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CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
IN LEGISLATION

AN APPROACH TO THE LEGISLATIVE
PRODUCTION OF SPANISH PARLIAMENT
(1979 - 1982)

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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to make an analytical assessment of
the period covered by the first ordinary Parliament elected af-
ter the approval of the new Spanish Constitution at the end of
1978. It was during the life of this Parliament,which lasted
from March 1979 to July 1982, that the first legislative deve-
lopments took place since the approval of the Constitution,
and this fact lends it special importance. After the long pa-
renthesis of the Franco dictatorship and the period of transi-
tion, Spain once again had a democratic Constitution and the
272 bills passed during the life of this Parliament formed the
first constitutional body of law since 1939. These Cortes (1)
were also the target of the attempted coup d'etat of 23 Februa-
ry 1981,which failed as a result of the firm intervention of
the King on the side on Constitutional legality and a variety
of other circunstances. Our objective is to analyze the different
phases of the legislative process during those years, using
both theoretical considerations,which will be of help in unders-
tanding the specific set of problems faced by the Spanish Par-
liament, and quantitative information which will provide exam-
ples and evidence in support of certain statements.

1. The Cortes. Composition

In Spain the Cortes represent and exercise legislative po-
wer. They consist of two co-legislative chambers: the Congreso
de los Diputados (congress, or lower chamber) and the Senado
(senate,or upper chamber). The relationship between the two
houses amounts to what is termed an "imperfect" two chamber sys-
tem, in that the upper house occupies a subsidiary position with
respect to the lower house, both in terms of the formation and
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control of the government and with reference to the whole process whereby laws are discussed and receive final approval.

The composition of the Cortes which emerged from the elections of 1 March 1979 was as follows:

Congreso de los Diputados (2)   seats   %

Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) (3)........168.......48%
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)......121.......34'5%
Partido Comunista de España (PCE).............. 23....... 6'6%
Coalición DEmocrática (4)..................... 9....... 2'6%
Minoría Catalana (5).......................... 8....... 2'3%
Minoría Vasca (6)............................. 7....... 2%
Grupo Andalucista (7)......................... 5....... 1'4%
Other deputies................................ 9....... 2'6%

                    TOTAL......................350.......100%

Senado (8)

UCD...122.......58'7%
PSOE.. 71.......34'1%
Minoría Vasca................................. 8....... 3'8%
Other senators................................ 7....... 3'4%

                    TOTAL......................208.......100%

The lower house owes its greater political weight to the presence in its midst of the country's most outstanding political figures, on account of which its holds greater attraction for the media. The senate, on the other hand, has been developing into a chamber frequented by former political leaders who have been thrust into positions which bestow honour but not power; leading figures of certain party organizations, who take on

representative positions which are neither particularly time-
consuming nor demanding; and a few influential personalities
from the provinces, who reach the upper house as a result of
the electoral system (9).

During the Parliament we are concerned with, the group which
commanded a majority in both houses was the UCD, a medley of
groups ranging from liberals to the odd social democrat via
others with christian democrat leanings. While some of the
clashes between these groups were on ideological grounds, the
great majority were due to personal differences and the strug-
gle for power among their respective leaders. It was such dis-
crepancies that undermined the UCD's strength throughout the
life of the Parliament and eventually led to the party's near
disintegration (10). As is apparent from the tables showing
the composition of the two houses, in spite of being the lea-
ding party in both houses, the UCD lacked an absolute majority
in the congress. It was thus obliged to enter into pacts with
forces of variable affinity to itself, such as Minoría Catala-
na or Coalición Democrática, in order to form succesive govern-
ment, to get its bills passed and to defeat the motion of censu-
re tabled by the PSOE.

2. Legislative initiative

In Spain the process whereby laws are drafted always begins
in the leower house. Bills may be introduced by the government,
or by the different parliamentary groups in the lower house,
the upper house, the legislative assemblies of the different
autonomous regions (11) and, in theory, by so-called "popular
legislative initiative" (12).

	intro duced	passed
Governement bills	287	207
Bills from Congress	200	33
Bills from the Senate	7	6
Bills from the legislative assemblies of the autonomous regions	1	–

The table shows that, while the number of initiatives emanating from the government and the lower house is relatively similar, in terms of the number of bills actually passed the government is clearly predominant. If this Parliament is compared with the previous one (the Cortes Constituyentes, which sat during the phase of transition and drew up the new Constitution), the number of bills introduced by parliamentary groups is seen to increase. This may be explained by several factors including: the graeter weakness of the UCD, the end of the "transitional" phase, and the decline in law-making initiatives on the part of the UCD during the last stage of the Parliament (13). It can also be observed that bills introduced by the government are much more "successful" than those submitted by parliament. There is no restriction in Spain of the bills tabled by the government for discussion in the lower house: no period for public information, no consultation with sectors of society which may be presumed to be concerned by the bill, and no prior examination by the upper house which, in theory, is supposed to represent the interests of the autonomous regions. On the other hand, bills submitted by either of the chambers are subject to a phase known as "toma en consideración" (prior consideration) during which the congress, in plenary session, debates whether it is appropiate to commence formal discussion of the bill. Both the government and the relevant parliamentary commissions submit reports to the plenary session of the lower house setting out their

their respective positions regarding the proposal. After this the assembly decides whether to authorize the beginning of proceedings. It will be obvious from this that the majority group possesses a powerful weapon for curtailing parliamentary legislative initiative. It is frequently stated that the government is planning, or preparing, to introduce a bill on the same subject, while in other cases the proposal is opposed simply on the grounds of disagreement with its basic philosophy. This phase also provides a good opportunity for pacts between the government and the group supporting it and others groups skin to it. Alternatively the government can oppose discussions of a bill if it considers it involves an increase in expenditure or a reduction in revenue. This is known as the "budgetary guillotine" (14).

	intro duced	"tomadas en consideración"*	passed
PSOE	83	23	10
PCE	32	7	3
Minoría Catalana	15	7	4
Coalición Democrática	11	7	2
Various gropus together	44	12	9
UCD	15	8	5
Bills from congress	200	64	33

(* i.e. debated beyond the "toma en consideración" or prior consideration stage)

The above table show that the opposition groups (PSOE and PCE) are only successful in taking 26% of their proposals beyond the prior consideration stage, and that no more than 11.3% of the

bills submitted by them are passed. On the other hand, groups which occasionally support the government manage to have 53.8% of their proposals debated and 23% of their bills are passed and become law. During the 1977-1979 Parliament, when the UCD was in a firmer position, these same groups were able to have only 23% of their bills carried. This increase is significant and may indicate a greater degree of joint responsability among these groups in the legislative process. One point which cannot be ommited when examining parliamentary legislative initiative is that the Minoría Vasca (Basque Minority), the group that represents the members of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, did no introduce a single bill during either the Parliament we are discussing here or the previous one. This amounts to five years' presence in Parliament without a single legislative initiative, a record which may be the expression of a policy situated outside the legislative organs of the state and exclusively concentrated on the negotiation between the Basque regional autonomous community. where this group forms the government, and the central administration (15).

.The above informationappears once again to show the clear predominance of the government in the law-making process. However if we pay more detailed attention to the laws passed and their content, the final balance may be substantially different. Thus out of a total of 207 government bills passed, 74 involve nothing more than granting or approving special or additional funds, 19 are laws modifying or creating particular sections of the civil service, while 13 are laws of extremely limited scope and significance (authorization or modification of taxes, modification of army posts, alientation of particular plots of public land, the inclusion of certain projects in the public works program, etc.). Hence a total of 106 may be considered

bills related to "means", that is, bills deriving directly
from the day-to-day executive and management activities of
the government which, by their very formulation, neither aim
at nor succeed in substantially changing or renewing the bo-
dy of law. These 106 laws went through the two houses without
arousing the slightest enthusiasm or controversy. Together
they represent 51,2 % of the total number of government bills
and 36,9 % of all the bills passed. Among laws of parliamen-
tary origin we obviously do not find this type of legislation,
though some proposals are markedly local in nature: the creation
of a University for Castille-La Mancha, prefrential transport
costs for the inhabitants of Mallorca, changes affecting the
maintenance staff at the Canary Island airports, and so on. But
aside from the question of laws of limited scope , our initial
statement about the overwhelming preponderance of the government
in legislative initiative needs to be qualified. The record of
these $3\frac{1}{2}$ years of legislative action, excluding the 106 laws
related to "means", shows a much clearer balance than might be
supposed. The lack of an absolute majority, together with the
will to continue, explicitly or implicitly, along the path of
agreement and consensus with this overall balance in which the
legislative initiative of the lower house is clearly visible.

In the of initiatives emanating from the senate, advance
approval by the whole of that chamber for the proposal or pro-
posals is required. Once this agreement is obtained, the procee-
dings commence in the senate and the bill is discussed, first
in commission and then by the chamber as a whole. Then the pro-
posal is sent to the lower house where it is referred directly
to the relevant commission. It will be clear that these procee
dings in the upper house merely serve to avoid the prior consi-
deration phase (toma en consideración) in the congress but that
afterwards the lower house regains its predominant role. In the

life of this Parliament only seven bills were introduced by the upper house, six of which were passed. The scarcity of proposals originating in the upper house is unsatisfactory and underlines the situation of near-marginality towards which senate is evolving. Only one of the six laws passed, moreover, is of any note, and since this fulfilled certain requirements laid down by the Constitution, its adoption was almost obligatory (16). The remaining five laws are of little importance, both in substance and in scope.

Finally there is the law-making initiative that belongs to the autonomous regions. The only proposal from this sector originated in the Catalan Parliament and aimed at the establishment of a regional television channel for Cataalonia. This bill, which was introduced at the very end of the Cortes, was never passed. Initiatives of this type are also subject to   prior consideration on the part of the lower house. A special feature of the proceedings is that three members of the regional assembly in question are responsible for defending the text. As can be seen, the record of legislative initiatives from this source could hardly be less impressive, though it should be remembered that the transformation of Spain into a "state of autonomous regions" was barely beginning in 1981 and 1982.

In addition to the 246 laws approved during this Parliament, as described in the table above, 13 statutes of regional autonomy,and 13 decrees (decretos-ley) introduced by the government were debated and passed (17). The statutes of regional autonomy are dealt with according to a special procedure in which the deputies and senators elected in the territory of the autonomous community take part in addition to other autorities representing the different provincial administrations. In this case no prior

consideration phase is required. During the Parliament that concerns us here, the discussion of statutes regional autonomy took longer than other bills. An average of 33 weeks elapsed before other laws received final approval, as against 45 weeks for the approval of statutes of autonomy.

In the case of decrees (decretos-ley) introduced by the government, the lower house has to decide within a maximum of 30 days whether or not they are to be confirmed by Parliament ("convalidadas")(18). If confirmed, a decree may then be debated in the same way as a bill, and all the amendments considered appropiate by the two houses may be adopted. Obviously all decrees have force of law once confirmed, but only if they are debated and passed as bills will they formally become law. During the 1979-1982 Parliament the average duration of the proceedings --25 weeks-- was shorter than for ordinary laws, but it should be remembered that during the debates the rules applicable to situations of urgency were always followed.

3. The proceedings. The amendment phase

The amendment phase begins immediately the bill has been introduced (in the case of government bills, decrees submitted for debate, proposals from the senate and statutes of autonomy) or following prior consideration ("toma en consideración") in other cases. Amendments may be proposed by private members individually or through their parliamentary groups. The time allocated is supposed be 15 days, but the average in the 1979-1982 Parliament was 25 days. The criterion generally followed is that an extension of the time allowed for amendments is granted whenever it is requested by any group of the grounds of the importance or complexity of the bill. In view of the lack of participatory methods in drafting bills, consultation with concerned sectors not being customary, this phase could in theory

serve to make known the opinions of the social groups involved
through the parties closest to them. In fact the time allowed
is very short and there is no opportunity for more thorough
information and discussion until later in the proceedings. It
is important to differentiate between overall amendments, affec-
ting the bill as a whole, and amendments to particular articles.
Overall amendments imply fundamental disagreement with the bill.
Their aim may be either simply to return the bill to the govern-
ment or to suggest an alternative text. This device makes it possi-
ble later to debate the whole project, its philosophy, social
consequences, possible controversiality, and so on. Groups
opposed to the government and those who have been left out of
the process of drafting the bill use this debate on the whole
text to expose their viewpoints and indeed to outline the po-
sition they are going to adopt throughout the legislative pro-
cess. Obviously, in addition tabling amendments to the whole bill,
they also propose a multitude of amendments to individual arti-
cles as a basis for later negotiation. In fact, in Spain today,
as in nearly all western parliaments, the presentation of amend-
ments constitutes one of the fundamental tasks of members and
their groups. This is what has been termed the "derived" legis-
lative initiative of parliamentary representatives, since it
is exercised on the legislative initiative of the government.
The only limit to the proposal of amendments provided for in
the regulations is that they must not necessitate changes in
budgetary provisions (19).

4. The "ponencia" or subcommision phase

    This phase in the legislative process has tended to become
increasingly decisive in the discussion and approval of govern-
ment bills ("proyectos de ley") and bills of others origins
("proposiciones de ley"). The "ponencia" is a sub-group formed
within the relevant commision, in which the various parliamen-

tary groups are represented. The number of members ranged from
four to over ten, according the importance of the text. Its
essential function is not merely to establish the order of
the amendments submitted; it can also modify the text of the
bill on the basis of one of the amendments, and even modify
any aspect of the original text according to the "spirit"
of various amendments. The document drawn up by the ponencia
-its report or "informe"- is often substantially different
from the text originally presented and has the backing of
the representatives of most of the groups. This is because
when decisions are made within the ponencia, disagreements
are not usually solved by taking a vote. Whenever possible
an attempt is made to reach a compromise or, failing this,
the conflict is passed on to the comission through the pre-
sentation of an alternative text. Another decisive factor
is that, whereas the commission's deliberations are held
in the presence of the media, who inform public opinion
of any pacts or concessions made by parliamentary groups,
the ponencia works behind closed doors. Being the only par-
liamentary body to do so, it is the ideal place for groups
to agree to modify their positions, to trade off concessions
and, so on, without running the risk of their attitudes be-
coming known to the public al large or to their elrctorate.
The ponencia stage is the key moment for agreement and con-
sensus.Hence examination of the legislative practice of the
1979-1982 Cortes reveals that the ponencia is far and away
the longest phase in the whole legislative process. The ru-
les of congress provide for 15 days of discussion in the po-
nencia, whereas in fact the time taken was five times grea-
ter: 71 days. The more controversial and complex the law,
the longer the ponencia lasts. The organic law for reforming
the code of military justice took 41 weeks to get through
the sub-comission stage, while the whole of the rest of the

process took only 28 weeks, including the debate in the Senate;
discussion of the Spanish divorce law took as long in the <u>ponen-</u>
<u>cia</u> as in all the remainder of the legislative proceedings, and
many other exanples of this phenomenon could be cited. This is
basically because it is at the <u>ponencia</u> stage that the proposed
text is discussed in depth, that the reactions aroused by the
bill in society at large are expressed through the various groups
present, and that a positions of consensus is sought that will
emerge in the report and will then be carried through the remain-
der of the proceedings. Even though the <u>ponencia</u> is finally
dissolved upon handing down its report to the commission, its
members usually play a leading part in the rest of the legisla-
tive process, being more familiar with the text and the problems
surrounding it than anyone else. It is significant that govern-
ment bills spent almost twice as long in the <u>ponencia</u> phase as
other bills, since the latter had already been debated during
the prior consideration phase (toma en consideración) when the
agreements and disagreements of the different groups had already
become apparent. The modification of the rules of congress in
February 1982 had hardly any effect during the life of the Par-
liament with which we are concerned. However it may lead to
changes in the relative time spent by government and non-govern
ment bills in the <u>ponencia</u> phase, since the debate on overall
amendments to the more controversial government bills will al-
ready have taken place and thus the level of the discussion in
the sub-commission will be similar for all bills. Whatever the
outcome, this will not entail a reduction in the particular im-
portance of the <u>ponencia</u> phase, which has grown consistently
throughout the transitional period and the life of the first
constitutional Parliament.

