machines, heaters, etc.).

These sectors will be obliged to confront the crisis, and Business, Labour and the Administration will share the costs involved. The Act guarantees to adapt the sector to existing market requirements. This implies lay-offs, production cutbacks and even the shutting down of some companies.

The plan stresses the importance of adapting new technologies but this requires funds that must be obtained somewhere and paid for somehow. Industrial reconversion is expensive and involves a lot of sacrifice, particularly during the first few years. The majority of the (sacrificial) victims belong to the working class: the Industrial Reconversion Act is expected to eliminate 200,000 jobs, mostly in Madrid and the Basque Country. *and Catalonia*

Reindustrialization consists of doing everything possible - from granting official credit for public purchases to supporting small business and regional policies - in order to build up a production system which generates employment and products in sectors with a future. These up-and-coming fields are not only electronics and biotechnics but include any sector which is economically profitable and viable.

JOBS THAT WILL BE LOST BETWEEN 1981-1985:
BREAKDOWN BY INDUSTRIAL SECTORS (1)

| Industrial Sectors | Total persons directly employed 31 Dec. 1981 | Estimated job losses from 1981-1985 | % |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|
| Home appliances | 19,400 | 4,527 | 23.3 |
| Special steels | 18,500 | 4,500 | 24.3 |
| Metal | 37,100 | 10,000 | 29.1 |
| Textile, ready-to-wear and synthetic fibres | | | |
| - textile | 208,000 | 41,000 | |
| - ready-to-wear and synthetic fibres | 212,000 | 27,000 | 21.4 |
| Electronic equipment for the automobile industry | 8,000 | 1,713 | 21.4 |
| Shipbuilding | | | |
| - large shipyards(1) | 27,000 | 6,600 | 24.4 |
| - small and medium shipyards | 12,000 | 3,238 | 26.9 |
| Semi-manufactured copper goods | 4,300 | 979 | 22.7 |
| Electronic accessories | 3,400 | 484 | 14.2 |
| Common steel | 14,500 | 1,834 | 12.6 |
| Footwear | 55,000 | 3,100 | 5.6 |
| Heavy metal | 1,000 | 370 | 37.0 |
| Other companies (2) | 47,000 | 13,369 | 28.0 |
| Total | 667,900 | 65,514 | 9.7 |

Source: El País, 19th June 1983

(1) Data from 1982, period ranges from 1982-85.

(2) General Electric, Westinghouse, Talbot Automobiles, Asturiana de Zinc, Standard Group

No

Labour, energy and financing costs must be reduced in order to spur investment. Inflexible market regulations discourage new investments and should be eliminated. A further investment incentive can be provided by restructuring some individual companies hit by the crisis.

Spanish Socialist
 The government ~~also~~ hopes to eliminate the shortage of financial resources by keeping down the public deficit and promoting private investment. The plan gives financial priority to re-industrialization. (As a result, agriculture is becoming increasingly financed by rising prices. (1))

No

Reconversion also aims at finding outlets abroad, preferably in the Common Market countries. Spain could sell parts and products to the big European multinationals: automobile spare parts, television sets. It could manufacture chemical components and machine accessories for export, particularly in subsectors like the food industry, printing, publishing, cables, specialized machinery and the perfume industry in all of which Spain is highly competitive.

(In short) the Spanish Socialist government has opted to spend the next four years fighting against inflation, keeping down the deficit in the balance of payments and trying to achieve a stable growth rate which will reduce unemployment. In this way they hope to stem a crisis characterized by a sharp drop in demand, rising costs, an investment slump and an inadequate business structure.

(1) Avui, 13th November, 1983.

2.- Steel, textile, automobile and shipbuilding industries

The drop in demand is due to the impossibility of competing in a market with an excess capacity. The drop has been most noticeable in the domestic market where it often coincided with new investments made too late, generating an even greater excess in supply. While this is particularly true of the textile industry, other sectors, such as the steel industry, have attempted to adopt technological innovations in order to cut down production capacity and/or adapt to new market demands, but this creates unemployment. Furthermore, public funds are being used to subsidize losses in certain industrial sectors. The greater the volume of investment per item produced the harder it is to adapt production capacity to changing demand.

To make things worse, protectionist measures are making it increasingly difficult for Spanish products to penetrate the international market. Among these measures are certain agreements in the metal sector which have caused Spanish motor-cycles to lose their power to compete internationally with their Japanese counterparts.

With the exception of the chemical industry (1) where the annual accumulated export growth rate (in Catalonia) for 1972-78 was 29.66%, exports in all the various subsectors of the metal and textile industries have dropped throughout the past decade.

Because there is little demand the rises in costs cannot be backed into prices. This is one major cause

(1) Gasoliba, C.A.: "El sector químico en la renovación de la base industrial de Cataluña", Información Comercial Española, nr. 571, March 1981, page 74.

in situ
of the crisis. Another is the multinationals' strategy of manufacturing products in different stages and in different countries in order to earn maximum profits, while disregarding the fact that they often wreak havoc with local employment in certain sectors, one of which is metalworking.

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The 1974 energy crisis seriously affected the national steel program approved by the Spanish government for 1974-1982 in an attempt to put the increasing steel supply into some semblance of order. Even though other measures were adapted in 1978 and 1979 to provide financial aid and restructure the steel industry, a number of plants were forced to close down. At the beginning of 1981 the government decided to implement a policy of ~~sectoral~~ restructuring which would involve Business, Labour and the Administration and the ensuing three-way discussions resulted in the Agreement on "Revitalizing and Reconverting the Steel Industry" (Decree 878 of 20th May 1981). This reconversion plan covered four points: financial revitalization and investment, marketing and labour policies, and was aimed at restructuring the demand for steel, reducing excess production capacity and replacing the least efficient production lines with others which would be more profitable. The ultimate goal was to make the sector more competitive and able to gain a share of the international market (1).

Not only is the steel industry in crisis but the economic recession that began in mid-1974 also

(1) Albentosa, L. and Zaragoza, J.: "Estructura y política siderúrgica. De la acción concertada a la política de reconversión". Información Comercial Española, Nr. 591, November 1982, pages 81-83.

hit the textile industry particularly hard: demand dropped, costs rose, and investments slumped.

The investment slump was most noticeable in the domestic market because the recession hit just when many textile companies were making investments that had been decided upon some time previously. As a result there was a general surplus in the textile supply. Textile firms reacted to this by transferring funds abroad and making a concerted effort to increase their exports.

Financing is very expensive in the textile industry and the small- and medium-sized businesses which account for the majority of textile firms simply cannot afford it. Furthermore, there is a big discrepancy between nominal investment and actual investment. Although 1979 investments in current pesetas equalled 75% of the investment made in 1974, the rise in prices translated to an actual investment of only 35% .

In 1983, the Spanish textile industry consisted of 7,200 companies: 80% of which were located in Catalonia. Although the textile

industry still provides employment for about 400,000 people, 200,000 of whom work in the garment industry (the subsector which, incidentally, employs the highest number of illegal workers: currently estimated at about 80,000), unemployment has spiraled: in 1979, 45,000 textile workers were jobless. This represents 17% of total unemployment in manufacturing industries and 12% of sectorial unemployment. Women have been hardest hit by joblessness as been the region of Catalonia where 75% of the textile industry is located. Job losses in this area are proportionately higher than in other textile producing regions.

There are currently only 23 textile firms in Spain with more than 500 employees, 164 with more than 100. The remaining 251 companies have less than 100 employees.

Furthermore, the situation is aggravated by obsolescent equipment. 14.8% of the machinery in spinning mills needs to be replaced while 20.1% of the machinery used in weaving is now obsolete.

The crisis has called the entire future of the Spanish textile industry into question. It is estimated that between 1980-1985, 40% of the existing jobs in the textile industry will disappear. Furthermore, obsolete manufacturing methods will cause production capacity to drop by 20%. The government is therefore considering drafting a new reconversion plan for the textile industry.

Actually, Spain is not alone in having problems with its textile industry. Other industrialized countries are also suffering as they find themselves forced to compete with imported products from countries where labour costs are low. Still,

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Spanish textile manufacturers have the added problem of being practically unable to export due to restrictions imposed by other European countries as a result of the GATT Multifiber agreement. The United States and Japan have also placed restrictions on textile imports. France, Belgium and Italy have drafted specific plans to protect domestic textile production. Nevertheless, despite the loss of jobs, the investment slump and financing problems // the textile industry in Spain and elsewhere still accounts for an important part of the Gross Industrial Product.

Prior to the Textile Reconversion Plan of 1981 other subsectorial restructuration plans, such as the Wool Industry (Restructuration Plan (Decree Nr. 6941) of 1975, had helped to somewhat revitalize the sector. However, these partial, subsectorial plans were drafted in times of full employment and considerable private investment when the industry was looking for loopholes in labour legislation which would permit obsolete companies to go out of business without having to officially declare bankruptcy. General restructuration was not one of the aims of the times. High customs duties still protected the Spanish textile industry from imported competition.

Today's reconversion plan is an entirely different matter. Although Spain has been forced to recognize the need to adapt financing structures to a qualitative market and to modernize machinery, this will not be enough to offset the effects of reduced customs protection nor will it suffice to make Spanish textile products

internationally competitive.

The Textile Reconversion Plan for 1980-1986 affects traditional textile industries (natural fibres), manufacturers of synthetic fibres and the garment industry. The plan aims to create, or at least conserve, employment by generally readjusting the industry so that job losses in one subsector will be compensated for by gains in others. A further objective is to increase quality so that Spanish textile products will be more exportable and better adapted to both domestic and foreign markets by virtue of new marketing policy. Business production and finance can be organized to optimize costs and adapt to existing markets through forecasting and correcting for the ups-and-downs in the supply/demand cycles which are so typical of the textile/ready-to-wear industry. A tendency to reorganize the rigid hierarchical structure of old-time textile companies and make them more flexible can already be observed. (1)

If the production structure of the textile industry is rationalized and improved and the industry is made more competitive, job losses should cease and the overall employment level in the various subsectors remain steady. An improved industrial structure should also make it possible to increase exports. This would translate into a higher level of employment, particularly in the garment industry, in sales, and in the industries that supply raw materials, accessories and services to the textile industry.

(1) Fabregat, V.; Granell, F.; Salmurri, J.A., "Problemas actuales y perspectivas futuras del sector textil-confección", Papeles de Economía . nr. 5, Madrid 1982, pages 174-176.

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 However, there is an entire subsector of intangibles which must be brought up to date: innovation, design, fashion, occupational training, sales management, etc. must be improved. Not only must the textile industry invest in machinery and installations, but also in improvements ^{int} in consulting services, engineering and other related activities.

In order to rationalize production and sales, obsolete machinery must be replaced. This requires sizeable investments in efficient equipment which, in turn, require proper financing so that the cost of capital does not outweigh the advantages of rationalization and modernization.

Special attention must be paid to developing sales structures in the garment industry so that Spanish ready-to-wear will be competitive at home and abroad. Here again, design, fashion, quality and brand image must be constantly studied and improved.

Other measures contained in the Textile Reconversion Plan deal with the size of factories and the extent to which manufacturers of certain products should diversify or specialize. According to the Plan, temporary employee lay-offs will help adjust supply to a changing demand. This means that employees will be contracted in the busy seasons and laid off in the slack ones. Still, the Plan considers this compatible with the general aim of maintaining the overall level of employment in the entire sector.

Automobile

Supply and demand in the automobile industry were also hard hit by the 1974 energy and raw materials crisis. Sales in the automobile industry

are a barometer of the economy: when domestic economies are pinched, people think twice about buying their first car or in making trade-ins on a new model. The crisis in the automobile industry is a reflection of the general economic crisis in Spain.

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Apartment from the drop in demand, the Spanish automobile industry is far from being rational and competitive and rising costs of energy, material inputs and financing have only made things worse. Rising energy costs in themselves have had relatively little effect on the increase in car prices which have been more seriously affected by the increase in the cost of material inputs, many of which are supplied by Spanish auxiliary industries. The increases in the prices of these inputs appears to be at least partly due to the problems of the Spanish metal industry (1).

Investments in the automobile industry have become increasingly scarce because of the crisis, the economic slump and the increased returns owing to the parent companies of cars manufactured in Spain. At the beginning of the 1970's these foreign companies used all their available funds to finance increased investments. While the Spanish branches did not benefit from this they were unfortunately affected by the slowdown in production growth which triggered an increase in real terms in the price of automobiles.

(1) Portillo, L. "La industria del automóvil en España: crisis y perspectivas", Información Comercial Española, nr. 587, Madrid, July 1982, pages 21-22.

Thus, the drop in demand on the one hand and rising prices on the other caused the growth rate of domestic automobile sales to fall off sharply. (1).

Among the other factors which have aggravated the crisis in the automobile industry are the excessively high taxes on automobiles. What with the various taxes and other purchase charges the cost of automobiles in Spain went up from 24% in 1973 to 29.5% in 1980 (2). Furthermore, the ratio of cars to urban inhabitants in Spain is lower than elsewhere and people are less prone to use their cars for daily commuting. Last, but by no means least, rising labour costs have contributed directly to rising automobile prices. Still, it was not until 1978 that the cost of wages within the gross added value began to increase and by then the crisis in the automobile industry was already a reality. On the other hand, the effect of wages on profits can be measured by productivity and productivity depends on investment, which in the Spanish automobile industry was less than the average investment in the rest of national industry.

(1) Portillo, L: ibid , pages 23-24.

(2) Rivilla, I.: "La fabricación de automóviles en España. Perspectivas económicas y empresariales". Papeles de Economía Española, nr. 5, Madrid 1980, page 191.

(3) Portillo L. ibid, pages 25.

The shipbuilding industry is also in line for reconversion. In January 1984 the Ministry of Industry and Energy announced that within a month it would present a plan which would serve as the basis for negotiations on reducing jobs and modernizing the industry's production structures. The plan aims^{ed} to provide measures which will stimulate demand but it will not specify which plants should be closed down, leaving it to the shipbuilders themselves to make this decision.

There is an estimated surplus of ten thousand employees in the large shipyards and reconversion is also expected to affect seven or eight thousand workers currently employed in smaller shipyards. The government believe shipbuilders should reduce their personnel surplus through early retirement plans, offering the workers incentives to quit and by establishing funds destined to create new jobs.

At the beginning of 1984 the Administration, SORENA (Society for the Reconversion of Small- and Medium-sized Shipyards), the National Industrial Institute and the unions CC.OO. (Communist), UGT (Socialist), ELA-STV (Basque nationalist) and INTG (Galician nationalist) met to discuss possible reconversion measures. The unions in general and CC.OO. in particular disagreed with the government's stance and announced that they would start mobilizing workers' protest actions. INTG charged that the government is delaying presentation of the Reconversion Plan for political reasons (elections in the autonomous regions of Spain) which have nothing to do with the interests of the shipbuilding industry.

The autonomous government of Galicia (Xunta de Galiza) has published a "White Paper on Maintaining and Developing Galicia's Industrial Capacity

as an Alternative to the Central Government's Reindustrialization and Reconversion Plans". Setting its time horizon for 1990, the paper argues that the crisis in the shipbuilding industry can be overcome and that Spanish shipbuilders need not stand by and watch their share of the world market shrink from five to two percent. The plan broaches the possibility of keeping the ASTANO shipyard alive under the aegis of the National Industrial Institute, of the Empresa Nacional Bazán ~~de~~ Construcciones specializing in the building of ships for the Spanish navy and of increasing the production of the smaller Galician shipyards.

The Xunta's white paper is opposed to dismantling shipyards, arguing that this has not been done in any of the EEC countries. In a market forecast for 1990, the paper estimates that demand will once again climb to where it was in the 1970's. By 1990 ASTANO, located in the town of El Ferrol, will have 3,384 employees working on construction of new ships (486 more than necessary). The Xunta's data on small- and medium-sized shipyards do not differ greatly from the official Spanish government estimates. Although the Society for Naval Reconversion (SORENA) estimates that there will be a surplus of 1,137 workers by 1990, the Galician government sets the figure at 350. In general terms the Galician regional government considers that the shipbuilding crisis can be survived while maintaining current employment levels rather than abolishing seven thousand jobs as proposed by the Spanish central government.

The restructuring plan presented at the end of 1983 would not only affect shipyards in Galicia but also those in Sestao and Olaveaga in the Basque Country and Astilleros Españoles, S.A.'s shipyards in Cadiz and Puerto Real in southern Spain. (Should the Euskalduna shipyards in the Basque Country close down, four thousand workers would be left jobless and another 15,000 who are employed in auxiliary industries would be in danger of losing their jobs. The Olaveaga yard, which specializes in building 16,000-32,000 ton ships, was profitable until it became part of Astilleros Españoles, S.A.: when orders were redistributed among all the shipyards belonging to the company the Olaveaga yard almost went under, registering a loss of three thousand million pesetas in 1982. Astilleros Españoles, S.A.'s shipyards in Valencia have also been hard hit by the crisis.

3.- Conclusions

To sum up, the Industrial Reconversion Act of November 30, 1983 aims to profit from the experiences of earlier sectoral plans and alter the framework for reconversion without exceeding the limits of previous legislation. It proposes a number of taxation and financing measures, but the only real innovation in comparison to earlier legislation is the regulation which permits both the State and the banks to hold shares in reconverted companies.

Labour measures are also similar to those contained in earlier legislation, but the new act does introduce the idea of establishing special funds for creating new jobs, which would reduce the efforts of INEM (National

Employment Office). Early retirement schemes would also be set up on a basis similar to the Social Security system and financed according to terms pacted in the sectorial plans. For many workers this could mean a severe loss in purchasing power.

Other measures deal with the possibility of stimulating investment by designating "urgent reindustrialization zones" in various parts of Spain, but the plan gives no further explanation of what exactly this would entail. The advantages of being such a zone would probably be similar to the advantages given to areas which are designated as industrial expansion areas, preferential industrial zones or industrial parks, all of which are similar to the old development pools. These are not reindustrialization measures per se, but cushions to soften the effect of reconversion and the social conflict which it might trigger.

Labour does not question the need for reindustrialization. Neither does Business or, obviously, the Government. However, the unions state that a necessary distinction should be made between the terms "reindustrialization" and "reconversion". Neither the White Paper on Reindustrialization published in July 1983 nor last November's Industrial Reconversion Act clearly address the problem of how to modernize production structures with an eye to Spain's possible entry in the EEC and the consequent need to compete on new terms in international markets without this resulting in a tremendous increase in unemployment in all the industrial subsectors ^{under} ~~subject~~ to reindustrialization.

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The Administration views reconversion as a way to free financial resources that are currently trapped in potentially viable businesses, resources which would be used to promote new businesses or new lines of production. They also believe that reconversion will trigger investment in sectors that supply new equipment. In short, the idea is to reconvert in order to reindustrialize. The Spanish Socialist government considers that the best way to reindustrialize and guarantee new jobs is to impose a general policy aimed at reducing labour costs, making employment contracts more flexible, reducing inflation and lowering interest rates.

Past experiences with reconversion demonstrate that there are obvious drawbacks to this approach. There is no guarantee that the financial resources freed in this way will necessarily go into investments that will generate employment nor that it will be Spanish industry that supplies the equipment for new investments. Furthermore, the supposed freeing of financial resources is not without its dark side: fixed assets threaten to be depleted by reconversion expenses and the costs, both social and financial, of cutting down on existing staffs. In order for the government's plan to work, the State must be directly involved in designing an industrial policy, the medium- and long-term objective of which may be reindustrialization, but which must serve in the short-term for negotiating reconversion measures with Business and Labour.

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The previous Industrial Reconversion Plan enacted on June 5, 1983 and supplanting the Government Reindustrialization Act of 1981 met with a good deal of criticism which can be

summarized as follows: first of all, the plan did not really aim at reindustrialization but was limited to proposing ways to cure ailing industries, reduce liabilities and cut down personnel costs. It made no explicit mention of the employment measures which needed to be considered: elimination or suspension of employment contracts, the feasibility of relocating employees, etc. Furthermore, in many cases the government planned company-by-company reconversion despite the tri-partite agreements (Government, Labour and Business) to the contrary which had already been made when the reconversion plan was published. This explains why, prior to the publication of the decree, the government only held formal discussions and negotiations with the unions but offered no guarantee that they would come to any agreement. In this way the government avoided any responsibility to the unions for reconversion measures and made it difficult for Labour to keep a close watch over how the measures were applied.

For all these reasons it is difficult to evaluate how successful the Industrial Reconversion Plan can be, particularly when Spain's industry - with the exception of the companies which belong to the public sector by dint of being run by the National Industrial Institute - is so dependent on multinational business. The multinationals have more technology and more money behind them than most big Spanish businesses. The multinationals in Spain have brought cheap foreign products into the Spanish market, but this

situation could be temporarily counteracted by enacting more protectionist measures. However, there still exists a true threat to the economy should the multinationals decide to pull out and set up in other countries where costs are lower and there are greater chances to increase profits.

Technological advances and innovations in the field of microelectronics are radically transforming production in industrially developed countries. Costs are falling as labour and energy intensive businesses are replaced by capital intensive ones. As a result new products are being created and others are fast becoming obsolete, i.e. the demand for and, consequently, the production of, goods and services is changing. Furthermore, production itself is changing: new kinds of technology, automation and production methods (industrial robots, new control systems, etc.) are being introduced. These innovations will gradually be exported to countries like Spain which are less technologically developed.

It is also difficult to predict the possible positive effects of industrial reconversion when the Spanish financing system remains deficient. Because of the way investment coefficients work there is a good deal of discrimination and interventionism. Thus low-interest credits are granted to certain firms selected in accordance with criteria which are usually set by the banks. This system doesn't work in a time of crisis when investment coefficients start dropping and the price of money goes up. Businesses are obliged to resort to bank financing and as very few businesses are even self-financing

nowadays, business' financing costs have skyrocketed. In many cases they have as much as doubled.

Internationally speaking, Spain could be classified as a country with medium-priced manpower and an intermediate degree of specialization. The fact that it is so economically dependent on the United States and other European countries without being a member of the EEC means it will have many more problems in remodeling and thoroughly overhauling its industrial production structure. Were Spain a member of the Common Market the possibilities of industrial reconversion, if not downright reindustrialization, would be more realistic.

On September 29, 1984, after a great deal of government pressure on Business and a month of intense negotiations, the Government, Business (represented by CEOE - the Spanish Employers' Association) and the two leading trade unions (CC.OO. and UGT) reached an Economic and Social Agreement (AES) to negotiate the following matters in detail:

- 1.- The labour market: i.e. hiring practices, vocational training, job redistribution (retirements, reduced working hours, overtime) and new amendments to the recently revised Statute of Workers' Rights).
- 2.- Income policies: wages, pensions, unemployment benefits, a more gradual increase of the tax burden; price controls.

Social Security: income and expenditures for 1985, pension reform and other aspects of the Social Security system.

3.- Institutional participation, i.e. distribution of historical trade union assets among business and labour organizations, as well as union participation in, and general reform of, public firms. Union participation in the Economic and Social Council (ESC).

The Agreement is intended to be either binding as is or with the parties concerned negotiating each issue and arriving at specific agreements which will then be signed by the government. The most conflictive points are those dealing with the labour market and Social Security. As far as the former is concerned and with an eye to Spain's eventual entry in the EEC, Business is fighting to eliminate the need for government authorization to lay off groups of employees for technological reasons or in cases of force majeure.

Furthermore, CEOE is not satisfied with the government's proposed cut in employer contributions to Social Security.

While the Socialist union, UGT, has some reservations about accepting the free firing practices which are common in the EEC, it nevertheless supports the recently-concluded pact. On the other hand, CC.OO., the Communist union, is a good deal more critical of the pact, objecting that it pays little attention to the issue of creating new jobs and actually limits some of the rights established in the Statute of Workers' Rights.

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 The Socialist government's Council of Ministers had made it clear that they would not approve the General State Budgets until the Economic and Social Agreement was signed. In fact, the budgets were deliberately not made public until 30th September 1984. Obviously, an agreement had first to be reached on public investment for 1985 and 1986 (an increase of 9% over last year's budget) as well as on the Special Investment, or Solidarity, Fund which is to be financed in equal parts by Government, Business and Labour (civil servants will also contribute to the fund) and establishment of a fund through which local, provincial and regional public agencies can contract temporary workers (this has hitherto been channeled through the National Employment Office). Furthermore, permitted wage increases were pacted at between 5.5 and 7.5%, with a predicted inflation rate of 7%. Labour disagreed with the wage increase ceilings set for 1986, which they felt should be at least 6%, but the AES was signed on Oct. 9.

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 This agreement had immediate repercussions^{effects} in highly industrialized Catalonia (in the north-east of Spain. On the very day negotiations were concluded, the Catalan employers' association Foment del Treball Nacional met formally with the Catalan chapters of CC.OO. and UGT, rather than even waiting for the meeting which was certain to be called by the Consell de Treball (Catalonia's tri-partite agency), which Business and Labour alike agree must serve as the framework for any discussion on possible economic and social agreements for Catalonia. Of the three parties, it is the Catalan

government, the Generalitat de Catalunya, that is least interested in concluding this sort of pact.

Catalan employers, as represented by the Foment, insist that there are good chances for fighting unemployment and the economic crisis in Catalonia. They feel that the Administration itself should limit the amount of public spending and they oppose the establishment of any new taxes. Furthermore, they are against the Generalitat using any public funds for community employment programs and they even oppose municipal intervention in vocational training programs. Here they differ radically from the unions, which are asking the Catalan government for more funds in order to create new jobs.

This attempt at forging a regional economic and social pact is attracting a good deal of attention. It could represent a realistic and pragmatic approach to the problems of unprofitable industrial sectors which are highly concentrated in certain regions of Spain. Not only does it reveal that Government, Labour and Business have very different ideas about what role the public sector should play when a market economy is faced with the need for industrial restructuration, but it also demonstrates that there is no relationship between general, nationwide pacts and industrial policy at the sectoral level. *Should the sphere* of possible application of social and economic pacts be reduced to a single region, a realistic approach to industrial sectors in crisis might eventually be found.

