

borders tend to be more precise. This problem of boundary delimitation renders the problem of partitioning either the island or its northern portion all the more difficult. Even in the 1920s it would have been difficult to partition the island into more or less homogeneously Catholic and Protestant areas (see maps and discussion in Douglas 1982: 107-116). Similarly, any attempt at repartition by local option ballot without population transfer would reduce the area of Northern Ireland but would still leave a 28 per cent Catholic minority, while "depatrinating" almost 90,000 Protestants into the Republic (Rose 1976: 160-163).

The content of ethnic protest: The Northern Irish Catholic community has, then, been endowed with a particularly strong sense of group identity that has depended on multiple criteria of ethnicity; this has been reinforced by a partial cultural division of labour which shows no sign of diminishing; and the Catholic minority is encouraged to be more assertive by its position as an "interface periphery" (to use the term of Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 28-30). It remains now to examine the dependent variable, the nature of ethnic protest.

Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 141) have outlined a uni-dimensional model of demands of peripheral ethnic groups, ranging along a continuum that relates to degree of territorial autonomy. While attainment of territorial autonomy is, perhaps, the most characteristic objective of peripheral ethnic protest movements, in some circumstances the demand may be for non-territorial autonomy (McRae 1975). On the other hand, the group's demand may not be for recognition of its distinctiveness but for an end to discrimination against its members (Allardt 1979: 43-47). Allardt suggests that, typically, one of these dimensions yields to the other over time: ethnic conflicts are now typically concerned with demands for recognition of group identity rather than for termination of discriminatory practices. The relationship between these two types of demand may be summarised as follows. Demands for an end to discrimination, associated with an era in which criteria of ethnicity were largely ascriptive, are based on the notion that society should comprise not groups, of which some are accorded special privileges, but individuals who should be treated equally. Demands for recognition of ethnic identity, by contrast, associated with an era in which criteria of ethnicity are largely achieved, are based on the notion that society is

TABLE 4: A TYPOLOGY OF ETHNIC MINORITY DEMANDS

		NATURE OF DEMAND	
		<u>Termination of Discrimination</u>	<u>Recognition of Group Identity</u>
NATURE	<u>Legal, Symbolic</u>	1. Negative; repeal of discriminatory laws	4. Formal recognition of minority culture
OF CHANGE	<u>Substantive Minor</u>	2. Positive; enactment of legislation outlawing discrimination; establishment of equal opportunity agencies	5. Territorial or cultural autonomy; minority participation in government
REQUIRED	<u>Substantive Major</u>	3. Positive; efforts to reverse economic and social position of minority; positive discrimination	6. Concession of self-determination of minority

divided into groups whose cultural identity should be allowed free expression and which should not be regarded merely as collections of individuals.

Examples of the types of demand that are characteristic of these two dimensions are presented in Table 4. This suggests a progression from position 1 (ending of formal discrimination) to position 6 (granting of self-determination). The "demands" in the two columns do not, however, fall neatly into demands for individual rights and demands for group rights, respectively; items 2 and 3 already entail recognition of the existence of distinct communities. The experience of inter-war Europe suggests that governments have found it easier to concede 1 and 2 than even 4, not to mention 5 and 6. International attempts to protect minority rights in the former domain date back to 1814, when the Congress of Vienna secured guarantees of the rights of Catholics in the new Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 made similar provision for the rights of non-Orthodox minorities in certain Balkan states. The League of Nations and the United Nations sought subsequently

to guarantee these basic human rights, the latter by inviting member-states to commit themselves to an International Declaration of Human Rights. The League of Nations, however, uniquely attempted to go beyond this, to protect also national rights of minorities (items 4 and 5), with mixed results. The League's limited success reflects the extent to which states tend to perceive demands such as 5 as direct threats to their sovereignty. Nor is the progression of a minority necessarily from 1 through 6; it may start with 6, in the expectation that the others will follow.

In view of the coexistence in Northern Ireland of contemporary criteria of ethnicity alongside traditional ones, it is not surprising that the demands of resurgent Catholics in Northern Ireland did not consist entirely of "modern"-type demands for recognition; in fact, the six-point programme of the Civil Rights Association consisted exclusively of demands aimed at ending de facto discrimination against or unfair treatment of Catholics (introduction of universal, equal suffrage in local elections; ending of electoral gerrymandering; fair allocation of public housing; ending of discrimination in employment; repeal of emergency public order legislation; and abolition of the paramilitary auxiliary police force). Catholics were, then, demanding essentially the rights of British subjects. As these demands were conceded, however, a new phase followed quickly; in 1969-70 Catholics began to demand the rights of Irish nationals, or recognition of their separate identity by means of power-sharing in government and establishment of institutionalised links with the Republic of Ireland. As a leading activist of 1968-69 put it, "over the months, the CRA [Civil Rights Association] had moved in a natural progression from demanding something for the minority (that is, the Catholics); to demanding Catholic equality; to demanding Catholic power" (Devlin 1969: 154). Over a longer time-span, of course, demands of Northern Catholics followed a more complex path, with considerable overlap between different types of demand: 1 (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) → 6 (1880-1968) → 1 (1968-69) → 2 (1969-73) → 5 (1970-81) → 6 (1981-).

#### CATALYSTS OF ETHNIC REVOLT

Kokkan and Urwin have suggested, as mentioned above, that ethnic protest takes place when a community possessing certain cultural, economic and

territorial resources responds to a catalyst of revolt. They have identified two such catalysts: the diffusion of democratic principles and structures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the "second industrial revolution" of the post-war period, which was characterised by the development of the welfare state (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 135-140). In a parallel argument, Allardt sets the recent ethnic revival in the context of a population whose basic material or physiological needs have been met and who can afford the luxury of being concerned instead about non-material needs such as belonging, esteem and self-realisation (Allardt 1979: 43-37). These general trends may help to explain why formerly passive groups became mobilised and why the new protest movements were more professional (the first and third points of Allardt's descriptive model). They do not, however, explain why the wave of ethnic resurgence took place when it did, why it was articulated in a distinctly left-wing manner nor why governments were disposed to respond more favourably than they had been in the past. It could be suggested that ethnic protest is a response not merely to long-term waves of social change over decades but also to short-term social psychological disjunctures that take place over months or even weeks.

If this type of approach is to be adopted, it is appropriate to look also at other types of protest that coincided with the wave of ethnic resurgence. The most notable was the set of student revolts that spread across the western world in the late 1960s; to this could be added the rather more muted reappearance of dissent in Eastern Europe, of which Czechoslovakia was the most noted example. It would be interesting to see whether Allardt's model could be adapted to cover these cases, along the framework outlined in Table 5.

The nature of the student protests of the 1960s is well documented. They satisfy all the conditions of Allardt's descriptive model with the probable and perhaps unavoidable exception of that relating to professionalisation of personnel: the evidence suggests that student activists in the United States were children of parents who themselves were professionals, while in Europe they tended to come from working class backgrounds (Lipset 1972: 80). In this sector, of course, "professionalisation" has a very special significance: students by definition are proto-professionals; whereas student activists may be

TABLE 5: CHARACTERISTICS OF "REBELLIONS" OF 1960s

	<u>Student Revolt</u>	<u>Ethnic Revival</u>	<u>East European Dissent</u>
<u>Target</u>	University administration	Centralised state	Authoritarian state, party
<u>Agents</u>	Students	Ethnic minorities	Intellegentsia
<u>Related post-war social changes:</u>	Explosion of numbers, over- crowding, anonymity	Expansion of middle class, restricted access to centre	Huge expansion of educated class, controlled access to centre
<u>Common features:</u>			
Timing (late 1960s, especially 1968)	✓	✓	✓
Activisation of previously passive group	✓	✓	✓
Professionalisation:			
- personnel	X	✓	✓
- organisation	✓	✓	X
Political orientation:			
- pro-participation	✓	✓	✓
- left-wing	✓	✓	✓ <sup>a</sup>
Institutional responsiveness	✓	✓	X

Notes: ✓ = present, X = absent

<sup>a</sup>The kind of changes in the economic order advocated by dissidents might be described as right-wing in Western Europe, but a strong strain of New Leftism ran through the reform demands.

"more professional" than their parents, they are typically "less professional" than the earlier generation of students as far as family background is concerned. While student activism in Northern Ireland bears clear similarities to the student revolt elsewhere, however, it was more obviously a part - if a rather atypical one - of the local movement of Catholic protest (Arthur 1974: 101-106).

Rather less well-known is the phenomenon of the protesting intelligentsia of Eastern Europe, which, though dominated by the Czechoslovak example, was to be seen also in Poland and the Soviet Union. In each of these cases, dissent and protest among the intelligentsia peaked in 1967-68 (Skilling 1973: 112-116; Gomböri 1973: 173-179; Reddaway 1975: 121-156). While the general demands were for a liberalisation of the apparatuses of state and party, there was an ethnic dimension in the Soviet Union: in at least seven of the fifteen union republics moderate nationalist agitation also peaked. The pattern shows a fairly close similarity to the elements of the Allardt model. The major differences relate to the nature of opposition organisation: as there could be no question of this being formally constituted, the question of professionalisation did not arise. Furthermore, the institutional response was one of repression rather than compromise in the Soviet Union and Poland;<sup>5</sup> and the Czechoslovak liberalisation could not survive Soviet intervention.

If such an extension of the model is feasible, the question of explanation becomes all the more fascinating. Almost fifty years ago the phenomenon of revolution was described as being akin to a fever (Brinton 1939). This metaphor might usefully be extended in exploring the phenomenon of ethnic unrest. The late 1960s witnessed the infection of a large number of institutions of different kinds by a particular kind of virus (comparable, perhaps, with the earlier epidemics of the 1790s, 1830, 1848 and 1917-20). On each occasion the predominant strain was democratism: the belief of certain groups that they were excluded from effective participation by illegitimate means. On the last occasion, and to some degree also in 1848, a second strain was present, nationalism: the belief of certain ethnic groups that they were entitled to institutional recognition of their separate identity. On the last occasion a third strain was also present, "sovietism": a belief, especially among the working class, that political life could be restructured by the transfer of power to workers' councils or soviets (to which was linked, especially in the Bolshevik variant in Russia and Eastern Europe, a belief that by this method a fundamental social transformation could take place).

Viruses of this kind appear to have had the effect (1) of weakening

the capacity and/or will of the authorities to resist pressure towards change and/or (2) of lowering the acceptance threshold of dissatisfied groups by either (a) undermining their sense of fatalism or (b) heightening their perception of grievance, or both. Such an analogy "explains" (subject to the qualifications made above) three elements in the Allardt model: timing, institutional responsiveness and political orientation. Coincidence of timing is explained by definition: an epidemic necessarily strikes simultaneously in many places. Each strain of the virus carries a particular political content (in 1968, emphasis on participation and defence of the underdog) and is calculated to weaken the central nervous system of its victim.

Variation in the effects of the political infection may be explained in terms of the characteristics of each type of patient. In the first place, the virus struck only those where an aggrieved, passive group was available for mobilisation. The nature and intensity of the disorder that was produced depended on the indigenous set of circumstances, on the health of the body politic; and its effects were a function of the capacity of the body to mobilise counter-agents.