5. The commission phase

During the period covered by our analysis, the commission did not play a particularly remarkable role in the general legislative process. Indeed one might say that it was "jammed in" between the crucial ponencia phase and the more directly political and public phase of the plenary debate. The commssion was required to discusse the ponencia's report and to decide on amendments and votes on specific articles that the remaining members of the commission still considered necessary. Nonetheless the key debate had already taken place and, in view of the work accomplished in the ponencia, further shifts in position were unlikely. Moreover the work of the commission had little impact on public opinion. Consequently this was a phase that took up little time -26 days on the average- and during which the only way of modifying positions was through so-called "transactional amendments", that is, amendments proposed in the course of the debate itself in an endeavour to bring the positions expressed in the text closer to some amendment that was considered inadmissible as originally formulated. The commissions could also approve government or non-government bills without the need for subsequent discussion by congress as a whole. Thus in certain cases (20) the commission enjoyed full legislative competence, and the text that emerged from its discussions was sent directly to the senate. During the life of the Parliament we are analyzing, however, only 46 bills were passed in commssion and all of without exception were of very limited scope: the allocation of funds, establishment of a new category of teachers, alienation of public property, reclassification of a national park, modification of article 20 of the Registry of births,mariages and deaths, and so on. All this was done, moreover, without any systematic criterion, that is, in other cases where funds were allocated, property alienated or categories of personnel set up, the process did not terminate in commission but continued in congress. Obviously such matters could be referred to the whole house whenever two parliamentary groups or fifty

deputies asked for a full debate. The point we wish to make,
however, is that during the life of the previous Parliament,
and above all as long as the old regulations of congress remai-
ned in force (that is, almost to the end of the period), the
decentralized form of proceedings, involving commissions with
full legislative competence, was somewhat exceptional. The new
regulations adopted in February 1982 substantially alter this
criterion, making the commission the final instance of the le-
gislative process, with only very precise exceptions. These
concern matters in which the Spanish Constitution itself makes
a plenary debate obligatory, or in which the whole congress
sets aside for itself the discussion of some particular government
or non-government bill. In the words of the rules of congress:
"Congress will be presumed to consent to delegate full legisla-
tive competence to the commission...". The final result of this
new formula will be to increase the power of the commssions and
to relieve congress of the need to debate and decide upon an
endless number of laws of little consequence or very limited
scope.

6. The plenary debate

There is no doubt that this is the phase most directly re-
lated to public opjnion for a variety of reasons. The presence
of the most powerful of the mass media, television, is of prime
importance in that it makes it possible to broaden the parliamen-
tary debate to a very considerable extent. The most controversial
topics are those most widely discussed and the fact that ministers
and other foremost political figures are more freqyuent parti-
cipants in this phase for depth analysis of bills, since nearly
everything has already been said and discussed. In practice

only a few contentious points are modified by way of direct
negotiation between the chief advocates of differing viewpoints.
Here too the custom established during the phase of political
transition -that of consensus- is maintained. The process
of negotiation, agreement, and political and other trade-offs,
in which political leaders play the main parts, may bring endless
days of debate in the _ponencia_ and the commission to a final
conclusion. In this respect the role of"transactional amendments"
is fundamental. All things considered, despite its short duration
(25 days) and its apparent formality and inflexibility, the
importance of this phase of the legislative process should not
be underestimated.

7. The role of the senate

The senate has a very limited role in the Spanish parliamen-
tary system. Although the Constitution singles it out a chamber
of territorial representation, its function basically duplicates
that of the congress. Its scope for legislative initiative is
very small; the mechanisms at its disposal/for controlling the
government are few and little used; it does not count leading
Spanish politicians among its members; government ministers
only attend its sessions in response to a direct summons; and
the senators themselves have to go to the congress if they
wish lobbying with ministers or party leaders. In short, the
senate is located outside the country's twofold centre of ins-
titutional and political attention: congress and the government.

The subordinate role of the senate is obvious in terms of its
legislative function. It is only allowed two months during

which to study, modify and approve texts tramitted by congress.
This period may be further drastically curtailed to 20 days if
congress decides to matter is urgent. Such timing makes it
impossible for the senate to give serious reflection to texts
approved by congress. It cannot negotiate at its own pace and
cannot leave the more controversial aspects to one side for la-
ter discussion. In short its task cannot amount to much more than
making technical corrections, rectifying oversights, or reformu-
lating aspects that fail to satisfy the majority group in either
house. In the 1979-1982 Parliament, only 30% of the texts tras-
mitted by congress were modified by the senate. As a rule the
modifications were minimal and, as the figures show, usually
not even a comma was changed.

The only way the Spanish senate can define a role for itself
is by reinforcing its theoretical position as the chamber of
the autonomous regions. To do this it must use the means at its
disposal (such as the Fondo de Compensación Interritorial);
accentuate the function exercised by senators from the autonomous
regions as intermediaries vis-à-vis the central administration
(22); make it necessary for government bills that may affect
regional interests to undergo prior examination in the senate,
and so on. Otherwise the very existence of the upper house will
be increasingly open the question.

8. Bills left pending

Finally we wish to refer to those legislative initiatives
which, for a variety of reasons had not completed all stages of
the proceedings by the time the Cortes were dissolved at the
end of July 1982.

Reference should first be made to those bills which, for
one reason or another,were withdrawn by the government during
the life of the Parliament. This is a device the government

may use at any phase in the legislative process, as long as the
bill has not received final approval. Ten bills were withdrawn
in this way between March 1979 and July 1982. Of these, the
bill concerning the police forces of the autonomous regions
deserves to be singled out as particularly important. This was
withdrawn by the government after 20 weeks of discussion when
it had already reached the commission stage. The debate on uni-
versity autonomy aroused more interest and controversy. Two
bills on this subject were introduced by the government,and both
were withdrawn at different stages in the procedures, the second
when it was in full parliamentary debate. The proceedings rela-
ting to this bill were among the factors that led to three succe-
ssive changes at the head of the ministry concerned.

Bills originating in Parliament can also be withdrawn, but
only before the "prior consideration" stage . This ocurred
approximately eight times during the life of the Parliament we
are discussing. The main reason why such bills were withdrawn
by their proposers was either that they coincided with a bill
introduced simultaneously by the government, or that they were
similar to bills proposed by other groups. As can be seen, bills
can have a "proliferation" effect, in that they oblige the govern
ment to react to initiatives from parliament with counter-initia
tives of its own, and that they drive other parliamentary groups
to introduce bills themselves for fear of losing ground or pres-
tige among the electorate. These are the type of bills referred
to by the Italians as "grappoli" (grape-bunch) proposals. Exam -
ples include the revision of the referendum law in order to fa-
cilitate the access of Andalusia to regional autonomy, or the
bills presented by socialists and communists to improve the
situation or former soldiers who fought on the Republican side
in the Spanish Civil War, the aim of which was clearly conci-
liatory. Another less important example, which was nonetheless
significant in terms of its effects on part of the electorate,
was provided by the two almost simultaneous proposals also tabled

by socialists and communists with respect to the creation of a
professional corporation of psychologists.

Other legislative initiatives did not reach the final stage
of the proceedings on account of the early discussion of the
Cortes . The law of cooperatives had been under discussion
for 65 weeks, and the law on conscientious objection for 54
weeks, both being in the ponencia phase. This is a frequent
occurrence when serious disagreements arise within the ponencia:
the controversial text is"shelved" while everyone waits for
the situation to unravel. If this does not happen, the text
may still be in this situation when Parliament is dissolved.
Even more often, when a government or non-government bill
is expected to arouse controversy, or alternatively fails even
to to arouse interest, the members of the ponencia are never
even appointed. Thus 69% of legislative texts that were still
pending in July 1982 had not progressed farther than the amend-
ment phase.

The early dissolution of the Cortes was also responsible
for the fact that, of the 87 bills introduced in 1982, only
9 were passed. The rest were left in abeyance, that is, the pro-
ceedings were never completed. When the new Parliament convenes,
it is the government's privilege to decide whether to resume
proceedings on texts not previously approved.

NOTES

1.-The "Cortes" is the name traditionally used to refer to
   Spanish Parliament.

2.-The congress is the lower house of the Spanish Parliament.
   It comprises 350 deputies elected by a proportional system ,
   the province being the basic electoral constituency which is
   represented by several deputies. Barcelona is the province
   with most deputies (33), Soria being situated at the other
   end of the scale with only 3.

3.-Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) is the party formed by
   Adolfo Suarez when he was already prime minister in May
   1977, a month befeore the first democratic elections in
   June 1977. Its ideology was far from clear, though it can
   be referred to in general terms as centre-right

4.-Coalición Democrática was the name of the group that compri-
   sed Alianza Popular, the party headed by Fraga Iribarne, (a
   former minister under Franco), as well as other smaller for-
   mations. Its mentality was basically conservative, and it
   represented those sectors of the right which had accepted
   the rules of democracy.

5.-The Minoria Catalana included the Catalan nationalist depu-
   ties belonging to the party Convergencia Democratica de Cata-
   lunya. Its position was centre-left, though during this Par-
   liament the group maintained a fertile working relationship
   with the UCD.

6.-The Minoría Vasca (Basque Minority) represented the deputies
   of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco. Its position was centre-
   right, and it only intervened actively in defence of the
   interests of the Basque people whom it claimed to represent.

7.-The Grupo Andalucista, with only five deputies, was able
   to gain recognition as a group only by agreeing to support
   the UCD in the formation of the new government. It represented
   deputies of the then Partido Socialista de Andalucía (now
   Partido Andalucista) which has centre-left leanings.

8.-The senate is the upper house in the Spanish Parliament. It consists of 208 senators elected by a majority system. The province is the electoral constituency, each province being represented by four senators, regardless of its population. cf.note 22.

9.-Examples are Ramiro Cercós, from Soria, and Tirso Pons, from Minorca. In these electoral constituencies it is possible to win a seat in the senate with only a few thousand votes. What is more, candidates do not need to be supported by any party, since voters can choose whichever candidate they prefer from an open list. In elections to congress, in contrast, the lists are closed.

10-The UCD won over 6 million votes and 168 seats in congress in 1979, as against only 1½ million votes and 12 seats in 1982. It has now been practically dissolved.

11-In the 1978 Spanish Constitution, provision is made for the creation of "autonomous communities" exercising legislative power within the areas under their jurisdiction. The Parliament of each autonomous region, in addition to passing laws of its now, can send bills to the central Parliament.

12-The Constitution established the possibility of bills being introduced with the support of 500.000 signatures. This will in fact only be feasible when a law developing this provision of the Constitution comes into effect, and this law has yet to be passed.

13-In the previous Parliament (1977-1979), only 9% of laws originated from parliamentary initiatives.

14-This is a measure introduced by the Spanish Constitution (art.134.6) which in theory seeks to safeguard the principle of a balanced budget.

15-It is common knowledge that a situation of considerable tension exists in the Basque Country and the position of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco is that virtually the only reason for its presence in the Spanish congress is to secure advantages for its own regional self-governing institutions.

16-We are referring to the law establishing the "Fondo de Compensación Territorial", the aim of which is to combat regional imbalance. The Constitution laid down that the proceedings for creating this fund must originate in the senate.

17-Statutes of autonomy are legislative texts which lay the foundations for establishing the scope of legislative and other competences to be enjoyed by the autonomous regions. They also define the organs of self-government they are to possess and the mechanisms whereby the statutes themselves may be revised. Hence they constitute a very special type of legislative text. Decrees (decretos ley) are texts that stem from the exceptional legislative powers that the Constitution grants to the government. In order for these powers to be used, the situation must be one of extraordinary and urgent necessity.

18-This gives the Cortes some degree of control over the motives for which the government uses this device, which is supposed to be of an exceptional nature, since normally only the Cortes can exercise legislative power. Any decree not confirmed ("convalidado") is anulled.

19-This is the same principle already referred to in note 14, which covers both non-government bills and amendments.

20-The Constitution provides for a device called "reserva de pleno" (reservation for plenary debate) which applies to matters of constitutional reform, rights and liberties, general electoral laws, statutes of autonomy, and budgetary laws.

21-See note 16

22-Each autonomous region can appoint one senator for every million inhabitants. The appointment is usually made by the regional parliament.

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The Split Between the Established and Non-Established
Left in Germany

INTRODUCTION

The concepts of Left and Right as instruments for classifying
and interpreting political positions have, since their
inception in the First French Republic, had a symbolic
meaning. These terms as well as others, such as "liberal",
"progressive", "conservative" and "reactionary" have been
defined on the basis of voting sets of issues: political
democracy versus monarchy, free market versus planned economy,
social reform versus laissez-faire and socialism versus
capitalism (Lipset 1981:233). While the frame of reference
has changed in the course of history, two main ideological
elements constitute the general basis of these concepts: the
stance towards social change and that towards equality. Using
these elements Lipset et al. offer an abstract definition of
Left and Right which includes their contemporary understanding:
"By Left we mean advocating social change in the direction
of greater equality - political, economic, or social; by Right
we shall mean supporting a traditional, more or less
hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward greater
equality (1954:1135).
The political relevance of the Left-Right Dimension for Western
Mass Publics conceptually to order policies, politicians and
parties as well as individual self-images could be demonstrated
in detail in recent years: more than 90% of the West-German
and even 2/3 of the American electorate has been found to
interprete individual policy preferences in terms of Left and
Right or to order politicians and parties along this dimension

(cf. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Klingemann 1979, Pappi 1983).

