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PAPERS

NOTE: Several papers touch upon more than just one problem or field. Overlapping is substantial. The division into different categories listed below is only tentative and does not suggest that working groups at the conference should be organized according to the same criteria.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

1. PARTY ELITE IN GOVERNMENT: ITALY 1946-1976
Mauro Calise & Renato Mannheimer (Italy)
2. SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ACTION IN PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM
Jacinto Choza (Spain)
3. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
Carlo Guarnieri (Italy)
4. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
Nicky Kaltzogia-Tournaviti (Greece)
5. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF POWER IN CATANIA & MESSINA
Liborio Mattina (Italy)
6. SOME CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION/
COMPARATIVE NOTES ABOUT ITALY AND SPAIN
Leonardo Morlino (Italy)
7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CATALONIA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
Marina Subirats (Spain)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT continued

8. CENTRAL, STATE AND PERIPHERAL NATIONALISMS IN SPAIN
Joan F. Mira (Spain)
9. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH OF SPAIN/
ANDALUCIA 1976-80
10. THE CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE FRANCOIST REGIME AND OF THE
PACIFIC POLITICAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN:
AN INTERPRETATION
Antonio Bar Cendon (Spain)

II. THE ECONOMY

11. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES:
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
Antonio Vazquez Barquero (Spain)
12. PUBLIC POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN ITALY:
ANATOMY OF A DEPENDENT INDUSTRY
Flavia Martinelli (Italy)

III. LABOR MARKET, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, LABOR MIGRATIONS

13. SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN ITALY FROM 1970-1978
Gilberto Ghilardi (Italy)
14. UNION POWER: THE ITALIAN SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 70's
Marina Montironi (Italy)
15. MANPOWER POLICIES AND THE NEW ENTRANTS IN THE LABOUR MARKET:
A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE INVISIBLE HANDSHAKE
Alessandra Del Boca (Italy)
16. LABOR RELATIONS DURING THE SPANISH TRANSITION PERIOD (1975-1981)
Manuel Ludevid (Spain)

IV. SOCIAL CHANGE

17. EDUCATION LABOR AND STATE
Giuseppe Colasanti (Italy)
18. THE IMPACT OF THE STATE ON CHANGING SOCIAL CLASSES:
THE CASE OF THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS IN ITALY
Carlo Carboni (Italy)
19. BUREAUCRACY AND PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF THE DOCTORS IN
THE HOSPITALS
Bianca Maria Tricarico (Italy)
20. HEALTH CARE CHANGE IN CATALUNYA: THE ALTEBRAT PROGRAM
Lluís Bohigas (Spain)

V. WOMEN'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

21. A REPUBLIC "FOUNDED ON LABOR..." NOTES ON WOMEN'S
CITIZENSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY
Yasmine Ergas (Italy)
22. WOMEN, DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL. COMPARATIVE ISSUES AND
PROBLEMS BASED ON A RESEARCH PROJECT ON FEMALE DEVIANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE
Irene Fereti (Greece)

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

23. THE SPANISH PRESS BEFORE AND AFTER FRANCO'S DEATH:
THE UNEXPECTED CRISIS
Juan A. Giner (Spain)
24. THE MASS MEDIA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A GENERAL THEORY WITH SOME SPANISH EXAMPLES
José Luis Dader (Spain)
25. FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATIONS IN ANONYMOUS ARCHITECTURE AND
THROUGH ELECTRONIC 2-WAY CABLE TV SYSTEMS REGARDING SOUTHERN
EUROPE
Mit Mitropoulos (Greece)

VII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, EEC

26. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND DEFENCE-RELATED PROBLEMS OF SMALL STATES WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON GREECE
Athanasios Platias (Greece)
27. THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: PROBABLE EFFECTS ON THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES
Okan H. Aktan (Turkey)
28. THE CASE FOR MONETARY INTEGRATION OF GREECE, PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND ITALY WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
José Garcia-Solanes (Spain)
29. CONTINENTAL SHELF PLANNING IN A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE ADRIATIC AND THE IONIAN SEA
E. Raftopoulos (Greece)



THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CATALONIA
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

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I. Introduction

Towards the end of 1981, the continuity of Spain's democratic political system is being threatened. This fact is difficult to explain if we take into account the results of elections held since 1977, which have given a parliamentary majority to a centre-right party.

However it is more readily comprehensible if we concentrate our analysis on the observation of the conditions which prevailed during the process of political change and also the evolution of the social forces during this same period. Francoism has left such a deep impression on Spanish society that the processes which take place within it are very different from those which we may observe in other Western countries, and as a result, election results are by no means a reliable indicator to the political and social situation.

Indeed, the questions which, from a sociological point of view, are relevant to an analysis of Spanish social evolution are the following: firstly, how political and social modernisation may be achieved and by what agencies. The blocking of the Spanish political system by Francoism brought in its wake a series of disfunctions perceived by widely differing sectors in society, and gave rise to a high degree of mobilisation at a certain period. But at the same time, no institutional system capable of channeling the forces of modernisation was in existence. Therefore, the relationship between civil society and political institutions is the first dimension to come under consideration. In the second place there is the fact that political change implies a redistribution of power among the different social sectors, and this redistribution comes about at a time of great fragility as regards the democratic

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institutions. The extent to which social mobilisation can assure a process of redistribution of power in these conditions is the second question to be formulated.

And a third question is that regarding the appropriateness of the system of representation by political parties in this kind of process. The relationship between political parties and social movements is highly complex, and in the case of Spain it does not seem to have been resolved in a satisfactory manner. This is the third dimension which we shall take into account in this analysis.

The scope of the subject under discussion must inevitably impose certain limitations. Thus, in this paper, we shall deal with the analysis of social evolution only as it is manifested in Catalonia, and try to establish some of the causes of why in this zone there has been a change from a high level of mobilisation and the construction of a democratic national bloc to a situation of scant political participation, demobilisation and uncertainty concerning the future.

Within Spain taken as a whole, Catalonia, together with the Basque country, is one of the more interesting zones from a sociological point of view. In Catalonia there exists an extremely complex system of interrelations between the positions of the different social classes as such and their positions in relation to the Catalan national question. This double line-up of the social forces confers on Catalonia a very special position in comparison with other Spanish zones, where a differential national identity has no existence or is less deeply embedded.

The social process which has developed in Catalonia in the last ten years presents two quite distinct phases. Between 1970 and 1977 we are witness to the formation of social movements and political parties and their slow confluence in the construction of a Catalan national bloc. From 1978 onwards, at a time when the instruments which in theory should serve as a political channel for this bloc begin to take shape,

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there begins a slow disintegration accompanied by growing social atomisation: which results in political scepticism and a low level of participation. This process is based on the one hand on the confrontation between the level of Catalan mobilisation and State politics; but on the other hand its roots are to be found in the characteristics peculiar to Catalan society and in the consequences of forty years of dictatorship.

II. The social situation in Catalonia between 1970 and 1977: the construction of an autonomic national bloc.

The characteristics of Catalan society during this period are defined by the following facts:

1) In 1975, 15.7% of the population of Spain, a total of 5,662,791 inhabitants, live in Catalonia. Together with the Basque country, Catalonia has been the region of greatest industrial development, development which was especially high in the sixties. The distribution of the Catalan working population in 1975 shows industry to be predominant, accounting for 51% of the total working population, with strong development in the services sector (42.7%) and a small agricultural working population (6.3%). The economic profile of Catalonia is the one which, of all the different parts of Spain, most resembles those of the industrialised countries of Europe.

2) The economic development of the sixties in Spain brought about a surge in geographic migration, with exodus from the rural areas and a high growth rate in the industrialised urban areas. Catalonia has been the main receiver of migrants from the south, so that in 1975 only 51.9% of the population living in this part was actually born in it, whereas 38.1% came from other parts of the country. However, the latter percentage is in fact lower than the real size of the immigrant community: the differential birthrate between the communities of natives and immigrants is favourable to the latter, since the native birthrate includes children of immigrants, a substantial number of whom are not integrated into local culture. Distribution by language (1) brings us much nearer the

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real dimension of the two communities (native and immigrant): 52% of the resident population of Catalonia is Catalan-speaking; if we add to this figure another 6% who may be considered to be totally bilingual, we obtain the figure of 58% of the resident population which may be considered as belonging to the sphere of Catalan culture, whilst the remaining 42% has either an imperfect or non-existent knowledge of Catalan culture and belongs to the immigrant community which, for the main part, perpetuates the culture of its origins, since there exists geographical and social isolation between substantial parts of the immigrant community and the Catalan community.

3) The economic evolution of the sixties has produced important changes in Catalan society: urban growth, rise in consumption, increase in the demand for services, especially as regards education and health. Nevertheless, these changes have not been accompanied by political and administrative modernisation, since the capacity for reform of the Franco regime was extremely small. So a breakdown occurs between the new necessities created and the kind of solution which the political and administrative institutions can provide. As a result of this breakdown a series of disfunctions is produced: industrial and urban growth have not been properly planned, and a situation of chaos is the result. Educational, health and other services are insufficient and badly run. At the same time conflicts which have arisen between the different social groups cannot be adequately resolved within the existing institutional framework, and consequently become disproportionately serious. In other words, during this period the State is not an adequate instrument for resolving either tensions and social conflict or for the planning and rationalisation of economic and urban growth.

4) The Francoist State was characterised, from its beginnings, by a centralist nature, opposed to the diverse national cultures existing in Spain. Catalan culture and the Catalan language were subjected to re-

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pression for a good many years after a process of Castilianisation of public life directly after the Spanish civil war. As a result, for the Catalans the national question is fundamental in the struggle against the Francoist state during this period.

These characteristics already demonstrate a double social segmentation. Let us now take a look at the positions and political interests of the different social classes.

The industrial working class is made up basically of immigrants, who inhabit the industrial belts of Barcelona and other large cities. It is this social group which demonstrates the highest degree of mobilisation, both within the factories themselves and in relation to housing and the organisation of collective services, which are very deficient in the working-class districts.

Inside the companies, organisation is realised by Comisiones Obreras (Workers' Committees); in city districts, through community groups, whose numbers and influence grow enormously throughout this period, in spite of difficulties of legalisation.

During this period, the social demand movements lead gradually to political positions of the struggle against Francoism. The need is raised for an alternative not only to Francoism but to the organisation of the State. Initially the working class movement does not adopt Catalan cultural and autonomist claims. But the reference to socialism is extraordinarily vague, since it does not take shape as a real alternative under the conditions of Francoism, and there is consequently the need for intermediate alternatives. Thus adoption takes place of the only alternative model which is taking shape in this period: that of Catalan autonomy. If for the working class the national question is not seen as an end in its own right, nevertheless it presents a series of political advantages: on the one hand, it is the most concrete and com-

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plete form which has been outlined as an alternative to the Francoist State, which has discredited the centralist option(3); and, on the other hand, the demand for autonomy goes hand in hand with a redistribution of political power, so that it supposes easier access to the decision-making centres and greater capacity on the part of the population to exert greater influence on administrative decisions.

This two-fold characteristic leads, in the period under analysis, to the most organised sectors of the working class movement adopting as their own the objective of autonomy for Catalonia, and consequently considering that this must be the political framework of post-Francoism.

The urban middle-classes are made up fundamentally of native-born Catalans, though we also find in them groups of immigrants. Catalans occupy the major part of middle and senior posts in industry and the services sector, but on the other hand immigration accounts for a substantial number of public servants: the army, the police, sectors of the civil service and an ample sector of the teaching profession. This is due to a differential trait which is very old in Catalan society: The greater number of work opportunities in industry, industrial tradition, and the absence of the centres of state bureaucracy have brought about a lack of interest in and knowledge of everything related to administration. For centuries the State has been regarded as an instrument of national oppression, and not as an instrument of collective organisation. Consequently, in Catalonia there exists great experience as regards organisation of civil society, but also great disregard for state mechanisms. Hence to a great extent public administration has been left in the hands of immigrants.

Politically, the middle classes and professional people both

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face the need for a rationalisation of social life and also the impossibility of using the instruments of administration to achieve this rationalisation. A remodelling of social life cannot be expected at all from the Franco regime, a regime which, in the eyes of the generations born after the civil war, and with a standard of living and customs which are very similar to those of the middle classes of the rest of Europe, is not only reactionary, but totally obsolete. But neither can any political force be expected to act from the centre of the country, since Catalonia requires specific solutions. Consequently the possibility of modernisation and social change, that is to say, of bringing the political and administrative structure into line with the economic and social structure of Catalonia must of necessity happen through a form of autonomy which would allow for the institutions to be used from Catalonia, and to find solutions to its specific problems.

Therefore it is in the middle classes where the plan for autonomy takes shape as an alternative organisational model to Francoism, and at the same time as a way of recovering national identity; though cultural and symbolic elements occupy an important place within the plan for autonomy they do not exhaust the field of social demands. At the same time, given that the main mobilisation takes place among the working class, the plan for autonomy which is outlined is not of an exclusively nationalist character, but embraces the need for modernisation and the rationalisation of the institutions as well as the need for democratisation.

As for the Catalan bourgeoisie, it has a very limited political presence in this state. Through the era of Francoism this class has been transformed: it has lost its previous local roots when it shifted to the Barcelona area and when it became increas-

ingly linked, from the beginning of the sixties, with multinational companies. At the same time, Francoism has not favoured its organisation as a social class, and as a result, at the time of political transition it does not present itself as a coherent group with a model for the modernisation of society. It is a divided class: some sectors are in favour of political change which is to permit a readjustment of the different institutions; other sectors are more reluctant to accept a democratic system, since they had become accustomed to a situation where controls were few and far between and the opportunities for speculation very good. Thus it is this group which, between 1970 and 1977, works out to a lesser degree its political platforms and which later will be confronted with greater difficulties in the forming of its own parties and in achieving a specific presence on the political scene.

The situations described previously bring about, and ever more so as this stage advances, a spreading of the social movements, the creation of different organisational platforms, the transformation of sectorial demands into political alternatives and the formulation of a series of definite plans with regard to the workings of the institutions as well as social and cultural life. There is a common element in the plans of this kind: the desire to unite the democratisation, the Catalanisation and the modernisation of the institutions. The kind of plan elaborated points to a package of reforms which in general are modelled on the workings of the institutions in the countries of Europe; in other words, a set of changes which in Spain have not been realised under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie due to the very weakness of this social class, and which at this point are considered to be pressing, to be carried out by a social bloc of centre-left.

Throughout these years, the different social movements tend

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to converge into a single body, the Assembla de Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia), founded clandestinely in 1971, which brings together members of political parties, representatives of social movements and prominent intellectuals. This assembly becomes the leading body in the fight against Francoism in Catalonia as well as that of the unification of the different social forces. Indeed, discrepancies can already be seen within the national bloc from 1974-75 onwards, and there are cohesion difficulties. The visible oncoming of the end of Francoism contributes to the creation of openings for organised political action, so that parties pass on to a situation of semi- secrecy , and can take action in their own right, without having to use necessarily social movements and their organisations as cover. Therefore, whilst on the one hand there is a spreading of the unitary movement and the joining of forces in a national bloc, on the other hand a system of political parties emerges, parties which have specific options and which are searching for a future position, whilst trying to maximize their advantages when that position arrives, i.e. when the time comes for the issue to be raised of the first general elections. This competition between the parties brings about internal confrontations even during the phase of the construction of the national bloc, confrontations which tend to weaken it but which are nevertheless seen as minor obstacles within the plan for national reconstruction.

III. The coming of democracy and the process of social demobilisation.

Let us briefly go back over the succession of elections which have marked political transition between 1977 and 1981 :

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- 1977 : First general elections (see results in annex).
1978 : Referendum on the Constitution.
1979 : Second general elections
First local elections
Passing of the Statute of Autonomy in the Basque country
and in Catalonia.
1980 : First elections to the Catalan Parliament.

Indeed, the results of the first general elections confirms the existence of a Catalan national bloc, which is represented by various left-wing and centre parties, all having autonomy as an objective. Socialists and Communists account for 36.6% of the total of votes cast. The number of votes obtained by the nationalist parties - among which the two previously mentioned parties are to included - amounts to 77.9% of the total number of votes. The large majority obtained by senator Benet (4), who was presented by Socialists and Communists jointly and who was characterised by his nationalist stand, shows the cohesion which existed at that time between the left and the nationalists. The massive demonstration on the 11th. September, a national date in Catalonia, in which more than a million people took part, is the last sign of this mobilisation which has as its objective the obtaining of the Statute of Autonomy. There is an echo of this mobilisation however in the first government of the provisional Generalitat (Catalan government), a government of unity in which all the major parties are represented.

But, from 1978 onwards and up to the present the following phenomena occur:

- 1) A sharp drop in the participation of the population in political activity, which can be observed in election processes as well as in party militancy.

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The evolution of participation in election processes is the following:

Participation in Catalonia	
1977 General elections	79.3%
1979 General elections	68.5%
1979 Local elections	61.3%
1979 Statute Autonomy Referendum	60.4%
1960 Elections Catalan Parliament	62.1%

The figures speak for themselves, even excluding the local elections and comparing solely the percentages of participation in the elections for the Spanish and Catalan parliaments, in three years there has been a drop of 17% in the number of voters. The Referendum for the Statute of Autonomy has registered the lowest number of votes, a surprising fact if we consider the great number of demonstrations which have taken place over many years and the long struggle, under Francoism, on account of the national question. The change in the attitude of the population is therefore perfectly plain.

As for the political parties, the drop in the number of militants and active sympathisers is a fact without exceptions. The only figures we have are those relating to militancy in the PSUC, one of the most prominent parties in this process: in 1976, when it was still clandestine, this party had a total number of 10,000 militants. The following year a number of 40,000 was mentioned, even when the most likely number was in the region of 32,000. Towards the end of 1979 the real number was calculated at 19,000 militants (5). Figures for later dates are not available, but probably a good many militants have left during these last few years, the loss being especially noticeable among the younger sectors.

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We have only one piece of information as regards other parties : the Catalan socialist party (PSC) gives the figure in 1980 of some 5,000 militants, and Convergencia Democràtica de Catalunya gives one of 20,000 militants for 1981 (5). There is a lack of information for previous years so that a comparison may be made; information which in any case is difficult to obtain since the parties were legalized only in 1977 and it is only from this time onwards that systematic calculations take place, and even so take some time to become normalised. In any case, all of the parties lose militants, and above all active militants. A similar process can be observed as regards affiliation to and participation in the trade union movement (~~sector~~).

2) We also witness a weakening or the disappearance of a great many of the institutions or stable platforms through which the social movements acted, in addition to the unitary organisms of the previous regime.

The community movement does not altogether disappear but undergoes a transformation and loses presence on the political scene. The evolution is as follows : The most active community groups under the previous regime, which had become incorporated to the greatest extent in a political plan suffer a process of breaking up; parallelly new community groups emerge in districts where previously there had been none, in zones far from Barcelona. But these new community groups are orientated towards specific demands or towards the organisation of collective activities of a local nature.

Mobilisation also diminishes in intellectual and professional sectors. These sectors, which had been extremely active under the previous regime, evolve in the direction of affiliation to political parties when the latter were legalised, in a search for the most effective means of intervening in the restructuring of

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institutions. Later on two trends develop: while some intellectuals and professional people go on to take up political posts in Parliament or in local government, a great many of them revert to their professional spheres and to private life, even to the extent of many of them leaving their professional associations or other similar institutions which they had used as a platform for their political activities under the previous regime.

The most recent social movements too, such as the feminist or the ecologist movements, undergo a loss of social influence. In the same way the Asambleia de Catalunya also disappears, and with the elections to the Catalan Parliament in 1980, so does the government of unity. In local government there is the setting up of a Pact for Progress, starting with local government elections in 1979, between Socialists and Communists, with occasional participation from Convergència Democràtica. This pact is seen as an opportunity to promote a policy of national reconstruction, but in practice it comes up against many difficulties in its execution.

3) Political parties experience grave internal crises. The parties on the extreme left or those of radical Catalanism - separatism - are left after the elections with no influence in society, and go into a phase of internal clashes and splits so that they are left completely outside the mainstream of events. Those parties which are represented in Parliament come to play a chief role in public life; but even so they undergo serious crises, especially from 1979 onwards, between various internal sectors which badly lack cohesion or are of diverging tendencies. The extreme right has a negligible presence in Catalonia, in contrast to the situation in Madrid, and has therefore been left out of this analysis.

4) Conflicts appear between the two linguistic communities.

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Already in 1976 there had appeared a strong mobilisation round what became known as the "normalisation of Catalan". This mobilisation indeed did give rise to some steps forward both in the use in public life of the language as well as introducing it into education. We have already seen how, during that period, there was a consensus as regards the need for autonomy, and consequently with regard to the use of the Catalan language: Catalan was even considered by immigrants to be a language whose use offered better work opportunities and opportunities for social advancement.

Beginning in 1978 generalised conflicts appear, brought about because of the linguistic question, or using it as a pretext. On the other hand there is a tendency for social pressure in order to extend the process of Catalanisation to decrease. There are some signs of a rejection of Catalan on the part of the immigrant population; a rejection which reaches its high point in 1961 with the publication of a manifesto signed by a numerous group of professional people and intellectuals who are Spanish-speaking and who maintain that the Spanish language is subjected to discrimination in Catalonia. This manifesto gives rise to a polarisation of positions, bitter argument and growing tension in sectors of both communities.

5) Finally the evolution of a series of collective attitudes should be brought to notice : a loss of confidence in the democratic institutions, the spreading of feelings of fear and insecurity, the loss of interest in the current political scene - verifiable by means of the drop in the sales of newspapers and magazines, which in some cases has led to closure - and what has come to be known as widespread "disenchantment" (7). Within the sphere of collective psychology, positions and symbols which

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work in favour of political participation, in favour of a break with conservative norms and in favour of giving importance to the equality of rights and opportunities between the different social groups - values which were of great importance under the previous régime - are gradually abandoned. In their place critical or sceptical positions gain ground as regards the possibility of re-organising society, together with an increase in authoritarian positions and a change of direction towards private interests. All of this brings about a loss of solidarity and social bonds, and as a result greater social atomisation, of which there is an awareness and which is taken not as a gain of the new situation but rather as a drawback or even a failure. This does not mean that there are no longer any initiatives whose aim is to restructure the institutions; what does happen is that these initiatives come through professional or administrative channels, which are far removed from the user social sectors, and quite often in open conflict with them.

All these events - to which others of lesser importance could be added - confirm the ebbing of social mobilisation, and once more highlight the fragility of a national bloc which seemed to be fairly cohesive in 1977. The break-up of this bloc seems to begin before the set of changes which made up its objective have been seen through, and at precisely that moment when Catalonia is beginning to have its own institutions, which in theory should facilitate the remodelling of society as a whole.

At this point, the issue which is raised, from the point of view of sociology, is that of the identification of the causes of the process which has been followed. What are the elements of the political and social process which has brought about demobilisation? Why, at a time when political involvement is easier and is

more likely to be effective, is there apathy?

IV. The causes of demobilisation: some hypotheses.

It must be pointed out, however, that when starting on an analysis of the causes of the demobilisation process we are still moving in the area of hypothesis. The change in social attitudes has been so rapid and so different from what could be predicted that it has produced a certain amount of bewilderment among social analysts. At the same time there are few studies available regarding this process: if it is true that there are detailed studies available on the election results or other definite aspects of Catalan evolution, up until now there has been no overall diagnosis made of the different factors which have had an influence in society during the last four years. Consequently, here we shall mention the most obvious causes, but without the possibility of considering them in depth nor of determining the specific weight each of them has had in the process as a whole.

