Janus on the Threshold

Between centralization and independence:
a comparative history of regionalism and the question of nationalities in
Bohemia and Catalonia

by

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Contents

In the two summers I spent researching and writing about Spain for *Let's Go: the Budget Guide to Spain, Portugal, and Morocco*, I visited every region of that country. As I traveled from place to place, observing and talking to the local people, I became impressed with the diversity that this united country had to offer - from Catalans to Castilians, Gallegos to Andalucians. Yet to me, an outsider, all of these peoples appeared to have common interests and a shared history. Many Spaniards also held this view, but many did not. This confused me: my previous background with Spain had come from my study at Salamanca. There, the issue of diversity was no great one. While the people I met were personally indifferent towards Spaniards of other ethnic groups, they also could not understand why Catalans and Basques needed to make such a fuss over the issue. But fuss they did: In the Catalan-speaking regions, some people, thinking that I was Castilian, spoke to me only in Catalan until they realized that I was a foreigner. One Basque tourist officer refused to speak anything but Basque even though she knew my identity. Yet many Gallegos, although asserting their own differences, seemed content with their Spanish identity: indeed, shortly after I left Spain in 1989, they elected a former Franco minister as President of their regional government.

Arriving back home, I realized that these issues were not merely simple ones involving peripheral Spain. Rather, ethnic groups seemed to be clamoring for recognition all over Europe, particularly in the still-Communist East. Many of these groups had done so earlier in the century as well, in the period that saw the destruction of Austria's Empire. I recalled my father's impressions of the Vienna he knew as a child: although deprived of its proud dominion, Vienna had remained, in spirit anyway, the cosmopolitan center of Europan civilization, where racial groups gladly

mixed, and where most people could not understand why anyone would want to destroy such a harmony of diversity. However, my grandmother had also instilled in me the horrible image of the city's masses jamming the streets, arms outstreached to greet the triumphant Adolf Hitler.

What made some expressions of ethnic identity appealing to those who wrote and thought about them, and why did others appear racist and hateful? The Austria of legend seemed a reasonable place, and certainly contemporary Spain looks like a unit. Nevertheless, larger states did not always seem to represent positive forces: the Soviet Union appeared horribly artificial, and Hitler's Germany was clearly unspeakable. Meanwhile, why did some peoples seem eager to break away from larger countries, while others were less so inclined? I was intrigued.

My probing developed over junior year, and my findings surprised me, as my personal vantage points evolved. While trying to understand how Czechs considered their identity crisis at the beginning of this century - still a part of Austria but longing for self-determination - I developed interest in Czech regionalism of the last century. Later, examining politics in Catalonia during the Civil War, I again shifted to an earlier regionalist phase. As I probed first the Czechs and then the Catalans, I became astounded at the similarities between the failures of their two regionalist projects. I also was astonished that so few had contemplated regionalist theory or done any comparative study. Nationalism has, especially since its resurgence, become a hot topic; why has regionalism been so neglected?

One of my case-studies in particular surprised people: the Catalans certainly have not gotten the kind of consideration they deserve outside Catalonia. The Catalans do a great deal of thinking about themselves, while the world is content to ignore them. Spain had been so much a part of my

identity, I decided to learn more about Castile's alter-ego. Besides, learning a language few people speak outside of one corner of Europe (although it will be the home-country language at the 1992 Olympics) was certainly fun - especially to see the expressions Catalans gave me when they realized I was an American speaking their language.

All translations in this thesis, unless otherwise noted, are my own. I have tried to remain as faithful as possible to the original language, realizing that this does not necessarily produce the most elegant English.

I would like to thank everyone who encouraged me to pursue this topic, especially in the developmental stages last spring. So many people tried discourage me from pursuing my diverse interests, that those with positive feedback proved more helpful than they even knew, especially Caroline Ford and Robert Fisher at Harvard who helped get me through the initial stages during junior year, and Juan Linz at Yale and Peter Sahlins at Berkeley. Although he denies it, Robert Fishman, my advisor for this project, contributed greatly to its outcome by forcing me to ask the right questions and then answer them thouroughly from diverse angles. His dormmate from Exeter, John Bodel of the Department of the Classics, gave me some of the most useful academic advice I received at Harvard and helped get me through these four years.

To the people of Barcelona, I owe a special mention. As I talked to the experts, sat in the archives, or even chatted with friends, I found myself a curiosity: a foreigner diving into their territory. As is probably true with any nationalism, the people most interested are the nationalists themselves. Yet, aside from their own studies, the Catalans receive especially little attention; they welcomed me with open arms. I should particularly thank Juan Cruz Valdoviñas, and also Jordi Portà of the Fundació Jaume Bofill, both of whom

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I should also acknowledge Phillips Exeter Academy. I had become convinced that Exeter had not prepared me for any aspect of college: I was wrong. Exeter taught me to think interdisciplinarily; while this has wreaked havoc with my somewhat odd course selections, and has even given me a rather special combined concentration, I have at last put all of my academic interests to work in one project. Exeter also taught me how to live on minimal sleep for months on end, a talent very useful for writing a thesis. And Exeter taught me to be and think for myself, while listening to and respecting the opinions and identities of others. To all those who made Exeter a memorable experience, thank you. To everyone who has helped make this thesis possible, I thank you. *Finis origine pendet.*

I.   Introduction:

Regionalism and the *Nationalitätenfrage*

The "nation" emerged as an important concept in post-Enlightenment Europe, yet the· multiple and contradictory definitions that historians, politicians, and the general population gave the word rendered it practically meaningless. To some, the "nation" corresponded exactly to the sovereign state; those who held this view sought, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, to provide equality for all citizens of a common "nation" through their assimilation within one centralized identity. These attempts, however, ignored - or actually opposed - the existence of so-called "lesser nationalities" - minority ethnic groups found within certain regions of greater states. The Enlightenment had awakened their identity and had proposed to give them a freedom they had never known in modern history, yet at the same time Europe's liberals challenged the very preservation of cultures these liberals regarded as inferior. Feeling threatened, the long silent peoples promoted their own identities, and often did so by stressing the same values of Enlightenment that their oppressors used. Indeed, the sub-state peoples also used the "nation" to refer to themselves, in order to underscore their common political project and identity, even though they formed part of a significantly larger and ethnically diverse state.

The birth of "nationalism" - movements that stress the concept of "nation" however defined - brought with it questions of how exactly the political forces and peoples should redraw the map of the continent to reflect concepts that had rarely concerned even their recent ancestors. Many (historically dominant) "macro-"nationalities, making up a large majority of

the population, simply disregarded the rights of the (historically a minority) "micro-"nationalities to their own identities. But some states found their minorities too large or vocal, and their attempts to suppress them merely opened up what theoreticians have termed the *"Nationalitätenfrage,"* the question of how to manage rival ethnic groups in a single polyglot state, without leading to political collapse. Virtually all nationalist groups held in common that the word "nation" should correspond to the state: either the minorities should take on equally the identity of the majority - thus making the state into a "nation" - or they should seek self-determination and independence - making their "nation" into a state. Either way, it seemed, nationalism became a destructive force, one which needlessly excluded one group from living with another under the same political framework, and which made the identity of one people the mortal enemy of that of another.

But when they wrought the "nation-states" of modern Europe, the relevant forces merely acted out human nature: the desires of men to associate with those who most closely resemble themselves, especially in the face of a real or perceived threat. Ethnic identities, as demonstrated through language, culture, and custom, have proven most fundamental in shaping the general world-view of individuals; when they have placed this concern above all others, they have resulted in "nationalism." Whether macro- or micro-, nationalists all have viewed this single basic identity as the most important factor in the shaping of the ideal modern state, and upon these singular outlooks have found their own answers for the *Nationalitätenfrage.* Answers, however, have not necessarily resulted in definitive solutions, as states have formed and decayed across Europe. Despite modernization and democratization, late-twentieth-century Europe has witnessed a resurgence in

nationalism even though most in contemporary Western society claim to accept the same framework for freedom.

Nevertheless, accepting that many consider this ethnicity the single most important distinguishing feature of their identity, historians have given nationalism much attention. Yet studies of nationalism have usually overlooked one expression of ethnic identity that has sought, through compromise, to find a lasting solution to the *Nationalitätenfrage*: regionalism. Regionalists have based their project on the possibility of dual-loyalty: to ethnic group and to central state, each forming a part of the identity of the individual. Some have viewed regionalism, however, as merely transitory, a developmental stage of nationalism, much like the original cultural revival. Others have seen it as a divergent movement, but, recognizing its history of failure, have given it little heed. But since it has tried to solve problems of nationalism, its existence alone, despite its lack of success, merits observation.

Regionalists made the important breakthrough of accepting minority status, thereby differentiating between state and ethnic identities. The "nation-state," crucial for nationalists, no longer become necessary in a system which allows for, and even encourages, diversity, while stressing the mutual dependence of each group on the others. But this mindset has had trouble taking hold, and often groups, macro- and micro-, have concluded that maintaining multi-ethnic states has compromised their own identities. As states consolidated in early-modern Europe, the dominant (usually majority) ethnicity attempted to centralize the state on its own identity and tried to assimilate minorities. In the framework of the Enlightenment, this represented equality: to treat men as equals required them to be the same. But such actions threatened those minority peoples that had not historically maintained their identities; their languages had produced no recent

literature, and their members had not risen in society unless they had assimilated into the macro-nationality. Under attack, their cultures revived. To them, to achieve enlightened equality meant to give their people the same status as the other peoples of Europe, and they could only achieve this, they felt, through self-determination or outright independence. Both types of groups, in the name of freedom, began destructive processes that in the end denied equal rights and fueled hate, widening the gap of understanding and cooperation. Once mistrust poisoned the debate and polarized the groups, not even the best arguments of the regionalists could save the situation.

These regionalist arguments usually owed their conception to the conservative anti-enlightenment, that accepted the notions of freedom, but which interpreted freedom as based on liberty rather than equality. Yet as generally conservative movements, they left themselves open to attack. The micro-nationalist left, which from the beginning questioned the ethnic basis of regionalists who profess loyalty to the central state, has criticized regionalism as merely a conservative movement, not at all ethnic. The macro-nationalist left, fearing the loyalty of regionalism to ethnic groups, has doubted its commitment to the central state and seen it as a conservative movement aimed to divide the solidarity of the working classes. Both types of opposition have feared conservatism, and both types have doubted that anyone can maintain two loyalties: the regionalists, they felt, needed to choose between central state and ethnic region: they needed a "nation."

This choice was not one regionalists were prepared to make. While the nationalists regarded them as idealists who thought they could maintain a dual-identity and preserve conservative values, regionalists thought of themselves as realists in that they recognized and accepted the actual status of their states, and sought to build a compromise solution based on that

situation and not on any fictitious history. Indeed, historical accidents had crafted Europe's most diverse state in mid-nineteenth-century Austria, and ever since Europe's ethnic reawakening, this polyglot state of polyglot states has served as a model for virtually everyone who has wanted to explore how ethnic groups can (or cannot) cooperate within a single governmental structure. Contemporary and *post mortem* accounts of the Habsburg Monarchy have long stereo-typed it as both inherently unstable and on the verge of collapse because of its diversity, and as an elitist and overly conservative power dragging its feet against the reforms that had begun to spread across the rest of Europe. Not surprisingly, the search for freedom and equality for the various groups led to the rise of micro-nationalism as an escape from this conceived oppression. Yet, in asserting his Czech identity during the Revolution 1848, František Palacký, the father of modern regionalism, maintained his loyalty to the *Donaumonarchie*, making the famous declaration that "indeed, if the Austrian Imperial State had not existed for so long, then in the interest of Europe and in the interest of Humanity itself, we would be obliged to hurry ourselves up and create it."[1]

Through treaties and marriages, the Habsburgs had built themselves along the Danube one of history's most ethnically mixed states. The systems of diversity, order, and class provided the pillars of the Empire's stability, yet they encountered difficulties when confronted with the problems of the nineteenth century. Most have attributed the origin of the problems to the Enlightenment's stirring up of the undermasses of Austria's *"geschichtlose* (history-less) nations." On the contrary, the German-speaking liberals, through social, political, and ethnic intolerance, set in motion the sequence that would shatter the Empire, while conservatives and regionalists desperately tried to create a federation that would acknowledge the equal

rights of the assorted groups and preserve the state on which all groups depended. Not oppression by the Kaiser, but the growth of the German Left drove many ethnic groups into the more radical micro-nationalist parties, which paralleled the Germans in intolerance and social platform, and came also to share their anti-Austrian sentiment. Conservatives sought to solidify the developments that led Oszkar Jászi, minister of racial minorities[2] for Kaiser Karl, the last Habsburg monarch, to write that "never in the history of the world was the principle of national equality in a great empire and under so many different nations carried so far as in former Austria."[3] The threat both pan-Germans and "lesser" nationalists brought to this Empire prompted Palacký's famous declaration, as he and his successors, particularly Franz Ladislaus Rieger, founder of the Bohemian regionalist *Alttschechische Partei*, worked towards a reconciliation between the Czechs and Germans, leading to the ill-fated *Ausgleich* of 1890. The Empire limped on for a quarter-century more, before its complete dismemberment in the First World War.

As one of the first important "lesser" nationalities to reawaken, the Czechs had presented a problem that would later appear throughout Europe. Their experience established much of the original theory concerning regionalism, and served as the model upon which later movements could build. The case of the Catalans in Spain presents a useful comparison, not only because Catalans (regionalists and micro-nationalists) looked specifically to the equivalent Czech groups, but also because the stages of development of the Catalan question share extraordinary parallels with the Bohemian one. That most non-Catalans have virtually ignored catalanism, and that virtually no one has placed the Catalans into a comparative framework, only provide more importance to the case-study. Spain, like Austria, experienced the eighteenth-century emergence of nationalism and later suffered a severe

weakening of the state. Here too, regionalist groups, with their conservative allies in the central government, forged compromises designed to solve the ethnic questions and restore the integrity of the state. Austria suffered revolution in 1848 and defeat to Prussia in 1866; Spain awakened to its backwardness after a devastating loss in the War of 1898 with the United States. Both countries possessed diverse minorities which, although previously stirring, responded vociferously to these set-backs, looking for new solutions to regenerate themselves. While radical micro-nationalists did exist, at first the most prominent politicians of the Czechs in Bohemia and the Catalans in Catalonia searched for ways to craft a new system which would allow all the ethnic groups to live together in a single, free, and diverse state. Both Austria and Spain could achieve greatness, they thought, through acknowledgement of their minorities. Yet, when they finally achieved compromise, their seemingly well-intentioned solutions failed in the face of pressure from radical macro- and micro-nationalists. Antagonized by first liberal and then revolutionary goals for establishing a new system based on their definitions of equality, these nationalists led to the collapse of the political system which virtually every group had tried to renovate.

In this framework, catalanism awakened as an important issue after the "Disaster of 1898."[4] Alarmed by Liberal domination and corruption of Spain, Conservatives and regionalists sought new solutions for regeneration through decentralization and ethnic individualism. The radical groups, however, had their own ideas. The Catalan nationalists sought to regenerate Catalonia as distinct from centralized Spain, viewing the larger country as the reason for Catalonia's demise, and they preferred autonomy or, increasingly, independence from Spain. Their main opposition came first from the Spanish Left, which believed that maintaining centralization could best unify

and strengthen Spain, and that permitting cultural divergence had weakened the country in the first place. As in Austria, both macro- and micro-nationalist groups, although often sharing similar socio-political ideals, radicalized in response to each other, placing any potential compromise in the realm of the conservatives from both linguistic groups. Leading catalanists like Enric Prat de la Riba and his disciples, including Francesc Cambó, later head of Catalonia's largest political party, the *Lliga Regionalista*, and a cabinet member in Madrid, also accomplished a regional *mancomunidad* ("association") for Catalonia, and actively promoted a "Spain of the Regions." Cambó predicted that these efforts would either "save Spain or destroy her."[5] His predictions proved unfortunately correct, as Spain headed towards dictatorship, failed republic, revolution, and civil war.

In the period of the post-Enlightenment, in which these case studies occurred, many groups drew some basic theory by examining the Classical roots of western civilization, and saw in the ancient world a useful reference point for their own situation. The administrative and ethnic organization of Roman Italy, however, serves not so much as a valid case study in itself, but rather acts as a framework which some used as an example for their own ideas. Because they looked to Rome for background, it becomes important to understand the way in which these actors viewed classical history. Enlightened macro-nationalism admired the early Principate, with its stress on the conformity of peace and civilized *humanitas*.;[6] micro-nationalists meanwhile disdained what they saw as oppressive Roman Imperial structure. In reaction, the opponents of the Enlightenment adopted the traditional values of the Roman Republic - or at least what they interpreted those values to have been - based on the notion of *libertas* (the freedom of an individual in

the framework of a group). Resurrected in the post-Enlightenment, *libertas* formed the basis of regionalist, federalist, and conservative doctrines.

Ethnicity, in the modern sense, had grown from the prehistoric concept of family and tribal loyalties. In the ancient world, national consciousness never existed; still, two peoples who had a direct influence on western thought, at least, did expand the concept of tribalism to a greater guiding force: The Israelites and Greeks viewed themselves as somehow special or "chosen" among the "barbarian" peoples, and also began to associate their ethnic identities with concepts of individualism and opposition to tyranny.[7] The western Mediterranean, however, did not develop its notions even this far, although nineteenth-century historians, concerned with nationalism in their own day, often misinterpreted classical history. But Rome's contact with and absorbtion of the cultures of the east allowed it to learn of eastern tribal conceptions, and, after the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE, Roman civilization assumed a greater moral weight to accompany its military prowess.[8] Interested in this history for application to their own times, post-Enlightenment historians examined the growth of Rome, which had, from its city-state origins, enlarged its influence through treaty with its *socii* ("allies") and annexed them into its greater Empire. Its treaties preserved the autonomy of others, even while Rome became the hegemonic power of the Mediterranean. Only as new radical ideas and corruption swept through Rome did its allies begin to agitate against it, culminating in the Social Wars, in which the allies fought against Rome to gain full rights of citizenship. The destruction of the Republic and the rise of the Principate, with the accompanying stress on the egalitarian ideals of a greater Roman *humanitas*, brought the end of harmony between the unassimilated tribes.

In building a state based on many loyal groups, the Romans had found, in an early day, a solution which their later decadence destroyed. The modern Europeans looked back to Rome's supposed Golden Age, and rather than see in it part of the decadence that destroyed individual rights, saw in it the model of equality and enlightened *humanitas* on which they wished to base their new society. Conservatives, not surprisingly, adopted the vocabulary of the Roman Republic, and of its defender Marcus Tullius Cicero, who, like the modern regionalists argued for dual-loyalty to home region and state. Cicero's *libertas* also became the crux for the modern conservative discussion of freedom. Unfortunately, the classical debate never could become clear-cut, since it relied entirely on historical interpretation, and the interpretation itself became colored with word-choice. Even in modern times, words, in the mouths of different people, and especially different people speaking different languages, take on different, and sometimes even contradictory, meanings. To analyze the entire scope of the *Nationalitätenfrage*, then, requires a standardization of terms.

The most common, and therefore the most confusing word, was "nation." Some, particularly groups which formed the majority and viewed the identity of the central state as that of their own group, considered nation as synonymous with state. Other macro-nationalities, such as the Germans, achieved this majority term and considered themselves a nation, even though they possessed no single state until very late. Still other groups considered themselves nations even though they had no independent state, while other members of their own community denied their nationhood simply because they had no state. Through all the confusion, everyone could agree on at least one concept: that of the *Volk*. The Catalan regionalist Lluís Duràn i Ventosa defined this ethnic demarcation using the German term as

"the hereditary community of spirit, sentiment, and race between a group of men of different professions and status... (that) feels united by culture and origin, especially by language and customs."[9] This concept, whatever its name, and the search for identity along these definitions, became the central struggle of the nineteenth century, and despite attempts to resolve the issue, it has carried on until the present.

Because of its many definitions, "nation" has become an effectively meaningless word. "State" functions more descriptively to express a governmental unit actually in existence. "Nationality" (not to be confused with "nation") would represent the *Volk* of Duràn's definition. This group might lend its character to a "region," or several regions, within one or more states, the boundaries of such units determined by historical accident, rarely corresponding exactly to the settlements of the *Völker*. These same historical accidents have often allowed one group predominance over the others within the greater state, evidenced usually by the existence of an official language, even in countries without an absolute majority.[10]

The inequality of the nationalities has offered two main "nationalist" solutions, macro- and micro-. "Macro-nationalism" has often represented the chauvinism of the majority *Volk* towards its minorities, while "micro-nationalism" has usually sought a quest for "self-determination" apart from domination. Because of their implied relationships to persecution, the different nationalisms have gained favorable and unfavorable reputations from historians. Yet both have represented the same underlying outlook: namely, placing one's own identity above others. The macro-nationalists, in a stronger position, have attempted this through seeking to remove or assimilate the minorities; the micro-nationalists, obviously disadvantaged, have reacted by seeking to escape, hoping to establish their own dominance

within their region, which should become separate from the greater state. Neither group wants to maintain the greater state as a mixture of peoples free to practice their own culture but all maintaining loyalty to a non-ethnically-defined unit. Only "regionalists"[11] sought this.

Respecting the historical accidents that established modern states, and not wishing to tamper with borders that they believed could never be made efficient and accurate, regionalists stressed cooperation between the groups for the benefit of all. Reopening the issue of border changes would lead to even greater problems, since borders rarely delineate exactly the pattern of settlement, and conditions for how to draw a fair border depend on the individual concepts of the assorted groups involved.[12] And when ethnic affiliation alone becomes the determining factor of a state or region, then citizens of different groups are necessarily, by definition, excluded. By dividing nations into their respective historical regions, the cultures of the groups that formed the majorities within the regions could better be promoted, but still not at the expense of that region's minorities, since, in Duràn's terms, the importance of the greater state served as a "guarantee and union based on the mutual respect of the rights of every (group)."[13]

These regions, according to this concept, must remain federated within the state. Duràn's federalism looked back to the Roman *foedus* ("treaty" from the root "trust, faith"), and was "the regionalism of convenience of political organisms bound in permanent union without the loss of their respective personalities."[14] Once the groups within a federation learn to trust each other and to cease thinking of others by ethnic classification, then a firm federation can acquire unity and loyalty to a greater state without abandoning particularism, such as in the United States, which had the advantage of not

being settled in the traditional tribal manner, but rather found itself mixed from its outset, open-minded from its outlook as a haven for all *Völker*.

Another crucial distinction realized early by the United States, is that between "federation" and "confederation." As Duràn explained, federalism is a "union of nations [nationalities] for a common end," while confederation consists of "separate states, that work together for common interests."[15] The federation remains one state, and thus represents a more effective way to accomplish common government and establish true equality of nationalities within one entity. Since confederate states are nominally independent, the entire unit can function less effectively, and the former regional character becomes synonymous with the state's. Regionalists, therefore, rejected this solution as well, because, as with completely independent states, when the identity of a *Volk* equals that of a state, the citizens lose loyalty to any greater concept of state, and thus to any concept of polyglot government. The Austrian Socialist Otto Bauer described the natural conflict of interests between polyglot states (*Nationalitätenstaaten*) and nation-states (*Nationalstaaten*) as the central struggle of Europe's entire *Nationalitätenfrage*.[16] While Austria maintained its central monarchy and Imperial institutions, the *Nationalitätenstaat* could survive; as radical groups pressed for their ethnic identities and the overthrow of the Habsburg Monarchy, they sought to give the resultant creation in *Mitteleuropa* the character of one (for the Germans) or more (for micro-nationalists) *Nationalstaaten*. Thus, even more, nationalist and socialist doctrine coincided.[17]

Valentí Almirall became Catalonia's great proponent of particularism, a system in which he sought to balance "variety" and "equality." Too much variety would entail no cohesion and lead to breakdowns in understanding and ultimately anarchy; too much equality would permit no progress and

develop into oppressive communism; too much of either would translate into lack of mutual respect and tolerance between groups and individuals. Hence, the regionalist struggle has been to maintain their identity and their dual-loyalty, despite the skepticism of the more radical groups. Through their compromises they sought to produce a truer equality and freedom for all, regardless of nationality. In the end, their solutions failed, and their plans to regenerate their states and regions collapsed. The force of ethnic identity as an exclusive affiliation has proven stronger than the ideal of mutual respect.

II. Disinventing the Wheel:

The failure of the *Alttschechische Partei* and the dissolution of Austria

"Austria Est In Orbe Ultima." - popular saying[1]

The Enlightenment with its stress on equality spread outward from France and reached the polyglot Austrian Empire in the third quarter of the eighteenth century.   The liberal Josef II introduced the reforms that he associated with progress, seeing a centralized state as the best protection for its citizens against the traditional Habsburg federal lands (*Länderbunden*) and their near-Feudal nobility.[2] To ensure equality, the citizens of his Empire needed a model on which to equalize, and the central German model seemed most superior to him.[3] Despite his emphasis on reforms, he earned the resentment of Austria's sizable minorities, whose reawakening both coincided with and was fueled by the rising pan-German consciousness.

However, during the alternate periods of liberal reform and conservative reaction that followed, the ethnic revival of the Empire's second largest minority, the Czechs, remained a movement of the educated classes.[4] Josef II's brother and successor, Leopold II, kept minority loyalties by undoing the forced reforms of his predecessor, bringing peace with Prussia and Turkey, restoring order and the old federal nobility, working for a new constitution, and allowing public debate and freedom of speech. His program insisted on decentralization to county governments to ensure that the assorted *Völker* could have autonomy and that the central government could not unduly meddle in the affairs of individuals.[5] Yet Leopold II reigned only two years until his death, and his successor Franz I continued the policies of forced

germanization. After defeating Austria, Napoleone Buonaparte considered breaking Austria's components into autonomous states, but ultimately, although he split off some regions for inclusion into other states, he decided on the importance of Austria's integrity. He left most of it whole, encouraging the *Völker* to assert their identities within its framework.[6]

After Napoleone's fall, the reactionary minister Klemens von Metternich failed to recognize the emergence of regionalism as a healthy component of the Empire, and suspected it, along with liberalism, of undermining the viability of the state. When the Revolution came in 1848, however, it was the German speaking groups who actually posed a greater threat to Austria than their supposedly oppressed Slavic countrymen. Inspired by the upheavals throughout Germany, their social doctrine looked away from the Habsburg Monarchy, as did their ethnic awakening. They viewed themselves as part of a Greater Germany with their comrades in other German-speaking states, rather than as part of the Danube Federation that Austria represented. Their agitation, that would become greater and more racialist as the century wore on, caused a radicalization amongst disaffected Slavic groups. Together, they would ultimately prove fatal to the Empire and leave post-First World War *Mitteleuropa* without its one stabilizing force.

Metternich failed to sense this German disloyalty and Slavic loyalty to Austria, and instead considered the latter group as dangerous as the restless nationalistic Magyars, or even the Italians or other groups that had begun to form irredentist movements. The Czechs, the Empire's third largest ethnic group (after Germans and Magyars), had no connection with a foreign center - they did not even seek to unite with the closely-related Slovaks until after the First World War - and thus, at this point in history, looked for nothing else save the restoration of Austria.[7] As the burgher classes of the Empire began

to grow in non-German areas, the Czechs of Bohemia developed their own cultural, political, and social goals based on the middle estates, growing *Bürgertum*, and free society.[8] The turmoil of 1848 at last provided a chance for these regionalists to assert their claims and spread their movement from the elites to the people.

For his role in the revolutions in the "German" crownland of Bohemia and as head of that territory's "National Committee" (revolutionary government), Palacký received an invitation to the Frankfurt German National Convention.[9] Yet he declined for two important reasons: not only was he not a German, but he was, as he explained, an Austro-Slav.[10] He had not revolted *against* Austria, but rather *for* her, in order to reorganize her in a way more realistic with her current situation. Austria "in unholy delusion, has for so long misjudged and denied the only righteous and moral basis of its very existence: the fundamental rule of complete equal rights and consideration of all the nationalities and all the religions united under its scepter. *Das Völkerrecht ist ein wahres Naturrecht.*"[11] Palacký opposed the Germans of Frankfurt, he wrote them, because they sought "to irrevocably weaken Austria as a self-dependant Imperial state, even make it impossible, - a State whose preservation, integrity, and nourishment is and must be a lofty and important priority not only for my *Volk* alone, but also for all Europe, even all Humanity and Civilization itself."[12]

Though Palacký may have protested against the regime in Vienna, he maintained his faith in the central government as a necessity for the preservation of the state which gave the Danube peoples stability. His goals for federation under a central government set the tone for the Austro-Bohemian movement during the next half century:

> Should the bond, which binds many peoples to a political entity, be strong and enduring, so must it have no ground for fear that through the union it will

forfeit any one of its most dear possessions: on the contrary, each must preserve the surest hope that it can find complete protection in the central state against whatever evil attempts of its neighbors.[13]

Palacký proposed a new constitution for Austria based on the ancient principle of "what you yourself do not want, do not do unto others."[14] He proposed an Austria of federated regions (Länder), which each included historical provinces; he emphasized the basic rights of ethnic groups; he granted the central government power over the affairs effecting the entire state and overlapping regions: foreign policy, finance, trade, public works, justice, culture, industry, and other areas; and he proposed equal voting rights.[15] His constitution guaranteed to even the smallest minorities well-being and preservation of their culture, within a framework of freedom and integrity within the greater State.[16] Austro-Bohemianism was thus fiercely ethnic, but not at the exclusion of the Empire's other groups, or even of the Germans and Jews who formed important minorities within Bohemia.