This evidence should, on the other hand, not be misinter-
preted. While 90% of the electorate may use the left/right
frame it seems to have personal relevance for a significantly
smaller group. In a 1976 German pre-election study only 36%
answered affirmatively the question "do you ever think of
yourself as being to the Left, the centre or the Right in
politics, or don't you think of yourself in this way?" And the
proportion of the electorate which is able to use these labels
in an abstract way, in Germany in 1974 hardly exceeds.
Corresponding figures are comparably low also in Great Britain,
The USA and Switzerland, and reach some 30% in Italy and the
Netherlands (Klingemann 1982:221).
Doubts as to the relevance of these concepts increased through
the findings of Norpoth (1979) and Pappi (1983) who have
demonstrated that, while on the aggregate level, perceived
party-orderings fit fairly well the Left-Right Dimension,
about 50% of those questioned were able "correctly" to order
the individual (German) parties along the Left-Right Continuum.
On this basis the latter author raised the question of
dimensionality of the Left-Right Continuum: he hesitates to use
and interpret the Left-Right-self-placement further until
the clarification of the contents of the the Left-Right-self-
placement and its references to ideological orientations is
reached (Pappi 1983:439).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this clarification.
Our principal hypothesis is that the value component of Left

and Right has to be differentiated into a value preference
(which is related to material preferences) and an
establishment/non-establishment component. A subsidary
hypothesis maintains that the latter component shows
substantial life-cycle effects. This will be done by a
conceptual discussion of the components of Left and Right and a
partial empirical test of corresponding hypotheses. For this
test, which will and must be extended comparatively, we use
data of the 1980 German pre-election study of Rudolf Wildenmann
and to a lesser extent for comparison the German data of the
1974 Political Action Study (Za No. o757).

2. A Test of Hypotheses: Who calls himself a Leftist-and why.

Based on the findings of Inglehart and Klingemann (1976)
that the Left-Right scale covers two components, party-
preference and issue-preference, our aim is to decompose the
latter component and discover the relation to the former. In
this analysis we will test hypotheses as to which social
groups should be found on the left and for what reason
In this context several hypotheses are offered. The most
common, historically founded understanding of "Left" and "Right"
is formulated by Robert McIver in the following way: "The
right is always the party sector associated with the interests
of the upper or dominant classes, the left the sector expressive
of the lower economic or social classes, and the center that of
the middle classes" (1947:216).

The question remains as to what constitutes the upper or
"dominant" classes and also that as to whether these categories
change with time. If we accept that these social groups could
and do perceive themselves as dominant who are able
effectively to deflect demands of competing social groups for
economic ressources (Offe 1972) these groups should change over
time. Whereas it was the working class, who, in the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution,was deprived of economic and
political power, this has seemed to change somewhat in modern
industrial societies. The working class has now established
itself as a strongly competing force, organized by the unions
and backed by a broad social security system. Thus it is not

surprising that the distances between working class and
the broad middle classes on the Left-Right Continuum are
fairly small. That they exist at all - as can be seen from
the 1980 data in table 1 - must at the same time not mean
that the working class must feel deprived. Their members can
also place themselves on the left, for they know that their
own preferred party is commonly perceived as left. Thus the
working class in Germany should in the Social democrats belong
to the left of the spectrum. The difference lies here in the
meaning of Left: It could for a member or supporter of the
leftist party denote either a f eling or personal depriviation
or a self-concious feeling of belonging to a strong value
community. The need for a separation of both components and a
further differentiation of the meaning of the value-component
is obvious.

Before we examine this relationship we should have a closer
look at the single effects of party primity and issue-preferences
For the former we have used the measure of party identification
introduced by Berger (see e.g. Berger 1977) and have
differentiated the identities for the two main parties by the
strength of their support. This measure, as expected, best
explains respondents` Left-Right self-placement. The second
best indicator is the issue-preference scale introduced by
Inglehart, the "Postmaterialism-Index" (Inglehart 1971). Those
who prefer non-material, participatory goals over material
goals are found significantly closer to the left. Thus far, these
findings meet our expectations.

This relationship should in the theoretical conceptualization of Inglehart extend to the younger age cohorts in terms of changed value-systems. These should therefore tend more strongly to the Left due to their more strongly non-material issue preferences. This hypothesis seems furthermore to fit the data: the older the German voter the more he feels located on the Right (Table 1).This finding on the other hand, has also in the literature been interpreted in terms of the aging-conservatism thesis (cf Cutler 1975, Crittenden 1962). This maintains that the position of older cohorts closer to the Right is a product of their relative situation in the life cycle-or, in other words of their personal establishment in the social hierarchy. While there is,in fact, some evidence that this explanation better fits the reality than the generation-socialization thesis of value changes by Inglehart (see Bürklin 1984) hypothesis cannot be tested against one another due to the lack of life-long panel studies.

Thus we have to disentangle these effects by testing whether - according the latter hypothesis - left sentiments in the younger cohorts are not only related to non-material issue-preferences but also to non- or anti-establishment attitudes.

We may begin the test of this hypothesis by disaggregating the educative effects upon Left-Right-selfplacement in table 1. Traditionally in Germany university education has generally led to a superior class position and accordingly to a position closer to the Right. While this relationship still holds in the older

generation, the effect of university education now seems reversed among younger age cohorts, higher education leading now to a selfplacement closer to the Left (Table 2).

When one considers that it is the generation of young academics who are severly deprived in their future expectations by cut-backs in the German civil service budgets in the late 1970`s we shall not hesitate to explain their decidedly left stance as a deprivational effect (in 1978 80% of all academics got a job in the civil service). This explanation of leftist sentiment should hold generally for the younger generation facing the worsened job situation since World War II: at the beginning of 1983, for example one-third of all unemployed were under 25 years of age. This generation-specific formulation of our hypothesis demands the division of our total sample into several distinct generational cohorts.

In this analysis a division into three broad generations will be used: 1) the generation of 51 years and older which experienced the Nazi dictatorship and World War II and which contributed substantially to post-war reconstruction; the generation which holds the current societal elite positions; 2) the generation which matured just after the war; and 3) the under 30 years old generation which experienced primary socialization only during reconstruction and has matured during the period of economic and political stability. The last being the generation with the greatest status insecurities.[1]

In order to tap the underlying dimensions of Left and Right corresponding to our argumentation we introduced a) two variables referring to the perceived trust (or "distrust") of

authorities - one on a specific and one on a diffuse support level (based on EASTON's 1975 distinction); b) one variable referring to the belief in the responsiveness of the political system; i.e., the belief in the ability to influence decisions of political authorities; c) the scales "liberal democratic rights", "conflict openness", and "postmaterialism" which measure dimensions of the basic liberal orientation; d) the last scale consists solely of one item, that dealing with nuclear energy (see following page 8a).

The party relatedness-measure in its traditional two-class form we have used as well as to measure proximity to the newly emerging Green Party (11-point Thermometer scale), cross-cutting now the early two-class concept. Finally, we have controlled for class-self-placement and for education.

Table 3 presents the correlations of these scales with the Left-Right scale in various age cohorts. These correlations tend to support our theoretical considerations: leftism among the youth is related to "libertarian" basic orientations and to opposition to nuclear energy, economic growth, and technological progress. Furthermore, young leftists tend to question the legitimacy of political institutions; their criticism is radical-democratic and conflict-oriented in nature and, due to the higher level of abstraction, appears to be directed against the system of established conflict mediation which is felt to hinder the attainment of their interests. Criticism by the old left, on the other hand, is system-internal and is more clearly

1) See for a more differential generational argumentation Baker,Dalton,Hildebrandt 1981 and Bürklin 1984.
2) See for the construction of these Likert-scales Bürklin 1984

Scale	Scale Items
I Liberal-Democratic Rights	1. Everyone should have the right to express his opinion, even when the majority is of another opinion.
	2. A functioning democracy is not possible without a political opposition.
	3. Every democratic party should have the basic right to participate in government.
II Conflict Openness	1. Conflicts between the various interest groups in our society and their demands on the government are detrimental to the general mood.
	2. The citizen does not have the right to strike and demonstrate when it disturbs public order.
III. System Responsiveness	1. I don't think that public officials care much about what people like me think.
	2. Generally speaking, those we elect to (Parliament) lose touch with the people pretty quickly.
	3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.
IV Distrust Political Institutions	1. Our democratic constitution certainly has its weaknesses but is nevertheless the best imaginable form of government.
	2. If the Parliament and the Government did anything not in accordance with the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court would be able to stop it.
V Distrust Government	1. Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few bi interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
	2. How much do you trust the government to do what is right?
VI Anti-Nuclear Orientation	Nuclear energy resources should be developed further in order to meet our future energy needs.

directed against the bureaucracy in general. In reference to
the belief in the power of government-distrust scale the
"few big interests" we consider to reflect the <u>class</u>
<u>standpoint</u> of the <u>old left</u>   of Unions and
social democracy. On the other hand a newly emerging class
conflict line which is related to education, is associated
since 1978 increasingly with support for the Green Party, or the
"New Left". Thus a "split" has occurred in West-Germany over
recent years as to the meaning of "left". Such a split had
already been predicted by Lipset (1981a). That this split runs
between "established" and "non-established" interests can be
seen fairly well in the fact that the second best predictor
of Left-Right self-placement (after established partisan scale) is
the anti-nuclear attitude.

This item is in 1980 not only the single issue position in the
West-German debate, but also the key issue of an anti-quantitative
growth, anti-technological dimension. The opposition to the
politics of quantitative growth - the politics of all the
established parties - was made concrete in the opposition to
nuclear energy. Consequently this issue cross-cuts loyalties
to the established parties (Figure 1).

In order to determine the relative weight of the anti-establish-
ment issue component controlling for the non-material issue-
preference as well as party relatedness we have used a regression
analysis, seperating our sample in 5 age-groups. Thus we can
differenciate between those young voters (a) who just begin their
tertiary socialization - i.g. their relevant experience with
the political parties, those (b) who were socialized in the
years of political mobilization in the Social Democratic Reform

era, those (c) who are in intermediary positions (this
includes 2 age-groups) and (d) the occupationally established.

Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Comparing the
beta weights of the three components we can conclude that our
expectation of the negativ reciprocal relationship between
the weight of issue preference (Postmat.) and that of anti-
establishment sentiment holds. In younger cohorts - especially
that socialized during the Social-Democratic era the anti-
establishment-effect outweighs the issue-preference and this
relation reverses in older cohorts. Furthermore the combined
weight of these components decline in their relative importance
for Left-Right-self-placement among older cohorts. The oldest
generation overwhelmingly use the traditional party distances
frame as frame of reference.

From the structure of the correlations between Party Identifi-
cation and postmaterialism and the anti-nuclear attitude we can
derive the increasing detachment of the value/issue-component
from the traditional partisan-component.
If we compare these inter-relationships between two points in
time - 1977 and 1980 - we may obtain the relative weights have
changed over time. The insights obtained through this comparison
add strength to the hypothezised increasing separation between
the value and partisan dimension of Left and Right.
While in 1874 the correlations between Postmaterialism[1] and the
party dimension in all age groups are of moderate degree
(Table 5) they are significantly lower in 1980 (T.6) The value
dimension in 1974 was more closely connected to the established

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1) In 1974 the anti-nuclear variable is not available

parties. While it is remarkably unconnected in 1980 our analysis elsewhere of 1983 pre-electoral data reveal that the " floating " new left vote has distanced itself further from the traditional Left-Right Dimension and is now fixed upon their political spokesman: the Green Party and constitute the "fundamentalist" wing of this party.

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      wahl 1980, Opladen, 422 - 441.

TABLE 6 : PARTISAN- AND ISSUE-COMPONENTS OF LEFT AND RIGHT
BY AGE-COHORTS *
(GERMANY 1980)

AGE-COHORT
(N)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

18-24   (17)   -47   LEFT/RIGHT
(133)   SELF-
                                                 -19   PLACEMENT
         POSTMATERIALISM   (R=.53)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

25-29   (16)   -57   LEFT/RIGHT
(156)   SELF-
                                                 -12   PLACEMENT
         POSTMATERIALISM   (R=.60)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

30-39   (10)   -45   LEFT/RIGHT
(374)   SELF-
                                                 -21   PLACEMENT
         POSTMATERIALISM   (R=.52)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

40-50   (07)   -47   LEFT/RIGHT
(385)   SELF-
                                                 -10   PLACEMENT
         POSTMATERIALISM   (R=.49)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

51+   (12)   -56   LEFT/RIGHT
(728)   SELF-
                                                 -06   PLACEMENT
         POSTMATERIALISM   (R=.57)

*ENTRIES ARE STAND. BETAS AND R'S (IN PARANTH.)

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Left-Right variations
in Scandinavia

Table 1   Party identification and left-right position
          in Norway.

	Mean	Distance from center	Standard deviation
Socialist Left party	6.9	− 1.9	.82
Labour	5.6	− .6	1.33
Liberal	5.5	− .5	1.50
Christian People's party	4.2	.8	1.33
Senter party	4.6	.4	1.08
Conservative party	3.6	1.4	1.44
Progress party	3.4	1.6	2.29
Non-identifiers	4.9	.1	1.51
Apolitical	4.9	.1	1.44

Table 2   <u>Selfevaluation of left-right position and party identification in Norway</u>. Mean values.

Identification	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Senter	Cons.	Progress
Strong	7.1	5.7	6.2	4.0	4.6	3.3	—
Weak	6.7	5.4	5.2	4.4	4.6	3.9	3.4[x]
Indep. voters	6.9	5.1	5.8	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.8

x). Too few cases for separate analysis according to strength of identification

Table 3   Left-right position and voting. Self-evaluation compared with evaluation of own party. Mean values

	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Center	Cons.	Progress
Self-evaluation	6.9	5.5	5.7	4.2	4.5	3.8	3.9
Own party	7.3	5.7	5.5	3.7	4.3	2.7	2.8

Table 4   Selfevaluation of left-right position in
           Norwegian voting: party members versus voters.
           Mean values.

	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Senter	Cons.	Progress
Party members	7.4^x	5.9	6.0^x	3.9	4.3	3.0	–
Voters	6.9	5.4	5.6	4.3	4.6	3.9	4.0

x) Number of party members less than 15

Table 2   Selfevaluation of left-right position and party
                 identification in Norway. Mean values.

Identifi-cation	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Senter	Cons.	Progress
Strong	7.1	5.7	6.2	4.0	4.6	3.3	—
Weak	6.7	5.4	5.2	4.4	4.6	3.9	3.4^x
Indep. voters	6.9	5.1	5.8	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.8

x). Too few cases for separate analysis according to strength of
identification.

Table 3   Left-right position and voting. Self-evaluation
compared with evaluation of own party. Mean values

	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Center	Cons.	Progress
Self-evaluation	6.9	5.5	5.7	4.2	4.5	3.8	3.9
Own party	7.3	5.7	5.5	3.7	4.3	2.7	2.8

Table 4   <u>Selfevaluation of left-right position in</u>
           <u>Norwegian voting: party members versus voters.</u>
           Mean values.

|	Soc.Left	Labour	Liberal	Christian	Senter	Cons.	Progress
Party members	7.4^x	5.9	6.0^x	3.9	4.3	3.0	–
Voters	6.9	5.4	5.6	4.3	4.6	3.9	4.0

x) Number of party members less than 15

Figure 1. Left-right distribution of the Norwegian voters: by 9-point scale. Self-evaluation.