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THE LOGIC OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND NEOCORPORATISM

Some Considerations from a Swiss Perspective

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FIRST DRAFT

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In most of the attempts at classifying West European countries Switzerland has been a deviant case in one or another respect. Swiss processes of policy formation and implementation did never fit neatly into the typologies developed by social scientists. One might for example remember the remark of an American scholar that Switzerland, according to the theory, should not exist (reported by Barry 1978:256), or - less drastic - Schmitter's comment that Switzerland is "too ruly for its relatively low corporatism" (Schmitter 1981:312).

The international discussion on neocorporatism in general has certain difficulties to place the country on the continuum ranging from strong to weak corporatism. Whereas Schmitter has rank-ordered Switzerland almost at the end of his scale of societal corporatism (Schmitter 1981:294), Schmidt (1982:245) places the country into the category of "strong corporatism". Lehmbruch, instead, shows a considerable reluctance to assess Switzerland as a case for neocorporatism. However, he thinks that the "patterns of coordination of government and interest groups" in Switzerland have a "functional affinity to the modal pattern of neocorporatism". (Lehmbruch 1982:25).

Swiss scholars, as well, give very different answers to the question, whether their country is to be conceived as neocorporatist or not. Kriesi (1982) states that Switzerland is not a good case for "corporatism". Even more fervently, Hayoz (1984) is speaking of the non-sense of applying the concept of neocorporatism to Switzerland. On the other hand, Parri (1984) has convincingly argued that neocorporatist arrangements do exist in Switzerland to a considerable extent.

Given this complex situation, a research project on "Neocorporatism and 'Concordant democracy' - Chances and Limits of Organized Interest Intermediation" *, of which this paper is somehow the theoretical starting point, has

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to answer two questions. First , which structures and mechanisms of interest intermediation do really exist in Switzerland? And, second , what are the consequences of the different mechanisms used in different policy areas?

A first step to answer these questions consists in clarifying the concept of neocorporatism. In the international discussion the concept has been defined quite differently. Therefore, in this paper we will turn to what we consider to be the most important contributions in this field.

As we try to show in detail, we think that the discussion on neocorporatism is characterized by four basic controversies:

- Section one of the paper deals with the question, whether neocorporatism is a new system beyond pluralism and capitalism or a structure within a pluralist society.
- In section two we are turning to the debate opposing those, who define neocorporatism as a specific pattern of interest intermediation, to those, who conceptualize it as a mode of policy formation.
- In section three we will enter the discussion on the factors explaining the emergence of neocorporatist arrangements. In this controversy one can broadly distinguish between a group of authors arguing from a functionalist perspective and a group of contributors who conceive neocorporatism as a result of strategic interactions.
- The last section of the paper deals with advantages and limits of neocorporatist arrangements. The ongoing debate opposes those, who think neocorporatism is a contribution to the problem solving capacity of modern societies, to those, who see neocorporatist structures and strategies as a danger to liberal democracy.

At the end of every section, we will give a first tentative interpretation of the Swiss case in the context of the controversy in question. The final remarks will summarize, which conclusions we draw regarding the 'working hypothesis' of our research on Switzerland.

1. Neocorporatism: A New System Beyond Pluralism and Capitalism?

Corporatism has made its reappearance on the terminological stage of political science during the seventies not only because it draws the attention to the growing interrelations between organized interests and the state. More important was the idea that corporatism defines a categorical new type of polity or society beyond pluralism or capitalism.

In Jack Winkler's view "Corporatism is an economic system in which the state directs and controls predominately privately-owned business toward four goals: unity, order, nationalism and success". (Winkler 1976:106). So defined, corporatism is distinct not only from socialism and syndicalism that combine public owned business with public (socialism), or private (syndicalism) control of the economy but also from capitalism where both ownership and control are private.

Philippe Schmitter on the other hand has "found it useful to consider corporatism as a system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interest of civil society with the decisional structures of the state". (Schmitter 1979(1974):8/9) Within this system "the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports"

(Schmitter 1979(1974):13). Schmitter then distinguishes between two subtypes of corporatism, the one called 'societal corporatism' in which the constituent units are autonomous and penetrative and the other termed 'state corporatism' in which the units are dependent and penetrated. "When viewed

statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation". (Schmitter 1979(1974):22). In this perspective, corporatism constitutes a system of interest representation categorically different from either pluralism or syndicalism.

Rather, the corporatist structures within most of the highly industrialized democracies are part of an *encompassing* pluralistic system of intermediation. Their influence is limited to general economic and social policy, whereas most policy areas are steered by pluralistic, but segmented modes of interest intermediation. Furthermore, a radical change in favour of the corporatist pattern is not to be expected. Division of labour and economic concentration do not affect societal interests symmetrically. They unilaterally favor capital and labour, and within the "working class" the interests of specialised and skilled workers. Groups and interests not submitted to the division of labour and the concentration of capital (consumers, women, environmentalists) cannot increase their 'organizability' and 'conflictability'. In this respect, the increasing rate of organization aggravates the pluralistic interest-intermediation. Similar processes of interest organization are stimulated by the growth of the public sector. Overall, both the technological-economic and the political development of capitalist societies converge to a pluralistic, but not balanced interest intermediation. Therefore, the hypothesis that pluralist mode interest representation in capitalist societies will be replaced by a corporatist one is far from being realistic. (See Lehner 1983: 106-109).

Kastendiek on the other hand, from a neomarxist position, states that the debate on neocorporatism is dominated by

approaches that overestimate partial structures of policy organization employing generalized concepts of corporatism. Instead, one should speak of corporatist structures within capitalist systems. Doing so, it is less interesting to ask whether there is a system change within capitalist democracies, than to look for the origins and functions of the present corporatist structures and strategies. (Kastendiek 1981:94/95)

The notion of corporatism represented by the perspective of Lehner and Kastendiek seems to be supported by most of the political scientists dealing with problems of neocorporatism. A certain consensus has been established that neocorporatism should be understood as a tendency, a strategy or a structure of interest intermediation or policy formation within the existing Western societies. This implies the persistence of liberal constitutions and capitalist economy. (Compare von Alemann 1983:124)

Considering the Swiss Case, corporatism hardly can be conceived as a categorical new type of polity or society. A strong interpenetration between public and private spheres can already be observed in the 19th century. The economy began to organize its interests more and more efficiently and effectively. The economic associations took charge of those tasks the liberal doctrine assigns to the spontaneous coordination of the market. Thereby, the associations executed several public functions. (Ackermann/Steinmann 1981, Hotz 1979) According to Parri (1984:5) "a highly organized and quasi-political framework emerged vis-à-vis the new-born liberal state, which was structurally weak.". This private self-regulation on the one hand relieved the state of certain functions, but on the other hand, as Gruner (1956:106) points out, the associations simultaneously gave rise to state interventionism. This development has resulted in a strong interdependence between state and organized economy.

Since the end of the 19th century the Swiss federal state, due to its weakness has to rely on economic associations performing quasi-political functions.

2. Neocorporatism: A Pattern of Interest Intermediation or a Mode of Policy Formation

At the beginning of a second controversy stands Schmitter's above mentioned definition of corporatism as a "distinctive mode of organizing the conflicting functional interests - whether these are based on social class, economic sector or professional status." (Schmitter 1982:262)

As Lehbruch criticized, such a definition has some disadvantages: "Being cast into the conceptual framework of Easton and Almond's input-output-model, the definition covers only the "input" functions ("interest articulation")... Thus, important aspects of "corporatism" are not really covered by the definition. It is precisely because of the intimate mutual penetration of state bureaucracies and large interest organizations that the traditional concept of "interest representation" becomes quite inappropriate for a theoretical understanding of corporatism. Rather, we are dealing with an integrated system of "societal guidance". (Lehbruch 1979:149/150)

Thus, in Lehbruch's definition corporatism "is an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation in which large interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in the articulation (or even "intermediation") of interests, but - in its developed forms - in the "authoritative allocation of values" and in the implementation of such policies. (Lehbruch 1979:150)

In his reply to this critique Schmitter insisted on his definition: "My egoistical preference ... is to conserve the

label of corporatism for interest intermediation". (1982:263)
Hence, he suggests to regard interest intermediation and policy formation as two distinct dimensions that should be cross-tabulated:

Types of interest intermediation and modes of policy formation

| | | Policy formation by | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | Pressure | Concertation |
| Interest Intermediation Through: | Pluralism | <i>Examples: classic American pressure politics; French labour politics</i> | <i>Examples: embryonic Italian policy co-operation between unions and the state; Swiss Vernehmlassung</i> |
| | Corporatism | <i>Examples: frustrated British efforts at negotiating a social contract; 'cure d'opposition' in corporatist systems à la Sweden</i> | <i>Examples: Austrian Paritätische Kommission; Swiss social peace treaty; Swedish Harpsund democracy</i> |

Source: Schmitter 1982:263

On the vertical axis, Schmitter draws his well known dichotomous distinction "between the multiple, overlapping, dispersed, non-hierarchical, voluntaristic type of interest intermediation - i.e. pluralism - and the singular, concentrated, functional differentiated, hierarchical and compulsory type - i.e. corporatism." (Schmitter 1982:263/264)

On the horizontal axis, he distinguishes 'concertation' from 'pressure': "In the former, affected interests, however organized, become incorporated within the policy process as recognized, indispensable negotiators and are made coresponsible (and occasionally completely responsible) for the implementation of policy decisions, which then take on a characteristically semi-public or para-state quality. In the latter, the affected interests remain essentially outside the

policy process, as consultants or combatants on the issues involved, and the implementation takes place exclusively under the responsibility of public authorities, however much they may be influenced by the autonomous actions of organized interests in the course of their activities."

(Schmitter 1982:263)

In a recent paper Lehbruch points out "that Schmitter's well-known definition covers sectoral corporatism but not trans-sectoral concertation." "The distinguishing feature would be that, in the first case, 'corporatist' representation of interests is limited to specific sectors in the sense that, first, sectoral interest organization is centralized and enjoys a representational monopoly, and, second, the granting of privileged access to government may result in strong institutional linkages (such as, for examples, "chambers" of public law). "Sectoral corporatism", as defined here, is a relatively old phenomenon. It can be traced back to the restoration of "chambers" and "guilds" ("Innungen") or the like, after a "liberal" interlude of free associational activities, in the 19th century." (Lehbruch 1983a:4,5)

Trans-sectoral concertation, however, "has grown in importance in the second half of this century" only, ... "when government interventionism is no longer limited to mere sectoral protectionism (as, in particular, in agricultural policy or, for some periods, in the politics of defense of small and medium business) and turns toward forms of intervention requiring the deliberate coordination of macro-economic parameters that are controlled by large interest organizations." (Lehbruch 1983a:5,6)

Identifying Schmitter's definition with 'sectoral corporatism' Lehbruch implies more or less that Schmitter's analysis, contrary to the expectations it raises, is limited to the examination of traditional sectoral arrangements, whereas it is not able to describe the striking new phenomenon of neocorporatism.

Remembering Schmitter's definition of societal corporatism one has to conclude that corporatism in the sense of a peculiar pattern of interest intermediation is extremely weak in Switzerland. The organization of Labour does not fulfill the criteria of representational monopoly. Due to ideological, religious and professional divisions, the interests of Swiss labour are represented by five independent peak associations. Compulsory membership does not exist. Collective agreements negotiated by the unions apply to all employees in the economic sector in question irrespective of union membership. Organizational centralization is relatively high in the political arena, whereas it is very low in industrial relations. In this area peak associations have only limited influence on their member associations traditionally enjoying a considerable autonomy (Höpflinger 1976, 1980)

On the contrary, capital interests are organized quasi-monopolistically. Big, export-oriented industry is represented by two closely cooperating associations, one dealing with foreign trade and macro-economic policy, the other one with incomes policy and industrial relations. The interests of service and artisan sectors as well as domestic trade industry, characterized by medium and small firms, are organized in one separate association. This also is the case for farmers. Regarding organizational centralization, the peak associations dispose of the prerogatives of representation in the political arena. In economic matters and industrial relations, however, the sectoral associations are considerably autonomous.

However, following Lehmbruch's definition of corporatism as a distinctive mode for making and implementing public policy things look completely different. As has been mentioned above, a strong interpenetration of state and organized economy can be observed since the end of the 19th century. This has had two consequences: 1) Private organizations are integrated to a considerable degree in the process of implementation of

public policies. 2) Representatives of economic interests play a crucial role in the process of policy formation.

In 1947 the revision of the constitutional articles relating to economy recognized this fact by establishing the obligation that economic interest associations are to be consulted in economic decision-making. Hence, a neocorporatist political circuit was created ensuring the interest organizations a stable, continuous influence on public policy formation and implementation.

One of the most important elements of this neo-corporatist political circuit is the so called "Milizverwaltung", a broad framework of ad-hoc and standing commissions taking charge of many administrative tasks. The members of these commissions are recruited from the state administration, the associations of economic interests, the decentralized territorial units (Cantons and cities), and from big firms (Germann 1981). The ad-hoc and standing commissions of the "Milizverwaltung" have advisory and study functions, prepare legislative proposals (laws, regulations etc.), and coordinate state and economic activities.

After passing the barrier of the "Milizverwaltung", in which state actors and representatives of interest groups bargain a compromise, a legislative proposal is then submitted to the "Vernehmlassungsverfahren" (proceeding of notification). The legislative proposal is sent to the main interest organizations, to smaller associations and groups (depending on the matter to regulate) and to the political parties, which formally are integrated at this stage of the legislative process for the first time. The written comments of these actors are then collected and evaluated by the state agency which is in charge of the respective matter. After administrative treatment the proposal goes to the government, which most of the time only marginally modifies the compromise

reached in the commissions or established through consideration of the written comments. Substantial modifications would seriously reduce the chances of a proposal to go through parliament and a eventual referendum campaign, both offering good prospects to the main organized interests to turn down "undesired" modifications. (Rüegg 1985)

Public-private cooperation is also important in the implementation of public policies. A great number of specialized commissions and bodies incorporating the respective state agency (agencies) and private interest associations are enacting and making public decisions. As Vogel (1981) has shown for the case of foreign trade policy, Ackermann/Steinmann (1981) the watch industry, Sommer (1978) for health services, Joerin/Rieder (1980)

for agriculture, Farago et al (1984) for food industry, or Kriesi/Schaller (1984) for the building industry, forms of sectoral corporatism in Lehmbruch's sense are widely used in Switzerland.

The Swiss neocorporatist political circuit is basically characterized by sectoral arrangements between state agencies and respective interest organizations. In these arrangements the influence of unions and employees' associations is markedly weaker than the influence of capital interests. Trans-sectoral corporatism, as defined by Lehmbruch, i.e. more or less formalized or tripartite arrangements are almost inexistent in Switzerland. However, there exists a functional equivalent to such arrangements. A limited number of top-level actors including the government, important state agencies, the economic and agricultural peak associations, the largest (social-democratic) union and the major political parties constitute an informal network of trans-sectoral co-operation in public policy formation and implementation. Kriesi (1980, 1982) called this network the "core of the Swiss political system" (Compare Rüegg 1985).

Given this situation, we agree with Parri's conclusion in a comparative study of the Swiss case and other European countries, "that Switzerland shows comparatively: a high diffusion and intensity of decisional and executive neo-corporatist arrangements and a medium-weak neo-corporatist structuration of the system of interest intermediation" (Parri 1984:22)

3. Neocorporatism: Functionally required or result of strategic interactions?

A third controversy arose in the international discussion of neocorporatism over the question why neocorporatist arrangements have emerged and - at least in some countries - have persisted. For heuristic purposes it might be useful to distinguish broadly between a group of scholars conceptualizing neocorporatism as functionally required by systemic imperatives of advanced capitalism and a second group of authors understanding neocorporatism as a (unintended) result of strategic interactions between organized interests. Whereas the former group shows a relatively great variety of conceptual approaches, only sharing the basic assumption that the development of modern capitalist societies is somehow the central cause for the diffusion of neocorporatism in these countries, the latter group is much more homogeneous regarding the normative and theoretical perspective.

Bearing in mind the latest article of Schmitter - arguing for an explanation at the meso-level of strategic choices by interest organizations and the state - one can read with a certain astonishment, that he wrote in 1974 that liberal and state corporatism seem to be "related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources". (Schmitter 1974:107) Lehmbruch took this idea up

and specified, that "corporatism appears to serve such imperatives by regulating the conflict of social classes in the distribution of national income and in the structure of industrial relations. As for the liberal variety of corporatism, it obviously is specifically related to problems of economic policy-making which arise in a rather advanced stage of capitalist development" (Lehmbruch 1979a:151/152) The mentioned problems are later on more precisely identified as "problems of Keynesian economic policy". (Lehmbruch 1979b:301) Whereas Lehmbruch never fully gave up this notion of a linkage between a "rather advanced stage of capitalist development", although primarily focusing on the neocorporatist logic of exchange, Schmitter is now convinced, that "the macro-functional imperatives of capitalist reproduction (are) too vague and indeterminant to explain its (neocorporatism) emergence". (Schmitter 1985:11)

However, this difference between the two authors is not very crucial, both essentially arguing in the context of a model of strategic interaction between organized interests.

Lehmbruch's concept of a "neocorporatist logic of exchange" is mainly focusing on the considerations on the part of labour leaders (and in a way assumes that post-Keynesian economic policy is favorable to capital interests by its very nature?). Lehmbruch formulates the hypothesis that "the more durable and stable the form of liberal corporatism, the more it will be characterized by its simultaneous treatment of other interdependent problems arising from the conflict of labour and capital". (Lehmbruch 1979b: 306/307)

This hypothesis is based on the following arguments regarding a rational calculus of member's interests by labour leaders: "Such a calculus would essentially consist in the expectation of compensations which may result in exchange for concessions (in terms of immediate member's interests), such as wage restraint". (Lehmbruch 1983a:12) Since expectations depend

on subjective assessments by union leaders and members it is difficult to measure the exchange by objective standards (policy outcomes). Moreover, "an outcome may be interpreted as a compensation even where it may have happen without an explicit concession". (Lehmbruch 1983a: 13)

In the case of the West German "Konzertierte Aktion" this implicit logic of exchange "without specific quid pro quos from government or organized business" was based on the mutually agreed upon idea of the interdependence of wages, profits, investment and employment: "The objective of "concertation" among organized actors would simply be to exchange information about the relevant data, about their respective expectations and assumptions and to arrive at a common assessment of the behaviour that would be necessary under given conditions of the market. High and stable employment would then be exchanged for wage moderation, as a result of market forces, not of explicit barter transactions. Experience, however, has taught labour leaders to mistrust such expectations arrived at by "concertation": The assumptions and the relationships of parameters postulated in the underlying model might prove false". (Lehmbruch 1983a: 14)

To overcome such mistrust on the side of labour, this implicit exchange might be replaced by "explicit barter exchange". The idea behind "social contracts" is some sort of a "deficiency guarantee" of the government thus trying to increase stability of expectations among unions. However, "package deals tying wage restraint to agreements concerning transfer payments and tax policy have increasingly been struck in the '70s... The countries of relatively stable corporatism, on the other hand, appear to be characterized by what might be called "generalized exchange" across issue areas. That is to say, by subjecting a major part of central policies to neocorporatist concertation, inter-organizational networks would emerge in

which labour unions could expect to participate in decisions of strategic importance not only for incomes, but, in particular, for employment and other long-term interests of their membership which might justify wage moderation even in the absence of formal incomes policy." (Lehmbruch 1983a:14/15)

Schmitter's considerations on the concept of 'scambio politico' (political exchange) is in its basic perspective similar to Lehmbruch's concept of a neocorporatist logic of exchange. The difference between the two concepts seems to consist in the conceptualization of the role of the state. Schmitter's model assumes a balanced power relationship between the distinct interests of capital, labor and the state. Lehmbruch instead is mainly focusing on the 'quid pro quo' between organized capital and organized labor, not conceiving the state as an independent actor; his neocorporatist logic of exchange is lacking a (explicit) theory of the state.

Schmitter explains the emergence and persistence of neocorporatism by a structural theory of strategic choices open to representatives of interest organizations and representatives of state authority: "Both have something to offer each other which neither may be able to obtain on their own. Both also have something to fear from each other" (Schmitter 1985: 18) Interest organizations trade their informational resources and the compliance of their members against attractive rewards offered by the state, fearing simultaneously to be transformed into "agents" of the state. State institutions on the other hand granting direct material rewards and structurally preferring established organizations to potential newcomers are concerned of being "colonized" by interest associations.

The stability of this political exchange depends on three conditions:

- Capital and labour, respectively their organizations, must be in a situation in which neither can impose its own 'societal project'. This balance between labor and capital doesn't have to be totally symmetric; interest organizations of labor only must dispose of 'veto power'.
- "Rival projects", for exemple ethnic, linguistic or religious interests must be disregarded (at least at the time neocorporatist arrangements are coming to function).
- A stable political exchange is more likely in countries with a limited international power status and in export-oriented economies.

Lehmbruch and Schmitter oppose to attempts at explaining the emergence of corporatist arrangements by "inexorable laws of history". Schmitter is firm on this point: the macro-functional explanation is dismissed as unsatisfying. Lehmbruch, instead, has a ambivalent position. On the one hand, he never fully gave up the notion of neocorporatism as a product of advanced capitalism, on the other hand, he mainly is emphasizing strategic options of organized interests. This might be due to the West German debate, in which 'functionalist' approaches of neomarxist scholars are very prominent. Lehmbruch's ambiguity might be explained by his attempt not to be identified with these theories.

To illustrate the neomarxist approach we take the contribution of Offe as an example. He conceptualizes neocorporatist arrangements as a "second circuit added to the machinery of the democratic representative polity. The institutional order of which periodic elections, political parties, and parliamentary government are the main elements is supplemented by a political arrangement consisting of major organized interest groups, their relative procedural status, and bodies of consultation and reconciliation." (Offe 1981:141). The reason

for adding a neocorporatist political circuit to the established liberal one, Offe first sees in the potential of the former for depoliticizing conflict. The "need" for depoliticization is due to the fact that the liberal, democratic processes tend to 'overparticipation' and 'overload' of unresolved conflicts. Especially political parties are less and less able to perform their function of designing coherent policy alternatives. Thus, political decision-makers are more and more dependent on direct relations to interest organisations. A second reason for the spreading of neocorporatist 'techniques' is - according to Offe - the impasse of the two commonly used strategies of a government to control its national and international environment: The application of positive and/or negative incentives fails, when structurally favoured actors decide not to react to these incentives (as for example business firms not complying to the steering intentions of tax exemptions), and the transformation of goods and services, the policy-takers have to buy, into 'public goods' (etatization) leads to massive opposition because the production of the mentioned goods is not judged efficient and effective. "To summarize the argument, corporatist structures are the solution to situations in which parametrical methods of political control have become insufficient for economic reasons and interventionist methods have become impracticable for political ones. In such situations, para-democratic political structures serve to contain and depoliticize conflict in a fragile reconciliation of the functionally required and the politically feasible." (Offe 1981: 145/146)

Lehmbruch and Schmitter, however, seem to overlook 'functionalist' approaches arguing from a liberal tradition. Such a liberal alternative to neomarxist contributions is offered by Willke (1983). Likewise arguing from a functionalist perspective, he points out that neocorporatist arrangements are the result of a functional requirement of modern societies. Societal change has led to the present situation in which

the state no longer can be conceived of as the center and summit of society steering functionally specialized and autonomous sub-systems and by doing so, guaranteeing societal integration. In this perspective the relation state-society in general, statist policy and policies of associations in particular is shifting to a new configuration. The central problem is the development of new, adequate mechanisms of mutual adjustments between relatively autonomous societal sub-systems. The procedural organization of these mechanisms simultaneously enables and forces the interest associations to take into consideration standards of system-rationality while articulating and representing their own standards of rationality. Therefore, according to Willke, neocorporatist bargaining systems, as established and tried out in Western Europe, are functionally required, organized societal learning processes that can cope with the overload of statist steering capacity. The traditional, hierarchic form of steering (European) societies by state intervention through generalized media of exchange (money, Law) thereby is replaced by forms of non-hierarchical, reticular steering.

Willke's reflections on a theory of societal steering and the 'strategic' arguments of Schmitter and Lehbruch need not contradict each other. Functionalist considerations are necessary to understand what Lehbruch called the 'new' phenomenon of neocorporatist arrangements. Schmitter, only focusing on the neomarxist subgroup of macro-level explanations, prematurely dismisses functional arguments, although he is right in stating that functionalist explanations alone cannot allow for differences between countries. For this purpose, the meso-level explanations of strategic choices made by interest organizations and state authorities are likewise necessary for an adequate theory of neocorporatism.

Looking at the Swiss case, the emergence of neocorporatist arrangements cannot be explained by a deliberate strategy of the state trying to restrict societal conflict between interest organizations. As Parri (1984:23) remarks, "the

Swiss state has not politicized the society, but has been socialized by a society which has strong political character, because of social-economic self-regulation". Private-public interdependence "is not a recent strategy for governability. It was instead a necessary choice, made by a state which could not avoid acknowledging the functional centrality and the quasi-political character of the regulation processes carried out by social-economic organizations." (Parri 1984:23)

Hence, state intervention always was low in Switzerland compared to other countries, the respective public tasks being managed autonomously by quasi-political procedures. Even in the latest period beginning at the end of the sixties, when this quasi-political policy-making showed signs of 'overload', state interventionism only increased in specific areas.

Speaking of a necessary choice made by the state, as Parri does, seems to imply that Swiss neocorporatist arrangements are due to functional requirements. But Offe's explanation of a deliberate strategy does not apply to Switzerland. Willke's strategy of a "disenchantment" of the state does not have to take place in Switzerland either, because the state never attained a strong position vis-à-vis the society. However, this does not imply that Offe's and Willke's theory might be entirely impracticable. The fact that the outcomes of public policy are markedly in favour of organized interests, attracts the attention to a bias of neocorporatist arrangements which - as we will see in the next section - can be explained by some arguments of Offe, and the fact that state interventionism is widely opposed can be accounted for by slightly modifying Willke's argument: The establishment of reticular mechanisms of steering the society does not seem to depend on the absolute level of state intervention. Rather, cultural norms decide to what extent state intervention is tolerable in a society. If this is correct, Willke's explanation of the emergence of neocorporatist arrangements might still

apply to Switzerland. Undoubtedly, there is some evidence that Swiss political culture is intolerant vis-à-vis state interventions (principle of subsidiarity, local autonomy, praise of smallness and diversity).