The toughest opposition to Bohemian regionalism came from this German minority within Bohemia which looked towards Berlin for most of the second half of the nineteenth century, and away from both the equality and conservatism of the establishment in Vienna and the realities of demographics in Prague. While most of the countryside was Czech, Prague had grown up and flourished in the germanizing period of Josef II. Even so, by 1848, as some noted, "Prague was no German city.... Perhaps it might have become one if the revival of the Czech nation had not intervened."[17] Indeed, while the majority of the population spoke German, the ethnic Czech (if not all Czech-speaking) population considered itself as having dual loyalties to both Bohemia and Austria.[18] As the German population rejected both the premise that they lacked an inborn right to rule over everyone else and the loyalty of the population to Vienna, tension was bound to develop. Most

German speaking members of the National Committee withdrew to protest Palacký's letter to Frankfurt,[19] and prepared to elect their own deputies.[20] To them, Bohemia was a German kingdom, and as such belonged to the *Grossdeutsch* confederation, while the (Czech) National Committee offended them by trying to keep it federated to Austria.[21] Conservative Austria was the enemy of 1848, standing against socialism and for ethnic reawakening, while the German lands demanded "Unity and Freedom."[22] Engels saw Austria's usefulness at an end: it had only served a purpose as a bulwark against Czarism, but after the 1848 revolutions it had lost this role and should unite with Germany.[23]

The Slavic revolt thus became separate from the simultaneous German one. Czechs, as one communist later understood, "mistrusted the German revolutionary leaders. They feared that a victory of the German revolution would lead to the annihilation of the Slav nations of the monarchy, and their Germanization in a Great German Republic. Therefore, they stood for the preservation of Austria, demanding her transformation into a federal state."[24] When turmoil in Vienna forced the Kaiser to flee, the Czechs refused to recognize the provisional (revolutionary) government, and Palacký organized the Slavonic Conference in Prague, gathering Slavic leaders from around the Empire.[25] Palacký foresaw the necessity of the Conference not just to organize against the pan-Germanists, but also to combat the pan-Slavism that had begun to trickle in from Russia. This pan-Slavism he saw as equally destructive as pan-Germanism, and both had become fueled by reacting to each other. A slavicized Austrian state would be, he explained to his accusers, "an incalculable and inexpressible evil, a calamity without measure or end, which I, a Slav in heart and soul, in the interests of Humanity would nonetheless deeply regret, even if it sought to declare itself

a primarily Slavic one."[26] Rieger would later write that the "loyal and good Austrian attitude of the Right... (is to) give the Slavs equality of rights and you have nothing to fear from Pan-slavism - Austria least of all."[27] The Congress, which lasted into 1849, stood for "a federation of nations all enjoying equal rights, whereby regard would be paid not less to the different needs of these nations than to those of the united monarchy. We see in such a federal union not only our own salvation but also liberty, enlightenment, and humanity generally."[28] Ironically, in order to communicate, the participants in the Conference had to speak in German, the only mutually understood language.[29]

After regaining control in 1849, the new Kaiser Franz Josef recentralized the Austrian government to restore order. The restoration cracked down on groups involved in the revolutions: not just the radical Left, but also, as Friedrich Engels wryly noted, the Slavic groups whose cause was loyalty to the Empire.[30] German was now reimposed on the Empire, but by this time the ethnic awakening had been accomplished to the extent that that the Imperial Statistical Bureau counted a significant majority of Pragers who considered themselves entirely Czech.[31]

After a decade, with the economy and military in disarray, Franz Josef felt ready to turn government over to a constitutional monarchy; his 1860 *Diploma* relegalized political groups. In Prague, the regionalist groups formed the fastest, seeking bilingualism and the promotion of Bohemia within the greater Empire.[32] In 1861, a coalition of Czechs and Germans won the municipal elections, and a moderate Czech acceptable to both ethnic groups became Mayor.[33] This may have been the last time virtually all groups of Prague society, from conservative to liberal and from Slav to German, could reach a satisfactory compromise. The local government began to Czechify

certain institutions and establish bilingualism, especially in the public schools. These actions first alienated the city's German radical groups, even though the new statutes did not impinge on the rights of Germans who could continue to send their children to all-German schools. Practically, the statutes also did not even affect Czechs wishing to survive in the larger Empire, who still continued to study just as much German alongside Czech.[34]

The Czech regionalists drew their support from the Church, Aristocracy, and conservative classes, while the German liberals opposed the reforms which the Czech/Conservative alliance wished to implement.[35] In the same year, Graf Eduard von Taaffe arrived as the Emperor's district administrator in Prague, and during this period he formulated his ideas on equality and compromise between ethnic groups that he would later employ when called on himself to head the government in Vienna after 1879.[36]

In contrast to the local election results, the Liberal groups rose to power on the imperial and regional levels, enabling them to set the rules under which the constitution was followed. Franz Josef's 1860 *Diploma* had established regional Diets in a federated system in the Austrian half of the Empire, which the new Minister-President, Anton von Schmerling, a German Liberal who had been involved in the 1848 Revolution, found distasteful, because it acknowledged the Slavic majority and meant that Austria could not count among the "German" states.[37] In his Patent of February twenty-sixth, 1861, Schmerling recentralized much of the government and through grotesque deprivation of suffrage and division of votes ensured an enormously unfair distribution of seats in the regional and imperial governments. This not only put him in conflict with the municipal governments, such as the one in Prague, but succeeded in alienating even the most moderate Czechs. In 1863, the Bohemian parties withdrew from the

Reichsrath in protest.[38] The battle lines were drawn that would ultimately rend the Empire apart.

During their years of boycotting the *Reichsrath*, the Czechs formulated their political goals among three parties. Most important was the "Old Czech" *Nationalpartei*, founded by Palacký's disciple and son-in-law, Rieger.[39] The Party stood for equality of nationalities, representative government, and "a free church in a free state" (equality and freedom of religion unincumbered by anti-clerical restriction), emphasizing equal rights for all races, including Jews.[40] For Bohemia they sought the same status as the other traditional Kingdom, that of Hungary, especially after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 made the dual (Austrian-Hungarian) monarchy - already to a great extent in existence - official. Within Bohemia they sought equality of Czechs and Germans that would give neither an unfair advantage over the other.[41] Three-and-a-half million Czechs lived alongside two million Germans in Bohemia, so the Old Czechs favored a regional identity that would be neither Czech nor German, but "Bohemian," for the benefit of all that region's citizens.[42] They were, a historian at the time described them, "earnest in their endeavors to live peaceably with all men."[43]

Their allies, the *Feudalen*, led by Heinrich Clam-Martinič, represented the Bohemian (though not always Czech) aristocracy. To them, Bohemia was more a geographical term than an ethnic one, and they too supported equality of both *Völker* within the region. They envisioned a monarchy composed of historical-political regions, each having control over internal affairs, while ceding to Vienna control over the army, foreign affairs, and finance.[44]

Angered by the Old Czech Party's ties with both the aristocratic *Feudalen* and the German-speaking conservatives, and because the Party emphasized equality between Czechs and Germans rather than outright Czech dominance

within Bohemia or even complete Czech independence from the Empire, the Young Czech Movement, led by Julius Grégr, protested against the Old Czechs by leaving the Party beginning in 1863; even so they would not form a serious political threat for many years.[45] While the Old Czechs sought realistically to work from the Empire's actual situation, the Young Czechs accused them of abandoning the (political-social) revolutionary ideals of 1848, which this new group wished to use as its foundation.[46] Their platform continued the 1848 European tradition of nationalism, Jacobism, and international revolution.[47]

After defeat to Prussia in 1866, the Austrian Empire suffered its greatest identity crisis. Prussian Minister Otto von Bismarck's success affirmed his Kingdom's hegemony among the German states. He had also satisfied the aspirations of the pro-Prussian Magyars, who could now negotiate from a stronger standpoint for the system of "dualism" that would give them control over the Hungarian half of the Monarchy. The Liberals could accept this reduction in Vienna's control of the Danube, because now that Prussia had begun consolidating its hold on Germany, the independent *Donaumonarchie* stood in danger of losing its German character and identity. Dualism preserved this character, while establishing the Magyars as a pro-German ally still bound to the Empire, rather than rebelling against it.[48] Also, since Prussia and other German states which sought a *kleindeutsches Reich* ("small-German Empire," that is, without Austria), had feared that including Austria would mean bringing in too many non-Germans, dualism allowed for a half-Empire that could later "rejoin" Germany.[49]

The official implementation of dualism in 1867 provoked heated opposition throughout the Empire. The Kaiser himself had opposed it because it offended his sensibilities regarding the treatment of the "lesser," neither German nor Magyar, nationalities.[50] As Palacký pointed out, dualism

hardly solved the *Nationalitätenfrage* in the Empire, it merely continued centralism, only with two centers. He needed only to remind people of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution led by Kossuth Lajos in the name of self-determination and freedom for minorities that had substituted for the Austrian system an even harsher, more oppressive, and plainly dictatorial government in Hungary.[51]

But granting dualism to the Magyars sent a chain reaction throughout the Empire of groups demanding their own recognition. Clam-Martinič and Rieger began the protest for a parallel Bohemian status; inspired by this, the Slovenes asked for minority status in Slovenia, which unlike Bohemia had had no strong historical claim; then the Italian minority in the South Tirol petitioned the *Tiroler Landtag* in Innsbruck for its own special status. Meanwhile, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, and other minorities protested directly to Franz Josef about their oppressed status in the new Hungarian half of the Monarchy.[52] In their Bohemian protests, Clam insisted on Czech loyalty to the Empire, while Rieger affirmed that all the ethnic groups, now more than ever, needed to "secure Austria's safety" by holding fast against the increasingly powerful Prussians in order to preserve Austria's own integrity and identity. The Old Czechs, to show both their personal loyalty to Austria and also a desire for autonomy, began to insist that Franz Josef, like his ancestors, be crowned King of Bohemia.[53] Grégr disagreed, however, arguing that dualism with Hungary and failure to grant the Czechs a similar agreement showed the Empire's true anti-Czech sentiments, and meant that the Czechs should only seek solutions outside Austria.[54]

During this storm, Franz Josef again recognized the regional problem in his *Gleichberechtigung*, which mandated that "all races in the state enjoy equal rights, and each has an inviolable right to its own nationality and

tongue." The reforms concerned schools, government offices, and other areas of public life.[55] Even so, the crownlands of St. Vaclav did not gain the same stature that those of St. Istvan acquired under the new dual monarchy,[56] and the Liberal laws limiting the electorate held. The Bohemians continued their boycott. On August twenty-second of the following year, the Czech deputies submitted a Declaration outlining the demands they wanted satisfied before they would return to their seats. They sought mutual treaties binding Bohemia to the Kaiser within a broader Austrian union; the Austrian *Reichsrath* would no longer be able to impose internal policy on Bohemia, and Hungary would have no say at all on Bohemian affairs; Bohemia would remain loyal to the greater Empire, but not to the historically fictitious "Cisleithania" (the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy after affairs in the Eastern, "Transleithanian," half were transferred to Budapest); and Bohemia would be represented on the basis of a just electoral law. Soon thereafter, the boycotting Czech delegates from Moravia submitted a similar declaration.[57] Limited reforms in 1873 enticed the Moravians back in 1874, but the Bohemians continued to hold out.

By 1879, a series of ineffectual Liberal governments had formed and fallen. The electorate had grown tired of the Liberal experiments, while Franz Josef had become upset over the continued absence of the Bohemian delegates. With the Liberals suffering large losses in the polls of that year, he called upon Taaffe as new Minister-President to form a coalition government. Taaffe set about to entice the Bohemians back into the *Reichsrath*, and to include them in a Conservative/Slavic coalition government. The Czechs, who were eager to gain the representation in Vienna they had not exercised in years, quickly joined Taaffe when he professed an interest in a federated state.[58] In entering government, they submitted a memorandum with two

conditions: that offices and courts be able to act in the language spoken by the majority in the area they served (which included not just Czech and German, but also Polish for parts of Silesia), and that both German and Czech be declared the official languages of Prague and all other mixed areas. The Kaiser himself supported the drafting of such legislation, commenting that it was "not enough... to declare that all nationalities were equal in rights, with an unquestioned guarantee of their language and ethnic individuality."[59]

In his first two years, Taaffe still required a handful of Liberals to maintain his coalition, but the publication of the Stremayr Ordinances (which, ironically, bore the signature of the Liberal Justice Minister, despite his personal opposition) on April nineteenth, 1880, finally knocked the last Liberals - including the indignant Karl von Stremayr - out of the coalition by June.[60] Taaffe's government became cemented firmly on the Right in 1881 with the addition of further regionalists, mostly from Slovenia. The Ordinances established that official business would be conducted in the language of the individual whom it concerned, recognizing the *Landsprache;* the University in Prague would offer instruction in both Czech and German.[61] The courts and government offices would respond in whatever language they were addressed, given that it was one officially recognized in their region.[62] Taaffe insisted that the language ordinances neither deprive Germans of their rights nor alter the status of German as *Staatssprache.*[63] The 1880 census became the first to request information on individuals' everyday language, to better ascertain the make-up of the populations, and to serve as a basis for improving the system of representation.[64] The new scheme was designed to break the Liberals, and by splitting the Empire into regions, Taaffe also hoped to stem the rise of Social Democratic elements who also necessitated a unified state. Against socialism, Taaffe pushed forward

industrialization towards a capitalist society, coming down hard against strikes, anarchy, and crime. He sought order, but not governmental dictation, and only after he restored that order did he bring in some limited social reform.[65] The *Eisener Ring* ("Iron Ring") coalition government managed to run the Empire for the next decade.

Not surprisingly, the Iron Ring met sharp reaction in the German Left, which was most offended by the smaller role played by German and German-speakers. The Liberal *Neue Freie Presse*, responding to the Language Ordinances, declared that "Austria will be German or nothing!"[66] In the wake of the Liberal collapse in 1879, the German Left, particularly Bohemia's substancial German-speaking minority, now faced playing a secondary role not just in the larger Empire but also for the first time in their own home region. The Germans began to abandon the last vestiges of loyalty to the Austrian state.[67] The center-left *Deutsche Liberalpartei* - although its centralist, anti-clerical, and anti-Slav voice still dominated much of the Vienna press - saw its demise as a viable political party in favor of the more radical lefts.[68] They felt that their interests could be better served by looking towards Germany and assuming a pan-German stance.[69] None of the new groups could accept leadership from other races which they considered inferior, and their *völkisch* doctrine worked against the very nature of the multi-ethnic Empire. In Bohemia, they supported German imperialism over any sense of Austrian patriotism, and their loyalties went to their race - which they saw based in Berlin - rather than to their country centered in Prague and Vienna. A germanized Czech summarized their views before the *Reichsrath*, arguing that Germanization would be "no deadly sin, for they (Czechs) rise from a lower step to the sunny height of a highly civilized nation; (whereas czechization would be) a disgrace unheard of in the pages of world history."

German Liberals, he argued, must hold off the Czech rise, and prepare Bohemia, surrounded on three sides by German-speaking regions, for addition to Greater Germany.[70]   Meanwhile, inferior Czech society should be kept separate from the German, so as not to contaminate it.[71]

During the same period, the infamous Georg von Schönerer rose to agitate the Left in Vienna, basing his platform on socialism; racism, especially anti-Semitism; and pan-Germanism stemming from Bismarck's Germany. He wished to purify the German race, *Herrenvolk* ("the Master Race"), under one state which it dominated, and to germanize the Czechs and Slovenes. He and his followers violently opposed Jews, capitalism, the Monarchy, and the Church.[72]   His slogan, *durch Reinheit zur Einheit* ("through cleanliness to unity"), emphasized purging Austria to give it an "unadulterated Germanness" (*unverfälschten Deutschtum*).[73]   The later National Socialist German Chancellor Adolf Hitler remembered the influence this group had had on him in his youth. He and his comrades backed *völkisch* nationalism over dynastic patriotism towards Austria and the Habsburgs. They draped themselves in red, black, and gold, and substituted *"Deutschland über Alles"* for the words to Austria's anthem, the *Kaiserlied.* Hitler mocked the Habsburgs who had supported the equality of the ethnic groups within the Empire, especially Franz Josef's heir at the turn of the century, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, who married a Czech and staunchly defended the Slavs, only to be assassinated by a pan-(South-)Slavic Serbian.[74]   Habsburg support for equality, Hitler argued, brought the Empire's downfall:

> That Germanism could be safeguarded only by the destruction of Austria, and, furthermore, that national sentiment is in no sense identical with dynastic patriotism; that above all the House of Habsburg was destined to be the misfortune of the German nation. Even then I had drawn the consequences from this realization: ardent love for my German-Austrian homeland, deep hatred for the Austrian state.[75]

The issue of Anti-Semitism split many Jews, who traditionally had supported German Liberals, from the radical Left. The German community of Prague, to a large extent Jewish, broke with the non-Jewish German population of the Bohemian countryside when the latter group refused to accept religious and ethnic equality. These Jews formed more natural alliances with the·Czechs, who accepted them as equals.[76] The more the Jews allied themselves with nationalities throughout the Empire against the German Left that increasingly proved less and less tolerant of religious and racial minorities, the more the Schönerianers became convinced of a Jewish conspiracy aimed at undermining the German race. The Jewish connection with capitalism and alliances with the aristocracy, socialism's other primary enemies, further estranged the two groups. Anti-Semites thus identified Jews with both capitalism and the ideals of the Austrian state: wherever they settled to pursue capital under the watchful eyes of their aristocratic friends, they also spread German language and culture (in a "degenerate" Jewish form), continuing the necessary common heritage of *Mitteleuropa*; meanwhile they assimilated into and took up the defense of their new regions, accepting notions of equality of the peoples of Austria against forced germanization.[77]

Nevertheless, many Jews continued to support the Left in uneasy cooperation with the anti-Semites. Schönerer and two Jewish leftists, Viktor Adler and Heinrich Friedjung, prepared the *Linzer Programm* in 1882, which proposed splitting off Galizia[78] and Dalmatia to give the Germans a majority in an Austria of "German" territories.[79] By 1885, however, Schönerer had begun the fracturing of the United Left coalition that had formed the opposition to the Iron Ring when he founded an anti-Austrian German Club in the *Reichsrath*. When this proved still to have too many Jews among its members, the German National Association grew from the most radical wing

in 1887.[80]   While some Jews in Vienna, notably Adler and Friedjung, continued to promote fanatical German nationalism and socialism,[81] the Jews in Prague finally broke with the Liberals in that year, forming a German-Austrian Casino to oppose the German Casino, and throwing their support behind the conservative parties.[82]

German animosity also caused the other ethnic groups to react. The Young Czechs, who represented the Czech Left in opposition to the conservative parties, grew even more radical and hot-headed in their opposing the Germans, with whom they actually shared some ideological social-political principles. Like the German Left, the Young Czech Party also did not seek equality of races in Bohemia, but rather wanted their own ethnic group's dominance. While originally content to form an autonomous Czech state within the Empire, they gradually looked more favorably towards separatism and freedom from any connection to Germans. While the Germans fought to keep Austria under their control by seeking to exclude other ethnic groups, the Young Czechs moved to isolate the Germans even more within Bohemia with the goal of removing them altogether.[83] Like the Germans, the Young Czechs rejected the idea of races living side-by-side within Bohemia, and this precluded compromise between these two groups. Yet as the Germans became more radical, so did the Czechs in reaction.[84]

Chaos stemming from the opening of a Czech University within the Karl Ferdinand Universität in Prague began the violence that would destroy the last trust between the groups and leave them entirely irreconcilable. In 1881, the Old Czechs in Taaffe's coalition requested from the Emperor their own university in Prague. The Liberals rejected the idea, seeing it as worthless to establish a school of higher learning in a language other than German, since they deemed Czech literature inferior and since few academics

outside the Czech regions spoke Czech. Yet, the German conservatives accepted the notion of a Czech institution, provided the German one maintained its renown and stature. The *Reichsrath* approved the splitting of the University into Czech and German halves, although requiring that the students at the Czech half would have to show proficiency in German. Since many of the leading professors continued to lecture in German, and since Czechs naturally had to audit courses in the German half to complete their educations, the partition sensibly did not impose an equal halving of the institution. This angered the Young Czechs, who demanded more, wanting to be able to undergo a complete education without knowledge of a word of German. The Old Czechs felt they had achieved enough by merely establishing a viable Czech faculty. Street demonstrations and riots broke out between German and Young Czech students, and Young Czech agitators proceeded to assault students at the German University, attempting to run them out of town, much to the alarm of the Old Czechs, the *Feudalen*, and the Taaffe government.[85] Ultimately, the conservative groups had to continue to make gradual concessions to the Young Czechs in order to attempt to keep them under control; an entirely distinct Czech University was founded in 1891.[86] But the German Left and Young Czechs never trusted each other again, while the conservatives of both *Völker* stood in the middle trying to maintain order.

"It is strongly in the interests of the Chekhs [sic] to be patient," Louis Leger, a French political scientist observed, "and at the present time their deputies (Old Czechs) seem to be willing to concentrate their energies on what is practicable, and to content themselves with whatever concessions they can from time to time obtain in favor of their language and their nationality."[87] Yet the more concessions the Germans made, the more the Young Czechs felt

they deserved; they demanded the most in the decade in which they had received the most, starting a downward spiral.[88]

In retaliation against the government's support of Czech and other linguistic groups, the Germans launched an offensive to have German declared the official *Staatssprache* of the Empire. The Young Czechs and micro-nationalist groups rejected the notion in principle. Most conservatives in Taaffe's Iron Ring also opposed it, not because they disagreed with the need for a common administrative language, but because in light of the the commotion caused by other language ordinances and the University debacle, they felt that to put something into law that was already done in practice would only bait the radical micro-nationalists. Grégr, representing the Young Czechs' disapproval, initiated talk of Bohemian independence rather than submission to German dominance. Vinzenz Hevera, another Czech orator, denounced the use of German by contrasting the rights of Czechs living in freedom in the United States who were allowed to use their native language in all areas of their lives. A conservative Czech aristocrat criticized this approach, responding that "Hevera did not say whether or not these Czechs in the United States were opposed to the Constitution or the use of English as a national language. Had they been,... sure(ly) the Americans would not have offered them the courtesy of Czech translation."[89] In the end, the bill was comfortably voted down, which really had no diminishing effect on the continued use of German in Imperial administration. But Grégr's violent stance contrasted with the more restrained opposition of Rieger and Clam-Martinič and set the Young Czechs clearly apart from the Czech regionalists.[90]

The German Liberals realized they needed to strike before they were overwhelmed, as their candidates were increasingly being defeated in favor of conservative and Slavic ones.[91] They did manage to bring politics and

progress to a standstill by walking out of the Bohemian Diet at the end of 1886. Taaffe's government and the future of the Habsburg Empire rested on whether there could be a reconciliation between the groups. Yet the Young Czechs continued to refuse to talk to the Germans for nationalistic reasons, and the *Feudalen* were equally implacable because of their broad political differences with the German Left. This left the Old Czech Party hinging its future on negotiations with the Germans.[92]

By this time, the German Liberals sought only to have Bohemia split, so that its primarily German perimeter might become separate from the Czech interior: "a dangerous proposal," Leger cautioned, "if it were possible, as it would mark out beforehand that portion which might become part of Germany, in case of any future annexation."[93] These concessions angered the more radical Germans who continued to hope to maintain an intact Bohemia restored to its former germanized status. The Old Czechs also wanted to keep the region whole, but were willing to accept the division of government offices and bilingualism in mixed areas. Franz Josef himself supported one Czech-led region, although he sought to preserve German equality and the use of German as at least a *de facto Staatssprache*.[94] German Liberals and Old Czechs began negotiations in 1889, and after a year concluded a compromise, known as the *Ausgleich* of 1890, which protected a German minority within an autonomous Bohemia.

Other regionalists hailed the agreement as a stepping stone from which the rest of the Empire could establish a federal system. One Slovene pointed out the improvement made in just over a decade, noting that the Germans never could have agreed to this previously. It also solidified in writing what developments the Bohemians had made during that period, and thus limited any future German attempts to reimpose themselves.[95]

The German Liberals also trumpeted their success, since the compromise protected them from what they saw as a system collapsing against them. But the more the Young Czechs observed German elation, the more they bitterly opposed the *Ausgleich*. The Party's newspaper, *Národní Listy* proclaimed indignantly: "The operation was a brilliant success, the patient is dead!"[96] Under Grégr's lead, the Young Czechs had grown more radical ever since they had left the Old Czech Party, and by reacting sharply to German radicalization and to conservative attempts at compromise, had won into their ranks an ever growing portion of the alarmed electorate. By 1887, Grégr had enough of his own support to leave the Czech Club in the Diet and establish the Independent Czech Club in the following year, which backed outright freedom from German and Austrian control.[97] The *Ausgleich* of 1890, and the support it received from Germans and Austrians, provided the ammunition for Grégr to denounce the Old Czechs as "traitors," who needed to be voted out of power in the following year's elections. Rieger, in his opinion, had given in to both German-speaking groups whose aim targeted destruction of the Czechs: the pan-Germans, whom he felt sought to force Czechs out of their strongholds, take over Bohemia, and annex it to Germany; and the Austro-Germans, who, Grégr believed, also wanted to de-nationalize the Slavs, and ultimately unite the entire Austrian Empire under Berlin in a greater German Empire.[98]

With the emerging proletariat and the peasant classes swelling their numbers,[99] the Young Czechs roared to victory in the 1891 *Reichsrath* elections, winning thirty-seven seats to the Old Czechs' twelve; the *Feudalen* held on to eighteen, while Bohemia's eight other seats went to other parties.[100] Facing the pressure, the Old Czechs agreed to suspend the *Ausgleich* agreements, but even this could not save their party, as the Young Czechs

continued to accuse them of not being able to identify with the Czech *Volk*.[101] The Party had completely collapsed by 1893.

The disintegration of the Bohemian compromise and the diminished Old Czech representation after 1891 spelled the end of the Iron Ring. Taaffe remained Minister-President until he, too, was forced into retirement in 1893. By then, the Old Czech Party had ceased to exist, and stirrings by German Nationalists, Anti-Semites, and Young Czechs kept a sturdy government from forming.[102] 1893 electoral reform, previously a useful means to break the Liberals, now worsened matters by increasing membership in the Socialist and assorted micro-nationalist parties, skewing any last chance for compromise, and burying any hope of saving the Empire's unity.[103]

The more the radical parties grew, the more they alienated voters who might have compromised, but who instead joined other radical parties themselves. In response to increasing Germanism, the Czechs flocked almost entirely to the Young Czech Party, as moderate alternatives like the Old Czechs seemed ineffectual.[104] By the 1897 elections, the Young Czechs had won all Czech seats but one, and they could declare that "the only road for the Czechs is leading out of the Habsburg Empire."[105] Czech political identity had effectively shifted from merely seeking recognition of the political rights of Bohemia to an aggressive, ethnic, and pan-Slavic solidarity looking outside the Empire.[106] To gain time, Kasimir Badeni, then Minister-President, enacted a set of Language Ordinances which made Czech the effective official language of Bohemia. This concession - completely ignoring the Germans - brought his government down by 1901.

Even more radical parties began to form which quickened the Empire's decay. The Czech National Socialist Party formed in 1897. It adopted the same agenda as the Social Democrats', but rejected their non-ethnic

characteristics and their emphasis on the international community of workers.[107] The Social Democrats recognized this trend at their Brünn conference of 1899, when they split into separate, mutually exclusive, parties, each representing different ethnic groups. Future Soviet dictator Josef Stalin attributed the break-up of the Socialists as the ultimate last straw in the dismemberment of the Empire - when the working class could no longer compromise in one state with its comrades, that state must cease to exist.[108]

The Czech intellectual and Prague University professor Tomáš Masaryk, who would become one of the founders of post-war Czechoslovakia, also broke from the Young Czechs at this time, finding them not "radical" or "honest" enough. He objected to the Monarchy and to Bohemia's[109] regional status in the Empire, and did not see how a polyglot state could effectively administer itself.[110] To him, neither Church nor State, but People formed humanity, and therefore only ethnic allegiances determined the welfare of individuals.[111] Russian pan-Slavism influenced him, while Franz Josef's ideals represented to him a poor attempt to hold together a polyglot assortment under a central authority. He agreed with one revolutionary, who had accused Palacký of undermining Czech self-consciousness and ethnic identity by insisting on Bohemian membership in Austria's *Mitteleuropa*.[112] His main objection to the Young Czechs was that they had substituted "negativism for true criticism."[113] They had won their support through opposing the Germans and the conservative Czechs, not through formulating their own sensible solutions. Masaryk's Social Realist Party strove to offer an "honest" solution to Czech problems, and he ultimately won the support of the Czech *Volk*.

Masaryk's influence in the West during the War perpetrated the view of an inherently evil Habsburg Empire which subjugated its peoples.[114]

Under these impressions, U. S. President Woodrow Wilson and the Allied Powers demanded its dismemberment, condemning Central Europe to decadence and permanent instability. The destruction of the federation also hastened the economic collapse. The new states, although defined by their ethnic majority, had borders of only historical significance - they did not properly divide the population. As a result, they contained large minorities who were unwilling to participate in the new states, making them inherently unstable and mutually exclusive. Masaryk hinted at the problem when he wrote of Bohemia's four million Czechs and two million Germans that

> We can find a mix of inhabitants in Germany, France, and elsewhere, but not to the extent that we do in Bohemia, where both peoples live right alongside each other and are deeply intermingled.... Although here, too, there are regions that are exclusively Czech and regions that are exclusively German, the majority of both peoples are mixed together.[115]

Masaryk, in reality, offered no solutions, but the defunct Austrian Empire did. It had managed to stay together for a reason greater than the historical accident which had brought it together in the beginning. The Danube federation was an economic and political necessity, which tied numerous ethnic groups together whose fate and well-being depended on one another. The House of Habsburg, though conservative and true to its class-based society, also staunchly believed in the equal rights of its subjects, recognition of individual merit and achievement kept Austrian Society open to a much higher degree than in other, supposedly less repressive, states. The *Völker* could further themselves for the greater improvement of the Empire at large, rather than merely their own benefit. Conservative groups like the Old Czechs were fiercely Slavic, but not at the exclusion of other ethnic groups. Both Germans and Czechs expressed their loyalty to Bohemia, and at one time, compromise could cement their regional pride, as well as their state identity: Austrian. Tolerance of others was the key ideal, and the ethnic

groups, loyal to the Kaiser and not brutally repressed by him, did not seek to cause his downfall, despite the misconceptions of many histories.

Ironically, it was instead portions of the German speaking population that undermined stability, after the social upheaval of 1848 spread across the border from Germany. As their intolerance and *völkisch* tendencies grew, they alienated the other ethnic groups, who previously had been prepared for compromise to preserve the Empire. The Empire still might have been saved by the *Ausgleich* of 1890, but by then, the radicalization of the German Left had driven too many into the ranks of the Young Czech Movement, and this latter group killed the compromise. The Empire managed to survive a quarter of a century longer, but during that period, intolerance and the decay of politics into mob movements brought the end into sight. To stem the polarization, conservatives continued to back a federal system,[116] and Kaiser Karl's last minute attempts to save the Empire were obstructed by radicals and broken off by the end of the War.[117] Indeed, Europe, and the groups that now have their own states, have never recovered. Palacký had argued that if the Empire had not existed, it would have needed to be invented. Yet nationalists, in their effort to satisfy their own exclusive aspirations in the name of progress, dis-invented it when it already did exist.

