



Geografia i recursos naturals

Amb una superfície de 450.000 km², Suècia és el quart país d'Europa per les seves dimensions. El territori suec abasta la part oriental de la península escandinava. La distància entre els extrems nord i sud del país és de 1.600 km. Suècia limita amb Finlàndia i Noruega.

Semblantment a com s'esdevé en aquests darrers països, Suècia té un clima més aviat suau en relació amb la seva posició geogràfica. La seva llarga extensió determina, a més, que les seves característiques naturals i climàtiques presentin una gran varietat. El país té grans existències d'aigua. El camp suec, que és relativament pla, es troba esquitxat per llacs de totes les mides (gairebé 100.000) que es comuniquen gràcies a una extensa xarxa de rierols. Els rius més cabalosos són al nord: neixen a la cadena muntanyosa dels Alps escandinaus i baixen cap a l'est fins arribar al mar.

Els cursos d'aigua tenen molta importància per al proveïment d'energia; la força hidràulica ha estat un factor decisiu per al desenvolupament industrial de Suècia. Així mateix, els rius també han estat importants per a la indústria forestal, com a vies de flotació de troncs. Moltes serradores i indústries d'elaboració de la fusta s'han establert, des d'antic, a la desembocadura dels rius al llarg de la costa septentrional.

El llarg litoral de Suècia és d'una gran riquesa en illes i ports naturals. La pesca i la navegació hi han estat durant molt temps fonts importants d'activitat econòmica. Avui dia, però, la costa és fonamentalment un paradís recreatiu.

El paisatge suec és dominat pels boscos, que cobreixen la meitat de la superfície del país. Aquests hi han tingut una importància vital per a la vida econòmica durant segles. A moltes parts el terreny és variat: els boscos es troben interromputs per prats oberts i terres de conreu, llacs i rius. Com a exemple de la importància, fins i tot cultural, que tenen els boscos, el dret consuetudinari que es coneix amb el nom d'*allemansträtten* permet que tothom pugui caminar-hi, ja siguin públics com privats, i recollir-hi baies i bolets, si bé amb l'obligació de respectar la naturalesa i la propietat.

Les terres conreades signifiquen menys del 10% de la superfície sueca, però el país s'autoproveeix completament pel que fa als productes bàsics alimentaris. Les extensions agrícoles més grans i la més gran productivitat es donen a la punta meridional, a la

regió d'Escània, que es coneix com "el graner de Suècia".

A més de fusta i d'energia hidràulica, Suècia posseeix recursos minerals abundants. Alguns dels nombrosos jaciments de ferro, coure i plata ja s'explotaven a l'Edat mitjana. Les reserves de ferro més importants es troben a l'extrem nord. De les exportacions de mineral de ferro i de fusta sorgiren els capitals que permeteren la ràpida industrialització de final del segle passat.

Els canvis meteorològics constants són característics del clima de Suècia, com també les baixes pressions que arriben de l'oest i que causen precipitacions de pluja i de neu. Durant l'hivern, la part septentrional es troba sempre coberta de neu, almenys durant el període que va del desembre a final de març, mentre que a la resta del país la magnitud de les nevades varia segons la regió i l'any.

Els suecs

Suècia compta avui amb 8.400.000 habitants. Atesa l'extensió del territori nacional, la seva densitat demogràfica mitjana amb prou feines arriba als 20 habitants per km²; no obstant això, a les regions del sud --on es concentra bona part de la població--, és molt més elevada.

Segons el cens de l'any 1980, el 83% de la població vivia a zones urbanes. Actualment, a l'àrea metropolitana d'Estocolm, hi viuen prop de 1.400.000 persones; a Göteborg, inclosos els suburbis, 700.000, i a la zona de Malmö, a l'extrem sud, 450.000.

Des del punt de vista ètnic, tradicionalment Suècia ha estat molt homogènia. La llengua sueca, que pertany a la branca germànica, era parlada com a llengua materna per gairebé tota la població i pràcticament tots els suecs pertanyien a l'Església luterana estatal. Les úniques excepcions les constituïen la població de parla finlandesa al nord-oest, al llarg de la frontera amb Finlàndia (actualment unes 30.000 persones) i els lapons o samis (15.000 persones, aproximadament).

Tanmateix, des de la Segona Guerra Mundial aquesta pauta homogènia ha canviat a causa de la immigració. El nombre d'immigrants que registren les estadístiques és de 800.000 persones aproximadament. La majoria procedeix dels països nòrdics veïns --de Finlàndia, sobretot--, amb els quals Suècia manté un mercat de treball comú. La resta prové de Iugos-

làvia, Grècia, Turquia i altres països europeus, Amèrica llatina i altres regions de la terra.

Història

Suècia començà a ser poblada cap a la fi del darrer període glacial per caçadors que anaren seguint la retirada dels gels.

L'agricultura s'hi inicià al segon mil·lenni aC. Cap al segle XV aC s'hi conegueren el coure i el bronze. D'aquells temps remots es conserven nombrosos objectes d'una bellesa artística remarcable i també dibuixos rupestres que representen escenes de la vida quotidiana. Lluny de romandre aïllats, els primitius habitants de Suècia mantenien un comerç intens amb els pobles del continent, interessats a aconseguir ambre.

El ferro el donaren a conèixer els celtes, i els nadius nòrdics aviat aprengueren a extreure'l del mineral que hi havia al fons dels seus llacs i pantans. L'entrada a l'edat del ferro, al voltant de l'any 500 aC, coincidí amb un empitjorament del clima, que de ser de tipus mediterrani passà a ser com l'actual, fred i dur. El canvi climatològic comportà migracions i la fi de la brillant cultura camperola de l'Edat del Bronze.

Durant els primers segles de l'Era cristiana, les fèrtils regions al voltant del llac Mälaren i els seus habitants, els esvions o *svear*, passen a ocupar un lloc destacat. Es tenen notícies de l'existència d'un regne *svear* a partir del segle VII de la nostra era, el centre polític-religiós del qual el constituïa la localitat d'Uppsala. Les troballes arqueològiques, per la seva banda, permeten d'establir que a la zona del Mälaren el comerç i la indústria havien arribat a un desenvolupament important, ja abans dels temps dels vikings.

L'era dels vikings (de l'any 700 al 1000 dC) fou especialment rica en esdeveniments, en multiplicar-se el nombre de les expedicions cap a l'est i estendre's espectacularment el seu radi d'acció. Navegant pels grans rius russos, els vikings suecs arribaren a les mars Negra i Càspia. Les expedicions vikingues sueques tingueren un caràcter menys depredador i més comercial que no pas les daneses i noruegues. L'objectiu era arribar als grans mercats orientals (Bulgar, Itil, Bizanci, etc.) amb esclaus i pells per canviar-los per plata, roba de seda i altres productes manufacturats de luxe. Però, quan es presentaven circumstàncies propícies per al saqueig i el pillatge, no era qüestió de desaprofitar-les.

Suècia entra en la història i s'incorpora al món medieval cristià en finalitzar el període viking. La unificació del país i la seva cristianització foren processos paral·lels en els quals el poder reial i l'Església es donaren suport mutu. L'any 1157 s'inicià la conquesta de Finlàndia, que el segle XIV quedaria definitivament annexada a Suècia.

La consolidació de l'estat suec es produeix durant el segle XIII, en el moment en què apareix una classe noble, són recopilades les lleis provincials i el "virrei" Birger Jarl estableix la capital del regne a Estocolm. L'intercanvi comercial amb els ports alemanys de la Lliga hanseàtica contribueix al progrés econòmic. El segle XIV constitueix un període pròsper des del punt de vista cultural: és l'època de Santa Brígida, que escriví les seves

Revelacions i funda el convent de Vadstena. En l'ordre polític destaca la unió (1397) amb el regne dano-noruec, l'anomenada Unió de Kalmar, per afrontar la penetració política d'Alemanya a Escandinàvia.

La Unió de Kalmar, no obstant això, havia de fracassar a causa del caràcter excessivament danès que prengué ja des de bon començament. La supremacia danesa suscità al llarg del segle XV rebel·lions populars i lluites turbulentes pel poder entre les famílies principals de la noblesa. Fou en aquest context que l'any 1435 sorgí el parlament suec, on a més del clergat i la noblesa hi havia representats la burgesia i els camperols.

El novembre de l'any 1520 el rei danès de la Unió, Cristià II, organitzà un parany a Estocolm i ordenà d'executar en massa la fracció separatista de l'aristocràcia sueca. El "bany de sang" d'Estocolm provocà una nova rebel·lió, aquesta vegada amb èxit, que conduí Suècia cap a la independència i el jove dirigent del partit secessionista Gustau Eriksson Vasa al poder. Coronat l'any 1523, Gustau Vasa és considerat el fundador i organitzador de l'Estat suec modern. Fou precisament sota el seu regnat que Suècia es convertí en un país luterà. La mesura, que significava la possibilitat d'expropiar els béns de l'Església, fou presa inicialment per motius bàsicament econòmics: per sanejar les finances de l'Estat, per una banda, i pagar el deute contret amb la ciutat de Lübeck durant la guerra contra els danesos, per l'altra.

Durant el regnat successiu dels tres fills de Gustau Vasa, a la segona meitat del segle XVI, el regne suec inicià la seva política d'expansió per la Bàltica. Els fins que es perseguïen eren trencar el setge del regne danès (del qual formava part també Noruega) i acon-

seguir el control directe del comerç exterior de Rússia a la mar Bàltica, a la qual aquesta no tenia accés directe. No obstant això, no seria fins el segle següent--i com a efecte de la seva intervenció en la Guerra dels Trenta Anys de la banda dels protestants-- que Suècia esdevindria la potència hegemònica del nord d'Europa.

Una de les claus de l'èxit de l'expansionisme suec rau en l'eficàcia de l'administració del regne, que fou capaç de mobilitzar completament els recursos escassos de la Suècia pobra i retardada del segle XVII. Darrera de les brillants victòries militars de Gustau II Adolf i Carles X Gustau, s'amagava el geni polític-administratiu infatigable del canceller Axel Oxenstierna.

Per mitjà de la pau de Roskilde, l'any 1658, Suècia aconseguí d'arrabassar a Dinamarca les províncies de Blekinge, Escània, Halland i Bohuslän, i d'aquesta manera estengué el seu territori fins al Sund: era la fi del setge danès.

El preu de l'expansionisme havia estat la cessió d'una gran part de les terres de la Corona a la noblesa, amb el debilitament consegüent del poder de l'Estat. No obstant això, el curt però intens procés de feudalització suec fou tallat en sec --amb l'aprovació dels camperols, sempre presents al Parlament-- l'any 1680 per Carles XI, mitjançant l'anomenada "Reducció", amb la qual la Corona confiscava a la noblesa les terres que havien estat cedides durant les dècades anteriors. D'aquesta manera la propietat de les terres tornà a estar repartida força equitativament entre l'Estat (35,6%), la noblesa (32%) i els camperols propietaris (31,5%).

L'hegemonia sueca al nord d'Europa es perdé després del desastre del temerari Carles XII a Poltava, Rússia, l'any 1709. Un cop mort aquest (1718) i perdudes la majoria de les possessions bàltiques (excepte Finlàndia i Pomerània), el Parlament suprimí l'absolutisme i el substituï per un règim constitucional, en el qual la funció de la Corona quedà limitada a ser l'executora de les decisions del Parlament: es tracta de l'anomenat "Temps de la Llibertat" (1718-1772). Aquesta època fou d'una transcendència especial per a Suècia, ja que el clima liberal que hi imperava (la primera llei de llibertat d'impremta és de l'any 1766) afavorí el desenvolupament econòmic, cultural i científic. La vida política, d'altra banda, fou molt agitada a causa dels enfrontaments constants entre dos partits que sorgiren en el Parlament, el dels "barrets" --mercantilista i revengista-- i el de les

"gorres" --liberal i moderat en política exterior. Les aventures militars dels "barrets" contra els russos costaren a Suècia la pèrdua de l'est de Finlàndia.

Gustau III fou el responsable de la fi d'aquest temps i de la restauració de l'absolutisme per mitjà d'un cop d'estat incruent, l'any 1772. La ironia de la història volgué, això no obstant, que fos també aquest partidari fervorós de l'antic règim qui, empès per la força de les circumstàncies, assestés el primer cop de mort contra els privilegis de l'aristocràcia l'any 1789. Fou la seva revolució "des de dalt", que obrí la burocràcia als talents i concedí als camperols el dret de comprar les terres de la noblesa, la qual cosa causà que fos assassinat en el cèlebre ball de màscares de l'any 1792 per un aristòcrata exaltat.

L'any 1809 Suècia entra en guerra amb Rússia, aleshores aliada de Napoleó, fet que li comportaria, al cap de poc temps, la pèrdua de Finlàndia. Immediatament després el rei Gustau IV Adolf fou deposat per un cop d'estat que posà fi a l'absolutisme i dotà el país d'una nova Constitució de signe liberal. La Constitució del 1809 estigué en vigor, amb modificacions, fins a l'any 1974.

La participació en la darrera coalició contra Napoleó permeté a la corona sueca d'obtenir el regne de Noruega l'any 1814. Aquesta operació havia estat concebuda i executada per l'ex-mariscal francès Joan Baptista Bernadotte, hereu del tron suec des de l'any 1810.

El segle XIX és el segle de les grans transformacions demogràfiques, econòmiques i socials, que obligaren la vella societat agrària a cedir el pas a una altra de més diferenciada. La població es duplicà fins a arribar als 5.100.000 d'habitants l'any 1900. I això tenint en compte que entre els anys 1840 i 1900 emigraren, principalment a Nord-Amèrica, prop de 850.000 suecs. "La pau, les vacunes i les patates" -- en una frase del poeta Esais Tegner-- foren els factors d'aquest espectacular progrés demogràfic.

A partir de l'any 1827 una sèrie de lleis agràries en favor de la concentració parcel·lària augmentaren l'eficàcia de l'agricultura, alhora que destruïen les comunitats mil·lenàries camperoles i en dispersaven els components en granges aïllades per tot el territori.

Tanmateix, els canvis més profunds són els que provocà la industrialització iniciada a mitjan segle gràcies a la creixent demanda internacional de fusta sueca. El procés d'industrialització s'accelera a partir de l'any 1870, en el moment en què es construeixen

els ferrocarrils, s'exporta el ferro dels jaciments del nord a gran escala i es desenvolupen les indústries metal·lúrgiques i altres indústries manufactureres.

En el terreny social, i com a conseqüència dels grans desequilibris ocasionats per l'evolució demogràfica i econòmica, fan la seva aparició els anomenats "moviments populars" --el moviment obrer, les lligues antialcohòliques, les esglésies lliures....--, l'acció dels quals configurarà de manera determinant la Suècia moderna.

Només en el terreny polític-institucional l'evolució és més lenta a causa de peculiaritats com ara el gran pes dels camperols propietaris --molt conservadors, en general-- en la vida pública. Així, malgrat algunes reformes importants com ara la transformació del vell parlament estamentari en un de bicameral i censitari (1866), el segle XIX s'extingí sense que Suècia conegués encara ni el parlamentarisme ni la democràcia en el seu sentit més modern.

El nostre segle començà amb la dissolució pacífica de la Unió sueco-noruega (1905), a la qual els noruecs sempre s'havien oposat. Durant la Primera Guerra Mundial Suècia romangué neutral, la qual cosa afavorí el progrés econòmic. En efecte, fou a partir d'aquest moment quan Suècia deixà de ser un país pobre per esdevenir-ne un de ric i, tecnològicament, dels més avançats.

La difícil situació social i política de la fi de la Primera Guerra Mundial es liquidà amb el triomf dels liberals i socialdemòcrates a les eleccions generals de l'any 1917 (des del 1909 la segona cambra era elegida per sufragi universal masculí) i la introducció definitiva del parlamentarisme i de la democràcia. Contràriament al que podríem suposar, els anys vint no foren rics ni en reformes ni en progrés social. La col·laboració entre liberals i socialdemòcrates havia acabat i ja no fou possible d'aconseguir formar nous governs de majoria.

Econòmicament, en canvi, la dècada dels anys vint fou molt pròspera: Suècia pogué exportar i vendre a tot el món els seus productes derivats de la fusta, els seus acers i els seus productes manufacturats. Per aquesta raó, la caiguda després del xoc que significà la Gran Depressió fou també molt dura. L'augment de l'atur i les reduccions salarials donaren lloc a intensos conflictes laborals. Fou en aquest clima que els socialdemòcrates accediren al poder, l'any 1932.

El llarg període de l'hegemonia socialdemòcrata, vigent fins avui, s'inicià amb un acord de cooperació

(1933) amb el partit agrari, que d'una banda permeté que els socialdemòcrates apliquessin mesures semblants a les que s'adoptaven als Estats Units per combatre la crisi i, de l'altra, evità la propagació del nazisme entre les capes mitges i baixes i entre els camperols. La governabilitat del país per part dels socialdemòcrates es veugué posteriorment assegurada per la signatura l'any 1938 d'un conveni marc de pau laboral --veritable compromís històric *avant-la-letre*-- entre la patronal i els sindicats.

L'actuació de Suècia durant la Segona Guerra Mundial fou més aviat grisa, ja que la neutralitat fou comprada amb concessions fetes a l'Alemanya de Hitler. Però, per al partit socialdemòcrata, el fet d'haver sabut evitar que el poble patís les calamitats de la guerra suposà la seva consagració definitiva com a pal de paller de la Suècia contemporània.