Question: "There is so much talk about radicalism and conservatism these days. Let us suppose that people who are most to left on the radical side should have the value of 9, and those who are most to the right on the conservative side should have the value of 1.
Where would you locate yourself on this scale?"

```
                        VPK    SD           CP     FP      M
Riksdag -69    ─────────────────────────────────────────────
               L 1.11   1.67         2.50   2.91   3.42          R
                    \      \            ¦      ¦     ¦
                     \      \           ¦      ¦     ¦
Riksdag -68    ─────────────────────────────────────────────
               L 1.19   1.73         2.51   2.93   3.43          R
                 VPK    SD           CP     FP      M


                        VPK    SD      CP    FP    M
Voters         ─────────────────────────────────────────────
1968           L        1.87   2.42  3.08 3.14  3.57           R
                          \      \     ¦    /     ¦
                           \      \    ¦   /      ¦
Voters         ─────────────────────────────────────────────
1964           L        2.00   2.47  3.06 3.09  3.55           R
                        VPK     SD     CP   FP    M
```

Figure 2. <u>Left-right position selvevaluation of voters and</u>
<u>elected representatives in Sweden</u>. Mean values.

Source: Søren Holmberg, <u>Riksdagen representerar</u>
<u>svenska folket</u>. Lund. Studenlitteratur 1975. p. 141.

Figure 3 . Left-right distribution of Norwegian electorate: by tenpoint scale.

Question: "Concerning politics there is so much talk about radicalism and conservatism, or simply the "left-side" and "the right-side". Where would you locate yourself on this scale".

Figure 4 . Left-right position (selfevaluation) and party preferance. 1981

Socialist Left party   Mean x̄ = 6,93

Labour   Mean x̄ = 5,49

Parties at the center   Mean x̄ = 4,71

Right (Høyre)   Mean x̄ = 3,75

Progress party   Mean x̄ = 3,93

Left   Right

Figure 5 . Selfevaluation of left-right position
and stand on attitudes (public control
versus private initiative and equaliz...

Public control ─── (TAU β −.435)

Equalization ───── (TAU β = .200)

Figure 6 . <u>Attitudes towards state interference and public control</u>

THE CENTER BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT:

DEAD OR VITAL?

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Let us imagine a respondent to a typical paper-and-pencil questionnaire pondering a question requesting a political location of self in a dimension that goes from left to right. To be more specific let the question be the following:

"Locate yourself politically on the following left-right scale:

Fig. 1   Left._____...Right

Although that dimension has only two poles, named and bounded by a dot, it has in fact three intellectual anchors; the two extremes and the center, even when the later is not identified in any way. Symetry is so frequent in nature that we instinctively locate a center, either by means of a dot, or by means of a dividing line, in any shape, visible or implied, that appears to us vaguely symetrical.

The center, in any symetrical object, has the perceptuel advantage of being unique and of offering a marquer that can be used either to extend or to fold. Consider how many of our perceptions are shaped in the image of the notation given by fig. 2.


Fig. 2

social and political thought, the contrast between the political and the religious being the more pronounced.

In the first section of this paper, I shall consider variations on the archetypes of the center in religious and in political thought; in the second I shall consider some of the problems posed by the various meanings of the middle in the left-right political dimension.

The center in religious and in political thought - three basic archetypes

I have argued elsewhere (Laponce, 1981) that all spatial dimensions, and more particularly a horizontal dimension such as left and right, are affected by the 'strongest' of all spatial orderings, that of verticality; (strongest because the pull of gravity and the way the human body is structured result in up-and-down being the least easily reversed, hence the most immediately understood of all spatial structures.)

If we apply a vertical effect on the center of the flat line of Fig. 1 - assuming the positive to be. associated with up and the negative with down - we obtain three major distortions (see fig. 4).

Fig. 4

The circle can symbolize any universe, any 'whole', Plato's original being for example; the dot may be Christaller's central city, the circle and the dot may stand for the way we perceive the relation between ourself and the world or between our inner-self and our body.

If one asks respondents, in a variation on a game suggested by Shelling (1960) to select one of the 9 dots of Fig. 3 and if one promises them a reward for selecting the same dot as somebody else who, unknown to them, is offered the same choice of dots and rewards; these respondents will select the central position more often than any other one (Laponce, 1981).


Fig. 3

However, the center, if more distinctive, is also sometimes more ambiguous. Uniqueness may mean specificity (fig. 2 & 3) but it may also signify lack of character (more likely so on fig. 1 than on 2 or 3).

Suppose now that we name the dimensions we have just displayed, suppose we call them religious, social, artistic or political. Would the meaning of the central location vary? Would it be more specific or more ambiguous, more or lesser valued in one domain than in another? The answer is clearly 'yes'. The meaning and value of the center are not the same in religious,

The order in which we have lined up these three different effects, from a to c represents, roughly, the order of the declining likelihood that the archetype will be used positively in the religious domain. Fig. 4a underlies, for example, the ideal of dominance from an elevation, such that as of the Gods of Olympus, or that of Rhe at its Zenith or that of the Inca sun-god. All major contemporary religions locate their supreme divinity somewhere high 'above', and typically in the very center of the universe. Most of the primitive societies whose myths are summarized in the Human Relations Area Files do the same. Through the center runs the 'tree of life', the 'vital axis' of which Eliade (1924) cites many variations in his study of religious archetypes. A perfect example of the elevating, the sublimating role of that central axis is in the spatial translation of the hinduist tension between center and periphey as well as between up and down. In the process of purification, the self becomes centered; it rejects the peripheries, it rejects the trivial and the concrete for the spiritual. The concentration on the center, on the vital vertical axis, renders ascension possible. In the Christian religions the association of center and ascension is not as strong, but frequent nevertheless.

In religious thought, the archetype 4.c is typically associated with negativeness: Hell or the Valley of Tears are down, though not, I admit, necessarily in the center. It is true also that primitive myths sometime locate the vital energy or the ancestors somewhere below and emerging at what becomes the center of the world, but, typically, if goodness and vitality

come from below, they do not return there. Value is attached to the upward not to the downward movement. The vital, the untamed forces that come from below are usually met upward and tamed by a more rational, by a superior divinity; as in some polynesian myths where the wind-god directs the energy born from the ocean.

The third type of up-down effect on the center is represented graphically in 4b. The center is not directly affected by the upward or downward push since it is the rotation point, but its relative position on the axis is changed from one of possible indifference on the horizontal axis, to one of significance in a vertical order. The b rotation is likely to characterize religious thought since the latter, nearly universally, associates up with godness, strength, justice and the divine. By contrast, in the realm of modern politics, for reasons to be considered now, the reverse is often the case.

In Western societies, the notion of 'left' was universally negative until, at the end of the 18th century, in the French revolutionary Assemblies, the term entered the vocabulary of politics. Left ceased then to be systematically negative; it tended on the contrary to assume many of the positive traits that had previously be reserved to the notion of 'right'. Left, the side of the revolutionists, became identified with emerging strength, success, the future and, to a lesser extent, virtue and universality; Right remained associated with the religious and the powers that be. By a perceptual and semantic reversal that results in a paradox, Left became positive because it was negative; it did so because it expresses well some essentially negative features of modern politics, where the polity is not

one of reconciliation and unanimity, but of contest and conflict, of divisions and oppositions. This semantic and perceptual revolution, born from an attempt that remained only partially successful to replace the vertical by the more equalitarian horizontal in the description of political phenomena, affected the center in a way that can be described in geological terms. If unanimity and reconciliation are the 'idees-force' the result will be, almost necessarily, a gathering toward a center that will be pushed upward, as a mountain born from the pressures on its sides (4a). If on the contrary, the prevailing assumption is that progress is born from conflict, that polarization is not only necessary but good, there will occur, then, a perceptual gathering of competitors in two separate groups (it could be more but two is the ideal number for a duellum; the archetype of a bellum). This moving apart creates a chasm in the center, a no-man land that is also a no-ideas land. The pulling aside, the polarization creates a valley, a swamp (the 'marais' of French revolutionary times) schematized by 4c.

These various pulls on the Left-Right dimension -- a dimension distorted by the combined effects of a stronger vertical order and by the specific effect of either polarization or concentration - leads to the contrasted shapes of Fig. 4, shapes that can be used to refer both to the perceptual and to the behavioural. Distinguishing the two is essential since the one does not follow from the other. As Duverger pointed out, France is typically governed from the center, but this has not resulted in the center being valued perceptually. A French

competitors; the reconciliation, the recentering occurs after the election. American and Canadian electoral campaigns, on the contrary, tend to bring the perceptual in congruence with the behavioural, a congruence which produces Dowsian normal curves located at or near the center. Such differences may well reflect deeper cultural variations involving the degree of dissociation between mind and body; but whether this degree of congruence or dissociation has religious roots or not, it can be used to characterize various polities according to a) what archetype of the center describes best their ideal Left-Right ordering and b) what is the actual, the effective function of the center in the operation of their polity. The joining of these two factors gives us the typology of fig. 5.

FIG. 5

Political systems according to the correlation among the archetypes of Fig. 4

Behavioral system

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25

perceptual system

TABLE 6

Tentative allocation of the meanings of center by fields of thought

religious	social	political
dominance	honor	.realistic
sacred	reason	.reconciliation
	reconciliation	.ignorance
		.paralysis
		.stage of transition
		.no idea's land

This typology can be used to charaterize political systems; (the US and Canada fit in 1, Israed in 5, France in 5 and 11); it can also be used to characterize individuals, individual electors in particular, those we survey before or after an election. In short, to read properly a respondent's location in a simple Left-Right ordering (that of Fig. 1 for example) we need to know the function and the value that this respondent assigns to a center that can be either evil, neutral or vital. Determining that would reveal, very likely, the degree of overlap or overspill between the religious and the political.

Generally, in a system of thought that values reconciliation, the center will be honored (in Aristotelian thought for example), while, in a system of thought that values tension (in Marxian thought notably) the center will have negative valence. If, as we just argued, the religious is a system of thought that puts greater stress on wholeness and harmony than does the political (in its modern version) then it follows that the perception of the significance of the center will change markedly as one moves from a more religious to a more secular and from a more Aristotelian to a more Marxian society; a move tentatively recorded on table 6.

In the absence of knowledge of the meaning attached by a respondent to the center of a Left-Right dimension, whether that center is named or not, whether it is pinpointed in a 7-point-Likert-scale or blurred as in the European Community surveys' 10-point-continuum; in the absence of knowledge of whether the center is vital or dead, elevated or downgraded, valued or despised, we tend to assume a flat, linear, horizontal spatial order, undisturbed in its middle by the effect of an up-down pull, a pull likely to structure any spatial ordering of politics. An assumption of flatness is likely to be misleading, it is likely to result in the loss of valuable information.

Consider for example the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of a central answer in the two following cases:

Case 1 - The French socialist respondents of Inglehart Klingemann and Abrams (1974) who said they discussed politics frequently with their friends, located themselves, on the average, at 3.48 on the 10-point-scale, while those who said that they either never discussed politics with friends or only rarely, located themselves at 3.96. The less involved are closer to the center. One might be tempted to assume that the center is a point of abstention, ignorance or indifference. Let us look at the distributions of the answers more closely (See fig. 7).

Any, or a mixture, of those meanings may thus possibly interfer with the simple 'lack of knowledge', the 'suspended judgement' that a respondent may assign to a central answer in response to a question offering a Left-Right continuum for the recording of an opinion or a perception. How could we sort out these various meanings? How can we sort the dead from the vital?

a) First of all by considering the respondent's political culture in its relation to the religious and the social. The typology of table 4, leads us to expect that countries that have no tradition of political anti-clericalism (the US and Britain compared to France and Italy) would be more likely to use a notion of the political center borrowed from their religious and social systems of classification.

b) By testing the reactions of the respondent to the notions of Left, Right and Center in Osgood's three dimensions of good-bad; active-passive, and dangerous-useful.

c) By separating the meaningful center, whether dead or vital, from the center used to record 'no opinion'. This implies that the questions using a Left-Right dimension be preceeded by a screening question that would separate - as recommended by Converse - those who have an opinion from those who, in the absence of any opinion, feel compelled by the school examination qualities of our questionnaire surveys to give an answer anyway, however meaningless.

The percentage of respondents locating themselves at 5 or 6 declines from 27% to 17% and stays there as we go 'up' from the 'never' to the 'occasionally' then to the 'frequently' category. As for the percentage of subjects located at the mode (3), it increases from 30, to 33 to 42%. Obviously, the more frequent the discussion of politics with friends, hence, we can assume, the higher the political interest and involvement of the respondent, the steeper the curve, the smaller the standard deviation and the greater the polarization on the Left. There is also, clearly, a decline in the occurence of central answers, but that decline is not as marked as one might have expected. The percentage of those who locate themselves at either 5 or 6 declines from 27% to 17% between the 'never' and the 'occasional' but does not decline any further among the 'frequently'. We could reason that among those who never discuss politics, a central answer might be either a point of indifference or a point of ignorance, but among those who discuss politics frequently that explanation is unsuitable. If a few of these respondents have taken a center seat on the continuum as they do in a movie house, irrespective of the program, most of the others must have attached a meaning to their central choice. But what meaning? did they value the center for its commanding, elevated postion, or did they see it as a neutral crossroad betwen Left and Right?

- Consider now the intriguing distribution of Irish supporters of the Labour party in the same survey of

FIGURE 7

French socialists' self-location in a 10-point Left-Right scale, by level of political interest

* *

*

discuss politics with friends

never   occasionally   frequently

1974 (fig. 8).

The Left-Right terminology is not as much a part of the folklore of Irish politics as it is of the French. We should thus expect that the dissociation of the social, the religious and the political usage of the Left-Right dimension would not be as pronounced in Ireland. That appears to be the case.

Among those who 'never discuss politics', two modes emerge clearly, two good locations for a socialist where to be: the 'right' and the 'center'; among those who discuss politics occasionally or frequently, another mode appears, the 'left', but the first two do not disappear. Obviously we have here at least three different usages of the spatial ordering - a religious ordering (what is good is on the right or center); a social ordering (a good place is on the right or in the center) and a more recent political ordering (the good is on the Left). But while the Left and the Right modes are relatively easy to interpret, the center still remains ambiguous.

FIGURE 8

Self location of Irish Labour supporters in Left/Right 10-point-scale by level of political involvement. 1974

* *

*

discuss politics with friends

never   occasionally   frequently

Between the 'no discussion' and the 'frequent discussion' groupings the percentage of respondents in the center declines slightly, but it remains high, as high as in France. And, as in France, it is likely to represent an unsortable mix of people for whom the center has varied meanings.

If the center is so difficult to interpret, why not eliminate it altogether - the use of a 10-point as compared to a 7-point-scale was in part intended to do that, but it is not clear that it succeeded. Do respondents distinguish clearly the 5th from the 6th position or do they see both or either as center? (Among Democrats and Republicans of the Barnes survey of 1974, the percentage of those using positions 5 and 6 is practically the same: 5=18% among Democrats, 13% among Republicans; 6=25% among Democrats, 23% among Republicans).