4. Neocorporatism: Advantages and Limits

Referring to Willke's theory of societal steering we have entered the field of a fourth controversy in the international discussion on neocorporatism. This debate opposes those who think neocorporatist arrangements can solve in a more or less elaborate way certain (economic) problems of modern societies to those who see corporatist structures and strategies as a danger to liberal democracy. The argument of the latter is not at all motivated by the same normative perspective. Conservative anxiety stems from a specific theory placing the state unconditionally at the summit of society. Being alone the bearer of the common weal he has to be guarded against all attempts of particular interests at colonizing its institutions. On the other hand, the political left fears that trade unions are transformed to pure agents of the capitalist state.

In the following section we will outline some of the more prominent contributions to this debate and draw some conclusions for our research project on Switzerland.

Willke's appraisal of neocorporatism is very positive. Neocorporatist arrangements are judged to enable complex industrial societies to cope with augmenting steering problems, which spontaneous market coordination and state intervention no longer can solve. Although not being as enthusiastic as Willke is, Czada and Lehmbuch, being aware of neocorporatist failures, basically arrive at a positive assessment of neocorporatism, too:

"Our general hypothesis is that trans-sectoral co-ordination (or "concertation") of state agencies and important interest

organizations aims at the realization of policies directed toward macro-economic goals considered as vital for the national economy and the general welfare - be it economic growth, full employment and price-stability... Obviously, consensual policies qualified to reach such goals cannot satisfy all the various claims on the nation's total output. Policy-making would be a mere child's play if there was a virtual identity of societal interests... (But,) in the middle range, corporatist trans-sectoral co-ordination appears to increase the political system's ability to create and execute comprehensive sets of interrelated policies. At least, this is suggested by the policy outcomes of Sweden, Austria and Japan. But in the long range, there might be a tendency of ostracism of marginal groups in society not represented within the corporatist system." (Czada/Lehmbruch 1981:5,22).

Empirical research on the relationship between neocorporatist structures and governability done by Schmitter (1981) and Schmidt (1982) supports this opinion:

"Politics in which interests are processed through formal associations that cover the widest variety of potential interests with national networks of representation, that have the highest proportion of those potentially affected as members, and whose pattern of interaction with the state is monopolistic, specialized, hierachical, and mutually collusive should be more orderly, stable, and effective, at least in the short run, given the conditions of contemporary governance." (Schmitter 1981:292/293)

Schmidt, though using other indicators for neocorporatism than Schmitter, draws a similiar conclusion. In his research on 21 countries, he has found that "the nations with strong corporatist modes of conflict regulation were, on the whole, better off than the other nations", and that "all the countries with low rates of unemployment during the crisis of the 1970s are characterized by either very strong or moderatlely strong modes of regulating class conflict". (Schmidt 1982:251,255)

Despite this positive assessment of neocorporatist structures the mentioned authors, however, do not overlook potential limits of this particular mode of conflict regulation. Lehmbruch and Schmitter explicitly confine their positive appraisal to the short and middle range. In the long run both authors can imagine severe challenges to neocorporatism from different sources of contradiction (see for example Schmitter 1982). Nevertheless, the basically optimistic outlook remains.

From a completely different perspective, Panitch draws the attention to the instability of neocorporatist arrangements. Strongly opposed to the "ideology and social harmony" which he sees realized in most of the contributions to "neocorporatist theory" he conceptualizes neocorporatism as an asymmetrical method of the capitalist state, "a powerful vehicle for reinforcing class dominance". The acceptance of this one-dimensional rationality by union leaders makes them unresponsive to member interests. "Not surprisingly, in the absence of extensive price and profit controls and a redistributive fiscal policy, union leaders eventually come under heavy pressure from their membership to withdraw from the incomes policy structures and abstain from cooperative behaviour in broader economic planning structure." (Panitch 1979:139/140). He concludes that "we are likely to see a further cycle of establishment, breakdown, and reestablishment of corporatist structures". However, in the long run "it is unlikely that these cycles can be continued indefinitely". The dynamic of these cycles eventually could lead to authoritarian response by the state. (Panitch 1979:145).

The critical perspective in neocorporatist decision-making was taken up and developed in two widely discussed hypotheses. The first one says that neocorporatism tends to replace representative party government and thus weakens the legitimacy of liberal democracies. The second hypothesis argues that neocorporatist arrangements are favouring a cartel of established interests simultaneously marginalizing groups of citizens not belonging to the productive "core" of the

capitalist economy and society.

According to Offe and many other political scientists, parties today are much more successful in "attracting voter support" for government personell than in "designing comprehensive programmatic policy alternatives to be executed once the party has achieved sufficient electoral success to occupy government positions". "The more diffuse and heterogenous the electoral basis of a party, and the more it attenuates its theoretical and ideological identity in order to become acceptable to as many groups and strata with in the electorate as possible, the less it can decide on clear-cut policy options and alternatives ... Proposals emerge from and are advocated by clearly identifiable segments, wings, and factions within the party and fail to get approval of the party as a whole ... The burden of building a programmatic consensus on policies is shifted to the level of coalition governments. ... This condition of often unresolvable intra-party conflict, plus the concomitant instability of governing party coalitions, generates the need for simpler, more reliable and predictable ways of reaching policy agreements. Governments depend on more direct supportive relations to major organized interests, and thus supplementary corporatist relations ... are the solution of a problem emerging form the disorganization of political parties." (Offe 1981:141-143). At the end - as easily can be added - parties are replaced in the function of policy formation by corporatist arrangements.

Furthermore, liberal democracies do not depend solely on justification by performance which, given certain circumstances, might be secured through neocorporatist mechanisms. At least as long as deserving the qualification "democratic", they must rely on principles of democratic legitimacy (universal suffrage, public discussion of policies, etc.). Neocorporatist arrangements though are typically restricted, closed, and not exposed to public debate. Therefore, "it is extremely hard in democratic theory to find grounds for investing the interests of capital and labour...with the

authority to make what are in effect public decisions. This is the flaw in any corporate theory of representation". (Anderson 1977: 14)

Lehmbruch opposes to speculations of this sort. He is convinced that functional (neocorporatist) and territorial-parliamentary mechanisms of policy formation can coexist. To him electoral competition in the party system gives precedence to short-run over long-term policy options. Since the long-term element in policy formation is growing in importance, such a short-term option of political parties may lead to a preponderance of the corporatist subsystem. However, "consensus-building and problem-solving in a corporatist subsystem of interest representation depend on a rather low level of conflict intensity because of the high threshold imposed by (de facto or de jure) unanimity rules which are essential to its functioning...Therefore, it is highly probable that the liberal corporatist subsystem will not tend to "supplant" the party system...It seems more plausible to interpret the trends in the relationship of "liberal corporatist" patterns and the party system as an instance of increasing structural differentiation and functional specialization of the political system brought about by certain requirements of consensus-building specific to economic policy-making... Instead of being rivals, both subsystems are interconnected by a sort of symbiosis which may take varying forms." (Lehmbruch 1979:149,155,180)

To illustrate this, Lehmbruch analyzes cooperative incomes policy in different European countries. He shows that this policy area has become a central domain of neocorporatist arrangements, because of the inevitable difficulties of building consensus over wage restraint in the party system and in parliament. (see Lehmbruch 1979:157-170).

Recent developments in incomes policy seem to support the hypothesis of a symbiotic relationship between corporatism and party government even better. This, Lehmbruch points out

in a congress paper of 1983. There, he states that under the "stagflationary" conditions of the Seventies the expectation of a pay-off for wage restraint built into the logic of post-keynesian macro-economics was increasingly questioned. Thus, new political strategies in incomes policy were needed and have been adopted in some European countries. Summarizing empirical studies of Armingeon (1982) and Schwerin (1980), Lehmbruch describes these new strategies as "package deals" including subject matters traditionally within the jurisdiction of representative institutions (non-wage elements of income such as taxes and transfer payments). These package deals do not shift the political responsibility to the neo-corporatist subsystem, rather, including legislative measures that form part of the package, they enlarge the political arena into a "complex process of national bargaining including different, and partially autonomous sub-systems", in particular government, "social partners", and parliament. "Taken together, . . . , our evidence shows that what has been left as autonomous function of representative institutions acts as an important limit to the autonomy of the neo-corporatist subsystem. . . . One can even go one step further: Neo-corporatist subsystems, for being effective in solving the problems on which they are functionally specialized, depend on the power resources of the party system. There are so many antagonistic interests at work within the corporatist subsystems that they cannot generate sufficient power resources of their own. If they are not supported by a parliamentary majority, they tend to disintegrate." (Lehmbruch 1983a: 29/30)

The second critical hypothesis concerning neocorporatist outcomes is especially of concern to the German debate. Esser/Fach's concept of "selective corporatism" claims that neocorporatist arrangements contribute toward an economically induced division of society. In the center of capitalist societies they find the core of industrial sectors being competitive on the world market (including the production of

related services), on the fringe of society a growing segment of the population politically controlled and ideologically isolated (unemployed, youth, old people, immigrants, etc.).

This conjecture is in part supported by Offe who imagines a scenario that "would be one of polarization between highly institutionalized modes of representation of 'core' interests and highly amorphous social movements of marginal segments of the social structure, This pattern of conflict appears most likely to emerge where core interests are not only highly institutionalized but also have interacted in a way that suggests the disappearance of conflict and outright class collaboration." (Offe 1981:152).

It is questionable whether marginal groups can be (re-) integrated into society through neocorporatist policy formation, because this mode of conflict regulation only functions through 'externalization' of costs to the disadvantage of 'third interests'. Moreover, neocorporatism has to concentrate on a 'cartel of economic growth' thus neglecting 'new', in the broadest sense, ecological values (environmental and cultural needs).

In opinion polls Switzerland almost always is considered as one of the best governed countries. Regarding to the societal and economic goals that have been empirically analyzed in contributions to neocorporatist theory - namely employment, price stability, and governance - Switzerland belongs to those countries doing best. The lowest rate of unemployment, a comparatively low rate of inflation, and a high rate of ruliness and stability are the distinguishing features (see Schmitter 1981, Schmidt 1982). But, can these results entirely be accredited to corporatist modes of policy formation and implementation?

First of all, it may surprise that the neocorporatist process of policy-making is widely accepted in Switzerland, although policy outcomes disfavour labour and employees interests, as has been shown by Kriesi (1980). In his analysis of thirteen decision-making processes, he confirms the impression that

influence of labour on economic and financial policies is weak. This but reflects the power situation of labour unions and the respective social-democratic party. The dominant bourgeois culture, the decentralized pattern of industrialization, the religious, and ethnic cleavages, and the presence of immigrant workers since 1945 are the outstanding factors accounting for a low unionization rate and a low voter turnout for the Socialdemocrats. Since the left never was strong in Switzerland the labour movement had to accept political integration, the terms of which were substantially defined by business interests and the bourgeois parties.

The traditional weakness of the political left is not an explanation for the establishment of neocorporatist arrangements in Switzerland in a strong sense. Rather, it seem to be a pre-condition for the functioning of the older, sectoral arrangements that characterize the policy formation in many areas since the end of the 19th century.

The emergence of a neocorporatist network itself can be accredited to the weakness of the representative political circuit. National political parties are historically weak. They are but aggregations of cantonal parties, which enjoy great autonomy. Thus, the aggregation and articulation of interests through parties has been poorly developed at the federal level. Interest organizations, which were founded at the end of the 19th century, have proven to be far more adequate instruments. Political processes, therefore, are centered on direct relations between associations and the state, not as much depending on the mediating function of political parties as in other countries.

Contrary to the conjecture of both liberal and neomarxist theories regarding the erosion of democratic legitimacy when parliamentary policy formation of replaced by a neocorporatist circuit, the weakness of parties basically doesn't bother Swiss political scientists and the Swiss public. Although weak,

the representative political circuit performs certain tasks necessary to the functioning of the system of policy formation and implementation as a whole. This functional interdependence of the two circuits can be explained with concepts developed by Lehbruch who postulates that viable neocorporatism must be supplemented by parliamentary government. (see Lehbruch 1983a).

Since 1959 the Swiss federal government is composed of the four most important parties holding over 80% of the seats in parliament. This grand coalition government strongly favours compromise solutions having a long tradition in Switzerland. (Some authors even trace it back to the Westphalian peace treaty of 1648). Moreover, the party system is closely linked to the system of interest associations through informal mechanisms (role cumulation of party and associational officials). The similarity between the parliamentary and the neocorporatist political circuit with respect to the structural distribution of power and the decision mode, combined with the informal network of interaction between parties, associations and the state ensure in most cases that pre-parliamentary compromise solutions bargained in the neocorporatist arrangements are adopted without substantial modifications by parliament.

If the weakness of the parliamentary circuit does not affect democratic legitimacy in Switzerland, this is ultimately due to the third circuit of the Swiss political system: the direct democracy. Popular initiatives and referendum are the source of democratic legitimacy. However, whereas constitutional modifications must be submitted to citizen vote, the facultative referendum, applying to laws only, is mostly avoided. If a bargained solution is really a compromise, the organized interests and the political parties stick to this solution. The remaining interest associations and parties, not disposing of adequate power resources, seldom are able to gather the 50'000 signatures which are needed to put a law to a popular vote. Therefore, the facultative referendum

is largely by-passed by the neocorporatist cartel of elites (Rüegg 1985). Thereby, its contribution to legitimacy is eroded. Hence, the possibility of a facultative referendum strengthens the power of those interest organizations disposing of resources high enough to threaten with a referendum in order to gain a better position in the neocorporatist circuit.

The institution of popular initiative and compulsory referendum on the other hand enables political parties to gain a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the organized interests. This possibility, not necessarily bound to the logic of compromise in neocorporatist arrangements and 'Konkordanzdemokratie', is, together with the symbolic resources of the state, which are controlled by political parties, the main independent basis of influence of parties. Thus, the structurally weak party-parliamentary circuit is not unilaterally instrumentalized by the neocorporatist circuit. Both can be seen as interdependent mechanisms of policy formation mutually supporting each other.

The close interrelation of the three political circuits in Switzerland favouring the well organized interests excludes an array of interests which for structural reasons are less organizable and hardly have the opportunity to request access to the cartel of elites. These interests cannot be reduced to the conflict of labour and capital. They find their expression in the environmental movement, the peace movement, the anti-nuclear movement, etc. These "new" problems advanced by new categories of persons do not fit well into the selective attention of the political system. The political system has, despite its comparatively high capacity of solving traditional problems, to a certain extent 'marginalized' these interests, which are in effect protesting against the cartel of elites. For the reason of their low organizability and the (yet) lacking veto power as well as for reasons of institutional inertia, both the system of interest intermediation

and the system of policy formation contribute to a 'representational deficit', which is more and more perceptible to the public, at least in specific issue areas (for example the problem of acid rain).

The discrepancy between changing problems and values in society and the 'stubbornness' exhibited by the inadequate sensitivity of political structures may explain increased political involvement of citizens. As a longitudinal study of political activity has brought to light, conventional modes of participation (voting, signing petitions, popular initiatives and referenda, etc.) continue to be practiced extensively. Additionally, the use of less-conventional modes of participation has markedly increased. Moreover, political activity is shifting from traditional cleavages (capital/labour, urban/rural, federal/cantonal) to problems not yet taken up sufficiently by the institutionalized pattern of political processes. And, recent empirical studies have discovered a shift in citizen activities from a 'double strategy', combining less-conventional forms of participation with conventional ones, to an exclusive strategy, only using unconventional methods (Kriesi 1981, Levy/Zwicky 1984).

If Switzerland is not yet an example for the marginalization of unskilled workers, this is largely due to the fact that the economic crisis of the seventies could be coped with by a 'veiled' marginalization, i.e. by the externalization of unemployment. Nevertheless, the Swiss political system, dominated by the influence of organized interests begins to show signs that the broadly accepted compromise is no longer self-evident. This is made evident for example by the growing tensions between the Social-democratic party and the bourgeois parties, which has considerably increased since 1975 and has culminated in 1984 in a party convention, in which a large minority (including the majority of the executive committee) of the delegates of the Social-democratic party voted for a withdrawal from the federal government.

Concluding Remarks

The preceding considerations on the discussion on neocorporatism can be summarized in five points, which simultaneously will serve as working hypothesis for our research on Switzerland.

1. The notion that neocorporatism might be a entirely new system of interest intermediation today is no longer supported by most of the scholars of neocorporatist theory. Theoretical reflections and empirical research have shown that neocorporatist arrangements are more or less widely used mechanisms beside other modes of policy formation and implementation.
2. The exclusive reliance on organizational structures has proven to be too restrictive regarding the reality of decision-making in Western countries. Therefore, a distinction between 'clientelism', 'sectoral corporatism', and 'trans-sectoral concertation', which Lehbruch has proposed, seems to be a more promising tool to understand the complex incorporation of organized interests into the political decision-making.
3. The different modes of relating organized interests to the state have to be considered as partial structures of policy formation, which are not viable on their own. They depend on other structures, especially on the parliamentary-representational circuit.
4. Although having been developed in the field of incomes policy, neocorporatist arrangements are not limited to this area. They have spread to other policy areas. Thus, it seems very difficult to classify countries on a dimension ranging from strong to weak corporatism. The differences between policy areas in the extent to which neocorporatist arrangements are used, seem to be much greater than the differences between countries with respect to a given area. Therefore, one of the main intentions of our

research is to describe the different patterns of interest intermediation and policy formation in seven policy areas.

5. As to the consequences of neocorporatist arrangements, we will concentrate on a detailed analysis of positive and/or negative policy outcomes for the involved interests in two or three policy areas. The working hypothesis is that neocorporatist cartels tend to marginalize less organizable interests, thereby eventually contributing to the creation of a yet latent potential of protest. In return, this could lead to the abolishment of neocorporatist arrangements, which, moreover, are difficult to legitimize in liberal and democratic political systems.

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First Draft

Industrial Policy in Southern Italy:
The Case of Eastern Sicily.

Pitruzzello Salvatore

Introduction

The problem I investigate in this paper concerns the formation of a future industrial policy for Southern Italy under the conditions of international recession, changing industrial structure, new international division of labor, and national fiscal crisis.

The formation of an industrial policy for the South has been the central problem in the Post-World War II Italian political agenda: state-steered modernization was seen as the path toward economic, social and political modernization. Today, the problem of an industrial policy for the South is more than ever central in national decisions of political economy: the international and domestic economic, social and political shocks of the last decade have thrown the industrial system of the South in a structural crisis, have unmasked unambiguously the ultimate failure of state-supported modernization, and have refuted conclusively the validity claims of modernization theories that informed the post-war state intervention.

In the context of the international and national crisis, the problem of the formation of a future industrial policy for the South presents an unprecedented political problem: on the one hand, as the dependence of the South on the state both for support and planning has increased, the capacity of the state has weakened; on the other hand, the state is confronting simultaneously not only a "new" southern problem but also a "new" northern problem. The crucial questions then are: what will be the content and form of a future industrial policy for the South? And how will it be shaped? Despite paradigmatic differences both on the nature and causes of the failure of state-supported modernization, and on the political preconditions to tackle the "new" southern problem, the Italian economic, social and political elites share a consensus on two key points which will affect

significantly the content and form of a future southern industrial policy. Firstly, the South needs a new industrial system characterized by small and medium-size firms and based on high technology sectors that are nationally and internationally competitive. Secondly, the creation of the new industrial system depends both on the prior solution of the pressing national macroeconomic and monetary problems, and on the restarting of the process of accumulation in the more dynamic sectors of the economy located in the Center-North. Implicit in this consensus is the hypothesis that the South has no significant impact on the national decisions of political economy, in general, and of industrial policy, in particular.

I argue that existing theories of, and policy solutions to, the new southern problem are reductionist. The economic, social and political conflicts that are taking place both within the South and between the South and the rest of the country refute their validity claims. They fail to grasp both the centrality of the South in national decisions of political economy and the national frame of reference of the southern problem because it ignores the interlocking and conflictual character of the economic, social and political relations of the South to the rest of the country.

Those theories cannot overcome their reductionism because they rest on a set of long-held set of premises which foreclose the possibility of "seeing" the interlocking and conflictual character of southern-national relations. In consequence, theory and research have followed two independent paths: the national, which slights the relevance of the southern problem; and the regional, which does not integrate the economic, social and political development of the South within the frame of national development. The most blatant result of this state of affairs has been to comprehend the "autonomous" economic, social and political relations within the South in term of clientelism. The historical situation, however, clearly requires that the

southern problem be posed within a national frame of reference, that its centrality in national decisions of political economy be grasped correctly, and that the interlocking and conflictual relations of the South to the rest of the country be assessed. And furthermore, it strongly suggests that the widely held hypothesis of clientelism, in its multifaceted formulations, is totally inadequate to account for, and explain, the economic, social and political relations both within the South and between the South and the Center-North. It requires, therefore, to theorize on, and research, the linkages between southern and national economic, social and political developments from new theoretical and methodological premises.

I propose here a theory of dependent development of the southern economy, society and polity from the whole mechanism of national development. It explains/predicts that the industrial, economic, social and political development of the South is the outcome of three interrelated factors: 1) decisions taken in the Center-North for the propelling sectors and imposed on the South; 2) the action/reaction of southern economic, social and political forces to affect those decisions and the emergence of a deep conflict; and 3) the direct political mediation of the state to recompose the conflict. The key hypothesis is that a future southern industrial policy depends upon, and is the outcome of, a matrix of political class conflicts, alliances and coalitions involving both national and southern capital, labor, political parties and state agencies. My intent is two-fold: firstly, to demonstrate that a future industrial policy for the South depends on, and is the outcome of, conflicts between dominant southern and national economic, social and political forces; and secondly, to prove that southern forces have a significant impact in shaping the industrial policy for the South. The analytic task requires the examination of the formation of the industrial policy for the South in relation

to the economic, social, political and institutional conflicts both within the South and between the South and the Center-North.

I will test the theory through a multilevel case-study analysis of the petrochemical growth-pole in the province of Siracusa in Eastern Sicily. The center contains four refining and petrochemical plants owned by national -both public (ENI-AGIP-ANIC) and private (Montedison, ISAB) - and international (EXXON) capital. It has developed since 1949, and at present is undergoing a deep process of de-industrialization. At the same time new opportunities for growth capable of contrasting the process of deindustrialization have emerged with the discovery of significant amounts of off-shore oil and the possibility of constructing the platforms needed to exploit the oil fields. The area of Siracusa, therefore, represents an excellent site for studying the formation of industrial policy in the South today. The information I use for the historical reconstruction has been gathered from national and local newspapers, official documents, interviews, and some scant specialized journals.

The Failure of State-Supported Modernization.

The problem of the modernization of the economic, social and political structure of Southern Italy was high in the Italian political agenda at the end of World War II. The Italian economic, social and political elites set forth the task of eliminating, through an appropriate use of public resources and state agencies, the structural conditions of the dualism of the Italian economy, of homogeneous backwardness and poverty, of total dependence on state support and total subordination to external investments and decisions. The guiding hypothesis informing the policy of intervention explained/predicted that the rapid and continuous development of the national ^{economic} (i.e., of the Center-North) would create the economic space for an adequate policy of extraordinary and permanent allocation of national resources for the modernization of the economic, social and political structure of the South.

The path to modernization passed through various phases. Firstly, the agrarian reform and the creation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno with the law 646/1950 (Rossi Doria, 1947; Medici, 1948; Molinari, 1949; Saraceno, 1949; Italian Government, 1952; SVIMEZ, 1976). Secondly, following the failure of the agricultural policy and of infrastructural public works, the shift to the industrialization policy with the law 634/1957 which determined both the role of the private and public industry and of selected industrial sectors, and the locational aspects of industrial growth (Vochting, 1952; Saraceno, 1957; Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1957; Graziani, 1956; D'Antonio, 1962; Lenza, Pierro, Ricciardelli, 1977). The crucial problem in this phase was whether to adopt labor or technology-intensive growth-poles (Perroux, 1955; Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958; Di nardi, 1960; Thomas, 1972). The choice fell on the latter. The hypothesis underlying the choice explained/predicted that such form of industrialization would spur rapid endogeneous accumulation necessary to generate socially integrated economies of scale

similar to, and connected with, the economic system of the Center-North and of Western Europe (Dobb, 1962). And thirdly, both the full implementation of the policy of industrialization through technology-intensive growth-poles with the context of national planning, and the direct intervention of the state through public holdings with the law of industrialization 717/1965 (Comitato dei Ministri per il Mezzogiorno, 1966; Saraceno, 1968; OECD, 1970; Graziani, 1980).

All Italian economic, social and political forces came to believe strongly that state-supported modernization was close to finally solve the long-standing southern problem. The new industrial system appeared to be able to alter radically the life-structure of the South: it was both integrating the South in the national system and in the European and international industrial and economic structure, and tearing asunder the semi-feudal, precapitalist economic, social and political relations (Colonna, 1977; Graziani, Pugliese, 1977; Del Monte, Giannola, 1978). According to plan, future expansion of industry, diversification of production, and development of intra and inter-regional linkages would have resulted in the convergence of regional economies and, consequently, in the elimination of the traditional gap between the Center-North and the South.

The optimism was first shaken in the early 1970s. It appeared then that state-supported modernization had resulted in an unintended form of industrialization without the expected economic, social and political development. The technology-intensive growth-poles neither had caused expansion of industry and diversification of production, nor had generated the diffusion effects and the forward and backward linkages needed to create socially-integrated economies, nor had been able to absorb significant shares of the available labor force. Their mono-sectoral and monoterritorial specialization had engendered, instead, an industrial productive structure which was disconnected from the southern economic, social and political life (Petriccione,

1976; Graziani, 1979; Formez, 1980; Allen, MacLennan, 1970; Allen; Stevenson, 1974; Holland, 1977).

The emergence of industrialization without development implicitly led to questioning both the intrinsic validity of the modernization theories that had informed state policies for the South, and the very content and form of intervention. The ad hoc explanations of the time, despite paradigmatic differences, were all in agreement that the unintended^{consequence} was the outcome of distorting domestic causes whose elimination would have insured the correct and successful modernization of the South.

The official government position treated the "unintended outcome" as the inevitable consequence of the modernization process that only time and the persistence of intervention would gradually solve (Ministero del Bilancio, 1972; ISRE, 1973).