La postguerra sol ser descrita a Suècia com "l'època de la collita", ja que la socialdemocràcia es llançà a realitzar els seus projectes socials més ambiciosos, que tant la guerra com la necessitat de mantenir la unitat nacional havien ajornat, i recollir-ne els fruits consegüents.

Els anys cinquanta s'iniciaren amb una política més moderada per part dels socialdemòcrates, que s'aliaren de nou amb el partit agrari per tal d'assegurar els avenços ja aconseguits en matèria de pensions, assignacions familiars per fill, assegurances de malaltia general, subsidis d'habitatge, etc.

La coalició roja i verda durà fins a l'any 1957, moment en què es trencà per la qüestió de la pensió complementària obligatòria proposada pel partit socialdemòcrata, que en els cercles no socialistes fou considerada com una amenaça de socialització, ja que implicava la creació d'uns fons de pensions estatals considerables. Durant les dues dècades següents els socialdemòcrates governaren en solitari. Les bones conjuntures econòmiques dels anys seixanta i l'augment dels recursos de la societat en general permeteren que anessin realitzant la seva política de millores socials sense gran oposició per part dels partits no socialistes.

L'època daurada de la socialdemocràcia sueca finalitza en començar la dècada dels setanta. La crisi econòmica, el descens per la burocratització i centralització creixent de la societat i l'aparició de nous problemes, com ara l'ambiental, van ser finalment massa feixucs per a la capacitat d'un partit que havia perdut ja part de la seva agilitat i imaginació política. L'any 1976 les urnes donaven el poder als tres partits

del bloc no-socialista: conservadors, liberals i centristes.

L'estada al poder dels partits "burgesos" no durà prou temps com per poder canviar res substancialment. Al capdavant del govern, els partits no socialistes hagueren d'enfrontar-se a la doble i incòmoda realitat d'un Estat fet a imatge i semblança de la socialdemocràcia i d'un marge de maniobra extremadament reduït a causa de la tremenda força del sindicalisme suec.

La persistència de la crisi econòmica i les divisions profundes al si de la coalició governamental no-socialista foren dues de les principals causes del retorn dels socialdemòcrates al poder, l'any 1982. Des d'aleshores i fins a l'actualitat, l'esdeveniment més dramàtic de la vida pública sueca ha estat l'assassinat del primer ministre Olof Palme, el febrer de l'any 1986.

Govern

Suècia és una monarquia constitucional amb un sistema de govern parlamentari. Segons la nova Constitució del 1974, "tot poder públic emana del poble". El rei hi té únicament funcions de caire representatiu i protocol·lari. El màxim organisme estatal és el Parlament (*Riksdag*).

El Parlament suec és monocameral, amb 349 membres elegits per sufragi directe cada tres anys. El sistema electoral és proporcional. Un partit només pot obtenir representació parlamentària si recull un mínim del 4% dels vots a tot el país, o el 12% en un districte electoral. L'edat mínima per ser elector i elegible és de 18 anys. Els immigrants que hagin residit a Suècia un mínim de tres anys poden votar a les eleccions per als òrgans d'administració local. La participació electoral sol ser del 90%, aproximadament.

A les darreres eleccions legislatives del 18 de setembre de 1988, la sorpresa la donà el partit "ambiental" (els Verds), en accedir al Parlament amb un percentatge de vots relativament elevat. Tot i la pèrdua notable de vots soferta pels socialdemòcrates, el partit liderat per Ingvar Carlsson aconseguí un marge de maniobra més gran a causa de la pèrdua de vots encara superior que experimentaren els conservadors i els liberals.

Els resultats dels comicis de l'any 1988 foren els següents:

Partits	Escons	Vots %
Socialdemòcrata	156	43,2
Comunistes	21	5,8
Conservadors	66	18,3
Liberals	44	12,2
Centristes	43	11,3
Verds	20	5,5

Política exterior

La millor manera de descriure la política exterior sueca és ressaltant-ne la "no-participació en cap aliança en temps de pau per tal de mantenir la neutralitat en cas de guerra". Això significa que Suècia no és membre de cap aliança política ni militar i que, en cas de guerra, es declararà neutral. Es considera que aquesta política de neutralitat exigeix un sistema de defensa fort, que es fonamenta en el servei militar obligatori. El pressupost de defensa significa prop del 3,5% del PIB.

La política sueca de neutralitat no implica ni desinterès pels esdeveniments mundials ni neutralitat d'opinió en qüestions relatives, per exemple, als drets fonamentals de l'home i als valors democràtics. Així, Suècia denuncià categòricament la guerra nord-americana a Vietnam i la invasió soviètica d'Afganistan. Suècia manté així mateix una postura molt crítica contra el sistema de segregació racial de Sud-Africa i contra les restes de colonialisme, i facilita ajut econòmic i humanitari als moviments d'alliberament d'aquest país i de Namíbia.

Una part important de la política exterior sueca consisteix en una col·laboració estreta amb els altres països nòrdics. El camp d'acció de la cooperació nòrdica en el marc del Consell nòrdic s'estén a totes les parts de la vida social (mercat de treball, assegurances socials, etc.).

Suècia participa en el Consell d'Europa, on contribueix en les tasques a favor d'un respecte més gran als drets humans, i és un dels trenta-cinc països congregats a la Conferència sobre Seguretat i Cooperació a Europa.

L'interès de Suècia pels afers del Tercer Món queda palès amb la seva assistència a les reunions del moviment de països no alineats com a estat convidat. A més, assigna l'1% del seu PNB a l'ajut al desenvolupament internacional.

Suècia fou membre fundador de l'EFTA. Des del 1972 té també un acord de lliure comerç per als productes industrials amb la Comunitat Europea. Suècia ha desenvolupat igualment amb la CE una àmplia cooperació en camps que no estan coberts per aquest acord. Tot i que Suècia aspira a desenvolupar encara més aquesta cooperació, no ha optat per sol·licitar el seu ingrés a la Comunitat, ja que ho considera incompatible amb la seva política de neutralitat.

La pertinença a les Nacions Unides és un dels punts claus de la política exterior sueca. Suècia, com a país petit al marge dels blocs militars, està interessada perquè es doni suport als principis de la Carta de l'ONU; perquè els conflictes siguin resolts per mitjans pacífics, i perquè els estats s'adhereixin a determinades normes de comportament en les seves relacions internacionals. Un exemple del suport actiu a l'ONU és el fet d'haver pres part en més operacions de salvaguarda de la pau que cap altre país, i que més de 50.000 suecs hagin format part de les forces de l'ONU arreu del món.

Economia

Suècia pot ser descrita com un sistema d'economia mixta. Els ferrocarrils, els serveis de correus, la xarxa de telecomunicacions, una gran part de la producció d'energia i altres infraestructures són propietat de l'Estat. A més, el sector públic té la responsabilitat de prestacions socials com ara l'educació, l'assistència sanitària i la previsió social. En el marc de la veritable indústria i el comerç, prop del 90% de les empreses són de propietat privada i actuen en un sistema d'economia oberta de mercat. El 10% restant pertany a associacions cooperativistes o bé a l'Estat. El més corrent és que les empreses passin al poder de l'Estat a causa de la política d'ocupació. Aquest fou el cas durant els anys setanta de sectors sencers de la producció que entraren en crisi, com ara la siderúrgia,

la indústria tèxtil i les drassanes, en què l'Estat pogué posar en marxa una àmplia reconversió. Les empreses estatals són dirigides segons principis purament empresarials, amb l'objectiu de produir uns beneficis.

Des de la meitat de la dècada anterior fins al començament de l'actual, l'evolució econòmica es caracteritzà per uns desequilibris greus i per un creixement lent. Això no obstant, en el període de 1982 a 1987 la taxa de creixement del PIB i de les inversions fou una mica més alta a Suècia que a la resta d'Europa occidental, encara que no arribà als nivells del Japó o dels Estats Units. Els grans dèficits anteriors en la balança de pagaments i en els pressupostos de l'Estat han estat en gran part eliminats. L'atur ha estat reduït d'un 3% a poc menys del 2%.

Principals sectors de l'economia

La indústria i el comerç suecs han experimentat i continuen experimentant grans canvis. L'agricultura ocupa només el 4% de la població (1950: 20%). Gràcies a la intensa utilització de maquinària i als mètodes moderns d'abonament i de conreu, el percentatge actual d'ocupació produeix, no obstant, un 20% més del que s'assolia l'any 1950. El país s'autoproveeix d'aliments bàsics. Amb tot, com la resta de països d'Europa occidental, l'agricultura sueca depèn de les regulacions i de les garanties de preus establertes per l'Estat.

A gran part del país, l'agricultura es troba relacionada amb la silvicultura, que constitueix una activitat secundària important per als agricultors. Aproximadament la meitat dels boscos són propietat d'agricultors individuals, i una quarta part d'empreses privades. La resta està repartida entre l'Estat, l'Església estatal i els municipis. La majoria dels boscos privats és administrada per societats cooperatives de propietaris forestals. La pesca és un sector de la producció d'importància reduïda a Suècia.

Els camperols venen i processen els seus productes en gran mesura per mitjà de cooperatives de producció, que tenen un paper important en la indústria i el comerç suecs i, en certa mesura, en la política econòmica.

La gran majoria dels assalariats suecs treballa en els sectors industrial i de serveis. Des de mitjan anys seixanta s'ha produït un desplaçament del treball purament industrial cap als serveis, de manera que

aquest sector representa ara més de la meitat de la població activa.

Durant els darrers deu o vint anys les indústries bàsiques tradicionals, la siderúrgia i la indústria forestal han hagut d'enfrontar-se amb una gran competència en els mercats exteriors, i ja han deixat de ser la força motriu de l'economia sueca. Aquest paper és exercit actualment per la indústria de construccions mecàniques, que constitueix aproximadament un 42% del valor afegit industrial i un 12% de l'ocupació de Suècia. Prop del 70% de la seva producció és exportat, la qual cosa significa el 45% de les exportacions totals de productes del país. Tanmateix, aquesta indústria importa en alguns casos fins al 50% dels materials que componen els seus productes acabats. Això significa que la indústria de productes forestals, que només importa quantitats insignificants de productes semiacabats i components, és un exportador net més gran que no el sector de construccions mecàniques.

Moltes empreses sueques d'aquest sector compten amb nombroses filials en altres països, de manera que ara tenen un fort caràcter multinacional. Històricament, una gran part d'aquestes empreses han crescut i prosperat sobre la base d'invents o conceptes creats per suecs a la fi del segle XIX o al començament del XX, quan estava prenent embranzida la revolució industrial del país. Entre aquests es troben els rodaments de boles, que han convertit la SKF en una de les companyies líders del món en el seu sector. Un altre d'aquests invents fou el separador de llet que donà per resultat la formació del grup d'empreses Alfa Laval --esteses igualment arreu del món-- les muniidores mecàniques i altres equipaments d'aquests són emprats pels agricultors, per la indústria alimentària i per la indústria química dels cinc continents.

PRINCIPALS EMPRESES MULTINACIONALS I EXPORTADORES DE SUÈCIA

<i>Nom</i>	<i>Activitat</i>	<i>Xifra de negocis 1985 (1.000 mil. de corones)</i>	<i>% de vendes totals a l'exterior</i>
Volvo	Automòbils, camions, autobusos, energia, aliments	86,2	84
ASEA	Equipaments de generació i transmissió d'energia, locomotores, robots industrials	40,2	61
Electrolux	Electrodomèstics i maquinària d'oficina, serres elèctriques	39,7	75
Ericsson	Sistemes de telecomunicacions, informàtica	32,5	80
Saab-Scania	Camions, automòbils, avions	31,8	65
SKF	Rodaments i altres productes d'acer especial	20,0	91
A. Johnson & Co.	Comerç, petroli, acer	19,8	86
Nordstjernan	Construcció, naviliera, acers especials, informació i serveis, construccions mecàniques, comerç minorista	17,6	45
Skanska	Serveis de construcció	15,0	22
Stora	Productes forestals, energia	13,1	71
SSAB	Grup d'aceries estatals	12,9	44
Svenska Cellulosa	Productes forestals, maquinària	12,7	65

Comerç exterior

Suècia és un país petit que depèn en grau considerable del comerç amb altres països, per la qual cosa s'ha realitzat una política activa a favor del lliure comerç. És membre de l'EFTA i ha signat un acord comercial amb la Comunitat Europea.

Durant el present segle les exportacions sueques han augmentat constantment a un ritme superior al PIB i han constituït una de les premisses del creixement de l'economia del país. Alhora, ha anat disminuint la importància relativa de les primeres matèries en el comerç, i en canvi ha augmentat cada vegada més la dels productes acabats. Les exportacions sueques de serveis estan adquirint així mateix una importància cada vegada més gran, especialment els de consultoria (per exemple en treballs d'instal·lacions), transports marítims especialitzats i projectes de clau en mà amb direcció assegurada durant un cert temps.

Prop d'una tercera part de tots els productes i serveis suecs són exportats. Si examinem únicament la producció de mercaderies, podem observar que gairebé la meitat són exportades a altres països. Les empreses industrials més grans del país presenten un coeficient d'exportació encara més gran. Moltes d'elles venen del 80 al 90% --o encara més-- de la seva producció als mercats exteriors. Comparativament, la indústria sueca ha realitzat també grans inversions en unitats productives que es troben a altres països. De tots els treballadors de la indústria sueca, més de la quarta part treballa en filials establertes a l'estranger. Un 80% aproximadament de les filials es troben a Europa occidental i a Amèrica del Nord.

COMERÇ EXTERIOR PER PAÏSOS O REGIONS (1985)

	Exportacions, % del total	Importacions, % del total
Comunitat Europea	47,1	54,0
República Federal d'Alemanya	11,5	17,9
Gran Bretanya.....	9,9	14,1
Dinamarca	8,3	6,8
França	4,8	4,6
Altres països d'Europa occidental	21,7	18,2
Noruega	10,5	6,0
Finlàndia	5,6	6,5
Països d'economia estatal	2,6	5,2
Unió Soviètica	1,0	2,3
Africa	2,8	1,8
Proper Orient.....	3,1	0,4
Extrem Orient	5,6	8,0
Japó.....	1,3	4,9
Amèrica del Nord	13,2	9,1
Estats Units.....	11,6	8,4

Suècia depèn de les importacions en un grau similar al de les exportacions. Una tercera part del consum suec de mercaderies i serveis, aproximadament, és cobert per mitjà de la importació. Hom calcula que gairebé una tercera part del valor de les exportacions sueques de productes industrials equival a les despeses d'importació de primeres matèries, productes semielaborats i components.

En corones, les exportacions sueques s'elevaren l'any 1985 a uns 260.000 milions i les importacions a 224.000 milions. Durant la major part dels anys setanta Suècia importà més de l'estranger que no exportà. Anteriorment, la balança per compte corrent de Suècia havia mostrat superàvit, però la situació canvià en produir-se els grans augments dels preus del petroli els anys 1973 i 1974. La balança comercial sueca ha mostrat superàvit en els darrers anys, però la balança per compte corrent, que inclou no només el comerç, sinó també transferències de pagaments com ara els de l'ajut al desenvolupament i els interessos del deute a l'estranger, ha estat deficitària fins ara, llevat de l'any 1984.

El mercat de treball

Suècia té una població activa d'uns 4,4 milions de persones. Més del 90% dels obrers estan afiliats a federacions sindicals en l'àmbit nacional, integrades en la Unió General de Treballadors de Suècia (LO), que manté al seu torn una relació estreta amb el Partit Socialdemòcrata. Prop del 75% dels treballadors administratius i funcionaris estan organitzats en sindicats que pertanyen a la Confederació General de Funcionaris i Empleats (TCO) o a la Confederació Central d'Acadèmics de Suècia-SACO/SR, centrals que no mantenen lligams especials amb cap partit.

Les centrals sindicals negocien, per períodes d'un a tres anys, acords marc sobre salaris i condicions laborals amb la Confederació Patronal Sueca (SAF), que representa la majoria de les empreses privades, i amb altres organitzacions patronals en representació de l'administració central i local, de les cooperatives i de les empreses al marge de la SAF. Després, i a partir d'aquests acords, les diferents federacions sindicals signen convenis col·lectius amb les organitzacions patronals del sector respectiu. Encara que el Govern posa mitjancers a disposició de les parts, poques vegades ha d'intervenir per frenar els conflictes laborals. La legislació i els pactes entre sindicats i patrons han anat donant darrerament una importància més gran a la seguretat en el lloc de treball, a la

participació dels assalariats en la presa de decisions i a la millora de la seguretat i higiene en el treball. L'any 1984 s'introduí un sistema de fons d'inversió controlats pels sindicats, dins del marc de les pensions suplementàries. Aquests fons són finançats principalment amb la participació en els beneficis empresarials i han de ser invertits sobretot en valors borsaris.

Els ingressos mitjans bruts d'un obrer industrial, home, eren l'any 1987 d'unes 117.000 corones anuals. Els ingressos mitjans d'una família són generalment més elevats, perquè gairebé el 70% de les dones casades treballen fora de la llar, si més no a mitja jornada, i també per les prestacions socials que es concedeixen a la família. La jornada setmanal de treball és, normalment, de quaranta hores, i les vacances remunerades reglamentàries són de cinc setmanes.