Of these elements which have influenced Catalan social evolution, some have originated outside Catalonia, as a result of the economic situation and the relationship of Catalonia with the rest of the State. Others, however, are a result of the structure of Catalan society itself and of the characteristics which it has taken on throughout the years of Francoism.

As regards the outside elements, the following are foremost:
1) The difference in political approaches which is established between the Spanish State and Catalonia beginning in 1977. Whereas in Catalonia the first elections give a majority to the parties of the left, in the State as a whole a centre party, UCD, is triumphant; a party made up principally of political personnel coming from Francoism, and therefore with a clear tendency towards political continuity in spite of their initial reformist position. As time goes on, this tendency becomes more and more evident, so

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that the reformist intentions are slowly abandoned.

The way in which the political transition has come about explains to a great extent the difficulties of imposing a real change, difficulties which are experienced by the majority party itself. Indeed, political change has been brought about in a completely superstructural way, with no profound modifications in the workings of the institutions with the exceptions of the political and trade union systems. In the administrative system, the law system, the army, the police, education and so on there is no change in personnel and the same routines exist together with corporative interests created in the era of Francoism. This quickly opens a breach between the directives laid down by the Constitution and the manner in which they are applied in practice. Thus, if the Constitution can be considered as a representative point of the balance between the different political forces it does not reflect the relationship of social forces, since the conservative sectors still have a great many power centres through which they limit the range of the reforms planned. Hence, beginning already in 1980, we are witnesses to a constant readjustment of UCD policy, a policy which is forced more and more to the right and which leads, in 1981 to an extremely serious internal crisis.

In this situation, the Catalan majority social forces, who were initially in favour of a political rupture, now find it impossible to carry out reforms, since they come in to head-on collision with the workings of the State institutions, which maintain their previous patterns. The plans for the reorganisation and rationalisation of the institutions, which under the previous regime acted as a catalyst for the cohesion of the social movements, now prove to be inapplicable and utopian. Attempts to apply them have come up against the real limits of power; for example, the

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changes which have been introduced in the workings of the universities have been for the most part frustrated, since they come up against a Ministry of Education which still kept its decision-making powers and applied the same mechanisms of selection and organisation which were in force under Franco (3).

In these conditions, the existence of reformist intentions from a state of autonomy has been converted into an element of a breaking up and wearing down of the social movements. The gradual abandoning of the alternatives of institutional organisation acts as an element of disintegration, since while some groups accept the game which has been established - giving up their opposition, as they did in the previous regime, since it is now legitimised by a democratic system - other groups cling tightly to a plan for change which becomes increasingly utopian, thus placing themselves in a situation completely outside and in conflict with the former. The scheme is quite simple: the social movements having hurled themselves time and again against an immovable administration, which acts as a wall, what eventually happens is that there are internal splits in the movements, and a fragmenting which scatters members in multiple directions, something which leads to atomisation rather than to the remaking of new groups.

2) A second element of great importance has been the influence of the economic crisis and its worsening during the last two years. This has been a decisive element in the whole of Spain, and is one of the major obstacles to the consolidation of democracy. Indeed, the establishment of democracy has coincided with the closing down of factories, the loss of jobs, a drop in investments, a decline in the level of consumption and a high rate of inflation. This inevitably increases social tension making practically impossible the policy of facts which the situation would require. At the

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same time, some social sectors establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the economic crisis and the political change, a fact which has weakened support for the democratic principles.

In the Catalan sphere too the influence of the economic crisis acts as a demobilising element. We have already pointed out that those objectives which kept the working-class sectors within the national bloc were not of a cultural nature, but were linked to the possibilities which autonomy would provide as regards decentralisation, establishing closer links between the institutions and the public, and an improvement in the quality of life. But, the autonomic institutions begin their work in a period of economic poverty, with very few possibilities of public investment. Therefore there are no immediately observable material improvements in the quality of life, at first quite the contrary, unemployment accelerates the worsening in many social sectors. This brings in its wake the "disenchantment" of the workers as regards the autonomic institutions and the loss of involvement in the community groups. A somewhat similar process takes place regarding the trade unions: formation coincides with a period of crisis which reduces their field of action and pressure, in such a way that the pacts and negotiations are interpreted quite often by the workers as a backing down since they experience no improvement with the existence of a trade union system but rather find themselves in a more precarious situation than in the past on account of the economic situation.

3) The third element of disintegration is the use made, by diverse social sectors, of the linguistic differences existing between the native and immigrant communities as a means of fostering internal conflict. This element must be considered still as a cause external to the Catalan political process, since it has

its roots in the role which the middle classes in the non-industrial zones have played in Spanish society. We have already pointed out the greater tendency for these groups to occupy public posts in comparison with the Catalan middle classes. The scant industrialisation of the centre and the south of Spain has been a historical determinant in the access, as a means of upward mobility, for these groups, to the administrative and State bodies, by means of which they occupy posts all over the country: the Franco administration left the continuity of this mechanism perfectly assured, a mechanism which uses centralism as an instrument of promotion and access to power for certain social groups. Taking the Spanish State as a whole, this is one of the major obstacles to the forming of a State of autonomies.

Indeed, the organisation of a State of autonomies as designed by the Constitution and the Catalan and Basque Statutes implies a gradual limiting of the scope of the central administrative bodies, and favours the access of members of the autonomic zones to public bodies. This immediately generates, in the sectors of the middle classes which traditionally supply members of public officialdom, the fear of seeing their work opportunities in the administration weakened, and thus the loss of power which these posts endowed them with.

There exists therefore an objective situation of conflict, brought on by the fact that autonomy means a redistribution of power among the different groups of the Spanish State. A particularly acute example of this conflictiveness is shown in Catalonia in the education sector: during Francoism a high percentage of schoolteachers residing in Catalonia came from Spanish-speaking areas. Even during the 1978-79 school year, 55% of primary schoolteachers in this zone are still Spanish-speaking. Now, given that

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one of the most important linguistic demands is that Catalan should be taught in schools together with Spanish, autonomy means that those teachers working in Catalonia should have a knowledge of Catalan and be trained to teach it. This demand is seen as a threat on the part of non-Catalan teachers, who begin a series of actions opposed to Catalanisation, looking for support in the working-class sector, which is numerically stronger. The question is a priority one in the field of language and culture, but the linguistic conflict is, in fact, no more than one of the many areas of confrontation between those groups who by tradition have all but monopolized power by means of the administration, and groups who attempt to gain access to it once the opportunities have been provided by autonomy. The transfer of this conflict to the working-class sphere - which for the moment it no more than sporadic, though it may grow in importance in the future - responds to the efforts of the non-Catalan middle classes to prevent the consolidation of an ample national bloc with a strong immigrant component.

It is worth considering, by way of hypothesis, that the accumulative effects of the three elements already described may go some way to explaining the phenomena previously mentioned of loss of mobilisation and political and social involvement. However, they do not exhaust the explanations of the causes, since there are elements internal to Catalan society itself which seem to have made a play in the same direction.

1) The element which, from within Catalan social structure, we may consider as the most important in the process which we are describing is the non-existence of a hegemonic social sector, capable of ordering the process of change as a whole and of pulling together the different social sectors round this plan. This char-

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acteristic is already present in the Catalan national bloc which is outlined in 1977, and which shows a certain balance of forces: while the working class and popular sectors are numerically more important, ideologically it is the sectors of the middle class and the intellectuals who carry the greater weight, being the groups entrusted with the nationalist plan after the Second Republic (9). The later organisation into political parties continues to reflect this balance of forces. Three parties represent, fundamentally, the social groups which are concerned with social change: CDC, PSC, and PSUC, the first two being roughly equal in electoral weight, and the third with less weight but still important. Thus, for example, the CDC will be the winning party in the Catalan Parliament, and the PSC in the local elections, a fact which demonstrates the lack of a clear leadership and of clearly favoured political options.

The lack of political leadership must be considered, in this case, as indicative of the lack of social hegemony, of which there is a need in the transition period. Even using as a basis the fact that there is no hegemonic group within Catalan society in this period, and that national reconstruction is only possible by means of a bloc in which widely differing sectors participate, the continuity of this bloc would require, at the moment of developing a policy of construction of institutions, the presence of a hegemonic group to take the lead in the process and to maintain cohesion.

Now, for a number of reasons, this group does not appear: the working-class and the popular sectors were the most highly mobilised during the Franco regime, but in the Spanish political situation as a whole they cannot take the lead in this process; they rather undergo a process of being gradually left to one side.

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The middle classes are made up of a conglomerate of diverse components: professional people and intellectuals may act as formalising elements of the processes, but they do not carry sufficient weight in the social web as a whole to be able to exercise hegemonic functions; the bourgeoisie does not act as an organised class, nor does it develop a definite plan. Thus, the bloc of forces which was in action until 1977 has an interclassist character and lacks any defined political leadership, a fact which has negative repercussions when the time comes to go on to specify a new model for the workings of the institutions.

2) In the second place, and related to the above, the effects must be considered of the superimposition of a party system on top of this bloc of social forces. Indeed, the party system which is created in Catalonia does not come from its appropriateness to perfectly distinct social forces, but rather follows divisions which have been inherited from political tradition, and which are difficult to adapt to the problems of this area. At the same time, a lack of any real knowledge on the part of a population which has lived for the most part under Francoism - that is without legal political parties - of what each party represents, has meant that the systems of affiliation and voting have not followed established patterns, and are often influenced by elements of an anecdotic nature.

In these conditions, difficult enough in themselves, the political parties had to respond to a series of extraordinarily complex problems, some of which could not even be openly formulated: 1) they had to give form to class interest and the national question, an operation which, in spite of its objective difficulties, was quite successful in Catalonia; 2) they had to give form to and channel the different social movements, without sub-

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stituting or dividing them, and this by making full use of mobilisation which was the only real political base for democratic change.; 3) each one of them had to find its own space and as established a position as possible, as an imperative of internal logic, which would permit a maximising of the share of presence and power. These last two tasks present themselves as being contradictory in practice, and give rise to constant struggles. In almost all cases the objective of self-consolidation prevails over unitarian consolidation of the social movements: thus, for example the parties have brought about trade union plurality, and with it the dividing of the working-class movement, which was to a good extent unified during the previous regime.

The introduction of the system of political parties has therefore meant that the search for ideologically differentiated political space has prevailed over the need to maintain the unity of the social movements, movements which in a certain way have been sacrificed to institutional politics. Now, at a time when the institutions are weak, when the only real force which can bring in change is social mobilisation, the decrease in and fragmenting of this mobilisation affects the capacity of action of the institutions themselves, which are presented as the only legitimate agents of social change but which, in fact, cannot count on sufficient support to carry it through.

3) The lack of a hegemonic group to act as a cohesive element of the national bloc and the competitive situation created by the organisation into parties in their turn bring about social atomisation and the replacement of collective aims by those of an individual nature. In the period of Francoism opportunities of individual promotion by means of the administrative and political systems were restricted in Catalonia to a very small group, iden-

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tified with the dictatorship. In the making of the national bloc prominent individuals are rare, in view of the political regression and the kind of ideology characteristic of that phase. At the moment of the appearance of expectations of power however, there is an effect of vying for important positions in society between individuals. This effect, which is perfectly predictable in situations of these characteristics, might have been diminished if sufficient mechanisms of social control had existed or likewise of confrontation between public action and collective plans. With the decrease in mobilisation, and with it the capacity of control, democratisation becomes an opportunity for certain individuals to experience upward mobility, above all in terms of an increase in individual power and influence. And this effect in its turn has new demobilising consequences, since the idea becomes widespread among the population that political change has not meant a real change for the sum total of the people, but has had no other visible consequence than to change the people in power.

V. Conclusions.

The situation which has been described thus far does not in itself explain the tendency to political regression. This is brought about by problems which for the major part are foreign to Catalan society: the weakness of the democratic institutions, the lack of a cohesive ruling class in Spanish society as a whole, the specific interests of certain social groups with links with the previous regime, and so on. Now, if the Catalan situation in itself does not lead to regression, then neither does it seem to offer any consistent elements to combat it at present: the weakening of mobilisation and the collective attitudes of "disenchantment" may lead to passiveness in the face of regressive processes,

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and in any case make no contribution towards stopping them.

Indeed, the risk of general political regression is today the greatest threat to the policy of Catalan national reconstruction: it is possible that, if this risk fails to materialise, then Catalan society may manage to survive the crises which have appeared during the period of political transition, and so regroup a substantial part of its forces to carry through a collective plan. If such is the case, then demobilisation will have been no more than a crisis brought on by the collision with the reality of political difficulties, far more complex than the plans elaborated in clandestinity.

However, whatever the future development of this society, the process which has been followed up to now has contributed some general points for consideration with regard to the theoretical subjects mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Thus, from the analysis of the case of Catalonia we can verify:

- 1) The difficulty of bringing about a change in and the modernisation of society in a situation in which the forces of modernisation do not have control over the institutions, or have access solely to recently created institutions which are not fully established. The complexity of present day societies is such that it means that modernisation and change can no longer be realised solely by means of social pressure, but they need a series of channels of institutional intervention, without which action directed towards modernisation becomes completely cut off from reality.
- 2) The redistribution of power among groups with different territorial bases comes up against the same kind of problem: mobilisation for nationalist aims is not a sufficiently powerful mechanism to guarantee this redistribution. Only as long as this redistribution is strongly backed up by the State and is made specific

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by means of changes in personnel in the institutions, is it possible to carry it through. But this brings on a vicious circle which seems impossible to break out of as regards the process which has been followed in Spain, a process based on the idea of gradual reform; hence the appearance of attitudes of violence - as has been the case in the Basque country, or the possibility in the future of a worsening of conflicts based on the national question.

3) Political organisation by means of parties in the classical mould is a response to situations in which democracy is fully established, and in which social options are defined to a certain degree of accuracy. However, its characteristics do not seem to be perfectly suited to the kind of transition which has been the case in Spain. Indeed, this form of organisation forces competition between social sectors which are very close, highlighting in civil society differences which are secondary with regard to the kind of objective aimed for in the transition, and which come less from social logic than from the logic of political machines. With the non-existence of a dominant social sector, the highlighting of these differences leads to the fragmenting of the forces of modernisation, to demobilisation, and, in short, to a social atomisation which is the complete opposite of *what* the process of transition itself requires.

NOTES

- (1) Catalan is a Romance language quite distinct from Spanish, and is also spoken in the Balearic Islands and part of the Valencia country. Spanish is often designated "Castilian" in Catalonia.
- (2) At this time, Comisiones Obreras is a unitarian and clandestine organisation, which first appeared in the sixties. Later on, beginning in 1977, trade union plurality takes place and Comisiones develops as a Communist-influenced trade union, with the largest following throughout the country, but very close behind it comes the Socialist-influenced UGT.
- (3) It must not be forgotten that the majority of the proletariat in Catalonia comes from Andalusia, and therefore is not identified with a centralist State, which is supported by the Andalusian upper classes, but not by the workers. Catalan Autonomy not only offered an alternative model for Catalonia but also constituted a general political model, that of the State of Autonomies, which also improves the Andalusian situation. This was another channel by which the working class became identified with the plan for autonomy.
- (4) Senator Benet is an intellectual well-known for his nationalist and anti-Francoist stands. He belongs to no political party and had not even previously been within the sphere of influence of the Socialists or Communists. His nearness to these parties during this period is a direct result of confluence in an autonomic and centre-left political plan.
- (5) Quoted by J. Borja, PSUC, un partido entre dos identidades (The PSUC, a two-identity party), in Argumentos, Year IV, Nº 44, 1961.
- (6) Quoted by J. Borja, *op. cit.*
- (7) The screening of a film entitled "The disenchantment" led to the generalised use of this term to describe the kinds of att-

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itudes which appeared in Spanish society from 1977 onwards.

(8) In some administrative spheres reforms have been possible, with the transference of powers to the Generalitat. The results have been relatively important, such as for example the introduction of Catalan into schools. However, the Generalitat itself often clashes with the power of the central bodies : some of the measures taken by the Generalitat have already been taken before the Constitutional Tribunal. Even in such banal matters as the fixing of holidays there has been interference from the central government.

(9) However, this is a much-discussed subject, since throughout the period of Francoism the PSUC and other Socialist-orientated groups maintained positions favourable to the Catalan national question, contrary to what has happened in the Basque country, where there has been a clear-cut difference between the left-wing parties which are representative throughout Spain and the nationalist parties.

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ELECTION RESULTS IN CATALUNYA

Total population: 5,990,170

Date	15.6.77	1.3.79	3.4.79	20.3.80
Election type	General	General	Local	Catalan Parliament
Census	3,912,155	4,393,489	4,393,499	4,392,298
Total vote	3,101,132 79.3	3,008,198 68.5	2,679,936 61.0	2,726,706 62.1
PSUC	564,574 18.2%	513,575 17.1%	540,429 26.2%	509,498 18.7%
PSC	880,339 38.4	877,226 29.2	713,992 26.6	609,791 22.3
CDC	522,060 16.8	484,154 16.1	499,520 18.6	754,788 27.7
ERC	141,959 4.5	123,496 4.1	108,337 4.0	242,293 8.9
UCD	521,419 16.8	571,681 19.0	359,185 13.4	287,616 10.6
CD	108,677 3.5	107,812 3.6	35,422 1.3	64,170 2.3
PSA	-----	-----	-----	72,101 2.6
Progressive groups	-----	-----	123,787 4.6	-----
Continuist groups	-----	-----	116,226 4.3	-----
Undefined groups	-----	-----	66,744 2.5	-----

Source: J. Borja et al., cit.

Political tendencies of the different parties:

PSUC (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia): Communist, linked to the Spanish Communist Party.

PSC (Catalan Socialist Party): Socialist, linked to the PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Party.

CDC (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia): Nationalist, with centre positions.

ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia): Nationalist, with centre positions but with greater verbal radicalism than CDC. This was the majority party in Catalonia in 1931.

UCD (Union of the Democratic Centre): Centre-right, with an ambiguous position as regards the Catalan national question. This has been Spain's majority party since 1977.

CD (Democratic Coalition): Right-wing, occupying fourth place in Spain as a whole. In favour of centralism.

PSA (Andalusian Socialist Party): Populist. Presents candidates at the Catalan Parliament Elections in an attempt to win the immigrant vote.

"AN INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
THE CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE FRANCOIST REGIME AND OF THE PACIFIC
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN" (*)

BY

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10

CONTENTS:

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE FACTORS OF THE POLITICAL CHANGE	2
1. The economic change and crisis	3
2. The social change	7
3. The loss of legitimacy and social support	10
4. The political disintegration of the regime	15
5. The political opposition	19
III. CONCLUSIONS	25
NOTES	28

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ANTONIO BAR

"AN INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
THE CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE FRANCOIST REGIME AND OF THE PACIFIC
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN"

I. INTRODUCTION.

The re-establishment of democracy in Spain after almost forty years of dictatorship has caused great surprise for many of those authors specialised in the subject, due to the pacific nature of the transitional process and to the characteristics of the outcome of that same process, all of which seemed virtually impossible only a few months prior to the dictator's death, on November 20, 1975.

However, aside from the often unforeseeable twists and turns that history can make, it can be said that a profound knowledge of Spanish reality over the last twenty years and of the international context in which the country is to be found, would have made the surprise almost minimal since all the necessary pre-conditions which tended to ensure not only a pacific change following Franco's death, but also that very establishment of a democratic regime, were already existent. Later events merely served to accelerate and accentuate a process that had been latent. Of course, the outcome of this process of political change could have taken on very different forms, but, from my point of view, there is no doubt that, from the seventies' on, at least, the francoist regime was heading towards its dissolution, peppered with internal tensions and contradictions, and the outcome of its disappearance could alone be that of the establishment of a democratic system, whatever its tendency, in Spain. And this would occur without there being any need for political convulsions of a violent nature.

This paper tries, precisely, to outline the principal factors which -as I see them- caused the francoist regime to disappear and which made it possible for the transition over to democracy to be carried out peacefully, without any act of a revolutionary nature being called for. However, in this paper I am not attempting to offer a purely descriptive historical work which would relate in great detail the events that took place during the period of political change, but rather I am trying solely to make an

interpretative analysis of all those more important factors which jointly played a part in that transition, taking for granted that there is at least a basic knowledge of the events taking place in Spain during the said period.

II. THE FACTORS OF THE POLITICAL CHANGE.

The political change that occurs in Spain from 1976 on is the result of the confluence of a whole series of factors or combined circumstances inseparable from one another, and of both an internal and an external nature¹. The limits of and my intention in this paper prevent me from dealing with the latter, which, undoubtedly, were of great importance when the moment for the transition to democracy arose in Spain, a country that reached its peak of international political isolation under the francoist regime, which, contradictorily, always held formal ideals of an imperial nature, constantly harking back to past greatness and its highly significant role in this context². This isolation and rejection on the part of certain international bodies and foreign governments of any attempt to prolong the dictatorship beyond the death of its founder and principal pillar of support, were, thus, from an international point of view, important factors when the moment for political change in Spain arose.

From an internal perspective, the fall of the francoist regime and the establishment of democracy were caused principally by three kinds of factors: 1) those of an economic nature, which was the rapid process of industrialisation and economic development that the country underwent from the sixties' onwards, and the economic crisis that the Spanish economy entered from 1974 on; 2) those of a social nature, which was the radical change undergone by the social structure of Spain also from the sixties' on; 3) those of a political nature, which were the progressive lack of legitimisation of the francoist regime and its own internal desintegration, the product of the struggle for hegemony between the political and social sectors that supported it, and which became much more apparent after General Franco's death.

In this sense, it is, thus, perfectly clear that the phenomenon of the political transition to democracy that takes place in Spain and which puts

an end to a long dictatorship, has in fact its origins and its causes in that period preceding it; so that, when on November 20, 1975, General Franco died, the minimum bases necessary to suppress the francoist regime and to establish a democratic system were already laid down. In other words, it can be said that the process of political change merely adapted the political structure and the State's way of functioning to the demands and requirements of an infrastructure and social conditions that had been gradually taking shape, but which, in 1975, clashed frontally with the francoist regime's State, which had permitted their development. And this is, along with the regime's progressive internal disintegration, which irretrievably occurs even more rapidly following the dictator's death, quite clearly the main reason for why this political transition came about in that relatively gentle and pacific manner that has surprised so many: the necessary pre-conditions were already present and the francoist regime lacked the strength and sufficient internal cohesion either to overcome them or to adapt itself to them.

Let us, though, first offer a basic analysis of each of these factors.

1. The economic change and crisis.

Spain, a traditionally and basically agricultural country, except for some isolated areas on the periphery, such as the northern provinces of Asturias and Biscay, or Barcelone in the East, and Madrid in the center, began to experience, from the fifties and sixties on, a rapid process of industrialization and of economic growth which turned her, in a very short time, into the ninth industrial power in the world.