A more drastic attempt at forcing the respondent to ignore the center is in the technique used in the Laponce surveys of 1962 and 1968. Instead of being asked to view the Left-Right world from the extremes, the respondent is asked to look at that same world from the center, a clearly marked center that cannot however be used as an answer. The question read: "Locate yourself by drawing an arrow from one of the sides of the center box toward either extreme:

Left   Right

[self]

This technique has the advantage of separating clearly Left

from Right and forcing those who cannot choose into abstaining; it has also the side benefit of forcing the hand of the respondent back into the same starting position after each classification (should there be a string of Left-Right classifications to be made). That technique has, however, the major disadvantage of quashing the center out altogether.

Maybe the answer to our center problem is in using both techniques, that which links the Left and the Right by a clearly identified center and that which separates them by removing any middle ground; in other words, combining a dimension that invites that the classification be made by proceeding from polar opposites toward the center, and one that invites the opposite intellectual operation. But it would still remain that we should screen our respondents and not allow the 'non-knowledgable' unto the Left-Right scale, and that, furthermore, we should test the knowledgable for the meaning and valence they attach to the three terms, Left, Right and Center, in order that we be able to sort out what is up from what is down, what is valued from what is not, what is vital from what is dead.

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Left-Right Self-Placement and Political Belief Structures of Party Activists
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Introduction.

Nuclear disarmament, unemployment, abortion, housing shortage and high taxes are only a few of the political catchwords that come up in the mass media, in our personal experience, or in a professional context. Each year governments make numerous decisions within such policy areas. In a democracy each citizen is expected to be able to evaluate the political process and to participate in it. But how can one evaluate such a myriad of decisions, given time restrictions and other priorities?

This question can be asked with even more emphasis about people who are active in political parties. Only a few people make a full-time career in politics; most party activists are amateurs. Nevertheless their views about political problems, about their urgency or about possible solutions to them, are relevant to the political process. Party activists determine to some extent what a party platform looks like, and they may also have some influence in determining policy programs of government or opposition. Even more than the ordinary citizen, the party activist needs a frame of reference with which to evaluate the political topics at hand, and with which to enter in the political debate.

In this paper I propose that the left-right continuum serves as such a frame of reference. This will be illustrated with data from Spanish and Portuguese party activists. The belief structures of these party activists will be studied in part with a statistical technique that has been around for the last twenty to thirty years, but that so far has had little practical application: the analysis of preference by Coombs'(1964) unfolding model. In this paper a usable version of a stochastic unfolding model is applied to analyze part of the belief structures of Spanish and Portuguese party activists.

Political Belief Structures.

In this study Easton's definition of the 'political process' will be adhered to: "... a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society" (Easton, 1979, p. 57). The process of 'value allocation' in the political system has been described by Fuller and Myers (1941) as the "natural history of a social problem". They distinguish three phases in this natural history: awareness, policy reform, and implementation. The notion of 'awareness' implies that some perception should exist that the problem is sufficiently important to be placed on the political agenda of decision-making The notion of 'policy reform' implies that the discussions about the directions in which solutions are to be found is a separate stage of development. These two aspects, degree of importance and direction of solution, therefore have to be distinguished.

Opinions about political problems should not be regarded as independent from people or organizations who define or organize a political problem, like interest, pressure, or action groups. Nor should they be regarded as independent from authoritative people or organizations who try to solve the problems, like political leaders,

political parties, officials, or departments of government. A 'political belief structure' of a group of people will therefore be regarded as the interrelation of opinions that individuals in that group have about political problems, as well as about people or organizations who formulate or organize political problems and about authoritative people or organizations who try to solve them. By 'opinions about a political problem' both the assessment of the importance of the problem as well as the favoured direction of solution are meant. By 'opinion about people or organizations' is meant the degree of affective closeness to these people or organizations. Each separate opinion will be called an 'element of the political belief structure', or 'political belief element' for short.

Note that a political belief structure is defined for a group of people rather than for separate individuals. In the study of the relationship among political opinions we generally use some form of association or correlation among these belief elements, so that inferences are made about a group of respondents rather than about separate individuals. It is possible to distinguish individual respondents on the basis of their place in the structure, but the structure is assumed to be the same for all respondents.

The Middle Level Elite Project

In this paper the belief structure of party activists is analyzed using the data from the Middle Level Elite Project of the European Election Study that pertain to Spain and Portugal (Note 1). Data from 3005 party delegates to the 1981 party conferences of three Spanish and five Portuguese parties are analysed. These delegates responded to identical survey questions. At the beginning of the party conference, each delegate received a questionnaire with a stamped envelope in which the completed questionnaire could be returned. Return rates differed widely among parties, although no systematic pattern of nonresponse with respect to types of parties has been detected. Nonresponse within a party is difficult to relate to other variables, since little or no relevant information about the party delegates is available.

The Spanish parties analyzed are the CDC, the AP, and the PSOE. The Portuguese parties analysed are the PSD, the CDS, the MDP, the PS, and the PPM. More information about these parties is given in Table I.

In Table I some information about the party conferences (number of questionnaires returned, response rate) and about the party delegates is given. The delegates are similar in some ways to delegates from parties in the European Community (cf. Van Schuur, forthcoming), and different in others. For example, average age and average school-leaving age are similar, as is the low percentage of women attending party conferences. However,   the average length of party membership is somewhat lower than in the European Community.

Both the number of respondents and the nonresponse rates within each party are highly variable. This means that no attempt should be made to make generalizations to an entire population of party activists with respect to the proportion of activists occupying a certain place in the belief structure. To the extent that we search for structure by performing scale analyses or factor analyses, our results should be validated by comparison with results from more homogeneous subgroups. Similar analyses performed for even more unequal groups of party activists in about fifty parties in the European Community (see Van Schuur, forthcoming) showed that the structure among different belief elements was indeed the same for subgroups of party activists from the same country or party group.

Political belief elements I: the political issues.

Fifteen issues, selected by the Middle Level Elite Project Group, were offered to each respondent. Two questions were asked. The first dealt with agreement or disagreement with a proposed measure to solve the problem, the second with the relative importance of the problem itself.

The text of the first question was "Here we present you with a list of important political issues. Would you please indicate your opinion on each issue: are you in favour of the proposed measures?". (Strong)(dis)agreement with the proposed measure was rated on a five point scale in the following order: very much in favour, in favour, no opinion, against, and very much against. The text of the second question was "Irrespective of your political attitudes on the above questions: which of the above fifteen issues do you consider to be the most important, the second most important and the third most important problem?".

The fifteen political issues, worded in terms of the proposed measures to solve them, were presented in the following order. Care was taken to formulate the proposed measures in such a way that most respondents could be expected to agree with some measures and disagree with others. This was done to diminish possible response set. Next to the full statement are given the short labels used to refer to these issues in subsequent discussion.

1. Fight against inflation (fight inflation)
2. Accelerate the process of European integration (accelerate integration)
3. Reduce the capacity of public control over private enterprises (reduce public control)
4. Women should be allowed to decide matters concerning abortion (women decide abortion)
5. Fight against unemployment (fight unemployment)
6. defense against super powers (defense super powers)
7. The most severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism (punish terrorists)
8. N clear energy should be developed in order to meet our future energy needs (develop nuclear energy)
9. There should be far more active control over activities of multinational corporations (control multinationals)
10. Greater effort should be made to protect the environment (protect environment)
11. Develop policies to reduce regional economic differences (reduce regional differences)
12. Implement the principle of equal opportunity for men and women (equal opportunity men and women)
13. Military expenditure should be increased (increase military expenditure)
14. Reduce income differences (reduce income differences)
15. In giving aid to the Third World Countries more consideration should be given to our own needs (concern own needs versus needs Third World).

Political belief elements II: pressure groups and more parties

Delegates' sympathies for a number of pressure groups and political parties were elicited with the following statements:"We would like to know what you think about other parties in our country" and "And what do you think about the following organizations?" (0=intensely dislike, 10=intensely like).

The pressure groups and the political parties offered are listed here in abbreviated form; more information is provided in Appendices 1 to 4.

Spain:

pressure groups: CC.OO, C.E.O.E., CEPMME, COPIME, CSUT, ELA-STV, UGT, and USO.

parties: AP, BNPG, CDC, EE, ERC, HB, PCE, PNV, PSA, PSOE, UCD, and UN.

Portugal:

pressure groups: AIP, CAP, CCP, CGTP, CIP, CNA, LPMA, MARN, UDAS, and UGT.

parties: ASDI, CDS, MDP/CDE, PCP, PCTP/MRPP, PDC, POUS, PPD/PSD, PPM, PS, PSR, UDP, and UEDS.

In the following discussion we take up first the party delegates' opinions about the relative importance of political problems. In the next three sections opinions about proposed measures to solve these problems, sympathy scores for pressure groups, and sympathy scores for political parties are considered. Finally, we look at the interrelationship of these four types of belief elements.

Analyzing judgments about the importance of political problems

In analyzing the importance judgments of Spanish and Portuguese delegates, I have used scales I developed earlier on the basis of data from party delegates from the nine EC countries. Application of these scales to the Spanish and Portuguese data is due primarily to shortage of time; however, it can be justified on grounds that the results across all the EC countries were very similar.

The scales were developed as follows. It is difficult to analyze responses to 'order the three most important problems from a set of fifteen problems' at the individual level. However, the data can be aggregated by determining the percentage of party activists that mention each problem among the three they consider most important. These aggregated data – presented in Table II – can be used to establish rank orders of the importance of political problems for each party; the various party rank orders can then serve jointly as the basis for scale analysis.

In performing this type of analysis on data from fifty EC parties (Van Schuur, forthcoming), I found that a 'maximum' or 'vector' model (one that assumes that problems are more important to the extent that they have a higher value on each dimension led to more interpretable results than an 'optimum' or 'distance' model (one that assumes that problems are more important to the extent that they conform to some optimal value on each dimension). This suggests that judgments of importance of political problems are based on criteria for which it holds that the more a problem exhibits a certain property, the more important the problem

is (e.g., the more people are affected by a problem, or the more intensely they are affected, or the more the problem is interconnected with other problems, the more important it is. This gives some support to theories which hold that there are 'objective' criteria for judging the importance of political problems. There is overwhelming agreement about the importance of political problems along with some systematic differences. The same patterns occur in Spanish and Portuguese data as in those of other party activists. For example, the importance of 'unemployment' and 'inflation' is almost unanimously high, while the importance of 'concern own needs versus needs Third World' and 'women decide about abortion' is unanimously low. Over some issues do the party activists disagree with respect to their importance judgment. There is disagreement over 'punish terrorists'; Many delegates from the Spanish PSOE and CDC and from the Portuguese MDP or PS do not consider it very important, whereas half the delegates from AP and CDS consider it very important. A similar trent, although less strong, can be seen in the other direction with respect to opinions on the importance of 'control multinationals'.

Since the partial rank order of importance data do not conform to the unfolding model (i.e., the distance model), an attempt to apply a stoch stic unidimensional unfolding model to these data failed miserably. Nevertheless, careful inspection of the results showed that two groups of political problems could be distinguished, with the problems within each group mentioned together more often than would be expected on the basis of statistical independence. These groups are:

I : 'inflation', 'European integration', public control', 'abortion', 'terrorism', 'nuclear energy', and 'military expenditure'.

II: 'unemployment', 'control multinationals', 'defense super powers', 'environment', 'regional differences', 'opportunity men and women', 'income differences', and 'concern own needs versus needs Third World'.

The first set appears to consist of 'conservative' problems, whereas the second group consists of 'progressive' problems (see Van Schuur, forthcoming, for discussion). To validate this interpretation for the Spanish and Portuguese delegates of the present study, I divided the respondents into four groups on the basis of the number of conservative and progressive problems they mentioned (3 and 0, 2 and 1, 1 and 2, and 0 and 3, respectively), and correlated this 'importance' index with self-placement on the left-right self-placement scale. The correlation is 0.31 for Portugal and 0.30 for Spain, as shown in Table VIII. Average scale scores on this index are given for each party in Table IX.

Analysis of political belief elements II: opinions about political measures

As in the case of importance judgments, I have used scales developed from my previous study of the nine EC countries to analyze Spanish and Portuguese delegates' opinions about political measures. The percentage of respondents who are (very much) in favor of each of the proposed measures are given for each party in Table III. The measures were analyzed for the EC party activists with three different analysis techniques: unfolding, cumulative scaling, and factor analysis. Results of these analyses are shown in Appendix 5.

The unfolding model assumes that the political measures and the individual party activists can be represented along one dimension in such a way that the measures each party activist is very much in favor of are all adjacent on that dimension. The party activist himself is placed on the dimension at the median of the measures he is very much in favor of. Measures that the party activist is not in favor of thus split into two groups: those that are either too far to the left on the dimension or too far too the right. Appendix 5 shows that twelve of the fifteen measures could be represented along such a dimension in the vertical order in which they are listed. Three measures could not be represented: 'women decide about abortion', 'accelerate European integration', and 'concern own needs versus needs Third World'.

Like the unfolding model, the cumulative scaling model also assumes that the political measures can be represented along one dimension, but in an order reflecting the increasing 'difficulty' or unlikeliness of being very much in favor of them. Party activists can also be represented along this dimension, placed according to the most difficult measure they are still in favor of. The representation of the party activists in the cumulative scaling model therefore differs fundamentally from the representation in the unfolding model: in the cumulative scaling model the respondent is represented 'at the end' of the measures he is in favor of, whereas in the unfolding model he is represented 'in the middle' of the measures he is in favor of. Two disjoint cumulative scales were found (see Appendix 5), each consisting of half of the measures of the unfolding scale. The first cumulative scale, consisting of the measures 'reduce income differences, etc., will be called a scale of 'progressive' solutions, whereas the second scale, consisting of the measures 'increase military expenditure, etc., will be called a scale of 'conservative' solutions.

A factor analysis gave essentially the same results as the cumulative scale analysis: a correlated (r=-.33) two factor solution was found in which stimuli from the progressive solutions scale loaded heavily on the first factor, and stimuli from the conservative solutions scale loaded heavily on the second factor.

Since the factor analysis results do not add to the interpretation of the
cumulative scales, we will not discuss it separately, but discuss first the
interpretation of the two cumulative scales.

The 'progressive' measures are endorsed by a large majority of party activists.
This makes the individual variation in representation of respondents along this
scale very slight, and turns the new 'variable' almost into a constant
(see Table IX). Correlations of this new variable with other variables, like
left-right self placement, the importance index, or the conservative solutions scale
are therefore low (see Table VIII). The conservative solutions scale gives a much
wider variety of responses of party activists and a larger variety of scale values for
for Spanish and Portuguese party activists than the progressive solutions scale
(see Table IX). Also the conservative solutions scale correlates much more highly
with other variables than the progressive solutions scale. It should be noted,
especially, that the lowest correlation is that between the progressive and the
conservative solutions scale.

How can we interpret the paradoxical finding that the cumulative scale
analysis and the factor analysis lead to a two-dimensional interpretation of the
measures, whereas the unfolding analysis led to a one-dimensional interpretation?
One possibility is to consider the two cumulative scales as two 'half' or
'unipolar' dimensions; if this is right, reversing the scale by recoding the
'positive response alternatives' to the conservative measures into '(very much)
against' should result in one cumulative scale for all measures. However, we
still found only eight of the measures represented along the scale. We therefore
need another explanation of our results.