For the theory of missed opportunities, widely held in planning circles, the dominance of the interests of the regions of the Center-North in shaping national political economy not only systematically prevented the realization of planned objectives, but also sacrificed the interests of the South to those of the Center-North (Saraceno, 1974; Castronovo, 1975; Collidà, De Rita, Carabba, 1966; Aa.Vv., 1970; Collidà, 1974; Ruffolo, 1973).

On the left, the theory of functional development explained failure as the consequence both of the dominance of the interests of national economic, social and political elites, and of their alliance with traditional southern dominant classes which were interested in preventing any radical attempt to transform deeply the economic, social and political structure of the South (Napoleoni, 1970; Ferrari Bravo, Serafini, 1972; Del Monte, 1974; Mottura, Pugliese, 1975). The theory of assisted backwardness, instead, explained the crisis by means of the corrupt and clientelistic practices that enabled the Christian

Democratic Party to conquer, impose and maintain its own power on the whole southern society (Bonazzi, Bagnasco, Casillo, 1972).

Finally, the business' theory of distorted development stressed the role of state intervention in reproducing and worsening the structural dualism of the Italian economy.

The concrete solution envisioned a slight modification both in the form of industrialization, through the promotion of small and medium size firms, and in state intervention, through the decentralization of government with the law 853/1971 (Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica, 1971; Aa.Vv., 1973; D'Antonio, 1977; Zappella, 1978; Podbielski, 1974).

The optimism was finally shattered in the 1980s. The new developments in the structure of the international and national economy have had devastating effects on the industrial, and, implicitly, economic, social and political structure of the South. They have rendered the industrial system of the South nationally and internationally non-competitive and obsolete. Furthermore, they have undermined the economic conditions of growth by weakening both the national mechanism of accumulation and the state's capacity to continue the flow of aid to the South. And ultimately have exacerbated the already precarious economic, social and political conditions of the South, creating as a result an unprecedented potentially explosive situation.

The state is torn between on the one hand the requirements of national accumulation, industrial restructuring and social welfare, and on the other the need to continue the flow of aid to the South for the survival of its economic, social, political and institutional structure. In the situation both of a blocked process of accumulation and of chronic fiscal crisis, for the state to ensure the survival of the national

industrial and economic system within the structure of the most advanced industrial countries, it must intervene massively in those sectors of the economy most competitive at the international level (high technology) located in the Center-North. Such a policy, and the consequent redirection of revenues from the South to the Center-North, risks creating in the South industrial and economic breakdown, administrative disarray, social unrest and political instability (Signorile, 1982; Confindustria, 1982; Saraceno, 1982).

The crucial question then is: can the state face, and how, a) international, national and southern capital, b) national and southern labor, political parties and state bureaucracies, c) the often contradictory needs of the populations of the Center-North and of the South, and d) the necessity to meet the requirements of the national and European economy and society, and still preserve the semblance of being democratic and legitimate?

The answer to the question sharply parts the Italian economic, social and political forces. Despite their agreement on the symptoms of the crisis and on the technical solution to solve the crisis - namely, that the South needs a new industrial system based on high technology sectors that are nationally and internationally competitive - a wide disagreement divides them both on the nature, causes and extent of the crisis, and on the political preconditions to realize the technical solution.

The neo-liberal answer sees the South as a burden on the national economy. The solution to the national crisis requires the unleashing of the mechanism of the market to re-start the process of accumulation in the Center-North. Such a solution also calls for the withdrawal of the state from the South in order to channel the maximum of public resources to the Center-North. The diffusion mechanisms of the market would also solve,

in a second moment, the new southern problem. In this interpretation, therefore, the South is seen not only as a burden to get rid of, but, more important, as a burden the state can get rid of without any significant countereffects (Piano Pandolfo, 1978).

Today the neo-liberal answer has been abandoned even by the staunchest conservatives. Several reformulations of the new southern problem have been elaborated.

The theory of a "Nuovo Mezzogiorno a pelle di leopardo", developed both by Censis' and by DC's researchers, and widely accepted in government, planning and business circles, projects the image of a South which has undergone an unplanned but positive process of economic, social and political development under the drive of autoctonous entrepreneurship and socio-political initiatives which have resulted in an industrial system based on small and medium-size firms. The implications they derive are far reaching: both structural dualism and homogeneous backwardness and poverty have been eliminated and have been replaced by internal imbalances; both the dependence on state support and the subordination to external investments and decisions have faded; the growth-poles have been redefined as being marginal in the life of the South, and, by implication, the whole model of industrialization steered by the state has become irrelevant. In the end, the southern problem has been resolved unexpectedly and in an unpredictable manner. The need for an unconditional and extraordinary transfer of resources no longer exists. The residual southern problem is a matter of ordinary public administration (Censis, 1978; 1981; Lizzeri, 1983; Bassetti, 1983; Pontarollo, 1982).

Despite the wide acceptance of these claims, government, planning and business officials take more moderate positions. They do not discard completely the reality both of the growth-poles and of their crisis: they represent a problem that requires a solution. Both, the reality of autoctonous small and medium-

size firms and growth-poles do coexist and can coexist in the future. However, the future of southern Italy rests not on the growth-poles but on the creation of a new industrial tissue of small and medium-size firms specializing in high technology sectors. To solve the new southern problem the government calls for a new solidarity among all economic, social and political forces in order to a) preserve and strengthen the national system while avoiding the collapse of the South, and b) to extend the acquired benefits to the South in a second moment (Signorile, 1982).⁺ Business, instead, favors the establishment of an unprecedented national neo-corporatist social contract; for the South it calls for a special statute that creates favorable conditions necessary to enhance its national and international competitiveness to attract external investments (Scognamiglio, 1982).⁺⁺

From a different angle, the Left's theory of uneven and dependent development projects the image of a South that has acquired a nationally relevant productive structure which, in the context of the crisis, is today in structural crisis. The South, however, is now tightly integrated with, but dependent upon, the productive structure of the Center-North. The new productive structure gives the South an as yet unknown and untested economic, social and political power. The implications here are also far reaching: gone are a) the structural dualism and the homogeneous backwardness and poverty, b) the dependence on state support as the South is also a producer of wealth. Thus, the centrality of the growth-poles in the South is maintained, while the need for diversification in the new high technology sectors is recognized. Thus the Left too believes, but for quite different reasons, that the traditional southern problem has basically been resolved. Yet, the new southern problem awaits an adequate solution. However, the technical solution cannot be realized through liberal and neo-corporatist social contracts, but only through a democratization of economic, social and political

⁺: Signorile, 1982a, 1982b; Disegno di Legge 2276; Saraceno, 1982.
⁺⁺: Confindustria, 1982a; Artom, 1982.

relations. The "questione economica, democratica e istituzionale" cannot be broken down. The solution requires, that is, the elimination of clientelistic relations (Occhetto, 1982; Fua, 1980; D'Antonio, 1983; Zappa, 1982; Zappella, 1980; Napoleoni, 1982).

What is significant, despite differences, is the perceived necessity to give priority to the solution of national macro-economic problems: only then will it be possible to consider again, and seriously, the possibility of solving the new southern problem.

The reductionist character of existing theories.

Existing theories of, and policy proposals to, the problem of a future southern industrial policy are reductionist. They ignore, or pass under silence, the economic, social, political and institutional conflicts both within the South and between the South and the Center-North. They therefore fail to grasp both the interlocking and conflicting character of southern-national relations and the centrality of the South in national decisions of political economy. Those conflicts suggest instead that the South has a significant impact on the future of a southern industrial policy.

Existing theories hold that the South has no significant impact on the formation of an industrial policy for the South.

The theory of the New Mezzogiorno skirts the problem altogether. The South does not need an industrial policy: industrialization is taking place anyhow. The implicit optimism, however, derives from faulty premises. Firstly their "photographic" approach has focused on special areas and problems: it can neither explain how the new autoctonous industrial tissue has emerged, nor link it to the remaining reality of the South and of the rest of the country. Secondly, and following from the first point, the proponents of the theory fall into the logical fallacy of deriving sweeping generalizations that do not rest on a cogent theory backed by sound empirical research. And thirdly, the worsening socio-economic conditions of southern Italy simply refute their claims that the southern problem has been solved. However, their research has demistified certain beliefs about homogeneous backwardness and poverty.

The official government position follows a more traditional reading of the southern problem. A future industrial policy for the South will depend on, and will be the outcome of, a new national solidarity, leading to a new social contract, among

the national dominant economic, social and political elites. The problem with this position is that the how and the why such solidarity and social contract can be created is not explained. And furthermore, it is very much entrenched into the notions of elitism, idealism, voluntarism, and instrumentalist use of the state, when these concepts have been harshly criticized since the early 1970s on logical, theoretical and empirical grounds. Finally the South is presented as a passive receiver of whatever can be delivered from above.

The position of business is very similar to that of government, except that instead of a liberal pluralist social contract it advocates a quasi-neocorporatist social contract. A future industrial policy for the South is thus the outcome of an arrangement at the national level among the organization of business and labor organizations and the government. The problem here is whether or not (and how and why) it is possible 1) to create such arrangements both for the country as a whole and for the South, 2) to impose it on the South, and 3) to expect that it works. Even in this position it is possible to observe both the residual notions of elitism, voluntarism, and instrumentalism, and the passive stand of the South.

The position of the Left presents a different set of problems. On the one hand it conveys the image of a new South characterized by unprecedented economic, social and political power, and on the other hand it neither accounts for how and why the South has developed such power, nor it explains how the South might use such power. Moreover, how and why the solution of the cathartic democratization of economic, social and political relations can take place nationally and in the South is not explained. And finally, the solution of the southern problem depends on the cathartic democratization of national relations, but the question of whether or not, the extent to which, and the reasons why the new South might contribute to the process is not posed at all. In the end, the theory remains a provoking hypothesis that needs

empirical testing. Anything else is ideological discourse.

What emerges clearly from this analysis is that the South does not seem to have a significant impact on national economic, social and political relations, and when it is suggested that it might have a significant impact the analysis is lacking.

The positions are historically inconsistent. The historical situation is much more problematic and fluid than they admit. I maintain that one cannot now determine whether or not, and how, the crisis can be resolved. Internationally, Italian capital and the state have engaged in a decisive struggle to seize a favorable position in the pecking order of surplus extraction of the world economy. Nationally, an equally decisive economic, social and political struggle is being waged in civil society and in the state between (and to some extent within) capital, labor, political parties and state bureaucracies. A third conflict exists between (and to some extent within) national and southern capital, labor, political parties and state bureaucracies.

These interlocking conflicts are shaping, and in turn are being shaped by, the content and form of state intervention both in the national and southern society, economy and polity. They are determining how the national system, and the South within it, is adapting to the international situation. And, ultimately, are affecting the kind of economic, social political and institutional developments that will take place in the South.

What is most novel and historically relevant is therefore 1) the overt emergence of the southern problem as a central problem in national politics; 2) the national as well as international frame of reference of the Southern problem; and 3) the interlocking of southern, national, and international crisis and future development. The crucial problem is to understand the role played by the South.

Theoretical critique

Existing theories do not and cannot grasp adequately the historical reality of the South and the structures and mechanisms through which its industrial policy is shaped. Theories, and solutions, rest on a set of four long-held hypotheses which constitute the body of what is commonly known as "Questione Meridionale": namely 1) the hypothesis of the passivity of the South in national life, 2) the hypothesis of the autonomy of the southern problem, 3) the hypothesis of the idealist commitment of the Italian national elites to solve the southern problem through an appropriate use of the state, and 4) the hypothesis of the two-phases policy, which explains that the continuous and sustained development of the national economy would create the economic space for an adequate policy of extraordinary and permanent allocation of national resources for the modernization of the South.

These hypotheses, together with the other hypotheses of the structural dualism of the national economy, of dependence on state support, of subordination to external investments and decisions, and of modernization through technology-intensive growth-poles, guided Post-World War II state intervention in southern Italy, offered the explanatory framework for the emergence of industrialization without development, and are now being amended to explain and solve the new southern problem. They also implicitly defined the region-centered character of the post-war "Questione Meridionale".

The consequence of the adoption of these hypotheses has been that theory and research have focused either at the national or at the regional level: the relationship of the South to the national mechanism of development has been neglected. Furthermore, theory and research on the extent to which and the reasons why national (and international) events have contributed both to the development, emergence of industrialization without development, and failure of southern modernization, and to the formation of

a future industrial policy is scarce and weak. Most important is the near absence of work on the extent to which and reasons why the South may have been affecting both national and southern development and policy. Even more rare are efforts at explaining how southern-national relations have been evolving and are affecting the formation of policy.

Theory and research pertaining the South has fallen broadly into three categories: 1) analyses of single areas and sectors, which concentrate on internal problems affecting them, but without attempting to link local events with national, not to say international, events and developments; 2) descriptions of socio-economic structures which are effective but partial and with little theoretical guidance; and 3) global pronouncements, such as clientelistic systems of power, DC's corruption, exploitation, which lack an adequate empirical basis. What is lacking is an analysis of the economic, social and political (and institutional) connective tissue that holds together the South within Italy. What is required is a theoretical analysis, supported by empirical research of the interlocking southern and national development. More specifically, a theory-informed research on the future of a southern industrial policy within the national context is non-existent. Only by abandoning the generally accepted premises of region-centered approaches and by replacing them with new ones that have greater logical and empirical content would it be possible to comprehend adequately the development of the South in general, and the formation of its industrial policy in particular. I will elaborate now a set of theoretical premises which promise to overcome the inadequacies characterizing existing theories.

Theory

I propose a theory of dependent development of the South from the whole mechanism of national (and international) development. In general, the theory's aim is to explain that the genesis, development, industrialization without development, and current transformations are the outcome of, and reflect changes in, four interrelated factors: 1) the post-war development of the world political economy, 2) the position occupied by the ^{Italian} political economy in the world political economy, 3) the crucial role played by the state intervention in national and southern economic, social and political relations, and 4) the matrix of post-war political class conflicts, alliances and coalitions involving both national and southern social classes, political parties and state apparatuses.

The development of the South thus on the one hand appears to be the outcome of choices and decisions which have been taken elsewhere (i.e., both in Italy and abroad) in the propelling sectors, and which have been imposed on the South; on the other hand, it offers both the possibility for a degree of modernization and the space for growth to local forces and interests. Such development, however, is neither generated nor completely steered from the outside: it is the outcome of a complex process which sees both traumatic conflicts tearing asunder horizontally and vertically the southern economy, society and polity, and the decline of old social blocs and the emergence of new ones - which are the outcome of conflicts, alliances, and compromises between certain southern and national economic, social and political forces. The state performs the task of direct political mediation of these conflicts to create a new realignment of forces. The theory therefore attempts to grasp the dialectical character of the relationship of the South with the mechanism of national (and international) development.

The theory suggests a set of hypotheses which run contrary to those underlying the whole Post-World War II "Questione Meridionale". To the hypothesis of the passivity of the South in national life

I am opposing a hypothesis of the conflictual and interlocking nature of the relation of the South to the rest of the country and of its significant role in shaping national economic, social and political relations. To the hypothesis of the autonomy of the southern problem, as defined by the region-centered character of the "Questione Meridionale", I am opposing a hypothesis of the simultaneous national (and international) dimension of the southern problem and of its centrality in shaping national decisions of political economy. To the hypotheses both of the idealist commitment of the Italian elites to solve the southern problem, and of their instrumental use of the state, I am opposing a hypothesis of political class conflicts in determining the content and form of state intervention in the South. Finally, to the hypothesis of the two-phases policy I oppose a hypothesis of the direct mediation of the interests of southern and national dominant classes by the Christian Democratic state.

The hypotheses suggest two crucial points: firstly, the genesis of state intervention, development in the 1960s, the emergence of industrialization without development, and the ultimate failure of state-supported modernization in the context of the current crisis, must be understood as the outcome of Italy's political economy as it has evolved within the structure of the world political economy; and secondly, the political class conflicts both within the South and the rest of the country have been a critical factor in the making of Italy's political economy.

The hypotheses also require five analytic tasks. Firstly, the examination of the genesis of Post-World War II state intervention: contrary to the hypotheses of the hypothesis of the passivity of the South, of the autonomy of the southern problem, and of idealist elite action, ^{these} suggest that the economic, social and political class conflict within the South in the aftermath of the war prompted intervention both of the state and of U.S. controlled international organizations such as the World Bank; the aim of

intervention was to recompose the economic, social and political conflict through the modernization policy.

Secondly, the examination of the development of the industrial apparatus: contrary to the hypotheses of idealist elite action, of technocratic planning and of the two-phases policy, they suggest that the content and form of state intervention and the very choice of the technology-intensive growth-poles model has been shaped by political class conflict both within the South and between the southern and national dominant classes; the final outcome is the result of direct political mediation of conflicting interests on the part of the Christian Democratic state.

Thirdly, the examination of the emergence of industrialization without development: contrary to the accepted hypotheses of the distorting conjunctural internal factors, they suggest that the extraction and transfer of surplus from the South to the Center-North and abroad, together with the non-productive use of social capital by national and international monopoly capital, prevented any possibility for endogeneous accumulation, and caused the growth-poles to become export-enclaves specialized in primary processing of raw materials for the subsequent use in the markets of the Center-North and Northern Europe.

Fourthly, the examination of the failure of state-supported modernization and the specific character of the southern crisis: 1) the persisting lack of significant endogeneous accumulation, 2) the high dependence on traditional manufacturing industries that have become noncompetitive and obsolete, 3) the high conditioning of public capital and its scarcity during the period of crisis, 4) the consequent weakening in the state's capacity for direct political mediation of conflicts, and 5) the withdrawal of national and international private and public capital from the South, are the key factors which explain the ultimate failure of the experiment of industrialization.

Finally, contrary to the existing explanations, they suggest that the future of state-supported development and a future southern

industrial policy depends on the outcome of the developments in the world political economy, in the ability of the Italian political economy to seize favorable positions in the pecking order of international surplus extraction, and in the recomposition of national conflict through a political realignment of national and southern economic, social and political forces.

In this paper I will deal only with the last point of the future of state-supported modernization and of the formation of an industrial policy for the South. Moreover, I will not deal with the international dimension of the problem (a task that I will have to undertake elsewhere). The theoretical task, therefore, is to explain/predict that the future industrial, economic, social and political development of the South is the outcome of three interrelated factors: 1) decisions taken in the Center-North for the propelling sectors and imposed on the South; 2) the action/reaction of southern economic, social and political forces to affect those decisions and the emergence of a deep conflict; and 3) the direct political mediation of the state to recompose the conflict. The key hypothesis is that a future southern industrial policy depends upon, and is the outcome of, a matrix of political class conflict, alliances and coalitions involving both national and southern capital, labor, political parties and state agencies. My intent is two-fold: firstly to demonstrate that a future industrial policy for the South depends on, and is the outcome of, conflicts between dominant southern and national economic, social and political forces; and secondly, to prove that southern forces have a significant impact in shaping the industrial policy for the South. The analytic task requires the examination of the formation of the industrial policy for the South in relation to the economic, social, political and institutional conflicts both within the South and between the South and the Center-North.

Research Design

To study the interlocking but differentiated impact of national and southern factors on the formation of a southern industrial policy I adopt a multilevel case-study analysis. It allows for the simultaneous inclusion of different kinds of units, and affords the possibility of specifying the interaction between different levels of overlapping units. Furthermore, it affords the possibility of answering questions about the relative size of national and southern characteristics on the chosen dependent variable (i.e., formation of industrial policy for the South).

In my research design the focus is on the petrochemical growth-pole in Siracusa. The selection of the petrochemical growth-pole renders possible the reduction of the amount of empirical observations to a manageable amount while preserving the analytic scope and substantive interest of the project. The analysis is not in danger of falling into exceptionalism since the problem both of a future

industrial policy for other depressed regions in Western Europe is widespread (Commission of the European Communities, 1983, 1982). Thus I am assuming that the case of the petrochemical industry in Siracusa exhibits characteristics that are typical of depressed regions in general. And although there are specific, unique characteristics to it that should be studied, it has relevance for the establishment of general propositions, and can make therefore an important contribution to the establishment of general propositions - end to many building (42) ->

The petrochemical pole of Siracusa represents a fertile ground for my research for three main reasons: 1) the international character of firms, which facilitates the examination of southern, national and international linkages; 2) the peculiar structure of the national petrochemical industry and its centrality in the economic, social and political life of the South; 3) and the importance of the growth-pole not only for the local life but also for the national and European petrochemical industry. These three factors make the center the best choice possible for the study of the interlocking and conflicting international, national and southern linkages.

The character of the oil and petrochemical firms is international. Therefore, evolution of the Italian oil and petrochemical industry can be understood correctly only by placing it in the international context. The key phases of the post-war development of the international oil and petrochemical industry, against which to picture the development of the Italian

industry, are: 1) the hegemony of the major "sisters" and the centrality of U.S. firms;⁴³ 2) the increasing competition from other European firms and, particularly, the tough competition of European public firms which sought to break the dependence on foreign firms for oil;⁴⁴ 3) the emergence of local interests in exporting countries and their direct participation in the oil industry through national oil companies;⁴⁵ 4) the further decline of the majors in the post first oil shock period and the proliferation of independent refineries;⁴⁶ 5) the entry of national oil companies of producing countries in direct marketing with single countries;⁴⁷ 6) the building of new refineries and petrochemical complexes in producing countries;⁴⁸ and finally, 7) the entry of North-Sea producers, the current oil glut, and the disarray of OPEC. This is the background against which to analyze the development and crisis of the national and southern oil and

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Tanzer, 1974; Turner, 1978; Adelman, 1972

44

Aharoni, Vernon, 1981

45

Jacoby, 1972; Ghadar, 1977

46

British Petroleum, 1981

47

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1978

48

Turner, 1978; Pazza, 1980; Alnasrawi, 1978.

petrochemical industry.⁴⁹

The development of the Italian oil and petrochemical industry can be understood properly only by taking into account three dimensions: 1) the international constraints and the drive toward autonomy through the use of the public sector (ENI, AGIP) in the post-war period; 2) the relationship between the private and public sector; 3) its relationship to the modernization of the South; and 4) the response of the sector to the crisis.

The sector possesses great economic and political significance in Italian life. Firstly it has occupied a central place in the manufacturing sector. Secondly, it has experienced a relevant intervention on the part of the state both through direct investments by public holdings (ENI-ANIC-AGIP), and through financial incentives to private firms.⁵⁰ The aim of state intervention was two-fold: to achieve a degree of autonomy from international dependence;⁵¹ to modernize the South.⁵² The

49
OECD, 1983.

50
Chiesi, 1983.

51
Rankel, 1966; Aharoni, Vernon, 1981.

52
Galli, Nannei, 1976.

most important attempts of the industrialization of the South have taken place in the sector. After the liberal phase of the 1950s, the first government of the Center-Left in 1963, the law of industrialization 717/1965, and subsequent laws in the 1970s, following the phenomenon of industrialization without development, have led to the allocation in the South of 92% of national investments in the refining and petrochemical sector, and to the concentration of 3/4 of the national productive capacity.⁵³ The first and second oil shocks (1973, 1979), the subsequent changes in the evolution of the international demand and in the prices of raw materials and of finished products, the entrance of new emerging countries in the manufacturing of basic petrochemicals, have forced a crisis in the structure of the Italian petrochemical industry.⁵⁴ The crisis has had a differentiated impact on the various branches of the sector: harsher on low-technology products; less so for high-technology products that are internationally competitive. Since the productive structure of the South is based on the former, the crisis has hit more severely.⁵⁵ Furthermore, because of the heavy concentration in the secondary petrochemical sector in the South

53
Forte, 197

54
Marchelli, 1983.

55
Ranci, Vacca', 1983.

the crisis of the sector is essentially a southern problem; and, conversely, most of the crisis of southern Italy is rooted in the crisis of the national and international petrochemical industry.

In the context of the current crisis, important policies of industrial restructuring are taking place in the sector. Most of those policies concern the rationalization of production in the South. After a period of oligopolistic wars among public (ENI, AGIP, ANIC) and private (Montedison) groups during the 1970s, the government, ENI and Montedison have reached an agreement on a thorough rationalization of the national refining and petrochemical productive apparatus. Montedison has been left free to specialize in the high-tech sectors that are internationally competitive. Its either obsolete or non competitive plants are going to ENI.

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The development, crisis and rationalization of the refining petrochemical sector in the South can best be observed in the petrochemical pole in Siracusa. Firstly, 2/3 of the southern refining and petrochemical capacity is located in Sicily. Secondly, 2/3 of the petrochemical and refining capacity of Sicily resides in the growth-pole of Siracusa; such capacity makes the center the most important pole not only in Sicily and in

Southern Italy, but also in the Mediterranean area and in Western Europe. Thirdly, the center has developed from 1949 to present, and it thus cover completely all the phases from the genesis of state intervention to the development in the 1960s, to the emergence of industrialization without development, and the effects of the current crisis. And fourthly, besides Exxon, Montedison, ENI, AGIP, ANIC, Sir-Liquichimica, are all present in the area. The center offers therefore the best possibilities for the multilevel (longitudinal) case-study analysis of the economic, social and political developments that are taking place at the provincial, regional, national and international levels.

The first phase of intervention, which was characterized by a liberal intervention of the state, goes from 1949 to 1960. The phenomenon of industrialization began suddenly in 1949 with RA.SI.O.M. (Raffineria Siciliana Oli Minerali). Moratti, an industrialist from Lombardy, had a whole oil refinery unloaded in Augusta from Houston (Texas) where the refinery was being dismantled because of its obsolescence. The closeness both to the supply sources of the Middle East and to the promising markets of Northern Italy and Northern Europe, the advantage offered by the geographical position (i.e., being in one of the most important oil routes of the world after the reopening of the Suez canal), the felicitous geological configuration (i.e., being the only place in Sicily with deep waters capable of accomodating super tankers, with a large and continous flat interland, and with a

significant supply of water), the abundant and cheap labor force, and the copious state and regional financial incentives, were the key factors that affected Moratti's decision. RA.SI.O.M. attracted small and medium-size construction and service industries (SAACS, UNICEM, SAVAF, ETERNIT SICILIANA).