III. Turning Bread to Stone:

The failure of the *Lliga Regionalista* and the collapse of concord in Spain

> *"Un català de les pedres fa pa."* - Catalan saying[1]

The *Nationalitätenfrage* emerged in Spain late in the nineteenth century, as the Catalans began to reassert their own culture against French-modeled centralization. Early catalanism, in a manner reminiscent of the Czechs, did not reject the concept of a greater state; rather it considered its importance as deriving from one of the alternate, non-Castilian, cultures of Spain. As Salvador de Madariaga, a Gallego regionalist and Spanish historian of the early twentieth century, explained, that Catalans spoke a language related to Castilian[2] had nothing to do with being a part of a common *Volk* or race, but rather with the "historical fact, fortuitive and independent of both, of a common Roman conquest... The case cannot be more clear. Catalan comes from Catalonia (not from Spain)."[3] Yet the two classifications, Catalan and Spanish, had grown together through history, so that Madariaga could define a Catalan as merely "a Spaniard who lives on the coasts of the Mediterranean."[4]

Catalan regionalists did not doubt this assessment, and like many Spaniards viewed the entire Iberian peninsula as the natural, geographical, and historical area for a Spanish state. In 1640, Portugal and Catalonia had both revolted against the hegemony Castile had acquired over hundreds of years. The Portuguese gained independence and the right to build a state based on, and able to defend, their own cultural identity; the Catalans failed in

the struggle, and lost their autonomous government. Cambó saw Catalonia's defeat as inevitable: the region had concentrated on the Mediterranean while Castile had worked to establish hegemony in Iberia, and then explored the Americas.[5] Castilian Spain would later lose Catalonia's Mediterranean inheritance; what remained of Catalan influence and power disappeared, leaving Catalonia firmly locked in a Spanish state whose concerns went elsewhere.[6] The War of the Spanish Succession at the beginning of the eighteenth century replaced the House of Habsburg with a line of Borbón rulers who brought with them French-style oppression and centralization.[7]

The liberal *Cortes* finished off the process of centralization in the restoration period after Napoleone's defeat, removing the last vestiges of Catalan autonomy.[8] Catalan came to be forgotten by the educated classes in favor of the Castilian Spanish of the central government. As Almirall felt, once a language, as a distinguishing mark of different ethnic groups, disappears, the central government can begin to absorb the powers of the region: "The sign of a slave is to have to speak the language of the master, and we carry this stigma all the way."[9] Catalanist movements of the nineteenth century were thus concerned with intellectual matters, seeking to restore Catalan as a literary language and to revive popular regional culture.

As in Austria, it took defeat and an accompanying internal identity-crisis to make regionalism a larger political movement and a viable means of regenerating the state. The young United States stripped proud Spain of its last important overseas colonies in 1898, and suddenly Spain had nowhere else to look but within, and to its own form of government. The political side of catalanism had grown only slowly until the 1898 disaster, which finally provided regionalist and conservative parties a way to gain credence by their attacks on the centralized liberal system of the 1800s. Until 1898, catalanism

had been marginal, perhaps because of popular acquiescence and the power of the liberal *caciques*. The new movement had grown among academics and intellectuals of the right, who favored liberty, manifested through increased cultural and economic freedoms, within Spain.[10] The central government had become corrupt and unresponsive, to the point that Cambó could call its democracy a "fiction." "During a century, Spain has lived under the appearance of a constitutional democratic regime, without the people having had, neither directly nor indirectly, any participation at all in the government."[11] The Disaster of 1898 was the catalyst for the Catalans, because it spurred a loss of faith in Spain, forced a decrease in trade with the loss of the colonies abroad - trade which affected industrial Catalonia more than any other region, and engendered a response to anti-Catalan repression by a government that could hardly manage itself.[12]

Catalanists saw the vigor of the regions as a means of revitalizing the moribund country. "Regional spirit," wrote Almirall, "is the only element for regeneration that remains to us," since all other methods had apparently failed.[13] "The sad and shameful situation of the nation in general," he explained, was "the collapse of the Castilian character, now unable to direct itself; and the denaturalization: the degeneration of Catalan. (These) were more than sufficient motives for us to want to leave the path that has brought us to this point."[14] Spain obviously was not functioning and its situation was deteriorating, so its future must lie in devolving power to its vital regions; since Catalonia was the most developed region, it should lead the way for Spain.[15] Thus the catalanist project fit within a broader regeneration of Spain.

Catalonia's capitalist burgher classes which formed the core of the regionalist movement naturally accepted the economic goals of the Spanish

conservatives. These included calls for maintaining, though decentralizing, the Spanish union. Thus, Catalan regionalists could be both "catalanistes" as supporters of catalanism, and "españolistas" - Spanish patriots.[16] Prat wrote in his newspaper, the *Veu de Catalunya*, of his opposition to the three radical movements that his regionalism confronted: against "francesisme català" ("Catalan French-ism"), which sought to ally Catalonia to France, but which he saw as bringing it merely under even stronger French centralization; against separatism, which he thought violated economic and cultural logic by leaving Catalonia alone; and against *españolismo*, which represented to him centuries of bad government. Yet, he admitted, "we will be *españolistas* if the men who govern Spain accept reforms seriously and give Catalonia autonomy."[17] When 1898 motivated Spaniards to consider these reforms and regeneration, the Spanish Conservatives had more ideas in common with their Catalan counterparts than with the Spanish Liberals who hoped to strengthen the existing system or the radicals who sought to overthrow it from below, thus, the two conservative groups could cooperate well - the first step in any concordance.[18]

Antoni Maura, a Mallorcan of Jewish descent and the leading Conservative politician in Madrid for the first two decades of the twentieth century,[19] first actively worked within the central government to bring about a solution to the Catalan problem through local government and the destruction of "Jacobin" centralization to release the "energy of the regions."[20] As Minister of the Interior in the cabinet of Francisco Silvela in 1903, he put forward his "Bases for the Reform of Local Administration" in which, working with the *Lliga*, he developed the idea of *mancomunidad* as an association of regional provinces with their own autonomy to more efficiently develop the economy, preserve culture, build communications,

and control local administration.[21] He first presented the idea to the *Cortes* after he became the leader of the Conservative Party and himself headed the Spanish government in 1907; later, he would succeed in implementing and augmenting the program.

The conditions of the system of *mancomunidades* had grown out of the work of nineteenth century theorists, culminating in the works of Prat and Almirall. Prat, and his disciple and successor Cambó, stressed "faith, order, and Spanish tradition" for a federal Catalonia within a federal Spain. Slightly to the left, but still regionalist, stood Almirall, whose 1886 book *Lo Catalanisme* (Catalanism) became one of the movement's early tracts. To him, catalanism represented merely a consequence of Spain's constitutional problem, and thus the country could resolve the question through progress, free thinking, and democracy.[22] These projects produced in the period before, during, and immediately after the Crisis of 1898, formed the bases that conservatives and regionalist catalanists would attempt to use to restore Spain.

In 1892, a Catalanist assembly in Manresa of right and center regionalists drew up the conservative, traditionalist, and anti-Liberal "Bases of Manresa," articles with which to negotiate Catalonia's relationship with the central state.[23] Under the guidance of Prat de la Riba's Catalan Union, which had become the dominant political voice of catalanism, the Bases sought home rule and language ordinances to turn Spain into a federal union.[24] Prat had objected to the provincialism suggested by the Liberal government, a system which used the provinces as mere administrative areas. This, he argued, had turned the state into a machine, each province as a mechanically specified part, "uniform, grey, and equal parts of the whole," not recognizing the reality that people were different.[25] Similar to Almirall,

Prat sought a balance of "unity" and "variety," with the admission of a dual-loyalty to Catalonia and Spain.

> In speaking of *our* language, of *our* Code, of *our* theater, referring to the language, code, and theater of Castile, we do not fault ourselves for a lack of having a language, a code, a literature of our own as well. We admit the coexistence of the two cultures, of the two psychologies placed over from top to bottom, and in the end we want to find a foundation (*fonament*).[26]

The loyalty must take the form of concentric circles: the regions must sacrifice for the benefit of the state, and the state must, in turn, recognize the identity of the regions. Every group should have its rights, but they must all work together to preserve all of their groups.[27]

On March tenth, 1897, the catalanist parties sent a letter of support to the Greek embassy backing Greece's struggle against the Ottoman Empire for the liberation of Crete and other Greek islands from oppression by the Turks. The Liberal Spanish government equated this letter with treason, deciding there was an implied parallel between the Greek status within Turkey and the Catalan within Spain, and so it began a crackdown and military occupation of Catalonia, arresting Prat and other prominent catalanists. The Catalan Union drafted a protest on March sixteenth, clarifying that by its original letter it only meant to show support for the recognition of the rights of minorities within larger states, not for separatism or rebellion. "This is our catalanism within Spain, this of the Bases of Manresa; this is our regionalism within Catalonia."[28] The occupation of Catalonia, however, would not be lifted until 1901, when the region was once again allowed to hold elections. Explained Cambó by that point, "Catalonia has no more than two paths to follow today: electoral struggle or revolution. But as we do not think the latter possible today, nor even would we think it in our interests, these two paths reduce themselves to one alone: electoral struggle."[29]

During the occupation and the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898, catalanism gained crucial support throughout the population, and the most influential voices favored its conservative and regionalist manifestation. Among them, Joan Mañer i Flaquer, the director of the *Diario* of Barcelona, published his support for regional consciousness as a means of supporting burgher capitalism and in turn producing progress.[30] These catalanists had already found a natural alliance with the Conservative opposition in Madrid, and the two conservative groups looked for ways to settle the Catalan Problem within Spain. The alliance with Spanish Conservatives, however, cost the regionalists the support of the Catalan Left, which objected both to compromise with Castilians and to Conservative politics.[31] In 1900, these radicals held strikes, protesting for a *"Catalonie Française,"* and making many Castilians fear that any concessions to the regionalists would only fuel the separatist movement.[32] But Almirall could not accept allegiance to France as viable, noting that the Bourbón influence had led to the current situation of centralization.[33] The debate was effectively silenced in public as the Liberal government imposed heavy censorship on the Catalan press in 1900 to 1901, making no distinction between the regionalist and more radical micronationalist varieties of catalanism. The censorship, however, actually worked against the Liberals, as it prepared a strong incentive for Catalans to air their opinions in the 1901 elections.[34]

The Liberals lifted the state of emergency on March eleventh, 1901, just two months before the elections scheduled for May nineteenth, and Prat wasted no time in reestablishing the *Veu de Catalunya,* which encouraged Catalonia to lead the way in Spanish politics by a strong turnout.[35] Two moderate and right parties, the Catalan National Center and the Regionalist Union merged for the elections to form the *Lliga Regionalista* (Regionalist

League) to combine their strength. But, since they had so little time between the end of the state of emergency and the election, they did not create a cohesive party platform, but rather let their candidates run and worry about specifics later. The election was crucial, they told the public, "to make Catalonia grow and to give respect to the personality of the Catalan *pàtria.*"36 The voters could guess the general policy the *Lliga* would follow by looking at its founders: the *bourgeoisie,* the middle-classes of the cities and countryside, the clergy, and intellectuals, who had already demonstrated their views for reform and against *caciquismo* and centralization. In the Madrid government, they proposed to put the personality of Catalonia before central uniformism.37 The Liberals, too, could guess the policies of the *Lliga,* and tried to block its formation and force any catalanists from public posts.38 On May sixth, Catalans held a strike to protest Liberal *caciquismo,* a *Lliga* politician declaring that "Catalonia, for its industry, art, and wealth is a European entity but it finds itself governed as though it were an African state."39

One of the *Lliga's* nominees who would gain election, Bartomeu Robert i Yarzàbal, would later define the party's regionalism as based not on class or specific political movement, but on the equality of groups and equal suffrage for individuals.40 The *Lliga's* ultimate platform backed corporate suffrage, the fostering of regional cultures, economic development, more available and improved education, better communications within Spain, and increased services. The first paragraph in the *Lliga's* founding statute described that

it is the objective of the *Lliga Regionalista* to defend the interests and the restoration of the rights of Catalonia employing all legal means to achieve the autonomy of the Catalan people within the Spanish State.... the *Lliga Regionalista* will assist all autonomy movements in the other Spanish regions, achieving the extension to all of the doctrine of autonomy.41

Historian Stanley Payne has noted that the party was hardly "subversive nor separatist, but intended to win Catalonia autonomy from and within the

established system;" he also classified the *Lliga* of that day as "perhaps the only modern, well-organized political party in Spain."[42] But the party had to act quickly, and by four days before the elections it had nominated four candidates for election to the five positions of "president." The right-wing nature of the party was confirmed above all, since all four were conservative businessmen.[43] These candidates, though, easily took the top four spots in the election, with one Liberal slightly ahead of two Republicans for the remaining seat. However, the Liberal *caciques* rigged the elections, allowing their own candidates to take all the seats. The *Veu* protested loudly enough, though, forcing the government to recount, confirming the original results.[44]

The next decade saw the debate continue and tempers flare, but the *torno* system (of alternating Liberal and Conservative administrations)[45] meant that the discussion did not often become effective policy. The stalemate and lack of action only served to fuel mistrust between all concerned groups. When the central government failed to grant the Catalans autonomy, the more radical Catalan groups gained support. As these groups agitated more, the centralist *españolistas* reacted more strongly, which in turn stirred up the catalanists even more. Issues of right/left politics also divided various groups, and the Anarchist labor union, the National Labor Confederation (CNT), also formed in Barcelona by 1910.[46]

In 1904, King Alfonso XIII visited Barcelona, and the radical Catalans boycotted the event. When the *Lliga* refused to support the boycott, the radicals withdrew from the party, and Prat had to publicly defend his views reconciling how he could be both a *catalanista* and an *españolista* in his treatise *La Nacionalitat Catalana* (Catalan Nationality).[47] Maura had accompanied the King, and on giving a discourse in his native Catalan, had impressed upon Alfonso the regional identity. "Then is it that the Catalan language is not a

Spanish language?" asked the King rhetorically. "The Catalan language - is it not from a region of Spain? It will be one of my first cares to learn it, so that when I return I can understand you just as you speak."[48] Tensions continued, and the Liberal central government called in the army to face radical-catalanist agitation in 1905 and 1906, much with the support of local Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radical Republican Party, whose group had a number of personal ties to army officers.[49] The Republicans had become the *Lliga*'s biggest foe within Catalonia, calling for a patriotic and aggressive *españolismo*, but also draining off the support of the large Catalan proletariat by proposing an anarchizing radicalism against burgher reform and a belligerent and anti-clerical jacobism.[50] The Liberal crackdown, in the name of Spanish patriotism, once again did not choose to acknowledge the loyalty of most Catalans to Spain, viewing any non-Castilian movement as one of separatism. "The focus of separatism," the Regionalist senators in Madrid responded in a statement, "is, then, in the ministries of the government; in the politics of bad government...; in inept, impotent, stupid centralization.... (The government should respect) the fact of the variety of the regions without detracting from the fact of their unity, as component elements of Spain." The government, it felt, should concern itself with promoting political liberty and freedom of expression.[51]

The catalanist parties once again joined together into "Catalan Solidarity" for the 1907 election in order to fight off the Lerrouxistas and to protect their order from the swelling ranks of Catalan anarchists. On April twenty-first, Catalan Solidarity won 41 of 44 seats.[52] In office, however, the catalanists proved they could once again not cooperate with each other. Cambó presented a modified version of the Bases of Manresa to Maura, his Spanish Conservative friend and ally then taking his *torno* as head of the

government, and the left-catalanists used this action to demonstrate the *Lliga*'s supposed lack of commitment to catalanism and to leftist politics. In regard to the Catalan Problem, they considered themselves *"totoresistes"* ("all-or-nothing-ists"), compared the "realist" *Lliga* which was ready to compromise. With the left wing withdrawing from Catalan Solidarity, Lerroux captured the polls in 1908. Although its support for one or another of the two main non-*torno* parties - the Republicans and the *Lliga* - swung the elections, this catalanist left had no actual major voice of its own until well into the second decade of the century. Lerroux, champion of the working class, represented not just the Andalucian "immigrants"[53] who occupied much of the Barcelona proletariat, but also many Catalans of this social class. Depending on their emphasis, this left found its voice trapped between the *Lliga*'s conservative catalanism and Lerroux's populist radicalism, and these contrasts helped impede the growth of a substancial catalanist left.[54]

Meanwhile, Maura had effectively killed the *torno*, which he called a "fiction." He tried to modernize and further democratize Spain by imposing reforms from above, and the Liberals preferred to ally with the non-loyal opposition and revolution from below. With this move, Maura viewed the Liberals as non-loyal themselves, and thus unfit to alternate in government, and he strengthened his allegiance with the conservative Catalans. This in turn made the Liberals fear his government even more since they viewed all catalanists as disloyal towards Spain.[55] By 1909, an anarchist revolution in Barcelona, partly inspired to delay the debate over the proposed implementation of the *Mancomunitat* and thus to embarrass the Conservatives and the *Lliga*,[56] set up *juntas* to manage local affairs apart from the state under the guidance of "Worker Solidarity," and brought about a government crackdown.[57] The immortalized *setmana tràgica* ("tragic week")

of the revolution brought down the Maura government. The *Veu* lamented the enormous campaign of personal hatred towards Maura which had driven him from power, calling it an affront to democracy and the trends of liberty that he had so vociferously promoted and defended as a means of regeneration after 1898.[58] But the Radical Republicans continued their attacks on the catalanists, seeing assimilation and unity as the true strength that would renew the country and as the driving force of the peninsula's history.[59] The Radical Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos described to a Barcelona council meeting the "four unities" necessary within Spain: unity of language, education, culture, and government.[60] But the *Veu* considered the Lerrouxistas too idealist, and described their tirades as "the violent, brutal, savage hate... the existent spirit of destruction, ultimate desperation of all radicalisms.... Pacifism, anti-clericism, republicanism have been the banners of that movement, the terms exploited by the radical leaders in order to stir up mass opinion."[61] Since the Catalan left held many of the same socio-political ideals as the *Lerrouxistas*, the *Lliga* had a means to effectively question the Catalan Left's catalanism in voters' minds. The *Lliga* captured the 1911 elections, and would hold onto power for over a decade.[62] With the *Lliga* back in control of Catalonia and the Conservatives back in control of Spain, a regionalist compromise could soon be attained.

After a decade of delay, the *Mancomunitat* was finally written by the fall of 1913, and passed by royal decree on March twenty-sixth, 1914. The new Catalan Assembly approved it on the following April sixth, at which meeting it overwhelmingly elected Prat its first president.[63] An agreement between conservatives of both nationalities, its goals followed Prat's original design. It established an administrative infrastructure which cut Catalonia's deficit and tariff and built up the regional economy; it enhanced cultural and educational

projects, opening them to all classes and training professors and teachers; it built up new industries, especially in textile and chemicals; it modernized the agriculture; and it improved roads, rail, telephones, telegraphs, and other communications.[64] It was, the *Veu* claimed, "the ideal of regeneration of Spain for the personality of each one of the nationalities that today live lost in the greyness of the whole."[65] While the *Mancomunitat*, as it stood, still had numerous restrictions from the central government, it provided a start and a firm compromise for all groups, representing, in Duràn's words, "everyone together for everyone."[66] "The *Mancomunitat*," argued a Conservative, "will bring to the State the richest variety within unity;"[67] its proponents hoped that its lessons could serve not only to increase its power later, but to inspire similar *mancomunidades* throughout Spain:

> If the complex ideal that inspires all Catalan energies in new and intense life, if the integral 'nationalism' [regionalism] of Catalonia goes further in this enterprise and accomplishes the awakening by its impulse and its example the dormant forces of all the Spanish peoples (*pobles*), if it can inspire those peoples to do the same thing in their regions that it has done, they will straighten out the decadency of today.[68]

Maura and his coalitions hoped all Spaniards would love their regions as much as the Catalans loved Catalonia, "and, more important than anything, Spaniards (should love) Spain, the single and indivisible Spain, as (we love) ourselves, and the catalanists (love) Catalonia."[69] Under the presidency of Prat, many of the limitations which Madrid still imposed became effectively moot, since, as he was often described, "given a stamp, he can do everything."[70] Prat stressed modern, regional, and conservative politics, much to the annoyance of both the Catalan and Castilian Lefts.[71]

During this period Cambó began to take over from the aging Prat the leadership of the *Lliga*. Full of energy and respected, if not liked, by the important figures of his day, Cambó was an industrialist who diverted his

tremendous energy into politics. His left-wing catalanist opponent Antoni Rovira i Virgili declared, almost longingly, that Cambó should have lived in America, where he could have achieved the status of a Rockefeller or Carnegie.[72] Ildefons Sunyol, another left-catalanist, described Cambó, saying that "the leader of the Catalan right is a living paradox, because he has the temperament of a revolutionary. He would be much better off in a radical party."[73] These evaluations were not lost on Cambó, who once declared that "considering the circumstances in which this country finds itself, the most conservative thing is to be a revolutionary."[74]

Cambó himself entered the cabinet in Madrid during Maura's continuing Conservative coalition there, and, responding to Liberal taunts that his regionalism was really a manifestation of Catalan egoism, stressed that Catalan capitalism was providing the energy that would regenerate all of Spain. As Minister of Development (*Fomento*), he tried to spread regionalism and modernity to other areas through improving communications and implementing of many of the industrial reforms Prat had pushed through within Catalonia.[75] He argued for the continuance of a "republic with a crown" for stability and preservation of a "Great Spain."[76]

Maura did implement Spanish language ordinances alongside the *Mancomunitat*, requiring that government documents in some way tied to the central state, including phone books and guides, be printed in Spanish, leading the micro-nationalist Rovira to accuse him of anti-Catalan sentiment.[77] But most regionalists, like the Gallego Madariaga, accepted this need for "peninsular unity" and "administrative utility," adding that it was even lamentable that Portugal had dropped the use of Castilian for communication.[78]

Cambó did not understand the separatist tendencies of the Catalan nationalists. "Is it," he asked,

> that the existence of distinct national personalities impedes the coincidence of a common unity, of a complete political being? Those who think this way have a very poor concept of Spain and they prepare for her dark destinies, because they deny Spain the possibility of obtaining a greatness through the path, through the route that Empires which today are enveloping the world have found and maintained.[79]

He once again called up the example of the still (barely) extant Austrian Empire and the Czech regionalists who "defend the survival of the Austrian Empire, and ever since Palacký to the latest of the Czech orators have always said that they need Austria to survive, because only in that way will the Czech nationality survive."[80] Cambó's policy sought regeneration of both Catalonia and Spain, and the *Mancomunitat*, extended to other regions, was a means to accomplish his goals. Yet the Leftist parties viewed his presence on and dominance of the government coalition as a manifestation of "Catalan selfishness" and the CNT denounced him for his ideas on reform as the "murderer of the revolution," prompting a sequence of strikes beginning in 1917.[81] These continued, blowing up into a "social war" fueled by counter-strikes and agitation between Leftist groups until 1923.[82] Yet nearly all opposition groups, even if they accepted Cambó's right to his own politics, complained in general that he could not try to regenerate both Spain and Catalonia, that the two were incompatible and he had to pick one.[83] A frustrated peacemaker, Cambó arrived at the conviction that "the resistance and prevention of Madrid and the restlessness and impatience of Barcelona remove for much time all efficacy in my action of so many years in trying to look for a Spanish solution, of effusive concord, to the Catalan Problem."[84]

Cambó sought desperately to reach a concord between rival groups, but the more he tried, the further the political movements diverged from each

other. Early in 1917, low-ranking officers stationed in Catalonia mutinied against the army, which still maintained its autonomy from the elected government. The *junteros* sought to make the military more accountable to the people, and thus permit Spain to move ahead with the army as a positive force. In its turn, the military violently put down the mutiny, giving the country yet another issue to debate. The Radical Republicans and large amounts of the leftist population supported the army as a legitimate political voice within Spain; whereas Maura, Cambó, and their respective conservative parties saw the military's defeat in 1898 as the ultimate source of Spain's collapse which had made it unfit for regenerating the state.[85] But after 1917, the army had reentered internal politics, and because it considered itself superior to the constitutional system it did not feel it ever had to be accountable to it or have to behave in any "legal" manner. In the period after 1917, progress towards regeneration had once again stalemated in the face of irreconcilable differences. The army was anti-Catalan and generally anti-Republican, yet did not feel responsible to anyone; Catalan conservatives were anti-Republican and anti-Socialist; the Catalan Left was anti-Conservative and anti-regionalist; all Republicans were anti-Conservative, some Republicans were anti-militarist, while others, like Lerroux, backed the army as the ultimate defense of the State against separatists; the Anarchists rejected all governments; the Socialists opposed the Conservatives and the Anarchists; and the intellectuals of the "Generation of '98" protested everything in general.[86] With Spain under this much disorder and getting no closer to a concord, General Miguel Primo de Rivera staged his *golpe de estado* in 1923, crushing once and for all the failed constitution.

Primo thought he could solve the Catalan Problem that had dominated a quarter century of Spanish politics by suppressing it. To him, Spain was *not*

regional in character. Castile had not been attacking the Catalan identity, but, rather, the Catalans had become misguided, and, although from the same stock as other Spaniards, they had fabricated their own language to drive themselves out of a Castilian Great Spain.[87] Primo sought out the two great enemies of Spain, the regionalists and the capitalists who had tried to break up the country from within. He further angered other segments of the population in Catalonia by promoting through his social and labor policy the Socialist trade union, the General Workers' Union (UGT) at the expense of the Catalonia-based CNT.[88] Primo, a self-styled "righter of society," had hoped to stay in power only long enough to remove what he considered the internal threats to Spain's stability, but he remained for six years until Conservatives could finally force him into exile. Despite his long tenure and his propaganda and self-deceit, Spain's problems did not vanish but had only been covered over, all to return even more vociferously after 1929.[89] As Cambó wrote from exile in 1927, Catalonia had not disappeared under Borbón oppression, so why should the Directory of Primo de Rivera solve the problem? After four years, it still existed; it had merely been glossed over.[90]

But Cambó's own prior attempts at solving the problems not by force but by compromise had failed as the pertinent groups polarized. After struggling for his ideal of the *Mancomunitat*, he felt that the Catalans themselves had undermined his efforts, as the radicals among them protested louder against Spain. People should only raise their voices, he thought, when they are not heard, not when they are gaining concessions, otherwise they might scare their opponent who might follow by cracking down even harder. The Catalans had made the most progress when they were willing to compromise.[91] Once again, History would prove him right, as Primo's entrance would erase the *Mancomunitat* and eliminate all the gains of the

previous twenty-five years. But Catalan leftists like Rovira had felt that Cambó's presence in Maura's government could not continue, because Cambó, not the radicals, was really undercutting true gains by setting up a false front not in the best interests of Catalonia.[92] Francesc Macià, a populist and extremely radical micro-nationalist general, commented - using the term "nationalist" to mean loyalty to ethnic group - that

> He who has nationalist ideas loves the freedom of his 'Nation' [again, ethnic group] as I love it; but he who pretends to have those ideals of freedom and, without doubt, in his actions, in other aspects of governmental life, shows that he does not feel that freedom and muzzles it continually, cannot be a nationalist.[93]

A battalion of Catalan leftists volunteered to fight alongside the French during the First World War, since the Allies had described one of their goals as "self-determination." Even so, no Catalans were invited to the Versailles peace conference after the war. "With autonomy there is not enough," clamored Macià for an invitation. "It is necessary that Catalonia be represented at the peace conference. We need independence."[94]

To the Catalan Left, the *Lliga* appeared too conservative and not catalanist enough. "Regionalism is not catalanism when it with such a great conscience uses that name," wrote Pere Aldavet, pointing to "regionalist" as a forced alternative to "nationalist" or "catalanist." The *Lliga* had purposefully called itself the "*Lliga Regionalista*" and not anything else so as to stress its Spanish non-ethno-specific character (as opposed to specifically Catalan one), promoting regionalism throughout Spain to solve its Crisis. But this did not enamor it to the Catalan Left, which used the term to question the *Lliga*'s commitment.[95] That it often put forward candidates better known for their conservatism than for their catalanism also strengthened this argument.