#### CONCLUSION

The case of the Northern Ireland disturbances that began in 1968 fall into the pattern posited by Allardt's model of the ethnic revival with a degree of accuracy that is infrequently to be found in social research. The fact that this case appears not to have been prominent among those from which the elements of the model were drawn is valuable confirmatory evidence. While identification of uniformities in political behaviour is one of the objectives of the social scientist, establishing such uniformities is no more than a first step. A satisfactory general theory that seeks to explain ethnic protest has yet to emerge. Research has tended to focus on domestic preconditions of ethnic rebellion, which, of course, are the most important factors. On the other hand, descriptive generalisations about the recent ethnic revival point to common sources of influence that the great variety of domestic cultural, economic and territorial circumstances can never explain. It would, perhaps, be appropriate to direct more effort towards examining the trans-frontier transmission of political ideas and impulses.

While the Northern Irish example is useful for illustrating and, to some degree, testing general statements relating to ethnicity, it should be pointed out that general theories of the kind discussed here also have implications for analysis of the Northern Irish case. It is tempting but unhelpful to pursue explanation in factors seen as inherent to a political flash-point without giving adequate consideration to explanations of similar phenomena elsewhere. While the Northern Ireland problem, of course, has unique or unusual features (some of which, such as the role of religion as a criterion of ethnicity, are particularly striking), its similarity to situations of ethnic contact elsewhere in Europe and, indeed, outside Europe, appears not to have been exhaustively investigated. In particular, despite the existence of a number of comparative studies, there has been a tendency to explain away the events that began in 1968 as flowing directly from internal Irish circumstances. It is to be hoped that those who regret what they see as apparently irredeemable flaws in the political disposition of Northern Ireland's two communities will find some consolation in the possibility that the conflict arises from a particularly virulent incidence of an infection that had effect in politics much further afield.



NOTES

1. Although Allardt includes Northern Ireland in his quantitative analysis, it appears not to have influenced the formulation of his model. A little-known but even better example of his descriptive model is that of Ireland's tiny Irish- (Gaelic-) speaking minority, which in the late 1960s for the first time ever organised in defence of their community and wrung some concessions from the government.
2. This evidence is mainly impression-based and requires checking. Some Nationalist dependence on the South is, however, implied in O'Brien 1972: 128-151.
3. United Irishman, December 1960. Internment without trial was used in both parts of Ireland during the earlier campaign, but only in Northern Ireland during the most recent one. At the beginning of 1958, 142 IRA members, almost all from the North, were being detained without trial in Northern Ireland and 120, almost all from the South, in the Republic (United Irishman, January 1958).
4. The Nationalists typically won 75 per cent of the "Catholic" seats in Northern Irish parliamentary elections from 1925 to 1965; the SDLP won more than 80 per cent of the "Catholic" seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 1973.
5. This refers to the Polish events of Spring 1968; the events that began among Gdansk shipyard workers, achieving prominence in 1970 and later, were of a rather different character.

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
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ISLAND AUTONOMISM

by

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## I THE ISLAND QUESTION

Islands undeniably have a certain romantic appeal, and travelogues on islands have long been popular on the shelves of public libraries, travel sections of which form a reservoir of escapist literature. The irony of this is not lost on islanders, many of whom have shown a marked propensity to emigrate; the ultimate state of affairs is the situation in one or two of Scotland's Northern Isles where all the natives have left and the population is composed entirely of incomers. The purpose of this paper is not to dwell excessively on the more romantic and colourful aspects of insular life - although they do not lack in colour. Nevertheless it will be argued that the psychological aspect of the island image is in fact of major political significance in understanding the rise of the phenomenon of island autonomism and, in short, that those seeking the achievement of autonomy for islands have an easier task than their opposite numbers in a continental setting.

One of the characteristics of island autonomism (and the word is used here not as one point on a spectrum but as a term applicable to the whole range of achievements of separate jurisdictions, from local government to full sovereign independence) is its relatively high visibility. Very few new European States have appeared on the international scene since World War II, but most of them are islands - Cyprus, Malta and (stretching a chronological point) the Republic of Iceland - plus two Germanies in place of one. Moreover, if one is allowed to stretch a further point of international law and include the territories which have opted out of the European communities, they are all islands: Greenland, Faroe, the Isle of Man and the four Channel Islands. Furthermore the recognition of a right to participate in international treaty negotiations - the ius ad tractatum (Asín Cabrera, 1984) has been extended to the Canary Islands and is being sought by others, notably the Azores (Amaral, 1984a). Taking the category of internal autonomy, las autonomías (to employ that useful Castilian term) include parts of the Finnish, French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish states. Even at local government level, the biggest island in England and the three major archipelagoes round the Scottish coasts have been successful in campaigning to retain island units against wider centralising proposals.

So there is a fairly strong *prime facie* case for saying that there is indeed a fairly recent phenomenon of European island autonomism to examine.

This phenomenon can be seen as part of a world-wide movement, and it is now true that the number of island states belonging to the United Nations is greater than the number of landlocked members. It is also the case that the number of island microstates, actual and potential, has come in for some discussion, arising out of the independence of Western Samoa, the Maldives and tiny Nauru, and a number of writers have expressed concern about the implications for international organisations of small island independence (see Murray, 1981, and Plischke, 1977).

Within the European context, a fairly recent development has been a series of conferences - one is due in Rhodes shortly - under various auspices, leading to the creation of a European island lobby (Hache, 1984a), whereby the farthest-flung "peripheries of the periphery" have begun for the first time to come together across thousands of kilometres of distance to discuss common problems. All of this contributes to the newly enhanced prominence of the island image in Europe.

It is worth pausing and asking why the island image is so clear to the rest of the world, if indeed that is the case. One powerful element must be the apparently clear boundary between island land mass and the sea, by contrast with the notorious difficulties in demarcating the territories of mainland ethnic communities, particularly from the Balkans northwards. In "problem" frontier areas there are problems in determining where linguistic borders lie, compounded by other factors such as religion, and by the question of "the type of unit that is to be selected as the basis for such calculations"; and linguistic frontiers are often at variance with the historic boundaries usually employed to define a particular nationality (see Coakley, 1983, pp.40-41). By contrast with such fuzzy if not messy boundary problems, the land/sea divide appears to present a beautifully clear-cut line. It is no accident that island maps are used as frequently as flags as symbols of particular insular identities (see Fig. 1): the island map is usually imprinted in islanders' minds.

Fig. 1

## Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities.



Hjalte Rasmussen, Editor.

Added to the appeal of the dichotomy between sea and land is the question of psychological distance. In the days of easy air travel, many islands are far more accessible than inland areas, yet the habits of mind which derive from motor car transport, roads and bridges persist, reinforced by the cost of air travel and the problems of adverse weather conditions (see Anderson, 1984, p.3). In other words the fear of being cut off or marooned remains in mainland psyches. By contrast islanders in the Hebrides talk of going "out" to cities like Glasgow on the mainland; and, as has been mentioned, island authorities are now utilising modern transport

and telecommunications to get together regularly. For them "insularity" is much more an amalgam of special factors, giving rise to certain problems, than a state of disadvantage or of being cut off from some kind of normal existence (see Hache, 1984b).

If some of this sounds as if there is prevalent a kind of mysticism about islands if not indeed a myth, then it must be stressed that this does not mean it can be dismissed, by those who regard themselves as enlightened, as irrational. The real point of this whole argument is that

There has been a general sentiment evident in the period of decolonisation that an island has a greater claim to autonomy than a chunk of land on a continent. So, for example, the claims of Barotseland got short shrift, while Anguilla was allowed to secede from St Kitts-Nevis, the Cayman Islands to establish an individual existence separate from Jamaica, and Tuvalu to leave the Gilbert & Ellice Islands Colony. (Murray, 1984, p.190)

By contrast with this presumption in favour of island autonomy has typically gone a fear of dismemberment, graphically illustrated in Fig. 2, which is the cover of a book written by one of Britain's leading unionists in opposition to the claims of his native Scotland.

Fig. 2

# TAM DALYELL DEVOLUTION THE END OF BRITAIN?



Ironically the leading Parliamentary opponents of Scottish Home Rule were active in urging the secession, or more accurately the excision, of Orkney and Shetland from the new Scottish jurisdiction (see Macartney, 1983, pp.16-18). How is this kind of schizophrenia to be explained? One answer, in the words of a British politician, is that politicians do not have to be consistent (Bochel, 1981, p. 170). But the rhetoric of states leaves the issue ambiguous. For example Jouve draws attention to the words added to a UN declaration on international law (1970):

Rien dans les paragraphes précédents ne sera interprété comme autorisant ou encourageant une action ... qui démembrerait ou menacerait, totalement ou partiellement, l'intégrité territoriale ou l'unité politique de tout Etat souverain et indépendant. (Jouve, 1983, p.16)

Whereas, he observes, "les minorités insulaires ont d'ailleurs progressé plus vite dans l'exercice de leurs droits" (Ibid., p.18).

Secessionism tends to be unpopular with the state governments who support the sentiments contained in the passage just quoted from the UN. As Lill puts it, "the established states will not admit any exception to the principle of territorial integrity" (Lill, 1983, p.131). But Anderson adds that the problem lies not just with governments but with the citizens of the majority area, faced with a bid for secession of a border area: "the psychological affront to the rest of the population would probably be so great as to make the transfer of legal sovereignty impractical .... the longer boundaries last, the harder they are to change" (Anderson, 1983, p.2).

The passionate devotion to territorial integrity is further elaborated on by Lill as follows:

Claims for self-government clash with an unwritten rule of the international system which grants the self-determination and secession rights to overseas colonies, but not to internal ones .... There are good grounds for this, as any precedent is likely to trigger an avalanche of claims and throw the whole system into chaos. But there is also a strong emotional and perhaps even biological basis to the territorial integrity principle. (Lill, 1983, pp.133-134; emphasis added).

Lill's distinction between "overseas" and "internal" is of course a crucial point. There are two ways of looking at the distinction, and they are thus of considerable significance in any appreciation of European island autonomism.

The first interpretation is to say that such distinctions are an accurate reflection of the double standards applied by many states, not least in General Assembly speeches at the UN: namely that overseas (i.e. trans-oceanic, intercontinental, often racially based) imperialism is unacceptable, and that that is what is meant by colonialism. This facile distinction thus allows third-world countries, which have but recently freed themselves from the indignities and shackles of rule by various West European powers, to join forces with the Russians and Chinese, who arguably possess empires, protected by the great principle of contiguity, which shades into the sacred principle of territorial integrity. While leaving question marks over Afghanistan, it leaves none over Estonia, or Tibet, or Eritrea, or the various Amerindian nationalities from Patagonia to the Arctic Circle. In other words, this cosy dichotomy between the historically seaborne empires of Western Europe and the land empires suits the 90% of independent states who are not classic nation-states but in fact multi-national or multi-ethnic states. But it does rule out the claims of the "internal colonies", whether Celtic (Hechter, 1975) or New World, for self-determination.

It is for this reason that the concept of the Fourth World has been born, i.e. the idea that the emancipation of the Tiers Monde must be followed by the liberation of the internally colonised. This is not the place to go into this interesting and major question in any detail, but suffice it to say that there is a large and growing volume of literature on, and concern with, the application of the principle of self-determination to subject peoples everywhere, not just the better-known stateless nations (for an extensive and helpful review of the literature see Knight and Davies, 1984).