Although I shall not attempt a detailed analysis of this process of economic development -which goes beyond the aims of this paper- I do feel that it is necessary to at least make reference to some of the more important aspects of it³. The process commences towards the end of the fifties', when the Government decides to adopt a series of economic measures designed to overcome the previous autarkical period and to adapt the Spanish economy to the international economic system. These were correctional measures which, basically, attempted to make the Spanish economy function in a more liberal fashion, thereby getting away from that State protectionism and interventionism of the post-war period. Thus, the

"Decreto-Ley de Nueva Ordenación Económica", of July 1959, better known as the Stabilization Plan, meant the adoption of a series of measures that tended to control demand and to redirect investment towards private savings rather than State; in short, it was a question of limiting both State and private expenditure, and in order to achieve this there were new measures in both the taxation and monetary fields (an increase in taxation, credit restrictions, etc.)⁴. The adoption of the Stabilization Plan also meant recognition for Spain and her entry into international economic organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, etc. However, this Plan was followed by other later measures, such as the Development Plans of 1964-67, 1968-71 and 1972-75, which led to the more rapid evolution and establishment of the process of economic development.

The rapidity with which Spain's economy grew is reflected in the growth of her GDP, which reached an annual accumulated rate of 7.4 % between 1960 and 1973, fluctuating between 11.3 % in 1961 and 4.5 in 1964. But it also became apparent in the sectorial transformation of the economy. Thus, the agricultural sector, as far as both its contribution to the GDP, and the amount of labor it employed are concerned, becomes drastically reduced during the period 1955-1980, while the industrial sector and that of services increase their percentages (Vid. table I). Consequently, a sector that in 1950 employed 52 % of the active population, calls for only 17.8 % in 1980.

TABLE I:

Percentual change in the economy by sectors (1955-1980)

	<u>Agriculture</u>		<u>Industry</u>		<u>Services</u>	
	<u>GDP at 1964 prices</u>	<u>Active labor force</u>	<u>GDP at 1964 prices</u>	<u>Active labor force</u>	<u>GDP at 1964 prices</u>	<u>Active labor force</u>
1955	22.10	46.05	32.65	28.08	45.25	25.87
1975	11.49	22.91	45.40	56.77	43.11	40.32
1980	8.76	17.80	36.66	36.10	54.57	42.00

Source: INE, Anuario Estadístico de España (Madrid: Ministerio de Economía y Comercio, 1981); BANCO DE BILBAO, Renta Nacional de España y su distribución provincial (serie homogénea, 1955-1975, Bilbao).

On the other hand, the GDP per head underwent a great increase, going from the \$ 330 of 1960 to the \$ 3,860 of 1978. (Yet it was still only 52 % of the EEC average).

This process of economic growth was also influenced by many other factors, which cannot be gone into in great detail here, due to the physical limitations of this paper, but among which one should at least mention the adoption of measures designed to make foreign investment easier and to increase tourism. As far as this last aspect is concerned, the figures are astonishing, because the 4 million tourists that entered Spain in 1959 became 34,6 million in 1973, and 39,9 million in 1978; these last two figures superceding the total population of the country, which was approximately 34 million in the late 60s' and is around 38 million at present. However, one should also bear in mind that, besides the economic aspect -the entry of the necessary foreign currency-, foreign tourism during those years was even more important in another way, in a sociological sense, for it opened up a whole world of social forms and customs which had never come to light in Spain due to the obscurantism that had fallen upon her at the end of the Civil War.

Yet, at the same time as the influx of tourism into Spain, as the process of industrialization -with the consequent deterioration of the situation in the agrarian sector-, there was also an enormous wave of emigration that headed towards the industrial centers both within the country and abroad -with France, Germany and Switzerland being the countries most frequently chosen by Spanish emigrants⁵. Aside from the human drama entailed here, this emigration was also positive as far as economics were concerned, for, apart from the entry of foreign currency into Spain, the exportation of surplus labor made it almost possible for Spain to achieve the idyllic goal of full employment during this period of growth. (In 1972 the unemployment index was barely 3 %).

However, this joyous process of economic development, which, due to its very rapidity, suffered all the defects of a disordered and badly planned growth and which only served to increase the accumulation of wealth in those places where it had already been started up in previous periods, both regionally and sectorially, accentuated the latent economic discord in the country and, above all, the economic imbalance among the regions, the political significance of which we shall look at later on.

But, and this is important from the point of view of the establishment of democracy in Spain, this process of economic expansion, which reaches

its zenith in 1973, was suddenly brought to a halt, and there set in a crisis from which it can be said that Spain still has not totally recovered. If the Stock Exchange may be considered as a thermometer of economic activity, the data proffered by the Madrid Exchange reveals quite blatantly a decrease in the activity of Spanish economy from 1973 on. Thus, if we take 100 as the base rate for the stock index for 1970, this became 172.67 in 1973, went to 161.49 in 1975, and dropped to 55.59 in 1979⁶.

What were the causes of this damming of the process of economic growth in Spain? If the rapid process of economic growth and development that took place throughout the 60s' benefited partially from a similar process of growth taking place in other Western countries, after WW II, then the halting of this process and the consequent economic crisis also had the same causes as that crisis that came about in Europe in the 70s': the disproportionate and progressive rise in energy prices, especially that of oil, from December 1973 onwards. But, other more specific causes must be added to this common one; causes that made the Spanish economy particularly sensitive to the crisis and which caused the problem to be terribly serious and to have even greater social repercussions. Firstly, the very characteristics of the Spanish economic structure, basically fragile as a result of inadequate planning and the huge internal imbalances and contradictions -as it was already stated-; and, secondly, the political crisis itself of the francoist regime, which begins to gather even more momentum precisely from December 1973 onwards, when the violent death of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the President of Government, cut off virtually all the possibilities of the francoist regime's continuing after Franco's demise. Thus, the economic crisis, on one hand, and the regime's inability to overcome it, on the other, accentuated social tensions and labor conflict to such an extent that the discontent began to be felt in all the social sectors, thereby depriving the francoist regime of the support it needed to survive. The regime lacked, then, the adequate institutional mechanisms and sufficient legitimation as to be able to take a stand against a crisis as the one then in existence. The inertia of the process of expansion and the Government's fear of adopting corrective measures which would evidently take their toll on society, meant that the economic crisis was not felt with all its force until well on into 1975, and then, when it finally became apparent, its effects were already greater and much harder to overcome; and this occurred precisely in the culminating moment of the regime's political crisis, when its central pillar ,

General Franco, died and its possibilities of responding adequately became absolutely minimal.

In short, although it was economic development that transformed Spain into one of the major industrialised countries, thereby establishing the necessary minimum basis for the creation of a new social structure and the establishment of a new democratic political system, it was, however, the halting of this process of expansion and subsequent economic crisis, and the francoist regime's inability to find a suitable way out of it, that helped decisively to precipitate the fall of this latter, thus opening up the way to political change.

2. The social change.

The process of economic development that I have just mentioned entailed an obvious change in the social structure of the country. The predominantly agrarian character of Spanish society until the first half of this century resulted in society being divided up into a very simple class structure, characterised by a great economic differences between the various social sectors. At the vertex of the social pyramid there appeared that very tiny sector formed by the aristocracy and the larger financier and land-owning bourgeoisie, and at the base was to be found the vast majority of the population, made up of wage-earners of all kinds and a great part of which suffered rather deplorable economic conditions. Between these sectors there existed a third and very small sector, formed by the town-dwelling petit bourgeoisie and by the better qualified groups of wage-earners. In these conditions, social clashes were tremendously virulent, as well as frequent. This was the origin of the II Republic's (1931-1936) failure, for it was this small middle-class sector that controlled it and could not withstand the blows of the upper and lower social sectors, which ended in the Civil War (1936-1939). A War that could be considered precisely as the consequence of that same middle-class failure - due to its insignificant size - in its role as a buffer for the contradictions between the two extremes of the social structure.

In 1950 the Spanish social structure was still very similar to the one that had always existed previously. According to F. Murillo's calculations⁷, the upper class represented 0.1 % of the active population, while the middle class was 27 % and the lower class 72.9 %. However, the econo-

mic development acquired in the 60s' was obviously reflected in the transformation of this social structuring and it produced a considerable increase in size of the so-called middle-class. Without entering into the complicated polemics upheld by the different theories on social stratification, which would make the percentages attributed to each sector vary according to the different conception of them, it can be said that, at the beginning of the 70s', and continuing with the tripartite classification, the upper class represented between 2 % and 5 % of the active population, while the middle class between 41 % and 47 %, and the lower class 49 % to 57 %⁸.

The general rise in the standard of living, made evident by the considerable increase in the GDP per head and in the increase in size of the middle class, entailed a greater social balance and a lessening of the seriousness of the conflicts caused by social contradictions. In these circumstances of greater social comfort and well-being it became very difficult, no matter what political transition was being attempted in Spain, for there to be a violent response, similar to the Civil War which bloodied the country in the late 30s'. But, again, that self-same comfort, that same standard of living acquired over the previous ten or fifteen years of hard work and sacrifice, was something too valuable to be allowed to be destroyed by an inept or futureless political line. What had been attained had to be kept, and in order to do that the political future had to be ensured. The insecurity of the francoist regime, collapsing internally and rejected in an international context, far from being useful, was becoming a dangerous impediment to the consolidation of that well-being already acquired. On the other hand, if fascism is traditionally considered as a middle-class movement⁹, the peculiarity of the Spanish case is that the francoist regime was established at precisely the moment when this social sector was very small, so its development took place under the dictatorship. Thus, when the economic and political crisis arose in the 70s', the way out of the situation could not be a dictatorship again, but rather a democracy in the style of the developed countries of the area, which appeared as a model. (One should not forget that in the 20s' and in the 30s', in a different situation, fascism was also a model for Spain to imitate).

And this is one of the reasons why the change of regime came to have such great popular support, made evident as much in the referendum on the "Ley para la Reforma Política", of December 1976 (94.2 % voted in favor of

this Law, which made the suppression of the francoist regime possible) and on the Constitution, of December 1978 (87.9 % voted in favor), as in the tremendously low percentage of votes obtained by the francoist sectors and their posture, both in the mentioned referenda (only 2.6 % voted against the "Ley para la Reforma Política", and 7.8 % voted against the Constitution -in which percentage votes of the extreme left were also included-) and in the two general elections held up to now (0.5 % in June 1977, and 2 % in March 1979).

But, again, among the contradictions of the economic development that occurred under the francoist regime there was to be found the accentuation of the regional imbalances regards the distribution of wealth. The exaggerated centralism of the francoist regime, contradictorily, did not correct, but rather accentuated the process of regional concentration of capital in the peripheral areas, something that had commenced in former historical periods. Thus, the already industrialised areas of the country, the Basque Country and Catalonia, as well as Madrid, saw their level of development increase considerably; and only to a much lesser extent, and in very specific areas, did those basically agricultural regions of previous times undergo any industrialization and economic development that could be considered as minimally acceptable even in general terms. As examples of this the cases of Levant, Galicia, and Asturias could be quoted, but very few others. On the other hand, the southern and central areas of the country suffered great economic stagnation which caused the emigration, both to the developed areas of the country and abroad, of countless numbers of workers who, by doing precisely that, helped (1) to keep the cost of labor relatively cheap throughout the entire period of rapid economic growth, (2) to increase the entry of foreign currency into the country by means of their work and savings abroad, and (3) to keep unemployment at one of the lowest levels the country has ever known. As an example, it can be said that while in Catalonia and in the Basque Country incomes are 25 % higher than the national average, in places such as Galicia or New Castille itself they are 30 % below the average⁴⁰.

These regional economic imbalances accentuated the regionalist problem, which not only continued to exist in those ethnically and culturally more distinct communities such as Galicia, Basque Country, and Catalonia, where it had already been important since much earlier on, without the economic question coming into the matter, but now extended to those other areas where previously there had been no important evidence of it, motivated by the differentiation and economic discrimination being suffered. In this

sense, the increase in regional consciousness in areas such as Andalusia, Canary Islands, Aragon, or Extremadura, to name but a few, is highly significant.

It was, thus, in this way -as we shall see again further on- that the regional question, along with the radical change in the social structure, became one of the most important destabilizing focal points of the francoist regime. And I say along with the radical change in the social structure, because it is precisely in those areas where the middle-class sector of society is larger that the regionalist-autonomist (or independentist) claim is stronger, making the regional question one of the most important factors of the political change. And it was thus because regional autonomy was adopted as a political alternative to the State centralism of the francoist regime, it being the way for the rich to keep and potentially increase their endangered privileged situation, and the chance for the poor to reach this same situation.

3. The loss of legitimacy and social support.

Despite its clear lack of original legitimacy, it is indubitable that the francoist regime managed to gain a quite appreciable social backing, the outcome, principally, of its success in the economic field, to which I have just referred. This backing, though very difficult to calculate due, precisely, to the total absence of truly democratic mechanisms of popular participation, bestowed upon the regime a certain legitimacy, which was publicly exaggerated by means of the typical massive demonstrations of support for the "Caudillo", that were held every so often in response to the slightest indication of criticism or accusation of a lack of social support. Thus, this legitimacy was based upon the regime's being accepted, though still in a purely passive manner, by the decisive sectors of the community, and in as much as the regime effectively achieved the collective goals⁴¹. Of course, when it comes to calculating what the bases for its stability were it is very difficult to determine, especially in those moments of its greatest apogee -the 60s'-, to exactly what extent the stability was based upon this legitimacy or upon the use of purely repressive force against any show of criticism or opposition, which had always been used in either case. What I wish to emphasise here

is that this so-called legitimacy, of indefinite scope, that the francoist regime was able to count on at certain times, eventually disappeared during the last years of the regime's life, when important sectors of society that had given their support to this latter and were objectively its debtors, in as much as a good part of their development had been achieved under this regime, withdrew their support, thereby leaving it in an authentic social void.

The working class's opposition to the regime, which became more pronounced and reached barely tolerable limits during these last years, is not very significant as an example of the regime's loss of legitimacy or social support, in as much as it cannot be said that the francoist regime would ever manage to fully attain the backing of this sector of society, against whose political ascent the Civil War had been provoked and the regime finally established. I do not propose to go into greater detail on the history of working-class opposition to the francoist regime, although I do think it revealing to proffer some data on its ever-increasing opposition during the last years of the latter's life.

Throughout the history of francoism we can come across innumerable examples of the working class's lack of total adhesion to the regime, examples that were more and more evident as the industrialising process increased the number of workers and their concentration, and, therefore, gave rise to the re-creation of their defense organizations -the Workers' Commissions (CC.OO), the country's main union today, have their earliest origins back in 1962-, and this opposition became both more evident and effective precisely when the regime was nearing its end, struggling to continue in existence. Thus, the number of work hours lost in strikes was 1.5 million in 1966, shooting up to 14.5 million in 1975, and increasing still further to 15.6 million in 1976, the year immediately after General Franco's death, when his last Prime Minister, Arias Navarro, re-elected at that time by the King, was striving to bring about a pseudo-reform of the regime, designed to keep it unchanged in its most essential facets, but which results in the most resounding failure. In that same year, 1976, the number of strikes, the eminently political nature of which could not be concealed, actually reached the figure of 39,979, of which 17,371 took place in the first three months and involved some 450,000 workers from virtually all the different economic sectors, ranging from industry to the services. Of course, it does not even have to be said that this workers' response to the francoist regime, which was always followed up by a harsh retaliatory repression that merely served to worsen relations with the workers, was one of the important factors that

contributed to its fall¹².

But although the workers' opposition, despite its valuable contribution to the collapse of the regime, is not terribly significant when it comes to emphasizing the withdrawal of social backing, for the regime had never fully had it, what was, indeed, very significant was the withdrawal of support by the entrepreneur sector, which had been^a loyal ally throughout the years of economic expansion. The francoist regime had been characterised by a State dirigisme that tried to regulate everything. It subsidised and penalised and created economic privileges and distortions, from which, one can say, Spain is still suffering. The State itself has acted and continues to act in a managerial capacity via the National Institute for Industry (INI), which owns some 60 enterprises with approximately 250.000 employees, and also participates in another 200, thereby becoming the most important enterprise in the country.¹³ But, in contrast to this State interventionism -the Spanish public sector is, anyhow, still smaller than that of other countries such as Great Britain or West Germany-, the private sector is not only very extensive but also very fragmented, much more than in all the other important capitalist countries of Europe. Thus, Spain is very far from achieving that "integrating national socialism" proclaimed by Fernandez Miranda in 1971.¹⁴ As an example, one can say that, in 1975, 98.3 % of Spanish enterprises (992,679) had under 50 employees, while 1.6 % (16,613) had from 50 to 500, and only 0.1 % (939) had over 500. There again, of those large enterprises, 50 % are, to a greater or lesser extent, controlled by foreign companies, 30 % by the INI and 12 % by national banks.¹⁵ These percentage figures offer a fairly clear picture of the importance and diversification of the private sector, as they do of the relative autarky or independence of Spanish capitalism with relation to foreign capital, which found it extremely difficult to establish in majoritarian percentages in Spain during the francoist period.¹⁶ This serves to refute the classic theory that conceive of Spanish capitalism as a dependent capitalism, due principally to its late economic development that was characterised -according to this theory- by a rapid destruction of precapitalist means and forms of production and by a parallel process of dependent industrialization¹⁷; things which, in my opinion, are not altogether exact: On one hand, although the process of economic expansion took place very markedly in the 60s', its bases lay in the already quite considerable industrial development which, even though very localized and on a par with the great importance of the agricultural sector, had occurred in the years of WW I; and, on the other hand, as can be shown from the data here, the industrializa-

tion of the 60s', far from being fully dependent, owed a good deal of its basis to the economic policies of the autarkic period of the regime (1939-1956), and, of course, to State support and domestic financial capital.

And this precision is important because it serves to ratify the significance, on one hand, of the close relation existing between the recent Spanish capitalist development and the francoist regime, and, on the other, of the withdrawal of social backing for it by the more extensive sectors of the bourgeoisie at a specific moment, thereby hastening its fall. Thus as Poulantzas upholds -even if the social stratification does not respond exactly to the origins outlined by him-, it is evident that in the last years of the francoist regime the industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie, overburdened by the growing economic crisis that starts to be felt more forcefully in Spain from 1975 on, and in the face of a lack of efficient measures by the Government, completely withdrew all their support for the francoist regime, in an attempt to find a new political regime both capable of and with enough legitimacy to adopt those harsh and very necessary measures. Of course, these industrial sectors were not the only ones to do this, for some sectors of the financier bourgeoisie, deeply concerned about their invested capital -one should not forget the high percentage of industrial enterprises belonging to banking sector- also did so, and their attitude towards the fall of the regime was, to say the least, fairly passive. Only in one very small sector of the financier oligarchy was there the most fervent support for this decadent francoism, which has continued beyond the regime's actual disappearance and which today still exists for the regime's political remnants -the present extreme right.

However, one should have to add to that fear of the economic crisis another whole series of motivations of similar importance that served to justify what was, in general terms, Spanish capital's withdrawal of support for the francoist regime. Thus, the need for a greater liberalisation of the economic system and for a protectionism that was becoming stifling to disappear; the need for more international interchange -entry in the EEC-, along with the opening up of new markets for products and capital. But, what basically was needed was a new system of labor relations to be established, a system that would offer greater guarantees of stability in that crisis situation that was being gone through¹⁸. That implied the need for the possibility to establish direct collective bargaining with the genuine workers' representatives, a possibility that, as is only too well-known, was made very difficult by the bureaucratic apparatus of the official corporative syndicates and by the refusal to

legally recognize the truly representative workers' organizations. Indeed, as examples of this new attitude on the part of capital regards the francoist regime one can cite the meetings that took place between entrepreneurs and the most important illegal unions -CC.OO, UGT, USO-, in one of which meetings, in May 1976, both sectors agreed on the need to publicly demand syndical freedom¹⁹.

The opposition to the regime that had always been felt within the peripheral nationalist bourgeoisie was also apparent; even though it was an opposition that had been rather minimized or inexistent, due to obvious motivations of an economic nature, during the years of reconstruction that came after the Civil War, and from which reconstruction great benefits had been drawn -it must not be forgotten that the francoist regime, far from redistributing the country's centers of industrialization, taking advantage of the destruction caused by the war and as a reprisal against the Basque Country's and Catalonia's republican commitments, was actually largely responsible for the economic reconstruction of those parts of the country, centers that had been industrially developed prior to the reconstruction's taking place-, it was now an opposition that became accentuated in the last years of the francoist regime, calling out for a greater political and economic autonomy which would make for a freedom that the centralised system, as protectionist as it was inefficient, of francoism made impossible at that time. It was an autonomy that was demanded all the more vigorously as soon as the claims for autonomy by the less developed areas of the country, asking for a fairer redistribution of wealth, put in danger their economic interests already endangered by the critical economic and political situation²⁰.

In short, then, the loss of social backing, principally from the economically powerful social sectors that shifted their expectations to democracy, left the francoist regime completely void of legitimation, and at the same time they withdrew their material support, too, which had decisive effects at the time of the regime's final collapse.

4. The political disintegration of the regime.

Contrary to what one might think, the francoist regime was never a monolithic, coherent and homogeneous structure. On the contrary, it based its stability and internal unity upon a game of balance and tensions that General Franco knew how to keep in play between the different forces and political and social groups that all converged within the regime and which strove to attain hegemony within dominant bloc²¹. In the different periods of the regime's evolution these groups varied somewhat and one cannot talk of the existence of a great continuity between them. Besides the strictly political forces which in the year 1936 joined the military coup that, after the Civil War, gave rise to the francoist regime -phalangists, traditionalists, monarchists, remains of the great confederation of right-wing groups that had been the CEDA during the republican period-, one can, in general terms, say that the social and political groups which composed the francoist regime took as a reference point the three fundamental pillars upon which the regime based itself: the Armed Forces, the Church and the Falange.

The Armed Forces, as such, stayed somewhat apart from the political game and limited itself rather more to acting as the regime's physical mainstay and occupying the military ministerial posts. The Church, besides its role as the regime's legitimating institution, both spiritual_{ly} and morally, and its socialising role in the regime's ultraconservative standards, via its virtual monopoly of the control of lower education, also wielded an important influence of a political nature, not only by means of its conditioning power, but also via its secular organizations such as the National Catholic Association of Propagandists (ACN de P) and the Opus Dei, whose influence would be greater from the 50s' on²². The Falange was originally the regime's "shock troops" and gave the regime a good deal of its politico-ideological content. However, after the end of the Civil War, once it became, in April 1937, along with all the political forces that had taken part in the military uprising, part of the unified single party of the regime, under General Franco's command, it turned into yet another piece of State apparatus, its role as a political group as such being much more diffusive from then on (carrying out functions more typical of a public service than of a political party). But the regime attempted to conceal as far as possible even this aspect of "single party", and finally conceived the National Movement which was what the party came to be called, as a "communion of all Spaniards"²³. In any case,

the official party militants became bureaucrats occupying posts within the State's institutional framework, and whose interests with regards to the other forces within the system were of a more material or corporative character than political or ideological²⁴.

However, at that moment that concerns us, those final years of the francoist regime's existence, the struggle between those wielding political power went from being the classic confrontation between the political and social forces previously outlined, to being rather more a confrontation between those who sought after some kind of remodelling of the regime, in order to adapt it to the new social reality that had arisen as a result of the economic development of the sixties, by means of what was termed "apertura", and the continuists, or those who considered that any kind of alteration in the basic tenets of the regime or its political organization was not only unnecessary, but also a real danger for its integrity and continuity.