Els impostos estatals sobre les rendes són d'una progressivitat accentuada, mentre que els impostos locals consisteixen en un percentatge fix dels ingressos. Tots ells són deduïts directament del pagament pels patrons en forma de retencions a compte. L'Impost sobre el Valor Afegit (IVA) que es carrega sobre la majoria dels productes i serveis arriba al 23,46%. Els empresaris paguen quotes corresponents a la Seguretat Social per un total del 40% de la massa salarial.

La Seguretat Social

A canvi dels impostos i altres contribucions, la gent rep una àmplia varietat de serveis públics i de prestacions socials que garanteixen un nivell mínim de vida, serveixen d'ajut en casos d'emergència, redistribueixen les rendes de manera més uniforme durant el període de vida d'una persona i redueixen les diferències entre els diversos grups d'ingressos.

Totes les persones residents a Suècia estan protegides per l'assegurança nacional de malaltia. Quan una persona cau malalta o ha de quedar-se a casa per tenir cura d'algun fill malalt, rep un subsidi diari subjecte a impostos equivalent al 90% dels ingressos perduts. A excepció d'unes cotitzacions reduïdes que corren a compte de l'interessat, l'assegurança nacional de malaltia cobreix totes les despeses d'hospitalització, les medicines receptades, les despeses per anàlisis de laboratoris i les visites als metges d'ambulatoris públics. Aquesta assegurança cobreix també una gran part dels honoraris per consultes a metges

privats i al voltant del 40% de les despeses d'assistència odontològica.

Quan neix un fill els pares tenen dret legal a un total de dotze mesos de permís pagat que es poden repartir entre el pare i la mare, amb la possibilitat de reservar sis d'aquests mesos per emprar-los durant els quatre primers anys de la vida del fill. Els pares reben igualment assignacions familiars lliures d'impostos, iguals per a cada fill, fins que aquests compleixen els setze anys d'edat. Els joves que després continuen la seva formació tenen dret a subsidis d'estudis, que en el marc universitari es componen principalment de préstecs reemborsables. Els municipis faciliten a un nombre de nens cada vegada més gran places a llars d'infants, com també activitats de diferent mena, a baix cost, després de l'horari escolar. Les famílies d'ingressos baixos i els jubilats poden obtenir subsidis d'habitatge.

L'assegurança contra accidents de treball cobreix totes les despeses en cas d'accident laboral. La gran majoria de les persones que treballen a Suècia tenen una assegurança de desocupació a través dels sindicats respectius, i les que no en tenen poden rebre un petit subsidi de l'Estat. Hi ha amplis programes estatals de reeducació professional i d'ocupacions protegides.

Els llocs de treball són adaptats a les necessitats dels disminuïts físics amb l'ajut de subvencions estatals. Als disminuïts físics que no puguin treballar se'ls dona la jubilació anticipada.

A partir de l'edat de 65 anys, tothom obté una pensió bàsica de jubilació, finançada amb els ingressos fiscals. L'Estat paga a més una pensió suplementària en relació amb els ingressos, que és finançada amb cotitzacions patronals sobre la massa salarial. Tots dos tipus de pensions, l'import de les quals segueix automàticament la taxa d'inflació, estan dissenyats per donar dues tercers parts dels ingressos mitjans reals obtinguts pel pensionista durant els quinze anys millor remunerats de la seva vida activa.

LA POLÍTICA DE SEGURETAT SUECA

Pau Puig Scotoni

"La política de neutralitat no ha de desvetllar mai la desconfiança de cap superpotència ni crear esperances a cap altra superpotència sobre possibles desviacions de la línia d'actuació triada."

Tage Erlander, primer ministre de Suècia entre 1946 i 1969

1. Consideracions generals

La política de seguretat de Suècia és, pel que fa a la seva concepció general i als mitjans emprats, una política de seguretat "diferent". Suècia no confia la salvaguarda de la seva pau i la seva llibertat a cap superpotència estrangera. No basa tampoc la seva neutralitat en garanties externes --en acords bilaterals ni convenis internacionals, com ho fan Finlàndia, Suïssa i Àustria--, sinó únicament en la seva pròpia voluntat i els seus recursos. I, finalment, tot i que no descarta els aspectes militars, no oblida tampoc --com passa sovint-- els factors polítics, econòmics i socials de la seguretat.

La política de seguretat sueca és --com ja hem avançat i és prou sabut-- una política de neutralitat. La classe política sueca i el poble suec en general són de l'opinió que la millor manera de preservar la pau i la llibertat de la seva nació és mantenir-se al marge de qualsevol aliança política o militar en temps de pau i manifestar la voluntat ferma de romandre neutrals en temps de crisi o de guerra internacionals. El neutralisme suec no és, tanmateix, un neutralisme desarmat, passiu i aïllacionista, ans tot el contrari. Com veurem, la neutralitat sueca és una neutralitat activa i armada.

Abans d'entrar, però, a veure detalladament el que és la política de seguretat sueca, caldria situar el neutralisme d'aquest país en el seu context originari.

2. Els orígens

L'actual política de seguretat sueca, que començà a prendre forma en el moment en què s'inicià la "Guerra Freda", sol ser vista com el resultat de tres factors fonamentals. El primer d'aquests és l'*experiència històrica*, i més exactament la idea, molt estesa entre la població sueca a la fi de la Segona Guerra Mundial, que Suècia s'havia lliurat de la guerra gràcies a la seva neutralitat.

El segon factor és la *situació geopolítica del país*. Suècia es trobava ben a la vora de les àrees de més importància demogràfica, econòmica i militar d'una de les dues superpotències enfrontades. En aquells moments això implicava dos perills: el primer, que Suècia es veiés obligada a sotmetre's a la influència de l'esmentada superpotència veïna, i el segon, que Suècia es veiés convertida en un post avançat de l'altra superpotència, amb tots els perills per a la seguretat del país que això comportava. La fórmula més lògica d'escapar de tots dos perills era, en conseqüència, la de declarar-se neutral en el nou conflicte mundial que es perfilava.

El tercer factor que es considera com a originari de la política de seguretat vigent el constitueix la *força relativa de l'Estat suec de la postguerra*. La Suècia de la segona meitat dels anys quaranta era, efectivament, una veritable potència de segon ordre ja que, malgrat el seu nombre reduït d'habitants, posseïa importants recursos naturals, una tecnologia avançada, era pràcticament l'únic Estat europeu que tenia l'aparell industrial intacte i estava sòlidament armada. La força aèria sueca, per exemple, era considerada la tercera més nombrosa del món. En resum, en començar la "Guerra Freda" Suècia tenia tot el que calia per fer *respectar* la seva ferma voluntat de ser un Estat neutral.

La rellevància d'aquests factors resulta evident si es compara, per exemple, l'evolució sueca amb la de Noruega i Dinamarca, les quals l'any 1949 optaren per la integració en l'Aliança Atlàntica a causa, principalment, de la mala experiència que tenien de la seva neutralitat i de la impossibilitat de sufragar les elevades despeses que comportava l'alternativa neutralista.

3. La política de seguretat

D'acord amb la doctrina de seguretat sueca, la finalitat de la política de seguretat és doble: en primer

lloc, assegurar la llibertat d'acció del país en totes les circumstàncies i, per tant, també sota qualsevol amenaça exterior; i en segon lloc, reduir les tensions i els conflictes en el món i a Europa amb l'objectiu d'evitar amenaces contra la pau i la llibertat de Suècia.

Des dels seus postulats neutralistes, la doctrina de seguretat sueca estableix com a principi bàsic el "no-alineament en temps de pau amb vista a obtenir la neutralitat en temps de guerra". Perquè la neutralitat sigui respectada cal que sigui sempre *digna de crèdit*, i això depèn del fet que cap de les superpotències pugui mai sospitar que Suècia, en un moment donat, pot fer causa comuna amb l'altra.

La política de neutralitat no implica, d'altra banda, la neutralitat ideològica. Mentre --s'afirma-- les opinions dels dirigents suecs en matèria de política internacional no semblin imposades per una de les superpotències, per més 'inoportunes' que siguin, no podran posar en perill la credibilitat de la neutralitat. És més --continua l'argumentació--: la defensa que

Suècia fa dels drets de les petites nacions, dels pobles oprimits i dels drets humans en general és, en realitat, un factor més de credibilitat, una manera de subratllar la independència de l'Estat suec no alineat.

La idea que la neutralitat no implica la imparcialitat ideològica també és fonamentada en l'experiència que mai cap nació neutral no ha estat atacada per les seves opinions o principis ideològics, sinó per motius de més pes, de naturalesa econòmica o estratègica.

Pel que fa als *mitjans* de la política de seguretat, la doctrina que aquí estem exposant n'assenyala quatre: 1, la política exterior a favor de la distensió, el desarmament i la solidaritat internacionals; 2, la política econòmica i comercial; 3, la política d'assistència al desenvolupament del Tercer Món; i 4, la política de defensa.

El fet que la política exterior i la d'assistència al desenvolupament siguin considerades com a mitjans importantíssims ("la primera línia de la política de seguretat") per a la seguretat de Suècia respon, òbviament, al fet que la reducció de les tensions i els conflictes mundials per evitar amenaces contra la pau i la llibertat sueques sigui un dels dos objectius fonamentals de la política de seguretat. La idea que la seguretat de Suècia es guanya i es manté afavorint les negociacions entre els dos grans, treballant activament per la distensió a Europa i a l'àrea nòrdica, com

també atacant les arrels polítiques, econòmiques i socials dels conflictes internacionals, constitueix alhora el tret més original de la doctrina de seguretat que aquí ens ocupa.

La política econòmica i comercial és considerada, per la seva banda, com un instrument de la política de seguretat, atès que en depenen tant el fet que Suècia tingui els recursos econòmics i el grau d'autosuficiència exigits per la defensa, com el que tingui la independència econòmica que cal perquè la neutralitat del país sigui digna de crèdit. Recordem un cop més que l'any 1971 el govern suec decidí de mantenir el seu país al marge de la Comunitat Europea, tot declarant que la seva adhesió seria incompatible amb la neutralitat.

4. La política de defensa

La defensa, en el sentit ampli de la paraula, és a dir la defensa militar, civil, psicològica i econòmica, constitueix l'escut físic de la política de seguretat. Entre les funcions que la doctrina de seguretat sueca atribueix a la defensa en destaquen tres: 1, donar suport i credibilitat a la política de neutralitat (una defensa forta és, com és sabut, una *conditio sine qua non* per a tota política de neutralitat, si més no per impedir que cap dels blocs enemics es vegi obligat a ocupar el territori declarat neutral per tal d'evitar que sigui ocupat per l'altre); 2, dissuadir qualsevol agressor potencial d'atacar, fent-li entendre que si ho fa tindrà uns costos desproporcionats en relació amb els avantatges que pot esperar obtenir; i 3, rebutjar qualsevol tipus d'atac convencional.

Les dues darreres funcions són comunes a qualsevol política de defensa i, per tant, no cal comentar-les. Passarem directament, doncs, a una breu presentació de la doctrina de defensa sueca. Tanmateix, abans caldria esmentar alguns problemes que la defensa sueca té plantejats i donar-ne algunes dades.

El primer gran problema de la defensa sueca és el que origina la gran extensió territorial del país i el seu nombre reduït d'habitants. En extensió Suècia és, efectivament, el quart Estat d'Europa; en població, en canvi, el dissetè. L'altre gran problema és la vulnerabilitat econòmica del país per la seva gran dependència del comerç exterior. Suècia és, en efecte, un dels països del món que depèn més del comerç exterior. Més de la meitat de la seva producció industrial està destinada a l'exportació, i tant aquesta producció com el consum intern depenen en gran part

de les importacions. Suècia no té ni petroli ni carbó. La seva agricultura, que en teoria autoproveeix el país en un grau superior al vuitanta per cent, ho fa en gran mesura amb adobs i fertilitzants importats.

Malgrat l'escàs nombre d'habitants, la força mobilitzable de la defensa sueca no és pas menyspreable: 850.000 homes, als quals s'han d'afegir els 250.000 de la defensa civil.

Suècia és el país del món que gasta més en defensa per habitant (el 3,5% del PIB i el 8% dels pressupostos de l'Estat), després de les dues superpotències i d'Israel. Té també una de les forces aèries més considerables d'Europa (430 unitats).

Com correspon a un país neutral, la major part del material de guerra és de producció nacional --més exactament, el 70%--. Tanmateix, una part significativa de la tecnologia emprada per la indústria militar sueca és d'importació.

La defensa sueca és en gran mesura una "defensa de closca". L'objectiu principal és evitar que l'enemic es pugui assentar en el territori nacional. D'aquí la gran importància que es concedeix a l'aviació i a la flota, és a dir, a les forces d'intervenció ràpida.

Fins a l'incident amb un submarí soviètic el 27 d'octubre del 1981, Suècia tenia unes forces permanents relativament minses. D'aleshores ençà aquestes forces han augmentat i s'han reforçat --en especial les defenses antisubmarines.

La defensa total sueca acumula carburants i altres articles indispensables per al cas de bloqueig i de guerra, i proporciona també protecció a la població civil contra eventuais atacs nuclears i amb armes químiques. A Suècia hi ha 55.000 refugis subterranis capaços d'acollir 6.000.000 de persones.

5. La doctrina de defensa

Un cop presentats alguns dels problemes i característiques de la defensa sueca, exposarem breument la doctrina en què aquesta es basa.

La defensa sueca no està pensada per afrontar qualsevol tipus d'amenaça militar. Concretament, no està imaginada per dissuadir ni replicar un atac nuclear, tot i que els experts oficials pensin que la defensa convencional pot servir també per evitar aquesta mena d'atac, si s'aconsegueix mantenir Suècia fora de l'eventual conflicte fins al moment de l'escalada nuclear: la guerra nuclear --pensen-- seria igual-

ment de curta durada, i en conseqüència no hi hauria prou temps perquè una Suècia neutral es pogués convertir en un objectiu d'interès per als blocs en combat.

Segons la doctrina de defensa sueca, l'amenaça militar més probable és un atac en el marc d'un conflicte entre l'OTAN i el Pacte de Varsòvia. La finalitat d'aquesta escomesa seria o bé utilitzar el país com a zona de pas i àrea de base per a operacions militars contra objectius situats al seu entorn, o bé evitar que el bloc contrari s'apoderés de Suècia amb les mateixes intencions. Aquestes suposicions estan basades en l'opinió que Suècia és un país amb poc valor en si mateix, ja que no té recursos materials que facin la seva conquesta atractiva ni tampoc un gran interès estratègic.

Els punts que la doctrina de defensa sueca considera com a més exposats a l'atac són Lapònia i les parts més meridionals del país. La raó d'això és que són les regions més pròximes a les zones de més importància estratègica d'Escandinàvia: els estrets Bàltics i la regió del cap Nord. És a dir, les vies d'accés de les flotes soviètiques a la mar del Nord, la mar de Noruega i a l'Atlàntic. I, òbviament, d'accés a l'importantíssim complex militar soviètic de la península de Kola i a la Bàltica.

Un altre element essencial de la doctrina de defensa sueca és el constituït per l'anomenada 'doctrina marginal'. El punt de partida d'aquesta doctrina és que aquell bloc que amenaci o ataqüi Suècia tindrà sempre la part més gran dels seus recursos ocupats en l'enfrontament contra l'altre bloc. En conseqüència, l'enemic eventual només podrà fer ús d'una part marginal de les seves forces en contra de Suècia. Aquesta concepció dóna, evidentment, una resposta a la qüestió de si un país petit com ara Suècia pot

presentar resistència a les pretensions d'una superpotència que trobi convenient d'apoderar-se del seu territori: si aquesta només pot utilitzar una part marginal de les seves forces, el fet d'oposar-se a les seves pretensions ja no resulta una empresa totalment inviable per a una nació de les característiques de Suècia.

6. Les crítiques

Com tota política de defensa d'un país democràtic, la de Suècia no ha estat tampoc exempta de crítiques. En contra seva s'ha argumentat, per exemple, que la planificació de la defensa no es pot basar només en les amenaces probables, sinó en totes les possibles. Una altra crítica --aquesta de signe totalment contrari-- ha estat que l'escomesa convencional que els polítics i els militars suecs esperen no pot tenir lloc perquè pressuposa una guerra continental limitada, considerada per aquests crítics teòricament impossible a l'Era nuclear.

La política de defensa en general ha estat criticada per no prendre prou en consideració les amenaces de tipus econòmic --l'esmentat problema de la vulnerabilitat econòmica-- i per aspirar a defensar més el territori que no pas les persones que l'habiten. Tampoc no han faltat crítiques contra les dimensions pretesament desproporcionades a allò que es volia aconseguir de les forces armades sueques.

No obstant això, aquestes i d'altres crítiques no posen gairebé mai en qüestió els altres aspectes de la política de seguretat, i en concret la política de neutralitat. La neutralitat a Suècia --tot i que darrerament algunes veus s'hagin alçat esverades pel tema dels submarins-- continua sent --com es diu en suec-- "una vaca sagrada": *en helig ko*.