If indeed the distinction between "overseas and internal colonies" is essentially an intercontinental one, then it does not help the cause of European island autonomists in the slightest; that is, provided Greenland can be conveniently regarded as lying in the Americas and not a European island at all. All the other European islands can be seen as "internal", as integral parts of their respective states.

The alternative view of the dichotomy is to interpret the word "overseas" in a literal sense. This would mean regarding the Balearic islanders as overseas, and so too with the Western Isles of Scotland and the English Isle of Wight, *inter alia*. The secession of any island, by this argument, while doubtless regretted by some in the métropole - witness the Irish Free State, or Algeria, or Iceland - nevertheless would not represent a surgical operation, nor open up the dreaded Pandora's box effect referred to by Lill (above). Putting it another way, contiguity of territory is the vital aspect which defines a territory as an "integral part" (or "internal colony", depending on one's point of view). The infantryman, not the ballistic missile, seems to lie behind such thinking. The psychogeography is fascinating. It is as if states feared contagious diseases and not infectious ones, with salt water providing the cordon sanitaire. Salt water fallacy this may be, but it does seem to provide some kind of explanation for the more relaxed attitude of central governments to island autonomism.

It is worth adding that, after a decade of neglect, the problems of self-determination for a variety of islands have been attracting increasing academic attention of late (see for instance Clark, 1980; MacDonald, 1975; Orridge & Williams, 1982; Premdas, 1977). There is no room to go into the world-wide questions in depth at this juncture, but suffice it to say that what they have in common with studies such as those of Anderson on Frontier Regions (Anderson, ed., 1984) is a concern with questions of viability.

## II EUROPEAN ISLAND AUTONOMY

It is now time to focus attention on the apparent successes of autonomism in islands around Europe. First these will be catalogued, then comparisons with mainland autonomism will be made, with an attempt to analyse the differences, while finally there will be a critical look at the thesis of the relative ease of "island success". As far as possible three elements will be presented in the case of each island or archipelago: institutional distinctiveness, cultural/ethnic distinctiveness and the degree of representation of organised autonomist movements. The list runs from north to south, and excludes independent states.



### Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat)

An integral part of the Danish Kingdom until the Home Rule referendum of 1979, has since acquired internal self-government (Hjemmestyre) under a democratic constitution, and has been allowed to leave the Common Market despite not being a fully sovereign state. Most people speak Greenlandic (an Inuit language). Officially a bilingual state. Autonomist majority in the last elections

Chose to use the Dannebrog (Danish flag) as the national flag. (See Rasmussen, 1983).

### Faroe

A former county of Denmark, under British rule during the war, which meant indirect rule through Faroese. Voted for self-government in a referendum at the end of the war; granted Home Rule in 1948. Used constitutional provisions to ask not to join the EEC along with the rest of the Kingdom of Denmark and this was granted. Accordingly takes part in various international bodies such as the Nordic Council and the North Atlantic Salmon Fishing Conference as a distinct unit nominally part of the Danish delegation. Faroese language, descended from old Norse, rescued by nineteenth century cultural nationalist movement, co-official with Danish. Parliament has six parties, dividing along constitutional lines (unionist, devolutionist and nationalist) and left-right. Shifting coalition governments with no major shifts towards the Republican (independence) Party. (See Olafsson, 1984)

### Aaland Islands

Swedish-speaking islands lying between Finland and Sweden. Sovereignty retained by the former after World War I (1920-22) provided that the Aalanders had Home Rule provided under the Guarantee Act 1922. Bilingual Swedish and Finnish. Aaland government attends Nordic Council as distinct part of Finnish delegation. No political movements to challenge existing constitutional settlement (revised in 1951). (See Janson, 1982)

### Shetland

Part of Scottish realm for over 500 years. Under new Scottish local government system of 1974/75 was one of three archipelagoes to acquire special new "Island Council", single-tier, most-purpose status (the Scottish mainland has a two-tier system). This status was achieved after a campaign

against proposals for a Highlands & Islands Region in earlier government proposals. Apart from Orkney, Shetland Islands Council is the only local authority to derive revenue from North Sea oil. Shetlanders speak a vigorous dialect of middle Scots with many Norse words in it. In referendum of 1975 was one of two regions (out of twelve) to vote against the EEC. In 1979 was one of six (out of twelve) regions to vote against the Scottish devolution proposals of the Labour Government. In 1977 an autonomist organisation, the Shetland Movement, was founded (Dowle, 1980), seeking an elected Shetland Assembly. The Movement has now affiliated to the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly. Half the members of the Island Council belong to the Movement but contested last local elections as independents. No Parliamentary candidate yet nominated.

#### Orkney

Similar historical and cultural background to Shetland, although accents and identity different. Same Island Council status. Orkney Movement founded soon after Shetland Movement, with similar mass membership pro rata but only four members of Island Council, one of whom elected on Movement ticket. Voted for EEC in 1975, against Scottish devolution in 1979. Orkney Movement has agreed in principle to field a joint Parliamentary candidate with Shetland Movement "when the time is ripe". The Orkney and Shetland constituency is currently held by a Scottish Liberal with limited sympathy with the autonomists.

#### The Western Isles (Outer Hebrides)

Like Orkney and Shetland, "late" (over 500 years ago) arrivals as part of Scotland, but new arrivals on local government scene as a unit: the Comhairle nan Eilean (Islands Council) was an entirely new creation in 1974/75, the Western Isles being formerly divided between two, predominantly mainland, counties. Predominantly Gaelic speaking, officially bilingual. Linguistic activism but no political autonomist movement. Island Councillors all independents; Parliamentary constituency held by bilingual Parliamentary Leader of Scottish National Party.

#### Scottish Islands

All three above Councils submitted evidence to recent Government Committee of Inquiry (the Montgomery Committee) arguing for extension of island councils' powers. Modest reforms of a non-constitutional nature were recommended by the Committee and Government reaction is awaited. (See Macartney, 1984 and 1985)

### The Isle of Man

Internally self-governing under the British crown but not part of the United Kingdom. Like Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles formed part of the Viking realm; unlike them managed to retain Norse-style assembly (Tynwald) which is now the Island's Legislative Assembly. Manx (Gaelic) language barely survives but is officially used for promulgating laws. Has own flag, anthem, currency and stamps. Opted out of EEC. Status as semi-independent state confirmed by Kilbrandon Report (Royal Commission) and accepted by British Government. Members of House of Keys all independents. Two nationalist (independence) parties, Mec Vannin and Manx National Party, have no seats and minority support. (See Kermode, 1984)

### Channel Islands (Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, Sark)

Status similar to Isle of Man: the Channel Islands are not part of the UK. Each has own flag and stamps. Not part of EEC but, like Mann, interest therein looked after by UK. Jersey and Guernsey are separate Bailiwicks; Alderney and Sark form part of the latter Bailiwick. Norman-French spoken to varying degrees; official "bilingualism" similar to Isle of Man. No nationalist parties. (See Shanks, 1984)

### Frisian Islands

No special status for North and East Frisian Islands (part of Denmark and Federal Germany respectively). Frisian language spoken by minority. West Frisian Islands form part of the province of Friesland, an integral part of the Netherlands. Each province however has an elected assembly and the Frisian National Party (Frysk Nasjonale Party) has seats at provincial and local levels, but not an abnormally high level of support in the islands.

### Corsica

Uniquely in the French Republic, granted Home Rule in 1981 and implemented in 1982 (elections to Assembly). Island identity long recognised: Corsican (dialect of Italian) widely spoken although French official language. Constitutional autonomism received 12.7% of the votes in 1982 (10.6%, and seven deputies, went to the Union of the Union of the Corsican People (UPC)).

After Governmental crisis fresh elections: the autonomists split with the UPC down to three seats and 5.2% and the MCA (Corsican Self-Determination Movement) the same share and three seats. Underground violent separatist movement (FLNC: Corsican National Liberation Front) sporadically active since 1960s. (See Felli, 1984)

### Sardinia

One of the few Italian regions to be granted internal self-government under the provisions of the post-World War II Italian constitution. Sard language (closely related to Italian), though in decline, widely spoken. Despite local autonomy, integration through the political party system. The Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d'Azione (PSd'A)) formed an alliance with, and was virtually absorbed by the Italian Communist Party, in whose leadership Sardinians such as Berlinguer were prominent. The decision two elections ago to resume an independent existence has been followed by a steady growth in electoral success with the PSd'A now at 14% (1984) the third largest party in the Sardinian Assembly; and, in an election pact with other autonomists (notably the Valdostan Union), the PSd'A gained a Euroseat in 1984. The Party also has members of both houses of the Italian Parliament. The rhetoric of the Party is nationalist rather than regionalist but it is clearly also interested in the European dimension. (McKinney, 1984)

### Sicily

Constitutional status same as Sardinia. Sicilian purely a dialect of Italian. Integration through the Mafia and Italian political parties (Catanzaro 1984). In 1981 a nationalist party, the FNS (Sicilian National Front) polled 2.6% and four minor autonomist parties also contested the elections.

### Balearic Islands

Home Rule as the "Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands" granted in 1983. Catalan the predominant language co-official with Castilian. The Island flag is in predominantly Catalan colours. In the Assembly elections of 1983 (Autonomous Council) eleven seats out of fifty-four

went to autonomist parties - the Majorcan Union (UM: Unión Mallorquina) got six, the Menorcan Socialist Party (PSM: Partido Socialista de Menorca) four and the small CIM got one. At local government level autonomists gained a number of local successes in 1983.

#### Canary Islands

The status of the Canary Islands is similar to that of the Balearic Islands and the Canarian flag previously used by autonomists is recognised as the island flag. In the 1983 elections to the Canarian Parliament the Canarian People's Union (UPC: Unión del Pueblo Canario) took only two seats out of sixty with 10% of the vote, while the new Canarian Nationalist Congress (CNC: Convergencia Nacionalista Canaria) gained one seat. At local government level the UPC slumped from twenty-nine seats to five.

#### Azores

The Azores were granted Home Rule in 1975/76, following the elections to the Portuguese Constituent Assembly in 1975 in which five out of the six representatives elected were strong supporters of Azorean autonomy. The first Regional Assembly elections were won by the Social Democratic Party, which has been in power since.

#### Madeira

The constitutional position of Madeira closely resembles that of the Azores, both deriving from the constitutional reforms of 1974/75. Both are integral parts of the Portuguese Republic.

### III MAINLAND AUTONOMISM

With Madeira we reach the end of the "island autonomism" list. Next follows a tour d'horizon of mainland autonomist movements grouped together where appropriate by state, with the objective of seeing whether central governments have reacted differently to island and mainland autonomism.

#### The Sami

The question of the Sami people (formerly known as Lapps) presents an almost unique problem to the "model democratic" states whose boundaries they cross and whose ethos they challenge. It has to be said that one of the major

complications is Sami nomadic habits, even if these are not now followed by the majority of Sami. But the traditional Sami concept of territory relates to the grazing habits of reindeer and not to static lines drawn on a map or demarcated by wire fencing. A number of steps have been taken concerning the Sami language and the establishment of a Sami Council, but the question of compatibility between the three States' philosophies and that of the Sami is currently the subject of extended academic debate (see Cramér, 1982, Modeen, 1982, and forthcoming special issue of the Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret).