In 1956 the Edison group began the construction of Sincat, which was oriented toward the manufacturing of inorganic chemical products and of fertilizers at first, and of petrochemical products later. In 1958, following the first law of industrialization, the Edison group, together with Union Carbide, created the CELENE, a plant specialized in manufacturing ethylene, polyethylene, and plastic products. The Montecatini group, in turn, built a plant for the production of ammonia. The SGES constructed Tifeo, the first thermoelectric plant in the area.

If the first phase experienced rapid industrial growth through private investments, a second phase, approximately from 1960 to 1970, was characterized by the consolidation and further expansion of the industrial apparatus. Firstly, consolidation: EXXON acquired RA.SI.O.M. in 1961, and turned it into one of the most modern and sizeable oil refineries in Western Europe; Edison and Montecatini merged nationally and locally, becoming Montecatini. Secondly, expansion: the industrialist Ursini set out to create Liquichimica, which would specialize in the

manufacturing of organic chemical products; a group of Sicilian and northern businessmen financed the construction of a new refinery, ISAB, which would work on commission, and which would specialize in anti-polluting mineral oils that were highly requested in the markets of Northern Europe; ENEL built a new thermoelectric plant; CO.GE.MA. specialized in the manufacturing of magnesium fibers; construction and service firms, both from the north and from the south boomed to meet demand (GRANDIS, SICILTUBI, SIRACUSANA METALMECCANICA, COSEDIN, MONTERO, GECO-MECCANICA).⁵⁷

The economic, social and political transformations of the area were revolutionary. The entire life-structure of the area was now dependent on the petrochemical complex. The industrialization had changed a pre-modern, pre-capitalist agricultural area into a modern capitalist industrial area. The port of Augusta became the third in Italy for movements of goods, and the first for the movement of oil products. The standards of living were the highest in southern Italy, and began to approach those of the national average. (Muller, 1967)

Yet, in the early 1970s, it became increasingly clear that the area of Siracusa had been object of a massive and disorderly

industrial development. Montedison, EXXON, Liquichimica, and ISAB had taken advantage of one of the most important natural ports in the Mediterranean area for the refining of oil and for the primary processing of basic petrochemicals, but had also created an ecological nightmare, had not induced a diffusion of industrial activities, offered very poor opportunities for a future expansion and diversification of production. The industrial structure of the area, which had become important for the national petrochemical industry, was nonetheless totally disconnected from the local life. Production was for export, with little use for local activities: EXXON exported 90% of its products; SINCAT, 80%; ISAB, 100%; CO.GE.MA., 100%. All production was concentrated in primary processing of low added-value products. In 1971, the Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Industriale (CIPI), attempted to restructure intervention and form of development.

The first and second oil shocks, however, engendered a crisis in the area which has shaken its economic fabric, and which can have crucial social and political repercussions. EXXON's refining capacity is running at 50%; Montedison is planning to close its plants; Liquichimica, both for internal and external reasons has gone into bankruptcy and has been taken over by ENI;

ISAB has been running at 60% capacity, and lately has stopped production for whole weeks; after the construction boom, northern small and medium-size firms are leaving the area, while local firms are disappearing from the economic reality of the area (Montedipe, 1983; 1984; Montedison, 1984; Maiorca, 1984). Thus unemployment is soaring and the local and regional dominant economic, social and political classes fear a disaster.

The national and regional government, the provincial administration, and the economic, social and political forces have been attempting to confront the process of de-industrialization through two strategies: 1) the rationalization/restructuring of the existing petrochemical complex; 2) a re-industrialization process which can introduce new high technology sectors that are internationally competitive. As for the first strategy, much is still unresolved. As for the second, the economic, social and political forces believe that the bases for a new socially-integrated industrial development based on a high technology sector have been laid: a sicilian consortium of firms - Ital Off-Shore - has won a "megacontract" to build the first, of what is hoped to be many, off-shore platforms for the exploitation of oil fields in the Mediterranean. The belief is that the combination of restructuring and reindustrialization might offset the negative effects of last decade's crisis. The theoretically relevant question thus is: how to explain these developments?

Testing

According to my (national version) theory of dependedevelopment the outcome is to be explained in relation to

- 1) the decisions taken in the Center-North for the propelling sectors and imposed on the South;
- 2) the action/reaction of southern economic, social, political and institutional forces to affect those decisions and the emergence of conflict;
- 3) the direct political mediation of the state to recompose the conflict.

Thus it should be possible to observe and to reconstruct the matrix of political class conflict, alliances and coalitions involving both national and southern capital, labor, political parties, and state apparatuses that have led to the outcome. Finally, it could be possible, also, to demonstrate that, in the context of the conflict, southern economic, social and political forces have had a significant impact in shaping the industrial policy for the area of Siracusa.

1) Effects of decisions by capital in the Center-North on the industrial development of Siracusa.

The most important external decisions concerning the future industrial development of the area of Siracusa have been made by the big private (Montedison) and public (ENI) capital. Montedison has been undergoing a deep process of restructuring: away from non-competitive products, such as fertilizers and intermediate compounds like ethylene, and toward internationally competitive products like fibers and farm^{ce}auticals. For the area of Siracusa the decisions has meant the closing of plants, unemployment, cassa integrazione, etc.

The national plan for the rationalization of the petrochemical industry, agreed upon by ^{Monte} Edison, ENI, labor unions and government, envisioned the concentration of Montedison in high technology products and the transfer of unwanted plants from Montedison to

ENI, which in turn would specialize in the secondary petrochemical sector. The aim of the agreement was not only to rationalize production, but also to eliminate wasteful competition between the private and the public sector in the petrochemical sector. For the area of Siracusa the agreement meant that Montedison would be left free to delink itself from non-profitable operations, that Eni would eventually take over certain plants, and ^{that} the government committed itself to safeguard employment levels for the time being. In practice, however, while Montedison operated its internal restructuring, ENI was reluctant about taking over (after payment) the plants: they were "decotti" and costly. From the standpoint of economic rationality, therefore, the choice would have been to close plants and abandon production. From a socio-political standpoint, however, the economic choice would have risked social conflict (strikes) and the debacle of the regional and provincial political class.

The position/answer of the regional government was a proposal to create a consortium between Montedison and ENI with the financial assistance of the region. In the proposal, Montedison would have contributed with its technological know-how, ENI with the necessary raw material (methane) over which it had national monopoly, and the region would have insured the financing of the restructuring of the industrial apparatus to produce both secondary and primary petrochemicals.

According to the scheme of the regional government, the industrial future of the area would have been in red: if Montedison and SAB had kept production and employment at existing levels while awaiting for an international recovery, and if the consortium were created, much of the problem would have been solved. The remaining part of the problem would have been solved through favoring initiatives in labor-intensive, high technology, small and medium-size firms.

The possibility for the introduction of the new industrial activities appeared in the first quarter of 1984. Both Montedison and ENI, together with other foreign firms (i.e., North-West, Petromarine, Conoco), had been involved in off-shore oil research in the south-east of Sicily. The positive findings led to the phase of exploitation of the resources. For it were necessary two off-shore platforms. Both ENI and Montedison seemed they wanted to award the contract to the private firm Belleli with headquarters in Mantova but located in Taranto (La Sicilia, 6/4/84).

The decision provoked a harsh response on the part of the regional and provincial economic, social and political forces, which saw in the possibility of building the platform in Siracusa the irrepitable opportunity for industrial development in high technology sectors. They were thus confronted with two interconnected problems: the still unresolved problem of the future of the petrochemical complex, and the new problem of re-industrialization (La Sicilia, 4/1/84).

2) Reactions at the provincial level.

The first reaction on the part of the economic, social and political forces was the request that the platform be built in the unutilized bay of Punta Cugno in Augusta. The commission would have had tremendous beneficial effects on the economic and social life of the area and of Sicily as a whole. It would offer employment opportunities that would ease significantly the unemployment pressure.

The second reaction was the request that a consortium of public and private sicilian firms, headed by Cimi Montubi (IRI) and Geco-Meccanica (ESPI), be admitted in the competition to get the contract. The major benefit, besides employment, would have been to create a high technology center in Augusta capable of servicing the whole mediterranean area. At the same time it would help to break out of the monoterritorial and monosectoral character of the industrial apparatus of the area of Siracusa.

The third reaction was that both ENI and Montedison owed the contract to Sicily: until then they had treated the island as an area that could be exploited and polluted while remaining indifferent to its economic and social problems. Thus the situation to all seemed to require that both firms be dissuaded from pursuing their traditional path. The means would have been strikes (on the part of organized labor) and pressures (on the part of politicians in the regional and national government) (La Sicilia, 4/5/84; 5/1/84; 5/26/84; 6/1/84; 6/2/84; 6/7/84).

3) Reactions at the regional level.

Regional deputies from the province of Siracusa brought the problem of the platform to the Sicilian Regional Parliament (ARS). They raised four key points: 1) the area of Punta Cugno was geographically and technically better endowed than Taranto; 2) the area of Siracusa had been for years under the grips of a crisis that had been caused by the choices made by Montedison and ENI, which now are requesting the platforms; 3) the sicilian consortium was technically qualified, had done work in the North Sea, and therefore should be allowed to enter the competition; 4) the combination of the location and of the contract going to the consortium would ease the employment pressure and open new possibilities of development (La Sicilia, 4/3/84).

By the middle of the following month a consensus was achieved at the regional level: firstly, the platforms were to be built at Punta Cugno; secondly, a refusal on the part of ENI and Montedison would be considered an open challenge to the sicilian economic, social and political forces; thirdly, in the latter case the regional government would invalidate the whole system both of permits for exploration and of royalties; fourthly, an international equipe of technicians had concluded that in all respects Punta Cugno was a better place than Taranto; and finally, Eni and Montedison were to show greater respect and sensitivity for the economic and social problems of Sicily. The regional government thus proposed both to take a hard stand toward ENI and Montedison,

and to pressure the national government to maintain the agreement to locate in Sicily a high technology sector (La Sicilia, 5/23/84; 6/1/84; 6/7/84; 6/12/84; 6/15/84).

4) The "conflictual" mediation of the national government.

The first effect of the common front among the Sicilian economic, social and political forces was the call for a general national meeting to discuss the future of the industry in the area of Siracusa. It involved: 1) provincial, regional, national labor union representatives; 2) the president of the Sicilian regions; 3) the president of the provincial administration of Siracusa; 4) the majors of the municipalities; 5) the representatives of ENI and Montedison; 6) the national ministers of labor (De Michelis), of industry (Altissimo) and of state holdings (Darida). Object of the meeting was the future both of traditional petrochemical sectors and of new sectors in metallurgy (La Sicilia, 6/6/84).

The outcome of the meeting was two-fold: ^{DM} on the one hand the national government reasserted the validity of the national agreement among the social parts and the government (of february 14, 1984).; on the other, it broke the latent equilibrium that existed among ENI, Montedison and Belleli by agreeing that the area of Siracusa should be considered seriously as a base for construction, and that private and public sicilian firms should be allowed to enter the competition. The first attack on the existing balance was launched within the state apparatuses. Officials of Cimi Montubi, a public firm belonging to IRI-Finsider attacked the minister of labor on the g^{so} that he favored Belleli. The minister, in defense, attacked the presidents of IRI (Prodi) and Finsider (Roasio) denying any favoritism. Both presidents denied any direct involvement in the accusations, but asserted that the magnitude of the contract was such that both Belleli and the Sicilian nsortium could work together (La Repubblica, 8/1/84).

Finally, the minister of public holdings publicly suggested that both public firms, IRI and ENI, could collaborate to get contracts for off-shore platforms in the Mediterranean, and that Siracusa be considered the strategic site for construction and servicing. The clash between the the public and the private sector was now in the open. Belleli refused any partnership with the sicilian Consortium, being willing to deliver only some work to ease the unemployment pressure, while Montedison, now isolated, had to postpone its final decision (La Repubblica, 8/6/84). The sicilian bloc, however, rejected Belleli proposals: the problem for them was not simply unemployment but re-industrialization as well, and whoever got the contract would have to insure both (La Sicilia, 9/15/84; Siracusa Nuova, 9/22/84; La Sicilia, 9/26/84).

The solution

It arrived in the first quarter of 1985. The contract went to the sicilian consortium Ital Off-Shore led by Cimi Montubi of the IRI group, and involving SAIPEM (ENI), Gecomaccanica (ESPI), Saldotecnica (Priolo), and Impa(Rendo). To all the sicilian forces the new technological adventure represents a way out of the crisis (La Sicilia, 3/6/85; 3/7/85; Gazzetta di Siracusa, 3/7/85; La Sicilia, 3/12/85).

Conclusion

The events in the province of Siracusa do confirm the validity claims of my theory of dependent development, and refute traditional theories that posited the passivity of the South, the autonomy of the southern problem, the idealist commitment of elites, and the two-phases policy.

The dependence on external conditions is a crucial factor in explaining the industrial development of the area of Siracusa. Nonetheless, there is nothing deterministic about it: the mobilization of economic, social and political forces can affect significantly external decisions. The effects appear to be direct and indirect: regional forces could threaten directly and indirectly, through the mediation of state apparatuses, ENI and Montedison. Furthermore, it is clear that the state as such does not appear as a homogeneous subject: it is traversed by all sorts of conflicts which foreclose the possibility of conceiving^{it as} a unity. Conflicts involve agencies and ministries which seem to have neither a coordination nor a concrete unifying goal. It is ludicrous, therefore, to speak of a planned industrial policy for the South. Finally, these relations/conflicts/alliances cannot be understood in terms of clientelism: clientelism does exist, yet more in other areas of life than in this one.

Although these preliminary results seem to confirm my hypotheses, more stringent tests are needed both diachronically and synchronically to elucidate the linkages between economic, social and political developments at the various levels (provincial, national and regional). Furthermore, a most important task is to explain and examine the extent to which and the reasons why conflicts and interests are mediated within the structures of the state. And finally, another very important shady area that needs to be investigated pertains the extent to which and the reasons why southern conflicts may be able to affect significantly national development.

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- - - - - , 8/1/84, Prodi e Roasio: facciamo pace sulle piattaforme petrolifere.
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First draft

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CORPORATISM AND SECTORIAL DYNAMICS

Numerical and Corporate Influence in two Political Sectors.

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Introduction.

The argumentation in this paper will be twofold. Firstly, I will argue that question of corporatist development should be posed as a question of degree. That is the question should be if influence through a specified corporatist channel, or channels, is more important than influence through other channels of political influence or political organizations: the general election channel, ad. hoc. organizations expert influence etc.

Secondly, I will argue that we do not have one corporate channel, but rather that we see a tendency towards segmented or sectorial corporatism, implying increasing and institutionalized interaction between specialized interest organizations on the one side and complementary political and administrative institutions of the state on the other side. The corporate channels are institutionalized in specific fields of activity, or policy fields - in agriculture, in fishing, in health care etc. In these fields, the leading actors in the interest organizations of the producers and the workers interact with specialized representatives of the state, mostly high-ranked officials in charge of specialized agencies or offices in the state apparatus.

The problem we are facing then, is that we must try to find out the importance of the corporate channel as a channel of political influence in different policy fields or sectors: we must analyse the political processes in agriculture, health care etc, and see if it is the interest organisations in the corporate channel or other political actors that are most important in determining the political decisions in the sector.

And by comparing the processes in different sectors or policy fields, it will be easier to find out what actors are the most important in each sector, and how the interplay between the different kind of actors in each policy field leads to different output from each sector. In this article, I will analyse two sectors in Norwegian politics in the post-war period: the fishing sector and the regional sector. And, particularly, I will try to find out whether the influence in these sectors is channelized through the corporate channel or through other channels of influence.

Corporatism: one kind of political influence.

As the definition of "corporatism" varies a great deal, it is clearly necessary to state that I consider corporatism as one type of institutional representation based on interest organizations, and then in particular on occupational or economic interest organization.

In our kind of societies this clearly means representation based on a specialized economic adaption: you can be member of the interest organization if your occupational status is either capital owner, industrial worker farmer or fisherman.

I further consider Schmitter's (1974) and Manóilescu's (1937) distinctions between different kinds of corporative systems useful in the conceptual discussion. As corporative state systems legitimized in its own right ("corporatisme pure"/societal corporatism) clearly must be something else than corporative systems where the prime political basis for the state is general elections or other forms of legitimations, and where the corporative channel is only an auxiliary channel for the state apparatus ("corporatism subordonne"/state corporatism). In making this distinction Schmitter states that he relies on Portuguese research in this field.

This labelling of different corporative systems gives a better understanding of political systems in different countries and the development of these systems. The state corporatism has been the dominant form in the Scandinavian countries, including Norway, and the societal corporatism has dominated in many of the Mediterranean countries, at least until recently.

Rokkan presents in his earlier works (1967, 1970) an analysis of the development of the Scandinavian model of political development, where the corporative system, at least from the beginning, only is a secondary channel of influence. The legitimacy of the state is based on parliamentary elections, and the political development in the 19th and 20th centuries is the story of successive waves of mobilization. In Rokkan's terms: the mobilization of the periphery, first the smallholders in the districts, the farmers and the fishermen, and then the industrial workers in the towns. This extension of

a free election system in the Scandinavian countries passed without violent reactions or coups from the ruling classes, which have been relatively weak in these countries. And accordingly Norway has had labour governments from 1935 till 1965.

In addition to the electoral mobilization, we have also witnessed a proliferation and institutionalisation of interest organizations, in particular after the last war. And the working class as well as capital owners and merchants ^{have} developed interest organizations. Clearly the larger of these organizations have become important channels of influence in the Norwegian society too, and Rokkan have launched bold hypotheses about this influence:

"The crucial decisions on economic policy are rarely taken in the parties or in Parliament: the central area is the bargaining table where the government authorities meet directly with the trade union leaders, the representatives of the farmers, the smallholders and the fishermen, and the delegates of the Employer's Association. These yearly rounds of negotiations have in fact come to mean more in the lives of rank-and-file citizens than the formal elections"(Rokkan 1966).

And his well-known conclusion about the growing influence of the interest organizations is: Votes (in the electoral channel) count, but resources (in the corporate channel) decide. That is, the corporate channel has become the most important channel of influence, even if the legitimate base of the state is the numerical or electoral channel.

The Labour Government and the regions.

What so far has been said about electoral mobilization and interest organizations in general is also relevant for the rural areas in Norway: people in the rural areas are part of the mobilized periphery, and particularly in the north the smallholders and the fishermen have supported the Labour Party. The coastal population in Troms even sent the first socialist MPs to the Norwegian parliament, in 1903. And the three northern counties have been among the "red" counties in Norway.

But the political support for the government through the numerical and corporate channels are only two of the important factors in the development of the so-called welfare states. And this certainly is relevant for the government policy towards the rural districts too. Even if the government had the formal power basis to propose measures aimed at bettering the living conditions for the population in the rural areas before and after the war, they neither had the kind of expertise nor the institutional arrangements to implement their policy. They had to build up bureaucratic agencies that should take care of the planning and policy measures for the rural areas. And the specialized agencies and departments recruited well-educated officials with professional training that was looked upon as necessary to plan and implement the policies within the different fields: economists in economic and regional planning, agriculturalists in agriculture, physicians in health care etc.

It is necessary to include these professional groups in an analysis of political development and influence in the Norwegian post-war society. The political process can thus be seen as an interplay within the specific sectors or policy fields between actors using the electoral or parliamentary channel, actors using the corporate channel and the professional actors in specialized bureaucratic agencies on the central level. And we may also add ad.hoc. organizations, that have become particularly active in the 1970-ies. And the discussion of political influence or power can then be based on analyses where we try to find out what actors, or alliance of actors, seems to be most important within the different policy fields.

The most important of the professional groups in the last decades in Norway undoubtedly have been the economists. Politically, many of them have been associated with the governing Labour Party, and professionally they have been inspired by Keynes/Frisch in questions like economic growth, public expenditure, and then with important implication for regional planning and development. Before and after the war the economists launched their scientific theories and models as relevant tools for the economic and social development. They argued that increased public expenditure and state planning were necessary to ^{reach} stated political aims: full employment, economic growth and welfare state development. And they could offer models (national

accounting, input/output analysis etc) that made increased state intervention possible. Their models were warmly welcomed by the labour politicians, and gradually by other politicians as well, as useful tools in the public policy. And after a while even the capital owners, particularly in the districts, had to admit that the state expansion had advantages.

Clearly, this widespread acceptance of macro-economic models and measures in its turn strengthened the position of the economists in Norway. They became the dominant profession in the central administration, with a particular strong position in the ministries of finance, fishing and regional policy and planning.

The fishing sector.

The state policy in the fishing sector clearly reveals the influence of the macro-economic models and way of thinking. Plans and measures aimed at developing large fish-processing plants in a few larger centers along the coast. And a fleet of large sea-going trawlers was build up to supply these plants. The investments in trawlers and plants were subsidized trough the state controlled fishing bank. And the aims for this sector policy were: economic growth through higher productivity in the coastal areas, full and stable whole-year employment for the population, and increased export.

The expansion of the trawler fleet and the development of larger fish-processing plants in towns and larger fishing ports was a development that ran against the interest of the large majority of the fishermen and the population along the coast. The population in North Norway in the 1950 was settled in accordance with the scattered natural resources: the fish in the sea and the arable land. The peasants or smallholders, mostly with a farmer/fisherman combination, based their way of living partly on subsistence production, partly on marked production, selling their catch to the nearest, mostly small-scale, fishery plant.

Needless to say, the sector plans to reorganise the fisheries, caused

considerable changes in the coastal areas. Many of the inhabitants, particularly the youth, had to leave their native villages and move to the centers where they got jobs: as trawler fishermen or industrial workers in the fish-processing plants. Or they moved to the better working conditions in the south. People in some outports managed to defy the state initiated development and maintained their adaptations and production units - smaller and midsized fishing boats and fishing plants. (Brox 1971) And this illustrates that centralization and large-scale production in the fisheries is not a "natural development" or an economic necessity, but primarily a politically conditioned development.

But clearly, maintenance or even growth in the smaller fishing ports are exceptions to the rule in Northern Norway in the 1950ies and 1960ies. Fast growth in the larger fishing centers in accordance with the public development plans undoubtedly was the rule in this period.

This development, however, triggered political opposition in the fishery districts, and the opposition was partly channelized through the Fishermen's Organization. In Norway, there has been legal constraints limiting the expansion of the trawlers: only active fishermen, not corporations, could own trawlers and trawler fishing has been restricted in large districts through particular regulations ("trawler-free zones"). The larger plant owners had to own and control the trawlers themselves in order to secure regular and wholeyear fish supplies, and the trawler-free zones were obstacles for their expansion.

And the natural consequence of this situation were strategies from central politicians, officials in the central fishing administration and large plant owners to bring about changes in the Trawler Act and the regulations (Sagdahl 1974). The defender of the law and regulations, the Fishermen's Organization, had the majority of the fishermen as its members and is accepted as the legitimate organization of the fishermen in the negotiations with the government, etc. Further, it was closely

associated with the Labour Party. But in spite of this strong position in Norwegian politics, the organization lost the battle over the Trawler Act. The law and regulations were gradually changed and the large plants and the trawlers took over an increasing part of the fish resources and state subsidies in the 1950ies and 1960ies.

It was not until the early 1970ies that the trawler expansion came to a halt. It is at least three important factors behind this stagnation: more expensive engine fuel, diminishing fish resources and a stronger periphery mobilization in Norway in connection with the struggle over Norway's entry to the EEC. In the late 70-ies and the 80ies this tendency has been strengthened, and now we witness a reduction in the trawler fleet, in spite of state subsidies. And a concomitant decline in the larger fishery centers and maintenance and even growth in many mediumsized or small outports.

This brief discussion of the development of the fishing sector in Norway after the war illustrates, I think, that we must analyse different political actors when we try to find the crucial factors in the political development in our kind of societies. In the Norwegian fishing sector we see that the corporate channel is only one channel of political influence and that influence through this channel is overruled by a coalition of influential professionals in the central public administration and leading politicians in the ruling Labour Party. A coalition with a strong legitimation basis in the electoral channel.

The regional planning sector.

The regional development policy in Norway reveals partly the same processes as the fishery policy, but also differences that can be helpful in the discussion of different kinds of political influence. As the fishery sector, the regional development sector has been influenced by macro-economic models and ways of thinking. Here, too, the aims have been economic growth and material welfare for the people in the districts and the policy measures have favoured industrialization in accordance with a growth center strategy.

The economists have been one leading profession in the sector. But as the macro-economic models are general, and not territorial, in their orientation, there was a need for regional or territorial based development schemes and models in addition to the economic models. And thus the positions in regional policy and planning were also filled up by architects and geographers. And the most prominent actors were inspired by British and Swedish regional development models and strategies (Mydske 1980). The key word was industrial base: the regional policy should stimulate the development of industrial centers that were large enough to generate "self-sustained growth" - that is industrial sites with 1000-2000 workers in centers with 15-20.000 inhabitants according to the ruling growth center theory.

This growth-pole model was the theoretical foundation for ambitious regional programs in the 60-ies and 70-ies including plans for concentrating public investments in larger regions and centers that were looked upon as large enough to survive and expand. In the 50-ies, public investments undoubtedly had been concentrated in larger centers. But there were numerous exceptions to this rule, and the regional planners now wanted to concentrate the efforts in order to reach the stated aims for the regional policy and try to keep up the population within larger regions. (Brox 1981)

But these attempts to establish co-ordinated regional distribution of public investments failed. The regional policy neither had the administrative arrangements nor the political position that was necessary to create this kind of planned co-ordination involving different institutional fields or sectors. In other words: the regional policy did not have the same cross-sectorial position as the macro-economic policy (Dahl-Jacobsen 1970).

But the most interesting aspect of the development in the regional policy sector in this connection is that the attempt to co-ordinate the policy also failed because the majorities of the municipal councils and the county councils opposed these attempts. And this strong opposition is not difficult to understand. The majority of the relatively small municipal units ("kommuner") in Northern Norway would be discriminated by these plans because the investment would be concentrated in relatively few larger units. And as the planners were explicit in their statements about these consequences before the plans were passed, it was possible for the municipalities and counties to give their answers to the plans. And the answer was no.