Macià blamed Cambó's affiliation with Spain and conservative politics for the suffering of the Catalan workers.[96] "We do not want a class struggle,"

Macià accused the conservative policies.[97] But the *Lliga* also denounced class struggle - and blamed the left for opening the social question, while it had democratized and modernizing Catalonia (and Spain) - for all, and for all political parties.[98] It had obtained autonomy for Catalonia, and could not understand how people could want to break the compromise that had taken years to achieve. ·Catalan historian Fèlix Cucurull has attributed the failure of the *Mancomunitat* to unsureness in the *Lliga* on how to proceed: the party had had a renovating temperament, but once it had accomplished the compromise, it became unsure what to do next. Its initial program carried it until the 1916 elections, but then it confronted Bolshevik influence, sweeping European revolution, the end of the War, and the ensuing European economic collapse. As the Catalan working classes began to swing vociferously to the opposition parties, the *Lliga* attempted to hold on to them by stressing its catalanist identity and pushed to make lasting the power which Prat had wielded in his stamp.[99] It proposed greater autonomy to the *Cortes* in 1918, but even this new autonomy avoided dealing with social and religious issues.[100]

While pushing for this autonomy, Cambó defended his role in the cabinet of the central government, insisting that he was trying to spread his ideas to other *pobles* of Spain, "that permits us to hope for the triumph at a not-so-distant date." "It is impossible to think about the greatness of Spain," he explained, "without the reform of the current organization of the entire State." Because Europe was thrown into confusion after the War, neutral Spain was in a better position to reintroduce itself as a political and economic power, and complete reorganization, in his opinion, would allow it to do so.[101] "The moment for Autonomy is now, now. Any delay would be fatal," he wrote. "Today, autonomy produces a very deep commotion for all

Catalonia and all Spain. The Autonomy of Catalonia will tell all Spaniards that through legal routes it is possible to bring about reforms."[102] But when the opposition could present to the masses apparent inconsistencies on Cambó's part, it exploited Cambó's opinions. Facing growing resistance both at home and in Madrid, the *Lliga* recognized its coming electoral defeat. On his deathbed in 1917, Prat's last words expressed one hope when he was informed of the potential formation of a republic: "that it emerge a federal one" ("*que sigui federal*").[103] But politics continued to heat up as the stalemate continued, and opponents resisted and impeded the actions of the *Mancomunitat*. The *Lliga* needed to found a "Political Action Commission" to defend its goals against the opposition, especially at the meetings of the increasingly separatist catalanist "national conferences."[104]

The radicalization of the catalanist movement had come naturally, and once put in motion, not even the best attempts of Cambó could stop it. Many Catalan historians saw even the conservative and moderate formation of the *Lliga* after 1898 as merely a stage in the Catalan nationalist movement of 1931,[105] and the party was continually plagued by *totoresista* splinter groups,[106] who felt that the *Lliga* was too willing to sacrifice Catalan purity for compromise with Madrid.[107] These nationalists had viewed catalanism as a means for progress out of a backwards Spain, contrasting with Catalan conservatives who saw in it stability against centralizing liberalization.[108]

Later, Madariaga would blame Cambó for accepting the current situation and not pushing catalanism fast enough to satisfy the radicals. "His disposition (was) to accept from every day what he could get, hoping that tomorrow may bring the rest." The radical catalanists also caused tension by feeling they had to make up for centuries of Castilian domination by moving swiftly through autonomy to independence.[109] As historian Raymond Carr

has pointed out, "catalanism could not remain the decorative appendage of moderate regionalism; it became the tool of radical nationalism. Hence moderate regionalism became treason to Catalonia; those who stuck to the old program were reviled as bad Catalans, as the allies of Madrid."[110] Gradually the term "nation" became associated with Catalonia, until "region" fell completely out of use.[111]

The nationalists would only support regionalism if they saw it as a step towards complete autonomy. Thus Rovira accepted the *Mancomunitat*, especially after the Spanish Left attacked the new agreement, when by accepting the regionalist gain he could show Catalan solidarity against an anti-Catalan front.[112] Because of his moves in support of the Regionalist gains, Rovira could understand why centralists felt threatened even by the most moderate of catalanists and could accuse them of separatism, making them even more radical in their assimilationist views.[113] Even Cambó noted how the two nationalisms fed off each other and accelerated the polarization, until "the two extremes meet."[114] "It is evident," he wrote,

> how the strengths of the assimilationists against all manifestations of the differential Catalan reality grow and stimulate in Catalonia separatist sentiment; how it is as well quite sure, on the other hand, that the separatist strides reenforce the passion of the centralists and invigorate cooperation with and sympathies for the campaigns frankly and brutally assimilationist.[115]

"If I were I separatist," a still applicable article by Robert during the crackdowns of 1899 had read, "I would not want Madrid to have any other conduct than that which it is following."[116]

In 1919, Rovira noted what he considered the crucial abandonment by Jaume Bofill i Mates of the ideal of a Great Spain as Prat had envisioned and as Cambó had attempted to create through *mancomunidades*. "We, sir, leave off working for Great Spain and we work for the aggrandizement of Little Catalonia," Rovira quoted Bofill. Before the polarizations, Bofill had been

willing previously to accept a Great Spain, but, Rovira noted, "it is useless to make a Great Spain against Spain's will."[117] Near the end of 1920, Cambó admitted to the Madrid press that, despite the *Lliga's* opposition, separatism was gaining strength, and the centrists urged government action against Catalonia. Rovira, however, interpreted the Catalan radicalization as a reaction to the centrists in the first place.[118] By January eighteenth, 1922, Rovira could proudly proclaim that

> today, the catalanists have already passed the regionalist stage that predominated in the past century under the forms of catalanism and federalism. Today they consider themselves nationalists, they see the nation in Catalonia, the totality of the nation... Catalonia, in the field of the nationalities, is a tree, not a branch. Catalonia is not a regional entity. It is independent in spirit. As independent as Castile - or as Castilian Spain, if you prefer - in front of the other nations.[119]

On June 10, 1923, the *Lliga* was defeated in the Catalan regional elections, and the Catalan Left took over the reins, with cries of "long live free Catalonia" and "death to Spain." Three days later, Primo launched his *golpe*.[120]

Ironically, the *Mancomunitat* had opened itself up to its own decay. The Conservatives and the *Lliga* had insisted on political liberty in an area of the country already hotly charged. There they tried to forge a concord, but the Catalan nationalists continued to press for more independence, and the radical Left for more social reforms.[121] Cambó hoped to center his concord on the ideal of federation, good government, and material improvements and progress. Everyone, he felt, suffered in Spain, because the country had fought itself for four centuries. The time had come, he thought, for everyone to work together to restore Spain. Yet everyone had different ideas.[122] When, by 1923, attempts at burying the differences failed, Cambó wondered if Primo's *golpe* would not aid the Catalan burghers he represented against radicalizations, although he quickly found out that Primo's socialist, authoritarian, and military outlook was incompatible with the *Lliga's* political

and social views. Yet the *Lliga*'s opponents used Cambó's initial wavering as still more propaganda to discredit his voice as that of Catalonia. Although Primo suppressed politics within Spain, the Catalan Left gained the overall upper hand over the *Lliga* for the first time in protests from exile.[123] The dictatorship which sought to stamp out deviant Catalan culture only made more previously ambivalent Catalans take up the cause;[124] Primo's suppression only made already extant catalanism more radical.[125]

At Primo's retirement, the three most important catalanists of 1930 offered different platforms. Cambó remained conservative, seeking a vital, modern, "European," and capitalist Catalonia federated to Madrid; Macià wanted a complete and immediate break from Spain; and Lluís Companys thought Catalonia needed some ties with Spain to safeguard its own and Spain's socialism.[126] *L'Opinió*, a voice of the radical catalanist Left in exile, debated two alternatives: a "national alliance" of catalanists or an "alliance of the Lefts."[127] It ultimately rejected the *Lliga* for its role before 1923, and noted the precedent since before the Directory for ties between the two Lefts as a means of uniting against the *Lliga* for an independent, Republican Catalonia.[128] On May second, 1930, the paper printed its Manifesto - starting with Catalonia, it sought to spread socialism across Spain, turning the tables on Castile by creating Catalan hegemony on the peninsula. First, though, Catalonia needed the freedom to pursue its own course, because, it explained to the *Cortes*, "only when (people) are free can they federate themselves."[129]

Macià had set up a Catalan government-in-exile as early as 1928, and originally refused to cooperate with the Spanish centralist Left, but he found he needed the support to return to Spain, and that the Spanish Left, in turn, required the addition of his followers to help overthrow Alfonso XIII.[130] Macià agreed to cooperate with the Republicans in return for complete

autonomy once the new Republic was established.[131] When the King fled Spain in 1931, the Spanish Left which undemocratically declared itself the new government initially rejected federalism, but decided to, for a period, keep its promise to the catalanists who had helped found the new regime.[132] The early Republic was unstable because it denied a voice to any group that had not formed part of the Leftist coalition; and the coalition itself was unsteady because its elements had spent years fighting each other. Popular as a catalanist politician and a Republican general, Macià, like his Catalan predecessor Cambó, tried to bridge the gap between two opposing ethnic groups with similar socio-political views, but unlike Cambó, Macià made a poor peacemaker because of his violent anti-Castilian tendencies.[133] He returned from exile in 1931, to be greeted as the "Father of the Country" by huge crowds in Barcelona.[134] He then set about trying to reconcile the two halves of his movement, writing up a new "Manifesto of the Catalan State" on March thirteenth, which called for the "defense of the integral liberties of Catalonia;" "an ample confederation, free and voluntary, of Iberian peoples;" and "a union based on legal tolerance and full freedom."[135]

Macià joined his Catalan State in coalition with *L'Opinió* and the Catalan Republicans of Companys to form the *Esquerra Republicana* (Catalan Republican Left), which after only three weeks of existence catapulted itself to the forefront of Catalan politics, sweeping in that region the first elections of the new republic, ahead of Lerroux's Radical Republicans and the distant *Lliga*.[136] Macià's victory showed a break from the former diplomacy of the *Lliga*, and he antagonized his Spanish allies of convenience. The night of the April fourteenth elections he declared: "In the name of the people of Catalonia, I proclaim the Catalan State, under the regime of a Catalan Republic, that freely and with all cordiality seeks and demands of the other

related peoples of Spain their collaboration in the creation of a confederation of independent Iberian peoples."[137] He instantly pushed the Spanish *Cortes* towards drafting a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia (*l'Estatut*).

The publisher of *L'Opinió* attacked these separatist tendencies, saying that "they cannot raise the political flag with efficacy because I sincerely believe that they would achieve the destruction of all the fruits that we intend to obtain for Catalonia, for the Republic, and for Spain."[138] The *Esquerra* then ostracized the paper, questioning its loyalty to Catalonia by calling it *"españolista,"* and its socialism by referring to its staff as "lordlings (*senyorets*) of good upbringing who talk a lot about the workers, but they have never worked in their lives."[139] To these taunts, *L'Opinió* replied that it would prove itself to be "more catalanist than anyone," and urged armed uprising against Spain. The Spanish patriotic and unitarist left lashed out against the impending *Estatut*, people on all sides referring to the "two separatisms," Catalan and Spanish. Republicans like the philosopher Miguel de Unamuno declared that they would rather see "before the *Estatut*, a civil war!"[140]

Amidst all the violence, the *Estatut* passed in the *Cortes* on September ninth, 1932[141] and through the *Generalitat* of Catalonia on October fifth.[142] It established an autonomous Catalan state, and permitted future expansion to include other Catalan-speaking regions such as the Valencian Community, the Balearic Islands, and even Catalan enclaves within non-Catalan-speaking provinces.[143] A triumphant Macià declared: "We are already free!"[144]

Cambó, too, opposed the *Estatut*, feeling that it provided no where near the freedom of the *Mancomunitat*. "The *Mancomunitat*, for the veritable catalanists, was a concession of immense value, because it reestablished the material unity of Catalonia which was a great means by which to reestablish

her spiritual and moral unity." The *Generalitat* was a creation of a single party, and thus could hardly represent all the people of Catalonia, while at the same time it was the creation of a party based on hate.

> The Government of the *Generalitat* was not the Government of Catalonia because it was the Government of some against the others, it was the Government of a party against the interest and the convenience of Catalonia. We can say that the *Mancomunitat* was like a house with little façade and great foundations. The Generalitat had no more than a façade, and (it was) a façade designed by someone with deplorable taste.[145]

Although there had been no armed struggle, the Castilians viewed the *Estatut* as another manifestation of Catalan selfishness which had been imposed on Spain as if she had been defeated.[146] Rifts grew wider in the Republican government, which further destabilized itself by disastrously mismanaging the country and supporting gangs which terrorized ideological opponents. After anarchist agitation, the conservative coalition CEDA captured the polls in 1933, although a year passed before CEDA ministers were actually allowed to enter government. When they finally gained power, the rightists attempted to stabilize the economic and political systems by rolling back socialist measures. The Left responded by sponsoring unrest and insurgency to weaken the new regime. When the *Esquerra* passed in the *Generalitat* a sweeping land reform in Catalonia, the laws were overturned by the central CEDA government as unconstitutional even under the groundwork of the *Estatut*. In response, the *Generalitat* denounced the Spanish constitution, and on October sixth, 1934, Companys declared an independent Catalan State.[147]

The government put down the revolution by the next day and imprisoned its leaders. The Conservatives showed their commitment to Catalonia, though, by approaching the *Lliga*, the only important catalanist group not tainted by revolution, to try to salvage the region's autonomy

within Spain.[148] But Spain would not survive long enough, and politics in Madrid decayed further. By 1936, Spain had collapsed into civil war. Plans emphasizing the "vitality of the regions" might have regenerated Spain after 1898, as might have commitment to democracy by the Liberals who payed it lip-service but controled its outcome through *caciquismo*, and by Republicans who through their very name pretended they sought it but through their actions suggested they had little respect for those of differing opinions. Catalonia's *Mancomunitat*, halfway between centralization and outright independence, might have saved Spain, if all the politicians had accepted Cambó's attempt at concord. But Cambó's actions did not save Spain. Rather, they triggered the responses of the various leftist parties, which contributed to a destructive political polarization.

IV. A Wasteland Called Humanity:

Interpretations of a Roman past

"Sol::udinem faciunt, pacem apellant." -
Calgachus[1]

Humanism and the Enlightenment brought to the peoples of Europe increased self-awareness through the vocabulary of freedom and learning. Even the conservative forces which opposed the Enlightenment did not attempt to dampen this trend, but rather emphasized different connotations of the common vocabulary and looked to different historical figures for their inspiration. History reemerged as a scholarly discipline because, applied to the present, the past became a tool for crafting the future. Awareness of the past, however, resurrected problems that had seemingly disappeared centuries before. Although the Enlightenment insisted on the absolute equality of all men, the removal of pre-Enlightenment oppression permitted men to once again behave as individuals and to realize that they differed from each other much more than they had previously imagined.

History in the hands of men became a powerful tool that proved both important and dangerous. Sociologist Karl Mannheim has shown the power that ideology can wield over perception of history, and thus over its use: "All the conflicting groups and classes in society seek this reality in their thoughts and deeds, and it is therefore no wonder that it appears to be different to each of them."[2] Democratic debate can function, however, when ideologies, though different, have the same criteria for validity - "it is still assumed that it is possible to refute lies and eradicate sources of error by referring to

accepted criteria of objective validity common to both parties."3 Mannheim defined the common-use term "group ideology" as occurring when a group of people reacts similarly, given the same set of validity and then further agreement within the greater framework.4

The age and circumstances in which someone lives color his view of the world.5 The importance of a "universal validity" then emerged, one which supposedly took no side in the political debates but which accepted the tenets of democracy. Mannheim's critique here was that this concept, too, carried with it its own ideology - the *Weltanschauung* upon which it was based not necessarily common to everyone in any given age. The Parliamentarism of the nineteenth century had become a system which allowed for a number of these group ideologies to legally interact, all sharing one common set of truths, yet each holding its own opinion in the interpretation of other beliefs. The problem Mannheim here posited is his overall definition of ideology, that of doctrine of truths taken on by specific classes and groups that color their ways of viewing and interpreting truth in general.6

Most historians of the nineteenth century, and thus the politicians who drew from them, examined the Romans under the gaze of their own day - by this period commonly humanized - and, depending on their own stance towards contemporary events, they derived their own lessons. The "enlightened" drew their inspiration from the Golden Age of Rome under Gaius Octavius, called Caesar Augustus, an age of peace, culture, and the spread of *humanitas* throughout the known world. In response, those opposed to the enlightenment admired the world that Augustus had destroyed: the Roman Republic, individualism, and *libertas*. More recent scholarship has questioned the interpretations of the past century, and research has brought forth a new version of ancient reality, based less on

modern interpretation and more on ancient sources. Nevertheless, the importance classical Rome carried as an example for a reference in the nineteenth century was not what might have been reality, but rather the perceptions that people then had of Roman history. After the Enlightenment, wrote Mannheim, "the world as 'world' exists only with reference to the· knowing mind, and the mental activity of the subject determines the form in which the world appears."[7] Classical Rome had been a pillar of Western Civilization, and now Western Civilization superimposed its own concerns on the Romans to create roots in the ancient world for modern problems. While the citizenship had played an important role in Roman history, its implications, as perceived by nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century politicians, served as background material for the *Nationalitätenfrage*.

The study of Roman history grew particularly strong in Germany, where the "New Humanism" had developed in the eighteenth century, stressing a strong classical education rooted in interpreting ancient works.[8] From this tradition, Barthold Georg Niebuhr revolutionized the method of writing history. A scholar, he felt, should present history in the form of criticism, singling out what was important for the current day and looking for meaning outside the literal text.[9] Niebuhr and his disciples, including Wilhelm Drumann and the influential Theodor Mommsen whose history became the standard text across Europe, broke the ancient tradition of writing history as either uncritical transcription or rhetorical adornment of events.[10] Classical culture rose again as a background for modern people and events:[11] everyone looked at Rome for examples and precedents of their own values.

Englishman Edward Freeman, widely admired on the continent, devised his belief in the "Unity of History." The Revival of Learning, he felt,

had focused solely on the ancient languages, when History, instead, represented a single, continuous, and interrelated thread, meant for historians to compare and contrast.[12] His especially influential studies in ancient federalism served to elucidate the nineteenth-century debate. In Freeman's view, Rome, growing up in the ancient tradition of the city-state on a peninsula that nevertheless included many who still kept the even more ancient structure of the tribe, had to find new answers for dealing with its neighbors as it expanded, and thus developed a type of "federalism" distinct from the Greek example. In turn, facing new sets of problems, the Roman federalism could and would be adapted by others for new purposes, both in the contemporary period and into the future.[13]

Like Freeman, most scholars saw the ancient origins of the Roman city-state as the source of ideas for its solutions to later problems of expansion and binding new tribes and ethnic groups to it. Freeman's model - not now entirely accepted - was based on the Greek *polis* in which the city traditionally corresponded with the state - any extra-urban territory and conquest represented glory and prestige, not aggrandizement of territory and citizenship. Loyalty, then, extended only to the city and to no greater community.[14] In such circumstances, the full rights of citizenship could be equally extended, since citizenship implied living within the bounds of a small, homogeneous city - if the area grew too big, rights of citizenship would have become impractical - especially in democratic city-states such as Athens - and this factor controled both expansion and incorporation of foreigners.[15]

Rome, however, grew up on the plains of Italy, not amidst mountains or on peninsulae and islands like the Greeks or Phoenicians, and this influenced forever its concept of *civitas*, equivalent to but distinct from the *polis*. The Romans had a lesser concept of distinct identity from their

neighbors, on whom they also depended for security. Their only natural boundary, the Tiber, also served as an international trading and crossing point, bringing contact with other peoples. Racial mixing occurred early on, and shared customs and ancestors made them more accepting of others later.[16] As Rome's power grew, it could more easily incorporate the Latin peoples nearby because they shared a common culture, language, and discipline, but other city-states needed to undergo a period of Roman influence before the Romans invented some new way of binding them to its growing federation.[17] Also, sharing the Latin language and culture, the early additions could more responsibly contribute to the vote in Rome than those of distinct tongues.[18]

Rome never actually had a federal constitution; it was rather a city-commonwealth, that as it expanded, assumed federal elements.[19] It built itself up based on existing *municipes* (towns) which gradually gave up many of their rights of independence in return for greater incorporation into the citizenship.[20] Each *municeps* received its own treaty acknowledging its autonomy and binding it individually to Rome. This process kept loyalty amongst Rome's allies, made the allegiance one on the state level, and kept the interests of the allies apart from each other.[21] All states in any way dependent on Rome became, no matter at what level, Rome's *clientelae*, and as such received protection from the alliance while maintaining autonomy.[22] In the "Italian Confederation," the term in common use today, Rome did not start off as the official *hegemon*, but rather grew into the role *de facto*; since all treaties bound the allies to Rome, Rome became the military power which intervened against any state who attempted to break its treaty. The enemies of Rome became the enemies of all Italy.[23]

As its own strength grew and as its allies became more and more integrated, Rome's Empire began to spread across Italy, ultimately to engulf the entire Mediterranean. But, as Freeman saw it,

in all these stages we must bear in mind that the rule of Rome was in the fullest sense the rule of a city,[24] a rule of essentially the same kind as the rule of other ruling cities before and after. It was distinguished from the rule of Athens, Sparta, Carthage, Bern, and Venice only by the vastness of the scale to which the rule of the Roman city extended, and by the process, unparalleled in the history of any other city, by which the franchise of the ruling commonwealth was gradually extended to all its allies and subjects.[25]

In devising a system for classifying its clients, the Romans categorized them as *cives* (citizens) and *socii* (allies), each divided, for practical reasons, into three sub-categories. *Cives Romani* (Roman citizens) lived in Rome and its environs and held full rights; *cives Romani coloniarum* (Roman citizens of the colonies) retained their rights, but because they resided in Roman *coloniae* could not exercise them; and *cives sine suffragio* (citizens without the vote) lived in fully incorporated regions, had full civil rights - and were even governed directly by Rome, but had not yet received the right to vote or hold office. *Municipes Latini* (Latin townships), which included Latin *coloniae*[26] were the allies most tightly bound to Rome; *civitates foederatae* (federated cities/states)[27] which had full self-government, but were subject to Roman foreign policy; and *confoederati* (confederates) *de facto*, like those towns in Etruria, which were officially sovereign, but entirely dependent politically on Rome.[28]

Although many treaties came in the direct aftermath of a Roman victory, the allies did not enter the Empire as slaves, even though they lost, either in treaty or in effect, their sovereignty. They still preserved complete autonomy in local matters, and thus the trappings of their own statehood.[29] Because they relied on the protection by Rome from the Gauls, the Etruscans, still nominally independent long after Rome had incorporated the other Italic tribes, also became Roman subjects *de facto*.[30] Since the Roman Republic

demanded little more than military support in war and did not interfere with local administration except to uphold the *status quo*, Italians viewed Rome's hegemony as beneficial, protecting them in war and in wealth, and allowing them self-government.[31] The Republican Senate, in fact, distrusted direct or centralized administration because of the tendency it might produce for governmental corruption or tyranny.[32] Rome's main goal was to prevent any accumulation of power near or within its hegemonic frontiers, using allied commitments when possible, and annexing new territory only when absolutely necessary.[33]

And in the earlier stages, annexed territory often involved the new concept of *civitas sine suffragio*. With this, the Romans reduced the status of the population to that of its own resident aliens, giving the Romans a means to incorporate non-Latin states they did not wish to assimilate, and setting the example for future Roman incorporations.[34] *Civitates sine suffragio* gradually became *municipes civium Romanorum*, as Rome developed its decentralized system of local government that preserved the customs of the incorporated *municipes*. Those which entered the Roman state as fully developed city-states could retain their identity, while ceding citizenship to Rome. Although denied a role in the governing of the Roman *Res Publica*, they did keep their rights to the administration within their territory.[35] But by the middle of the third century BCE, the Romans had superceded *civitas sine suffragio* with the more benign sounding *"societas"* ("alliance") through *foedus* ("treaty"), which unlike earlier treaties was between cities of unequal status (Rome the dominant partner). The *socii*, therefore, had the same actual status, and were bound "to preserve the majesty of the Roman people."[36]

In defining modern terms, the concept of the Roman *foedus* played a central role. Duràn, in his treatise, wished to restore the concept in order to

undo centralization, seeing in the root of the Latin word the idea of "trust and faith."[37] Modern nationalists saw the Roman situation of this period as one of confederation, which Duràn defined as "equality between the contractant part... without distinction in the fundamental right to life, for their greater or lesser strengths and riches."[38] Since the Italian states had individual relationships with Rome, where their citizens lacked suffrage, many considered this, as it has passed into common reference, an Italian Confederation; but since all non-resident, non-suffrage citizens were, in actuality, equal under the Roman rule, and since the allied *municipes* had also effectively lost their independence, and had all become subject to the Roman state, Duràn and other regionalists preferred to consider Italy a federation.

The following centuries saw the near collapse of the federation, its necessary consolidation, Rome's rise to Mediterranean Empire, and ultimately, the destruction of the Republic in favor of the centralized and despotic Principate. During Hannibal's invasion at the end of the third century BCE, more than half of Rome's allies rebelled.[39] After the war, Rome purged Italy, and installed its own direct control until it had neutralized the dangerous situation. After this time, other Mediterranean peoples began to show confusion between the terms "Roman" and "Italian," as the former word stood for both.[40] In the eyes of foreigners, Rome had become the recognized sole state, to which all Italians belonged, whatever their actual ethnic origin.

The expansion of Rome in the second century BCE once again brought problems of annexation that the Romans tried to avoid through a new series of treaties. Most importantly, the Romans had to distinguish between the Hellenicized peoples of what would ultimately become the eastern half of their empire and the barbarians of the western half. In the west, Rome

expanded, pacified, and occupied, adding new provinces; in the east, it continued to bind other regions by treaty, adding provinces later as a last resort.[41] The cultured Greek-speaking world had organized city-states and kings, while the barbarians still functioned on a tribal system. Dealing with peoples they considered equally - or more - civilized, and who possessed a state easily bound in some manner to Rome, the Romans acted with care. With anyone whom they did not respect, they "made peace."[42]

After the Romans took over - and later incorporated - Carthaginian colonies in Spain and Greek ones in Gaul, they used them as bases for gradual expansion for the benefit of Rome. In the East, they left the peoples alone except to preserve peace and maintain hegemony. When they first subdued Greece in 196 BCE, they intended to leave it "free," bound to Roman influence, but with minimal intervention. The Republic, indeed, prided itself for liberating the Greeks from the tyranny of kings, and broke Greece back down into component, monarch-free territories, governed by their own people and their own laws.[43] But "freedom" in the sense of sovereignty gradually merged to the status of "freedom" as held by the *foederati* elsewhere.[44] Only a Greek resurgence brought the Roman armies back in the middle of the second century BCE. By the end of the Achaean War (146 BCE), the Greeks had become absorbed to the point of having the same essential status as the Western provinces.[45]

Unlike the western subjects, however, the Greeks did exercise increasing cultural influence over the Romans. In the west, Rome knew it was the superior power culturally as well as militarily, and thus went about establishing *coloniae*, either of its own or of Latin citizens, within its conquered territories in order to bind them more firmly to Rome, and to provide a base for spreading *romanitas*.[46] As some, like the German Wilhelm

Ihne, pointed out, many peoples, especially those Italians not-too-distantly related, ultimately adopted, with little struggle, Latin and Roman culture not just for use within the Empire, but also for use at home. Like the "lesser" nationalities of the centuries to come, they took on the forms of the "greater" nationality that absorbed them. But even Ihne admitted that the often enormous numbers of Roman settlers had displaced the original inhabitants, and that the new *coloniae*, which later became *municipes* in their own right,[47] actually had more in common with Rome than the people whose land they occupied. The original peoples held out until the second century BCE.[48]

Mommsen affirmed the attempt by the Republican Senate to uphold the distinction between what he called "nationalities" in their policy towards the allies. Although they dealt with everyone in the west equally in Latin (as *Staatssprache*), the Romans in no way wanted to make everyone they conquered a Roman, except in recognition of the state.[49] Nevertheless, to make names for themselves, many foreign families migrated to Rome. As an element of the ancient Roman nobility became caught up in the growing corruption and demagoguery of the late Republic - most notably the dictator Gaius Iulius Caesar - the *novi homines* ("new men") of the provinces took up the defence of the aristocracy, of the Republic, and of *libertas* (of the arch-conservative politicians, Marcus Tullius Cicero was a Volscian, Marcus Porcius Cato was a Latin).[50] But these last men, considered conservative in their own day, lived at the end of an era; distinctions still existed until the first century when they lived, but the process of the Republic's destruction completed the romanization of Italy. Only study of the period between Rome's ascendency to the role of sole Mediterranean power and the beginning of the Principate could disclose how strong the Italians felt their ethnic identity. With limited records either surviving for or known to the

historians of the last century, they were left free to interpret. Those who looked for the *Nationalitätenfrage* that then existed in Europe found their echo in classical Italy.

At no point in the last century of its life was the Republic a stable government. Demagoguery and corruption grew, and the *Populares* (the Roman senatorial equivalent of a left-wing political party) agitated for reforms that would benefit the Roman masses at the expense of the *status quo* - the Republican system, the upper/middle class, and the Roman federation. Faced with developments in Rome that concerned them but over which they had no say, the Italians began to reconsider the status of their citizenship and their exact relation to the Roman City.

The two brothers, Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, who each served as Tribune of the People (in 133 and 123-122 BCE, respectively),[51] first stirred the debate with inflammatory populist rhetoric and even armed disturbance. They were determined that the Empire should exist purely to benefit the Roman populus, and therefore the wealth of the provinces should be reapportioned among citizens of the Roman city.[52] "Tiberius Gracchus," Cicero wrote, "stayed with the citizens and disregarded the rights and treaties of the allies and the Latins."[53] Tiberius Gracchus first developed, against conservative opposition, extensive plans to romanize the provinces by transplanting Italians, which would also reduce the number of non-Romans living in Italy.[54] Meanwhile, Italy would undergo massive agrarian reform.

Roman conquest overseas had reduced the need for Italy itself to produce, and much arable land been converted for other specifically money-making purposes. Wars abroad also removed many of the ablest men from the land, leaving much more untilled.[55] Tiberius Gracchus, then, suggested transferring the farmlands to the Roman *plebs* (underclass) to use for

agriculture rather than capitalism.[56] When the heirless king of Pergamum died during Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate, he left his kingdom to the Roman *"populus."* Gracchus interpreted the bequeathal as to the Roman *plebs,* and proposed the pillaging of the new province to provide for the Roman underclass, opposing the Senate which, as the traditional legal government, had reserved the right to decide the fate of new territory, which customarily meant leaving the cities free in the sense of local administration, and bound to Rome by treaty.[57] Tiberius Gracchus, as the Tribune of the People, received the royal diadem, leading to allegations that he intended to use his political position to further regal intentions, certain political suicide in anti-monarchy Republican Rome.[58]

Closer to home, the Gracchi proposed enfranchising the Italian underclass as well, and thereby to profit from their votes: Latins would receive full suffrage, and Italians partial voting rights.[59] The move would also place all of Italy under direct Roman control, leveling local autonomy. Italian leaders objected to Roman meddling in their internal affairs and appropriation of their property for (ethnic) Roman citizens.[60] The Senate opposed these measures, and ultimately voted down the younger Gracchus' attempt, the conservatives arguing that too great an electorate in the Roman city government would only become unwieldy, and that the new system would require too much centralized interference in local administration. Interference in the provinces had already begun to lead to corruption, mismanagement, and personal aggrandizement on the part of unscrupulous governors, which activity offended the moral sensibilities of the conservatives.[61] First one, then the other Gracchus was defeated. Armed and surrounded by their personal gangs, both Gracchi met violent deaths at the hands of pro-Republican forces.

While the Gracchi did not succeed in implanting their reforms, they did irrevocably weaken tradition by their blatant disregard for its laws, and by setting an example for future leaders with despotic intentions.[62] This deteriorated situation in Rome left the allies searching for a more defined relationship. Many simply wanted a form of full franchise in the Roman State, a move which showed no lack of respect for the sovereignty of Rome, and which was proposed by Romans of across the political spectrum. The Latins, living nearest Rome and having the same language and culture, pushed hardest for this integration. Other groups, however, mistrusted the central government, and feared that complete integration would cause them to lose their own autonomy. Speaking different languages and coming from different ethnic groups, many other Italic races did not want incorporation at the expense of federation. Etruscans and Umbrians, satisfied with federation, merely wished to strengthen the treaties to keep Roman popular politics from infringing on their local rights. Some of the southernmost peoples, however, like the Samnites and Lucanians - no longer by this period threatened by foreign attack as the northern regions were - suggested independence if Rome could not satisfactorily guarantee their rights.

Roman Republicans considered enfranchisement to preserve the diversity of the state; but when enfranchisement meant enlarging the popular assemblies, they feared that they would become too large for effective government, and would also entail more of the mob violence that had lately accompanied such assemblies.[63] Many Italians realized the Roman concerns, and began to despair of a solution.[64] In response to thousands of Italians illegally enrolling themselves on the Roman voting lists, the Senate passed a law that would remove their names and leave them open for prosecution. [65] This action by the Senate, combined with a failure to effectively resolve the

question of land redistribution, irked the allies, who disdained of a solution. When a last attempt at addressing their grievances failed in 91 BCE, the situation collapsed. By 90 BCE, convinced of the decay of the Republic, the allies, who merely wanted to assure themselves freedom of oppression, had revolted. They had helped Rome grow to Empire, and now felt abandoned.[66]

The early part of the Social War saw virtually complete allied dominance. The allies set up their own capital at Corfinium, which they renamed Italica. While their institutions were modeled directly on those of Rome, they were even more federal. Senators represented all of the constituent *municipes*, which retained control over their individual affairs. The only important difference between Italica and Rome was simply that Italica the city existed only as the capital of a federation, and its own local government had no control over Italy like Rome's did.[67] The successes of the allies encouraged the more radical elements in the loyal regions. The Etruscan and Umbrian aristocracies had hoped to continue the *status quo*; now the lower classes had a chance to rise up if they supported the Italians who seemed certain of victory.[68] To retain any allies who had still not rebelled, the Romans extended the citizenship by the end of the first year. Since these communities were already predisposed towards full citizenship, the new laws succeeded in stemming the spread of rebellion.[69] At this point, Rome offered citizenship to anyone - community or person - who gave up the revolt, hoping to break the new federation. But this plan backfired, because these groups did not want to enter a centralized Roman state. Now the moderates who had merely fought against Rome to preserve a federal Roman Italy became torn between centralization on Rome's terms or federalization on the rebels'. Faced with this decision, rather than break the Italian federation, they fought even more determinedly.[70]

On top of the already dire circumstances of the Social War, Rome's enemies abroad took advantage of the discord to attack the Empire; partially due to disputes over who should take up the prestigious foreign command, Rome itself broke into its own civil war as factions loyal to two generals with their own despotic tendencies clashed. The mean-spirited Lucius Cornelius Sulla, backed by the *optimates*, marched on Rome when the *Populares* transferred his command to the elderly *popularis* Gaius Marius, before heading abroad with his legions. Marius and his allies, who had fled Rome, went into open rebellion. Accepting the demands of some allies, the Marian camp hoped to fill out its ranks.[71] Trying to neutralize this ploy, the *optimates* also offered enfranchisement. But the Samnites, whose forces had secured the entire southern half of the peninsula, held out. The action returned to Rome, where the aristocratic forces had to defend themselves both against Marius' insurgents and against the approaching Samnites.[72] Rome fell to Marius, who massacred its loyalist Republican inhabitants, including the Roman Consul.[73] But Marian control of most of Italy, gained with the aid of loyal Italians, brought about complete enfranchisement, and all but the most determined Italians rejoined the Roman state. Marius died in 86 BCE, and his son, also Gaius Marius, succeeded him.