### Scotland and Wales

Scotland and Wales have separate administrations, headed by Ministers appointed by the British Prime Minister, but no democratic control over these administrations. Both countries are independently recognised (as is England) in various international sports. All three have their own flags. Scotland moreover possesses a distinctive (Roman based) legal system, an established (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland, her own banks and banknotes, and an educational system all of which distinguish her from England. Unlike Scotland and England, Wales has no established church, but has a substantial minority (over 20%) who speak Welsh (whereas Scotland's linguistic distinctiveness is much less). Scotland, Wales and England are the three historic nationalities within Great Britain. It was the acceptance of the case for internal democracy for the Scots and the Welsh that led every party contesting the October 1974 elections (except the tiny, extreme Right National Front) to promise a legislative Assembly for Scotland, and something less but similar for Wales. Yet five years later autonomists could look back and see first the Conservatives do a volte face on the issue, then the Liberals voted against giving time to the Scotland and Wales Bill, and were joined by sufficient Labour rebels to defeat those plans. Then in 1979 when a referendum (not promised in the Government's election manifesto) was held in Scotland and received an affirmative vote (52% "Yes" to 48% "No") the Labour Government preferred defeat at the hands of the Nationalists in Parliament to the hazards of trying to force its own unionist backbench MPs into line. Shortly after the ensuing General Election in 1979 the Conservatives used their essentially English majority to repeal the Scotland Act 1978. (See Bochel, 1981, for an account of the referendum.) Since then the Scottish National Party has kept going at about half its

previous peak of support; and all parties except the Conservatives are "pledged" (again) to give Scotland Home Rule.

For the Welsh, who rejected the Wales Act 1978 in the Referendum in 1979 (see Hume, 1981), the issue is still to be resolved, but Plaid Cymru ("the Party of Wales") have just recorded their highest level of national support in the Euro-elections, which they fought in alliance with Flemish, Sardinian and Valdostan nationalists.

#### Flanders and Wallonia

The respective nationalist movements (the Flemish People's Union (Volksunie) and the Walloon Rally (Rassemblement Wallon)) after decades of fighting elections, find themselves in the position of having provincial assemblies within a federal Belgium. The Flemish People's Union has a reasonably stable level of support at all levels from the Strasbourg Parliament to municipal level, but the Walloon Rally has virtually collapsed, leaving a vacuum.

#### Brittany, Occitania and North Euzkadi

The Breton Movement is a byword for fragmentation along various lines but nevertheless there has been recognisable Breton autonomist pressure, for decades, which has got nowhere in constitutional terms. The same is true a fortiori for the Basques, Occitans and other smaller minorities, all of whom are green with envy at the Corsican example, which they would see as a precedent, even if the Parisian view is that Corsica is an exception to the rule of Jacobin centralism.

#### The Aosta Valley and the South Tyrol

For different reasons but in the aftermath of World War II both of these regions were given special autonomous status, with provision made for the special position of the French and German languages respectively, pressurised by the Valdostan Union (UV: Union Valdôtaine) and the South Tyrol Peoples Party (SVP: Südtiroler Volkspartei), both of which are currently ensconced in their respective corridors of power.

### Catalonia and Euzkadi

The historic federalising reforms led by Basques and Catalans, spearheaded by their well-known mass movements, have clearly been a major catalyst for Spain, and it seems clear from the evolution of policy that the pace was set by these autonomists of the "historic nationalities" and that others followed. (See Clavero Arévalo, 1983)

## IV COMPARISONS

In assessing the relative success of insular, as opposed to mainland, autonomism the most useful approach is to look at the various central governments in turn.

### The Nordic Countries (members of the Nordic Council)

This century the secession of Norway from Sweden was achieved after the mobilisation of a full-scale nationalist movement, while Finland had to defend her independence by force of arms, losing some territory during the process. By contrast the achievement of Home Rule by Iceland (and later independence), by Åland, by Faroe and last by Greenland were at relatively low cost, and this leaves only the Sami with an outstanding claim which, despite vague good will, has so far foundered on the rock of the principle of territorial integrity, not assisted of course by the nearby presence of a superpower.

### The British Isles

Mention has already been made of the benign attitude towards the islands of Scotland by people like Conservative MP Betty Harvie Anderson (Wheatley, 1969, pp.287-290) who was also a bitter opponent of Scottish Home Rule (Bochel, 1981, pp.21-27), or Liberal MP Russell Johnston (Wheatley, 1969, pp.278-290), who voted against the Scotland Bill in 1977 (Dalyell, 1977, p.139). The same double standard, if such it is, was characteristic of unionist MPs (Liberal and Conservatives) in Great Britain who opposed Irish Home Rule on the grounds that it would dismember the United Kingdom while accepting the semi-independence of Mann and the Channel Islands. Likewise Conservative MPs today continue to support Manx and Channel Island Home Rule while opposing it for Wales and Scotland, not to mention Cornwall. Similarly London has granted full independence to Malta and, after a bitter guerilla war aimed at achieving not independence but transfer to Greek Sovereignty, also to Cyprus, but is hanging on to Gibraltar.



Admittedly the argument over Ireland is an involved one. To sustain the thesis advanced in this paper one has to see Ireland pre-1920 as one half of a unitary state, the other half of which was Great Britain, itself also an island, and that only "offshore" or "remote" islands are free of the phobias about "dismemberment" or "threats to territorial integrity". It would then however further be argued that the perception in Great Britain has now changed and that a majority in England now sees Ireland, North and South, as remote, as different, as "another place", in a way in which Scotland and Wales are not; in other words that the insular position of Northern Ireland makes that province qualitatively different from parts of Great Britain which might also be candidates for secession (Wales and Scotland). Irish nationalists have long seen the "unity of the whole island" as their legitimate objective and talk of the "artificiality" of the partition of the 1920s.

#### The Low Countries

As has been seen, the question of island autonomism does not arise, but the obstacles facing the Frisian National Party (notably the centralised electoral system) are considerable, as are the hurdles to be surmounted before there is any prospect of independence-within-Europe for Flanders or Wallonia.

#### France

The French case provides the most dramatic evidence of the presumption in favour of island regionalism. Certainly terrorism was a feature of life in Corsica, but terrorism has not been unknown in Brittany or the northern Basque Country. Brittany is the test case: if Corsican-style Home Rule were to be granted to Brittany it is likely that persistent demands for "autogestion" would follow in Occitania, the Pays Basque and perhaps other areas such as the North and symbolic Alsace. For this reason the forecast is ventured that Corsica will remain the exception, fulfilling the prophecy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Contrat social: "J'ai quelque pressentiment qu'un jour cette petite île étonnera l'Europe".

#### Italy

The Aosta Valley received Home Rule as a reward for Valdostan sacrifices in the wartime resistance to Fascism and Nazism and the UV got 27% of the vote in 1983; the South Tyrol People's Party currently has the highest level of support (61%) of any autonomist movement in Europe (and incidentally

a Member of the European Parliament) (McKinney, 1984). The level of support for Sardinian and Sicilian autonomist movements (14% and 3% respectively) is much lower. Yet all four regions have similar status.

#### Portugal

Only the islands have special status, despite having no ethnic claims to separate identity; but there are no other parts of the Republic which have autonomist movements.

#### Spain

The position within Spain is in some ways parallel to that of Italy: it was the Catalan and Basque nationalists (over 50% of electoral support in their respective territories) who paved the way for the granting of autonomy to many other parts of the Kingdom, including the Balearic and Canary Islands, despite the much lower levels of support for organised autonomism in these archipelagoes.

#### Greece

For the sake of completeness, mention must be made of the one major exception to the general thesis (less significant exceptions are the offshore islands of Norway, Sweden and Denmark). There is no discernible island autonomism in any of Greece's many islands. Instead they are integrated fully into the Republic and this despite the fact that three groups in particular had lengthy periods of separation from Greece (the Ionian Islands, Crete and the Dodecanese); and such a history has often nurtured separate identities elsewhere. The answer seems to lie in the fact that the islanders were part of the Greek nationalist movement which was aimed at both independence and (like the 1848 movement in fragmented Germany) unification. The recent hostilities between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and rumblings in the Aegean, have moreover reminded islanders in Eastern Greece of their frontier position (see Provatas, 1984).

#### V CONCLUSIONS

The argument of this paper is that the history of autonomist movements in twentieth century Europe bears out the view that there is indeed a presumption in favour of island autonomism which does not apply to equivalent mainland movements.

There are two major points still to be made, and they are closely related. The first is that there has been little mention of resources available for island communities, should they decide to go it alone. Two subsidiary points must be made in this context. One is that, with the noticeable exception of the Balearic Islands, Europe's islanders tend to have lower standards of living than mainlanders (see Hache, 1984a) and often suffer from multiple deprivation exacerbated by transport costs (Amaral, 1984b). The second point is that the resources which are closest to islands - fish and seabed minerals - immediately bring island administration into contact with international questions, thus enhancing their already high profile internationally.


The consideration of resources, and the lack of them, leads on to the other major point about insular autonomism. Whereas in dealing with the outside world island autonomists can harness romanticism, domestically this is not the case. Islanders are not normally romantic about their island homes (until they have left them), and the biggest battle island autonomists face (and this is certainly true of the Scottish islands) is to convince their own electorates that steps towards greater autonomy are actually in the islanders' interests.

The next task for researchers is to look in detail at the internal politics of Europe's islands and fit them more closely into European centre-periphery studies which have been under way for some time.

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Fig.3



*"No man is an island, James . . ."*



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March 1985





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**LES RHETOROMANCHES  
UNE NON MOBILISATION POLITIQUE**

Papier préparé pour le groupe  
de travail de l'ECPR, "Les  
rapports centre-périphérie  
et la résurgence d'un nationa-  
lisme périphérique dans les  
démocraties occidentales".  
Barcelone, 25-30 mars 1985



*Rumansch ! cumbatta l'inimi intern,  
l'indefferentissem, e nossa lingua  
rara salvada !*

*Eir da Te dependa il destin da nos  
rumantsch !*

*Leza UFFER*

Les Grisons, seul parmi les cantons suisses à porter la marque du pluriel, sont officiellement trilingues. L'allemand, l'italien et le romanche sont langues nationales (1). Cette marque du pluriel s'impose tant par le nombre de langues, l'histoire, la topographie des Grisons que par la variété inhabituelle de collectivités au sein d'un canton suisse. La communauté italophone se subdivise en 4 unités présentant toutes des caractéristiques profondes; les germanophones se partagent en collectivités aussi diverses que les "Walsers" (d'origine haut-valaisanne) et les "Bündner" (2).

La communauté rhétoromanche se compose de 5 collectivités utilisant un idiome propre (voir carte en annexe). 26 dialectes locaux présentent en plus des variations significatives.

Culturellement, le romanche est isolé, sans bassin linguistique sur lequel s'appuyer. Il est en effet cerné entre une zone germanique au nord et italienne au sud.

En pratique l'allemand est devenu langue de chancellerie aux Grisons, alors que le schwytzërdütch s'impose dans les communications entre les diverses communautés et parfois entre les collectivités elles-mêmes. Cette situation de diglossie est typique à l'ensemble de la Suisse alémanique. Aux Grisons, cependant, les concepts font défaut pour qualifier la situation des Romanches obligés de pratiquer l'allemand dans l'expression écrite, le schwytzerdütch pour la communication orale extra-communautaire et qui utilisent le romanche à l'intérieur de leur collectivité.