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND 1992

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- 2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' PRESENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EC
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FIGURE 1

SHARES OF HOME DEMAND FOR MANUFACTURES:

SWEDEN, NORWAY, EFTA AND EC, PERCENT, 1985

	<u>PERCENT</u>
EFTA's SHARE OF HOME DEMAND IN THE EC	3,5
OF WHICH	
SWEDEN's SHARE	1,0
NORWAY's SHARE	0,3
EC's SHARE OF	
SWEDEN's HOME DEMAND	25
NORWAY's HOME DEMAND	20

THE EC'S "FOUR FREEDOMS"

1. FREE TRADE IN GOODS
2. FREE TRADE IN SERVICES
3. FREE CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
4. FREE MOBILITY OF LABOUR

EXAMPLES

- A. MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS
- B. INTRA-COMMUNITY COMPETITION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
- C. RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR EC BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES
- D. INCREASED COMPETITION IN AIR AND MARITIME TRANSPORT
- E. HARMONIZATION OF INDIRECT TAXES
- F. RE-INTRODUCTION OF FREE TRADE IN AGRICULTURE
- G. COMMON COMPETITION LAW BETTER ENFORCED

COMPLETE ABOLITION OF BORDER CONTROLS BETWEEN
NORDIC COUNTRIES AND EC NECESSITATES:

1. CO-ORDINATED EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY
2. CO-ORDINATED AGRICULTURAL POLICY
3. CO-ORDINATED INDIRECT TAXATION (VAT, EXCISE DUTIES)
20 22% IVA e as products
4. CO-ORDINATED TRADE IN SERVICES (TRANSPORT, BANKING,
INSURANCE), INCLUDING TRADE RELATED INVESTMENT
5. CO-ORDINATED EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY

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THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND 1992

by

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- 2 The Nordic countries' present economic relations with the EC
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1. Introduction - The Community's twin decisions

Whenever the issue of the European integration has been discussed in the Nordic countries the impulse has come from abroad. Typically the reason has been decisions on the Continent to push ahead with economic and political cooperation. Because of the decisions taken by the EC in 1985, time has again come for a reaction from the Nordic countries.

The Community took two important decisions in 1985. The first one was to deepen integration among member states through the programme creating the so-called Internal Market. The aim of the Internal Market programme is to realize within the Community truly free mobility of goods, services, labour and capital. Border controls are to be abolished between member countries. In the different countries one shall accept each others quality, health and safety regulations, and these regulations are also to some extent to be harmonized. Public procurement is to be opened up to intra-Community competition, and a Common market created for trade in services like transport, information services, bank- and insurance services. Capital movements shall be completely free, and a common company law shall be available to those firms that want to work under a law common to all member countries. There shall be a right of establishment for firms and banks in the whole of the Community. Also indirect taxes shall be partly harmonized.

The economic objective of the Internal Market is to inject into the Community some of the dynamics, economic growth and employment creation that has characterized the US and Japan more than Western Europe.

The second decision of 1985 was to increase the efficiency of the Community's procedures for decision making. Previously in practice all member countries needed to agree among themselves to reach a positive

decision, that is, a decision to change the status quo. This unanimity rules lead to increased problems as the number of member countries increased. A country, like Greece, could use its veto power to extract special claims (side payments) from the rest. This "the rest" became increasingly dissatisfied with this situation. Now, with the Single European Act (SEA) in most cases it is enough to reach a qualified majority. This goes for most of the proposals contained in the programme for the Internal Market. However, decisions regarding fiscal matters, and on accepting new members into the Community still require total agreement among member states.

Today Sweden and each EFTA country has its own agreement with the Community on free trade in manufactures. However, from the agreement is excluded some types of processed foods, and this limitation of the free trade agreement has its root in the fact that neither agricultural products nor fruit and vegetables are included. With regard to fish and fish products there are individual agreements with each EFTA country. Trade in services are not covered by any EC-EFTA agreement, neither exist there any agreements regarding capital movements or labour movement, excluding Denmark's participation in the free Nordic labour market.

2. The Nordic countries' present economic relations with the Community

The Nordic countries' economic relations with the Community are intimate. However, this does not mean that the Community is particularly dependent on the Nordic countries. When pondering over the importance of the Nordic countries for the Community, several measures of interdependence can be used, e.g. interdependence through trade in goods, trade in services, foreign investment, migration, currency

pegging and exchange rate arrangements, etc. However, I will limit myself to an unusual, but correct, measure of interdependence through trade, viz. a comparison of trade with total home demand (apparent consumption). Let us start with EFTA's exports to EC relative to the Community's home demand. This is presented in Table 1. It can be seen that the EFTA countries' share of the Community's home demand for aggregated manufactures was 3.5 per cent in 1985. (EFTA includes Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria). Of these 3.5 per cent Sweden took approximately 1 per cent, and Norway 0.3 per cent of the Community's home demand.

Turning around the perspective and considering the Community's share of home demand in Sweden and Norway, the asymmetry becomes very apparent: The Community takes approximately 25 per cent of Sweden's and 20 per cent of Norway's home demand.

The Community's total foreign trade is fairly small in relation to its home market, and this is just a reflection of the simple fact that today's Community is an economic super power with a large home market and GNP. The Community has grown from 6 to 12 members during the last 15 years, and today it has some 320 million inhabitants, and a GNP which is only 15 per cent less than that of the United States.

It is true that EFTA is the largest trading partner of the Community, i.e. when the comparison is made with e.g. the US and Japan. But I want to warn against a tendency in the official Nordic rethoric to compare the Nordic countries, or EFTA, with other trading partners of the EC, rather than comparing with the size of the EC itself, i.e. trade must be seen in relation to the size of the market it is a part of. Suppose, as a hypothetical experiment, that all countries except the Nordic ones joined the Community. The Nordic countries would then take

100 per cent of the Community's foreign trade and other external economic relations. Still, that could not be taken to imply that the Community then would be much dependent upon the Nordic countries, or that the Nordic countries would have a strong bargaining position.

3. Norway and Sweden's policy papers on the Internal Market

Among the Nordic countries Norway was the first one to produce a policy paper on the Community and the Internal Market. In May of 1987 the Norwegian government submitted to Stortinget an excellent survey of the developments in the Community leading up to the twin decisions on The Single European Act and The Internal Market, and it covers also the many issues that the White Paper on the Internal Market contains.¹ The paper also has some very carefully worded conclusions that Norway should make determined efforts both at home, in Brussels, via EFTA and together with other Nordic countries to avoid being discriminated against as a result of the creation of the Internal Market. It is pointed out, however, that all these efforts and adjustments must take place within the framework of Norway's present institutional arrangements ("innefor rammen av den tilknytningsform som Norge idag har med Felleskapet"; p. 6).

The Swedish government submitted its policy paper to Riksdagen in December 1987, and the factual parts of that paper are also of unusually high quality. This policy paper, and the following majority text of the Riksdag, is more far-reaching than I think most of you would imagine.² In effect, it is stated that Sweden is prepared to become a member of

¹Norge, EF og europeisk samarbeid, St. meld. nr. 61 (1986-87), Utenriksdepartementet, Oslo, 22.5.1987.

²Sverige och den västeuropeiska integrationen, Proposition 1987/88:66, Stockholm 17.12.1987, and Riksdagen, Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1987/88:24, 21.4.1988.

the Community in all respects, except for possible requirements regarding discussion of foreign policy and security issues. The possibility of Sweden becoming an associated member of the Community is mentioned, and is not excluded (p. 28). Since the Swedish Parliament's decision so far is the most concrete and far-reaching one among the Nordic countries, and because developments in Sweden have an important bearing also on the policy of others, especially Finland, I will use Sweden and its policy paper to illustrate the implications for the Nordic countries' of the suggested adjustments to 1992.

Let us make the assumption that the more important parts of the Internal Market have been completed by the mid 1990s and that the integration process continues also after that. Let us also assume that the stated objective of the Swedish government, and Parliament, should be taken seriously, viz. that: "With regard to the proposals in the [Community's White Paper on the Internal Market], Swedish consumers and Swedish firms should have all the same rights and the same obligations as have consumers and firms of the Community's member countries, and that Swedes and Swedish firms in no way whatsoever shall be discriminated against". (This is a quotation from Parliament's decision of May 1988). Parliament has also stated that "Sweden should try to abolish all types of border controls between Sweden and the Community in a way parallel to the abolishment of border controls between member states of the Community." Further, "Sweden has a clear interest in coordinating the free Nordic labour market and passport union with the [equivalent future] system of rules of the Community".

Summing up, the stated official objectives of Sweden's discussions with the Community imply that the Swedish border against the Community,

if possible, should be as easy to cross in both directions as it will be in 1993 to cross the borders between EC member states.

Taking these objectives seriously, Nordic and Swedish every-day life in a number of different ways would then have to adjust to future decisions taken in Brussels. In those Nordic countries that wish to adjust to the Internal Market, public authorities, firms, employers, trade unions etc. would all have to cope with adjustment problems and adjustment costs. However, one would hope that these temporary costs will indeed be temporary and counter-balanced by permanent net benefits, once the adjustment phase is over.

4. Three questions for the Nordic countries

In my mind, the proposal for the Internal Market raises three questions for the Nordic countries.

First, what will be the consequences, in each country, if one adjusts fully to the Internal Market, and makes the Community's Internal Market decisions one's own? What will be the consequences for Iceland, Sweden, etc. of not adjusting?

Second, what should be each Nordic country's objectives in the discussions with the Community? When one has completed a preliminary investigation of the consequences, Nordic lobbying in Brussels should concentrate on a selection of the over 300 proposals included in the White Paper on the Internal Market. This is the short-run perspective, up to the end of 1992. The long-run perspective, i.e. beyond 1992, cannot avoid the question of what institutional arrangement each Nordic country should seek with the Community. In the case of Norway, but also for Sweden, membership is an option that is excluded for now in the policy documents, but no firm long-term commitment is made either way.

Third, what is the most efficient negotiating track? Is it via EFTA, via a Nordic coalition, or bilaterally for each country?

I will try to point out the most important economic consequences for a Nordic country which, like Sweden, has as its objective to completely remove the border controls between itself and the EC.

5. Coordination of policies

5.1 Coordinated external trade policy

In order to abolish border controls between a Nordic country and the Community it is necessary for the Community that this Nordic country maintains the same external trade barrier as the Community, i.e. a customs union. This is necessary since prices on the two sides of the removed border will tend to equalize. If the external trade policy was not the same, a product which e.g. faces a high trade barrier in the Community, and a low trade barrier in Iceland, say, could be exported to the Community via Iceland to avoid the higher Community barrier. Such trade deflection would be unacceptable to the Community, of course, and vice versa for Iceland.

An adjustment of the EFTA countries' average tariff to the Community's common external tariff would be almost painless. The Community's average external tariff for manufactures is approximately 4 per cent, compared to EFTA, Sweden, and Norway's average of 2 to 3 per cent. However, in addition to tariffs, a Nordic country would also have to apply the Community's set of non-tariff measures. Disregarding agriculture and fishing, today probably the most important restrictions are on imports from Japan of household appliances, videos and similar goods, as well as automobiles and motorcycles, but also imports from developing countries, like textiles and clothing. If non-tariff measures were not harmonized with those of the Community, a product

under e.g. import quota in the Community could enter the Community through a Swedish "back door".

Today the Community has three associated members, namely, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. With Yugoslavia and a number of Arab countries along the shores of the Mediterranean the Community has preferential agreements. In order to achieve a common external trade barrier, a Nordic country would have to implement in its practical policy these trade agreements.

If adjustments like these were undertaken today in Sweden, consumers would have to pay more for several products from Japan, and perhaps less for some products originating in developing countries, like fruit and vegetables from countries around the Mediterranean.

5.2 Coordinated agricultural policy

Since the abolishment of border controls between two countries will tend to equalize prices of goods, a Nordic country abolishing its border controls vis-a-vis the Community will have to adjust its domestic prices of agricultural products to the prices prevailing in the Community.³ If prices were not approximately the same in the Nordic country and in the Community, farmers and their wholesalers would transport their agricultural output across the borders to those countries with the highest purchase prices. Consumers would tend to trade in the opposite direction.

To introduce approximately similar prices of agricultural products in Sweden and in the Community would probably be a manageable problem, given some adjustment time. (If undertaken today, Swedish milk

³ Because of special "green" exchange rate arrangements, today there is, in practice, no free trade in agriculture within the EC, but there should be free trade in 1992.

production would suffer significant lower purchase prices.) Possibly more important from the point of view of society and Swedish consumers, an abolishment of border controls against the EC would put a brake on the suggested attempts to reform Swedish agricultural policy in the direction of lower production and consumer prices. In both Norway and in Finland the agricultural sectors are more protected than in Sweden, and I understand that also in Iceland consumers have little choice but to buy very expensive, domestically produced food products.

It is worth noting here, that the future of agricultural protection in Europe is one of the crucial issues of the present international trade negotiations within GATT's so-called Uruguay Round. Pressures for liberalisation and market access are very strong from countries like the US, Canada and Australia, but also from several developing countries, like Argentina. These negotiations are planned to finish in 1990, so for Nordic agriculture in the near future the outcome of the GATT negotiations may be as important as discussions with the Community.

5.3 Coordinated indirect taxation

Differences in the general price level between two countries due to different VAT rates can in principle be adjusted for through a change of the exchange rate. However, without border controls there will be problems with border trade if taxes on specific products, or product groups, would differ significantly on the two sides of the border. For example, it is familiar that there are large differences in the taxation of alcohol in different European countries, as well as different rates of value added tax on food.

Today, when a good, or a service, is exported, value added tax, or any excise duty, is deducted from the export price upon exportation.

When goods are imported, value added tax and any duty is levied on the import price. If border controls are abolished these tax adjustments cannot be undertaken. Indirect taxes will have to be harmonized unless one is prepared to accept a significant border trade and an erosion of the high-tax country's domestic tax base. Abolished border controls thus necessitate some coordination of indirect taxes. Such coordination can come about either through a political decision, or through an adjustment through the market, viz. the threat that if political decisions on coordination are not undertaken in the high tax country, the result will be border trade reducing the tax base of the high tax country. Judging from the experience of federal states like the United States, Canada and Australia, the difference in indirect tax rates can be at most some 5 percentage points between states. In central Europe this would probably be too large a difference, but of course between Iceland and the Continent there could be a much larger difference without any serious threat to the Icelandic tax base.

For a Nordic country closer to the EC than Iceland, adjusting indirect taxes would mean both a harmonization of the tax base to that of the EC, i.e. accepting EC decisions on which goods and services that should bear indirect taxes, and also one would have to harmonize the rates of indirect tax.

In 1987 the EC Commission suggested that member countries would choose their VAT rate for 2/3 of all goods and services in the interval 14 to 20 per cent, with a lower VAT on food - between 4 and 9 per cent. Compared to most Community countries, today Nordic countries like Sweden and Iceland have high indirect tax rates rate - in the Swedish case 23.5 per cent. For Sweden the problem would then be to reduce its VAT rate on food and some other products to less than half of today's VAT, and,

at the same time, having to reduce the VAT rate on remaining goods and services to some 20 per cent. Clearly total revenue from indirect taxation would be significantly reduced, which worries the Minister of Finance, of course.⁴ However, one may ask, why anyone outside Sweden, or any other high tax country for that matter, would bother with our tax rates so long as they are above those of our neighbours. It would be the Swedish tax collector and no one else that would suffer if Swedes travel abroad to buy their goods and services.

To avoid "excessive" border trade - whatever volume the government regards as excessive - prices of goods like petrol, tobacco, wine and spirits, would have to be approximately the same in neighbouring countries. In Table 2, I have calculated the change in sales price in Sweden if the Commission's proposal for 1992, was implemented in 1987. Apart from the strong dose of reduced liquor tax, the present duties on Swedish charter flights are worth noticing. It can be looked upon an import tariff on tourist services. The abolishment of the charter tax will be an obvious objective for the Community's negotiators since it hits employees and capital owners in the Community's service sector, apart from Swedes looking for sun and culture.

It is important to note, however, that there is still a long way to go for the Community on the issue of indirect taxes, and not until some time in the 1990s we will know the final outcome of the internal bargaining process. One possibility is that there will be a harmonization of the tax base, some harmonization of rates, and a trial and error period over several years to find out what intra-Community tax differences each government thinks it can live with (some countries

⁴There is also a compensation scheme suggested by the Commission, the aim of which is to restore the principle of VAT collection in the country of final consumption.

would gain tax base, of course). This would imply a form of "competition among rules" for indirect taxation. For the Nordic countries the problem will be how high the tax can be without losing too much of the domestic tax base to neighbouring countries.

The Internal Market proposals for reduced barriers to trade, and freer movement of factors of production, bring up a general problem for high tax countries like the Nordic ones, namely that the tax base will more easily move to a low tax country. So far, however, the experience is that at least individuals have proved to be fairly unwilling to move within Western Europe, in spite of the fact that many - like automobile workers - could increase their after tax income two to four times if they moved to another country.

If high tax countries reduce their indirect taxes, the effect of this will, of course, depend on what other measures the government would take at the same time. If the alternative is higher personal income taxes, this may lead to reduced efficiency in the economy because of larger tax wedges, i.e. a larger difference between the individual's return to extra work effort and society's return. A decision on increased personal income taxes would go against the present international trend, however. If the alternative is reduced public expenditure, in order to say anything about the effects on the growth of the economy, one would need to know what expenditures are up for reduction. For example, would there be transfers to housing, or reduced public investment, e.g. investments in international transport facilities?

The important conclusion from these very brief remarks on Nordic taxes and 1992, is that a Nordic adjustment to the Internal Market is

likely to imply significant constraints both on the formulation of the tax policy, and on the rates to be paid.

5.4 Coordinated trade in services

The Internal Market programme includes an ambitious programme for deregulation of several - but not all - service sectors. Trade in services includes transport, banks, insurance companies and the information service sector, including tele communications.