I propose that the seeming paradox can be resolved in the following way.
Under the assumption that the political measures can be represented along one
dimension, which holds for both the unfolding model and the cumulative scaling
model with reversed positive response alternatives for the conservative measures,
we would expect that, to the extent that more progressive measures are favored,
fewer conservative measures are favored, and vice versa. However, this does not
seem to be the case. There are indeed some respondents who are very much in favor
of many progressive measures and few conservative ones, and, conversely, some
respondents who are very much in favor of many conservative measures and few
progressive ones. But there are also a number of respondents who are very much
in favor of both many progressive and many conservative issues, and still other
respondents who are very much in favor of only a few progressive and only a few
conservative issues. My interpretation of this phenomenon is that respondents
differ in their range of acceptable policy positions. From the left most favored
measure we cannot predict what the respondent's right most favored measure is,

and the other way around. Respondents should therefore not be represented as points along a dimension, but as a range of acceptable policy positions. To the extent that the range of acceptable policy positions is relatively small for all respondents, a factor analysis may lead to a uni-factorial solution. Conversely, to the extent that the range of acceptable policy positions is relatively wide for all respondents, factor analysis would result in a multi-factorial solution.

The idea of representing respondents not by a point but by a space is not new. Van der Eijk and Niemöller's (1983) suggestion of 'multiple party identification' is similar. But in the present paper I am suggesting extending this idea to other aspects of the political belief structure as well. A new variable, which may be termed 'width of the acceptable policy range' may have interesting implications. For example, respondents with little political political interest may have a much wider range of acceptable policy positions than respondents with much political interest.

In this study I have not measured the width of the acceptable policy range. For present purposes I will still use the cumulative scale scores of the respondents, especially their scores on the conservative solutions scale, to indicate their opinions about agreement with political measures.

Analyzing political belief elements III: sympathies for pressure groups and parties

Sympathies for pressure groups and parties can be modelled by a representation of these organizations along a stochastic and nonparametric uni-dimensional unfolding scale, with the use of the MUDFOLD model (Van Schuur and Molenaar, 1982). The analyses presented here are all based on those respondents whose three highest sympathy scores could be distinguished from their other scores (in technical terms: 'pick 3/n' data). Respondents whose third and fourth highest sympathy scores were identical were therefore deleted from the analysis. The analysis only includes those pressure groups and parties that were offered to all respondents from the same country. A description of parties and pressure groups was given in Appendices 1 to 4. For each party the percentage of respondents is shown who gave a 'high' sympathy score (i.e., 6 and up) to an organization. This information is given under the heading 'rating' in Tables II to V.

The unfolding results are given in the following way. The organizations are ordered vertically in the permutation in which they formed an unfolding scale. For some scales there is not one unique order in which the organizations form an unfolding scale, however: interchanges of adjacent stimuli sometimes do not violate the goodness of fit very much. Goodness of fit is expressed by H and H(i), which are coefficients of homogeneity for the scale as a whole and for each item

separately. Acceptable values of H and H(i) lie between + and 1, preferably close to 1. The p(i)'s given for each item are the proportion of respondents who included the organization among the three to which they were most sympathetic. The sum of all p(i)'s therefore has to be 3.0.

Some organizations cannot be represented in the scale. This means that sympathy for these organizations is obtained from respondents with widely different positions on the scale. The best example of this is the Portuguese party PCTP (see Table VII). It can be interpreted by assuming that sympathies are not always given on the basis of underlying left-right considerations, but sometimes on the basis of other considerations as well. Unfolding sympathy scores from EC party activists for their national pressure groups and parties revealed the nonscalability of some regional organizations, white collar trade unions, ecological organizations, a feminist organization, Christian organizations, protest parties or some extreme left wing parties. In each of the scales for each of the nine EC countries, however, a strong dominant unidimensional representation of most pressure groups and parties could be found. Scale scores of respondents on these unfolding scales correlated highly with the left-right self placement scale. This is also true for Spanish and Portuguese respondents. Due to a technical error, I have unfortunately not been able to correlate the Spanish pressure group scale scores with the other variables. The Spanish party scale correlates highly with other variables, as do the Portuguese pressure group and party scales.

Left-right self placement and the political belief structure

The correlations between different types of political belief elements are generally high. The low values of correlations with the progressive measures scale have been explained above in terms of restriction of range. The remaining correlations all indicate a strong latent underlying construct that can be interpreted as a unidimensional belief structure. The left-right self placement scale taps a respondent's position in that structure most directly.

In conclusion, let me make two final remarks.
First, it appears from the analysis of opinions on political measures that respondents should not be represented by a single point along the left-right continuum, but rather by a range of acceptable policy positions. This might explain why we found a two-factor solution to opinions about political measures, and it is in line with other literature about this topic.

Second, we need to consider why some political measures could not be represented in either an unfolding scale or in the cumulative scales, and also why certain pressure groups and parties could not be represented in the dominant

unfolding scale. Clearly some political problems and some organizations that try to organize or solve political problems do not fit well with the dominant left-right interpretation. This implies that other criteria are used in evaluating these problems or organizations. Some researchers have proposed that extra 'dimensions' are needed to interpret such findings (i.e., that a multidimensional analysis is needed, (e.g., Lijphart (1984), suggests that seven 'issue dimensions' should be distinguished). My analyses show, however, that the fact that certain stimuli do not fit along the dominant dimension should not be taken to mean that all those stimuli that <u>were</u> representable should also be assigned a position on one or more 'extra dimension'. Multidimensional models may simply be inappropriate; preferable alternatives for given sets of stimuli may be hierarchical, lexicographical or 'multiple' dimensional models, or even simple cluster interpretations. If every detail of the structure must be explained, then models of these latter types should be considered. But for most party activists and for most political belief elements the unidimensional left-right interpretation suffices.

Notes

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Table I. Information about parties and party delegates surveyed.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
CDC	January 1981	Barcelona	403	54%	23	4	11	5	43	20	22	4.6
AP	February 1981	Madrid	269	15%	10	3	18	19	45	21	51	7.9
PSOE	October 1981	Madrid	170	20%	56	7	36	2	39	21	42	2.7
PSD	February 1981	Lisboa	461	63%	53	6	15	4	41	21	19	5.1
CDS	March 1981	Lisboa	360	50%	45	4	14	16	44	21	16	7.1
MDP	April 1981	Lisboa	374	66%	38	6	6	18	44	20	24	2.5
PS	May 1981	Lisboa	792	44%	54	6	2	7	40	20	13	3.6
PPM	May 1981	Lisboa	176	60%	27	5	8	21	41	22	26	6.4

1: name of party

2: month and year of party conference surveyed

3: place of party conference

4: number of returned questionnaires

5: response rate in percentages of questionnaires distributed

6: percentage of party delegates with a representative function (e.g. city councillor)

7: average length of membership in the party

8: percentage of party delegates spending more than fifty hours each month on party

9: percentage of women among party delegates

10: average age of party delegates

11: average school-leaving age of party delegates

12: percentage of party delegates who live in a town of over 50,000 inhabitants

13: average self-placement on ten point left-right self-placement scale

Appendix 1.

Spanish pressure groups.

CC.OO: Comisiones Obreras (trade union confederation near to the Communist Party, clearly dominating in Spanish labor movement until very recently.

Estimated number of members: 1.2 million. It was founded illegally in the 1960s.

C.E.O.E.: Confederación espanola de organizaciones empresariales.

Business organization, similar to French CNPF or Italian Confindus-tria.

CEPIME: Confederación espanola de pequenas y medianas industrias.

This organization is part of C.E.O.E., but for small firms.

COPIME: Confederación de organización de la pequena y mediana empresa.

The second 'small firms' business organization, but with a more progressive -center political and economic orientation.

(CEPMME, in contrast, is clearly right).

CSUT: Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores.

'Unitarian' confederation, created by a small Maoist party, PTE, which ran the first free elections as FDI. The union was never too important and was beginning to disappear in the final months of 1980.

ELA-STV: Sindicato de Trabajadores Vascos (Basque Workers Trade Union; ELA is the abbreviation for its name in Basque). This trade union is closely tied to the Basque Nationalist Party. It has more than 100.000 members.

UGT: Unión General de Trabajdores. Trade union confederation close to the PSOE; its main leaders are also members of the socialist leadership.

The organization has about 0.8 to 1.0 million members. Founded in 1879, it is the oldest of the organizations listed here. It disappeared during Franco's regime, and has been active again only since 1975.

USO: Unión Sindical Obrera (trade union confederation with a Christian progressive orientation, similar to French CFDT. Like the CC.OO, this organization was founded illegally in the 1960s.

All organizations, apart from the CC.OO and the USO, were created immediately before or during the Spanish transition. Membership figures are not reliable. Reasonable estimates are given for CC.OO, UGT, and ELA-STV; the others are clearly minority organizations. For business organizations membership figures are not available, but certainly these groups encompass a larger proportion of the 'bourgeoisie' than do trade unions with respect to employees.

Appendix 2.

M. J. STOCK

Portuguese PRESSURE GROUPS

Sigla	Description	Main Characteristics	Relation to Political Parties	Number of Members	Date of "birth"
CGTP/Inter sindical	Portuguese Workers General Confederation - Trade Union Central	. With a clear ideological domination of the PCP, defending a democratic-leninist-centralismus, proposing legalists reinvindications directed to the State.	PCP almost hegemonic; there are also some "wings" of PS and other minorities such as trotskists, maoists, etc.	350 Trade-Unions; more or less 1.200.000 members.	1970
UGT	Workers General Union - Trade-Union Central	. Created from a clivage of the CGTP as a result of different and irreconcilable currents within it . The socialists left the CGTP and made a pact with the PSD that gave birth to the UGT which defends a reformist-pluralist model and is constituted mainly by white-collar unions.	PS and PSD (PS tendency is more important).	48 Trade-Unions; more or less 650.000 members.	1978
AIP	Portuguese Industrial Association	. Association of Companies with the purpose of give them technical support.	Near to the Eanes (President of the Republic) sector of opinion.	More or less 1.500 members.	1860
CIP	Portuguese Industry Confederation	. Employers confederation ; highest organ of sectorial industrial associations ; very important "social partner" aiming to the progress of free iniciative.	Directly none; near to the right wing of CDS.	74 industrial associations and 22 companies directly associated.	1975 (legally) in fact working since 1974.
CAP	Portuguese Farmers Confederation	. Confederation of several agricultural organizations fighting for a better way of life for rurals, defending the free association of all farmers : - owners, tenants, workers	Directly, none; near to the right of PSD, left of CDS but capable of a "breaking" for the purpose of the defense of their own interests (recently, because of the "reservas" process, a more rightist faction left the CAP and organized itself).	66 regional associations, 2 specialized associations ("aviculture") and 5 agricultural "cooperativas".	1976
CNA	Agriculture National Confederation	. It was not recognized as "social partner".	Near the PCP.	-	197?
MARN	Northeen Tenants Associative Mouvement	. Very small importance and only in the North of Portugal; it was not recognized as "social partner".	Near the PCP.	-	197?
UDAS	Agriculture "Distrital" Unions	. Very small importance and only in the Center of Portugal; they were not recognized as "social partners".	Near the PS.	-	197?
L PMA	Small and Medium Farmers League	. Very small importance and mainly in the South of the country; it was not recognized as "social partner".	Near the PCP	-	1974
CCP	Portuguese Commercial Confederation	. It has mainly two associate members: the Federation of Wholesale Trade and the Federation of Retail Trade, which agregate each several commercial associations.		160 associations.	1977

Appendix 3.

Spanish political parties

AP   : Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance).

BNPG:

CDC : Convergencia Democrática de Catalunya (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia)

EE   : Euzkadiko Ezkerra,(Basque Left)

ERC : Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left)

HB   : Herri Batazuna (Union of the People, Basque party)

PCE : Partido Comunista de Espana (Communist Party of Spain)

PNV : Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party)

PSA : Partido Socialista de Andalucia (Socialist Party of Andalusia)

PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Espagnol (Spanish Socialist Workers Party)

UCD : Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Center)

UN   : Union Nacional (National Union)

Distribution of seats in the Spanish State's Congress of Deputies, 1977-1982

	1977	1979	1982
AP	16	–	105
BNPG			
CDC	13	8	12
EE	1	1	1
ERC	1	1	1
HB	0	3	2
PCE	20	23	4
PNV	8	7	8
PSA	0	5	0
PSOE	118	121	202
UCD	165	168	13
UN	0	1	0
Total	350	350	350

Appendix 4.

Portuguese political parties

ASDI   : Associacao Social Democrata Independente (Independent Social Democratic
              Association)
CDS   : Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Party of the Social Democratic Center)
MDP/CDE   : Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Movement) was called
              Comissao Democrática Eleitoral (Democratic Electoral Committee) before '73.
PCP   : Partido Cumunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)
PCTP/MRPP   : Partido Comunista de Trabalhadores Portugueses (Portuguese Workers
              Communist Party), before 1979: Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido
              do Proletariadc (Reorganizing Movement of the Party of the Proletariat)
PDC   : Partidc da Democracia Crista (Party of Christain Democracy)
POUS   : Partido Operário Unificado DSocialista (Unified Socialis Workers Party)
PPD/PSD   : Partido Democrático Pop..lar (Popular Democratic Party), after 1976:
              Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party)
PPM   : Partido Pop..lar Monárquico (Pop lar Monarchist Party)
PS   : Partido Socialista Portuguesa (Portuguese Socialist Party)
PSR   : Partido Socialista Revol.cionário (Revol..tionary Party of the Workers)
UDP   : Uniao Democrática Pop..lar (Pop..lar Democratic Union)
UEDS   : Uniao de Esquerda para a Democracia Social (Left Union for Social
              Democracy)

Distribution of Seats in Portugal's Assembly of the Republic, 1976-1980

	1975	1976	1979	1980
ASDI	–	–	–	4
CDS	16	42	42	46
MDP/CDE	5	0	3	2
PCP	30	40	44	39
PPD/PSD	81	73	75	82
PPM	0	0	5	6
PS	116	107	74	66
UDP	1	1	1	1
UEDS	–	–	0	4
Total	250	263	250	250

Table II

Importance of political problems: percentage of respondents in party who mention problem among three most important

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
PSOE	88	28	12	36	15	16	14	2	16	1	1	6	18	1	3	14
CDC	74	58	22	13	21	11	25	11	7	6	4	9	5	3	2	10
AP	69	57	54	17	4	6	7	13	2	6	1	1	2	5	7	13
MDP	51	46	7	9	11	16	3	4	23	3	8	7	7	2	6	32
PS	37	34	25	20	22	28	5	15	21	1	12	18	8	4	5	15
PSD	48	54	37	26	20	21	21	12	4	12	9	5	2	6	1	7
PPM	22	27	49	29	47	18	7	17	11	6	10	3	5	11	2	12
CDS	38	43	50	20	21	13	18	18	4	23	11	6	1	9	3	7

Table III: Agreement with proposed political measure: percentage (strongly) in favour

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
PSOE	100	96	89	99	100	94	96	17	99	9	8	100	96	51	78
CDC	99	100	82	89	99	86	97	79	91	63	8	96	78	56	43
AP	100	99	100	98	98	91	91	96	84	81	58	91	74	80	8
MDP	99	96	92	96	99	98	4	19	97	18	2	99	84	65	96
PS	98	97	91	91	100	94	79	29	97	34	4	97	89	79	37
PSD	99	100	99	97	99	92	96	65	91	95	7	94	86	90	40
PPM	96	96	97	94	99	79	72	12	85	89	12	94	87	84	25
CDS	98	98	99	93	99	81	95	79	84	97	16	88	81	92	26

meaning of columns:

A: fight unemployment
B: fight inflation
C: punish terrorists
D: reduce regional differences
E: protect environment
F: reduce income differences

G: accelerate integration
H: develop nuclear energy
I: control multinationals
J: reduce public control
K: increase military expenditure
L: equal opportunity men and women

M: defense super powers
N: concern own needs versus needs Third World
O: women decide abortion
P: percentage of nonresponse to this question

Appendix 5.