C'est le néologisme "quadriglossie" qu'il faudrait utiliser pour qualifier la situation linguistique rhétoromanche depuis la création d'une koïné que tous les Romanches sont à même d'utiliser de manière passive, le "rumantsch grischun" (3).

Le tour d'horizon sera "complet" si l'on précise encore que le romanche, langue officielle, n'est que rarement utilisé dans les activités politiques comme le parlement grison. Les rares tentatives ont soulevé un beau tollé (4).

\* \* \*

Réfléchir sur le problème rhétoromanche dans le canton des Grisons pose par ailleurs un problème épistémologique, ou plus précisément gnoséologique intéressant. La communauté romanche n'a, en effet, pas engendré dans son histoire de mouvement autonomiste ou de revendication régionale. Et pourtant, depuis plus d'un millier d'années le romanche ne cesse de reculer pour ne représenter aujourd'hui qu'un peu plus du cinquième de la population des Grisons.

Tenter de comprendre le problème romanche c'est donc à la fois s'interroger sur l'origine d'un tel déclin, mais également sur le pourquoi d'une non mobilisation, alors que parallèlement, peu de pays européen échappent au phénomène du parti autonomiste. Nous limiterons notre approche au problème des rhétoromanches, ne nous intéressant pas à celui des autres communautés grisonnes qui posent selon nous des problèmes spécifiques.

Poser le problème de la non mobilisation c'est faire appel à une méthode comparative. L'utilisation d'une telle démarche pose pourtant des problèmes. Les travaux théoriques qui ont été menés dans ce domaine sont de deux ordres. D'une part, les démarches hypostasiantes, cherchant des concepts censés cerner complètement des problématiques hétérogènes; d'autre part, des recherches prenant en quelque sorte le contre-pied, en formulant des analyses

catégorielles propres à chacun des systèmes étudiés. Dans le premier cas on s'interdit de réfléchir sur les spécificités d'une collectivité culturelle, dans le second on exclut une lecture à même de révéler une logique sociale.

La situation atypique des Grisons nous pousse à choisir une analyse s'inspirant de cette dernière démarche. En effet, le canton des Grisons associé à la Confédération suisse en 1803 a intégré ce nouveau cadre politique en préservant des structures politico-sociales contemporaines à l'éclatement de la Lotharingie en Ligues.

### Eléments théoriques

Dans cette mesure, nous choisirons de n'utiliser la comparaison que ponctuellement pour comprendre l'influence de courants de pensée européens ou l'impact d'événements touchant une partie importante du continent.

Toutefois pour ne pas tomber dans la particularisation à outrance nous nous proposons d'élaborer un modèle théorique de la domination linguistique, en essayant de comprendre à quelles structures sociales correspond la situation linguistique des Grisons et plus généralement de vérifier si les changements structurels se traduisent par des variations d'ordre linguistique (5).

Le recul d'une langue est pour nous la traduction de l'interpénétration de deux cultures, de deux systèmes de symboles, de normes que la langue médiatise, et qui organise les relations sociales (6). La confrontation signifie interinfluence, mais l'importance de l'échange est cependant fonction de la densité et de la forme de chacun des systèmes en présence.

Dans notre acception, la langue n'est pas un simple vecteur d'une culture. La langue est le produit de données sociales, économiques et culturelles qu'elle contribue à diffuser, mais dont elle module des valeurs. La langue ne peut être définie dans son acception linguistique ou structurale classique qui prétendait

étudier la langue en elle-même et pour elle-même (7). Dans notre optique la langue doit être étudiée dans son contexte parce qu'elle n'est pas autonome. Elle est bien un accès subjectif à la réalité, "le réel étant ce dont on peut faire l'expérience conformément aux interprétations d'une symbolique en vigueur" (8).

Le passage d'une langue à l'autre n'est pas fortuit. Il est à comprendre comme partie prenante d'un complexe jeu de stratégies dont la finalité est une perception différente de la réalité. En d'autres termes, une variation dans le positionnement de deux langues traduit une modification de nature plus profonde, issue de la constitution préalable de champs de domination socio-économique et politique, le champ étant le lieu où s'expriment ces rapports de force. La constitution par extension d'un champ linguistique s'exprime donc dans une relation de type langue dominante/langue dominée qui reproduit une opposition plus générale en termes de structure.

Louis Quéré décrit cette relation en termes de langue pratique/langue traditionnelle. Une telle opposition est issue, selon lui, de la constitution d'un ordre politique nouveau. Dès lors deux modes de légitimation de nature différente sont en confrontation; l'un recouvre "un type de rationalité tout à fait particulier, celui de la société moderne organisée autour de l'Etat-nation (...). [Ainsi], l'idée mais encore la construction d'une langue légitime s'avèrent (...) étroitement liées à la genèse de l'idéologie dans les sociétés moderne" (9). L'autre, "une collectivité dont les institutions sont fondées sur la reconnaissance de la validité de la tradition culturelle et sur ses interprétations mytiques, religieuses ou métaphysiques de la réalité dans son ensemble", dans laquelle la légitimité nécessaire à un système politique n'a pas de raison d'être (10).

La confrontation s'opérant de cette manière n'est pas, selon nous, <sup>uniquement</sup> liée à la société moderne, même si la constitution de l'Etat-nation donnera à ce processus sa forme la plus achevée. Nous pensons qu'elle est inhérente à toute création d'un espace de souveraineté. La création d'un tel espace ne se répercute sur le plan

linguistique, que dans la mesure où, codifiée, abstraite et artificielle, la langue dominante (du pouvoir) se présente comme la condition d'une ascension individuelle.

La création de ce rapport de force se répercute alors sur le plan linguistique ; la langue dominée subit dès lors un déclassement systématique face à la langue dominante, laquelle par ce processus s'investit de légitimité. L'abandon de la position de culture minoritaire est alors ressentie comme un changement d'état, un moyen d'échapper à une condition d'humiliation.

Mais l'imposition de la légitimité ne devient réellement efficace, que lorsque l'arbitraire de la situation n'apparaît plus comme tel. La légitimité qu'implique la reconnaissance de cet arbitraire empêche dès lors l'appréhension des rapports de force qui fondent la relation de domination. La légitimation conduit ainsi à l'application des critères du dominant par les dominés, inaugurant par là même une hégémonie symbolique d'autant plus performante que les victimes collaborent à leur propre dépossession.

Ce processus d'aliénation ne se limite pas selon nous à l'éthique bourgeoise ou au rationalisme capitaliste. Il concerne un processus réel de dépossession culturelle subjective. Il est applicable à des phases historiques aussi diverses que la suppression des autonomies locales, des "enclosures", l'extension de l'éthique protestante ou l'éradication de certains parlers régionaux(11).

La relation de domination n'est pas à comprendre comme nécessairement liée à une répression objective par un affrontement brusque des forces en présence. Une forme de contrainte ne peut être qu'exceptionnelle, son utilisation n'étant pas nécessaire à cause de la reconnaissance par la "périphérie" de la légitimité de la domination du "centre".

\* \* \*

Nous utiliserons ce modèle afin de nous guider dans la lecture des développements historiques nécessairement d'une certaine ampleur, puisque nous tenterons de comprendre les conditions de produc-



tion de la domination linguistique.

Nous mettrons également l'accent sur la structuration interne des collectivités étudiées et sur les formes d'intégration au reste de la société. Nous pensons qu'il s'agit là d'un facteur décisif pour comprendre le pourquoi d'une mobilisation ou celui d'une non affirmation périphérique. Une forte structuration interne est en rapport direct avec un processus de mobilisation comme l'a montré A. Oberschall notamment (12).

Dans un second temps nous nous interrogerons sur les facteurs pouvant expliquer la non mobilisation des collectivités romanches autour d'un parti autonomiste afin de s'opposer à cette enculturation qui les menace. Nous utiliserons notamment le paradigme de Stein Rokkan pour comprendre le système partisan des Grisons.

Notre hypothèse de travail se formule de la manière suivante, Les modifications d'ordre linguistique sont en rapport avec des changements sociaux profonds. Elle se ventillera en:

- hypothèse 1. La domination linguistique est permanente dans le recul de la langue romanche
- hypothèse 2. Le conflit religieux entre catholiques et protestants a favorisé l'occultation de la domination linguistique
- hypothèse 3. La non mobilisation politique des rhétoromanches est en grande partie le fait de la préséance du clivage confessionnel

### Position et genèse du problème

Langue romane, le romanche est issu du latin ou plus exactement du romanice. Il semble avoir été présent sur l'ensemble d'un bassin s'étendant du Danube supérieur à l'Adriatique. Confronté au nord à l'avance du germanique et au sud à celle de l'italien, son recul s'est fait face à des langues codifiées très tôt. Aujourd'hui trois poches régionales utilisent encore le rhétoromanche (13). Les Romanches de Rhétie sont les seuls qui aient résisté à la pression germanique. L'allemand a cependant passablement influencé leur manière d'être et de s'exprimer. Ainsi comme les Alémaniques les Romanches intervertissent sujet et verbe dans les relatives. C'est en quelque sorte une combinaison de la matière latine et de l'esprit germanique (14).

L'événement essentiel dans la germanisation du territoire rhétique est le rattachement de l'évêché de Coire à l'archevêché de Mayence et à l'Empire germanique en 843, alors qu'auparavant il dépendait de celui de Milan.

La lente désagrégation de l'Empire fut marquée en Rhétie par le transfert du droit de nomination de l'évêque au chapitre de la cathédrale de Coire en 1122. L'évêque obtint à cette occasion des avantages territoriaux et pécuniaires importants (voir carte en annexe). La réorganisation du territoire rhétique fut l'occasion de luttes incessantes entre une noblesse germanique en plein déclin et le nouveau pouvoir épiscopal. Cette lutte généralisable à une partie de l'Europe de la seconde moitié du Moyen-âge, a cependant pris une dimension particulière en Rhétie en raison de la faiblesse respective des deux belligérants et de la configuration particulière du sol, fortement montagneux. Ces circonstances ont permis à un certain nombre d'hommes libres de maintenir leur état et à d'anciens systèmes de gestion des terres, les "almend", développés sous les Carolingiens, de persister alors qu'ils disparaissaient progressivement ailleurs en Germanie. Il s'agissait en fait de la tenue en communauté des alpages, forêts et autres pâturages.

Cette forme particulière de gestion permettait aux membres de la communauté villageoise l'usage des ressources. Faisant fi des privilèges de classes ou de fortune, les "almend" plaçaient chaque membre sur pied d'égalité. La persistance de ces formes d'utilisation des ressources en commun dans la région alpine s'explique d'une part par la difficulté d'accès à ces territoires, et d'autre part par la pauvreté des sols qui dissuadaient les nobles de chercher à s'en emparer. La pression de la noblesse devait tout de même contribuer à la répartition de ces territoires, qui recouvraient des vallées entières, en "Markgenossenschaft", d'une surface restreinte. A leur tête, un amman dont la présence puis les compétences furent longtemps contestées.

Si ce mouvement a été général en Rhétie, chaque vallée, chaque une des régions la composant utilisa une voie particulière vers l'autonomie, au gré des circonstances (15). Ces communautés villageoises prirent une importance politique certaine, en raison inverse de l'affaiblissement d'une noblesse en état de guerre permanent. Les prérogatives de ces corporations économiques s'étendirent progressivement de la gestion des biens communs aux ordonnances communales et enfin aux droits de juridiction(16).