Indeed, the francoist regime was fundamentally based upon the figure of General Franco, a charismatic leader ("caudillo") who, besides holding in his hands all the powers of the State, was the axis of the system's political unity, and the system itself worked on the principle of adhesion. His possible physical disappearance and the fact that Spanish society had already achieved a considerable level of development and economic well-being, caused one sector of the regime to think, in the latter half of the sixties, about the need to introduce certain modifications into its structure and functioning; modifications that tended, on one hand, to ensure its continuity after the ever more possible demise of Franco, and, on the other, to seek new sources of legitimacy that would allow the regime to survive. It is precisely due to this that in the mid-sixties the regime's "political development" starts to be talked about, making use of the simile with the economic development that was occurring at that time; a development that was most apparent in the "Ley Orgánica del Estado" (LOE), of January 1967, but also in the minimal liberalizations being carried out in very specific aspects of the socio-political life then -Ley de Asociaciones (1964), Ley de Prensa (1966), Ley de Libertad Religiosa (1968), Ley Sindical (1971), etc. There even occurred the first attempts to give formal recognition to the relative social pluralism that the regime boasted of -and which gave J.J. Linz a motive for characterising it as "authoritarian"²⁵ - via the creation of political associations -not parties-, which would encompass the different political families or tendencies of opinion included in the single party, the National Movement²⁶.

But the political development, like the aperturism later on, came up against innumerable difficulties and the declared opposition of the regime's more conservative sectors and likewise of the technocrats -for the most part members of the Opus Dei-, who felt that what was important was not so much the dangerous political reform of the regime as the consolidation and even greater expansion of the recently achieved economic development, which would have the power to appease the possible political anxieties the people might have. Consequently, they preferred to go on with the economic policy of the "Planes de Desarrollo" and even to increase the repressive measures if necessary -which is what they did after having pushed out of the Government (1969) those who attempted this first reform of the francoist regime²⁷. And that was somehow logical, for the regime could find no other alternative sources of legitimacy and principles of functioning that were not the democratic ones proper, which went against its own essence. Its destiny was then either to perpetuate itself in the way that was most loyal to its own original tenets, or to disappear.

It is quite clear that this dynamic of internal confrontation between the reformists and the continuists would not have been sufficient to destroy the regime's unity had it not been for the physical disappearance of he who was its unifying center and he who had been designated his successor in this role. Indeed, the disappearance of General Franco, and two years earlier that of the Admiral Carrero Blanco, his dauphin, who also enjoyed enough charisma and power as to be able to ensure the unity and the continuity of the regime beyond Franco's death, were the final blow that caused francoism to desintegrate.

After Carrero Blanco's assassination, in December 1973, Franco named Arias Navarro Prime Minister, and it was he who, aware of the dangers hanging over the regime, attempted to work along the political line of "aperturism" for the regime, seeking the minimal democratic legitimation necessary which would ensure the continuity of the political regime without affecting its substance too much. It was, then, a question of trying to substitute the principle of adhesion with that of participation in the regime's very functioning, as he stated in his speech of February 1974, where he presented his new political line; a political line that was soon to become known as the "spirit of February 12" (because of the date when the speech was made). Essentially, what it was about was the idea of gradually making it possible for there to be democratic representation, first, in the local corporations, and then, hypothetically, in the organs

of national scope. In this respect, the Arias aperturism culminated with the passing of a local administration law, and with the passing of the statute of political associations. The latter barely allowed the different political sectors within the National Movement to group together in autonomous political associations, which had to be authorized by its National Council. But he could not go very much further: the reaction from the regime's most conservative sectors halted all chances of reform, and to such an extent that in October 1974 Arias Navarro had to introduce changes in his Government and give up his first attempt of reform²⁸. Arias Navarro neither possessed the charisma of someone of the like of Carrero Blanco, nor had he the sufficient strength to maintain the unity of the political and social sectors that supported the regime, and even less did he have when it came to trying to impose a political reform on it.

Nevertheless, following General Franco's death, the King Juan Carlos I re-appointed Arias Navarro as Prime Minister, which implied a relaunching of the reformist political line, which, in its attempt to go a little further than had been sought in the previous period, now enjoyed greater support. Among those who participated in the second Arias reformist attempt were those figures who in the sixties had initiated the frustrated attempt of "political development", and who since then had remained out of the limelight, such as Fraga Iribarne^{or} Solís Ruiz, and others who came to uphold relatively distant or critical postures regards the regime in its final years, such as Areilza or Garrigues. But the political situation was changing very rapidly, and this second attempt was also to come up against not only the rigid opposition of the more conservative sectors of francoism, which then emphasized their critical posture against any kind of reform even by violent acts, but also against the response from those groups, then clandestine, that formed part of what was then known as the "democratic opposition" to the francoist regime. (The latter -as we shall see later on- had gradually been acquiring not only greater strength and popular support, but also, and this is more important, a greater co-ordination among themselves in their activities against the francoist regime).

The Arias reform, once again, got no further than being a mere plan. Out of the partial reforms that had been planned, he only managed to get the last francoist Cortes to pass two ^{bills} :the "Ley de Reunión" (May 1976) and the "Ley de Asociaciones Políticas" (June 1976). This latter, more lenient than the one passed in 1974, accepted the possibility of political parties with not too radical an ideology becoming legal by making their permission for legalization the responsibility of the Interior Ministry, rather

than of the secretariat of the National Movement as had occurred before.

The failure of this final attempt of reform, which also saw, besides, a great opposition within the international context²⁹, brought about the dismissal of Arias Navarro, in July 1976, and his replacement by Adolfo Suárez two days later. Suárez was to open up the way to a new period of political reform, of notably different sign to the previous ones and which was going to culminate with the total suppression of the francoist regime, the approval of the "Ley para la Reforma Política" in the referendum held up in December 1976, which opened the possibility of a real reform of the political system, being the starting point. In this sense, one should emphasize the important role that the King Juan Carlos played in these changes, for not only did he dismiss Arias Navarro when it became perfectly clear that reformist francoism was just not feasible, but he also ensured the neutrality of the Armed Forces, as commander-in-chief of them, during this difficult period of transition, thereby depriving the francoist regime of one of its most important pillars of support.

Thus, the confrontation between "continuists" and "aperturists", firstly, and between "continuists" and "reformists", later on, ended up by destroying the internal unity of the francoist regime, rendering it virtually powerless to oppose with any semblance of efficacy the growing opposition of the political and social forces that were against it, there by causing its disintegration and final disappearance.

5. The political opposition.

Until now I have made reference to the most important factors which, from an overall point of view, jointly brought about the suppression of the francoist regime and the establishment of democracy in Spain; but these factors, especially those of a strictly social nature, would, however, have been of very little significance had they not been properly politically channelled and orientated. In this respect, it is essential to emphasize the important role that the political forces opposed to francoism played. Indeed, the groups that were against the francoist regime not only played an important part in the mobilization of the social forces against the regime, within the country, but they also en-

sured the regime's political isolation abroad, by causing it to be rejected, as was also any attempt at perpetuating the system, in so many international settings. But their role was not merely that of standing up to the regime; they also provided alternatives for the country's political reconstruction, serving as interlocutors for those sectors of the francoist regime also interested in seeing it evolve. In this last respect one should emphasize the democratic opposition's moderate attitude, always open to discussion, which went from being that of the more radical stands adopted at the beginning of the transitional process, when a break ("ruptura"), pure and simple, with the francoist regime was called for, up to the negotiatory positions ("ruptura pactada") adopted later on which ensured the definitive establishment of democracy in Spain. And, on the other hand, these last positions were possible because of the regime's lack of legitimacy which imposed the need for the negotiation with the political opposition to insure any kind of political change that was not based on the use of force. In this sense, one could say that in the establishment of democracy in Spain both the regime-reformists and the political opposition were complementary, for the former had the power but not the legitimacy, and the latter had the legitimacy but not the power to insure the establishment of democracy in the country³⁰.

Without entering now into a historical analysis, which again goes beyond the aims of this work, suffice it to say that the sad outcome of the Civil War not only caused great confrontation between the different political forces that had fought together on the republican side, but also an endless number of tensions and escissions within each of those forces, who were mutually recriminating one another for the disaster. However, in the seventies, the political forces opposed to the dictatorship, either as clandestine groups within the country, or abroad, start to reconstruct and reorganize themselves. Some of the groups, like the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) had managed fairly well to keep their internal organization^{intact} throughout the dictatorship, which made them the group that most efficiently and most constantly confronted the francoist regime. Others, such as the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), had fallen victim to the blows of internal tensions, which reduced their opportunities of acting during the dictatorship, although they did finally begin their process of reunification and reconstruction in the seventies. Finally, other groups of lesser importance, both of national and regional scope, were also formed in precisely this period. Yet the most important element of this process was not only the reorganization of the political forces opposed to the dictatorship, but the return of an understanding between them all. Throughout the entire dictatorship attempts at co-ordination between different political forces opposed to the regime had occasionally taken place, but these attempts had never succeeded in bringing together those who were the more vital forces of opposition, nor had

they managed to last long enough to be efficient; and, on the other hand, the dictatorship was at the height of its strength at that time. It was, in fact, necessary to wait for the most important political forces of opposition to reorganize and for the dictatorship to show the first signs of cracking before the process of unifying and co-ordinating these forces could be started anew; and that happened only well on into the seventies'.

The first organization of an unitary nature was the Junta Democrática, formed in Paris in July of 1974, exactly the same month as when General Franco suffered the first ailment of a whole series of illnesses that were to cause his death one year later. Headed by the PCE, the Junta Democrática was composed of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the Carlist Party (PC), the Spanish Work Party (PTE), the Independent University Party (PUI), Workers' Commissions (CC.OO), and various independent personalities. It was precisely this last sector that was one of the more distinctive features of the Junta, and their forming part of it alongside the political parties (although this was not always understood) was due to the feeling that they would be a more concrete focal point to attract Spanish public opinion, at that time barely accustomed to the names of the different parties that either existed or were forming then, and which meant absolutely nothing to them. The Junta Democrática extended very rapidly in the country, and its program was fundamentally based on the break with the francoist regime, the opening up of a constituent period with a provisional Government, the recognition of the fundamental rights and public liberties, and the recognition, too, of Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia's right to autonomy.

A few months later, in October of 1974, the PSOE held its highly important 26th. Congress, as a result of which the party finally got reorganized and strengthened, and in which Felipe González was appointed secretary general. In this Congress it was decided not to join the Junta Democrática and, on the contrary, it was decided that a new unitary organization should be founded; one in which there would not be room for independent personalities and in which the socialists themselves would be the hegemonic force. This organization, the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática, was created one year later, in June of 1975, and within it there were to be found the PSOE, the Spanish Socialdemocrat Union (USDE), the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Democratic Left (ID), the Spanish Communist Movement (MCE), Basque Action (AV), Gallician Socialdemocrat Party (PGSD), the Socialist Movement of Catalonia (MSC), Catalanian Republican Left (E R), Revolutionary Workers' Organization (ORT), and the unions General Workers' Union (UGT), National Confederation of Labor (CNT), and Basque Workers' Union (STV). For the rest, its program barely differed from Junta Democrática's, except for the wish to create a federal

State in Spain.

Thus, via these two unitary organizations, the two most important political forces opposed to the francoist regime, the PCE and the PSOE, became the two axes that were, basically, to direct the fight against the dictatorship in the short lifetime that was left to it, as were they to be the head of the negotiations leading towards democracy's establishment. Beside these two unitary organizations, numerous regional organizations of a similar nature, although of less importance, were also formed.

General Franco's death speeded up the unificatory process, and indeed, in March of 1976, the Junta Democrática and the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática united, thereby forming a new unitary organism, Coordinación Democrática, which was to give rise to the inclusion of other democratic groups. Thus, if the two previous organizations had to fight against francoist continuism, Coordinación Democrática would have to confront the Arias-Fraga pseudo-reformism of the Monarchy's first Government. And indeed, the change of circumstances required a change of strategy in such a way that it was now a question of trying to combine the political pressure out in the street with the political negotiations with the Government. It was thus that the idea of the "pacted break" with the regime ("ruptura pactada") was launched, with which it was hoped that an agreement with the regime's reformists could be reached; according to this pact, the Government would agree to dismantle the francoist regime and the democratic opposition would collaborate in the construction of a new one of a democratic nature. But the Arias Navarro Government, which continued in power after Franco's death was too strongly linked to the past and its authoritarian and dubious reformist attitude caused it to sharply reject any kind of negotiation with the democratic opposition, not only on account of the communists' presence in it, but also because they saw there a revengeful attitude that only wished to get its own back for the defeat suffered in the Civil War some forty years earlier.

Obviously, the pressurizing by the democratic forces continued, with 1976 being one of the most politically disturbed years in a long time. The fall of the Arias Navarro Government in July of 1976 provided the convergence of political forces opposed to the francoist regime with a new incentive, and their unity tended to become more extensive. Consequently, on the day after Adolfo Suárez's appointment as the new Prime Minister, 52 political leaders, representing all the parties included in Coordinación Democrática plus some others of a liberal and christian democrat tendency which were not, made public a document in which they expressed the basic reivindications of the democratic opposition to the

regime and where they rejected the plans for reform made up until then by this latter. President Suárez's new attitude, more open to negotiations, caused the democratic forces' posture to become more flexible, and it also caused there to be more emphasis placed upon the second term of the binomial pressurizing-negotiating strategy³¹. This new strategy facilitated the extension of the democratic opposition's unitary organization even more. Thus, on October 23, 1976, as a result of Coordinación Democrática's union with other organizations of regional scope and some other moderate groups, the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos was formed, the last and the largest unitary organism that the political forces opposed to the francoist regime would ever manage to form and which encompassed virtually all of them. This organization drew up a definitive programme consisting of seven points which it was hoped that Suárez would recognize in order for the democratic forces to begin to collaborate in the process of political change³².

However, the very extensiveness of the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos held grave dangers for the democratic opposition. On one hand, the vast number of political groups included in it made it barely operative, as much regards negotiations as pressurization, on account of the enormous difficulties involved in trying to bring them all together (it must not be forgotten that they were still living in a semi-clandestine circumstances at that time) and to get them all to be in agreement. And then again, the political spectrum covered was of the most varied -ranging from maoists to christian democrats and liberals- for which reason the resolutions taken, after a tediously long and problematic elaboration, were necessary moderate and vague in nature. Indeed, the holding of the referendum for the Political Reform Law, which was to afford the opportunity to suppress the francoist regime as a result of electing a parliament that would be constituent, merely served to prove this. The democratic opposition saw itself faced with a difficult choice then, for, on one hand, it could not be radically against a legal measure that clearly paved the way for change -in fact, it was the francoist forces themselves who most ardently cried out no in the referendum-; but, on the other hand, neither could they openly vote yes since the minimum guarantees that were necessary to ensure that the consultation was really democratic still did not totally exist (the political parties were still illegal and the francoists controlled all the State apparatuses). Thus, while some opposition groups merely ran small campaigns in favor of abstention, others -the liberals, some christian democrats- decided to vote yes.

With the approval of the Political Reform Law (94.2 % voted yes) and the low figure for abstention (only 22.3 %, quite considerably lower than the percentage that would be obtained in later consultations), it was perfectly clear that, on one hand, there was no solution other than negotiating with the Government, and, on the other, the negotiation could only be carried out by those groups that were opposed to radical solutions. It is for this reason that in January of 1977 the POD appointed a nine-man commission (Felipe González, Santiago Carrillo, Tierno Galván, Fernández Ordóñez, Paz Andrade, Jordi Pujol y Jáuregui), representatives of the most important parties and of the three nationalities that aspired to autonomy, to negotiate with the Government. From then on, and with various incidents, the seven points that the POD had put forward to the Government were gradually fulfilled. But, at the same time, the Government's discriminatory way of carrying out the negotiations -rejecting some of the groups, legalizing some and not others, etc.- also ended up bringing about the definitive disintegration of the POD and reinforcing the role of the Suárez Government and of those who took a more direct part in the negotiations with it -principally socialists, socialdemocrats and Basque and Catalanian nationalists. Thus, following its legalization in February of 1977, the PSOE left the POD and, shortly afterwards, other groups would also do so, some of which -christian democrats, liberals, socialdemocrats, though not all of them- even joined the sectors supporting the Government in order to form the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), which then won the first elections (June 15, 1977).

In this way, in an already pre-electoral atmosphere, the more important groups that years before had been in favor of creating these unitary organizations in order to coordinate the fight, first, and then the negotiations with the francoist regime and its reformists sectors, decided, once the basic claims contained in the POD's programme had been fulfilled, to suppress the POD and to again set out alone along the path to democracy. However, the negotiatory and moderate attitude was, of course, not totally forsaken, and the reconstruction of the democratic State, after the elections of June 1977, gave cause for new and decisive agreements to be established, but that is not the concern of this paper³³.

Anyhow, one should, finally, emphasize the tremendously important role played by the political forces opposed to the francoist regime in the substitution of this latter and in the establishment of democracy, as much on account of their success in channelling and orientating that vast social discontent which was unleashed at that time, as because of how moderate and how much in proportion their actions and demands were, without

all of which certain things would hardly have happened, or would have been of a markedly different tendency.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

As I have attempted to expound throughout this work, the causes for the change of political regime in Spain, which involved going from a dictatorship of almost forty years to a democratic system, being carried out so pacifically, without there being the need for any acts of a revolutionary nature at all, were due to a long process and to the conjunction of a whole series of factors whose origin lay within that very dictatorship. In this sense it could be said that the process of political change in Spain was something similar to a fruit that gradually ripens on the tree and which, when it is finally ripe, either falls from the tree because of its own weight or at least offers no resistance at all when picked. Hence, one can see that a relatively profound knowledge of the Spanish socio-political reality of the last ten or fifteen years would have avoided the great surprise that this process of transition has caused in so many people. Naturally, there were many difficulties and the occurrence of some of them in the said process was somewhat unforeseeable. Nevertheless, though, there can be no doubt that, given the factors outlined above, the process of political change would have come about, whether or not it be more quickly or more slowly, more or less costly, and it would have led the country towards democracy, whatever its political content might have been.


And that is because, as one can clearly see after each one of the factors have been analysed, Spain is a modern country, with a high level of industrialization and economic development; with a relatively balanced social structure, characterized by the presence of an extensive middle-class and by the lessening of the radical differences between the most extreme sectors of society, which had in previous period prevented the existence of the minimum social consensus necessary for a democracy to survive. However, this developed and relatively balanced society clashed, principally from the seventies on, with the political structure of a

petrified regime, which had protected its development, but which felt incapable of prolonging it, pressed by the demands of a serious economic crisis in an international context and by even more serious internal repercussions, and by a lack of future, on account of its being unable to elaborate a political reply which, coming from within the regime itself, would allow that same regime to continue beyond the life of its founder, General Franco, and which would not be contradictory to its own essence. Thus, the francoist regime entered a phase of internal disintegration, at the same time as it saw itself powerless to stop the most varied social sectors from withdrawing their support on account of its lack of efficiency and of a minimum security for the future. The increase in political repression unleashed in the last months of its existence was not enough to stop this process (See figure I).

In this critical context, the political forces opposed to the dictatorship gathered great strength and managed to attain and control the necessary minimum social mobilization against the francoist regime, to the point of being able to impose negotiations on the more open sectors of the regime in order to seek a pacific solution to the crisis; a solution which, on one hand, meant the establishment of a democratic system in Spain, but, on the other, did not necessarily imply the complete dismantling of the State nor the purging of its institutions. In this last sense, the keeping of the Crown, among other elements conserved from the previous regime, was of special significance, since it gave the appearance of sufficient continuity so as to be able to keep the armed forces and the police loyal to it and neutral as far as the process of political change was concerned, for their opposition would have meant a hindrance very difficult to overcome.

In short, there is no doubt that beside the five outlined factors — (1) the development and economic crisis, (2) the change in social structure, (3) the loss of legitimacy and social support by the francoist regime, (4) the regime's own crisis and political desintegration, and (5) the co-ordinated and moderate behavior of the political forces opposed to the dictatorship—, there existed another innumerable series of factors that came together in this process of political transition in varying degrees of importance —among which one should mention the opposition or, at least, the lack of sufficient support that was found in the international context by those who in one way or another tried to perpetuate the regime created by General Franco. But it is, in my opinion, only the joint action of these five factors —without it being possible to say that any one

FIGURE 1



of them would have been sufficient by itself- that can be considered as essential when it comes to determining the fall of the francoist regime and the pacific establishment of democracy in Spain.

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NOTES

- ¹ On the crisis and fall of the francoist regime, see: J. Acosta Sánchez, Crisis del franquismo y crisis del imperialismo: Aproximación a la coyuntura política española (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1976); R. Carr, J.P. Fusi, España, de la dictadura a la democracia (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979); J. de Esteban, L. López Guerra, La crisis del Estado franquista (Barcelona: Labor, 1977); J. Oneto, Arias entre dos crisis, 1973-1975 (Madrid: Cambio 16, 1975); N. Poulantzas, The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain (London: New Left Books, 1976); P. Preston (ed.), Spain in Crisis: The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime (Hassoks, England: Harvester Press, 1976).
- ² Cfr. M. Ramírez, España, 1939-1975: Régimen político e ideología (Barcelona: Labor, 1978), pp. 84 ff.
- ³ On the industrialization and economic development of Spain in this period, see: C.W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison: U. of Wisconsin P., 1970); L. Gamir, La política económica en los sesenta (Madrid: Gaudiana, 1974); A. López Muñoz, J.L. García Delgado, Crecimiento y crisis del capitalismo español (Madrid: Edicusa, 1968); J. Velarde Fuentes et al., La España de los años 70: II. La Economía (Madrid: Moneda y Crédito, 1973); J.B. Donges, La industrialización en España: Políticas, logros, perspectivas (Barcelona: Oikos-Tau, 1976); R. Tamames, Estructura económica de España (Madrid: Gaudiana, 1974).
- ⁴ OCYPE, "Nueva ordenación económica", Documentación Económica, 7 (Madrid, 1959).
- ⁵ In 1969 the number of emigrants to other countries was 3.4 million, which represented 10 % of ^{the} Spanish population (R. Tamames, Introducción a la economía española, Madrid: Alianza, 1977, p. 46).
- ⁶ Data from the Gabinete de Estudios de la Bolsa de Madrid (El País, December 30, 1979).
- ⁷ F. Murillo, Las clases medias españolas (Granada: Escuela social, 1959), p. 30.