Compared to road traffic the commission has so far been somewhat less ambitious with regard to deregulation of passenger air traffic and maritime transport. European railways are not at all touched upon in the 1992 programme. What will deregulation then mean? Take the road haulage sector! Today in Western Europe there is a system of quotas on the volumes of international road transport. A producer must have a license to carry out a transport service across national boundaries between (i) his home country and other countries, (ii) between third countries, and (iii) he is not allowed ever to transport goods between two points within a foreign country. (However, no rule without exceptions. Already today road haulage traffic is partly deregulated on points (i) and (ii) among the Nordic countries and among the Benelux countries.)

The volume and allocation of these quotas (transport rights) are determined on a bilateral basis between governments. They have several effects. A first one is that large firms like Volvo and Siemens set up their own transport divisions so as to avoid the whole system of regulations.

Secondly, transports are not being carried out along the most efficient routes, and not using the most efficient producers of transport services creating an inefficient employment of resources and

higher costs than otherwise would be the case. In the end these additional costs are borne by consumers, tax payers and goods producing firms. In a recent report from the Commission the additional costs to the consumers of road haulage services are estimated to be equivalent to a 5 per cent tariff. That the transport quotas are binding, is shown by the fact that these quotas are traded on a black market. For example, in the mid 1980s, the right to use one lorry during one year to carry out transports between the United Kingdom and the Continent caught a black market price of some GBP 12.000. Such additional costs would vanish with the disappearance of any binding quotas, of course.

To eliminate restrictions on competition in international transport has the same effect as a reduction of a tariff. Countries with a comparative advantage in production of transport services will increase their production and export of such services. Other countries will experience reduced production. Some large firms that today have their own fleet of lorries, will find it more profitable to use professional road haulage firms and air lines, and will dismantle their transport divisions. During this adjustment period, transport firms will be reorganised, merge, exploit economies of scale more fully, and specialise on certain types of goods and routes. The total transport sector in Western Europe is likely to increase in volume as a result of the lower transport prices. Of course, this could be dampened by increased taxation and environmental considerations meaning that it would be the public purse rather than the consumers that would benefit.

5.5 Coordinated migration policy

Just as there is a need for a common external trade policy without border controls there will be a need for a common policy regarding migration from areas outside of West Europe. However, there will still

be national requirements for work permits and residence permits for individuals from countries outside a common passport union and labour market.

Sweden has stated that it is prepared to participate fully in a common labour market, with the modest reflection that this would just be an extension to the rest of Europe of the Nordic passport union. With membership of a common passport union follows that a Nordic citizen would not need a residence permit or a work permit in any Community country. In the name of reciprocity, the same would hold for citizens of the Community who wish to work and live in a Nordic country. Nordic degrees and diplomas would give a Nordic citizen the right to exercise his profession freely in the Community on the same liberal terms as Community citizens, and vice versa in the Nordic countries. Today's discrimination of Nordic students would disappear, e.g. with regard to fees in the United Kingdom, and participation in educational programmes like Eureka.

6. Permanent costs and benefits

The adjustments of external trade policy, agricultural policy, indirect taxation, trade in services and migration policy would imply adjustments to partly new regulatory and legal frameworks, and a change in conditions for economic activity in the Nordic country in question. Once having taken upon oneself these adjustments, will the overall outcome result in higher living standards and economic growth for the Nordic country? I cannot answer this broad question for any of the Nordic countries, and will limit myself to some remarks on the Swedish situation and the economic aspect.

There is one reason, at least, to expect a lower rate of growth if Sweden would adjust fully to the Community's common economic

institutions. Sweden is a small and very open economy, and for this reason in the past Sweden has been forced to accept structural change more quickly than it probably would have had to demand of itself if it was closely integrated with the EC's common institutions. Sectors like shipbuilding, steel, textile and clothing have been dismantled more rapidly in Sweden than in the Community, which has been able to afford more prolonged policies of government support, e.g. through protection against competition from Japan, production quotas, etc. If there would come a severe slump in the auto industry, for example, in Sweden that industry is just too big, relatively speaking, for the government to support for any extended period of time.

Two obvious factors pointing in the direction of higher Nordic growth rates through an abolition of border controls and integration with the Community are:

First, a deregulation of several sectors, like international transport, financial services, increased opportunities for training and working in other countries, obviously cannot be undertaken by the Nordic countries in isolation, but only together with a simultaneous deregulation abroad. Integration with the Community is thus a precondition for increased competition in the Nordic countries, and this should lead to a once and for all increase of the Nordic growth rate.

Second, through full integration with the EC, Nordic firms will have the opportunity of competing on equal terms with their Community competitors on the Community market. For Sweden in particular, I would stress the importance of equal treatment in public procurement since several Swedish firms including Volvo, Ericsson, and ASEA Brown Boveri all sell considerable parts of their output to the public sector in foreign countries.

However, in my view, more important than the reduction of today's barriers, is the fact that a decision by the Community to completely abolish its border controls against the Nordic countries would mean a decision by the Community to abolish its very instrument of protection against trade with the Nordic countries. It would mean the achievement of full certainty of market access to the Community for firms located on Nordic soil. This binding to a zero level of trade barriers is likely to affect the choice of location of future investments. Firms' propensity to invest in the Nordic countries will be larger than it otherwise would be and this holds not only for firms involved in trade in goods, but also services, like banking and insurance. Further, this secured binding to a zero level is a relevant aspect not only for Nordic firms, but for all investors from countries outside of the Community, e.g. North American or Japanese, when they consider possible locations in Europe from which to serve the Community and the EFTA markets. Without a binding of all barriers to a zero level, Nordic, American and Japanese firms will require a risk premium - i.e. a higher rate of return - when investing in the Nordic countries. Since the price of capital in the longer run is given internationally, it would be the returns to other factors that would have to be lower in order to pay investors this risk premium, i.e. lower wages, salaries and return to land than otherwise would be the case.

7. Free capital movements

Free capital movements are not necessarily part and parcel of an institutional agreement with the Community, but it would be illogical not to accept free capital movements if one is prepared to accept some of the other parts of the integration package, especially reciprocity in rights of establishment of banks and insurance companies - the agents

that implement capital movements. In fact, if reciprocity is accepted fully so that foreign banks can move their equity capital freely across borders, the situation of completely free interest arbitrage is a fact.

For Sweden and the other Nordic countries, free capital movements would mean a new situation for - on the one hand - commercial banks and insurance companies, and - on the other hand - for those responsible for monetary and fiscal policy.

For the commercial banks free capital movements mean increased competition. This is to the benefit of consumers of bank services, and such increased competition can typically be expected to be opposed by the producers of such services. The same conflict of interests applies to consumers and producers of insurance services. Most observers seem to hold the view that at least Swedish banks in an international comparison are quite competitive. If true, the Internal Market would give such Swedish banks an opportunity to expand in the Community, and still keeping their base in Sweden.⁵

With free capital movements the influence of the Central Bank also on short-term interest rates will disappear. A Nordic country can, with or without membership of the EC, join the European Monetary System (EMS). If the government joins the EMS, future devaluations would be possible only after an acceptance to devalue has been given by the other governments and central banks of the EMS. In a Swedish context, Swedish membership of the EMS could make the Swedish government's stated anti-inflationary policy more credible, and also enhance the credibility of the government's undertaking in 1982 to devalue never again. Taking

⁵Swedish insurance companies, however, do not seem to have a similar reputation of competitiveness. The Internal Market would then inject increased competition into the Swedish insurance market, possibly leading to a considerable reallocation among insurance companies.

this view, inflationary wage settlements in the Nordic countries would be held back since both employers and trade unions would know in advance that they as opponents to inflationary wage settlements would have not only their own government - often a minority one - and their own Central Bank, but also governments and central banks of the EMS countries. Having as a credible alternative low profits and higher unemployment, in advance employers and unions would avoid inflationary wage settlements.

8. Membership beyond 1992?

Earlier on I stated the economic objectives that at least Swedish politicians have said they want to have resolved in the coming talks with the Community, namely non-discrimination through a parallel abolishment of barriers to trade in goods and services, as well as removal of all barriers to free mobility of labour and capital. Can these objectives be reached without membership of the EC?

Let me concentrate on the Swedish problem, since it is difficult enough! In the long run the solution to Swedish fears of discrimination cannot be separated from the question of the form of Sweden's institutional arrangement with the Community. Earlier negotiations that the Community has undertaken with external countries - including Sweden in 1972 - have demonstrated that, so far, outside countries have only been able to achieve objectives of non-discrimination through a customs union either as a member, or as an associated member of the Community. The reason is that outside countries have a credibility problem. What do I mean by this?

Take the external trade policy as an example! As mentioned before, abolished barriers between Sweden and the Community imply that Sweden's external trade policy has to be more or less identical to that of the Community. Only then can the Community disregard the origin of

goods crossing the border from Sweden and abolish its border controls against Sweden.

But, can the Community for ever be convinced that Sweden will follow the Community in its common external trade policy, including application of all future changes in that policy? In my judgment it would not be enough for the Community to be given a written assurance by Sweden - a treaty - that she would in a slavish manner implement the Community's external trade policy. The Community would also have to assess future Swedish governments' ability always to honour such a far-reaching undertaking. From the Community's point of view it is not credible that any future Swedish government can honour such an undertaking. After all what we are talking about is a government operating in a democratic setting with parties and special interest groups all the time competing for power and influence. It is doubtful - the Community must say to itself - to assume that all future Swedish governments will be able to honour these sorts of agreements, without these governments also having some influence over the formulation of the policy it is supposed to implement. As I indicated, the Community's line in similar situations has been that governments that are neither integrated in the Community's common institutions, nor in the decision-making process through membership, cannot be expected to implement policies at home that are decided for them abroad, that is, by the Community in this case.

But could this problem not be resolved by the Community giving an outside country the right to be consulted, and the right to voice its point of view before the Community alters its external trade policy? The answer is a clear one: No! A fundamental ingredient of the Community's way of taking decisions is (i) that it does not allow

outside countries to exercise any influence over the outcome of its internal decision-making process. The Community has also stated this as one precondition for its talks with the EFTA countries. In addition it has stated (ii) that the Community's own integration process always takes first priority, and (iii) that the Community's cooperation with external countries in no way can be allowed to restrain the Community's internal decision-making process. With regard to Sweden's problems, the conclusion is then that only if Sweden, just like a Community member, allows itself to participate both in the process leading up to a decision, and in the taking of decisions, will it be credible for the Community that at home a Swedish government will always be able to defend, and implement, decisions taken in Brussels. Only through such a strong institutional link between Sweden and the Community will it be possible for the Community on its part to accept an abolishment of its border controls against Sweden.

In other words: the economic objective of non-discrimination that has been stated by the Swedish government, and Parliament, is in my view unrealistic unless Sweden also becomes fully integrated in the Community's common institutions in the same way as if Sweden is a full member of the Community in all spheres except foreign policy. In this way the possibilities to achieve the objectives in the economic sphere are closely related to the issue of how Sweden institutionally should be linked to the Community.

Whether Sweden actually can achieve the objective a non-discriminated status country without full membership seems doubtful, at least to me. A clarification of Sweden's alternatives will not be forthcoming, however, until Sweden is brave enough to submit a concrete application to the Community stating precisely what she wants, for

example associated membership or full membership, with or without a formal neutrality reservation. Only then will the twelve governments of the Community be forced to think through "the Swedish question", and to turn from today's general and positive diplomatic statements regarding Sweden to actually cracking the question whether e.g. associated membership for Sweden would be acceptable, or if full membership would be compatible with restrictions on participation in discussions on foreign policy.

However, before any Nordic country should submit any kind of application, I think it is necessary that we try to clarify to ourselves what role we would like our country to play in tomorrow's Europe. Here the economic aspect is only one, of course. For one thing is certain - the European integration process does not end in December of 1992!

Els països nòrdics, i especialment Suècia, no poden pretendre tenir un tracte privilegiat amb la Comunitat Econòmica Europea ni no acceptar les conseqüències de la integració - a tots els efectes com a membres de la EEC. Resta per tractar la necessitat de conservar una independència a la política internacional, especialment pel que fa a la neutralitat, prerogativa dels Països nòrdics més que de pel poble suec.

Ulkoasiainministeriö
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The Nordic Countries (Norden) and Europe
Matti Klinge

The Nordic identity has emerged in a way contrasting with that of Continental Europe. Our historical development has for long periods been a reflection of the movements that characterize wealthier civilizations to the south, but at times it has been possible to assert a 'uniqueness of remoteness'. The geographical and also cultural distances have played a crucial role in our contacts with the Continent and our participation in the evolution of European traditions.

During the Middle Ages the (Western) universal Church and the German mercantile culture were predominant, even in the Nordic region, which still did not at that time form a distinct unit in the European community. It was not until the Reformation and the Wars of Religion that the sovereign states of the Norden were formed, initially orienting themselves in relation to one another. They did not assert themselves in a Continental European context until the Thirty Years' War.

The Norden as periphery

In relation to Central Europe, Sweden (which then included Finland) was a large peasant country, but a highly militarized one. It could be compared to the 'new' Germany east of the Elbe, which had been gradually united, though mainly only after the year 1000, with 'Roman' Germany, and which was a feudal-military agricultural country. The difference lay in the social structure. Instead of the 'pure' feudalism of eastern Germany, and above all of the Baltic region, Sweden was and remained a peasant country with yeoman farmers (and later, farmers granted land by the Crown) as the dominant element alongside the manorial estates.

Basic geological factors alone provide a conclusive explanation for this: compared with the large plains of Northern Germany and the Baltic region, the farmland here usually divides naturally into small units. The difference is most apparent if you compare the north and south sides of the Gulf of Finland.

While Sweden's outward propaganda and inward construction of a national identity were first directed towards Denmark, her position in relation to Europe, Germany and the Holy-Roman Empire was established during the 17th century. To these countries Sweden was primarily a military power recalling the triumphal progress of the period of the great migrations. Like the marauding Goths and Vandals, the Swedes and Finns were regarded by the Germans as barbarians and, like their early predecessors, the 17th century conquerors were influenced by the culture and customs of the areas they conquered. Sweden took to 'Europeanization': the nobility was gradually transformed from a breed of high-handed farmers with extensive lands to a 'presentable' court aristocracy. A clergy and a civil service were turned out by the many universities which were founded in the realm - the University of Upsala got going in earnest during the 1620s, Åbo University (now the University of Helsinki) was established in 1640, and for the newly captured provinces of Livland and Skåne the universities of Dorpat and Lund were founded in 1632 and 1668, respectively. A firm line was taken to render the burgher towns modern and European, and the farmers were subjected to tough discipline: not only were they forced to learn to read and write but, in general, were made to abandon their old ways of life, which were branded as idle and wasteful, in favour of hard work and thrift. *misses low gaudul i malpastador*
astelhadu.

By the same token and with the same aims, Peter the Great went in somewhat later for modernizing and organizing his people for greater efficiency. The same movement was afoot, though naturally, in practice in very different ways, in Prussia.

During the 17th and 18th centuries Sweden was characterized by a combination of inferiority complex coupled with an active involvement in military exploits. The latter half of the 18th century brought increased equality and polish; the political and military pretensions had been sufficiently toned down, while cultural endeavours started to yield results. The society became bourgeois, and thus drew nearer to that on the Continent.

But the great period of change that started with the French Revolution brought a long period of uncertainty, and was a great blow to the Nordic region. The Nordic identity had to be recreated according to the idealistic, political and economic circumstances of the times. The Age of sentiment (?) paved the way for an idealization of nature whereas an anti-revolutionary standpoint linked it with a popular conservatism, and the economic and political role played by the Norden, now consisting of four nations, was small. Population growth, which had been considerable during the 18th century, continued during the 19th century, and despite advances in farming and industry the numbers of poor people grew continually. This led to widespread emigration and difficult regroupings within society. The keynote was a sense of poverty coupled with an idealization of nature - the most familiar manifestation being the Finnish poet Runeberg's *Our country*, which even in Sweden was long conceived of as the national anthem.

Against this background the rise in the standard of living and expanded social security arrangements became, even ideologically, extremely important in Sweden. During the 1930s and later in the 1950s and '60s, the concepts *folkhem*, the People's home, as Swedes describe their welfare state, and *välfärd*, welfare, had a particularly positive ring. Foreign policy, defence and patriotism were pushed aside, partly due to faith in the international peace-preserving bodies and partly because Finland had emerged as an independent state, furnishing protection on the most vulnerable flank.

A consequence of the military and social policy traditions was that the higher forms of culture have not enjoyed the same priority as in France, Germany or Italy. It has usually been thought that we could not afford 'useless' culture. There are exceptions: the predominantly ecclesiastical high culture of the 15th century and the first - unsuccessful - attempts to found a national university; church architecture and art; the mid 17th century with its great castles and country estates; the Gustavian epoch with its interest in literature, theatre, Antiquity, Italy and France; perhaps even the *Jugend Art* (Art Nouveau) and the great, philosophical literature of the turn of this century. But otherwise, the practical, social-minded, i.e. short-term, perspective prevailed, reflecting the demand for immediate or very rapid return. This has had its positive sides: since high culture was imported from Germany and France the link with these countries still remains. But it need hardly be pointed out that imports have completely overshadowed exports.

This applies not only to the visible aspects of culture. Ideas have also been imported - though usually in a rather superficial way, which is understandable enough in the light of the resources available. What is always dangerous with imported ideas is that the debate that surrounds the new ideas in the 'big, wide world' does not usually manage to accompany it, so that on the periphery even these conceptual products are received in simplified, abbreviated form. The basis and tradition for detached treatment of ideas is weak. This would require a long educational tradition emphasizing conceptual analysis and active creativity.