But after years away settling Rome's foreign concerns, Sulla returned from the east in 83 BCE with his battle-hardened army. Fearing that a Sullan triumph would deprive them of the citizenship they had won from Marius, some Italians switched into his camp, and with them he formalized their new status into treaty.[74] The following year, the tide indeed did turn, and the younger Marius was routed with his Samnite allies. The Samnites, in one last daring effort, marched on Rome, taking Sulla off guard. In the bloody battle that ensued before Rome's Colline Gate, the last important Italian rebels

were defeated,[75] allowing Sulla to begin his reconsolidation of Italy. The peninsula would never recover, as Sulla ordered the purges of anyone suspect: wealthy aristocrats, Marian supporters, whole rebel communities; the confiscated wealth went to support Sulla's army.[76]

Like Francisco Franco in twentieth century Spain, Sulla as dictator turned against many groups he had pledged to support, purging them with his enemies. Although he had previously signed treaties guaranteeing the rights of the allies, he cancelled all of his promises because some of them had still supported Marius. He subjected all to the central control of Rome. "Sulla could not forget," Ihne wrote,

> that the aim of the Italians had been a secession from Rome on a grand scale, and the establishment of a confederacy that would have been a rival state in Italy, and a splitting up of the Roman dominion in every part of the empire. He remembered that in the heat of the final struggle they had marched upon the capital, and had vowed to exterminate the Roman people. Now the time was come when he could turn the tables upon them, and he did not shrink from the awful thought of sacrificing whole nations to the greatness of Rome.[77]

During the aftermath of Sulla's victory, Italian ethnicities lost their distinct characters, as their cities were destroyed and their territories forcibly romanized, partially through the Gracchan policy of colonization.[78] Everyone now received the franchise, but all on equal, Roman terms, just as Franco had made - or, attempted to make - all Spaniards into Castilians. Sulla reorganized the Republic and gave it a new constitution, which he passed on to posterity when he retired his rule. He had hoped that by restoring order and equalizing the Roman citizenry, he could salvage the Republic and the Empire. The latter element he did preserve; yet even though he tried in his brief dictatorship to restore the former, the decade of war and despotism had done too much damage.[79]

Since the early part of the twentieth century, as methods of history have changed, many scholars have put nationality into doubt as a paradigm

for the Classical world. They have pointed out the willingness of many foreigners to come to Rome and adopt Roman language and culture throughout ancient history. The only group to withstand romanization was that of the Greeks, in part because of the great admiration Romans had for the Greek culture.[80] Nationality was never an issue; people only distinguished between the civilized and the barbarians. Hellenism spread even in Rome, and the truly cosmopolitan spoke both languages even before numerous Greek-speaking subjects entered the Empire. In the West, Rome subdued barbarians, who, though they knew they shared more in common with each other than with the invading Romans and often rallied around that idea, never escaped primitive tribal tendencies. Rome brought a welcome culture.

Previous historians did not necessarily accept this paradigm. Mommsen[81] saw Rome's subjection of Italy as macro-nationalism, resisted only by silly Italians who clung to remnants of defunct cultures. Freeman, whose work on later ages showed great affinity for micro-nationalist groups, sympathized with the Italian allies in their struggle. Widely read throughout Europe, the work of these authors influenced how Europeans viewed Roman history. And even when these historians did not present a defined point of view, politicians, looking for examples in classical history, would read meanings into the text. Cicero, writing after Sulla but before Augustus, hoped to return to the format of the old Republic, and his conservatism became the inspiration for European conservatives. Augustus, ushering in the Golden Age of *humanitas*, restoring peace and the semblance of republican institutions in his Principate, became the favorite of enlightened readers.

But whether nationalism played any role or not in Roman politics can successfully be overlooked. The death struggle of the Republic involved the future of *libertas*, both at the personal and at the administrative level. Cicero

and the Republicans placed the concept above all others, while their opponents preferred to favor the notion of equality. Since modern regionalists often stressed the greater importance of the regional autonomy over the dominance of any particular ethnic group within a state or region, *libertas* for them also became a crucial issue. And because of these beliefs, their opponents often accused them of not really representing the interests of their *Volk*, but rather of conservative capitalism.

V. Towards a Final Solution:

Regionalism under siege

The notion of *libertas*, to the Romans, implied the individual freedom of citizens, defined as the opposite of what it was not, namely slavery. It therefore paralleled the concept of *civitas*, which represented the freedom of the state. *Civitas* meant freedom from the *dominatio* of another government, much as *libertas* signified freedom from the *dominium* of a master. Having overthrown a monarchy early in its existence, the Roman Republic regarded the *regnum* (kingdom) as the ultimate of evil *dominationes*. But in taking power from their king, the Romans required a new concept if they hoped to maintain order, and hence they formulated *libertas* as the guiding ideal of the state, establishing freedom as the quintessential trait of its citizens.[2]

The great upholder of traditional republicanism, Cicero was careful to distinguish *libertas* from *licentia*, however: freedom meant freedom from oppression, not freedom to oppress; too much freedom, *licentia*, brought anarchy.[3] "We set up laws around everyone so that we might be free," he wrote.[4] A fine line existed between allowing the people to be free without impeding their individual rights and giving them so much freedom that the state could not function and no one's rights would be protected; Cicero's treatise *De Re Publica* ("On the Republic") sought to find that balance in the traditions of the Roman past. The *Res Publica* itself literally meant the "thing of the people," and as such the people gave it its legitimacy.[5] Tyranny

provided stability, but trampled the citizens. "It is the situation that the eternal power, as well as justice and wisdom, of one man rules the safety, equal-rights, and leisure of the citizens. Yet they... who live under a king lack freedom, which is not that we serve a just master, but that (we serve) none."[6] Cicero asked, then, how such a system could be called a *Res Publica*. "When there is a tyrant [that is, a single ruler], we should not say we have an oppressive Republic... but it should be said that clearly there is no Republic."[7] On the other hand, Cicero feared the immediate removal of tyranny because of the anarchic backlash it would create in the people, as it had when Rome toppled its last king.[8] "Unlimited license," Cicero paraphrased Plato, "leads to the ultimate result that... (the people) begin to neglect the laws, so that they are equally without any master."[9] Almirall would reexamine this balance 1900 years later, placing his own theory of "particularism" between anarchic individualism and authoritarian oppression.[10] Cicero had tried to save a dying Republic by restoring traditional values; centuries later, when *libertas* surfaced once again as an important concept in Europe, its proponents sought to maintain order while creating a tolerant society of individuals, crafting it finely to prevent the destruction either of that society or of those individuals.

The Roman Republic had grown out of the ancient city-state, but had not assumed the Greek form of the *polis* - a system which had proven so crucial to the development of democracy - in which all citizens existed as equals, no one ever allowed a position of any sort greater than anyone else's. Cicero rejected this notion: the Roman Republic spurned *aequitas* in favor of *libertas*, what seemed to Cicero more fair and accepting of individual differences.[11] The same distinction would later appear between the goals of the popular French Revolution ("*egalité et fraternité*") and the independence-seeking American one ("Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness").

But in equating *libertas* with *civitas*, the allies, under Roman dominance, found themselves deprived of the freedom upon which the *res publica* was based; their attempts to win *libertas* did not require individual independence, but rather citizenship of some form,[12] even if that citizenship formed part of a new federation like the one established at Italica. As the Roman Empire grew, and the power of the Roman city rose with it, the allies increasingly felt the weight of Roman domination despite their supposed freedom, and this *libertas* became their warcry.[13] Cicero hoped, perhaps too late, to restore a Republic he saw as founded on the notion of *libertas*, and which had grown up ordered while respecting the rights and interests of all component groups.[14]

Extending full citizenship in the Roman *civitas* did not provide the freedom for the allies that they might have had in a more legal Roman federation, the Ciceronian *res publica*. In the aftermath of the Social Wars, Rome did not try to federate or take the individuality of the allies into account, but instead tried to invest in everyone the rights of the Roman city, leaving a phenomenon that Freeman has described as "an ungovernable mob," which could produce only magistrates from the central authority, corruption, and oppression.[15] Cicero felt this could only lead to the fall of the entire system.

> If habit and lawlessness begins to spread and changes our rule from one of justice to one of force, so that those who up to the present have obeyed us willingly are held faithful by fear alone, then, though our generation has perhaps been vigilant enough to be safe, yet I am anxious for our descendants, and for the permanent stability of our commonwealth [*res publica*], which might live on for ever if the principles and customs of our ancestors were maintained.[16]

Within Rome's larger imperial structure, with tensions already running high because of decaying politics, the Mediterranean Empire could either burst or become centralized, and it took the latter route. The Augustan Principate became a necessity to restore order and peace, but *libertas*, in its

turn, would disappear from civilization for nearly two millennia. Under Augustus, protege of the dictator Caesar, the Empire did indeed survive Cicero's foretold doom, only *libertas* did not. Revamping constitutional structures, Augustus claimed to restore the Republic, placing himself as its *princeps* (leading citizen).[17] He brought peace to Italy and brought the provinces fully under Rome's dominion, defending them from the "barbarians" in the name of *humanitas*, the cause of which he furthered both through territorial assimilation and through promoting the arts.[18] The Principate brought urbanization, modernization, and above all, romanization across the Empire, and the peoples who came under Rome's domination lost their rights along with their cultures.[19]

A historian living during the early Principate, Diodoros Siculus described the climate of the first century BCE: "All mankind was coming to form a 'common' civilization, a 'common' society, and... a 'common life' in the sense that the whole Mediterranean world was now interested in the same things and what benefited one nation was of common value to all."[20] Civilization, then, could have gone two ways: it chose the Augustan definition of *humanitas* based on one imposed Roman/Hellenistic culture.[21]

But Cicero had instead offered another, not equalizing but cosmopolitan, interpretation of this common civilization.[22] To Cicero, the Roman state had indeed grown to engulf other peoples, whose *municipia* became absorbed into the Empire. But on expansion, Rome allowed these peoples to maintain their local autonomy, whether based on a city or a tribal structure. An expert in constitutional law, Cicero in his legal writings needed to explain the apparent contradiction that did not permit any ancient - specifically any Roman - to hold dual-citizenship, yet allowed people to govern themselves despite their necessary allegiance to the Roman state.[23]

Hence he derived from Roman tradition the notion that everyone had two

patriae, corresponding to the region and the state of the modern politicians:

> I, by Hercules, think that he (Cato) and everyone from the *municipes* has two
> *patriae*, one by nature, the other by citizenship, just as Cato himself, although
> born in Tusculum yet received the Roman citizenship, so, although he was
> Tusculan by birth, and Roman by citizenship, he had one *patria* of birthplace,
> one of right.... But it is necessary to value that one more highly which with
> the name of *Res Publica* contains the universal citizenship.... And so I will
> absolutely never deny that my homeland is this one, while that one is greater
> which contains this one inside it.[24]

By its relation to the common needs of a larger and more diverse group

of people, Cicero argued that the state needed to retain the greater loyalties,

but he never advocated that people abandon their origins. Common destiny

gathered the peoples together, and together they needed to exchange culture

and politics for mutual enrichment and for order. Just as the Roman state

could never rise as high if it devolved into smaller states, so would it be an

injustice to destroy the freedom of its individual citizens, including the

removal of that half of their identity that represented their heritage.

Augustus imposed order, and many centuries later "enlightened" men

looked to his period of peace and arts as an ideal. Naturally, opposition to the

Enlightenment grew that looked to an even earlier period to examine what

the *Princeps* had destroyed. Regionalism was "rediscovered;" once again it had

to find a mean between central oppression and local fragmentation.

True, Cicero, like Augustus, preached his doctrine in the Latin

language; but that language had become the center of the Roman order, and,

with the exception of Greek in the East, the introduction of other languages by

the political center would only have resulted in mass confusion. At a later

date, Palacký would call such an outcome an impossibility, on one hand

because it would produce the effect of the Tower of Babel, and on the other

because it would be impossible for most people to learn all the languages of a

truly polyglot Empire. In the case of Austria, Palacký also rejected the notion of redrawing regional boundaries to reflect language boundaries, because of the mix (through settlement or otherwise) of different ethnic groups within the regions. Already extant, historically-determined regions could allow for government in the predominant language of the region, but must also recognize the *Staatssprache*. German, the language Palacký himself used for most of his political writings, he accepted as this *Staatssprache*, but in doing so he in no way implied a "German character:" rather an *Austrian* one, with German as the language of convenience.[25]

The German-Austrian conservatives agreed - as Bauer unhappily admitted - stressing the economic unity of *Mitteleuropa*, Habsburg leadership, and a foil against the socialist tendencies of Germany. The Austrian *bourgeoisie* "wanted to develop the German language and a good piece of singularly German culture away from itself: its feeling was rather Austrian, not German; not the depraved Germany, but the people-rich (*völkerreiche*) Austria was its fatherland."[26] These people expressed their belief in ethnic origin only as a part of an individual's identity, much like Cicero had written. More important was the unity of the state, so that everyone could live his own life as part of whatever ethnic group. The state itself should have no specific ethnicity, only freedom of identity for all groups and individuals.[27] The *Donaumonarchie* must not be German, nor, for that matter, Magyar or Slavic, rather "Austrian."[28] "Only then," wrote an Austrian federalist, "can someone in Austria... when asked for his 'nationality' give the reply that he belongs not to one nor another nationality, but that he is 'Austrian.' That answer sounds so patriotic!"[29]

Micro-nationalist critics have found problems with the ability of such polyglot states to function, however. Bofill i Mates could clearly see the

difference between the state and the traditional hegemonic *Volk*, but used that difference merely to doubt the viability of the state as a federal one, because loyalty should go first to the *Volk*. "It is necessary to distinguish between Spain and Castile," he wrote of his own peninsula. "Nevertheless, (it should be) understood that it is unreasonable to place the love for Spain above all the other loves, like those for Castile... or for Catalonia."[30] The problem with the Old Czechs, Bofill's friend Rovira pointed out in his *History of Nationalist Movements*, was that they participated in the central government - even worse, that they formed part of the governing coalition. This signified a "moderate character that disgusted a great part of the (Czech) patriots."[31] Here Rovira defined patriots merely as those who would settle for no less than complete local independence; in making this reference in 1913, he could by comparison attack the participation of the *Lliga* in the Madrid government, and anticipate what would to him seem the unspeakable: that Cambó himself would soon become an important minister in that government's cabinet.

Bauer, a socialist who argued for micro-nationalism when it suited his convenience, also felt that the Danube-area had too great a mix of peoples to form a successful polyglot state. For historical-political reasons, though, the "ruling class" (*Herrenklasse*) had adopted German, thus reinforcing the oppression of the *geschichtlose* peoples, who now needed to rise up against linguistic as well as economic hardship.[32] Since German was a "sign of distinction," Rovira interpreted its use by the Czech aristocracy and *bourgeoisie* to show that they were not merely not nationalists - in the sense that anyone showing concern for his *Volk* was, for Rovira, a "nationalist" - but that they were actively *anti*-nationalist.[33]

Austrian federalists however did not always equate this "assimilation" with loss of identity. It was, rather, crucial for the state to function, and for

the assorted groups of the Empire to maintain mutual respect. If they could not work together for their common "Austrian" culture, one which accepted and included the individual cultures, then, thought Austrian federalists cynically, the Empire might as well employ forced segregation and confine the racial groups to their own areas apart from one another.[34] A non-nationality-specific state could preserve everyone's identity; independent, these micro-nationalities could never survive. A Catalanist explained in 1900 that

> placed between two powerful *Völker* and at the extreme of Europe (Catalonia could never survive independent). Studying the conditions of each of the peoples that compose the "Spanish Nationality" (*nacionalidad española*), it (should be) admired... the harmony that results in the counterposition of diverse qualities, that complement one another and would make for a complete harmony the day that none predominates over the others. To separate them... or give preponderance to one would be to produce... an illness of the entire organism.[35]

The events that had led to the settlement, composition, and formation of the United States served as an example. Everyone who came to America assimilated *de facto*, never *de iure*. A federal system provided for the devolution of power, yet the regions (in this case called "states"), did not themselves have specific ethnic identities, but were mixed. Hence, everyone retained his identity, but at the same time, everyone was "American" and formed a part of that culture.[36] Strong federations, rather than having primary allegiance to the federated region, instead had a strong state unity, Duràn noted.[37] "The State is the society, in the juridical aspect, that gives order to the assemblage (*conjunt*) of the organisms that make it up in the framework of the liberty of their development."[38] Regionalists then saw themselves as regionalists of the state (e.g. "Austro-slavs") not as separate "nations" entitled to self-government either inside or outside their State.[39]

To the nationalists, this implied a denial of self-interest. If regionalists were truly loyal to the central government, it meant they had abandoned

their ethnic identity in favor of capitalist concerns.[40]   For economic development, Cambó's regionalism looked inward to Iberia, and his opponents responded that Catalonia would be better served looking outwards towards Europe. The reasonaby moderate micro-nationalist Bofill anticipated by over half a century a "United States of Europe," in which, in his model, each ethnic group, independent of its former state, would form part of a greater European confederation of peoples.[41] But because of often unclear ethnic boundaries and loyalties, nineteenth-century Europe, with new states forming and others decaying, had to face questions as to how it should draw boundaries. An economically practical scheme would have crafted states around natural units - such as Iberia or the Danube - each further divided into ethnic regions, which, in turn, would guarantee the rights of groups that made up minorities within these regions.[42]

That areas of ethnic settlement did not correspond with historical regions most bothered critics of regional federation. Bauer, arguing that the ties between the proletariat should make ethnic origin secondary in the end, admitted "national" socialism, but only because he attributed the reawakening of many of Europe's peoples to their awareness of ruling class oppression. Once they had used nationalism to free themselves, they should realign with their proletarian comrades.[43] Strict micro-nationalists disagreed, arguing against cooperation with other groups. Rovira criticized those who restricted themselves to merely their own region, when many of the same nationality lived outside: thus the Old Czechs should have not been a Bohemian party, but should also have concerned themselves with predominantly Czech Moravia as well as with Silesia (where 150,000 Czechs lived, out of a population of 850,000 Czech, Polish, and German speakers).[44] This was also his critique for the *Lliga*: true catalanists, as Catalan micro-

nationalists thought, included the Valencian Country, the Balearic Islands, and even Roussellón and Andorra in their "*Catalunya.*" Seton-Watson saw as the weakness of regionalism precisely the fact that it did not try to rally larger areas around its cause - the lands of a single *Volk* should remain one unit.[45]

These men had picked up some of the regionalist language and carried it to an extreme. To argue their cases for regional autonomy from a centralized faceless government, regionalists had stressed their individuality as purely natural. The state itself had formed as a contract between different men for their mutual benefit, not the subjugation of one by another. "A *res publica*, therefore, is a 'thing of the people,' but the people, however, is not any collection of men somehow put together, but a collection of groups allied with an agreement of justice and with a sharing of advantage."[46] Cicero's definition reemerged. "The State is a political entity, artificial and voluntary; the *Patria* is a historic community, natural and necessary. The first is the work of men; the second is the fruit of the laws that the Almighty has imposed on human generations."[47] Prat made the distinction, but he did not make a rupture. Yet Prat's micro-nationalist followers credited him with taking the biggest step by speaking of "nations" and "nationalism," even though he himself used the terms strictly to support regionalism.[48]

Prat explained, however, that he did not like the term "region," simply because it implied subordination, when he really insisted on equality.[49] Liberty, which had been most important to Almirall, should not, in Prat's opinion following Cicero, become absolute, so as not to impede upon others. Instead, he stressed "social coexistence:" equality, but not uniformity.[50] He was careful to distinguish between "nation" and "state," redefining the former term to mean "people," and the latter to refer to a political

organization such as Spain. Catalonia, with its own language, code, art, spirit, character, and worldview, qualified as a nation.[51] Yet too many people, he cautioned, used "nation" to signify independence.[52] Prat saw this micronationalism as regression, breaking the state down into smaller "clan" components that civilization had spent centuries of social progress to eliminate.[53]

Cambó, picking this theme up, warned that an independent Catalonia would have nowhere to go. France would not ally itself with Catalonia, because that might inspire irredentism in Catalan-speaking Roussellón. He offered a comparison with Portugal, which, ever since it had separated from the rest of Iberia, and especially since it had split from its Gallego kinsmen, had been in worse shape even than the rest of the peninsula. Only within Spain could Catalan culture survive.[54] Despite all the debate, until 1898 many Catalans were unsure that their protests could become effective. One moderate wrote of Prat's group that

> they want to create a great press, to conquer Catalan opinion, to organize our people politically, to invade the governments of the municipalities (*ajuntaments*) and the provinces (*diputacions*), to promote the literature, the art, and the wealth of our country, to transform, in a word, Catalonia; and this so quickly, so quickly, perceiving everything during such a long way in so little time a future like a Mediterranean Belgium. A Dream! A beautiful dream! But they think it possible; and I cannot admire and applaud more this optimism.[55]

Almirall's tract *Lo Catalanisme* laid much of the groundwork. To avoid confusion of vocabulary, Almirall termed his system "particularism," stressing the importance of tolerance, liberty, and democracy. Particularism would accept whatever system of government the people freely chose so long as it maintained all the guarantees of a simple state with the mutual respect and tolerance of many groups.[56] A particularist Spain could even maintain its monarch if it chose to, allowing the king to serve as a figurehead for a united "composite state" (*l'Estat compost*).[57] Cambó would later pick up these

sentiments, arguing that a monarch not specifically affiliated with any group would be the most effective symbol for keeping the loyalty of all the different groups.[58] Both admired the example of the Austrian Empire, in which the Kaiser served as the head of state and the central link for all the diverse nationalities, which coexisted as equals within a greater Danube federation.[59] "The program of Catalanism in all its manifestations," Almirall explained, "cannot be more than to break the chains that hold our Region bound and subject, substituting for them the soft and sweet bonds of brotherhood."[60] Catalonia's internal government, according to Almirall, must also remain open and itself recognize even smaller subdivisions.[61] Almirall acknowledged his debt to the American Declaration of Independence, which recognized that from time to time different groups would differ in opinions, and the subject group might need to remove the controlling power that oppressed it.[62] While he agreed with the Declaration's sentiments, he stressed that he did not support independence but rather regionalism within Spain.[63] This regionalism he defined as "a system complete and harmonic in organization within Spain, (in which) we require that all the regions that form it aspire to the same ideals that we do, and all seek to accomplish their aspirations together."[64]

While separatist tendencies did circulate in Catalonia in the nineteenth century, they did not receive nearly the support of the regionalists who sought a solution within the Spanish state. Madariaga pointed out the recent historical trend towards federation and absorbtion of small states into larger ones, such as in Britain into England, Germany into Prussia, and Italy into Sardinia. These mergers did not destroy cultural distinctions, but rather reinvigorated them. Micro-nationalism, which Madariaga classified as "negative" nationalism, ran counter to historical tendencies and to the

"positive" nationalism of patriotism towards the greater state.[65] Madariaga viewed separatism as the easiest way out of the collapsed Spain of 1898,

> but the true path, the strongest one, the toughest one, is the one that tries to construct a Spain through a common effort of all Spaniards. The differences of character, of style, of point of view are within a civilized country not negative forces that lead to civil war or separation, but instead positive tensions that enrich the internal life. Spain is rich in such tensions.[66]

Cambó too later responded to the separatist tendencies of his Catalan nationalist rival Rovira. Yes, Cambó agreed with Rovira, different areas of Spain were different, but they had grown together through history, and now had a linked interdependence. Yes, he agreed again, Catalonia had formed a separate entity with a Mediterranean outlook, but history had intervened, and now Catalonia should use its vitality to further Spain.[67] Almirall had inspired this logic, that a common history linked both groups in a natural partnership;[68] he continued to admire the formation of the United States, which he said "have found the solution sought for in the particularist system and useless under unitarism, and it has followed as well what in the very heart of Europe some small groups have obtained the same advantages through the same path as the American Union," namely a destruction of organized varieties, establishment of a free republic, and the setting up of a composite state, meaning an association of various simple states.[69] Such a system, despite its apparent internal contradictions and counterpositions, would better preserve itself and its people, meeting Cicero's definition of "Republic." The Lliga in an official document of March 1916 declared that

> the maximum of cohesion coincides with the maximum of federalism. (Austria, for example, has) more parliaments, more legislative assemblies than all the other states of Europe combined; as many legal, civil, and administrative regimes as provinces; almost as many official languages as languages spoken within its borders.

This, the regionalists said, marked a well-run state.[70]

The conservative federalists agreed. Maura, when he tried to break corruption and the *caciques* that ran Spanish politics always insisted, like Cicero, that a government can only exist with the consent of the governed, and this included recognizing the desires of individuals for their identities.[71] The people needed to find a new political spirit, to be themselves while at the same time seeking a consciousness of higher loyalty.

Napoleone, who had played an important role in the spread of reawakening to the peoples of Europe, himself started out as a Corsican nationalist. He had followed Pasquale Paoli, the Corsican leader who first fought against the centralization of the French Bourbons who had bought the island from Genoa in 1768 and then, after the French Revolution, had radicalized against the renewed centralization of the Jacobins. Buonaparte, who never lost his Italian accent when he spoke French, had also embraced the ideals of freedom preached by the early French Revolution, and broke with Paoli because the latter had turned permanently away from France. Corsica, to Napoleone, was a part of France no matter how recently that historical accident had happened. To him, the French Revolution, initially, proposed liberty, and that meant liberty for all, no matter where they lived or what ethnic group they belonged to. He stepped in to restore order to the deteriorated French state, and from there spread his message across Europe.[72] Napoleone was no nationalist, and although his actions led to increased nationalism throughout Europe, he himself never embraced the doctrine; to him, as with many other anti-nationalists, all of civilization was interdependent. Nationalism cut a people off from outside influence with the goal that this *Volk's* culture could perfect itself.[73] Whether macro-, demanding conformity within the state, or micro-, seeking separation to develop on its own, nationalism equalled chauvinism.[74]

Socialism, as it would develop to emphasize the role of the international worker, inherited parts of both arguments. Yes, the whole world was dependent on all the other parts thereof, in the sense that the workers of the individual states had more in common with each other than they did with the *bourgeoisie* of their own state; but, on the other hand, this meant denying their ethnic identities. The proletariat should use nationalism if it is a way of gaining power, but once in power should work to break down the difference between states.[75]

In fact, Bauer, in one of his more macro-nationalistic moods, blamed the rise of ethnic identity on a conservative plot. The conservatives, he claimed, wanted many differences between individuals to keep them separate and powerless. A "language of national unity" (*Nationaleinheitssprache* as opposed to *Staatssprache*) was crucial for solidarity and progress.[76] The Communist International adopted the jargon of the French, who had spread the term "*patois*" to refer to any non-French language, aiming to reduce the self-esteem of other linguistic groups.[77] Stalin, elaborating on Lenin's interpretation of Marx, hoped to use nationalism against a common capitalist enemy. Whenever these movements represented conservative interests, they should not be supported.[78] Marx himself had backed the Poles in Russia and the Magyars in Austria as "revolutionary nationalists" fighting imperialism, but he supported neither the Czechs nor the Southern Slavs, "reactionary nationalists" who had aimed at preserving the Empire.[79]

Writing about the Austrian Socialist Party, Rovira had remarked on the example they had set for merging nationalism and socialism. Regionalists, supposed spokesmen for the Austrian *Völker*, had adopted a stance intended to coincide with their federalist conservative allies in Vienna, in order to preserve, in Rovira's words, "the general solidarity of the

bourgeois interests." Thus, in this case, socialism began to address the radical nationalist as well as the social aspirations of the underclasses. As for the apparent conflict with international socialism, the Brünn Conference of the Austrian Socialist Parties[80] in 1899 clarified its goals as "national autonomy and international union."[81] Calling it "the monstrous multi-national Empire," one Catalan nationalist leader affirmed that this case only demonstrated how polyglot states hindered communication within the proletariat, keeping it divided, while the interests of the *bourgeois* market dominated governmental policy. The workers needed to achieve the break-up of these states first before joining the international workers movement.[82] Mere federation would not work as a viable solution because it would provide every region the same freedom, and this would not take into account that some groups like the Catalans had an identity completely foreign from the ruling people, while others, like the Andalucians, had become almost completely castilianized. These groups could not exist in federation because they were not parallel.[83] Rovira, though, applauded rising micro-nationalism elsewhere in Spain.[84]

But while Bauer could, in part, reconcile himself with the aspirations of the micro-nationalist socialists - in his model, the Czechs - he still asserted his own culture's superiority. Czech nationalism had arisen from a once-strong regionalism that had opposed the Revolutions of 1848 and had underscored the "natural inequality of men" (*natürliche Ungleichkeit der Menschen*). Bohemia in the mid-nineteenth century had become infused with capitalist interests, which explained why its radicals had such an audience within the growing working class for the principles of socialism. But worst of all, Bauer mocked, the Czechs most important in the so-called

"reawakening," Palacký included, had all written in German.[85] Bauer, in such passages, clearly had no tolerance for minorities.

The coincidence of nationalism and socialism would lead to Bauer's ideal unity of interests, and in such a way the two had to be compatible; thus Bauer stressed macro-nationalism when it served the workers' benefit. Bauer's "nation" resulted from the process of integration that had formed the modern state. Formerly, the state had been embodied purely by identification with the feudal and then proto-capitalist ruling classes. These had then dictated culture and identity to the people, and so created the *Nationalitätenfrage*. Breaking down what these classes had wrought - removing differences between the common men - became the goal of Social Democracy in light of the problem that Bauer, as an Austrian, faced, and needed to address even more than most of his political comrades elsewhere in Europe.[86] Occasionally he expressed his views in a manner favorable to micro-national assertions of autonomy, and at other times he appeared completely macro-nationalist and unitarist. But many of his ilk had tried to explain these apparent contradictions through the language of whatever happened to coincide best with the interests of the proletariat.