- 8 Cfr. J. Díez Nicolás, J. Pino Artacho, "Estratificación y movilidad social en España en la década de los años 70", in M. Fraga Iribarne et al., La España de los años 70, I (Madrid: Moneda y Crédito, 1972), pp.381-430; S. Giner, "La estructura social de España", in A. López Pina et al., Poder y clases sociales (Madrid: Tecnos, 1978), pp.75-133; J.F. Tezanos et al., Las nuevas clases medias (Madrid: Edicusa, 1973); I. Fernández de Castro, Las clases sociales en España en el umbral de los años 70 (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1974); L.G. San Miguel, Las clases sociales en la España actual (Madrid: CIS, 1980).
- 9 S.M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963) pp. 131 ff.
- 10 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development itself found Spain's internal disequilibrium "unsustainable" (OECD, Spain: 1978, Paris: OECD, 1978, p. 1). On this problem see also: S. del Campo et al., La cuestión regional española (Madrid: Edicusa, 1977); A. de Miguel, Recursos humanos, clases y regiones en España (Madrid: Edicusa, 1977); R. Martínez Ortiña et al, Regionalización de la economía española (Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, 1975); J. Abad Caja, Regionalismo y desarrollo regional (Madrid: Euramerica, 1975); Banco de Bilbao, Renta nacional de España y su distribución provincial (Bilbao: BB, varios años); C.W. McMillion, "International Integration and Intra-national Disintegration", Comparative Politics, 13, 3 (April 1981), pp. 291-312.
- 11 S.M. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 64 ff.
- 12 On the working class opposition to the francoist regime see: J.M. Maravall, Dictadura y disenso político (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978) and "Remarques sur le Mouvement Ouvrier dans la Transition a la Démocratie en Espagne", Pouvoirs, 8 (1979); N. Sartorius, El resurgir del movimiento obrero (Barcelona: Laia, 1975); S. Ellwood, "La clase obrera bajo el régimen de Franco", in P. Preston (ed.), op. cit., pp.265-302; I. Fernández de Castro, De las Cortes de Cádiz al postfranquismo, II (Barcelona: Viejo Topo, 1981); J.A. Biescas, M. Tuñón de Lara, España bajo la dictadura franquista (Barcelona: Labor, 1980).

- 13 P. Schwartz, M.J. González, Una historia del Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1941-1976 (Madrid, 1978); M. Boyer, "La empresa pública en la estrategia industrial española: el INI", Información Comercial Española, 500 (April 1975).
- 14 Cit. in R. Carr, J.P. Fusi, op. cit., p. 253.
- 15 Cfr. J. Muñoz, El poder de la banca en España (Madrid: Zero, 1970); S. Roldán, La internacionalización del capital en España (Madrid: Edicusa, 1978).
- 16 Only after 1959 were the industrial enterprises in Spain allowed to have more than 50 % of their capital in foreign hands, and this after having got special permission from the Government. Before, they were not allowed to have more than 25 %, extensive to 45 % after special permission. But the dependence was much higher in technical terms, for Spain had to buy all of its modern technology abroad, paying high sums in royalties. On the other hand, the presence of foreign capital in Spain is very diversified, the percentage of US capital being smaller than in other European countries - \$ 5.2/inhabitant in Spain, and between \$ 6.4/inhabitant and \$ 13.9/inhabitant in Italy, France, Belgium, or West Germany- (S. Roldán, op. cit.; R. Tamames, op. cit.; M. Vázquez Montalbán, La penetración americana en España, Madrid: Edicusa, 1974; E. Jaillardon, "L'Espagne post-franquiste: Le consensus et ses équivoques", Revue Française de Science Politique, 29, April 1979).
- 17 Cfr. N. Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 45.
- 18 On this point see J. Rodríguez Aramberri, "Origen y evolución del sistema de partidos en la España democrática: Un ensayo de interpretación", in F. Claudín (ed.), ¿Crisis de los partidos políticos? (Madrid: Dédalo, 1980) pp. 65-152.
- 19 El País, May 12, 1976.

- 20 On the political aspects of Spain's regional problem see an extensive bibliography in J. García Fernández, "Repertorio bibliográfico sobre federalismo, nacionalismo y regionalismo", Revista del Departamento de Derecho Político, 5 (1979); and in A. de Blas, "Nación y nacionalismo: Repertorio bibliográfico seleccionado", Revista de Política Comparada, 3 (Invierno 1980).
- 21 Cfr. A. de Miguel, Sociología del franquismo (Barcelona: Euros, 1975); S. Vilar, La naturaleza del franquismo (Barcelona: Península, 1977); S. Giner et al., "Despotismo moderno y dominación de clase: Para una sociología del régimen franquista", Papers, 8 (1978); J.F. Tezanos, "Notas para una interpretación sociológica del franquismo", Sistema, 23 (Marzo 1978). J. Bardavío, La estructura del poder en España: Sociología política de un país (Madrid: Ibérico Europea, 1969).
- 22 See: A. Sáez Alda, La ACN de P (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1974); D. Artigues, El Opus Dei en España, 1928-1962: Suevolución ideológica y política (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1971); J. Ynfante, La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei: Génesis y desarrollo de la Santa Mafía (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1970).
- 23 See: J.J. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organización: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968", in S.P. Huntington, C.H. Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 128-203; S.G. Payne, Falange: Historia del fascismo español (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1965); H.R. Southworth, Antifalange (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1967).
- 24 On the history of the francoist regime see: I. Fernández de Castro, De las Cortes de Cádiz al postfranquismo, cit.; M. Gallo, Histoire de l'Espagne franquiste (Paris: Marabout, 1969); R. Tamames, La República. La era de Franco (Madrid: Alianza, 1973); J.A. Biescas, M. Tuñón de Lara, España bajo la dictadura franquista, cit.
- 25 Cfr. J.J. Linz, "An authoritarian regime: Spain", in E. Allardt, S. Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics. Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970). See critics on this perspective in: J. Martínez Alier, "Crítica de la caracterización del franquismo como régimen autoritario de pluralismo limitado", Cuadernos Ruedo Ibérico, 45-45 (1975), pp. 67-75; B. Oltra, A. de Miguel, "Bonapartismo y catolicismo: Una hipótesis sobre los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo", Papers, 8 (1978); S. Giner et al., "Despotismo moderno...", cit.
- 26 On the "political development" of the francoist regime see: M. Fraga Iribarne, El desarrollo político (Madrid: Bruquera, 1975); R. Fernández Car-

vajal, La Constitución española (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1969); J. de Esteban, et al., Desarrollo político y Constitución española (Barcelona: Ariel, 1973); J. Solé Tura, Introducción al régimen político español (Barcelona: Ariel, 1970).

27 As an example of the repressive measures taken by the regime from then on one can mention the following ones: the states of exception of 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1975; the Ley de Peligrosidad Social (1970); the reforms making more strict the Criminal Code and the Military Justice Code (1971); the extension of the Tribunal de Orden Público (1972); the Decreto Ley Anti-terrorismo (1975); the numerous **arrests** and trials against political and syndical activists -the "Consejo de Guerra de Burgos"(1970), against ETA members; the "Proceso 1.001"(1973), against CC.OO members; the execution of the anarchist Puig Antich (1974); the shooting of three ETA members and two FRAP members (1975) , etc.

28 In April 28, 1974, the most conservative francoist leader, Girón de Velasco, launched a hard attack against the Arias Navarro aperturist line from the pages of the phalangist Arriba, calling traitors those who were attempting to reform the regime and threatening to take up arms again if the latter were endangered. The eventual success of the conservatives was due, among other circumstances, to the tense situation in the country at that moment threatened by a high wave of terrorist acts which were the justification of the extreme right's arguments.

29 In this sense one should mention the Council of Europe Assembly's decision to reject the Arias Navarro reform on account of it not being democratic and recommending the establishment of public liberties, of May 12, 1976; and, in a similar way, the resolution by the US Senate that provoked the protest from the last francoist Cortes, of July 29, 1976, calling it interventionist.

30 On the political opposition to the francoist regime see: J.J. Linz, "Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime: The case of Spain", in R.A. Dahl (ed.), Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1973); S. Vilar, Protagonistas de la España democrática: La oposición a la dictadura, 1939-1969 (Paris: Ediciones Sociales, 1968); E. Fuentes, "La oposición antifranquista, de 1959 a 1955", Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, Horizonte Español 1966, II (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1966); P. Preston, "La oposición antifranquista: La larga marcha hacia la unidad", in P. Preston (ed.), op. cit., pp.217-263; X. Tusell, La oposición democrática al franquismo (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977).

31. On September 4, 1976, in a very important meeting held in Madrid, the most important groups of the democratic opposition decided to establish negotiations with Suárez's Government, but still keeping up the pressure out in the streets as a reinforcing argument.
32. The seven points were: (1) Recognition of all political parties and syndical organizations; (2) recognition and protection of political and syndical liberties; (3) dissolution of the National Movement and neutrality of the Public Administration; (4) a true political amnesty (in August 1976 the first one had been declared, but it had been very restrictive); (5) an equitable utilization of the mass media; (6) a negotiation of the electoral law; and (7) recognition of the need to institutionalize the "countries" and "regions" of the State.
33. On this subject see Antonio Bar, "El sistema de partidos en España: Ensayo de caracterización", Sistema, 47 (Marzo 1982), pp. 3-46.

SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ACTION IN THE
PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEME

Regionalism, in the bosom of some nations, seems to be a political problem because it presents itself in the form of a reply to the sovereignty of the state, and, on certain occasions, such as in the case of the United Kingdom and Spain, with clamorous violence. These characteristics of the phenomenon justify without doubt its being considered as a political problem, but the political is not the only, nor perhaps the most radical dimension of the problem in question.

Regionalism is also, and most especially a socio-cultural phenomenon and in this sense it may be considered from an anthropological point of view which, at a later moment, could be expressed with the political perspective.

From the socio-cultural point of view, Regionalism appears as a problem since it manifests itself as the search, by a human group, of its own collective identity. Such search has the character of a problem, in the first place because it implies that the identity possessed on an earlier occasion not in harmony with itself and it does not come up to par with that which one is at present or wishes to be: the search is an indication that there has been produced in the process of socio-cultural change a series of transformations in virtue of which the objective expressions, in which the group recognized itself satisfactorily, no longer adequately serve the function of satisfactory self-recognition.

Secondly, this search has the character of a problem in the same way as all poetic, that is, artistic activity is a problem: we are talking about parting from that which is grasped in a pre-objective and obscurely immediate (perhaps sentimental) way, so as to bring it to an objective and symbolical expression which would permit its possession and pursuit, that is, to project and develop it in a satisfactory manner. We are talking about the problem of searching, finding, expressing and possessing, in which the object of these activities is not given a priori at any stage, since it is possible not to give with it or to give with one which is not adequate or satisfactory with respect to the starting-out point.

In the third place, the search has the character of a problem in the sense that that which to be found (inventio) must be invented and it has to be invented at the cost of, or in conflict with the juridico-social reality of the nation-state, that is to say, in conflict with another invention which was consolidated by the configuration, in a determined way, of factors which must be expressed diversely in the new configuration sought. In this third stage, regionalism appears explicitly as a political problem whose solution is sought through political action.

Obviously, the second and third phases of this problem depend on the first: why does one look for one's own identity? Why this restlessness and inquietude respect to that which expresses and guides what it is? Clearly, by the discordance between what it is and that which it expresses and guides. This discordance may be called crisis of identity, loss of one's own objective standing from a former identity or in some other way.

The fact itself of discordances may, of course take many forms. For example, in the case of Christian conscience, the discordance may be produced when a group of prefigurative guidelines for conduct or values does not function or becomes impossible to apply by modification of the socio-cultural context: in so far as such guidelines fell within the definition of being a Christian, a group of individuals could remain perplexed about being a Christian, and respect to whether it can be.

If another case is taken, not making use of a well-used definition of the collective identity but rather the formulation of a definition for the first time, the crisis of identity may be produced because the definition does not contain pre-figurative guidelines of conduct or values for the human group in question. For example, a Yoroba knows what it means to be Yoroba; how to behave himself and what is expected of him as a Yoroba, but he does not have the same level of certainty nor the same amount of knowledge of what it means to be Nigerian (neither before nor after the civil war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970).

As can be seen in these two examples, the discordance between that which one is and the socially recognized objectives which express it and guide it, provokes a restlessness and inquietude which are not resolved until the discordance falls below a determined threshold. These examples, selected on purpose, are distinct from the case of European regionalisms and consequently aid us to centre the latter within the more general frame of the problem of the constitution, loss and transformation of the collective identities.

Being Christian, being Palestinian, being democratic, being Irish, being a soldier etc., when it is not possible or one does not know how to make out the meaning of these adjectives, causes problems of collective identity which, for certain levels of generality, could be the same ones for every case, and which, outside these levels, present distinct profiles for each one of them.

In the case of the European regionalisms, the problem consists in the need to formulate once again one's own identity because the one previously possessed is inadequate. What is more, it seems coercive. Why does this happen?

So as to reply in a fitting way to this question, a certain methodological clarification, that is some references to the conceptual implements most useful for the purpose, must be made. I do not intend to use the categories of superstructure nor the reification of Marx because they imply a certain note of falsity with respect to the cultural products or a certain character of provisionality in relation to what must come in a definitive way. For this second connotation, I also feel the Hegelian category of alienation has little to offer.

In recent times, E.T. Hall has proposed, basing himself to a degree on M. McLuhan, the concept of "extension transference (ET)", which denotes the confusion between the objective external expression of psychic and mental processes and the reality of such processes (1). With this concept, Hall explains well the phenomena of alienation, in the crisis of identity etc., in the centre of socio-cultural processes. Nevertheless, the concept of ET, as Hall mints it does not seem to be adequate either, because it implies "confusion" or just falsity.

But in the phenomenon of nationalism and regionalism, in other words in that of the configurations of collective identities, if one starts with any one of the above-said categories, the supposition of falsity, error, illegitimacy or provisionality is established with respect to the idea of state and of region. Since, on the one hand the establishment of such suppositions is to pre-judge excessively, and on the other, there is sufficient reason to admit the legitimacy of cultural products such as nation, State and reason, I intend to use the category of process of poetic configuration so as to explain the conflict between them.

The concept of poetic configuration was coined by Vico so as to account for socio-cultural processes. The said concept contains not only factors which came to form part of the conceptual systems of Hegel and Marx, but also factors which have been used by T. Parsons to elaborate his own system from which Clifford Geertz also draws, to initiate the difficult study of the problem of the identity of the recent nations of Asia and Africa, and propose theses which would explain the facts and make them sufficiently understandable in a sufficient way (2).

The concept of poetic configuration when Vico formulated it for the first time, seems to me to be the most adequate one to deal with the problem in hands because it has sufficient amplitude and neutrality (3).

Now that I have made these clarifications, I will start dealing with the problem in the following divisions:

2. How did the collective identity, which has become unsatisfactory nowadays, take shape? Why was it satisfactory beforehand? If satisfactory, where did it get its coherence? This is the theme of the configuration of the binomial nation-state.
3. Why has the identity which has been in force up to now been weakened? What form do the manifestations of this weakening take? What are the characteristics of the new identity needed? This is the problem of regionalism as the search for collective identity.
4. To what degree is political action a way to solving the problem? In this respect, what would a reasonable political action consist of? This is the question of the scope and limits of political action.

2. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE BINOMIAL NATION-STATE

Entire libraries, made up of treatises on history, sociology, political science and juridical and social philosophy, deal with the apparition of nations, with the relation between the two. Here we shall examine one of the aspects which the anthropological point of view of

the theme brings to light: that of the configuration of a collective conscience self-conscious of its identity by reference to the binomial nation-state.

It is generally admitted that it is the thinkers of the seventeenth century, especially Hobbes, Spinoza, Grocio and Puffendorf, who formulate the possibility of establishing a juridical and social order with a tendency towards a rational description of society presented on a theoretical plane. They do not form part of, but are rather the precursors of the Enlightenment, starting point of what later would come to be enlightened thought in the intellectual sphere and, in the political sphere, enlightened despotism. One can take it for granted that the work of Hobbes, Spinoza and the thinkers of the Enlightenment constituted the objective expression which gave an outlet for and increased the intensity of a group of forces of great social relevance, which in their turn fed the process of formulation of objective expressions in the field of philosophical thought, of the promulgation of laws and of the creation of political, economic, scientific, industrial institutions etc. It can be supposed that between social forces and objective expressions, a feedback relation was established, whose moment of greatest solidity and intensity may have been the Romanticism of the nineteenth century.

In this moment the collective conscience reaches a self-consciousness of its identity by reference to the binomial nation-state which is fully satisfactory.

I do not, of course, pretend that this conceptual scheme will fit the historical process that takes place between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in a perfect and exact way. There exist objective expressions and social forces which do not maintain between each other the sort of relation I sketched of the hypothetical model, but this model is useful to explain the relation between other forces and other objective expressions which are considered very proper to that period.

Why should this self-consciousness of one's own identity work out satisfactorily? Because there had been a settlement between determined social forces being applied at that time and the institutional devices which guide these forces.

This reply has been given with a terminology which sounds strongly mechanistic, and since the concept of "satisfaction" and the concept -which is solidary to it- of "conscience" does not make sense, it becomes more comprehensible to reply by reference to the category of poetic configuration in the following terms: this self-consciousness of one's own identity was satisfactory because there was concordance between certain collective desires and certain objective expressions (institutional and cultural for the most part), in which these desires obtained a channel for their satisfaction, that is to say, to reach the end towards which they pointed, though in an obscure way.

The process of poetic creation may be described as the effort to express an obscure impulse by means of more

or less suitable words. That which expresses is seen to be agitated or constrained by some kind of demon initially unseen, and the expression is a kind of exorcism which has the characteristics of a certain liberation (4).

What sort of obscure impulses lie behind State nationalisms?

In the first place, the impulse to constitute oneself as a subject, whose first movement, as Hegel very accurately points out, is self-limitation, which signifies at the same time the first moment of freedom. Self-limitation is the abandonment of indeterminate existence, of existence confused and dissolved in a diffused union: it is the self-determination and the self-affirmation, and therefore it is also freedom. On the level of the formation of nation-state this signifies the existence of frontiers, independence and sovereignty, which may also be expressed in the idea of "perfect society".

Among these obscure impulses, of course, are included in a confused way, religious beliefs, ethical principles, aesthetical tendencies, juridical traditions, the struggle for power etc. But if these last two factors are taken as the only real ones and as those which determine the objective expressions, then they appear as illegitimate superstructures (as an ideology, in the sense that Marx gave to the word). From this point of view, the nation and the state appear as something illegitimate and false,

that which alienates etc..., as if they were expressions of a really common depth and strength, binding all individualities.

This is the reason why the nationalisms and regionalisms constitute a problem for socialist doctrine and politics, which, when it meets up with them as real forces, or it supports them tacitly, or it really makes them part of itself, introduces some modification in its doctrinal structure. And this is also the reason why I said at the beginning that the concept of superstructure did not seem adequate in the study of regionalisms.

The obscure impulses from which the nations-state derive constitute a depth and strength which are really common and binding for all individualities of the different social sectors. For this reason, although one could say that the nationalism of Kipling, for example, were an expression of the point of view of a social sector, it would be inexact to say that it did not also express the nationalism of all British society. This character of nationalism as a common and binding strength and depth may be seen with more clarity in the work of Hölderlin, whose fundamental protagonists are the earth and the people, and most of all in the Spanish war of independence against the troops of Napoleon, which greatly evoked the enthusiasm of Fichte because it expressed the strength and self-determination of a people-nation as such, that is to say, without state nor statesmen.

More and more examples could be given, but this is not necessary. We are dealing with forces with these characteristics, with a tremendous power, without which -according to the opinion of Jouvenel- the two world wars cannot be explained, nor would they perhaps have taken place(5).

To the degree in which this force-desire was as described, the frontier, independence and sovereignty constituted satisfactory expressions because they were already an affirmation of one's own collective identity and freedom, and besides, the open way for the fecundity of one's own being.

These cultural products implied, besides, a coefficient of increase in the satisfaction because they strengthened the collectivity. Effectively, if it is taken for granted that the desire in question does not have the characteristics of the Freudian impulse, whose destiny is to become extinguished as soon as it is satisfied, but rather that which Plato calls the eros, whose destiny is fertility, and which implies what Aristotle called habit (hexis), then the satisfaction of the desire in terms of fertility brings with it an increase in the desire as an increase in the poetic capacity, that is, expressive-creative. Once again we are dealing with a feedback relationship.

On the other hand, the desire in its collective aspects is strengthened because what is done is the objective expression of the bond of the two subjects, that is to say, of their unity, in such a way as that the latter becomes consciously assumed, known, and the fruitfulness permitted by what has been expressed is precisely the fruitfulness of this unity. If this

is the case, it follows by hypothesis that the moment of culmination of the nation-state be the moment in which the problems of regionalism could, with most difficulty, be posed. Naturally, the fate of this process by no means has to be that marked out by Hegel. It has not been, in fact. The way in which the nations-state, integrated in themselves, refuted or simply remained juxtaposed to the currents of a religious, aesthetic, juridical, economic etc. kind was different in each case according to the socio-cultural characteristics of each collectivity and according to the personal cast which the builders of the nations-state left in the cultural and institutional configuration of the latter. On the other hand, the process of the configuration of the nations-state cannot be considered as necessary (at best, such an hypothesis would be impossible to verify), but rather probable, with a different degree of probability in each case.

If, then, the binomial nation-state was an objective satisfactory expression, in other words, that it strengthened certain collective impulses, considered in the double sense: as collective and as impulses, it may also be supposed that the more above-mentioned currents it includes, the more consistent it is.

But in virtue of what, did the identity, established by reference to the binomial nation-state, have consistence? Undoubtedly the answer is: by virtue of that by which it turned out satisfactorily.

If we now had to determine the centre of gravity of this consistence, that is, the weakening of which could provoke the emergence of other currents in conflict with the nation-state, I would risk as an hypothesis that said centre of gravity is derived from the intersection of the following two factors: 1) faith in reason, in the realization of a national design of society, and 2) an oft-denounced historical conscience, which adopted that form of conscience of the historical mission of the peoples. This bound together the individual consciences and made them take root in the future. For this reason it can be said that eighteenth century man has his roots in the future.

Of course the thesis, that these two factors constitute the centre of gravity of the nation-state, is by no means evident. But it does seem probable if it is considered, on the one hand, that regionalisms emerge when this faith in reason and in the future are very weak and, on the other, that these two factors could, within the impulse of being constituted as a collective subject, unite and guide a certain number of the currents already referred to.

There is no doubt but that faith in reason and in the future imply to a high degree consciousness of self and a will to exist as a delimited collectivity (frontiers, independence and sovereignty), that is, the affirmation of itself and its presentation as a collectivity, since that which is perceived as realizable or whose realization is aspired to is sufficiently grandiose to be considered as the task of many, or more exactly, the "mission" of

a people. If it is assumed that a primordial stage in this process is the self-limitation and self-configuration according to a rational design of society (similar to that pointed out by Hobbes, Spinoza or Rosseau, for example), then the nation-state appears as supremely united if the State is absolute, and it is considered to express and to carry out a general will and rationality: the laws can be rational and codified, the land can be structured in a rational way by administration, industry can begin and develop itself as a rational force of the nation, as a national industry (not in the sense of being nationalized, but rather in the sense opposed to the "multinational" of the twentieth century).

Besides, it may be considered that this configuration of one's own identity in function of the binomial nation-state, was apt to include other impulses of a different temperament. Religion could be integrated into the nation-state, either if the State takes on the responsibility of representing and guarding religious beliefs and institutions in the form of a "nationalized" church, a confessional State etc., or that the State itself might take the place of religious beliefs in such a way as that faith in religion would come to adopt the form of faith in reason and faith in the future as faith in the State. In this second case, we are dealing with the affirmation of Feuerbach that the State does not arise from the faith in God, but rather from the lack of confidence in God; in the first case, on the other hand, we would be dealing with a State which does indeed arise from a religious faith in the proper

sense of the word. Of course, there likewise exist those cases in which the binomial nation-state does not include religion, rather it sets itself up against it. In these cases, by the theoretical hypothesis, the binomial would have one support less, or one more weak point.