From the Continental European viewpoint, Nordic 'anti-intellectualism' or 'unscientificness' is perhaps the Norden's most typical feature, though as a rule we ourselves are quite unaware of this. The Nordic peoples never have been, and are still less today, able to raise themselves to the level of thought and writing achieved by Continental Europe, which has a deep-rooted philosophical and Latin background. This may quite certainly also be attributed to the more limited social mobility

of Nordic society, as a consequence of which literary bourgeois culture has had a much stronger position in society as a whole.

In a densely populated Europe, despite urbanization and industrialization, the Norden - primarily Sweden and Finland - is sparsely peopled. The population is, and will remain, small compared with France, England, Germany, Russia, Poland, Italy, etc. Each of these countries has a population considerably larger than the whole of the Norden, which is, furthermore, by no means a unified whole in practice.

Consequently Sweden, Finland and the other Nordic countries are and will remain, small and peripheral, and can only temporarily, under favourable or dramatic political, ideological or economic circumstances, hold their own globally.

Under certain circumstances, however, even a peripheral region can exercise influence or earn approval. The bravery of the Spaniards in the 16th century, the Scottish Enlightenment during the 18th century, Czechoslovakian democracy in the 1920s, Finnish endurance during the Winter War, Swedish social ideologies of the '60s, all serve as examples of what the rest of Europe has talked about and admired at a particular period. But for the most part the influence flows outwards from the centre.

For this reason any attempt to assess the Norden's status in Europe must view events from a long, historical perspective.

The objective and the subjective Europe

The concept of Europe can be broken down into at least three separate levels of interpretation - which, of course, constantly interact with one another. We have, *pro primo*, the geographical concept of Europe, *pro secundo*, a concept of Europe based on organizational and communications relationships, and, *pro tertio*, a concept of Europe that is a subjective interpretation and

perhaps expresses better what we think Europe *ought* to be than describes how we see it.

The geographical concept of Europe is clearly defined, and thus the least interesting. That there is far too little interest in geography, and the usual school geography is far too limited and ill rewarded these days is another matter. In schools, a knowledge of facts of this type, together with a knowledge of animal and plant species, historical dates and personalities, has had to give way to the spirit of the age, which does not believe in memorizing and learning things by heart but overestimates the desire and ability of a child to learn structured thinking and broad truths.

Mass tourism appears to have done nothing at all to increase knowledge or interest in maps and handbooks: it seems to be only the main roads that we learn, and pre-ordained sights that are seen and stay in the mind - or at least on film. Take the average Nordic person and ask him to describe where the Carpathians are, to name the cities on the mouth of the Weser or the Oder, say what seas the Garonne, the Po or the Volga flow into, whether Leningrad has more inhabitants than Geneva or Athens - the likelihood of getting the right answers is slight. Nevertheless a good, general education in geography would be of utmost importance to a better understanding of our own country, its history and future.

extracts It is true, of course, that people from major nations know even less about the world beyond the boundaries and cultural circles of their own countries (and perhaps colonies), but that is hardly an excuse for us, who so often have occasion to reproach them for their narrow ideas about the world. We in the Norden, who know that our language is not of much use in international contexts, should have some insight into the narrowness of outlook of the peoples of the great powers, as clearly as we repudiate their assumption of the universality of their own world language.

A large number of organizations include the word *European* in their name, and there are also a large number of 'European' organizations that no longer exist. For instance, *Compagnie internationale des wagon-lits des grands express européennes* ... Nowadays many of these 'European' attributes stem from the European free trade market organizations and their areas of influence. As we know, current usage has increasingly gone in for equating Europe with the Common Market. Instead of *l'Europe des six* or *l'Hexagone*, today we often see merely 'Europe'.

Free trade, common measurement systems and so forth have a great deal to do with communications and exchange (of goods, knowledge, people). The absence of strictly controlled borders and customs boundaries, and all kinds of relaxations on interaction, seem attractive, while at the same time the outward borders are growing in importance and becoming increasingly difficult to force.

Goods, the material culture, their movement and flow and the organizations and communications network associated with them, are important. But there is cause to remember that it is not always the exchange of goods that leads the way. It may come first, and bring with it a form of culture that eventually assumes organizational shape right up to government level. But national, political or military initiatives can also be the primary forces, with trade and other forms of culture adjusting themselves accordingly. The development of Europe after World War II has basically been a consequence of the outcome of the War and of which areas were occupied, but by degrees this has had to give way to other forces, to trade and culture.

It is perhaps not particularly worthwhile trying to determine what is primary and what secondary. In the Crusades of the Middle Ages, religious ideology and politico-commercial interests were united. The answer to the famous question of why Sweden took part in the Thirty Years' War in Germany makes no difference. It is only an over-smart posterity that has chosen to determine whether

political or religious interests were predominant; it all amounts to the same thing. This is also true of the present day - ideology is trade and trade is ideology, even if we, as participants in the action do not have to account for or even notice the connection.

During and after World War II, the greater part of Europe was divided into two military camps - Russian forces on the one side, American and British on the other. They shook hands with one another as liberators and friends, and then military alliances were formed, which also harbour ideological and trade policy interests. Were we to apply the same yardstick as we usually do to history, we would designate both parts of modern Europe as occupied territories. That is, of course, a gross caricature of a complex reality which can never be wholly compared with the past. But various kinds of simplification are perhaps needed to bring out the difficulties involved with concepts that tend to have different 'objective' and 'subjective' meanings. People cannot usually say whether they feel like Europeans without first asking "What do you mean?" Are we talking about a political or a cultural concept, about language or lifestyle? Is it a manifesto?

Europe like Greece

To understand our concept of Europe we have to go back to the Phoenicians. Their trading routes are the background against which the other coasts of the Mediterranean take shape: there was Asia, i.e. what we, using a term dating back to Roman times, refer to as Asia Minor, and Africa, and finally the north coast of the Mediterranean.

Europe was thus defined from the start in relationship to the East and the South, while the West and the North remained open - Europe's 'hinterland', as the Levant and Africa each had their own 'hinterland'. As known to everyone at the time, the 'Near' East, the Levant, extended to Mesopotamia and India. And somewhere at the source of the Nile, beyond the desert, there were no doubt more people, and tradable goods. That was how it

was to the West and the North. Colonies could be established west of the Alps, around the mouth of the Rhone, as they could on the coasts of the Black Sea where the mouths of rivers we know as the Donau, the Don and the Dnieper linked the Greeks with the products of the vast forests.

From this perspective, what we now call the Norden - the area around the Baltic and the North Sea - is automatically a periphery. The word Nordic means periphery, remote, something you neither know nor need to know much about, something that gradually recedes into vague, hazy areas of knowledge, to do with the end of the world: the rest already belongs to the world of legend, as Tacitus ends his *Germanica*, "caetera iam fabulosa".

For better or worse, this sense of being on the periphery of Europe is an essential ingredient of the Nordic people's self-image, a source of both their inferiority complex and their hubris. And yet the borders have been quite flexible. Though not northern, the Romans were nevertheless already western upstarts to the Greeks, and the battle between northern force and southern culture is a recurrent theme throughout European history.

The geographical relationships have, furthermore, been anything but constant. The north has spread southwards during the period of the great migrations, the Middle Ages, during the Thirty Years War, in Hitler's time. The South, the culture of Antiquity, has reconquered lost terrain in the Nordic consciousness through the renaissances, the Carolingian epoch in the 9th century, the 13th century Renaissance with its Gothicism, universities and Crusades, through 15th and 16th century humanism, through the neo-humanism of the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, and so forth. The progress of Latin was certainly linked with the empires formed by Charlemagne and Napoleon, who both wanted to restore the Roman Empire.

The Christian Church has created powerful links between the North and the culture of the Mediterranean; we typically usually see

biblical inscriptions and proverbs in Latin and Greek, Greek pillars and columns, and Roman basilicas. Jointly, the whole Mediterranean culture has represented, and still does represent, an ideology defined in relation to what is 'pagan', what is 'Nordic'. Judaism has played a subordinate role; it is primarily religion that has carried on the Greco-Roman image of Europe. Just think of whom the Epistles of St. Paul were addressed to: the Corinthians and the Ephesians.

Politically, the Athenian ideal of the citizen returns hand in hand with the renaissances and humanist movements against the eastern and northern sovereign states (?). It was not only the French Revolution that wanted to restore the democratic tradition of Antiquity: also the revolutions in North and South America and the states founded thereafter wanted to establish new Greek societies. Marx read the Classics, and Grundtvig, Geijer and Runeberg saw in Greek thought a major potential for national revival in a Norden shattered by the Napoleonic Wars. At the beginning of the 19th century, Berlin, Helsinki and many other cities were transformed into Greek *polis*, city states, with temples and colonnades, white statues, classical ornamentation and friezes, and a literary extolment of the virtues of Antiquity. I myself have lived practically all my life under the cloak of the Classicism that dominates Senate Square in Helsinki, constantly reminding us, as in so many other places throughout the world, of Europe as *Hellas*. The heroes in the *Elk Hunter*(?), the *Tales of Ensign Stål* and *Frithiof's Tale* (?) are Greeks in disguise: the *kalokagathos* ideal (beauty and good) is incarnated in the poor crofter of the Finnish hinterland.

Faust is also a Greek, a seeker of truth and tester of morals, the true European.

Being European has, in fact, again and again meant being Greek, directly or indirectly. The Greek ideal of beauty, the Greek concept of citizenship, the Greek method of seeking the truth, all these have been essential components of the human ideal in

Europe; whether this is historically justified in relation to the true Ancient Greece is irrelevant here. It is not Ancient Greece itself, above all not in the concrete sense, but the *understanding* of the classical ideal that is important. Because knowledge of and interest in Greek culture varies, the Greek heritage often has an indirect effect, but there is no reason to deny or forget its significance.

The Divided Europe

The division of Europe flows like a compelling pattern throughout the ages: the principles of division and actual borders have, on the other hand, varied.

The Roman Empire stretched enduringly to the northern limit of the viticultural area in Germany. There the great fortifications and defence lines, the *Limes*, were built in the course of a few hundred years. In this remarkable way Europe was divided into two parts, the Roman and the Germanic. The right flank belonged to the Germanic world, peopled by tribes which by then were classified as Slavic, Finnish, Latvian, etc., and the left flank, including Brittany, Wales and Ireland, which still bore linguistic relics from the time when the Franks, the Angles and the Saxons had not yet expanded as far west as they did later.

The division of Rome and Germania was succeeded by another bisection, between the West Roman and East Roman Empires, Rome and Byzantium. So gradually, West Rome and Germania were fused, primarily under the Carolingian Empire of the 9th century, while East Rome was gradually excluded, also in the religious sense. Throughout the centuries, the division of Christianity was a difficult, much-debated problem, that finally dissolved in the 15th century when East Rome (Constantinople) fell to the Turks. The Greek tradition lives on in the Orthodox church, but in weakened form and is perceived as peripheral by the rest of Europe.

On the other hand, a new division then arose within Western Europe. Protestantism became mainly a Nordic and North-westerly religious form in opposition to that of the old Europe. England and Holland took up the tradition that the Italian, Dutch and German cities had developed in opposition to the religious and territorial powers. In lieu of faith and sovereign, or the traditions of military organization, they developed a bourgeois morality and a practical view of the world. The idea of a universal realm under the leadership of an emperor or the Pope was left to the Germans. As such, this idea continued to be administered in the European manner, according to the traditions - not least the idealistic existence - of the Roman Empire, with Latin as the European language.

In addition to the trading nations of England and Holland, the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden developed into minor empires. But they did not manage to repeat the achievements of the Ancient Germans of conquering the Roman Emperor and occupying Rome or Vienna. They did, however, succeed in establishing their own uniqueness, and consolidating themselves by means of an identity that no longer emphasized a cultural colonial relationship to the Church of Rome and the Roman concept of the state.

The weakness of Germany after the Wars of Religion helped France to achieve a leading position in Europe, but England on the one hand and Austria on the other wanted to balance this position. At the end of the 18th century we again have a clear division of Europe according to two principles: revolutionary France against the rest of Europe. To start with, France, under Napoleon, was the victor of this battle.

Austria's role as an opposite to France was at this stage transferred to Russia, which during the 18th century had assumed an increasingly strong profile as an effective great power with global political interests.

In 1807 the western emperor Napoleon and the eastern czar Alexander divided Europe into spheres of interest. A bisected Europe emerged. The Napoleonic wars had lasting effects on the formation of states in Europe; the Swedish and Danish kingdoms were both split into two, while the borders of the Netherlands, Poland and Italy were reorganized.

In the 19th century the division was different. Western Europe, including England, Belgium and France, was dominated by industrialization, the first railways, liberalism, with the bourgeoisie and money as the prime social forces. Prussia, Austria, Russia and so forth were dominated by agriculture, conservatism and centralism. Instead of the bourgeoisie, it was the aristocracy and the peasantry, the military-agrarian complex, which steered society.

Later, Western Europe was drawn into colonial expansion, which previously had mainly involved Spain and Portugal. Now England, France and Holland predominated. Historically speaking, however, the real epoch of the French, Dutch and German colonial epoch was relatively brief. Where Portugal and England are concerned, what happened can perhaps be described by saying that the daughter gradually grew larger and more influential than the mother - first on the political, and then on the linguistic and cultural level. Through this process the European dichotomies came to be governed by interests outside Europe.

After World War II both superpowers further underlined this non-European influence. Then, gradually, new organizational and identification processes have become discernible. From an historical point of view, it is interesting to note how the Economic Community, the EC, has in recent times spread in a south-westerly and south-easterly direction and thus come to embrace the area of the old Roman Empire. So the EC is more Catholic (and Orthodox) than Protestant. The role of Ancient Germania has been taken over by the so-called East European states, East of the Elbe; in the intermediate area we have the

EFTA countries, which have not, however, taken a particularly strong cultural stand nor are their populations yet comparable in size to those of the other groupings.

The Norden, Russia and Germany

In the Norden, the religious border between western and eastern political and military expansion was established in the 13th and 14th centuries. Roman Catholic expansion stopped at the Neva and Lake Peipus, when Novgorod warded off the Swedes on the one side and German expansion on the other. Denmark also established its position on the Gulf of Finland at that time. Nevertheless the first peace treaty between Sweden and Novgorod, the Peace of Nöteborg 1323, gave Russia influence north of the Gulf of Bothnia and in Lapland. The opportunity for a highly spectacular expansion by the Swedes, Danes and Germans had arisen through Mongolian invasions from the east. All the coasts of the Baltic came to belong to the Western church, and the German urban culture established itself economically for many centuries in the most important coastal cities, from where it was to exert as great an influence on material culture as the ecclesiastical organization had on the spiritual one.

The Reformation had an enormous effect on the position of the Norden. To start with, the Nordic region was even a periphery of Lutheranism, but the Wars of Religion weakened Germany to such an extent that the Nordic, particularly the Swedish, nations were firmly established, allowing Sweden, through its temporary position as a great power, to win a lasting identity both at home and abroad. This position was not so securely established, however, that Russia, Germany and Saxon Poland under Charles XII did not plan to divide the country between them, or that France in 1808-1809 did not try to get Russia to take Stockholm as well as Finland, so that Sweden not only would have been split but, like Poland, completely divided.

Since at the end of the 19th century both Russia and Germany had established themselves as political, military and economic great powers in Europe, development in the Norden came to depend on their relations with one another. For a long time these were excellent and during this period the Baltic Sea area was relatively safe. Russia no longer feared a Swedish (or Danish, though they were for the most part allied) attack, and was not afraid of a German one. The unknown element was the British, who already in 1808-1809, and then mainly during the Crimean War of 1854 and 1855, and even during the final stages of World War I, wanted to affect politics here through their naval presence and fleet operations.

Russia and Prussia were linked by dynastic ties, military traditions dating from the campaign against Napoleon, and resistance to both social and national nineteenth century revolutionary movements. The Prussian support for Russia during the subjugation of the Polish rising of 1863 bound these states together, and Russia expressed gratitude by allowing Bismarck's Germany to emerge during the following eight years.

This pattern changed during the 1890s. Russia allied itself with France against Germany, and the situation in the Baltic Sea area changed rapidly. Germany started rearming its navy which was centred in Kiel on the Baltic, while Russia pursued a new policy in Finland aimed to bring the Grand Duchy closer to the Empire in military terms, but also politically and psychologically, bearing in mind the possibility of invasion by Germany. Sweden was drawn closer to Germany, but also tried to maintain good contacts with Russia - as evidenced by Czar Nicholas II's state visit to Sweden and Prince Wilhelm's dynastic marriage to the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlova. During World War I Sweden's neutrality was stretched to the limit. But despite obvious sympathy for the Germans, they managed to keep out of the war if the Åland expedition is disregarded.

In the Baltic area the constellation of forces which appeared in World War I was largely repeated during World War II: German and Russian occupations of Lithuania and Estonia, Sweden's pro-German attitude and neutral assistance, Finland independent, but on the German side in the struggle against Russia. In contrast, the situation in Denmark, and particularly in Norway, was very different during both world wars.