Au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle la Rhétie se différenciail, à l'instar de certaines Républiques alpines, de l'évolution de l'ensemble des terres germaniques dont elle constituait néanmoins un appendice. Elle se présentait en effet comme un embrouillamini de domaines féodaux juxtant des juridictions corporatives et de petites entités indépendantes sur lesquels régnait un évêque (17).

Il ne faut pas trop idéaliser un système qui, s'il accordait une certaine latitude au plan local, ressortissait tout de même de la féodalité. Les juridictions bénéficiaient de certaines prérogatives, mais elles n'en restaient pas moins soumises à la Haute justice, administrée par la noblesse.

La situation qui prévalait sur le plan linguistique au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle était relativement simple. Le romanche était la langue dominante, exception faite des colonies Walsers émigrées du Haut-Valais

qui utilisait un patois germanique. La noblesse, tout comme le Haut-clergé, s'exprimait en langue germanique. Dans leurs rapports avec les sujets, les nobles substituèrent le germanique au latin. La noblesse déploya même beaucoup d'efforts afin d'accroître la présence germanique dans la région. La langue était une manière de démarquage et pour qui voulait exercer une fonction économique ou politique, le germanique était la voie obligée. Le choix du germanique était le signe d'une promotion; il était le moyen d'échapper à une condition misérable assimilée entre autres à l'utilisation de la langue romanche. Il s'agissait d'une sorte de salut individuel au détriment de la communauté (sens retreint) (18).

Quant à l'Eglise, outre le Haut-clergé qui s'exprimait en germanique, elle contribua également à la germanisation, puisque de nombreux moines venant du nord exercèrent leur action pastorale en Rhétie. Ils contribuèrent surtout à la pénétration de la culture germanique et à son prestige.

L'insinuation de la langue et des coutumes germaniques se fit surtout le long des voies de communication; elle n'atteignait que difficilement les régions montagneuses dans lesquelles les villages vivaient en autarcie. La force communautaire, la cohésion de la population rendait presque impossible une percée culturelle "étrangère".

Néanmoins la noblesse et le clergé surent habilement jouer sur les rivalités ethniques (19), pour étendre leur domination. L'implantation des Walsers fut très souvent le prétexte pour les seigneuries (titres que se donnèrent les nobles) pour asseoir leur pouvoir. Les collectivités romanches se virent assez systématiquement déclassées. Certains villages jouèrent sur ces rivalités ethniques en adoptant le germanique afin de se distancer des entités romanches et gagner des droits (20).

Ainsi, la noblesse utilisait le territoire pour définir un espace de souveraineté en agissant sur deux niveaux: d'une part, celui de la représentation, avec la délimitation d'un espace à l'aide de frontières physiquement défendues; d'autre part, par la diffusion

d'un récit de légitimation idéologique sur une base juridico-politique. L'espace ainsi défini, l'était à des fins militaires mais également économiques (21). Les nobles utilisèrent aussi les signes de démarquage des collectivités entre elles -notamment la langue-, pénétrant ainsi les structures traditionnelles pour établir leur pouvoir.

Le Tyrol voisin de la Rhétie passant aux mains des Habsbourgs, la stratégie des différents acteurs va sensiblement se modifier. En 1360 l'évêque de Coire, nouvellement nommé, aliéna les biens épiscopaux en faveur de la Maison autrichienne. L'ensemble des Juridictions sujettes fut réuni à Coire à l'initiative de la "Notgemeindschaft" (22). Il fut décidé de refuser à l'avenir que l'évêque s'occupât de questions temporelles sans leur assentiment, et de ne pas accepter l'aliénation des biens. Les délégués se promirent aide mutuelle pour l'accomplissement des décisions. C'est ce traité qui est à l'origine de la première Ligue, celle de la Maison-Dieu.

La dimension politique ainsi créée n'est pas le fruit du hasard. Ce territoire constituait déjà sous le pouvoir carolingien le "cent de Coire", unité juridico-administrative.

La fondation de la Ligue Maison-Dieu était la conséquence d'une double contingence, menace intérieure et extérieure. Elle était militairement exposée. La création de la seconde Ligue, dite "Ligue Grise" ne survient par contre que pour conjurer un péril intérieur, lutte de succession provoquée par l'extinction d'un lignage seigneurial important, les von Vaz. A cette occasion, l'abbé de Disentis/Mustèr, les nobles et certains sujets scellèrent une alliance. Cette dernière était plus destinée à la protection des intérêts nobiliaires qu'à une réelle coalition. Les paysans libres n'y gagnèrent que leur reconnaissance. Une cour arbitrale fut créée, pour tenter de concilier les dissensions qui agitèrent la Ligue Grise longtemps après sa conclusion. Ces querelles intestines amenèrent à un renforcement des prérogatives de l'autorité exécutive en 1424, ce qui fit d'elle la plus centralisée des Ligues. (carte en annexe).

La troisième Ligue, celle des Dix-Juridictions, fut fondée sur la base d'une menace extérieure, l'intervention des Habsbourgs. L'alliance des Juridictions visait une aide mutuelle et établissait un tribunal arbitral. C'est au sein de cette Ligue que l'autonomie locale était la plus large. La menace militaire aux confins du territoire avait poussé les seigneurs à céder une partie de leur pouvoir juridique en contrepartie d'une aide militaire.

Les alliances entre membres des différentes Ligues, tout comme les hostilités, furent fréquentes. Si la création des Ligues fut surtout favorable aux familles nobles, qui préservaient ainsi des privilèges qu'elles auraient perdus en toutes autres circonstances, elle a surtout été l'occasion pour ces familles de se lancer dans la conquête de territoires au sud des Alpes.

La constitution de territoires sujets tout comme le service du mercenariat vont passablement modifier les conditions sociales à l'intérieur des Ligues. Des familles paysannes s'enrichirent; la Rhétie dans son ensemble bénéficia de meilleures conditions de vie. Les familles nobles et patriciennes s'attachèrent à l'administration de ces nouveaux territoires, dont elles tiraient de larges profits. La déféodalisation au sein des Ligues se fit dès lors plus facilement. En 1524, date de la constitution de la République Rhétique, les privilèges furent dans leurs majorités abolis. L'autonomie des Juridictions s'étendit alors du contrôle civil aux affaires judiciaires.

De la confrontation des communautés rurales à la noblesse est née cette structuration particulière à la Rhétie: la Juridiction, aux pouvoirs fort étendus. Ainsi à la structuration traditionnellement forte du monde rural correspond en sus en Rhétie une tradition séculaire de regroupement sociétaire. Les Romanches s'inscrivent dans cette tradition germanique et slave d'intégration communautaire. L'homogénéité de ces communautés (sens restreint) se verra encore renforcée par la période de réforme et la contre-réformation.

Les effets de la réforme et de la contre-réforma-  
tion sur le romanche

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L'impact de la pénétration de la réforme au sein de la République Rhétique a été si considérable qu'il a transcendé le temps pour exercer aujourd'hui encore ses effets de manière décisive.

L'introduction de la réforme se fit très tôt, surtout par des écrits en provenance des villes germaniques. La forme que prirent les conflits religieux sont révélateurs de la latitude considérable dont disposaient les villages face au pouvoir féodal. En effet, contrairement à l'ensemble des querelles religieuses qui divisèrent l'Europe, les seigneurs et les familles patriciennes n'eurent pas le pouvoir de décision. Au contraire, conformément à la décision des Diètes de 1524 et 1526, c'est la population de chaque village qui, réunie en assemblée, décida l'acceptation ou le refus de la réforme (23). Les familles patriciennes furent d'ailleurs souvent désavouées. Afin de donner voix au chapitre à chacune des tendances religieuses, de nombreuses disputes publiques furent organisées. Le découpage religieux qui en résulta fut des plus enchevêtré.

Une identité romanche suffisamment développée, alliée à la volonté affirmée des grands réformateurs d'utiliser le langage local, fit du romanche la langue des disputes dans les villages non-germaniques. Le souci de l'efficacité a sans doute été aussi important que la volonté de respect de l'autonomie locale dans la décision des réformateurs (25). Aux disputes orales s'enchaînèrent les polémiques écrites, développant du même coup une littérature romanche à peine esquissée. L'émulation ainsi provoquée a donné une force étonnante à une langue réduite jusqu'alors au rang de dialecte. De nombreux humanistes participèrent à ce courant. C'est l'un d'eux, Jochiam Bifrun, qui donna une première version de la Bible en 1552 (26).

L'impact des disputes religieuses dans le développement de l'écriture est perceptible en Surselva (Ligue Grise), restée en dehors des controverses, et dont la forme écrite du dialecte

n'apparaîtra qu'avec un siècle de retard sur les autres dialectes rhétoromanches. La codification du sursilvan se fera d'ailleurs à la suite de quelques tentatives d'extension de la foi réformée dans la région.

De cette situation troublée, il faut essentiellement retenir la partition du territoire rhétique en deux camps tranchés. D'une part l'Engadine, devenue presque entièrement protestante, ses deux variantes linguistiques -le putèr et le vallader- étant assimilées au protestantisme. D'autre part, le sursilvan identifié comme la langue du catholicisme. Cette partition en deux camps a même eu des conséquences sur le plan linguistique, la zone intermédiaire entre les deux pôles religieux développant deux variantes, catholique et protestante; chacune des variantes se basait sur le parler d'un centre différent tout en ayant un référentiel commun (27). Du clivage religieux naissait une pratique linguistique différente comme par capillarité (voir carte en annexe).

A la division de la population rhétique entre romanches et germaniques grisons s'est greffé le problème religieux, les deux clivages ne correspondant en rien. Toutefois le clivage religieux a constitué un ferment culturel comme nulle part ailleurs en Europe. Les collectivités romanches isolées dans leurs oppositions religieuses ont en effet été contraintes de développer une littérature religieuse en langue romanche. L'environnement autrichien et catholique pour l'Engadine, alémanique et protestant pour la Surselva ont contribué à un développement respectif en vase clos. Les luttes sanglantes qui ponctuèrent la contre-réformation contribuèrent, quant à elles, à la stabilisation tant des frontières religieuses que linguistiques. Le besoin d'altérité, aussi bien que l'isolement, forgèrent une forte identification à chacune des collectivités romanches.

Cependant l'utilisation de la langue romanche en dehors des communications locales donna lieu à d'âpres disputes au sein même des trois Ligues. Le romanche était considéré comme impropre à la forme écrite, et pour les usages officiels. Des comparaisons avec des langues codifiées telles que l'italien ou l'allemand, il



ressortit que seules ces deux langues pouvaient être utilisées comme mode d'expression officiel au sein des Ligues (28). Les Romanches formaient pourtant la majorité de la population, même si la Ligue des Dix-Juridictions avait été presque totalement germanisée au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Dès la fin de la contre-réformation le romanche fut néanmoins utilisé dans les activités de chancellerie de nombreux villages. Il a également servi de langue d'enseignement dans les écoles romanches, le système scolaire ayant été développé très tôt dans l'ensemble de la Rhétie.

L'autonomie locale de la Rhétie avait également contribué à assurer l'existence du romanche comme il avait permis la "cohabitation" religieuse. Il est cependant certain que la répartition de la vie politique à deux niveaux, local et rhétique, a relégué le romanche au rang de langue secondaire. Le compartimentage des langues est devenue particulièrement nette avec la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, reportant le contraste entre une Rhétie agraire et figée dans ses structures, cultivant le particularisme, et une Europe en pleine effervescence dans laquelle les familles patriarcales rhétiques jouèrent un rôle sans rapport avec leur importance militaire.