With either interpretation of socialism, however, the regionalists represented the greatest enemy. The left saw in them the agents of conservatism, not of ethnicism; for the micro-nationalists, they had placed this conservatism above any true loyalty to the people they proposed to represent, while for the macro-nationalists, they unnecessarily divided the people of their states in order to keep them under the control of the capitalist market. One radical catalanist said of their ethnicism that "they talk big from the opposition and become tame in power."[87] Characterizing Cambó as "not a realist spirit," Rovira accused the Catalan regionalist leader of lacking two

essential traits necessary for politics: a fixed orientation, and the ability to understand men and to grasp human realities.[88] These realities of Rovira essentially stated that the common man had two loyalties: to his nationality and to his economic class. The conservatism of Cambó denied both.

From the other side, the centralizing macro-nationalism felt threatened by regionalism. Primo claimed, after all, that he could not distinguish between regionalists, micro-nationalists, and separatist extremists - while they might speak in different terms, he felt they all essentially sought the same ends. "They wouldn't be good nationalists those who upon achieving the 'nation' do not seek to achieve the state."[89] Primo could not conceive of a polyglot state, so he merely suppressed all movements. Primo realized, a Catalanist newspaper reported, that

> the reconstruction from power of the region reinforces the personality, exalts the pride in differenciation between some and others; it is to contribute to the unmaking of the great work of 'national unity;' it is to initiate the disintegration for which there is always stimulus found in the pride or egoism of men.... The regional sentiment that, contrary to what it says that it is compatible with the great country, gallops frenetically towards nationalism and separatism.[90]

Regionalists defended themselves against these attacks, but in these historical cases, their attempts at reconciling dual-loyalty failed. "Don't believe that catalanism is (necessarily) separatist," a Maurist urged. "Catalanism is Spanish, nicely Spanish... by not considering it in this manner, we have had a thousand misfortunes, perhaps we have lost the possibility of many benefits."[91] After the failed revolution of 1934, the *Lliga* turned the tables on the micro-nationalists, publishing a condemnation questioning their ability to represent Catalonia. That the *Esquerra*, in the name of "worker alliance," had staged the revolt in Barcelona only, the *Lliga* claimed, rather hopefully, that it could hardly represent the will of all Catalonia. "This was not a catalanist (revolt), but purely a social one in the worst sense of the

word,... it would have to be one of the bloodiest days in the civil history of our land."[92]

Bloodier days would come, as the conservative regionalists had by this time no real power. On the stage here, as in Austria, only the micro- and macro-nationalists remained to fight the battle to the death. Although their stances on social issues often corresponded, they could never bring themselves to respect each other's identity. Regionalists, unhappy peacemakers, lost out to both of them. Austria lost its struggle for survival, leaving behind uncooperative and doomed successors. Spain won its struggle at the cost of an eternal scar and a dictator[93] who undercut the rights of all citizens; regionalists found themselves distrusted on both fronts: by the (macro-) nationalists who could not stomach their will to be different; and by the forces of the Left, who equated them with capitalist oppressors, every bit as much the enemy as Franco. When the smoke cleared after Franco, the Catalans had forgotten about Cambó and regionalism;[94] in Middle Europe, after the holocaust created by Hitler[95] and the tight reign and legacy of Stalin, nationalism, with racism and hatred, has risen again from the ashes, as it has recently elsewhere around the globe. The regionalists have offered *libertas*, but the world has mostly seemed too unconcerned to accept. While most men have embraced the concept of a pluralist society, few, in practice, have shown themselves willing to enact it. As the world today seeks a new order based on Freedom, it must first decide if the regionalist outlook on compromise can help it bridge the gaps that still separate not only individuals, but entire peoples.

VI. Conclusion:

Janus on the threshold

1989 witnessed the breakdown of communism and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Across this area of the world, most have looked to a new order based on the modern and democratic tradition of the West. However, the new political framework has allowed for nationalism to vociferously resurface, even from the very lips that have clamored for freedom. Western Europe has also not found itself exempt, and anticipation of economic union in 1992 has heightened anxieties over ethnic identities. The *Economist*, commenting on the shifting character of contemporary state identities, has noted how many of today's problems have arisen as a direct result of the fact that state boundaries rarely correspond with ethnic ones. One recent editorial painted a pessimistic picture of a new world order influenced by what it called "tribalism" or "chauvinism." This combination of basic human characteristics has proven, ultimately, a more durable basis for collective identity than any other notion.[1] Within the paradigm of "freedom" established in the post-Enlightenment, regionalists have hoped to use the forces of individuals for the benefits of communities. Yet without the consent of the individuals, government loses its legitimacy. When under threat, real or perceived, of an "other," people have naturally tended to group with those they think are most like them, and the consolidation of these groups has hardly led to mutual understanding. Nationalism has proven the most enduring (semi-)political force of the past two centuries, and along with economic questions that have sometimes coincided, it has shaped the

political spectrum. The *Nationalitätenfrage* remains unsolved, despite numerous attempts.

To begin to understand the question requires a definition of what the groups are and why they consider themselves as they do. Bauer offered an ideal-type definition of "nation" as a group composed of people who share: area of habitation, political voice, language, customs and practices, experiences and historical past, and laws and religion.[2] All of these, however, seemed to him impractical or inapplicable in most cases. In modern Europe, he felt - in his anti-micro-nationalist voice - that divisions between men were actually artificial: intermarriage had mixed many European races sufficiently to blur distinctions. Language as a criterion seemed arbitrary, since Danes and Norwegians, and Croats and Serbs each spoke the same languages, yet considered themselves distinct; the Jews had no language; and many German speakers chose not to consider themselves Germans and preferred not to live in Germany. And, in the end, the Germans had more in common with any other western society ("*Kulturnation*") than they had with the Germans described by the Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus.[3]

Living a century into the Principate, Tacitus himself lamented over the lost freedom of the Roman people, and to make his point he often contrasted the Romans with the "noble savage," the free barbarian. He purposefully picked his words to allude to the Republican period around the time of the Social Wars. Although much of his technique was purely literary, modern readers, predisposed to see nationalism as a primary issue, easily could find in his writings an early enunciation of their own values. That influential historians such as Mommsen used words like *Nationalität* even to refer to such relatively minor distinctions as existed in areas of the Italian peninsula only left readers more convinced of a direct connection. One sense, however,

justified the moderns: the original Latin word *natio* meant "tribe;"[4] when the Romans talked of *natiónes*, they did so using a word which had different connotations than it would in future generations. But, even defining "nationalism" based on the original definition of the root word, the result, quite ironically, is "tribalism," much as the *Economist* and many regionalists have hinted.

It would be anachronistic to argue that Tacitus considered even such a nationalism, but his literary methods did suggest collective identity and liberty. The Italians had, defending their revolt, called the Romans "despoilers of Italian liberty" (*raptores Italicae libertatis*), language Tacitus alluded to when he put into the mouth of a British general the description of Romans as "despoilers of the world" (*raptores orbis*).[5] Another Briton told his men that their struggle with the Romans would mark "the beginning either of liberty which should be recovered, or eternal slavery"(*aut reciperandae libertatis aut servitutis aeternae initium*).[6] Tacitus gave the term *servitus* both of its Roman connotations: one the actual bondage into which the Romans sold defeated barbarians; the other the state of those living under the Empire who still - technically - retained their freedom: those citizens of Rome oppressed under the depraved Principate; and those in the pacified provinces, who suffered from enormous taxes, military occupation, and the moral decay that broke down traditional tribal values.

The barbarian "nationalists" described by Tacitus often banded together to fend off the onslaught of Rome, although his own political message severely clouded his histories. He desired to contrast barbarian peoples who were willing to fight for freedom, with Romans who had become too morally corrupt to care about their own or anyone else's freedom and traditional values. Tacitus' "noble savage" had many of the characteristics of a Roman

Republican.7 In the provinces and border peoples, the Empire represented the same basic conflict as in Rome: a fight by a few brave men to maintain their *libertas* in the face of oppression and *servitus*. The Romans themselves had become by this time degenerate, yet their cultural and military superiority spread their *humanitas*. Although Tacitus' contrasting nationalisms were stylistic more than historical, post-Enlightenment readers concerned with such issues could easily read into his text their own problems. Enlightened macro-nationalists had adopted the Roman *humanitas* as described by the romanized Greek Publius Aelius Aristides: writing about a century after Tacitus, Aristides credited *humanitas* with having cleansed civilization of barbarism and extended high culture across the known world.8 Tacitus' noble savages inspired the micro-nationalists for how they sought freedom from Roman domination. But for the conservatives who also admired these barbarian leaders, the issues of tradition were at stake. Regionalists upheld the *libertas* of all under one free system, while most of Europe discussed the "nation," quarreling on its varied interpretations.

In the end, the issue becomes less one of specific differences, and more one of the right to be different. This the regionalists accepted, yet here they failed to grasp reality. Their micro-nationalist opponents accused them of not actually defending ethnic interests, but rather conservative or capitalist ones, given that their goals often corresponded. Micro-nationalists felt that *Völker* must have freedom of self-determination, while macro-nationalists, defining freedom by equality within the central state, tried to stamp out differences. Both types of nationalists have accused regionalists of placing conservative concerns above ethnic ones: true nationalists would hold their *Volk* identity above all else; obviously, in their thinking, other concerns must motivate regionalists. On this point, the critique was right. Even Cicero, the epitome

of conservative republican thought, considered the homeland as the fundament of the individual, but placed the state above all the homelands, because the state concerned everyone. Although Cicero, himself steeped in Greco-Roman culture, may not have considered ethnic origin important, his comments nevertheless would resurface centuries later. Besides, his philosophy concerned *libertas*, the central concept of conservatives of the modern democratic era. If regionalism as a movement was not ethnic by nature, as its opponents claimed, then it certainly carried the torch of conservative *libertas*.

Finding *libertas*, as Cicero noted, meant walking a fine line. Many conservatives, in the name of restoring order and tradition, have trampled certain individual identities: Metternich, Franco, and Sulla, to name three. Augustus' Principate adopted the vocabulary of the Republic to give itself legitimacy, while modern dictators like Hitler and Stalin have justified themselves based on the (assumed or even imposed) collective will of the people they have governed. In the second half of the twentieth century, capitalism and the world market have made international cooperation more vital, and where conservatives have sought cooperation, their enemies have accused them of selling out their people in turn for money. "They impose on us," radicals, as represented by Catalan independentists today, still feel, "integration... into a Europe submissive to the economic and expansionist interests of international capitalism."9 Marx denounced Palacký and his regionalists as mere tools of capitalism, and the appellation stuck with the regionalist movements that grew all over Europe, their ideology based on the Czech example. The industrialist leaders of the *Lliga* required a Spanish solution for Catalonia to provide them easy access to their market, while at the same time they did not want Madrid interfering with their business in

Barcelona. To express this concern, they used their ethnicity, and in doing so enraged the Castilian and Catalan populations.

But the Marxist view is too simplistic. Economics has played a role, but in the past two centuries nationalism has played as big a role as socialism, and has proven, of late, even more durable. With the break-up of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has come freedom; with this freedom, however has come racism: Anti-Semitism has run rampant, Bulgarians have continued to persecute Turks, Slovaks have called for independence while at the same time outraging Slovakia's Magyar minority, and Romanians too have renewed their hatred for the Magyars, even though the revolution that toppled their dictator was started by Magyars protesting ill treatment by that dictator. Prat had warned that mankind might regress to tribalism, and, in the *Economist's* terms, it already has. Certain aspects of human nature have seemed to withstand the test of time, and this disorganization has tended towards the decay and *licentia* that Cicero tried also to avoid.

To combat the innate qualities of man, *libertas*-seekers have generally accepted one means of organizing a greater state: federalism. Freeman defines it immediately in his influential work:

> Federal Government... is, in its essence, a compromise between two opposite political systems.... The name of Federal Government may... be applied to any union of component members, where the degree of union between the members surpasses that of mere alliance, however intimate, and where the degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses anything which can fairly come under the head of merely municipal freedom.... On the one hand, each of the members of the Union must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively.[10]

Freeman, like many federalists after him, makes no mention of ethnicity in his definition. Most important, as Cicero said above and others since, is that the *res publica* hold the highest loyalty, because it belongs to everyone. The

state should not concern itself with the individual identities, it should merely provide them with a place to be individuals, the federalists have argued, and by extracting ethnicity from the definition of government, they have hoped to overcome the equation of state with ethnic identity.

But the history of European settlement has often made such attempts difficult. A country called "Hungary" is not home to all Hungarians - many live in other places called "Romania," "Slovakia," or "Serbia." Yet when asked his nationality, the Hungarian living outside Hungary likely will say just that - that he is a Hungarian living in a foreign land. The words "Austria" and "Spain" imply geographical areas, and as such, federalists have argued for a concept of state broader than that of nationality. Admittedly, some contemporary pro-democracy conservatives have criticized regionalism, because they have felt that all parts of a state must feel bound by the same laws, and must give their loyalty to a single central government that makes and enforces those laws. With regard to regionalism, noted social scientist Juan Linz asks when the primary loyalty goes to the central government. In a democracy, he argues, "today's minority might in the future become a majority by convincing those in the present majority to agree with them.... The system is quite different in the case of ethnic, cultural, or linguistic minorities.... In fact, we should say that the principle of nationality... is not likely to lead to stable democracies."[11]

In principle, nationalism and democracy do not complement one another, but Linz has mistaken regionalism for a stage of nationalism. That regionalists considered themselves members both of their *Volk* and of their state, entitles them to claim dual-loyalty possible, as even the micro-nationalist catalanist political-scientist Isidre Molas has admitted.[12] Indeed, regionalist leaders themselves rarely convert to nationalism. But, historically

speaking, populations which feel antagonized by other ethnic populations have radicalized gradually, until nationalism has predominated. Federalism's "different forms occupy the whole middle space between two distant extremes," Freeman wrote. "It is therefore only natural that some of these intermediate forms should slide off imperceptibly into the extremes on either side."[13] Regionalism and federalism try to keep the extremes from antagonizing each other, while they develop the composite state. For the same reason, they emphasize maintaining historical regional boundaries, although these often do not coincide with ethnic boundaries.

The opponents of regionalism successfully placed doubt in the minds of the underclass about the movement's true motives, but in doing so lacked consistency, for example, in their definition of socialism as the goal of the proletariat. Socialism, the descendent of the values of the Left-Enlightenment, has stressed equality over liberty to achieve freedom, but has had two formulae for defining equality. Bauer, sometimes empathetic with regard to micro-nationalists, suggested "national unity," in preparation for future international solidarity, while unabashed hot-headed demagogues like Schönerer and Lerroux pressed their own radical breeds of macro-nationalism. Members of other parties with socialist inclinations, like the Young Czechs and the *Esquerra*, saw equality as a function of revolt against existing government, breaking the minority people away from domination by the central state's majority. Likewise, the two socialist systems presented two distinct capitalist enemies. One saw capitalism as looking for ways to break up the workers to keep them divided, while the other saw it in search of preserving a larger market economy. If some opposed to regionalism claimed they did so for socio-economic reasons, they had become confused as how exactly to define those reasons.

Classical Marxism tried to explain all history through economics, partially because Marx himself failed to grasp the complexity of human nature. Nationalism has proven more durable than he gave it credit for. Lenin accused many socialists of taking it too seriously, arguing that it was the mere by-product of - and discontent with - the human condition, and that therefore it really existed as a socio-revolutionary force. The ethnic group, he reasoned, was a false identity crafted by history, useful only if it furthered the international revolution.[14] The Austrian Bauer, while continuing socialist rhetoric, has nevertheless admitted a connection between micro-nationalism and oppression. Micro-nationalism grew out of the same concerns that socialism had: oppression by a certain conservative group; but he called for all workers, minorities, and people without money ("die die keine Geld haben") to unite for their freedom. Even so, the existence of macro-nationalism gave him empathy for the minorities struggling to combat it.[15]

Nationalism, then, exists as a negative force: it comes into being only to oppose some other group perceived as threatening: Until a "them" existed, there had been no "us."[16] Hence, after centuries without collective self-awareness, many languages and peoples of Europe reawakened. These began as non-political movements, but as the central states grew stronger and tried to return these groups to their former disregarded identities, the groups became political. At first, in some cases, they professed only regionalism, trying to reconcile their beliefs in *Volk* and *Staat*, if only, as a cynic might conclude, for "selfish" conservative reasons. The existence of conservative regionalism strengthened liberal macro-nationalism, and in turn, the existence of macro-nationalism polarized the popular minority groups to form micro-nationalists movements. Democracy, as Linz rightly suggested, could never take proper shape under such extreme conditions, although,

ironically, it was precisely the framework of freedom in democracy that permitted open debate.[17]

Duràn had argued that the only way for regionalism to function would be for all ethnic groups to pass their loyalty to a non-ethnic state. But this would never work, he argued, when the component groups feared each other, and used nationalism as a means to stress their superiority: either superiority to set the model for the central government or superiority to break away and develop independently.[18] An Austrian regionalist also proposed creating distinctions in vocabulary. The modern concept of "nation-state" - in which every state needed to correspond to a single *Volk* - he wanted to replace with "state-nationality," to get the population to think of its "nationality" not as its ethnic group but as its state citizenship. Then *Staatssprache* needed to supplant *Volkssprache*, if only *de facto*. Finally, people would begin to consider their mothertongue distinct from their nationality-language of convenience.[19]

This proved difficult in Europe due to settlement patterns in which boundaries correspond roughly but never exactly. Either Europe needed to find some resettlement plan to separate the ethnic groups, or it needed to accept its patchwork quality. Regionalists and Federalists acknowledged historical accident, and tried to forge a future based on the reality of the past; nationalists denied this possibility, and sought instead to build from the reality of human nature. Anything seen as different became foreign: peoples needed to be expelled or absorbed, or they needed to break free. Socialism, another philosophy that sought to wipe the past clear and start over, only made the regionalists' problem worse by placing their motives into suspicion. In the end, many historians looking at polyglot states have concluded that these states should not exist: they either need to be broken up, or the minority

element needs to be removed through assimilation or (in an extreme case when the *Volk* controls a nearby country) expulsion. Many have concluded that different *Völker*, once antagonism appears between them, cannot coexist.[20]

Duràn unhappily foresaw this problem, aware that the very existence of a macro-nationality meant that one people had at some time conquered another, and then followed the early-modern tendency towards crafting a large nation-state. This historical evidence, made it inherently difficult to accept the two or more peoples as equal within the state at a later date.[21] Most durable would be federations that had formed out of the voluntary union of the components.[22] The terms of federalism also had to carefully balance a manageable area, as the Romans had found out when they tried to extend their city-citizenship across Italy. Too vast a territory, especially with a legacy of imperialism, would include too many groups and complications. But the agreement of the component groups forms the key in all cases.[23] Freeman, in 1862, commented on Austria that

> long years of tyranny and faithlessness have produced a hatred of the central power which separatism alone can satisfy. But, were this otherwise, it may be doubtful whether a union of such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest terms, could ever satisfy the condition for a Federation of any kind.[24]

Indeed, once antagonism has begun, it has proven difficult to hold back polarization. The tyranny Freeman discussed: Metternich's absolutism, 1848 social revolutions, post-1848 crackdowns, and ultimately the new Liberal constitution, all assured that Austria would collapse half a century later. The regionalist Old Czechs and their allies tried to reconcile the different ethnic groups, but this engendered sharp agitation from the German-speaking Left, which in turn shifted the balance of Czechs into the Young Czech camp. By 1891, the compromise had failed. A similar situation would undermine

compromise in Spain. Although the *Mancomunitat* was enacted and had begun to fill many of its goals, tensions nevertheless increased. After 1918, when anti-Catalan demonstrations in Madrid caused the Catalan delegates to leave Parliament, Catalan separatism suddenly began to increase its credibility.[25] In 1923, Primo took power; by the following decade, Spain was embroiled in a civil war. Franco's dictatorship after his victory was responsible for holding Spain together, but even today, in democracy, some Catalans look away. Cambó's daughter has regretted how few people study today the works of her father: Catalans usually take the nationalist *Estatut* of 1931 as a reference, rather than examining the regionalist *Mancomunitat*.[26] The largest and most moderate catalanist coalition in contemporary Spain, Covergence and Union (*CiU*), looks not for a Spanish solution to the Catalan question, but towards a European one: Catalonia should form part of a European confederation of regions and their corresponding peoples, but should keep within the framework of its own nationhood.[27] This is still not the same as seeking regionalism at a continental level, but merely a cooperative form of micro-nationalism that will work with other peoples when productive and profitable, but which recognizes ethnic origin as a fundamental delineation between people, keeping them from working together within the same state.

Palacký decried this tendency towards "egoism;" unfortunately, even he recognized the trend in polyglot states towards either centralization or collapse into many small states.[28] Nevertheless, Palacký and others tried to craft new polyglot states: functional and federal. The "all-or-nothing" (*totoresista*) approach of nationalists was denounced, as Cambó characterized it, as destructive: "mine or no one's."[29] Micro-nationalists at first either did not exist in any strong numbers, or accepted regionalism as a stepping stone.[30]

The fear that many regionalists really were disguised nationalists frightened the majority even more, and did not help the regionalist cause. Other micro-nationalists ignored compromise altogether. Rovira, in his history of the Czechs in Austria, completely passed over the period leading to the *Ausgleich* as if no developments at all took place. Despite the efforts of regionalists of the nineteenth century, the only real path he considered for the Czechs, like the only one he considered for his people, was that of independence.31

So the regionalists, claiming that they accepted history as it had happened and that they sought to work within the parameters of reality to find a better system accused their opponents of idealism. Their opponents accused them of idealism, saying that they ignored the fundamental loyalty of man to *Volk*. The regionalists found a valuable ally, in the Austrian and Spanish cases, in the Conservative parties of the central government, parties which also sought to reform a system that had been shaped in the mold of the post-Enlightenment. While these conservative parties accepted freedom they denied - in the name of both order and tradition - its foundation on equality, and instead substituted a profound belief in human liberty. All people, they saw, were not equal, meaning that they were not the same. Perhaps, of course, the conservative party leadership had something to do with the alliance, since in at least two cases the leaders were themselves from transplanted backgrounds. Regionalism made its greatest strides towards enactment under Taaffe in Austria and Maura in Spain. The former was of Irish descent, his ancestors having fled from the English to the continent; the latter was of Jewish origin, a member of that stateless people that has been persecuted all across Europe.32

To transplants, like the entire population of the United States, a just *Res Publica* easily assumes precedence in loyalty. Regions become mere

administrative units designed to increase liberty by removing centralized control. And, most importantly, ethnic settlement becomes secondary. In such a framework, dual-loyalty becomes practical and possible, but only for those who accept the framework. Here the critics of regionalism, despite the numerous angles from which they attacked, all scored one correct assessment: regionalism was primarily conservatism, and it would fail because the less-developed underclasses would recognize their tribal identities above any other loyalty and would simultaneously gain class-consciousness. Equality and liberty had struggled for millennia, but in the end, to most Europeans, equality would prove most compelling: either everyone had to conform to the identity of the center, or the center must fragment to allow for the component parts to establish new centers.

Regionalism's characteristic dynamics, then, opened it up to its own failure. These arose in two aspects of its project: its emphasis on dual loyalty to ethnic *Volk* and greater state, and its alliance with conservative economic forces and particularly the conservative parties of the central government. In that nationalism asserts the identity of one group apart from others, any attempt at compromise with other ethnicities placed in doubt the commitment of the regionalists to their own ethnic identities. Often, the compromise instead had economic considerations: the preservation of the greater state combined with its federalization to remove centralized governmental intervention naturally appeals to certain economic forces. But these forces did not represent the masses, and as such could not legitimately survive once the proletariat gained its class consciousness along the Marxian model. Although Marx did not accept nationalism as a valid long-term movement, history has proven that it has also appealed to large segments of the population. Once the masses also underwent a revival of ethnic

consciousness, nationalism, too, would eliminate the conservative forces of regionalism.

Historically, opponents of regionalism, in light of these arguments, have seen themselves as the realists: mass ethnic consciousness could admit only one loyalty. But in that regionalists themselves believed in their two-faceted identities, such a dual-identity is, contrary to the assertions of opponents, possible. Nevertheless, their assertions failed; but while they lasted, they threatened the forces that could cause their failure. Like the Roman god Janus, they looked two ways: in to the greater state and out to the lesser nationality. Like Janus, they guarded one from the other, as their identity between groups allowed them the leverage to draw up compromise. But they stood neither in nor out, and this fact made those on either side uneasy. Macro-nationalists wanted to bring them in, but feared the face looking out; micro-nationalists thought they should step out, but distrusted the face that looked in. While neither side could accept the other, neither side could understand the regionalists in the middle. But to Janus who stood in the doorway, his position was entirely logical. He stood on the threshold of a new ideal, but no one cared to join him. The door swung closed from both sides; yet new doorways still remain.

Notes to chapter I:

1 Palacký, *Gedenkblätter*, 152. This most famous of tracts written to assert Czech identity was, of course, written in German.

2 by "race," European theorists often mean a concept corresponding to what Americans would refer to merely as "ethnic origin." This thesis will use the term in this sense.

3 Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 296.

4 the aftermath of the War of 1898.

5 Carr, *Spain*, 502.

6 Juan Linz, telephone conversation of 23. Aug. 1990.

7 Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 27f. He notes how both Israelites and Greeks distinguished themselves from others simply because they alone could acknowledge their beliefs in these concepts of individuality.

8 ibid., 63f.

9 Duràn, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, 30.

10 German had this role in Austria, although the Germans made up only one quarter of the Monarchy's population.

11 Duràn, 10f. The term "regionalism", in common usage in Spain, replaces what, in Northern Europe, is often referred to as "nationalism." Duràn recognizes this fact, and supplies the term "regionalism" to the theory in order to make a clear difference between types of "nationalist" objectives. The only drawback to using this term, Duràn admits, is that its root implies geography, not ethnicity. While Duràn himself did not mind this drawback, he feared it might allow micro-nationalists a means to question regionalism as a movement of ethnic identity.

12 Aleksa Djilas, talk to Harvard Institute of Politics Study-group "Who is the 'self' in self-determination?" 31. Oct. 1990.

13 Duràn, 102.

14 ibid. 13.

15 ibid. 96.

16 Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 187.

17 Kohn (*Nationalism*), 18.

Notes to chapter II:

[1] "Austria is on its last wheel" would be an appropriate translation.

[2] Franzel, 31.

[3] Henry, 35f.

[4] Seton-Watson, 162. While members of the intelligensia began to speak Czech again, they published mostly in German so as to attract the greatest readership.
It is, of course, always interesting to examine which classes of people speak which languages. Historically, only the rural masses preserved the ethnic languages, although by this period, most had begun to adopt the languages of the central states because these represented social mobility. Ethnic reawakening, therefore, took place among parts of the intelligensia. Seton-Watson here tells an amusing anecdote about a Czech revivalist group gathering at its weekly *Stammtisch* at a Prague inn. One member commented that, "if the ceiling were to fall, it would be an end to the national revival." To reach the masses, and also to inform non-Czechs of their intentions, German was a much more practical language.

[5] ibid., 160.

[6] Franzel, 54f.

[7] Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 386.

[8] Cohen, *The Prague Germans*, 9f.

[9] ibid., 16.

[10] Palacký's own discription, in Jelavich & Jelavich, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 18f.

[11] Palacký (*Gedenkblätter*), 153. The last sentence, which sounds better left in German, essentially means "Ethnic right is a true right of nature."

[12] ibid., 151.

[13] ibid., 153.

[14] Palacký, *Österreichs Staatsidee*, 11.

[15] Palacký, *Gedenkblätter*, 168f.

[16] see Lorenz, *Monolog über Böhmen*, 57.

[17] Friedrich von Wieser, a German economist living in Prague, quoted by Cohen, 8.

[18] Cohen, 4.
An old Czech adage, "S čestinou nedojde se daleko" ("You won't get far with Czech"), explains that while Czech was fine for daily life in Bohemia, it did little good in communicating elsewhere in the Empire, and certainly not elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, a Czech out of necessity had to learn German if he hoped to communicate with the government or with other Austrians. See Cohen, 24.

[19] ibid, 16.

[20] Lingelbach, *Austria-Hungary*, 365.

[21] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 21.

[22] Bauer, *Die Österreichische Revolution*, 50.

[23] ibid., 51.

[24] Beuer, *Berlin or Prague*, 17. Gustav Beuer, a Bohemian of German decent, was a founding member of the Czech Communist Party, which was a non-national movement tied to Europe's other Communist Parties and not to any ethnic group. He supported the political and social goals of 1848, but not the regionalist or nationalist ones.

[25] Lingelbach, 365.

[26] Palacký (*Gedenkblätter*), 152.

[27] quoted by Seton Watson, 228.

[28] "Manifesto of the First Slavonic Congress to the Nations of Europe," reprinted in Jelavich, 23. The word translated "nations" as it appears in the first sentence, more specifically refers to "*Völker*."

[29] Friedrich Engels, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, reprinted in Jelavich, 29. The editors explain: "Neither man (Marx nor Engels) had any sympathy with the national strivings of the small Slavic nations because both believed that all would be absorbed in the eventual great German social movement.... The culturally backward peoples were not believed worthy of an independent existence."(pg. 28)
The great theorist Rosa Luxemburg has quoted an extremely harsh portrait of the Czechs, especially Palacký, made by Karl Marx. In Marx's words, "The chief champion of the Czechian [sic] nationality, Professor Palacký, is himself nothing but a learned German run mad, who even now cannot speak the Czechian language correctly and without a foreign accent. But as often happens, dying Czechian nationality, dying according to every fact known in history for the last four hundred years, made in 1848 a last attempt to regain its former vitality - an effort whose failure, independently of all revolutionary considerations, was to prove that

Bohemia could exist, henceforth, as a portion of Germany, although part of her inhabitants might yet, for some centuries, continue to speak a non-German language."(Luxemburg, *The National Question*, 117)

[30] Engels, in Jelavich, 29. Engels wrote this in 1852.

[31] Cohen, 21f.

[32] ibid., 31.

[33] ibid., 43f.

[34] "Even in the heated debates over the primary schools, the Germans realized that the Czech moderates accepted the German's basic rights of coexistence and that neither the Czech aldermen nor the Czech populace were fully prepared for a completely enclosed Czech society." Ibid., 50.

[35] ibid., 51.

[36] Jenks, *Austria under the Iron Ring*, 30.

[37] "To Schmerling and the German Liberals, Germany without Austria playing a leading role in it, and on the other hand, Austria as a state without *deutscher Charakter*, were unthinkable. They were completely *Grossdeutsch*. They ignored the aspirations of the Slavs, which they neither understood nor wished to understand." Wiskemann, 29.

[38] The *Reichsrath* session and the obstruction of free speech that finally triggered the walk-out are described in ibid., 32.

[39] By "national," the Old Czechs did not imply nationalism. They, rather, used the term to denote their ethnic conception, much as the Catalan regionalist Prat de la Riba would later define the word.

[40] Seton-Watson, 212.

[41] Jenks, 16.

[42] Lorenz, 51.

[43] Leger, *Histoire de Aûtriche-Hongrie*, 614.

[44] Jenks, 15.

[45] Cohen, 39 and 52.

[46] Masaryk, *The Meaning of Czech History*, 87.