Whereas both the great powers in the Baltic were in defeat following after World War I, after World War II one great power was completely defeated, occupied and demoralized, while the other was not only among the victors but in the post-war years procured the status of superpower - with the other conquering forces combined as its opposite pole. In the Baltic region, the Baltic States were, as we know, incorporated into the Soviet Union. Poland's borders were greatly changed. Germany collapsed and was divided. The military policies of the Nordic countries took shape against the background of their wartime experiences. At the end of the '40s Norway and Denmark joined the American military alliance, while Finland undertook to ensure that neither "Germany nor states allied with Germany" would use its territory for an attack against the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the situation around the turn of the century has to some extent been restored: Russia and (West) Germany, this time with Denmark, again stand against each another. The Russian sphere of influence has shifted considerably to the east (?? west) on the southern shores of the Baltic. Territorially, however, the Russian position in the Baltic is weaker than at the turn of the century when the Russian military presence extended to Åland and the Bothnian coast, as compared with its current limit at the present Finnish-Soviet border. The Soviet Union no longer has the bases it thought fit to demand at the signing of the armistices with Finland in 1940 and 1944, first in Hanko and then in Porkkala. Hanko was recaptured by the Finnish army in 1941 and Porkkala, which was leased to the Soviet Union until 1994, was given back in 1955.

But the situation can also be compared with the time before the powerful emergence of Germany, when Russia was the only real great power on the Baltic but still had to be on the look-out for foreign (British and French) fleets, which could turn up in the Baltic in times of war and even, during the Crimean War, wreak considerable damage along the coasts. The havoc caused by 'the Englishmen' along the Finnish and Bothnian coasts is still not entirely forgotten.

People and freedom

Above we have examined political, and to some extent religious dichotomies in Europe. The adoption of a philosophical pattern of division would further contribute to the analysis.

A dynamic relationship between accentuation of the individual and of the social runs through history. According to this viewpoint even Athens and Sparta may be regarded as paired opposites, and what we call the Renaissance was a glorification of human and individual awareness as against social organization and collective identity.

The idea of freedom, that is to say individualism, became the basic principle of the French Revolution and of the North and South American revolutions at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. With no revolutionary background, the merchant-dominated Dutch, Swiss, English and Scottish traditions joined this movement, though they usually also harboured a revolutionary attitude to the church (Catholicism) and centralized power. Basically this part of the world opposes limitations and customs duties whether they be on goods or ideas, political opinions or religious notions, or the freedom to depict in words and pictures anything whatsoever.

The concept of *Nation* was linked early on with that of *liberty*. The nation consists of free individuals, of people liberated from

tyranny. Against this we have the concept of the *Volk* dating from the beginning of the 19th century, an organic whole united by language, tradition and a feeling of affinity. All movements seeking to promote the common cause, to represent the masses and build on their solidarity are founded on the legacy from this latter tradition. Modern 19th century nationalism implanted old, vague feelings of solidarity into the system, and primarily stood for a conscious process of indoctrination, to which primary schools, in particular, made an effective contribution.

Obviously, in a country as linguistically, historically and racially uniform as Germany, this was more successful than it could possibly be in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual countries such as the United States or Russia/the Soviet Union. In these countries, freedom and socialist identification have worked best, because the concept of the *Volk* has not been as easy to apply.

Nowhere, of course, do these ideas appear in pure form, but it is still important to think about them. It is evident that the Americans in World War II were fighting primarily for ideas and ideological domination as they were in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, whereas with the Germans, and no less the Russians, it was largely a question of their native land and its defence, regardless of the dominant ideology. Thus, the Americans may in the future attach more weight to ideas and overlook the importance of common historical experience that has been of vital importance to national unity and identity for all peoples who have suffered during wars.

Individualism and collectivism are of course also socially rooted attitudes, and are linked to methods of production. Above, the traditional split between town and country, between trade and farming has already been intimated.

There has been no lack of efforts to bridge the gaps between the interests of the individual and those of society, to counteract the narrow egoistic principles of the one, and the anonymous,

^{obnoxious}
 stifling element of force in the other. At an earlier stage, societies and 'movements' functioned as links. Later, people tried to work out a 'personalistic' view of society that would preserve freedom of the individual while taking man's personal qualities as a social being into account.

The European tradition is permeated by the moral views of Antiquity: personal freedom stands in relation to duty towards society. Through the centuries, this moral view has been taught in schools and universities: studying Latin meant growing up with the civic morality taught by Cicero, and told us by Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch in their depictions of the lives of great men. The great storytellers, such as Zacharias Topelius, here in Finland, as well as Verner von Hedenstam, and leading philosopher-poets such as Runeberg and Rydberg, grew up in the classical tradition whose values they passed on.

A later age has come to emphasize freedom and rights to the extent that duty has been almost entirely forgotten. Equality is much spoken of as a right to ^{enjoy} strive for; a great deal less is said of its value as a challenging duty to others. Fraternity is seen as something that can give me something, not as something I can give others, and so forth.

Christian morality - which is to a very great extent tied to Greek morality, preaches love, submission and no expectation of ^{recompense} reward, but the far more primitive eye-for-an-eye morality is unfortunately very widespread in today's world. Morality as such is afforded little attention. Huge sums are sacrificed on the altar of technology, while the person who is to take advantage of this technology and be responsible for it is left on his own, with only limited opportunities to ponder the present and the future in terms of concepts and morality.

Religion and morality have been pushed aside into the private sphere. But clearly, parents, day-care staff, teachers and officers in charge of conscripts are far too seldom aware of

their role as representatives of public morality, nor yet do they have the ability to teach it. At some juncture, children are given a fleeting opportunity to read the UN Charter on basic human rights or something similar. And yet morality and responsibility cannot be grasped without thorough study and independent thought. The most effective means would be classical art and recognized literature, which always deals with the individual's relationship to his environment, with decisions and solutions that have good and bad consequences.

Today *freedom* and *duty* have been disastrously polarized by the so-called superpowers, each from its own camp pursuing both principles *in absurdum*, thereby contrasting two principles that should rather be providing strength and legitimation to one another. Here, Europe, were it to take hold of its traditions and origins, should not only be able to make a unique stand but also strive to improve and ennoble the world by stressing classical virtues such as tolerance, restraint and the Golden Mean.

A European renaissance

As a result of World War II, Europe became impotent, and the two non-European - or semi-European - 'superpowers' came to dominate the world in military, material and ideological terms. But it is obvious that the post-war system is no longer tenable, especially at the ideological level. Both the new liberalism of the United States and Soviet socialism are ultimately - like all other forms of liberalism and socialism - based on the legacy of what is called the Enlightenment. The Age of Enlightenment - a name loaded with subjective evaluations - has been presented almost without criticism as a positive phenomenon for many generations of school education and public opinion, and yet the many shortcomings and morally dubious aspects of this universal approach were already 'exposed' by contemporaries of Goethe and Schiller.

p.59. European ideas in the melting-pot.

Inter-Nordic Cooperation: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

I

The history of the Nordic nations is in many respects unique. For all of recorded time, people of Nordic, or Germanic, stock have inhabited Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Iceland and the Faroe Islands were settled by people from these countries, and from Britain and Ireland, during the latter part of the ninth century. Much earlier, shortly after the birth of Christ, the Finns, a people of quite different stock, who spoke a language unrelated to the Germanic languages, migrated from the Baltic countries to the area now known as Finland. Culturally, the present-day Finns are considered to be a Nordic nation, because of their long-standing relations with the Swedes. With the exception of the Finns, the Nordic nations were bound together by common, or closely related, languages. Their religion and world-view was the same. They abandoned heathenism for Christianity more or less simultaneously, and later turned from Catholicism to the Lutheran faith at similar times. They developed similar customs and attitudes toward life, and their social and political views were likewise similar. Their laws were also very much alike. Gradually, their separate cultures became one and the same.

Today, the five Nordic countries are modern industrial states. They all belong to that part of the world which has been moulded by modern technology and offers its inhabitants a good standard of living. They are all in the group of nations which we call "the developed countries". The central Nordic states, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, became industrialized early, in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Finland, and especially Iceland, were industrialized only much later—Iceland was wholly agricultural until the present century. In addition, all of the Nordic nations have formed their societies in the spirit of welfarism, and have indeed been, in many respects, leaders in this area.

But within the family of modern industrial states the Nordic countries are all comparatively small. The Nordic nations are all tiny nations; and they include not only the Danes, Swedes, Icelanders, Norwegians and Finns, but the Faroese, Greenlanders and Lapps as well. In all, about 23 million people inhabit the Nordic countries. Even if they were to unite into a single state, that state would be a small one within the family of modern industrial states.

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II

Over the centuries, many changes have occurred in the political relations among the Nordic nations. Between 1380 and 1814, Denmark and Norway, together with Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland were united together in a double kingdom. From the early Middle Ages until 1809, Sweden and Finland formed a single state. The result of this division was that different institutions became established in each of the two halves of the Nordic sphere, while at the same time certain interests became common to both. In the period between 1397 and 1523, with some interruptions, all of the Nordic countries were united under Danish leadership in the so-called Kalmar Union. The main task of this union was to prevent the Germanization of the Nordic region. Aside from this, the influence of the Kalmar Union was more ideological than political.

The close connections between the Danish-Norwegian and the Swedish-Finnish kingdoms did not prevent them from engaging in damaging wars with one another in the period between 1563 and 1720, as each attempted to attain leadership over the Nordic region and control of the Baltic. After 1720 there was a long period of peace. The peace was broken later when the two kingdoms were drawn into the Napoleonic Wars, but the ensuing battles had little real effect.

The radical changes occurring in Europe had, nevertheless, momentous consequences for the two Nordic kingdoms. The Tsar of Russia split the eastern kingdom by subjugating Finland. The western kingdom suffered a similar disaster when the King of Denmark and Norway was forced to cede Norway to the King of Sweden, who had joined the Great Power Alliance against Napoleon. But the Norwegians declared their independence and adopted a democratic constitution. A powerful popular awakening greatly strengthened Norwegian nationalism so that the union with Sweden was in reality only a personal union between the two nations. On the initiative of the Norwegians, this union was at last peacefully dissolved in 1905.

Finland became an independent republic in 1917, in the wake of the Russian Revolution. In the ensuing years, the Finns and the Swedes contested control of the Åland Islands, which lie off the shores of Finland but are Swedish-speaking. In 1922, the League of Nations decided that

the Åland Islands should belong to Finland but should have extensive autonomy.

During the Middle Ages, Iceland was a republic for about three hundred years. From the late 800's until the middle of the 13th century, the Icelanders were the only nation in Europe which had no king. At that time, however, the Icelandic nation was not as tiny by comparison as it is today. There were almost a third as many Icelanders as there were Norwegians. But in the latter half of the 13th century, the Icelanders subjected themselves to the Norwegian crown. When the King of Denmark gained control of Norway a hundred years later, his sovereignty extended to Iceland, as well as to Greenland and the Faroes. With the reorganization of Europe in 1814, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, these three last-named areas were considered to be subject to the Danish crown. Iceland achieved full independence at the end of the First World War in 1918, but remained in a personal union with the King of Denmark until 1944, when the 1918 treaty of union expired and Iceland became formally recognized as an independent republic. The Faroese became a self-governing nation within the Kingdom of Denmark in 1948. And Greenland was granted comprehensive home-rule in 1979.

III

The idea of Nordic Cooperation is about 150 years old. One can say that it was formed just prior to the middle of the 19th century. The idea was born in the minds of Nordic nationalists—liberal intellectuals—and was comparable to certain ideas associated with German and Italian efforts to achieve national unification. This Nordic movement was called "Scandinavianism". It was strongest amongst the Danes, doubtless because they wielded it in defending themselves against a growing German nationalism. Swedish kings were, in this period, favorable to Nordic unity. They may have been tempted by the possibility of adding Denmark to the Kingdom of Sweden.

Many of the leaders of Scandinavianism thought of establishing a defense alliance and even a unified kingdom. The impracticability of this idea became clear in 1864, when the Prussians and Austrians attacked Denmark and occupied the southern part of Jutland, and Danish hopes for military support from Sweden and Norway came to nothing. But the idea of Nordic cooperation remained alive and unvanquished, and has in fact

served ever since as the cornerstone of the extensive cooperation which has subsequently grown and developed within the Nordic region.

After 1870, the supporters of Scandinavianism established numerous folk high schools, which became centers for the idea of Nordic cooperation. A Nordic currency union was even established, but did not survive the First World War. The idea of Nordic cooperation was taken up by one social movement after another, not least by the rapidly-developing labor movement. Parallel institutions within the several countries began to cooperate on a variety of projects. Special societies, the Nordic Societies, were established precisely for the advancement of Nordic cooperation in all areas. These societies have tied the Nordic nations together in various ways, not least through the sister-city movement which has established close ties between various cities and towns across the Nordic region.

The First World War marked a turning-point in these affairs. The Nordic countries formed a joint neutrality policy. The three Nordic kings held meetings, in the first instance in Sweden in 1914. The Nordic countries cooperated in drafting measures designed to reduce the effects of German submarine warfare and the Allied shipping embargo against Germany.

The Great Depression, the growth of Nazism in Germany, and the growing danger of war stimulated increased Nordic cooperation in economic affairs. Iceland began to participate in Nordic cooperative efforts during the 1920's. And in 1935 the Finnish government declared that Finland would seek increased cooperation with the other Nordic countries and would adopt their policy of neutrality.

The rise Nazism strengthened Nordic cooperation, and the heroic resistance of the little Finnish nation against the Soviet invasion of 1939-40 awakened a strong wave of sympathy in all of the other Nordic countries. The German occupation of Denmark and Norway brought Nordic cooperation to a temporary halt, for obvious reasons. But the experience of those years, and the assistance provided by the Swedes to their sister-nations, laid the ground for closer ties among the Nordic states. Extensive relations developed in a great many areas, excluding, however, both foreign policy and commerce.

It is primarily history and culture which form the basis of Nordic relations. But geographically the Nordic region lies between the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This has made it

impossible for the Nordic countries to form a common foreign policy and has prevented full economic cooperation among them.

In the years 1948-49 an attempt was made to establish a defense alliance between the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes. But this attempt ran aground, because it proved impossible to satisfy both the Norwegian request for relations with the Western Powers and the Swedish request that the Nordic alliance remain neutral. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union made it impossible from the start for her to join the proposed Nordic alliance. The Icelanders had made a treaty agreement in 1946 granting the United States use of Iceland's principal airfield, located in Keflavík, and could therefore not participate in the Nordic alliance. The final result was that Denmark, Norway and Iceland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Swedes steadfastly retained their policy of neutrality. And the Finns, who in 1948 made a treaty with the Soviet Union providing for friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the two nations, have increasingly succeeded in gaining recognition as a neutral state.

The paths of the Nordic countries have thus diverged in fundamental ways in the sphere of foreign policy, but this has not prevented their foreign ministers from cooperating closely in all of the international institutions in which they participate together, as well as in Nordic affairs.

As early as 1948, the Danes, Swedes and Norwegians had begun to discuss an agreement for a Nordic common market. The Finns entered these discussions in 1956, and the Icelanders followed the discussions closely. The chief aims were to abolish trade barriers within the five-nation Nordic region, and to establish a joint customs policy with respect to other countries. In 1960, before these discussions were concluded, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established at the instigation of the British, who had declined to join the European Common Market (EEC). Denmark, Norway and Sweden were among the founding members of EFTA. Finland made a special trade agreement with EFTA in 1961 and later became a full member of the Association. The Icelanders joined EFTA in 1970. In various respects, EFTA membership has brought the Nordic nations the benefits which they had hoped to attain through the Nordic customs union, which was to have been called "Nordek".

Despite the advent of EFTA, the governments of the Nordic countries—Iceland excepted—made another attempt to establish a Nordic common market after de Gaulle had for the second time blocked the British from joining the European Common Market in 1967. The primary objective was not increased economic benefits for the Nordic countries, but rather a stronger bargaining position in the continuing discussions concerning the expansion of the EEC. But this very comprehensive plan for Nordic cooperation was never executed. Once again, developments in international affairs were decisive. When the British were given the opportunity to join the EEC following de Gaulle's retirement, the Danes, Swedes and Norwegians decided to examine their own possibilities for membership. In addition, it became clear that the Finns were not prepared to affirm the declaration in the draft-treaty for Nordek which stated that Nordic economic cooperation was to pave the way for Nordic participation in the EEC, or at least for the cooperation of the four Nordek members with the expanded European Common Market.

In the beginning of 1973, the Danes became the only Nordic nation to join the EEC, the Norwegians having declined, in a national referendum, to apply for membership. Many became apprehensive that the cooperative activities which had been realized within EFTA would now be seriously weakened. But such fears proved groundless. The Nordic nations, which continued to be members of EFTA, made advantageous trade agreements with the EEC, while the free trade of industrial products among themselves continued unchanged. The plan for the further unification of the EEC (now the EC) in 1992, including the elimination of all internal trade barriers, will certainly raise difficult problems for Nordic economic cooperation. But although the Nordic defense alliance came to nothing in its time, and while the most ambitious plans for Nordic economic cooperation also failed, Nordic cooperation in other areas has borne fruit to an extent which is unique within the family of independent states.

IV

What makes the cooperation among the five Nordic states—and the eight nations which inhabit them—unusual in the area of international cooperation is that these countries founded, in 1952, a special institution

for the purpose of organizing and sponsoring such cooperation: the Nordic Council. This Council was established by the Danes, Icelanders, Norwegians and Swedes, joined by the Finns in 1955. The Faroese and the Åland Islanders received representation in the Council in 1970, and the Greenlanders in 1984. The Nordic Council held its first assembly in 1953.