The configuration nation-state could also include the more obvious ethical and aesthetical values, juridical traditions, economic and class interests, launching them towards a fuller future, and to the degree in which this were achieved, it could have one factor more of consistency or one less.

In a certain way this is a very characteristic trait of the so-called ideologies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the aspiration for an integration into a national system with the greatest possible number of socio-cultural factors, the aspiration to carry it out in the future and an aspiration bent on expansion which takes the form of an affirmation of nationality or its being overcome.

Naturally, the model presented above is a theoretical one, which has a consistency in each different European country and in each one of the men who contributed to express the national temperament, according to the respective idiosyncrasy.

Taking two thinkers with widely opposed ideas, Comte and Marx, faith in reason and in the future tends more

towards the suspension rather than the affirmation of nationalities; this does not mean to say that such faith has these same characteristics in the whole of the French or German population, nor in the mind and action of Talleyrand or Bismark.

It is now time to consider the weakening of this consistency and, in correlation with it, the emergence of the problem of the regionalisms.

3. THE PROBLEM OF REGIONALISM AS THE SEARCH FOR THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

The resurgence of regionalism as the search and affirmation of the collective identity is a clear sign that the earlier definition of one's own identity has been weakened or made redundant, which seems to be unsatisfactory or coercive. What is the cause of this weakening? Obviously, the weakening of the connection between desire and ideal, between obscure impulses and the cultural and institutional expression and guidance of these impulses.

Of course, whereas this thesis is valid for the States of Europe, it is not so for those of Africa: the agreement of the Organization of African States not to bring up the problems of frontiers and to maintain at all cost the territorial boundaries in force, is made

with the clear conscience that the African State-nations are artificial for the present. These nation-states therefore have never been and as yet are not cultural expressions of the State will, since the State is the expression of the desire for independence of the peoples (6).

Well enough, if in fact there does exist a weakening in the connection between desire and ideal, between impulse and cultural expression, it is a clear sign that the collective desire for identity has been weakened in both the desire and the collectivity: precisely because the strength of the connection between desire and ideal was what reinforced the desire in its twofold dimension. The cultural expressions of the collective unity are not consistent with the desire for collective unity as the new situation presents them: they do not satisfy it, nor direct it, nor strengthen it, and, to the same degree, the desire is weakened or extinguished altogether.

Manifestations of this phenomenon are the reduction in or lack of enthusiasm for the plastic and verbal symbols of the nation-state, and in general for the liturgy and rhetoric of patriotism, an increasing indifference towards the political activity of those who govern the nation-state, and towards the ideologies which the statesmen represent, that is to say, an excessive and progressing remoteness between the political action of the statesmen and the real social life of the citizens. Related with these weakenings and remotenesses, the development of a liturgy and a rheto-

ric of patriotism may be pointed out, such patriotism whose object is not the nation, but precisely the region; this indeed awakens and strengthens enthusiasms.

The above are some of the manifestations of the weakening of the collective identity taking place up to these times. As for the causes of this weakening, it could be said -Durkheim comes to mind in this regard- that the collective conscience becomes more and more indetermined as the division of functions develop.

According to the study of Durkheim, if this division of functions does not produce a strengthening of organic solidarity, it is given the name of "anomic division" (7). This expression, in the context of the theme being dealt with, could give the idea that the weakening of the binomial nation-state is an anomic or pathological phenomenon, which in its turn could give rise to the idea that such a binomial has a certain legitimacy which is invulnerable with respect to socio-cultural changes. This may also be excessively prejudiced.

There is no need to go into the question of whether or not industrial society has been produced anomically or not. Suffice it to say that it has in fact been produced.

The increasing separation between objective expressions and social reality, and consequently the bond between both, can be also explained by reference to the process of growing

bureaucratization as Max Weber explains it, in so far as it affects the objective expressions themselves of the binomial nation-state. Perhaps one of these expressions in which the process of bureaucratization can be best seen is in administrative law. The level of complexity and development which has taken place in this field in the last hundred years can be taken as an index of the complexity and the abstract character which the nation-state has gradually acquired, given that administrative law is perhaps the best expression of the State's effort, to grasp the fullness of the social reality.

In the extent to which administrative law becomes more complex -the same can be said about fiscal, mercantile and even civil law- the connections or mediations between the social reality and the State-nation turn into an ever-thickening bureaucratic network. Naturally, bureaucratic mediations exist in benefit of the nation-state, for the better fulfillment of its own ends, but to the degree in which they become more involved and extensive, while continuing at the same time to be the means to ends which the entire collectivity could make their own, they also turn into obstacles which prevent these ends from being seen and from being felt as one's own.

The mediating systems can become so complex and rationalized, that technocracy could appear as inevitable or as the highest ideal. And technocracy most of the time brings with it the abdication of political ideals and of the impulse to project one's own collective identity, because it implies a

transfer of individual and solidary responsibilities to a small group of experts, who, in their private circles, take decisions which have to do with the best attainment of the proper ends of the nation-state.

Between the social reality and its objective expression and the channels in which the latter can be continued, the mediation of science and technology is introduced, to which the responsibility for the decisions are conferred. But the transfer of responsibilities in favour of efficacy has a limit, which when crossed, the efficacy is no longer an unquestionable value, but it comes into conflict with its own identity and could become weaker than the latter or even lacking in foundation.

Effectively, efficacy is a value suitable for a collectivity if it is experienced just as it is, that is to say, as one. But if the efficacy requires a configuration of the collectivity in such a way that the latter no longer experiences itself as one, then the efficacy cannot be considered as a value for itself, but at best as a value for nobody, as an abstract value or as a non-value.

A collectivity in this situation may be described by the title of a "solitary multitude", or with the diagnostic of "crisis of identity" or that of the "anomy or the organic solidarity". In whatever case we are dealing with a weakening or a loss of the collective identity.

I do not mean to say with this that the phenomenon in question be a pathological one. It could just as easily be considered as a natural phenomenon. It could happen that, in the moment of the configuration of the binomial nation-state, the values of one's own identity and that of efficacy be mutually dependent, in such a way that one could not be realized without the other nor the two without the nation-state: And it could take place that, given a process of concentration of mediations as described, the earlier association could become indefensible and that the value of the collective identity could acquire another kind of cultural expression.

If the corrosion of the configured identity by reference to the nation-state has the characteristics marked out, then it becomes comprehensible that, correlative with this corrosion, a revival of the regionalisms is produced as the search for a new identity. From this perspective, regionalism does not appear as the emergence of latent irrational forces.

This thesis is very ambiguous precisely because the concept of "irrational force" also is. It would be necessary to define it with a certain accuracy to see if it exists, that is to say to determine its real bearings and to find out where it does not fit. Without these clarifications, the concept of irrational force could seem somewhat pejorative, a kind of desire which does not fit into the rationality which gave rise to the nation-state, and consequently the concept in question is not particularly genuine, because it is not irrational; what is more, it is not in agreement with a very

specific form of rationality.

The force which stimulates the search for self-identity is not of itself irrational; what happens is that it can seem to be so as long as it does not find a suitable and comprehensible expression: if this took place the force would no longer seem to be "irrational".

One could still insist that a tendency which prefers individuality and indigence to efficacy and self-sufficiency is irrational. But, apart from the fact that this does not seem to be the case of the regionalisms, and even if it were, it would be necessary to add to what has already been said the observation which G. K. Chesterton -an author who is by no means suspect in this respect- holds as the basis of his democratic convictions.

His observation is the following: there are activities which a man must always be able to do by himself, even if he does them badly, that is, to clean his own nose, choose his own wife and decide public affairs. Such things as education of his own children and other activities of the same style could be added.

If a very involved scientific-technical mediation is introduced between man and the objective to which these activities are directed, in such a way that he becomes protagonist of and takes the responsibility for the activities themselves, the outcome would be the rejection of these systems of media-

tion or a lack of interest for the purpose of these activities. In this second case, the lack of interest could bring about a crisis of identity for the husband, as a citizen or as father-educator of his own children. Such would be the situation -caricatured by the British sense of humour- of a father who withdraws from kissing his son or from scolding him for not having read involved monographs which explain how both things are done.

The comparison is also valid for the case of the regionalisms, and brings us back again to the thesis that if the demands of efficacy destroy one's own identity, in that moment efficacy ceases to be a value.

To reply in a more complete way to the questions: why does an identity weaken more during a particular time? and, what are the manifestations of this weakening?, some clarifications must still be made.

The identity is weakened because the socio-cultural change provoked a mismatch between the factors whose association it had constituted. For every factor (religion, ethics, aesthetics, law, economics, political ideology etc.) integrated into the socio-cultural system, the binomial nation-state becomes more consistent, in a more or less explicit or more or less sublime and unconscious way, and it could be less consistent to the degree in which these factors come into conflict more or less openly with it.

Each European nation is an example of the cohesion and

conflict between these factors, some of which have acquired a tendency in their dynamism to overcome nationalities: for example, political ideologies, the economy, industry, the systems of military defence. In this dynamism, such factors could seem to become ever more abstract and complex; the same can be affirmed of the nation-state. Not being called into question in this moment is the correlation or the kind of causal relationships between the process by which the nation-state evolved into something more and more complex and abstract and the process by which the political ideologies, the economy and industry, the systems of military defence, the juridical ordinances etc. followed a similar path.

What is important in the theme being dealt with is the fact that, to the degree in which these factors appear abstract and unconnected to the collective conscience, with no relation to religion and ethics, which are particular uniting factors, they appear, for this very reason, ever more empty and without meaning. In this case the socio-historical situation is particularly suitable for the eruption of anti-cultural movements, of the movements of going back to one's origin, of the return to nature, to what is real etc., movements which may also be detected, apart from in the sociological sphere, in the fields of philosophy, art, religion etc. What do these contracultural movements manifest: the understanding of a lining-up and its rejection, in other words, the sense of the loss of one's own identity and the effort to find it again. In this situation, the nation-state could appear to be a superstructure and an alienation, but beforehand, no. Before, it justly appeared as a way to self-realization, as a satisfactory collective identity.

Political ideologies, in their supranationalist sense, could easily appear now to be suspicious from the regionalist and contraculturalist points of view, and the conflict with them will be presented in such a way that the region would prevail over the political party. Besides, the movements which at present appear to be most naturally allied with regionalism would be the ecologist ones, because, unlike the ideologies which arise in the nineteenth century, they do not concentrate on abstract ideals (that is, those which nowadays seem so abstract) such as do the perfect socio-economic system or the perfect harmony of wills, but rather on concrete and perceptible realities such as this earth and this landscape in which the human group lives. And besides, the ecological current and regionalism itself could come out winning if they were to include a factor of such uniting power as that of religion, which is what happens in the cases in which the latter, with very interesting characteristics, takes the form of neo-paganism (8).

The questions on the why and how of the weakening of the collective identity in force for a certain time are thus seen to be somewhat more completely answered.

Such weakening, as has already been said, goes hand in hand with the need for a new identity and the search for it. Why then is a new identity necessary, and in general why is

it necessary that the self-consciousness of the collective identity be referred to objective expressions? Because man needs to know to a certain extent who he is so as to be what he is, to affirm himself as he is, to act, not to become disintegrated, and, since he is social by nature, he needs to know to a certain extent which society is his so as to be social in an existential way (which is the same as saying, in second act), to live solidarity with other men as social beings and in their action, so as not to be dissolved in the abyss of solitude. The fact that man is a being conscious of what he is and of what he is not, in other words, conscious of the world, of man and of God, makes demands on and has repercussions in the make-up of human societies, which make them so different from groupings of animals and vegetal colonies. Human societies, to constitute and maintain themselves, need a self-consciousness of their own collective identity which is only reached by reference to objective expressions, that is to say, to cultural products.

Now is the moment to look into the question of the characteristics of the new identity which the regionalisms require.

The search and configuration of the collective identity takes on many facets: folklore, art in all its different

forms, religious uses, customs and laws, institutions, organs of public opinion, political action etc. All these factors are mediations within society itself, or, to express it in the terminology of classical philosophy, between the society as first act (social nature of man) and society as second act (cultural configuration of each society in particular).

When this search is carried out principally by means of political action and according to the objective to which the latter is directed (which can be anywhere between a minimal autonomy in the heart of the nation-state and an absolute sovereignty incompatible with this), it could happen that the value of one's own identity is preferred to that of efficacy. It has already been said why and how this can take place and why it is not irrational, and it was said that this was not the case of the regionalisms as a general rule, since it is not clear that the maintenance of the binomial nation-state be the most effective.

If the search for the identity takes on more intensely the aspect of a political action, it could happen that the affirmation of this identity automatically implies greater efficacy, as previously the nation-state implied a greater efficacy; what is more, it could happen that in the search for the new identity, a need is felt to possess in oneself (according to the variety of cases) the centre of one's own self-determination, that is to say, the political power. In the same way in which an individual needs, in order to experiment his own self, not only to have will, but also a more or less wide field of aptitudes in which to exercise it, a certain scope for his

decisions for which he could feel himself responsible.

From this point of view, being oneself, as an individual but as part of the collectivity, implies deciding for oneself and being effective (or not) by oneself.

It is possible that this problem might not be considered when the nation-state is being shaped, because the level of solidarity -of identification- of the regions with the nation-state are so intense that the regions would feel the actions and decisions of the nation as their own, or because the regions had a level of autonomy sufficient to express their own identity in a satisfactory manner. This implies that, as the collective identity -expressed by the configuration of the binomial nation-state weakens, the new identity sought for supposes a greater autonomy, and, in some cases, an absolute sovereignty.

Consequently, the political struggle takes on the form a collision with the nation-state, and this adds a violent dimension to the regionalisms, which is different in each case of course; all of its manifestations can be observed by means of social psychology as a form of susceptibility and mistrust.

Effectively, if an effort is made to attain one's own collective identity, in which this effort seems opposed to the nation-state, the most serious threat to this identity is the one which opposes it from without: as such, whoever is not one of us and belongs to the ambit of the opposing nation-state

could seem to be an enemy. His presence could perhaps be interpreted as an implicit attack on one's own collective identity, from which susceptibility and mistrust arise, which in the extreme could arrive at hate for the stranger, that is to say, for he who belongs to the ambit of the nation-state.

This mistrust also has its counterpart in the field of individual psychology. In the situations in which an individual tries to conform his own identity to an ideal to which he aspires and which he tries to carry out within himself, -for example, in adolescence-, a straightforward discrepancy over the ideal in question on the part of another individual could be interpreted as a personal attack, and this could cause mistrust or even hate towards the other person.

When the individual or collective identity is already properly constituted, susceptibility is reduced, and only real attacks are interpreted as such.

After having made these analyses it could be said that the force which propels the regionalisms is very similar if not the same in nature to that which propelled the nationalisms.

It is possible to think that nations which are simple by nature and have been submitted to external pressure for a long time, it is likely that regionalism will not constitute a serious problem: nor is this likely in old nations such as Portugal, Ireland and Poland, for example, nor in other recent ones such as Malta or Barbadoes, because in these, the diffe-

rences between nation and region are minimal or non-existent.

In nations more synthetic by nature, old ones such as Spain and the United Kingdom or more modern ones such as Italy and Czechoslovakia, it true to say, on the contrary, that regionalism is an historically recurring problem, which has to do with the identity of the nation-state and of the regions, since the national and regional sentiments which had satisfactory objective expressions for prolonged periods, can be rooted with equal force in the form of a habit in the different social sectors.

Finally, in the nations which have been constituted recently, such as the greater part of the African ones, being of a particularly artificial and abstract nature, one might think that regionalism could arise as a serious problem. These nations, while being constituted by administrative conventions, could be considered for this very reason as an a priori synthesis, but it cannot be deduced that regionalism would arise in them as a serious problem. It could easily happen that these artificial syntheses would act as catalysts for well integrated and stable cultural syntheses.

In reality, these analogies cannot be brought to their extremes, since the process of formation or dismemberment of a nation by the union or separation of a group of regions does not correspond to the process of a chemical reaction, whose characteristics are always and everywhere the same. The states of the collective conscience and of the socio-cultural factors

have consequences in time which cannot be foreseen and which impede the construction of theoretical models having the permanent validity which the theoretical models of chemical reactions have. Socio-cultural sociology and anthropology cannot function on the fringe of history (9).

What characteristics do the new regional identities need? After what has been said, the need is clearly for political self-determination, at least in the case of Spain. To what extent? What kind of political action would bring us to the attainment of such an objective? This brings us to the last part of the present study.

4. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL ACTION

It was said at the beginning of this work that regionalism is not only nor perhaps principally a political problem. If this is the case, then the problem needs not only a political solution.

The task of finding one's own identity is one of finding objective expressions, symbols, institutions etc., which are well in keeping with the collective desires and which direct them as well as possible, that is to say, in the most fruitful way. This is a task of the creators of symbol-projects (10) in the ambit of art, religion, morals, law, folklore, the economy, administration etc., which greatly exceeds the limits of political action.

Neither are we trying to minimize the scope of the latter: although the hypothesis that, if in 1640, Catalonia were to have followed the lot of Portugal, it would have a richer personality than it now has, is impossible to verify, nevertheless, it can indeed be affirmed that it would have a different personality. Besides, and at the same time supposing that Catalonia had in fact acquired independence in 1640, it could also be said that the possibility of developing a rich personality of its own even that of maintaining independence would have been directly proportional to the fruitfulness of the creators of the symbol-projects already referred to, such fruitfulness as would have taken place without independence.

To say it in another way: political action has certain limits, which when exceeded, is exposed to failure. As C. Pereira ironically points out, the English revolution of the seventeenth century reached its objectives because they were strictly political, and as such, modest, that is, to establish a particular parliamentary system and enthrone a determined dynasty; in this way a political system was achieved which has shown itself as the most stable in Europe. The French Revolution of the eighteenth century aimed to accomplish much more: from the creation of a new divinity to the creation of new men, free, equal and all of them brothers, and to a new weekly, monthly and yearly chronology. It cannot be said though that it will reach its objectives or for that matter achieve a stable political system (11).

In this way we can begin to see to a certain extent the

scope and limits of political action and what could be understood as reasonable political action in relation to the problems of regionalisms. A panoramic political action is not reasonable.

At this stage I would like to point out that a panoramic political action is not the same as a suicidal one: the latter may not be irrational. Although in certain aspects Basque regionalism in Spain and that of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom may seem suicidal and irrational, they do not appear like that from the point of view of a subjectivity -be it individual or collective- with such a sense of humiliation and pressure, that it comes to prefer death rather than a life with slavery. Feelings of this type, which have almost brought about decisions of collective suicide, have taken place on definite occasions in the history of Spain: for example in the cases of Numancia and Sagunto. But the state of indetermination in the collective conscience is such at present, that the analogy is surprising, and this alone is probably enough to assure that the same thing does not happen again after twenty centuries.

A political action directed towards the constitution of the regional identity is reasonable if it conforms to the real socio-cultural change, to the actual situation and to that which is being tended towards. That is to say, if it expresses the really important regional and national sentiments in such a way that both can be satisfied. And in this sense, it must be said, that if the regional sentiment exists side by side

with the national one in the same individual or collectivity, then regionalist political action, suicidal in form, is not reasonable, that is, it is irrationally suicidal because it denies reality, which is the same as saying it denies reason.

Reasonable political action does not consist in finding out what is going to happen and favour it, because in the field of politics, as in that of art, law etc., there are no fixed methods: as was said in the beginning, we are dealing with poetic configuration, that is, to find, in the sense of inventing objective expressions from among several possibilities: there is an ample margin, and this amplitude is not saved by deduction but rather by invention, and of course in the invention, as in the poesis, the genius of the poet naturally leaves his mark.

In the effort to constitute the collective identity through cultural products, this will be more satisfactory and consistent to the degree in which it includes more cultural factors. In the down to earth of political activity, the task comes across several difficulties: in the first place, that in the same collectivity there exist regionalist and nationalist sentiments side by side, with a changeable intensity and proportion difficult to grasp in their reality; in the second place, that, although it is true that the modern State finds itself in a crisis situation, it is not disposed just because of that to spontaneously renounce the powers which it has accumulated; in the third place, that political

ideologies, either because they arose with the modern State itself and so have a nationalist or internationalist tone, or because they aspire to possessing the greatest possible amount of power and so to conquer the State, have attitudes towards the regionalisms which, at the very best of times, does not go beyond mere tolerance. In the case of Spain, there do not exist national political parties which have not come into conflict with the regionalisms.

But these difficulties do not make political action, whose object is to constitute the regional collective identity in its own level, impossible. Undoubtedly, the artistic configuration of the politician is more arduous than that of the poet, painter or musician, because the matter which the latter have to harmonize -words, colours, or sound- are less changeable and less conflictive among themselves as are the questions which the politician has to harmonize, namely free human wills, that is, religious beliefs, ethical and juridical aspirations, economic interests, desires for power etc. For this reason Aristotle said that politics is the noblest and most difficult of the arts.

Although in politics are dealing with the most difficult of all arts, there is no need to make an impossibility of it apportioning it unreachable tasks or rash objectives. When this in fact does take place, the outcomes are the discredit of and the contempt and indifference towards political activity.

The greater part of the regionalisms have no aspirations:

towards an absolute sovereignty, and where this seems to be the case, it is not of the whole collectivity, but rather of radical sectors which are in the minority. Perhaps it is not possible to break up the nation-state, perhaps it is unnecessary, perhaps undesirable. But perhaps it just is possible, necessary and of course desirable that the regions would obtain a collective identity sufficiently consistent and satisfactory, that the presence of the stranger is not regarded as a threat, the nation state neither is nor does not see itself as an oppressor, and that it becomes possible in a certain degree to carry out the project-desires in which the collectivity expresses itself and possesses itself as a unity.

As has already been said, this is not only nor perhaps principally the task of political art. Nevertheless, in its specific area, its contribution to the solution of the problem would have to be to attain a level and ambit such, that the political self-determination be as much in keeping as possible with the identity which the region requires. To obtain this situation at the lowest possible cost, or in a way which best suits all political sentiments, economics interests, ethico-juridical aspirations etc., is somewhat more than a reasonable political action: it would be a brilliant one.

NOTES

- (1) Cfr. E.T. HALL, Beyond culture, Anchor Press, New York, 1977, pp. 28 et seq.
- (2) Cfr. C. GEERTZ, The interpretation of culture, Basic Books, New York, 1973.
- (3) I think I have demonstrated these characteristics of the concept of poetic configuration of Vico in my study "Reflexión filosófica y desintegración sociocultural en la antropología de G.B. Vico" ("Philosophical reflection and sociocultural disintegration in the anthropology of G.B. Vico"), in Anuario Filosófico, XIV-2, 1981.
- (4) "I don't believe that the relation of a poem to its origins is capable of being more clearly traced", T.S. ELIOT, On poetry and poets, The Noonday Press, New York, 3rd edition, 1976, p. 107.
- (5) Cfr. Bertraud de Jouvenel. El origen del estado moderno (The origin of the modern State), EMESA, Madrid, 1977, p. 401.
- (6) The difference between independence and collective identity can be shown in these new State-nations by

the fact that, after having obtained independence and living with it in a peaceful way, the problems brought up are precisely those of the regionalisms, the problems of discordances between the different attempts to define the collective identity. Cfr. C. GEERTZ. "After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States", pp. 234-254.