Les ingérences répétées des puissances militaires européennes et la collusion de quelques familles dénoncées comme agent de l'ennemi devait se traduire par la recherche d'une cohésion interne plus importante. En 1794, une foule imposante se réunit en assemblée extraordinaire ("Standesversammlung") pour nommer des autorités chargées de remédier à la situation cahotique qui prévalait en Rhétie. A côté du renforcement des prérogatives des autorités politiques des trois Ligues, on reconnut le romanche comme langue officielle dans ses formes ladine et sursilvane (29).

Fruit de cet élan populaire, la reconnaissance du rhétoromanche comme langue officielle, doit être comprise comme la volonté de cohésion autour de la République Rhétique face aux menaces extérieures, comme une sorte d'identification à une spéci-

ficité rhétorique. Il ne s'agit en aucun cas de l'établissement d'une situation de parité avec l'allemand. Les différentes Constitutions qui jalonnèrent la formation du canton des Grisons au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle ne citeront d'ailleurs jamais le romanche comme langue officielle.

### Le passage au rang de canton

Avec la mise sur pied d'un canton des Grisons, rattaché à la République helvétique par Napoléon, coïncident des changements sociaux et culturels profonds au sein de l'ancienne Rhétie. L'intégration des Grisons à la Suisse sera un choc sans précédent dans cette région, dont l'existence politique n'avait été rendue possible que par un délicat équilibre interne des niveaux de développements mais surtout les structures politiques étaient différents.

L'impact de l'intégration d'une région ayant connu des siècles de souveraineté à un ensemble politique plus important, a eu des conséquences sur plusieurs plans:

1) le niveau économique. La perte des pays sujets, Bormio, Chiavenna, etc, aura été incalculable à la fois pour les familles patriciennes et pour les Juridictions qui bénéficiaient de certaines taxes. L'ouverture, même progressive, des frontières à un vaste marché économique va perturber une économie habituée à un fonctionnement en vase clos. La concurrence de nouveaux produits agricoles, de méthodes nouvelles de production vont mettre à mal les structures rurales et artisanales. La culture de légumes ou fruitière fut introduite au XIX<sup>e</sup> seulement aux Grisons, par exemple (30).

2) Les problèmes politiques. Les Grisons, une république de communes, sans ressources et sans administration ou presque, va cotoyer, dans le même ensemble politique, des Etats constitués sinon centralisés. D'autre part, les Grisons ayant réussi à subsister grâce à une forte autonomie au plan local, devront en un court laps

de temps s'adapter aux conditions nouvelles brisant net un équilibre qui lui avait permis d'exister. Pensons également à la perte de souveraineté, et la nécessaire modification de l'idéologie et de la symbolique qui avait prévalu jusqu'alors.

3) au plan social. Changement d'identité et d'histoire. Intégration à une République essentiellement alémanique et à majorité protestante avec le nouvel équilibre à réaliser au coeur d'un Etat lui-même en formation. Il est certain que cette intégration s'est faite surtout au détriment d'une population romanche pénalisée dans une économie et un système politique germanisé, préteritiée par son excentration géographique (31).

La confrontation entre un centre politique (Brinbaum) doté désormais d'autorités permanentes et les Juridictions communales défendant leur indépendance agitera la scène politique jusqu'au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Comme dans l'ensemble de la Suisse les courants conservateurs et libéraux s'opposèrent vivement. On n'aurait tort de voir une opposition univoque. Ainsi les libéraux refusèrent, par exemple, la liberté d'établissement, parce qu'essentiellement protestants, ils craignaient un renversement de majorité (32).

#### Formation de l'Etat grison

La formation de l'Etat grison, dont la construction avait été échafaudée en 1524, n'avait guère progressé en deux siècles. L'Eglise catholique avait vu ses pouvoirs temporels limités et les privilèges féodaux avaient été supprimés. Néanmoins, la structure étatique était squelettique, paralysée par les contradictions internes. Au début le centre politique grison se trouvait en présence d'une situation inextricable de Juridictions vivant en quasi autarcie et d'une cristallisation des positions sociales sous la confrontation religieuse. La tâche des constructeurs de la nation (Rokkan) sera stratégiquement complexe. Il s'agira à la fois de créer des organes politiques et d'occuper les mécanismes de socia-

lisation. Créer un Etat, afin de faire coïncider les deux dimensions du territoire politique, l'ordre juridique et la réalité culturelle, va nécessiter un jeu subtil d'alliances. La non correspondance des clivages religieux et linguistique obligera à de nombreux compromis.

Au travers de la lutte menée par le centre politique pour accroître ses prérogatives, et la différence de mentalité qu'elle traduisait, les Grisons étaient perçus, dans le reste de la Suisse, comme un pays à demi-civilisé, une région sans lois (33). Cette différence paraissait intolérable à la lumière du progrès et de la science. Cette marque d'ethnocentrisme, répercutée par les intellectuels grisons libéraux se focalisera sur les Romanches et sur les milieux catholiques, hostiles à la main-mise d'un centre politique alémanique et surtout protestant (34).

Bien que des modifications d'ordre linguistique et social aient été perceptibles à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, la pénétration alémanique est devenue significative avec les changements économiques. Deux raisons à cet état de fait: l'exode des populations rurales vers les centres urbains germanisés, et la réticence des Romanches à prendre en charge des activités commerciales même au sein de leur région. La germanisation se faisait donc de deux manières; saignement des régions romanches mais également installation de germaniques dans ces mêmes territoires.

L'interpénétration de deux systèmes normatifs différents est particulièrement bien compréhensible dans ce double courant émigration/immigration.

C'est cependant à propos de l'école que le processus de domination linguistique a été le mieux perceptible, notamment à cause des discours qu'il a suscité.

Les velléités de changement du système scolaire s'étaient fai-

tes sentir dès 1780 dans le "Sammler", porte-parole des idées du Siècle des Lumières et des nouvelles méthodes pédagogiques (35). Le discours tenu par les réformateurs scolaires aux Grisons est du même acabit que celui pratiqué par Grégoire devant la Convention (36). Le leitmotiv de ses prises de position était que le romanche devait disparaître afin d'extirper les préjugés, développer les vérités, les talents.

"Le plus grand obstacle au développement moral et économique de l'Engadine, c'est le langage de la population, le ladin. Bien que différents travaux aient été écrits et publiés dans cette langue et pour une vallée longue de seize heures, il y en a beaucoup ce ne sera néanmoins jamais suffisant pour porter des fruits. Ce serait une grande réalisation du Gouvernement que d'introduire la langue germanique dans toute l'Engadine; cela aurait d'incalculables et fructueuses conséquences. Si la population était convaincue des résultats bénéfiques d'une telle opération, il serait facile d'introduire l'allemand en Engadine. Le moyen décisif pour atteindre ce but serait la mise sur pied d'une école publique en Engadine. (...) L'unité des Grisons serait renforcée par l'utilisation d'un langage simple, commun à tous." (37)

Cette prise de position -extrême- donne tout de même une bonne idée du climat scolaire régnant aux Grisons au début de XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. L'emprise de l'Eglise sur l'école était également dénoncée. Selon une stratégie identique à celle menée par Grégoire en France contre les patois, les réformateurs grisons s'en prirent à l'insuffisance d'ouvrages en romanche et surtout à l'inadéquation de cette littérature à la vie nouvelle (38). Les arguments utilisés visaient également à montrer l'importance pour l'avenir des enfants de choisir la langue allemande comme langue de scolarité. On invoqua également l'inadaptation au cadre helvétique d'ouvrages romanches traditionnellement fondés sur la communauté villageoise.

Cette logique manichéenne, consistant à opposer la civilisation germanique moderne au monde archaïque, obscur, moyenâgeux des régions romanches, signifiera une percée importante de l'al-

l'allemand au sein des groupes de villages les plus isolés dans la Surselva et le Surmeir. Cependant la conséquence la plus perceptible sera une diglossie progressivement généralisée à l'ensemble de l'ancienne Rhétie, l'allemand s'imposant comme seconde langue. La connaissance de l'allemand était présentée comme indispensable pour les Romanches dans la mesure même où la langue germanique ouvrait les perspectives à une vaste culture, livresque notamment.

La domination linguistique s'opérera en profondeur. Le romanche dont la finesse d'expression avait été soulignée par des générations de poètes et d'écrivains, se verra reléguée au rang de langue bâtarde, sans utilité dans la "vie moderne", incapable de s'adapter aux nouveaux besoins et cela aux yeux mêmes des Romanches. Le mécanisme décrit par L. Quéré semble parfaitement correspondre à la situation des Grisons au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

A témoin de cette situation le thème d'un débat général dans une école de la Surselva "Est-il désirable, et sur quelle base, de voir l'élimination systématique de la langue romanche de notre canton ?" (39).

Les autorités cantonales ne règlementèrent cependant le domaine scolaire que par petites touches successives. Devant la forte résistance catholique, il instaura deux sociétés, une pour chaque une des confessions afin de mieux diffuser l'idée d'un nécessaire développement de l'Ecole. Des pasteurs, et respectivement des laïcs en prirent la tête. Il fallait convaincre de l'inadéquation de l'ancien système scolaire. Les avocats du changements faisaient miroiter, dans leurs discours, les avantages en termes de développements économiques que l'adoption d'une Ecole nouvelle pouvait amener aux régions rurales. L'idée forte à propos de la langue d'enseignement restait le compartimentage ; l'allemand dans l'enseignement, le romanche dans la vie quotidienne.

Les lois scolaires de 1846 et de 1859 créèrent en deux étapes l'école publique en constituant une organisation scolaire et en règlementant les programmes. L'enseignement, quant à lui, pouvait se faire dans la langue maternelle ; mais l'apprentissage

de la langue allemande devait se faire aussitôt que possible. Le résultat d'une telle opération est identifiable. Au travers d'un discours sur un bilinguisme généralisé, c'est en fait à une situation de diglossie dans l'aire romanche que les autorités politiques aspiraient (40).

La vivification du champ de domination linguistique ne se fit pas sans réaction au sein des collectivités rhétoromanches. Un mouvement de régénération, en particulier dans la littérature, s'était amorcé depuis la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. D'écrits presque strictement religieux, l'édition romanche s'étendit à la poésie et au roman. Les intellectuels grisons, revenus en pays romanche après des études dans les universités européennes, exercèrent une influence considérable sur le mouvement. La diaspora y contribua également : commerçants, artisans, intellectuels établis hors des Grisons produirent de nombreux textes. Sur place, les enseignants, les hommes d'église, entre autres, participèrent à l'élan de revitalisation de la langue régionale.

L'intérêt pour les parlars régionaux commun à l'ensemble de l'Europe suscita de nombreuses recherches sur le rhétoromanche au sein des universités allemandes en particulier. La sollicitude témoignée à "une langue proche du latin", à l'étranger comme en Suisse, fut d'un grand bénéfice au sein même des régions romanches. Des notables politiques comme Gaspar Decurtins prirent part au mouvement de soutien.