[47] Franzel, *Der Donauraum*, 116.

[48] ibid., 105.

[49] ibid., 95.

[50] ibid., 98.

[51] Palacký (*Staatsidee*), 37.

[52] Franzel, 95f.

[53] Henry, *Questions d'Aûtriche-Hongrie*, 38.

[54] Jenks, 45.

[55] Franz Josef, quoted in Lingelbach, 400f.

[56] The crownlands of St. Vaclav (Wenceslaus) of Bohemia were Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; those of St. Istvan (Stephen) of Hungary were Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia.

[57] Lingelbach, 403f.

[58] Jenks, 40.

[59] quoted in ibid., 54.

[60] ibid., 64f.

[61] ibid., 59f.

[62] Cohen, 225.

[63] Jenks, 63.

[64] Cohen, 132.

[65] Franzel, 125.
Crankshaw has described Taaffe best: "Taaffe was the negation of all the great forces then at work. He was not interested in nationalism... but he wanted fair play for those who were - Germans, Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, and the rest. He was not interested in social theories, but he did more than any man to help the oppressed. He appeared to take nothing seriously, but for fifteen years he made things work as they had never worked before and were never to work again. Under his light-hearted, light-fingered regency, groupings took shape and forces emerged which were to change the face of the world; but, until his fall, he kept them all in check. The Austria he established... was the Austria of legend. And the legend survived his downfall." *The Fall of the House of Habsburg*, 271f.

[66] quoted in Jenks, 62.

[67] Cohen, 246.

[68] Henry, 47.

[69] Cohen, 250.

[70] Svobodo, cited by Beuer, 19f.

[71] commented on by Cohen, 221.

[72] Wiskemann, 40f.

[73] cited by Seton-Watson, 227.
"He was treasonable irredentism, an insult to the Emperor's concept of honor and the Crown Prince's respect for the workings of a parliamentary system." Jenks, 14.

[74] Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 12f.

[75] ibid., 16. Italics his.

[76] Cohen, 260f.

[77] Jászi, 170f. Granted, these beliefs are self-contradictory, but such is anti-Semitism.

[78] to distinguish Europe's two "Galicias," the central-european one will be spelled with this alternate spelling.

[79] Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1808-1918*, 161f.

[80] Jenks, 12.

[81] Taylor, 162.

[82] Cohen, 252.

[83] ibid., 234.

[84] Taylor, 164.

[85] Jászi, 295.

[86] A good summary of the University debacle and its repercussions appears in Jenks, 71f.

[87] Leger, 613f.

[88] Jászi, 287.

[89] Max von Scharschmid, cited in one account of this interchange in Jenks, 102.

[90] A good narrative of the *Staatssprache* debate appears in Jenks, 90f.

[91] Cohen, 242f.

[92] Jenks, 242f.

[93] Leger, 613.

[94] Jenks, 251f.

[95] Leopold Gregorec, cited by Jenks, 259.

[96] quoted by Jenks, 255.

[97] Wallace, *Czechoslovakia*, 43f.

[98] Jenks, 258f.

[99] Cohen, 265.

[100] Jenks, 277f.

[101] ibid., 284.

[102] ibid., 292.

[103] ibid., 296.

[104] Wiskemann, 42f.

[105] quoted in Wallace, 45.

[106] Kann, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 121f. and 132.

[107] Wallace, 48.

[108] cited by Beuer, 22.

[109] Masaryk, "The Czechs," in Shillinglaw (ed.), *The Lectures of T. G. Masaryk*, 45. Lecture given in 1902. His "Bohemia" meant Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.

[110] Masaryk, "State Political Institutions in Austria," in ibid. 124.

[111] Masaryk, *The Problem of a Small Nation*, section 2. A lecture goven in 1905.

[112] J.V. Fric, cited in Masaryk (*Problem of a Small Nation*), section 4.

[113] Masaryk (*Meaning*), 88.

[114] Gainham, 2.
The belief was spread further by numerous anti-Austrian tracts. For such absurd propoganda see Namier, *The Czecho-slowaks, an oppressed nationality*, published in Britain in 1917.

[115] Masaryk, "The Czechs," in Shillinglaw, 45.

[116] Hodža, 26f. and Gainham, 2.

[117] Wiskemann, 69 & 75.

Notes to chapter III:

[1] "A Catalan makes bread from the stones."

[2] In Spanish, *"español"* signifies "that which pertains to Spain," and as such technically includes the country's non-Spanish languages, while *"castellano,"* the language that originated near Burgos but which has become the *Staatssprache* of Spain, refers to what in English is called "Spanish." Properly speaking, then, English-speakers would refer, as linguists do, to "Castillian," rather than to "Spanish."

[3] Madariaga, *España*, 208.

[4] ibid., 225.

[5] Cambó, *Per la Concòrdia*, 38.

[6] ibid., 39.

[7] Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, 20.

[8] Madariaga, 249. The central government eliminated the penal code in 1822, teaching of Catalan in schools (1825), the commerce code (1829), regional tribunals (1834), local money (1837), and regional administration (1845).

[9] Almirall, *Lo Catalanisme*, 82.

[10] Riquer, *Regionalistes i Nacionalistes*, 20.

[11] Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 98.

[12] Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal*, 605.

[13] Almirall, 252.

[14] ibid., 79.

[15] ibid., 28.

[16] Riquer, *Lliga Regionalista*, 22f.

[17] Prat de la Riba, *Articles*, 42.

[18] Riquer (*Lliga*), 42.

[19] Brenan's anecdotal account *The Spanish Labyrinth* provides a concise, readable description of Maura, portrayed as a determined reactionary, a politician who commanded respect like no other in Spanish politics (even the King did not address him in the familiar), yet in the end proved entirely ineffectual. "We are who we are," (*Nosotros somos nosotros*) he summarized his entire program. (31f.)

[20] Carr, *Spain*, 477.

[21] Lliga Regionalista, *Les Mancomunitats*, viii.

[22] Madariaga, 251.

[23] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 19.

[24] Carr, 546.

[25] Prat, (*La Nacionalitat Catalana*), 31.

[26] ibid., 34.

[27] ibid., 36f.

[28] quoted in Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 22.

[29] quoted in ibid., 46.

[30] Riquer (*Lliga*), 37.

[31] Carr, 547.

[32] ibid., 480.

[33] ibid., 544.

[34] Riquer (*Lliga*), 183f.

[35] ibid., 191.

[36] quoted in ibid., 193f.

[37] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 51.

[38] Riquer (*Lliga*), 67.

[39] Josep Pella i Forgas, quoted in ibid., 196.

[40] cited in ibid., 225.

[41] Lliga Regionalista, *Estatuto* (1901), 5.

[42] Payne, 605f.

[43] Bartomeu Robert, a professor of medicine, was formerly mayor of Barcelona and the former president of the Economic Society of Friends of the Country; Albert Rusiñol, a textile manufacturer, was formerly president of the National Work Initiative; Lluís Domènech, a professor of architecture, was formerly president of the Barcelona Atheneum; and Sebastià Torres, a merchant, was still president of the Industrial and Commercial Defense League. (Balcells, et al., *Les Eleccions Generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923*, 36.)

[44] Riquer (*Lliga*), 201f.

[45] with the alternation preceding - rather than following - the calling of new elections, which the new government party predictably won.

[46] that many Catalans did not believe in any government at all and joined the anarchists also impeded catalanism. But on the other hand, since Catalonia was the base of the CNT, and one of only two regions where anarchism was prevalent, any attempts by Spanish groups to curtail its influence could also be seen by many as attacks on Catalans.

[47] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 51.

[48] reported by Cambó, *Discursos Parliamentaris*, 218. The king, however, never did learn Catalan.

[49] Cucurull, *Panoràmica del Nacionalisme Català*, vol. III, 198.

[50] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 50. Alvarez Junco, Lerroux's latest biographer, has pointed out that since the Catalan proletariat still at this time mostly associated catalanism with conservatism, many, in the name of social mobility, were willing to throw their lot with their social class rather than their *Volk*. (Conversation of 20. Nov. 1990)

[51] Cucurull, vol. III, 282.

[52] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 53f.

[53] Catalans refer to the non-Catalan population of Catalonia as "immigrants," even though they come mostly from other parts of Spain (particularly Andalucia), and even though their families may have lived in Catalonia for generations.

[54] Cucurull, vol. III, 201.

[55] Carr, 484.

[56] Lliga Regionalista (*Mancomunitats*), xv f.

57 Carr, 484.

58 Nadal, *El Maurismo ante el Problema Catalán*, 16f.

59 Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 45f.

60 cited by Rovira i Virgili, "Els Radicals, Unitaris" in *Catalunya i Espanya*, 34.

61 Prat (*Articles*), 192.

62 Carr, 549f.

63 minutes can be found in the Fundació Jaume Bofill's *Dossier de Documentació sobre la Mancomunitat Catalana*, 3.

64 Lliga Regionalista (*Mancomunitats*), xix f. See also analysis by Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 78f.

65 *Dossier de Documentació*, 37.

66 ibid., 16.

67 Víctor Olesa, a representative from Tarragona, in ibid., 14.

68 *Novel·la Nova*, vol. II, nr. 68, 8.

69 Nadal, 9.

70 The common saying was first brought to my attention by Helena Cambó, daughter of the *Lliga* leader (6. Sept. 1990).

71 Carr, 552.

72 Rovira, *Els Politics Catalans*, 153f.

73 quoted by ibid., 186.

74 quoted by Brenan, 57.

75 Conversation with Helena Cambó, 6. Sept. 90.

76 Carr, 506f.

77 Rovira (*Catalunya*), "Offensiva contra Catalunya," 49.

78 Madariaga, 477f. He notes that he says this although he himself is not a Castillian. Rovira countered this argument by noting that despite its use in more than thirty countries, Spanish carried no international clout. Besides, he pointed out, Castillian ministers tended to

speak only Spanish, and hence had trouble communicating with the rest of the world compared to the multi-lingual Catalans. (*Catalunya*), "Dificultats Lingüístiques," 129f.

[79] Cambó, *El Pesimismo Español*, 118f.

[80] Cambó (*Discursos*), "El Problema Català" (7. June 1916), 212.

[81] Carr, 503f.

[82] ibid. 509f.

[83] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 116.

[84] Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 9.

[85] Carr, 500.

[86] ibid., 525.

[87] ibid., 568.

[88] ibid., 570f.

[89] ibid., 586f.

[90] Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 61.

[91] ibid., 27.

[92] Rovira (*Catalunya*), "Això No Pot Continuar!" 206.

[93] as early as 6. Nov. 1918; in Cucurull, vol. IV, 29.

[94] in ibid., 160. Cucurull notes (pg. 176), that of the 12,000 Catalan troops to see action, 10,000 fell as casualties.

[95] quoted in Riquer (*Lliga*), 199.

[96] Cucurull, vol. IV, 30.

[97] Macià, *Discurs al Parlament Espanyol* (5. Nov. 1918), in Cucurull, vol. IV, 155.

[98] *Dossier de Documentació*, 4,

[99] Cucurull, vol. IV, 19f.

[100] ibid., 32.

[101] Cambó, *Autonomia*, 13f.

[102] ibid., 20.

[103] reported in Rovira (*Politics*), 46.

[104] *Declaració de la Commisió d'Acció Política de la Lliga Regionalista, a propósit de la Coferencia Nacional Catalana* (25. May 1922), in Cucurull, vol. IV, 211f.

[105] for example, Josep Fontana, in his Preface to Riquer (*Lliga*), 5.

[106] see Payne, 600 and Riquer (*Lliga*), 164.

[107] Carr, 549.

[108] ibid., 542.

[109] Madariaga, 262.

[110] Carr 542.

[111] Riquer (*Regionalistes*), 24.

[112] Rovira (*Catalunya*), "La Bufetada," 20f.

[113] ibid., "El Catalanisme i les Esquerres Espanyols," 12.

[114] Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 61.

[115] ibid., 43.

[116] quoted in the *Veu* (29. Aug. 1899), Prat (*Articles*), 46.

[117] Rovira (*Catalunya*), "Endins!" 68.

[118] ibid., "El Separatisme," 123f.

[119] ibid., "Regió i Nació," 197.

[120] Cucurull, vol. IV, 42.

[121] Gerpe, *L'Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya i l'Estat integral*, 284.

[122] Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 106f.

[123] Gerpe, 11f.

124 Cambó (*Concòrdia*), 25.

125 Carr, 569.

126 Madariaga, 518f.

127 Culla i Clara, *El Catalanisme d'Esquerra*, 25.

128 Carr, 555.

129 ibid., 90.

130 Gerpe, 285f.

131 Carr, 592.

132 Culla, 91.

133 ibid., 68.

134 ibid., 54.

135 quoted in ibid., 56.

136 ibid., 67 and Riquer (*Regionalistes*). 135.

137 quoted by Madariaga, 475.

138 Joan Lluhí i Vallescà, quoted in Culla, 93.

139 Joan Torradelles, quoted in ibid., 51.

140 ibid., 92.

141 ibid., 94.

142 Gerpe, 391.

143 ibid., 323.

144 quoted in Carr, 609.

145 Cambó, *Memòries*, 215.

146 Carr, 615.

147 Payne, 636f., Carr, 630f.

[148] Madariaga, 527f.

Notes to chapter IV:

[1] "They make a wasteland, and they call it peace." Calgachus was a British general leading a rebellion against Rome, and supposedly made this famous comment to rally his troops against Roman oppression. Tacitus, *Agricola* 30.5.

[2] Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie*, 98.

[3] ibid., 57.

[4] cf., ibid., 58.

[5] cf., ibid., 68 & Drerup, *Der Humanismus in seiner Geschichte*, 85. "Accordingly, from our point of view, an ethical attitude is invalid if it is oriented with reference to norms, with which action in a given historical setting, even with the best intentions, cannot comply." (Mannheim, 95.)

[6] ibid. 167.

[7] ibid., 66.

[8] Sandys, *A Short History of Classical Scholarship*, 288f.

[9] Drerup, 53.

[10] Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. III, 236.

[11] Drerup, 66f.. Drerup later summed up the logic behind the newly rediscovered classical education: "which in the last reason, not in order to promote Latin skills (themselves), but to gain a good German expression, to think, feel, and wish like a true German." (pg. 82.)

[12] Sandys (*History*), vol. III, 440.

[13] Freeman's 1862 book, *Federal Government*, was originally planned as the first volume of a series analysing aglomerations he regarded as federations, from the Greeks and Roman republicans to his own century. He only wrote the first volume on Greece and Italy, however.

[14] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 15.

[15] ibid., 22.

[16] Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 5f.

17 ibid., 58.

18 Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 19.

19 Freeman (*Federal Government*), 572.

20 Sherwin-White, 65.

21 Gelzer, *Gemeindestaat und Reichsstaat in der römischen Geschichte*, 8f.

22 Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*), 42f. & 144.

23 ibid., 142.

24 he means "*civitas.*"

25 Freeman, *The Chief Periods of European History*, 42.

26 The term "Latin" gradually became less one of race as one of status. Thus, these colonies were not settled necessarily by Latins, but instead had Latin status. Culturally speaking, however, they were thoroughly latinized.

27 Wilhelm Ihne unfortunately insisted on calling these states "confederated." Since no federation or confederation constitutionially existed, both terms would be anachronistic. However, the Latin implies "bound by treaty," and in actuality these treaties made their *civitates* subject *de facto* to Rome (although legally, as *socii*, Rome had no power over them outside the *foedus.*)

28 Ihne, *The History of Rome*, vol. I, 547f.

29 ibid., vol. I, 542, & Badian, *Roman Imperialism*, 16.

30 Ihne, vol. I, 541.

31 ibid., 546.

32 Badian (*Roman Imperialism*), 8.

33 ibid., 33.

34 Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*), 16f. The first known incidence of this occurred in Caere. After Rome defeated this old Etruscan ally, which had joined an enemy, in 355 BCE, the Romans required a new means of incorporation. The traditional means involving destruction of the city and transplant of its citizens to Rome proved impractical - especially because the Caerites were not Latins - and unsentimental - because of the long association between the two cities. A simple treaty would also not have been binding enough.

35 Sherwin-White, 67f.

36 ibid., 113f. The stock phrase was *maiestatem populi Romani comiter conservare*.

37 Duràn, 13.

38 ibid., 43.

39 Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*), 141f.

40 ibid., 149.

41 Badian (*Roman Imperialism*), 4.

42 the *Pax Romana*, which would become infamous as Roman expanded over the known world. Showing no respect for the barbarian peoples and cultures, the Romans obliterated and enslaved entire populations. Roman authors often drew parallels between the increasing degeneracy of the Roman population and the extent of the oppression. At Rome, however, *pax* became a virtue of civilized *humanitas*; Rome represented true civilization, and the *barbari* were just that. As a result, barbarian leaders found themselves not merely at war with Rome, but in a desperate struggle for the survival of their people.

43 Badian (*Roman Imperialism*), 2 & (*Foreign Clientelae*), 73.

44 that is, though nominally independent, the actual extent of their freedom depended or the grace of Rome. Sherwin-White, 162.

45 Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*), 84f.

46 Sherwin-White, 89.

47 cf. ibid., 81.

48 Ihne, vol. I, 543f.

49 Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, vol. 1, 452.

50 Freeman (*Federal Government*), 574.

51 The *Tribuni Plebis* represented the Roman lower classes, and in the Republican system represented the check these classes had against the Senate and the senatorial upper class. In translating the office as "of the people," it must be noted that the reference is to *plebs* not *populus*, although politicians seeking popular support often equated the two.

52 Badian (*Roman Imperialism*), 46.

53 Cicero, *De Re Publica*, III.41.

[54] Mommsen, vol. II, 407 and Long, *The Decline of the Roman Republic*, vol. I, 277.

[55] Long, vol. I, 173.

[56] ibid., 177.
Most of this farmland, acquired by Rome across Italy, partially by conquest and partially by *foedus*, as its influence expanded, also made up large parts of the land actually occupied by the allies, so any proposal for redistribution to Romans also threatened the Italians.

[57] Long, vol. II, 126. See description in Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*, LVIII.

[58] Long, vol. I., 190f.

[59] reported in Appian, *Rōmaika*, I.3.23.

[60] ibid., I.3.19. Cf. Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*) 176.

[61] Long, vol. I, 275f.

[62] Ihne, vol. V, 115.
Instead of a formal constitution, the Romans relied on *mos maiorum*, the "custom of the ancestors."

[63] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 579f.

[64] Sherwin-White, 127.

[65] The *Lex Licinia Mucia* of 95 BCE.

[66] See Appian's account for the most complete classical-period (though not contemporary) discription of allied grievences (I.5.38-39).

[67] Long, vol. II, 185.

[68] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 587,

[69] Appian, I.5.49.

[70] Ihne, vol. V, 212; Long, vol. II, 198.

[71] Long, vol. II, 221.

[72] Ihne, vol. V, 324f.

[73] ibid., 329f.

[74] Long, vol. II, 340.

[75] Ihne, vol. V, 366f.

[76] ibid., 372f. & Long, vol. II, 358f.

[77] Ihne, vol. V, 392. He still, of course, calls Italy a confederacy.

[78] ibid., 392f.

[79] ibid., 453f.

[80] Even Publius Vergilius Maro, the great propagandist poet of the Augustan age, in his famous ode to the superiority of Rome from Book Six of the *Aeneid* implied the Greeks when he wrote that "Others may more craftily strike breathing bronze,... bring living forms from marble, argue cases better, chart the circuit and measure of heaven, and name the rising stars; Remember, Roman: you rule the peoples in Empire! These are your arts: impose laws for peace, be merciful on your subjects, and wage war on the proud!"(*Aeneidos*, VI.847f)

[81] Mommsen wrote his history almost with more popular/political concerns than scholarly ones. He was, at the time, in exile in Switzerland for his relation to the Frankfurt Convention of 1848.

Notes to chapter V:

[1] "Esteemed Representatives, regionalism is the rule of liberty, and liberty and equality cannot travel together in good company." From "El Problema Català," speech given in the *Cortes*, 7. July 1916 (*Discursos Parliamentaris*, 205).

[2] Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome*, 3f.

[3] ibid., 7

[4] Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, 146.

[5] Cicero, *De Re Publica*, I.25.

[6] ibid., II.23.

[7] ibid., III.31.

[8] ibid., I.39.

[9] ibid., I.43.

[10] Almirall, 167f.

[11] Wirszubski, 13.

[12] ibid., 66f.

[13] cf. Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*), 87.

[14] Wirszubski, 80f.

[15] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 23.

[16] Cicero (*De Re Publica*), III.29. I have this one time used the standard Loeb translation, which here adequately conveys the original sense. By "commonwealth," the translator has attempted to render *res publica*, even though the connotations are different in English. Although Cicero wrote this in 54 BCE, the fictitious conversation Cicero has recreated for his book is set before the Social War.

[17] although, as Cicero has said above, when one man possesses the powers of state, the state ceases to be a *res publica*.

18 Reinhold, *The Golden Age of Augustus*, ix.

19 Millar, *Das Römische Reich und seine Nachbarn.*

20 quoted by Kohn (*Nationalism*), 65f. (uncited).

21 cf. Mommsen, vol. II, 428.

22 Kohn, *Modern History*, 43.

23 Sherwin-White, 134.

24 Cicero, *De Legibus*, II.5.

25 Palacký (*Staatsidee*), 31f.

26 Bauer (*Österreichische Revolution*), 49.

27 Hanau, *Absolutismus und Föderalismus*, 58f.

28 Palacký, quoted in Franzel, 127.

29 Russ, *Der Sprachenstreit in Österreich*, 6.

30 Bofill, *L'altra Concòrdia*, 101.

31 Rovira, *Història dels Moviments Nacionalistes*, vol. II, 32.

32 Bauer (*Nationalitätenfrage*), 190f.

33 Rovira (*Història*), vol. II, 23.

34 Russ, 9. Such a proposal was actually made and partially implemented in South Africa's "homelands."

35 Joan Mañé i Flaquer, *El Regionalisme*, reprinted in Cucurull, vol. III, 189.

36 Bofill (*L'altra Concòrdia*), 32.

37 Duràn, 16. He gives Switzerland and the U.S. as examples.

38 ibid. 27.

39 Thompson & Ronen, *Ethnicity, Politics, and Development*, 35.

40 Rovira (*Histròria*), vol. II, 51.

41 Bofill (L'altra Concòrdia), 49.

42 Janowski, Nationalities and National Minorities, 145f.
Henry, in an book widely acknowledged by catalanists, discussed the three alternatitves facing Austria, the greatest state in the middle of this crisis: the restoration of historic/geographic regions and their ensuing re-federation (like Switzerland); redrawing the Empire into linguistic regions, with a particular ethnic dominance in each; or, what happened in 1867, merely setting up the dual-monarchy, which allowed the Hungarian half of the Empire to retain its centralization, while the Western half continued to debate federalism. (72)

43 Bauer (Nationalitätenfrage), 325.

44 Rovira (Història), vol. II, 31.

45 Seton-Watson, 198f. He stressed the Czech example.

46 Cicero (De Re Publica), I.25.

47 Prat de la Riba and Pere Muntanyola, "La Pàtria" from El Compendi de la Doctrina Catalanista (of 1894), reprinted in Cucurull, vol. III, 152f.

48 Rovira (Politics), 34.

49 Prat (Nacionalitat Catalana), 37.

50 ibid., 39f.

51 ibid., 54.

52 ibid. 56.

53 ibid. 118.

54 Cambó (Concòrdia), 62f.

55 Joaquim Ruyra, "La lliçó d'En Prat de la Riba" from Obres Completes, reprinted in Gili, Catalan Grammar, 143.

56 Almirall, 167f.

57 ibid., 247f.

58 Cambó (Concòrdia), 83f.

59 Bofill (Altra Concòrdia), 108f.

60 Almirall, 21.

[61] ibid., 254f.

[62] ibid., 89f.

[63] ibid., 93.

[64] ibid., 79.

[65] Madariaga, 246f.

[66] ibid., 278.

[67] Cambó (Concòrdia), 40.

[68] Almirall, 77.

[69] ibid. 154.

[70] Lliga Regionalista, "Per Catalunya i l'Espanya Gran" in Història d'una política, reprinted in Cucurull, vol. IV, 103.

[71] Brennan, 31.
Joaquín Nadal, one of Maura's followers described his policy as "the leveling of political rights and obligations, just as religion is the leveling of the obligations of the spirit; Maurism is no more than the religion of citizenship." (El Maurismo ante el Problema Catalán, 4.)

[72] Kohn (Modern History), 90.

[73] ibid., 45.

[74] Alcock, et al., The Future of Cultural Minorities, 157.

[75] Bauer (Nationalitätenfrage), 106f.
This they inherited from revolutionary democracy, such as the Jacobin cry: "Citizens! The language of a free people ought to be one and the same for all." (Cited by Janowski, 15.)

[76] Bauer (Nationalitätenfrage), 164.

[77] Luther Baier, "Mein Okzitanien," in Gustafsson, Tintenfisch, 28.

[78] Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, 79.

[79] ibid., 80.

[80] note plural: at this conference, the unified Socialist Party formally split into constituent parties representing the individual Völker.

81 Rovira (Història), vol. II, 39f.

82 Nin, Els Moviments d'Emancipació Nacional, 71. Interestingly, macro-nationalist socialists used the same argument to support unitarism.

83 Sieberer, Katalonien gegen Kastillien, 116.

84 He had been impressed by correspondence he had received from radical galleguists which neatly summarized his own micro-nationalist feelings: "We are not Spaniards; we do not have to love Spain; we have, indeed, to hate her; Spain is where the free defenders of Galiza are oppressed; Spain is who opposses the agrandizement of the Gallego land; Spain is the usurper of Gallego interests; Spain is the eternal empress of all that which counters the prestige and well-being of Galiza." Rovira (Catalunya), 266.

85 Bauer (Nationalitätenfrage), 233f.

86 ibid., xxvi f.

87 Francesc Layret of the Catalan Republican Party, 1. Dec. 1918, quoted by Cucurull, vol. IV, 32.

88 Rovira (Politics), 156.

89 quoted in the Dossier, 41. By "nation," Primo means "consciousness of nationality."

90 "La nota de la Presidència" in La Publicitat (22. March 1925), in the Dossier, 40.

91 Nadal, 7f.

92 Cruells, El 6 d'Octubre a Catalunya, 200.

93 Franco, incidentally, came from Galicia, although he even tried to eliminate his own native language and distinct culture.

94 Helena Cambó has regretted this lack of interest. Catalanists have ignored his contribution because he was too conservative; the right has ignored his conservatism because he was a catalanist, and as such an enemy of Franco. (Conversation of 6. Sept. 1990.)

95 indeed, Hitler's Endlösung, the "final solution to the Jewish question," represents the extreme breakdown of racial tolerance. If regionalism proposes the mutual acceptence of different groups which have learned to dissociate the concept of Volk from that of the state, then National Socialism as carried through in Germany would be the polar opposite.

Notes to chapter VI:

[1] *Economist* (23. June 1990), 12.

[2] Bauer (*Nationalitätenfrage*), 130.

[3] ibid., 1f. Cf. also Kohn (*Nationalism*), 14.

[4] The root of *natio*, in turn, implied birth, origin.

[5] Calgachus, quoted by Tacitus, *Agricola 30.4*.

[6] Caratacus, quoted by Tacitus, *Annales* XII.34.

[7] Goodyear, *Tacitus*, 35.

[8] Arisides, *Eis Rōmēn*. "You have made the word 'Roman' apply not to a city but to a whole nationality," he wrote, adressing Rome (63). On centralization, he had this to say: "You are the only ones ever to rule over free men.... Is this not better than any democracy? Under democracy, once a man's case is decided in his town, he cannot take it elsewhere or to other judges; he must be content with that verdict.... Another great judge remains from whom justice is never hidden." (36f.)

[9] Catalunya Lliure, *Declaració Política Fundacional de la Catalunya Lliure*. This new party, as the name suggests, is for an independent Catalonia.

[10] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 1,2.

[11] Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 62.

[12] Molas, conversation of 7. Sept. 1990.

[13] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 1.

[14] Dov Ronen, conversation of 5. Oct. 1990. Cf. also Luxemburg's counter-arguments.

[15] Bauer (*Nationalitätenfrage*), 165.

[16] Ronen (5. Oct. 90).

[17] although he does not address the *Nationalitätenfrage*, Schmitt's controversial critique of democracy can provide an interesting interpretation of this point. Schmitt proposes that the

very paradigm of freedom within democracy is what opens democracy itself up to it own destruction. Likewise, any system that tolerates opposition places itself in danger of being undone by that opposition. (*Die geistgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*)

[18] Duràn, 39f.

[19] Russ, 35.

[20] cf. Franzel, 71 & Sieberer, 43.

[21] Duràn, 45.

[22] cf. Cucurull, vol. III, 53f.

[23] Alcock, 138f. Other federations, like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, themselves formed out of the break-up of other states, are also vulnerable because the very existence of their state implies the viability of break-up as an option.

[24] Freeman (*Federal Government*), 76.

[25] Cucurull, vol. IV, 170.

[26] Helena Cambó (6. Sept. 90).

[27] see Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, 15.

[28] Palacký (*Staatsidee*), 11f.

[29] Pabón, 40.

[30] cf. Cucurull, vol. III, 21f.

[31] Rovira (*Història*), vol. II.

[32] Indeed, unfounded rumors had suggested that Cambó, too, was Jewish, since he had "pronounced facial features" and came from a county with a large Jewish population. (Pabón, 57f.)

Appendix A:

Glossary of personal names

Adler, Viktor: Founder of Austrian Social Democratic Party, which he led until his death (1918), one day before the creation of the Austrian Republic. Although Jewish, he was associated with Schönerer, with whom he drew up the *Linzer Programm* (1882), calling for unification of Austria's "German Lands" (including Bohemia) with Germany, and advocating massive social reform.

Alfonso XIII: King of Spain (1886-1931). Ineffectual monarch, who ultimately supported Primo de Rivera in order to forcibly restore loyalty to a central crown. Abdicated and fled Spain.

Almirall, Valentí: Late-nineteenth-century Catalan theorist. Wrote *Lo Catalanisme*, which applied his theories of "particularism" to extend to regionalism and Catalonia.

Augustus Octavianus, Gaius Iulius Caesar: Roman *Princeps*. Protege of Iulius Caesar, who adopted him posthumously. After defeating all opposition and concluding the Civil Wars, he established the *Pax Augusta* - a period of peace and prosperity at Rome after a century of turmoil. Pretending to restore the Republican system, he set up the Principate, with himself as "leading citizen." He suppressed *libertas*, and replaced it with *humanitas*, ushering in the Golden Age of Roman culture, whose influence he spread throughout the Empire. He centralized and consolidated his rule upon the principles of his adopted father.

Bauer, Otto: Austrian Socialist leader and theorist, who tried to reconcile Socialism with his experience with Austria's *Nationalitätenfrage*. Although he sometimes empathized with micro-nationalities enduring oppression much like that afflicting the proletariat, he also emphasized the need for "National Unity," suppressing ethnic difference for the benefit of the workers.