Analysis results for the proposed measures questions:
proximity analysis, cumulative scaling and factor analysis
of party delegates from the European Community (summary)

	unfolding		factor analysis	
	p(i)	H(i)	I	II
1. reduce income differences	0.36	0.50	.65	-.39
2. equal opportunity men and women	0.49	0.40	.66	-.28
3. control multinationals	0.49	0.43	.53	-.28
4. protect environment	0.56	0.38	.59	-.22
5. reduce regional differences	0.43	0.36	.59	-.06
6. defense against super powers	0.45	0.34	.47	.01
7. fight unemployment	0.82	0.38	.49	.04
8. fight inflation	0.69	0.43	.07	.49
9. punish terrorists	0.46	0.47	-.13	.68
10. reduce public control	0.26	0.42	-.40	.69
11. develop nuclear energy	0.32	0.44	-.34	.72
12. increase military expenditure	0.14	0.46	-.32	.65
13. accelerate European integration	—		-.12	.49
14. women decide about abortion	—		.43	-.26
15. concern own needs/needs Third World	—		-.18	.63

pos.alt.: very much in favour   H= 0.41   tot.var.expl.: 5.5; $r_{12}=-.33$

Cumulative scales

	p(i)	H(i)		p(i)	H(i)
reduce income differences	0.70	0.48	increase military expenditure	0.37	0.50
reduce regional differences	0.87	0.32	concern own needs/needs 3rd W.	0.44	0.38
control multinationals	0.82	0.37	reduce public control	0.53	0.43
equal opportunity men-women	0.85	0.35	develop nuclear energy	0.63	0.48
protect environment	0.95	0.41	punish terrorists	0.73	0.51
fight unemployment	0.98	0.34	fight inflation	0.98	0.43

H=0.38   H=0.46

pos.alt.: (very much) in favour

Table IV

Sympathy ratings and unfolding results for Spanish pressure groups

	PSOE	CDC	AP	p(i)	H(i)
CSUT	9	2	0	0.21	0.45
CCOO	5	2	26	0.29	0.35
UGT	38	12	0	0.42	0.62
USO	7	41	0	0.55	0.52
ELA-STV	0	40	0	0.29	0.64
CEPMME	6	41	51	0.51	0.54
COPIME	0	2	0	0.18	0.80
CEOE	2	25	51	0.54	—

H=0.55

rating   unfolding

Table V

Sympathy ratings and unfolding results for Spanish political parties

	rating		unfolding	
	PSOE	AP	p(i)	H(i)
EE	17	0	0.13	0.96
PCE	33	0	0.30	0.86
PSOE	94	1	0.65	0.41
ERC	10	0	0.08	0.57
PNV	2	2	0.07	0.48
CDC	2	7	0.16	0.45
UCD	4	12	0.36	0.43
AP	0	94	0.65	0.53
UN	0	26	0.35	0.73
HB	5	0	0.02	—
PSA	8	0	0.15	—
BNPG	7	1	0.07	—

H=0.56

Sympathy ratings for Spanish political parties were not asked of CDC delegates.

Table VI

Sympathy ratings and unfolding results for Portuguese pressure groups

	rating					unfolding results	
	MDP	PS	PSD	PPM	CDS	p(i)	H(i)
CGTP	38	12	0	0	0	0.31	0.60
MARN	68	19	5	9	4	0.32	0.64
LPMA	70	26	9	13	7	0.40	0.62
UDAS	26	45	4	4	3	0.28	0.61
UGT	26	45	4	4	3	0.28	0.61
AIP	3	3	36	29	56	0.21	0.66
CAP	0	2	55	43	80	0.33	0.74
CIP	2	1	40	30	62	0.25	0.78
CCP	2	2	38	29	51	0.17	—
CNA	49	11	7	9	8	0.13	—

H=0.64

Table VII

Sympathy ratings and unfolding results for Portuguese political parties

	rating					unfolding results	
	MDP	PS	PSD	PPM	CDS	p(i)	H(i)
PCP	83	3	0	1	0	0.14	0.81
MDP/CDE	—	10	0	2	0	0.18	0.78
UEDS	43	42	1	1	0	0.39	0.70
UDP	18	5	0	1	0	0.02	0.52
PS	39	—	14	14	6	0.56	0.53
PPD/PSD	1	4	—	69	35	0.44	0.92
PPM	1	1	51	—	51	0.46	0.91
CDS	0	0	21	37	—	0.39	0.92
PDC	1	1	3	10	15	0.07	0.87
PCTP	1	1	1	1	1	0.01	—
POUS	4	1	0	1	1	0.01	—
PSR	9	2	0	1	1	0.01	—
ASDI	6	33	4	3	2	0.32	—

H=0.76

Table VIII

Correlations of different types of belief elements in Spain and Portugal

	Spain	Portugal
left-right/importance	0.39	0.31
left-right/progressive solutions	-0.13	-0.31
left-right/conservative solutions	0.54	0.49
left-right/pressure group scale	–	0.68
left-right/party scale	0.85	0.66
importance/progressive solutions	-0.18	-0.21
importance/conservative solutions	0.43	0.32
importance/pressure group scale	–	0.32
importance/party scale	0.64	0.30
progressive solutions/conservative solutions	-0.00	-0.09
progressive solutions/pressure group scale	–	-0.21
progressive solutions/party scale	-0.22	-0.20
conservative solutions/pressure group scale	–	0.59
conservative issues/party scale	0.76	0.60
pressure group scale/party scale	–	0.81

TABLE IX   Average scale scores and standard deviations for the scales

	left-right		importance		prog. solutions		cons. solutions	
	x	s.d.	x	s.d.	x	s.d.	x	s.d.
PSOE	2.7	1.3	1.6	0.7	5.9	0.3	2.7	0.9
CDC	4.6	1.2	2.4	0.7	5.6	0.7	3.9	1.1
AP	7.9	1.6	2.8	0.5	5.6	0.7	5.1	0.9
MDP	2.5	1.4	2.2	0.7	5.9	0.4	2.9	0.9
PS	3.6	1.5	2.1	0.8	5.8	0.5	3.3	1.0
PSD	5.1	1.2	2.6	0.8	5.7	0.6	4.6	0.7
PPM	6.4	1.9	2.4	0.8	5.5	0.8	3.9	0.8
CDS	7.1	1.4	2.9	0.7	5.4	0.8	4.8	0.7

Left, Right and Centre in Spain: Perceptions and Attitudes in Mass Electora-

tes and Party Elites.

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After presenting some general data concerning the distribution of Spanish electorate along the Left/Right continuum (see also the paper by Montero and Sani; Molas (1979) and, for a general review, Monzón (1982)), we want to focus oura attention on a two-fold problem: the relationship between voters' and party activists self-placements on the scale, and the contents (or, at least, a part of them) of these self-placements, in terms of evaluative o-rientations.

It is often assumed (but seldom discussed) that the corresponden-ce between voters' and parties' attitudes is never complete; we want to discusss now in what sense do these attitudes diverge: do parties, as compared to voters, shift towards the centre, or do they tend to exaggerate the differences which can be found at a mass level?

Secondly, we also want to examine some attitudes concerning impor-tant political problems, attitudes that can possibly be implicit in the choice of a placement along the L/R continuum, in order to see to what extent the different placements on the scale are rela-ted to different positions towards a given set of issues. Once a-gain, we shall present data concerning voters and party elites as well, in order to test the results presented in the first point.

Finally, we shall also present some comparative data, in order to make possible a better interpretation of our results.

1.- Voters and party elites on the Left/Right scale.

Table 1 presents the distribution of AP and PSOE national conferences delegates along a ten-positions scale.

Table 1.- Distribution of party delegates along the scale.

	'1'	'2'	'3'	'4'	'5'	'6'	'7'	'8'	'9'	'10'
AP	–	.9	–	–	5.6	10.7	21.8	25.9	12.5	22.7
PSOE	24.8	16.8	32.4	18.8	6.6	–	.6	–	–	–

While the PSOE shows a distribució similar to parties such as the French PS or the PSI (the mean placement for PSOE is 2.7, as compared to 3.0 for PS and 2.7 for PSI), AP shows a very "right" profile, more than other parties from other countries. AP mean placement is 7.9, clearly more to the right than Italian DC (4.2) or RPR (5.4).

How do these distributions compare with each party's voters distribution? Comparison is not easy, because ten-points scales are seldom used in surveys in Spain; as a matter of fact, we can only use data from a survey conducted in 1978 (i.e., three years before our survey among party conferences delegates, and with a party system format clearly different). More frequently, opinion polls use five-positions scales, but comparisons between these scales and the ten-positions ones may be dangerous, as there can be some kind of bias associated to the type of scale used. Therefore, in table 2 we present the results of two surveys, using both types of scale.

Table 2.- <u>Distribution of voters along the scale (1978 and 1983)</u>.

	'1'	'2'	'3'	'4'	'5'	'6'	'7'	'8'	'9'	'10'
AP	-	-	-	-	1.1	4.4	12.1	27.5	26.4	27.4
1978										
PSOE	2.2	8.7	25	41.3	16.3	4.3	1.1	1.1	-	-

	'1'	'2'	'3'	'4'	'5'
AP	-	2.2	37.1	50.6	10.1
1983					
PSOE	8.1	72.1	17.4	2.3	-

In spite of the use of different scales, and the period of time elapsed between both surveys (period of time with enormous and well known changes in the distribution of votes), the situation of both electorates seems to be rather constant. Using the ten-positions scale, mean values are AP, 7.1, and PSOE, 3.9; using the five-positions scale, mean values are, respectively, 3.6 and 2.1. On the other hand, if we recode the ten-positions scale used for party elites to a five-positions scale (by merely recoding '1' and '2' into '1', '3' and '4' into '2', and so on), we have AP, 4.2, and PSOE, 1.7. Table 3 summarizes these results.

Table 3.- <u>Mean self-placements on five- and ten-positions scales</u> (within each cell, from left to right, mean values for PSOE,AP).

	Party elites	Voters
Five-positions scale	1.7; 4.2	2.1;3.6
Ten positions scale	2.7;7,9	3.9;7.1

Whatever the scale actually used, we find the same structure on both sides of the continuum: elites place themselves more extremely than voters do; these differences are quite marked, and indeed significant.

Perhaps these results may not appear surprising. However, it must be kept in mind that Spanish parties have been severely criticized for being too "consensual", i.e., for having led policies of large, over-sized agreements at the "top" level, not entirely endorsed, or followed, by their voters (who, disappointed, turned subsequently to lower turn-out rates). Our figures suggest a contrary situation, normal in a comparative approach, but not obvious at all in Spanish politics.

Although perhaps marginal, another result of our party elites survey providesf further evidence. When asked about their families' orientation during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, party delegate answers were as presented in table 4 (and perhaps should we mentio the fact that this question was the one a lowest percent of "no answer").

Table 4.- Delegates families' preferences during the Civil War

		AP	PSOE
	Francoist	88.5	24.2
	Republican	2.2	61.5
Family was			
	Divided	4.6	9.9
	Not aligned	4.6	4.3

Differences in family backgrounds (and, therefore, possibly in political socialization) are simply enormous, and it is obvious that we are touching here a central point of cleavage between left and right in Spain. But, on the other hand, it should also be obvious that a democratic system could hardly survive if this degree of civil war-related cleavage existed also at the mass level.

Thus, we find that while PSOE and AP voters place themselves in quite separate positions on the continuum, this separation is larger when we analyze party elites' placements, this movement appearing on both sides, AP amd PSOE as well. We may now turn to a more complex question, i.e., attitudes underlying these placements.

2.- <u>Attitudes on issues.</u>

We have used a common question for our voters and party elites surveys, asking them to express their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements concerning some important political issues, and also to express which of those issues were perceived as more important. (For detailed results, see Tables 5-a to 5-b). Of course, the list of issues offered in our questionnaire can raise objections, but we feel that it touches some central, interesting points and, having been used in other surveys, it makes possible meaningful comparative analyses.

Let us select some aspectes from tables 5-a to 5-d. First of all, table 6 presents the six issues with a larger support within respondants (i.e., AP, and PSOE, middle-level party elites and voters).

Table 5-a Agreement with issues: AP delegates

	Strongly agree	Agree	No o-pinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fight against inflation	75.1	17.1	7.4	--	.4
Accelerating european integration . . .	27.9	53.9	14.9	2.6	.7
Reduction of public control over private sector firms. . . .	33.5	35.7	23.8	6.7	.4
Letting women decide concerning abortion,	4.1	3.7	11.5	35.3	45.4
Fight against unemployment.	85.1	8.6	6.3	--	--
Defending against superpowers (USA, USSR).	23.4	34.6	32.4	8.6	1.1
More severe penalties for terrorism .	87.0	7.1	6.0	--	--
Development of nuclear power plants	62.1	27.9	9.3	.7	--
More control over multinational firms . . .	36.4	39.0	20.3	4.1	.4
Protection of environment	54.6	36.1	9.3	---	--
Reduction of economic unequalities between regions	65.8	24.2	10.0	--	--
Equality between men and women	43.1	39.4	13.4	3.7	.4
Increase of military budget	14.5	35.7	33.8	15.6	.4
Reduction of income unequalities. . . .	35.3	43.1	19.3	2,2	--

Table 5-b Agreement with issues: PSOE delegates,

	Strongly agree	Agree	No o-pinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fight against inflation	30.6	58.8	8.3	2.4	—
Accelerating european integration . . .	31.2	57.6	7.7	3.5	—
Reduction of public control over private sector firms. . . .	.6	7.6	19.4	55.3	17.1
Letting women decide concerning abortion.	29.4	40.0	14.7	13.5	2.4
Fight against unemployment.	89.4	5.9	4.7	—	—
Defending against superpowers (USA, USSR).	54.1	35.3	8.9	1.8	1.2
More severe penalties for terrorism .	31.2	52.9	5.3	5.3	5.3
Development of nuclear power plants	1.2	14.1	22.9	52.4	9.4
More control over multinational firms . . .	65.3	27.1	7.1	.6	—
Protection of environment	68.8	25.3	5.9	—	—
Reduction of economic unequalities between regions	70.0	22.9	6.5	.6	—
Equality between men and women	65.9	27.6	6.5	—	—
Increase of military budget	1.2	5.9	20.0	49.4	23.5
Reduction of income unequalities. . . .	63.5	23.5	10.6	1.2	1.2

Table 5-c Agreement with issues: AP voters

	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fight against inflation	42	40	18	1	--
Accelerating european integration . . .	19	48	27	5	1
Reduction of public control over private sector firms. . . .	13	36	38	12	2
Letting women decide concerning abortion.	7	20	14	34	24
Fight against unemployment.	61	29	10	--	--
Defending against superpowers (USA, USSR).	16	40	34	8	1
More severe penalties for terrorism .	50	33	14	2	1
Development of nuclear power plants	18	36	34	10	2
More control over multinational firms . . .	14	34	43	--	1
Protection of environment	34	47	18	--	--
Reduction of economic unequalities between regions	26	49	24	1	--
Equality between men and women	25	46	16	12	--
Increase of military budget	9	20	29	33	9
Reduction of income unequalities. . . .	21	49	24	6	--

Table 5-d Agreement with issues: PSOE voters.