The strong opposition against the growth pole plans through the numerical channel undoubtedly was representative for the general public opinion in Northern Norway in this period. And the municipalities and county councils were the main channels for this opposition because the people in the north did not have interest organisations for this kind of political mobilization. The similar opposition in the fishery sector was channelized through the corporate institutions. But the regional sector is not a specialized occupational sector like the fishery sector, or the other occupational sectors with large interest organizations. And this clearly reveals a general problem: the interest organizations and the corporate system in our countries, at least in the occupational field, is a system based on specialization. And so the people in the districts, and in other territorial units as well, has to rely on the numerical channel or ad.hoc. organizations when they want to influence the central authorities in questions like this.

In the early 70ies the plans to develop Northern Norway in accordance with the growth pole theory were given up. Instead, the campaign against membership in the EEC and Norway's no in 1972 caused a marked political vitalization and increased "regional consciousness" in the Norwegian rural areas. The periphery^{mobilization} caused political changes within the regional planning and by the midseventies the county councils passed county plans where the main aim was maintenance of the established population pattern and with measures that should secure a development for the local communities in the districts. And in the seventies we have witnessed a trend towards stabilization in the population pattern in Northern Norway.

Conclusion.

The data from the fishery sector and the regional sector reveal partly similar and partly different patterns of development and policy processes. One important common trait clearly is the impact of macro-economic models paired with social democratic development strategies. In the regional sector the macro-economic models and general growth aim was supplemented by regional development models and more specific territorial aims. But the regional policy undoubtedly was complementary to the macro-economic measures, with the weight on large-scale industrial development in accordance with the growth pole theory.

But the macro-economic policy, in my example implemented through the fishery sector, was a success, at least up to the 1970ies. And the regional policy was a failure. So, clearly there must be important differences between the sectors. I have already mentioned the important differences of political and administrative position between the macro-economic policy and the regional policy. But, in addition, the time factor seems important in this connection: The reforms in the fishery sector were initiated soon after the war, and the regional policy in Norway was born in the 60ies. And, as we have seen, the attempts to pursue a co-ordinated regional policy in this period partly caused political unrest and opposition in the districts. And the opposition involved the majority of the population in the districts, at least in Northern Norway, exemplified by the majorities in the county councils. The reforms in the fishery sector primarily mobilized opposition among the fishermen in the region, and thus only a segment of the district population.

Then we can turn to the question of channels of influence, including the discussion of corporatism. I have argued that the corporate channel was not the most important channel of influence in the fishery sector. The Labour Government, with the strong electoral basis and the useful macro-economic measures for planning and policy measures, overruled the opposition in the corporate channel, as the Fishermens organisation lost the battle over the Trawler Act. Thus we can only speak about state corporatism or auxiliary corporatism in this specific sector.

And we can question Rokkan's bold hypothesis about votes and resources: in the fishery sector in this period it seems to be the votes or the numerical channel that decide, while corporate influence only counts.

In the regional sector, there is no important interest organisations after the war. And influence and opposition accordingly is channelized through the numerical channel or ad. hoc organisations. But here we see that the opposition is more successful, at least as far as the public aims for the sector is concerned. And it thus seems that opposition through the numerical channel can have larger effect than opposition through the corporate channel.

Clearly, these preliminary conclusions should not lead us to think that the corporate channel, or channels, is of only minor importance in Norwegian politics. We have only discussed two policy sectors for parts of the post-war period, and in other sectors corporate influence seem to be more important than in the fishery sector and the regional sector.

What we will claim, however, is that the importance of the corporate channel, as compared with other channels of political influence, varies from sector to sector. And that we need the kind of sectorial comparison that I have tried to use in this paper, to find out how important the different channels are in generating output or political results. We must develop a research design that enables us to analyse the strategies of the different political actors - interest organisations, client groups, ad.hoc.organisations, professional groups in public administration, politicians - and the interplay between these actors. And one contention in this paper is that this interplay increasingly takes place within specific sectors or policy fields, and that political analysis thus to a larger degree must be analysis of the interplay and the development within such sectors or policy fields - that is: analysis of sectorial dynamics. Finally, this kind of analysis will help us to find out to what extent the political results and decisions are results of influence through the corporate channel or not. The two examples I have used, show that the corporate channels are of only minor importance in the two sectors, and thus I will not label the influence or political processes in these sectors as "Corporatism". In other sectors, the processes clearly are different, and maybe the processes in the same sectors in other countries are

different, that is, involving interest organisations in the corporate channel to a larger degree than in the examples I have used. And then, of course, the right label will be "corporatism".

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LES GROUPES D'INTERET TURCS - RECHERCHE D'UNE NOUVELLE VOIE

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(version provisoire)

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politiques, les groupes d'intérêt, comment s'organisent-ils? La rupture souhaitée par le régime militaire peut-elle être réalisée? Nous observons simultanément une certaine continuité et une série de ruptures, tant dans le fonctionnement des institutions que dans l'organisation de la vie politique et économique du pays. Il nous semble que la rupture est perceptible plutôt sur le plan économique que sur le plan organisationnel et fonctionnel des acteurs concernés. Le nouveau gouvernement qui pratique une politique économique libérale, rompt peut-être un peu brusquement avec les anciennes habitudes.

Le passage d'une économie hautement protégée à une économie ultra-libérale crée des difficultés énormes aux entreprises publiques turques, largement subventionnées jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, l'encouragement apporté au secteur privé forme un contraste assez inhabituel avec le principe du secteur public protégé et encouragé par différents gouvernements, depuis plusieurs décennies. La libéralisation des importations et l'encouragement des exportations semblent créer un dynamisme inégal entre les secteurs économiques traditionnels et les secteurs modernes. Le libéralisme économique est renforcé, tous les jours, par les décisions économiques importantes et sans précédent du gouvernement actuel. Ainsi, plusieurs lois protectionnistes en matière fiscale, monétaire et économique ont été supprimées. Même la privatisation des entreprises publiques est envisagée. L'entrée des capitaux étrangers est largement facilitée. Depuis janvier 1983, la Turquie applique la TVA, bien que dans une certaine confusion. Cette orientation ultra-libérale de l'économie donne un poids énorme au secteur privé et, inévitablement, aux groupes d'intérêt qui sont son porte-parole.

INTRODUCTION

Après trois années de régime militaire, la Turquie, depuis novembre 1983, a retrouvé un certain cadre démocratique. La nouvelle constitution et les lois cadres sur l'Université, les parties politiques, les syndicats et les associations volontaires ont été élaborées par le Conseil consultatif et ensuite approuvées par le Conseil de Sécurité National (CSN), et c'était bien avant les élections générales de 1983. Autrement dit, le régime militaire a tracé un cadre juridique pour orienter les activités des acteurs politiques et économiques du pays. La nouvelle constitution approuvée par le peuple avec 91.5% de voix et les lois cadres semblent vouloir donner une autre orientation à la vie politique turque. Ainsi, les nouveaux partis politiques ont fait leur apparition sur l'échiquier politique, les nouvelles institutions sont apparues également sur les plans social, politique et économiques. Citons comme exemple la création du Conseil Supérieur de l'Éducation. Les associations, les groupes d'intérêt qui ont été suspendus pendant les 3 ans de régime militaire, ont commencé à fonctionner dès novembre 1983, dans un contexte différent.

Ces changements structurels, fonctionnels et organiques soulèvent des questions complexes. Notre objectif est d'esquisser, dans la mesure du possible, quelques unes de ces questions et d'apporter un certain éclairage au fonctionnement actuel des groupes d'intérêt turcs. Une première question importante est liée à l'organisation de la vie politique actuelle, dans ce nouveau contexte. Y'a-t-il une continuité ou une rupture sur le plan organisationnel et fonctionnel de la vie politique? Les nouveaux partis

Pour comprendre cette évolution et la situation actuelle, un bref rappel nous paraît nécessaire sur le rôle et la place des groupes d'intérêt dans la société turque. Notre analyse et les éléments dont nous disposons sur la situation récente ne nous permettent pas d'approfondir l'accès des groupes d'intérêt à l'administration et au gouvernement, d'une part, et leurs stratégies, d'autre part. Par le simple fait que notre période d'observation est très courte et que, de plus, il s'agit d'une période d'observation et d'attente. C'est pourquoi notre analyse ne peut être considérée que comme exploratoire et indicative.

I - LE RÔLE ET LA PLACE DES GROUPES D'INTERET DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ TURQUE

Étudier le rôle et la place des groupes d'intérêt dans la société turque contemporaine est un sujet vaste et très ardu. C'est un sujet très vaste par le simple fait que, même actuellement, le cadre et la stratégie du gouvernement d'État sont différents en cette matière; les habitudes, les structures et même parfois leur approche sont largement influencées, encore aujourd'hui, par le système et l'environnement économique et social précédents. Le changement radical d'orientation économique du pays, depuis 1983, demande inévitablement un temps d'adaptation et de socialisation parfois assez long. Dans ce nouveau contexte économique, le rôle et la place des groupes d'intérêt, leur stratégie en formation et, surtout, leur possibilité d'accès au pouvoir diffèrent considérablement de ceux de la période antérieure. Notamment, les clivages classiques existant entre les industriels et les commerçants, les entrepreneurs de travaux publics et le milieu bancaire, les industriels orientés vers les exportations et ceux qui travaillent pour le marché intérieur, les exportateurs et les importateurs, les industriels et les agriculteurs se trouvent, éventuellement, tout à fait modifiés en fonction de la nouvelle orientation économique libérale. Certains secteurs économiques sont favorisés, alors que d'autres ont été désavantagés par cette politique. De ce fait, les coalitions se sont et se défont régulièrement.

Cette période d'adaptation, très riche en soi pour l'observation, nous pose une question méthodologique très importante. Il s'agit de systématiser et d'analyser cette évolution en pleine mutation. Sur ce plan, plusieurs signes, à peine perceptibles, nous laissent croire qu'une stratégie néo-corporatiste semble se mettre en place peu à peu. Il s'agit de savoir si un pays en voie d'industrialisation, qui est largement marqué par une structure économique agricole, peut pratiquer un type de néo-corporatisme. Ce type de relations est souvent étudié dans les sociétés capitalistes avancées,

mais rarement dans les pays en voie d'industrialisation encore dominés par des structures de caractère agricole. Autrement dit, le néo-corporatisme est-il un type de relation spécifique aux pays capitalistes fortement industrialisés ou bien ce type de relation trouve-t-il également un terrain d'application dans les pays moins industrialisés et largement agricoles.

La réponse à cette question vaste et complexe n'est pas aisée. Tout d'abord, les données et les études systématiques manquent considérablement. De plus, il s'agit d'une expérience récente et en pleine évolution. Enfin, le développement et le maintien de cette stratégie dépendent en quelque sorte du succès ou de l'échec de la politique économique turque. De deux choses l'une, ou bien la politique économique libérale réussit avec ce type de relation néo-corporatiste ou bien cette stratégie échoue et la relation néo-corporatiste est abandonnée.

Notre objectif n'est pas de fournir tous les éléments d'une réponse, mais simplement d'apporter et de décrire les premiers signes de l'application néo-corporatiste en Turquie. A cet effet, nous allons rapidement résumer l'évolution du rôle et de la place des groupes d'intérêt en Turquie. En deuxième lieu, nous allons examiner le cadre juridique et institutionnel de la nouvelle politique économique et la stratégie néo-corporatiste de ces groupes d'intérêt.

1) Période de 1923-1946

Depuis la fondation de la République Turque en 1923 jusqu'à la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale, la vie politique et économique turque a largement été influencée par le parti unique, d'une part, et par son idéologie étatique, d'autre part.

Le parti unique (PP - Parti Républicain du Peuple) qui a dominé cette période de construction et de consolidation de la nouvelle République, a voulu surtout créer un état turc en renforçant la cohésion nationale. Plusieurs réformes sociales, économiques, culturelles et politiques ont été réalisées durant cette période. Sur le plan économique, l'étatisme était de règle. Le secteur public, par les entreprises d'état, a connu un développement extraordinaire. Elles ont été créées dans tous les domaines de la vie économique et commerciale. La bureaucratie étatique centralisée a dominé; elle a géré le pays sous la responsabilité politique du parti unique.

Cette période a été caractérisée par l'absence de groupes d'intérêt représentatifs et forts (Pars ESIN, 1974, p. 102 - Robert BIANCHI, 1984, p. 108 - Ahmet INSEL, 1984, p. 86). Les quelques groupes d'intérêt existant avaient une activité limitée et strictement contrôlée par l'Etat. Les chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie, qui furent réorganisées en 1925 et acquirant le statut de personnes morales de droit public, ont constitué les premiers groupes d'intérêt turcs. Tout commerçant devait obligatoirement y adhérer (A. INSEL, 1984, p. 116). Mais il était interdit aux chambres locales de constituer une confédération nationale. Elles ne pouvaient réunir, qu'une fois par an, un congrès qui n'avait aucune organisation permanente fonctionnant entre deux assemblées. Elles dépendaient du Ministère du Commerce. Même avant la réorganisation des chambres de commerce et d'industrie, l'Association Nationale Commerciale Turque avait créé, dès 1923, l'Association du Commerçant d'Istanbul d'une part, et l'Association Générale des Travaillieurs Turcs d'autre part (ESIN, 1974, p. 106 - Maksut MURKUCOGLU, 1979, p. 143 - Alpaslan ISIKLI, 1979 p. 350). Ces associations eurent une vie éphémère. Dès 1925, la loi sur le maintien de l'ordre (Taktir SUKUW - BIANCHI, 119) et plus tard, en 1938, la législation sur les associations interdisait la création d'organisations sur le concept et l'idée des classes sociales. Autrement dit, les associations qui furent créées entre 1923 et 1925, se basaient sur le code civil et sur la liberté d'association de la

constitution de 1924. Mais leur champ d'activité fut limité par différentes lois d'ordre politique, économique et social. L'objectif poursuivi était simple: il s'agissait de mobiliser toutes les forces économiques, sociales et politiques du pays devant la crise économique et devant la guerre, et de les contrôler. Le parti unique voulait créer un Etat fort. Selon l'idéologie officielle de l'époque, la Turquie était une société sans classe. Toute organisation voulant défendre l'intérêt d'une classe, était interdite, en vertu de l'article 9 de la loi sur les associations. Pendant cette période, en dehors des chambres de commerce, d'agriculture et d'industrie, nous pouvons signaler l'existence de quelques associations telles celles des exportateurs (1936), des juristes (1938), des journalistes (1938-46) (BIANCHI, 1984, p. 134). Ces associations ont été créées par des lois spéciales. Elles jouissent de la personnalité morale de droit public.

Nous assistons également, à l'initiative officielle, à la création d'associations privées ou publiques: citons comme exemple l'Association d'Economie Nationale et d'Epargne créée en 1929. L'objectif de cette association était de défendre les produits et les producteurs nationaux par rapport aux produits importés.

Cette période a été caractérisée par plusieurs législations sur le travail (Code du Travail de 1936), sur la défense nationale, la loi du maintien de l'ordre qui limitait considérablement la création et le fonctionnement des associations et des groupes d'intérêt dans un système démocratique. Le parti unique et son idéologie étatiste ne tolérait pas l'existence de ces groupes d'intérêt qui pouvaient affaiblir la cohésion nationale. Le parti unique privilégiait énormément le secteur public au détriment du secteur privé. Le peu de groupes d'intérêt créés étaient généralement des associations de droit public. Les autres associations de droit privé avaient un champ d'action et un pouvoir limité et strictement contrôlé par l'administration étatique. Les groupes d'intérêt existant étaient utilisés par le pouvoir en place, et ce toujours dans le sens de renforcer l'idéologie étatiste et le pouvoir de l'Etat.

2) La période de 1946-1960

Après la seconde guerre mondiale, sous l'influence intérieure et extérieure, la Turquie abandonnant le système de parti unique, optait timidement pour le pluralisme des partis. Le deuxième parti politique fut créé juste avant les élections législatives de 1946. Le parti démocratique (DP) favorable à une économie libérale, prévoyait dans son programme la création des syndicats. Ce parti en opposition entre 1946-50, défendait le secteur et l'initiative privés. Ce changement dans la vie politique turque a eu une influence immédiate sur le plan économique et social. En 1946, la loi sur les associations fut modifiée. L'interdiction de créer des associations de classe fut abolie. En 1947, la loi sur les syndicats (employeur-travailleur) fut adoptée. La création des syndicats devenait possible, mais le domaine politique était interdit. Autrement dit, les syndicats ne pouvaient pas s'occuper de politique et ne pouvaient pas être utilisés par les partis politiques (ESIN, 1974, p.137 - ISIKLI, 1979, p. 357) Ce n'était plus le Ministère du Commerce, mais la Profession qui créait la chambre de commerce, d'industrie et des bourses. Le Ministère restait toutefois l'institution tutélaire des chambres. La création de la confédération des chambres devenait désormais possible. Elle avait entre autres tâches de fournir des avis, des informations aux administrations, aux ministères et aux commissions de l'Assemblée nationale. La nouvelle législation sur les chambres de commerce, d'industrie et des bourses, relativement plus libérale que l'ancienne, permettait la création et l'organisation de certaines professions comme un groupe d'intérêt dans la vie économique. Cette période considérée comme importante par les observateurs, voyait également la création des premiers syndicats de travailleurs et d'employeurs, dès 1947-48. On redéfinit l'étatisme, en parlait même de l'étatisme libéral parce qu'on reconnaissait une certaine place aux secteurs privés (ESIN, p.142 - BIANCHI p.41 - INSEL, 1984, p. 156).

Les commerçants d'Istanbul, de leur côté, ont créé une association en 1947. Le premier syndicat des employeurs fut celui des textiles (ESIN, p. 173). L'arrivée au pouvoir du DP a influencé, dès 1950, la vie économique et politique turque. La loi sur l'encouragement des capitaux étrangers fut élaborée. Les syndicats internationaux ont apporté leur aide financière et technique pour la création d'une démocratie pluraliste en Turquie. L'aide américaine, l'aide des organisations internationales commençaient à influencer sur l'orientation des syndicats turcs (BIANCHI, p. 141 - ISIKLI, p. 366 - HUKUCOGLU, 1979, p. 151). Les syndicats ouvriers furent systématiquement créés dans plusieurs domaines, alors que les syndicats d'employeurs étaient relativement lents dans leur organisation. Ainsi, la première confédération syndicale ouvrière fut créée en 1952, celle des employeurs après 1960.

Le retard dans l'organisation des employeurs nous a paru intéressant. Les chambres de commerce, d'industrie et des bourses auxquels les professionnels devaient être obligatoirement affiliés, semblaient freiner quelque peu l'organisation des employeurs. Par ailleurs, la couverture géographique des chambres était assez vaste. De plus, elles représentaient la profession et restaient en contact étroit et régulier avec les administrations, les ministères et les commissions parlementaires. Il faut dire que le système de la convention collective a joué un rôle limité dans la vie économique turque de cette époque. La première confédération des employeurs a été créée presque dix ans après celle des travailleurs (ESIN, p. 179).

Le DP, partisan et défenseur du secteur privé, même dans la conjoncture économique favorable entre 1950-1954, n'a pas mis en application sa philosophie économique. En revanche et contre toute attente, il a élargi constamment l'espace du secteur public. Ainsi, l'Office de la Viande et du Poisson (1952), l'Office du Matériel de l'Etat (1954) furent créés pendant cette période. Le secteur bancaire était domané largement par le secteur public. Durant la même période, les investissements étatiques dans le secteur

industriel dépassaient le seuil de 60% (INSEL, p. 160). L'Etat libéral devenait dirigiste, dès 1954, avec l'apparition des difficultés économiques. Il faut tout de même signaler que certains domaines d'activité économique étaient laissés au secteur privé tels que les travaux publics, le commerce extérieur.

Tableau I - Evolution de la création des groupes d'intérêts turcs entre 1946-60

| Syndicat | Employeur | Travailleur | Agriculteur | Fonc. | Prof. lib. | Esnaf |
|----------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------|------------|-------|
| 1946 | - | 14 | 20 | 42 | 28 | 103 |
| 1950 | - | 91 | 49 | 166 | 53 | 253 |
| 1955 | 9 | 275 | 146 | 349 | 119 | 1460 |
| 1960 | 23 | 408 | 272 | 665 | 189 | 2745 |

(YUCEKOK, 1972, p. 150)

Ce tableau nécessite quelques brèves explications:

Le nombre des groupes d'intérêt turcs organisés jusqu'en 1946 reste très symbolique; leur nombre ne dépasse guère quelques centaines, dont la plupart sont des associations volontaires. Dès 1946, et plus particulièrement après l'arrivée au pouvoir du gouvernement du DP, nous assistons à une création systématique de groupes d'intérêt dans tous les domaines. C'est surtout le changement de la législation sur les associations qui a suscité cet intérêt. Le groupe le mieux organisé, tant sur le plan quantitatif que selon la répartition géographique, est sans aucun doute celui des Esnaf; les associations des agriculteurs et des professions libérales viennent ensuite.

Cette période pendant laquelle les groupes d'intérêt turcs commencent à s'organiser, peut être considérée comme temps d'apprentissage. La vie économique étant largement dominée par le secteur et les entreprises d'état, le développement de l'organisation des groupes d'intérêt reste assez fragile. Tout d'abord mises à part les chambres de commerce, d'industrie et de bourse et les chambres agricoles, nous ne connaissons pas de groupes d'intérêt bien organisés et assez représentatifs. L'état semble utiliser les groupes d'intérêt comme un appui à sa politique. Plusieurs groupes d'intérêt ont été créés à l'initiative officielle. C'est pourquoi certains auteurs qualifient cette période comme "debilitating pluralism" et la période antérieure comme corporatisme d'état (BUNCHI, P. 141).

Il nous semble cependant qu'il y a une différence essentielle avec le système corporatiste répandu en Europe par le simple fait que l'état provoque leur création sans que les groupes d'intérêt soient intégrés dans le système économique et politique du pays.

3) La période de 1960-1980

Cette période durant laquelle apparaissent les groupes d'intérêt plus organisés, et plus représentatifs est marquée, sur le plan politique, par deux coups d'état et une intervention indirecte de l'armée dans la vie politique.

Le gouvernement de Menderes (DP) a été renversé par une junte militaire en mai 1960. Le régime militaire, entre mai 1960 et octobre 1961, a élaboré une nouvelle constitution. Une série de lois cadres sont élaborées conformément à la nouvelle constitution, sur le plan politique, social et économique. Cette constitution introduisit l'ensemble des libertés d'expression et d'organisation. Le DP est suspendu, les nouveaux partis sont créés comme le Parti de la Justice (PJ), le Parti ouvrier turc (POT), en 1961,

et plus tard le Parti de l'action nationale (PAN), le Parti du salut national (PSN). Les forces politiques et économiques du pays sont réorganisées. La nouvelle constitution a apporté le concept "d'état social de droit" (INSEL, P. 165). Sur le plan politique, une planification indicative est adoptée. Le principe de l'économie mixte à l'occidentale est instauré. Les nouvelles institutions comme le département de planification, la Cour constitutionnelle, le Sénat sont créés. Cette période est marquée, sur le plan politique, par la formation des premiers cabinets de coalition de l'histoire turque. L'instabilité gouvernementale est l'une caractéristique de cette période. Examinons brièvement l'organisation des groupes d'intérêt turcs.

3.1 Les syndicats

La nouvelle loi sur les syndicats, la convention collective, la grève et le lock-out, le Code du Travail, etc. sont élaborés. Tous les liens organiques et financiers entre les syndicats et les partis politiques sont interdits. Les syndicats de travailleurs sont consolidés. Entre 1960-70 Türk-İs a obtenu des appuis financiers et techniques de la Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres (CISL), de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économique (OCDE), de l'Agence pour le Développement International et des syndicats américains de l'APL-CIO (ISIKLI, P. 367). Dès le départ, la première confédération syndicale s'est définie comme un syndicat pragmatique, nationaliste, anti-communiste et laïc (GUZEL, 1984, P. 288). Elle semble accepter une collaboration avec le gouvernement et la limitation de l'action syndicale aux seules conventions collectives. Adoptant une ligne politique au-dessus des partis, Türk-İs se voulait un syndicat apolitique. Dès 1961, les syndicalistes de Türk-İs ont montré leur intérêt pour les partis politiques. Ils ont, par exemple, à l'origine de la création du POT en 1961 (MUMUCOGLU, P. 158-159)

Les partis politiques ont présenté des syndicalistes de Türk-İs comme candidats à la députation. En effet, en 1961, un seul syndicaliste était élu dans le PJ; aux élections de 1965, 7 syndicalistes sont élus députés, dont 3 dans le POT, 4 dans le PJ; aux élections de 1969, 12 syndicalistes sont élus députés, dont 1 dans le POT, 4 dans le PJ, 7 dans le PEP; aux élections de 1973, 7 syndicalistes sont élus

députés dont 2 dans le PJ et 5 dans le PRP. (ISIKLI, P. 378 et s.).
 Aux dernières élections avant le coup d'état de 1980, 9 syndicalistes sont
 élus députés dont 6 au PRP. (ISIKLI, 1981, p. 365)

L'expulsion proviesaire des cinq fédérations de Türk-Is provoqua, en
 1966, une scission. La seconde confédération - confédération des syndicats
 révolutionnaires des ouvriers (DISK) - fit son apparition en 1967;
 et plus tard, la confédération des syndicats ouvriers nationalistes
 (MISK) proche du parti de l'AN fut créée ainsi que la confédération
 ouvrière islamique (HAK-Is), proche du parti du salut national (PSN).
 (GÜZEL, 1984, p. 292 et s.). Les syndicats étaient un enjeu politique
 et chaque parti politique voulait contrôler une centrale syndicale.

Tableau 2

Nombre de syndicats et taux de syndicalisation

| année | nombre de syndicats | nombre de syndiqués | taux de syndicalisation |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 1963 | 565 | 290.000 | 16,8% |
| 1965 | 668 | 360.000 | 18 % |
| 1970 | 737 | 2.088.000 | 29,6% |
| 1975 | 781 | 3.329.000 | 42,8% |
| 1977 | 863 | 3.808.000 | 46. % |

(KOC, p. 292 et ÖZTAŞ, 1983, p. 109)

Ces chiffres doivent être interprétés avec prudence: Les indications
 du Ministère du Travail ne peuvent qu'être indicatives puisque l'affiliation
 à plus d'un syndicat était possible: les syndicats indiquent des
 chiffres exagérés, etc.)

Sur ce total, on estime que 600.000 travailleurs étaient affiliés
 au Türk-Is, 500.000 au DISK, 15 à 20.000 aux autres confédérations et
 le reste aux confédérations ou syndicats indépendants.