Bismarck, Otto von: Prussian statesman. Unified Germany (1871). His rabid German macro-nationalism influenced the German-speaking Left in Austria, which claimed allegiance to Berlin.

Buonaparte, Napoleone: Emperor of France (1804-1815). Corsican general, restored order to France in the aftermath of the French

Revolution. Once a backer of Corsican independence, he came to support the ideal of preserving the French state. The Napoleonic Wars helped awaken many dormant European nationalities, although he favored the organization of Europe into large polyglot states. Annexed Catalonia and Austria's Illyrian coast, amongst other regions, to France.

Caesar, Gaius Iulius: Roman general and politician. A leader amongst the *Populares*, he was also well-known for his corruption and his exploitation of the provinces. Politically, he stood for agrarian reform and the centralization and consolidation of Roman power. After the Civil Wars, he became dictator (47 BCE), and was assassinated by Republican senators (44 BCE) shortly after he had assumed the position "dictator-for-life."

Cambó i Battle, Francesc: Catalan industrialist. Became leader of the *Lliga Regionalista*, which he represented in the Spanish *Cortes*. Participated as a member of the Conservative cabinets of Maura.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius: Roman politician and orator. Although middle-class, he rose to the rank of Consul (63 BCE) and became a leader of the *Optimates* in the Senate, due to his brilliant oratory and his ultra-conservative politics. He argued for the restoration of traditional Republican values in the face of perceived moral decay, and placed above all the notion of *libertas*. Also proposed the idea of loyalty to two fatherlands - home region and *res publica*, the former never forgotten but the latter taking precedence. During his consulate, he put down a popular rebellion, and his execution of its leaders led to his later exile (58-57 BCE). Thereafter he partially withdrew from active politics, but in Rome's various civil wars he supported the side which represented the Republic. Proscribed and put to death (43 BCE).

Clam-Martinič, Heinrich: Leader of the Bohemian aristocracy's political group, the *Feudalen*. Ultra-conservative, and seeking greater federalism within the structure of the Empire.

Companys, Lluís: Catalan Republican leader, and President of the *Generalitat* (1933-1934 and 1936-1939). After the central government ruled his sweeping agrarian reforms unconstitutional, he declared Catalonia independent (1934). His revolution lasted one day, and he was jailed until 1936, when the leftists again gained control.

Duràn i Ventosa, Lluís: Catalan regionalist theorist of turn of twentieth century, most known for his book *Regionalisme i Federalisme* ("Regionalism and Federalism").

Engels, Friedrich: Communist theorist and supporter of international socialism. Opposed ethnicity as divisive of the proletariat. Thought groups like the Czechs deserved to be absorbed by "higher" nationalities such as the Germans.

Franco, Francisco: Spanish general. Although from an apolitical background, he was unpopular with Spanish Republicans after the center-right coalition government used him to suppress a socialist and secessionist revolution in Asturias (1934). Finally convinced of the failure of the Republic, he joined the Right and opened the bloody Civil War (1936). After his victory, he became dictator (1939-1975), and sought to castillianize Spain. Also, however, remained neutral in the Second World War, and used Spain as a base for rescuing Jews from Hitler's Holocaust.

Franz Josef: Austrian Kaiser (1848-1916). His long rule epitomized "personal monarchy." He respected the identities of Austria's *Völker*, which, for the most part, looked to him as the bond of loyalty common to Austria's various regions.

Freeman, Edward Augustus: English classicist, and Professor of Modern History at Oxford. Devised belief in the "Unity of History," viewing that discipline as continuous and interrelated. His most influential works concerned federalism in the classical world as a model for late-nineteenth-century Europe.

Gracchus, Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius: Brothers and Roman politicians. Both served as Tribunes of the People (Tiberius in 133 BCE, Gaius in 123-122 BCE). Both had immense popularity within the Roman underclass for their proposed social reforms, although their agrarian reforms angered the Italians whose land was threatened with appropriation for redistribution to citizens of the city of Rome. Sought to extend full suffrage to all Italians and to place Italy under the direct control of Rome. Both were assassinated.

Grégr, Julius: Leader of the Young Czechs. Micro-nationalist and socialist in character. Agitated for greater autonomy and ultimately independence from Austria.

Hitler, Adolf: *Führer* of Germany (1933-1945), as leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). Born in Austria, where he was influenced by pan-German radicalism and anti-Semitism. *Völkisch sine qua non.* Responsible for the Holocaust of six million European Jews.

Josef II: Holy Roman Emperor (1765-90) and King of Bohemia (1780-1790). He brought enlightened despotism to Austria. His extensive liberal reforms included centralization and germanization of Central Europe, which measures proved unpopular with minority groups and thereby unwittingly contributed to ethnic revival.

Kossuth Lajos: Magyar revolutionary. Socially liberal, he became the spokesman for Hungarian nationalism, achieving independence in 1848. In power, he proved macro-nationalist, suppressing Hungary's minorities. Defeated and driven into exile in 1849.

Lerroux, Alejandro: Andalucian politician. Macro-nationalist and socialist. Founded the Radical Republican party as a workers movement within the Barcelona "immigrant" population, and represented it in Madrid. Fiercest opponent of the conservative and regionalist policies of the *Lliga*. Later shifted politically to the center, and headed a center-right coalition during the Second Republic, before his corruption forced him into exile (1935).

Macià, Francesc: Catalan colonel and independentist. Established *l'Estat Català*, a self-styled government-in-exile during the Directory. The Spanish Left cooperated with his demands to gain his support for the establishment of a republic, in which Catalonia would receive complete autonomy. He merged his party with those of other Catalanist leftists to form the *Esquerra Republicana*.

Madariaga, Salvador de: Gallego politician and historian of Spain. Served as galleguist delegate to *Cortes* during the Second Republic, later exiled to Argentina.

Marius, Gaius: Roman general. An opponent of the Republicans and of Sulla, he rebelled after the outbreak of the Social Wars, and offered full suffrage to Italians into the Roman *civitas*. Sacked Rome and massacred his opponents there. He died before Sulla returned to Italy to put down his rebellion.

Marx, Karl: Father of modern communism. Supported micro-nationalism only inasmuch as it sought to free its proletariat from capitalist domination. Otherwise, viewed regionalism, such as that of the Czechs, as "reactionary."

Masaryk, Tomaš: Professor of Philosophy at Prague and advocate of Czech independence. Ultra-liberal and micro-nationalist. Spent time in America, and there influenced President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of "self-determination." President of Czechoslovakia after its founding (1918-37).

Maura i Montaner, Antoni: Premier of Spain (on and off, 1903-1922). From Mallorca and of Jewish descent, he sought to reform Spain "from above" after the Crisis of 1898. A Conservative, he gave the greatest support to the Catalan regionalists, who aligned with him. Unpopular with the Left for ordering the suppression of a workers' rising in Barcelona, the *setmana tràgica* of 1909.

Metternich, Klemens Prinz von: Reactionary Austrian statesman. Crafted post-Napoleonic Europe. Preserved order within Austria through suppression of liberal and ethnic movements. Driven into exile in 1848.

Mommsen, Theodor: German classicist. His *Römische Geschichte* (1854-1856) popularized Roman history throughout Europe. He wrote his History in exile after his participation at the Frankfurt Convention in 1848, and his anachronistic historicism highlighted many of the politics of his own day.

Palacký, František: Professor of History at Prague and leader of Czech cultural revival. Headed Czech revolution of 1848 in favor of preserving a federal Austria, and presided over the Pan-Slavonic Congress of that year. Served in Austrian *Reichsrath* and Bohemian *Landtag*.

Prat de la Riba, Enric: Catalan publisher and politician. Founded the *Lliga Regionalista* (1901) and published its newspaper, the *Veu de Catalunya*. First President of the *Mancomunitat* (1914-1917), which position he used to modernize Catalonia, free from centralized constraints. Though regionalist in actions, he insisted on referring to the Catalans as a "nation," and thus influenced micro-nationalists.

Primo de Rivera, Miguel: Andalucian general. Staged a *golpe de estado* in 1923 and established the Directory. Annulled the *Mancomunitat*, restoring centralization, and reorganized labor, favoring the socialists. Forced into retirement by conservatives (1930).

Rieger, Franz Ladislaus: Czech regionalist and leader of the *Alttschechische Partei* which formed part of Taaffe's *Eisener Ring*. Son-in-law and protege of Palacký. The failure of the *Ausgleich* of 1890 marked the end of his influence.

Rovira i Virgili, Antoni: Catalan historian and micro-nationalist politician. Admired Prat de la Riba, but carried his vocabulary of "Catalan nation" to an independentist conclusion. Constantly at odds with Cambó.

Schönerer, Georg: German-speaking Austrian socialist demagogue. Macro-
    nationalist in character, he proposed the germanification of
    Austrian minorities and Austrian unification with Germany.
    Served in the Austrian *Reichsrath* until 1887, when his violent
    anti-Semitic antics got him barred from politics.

Stalin, Josef: President of Soviet Union. A Georgian by birth. V. I. Lenin
    placed him in charge of ethnic minorities, which he suppressed
    in the name of socialism. Extended centralized rule, and
    murdered enormous numbers of his citizens.

Sulla, Lucius Cornelius: Roman general. Led the Senatorial faction in the
    Civil War against Marius. Returning from his foreign
    command, he offered to affirm the rights granted to the Italians
    by Marius, in order to undercut support for his opponent. After
    his victory, he, as dictator (82-79 BCE), purged his enemies,
    consolidated Italy, and restored order by brutal repression. He
    retired to make way for a "restored" Republic.

Taaffe, Eduard Graf von: Austrian Minister-President (1879-93).
    Conservative, he formed the "Iron Ring" coalition of
    conservative, federalist, and Slavic groups. His government
    made enormous advances in expanding suffrage and rights to
    minority groups, yet it fell in the aftermath of the *Ausgleich* of
    1890, when it proved unable to reconcile radical Czech and
    German nationalists, both of which groups had captured support
    in the polls over the parties in his coalition. Of Irish descent, he
    had been a childhood friend of Kaiser Franz Josef.

Tacitus, Cornelius: Roman historian. Writing in a period of limited freedom
    under the Principate, his histories of the Principate's first century
    extol the virtues of *libertas*. Although he did not write about the
    republican period, he alluded heavily to it.

Appendix B:

Glossary of terms

Ausgleich of 1867: The agreement which divided the Habsburg monarchy into Austrian and Hungarian halves. While the Austrian ("Cisleithanian") half continued to grapple with the *Nationalitätenfrage*, the Hungarian ("Transleithanian") half came under complete Magyar domination, and forced magyarization replaced germanization as the enemy of minority ethnic identities. In the West, the granting to the Magyars of these special rights only caused envy and unrest amongst Cisleithanian minority groups, who achieved no such recognition of rights.

Ausgleich of 1890: A compromise between Old Czechs and the German-Austrian Left, which sought a solution to the *Nationalitätenfrage* in Bohemia. The region's boundaries remained intact, and the agreement recognized official bilingualism, protected the rights of all ethnic groups, and suggested a federal model for the Empire. The Young Czechs felt that the *Ausgleich* bound the Czechs within Austrian domination, and disrupted it. The *Ausgleich* was suspended in 1891.

Austro-bohemianism: The regionalist solution proposed by Palacký which sought the affirmation of a Bohemian identity within an Austrian State.

Bases of Manresa: The groundwork of Catalan regionalism, set up at Manresa in 1892. Center-right in orientation, the Bases objected to the centralist policies of Liberalism. Proposed a federal union, with the mutual cooperation of Spain's peoples.

Bohemia (Czech - *Čechy*): Region in *Mitteleuropa*, historically a crownland claimed by both Czechs and Germans. Formerly part of the Habsburg Empire. Radical Czech micro-nationalists, including Masaryk, once used the term to refer to all the "Czech lands," including Moravia (*Morava*) to the east and Silesia to the north.

Brünner Konferenz (1897): The meeting of the Austrian Socialist Party, at which it was decided that the party would fragment into smaller parties, each representing a separate *Volk*.

Caciquismo: A system of government in which local party bosses control election outcomes. Widely employed in post-Restoration Spain.

Catalanism (Catalan - *catalanisme*): Any variety of movement which promoted Catalan identity, from the purely cultural movements of the mid-nineteenth century through the independentist ones of the 1930s.

Catalonia (Catalan - *Catalunya*): Region of northeastern Spain, including the provinces of Barcelona, Gerona (*Girona*), Lérida (*Lleida*), and Tarragona. Catalan micro-nationalists have often used the term to refer to all regions where Catalans still predominate, broadening to include the three provinces of the Valencian Country (*País Valencià*), the Balearic Islands (*Illes Balears*), Andorra, and the *Rosselló* region of Southeastern France.

Civitas: The Roman citizenship, implying rights within the state. The word also meant the (city-)state itself.

Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (National Labor Confederation): The anarchist trade union in Spain, begun in 1910, which drew much of its membership from the working class in Catalonia.

Confederation: An agroupation of individual states which agree to work together for a common end, but which ultimately maintain full rights of sovereignty.

Conservative Party (Spanish - *Partido Conservador*): In Spain, the state's traditional right-wing party. Came to support regionalism in the early twentieth century. Maura served as its leader during much of the first quarter of the century.

Cortes: Spanish parliament.

Dualism: In Austria, the system whereby the Habsburg Monarchy was split in 1867, providing for a federalism that, however, recognized only two greater regions, and thus functioned more like a centralized state with two centers.

Españolismo: Patriotism towards Spain, stressing the unity of the Spanish state. Most often used by Castillian macro-nationalists to imply loyalty to a centralized state, but also employed by regionalists to mean any loyalty of a component region to the greater Spain.

Esquerra Republicana: The Catalan "Republican Left," a political party formed in 1931 through the merger of catalanist leftist parties. Easily defeated the *Lliga* in the elections of the Republic.

Estatut d'Autonomia: The Catalan Statute of Autonomy, which granted virtually complete autonomy to Catalonia and recognized the dominance and primary rights of Catalans within that region. First enacted in 1931, it was suspended after the revolution of 1934. The leftist government restored it during the Civil War, and it was canceled again after Franco's victory. A new, less radical attempt was ratified in 1979, under the fledgeling democracy.

Federalism: A system of government which sustains the unity of the state while allowing for the diversity and self-administration of the component regions.

Federation: A union of regions with local autonomy but maintaining a common central government with power over affairs concerning all, or more than one, of the component regions.

Feudalen: The conservative Bohemian aristocracy's political party. It was neither specifically Czech nor German in character, and, allied with the Old Czechs, favored a federal solution for Austria. Clam-Martinič headed the party in the last half of the nineteenth century.

Frankfurt Convention (*deutsche Nationalversammlung*): During the Revolution of 1848, representatives from all the "German Lands" gathered in Frankfurt. The Convention split politically between liberals and socialists and between those who sought a unified Germany which absorbed conservative Austria and its minorities or a unified Germany which would stand as a front against Austria. The identity of the Convention presupposed German macro-nationalism, and within it the socialists came to dominate. It dissolved in 1849.

Generalitat: The government of Catalonia under the *Estatut*.

Humanitas: The Roman concept of "civilization." Egalitarian and assimilationist, the Principate proposed to promote it and spread it throughout the Empire to the non-Roman peoples. Despite its Romanity, *humanitas* owed greatly to original Greek culture and influence.

Iron Ring (German - *Eisener Ring*): The coalition of German-speaking conservatives and Slavic regionalists put together by Taaffe that ruled Austria from 1879-1893. It maintained a federalist and conservative platform, undertook industrialization, and extended the suffrage to allow fair representation for minority groups.

Liberals: The traditional party of the Enlightenment in European countries. Usually existed in the central governments as a legal foil to conservatives. In Austria (*Deutsche Liberalpartei*) and Spain (*Partido Liberal*), the Liberal Parties, both also macro-nationalist and centralist, became tainted with corruption and misgovernment, and were replaced on the Left by more radical, socialist parties.

Libertas: The individual freedom of citizens from the domination of another. The concept has linked traditional conservative doctrine through the centuries as a balance between order and anarchy, and as a foil to (forced) equality. *Libertas* recognizes the equal rights of individuals, insofar as they do not infringe upon the rights of others.

Lliga Regionalista: The Regionalist League, from Catalonia. Created during the general elections of 1901 from the merger of already extant moderate and conservative catalanist parties, it became the dominant party in its home region. It promoted the concept of an ethnically diverse Spain rebuilt on a federal model, and based its policies on the concerns of industrialism and commerce. Cambó succeeded Prat de la Riba as its leader. After the Directory of Primo de Rivera, it reemerged as the "*Lliga Catalana*" in 1931, but failed to win support of the radicalized Catalan population.

Macro-nationalism: The nationalism of tl.e dominant group within a state. This movement usually does not recognize the individualities of minorities, which it often attempts to convert, assimilate, or expel.

Mancomunitat: The "Association" of Catalonia, enacted by the Conservative government in Madrid in 1913 and ratified in Catalonia in 1914. It provided the region with autonomy, enabling Catalonia to control its own internal affairs. Under its first president, Prat de la Riba, the *Mancomunitat* rapidly modernized the region, but after 1917, its progress was hampered by opposition from the Spanish-speaking macro-nationalist Left which opposed its emphasis on a Catalan identity separate from a centralized Spanish one, and from the Catalan micro-nationalist Left, which

sought greater autonomy or complete independence. Primo de Rivera suspended the *Mancomunitat* at the beginning of his Directory.

Micro-nationalism: The nationalism of a minority *Volk* which seeks to preserve its own identity by achieving a degree of "self-determination" from the central state, through autonomy or outright independence.

Nationalism: Any movement which places the identity of a *Volk* above any governmental cooperation with others of different *Völker* in order to purify or preserve its own culture. The internal logic of a nationalism consolidates definitions of "nation" to pertain to a *Volk*. Exists in macro- and micro- varieties.

Nationalitätenfrage: The question needing a solution for problems of nationalism within a polyglot state.

Nationality: The classification an individual uses to describe his origins. In most cases, it implies *Volk*. However, ambitious federalists hoped to extend the association to mean "state of origin." Thus, people would stop defining themselves and others by ethnic background, but rather by citizenship.

Old Czech Party (*Alttschechische Partei* or *Nationalpartei*): Center-right Czech regionalist party of the late nineteenth century. Based on the principles of Palacký, the party, under the leadership of Rieger joined the *Eisener Ring* coalition of Taaffe in 1879, securing Bohemia and the Czechs greater rights. It negotiated the *Ausgleich* of 1890, but after its failure in 1891, the Old Czechs lost their majority within Bohemia. The party vanished after the 1893 elections.

Populares: Not in any way a political party in the modern sense, but a loose grouping of politicians in the Roman Senate that represented, or claimed to represent, the interests of the Roman underclass.

Principate: The regime established by Augustus, which feigned Republican government but which existed under the domination of a single *princeps* ("leading citizen").

Radical Republican Party: In Spain, the party of Lerroux, advocating macro-nationalist and socialist goals.

Region: A historical unit within a state, roughly, but rarely exactly, corresponding with ethnic boundaries.

Regionalism: A movement favoring the preservation of a greater, polyglot
state on a federal model. Each region would administer its own
affairs and look after its own identity. The system would
recognize the diversity and equal rights of the component *Völker*.
Often conservative politically, regionalism emphasized dual-
loyalty to home region and greater state, the latter serving as the
guarantor of the rights of the component groups.

Reichsrath: Austrian parliament.

Republicans (1): Roman conservatives who supported the traditional values
of the Roman state (*Res Publica*) against perceived moral decay
and political tyranny. The pillar of the *res publica*, as its defender
Cicero explained, was an emphasis on *libertas*.

Republicans (2): The forces in post-Enlightenment Europe that sought to
overthrow traditional monarchies and establish "Republics."
Often, sweeping social reform accompanied this revolutionary
goal.

Self-determination: As used in the early twentieth century, the term implies
the freedom of a minority *Volk* to govern itself apart from a
more powerful one.

Slavonic Conference: Held at Prague in 1848 during the Revolution, to
establish a policy towards the continued existence of Austria.
Palacký presided.

Staatssprache: The accepted language of convenience for the central state.
Determined by historical accident, it corresponds with the
language of the dominant *Volk*, but, in a regionalist or federalist
model, does not have any current implication of dominance.

State: An existing country or greater governmental unit.

Torno: In Spain, the agreement after the Restoration of the constitutional
monarchy in which the Liberal and Conservative Parties would
alternate power. Maura opposed the system as undemocratic,
and by questioning Liberal suitability to govern after that party
had sought support from the revolutionary parties of the far-
Left, he effectively put an end to it.

Totoresistes: Catalans who sought complete and immediate independence
from Spain, and opposed any gradual approach.

Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers' Union): The Socialist trade union in Spain, affiliated with the country's Socialist Workers Party. Its membership grew greatly after it received support from Primo de Rivera during the Directory.

Veu de Catalunya: Newspaper founded by Prat which became the organ of the *Lliga*.

Volk (Plural - *Völker*): An ethnic group that considers itself a people sharing a common identity, often distinguished by language.

Young Czech Movement: Micro-nationalist movement seeking complete Czech dominance within Bohemia, and that region's autonomy or, later, independence from Austria. Led by Grégr, the group also subscribed to the social ideals of 1848. Opposed the Old Czechs, whom they viewed as too conservative, and ultimately accused them of being "traitors" to the Czech cause by arranging the *Ausgleich* of 1890. The Young Czechs defeated the Old Czechs for the first time in the 1891 elections.

Appendix C:
chronology

Classical period

202 BCE	Battle of Zama: defeat of Hannibal.
146 BCE	Destruction of Carthage and Corinth.
133 BCE	Tiberius Gracchus serves as Tribune of the People.
123 BCE	C. Gracchus becomes Tribune of the People.
95 BCE	Lex Licinia Mucia disenfranchises illegally enfranchised Italians.
90 BCE	Outbreak of Social Wars.
89 BCE	Rebellion by Marius opens Civil Wars.
88 BCE	Sulla marches on Rome.
87 BCE	Marius captures Rome.
86 BCE	Death of Marius.
83 BCE	Sulla returns from foreign command in East.
82 BCE	Battle at the Colline Gate: defeat of Marians and Samnites. Sulla becomes Dictator.
79 BCE	Sulla retires.
63 BCE	Cicero consul.
58 BCE	Cicero exiled.
47 BCE	Caesar becomes dictator.
44 BCE	Assassination of Caesar.
43 BCE	Proscription and murder of Cicero.
31 BCE	Battle of Actium: Octavian gains supremacy.
28 BCE	Octavian assumes title "Princeps."
27 BCE	Octavian becomes "Augustus."

Modern period

1492	Unification of Spanish monarchies.
1519	Ascension of Karl V, already King of Spain, as Holy Roman Emperor: personal union of most of Europe.
1620	Battle of the White Mountain: suppression of Bohemian rebellion.
1627	Official incorporation of Bohemia into Habsburg Monarchy.
1640	Revolt of Portugal and Catalonia.
1641	Portugal gains independence, Catalonia loses traditional autonomy.

1713	Treaty of Utrecht: Felipe V opens Borbón dynasty in Spain, beginning of centralization.
1775	Outbreak of American Revolution.
1787	Constitution of the United States written.
1789	Outbreak of the French Revolution.
1797	Napoleone Buonaparte becomes First Consul of France.
1804	Napoleone becomes Emperor of France.
	Franz becomes first "Kaiser of Austria."
1815	Defeat of Napoleone.
	Congress of Vienna.
	Metternich begins absolutist regime in Austria.
1848	Revolution (socialist and nationalist) sweeps across Europe: Frankfurt Convention, Slavonic Conference, Hungarian Independence.
	Franz Josef becomes Austrian Kaiser.
1860	Establishment of Liberal government in Austria.
1861	Taaffe becomes imperial administrator in Prague.
1863	Czechs withdraw from *Reichsrath*.
1866	Prussia defeats Austria.
1867	*Ausgleich* of 1867 establishes Dualism.
1871	Unification of Germany under Prussia.
1879	Collapse of Austria's Liberal government: Taaffe becomes Minister-President at the head of the Iron Ring coalition.
1881	Debate over Czech University: riots in Prague.
1886	Some German parties withdraw from Bohemian *Landtag*.
1890	*Ausgleich* of 1890.
1891	*Ausgleich* of 1890 dissolved.
	Defeat of Old Czechs.
1892	Catalanists draw up Bases at Manresa.
1893	Collapse of *Eisener Ring*: Taaffe retires.
1897	Military occupation of Catalonia.
1898	"Disaster of 1898:" Spain loses War of 1898 with United States.
1899	Brünn Conference.
1901	Free elections held in Catalonia: *Lliga* triumphs.
1903	Maura becomes head of Spain's Conservative Party.
1909	*Setmana tràgica*: anarchist revolution in Barcelona.
1913	*Cortes* approves *Mancomunitat*.
1914	Catalan assembly approves *Mancomunitat*: Prat elected President.
	Assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalist.
	First World War.
1916	Death of Franz Josef.
1917	Russian Revolution.
1918	Collapse of Habsburg Monarchy.
	Treaty of Versailles.
	Establishment of Republics in "Austria" and "Czechoslovakia."

1923	Primo stages *golpe*: beginning of Directory.
1930	Primo resigns.
1931	Alfonso XIII of Spain abdicates: establishment of Second Republic.
	Catalonia gets *Estatut*: Macià first President.
1933	Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany.
1934	Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss assassinated by pro-German National Socialists: Austria protected by Italy, aligned with Hungary. Rome Protocols.
	Revolutions in Catalonia and Asturias.
1936	Outbreak of Spanish Civil War.
1938	*Anschluss* of Austria into Germany.
	Fall of Barcelona to Franco.
1939	Franco becomes "*Caudillo*" of Spain.
	Outbreak of Second World War.
1945	Fall of Berlin. End of War.
1975	Death of Franco.
1979	Establishment of new *Estatut* in Catalonia.
1989	End of Soviet hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe: reawakening of *Nationalitätenfrage*.
1990	Reunification of Germany.
1992	European Economic Union (planned).

Appendix D:
sketch maps

comments:

Map 1: The historic regions of *Mitteleuropa*, 1878 - 1918.
"Cisleithania" - Bukowina, Galizia, Silesia, Moravia, Bohemia, Upper-Austria, Lower Austria, Styria, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg, Carinthia, Cariniola, Istria, Triest, Dalmatia.
"Transleithania" - Hungary (including Slovakia and Vojvodina), Transylvania, Croatia.
Jointly administered - Bosnia, Hercegovina.

Map 2: The ethnic boundaries of *Mitteleuropa*, 19th cent.
A large ethnically-mixed population lived in Vienna. Prague and (to a lesser extent) Buda-pest also had a substancial German-speaking population. Jews were generally classified by primary language, often German. Szeklers, ethnically Turkish, spoke Magyar.

Map 3: The historic regions of Iberia, 19th cent.

Map 4: The ethnic boundaries of Iberia, 19th cent.
Ethnic boundries in Spain are often unclear, and do not necessarily correspond to the linguistic boundries (shown here) for which more accurate data exist. The Catalan linguistic frontier includes ethnic Aragonese, while the Basque linguistic frontier does not include all Basques, especially in the last century. Gallegos, speaking a language akin to Portuguese, are ethnically Celtic. Asturians are also Celtic, although they speak a language akin to Castilian. Leonese and Aragonese, ethnically related to Castilians, once posessed their own widespread language-variants, now virtually extinct save for occassionally asserted dialectical remnants along the Gallego-portuguese linguistic frontier (Leonese) and in the foothils of the Pyrennes (Aragonese). Dialects of Castilian completely replaced the Mozarabic language in southern Spain during the reconquest, although Andalucians have continued to assert their distinct Moorish-influenced identity. Catalonia, especially Barcelona, gained a large "immigrant" population (largely Andalucian, but many Gallegos) during and after the industrial revolution.

[sources: Kann, *Nationalitätenproblem*; Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Etniques i les Nacions (Barcelona); Spanish Office of Tourism (New York); Gili, *Catalan Grammar*.]

Map 1: The historic regions of *Mitteleuropa*, 1878 - 1918.

Map 2: The ethnic boundaries of *Mitteleuropa*, 19th cent.

Map 3: The historic regions of Iberia, 19th cent.

GALICIA / GALIZA
- Santiago de Compostela
- La Coruña / A Coruña

ASTURIAS / ASTURIES
- Oviedo / Uviéu

LEÓN
- León

CASTILLA LA VIEJA
- Burgos

CASTILLA LA NUEVA
- Madrid
- Toledo

PORTUGAL
- Lisboa

ESTREMADURA

ANDALUCÍA

MURCIA

ARAGÓN
- Zaragoza

CATALUÑA / CATALUNYA
- Barcelona

LA RIOJA

NAVARRA / NAFARROA
- Pamplona
- Iruña

BEARN / ZUBEROA

ANDORRA

ROUSSELLON / ROSSELLÓ
- Perpignan / Perpinyà

LANGUE D'OC

PAIS VALENCIANO / PAÍS VALENCIÀ
- Valencia / València

ISLAS BALEARES / ILLES BALEARS
- Palma

1. VIZCAYA / BIZKAIA
2. GUIPÚZCOA / GIPUZKOA
3. ÁLAVA / ARABA — S. Sebastián / Donostia
4. LABOURD / LABURDI
5. BASSE NAVARRE / BEHENAFARROA

OCCITANIANS

GASCONS

(ARAGONESE)

BASQUES

CASTILANS

ASTURIANS

(LEONESE)

GALLEGOS

CATALANS

ANDALUCIANS

PORTUGUESE

Map 4: The ethnic boundaries of Iberia, 19th cent.

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[Due to the broad nature of the theme, many books overlap in their nature and subject matter. They are here classified as close as possible to their most appropriate category. Authors are alphabetized under their own name if they used a pseudonym. Otherwise, all names have been listed as published, although these may not agree with their forms in their native languages or with modern spelling conventions.]

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[Truthfully speaking, none of these sources could carry the label "primary," since some were written centuries after the events they describe. The problematic nature of (usually non-surviving) primary classical history sources, however, makes such accounts as these indespensible. Authors are listed after the name most familiar through convention.]

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J. Miscellaneous important writings and theories on the *Nationalitätenfrage*

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K. Conversations with experts

[Of the many conversations I had with experts on this topic, the following have proven most influential.]

Badian, Ernst - Professor of Ancient History, Harvard College.

Barzelay, Michael - Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University).

Brademas, John - President, New York University.

Cambó de Guardans, Helena - daughter of Francesc Cambó.

Djilas, Aleksa - Yugoslav historian and editor.

Fishman, Robert - Professor of Government and of Social Studies, Harvard College.

Kirschbaum, Stanislav - Slovak nationalist; Professor of International Studies, York University.

Linz, Juan - Professor of Sociology and of Political Sciences, Yale University.

Lukes, Igor - Professor of International Relations, Boston University.

Molas, Isidre - Catalanist professor, Institute of Political and Social Sciences (Barcelona).

Raguer, Hilari - Monk/Historian at the Abbey of Montserrat.

Ronen, Dov - Scholar of Self-Determination (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University).

Sahlins, Peter - Professor of History, University of California (Berkeley).