	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fight against inflation	42	45	13	1	--
Accelerating european integration . . .	17	49	26	7	1
Reduction of public control over private sector firms. . . .	9	30	36	22	4
Letting women decide concerning abortion.	22	42	13	18	5
Fight against unemployment.	60	30	8	2	--
Defending against superpowers (USA, USSR).	23	48	24	5	1
More severe penalties for terrorism .	31	46	15	7	1
Development of nuclear power plants	8	36	25	23	9
More control over multinational firms . . .	20	46	31	3	--
Protection of environment	41	47	11	--	--
Reduction of economic unequalities between regions	26	56	17	1	--
Equality between men and women	33	54	11	2	--
Increase of military budget	2	10	20	44	25
Reduction of income unequalities. . . .	29	53	16	2	--

Table 6.- Issues with higher percents that "strongly agree" (in
brackkets, percent for the other party. For complete
labelling of issues, see tables 5-a to 5-d)

	AP	PSOE
Party elites	Terrorism 87.0 (31.2)	Unemployment 89.4
	Unemployment 85,1	Unequalities between regions 70.0
	Inflation 75.1 (30.6)	Environment 68.8
	Unequalities between regions 65.8	Equality sexes 65.9(43.1)
	Nuclear power 62.1 (1.2)	Multinationals 65.3(36.4)
	Environment 54.6	Income unequal. 63.5(35.3)
Voters	Unemployment 67.8	Unemployment 65.2
	Terrorism 58.1	Inflation 47.7
	Inflation 50.6	Environment 46.6
	Environment 42.0	Equality sexes 37,1
	Unequalities between regions 34.2(31.3)	Terrorism 36.5
	Equality sexes 30.1	Income unequal. 34.5(27.6)

Let us first compare rows in table 6. PSOE delegates appear as a
classic left party, placing highest support on reduction of unem-
ployment, favouring equality (between regions, sexes and different
income levels), control over nultinational firms, and with an "o-

-pening" towards "new left" positions (protection of environment, low support for nuclear power plants).

On the other hand, AP delegates seem clearly more conservative. Repression of terrorism is the more popular issue ("law and order") and, if unemployment is important, control of inflation ranks short below. Equalitarian concerns refer only to inter-regional differences, and, if environment protection is desired, a more important majority favours nuclear development.

Looking now at voters, differences are less important. Five of the six issues appear in both cells, and differences in percents of respondants are limited. Only terrorism seems to make a difference in the expected sense (i.e., more AP voters favour a more repressive policy).

What is more important here is the difference between party elites and voters, within each given party. A look at the columns in table 6 shows immediately that the main dividing line is not the vertical one (division between parties) but the horizontal one (division between elites and voters within each party). In fact, divisions between both parties' voters' opinions are small and, somehow, umpredictable: for AP voters, unemployment and regional unequalities are more important than for docialist voters, which would not seem consistent with an "a priori" definition of attitudes linked to "right" positions.

If we turn now to rejected options (i.e., those issues where an important percent "ag "disagrees" or "strongly disagrees"), the picture is slightly different, as table 7 shows.

Table 7.- <u>Issues with higher percents of disagreement</u>   (figures are the parcent that "disagree" plus "strongly disagree"; for complete labeling of issues, see tables 5-a to 5-d; in brackets, corresponding percent for the other party)

	AP	PSOE
PARTY ELITES	Abortion 80.7	Military budget 72.9
	Military budg. 16.0	Reduction of public control 72.4
	Superpowers 9.7(3.0)	Nuclear 61.8 (0.7)
	Reduction of public control.. 7.1	Abortion 15.9
	Multinationals 4.5(1.2)	Terrorism 10.6 (-)
VOTERS	Abortion 68.2	Military budget 85.2
	Military budget 59.2	Nuclear 42.1
	Reduction of public control... 22.2	Reduction of public control ... 40.0
	Nuclear 18.2	Abortion 26.4
	Multinationals 15.8(4.3)	European integr. 10.8 (8.2)

What is more important in table 7 is a greater consistence between party elites and voters: "vertical" differences are small, while "horizontal" differences are larger than in table 6. However, cleavages at the mass level are clearly less important than at the party elites level. Issues such as public control over private firms, nuclear power or abortion show considerable lesser differences at the mass level. For instance, while party delegates against abortion are 80.7 % in   AP and 15.9 % in PSOE, respective figures for voters are 68.2 and 26.4.

A visible exception is shown by attitudes concerning military budget (or, more precisely, its increase) where, in both parties, electors oppose the issue massively, to a larger extent than elites do.

At this point, it is clear that, although "left" and "right" have a meaning in terms of preffered policies concerning several issues, mass perceptions of differences related to each issue are less clear-cut than at the party elites level. It is, then, necessary, to measure how mass electorate perceives each issue in terms of

left and right (i.e., an approach which is complementary to developments presented thus far). Table 8 presents the results to the following question: "From this list of issues, which ones do belong to the right, and which ones to the left?".

Table 8.- Attribution of policies to the left or to the right, according to AP, PSOE voters´opinion

	AP voters				PSOE voters			
	Left	Right	Both//none	No ans-wer	Left	Right	Both/none	No ans-wer
Inflation	5	21	43	31	32	2	41	25
European integr.	3	27	36	34	23	8	39	30
Reduction of public control over private	13	29	17	42	21	29	14	37
Abortion	48	9	17	26	57	2	18	22
Unemployment	5	26	47	23	32	4	47	18
Superpowers	8	19	32	40	29	6	34	31
Terrorism	2	47	26	25	12	27	39	22
Nuclear	2	29	27	38	13	24	31	32
Multinationals	24	12	21	43	45	2	19	34
Environment	10	13	47	21	40	2	36	22
Regional unequal.	13	14	40	33	41	1	31	27
Equality bet.sexes	21	10	40	29	50	2	27	21
Military budget	5	35	24	36	6	46	19	29
Income unequalities	23	11	33	33	53	2	19	25

Perhaps the most important feature in table 8 is the important amount of in-
difference in the perception of each issue in a left/right scheme, visible in
the high percents of respondants who attribute these issues either to both the
left and the right or to none of them.However, these answers may hide an absen-
ce of opinion or a "no answer", so let us concentrate on the first two columns
for each party electorate. We can classify the issues in two groups:issues
which are attributed to its "own" sector by each group of voters, and issues
which are clearly differentiated.

a.- Both parties' voters attribute to their own "side" of the continuum:
      - reduction of inflation
      - reduction of unemployment
      - european integration
      - defense against superpowers
      - protection of environment
      -reduction of regional unequalities
b.- Both parties' voters agree in attributing
      b.1.- To the left: abortion
                              control over multinational firms
                              equality between sexes
                              reduction of income differences

      b.2.- To the right: reduction of public control over private firms
                              repression of terrorism
                              nuclear power
                              increase of military budgets

We can find here a certain degree of paradox. Take, for instance, the "increa-
se of military budget" issue: although AP voters place themselves clearly on
the right side of the continuum, and although most of them disagree with the
proposal, most of them attribute this policy to the right.
There seems to be a certain independence between preferences in issue-policies

self-placement on the L/R scale and attribution of each issue to the left or to the right. Of course, this independence cannot be exaggerated (because of high rates of "no answer" in table 8, and also because of a certain degree of dispersion around the mean for placements on the scale) but nevertheless a visible fact remains.

What is clearer, however, is the concordance between table 8 and the ordering of issues made by party elites. Looking at tables 6 and 7, it is easy to see how those issues which differentiated more deeply between party elites are precisely those which voters attribute either to the left or to the right, independently of voters' own position when facing those issues, and of voters' self-placement on the L/R scale.

It is clear, then, that there exists a certain degree of independence between perception of the political contents of the issues and evaluative orientations in front of those issues, when we refer to the mass public level. Elites' attitudes seem to play an important role in the "labeling", in terms of left and right, of each issue, but not in shaping voters' attitudes in front of each issue (even if the distance between self-placements of voters and elites is rather short).

Thus far, we have seen serious differences in attitudes concerning issues between party elites and voters of a given party. We can now focus the problem in a different way: as the idea of a L/R scale has a basically comparative use, let us try to compare parties from different political systems. Do similar placements on the scale lead to similar attitudes concerning issues? Or, perhaps, do differences in self-placements lead to serious differences in policy orientations?

3.- Left/Right scale and issues: a cross-national comparison.

We can only use data concerning party elites; however, the essence of our argument is not affected ny this limitation, because we want to focus on the problem of comparability. We shall use a "most similar systems" and "most similar parties" approach, in order to reduce as much as possible other influences. We shall, therefore, present some data concerning some parties in Spain, France and Italy.

In fact, truly comparable data are only those for Socialist parties. As we

Table 9.- A comparison between Southern European Socialist parties: PSOE, PS, PSI.

a.- Issues with higher disagreement:

	PSOE	PS	PSI
European integr.	3.8	17.3	1.2
Reduction of public control	79.9	80.3	29.4
Abortion	17.6	8.8	29.8
Terrorism	10.6	3.6	41.7
Nuclear	69.4	51.3	22.5
Military budget	80.2	72.4	83.9

b.- Issues perceived as most important

PSOE		PS		PSI	
Uemployment	94.7	Unemployment	94.0	Inflation	84.5
Regional unequalities	38.9	Inflation	70.4	Unemployment	75.7
Income uneq.	38.2	Income uneq.	33.4	European integration	29.5
Inflation	29.9	Multinationals	23.4	Environment	22.6
Superpowers	19.1	Superpowers	18.7	Income uneq.	20.6

have seen, party delegates in PSOE, PS and PSI place themselves in very simi-
lar mean locations: 2.7, 3.0 and 2.7. Cayrol and Ignazi (1983) find interesting
dissonances between self-placements on the scale (with italian Socialists more
to the left than french ones) and attitudinal orientations (with italian socia-
lists appearing more to the right than their french equivalents). Let us see
what is the situation of Spanish Socialists. (Table 9).

No clear image emerges from table 9. For some issues, Spanish socialists seem
to agree strongly with their Italian equivalents (european integration, milita-
ry budgets, "third world"), while on others their equivalent would rather be
the French PS.

Similar conclusions are to be drawn from the data on "priorities". In several
oints, PSOE delegates are closer to the French socialists (importance of unem-
ployment, reduction of income differences). PSOE delegates, on the other hand,
diverge clearly from the other two parties in a very low concern for inflation:
only 30 % of them think of inflation as one of the three most important pro--
blems (versus 70.4 % in the PS and 84.5 % in the PSI). In a general sense, PSOE
delegates appear to be mainly "equalitarian", or, at least, more so than the
other two parties, which seem more sensitive to "national" issues (particular-
ly the PS) or to issues which are not easily related to classic notions of left
and right (such as european integration or protection of environment): it seems
to be case of the PSI.

Although this analysis should be continued, it seems clear that, even if their
self-placements on the L/R scale are quite similar, the policy orientations of
the three socialist parties diverge significantly. Of course, one must take in-
to account an important number of national specific factors (such as regional
problems in Spain, traditions in French foreign policy or terrorism in Italy);
but the idea of a homogeneous, comparative scale (conceived either as a concep-
tual framework, or, less ambitiously, as a measure tool) lies precisely on the
assumption of a basic common structure of opinions, lying under (and expressing
itself across) various sets of national, specific issues.

Conversely, very different locations on the scale may go along with visible convergences in terms of policy preferences. As we have reported, the mean self-placement of AP delegates on the L/R scale is clearly more to the right than it is for RPR or DC: mean values are, respectively, 7.9, 5.4 and 4.2. It is, then, amazing to see how these parties, well differentiated by their placements on the scale, seem to agree when it comes to policies. A general comparison cannot be made, because presentations made by Ysmal (1984) and Ignazi, Mancini and Pasquino (1980) are not homogeneous, but several data (as presented in table 10) can illustrate this statement.

Table 10.- A comparison between AP, RPR delegates.

- Issues with higher percents that "strongly agree".

AP		RPR	
Terrorism	87.0	Unemployment	97
Unemploy.	85.1	Terrorism	90
Inflation	75.1	Inflation	86
Regional une-qualities	65.8	Nuclear	79
Nuclear	62.1	Superpowers	76

- Most important issues

AP		RPR	
Unemploy.	79.7	Unemploy.	91
Terrorism	73.7	Inflation	71
Inflation	66.1	Nuclear	31
Regional une-qualities	19.8	Terrorism	21
Nuclear	14.6	Income diffe-rences	19

In our opinion, we have here a good example of a situation different from the one previously reported for socialist parties: when comparing AP and RPR we find a strong convergence on policy preferences (with the exception of two quite nationally specific problems: regions in Spain and gaullist tradition in foreign policy), even if their placements on the scale are quite diffe-rent, while for Socialists we had found very homogeneous placements on the scale with visibly diverging policy attitudes and priorities.

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We are aware that tha anlysis conducted thus far is limited by several facts: our data concern a limited number of parties; perhaps our list of issues, does not include some central, crucially differentiating problems; and so on. There-fore, general conclusions cannot be drawn; however, some elements emerge cle-arly:

- the Left/Right scale is perceived as a real, significant dimension by Spa-nish voters and party activists, and it has been found to be a very good pre-dictor of electoral results.

- however, placements on the scale are not associated in a constant and homo-geneous way to policy preferences. As we have reported, considerable diffe-rences can be found between voters and party elites, and between party eli-tes from similar parties. Conversely, we have also found significant conver-gences between parties well differentiated, in L/R terms.

- the set of policies associated to each position on the scale is variable, is -perhaps- specific to each political system, and subject to changes over ti-me. An important fact in this respect ia the superior consistence of elites' attitudes, and the role they play in creating and sustaining a state of di-vision in the electorate's perceptions and preferences.

- The generation and consolidation of supra-national political institutions

can, perhaps, generate some large homogeneity in the political debate and, thus, contribute to stablish more general connections between the L/R scale and policy orientations.

This is not to say that the use of Left/Right scales must be condemned. It is indeed a useful analytic tool, but it requires more, and more deep, analyses, and a scientifically critical approach.

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