On the initiative of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Convention on Cooperation or so-called "Helsinki Convention" was ratified in 1962. The treaty negotiations between Denmark, Norway and Sweden and the European Common Market led to the inclusion, in the Convention, of provisions concerning the objectives and achievements of Nordic cooperation—the first time such provisions were committed to writing in an international agreement. In 1971, the Helsinki Convention was reviewed and extended, at the same time, and in connection with, the discussions concerning the Nordic common market, Nordek. The procedural rules of the Nordic Council had, up to this time, been included among the legislative provisions of each individual participating state; these rules now became part of an international agreement. A Ministerial Council was established to act on behalf of the several Nordic governments. Indeed, one might rightly call the Helsinki Convention a kind of Nordic constitution. To this Convention were added a Cultural Convention in 1971, a Convention on Communications in 1972, a Convention on Environmental Protection in 1974, a Social Security Convention in 1981, and a Convention on Safety and Protection in the Work Place in 1989. With these conventions, the institutions upon which Nordic cooperation has subsequently rested, came into being.

The Nordic Council is a forum for cooperation among the governments and legislatures of the Nordic countries. The Council does not have legislative powers, but it does have the power of approval over requests and reports of the Ministerial Council and the individual governments. The aforementioned requests are political declarations of policy which are ratified by representatives of the national parliaments in the Nordic Council; they often lead to actions by the various governments or ministerial committees.

Each year, representatives to the Nordic Council, elected by the parliaments of the various countries, attend a week-long assembly of the Council. Ministers of state, appointed by the national governments, likewise attend this assembly but do not have voting privileges. The

representatives to the Council number 87: 20 each from Sweden and Norway; 18 from Finland, with an additional 2 from the Åland Islands who are considered to be Finnish representatives; 16 from Denmark, with an additional 2 from the Faroe Islands and 2 from Greenland, all 4 of whom are considered to be Danish representatives; and 7 from Iceland.

The Council representatives divide themselves into six standing committees: a committee on culture, a committee on social and environmental affairs, a communications committee, a committee on economic affairs, a committee on legal affairs, and a budgetary committee.

When the Council is not sitting, its affairs are managed by an executive committee made up of ten Council representatives, two from each country. The office of the executive committee is in Stockholm, but each national division maintains its own office in connection with its home parliament.

The Council has three working languages, Norwegian, Danish and Swedish; but a knowledge of one of these languages generally suffices for understanding the others. In addition, at Council assemblies all discussions are interpreted from and into Finnish. Most Icelanders have a good command of Danish, which they begin learning in elementary school. This knowledge of Danish gives them access to discussions conducted in any of the Scandinavian languages.

The costs of Nordic cooperation are divided proportionally among the various countries according to the contribution of each to the gross income of the Nordic countries as a whole.

As previously mentioned, a Nordic Ministerial Council was established in 1971, which serves as a forum for cooperation among the several national governments. The home-rule governments of the Faroe Islands and Greenland and the regional government of the Åland Islands generally participate in the work of the Ministerial Council. The Ministerial Council lays its proposals before assemblies of the Nordic Council, sees to it that the requests issued by the Nordic Council receive proper treatment, and makes annual reports concerning the results of Nordic cooperation. The Ministerial Council also directs cooperative projects in various areas.

One minister of state in each national government is assigned the responsibility of dealing with Nordic issues and is called the "Minister for

Nordic Cooperation". The ministers sitting in the Ministerial Council are, in each instance, either the Ministers for Nordic Cooperation or the ministers having special authority in the particular issues under discussion: ministers of education when educational matters are in question, ministers of industry for industrial matters, and so on. Unanimous decisions of the Ministerial Council are binding upon the several governments, except in certain cases where national laws require parliamentary ratification. Decisions which concern the spheres of authority of the home-rule countries become binding upon the Faroese, the Greenlanders and the Åland Islanders only when signed by their representatives. In addition to the work of the Ministerial Council, the prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers of the Nordic countries meet together on a regular basis.

The office of the Ministerial Council is in Copenhagen. Fifteen committees composed of officials deal with special matters. And approximately sixty institutions and standing committees, financed by the Nordic Council, work on specific cooperative projects.

V

Nordic cooperation has gradually become extremely extensive.

Residents of the Nordic countries can travel freely throughout the Nordic sphere without passports or visas. Passport requirements were dropped in 1954. Similarly, the Nordic countries form a single passport-zone for travelers from elsewhere. Travel between the Nordic countries has also been made easier by streamlining border procedures. Traffic laws have been made uniform to increase traffic safety. Postage rates for mail sent between two Nordic countries are the same as internal postage rates.

Cultural cooperation is very extensive and is based upon the Cultural Convention of 1971. With that agreement, the Nordic states undertook an obligation to strengthen mutual cooperation in cultural affairs, cultivate the Nordic cultural heritage, and increase support for education, research and other cultural activities. Official cooperation represents, however, only a fragment of Nordic cooperation in cultural affairs. The Nordic Societies, and other independent organizations, such as business and professional societies of various sorts, are extremely active in this area.

A number of joint institutions, such as the Nordic School of Health in Gothenburg and the School of Journalism in Århus, are active in the field of education. A Nordic folk high school operates in Kungälv, Sweden. Some 20 Nordic institutions and committees are active in the area of scientific research. Examples include the Nordic Institute for Atomic Science in Copenhagen, the Nordic Volcanological Institute in Reykjavík, and the Nordic Institute for Maritime Law in Oslo. In 1983, a Nordic Research Council was established. The Nordic countries have worked together to purchase and operate expensive research equipment.

Cultural cooperation also extends to music, drama, literature, fine arts and cinematography, and the Ministerial Council finances the activities of a number of institutes and committees in these areas. The Nordic Cultural Foundation supports a variety of cooperation projects. A special system of grants supports guest performances, translations from one Nordic language into another, cooperative youth-group projects and the distribution of Nordic films within the Nordic countries. In addition, special grants are available for the purpose of publishing literature in the minor languages of the Nordic world: Greenlandic, Faroese and Lappish.

The Nordic Center for the Arts has as its special task to increase cooperation in the field of visual arts. The Nordic House in Reykjavík, its companion in Thorshöfn in the Faroe Islands, and the Nordic Institutes in Nuuk, Greenland and Mariehamn in the Åland Islands work toward the development of a broad spectrum of cultural exchanges. Nordic television stations have cooperated since the early 1960's in developing programming and exchanging materials. They have not as yet managed, however, to develop a scheme for the cooperative utilization of artificial satellites in television broadcasting.

Literary prizes are awarded yearly in connection with Nordic Council assemblies, and music prizes every other year.

In 1954, a common labor market was established in Nordic countries. A person residing in any of the Nordic countries has the right to seek employment in another Nordic country without applying for a work permit. Special agreements have subsequently been made establishing common labor markets for various kinds of licensed professions, for example physicians, nurses and teachers. Continuous efforts have been made to secure reciprocal employment rights in as many fields as possible. A Nordic agreement on social security, signed in 1955 and reviewed in 1981, insures that any Nordic citizen working or resident in

a Nordic country other than his own has the same rights to social benefits—for example, health care, child support, retirement benefits and unemployment benefits—as the citizens of his country of residence.

The standardization of law is the oldest form of Nordic cooperation. It was initiated at the first Nordic lawyers' convention in 1872. The laws of the Nordic nations have long been similar in many areas. When new laws are being enacted, an attempt is made to take account of comparable existing legislation in the other Nordic countries. The Nordic Language Rights Convention of 1981 gives any resident of the Nordic countries the right to use his native tongue in dealing with the authorities or with public institutions anywhere within the Nordic region.

The Nordic countries are rich in energy resources, but these resources are unequally divided among them. The Finns, Icelanders, Norwegians and Swedes use water power to generate electricity, while the Danes use only oil. The Norwegians and Danes pump oil from beneath the sea floor. The Swedes and the Finns also utilize nuclear power. The Icelanders use geothermal sources to heat their homes, and Iceland possesses a great deal of untapped geothermal energy and water power.

Oil and gas processing along the Norwegian coast provides work for many Nordic corporations. The Nordic countries have a cooperative network for the distribution of electric power, which makes it possible to utilize temporary oversupplies of power in one Nordic country by sending electricity to others. Cooperation in environmental affairs has been growing steadily. A Nordic environmental convention of 1976 states that responsibility for the environment extends beyond the borders of any one country. This means that a party convicted of harming the environment in one Nordic country can as well be made to pay for resulting damages in a neighboring country.

The work of the Nordic Investment Bank in Helsinki provides the clearest example of Nordic cooperation in financial affairs. This Bank provides investment and export loans for projects jointly undertaken by corporations or public institutions in two or more Nordic countries. Its operations have greatly stimulated cooperation among Nordic corporations.

It is perhaps proper to mention here that at the most recent assembly of the Nordic Council, convened in Stockholm in February, 1989, a comprehensive economic plan for the Nordic countries, covering the

period 1989-1992, was ratified. This plan provides for increased freedom in financial capital movements..

The steadily-growing cooperation among the Nordic countries has inevitably brought in its wake the employment of a considerable number of personnel and a spate of clerical activity. Increasing mention has been made in recent years of the flood of paperwork and ever-expanding bureaucracy within the Nordic Council, the national parliaments, and most especially the media. The Nordic Council and the Ministerial Council have thought themselves duty-bound to maximize efficiency in cooperative ventures.

VI

I mentioned earlier that all of the Nordic nations are rather small. Despite this, they have managed to utilize their natural resources and highly-educated work force in such a way as to offer a standard of living which is among the best in the world. In recent years, to be sure, many have questioned whether the movement in the direction of increased wage equality and wide-ranging social services for the disadvantaged has not gone too far. This movement has led to expansion of the public sector and increasing tax burdens. And this, it is said, has hampered economic growth and reduced initiative. In my view, the experience of past years has shown that there is considerable justice in this criticism and that it would be well to make certain reforms in public welfarism, without, however, abandoning its basic principles.

Yet another matter which affects the future of the Nordic countries has received less attention than it deserves. Due to advance of technology and the growth of international commerce in the industrialized world, to which the Nordic countries belong, the number of enterprises which can be approached only through large-scale efforts—efforts which are beyond the means of small nations—is on the rise. Space travel and nuclear power projects have thus remained primarily in the hands of large corporations and major states. There is little to be accomplished by the smaller industrial countries in these areas. In the fields of microcomputers and telecommunications, by contrast, it is not only the large nations and corporations which can achieve results, but the smaller nations as well, although international cooperation is undoubtedly necessary to this end. There is no doubt that that Nordic

countries would be better able to undertake projects in these fields if they were one state instead of five. This raises the fundamental question whether, and to what extent, technological and economic considerations should affect the policies of the smaller industrial nations as regards their mutual relations and their dealings with larger nations.

The preservation and cultivation of an independent culture consisting of a national identity and a language, distinctive literary and artistic traditions, and a well-established heritage are characteristic of nations and nation-states. Every nation has its own history, its special background of experience, and its own particular destiny. And such things are of great value to every individual who inherits a national culture from his forefathers, whether he belongs to a large nation or to a small one. This applies especially to the Nordic nations, each of which has a strong national identity and native literary and artistic cultures, and each of which has preserved its own venerable traditions, even as it has absorbed international technology and participated in international relations. But if a number of little nations were to grow together into a single nation, these values would disappear. Certainly, with time, new values would replace the old. But the fact remains: Ancient values would be lost.

If the question were whether or not small nations like the Nordic nations ought to increase their material prosperity by founding a unified Nordic state, which would imply the eventual replacement of the old nationalities and cultures by a new Nordic culture, then I would answer "no". But, fortunately, I do not think that we have only these alternatives.

Experience has shown—at least in democratic societies—that the large and small nations can work together in matters as difficult and sensitive as defense. In the economic sphere, such international cooperation has also proved feasible without undermining the basic independence of the smaller states, and, even more importantly, without corrupting their distinctive characteristics, that is, primarily, their language and national identity. Although there is likely to be a growing division of labor among the larger and smaller nations in the coming decades in the areas of defense, technology and trade, and although the number of enterprises which only large nations can undertake will grow ever more numerous, it is vital for the small nations to understand that this does not mean that they must grow in size, or merge into great powers. The larger nations should reserve to themselves such

enterprises as they are better able to undertake than the smaller nations. In this they should enjoy the support of the small nations. The latter should preserve the cultural diversity which they create, and in this they should enjoy the respect and support of the larger nations. It is not just that there is room for both large and small nations in the industrialized world. There is a positive need for both. Without the large nations, the progress which has occurred—and which has yet to occur—would not be possible. Without the cultural diversity which the smaller nations create, the industrialized world would become a less pleasant place than it need be.

Obviously it is in various respects disadvantageous to live in a small country, or to belong to a tiny nation. Would it not clearly be more efficient for all the residents of the Nordic countries to speak Swedish, for example, instead of having to learn each other's languages? Or to speak English, which is used all over the world and which we have to learn anyway? There is no one to whom the disadvantages of smallness should be more obvious than to an Icelander, who belongs to a nation numbering a mere 250,000.

The predicament of smallness was nicely brought out in a quip made by the Icelandic author, Halldór Laxness, when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in Stockholm in 1955. In honor of the occasion, his publisher in Stockholm held a reception to which were invited a great number of journalists, both Swedish and foreign; they were given the opportunity to ask questions of the author. Halldór Laxness had previously held rather radical political views, but those who knew him personally were aware that he was always very fond of worldly goods and owned, for example, an extremely expensive American car. A Swedish journalist asked him whether it wasn't rather costly to operate a luxury car on the rugged, gravel roads of Iceland. A deathly silence gripped the room. Many of those present thought that the Nobel Prize winner would certainly find this a discomfiting question. Halldór Laxness thought for a moment and then answered: "It is, generally speaking, terribly expensive to be an Icelander".

This problem affects not only the more sparsely populated of the Nordic states. It is true of all small nations, and thus of all of the Nordic nations. It is in many respects miraculous that five tiny states, populated by eight tiny nations and located, so to speak, on the edge of the world have managed to establish independent societies, free and prosperous,

which emphasize justice in social affairs and tolerance in matters of opinion, and which coexist peacefully with one another to such an extent that strife among them has become inconceivable.

The reason why the idea of a Nordic confederation or a single Nordic state has been met with little enthusiasm is that people evidently think that the preservation of their national heritage and culture is worth more than the economic benefits which might be gained through the formation of such a confederation or state.

The Nordic nations have shown the world that it is possible for tiny nations to go far in economic, social and cultural affairs. Consequently, they ought to continue to maintain themselves as small, independent nations, defending their individuality while at the same time cooperating extensively among themselves and taking a full and responsible role in international affairs.

Gylfi P. Gíslason
University of Iceland

Dijous, dia 9

MATÍ

11.00h.-13.00h.

Sessió inaugural presidida pel **Molt Hble. Sr. Jordi Pujol**,
President de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

Intervencions:

Sr. Carles A. Gasóliba i Böhm,
Secretari General del Patronat Català Pro Europa.

Sr. Jörgen Tranberg

Director General de relacions amb la CEE a l'oficina del
Secretari General del Consell de Ministres Nòrdics.

Conferència:

"Una visió catalana dels Països Nòrdics"

Sr. Lluís Foix

Director Adjunt del diari "La Vanguardia"

TARDA

16.00h.-16.45h.:

Ponència:

"Els Països Nòrdics en la perifèria d'Europa"

Sr. Matti Klinge

Catedràtic d'Història de les Idees de la Universitat
d'Hèlsinki.

17.00h.-17.45h.:

Ponència:

"La cooperació internòrdica"

Sr. Gifty Gislason

Catedràtic d'Economia de la Universitat d'Islàndia.

18.30h.:

Recepció al Parlament de Catalunya

Divendres, dia 10

MATÍ

10.00h.-10.45h.:

Ponència:

"La política de defensa dels Països Nòrdics"

Sr. Johan Jorgen Holst

Secretari General de l'Institut Noruec de Relacions
Internacionals

10.45h.-11.15h.:

Pausa - Catè.

11.15h.-12.00h.:

Ponència:

*"La relació dels diferents Països Nòrdics amb la
Comunitat Europea"*

Sr. Christian Thune

Degà de la Facultat de Ciències Socials de la Universitat
de Copenhaguen.

12.15h.-13.00h.:

Ponència:

*"Mercat interior, Integració Europea i Països Nòrdics:
perspectives de futur"*

Sr. Carl B. Hamilton

Professor d'Economia de la Universitat d'Estocolm i Cap
de la Comissió Estatal Sueca d'Estudi de les Relacions
desl Països Nòrdics - CEE.

TARDA

16.00h.-17.00h.:

Debat final i conclusions.

Moderador:

Sr. Jordi Porta

Director de la Fundació Jaume Bofill.

17.15.:

Acte de clausura, presidit pel

Molt Hble. Sr. Joaquim Xicoy

President del Parlament de Catalunya

Inscripció:

Atès el nombre limitat d'invitacions, sou pregats de confirmar la vostra assistència a la senyora Neus trucant al telèfon 318 26 26.

Dates de celebració: dies 9 i 10 de novembre

Lloc:

Les sessions es desenvoluparan a la seu del Patronat Català Pro Europa, (c/Bruc, núm. 50, 2n., de Barcelona) llevat de l'acte inaugural, que se celebrarà al Palau de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

Llengües de treball:

Català, castellà i anglès.

Seminari sobre els Països Nòrdics davant la Integració Europea

Organitzat conjuntament per:

- Patronat Català Pro Europa
- Les Ambaixades de Dinamarca, Finlàndia, Islàndia, Noruega i Suècia.
- El Consell de Ministres Nòrdics.



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