Les confédérations ont pris des positions politiques dans les
 élections nationales; par exemple le DISK a soutenu le PCP dans les
 élections de 1969 et le PRP dans les élections de 1973 et 1977. Quant
 à Türk-Is, fidèle à son principe apolitique, il n'a pas pris officiellement
 position en faveur d'un parti ou d'un autre pendant les élections qui
 se sont déroulées entre 1965 et 1977. Pour les élections de 1965,
 Türk-Is avait élaboré une liste noire où figurait le nom de 9 députés
 hostiles aux questions syndicales dans la législature de 1961-65.

Les députés appartenant aux diverses formations politiques ont réagi
 à cette campagne de Türk-Is. Un procès lui fut intenté pour infraction
 à la loi sur les syndicats et la loi sur les partis politiques. Türk-Is
 n'a pas été poursuivie, mais sa campagne et son action n'ont pas donné
 l'effet escompté puisque 3 des 9 députés furent réélus (MUMCUOĞLU, p. 198).
 La confédération n'a pas soutenu un parti politique officiellement, mais les
 fédérations ont pris position en faveur du PRP pour les élections de
 1977. La constitution de 1961 reconnaissait également le droit syndical
 aux fonctionnaires, mais la décret d'application n'a été promulgué qu'en
 1965. Les fonctionnaires ont créé d'abord des associations. Dans le secteur
 syndicat et plus tard, de nouveau, des associations. Dans le secteur
 public règne une situation particulière à propos des salariés: des
 services généraux de ce secteur; ceux-ci ont un statut spécial: ils
 ne peuvent pas créer de syndicats; leur nombre tourne actuellement
 autour de 1.500.000 (KOC, p. 313).

En résumé, nous pouvons dire qu'entre 1960-80, le nombre des
 travailleurs s'est considérablement accru dans la population active.
 Ils sont bien organisés dans le secteur industriel. Le secteur étatique
 employait approximativement plus de 2.000.000 de salariés en 1980, dont
 724.000 ouvriers dans les entreprises d'Etat, presque 1.250.000 comme
 fonctionnaires (INSEK, p. 231).

L'intervention de l'armée apparaît, au-delà de son objectif explicite - réprimer l'anarchie - comme une "crise de participation", une réaction restrictive de certaines élites du système politique devant une mobilisation sociale et politique considérable" (KAZANCIGIL, p. 13). Quelques mois après l'intervention de l'armée, les industriels et les hommes d'affaires turcs créèrent une association (TUSIAD) (BIANCHI, p. 268). Cette association, conformément aux principes d'Atatürk, a pour objectif d'assurer le développement planifié et démocratique de la Turquie, en respectant l'économie de marché. Cette association modérée qui regroupe en son sein les industriels et les grands entrepreneurs de travaux publics, joue le rôle d'un centre de contacts et de recherches et va influencer l'opinion publique. Ses membres sont des personnalités et non des entreprises. Elle regroupe actuellement plus de 200 industries et hommes d'affaires les plus importants de Turquie. Le siège de cette association est à Istanbul.

Les Chambres de Commerce, d'Industrie et de Bourse sont organisées à l'échelle du pays - presque plus de deux cent chambres locales. TOB regroupe en son sein presque 500.000 firmes enregistrées. Ce sont surtout les ASPEN et, de ce fait, TOB semble plus sensibilisé à leurs intérêts qu'à celui des grands industriels (BIANCHI, p. 252). Il existe actuellement 9 chambres industrielles, séparées des chambres de Commerce, qui agissent comme un groupe de pression au sein de TOB - longtemps dominé par la Chambre de Commerce d'Istanbul. La situation s'est modifiée sous l'influence du PJ, en faveur des chambres de Commerce des autres villes.

La création de TUSIAD a été interprétée comme une désapprobation de la part des industriels et des entrepreneurs de la politique menée par le TISK jusqu'en 1971-72. Cette interprétation paraît un peu simpliste: peut-être d'autres clivages d'intérêts ont-ils suscité la création de TUSIAD.

3.3 Clivages entre les grandes organisations

Il existe depuis longtemps des clivages importants entre les industriels et les commerçants, principalement sur la politique d'importation, d'exportation, la protection du marché intérieur, le rappro-

Tableau 3

L'emploi dans le secteur public

| | Fonctionnaire | Ouvrier | Total | Population active | Pourcentage |
|------|---------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|
| 1960 | 359.303 | 292.026 | 651.329 | 12.323.500 | 5,3% |
| 1970 | 823.829 | 526.111 | 1.349.940 | 12.969.000 | 10,8% |
| 1980 | 1.250.000 | 713.958 | 2.043.958 | 15.231.000 | 13,4% |

(Milljet - 128/08/1984)

3.2 Syndicat des employeurs

Du côté des employeurs, nous observons tout d'abord un certain retard dans l'organisation. Les premiers syndicats d'employeurs ont traité des questions purement économiques de leur profession. Entre 1960-62, plusieurs syndicats d'employeurs sectoriels furent créés à Istanbul. Dans une deuxième étape, les divers syndicats d'employeurs créèrent, sous la pression de la Chambre de Commerce d'Istanbul, l'Union des Syndicats d'Employeurs d'Istanbul. Entretemps, la législation sur les conventions collectives fut promulguée; c'est en décembre 1962, que l'Union des Syndicats des Employeurs d'Istanbul a changé de statut et de nom pour devenir la Confédération des Syndicats des Employeurs Turcs (TISK); son organisation s'étendit peu à peu dans tout le pays. En 1965, le siège a déménagé d'Istanbul à Ankara pour être près du gouvernement, du parlement et de l'administration (ESIN, p. 186).

En 1967, les chambres des industries créèrent informellement leur union au sein de l'Union des Chambres de Commerce, d'Industrie et des Bourses. Entre 1969-71, nous observons la dégradation du climat social en Turquie. L'occupation des usines, des grèves, des manifestations de rues et de la violence politique dominent cette période. TISK a durci sa position dans les négociations collectives avec le DISK - qui était essentiellement l'interlocuteur du secteur privé, alors que Türk-Is l'était dans le secteur public. Le 12 mars 1971, l'armée, par un memorandum, provoqua la démission du Premier Ministre

et une solution rapide avec la CEE. La position des fabricants d'articles électro-ménagers, proche du groupe des producteurs de textiles, est également favorable à une politique d'exportation plus dynamique.

Cette brève et schématique présentation nous montre les plus importants clivages existant entre les grandes organisations du pays. En ce qui concerne les autres associations, nous nous bornerons à indiquer quelques évolutions notables. Sur le plan global, nous observons la création systématique de groupes d'intérêt plus ponctuels, à cette période. En effet, l'augmentation de leur nombre entre 1960 et 1968 pour laquelle nous avons des données systématiques, montre clairement cette tendance.

Tableau 4

Evolution de la création des groupes d'intérêt entre 1960-68

| | syndicats | agriculteurs | fonctionnaires | prof. | commerçants | |
|------|------------|--------------|----------------|-------|-------------|------|
| | employeurs | ouvriers | | | lib. | |
| 1960 | 36 | 490 | 385 | 881 | 207 | 2992 |
| 1964 | 76 | 601 | 501 | 1090 | 220 | 3236 |
| 1966 | 132 | 738 | 603 | 1759 | 244 | 3555 |
| 1968 | 190 | 995 | 683 | 2355 | 259 | 3670 |

(YUCEKOK, 1972)

Ce tableau cumulatif nous indique qu'entre 1960 et 1968 la création des groupes d'intérêt s'est poursuivie régulièrement. Ce tableau n'a qu'un caractère indicatif car il ne nous éclaire pas sur leur importance et sur leurs structures organisationnelles. De plus, ces données partielles nous informent seulement de la création des groupes d'intérêt et non de leur disparition.

cherent avec la CEE. Les premiers, qui souhaitent un rapprochement avec la CEE, sont en faveur d'une spécialisation dans les exportations et d'une plus grande libéralisation des importations et des exportations. Autrement dit, ce groupe qui met l'accent sur une concentration des capitaux et une amélioration de la qualité, est favorable à une concurrence. Le second groupe, qui est essentiellement composé de commerçants, d'importateurs, etc., travaille pour le marché intérieur; il demande, au contraire, une certaine protection et reste assez prudent à l'égard de la CEE (BIANCHI, p. 259).

Le second clivage qui divisait les commerçants, les industriels d'un côté, et les agriculteurs de l'autre côté, concerne les réformes fiscales et agraires. Pendant toute cette période, la politique fiscale protégeait énormément les agriculteurs. Ils payaient moins d'impôts que les commerçants et les industriels. Les réformes fiscales souhaitées par les industriels, les commerçants mécontents, les agriculteurs qui avaient le soutien des partis politiques. Un tel changement de la politique fiscale a été déstabilisé l'électorat des partis de droite, notamment.

Ce clivage est devenu plus net au moment et après la création du Conseil des Entreprises Privées. Ce Conseil, créé par le TISK, le TOB et l'Union des Chambres d'Agriculture ainsi que par la Confédération des Artisans, a pris des positions radicales. Ce sont surtout les représentants des chambres d'agriculture et des artisans attaquant les syndicats des travailleurs d'une part, et plus discrètement les industriels d'autre part, qui souhaitent que ce Conseil exprime clairement leur option politique en faveur d'un parti pour empêcher la prolétarianisation des artisans et des agriculteurs (MUMCUOGLU, p. 258 - BIANCHI, p. 272). C'était presque une coalition contre le TUSIAD et la chambre industrielle. En attaquant les industriels sur la réforme fiscale et agraire et sur un rapprochement entre la Turquie et la CEE, le représentant des agriculteurs et celui des artisans ont montré non seulement leur préférence pour un statu quo économique et politique dans le pays, mais également leur hostilité à l'égard des réformes de structure. De leur côté, les producteurs de textiles d'Istanbul et d'Izmir, très compétitifs sur le marché mondial, demandent toujours une négociation

n'a pas été respectée lors de cette période.

Dans la période considérée, les groupes d'intérêt, avec des nuances, ont agi surtout comme des groupes de pression, privilégiant spécifiquement leur accès vers des partis et des gouvernements. Les trois interventions militaires en 1960, 1971 et 1980 créent des bouleversements, des interruptions et surtout la suspension ou le contrôle plus sévère des activités des groupes d'intérêt. Entre 1960 et 1980, l'état de siège est appliqué plusieurs fois dans tout le pays ou dans certains départements.

II - LA PERIODE ACTUELLE DEPUIS 1980:

L'intervention militaire eut lieu en septembre 1980, après une période de violence et d'anarchie sans précédent. Entre septembre 1980 et novembre 1983 - date des élections générales - le pays est dirigé par le Conseil National de Sécurité. Les partis politiques, les syndicats, sauf Türk-Is, TISK, les activités des associations ont été suspendus. DISK et leurs dirigeants ont été poursuivis devant les tribunaux. Une nouvelle constitution, des lois sur les partis politiques, les syndicats et les associations ont été élaborées. C'est seulement depuis novembre 1983 que l'activité politique, économique et sociale commence à fonctionner. Examinons brièvement les traits généraux de ce nouveau cadre.

Tout d'abord, les anciens partis ainsi que leurs emblèmes sont interdits. Souds trois partis ont obtenu la bénédiction des militaires pour participer aux élections; ce sont le Parti de la Mère Patrie (PMP), le Parti Populaire (PP) et le Parti National Démocratique (TND).

La nouvelle constitution est approuvée en novembre 1982 avec 91,5% des voix. Elle comprend cent soixante-dix-sept articles fort détaillés. Elle confère au Président de la République des pouvoirs assez étendus en matière de nomination, de contrôle et de pouvoir de blocage en matière législative. Quant aux droits et libertés, elle prévoit leur rétablissement. Elle énonce aussi leur limitation. Les droits et les libertés peuvent être limités par la loi en vue de préserver l'intégrité de l'Etat et de la nation, la sécurité nationale,

Sur l'ensemble des groupes d'intérêt organisés jusqu'en 1980 nous pouvons faire une série d'observations:

1. Les syndicats (employeurs-travailleurs) ont une législation spéciale. L'activité et le rapprochement avec les partis politiques sont interdits. Mais ils ont pris des positions politiques lors des élections; comme exemple nous pouvons citer Türk-Is, TISK, etc.
2. Les organisations professionnelles constituées par des lois spécifiques ont un statut particulier. Elles jouissent de la personnalité morale de droit public. Chaque loi organique définit les conditions de leurs créations et du fonctionnement. Elles remplissent des fonctions publiques dans la vie économique et sociale. Elles ont des contacts fréquents et réguliers avec les pouvoirs publics, l'administration. Elles ont un statut semi-officiel et sont assez souvent consultées par les gouvernements. Autrement dit, elles sont intégrées dans le système économique et social du pays. Elles exercent un contrôle sur leurs membres. Dans certains cas, elles peuvent arbitrer des conflits surgissant entre leurs membres: TOB et les chambres de commerce.

3. Les associations volontaires qui sont constituées sur la base de la loi sur les associations sont des exemples plus concrets. Ces associations ont un autre statut et une autre place dans la vie sociale et économique. Tout d'abord, elles jouissent d'une plus grande liberté dans leur organisation et leur fonctionnement. Ensuite, elles défendent directement l'intérêt de leurs membres. Enfin, elles choisissent leur interlocuteur et l'accès qui convient à leur intérêt. Comme exemple nous pouvons citer TUSIAD, etc.

Une autre caractéristique de cette période est l'existence d'une double structure dans certains domaines. Par exemple, on trouve certains exportateurs dans les associations volontaires comme les exportateurs de textile alors qu'existe la chambre des exportateurs. Cette double structure leur assure une représentation officielle auprès de l'autorité et une représentation professionnelle plus limitée. Le lien entre les syndicats et les partis politiques était interdit, mais comme nous l'avons dit précédemment cette interdiction

l'ordre public, l'intérêt public, les bonnes moeurs et la santé publique. Ces limitations ne peuvent être en contradiction avec un ordre social démocratique. L'état d'urgence ne peut être décrété que par le Conseil des Ministres. Le gouvernement pourra alors émettre des décrets-lois limitant les libertés et droits fondamentaux. Le régime de l'état de siège ne sera décrété qu'en cas de guerre ou de rébellion armée. Dans ce cas la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre est automatiquement dévolue aux militaires. La création de partis de classes ou d'obédience communiste, fasciste ou pro-islamique est interdite. La liberté d'association est garantie par la constitution. Les associations ne peuvent suivre des objectifs politiques ni exercer des activités politiques ou soutenir des partis politiques. Dans cette perspective, elles ne peuvent pas agir de concert avec les syndicats, les organisations professionnelles de droit public ou des fondations ni recevoir d'appui financier de la part des partis politiques. Les travailleurs et les employeurs ont le droit de créer des syndicats pour développer et protéger leurs intérêts et le droit social et économique lié aux conditions de travail. On ne peut être affilié qu'à un seul syndicat. Le check-off est interdit pour être dirigeant dans les syndicats travailleurs, il faut être travailleur depuis plus de dix ans. Toute activité politique est interdite. Autrement dit, les syndicats comme les associations professionnelles ne peuvent soutenir des partis politiques, etc. Le droit de grève et de lock-out est reconnu par la constitution. Les juges, les procureurs, les membres des Cours Suprêmes, les enseignants des écoles supérieures, les membres du Conseil de l'Education Supérieure, les fonctionnaires du secteur public et les agents des services généraux du secteur public qui n'ont pas le statut d'ouvrier, les étudiants, les soldats et les militaires ne peuvent être membres des partis politiques. Les partis politiques, dans l'accomplissement et le renforcement de leur politique, ne peuvent établir de relations et de rapport politiques avec les syndicats, les associations, les fondations et les associations professionnelles de droit public et de leur union. Ils ne peuvent recevoir de fonds de ces organisations. Ces restrictions se retrouvent également dans la loi sur les partis

politiques, les associations et les syndicats. Par ce double blocage, l'un dans la constitution l'autre dans les lois cadres, tout rapprochement, soutien, relation entre les syndicats, associations fondations et associations professionnelles de droit public et les partis politiques sont interdits. Si elles ne respectent pas ces limitations, elles peuvent être poursuivies pour infraction aux lois cadres et à la constitution.

Ce bref résumé de la constitution et des lois cadres nous montrent clairement que les groupes d'intérêt en Turquie vont exercer leurs activités dans le cadre défini par le législateur. De ce fait, le terrain politique leur est complètement interdit. Par ailleurs, plusieurs des restrictions formulées ne laissent aucune possibilité de rapprochement entre les groupes d'intérêt et les partis politiques. L'activité politique est essentiellement réservée aux groupes et à une classe politique dont la composition est également réglementée. Cette séparation voulue entre le domaine politique et toute activité économique et sociale peut, le cas échéant, renforcer la tendance corporatiste de certains groupes d'intérêt. Il s'agit de savoir que sera leur nouvelle stratégie. Sur ce plan, les mesures économiques libérales prises par le gouvernement d'Ozal (le Parti de la Mère Patrie de tendance centre droit nationaliste, semble-t-il, du moins pour le moment) mettent en place une certaine structure néo-corporatiste. Le gouvernement Ozal tient une réunion avec les représentants des principaux groupes d'intérêt (le Président du Syndicat Ouvrier, le Président de l'Union des Chambres et des Bourses, le Président de la Confédération des Artisans et le Président de l'Union des Chambres Agricoles). (SOURRIER, 10 Janvier 1985). Plus tard, le Conseil du Travail sera également organisé. Les réunions entre les organisations des groupes d'intérêt et le gouvernement sont une pratique récente. Est-ce que l'on va vers une institutionnalisation de ces réunions? Quelles seront les influences de ces réunions sur l'élaboration de la politique économique? Ce comportement néo-corporatiste du gouvernement

dans un pays en développement soulève une interrogation importante: une structure néo-corporatiste est-elle viable dans un pays en développement. Si les groupes d'intérêt n'ont pas une longue tradition de négociation

Le néo-corporatisme est généralement défini comme une structure politique propre au capitalisme avancé, qui intègre les groupes organisés de producteurs socio-économiques par un système de représentation et d'interaction mutuelle coopérative au niveau des dirigeants, et un système de mobilisation et de contrôle social au niveau de la base (Leo PANITCH in Schmitz-Lehmbruch, 1979, p. 123; etc.)

CONCLUSION

Le fonctionnement des groupes d'intérêt turcs, depuis novembre 1983, nous montre une certaine tendance ou une tentative pour la mise sur pied d'une certaine structure néo-corporatiste. Toute activité politique étant interdite aux différents groupes d'intérêt, par la voie législative, la défense de leurs intérêts est tolérée sur le plan économique et social. Ils peuvent faire valoir leur point de vue dans la défense de leurs intérêts et c'est par la voie de négociation. De plus, les grèves et les manifestations sont très difficiles, voire même impossibles. Est-ce qu'une structure néo-corporatiste est viable dans un pays comme la Turquie? Comment les contacts sont-ils organisés entre les groupes et le gouvernement? Quel est l'objectif de ces contacts? Y-a-t-il des mesures prises? Comment se font les contacts personnels entre les représentants des groupes et ceux du gouvernement? Quels sont les réseaux amicaux établis entre les représentants des groupes et ceux du gouvernement? Ce sont autant de questions importantes qui restent, pour le moment, sans réponse. Nous avons entrepris une enquête sur le terrain pour apporter des précisions à ces interrogations.

Terminons ce bref aperçu par une remarque générale: le néo-corporatisme est-il une structure du capitalisme avancé ou une condition de l'économie libérale (INSEE, 1984, p. 188)? Les relations sociales de l'économie de marché se mouvent malgré la propriété étatique, non pas au sein des instances politiques mais sous forme de rapports "privés" (relations de clientèle, tribunal commercial, relations contractuelles, responsabilité civile - ce qui n'entre pas dans la définition du néo-corporatisme. En fait, l'entreprise d'Etat permet une dépolitisation institutionnelle des rapports "civils", même si les agents économiques savent matériellement qu'ils sont en relation avec le pouvoir politique. C'est peut-être la raison pour laquelle, depuis 1950, les industriels en Turquie n'ont jamais eu besoin de devenir directement députés". (Citation d'une déclaration du Président de TUSIAD no 203, 1981).

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Tableau 5 : Pourcentage de la population urbaine et nombre de grandes villes : plus de 10 000 habitants

| Années | population urbaine | reste | Nombre de grandes villes |
|--------|--------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 1935 | 16,3 | 83,7 | |
| 1940 | 18,1 | 81,9 | |
| 1945 | 18,6 | 81,4 | |
| 1950 | 18,7 | 81,3 | 102 |
| 1955 | 22,5 | 77,5 | |
| 1960 | 26,2 | 73,8 | 147 |
| 1965 | 29,8 | 70,2 | |
| 1970 | 35,1 | 64,9 | 229 |
| 1975 | 42 | 58 | 292 |
| 1980 | 47 | 53 | |

(Source : OKTAY, (1983), P. 92, BIANCHI (1984), p.40, Banque mondiale (1983), p.211)

Tableau 6 : Structure de la population active (en %)

| Années | Agriculture | Industries | services | non définis |
|--------|-------------|------------|----------|-------------|
| 1935 | 85,3 | 6,5 | 8,2 | |
| 1940 | 84,8 | | | |
| 1945 | 84,8 | 5,5 | 9,7 | |
| 1950 | | | | |
| 1955 | 77,4 | 8 | 8,6 | 6 |
| 1960 | 74,7 | 9,5 | 10,5 | 5,3 |
| 1965 | 72,1 | 10,1 | 11,3 | 6,5 |
| 1970 | 66,6 | 11,7 | 20,8 | 0,9 |
| 1975 | 64,8 | 10,4 | 20,6 | 4,2 |
| 1980 | 54 | 13 | 33 | 0 |

Tableau 7 : Répartition des investissements entre le privé et public

| Années | secteur privé | secteur public |
|--------|---------------|----------------|
| 1972 | 50,2 | 49,8 |
| 1975 | 48,6 | 51,4 |
| 1980 | 44 | 56 |
| 1981 | 42,6 | 57,4 |
| 1982 | 39 | 61 |
| 1983 | 40,7 | 59,3 |

TUSIAD (1984), P. 14

ANNEXE

Tableau 1 : Les exportations turques par secteurs

| Années | Agriculture | Mines | Industrie (en \$) |
|--------|-------------|-------|-------------------|
| 1965 | 75,9 | 4,5 | 19,5 |
| 1970 | 75,2 | 7,7 | 17 |
| 1975 | 56,5 | 7,5 | 35,8 |
| 1980 | 57,4 | 6,5 | 35,9 |
| 1981 | 47,1 | 4,1 | 48,7 |
| 1982 | 37,2 | 3 | 50,7 |
| 1983 | 32,8 | 3,3 | 63,8 |

(source : rapport de TUSIAD, 1984, P. 93)

Tableau 2 : Répartition du PIB (en \$)

| Années | Agriculture | Industrie | Services |
|--------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| 1965 | 36,9 | 24,5 | 38,6 |
| 1970 | 32,2 | 27,4 | 40,5 |
| 1975 | 26,1 | 28,8 | 45,1 |
| 1980 | 22,7 | 30,4 | 46,9 |
| 1981 | 21,8 | 31,4 | 46,8 |
| 1982 | 22,1 | 31,5 | 46,4 |
| 1983 | 21,4 | 32,2 | 46,4 |

Tableau 3 : Importations et exportations turques (en millions de dollars)

| Années | Importations | Exportations |
|--------|--------------|--------------|
| 1979 | 5,069 | 2,261 |
| 1980 | 7,909 | 2,910 |
| 1981 | 8,933 | 4,702 |
| 1982 | 8,842 | 5,746 |
| 1983 | 9,235 | 5,727 |

Tableau 4 : Evolution du PNB par Habitant

| Années | en dollars |
|--------|------------|
| 1960 | 190 \$ |
| 1965 | 270 \$ |
| 1970 | 900 \$ |
| 1975 | 900 \$ |
| 1980 | 1,200 \$ |
| 1982 | 1,122 \$ |

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INTEREST GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE:
THE TWIN ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY AND AUTONOMY

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Interest groups in Greece remain neglected and uncharted territory to a surprising degree. Only a few (and dated) studies of the labor movement and even fewer of the industrialists are worth mentioning in this connection. Mostly undertaken in the early sixties, they have had no comparable sequel.

This pronounced and continuing lack of scholarly interest is undoubtedly linked and partly attributable to two related problems: the legitimacy and the autonomy of interest groups in Greece. Interest groups are studied less than political parties largely because they are considered less legitimate than the latter; they shouldn't matter. Another reason why interest groups are studied less than parties is that they are mostly perceived as mere party appendages: they don't really matter.

The twin issues of the legitimacy and autonomy of interest groups have actually become more salient than ever before, because of PASOK policy in this area since its accession to power in 1981. Few other aspects of Greek society are undergoing such radical transformations in this era of "Change" (Allagi).

Legitimacy

In Greek political culture, as in other Mediterranean cultures, a fundamental ambivalence towards "politics" and the State may be readily identified. Nevertheless, it is overlaid and remains in perennial tension with a grudging consensus on the legitimacy of electoral and parliamentary politics, which was never seriously challenged over the century and a half since Greek independence, notwithstanding repeated interruptions in the actual operation of a parliamentary system.

It is precisely against the background of this deep-rooted legitimacy of parliament, elections, and, therefore, political parties that the articulation and organization of particular interests is viewed with suspicion. Interest groups obviously lack the aura of popular legitimation. But they are also perceived as perniciously subversive of popular sovereignty, as embodied in parliament.

Beyond this general level, one may also identify patterns of discrimination between particular interests from the point of view of legitimacy, along ideological and specifically class lines.

Such discrimination has reached unprecedented virulence in the past few years, under the PASOK government. Two broad categories may be actually distinguished (the "good" and the "bad"). The legitimacy of labor and farming interests is rarely challenged: both are perceived as partaking of "the People." In sharp contrast, the articulation of bourgeois interests, whether commercial, industrial, or shipowning, is increasingly viewed as congenitally illegitimate. White-collar employees, small businessmen, and professionals fall somewhere in between.