- (7) I am referring to the third chapter of book II and the first three chapters of book III of La división del trabajo social (The division of social work) of E. DURKHEIM.
- (8) I think that this sense of regionalism, when applied to the Basque country in Spain, is worthy of attention for socio-cultural anthropology.
- (9) For a detailed consideration of regionalism in the Iberian Peninsula, cfr. La España de las autonomías (Spain: land of autonomies), 2 vols, Espasa-Calpe S.A., Madrid, 1981.
- (10) The expression "symbol-projects" is used in the same sense as what Paul Ricoeur calls "prospective symbols". Cfr. P. RICOEUR, Freud: una interpretación de la cultura (Freud: an interpretation of culture), siglo XXI, Madrid, 2nd edition, 1973, p. 440.
- (11) Cfr. C. PEREIRA, Doce tesis sobre la política (Twelve theses on politics) in A. Llano and others, Ética y política en la sociedad democrática (Ethics and politics

in democratic society), Sepasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1981,
pp. 143-144.

28

THE CASE FOR MONETARY INTEGRATION
OF GREECE, PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND ITALY
WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

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I. INTRODUCTION (*)

One step in the long process leading to complete economic and political integration among a group of countries is the adoption of a common currency in the area defined by these countries, that is, their monetary integration.

Given that there exists an explicit commitment to achieve economic and political integration among the member countries and the forthcoming candidates to the European Economic Community, it seems justified to ask as how ready are some of these countries to join a foreseeable EEC currency area. The primary purpose of this paper is to find a satisfactory answer to this question in the case of four Southern European countries: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy.

The basic economic criterion of our analysis will be the need of each of these countries for varying their real-exchange rate vis-à-vis the E.E.C. Section II explains the foundations of this criterion that was proposed by Vaubel (1976). In Section III developments of nominal and real exchange rates of the four Southern European countries, Netherlands and Germany in the 1970's are presented, and the different patterns are analysed in the light of the current theory. Section IV tries to appraise the relative costs of currency unification for the six countries. As could be expected, Germany is the candidate number one (lowest

(*) This paper is based on a previous research undertaken at the University of Michigan (U.S.A.) during the academic year 1977-78 with financial support provided by the Southern European Fellowship program of the Ford Foundation. I have benefited from discussions with professors Robert M. Stern, Jean Paul Abraham and Arielle Beyaert.

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costs) to currency unification. A more striking result if account is taken of the current arrangements in the European Monetary System, is that Italy turns out to be a more desirable membership than Netherlands. The ranking of readiness to currency unification is completed with Portugal, Spain and Greece, in this order. Exchange rate policies by each of the four Southern European countries in the 1970's are analysed in Section V. It is shown that nominal exchange-rate variations have been an effective instrument for economic policy although it has not always been well managed by the monetary authorities. The best behaviour corresponds to Italy. In Section VI intra-eleven countries (E.E.C. plus Greece, Portugal and Spain) variations of nominal and real-exchange rates are measured. Because the pooled exchange-rate variances show that the variability in nominal exchange rates has served mainly to make necessary real exchange-rate adjustments the implication drawn is that by the time being the area defined by the eleven countries is not a desirable currency area. Some general conclusions are presented in Section VII.

II. THE NEED FOR REAL EXCHANGE-RATE VARIABILITY AS A CRITERION FOR MONETARY INTEGRATION

Since the essential component of monetary integration is exchange-rate union and implies giving up the utilisation of the exchange rate for economic policy purposes, ascertaining the readiness of one country for joining a monetary integrated area will be based on the following considerations about medium and long-run variability of nominal-exchange rates:

- Discrepancies in monetary developments, like different rates of growth of the money supply, are reflected in the inflation-rate differential and in the nominal-exchange rate in such a way that the real rate of exchange remains constant. Indeed, if the index of real-exchange rate; E_r , between the domestic country and the foreign currency area is defined by:

$E_r = E \cdot P/P^*$ (where E is the domestic index of effective-exchange rate that varies in the same direction as the value of the domestic currency, P and P^* the domestic and foreign price level respectively), this means that monetary factors, as they affect E and P/P^* in the same proportion but in the opposite direction, will keep E_r unchanged.

- Divergences in real factors affect the nominal-exchange rate and/or the inflation-rate differential in such a way that variations in E and P/P^* substitute one for each other and both contribute to modify E_r in the same manner. An example will serve to clarify this idea: suppose that there is a relative increase in the productivity of the domestic tradable sector with respect the foreign tradable sector. This economic divergence will be reflected in either one or in both of the following developments which appreciate the domestic real exchange rate:

- . an improvement in the foreign sector that brings about appreciation in the nominal exchange rate (E increases) and/or an increase in the stock of foreign reserves that will be repercutated in a higher domestic rate of inflation.
- . an increase of wages in the domestic tradable sector. In so far as trade-unions can impose the same wage-increase in the domestic non-tradable sector a higher price level will result in this last sector that will contribute to raise the domestic general rate of inflation.

Therefore, variations in the real-exchange rate reflect only divergences in real factors developments. And, conversely, divergences in the latter require variations in the former. However, although the need for changing E_r has to be satisfied by an adjustment in E and/or by a change in P/P^* , there are theoretical reasons to think that a large part of the adjustment will take place through variations of E . In particular, a downward adjustment in the rate of growth of nominal prices and wages is very costly. Since exchange-rate illusion is not fully widespread it is much more easy and effective to get downward adjustments in real wages through exchange-rate depreciation. Empirical evidence also suggest that variations in nominal-exchange rates are the main determinant of variations in real-exchange rates.

From the preceding reasoning the following conclusions can be drawn:

- a) When there are not divergences between the economic structures of the domestic country and the foreign currency area, and nominal-exchange rate variability is only due to a lack of coordination in monetary policies and subsequent differences in the rates of inflation, the only obstacle to monetary integra

tion of the domestic country with the currency area will be of a "political" nature according to Vaubel's terminology. There could be an economic reason only in the case where each domestic rate of inflation could be associated to a different rate of unemployment (the traditional Phillips curve).

- b) Since the need for real exchange-rate variations has to be satisfied mainly through nominal exchange-rate changes it follows that only divergences in the economic structures are to be considered economic obstacles to monetary integration.
- c) Any indicator of the relative variability of nominal with respect real-exchange rates will be a reliable measure of the relative importance of political with respect economic obstacles to monetary integration.

The variations in real-exchange rates we are referring to are permanent changes originated by those factors that shift the demand and/or the supply of tradable goods and the demand for assets among a group of countries¹. There also exist other kind of changes disregarded here because of their temporary character, v.g. those variations produced by sudden unforeseen shifts in the demand and/or the supply of assets that give rise to excessi

1. For an explanation of the way through which some of these factors operate, see, for instance, Korteweg (1980), p. 8 - 10.

ve adjustment (overshooting) in the nominal-exchange rate².

The problem arises as to how to appraise the need for permanent real exchange-rate variability. An appropriate way, proposed by Vaubel (1976) is to measure permanent real exchange-rate changes over a sufficiently long recent period of time. To this task will be devoted the following Sections.

III. NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE-RATE CHANGES

Table I summarizes the accumulated changes in both nominal and real-exchange rates in the four Southern European countries, Netherlands and Germany vis-à-vis the whole E.E.C. over the period 1971-1980. The last two countries are added in order to make some comparisons with the behaviour of two strong currencies in the European monetary arrangements. Given the lack of data concerning effective-exchange rates for the Greek drachma and the Portuguese escudo I decided to elaborate a nominal-exchange index on the basis of the market value of the Ecu expressed in each of the six currencies. The year 1970 was taken as the base year.

2. Some very well known examples are sudden unexpected changes in a country's rate of monetary expansion, and variations in exchange-rate expectations that originate instability in the demand for international assets. In order to avoid excessive exchange-rate fluctuations and their inflationary consequences in the countries that want to achieve monetary integration Optica Report(1977) suggest some foreign exchange-intervention rules tending to assure the equilibrium condition expressed by the purchasing power parity doctrine. For a survey of the sources of overshooting, see Isard (1978).

Table 1 - Indices of Nominal Effective Exchange Rates, Relative Prices and Costs, and Real Effective Exchange Rates vis-à-vis the E.E.C. in 1980 (1970 = 100)

Country	Index of Nominal Effective Rate (E)	Indices of relative prices and costs (P/P*)				Indices of real exchange rates (E.P/P*) based on indices of			
		Export Unit Value	Wholesale Prices	Consumer Prices	Hourly Earnings	Export Unit Value	Wholesale Prices	Consumer Prices	Hourly Earnings
Greece	50,61	158,4	192,5	163,6	194	80,2	97,4	82,8	98,2
Italy	52,56	198,2	187,6	157,4	126	104,1	98,6	82,7	96,5
Spain	70,20	138,3	139,2	174,3	238,5	97,1	97,7	122,3	167,5
Portugal	41,28		220,1	231,5	183,7		90,8	95,6	52
Netherlands	131,16	84,9	80,2	87,3	78,3	111,4	105,1	114,5	102,7
Germany	145,23	67,2	74	70,9	65,5	97,6	107,5	102,9	95,1

SOURCE.- I.M.F. International Financial Statistics.

Three indices of prices were used: export unit value (not available for Portugal), wholesale prices, and consumer prices. To measure cost-competitiveness there was only one common index available: hourly earnings from International Financial Statistics of the I.M.C. In this respect, I am not convinced that the index of unit labor costs would be more representative because, as pointed by Thygesen (1979), changes in output per manhour which is the correction introduced by this last index is not a good approximation to changes in the unobservable total factor productivity in the 1970's. Indeed, in all four countries, an important part of the statistical gains in total factor productivity have

been obtained at the expense of less employment resulting from a continuous increase in hourly earnings, and lower rate of production growth.

The figures of Table 1 point out a large nominal depreciation of each of the four Southern currencies contrasting with a large appreciation of the Dutch guilder and the Deutsche mark. Were these divergent performances matched by the evolution of relative prices and/or costs? Columns 6 to 9 show the value of the indices of real effective exchange rates of the four Southern countries, Netherlands and Germany. As could be expected, the indices of prices with a larger weight with tradable goods in their elaboration give rise to real exchange-rate indices that conform more closely to the PPP doctrine. This is very clear in the case of the wholesale-price-index the reason being that this index is elaborated mainly on the basis of manufactured goods. It is also the case when using the export unit value except for the drachma. The reason for this discrepancy is probably to be found in the system of foreign exchange controls still prevailing in Greece. It is also shown that the countries whose currency depreciated most (Portugal, Greece and Italy) improved their international competitiveness whereas the competitiveness of Spain worsened in terms of both consumer prices and hourly earnings³.

Since the figures presented in Table 1 clearly depend on the base year adopted, it seems convenient to ask as whether our

3. As can be realized the results about competitiveness are sensitive to the index of relative prices or relative costs chosen to calculate real exchange rates. The Bank of England (1978) analyses the "pros" and "cons" of each index.

base year (1970) was one of equilibrium in the exchange rates. The adjustments decided in December 1971 by the Smithsonian Agreement may indicate that the exchange-rate constellation prevailing one year before was not an equilibrium one, but there is no convincing argument to think that this Agreement resulted in equilibrated exchange rates. Furthermore, and according to Thigesen (1979), the modifications agreed, expressed in terms of effective rates were generally small compared to the changes in real rates that have actually been observed over the 1971-1980 period. Figure 1 shows the evolution of nominal and real-exchange rates of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Germany. Again one can realize that in general there has been less scope for changing real rates on the basis of relative wholesale prices and relative export-unit values. After temporary departures that generally appear when the rate of change of nominal-exchange rate is more pronounced, both of these real exchange rates modify their trend to approximate more closely to PPP doctrine⁴.

As far as real exchange rates elaborated with the consumer price index are concerned, it has been shown in many works that there exists a systematic positive deviation from the PPP line in the fast-growing and innovating countries⁵. As explained in Section II, the growth of the productivity of a country's tradable goods sector leads to real appreciation of its currency

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4. This does not mean that PPP necessarily determines the long-term value of the nominal exchange rate. For an explanation of the difficulties involved in the determination of the long-term value of the nominal-exchange rate, see Artus (1978).
 5. This effect was pointed out by Balassa. For a discussion, see Dornbusch (1979), p. 91.

FIGURE 1

Indices of Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (N) and Indices of Real Exchange Rates based on Consumer Prices (C), Wholesale Prices (W), Export Unit Values (X) and Hourly Earnings (H). (1970 = 100)




FIGURE 1 (continued)

Indices of Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (N) and Indices of Real Exchange Rates based on Consumer Prices (C), Wholesale Prices (W), Export Unit Values (X) and Hourly Earnings (H). (1970 = 100)

160
150
140

ITALY


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NETHERLANDS


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
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against other currencies. The experiences of Germany and Portugal (1971-1976) fit perfectly in this rule whereas the case of Spain results, as will be seen below, from the explosion of labor costs (originated by both an acceleration in hourly earnings and a rapid growth of social security taxes) not sufficiently matched by the nominal depreciation of the peseta. The reasons for the strong appreciation of the real-exchange rate of the Dutch guilder between 1975 and 1978 may be attributed to a conjunction of several factors among which the successful exploitation and exports of the Dutch natural gas played an important role⁶. The depreciating real-exchange rate of Greece and Italy can safely be attributed to three main factors: a slowdown in the rate of productivity increase, the acceleration in wage costs (since 1975 in Italy and since 1976 in Greece) more than compensated by depreciation in the domestic currency (see below) and the considerable weight in the consumer index of goods and services with prices regulated by public authorities⁷. Price controls and a strong nominal depreciating exchange-rate policy are the factors responsible for the declining real-exchange rate of Portugal (1977-1980).

It seems justified to ask whether the degree of openness of one country is related with the factors mentioned above. That is, whether the degree of openness influences, the departure from PPP. Conformity to PPP means that the real exchange rate (E_r) does not change over time and that in the equation

6. See Vaubel (1976), p. 461.

7. A detailed study of the Italian competitiveness using different relative prices indices can be found in Ulizzi (1977).

$l_n E = a + b l_n P/P^*$, the coefficient b which is the elasticity of the nominal exchange rate to changes in competitiveness approximates unity. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 summarize the estimation of this equation using annual data for exchange rates and consumer prices for each individual country. Column 3 presents the degree of openness of each country with respect to the EEC measured by the per cent ratio of the imports from the EEC relative to gross domestic product. Except for Netherlands we find a close relationship between openness and the degree of conformity to PPP.

Table 2 - Estimation of $l_n E = a + b l_n P/P^*$ (period 1971-1980)

Country	a	b	Openess (%)
Greece	4,1760	-1,1128	9,4
Portugal	4,1256	-1,0545	11,2
Spain	3,3270	-0,6587	3,9
Italy	4,6410	-1,3430	10,5
Netherlands	5,4961	-1,7234	26,04
Germany	4,2211	-1,0992	9,3

(*) Portugal's figure has been obtained with only imports from the six initial members EEC.

SOURCE.- OCDE: Annual Reports on the Economy of individual countries.

Concerning real exchange rates based on hourly earnings, the development of line H compared with the evolution of line E shown in Figure 1 allows to draw another kind of conclusions. Given that there is little scope for modifying the real exchange rate obtained with export prices (E_r, P_n) out of temporary changes, a continuous acceleration in the relative hourly earnings

(h/h^*) not matched by nominal exchange-rate depreciation will reduce the profit margin in the tradable sector. In so far as wage increases can be translated into higher output prices in the non tradable sector additional results will be the declining of the relative price of tradable versus nontradable goods (P_T/P_N) and the rising in the real exchange rate based on consumer prices. The experience of the Spanish economy during most of the 1970's fits well into this case. If the phenomenon of wage acceleration is accompanied by appreciation of the domestic currency, the three results stressed in the preceding paragraph will be even more pronounced⁸. In both of these cases the domestic currency shows symptoms of overvaluation⁹.

By contrast, when the monetary authorities permit a more than compensating depreciation of their currency we find the symptoms of an undervalued currency: the profit margin of the tradable sector and the relative price of tradables versus nontradables increase whereas the real exchange rate based on consumer prices decreases. This has been the experience in Portugal since 1976 and in Greece and Italy in most of the 1970's.

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8. This is what happened for instance in Norway in the period 1973-77 and in Denmark in the last years. A comprehensive analysis of these two overvaluations can be found in Thygesen (1979).
9. Symptoms of overvaluation may also arise when an increase in E is less than compensated by a decrease in h/h^* . This has been the case of Belgium in the last years, very well studied by De Grauwe (1980).

IV. ASSESSING THE COSTS OF CURRENCY UNIFICATION

The pattern of real exchange-rate changes elaborated with general price indices serves to determine the distribution of the costs and benefits of currency unification among the various members of the union¹⁰. The reason is that, according to the expression $\hat{E}_r = \hat{E} + (\hat{P} - \hat{P}^*)$, obtained taking percentage rates of change ($\hat{}$) in the expression that defines E_r , the larger a member country's need for real exchange-rate variations vis-à-vis the EEC average the larger will be the adjustment in its inflation differential with respect the EEC if $\hat{E} = 0$ (currency unification).

Following Vaubel's criterion, the price-level implications of EEC currency unifications for each of the six countries are shown in Table 3. According to the annual compound average rates of change vis-à-vis EEC average it appears that the Spanish peseta appreciated the most whereas the largest depreciations were suffered by the Italian lira and the Greek drachma. This means that if the European Community had been a currency union and if its monetary policy had been implemented so as to keep the average EEC inflation rate constant, Spain would have suffered from having the highest inflation differential with respect to the average EEC (2,23 % p.a.) whereas Italy and Greece would have suffered most from deflation: with respect to the EEC average, their annual inflation would have been respectively 1,73 and 1,72 percentage points lower. Given the actual rate of inflation

10. For benefits it is meant here less departure from EEC inflation level. For a good description of the benefits accruing to a country that joins a currency area, see Magnifico (1973).

Table 3 - Real Exchange-Rate changes of individual Countries.

	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Italy	Nether lands	Germany
Annual rates of change vis-à-vis de Ecu						
1971	- 3,8	+ 4,5	+ 1	- 1,2	+ 1,4	+ 3,1
1972	- 8,83	+ 2,10	+ 2,87	- 1,62	+ 5,62	+ 1,35
1973	- 6,55	+ 0,65	- 1,44	-10,80	0	+ 2,96
1974	+14,46	+ 9,40	+ 6,15	- 5,42	+ 2,52	- 0,83
1975	-10,92	- 3,32	- 1,10	- 0,97	- 1,18	- 5,90
1976	+ 8,05	+10,91	+ 7,16	+ 0,12	+12,44	+10,75
1977	- 0,55	-12,85	- 2,43	- 1,60	+ 2,37	+ 0,27
1978	- 4,29	- 9,20	+ 1,06	- 0,87	+ 0,48	+ 0,71
1979	+ 1,04	- 4,61	+12,56	+ 0,37	- 4,06	- 2,67
1980	- 4,21	+ 0,52	- 4,37	+ 3,89	- 4,90	- 5,85
Annual Compound average rates of change vis-à-vis EEC average						
1971 - 1980	- 1,72	- 0,44	+ 2,23	- 1,73	+ 1,45	+ 0,29

A positive sign indicates that the country's real exchange rate has appreciated vis-à-vis the Ecu.

these countries went through monetary integration with the EC would have imposed a reduction in the domestic rate of inflation of 8,08 percentage points for Greece, 13,59 for Portugal, 5,20 for Spain, and 7,47 for Italy. By contrast, the strong-currency countries, Netherland and Germany, would have been bound to exceed by 4,12 and 3,20 percentage points p.a. respectively their actual compound inflation rate experienced in the 1970's.

Because that compound average rates of real exchange-rate change may fail to take account of the year-to-year fluctuations around the long-run trend I have calculated, following Vaubel (1976), the average absolute real exchange-rate change vis-à-vis the Community average. And, in order to capture the instability of the national rates of inflation/deflation that would have been implied by currency unification, I have calculated the average of absolute year-to-year changes in a country's real exchange-rate changes vis-à-vis the Community. The results are reported in Table 4.

Table 4 - Measures of the stability of Real Exchange-Rate Changes of individual Countries vis-à-vis the Community Average

	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Italy	Nether lands	Germany
Annual Average of Absolute Annual Real Exchange-Rate Changes						
1971 1980	6,27	5,81	4,03	2,68	3,49	3,44
Annual Average of Absolute Year-to-year Changes in Real Exchange-Rate Changes						
1971 1980	9,94	8,12	7,18	2,89	4,94	4,93

In Table 5 a summary measure of the price-level implications of EEC currency unification which takes account of all three criteria is presented. For each criterion a rank of desirability (lower costs) of joining a currency union has been established.

Table 5 - Price level implications of EC currency unification
Countries Ranking. (1971 - 1980).

	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Italy	Nether lands	Germany
CRITERIA:						
Compound Average Deviation	4	2	6	5	3	1
Average Annual Absolute Deviation	6	5	4	1	3	2
Average Annual Absolute Change	6	5	4	1	3	2
SUM OF RANKS	16	12	14	7	9	5
RANKING BASED ON THE RANK SUM	6	4	5	2	3	1

Finally, the ranking based on the rank sum shows the ordering in currency union desirability. It turns out that Italy is an even more desirable member than Netherlands. Portugal, Spain and Greece (in this order) are considerably less desirable members mainly due to the bigger instability of their real exchange-rate changes (Table 4).

V. REAL EXCHANGE-RATE CHANGES AND EXCHANGE-RATE POLICIES

In Section III it was shown that a wide utilisation of the nominal exchange-rate has been made in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy in order to satisfy the needs for real exchange-rate changes, and in Section IV the repercussions on the internal rate of inflation that would have followed from monetary integration were analysed. In this section an attempt is made to find the consequences other than those reflected in the internal rate of inflation that would probably follow from currency unification and from measures aimed at avoiding currency overvaluation. This will serve to make some statements on the suitability of the exchange-rate policy implemented in each country in the 1970's. For this purpose the evolution of some basic economic indicators presented in Tables 1 to 4 of the Appendix will be needed.

a) GREECE.-

After the Smithsonian Agreement the drachma was linked to the US dollar and consequently depreciated vis-à-vis the Ecu, especially in 1972 and 1973, when the dollar was devaluated. In October 1973 the Greek monetary authorities revaluated the drachma ten per cent against the dollar, but this did not preclude an effective depreciation of 13 per cent vis-à-vis the Ecu in that year. In March 1975 the Bank of Greece pegged the exchange rate of the drachma to a basket of currencies, and this exchange-rate regime induced a twelve per cent depreciation of the drachma vis-à-vis the Ecu in 1975. At the end of 1979 the Bank of Greece initiated a more consistent exchange-rate policy that is being founded not only upon a more pronounced depreciation at least vis-à-vis the Ecu, but also on the maintenance of strict exchange controls and tight management of the foreign exchange market. This policy is aimed at achieving two main objectives:

- On one hand, this policy intends to overcome the limits imposed by the deficit in the current account that arise especially when expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are put in

work to reduce the high level of unemployment (which is bigger than the value indicated by the figures presented in Table 1 of the Appendix because some unemployment is hidden in the Army and in the agricultural sector).

- In the other hand, a more aggressive depreciating exchange rate policy serves to reconstitute the profit margins of entrepreneurs that have been squeezed by the wage explosion initiated in 1976 accompanied by a deceleration of productivity increase (see graph nº 1).