This situation reflects a sharp reversal with respect to the past, when the legitimacy of peasant and especially labor interests appeared suspect, insofar as they might constitute a challenge to the bourgeois order. It should also be emphasized that the experience of the dictatorship was a watershed in this as in other respects, leaving bourgeois interest groups tainted with the stigma of collaboration with (if not enthusiastic support of) the Colonels.

From yet another angle, the legitimacy of interest groups and of their activity is typically viewed as contingent upon their actual or presumed autonomy from political parties. Interest-group leaders identified with the government of the day risk loss of credibility and even total discredit. For its part, the government (and now increasingly the PASOK government) rarely fails to challenge the legitimacy of interest-group demands and actions by denouncing them as purely partisan moves of the opposition parties.

Autonomy

If legitimacy is conditional upon autonomy, the autonomy of interest groups is in turn linked to the legitimacy they command. In the past, state intervention and effective tutelage of peasant and especially labor organizations was clearly linked to the perception of their subversive potential and, explicitly, to their actual or presumed penetration by parties of the Left. In contrast, the autonomy of bourgeois interest groups was rarely tampered with (except under authoritarian rule).

Under PASOK, the problem of interest-group autonomy has been posed in apparently novel terms. Lip service is ritually paid to such autonomy, which was supposed to flourish once the abusive practices of past conservative governments had been eradicated.

Yet, "democratization" has actually meant the wholesale transformation of interest-group structures and statutes through government legislation regulating the most minute details and often even through court rulings appointing provisional boards.

Whereas state intervention through legislation and the courts essentially perpetuates past practices, the single most novel element of PASOK policy is the imposition of proportional representation as the universal formula for interest-group elections. "Democratization" of interest-group operation has actually become synonymous with proportional representation.

The predictable (and intended) consequences rapidly became apparent, first among students, then among workers, farmers, and professionals, soon to be followed by small businessmen. Only the bourgeois bastions par excellence (the organizations of merchants, industrialists, and shipowners) remain so far unscathed. Elsewhere, interest-group elections are increasingly contested by thinly disguised party lists which gain proportional representation on the governing bodies, reproducing more or less faithfully the parliamentary party spectrum. Ironically, the issue of legitimacy is now being resolved through the liquidation of autonomy: interest groups are now deemed legitimate insofar as they are mini-replicas of parliament.

Agriculture

The first and most thorough transformation was undertaken by the PASOK government in agriculture, where two parallel structures coexist: the older and more widespread web of agricultural cooperatives, whose peak organization is PASEGES ("Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives"), and the more recent agricultural associations, whose peak organization is GESASE ("General Confederation of Agricultural Associations of Greece").

Within the first few months of PASOK rule, Law 1257 of 1982 ("for the restoration of the democratic operation of cooperative organizations") imposed the principle "one man, one vote" (irrespective, that is, of the value of individual shares), as well as proportional representation (except on the local level, where statutes providing for majority elections were allowed to stand).

The government's objectives were soon reached, in January 1983, when the PASOK list won an absolute majority and the solid control of PASEGES. Under its new leadership, PASEGES has since lent unflinching support to the policies of the Ministry of Agriculture culminating in a new law which recreates completely the cooperative movement, imposes a single hierarchical structure and proportional representation from top to bottom, as well as novel constraints on members. Although membership is not compulsory, it carries such privileges in credit and in other respects that it almost amounts to the same. This was the bill that provoked the most vociferous resistance and longest filibuster to date on the part of New Democracy. The conservative opposition denounced it as ushering the "collectivization" of Greek agriculture and succeeded in delaying its passage for several months.

In contrast to the distinctly corporatist direction imposed on the cooperatives, agricultural associations remain in the realm of pluralism, despite the detailed provisions of Law 1361 of 1983 (which did not fail to institute proportional representation). Although some had existed before 1967, agricultural associations mushroomed only after the demise of the dictatorship in 1974. For the most part, they were jointly created by PASOK and KKE (Communist Party of Greece) as class organizations of the peasantry and spearheaded agitation in the countryside against the ND governments. The leadership of GESASE itself, most recently elected in July 1983, was shared among the two parties, with a majority for PASOK. Strains appeared in the course of 1984, however, as KKE escalated its attacks on the government by mobilizing all the organizations it controls, both rural and urban. The split between the two erstwhile partners has not reached the top as yet, but is proceeding apace on the local level, where PASOK and KKE are sponsoring rival agricultural associations under their exclusive respective control. The most spectacular recent development, however, has been the massive organizational drive of ND in the countryside. Excluded at the outset from GESASE and its member associations, the Right has been creating its own rival network of agricultural associations, which should logically lead to the formation of a "blue" peak confederation.

Agricultural associations are thus the only associational arena in Greece where competing organizational structures (two or three, depending on the area) along strictly party lines have

been allowed to develop. Nevertheless, it may be expected that recognition and access will continue to be reserved to GESASE by the PASOK government, as long as GESASE itself remains in PASOK hands. The government may also be tempted to impose by law a single structure, whether directly or indirectly (by raising the membership requirement, as has been suggested). In any case, GESASE is recently proving unable to contain rural agitation in several regions, which is mobilized by ND, KKE, or both.

Labor

The legislative restructuring of agricultural cooperatives in 1982 was immediately followed by analogous legislation on trade unions. Law 1264 ("for the democratization of the labor movement") imposed the principle "one man, one vote" (ruling out multiple membership or voting by the same individuals) and proportional representation throughout the union structure, whose peak is GSEE ("General Confederation of Workers of Greece").

Legislative intervention in this case had been preceded by judicial intervention. A court had obligingly annulled the previous GSEE Congress (held by the then dominant ND wing of the labor movement only two weeks before the 1981 election) and had appointed a provisional leadership controlled by PASOK. It was this appointed leadership that undertook the rapid implementation of Law 1264, leading to the 22nd GSEE Congress in December 1983, with predictable results. PASOK held an absolute majority of the delegates, while the remaining belonged to KKE, except an insignificant number affiliated with its Eurocommunist rival (KKE Esoterikou). The right wing (associated with ND) boycotted the Congress. Although PASOK could have kept the top Executive Committee all to itself, the party leadership intervened and ordered its union cadres to concede a minority of GSEE offices to the KKE, including the post of Secretary-General. The official leader of the PASOK party organization in the labor movement became himself GSEE President.

This semblance of bipartisan cooperation between PASOK and KKE at the helm of the labor movement (with KKE Esoterikou as a junior partner) proved short-lived nonetheless. Bitter disputes developed over such issues as the reorganization of GSEE itself,

since various plans would favor the one party at the expense of the other. A particularly significant area of conflict involves the creation of factory unions and of a corresponding federation by PASOK, which is savagely fought by the KKE, since it invades the territory of some of its own sectoral federations.

The split between KKE and PASOK eventually erupted over the 1985 national labor contract. Whereas the PASOK labor leadership limited its "demands" to the pay increases already outlined in the government's incomes policy, the KKE labor leadership openly denounced this position as a sellout. Collective bargaining with the employers' organizations actually degenerated into an elaborate charade, with the industrialists offering symbolic resistance--to placate the government and boost the image of its supporters in the GSEE, as was suggested. The national labor contract was eventually signed by the GSEE President alone, while the Secretary-General refused to even attend the perfunctory negotiations. In effect, the most solemn annual act in Greek industrial relations committed only the PASOK wing of the labor movement.

For its part, the KKE launched an impressive campaign of protest by the labor organizations it controls, culminating in a series of strikes in such crucial sectors as construction and the banks. In the latter case and in many other cases as well, an objective alliance between KKE and ND in the labor movement is manifesting itself behind strike action, as the government and its labor loyalists tirelessly denounce. It should be emphasized at this point that both KKE and ND have so far refused the option of creating a correspondingly "red" or "blue" GSEE and remain ostensibly committed to the preservation of a unitary labor confederation. Its control by the government through the PASOK labor leadership is largely rendered meaningless by the growing tendency of otherwise quite disparate opposition forces (mainly KKE and ND) to jointly call strikes over the ineffectual protests of PASOK unionists, who often end up in the unenviable role of scabs. Just like GESASE in agriculture (or PASEGES, for that matter), GSEE is proving unable to contain labor agitation against the PASOK government.

A broadly similar picture may be sketched for civil servants, whose separate peak organization is ADEDY ("Supreme Directorate of Civil Service Unions"). While most of the provisions of Law 1264

also apply to civil servants, judicial intervention was far more decisive in this case. The courts eventually prevented the holding of an ADEDY Congress in 1982 by the previous moderate leadership and replaced it by an appointed provisional leadership entirely controlled by PASOK. The Congress was eventually held in December 1983. PASOK had an absolute majority, while ND had the second largest group of delegates, and KKE the third. As in the case of GSEE, PASOK did not keep the Executive Committee all to itself, but chose to include a few KKE representatives (and one KKE Es.). In contrast to GSEE, however, the KKE presence was in this case rather inconsequential, given the party's weakness in the civil service.

Under its new leadership, ADEDY has been towing the government line in all matters, including the highly controversial and drastic reform of the pay structure of the civil service and the (still pending) radical transformation of the grade hierarchy. It could not prevent, however, a bitter strike by the government civil engineers against the reduction of their perquisites, which lasted several months and brought all public projects to a standstill. A recent bill for the reform of elementary and secondary education is promising to have more farreaching consequences, since it is forcing the two corresponding federations of teachers into an open confrontation with the government. Both federations have long been PASOK strongholds and it was actually thanks to them that PASOK secured overall control of ADEDY. In this case, once again, ND and KKE are joining forces in exploiting grassroots opposition to the bill and in imposing strike action against the strenuous resistance of PASOK unionists, who are sacrificing their credibility in the process.

Business

Merchants and industrialists are effectively represented both by the compulsory Chambers of Commerce and Industry and by the voluntary merchant associations and Federation of Greek Industries--which is still regarded as the most powerful interest group in Greece. Following PASOK's accession to power, both sets of organizations suddenly found themselves deprived of their traditional privileged access to (and cozy cooperation with) the government. They have been loudly protesting ever since against

a series of government measures and above all against the climate of uncertainty and insecurity that such measures (or half-measures) breed for private enterprise. The most vexing aspect of the situation involves the pronounced hostility against businessmen and especially merchants which is reflected not only in the pro-government press, but also in the state radio and television and even in official statements by PASOK ministers. Whether individually or collectively, merchants and industrialists have repeatedly served as scapegoats in propaganda campaigns orchestrated or otherwise encouraged by the government and its supporters.

The most spectacular reaction of the business world against this increasingly hostile environment was the public rally held in May 1984, to which all entrepreneurs, big and small, were invited--to demonstrate in defense of free enterprise. The spirit of that unprecedented event was subsequently embodied in the newly-founded ESIP ("National Council of Private Enterprise"), which aspires to become the universal spokesman of the private sector. In many respects, this is the most novel and intriguing experiment in Greek interest politics today.

Retaliation on the part of the PASOK government against recalcitrant business organizations has first taken the form of yet another "democratization" bill, this time involving the voluntary associations of merchants, tradesmen, and craftsmen. Analogous to the legislation on agricultural and labor organizations, it facilitates membership while placing limits on multiple memberships and, inevitably, imposes proportional representation. This project was undoubtedly prompted by the dismal showing of PASOK tickets in such cases as the prestigious Merchant Association of Athens. It provoked strong protests on the part of the merchants and remained in limbo for several months, but now seems to be moving again.

Another form of retaliation may soon be expected against the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, on the pretext that they have been overstepping the limits imposed by their public status in voicing the demands of their constituencies. It is highly significant that this threat was voiced by the government in the tense climate recently created by Papandreou's about-face on the reelection of Karamanlis as President of the Republic. If it is carried out, it is bound to provoke an explosive confrontation with farreaching economic and political repercussions.

On the other hand, small business has been a central target of PASOK propaganda ever since the party's inception. The term itself thus entered everyday discourse as mikromesaios ("small-to-middling"), acquiring a distinctive social and political connotation in the process. Nevertheless, it was only in late 1984 that PASOK (in coalition with KKE) managed to wrest control of the relevant peak organization GSEVE ("General Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Greece"). Earlier, in 1981 and 1982, PASOK (again with KKE) had won control of the corresponding Athens Chambers which are, however, of secondary importance compared to GSEVE or to their commercial and industrial counterparts. The new GSEVE leadership immediately proceeded to demand the long-delayed "democratization" of its own constituency and to applaud the manifold government policies in favor of small business.

Whereas PASOK strategy (as well as that of the KKE for that matter) has always involved an alliance of small business with labor and farmers, ESIP embodies quite the opposite wager: that of welding a new alliance between small and big business against an ever-growing and increasingly inimical State. It is probably too late or else too early for that. Formidable obstacles stem from the long-standing conflicts between big and small business, which are exemplified by such classic cases as the bitter competition between supermarkets and traditional grocers. PASOK policy in fact aggressively exploits and exacerbates such conflicts, by promising to redress past inequities to the benefit of the small. It remains to be seen whether the overgrown petty bourgeoisie can be scared away from the appeals of unbridled populism and lured back into the conservative fold, under the stifling and perhaps no longer protective wing of industrial capital.

The European Periphery: the combined process of industrialization and 'social-democratization' in Spain, Greece and Portugal

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1. Introduction

One of the most important developments within the post-war International Division of Labour is the emergence of a group of states which are known as the so-called 'Newly Industrializing Countries' (NICs). The heterogeneous character of this group of countries becomes clear when we look at its composition (OECD, 1979). To some extent this also applies to three NICs which are an integral part of the periphery of Western Europe: Spain, Greece and Portugal. Nevertheless there are some economic and socio-political resemblances between these countries, making a comparative analysis highly interesting. Economically:

- Spain, Greece and Portugal find themselves in a relatively advanced stage of capitalist development;
- in the sixties and seventies they have increased their share in total world exports and imports and total industrial production;
- and they have reduced the gap between them and the industrialized countries in relation to GNP per capita.

On the socio-political level the developments in Spain, Greece and Portugal in the seventies have been characterized by a process which has sometimes been called 'the crisis of the dictatorships', a socio-political movement in the direction of less authoritarian governments. Secondly, the installation of 'socialist-led' governments in these countries represents a legitimization of the parliamentary socialist alternative, the first after a long period of time (in the case of Spain). Thirdly, it is striking that these 'socialist' changes aren't characterized by spectacular social reforms, but rather by the moderate impact they have had on socio-economic policy ('the internalization of international austerity'). This last phenomenon could be explained both from internal power structures, the basis on which these governments have obtained their political legitimacy, and the restraints the capitalist world economy puts on these countries.

In the field of foreign policy the 'socialist' governments

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in Spain, Greece and Portugal are progressively orientated to Western Europe, with a formal membership of the Common Market as an ultimate purpose. Most explicitly, this development bears in it the combination of the two processes above-mentioned, the industrialization and 'social-democratization'. A comparative analysis of the political and socio-economic developments in Spain, Greece and Portugal shall thus have to take the 'European Aspirations' within these countries as a main, although implicit, point of departure.

In order to examine the fundamental economic and socio-political resemblances between Spain, Greece and Portugal, we have, first of all, to distinguish three different levels of analysis. This is mainly because most students in the field of political science, analytically, try to explain specific developments within a country at one level, or, which is worse, intermingle the three levels without making any distinction. In trying to prevent the same errors, three approaches in analyzing the problems of development and underdevelopment can serve as an illustration (cf. Bach, 1980: 290-297).

The first approach to mention is the so-called 'modernization-approach'. One of the most important assumptions of the modernization theorists is that nation-states are independent units of the international system whose level of development is determined by the presence or absence of certain national conditions. To the extent that part-whole relations are discussed, relationships found at the individual or national level are used to develop by analogy the mechanisms of the world whole. In other words, when talking about a totality, a world-order, this totality is nothing more than the sum of its individual parts. A classical example of this approach is the work of Walt Rostow (Rostow, 1971).

Secondly, the so-called 'interdependence-approach' tries to identify those relations between states which block national development and establish a dependence among states. One of the most important assumptions is that such states are part

of a larger structure which works to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. Each state, therefore, can not be studied as an independent unit, but only as a part of a larger whole. This recognition of a larger whole, a larger organization, has an important methodological implication: states are not only subunits but are political structures contained within a larger economic structure. From this it follows that a network of societies becomes the social whole which is no longer reducible to each several part, in other words the totality is more than the sum of its individual parts. Nevertheless, the parts remain the same regardless of their ordering, regardless of their position in the larger social structure. That is, we can identify the parts independently of their occurrence in the organization. A new totality or 'whole' is formed by shifts in positions; we do know what is the sum of the individual parts, but the totality remains abstract and not specified. An example of this approach is the famous book of Andre Gunder Frank on capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America (Frank, 1967).

Finally, the 'world-system approach' suggests that there is more than just the notion that states are part of an international organization which conditions national development. A world-system consists of a set of singular processes. This process lays the emphasis on the formation and development of the system itself and not merely on patterned relations among its elements. The most important difference with the other two approaches is that "the unit of analysis is a world-system, defined in terms of economic processes and links, and not any units defined in terms of juridicial, political, cultural, geological, etc., criteria" (Hopkins, Wallerstein, 1977, 123). In other words, the single parts may not be identified independently of their occurrence in the whole. The most important representative of this approach is Immanuel Wallerstein.

With the three approaches above-mentioned in mind, we can now distinguish three different levels of analysis which are commonly applied in studying international relations. Firstly, there is the analysis of internal factors behind the (foreign) policy of individual states. Secondly, we can analyze the

interaction between states in the international state-system. And finally we can analyze the impact of international events and developments on the internal development of a particular state (Junne, 1982). It is important to note that this distinction is necessary in order to avoid one-sidedness or confusion as a result of the mixture of this different levels of analysis.

For the purpose of this paper, therefore, in the next section I shall examine the internal economic and socio-political factors in Spain, Greece and Portugal behind the breakdown of the military dictatorships in the seventies. Thereafter I shall analyze the international restraints international economic developments have on the margin of the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese 'socialist' governments to pursue a national stimulation policy, within the framework of the international economic crisis. Finally, an attempt will be made to characterize the social origins of the social-democratic governments in Spain, Greece and Portugal. The process of 'social-democratization' now under way in these countries will be analyzed both from internal factors and external developments, i.e. as an 'synthetic' process.

2. The crisis of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal

The problem that confronts us in analyzing the specific developments that have led to the fall of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal, consists of the choice for an appropriate level of analysis, that is to say a level of analysis which has a predominant expressiveness over other ones in explaining specific characteristics. In this concrete case such a choice is the more important because a tendency exists to explain certain developments within under- or less developed countries from external factors, starting from the assumption that autonomous, strict national processes play an insignificant role. May this be the case for certain underdeveloped countries, to my opinion this is certainly not applicable to Spain, Greece and Portugal. Before I shall explain this more in detail, a single, although rather extensive example can show to which conclusions such (common) misperceptions can lead.

In his 'Crisis of the Dictatorships' Poulantzas tried to explain the fall of the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese dictatorships from a struggle for power between two fractions of the bourgeoisie, whether or not related to foreign capital. He distinguished a domestic bourgeoisie and a comprador bourgeoisie. The latter Poulantzas defined as "that fraction whose interests are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capital, and which functions as a kind of staging-post and direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign capital (...)" (Poulantzas, 1976: 42). Whereas the comprador bourgeoisie supports the dictatorial regime until the last moment, the domestic bourgeoisie makes it her aim to restore her position within the power bloc, by means of political liberalisation, at the expense of the comprador bourgeoisie. To this end she seeks an alliance with the labour movement. Precisely through this alliance a shift occurs within the power bloc in favour of the domestic bourgeoisie, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the dictatorship.

Of central importance herewith is the central question Poulantzas asked himself: "(...) in what way have the so-called 'external' factors, the changes involved in the present phase of imperialism, been reproduced and internalized actually within the socio-economic and political structures of these countries?" (Poulantzas, 1976: 41) We don't have to wait very long for an answer: the post-war process within the Atlantic Alliance serves as a model for / is projected on the developments in Spain, Greece and Portugal, and particularly for/on the relationship between the 'domestic' bourgeoisie (read: Western Europe) and the 'comprador' bourgeoisie (read: United States). As in the case of the changing relationship between the United States and Europe in the seventies, an 'emancipation' of the domestic bourgeoisie takes place which produces a contradiction centring on a rearrangement in the balance of forces with the comprador bourgeoisie, but still always under the hegemony of the comprador bourgeoisie. (Nota bene, it is important to note that Poulantzas' concept of the domestic bourgeoisie is not the same as the autochthonous or national bourgeoisie, i.e. a bourgeoisie that is really independent of foreign capital. To his opinion, this national bourgeoisie has ceased to exist in Spain, Greece and Portugal.) The problem herewith is that Poulantzas, in his analysis of the fall of the dictatorships, can not explain why the (temporary?) coming to power of the domestic bourgeoisie interferes with the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie, while at the same time taking place under the absolute hegemony of this comprador bourgeoisie.

Moreover, and for the purpose of this paper of more importance, the analysis of Poulantzas, and more specific his concept of the comprador bourgeoisie, shows a remarkable shortage of insight into the historical developments within Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 20th century. In the case of Spain, especially the transition from an independent underdevelopment to a dependent development of the Spanish economy, formally established by the Stabilisation-plan of 1959, remains out of consideration (Starke, 1976). In Poulantzas' view, in the second half of the 19th century, simultaneous with the

first penetration of foreign capital into Spain, a comprador bourgeoisie comes into existence with a weak economic economic basis, remaining the same until this foreign penetration takes definite shape in the 1960s. Moreover he identified the comprador bourgeoisie with Spanish bank capital. One of the theses that shall be worked out in our ongoing research is diametrically opposed to this view: the enormous, 'independent' economic and political power of Spanish bank capital at the end of the 1950s (that is, before the massive penetration of American capital) weakens any analysis which puts the emphasis on the assumption that this bank capital becomes the 'agent' of, and thus totally subordinated to foreign (American) capital in the period thereafter (cf. Munoz, 1970; Tamames, 1966).

As a matter of fact, from the beginning of the First World War a gradual nationalization of by far the greatest part of foreign capital took place in Spain, a process which had important consequences on the power-relations within the Spanish bourgeoisie (Roldán, et.al., 1973; Santin, et.al, 1981). In short, it can be stated that the predominant agrarian character of the Spanish economy at the beginning of this century, combined with an almost non-existent industrialization, generated a class of large landowners who invested their profits particularly in bank capital. Subsequently this led to a resemblance of interests between agrarian and bank capital and, together with the post-1914 nationalization of foreign capital, to a relative independence of Spanish capitalism under the hegemony of large landowners and banking. After the Spanish civil war, the autarchic phase of Spanish capitalism (1939-1959) was extremely beneficial for the so-called 'Oligarquía Financiera' and showed the strengthening of an industrial bourgeoisie who gradually weakened the position of the large landowners within the power bloc. The economic liberalisation of 1959 and the penetration of foreign capital in the period thereafter consolidated this gradual shift within the power bloc from a coalition between large landowners and banking to a coalition between financial capital and (increasingly more foreign) industrial capital, but still

always under the hegemony of financial capital (Starke, 1976). In contrast to Poulantzas, Juan Munoz, et al., have pointed out that Spanish financial capital has strongly benefited from the cooperation with foreign capital. They stress the fact that Spanish national capital, thanks to the involvement of foreign capital and accordingly the import of modern and diversified technology was able to experience a rapid development: the introduction of new forms of industrial organization; the increase in productivity and the increasing medium size of industrial plants; the increasing urbanization and the subsequent extension of the domestic market; the introduction of other productive activities and economic sectors; all these economic improvements wouldn't have been possible without foreign technology and capital (Munoz, et al., 1978: 268/269). Without the influence of foreign investments the Spanish economy would have come to a dead end (as actually was the case before 1959) and the danger of social unrest and systemic disintegration would have been very great. The interests of the national bourgeoisie as a whole and foreign capital are therefore complementary, their contradictions being of secondary importance, and the cooperation between both is founded on such a strong base that a possible obstruction on the part of certain fractions of the national bourgeoisie can be easily eliminated.

Resuming the above, it has to be stated that Spanish bank capital isn't acting as a mere agent of American capital. Rather it enters into an interrelationship with foreign capital, based on mutual interests, as a necessity for the continuing growth of the Spanish economy. Moreover, as a result of its historically established, dominant position in the economy and its special ties with the state apparatus of the Francoist regime, Spanish bank capital controls almost completely the economy and the economic development. In the case of Portugal and Greece, the very same conclusion can be drawn. Before the massive penetration of foreign capital in the Portuguese economy in the sixties, a strong oligarchy already existed, consisting of a few families who dominated

almost completely the Portuguese private sector. For instance, the top ten families owned all the important commercial banks, through which they controlled a large part of the national economy (Baklanoff, 1978: 108). And, as in the case of Spain, this oligarchy was characterized by its very strong ties with the Portuguese state (Makler, 1976). This strong relationship and interdependence between the oligarchy and the state, together with the direct economic power of the large financial industrial family groups makes the characterization of the latter as comprador bourgeoisie very unrealistic. Especially the groups such as the 'Companhia Uniao Fabril' (controlled by the Melo family), the Pinto Basto and Quina families, Espirito Santo, etc., have to be considered as an integral part of the autonomous national bourgeoisie in Portugal (analogous to the position of the bank capital in Spain).

Although the situation in Greece is at first sight very different, the same conclusion with regard to the supposed existence of a comprador bourgeoisie can be drawn. At least two main differences exist between Spain and Portugal on the one hand and Greece on the other. In the first half of the 20th century in Greece a commercial bourgeoisie came into existence, strongly related to the massive influx of Greek diaspora merchants, while in Spain and Portugal a financial-industrial bourgeoisie became dominant. Very characteristic for this commercial bourgeoisie was its reluctance to invest capital in industrial activities at home. This, together with a general lack of capital in the Greek economy, "obliged (and still obliges) Greece to depend on foreign capital and technology to fill the gap" (Evangelinides, 1980: 127).

A second main difference is the fact that in Spain and Portugal bank capital remained in private hands and controlled directly or indirectly a great part of the industrial activities, while in Greece the financial institutions were (and are) to a large extent controlled by the state.

As to the first point, Mouzelis has made clear that neither an intra-bourgeois conflict, as suggested by Poulantzas, did exist in Greece, nor the two fractions in itself. But even when they would have existed, then there is no reason to