Hence, it seems clear that:

- . Currency unification, i.e. the non utilization of the exchange rate as an instrument of economic policy, without first correcting the current need for real exchange-rate variation would impose, in addition to a lower rate of inflation, either a higher rate of unemployment or a bigger deficit in the current account of the balance of payments accompanied in any case by a shrink in the profit margins.
- . A higher rate of currency depreciation would be able to make up the profit margins only if backed by strict controls on wage increases and/or by actions on other sources of real exchange-rate changes (an increase in the rate of productivity growth for instance).

b) PORTUGAL.-

The Portuguese escudo maintained fixed its parity with the U.S. dollar up to February 14, 1973, when it was revaluated by 7 per cent vis-á-vis the U.S. dollar. During all this period, the effective exchange-rate of the escudo registered a gradual depreciation vis-á-vis the Ecu despite the ample balance of payments surpluses, and cost competitiveness was improved.

While the exchange rate of the escudo vis-à-vis the Ecu depreciated only smoothly in 1974 and 1975 and remained stable in 1976, hourly earnings increased sharply in order for the Portuguese authorities to achieve the Revolution's objective of income distribution. The subsequent loss of international competitiveness harmed the demand for Portuguese exports and produced the typical results of an overvalued currency. The escudo was devaluated by 15 per cent in effective terms in February 1977, but this proved to have no effects on competitiveness, because no supporting measures were taken. This led the Portuguese government to elaborate a stabilization programme designed to correct the country's severe external disequilibrium without reducing to a too large extent the growth of economic activity. More flexibility was introduced in the exchange market and the effective exchange rate of the escudo began a pronounced depreciating phase in August 1977, that permitted a rapid recovery of the profit margins thanks to the freezing of nominal wages.

Information reported in Table 2 of the Appendix shows that the programme turned out to be a resounding success¹¹ and that the exchange rate may be a very useful instrument when is accompanied by complementary measures. By mid-1979 it was felt that the restoration of export competitiveness had gone far enough and attention was turned to reducing the inflationary impact of a more flexible exchange rate policy. The crawling peg system remained in force, but in view of the favourable trend of the balance of payments the depreciation rate of the escudo was reduced in April and further in June, declining from 1,25 per cent

11. For a valuation of the effects of this programme, see Craik (1981).

to 0,75 per cent in terms of the monthly average of the effective exchange rate. In February 1980 the escudo was revaluated by 6 per cent and the rate of depreciation was reduced to 0,5 per cent four months later.

The Portuguese experience seems thus a case of bad timing in the short-run exchange-rate policy actions that resulted in sharp swings in nominal exchange-rate changes, rate of inflation and profit margins. During the period 1971-1976, an inappropriate exchange rate policy permitted the real exchange rate of the escudo to appreciate when according to economic indicators internal and external equilibria required the opposite. As a consequence of this passive behaviour in the foreign exchange market implementation of the stabilization program had to rely on a sharp currency depreciation that resulted in strong inflationary pressures.

c) SPAIN.-

In the period running from 1970 to 1973, the peseta was linked to the U.S. dollar, except for the devaluations of the American currency of December 1971 and February 1973, when the decision of keeping stable the effective exchange rate of the peseta against the whole of the principal currencies prevailed¹². The peseta accumulated a depreciation of 5 per cent vis-à-vis the Ecu along these years.

In spite of the large worsening in both internal and the external sectors of the Spanish economy occurred between late

12. For a more detailed analysis of the exchange-rate policy and its relationships with the monetary policy in the 1970's, see Banco de España (1979).

1973 and late 1975 (see Table 3 of the Appendix) the Spanish authorities who had formally initiated a policy of exchange flexibility in January 1974, preferred to defend the effective exchange rate of the peseta registered in 1973.

In February 1976 the Spanish authorities decreed a 10 per cent devaluation for the peseta, whose positive results if any had disappeared a few months later because this measure was not inserted in a well defined general economic program. Renewed conviction of future strong depreciation triggered by political uncertainty and the weak economic performance led to important capital outflows and the public sector was bound to resort to foreign borrowings.

The 20 per cent devaluation of the peseta decreed in July 1977 by the new government issued of general elections was framed in an ambitious stabilization program aimed at reducing the internal rate of inflation and overcoming the restriction imposed by the current account. The results were very satisfactory and the Spanish authorities allowed the effective exchange rate of the peseta to appreciate since the summer of 1978 in order to keep control over domestic monetary aggregates. The peseta appreciation that lasted until May 1979 seems to have had a moderating effect on the internal inflation rate, but worsened the international competitiveness of the Spanish commodities. Since the summer of 1979 a more flexible exchange-rate policy was adopted that combined with slower increases in relative wages brought about in 1978, for the first time since 1976, some recovery in competitiveness. A very illustrative indication of the extent to which profit margins had been eroded is provided by the fact that in 1979 and 1980 the Spanish exporters increased their export prices in order to make up profit margins at the expenses of losing shares in foreign markets.

Consideration of what has been mentioned leads me to conclude that exchange rate policy, as occurs with the whole economic policy in 1970's failed to take action when the need was clearly obvious, and because the measures have been adopted with a considerable lag, unnecessary swings in real exchange rates and profit margins have resulted.

The exchange rate has been an effective and important tool of economic policy in the 1970's because it was necessary to deal simultaneously with the problems of unemployment and current account deficit, at least since late 1973. The exchange rate of the peseta clearly shows symptoms of overvaluation and indicates that, as long as an important increase in the productivity growth will not be obtained, a substantial devaluation of the peseta is an unescapable measure to reconstitute the profit margins in the tradable sector and to compensate for past losses in competitiveness. But, as has been argued elsewhere¹³, such an exchange-parity change will not be effective in so far as the current inflationary expectations will not be curbed and a more rational wage-setting mechanism established.

d) ITALY.--

The Smithsonian realignment of December 1971 and the satisfactory economic performance of Italy in the beginning of the 1970's induced the Italian authorities to participate in the smake arrangements when it entered into force in April 1972. In February 1973 however the Italian authorities withdrew their currency and adopted a managed floating regime in order to attain two objectives: a) to improve the competitiveness of the Italian

13. Teijeiro Ruiz (1981).

exports and to keep from falling the profit margin of the tradable sector, and b) to stabilize the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar in order to moderate the imported inflation.

In 1978 a conjunction of positive factors had changed the Italian economic scene (see Table 4 of the Appendix): the current account had attained a high surplus, the terms of trade improved and a program oriented to structural changes was elaborated. All these phenomena induced the Italian authorities to participate in the European Monetary System (E.M.S.) since the moment this mechanism entered into force (March 1, 1979). Consequently, the subsequent evolution of the lira has been marked by a slower depreciation vis-à-vis the Ecu.

In contrast to what happened in the other Southern European countries, the exchange-rate policy in Italy has been appropriate to deal with the economic problems during the 1970's. Enough flexibility permitted the utilisation of the exchange rate just when the need was arising. This explains why intermittent swings in nominal and real exchange rates have been much less pronounced there (See Table 4) and why this country is a much more suitable candidate for a foreseeable currency union with the E.E.C.

The exchange rate has proved to be a very useful instrument for the Italian authorities in the 1970's. The non-utilisation of this instrument would have required contractive policies in order to bit down the rate of inflation to the level required by the need for real exchange rate changes. And a big increase in the rate of unemployment would have resulted, for the sliding scale arrangements prevent real wages from declining. In short, a wise utilisation of the exchange rate has allowed the Italian authorities to avoid the consequences of an overvalued currency.

VI. INTRA-GROUP VARIATIONS OF NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES

In this section the variance of the rates of change (nominal and real) of the currencies of the E.C. countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain vis-á-vis the U.S. dollar is calculated following the Vaubel's method; the formulas used are:

$$V_N = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n=11} (e_i - \bar{e})^2}{n - 1} \qquad V_R = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n=11} (\pi_i - \bar{\pi})^2}{n - 1}$$

where e_i is the percentage rate of change of the average number of dollars required to obtain one unit of currency i (E_i) from one period to the next; \bar{e} is the arithmetic mean of the e_i 's of the eleven countries. Denoting the consumer price index of country i with P_i , π_i is the percentage rate of change of $E_i P_i$, and $\bar{\pi}$ is the arithmetic mean of the π_i 's of the eleven currencies.

The results obtained for quarterly and annual rates of change are reported in Table 6 and allow for the following conclusions:

- a) Like in Vaubel's work, it is apparent that the largest part of the variations in real exchange-rate variances is explained by variations in nominal exchange-rate variances. Indeed, the regression of the individual quarterly and annual real exchange rate variances (V_R) on the corresponding nominal exchange rate variances (V_N) give the coefficients of determination 1.035 and 0.7205 respectively. It seems clear then that nominal exchange-rate changes have been a potent tool to affect necessary real exchange-rate adjustments.
- b) The pooled real exchange-rate variance has been larger than the pooled nominal exchange-rate variance in both averaging periods. Furthermore the F-ratio for the pooled variances

Table - Nominal and Real Exchange-Rate Changes in the eleven Countries

Variances of quarterly rates of change											
t	VN	VR	t	VN	VR	t	VN	VR	t	VN	VR
1970			1974			1978			1971-80		
III	0	1,254	I	9,120	15,920	III	30,250	17,808	I	9,3632	15.7404
IV	0	0,336	II	19,891	17,808	IV	4,884	11,628	II		
1971			1975			1979			80-IV		
I	0	0,123	III	5,953	12,816	I	10,368	7,182			
II	0,260	0,846	IV	39,438	41,602	II	10,261	7,728			
III	2,856	4,972	I	26,936	31,584	III	6,553	9,922			
IV	4,972	3,763	II	4,326	3,385	IV	7,672	4,752			
1972			1976			1979					
I	6,864	7,672	III	2,822	7,452	I	2,992	4,622			
II	0,547	0,792	IV	1,232	2,220	II	7,075	11,628			
III	6,150	5,616	I	11,764	210,250	III	4,243	8,065			
IV	1,742	2,592	II	20,793	28,729	IV	4,452	3,168			
1973			1977			1980			1971-II		
I	5,569	4,000	III	4,368	12,460	I	5,569	7,952	75-IV		
II	13,542	9,610	IV	20,793	19,184	II	6,864	9,120			
III	26,112	22,372	I	11,356	11,155	III	3,027	3,097			
IV	5,664	27,352	II	12,320	9,000	IV	4,928	9,672			

Variances of annual rates of change					
t	VN	VR	t	VN	VR
1971	2,5063	14,9295			
1972	12,2269	14,5611			
1973	65,6084	65,8775	1971-80	40.6469	59.0942
1974	25,7861	20,591			
1975	33,3010	25,6390			
1976	44,4730	280,7412			
1977	76,9795	66,7146			
1978	70,7920	7,7034	1971-75	27.8857	28.3032
1979	42,1603	48,3039			
1980	32,6361	45,9620			

turns out to be considerably bigger and much less sensible to the time span over which both types of exchange rate are averaged, than the F-ratio Vaubel obtains for the EC area¹⁴. The values obtained are 1,6811 and 1,4538 for quarterly and annual figures respectively. To make figures more comparable with those of Vaubel's work, I obtained the quarterly and annual F-ratios for a common subperiod in both works. For the period 1971-II/1975-IV my quarterly F-ratio is 1,2086 whereas Vaubel obtained 0,866. And for the period 1971/1975, the annual figures are 1.00149 and 0,701 respectively.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from my results is that since real exchange-rate changes in recent years have not been smaller than nominal exchange-rate changes and the latter have had a very strong impact on the former, variability in nominal exchange rates has served mainly to make necessary real exchange-rates adjustments resulting from divergences of economic structure among the eleven countries. The reason for this different conclusion with respect to the Vaubel's work lies in the inclusion of three additional countries in my analysis (Greece, Portugal and Spain) with enough divergences in their economic structure with respect to the E.E.C. to make the area defined by the eleven countries a non-desirable currency area.

14. The observed F-statistic is simply $\frac{\sum^k V_R}{\sum^k V_N}$; where k is the number of periods.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

It has been shown in this paper that big changes in real-exchange rates have taken place in the 1970's between each one of our four Southern European countries and the E.E.C. as a whole. These changes are higher than changes registered by Netherlands and Germany, the two countries taken as a benchmark. Portugal has a lower annual compound-average rate of change vis-à-vis E.E.C. average than Netherlands, but the Portuguese figure hides the big swings undergone by the real-exchange rate of the escudo along the 1970 decade. Indeed, these swings originated by a lack of synchronisation between exchange-rate policy and economic needs make Portugal a less desirable member of a foreseeable EEC currency area than Italy. By contrast, a suitable exchange rate policy renders Italy a more desirable member of an EEC currency area than Netherlands. The analysis of costs and benefits of currency unification also reveals that the farest countries from monetary integration with the EEC are Greece and Spain.

Both the analysis of the need for real-exchange variation (for each individual country and for the eleven countries as a whole) and the ordering in currency union desirability show that the four Southern European countries cannot be integrated for the moment in a EEC currency area. They need to resort exchange rate variations in order to undertake real internal adjustments. And since Italy can participate in the European Monetary System only with special arrangements and with the help of occasional adjustments in the parity of the lira vis-à-vis the other European currencies, it is evident that neither the escudo nor the peseta nor the drachma have to be considered candidates for the time being for participating in the European Monetary System. Before retailing the possibility of making external (nominal-exchan

ge rate) adjustments the three countries concerned have to smooth their structural economic differences with the EEC.

Among the common problems for the four Southern European countries that should receive priority attention in order to smooth their structural economic divergencies with respect the EEC, I would like to mention the narrowness in industrial sectors which are furthermore short of investment and contribute to declining productivity, excessive increases of labor-costs, inappropriate diversification in exports that have not been adapted to the changing pattern of the international demand, and regional disequilibria. The solution of these problems have to keep path with the general and progressive liberalization of these economies i.e. the removal of the still prevailing complex systems of exchange controls, existing restrictions in capital exports and limited flexibility of current transactions.

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A P P E N D I X

SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE PERIOD 1971-1980

TABLE 1 - GREECE

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Annual rate of change real GDP	11,6	7,6	9,8	7,5	-3,7	5,5	6,5	3,7	5,9	3,8	0,3
Rate of unemployment							2,3	2,1	2,3	2,2	2,4
Current account balance in millions of dollars	-414	-341	-374	-1189	-1136	-953	-932	-1081	-958	-1883	-2100
Financial need of the Central Administration in % GDP	1,8	1,4	1,5	1,3	-0,5	-2	-1,1	-1,7	-2,2	-1,3	
Growth rate of M ₂	18,8	22	23,2	22,5	21,3	27,4	25,2	22,6	26	18,4	24
Relative consumer price index P/P* (1970=100)	100	97,16	95,3	102,3	116,6	118,2	122,6	125,2	133,5	146,3	163,6
Relative hourly earning index, h/h* (1970=100)	100	97,3	96	98,4	107,5	115,1	133,4	143	160	173,4	194,1

TABLE 2 - PORTUGAL

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Annual rate of change real GDP	7,6	5,4	8,1	10,9	0,7	-4,3	6,7	5,6	3,4	4,5	4,6
Rate of unemployment					1,8	4,5	6,4	7,5	8,1	8,2	7,8
Current account balance in millions of dollars	117	174	350	351	-829	-819	-1289	-1495	-826	-52	-1048
Financial need of the Central Administration in % GDP	0,9	0,55	-0,1	1,4	-1,1	-3,9	-4,1	-5,9	-8,4	-8,5	
Growth rate of M ₂	2,2	13,5	16,2	36	11	17,4	19,6	13,5	28	36,5	35
Relative consumer price index P/P* (1970=100)	100	105,5	110	115,1	129,5	133,4	148	167	194,4	133,4	231,5
Relative hourly earning index, h/h* (1970=100)	100	99,1	97,1	97,6	111,6	113,6	114,6	113,8	114,4	118	126

TABLE 3 - SPAIN

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Annual rate of change real GDP	6	4,4	7,7	8,4	5,2	0,8	2	3,3	2,7	0,8	1,2
Rate of unemployment	1,5	2	1,6	1,2	3,2	4,6	5,3	5,7	7,5	9,2	11,7
Current account balance in millions of dollars	79	856	571	557	-3244	-3488	-4294	-2164	1633	1126	-5000
Financial needs of the Central Administration in % GDP	0,01	-0,9	0,2	1,01	0,1	0,2	0,4	-0,2	-1,5	-1,4	-3,1
Rate of growth of M ₃	15	24	23	24,2	19	19	19,3	18,3	20	18	16,7
Relative consumer price index P/P* (1970=100)	100	101	104	107,5	111,7	116,7	123	139,4	158,3	168,5	174,3
Relative hourly earning index, h/h* (1970=100)	100	102	106,2	109,7	126,6	141,4	134	181,5	219,2	243	238,5

TABLE 4 - ITALY

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Annual rate of change real GDP	4,8	1,4	3,1	6,8	4,2	-3,4	5,7	1,9	2,7	4,8	4
Rate of unemployment	3,1	3,1	3,7	3,5	2,9	3,3	6,7	7,2	7,2	7,7	7,6
Current account balance in millions of dollars	761	1846	2043	-2662	-8017	-751	-2816	2465	6198	5114	-10000
Financial needs of the Central Administration in % GDP	-2,1	-3,6	-4,3	-5,7	-4,3	-8,1	-5,2	-11	-9,2	-7,3	-9
Rate of growth of M ₂	14,8	16,6	17,9	23,5	15,5	23,3	22,3	20,2	22,3	20,3	12,6
Rate growth M ₃ / rate growth of nominal GDP	1,25	1,35	2,93	1,37	0,75	1,52	0,56	0,95	1,32	0,95	0,51
Relative consumer price index P/P* (1970=100)	100	99	98,5	101,3	108,3	113,3	121,2	129	137,2	145	157,4
Relative hourly earning index h/h* (1970=100)	100	100	98,7	107	111	122	133	150,5	158,3	169,7	183,7

SOURCES: - OCDE: Annual Economic Reports on Individual Countries;
 - IMF: International Financial Statistics
 - International Labour Office, Geneva: Bulletin of Labour Statistics.

not for quotation

SOME CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
Comparative Notes about Italy and Spain

by

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The process of consolidation has to be considered a crucial one for anybody who would scrutinize the chances of persistence for a democratic regime: it represents a fixed phase in the transition from the establishment to the maintainance of a democracy. Thus, if we consider both the future probabilities of persistence in a regime just established or, from another point of view, the chances - and the forms - of crisis in a regime installed a long time ago, it is very important to look at that central process called "consolidation", and above all at its characteristics comparatively as well as in single case-studies.

This is the basic reason why we focus now on this process, here roughly sketched out. In this short paper I shall consider and discuss primarily this process in two cases, Spain since 1977-78 and Italy since 1948. But I think we could also expand this research in a more systematically comparative way to include all the cases of democratic consolidation that took place in the Mediterranean European area since World War Two. So we immediately have two questions: why the Mediterranean area of Europe and why since World War Two? Without claiming to give a reply to these problems, I think that, on one hand, Mediterranean Europe can be regarded as a good area for comparative work given its quite common socio-economic background and historical traditions (see various essays about this problem). On the other hand, World War Two appears as a watershed in European history, at least regarding some later typical political developments.

Along this line the cases to take into account are the two mentioned ones, Italy and Spain, the two French consolidations (where the second one has to maintain a particular place since the previous regime was still a democratic one), and the Portuguese and the Greek consolidations. In the Greek case I would tend not to consider the period before 1967, provided that during those years the Greek regime does not attain the ne-

cessary requirements - see below - to be defined as a democracy. Therefore, we are left with six cases: two of them took place during the Forties, three about thirty years later, the sixth one in the middle, and in a particular position. Here, the consolidation process will likely show some general common aspects and other still similar characteristics, respectively, between the cases of the Forties and among those of the Seventies, but also a great deal of differences, impossible to simply gloss over. It is also rather easy to foresee that such research will raise several problems to get coherent, quite homogeneous, and sufficient data for carrying out good comparative work.

At this point the salience of the topic, the main cases of reference and why, after all, it is worth while to try to go on with such work should be clear. Now, consciously overlooking several methodological problems typical of such a kind of comparison, let me turn to other problems one should raise when dealing with this matter: 1) one has to define democracy as a regime; 2) to outline the main characteristics of the consolidation process; 3) which are the differences between the process of instauration and that of consolidation; 4) which are the conditions that could make such a process a successful one; 5) when one should consider a democracy as a consolidated regime; 6) whether it is possible to distinguish among various kinds of consolidation. Here I shall not deal systematically with any such problems, but only with some of them. More exactly, I shall point to the following themes: main theoretical assumptions; conditions for a successful democratic consolidation; typology of consolidation; and research perspectives.

Theoretical puzzles

. Most authors have pointed out that a democratic regime is primarily characterized by the effective guarantee of civil and political rights. These aspects are mirrored by the largest politi

tical citizenship and an open competition in political elections (see the so-called Dahl's box). Along the same line, but also from an historical, genetic point of view, other scholars have emphasized the presence of dissent and opposition as the best proof for the existence of a democratic regime. Some others have paid attention to democracy as a method or a procedure (see Schumpeter). Moving basically from Schumpeter, I would like to stress only that a democracy is the result of a compromise or an agreement among some political actors on institutional procedures bound to solve their substantial conflicts. But I have to add also that the democratic procedures are not completely separated from some substantial aspects. Probably the most important of them are private ownership and, in some way, the maintenance of an economic market. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, it is not possible to support the tenet according to which democracy is just a political "frame" ready for any "content". In the best case this opinion is only a value assumption easily proven false by historical reality.

It is rather hard to provide also a careful, thorough definition of consolidation process. In most cases it is not even a real, largely visible process, but it merely consists of some policies of consolidation, made by certain political actors. Furthermore, actually, there is a clear overlapping between democratic establishment and the first phases of consolidation. So, by only making these two remarks, one may understand that consolidation is a process to be distinguished from the more complex and larger change that the system is experiencing, although, by itself, such a process is connected with all of the most salient features of the democratic regime. With these warnings, one could basically define the democratic consolidation as a process where there is no longer the problem of creation of new political structures. But the problems are to have those structures institutionalized and working,

to have a party system and a trade union system set out, and to have clear and firm connections between political actors or institutional actors, on one hand, and élite groups and, more generally, civil society, on the other hand

Therefore, for example, it is possible to recognize quite clearly stable social and political alignments, the dynamics of the party system, governmental coalitions with parliamentary oppositions, and so on. One should think that the consolidation is a fully accomplished process when those targets are reached (on this point see below).

Let me now gloss over other more specific theoretical questions - such as the identification of the main actors of consolidation or the kinds of resources to consider effective in it - and turn immediately to the conditions for a successful consolidation.

Conditions for a successful consolidation

It is intuitively obvious that the conditions for democratic establishment are not the same as those for consolidation. If it were so, then the same factors that allowed the instauration would bring about the consolidation and any installed democracy should experience the consolidation. This conclusion is evidently wrong. By and large, the single most important difference between instauration and consolidation consists in the different roles played by élite actors and mass actors. In the first case, élite actors have a prominent position in the process. In the second case, the positions of mass actors are also important. However, it is needless to say that some characteristics of the crisis experienced by the previous regime, of the transitional period, and of establishment process - here cursory summarized in

figure 1 - affect the democratic consolidation in several ways. Thus, we have three background conditions and hypotheses:




Fig. 1: A sketch of democratic installation