A l'instar de la "Società retoromantscha", des sociétés "pour la défense de la culture romanche" furent fondées dès 1860. Des intellectuels-éditeurs en étaient les instigateurs. L'idée était de soutenir la littérature, de fournir des textes aux écoles et de tenter une codification des différents idiomes. Les divergences religieuses (kulturkampf), politiques, mais également régionales secrétèrent la méfiance. Les projets d'unification linguistique furent interprétés comme des tentatives d' "hégémonisme religieux ou culturels" (41).

Les problèmes scolaires et la politique menée par les autori-

tés donnèrent lieu à une mobilisation dans les milieux rhétoromanches. Des instituteurs se groupèrent afin de promouvoir l'enseignement en romanche et produire des textes scolaires. Leur action entrava notablement les velléités de germanisation totale de l'enseignement dans les Grisons.

Néanmoins la position acquise par l'allemand dans l'enseignement professionnel, technique et supérieur était telle que pour ne pas entraver les chances des élèves romanches, il fut décidé d'utiliser la langue germanique pour l'enseignement dès la quatrième année d'école sur l'ensemble du territoire grison.

Par cette dernière mesure le romanche subissait un déclassement décisif face à la langue allemande, l'enseignement exerçant un rôle clé dans la formation de l'identité (42).

Le mouvement de défense du romanche s'institutionnalisa en 1919 avec la création de la "Lia/Ligia romontscha" (ligue romanche), laquelle parvint à fédérer l'ensemble des sociétés régionales. Selon une pratique bien helvétique, cette organisation devint le répondant officiel des Rhétoromanches auprès du gouvernement grison. Groupe de pression et à la fois interlocuteur privilégié du gouvernement, la Ligue romanche (LR) présente les doléances des régions et reçoit les subventions destinées au soutien de la "culture romanche". (Le rôle politique de l'organisation sera examiné dans la dernière partie.)

Les buts de la LR sont le soutien au romanche en général, à sa littérature et à sa presse, aux écoles, aux coutumes, etc. Son action a visé aussi bien des modifications dans la toponymie que la reconnaissance du romanche comme quatrième langue nationale en Suisse. Ce but fut atteint en 1938 grâce à des éléments d'ordre conjoncturels (43).

La politique menée par la LR a provoqué de nombreuses dissensions internes. Notons par exemple sa "bienveillance" à l'égard



de la création d'une koïné sutsilvane (1943/44) qui était implicitement destinée à devenir l'idiome commun aux différentes collectivités rhétoromanches. L'aboutissement de l'expérience n'est pas sans rappeler celle menée en Eire avec le gaélique (44).

\* \* \*

Si la domination linguistique est décelable au travers de la genèse du romanche, nous ne sommes pas à même de comprendre tous les aspects de la non apparition d'un parti ou d'un mouvement de revendication régionale. L'analyse diachronique nous a permis de vérifier l'existence d'un processus de domination linguistique, son intensité, tout comme la correspondance du recul linguistique avec les variations de l'organisation sociale et la nécessaire réorganisation de l'hégémonie culturelle qui en découle (Gramsci).

Compléter l'étude du champ de domination linguistique signifie dans un second temps comprendre les mécanismes politiques qui ont présidé à l'intégration du problème romanche à travers le processus d'édification stato-national aux Grisons. Pour ce faire, nous nous proposons d'appliquer le paradigme de Rokkan (45).

#### clivage Centre/Périphérie

Stein Rokkan définissait précisément ce qu'était une périphérie. Selon lui, une périphérie doit être dépendante ; elle doit avoir peu de contrôle sur son destin, peu de ressources pour son affirmation ; elle doit être géographiquement, socialement, culturellement en marge ; avoir été territorialement conquise et administrée par le Centre ; son économie doit être peu développée et se situer hors du réseau habituel d'échanges, ou être un marché dépendant. Sa culture doit avoir tendance à la marginalisation. Sans institutions développées, distinctes ou unies, sa culture ne doit pas

être intégrée au système communicationnel du territoire politique (46).

En raison des développements historiques qui précèdent, nous pouvons poser que c'est le facteur religieux qui a engendré le clivage Centre/Périphérie. Il recouvre ou plutôt occulte le clivage Clérical/Anticlérical. Le Clivage Centre/Périphérie (C/P) ne recouvre pas l'opposition ethno-linguistique. En effet, si une partie des Rhétoromanches répond aux critères périphériques, l'Engadine ne peut y être incluse. Grâce au tourisme, cette région a en effet connu un développement économique qui fait d'elle l'une des plus riches du canton. L'analyse pourrait être poursuivie dans d'autres domaines. La place nous manque cependant pour pousser plus avant les investigations.

Retenons que la césure Catholique/Protestant divise la communauté rhétoromanche de manière beaucoup plus profonde que la fêlure Romanche/Allemand. Nous en avons vu les caractéristiques précédemment.

Sous cet angle de vue la formation de l'Etat grison apparaît comme le désir de "libéraux" germanophones et protestants. Sont marginalisés dans cette dernière phase, les "conservateurs" romanches protestants et surtout catholiques. Avec les tensions politico-religieuses des années 1840 à 1890 le clivage libéraux/conservateurs s'épure en dissociant plus nettement protestants et catholiques.

En effet, à la radicalisation du conflit religieux correspond un rapprochement entre réformateurs (libéraux) et réformés conservateurs et/ou romanches. Cela signifie que des concessions politiques doivent être consenties en faveur de ces groupes. Le compromis réformateurs/conservateurs protestants et/ou romanches explique, le maintien de l'enseignement en romanche (loi scolaire 1846). Il explique également l'omniprésence protestante aux leviers de commandes de certains postes clés de l'Etat et de l'administration grison. Ainsi, "parmi ses cinq membres, le Conseil d'Etat [exécutif] ne pourra jamais compter plus de deux catholiques. Et le président du Tribunal cantonal, le recteur de l'Ecole cantonale, le directeur de l'Ecole normale et le chef du département de l'Ins-

truction publique seront forcément protestants" (47).

La périphérisation des régions catholiques est perceptible sur le plan économique. Aucune étude d'économie régionale n'ayant à notre connaissance été réalisée aux Grisons, nous ne pouvons nous baser sur des chiffres précis. Disons tout de même qu'un réel contraste est décelable entre une Engadine prospère et une Surselva catholique où la petite entreprise agricole et pastorale, aujourd'hui largement subventionnée, reste la règle. L'industrialisation, à quelques exceptions près, ne s'est pas implantée. Elle est une activité relativement faible aux Grisons d'ailleurs. (48).

L'éclairage porté au système partisan nous indique que même si le clivage religieux s'est quelque peu estompé au cours du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, sous l'effet conjugué de l'indifférentisme et de la déchristianisation, l'atavisme confessionnel est perceptible. Le comportement électoral traduit en effet de manière nette la cristallisation socio-politique que l'opposition religieuse a engendrée.

Les régions catholiques votent pour le parti Démocrate chrétien à raison de 90, voire 100 % dans certains cercles électoraux. La région de la Surselva présente d'ailleurs toutes les caractéristiques d'un groupe homogène exprimant par son vote une attitude de défiance face à un Centre perçu comme protestant. Le conservatisme sans compromission s'exprime dans son bihebdomadaire la "Gassetta romontscha", mais encore par un soutien important à la société locale de défense du romanche. C'est la collectivité romanche la plus compacte.

Certes, le découpage électoral, qui épouse les anciennes juridictions rhétiques (15 cercles sur 39 ont moins de 1500 habitants), tout comme le mode de scrutin majoritaire favorise le vote en bloc.

Mais selon nos observations le PDC exprime bien plus que le clivage confessionnel. Il est un parti de défense de la périphérie catholique et romanche. Le PDC constitue donc un obstacle de taille à la mise sur pied d'un parti de défense régionale. L'interaction romanche-catholique étant très forte, même avec un électorat

le PDC en partie germanophone, défend les options romanches traditionnelles. Il s'inscrit donc comme le protecteur des "minorités". (voir tableaux en annexe).

Le vote protestant, quant à lui, s'exprime au travers de deux partis depuis les années 1920. Du Parti Radical est née une dissidence de gauche et plutôt laïque, le Parti Démocrate. Cette division s'inscrit dans un mouvement général de rupture au sein des Radicaux suisses. Mais alors qu'ailleurs la dissidence réintégrait le parti après quelques années, aux Grisons en revanche, les Démocrates persistaient et devenaient rapidement le premier parti du canton. Faute de travaux réalisés sur l'électorat il est difficile de comprendre la signification de la fracture Radicaux/Démocrates. Il semble toutefois que l'on puisse avancer qu'elle ne recouvre pas le conflit romanche/allemand, même si localement une telle lecture pourrait être pertinente. Nous pourrions tester à ce propos l'hypothèse selon laquelle cette opposition est de type C/P, mais recoupe les clivages Possédants/Travailleurs et secteurs secondaire/primaire, les variations étant fonction des époques considérées (49).

Le parti socialiste s'inscrit quant à lui dans un clivage classique Possédants/Travailleurs. Il constitue également l'unique alternative au vote en bloc dans la Surselva, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les autres régions/cantons catholiques de Suisse où existe également le parti radical.

De cette lecture très superficielle du système politique grison, nous trouvons une première explication à la non apparition d'un parti de défense de la région ou d'un parti autonomiste. Le PDC assumant ce rôle, en raison de la superposition des clivages C/P et Eglise /Etat, l'édification d'un parti de défense du romanche semble problématique. De plus un tel parti aurait préalablement à résoudre les contradictions confessionnelles, et son corollaire la participation d'une collectivité romanche, au moins, au Centre.

Pas plus la population catholique que les collectivités rhétoromanches ne se trouvent en situation de segmentation totale. Le fédéralisme suisse conçoit le jeu politique par la participation

directe des "minorités" aux prises de décision. Le gouvernement grison comprend ainsi en son sein des représentants catholiques et romanches.

La non apparition d'un parti spécifique de la défense périphérique n'épuise cependant pas le problème de la non mobilisation. Le champ politique ne se réduit en effet pas au jeu partisan, même si le parti en reste l'acteur privilégié. Le système politique suisse, comme ses composantes cantonales, offre par exemple une place privilégiée, par d'autres canaux d'expression, aux "groupes minoritaires".

Il est vrai cependant que pour avoir voix au chapitre, une "minorité" doit être reconnue; elle doit par ailleurs respecter les règles en vigueur. Parce que c'est justement la multiplicité culturelle (langue, religion, etc) qui est le fondement de l'équilibre politique. L'hétérogénéité est institutionnalisée et c'est avec elle que le système se pérennise. Cette pratique particulière d'intégration, sous le couvert pluraliste, recouvre la rigidité d'une pondération idéalisée, mais cristallisée. De ce fait toute modification est, à l'instar de systèmes plus centralisés, présentée comme une atteinte à l'ensemble. On perçoit l'importance d'une étude portant sur l'idéologie et son interaction entre les niveaux national et cantonal (50).

La Ligue romanche (LR) est un des rouages reconnus pour l'expression d'une "minorité reconnue". En effet conformément à une pratique bien établie en Suisse, la LR joue le rôle de groupe d'intérêt auprès du gouvernement grison. Elle est donc investie d'une tâche spécifique, la défense du romanche. La LR n'étant pas un organe politique mais "culturel", la question rhétoromanche se réduit du coup à ses aspects "culturels". Un tel groupe d'intérêt réduit, divise le problème romanche tout en l'institutionnalisant. Mais il limite surtout la portée politique de ses interventions en ne produisant pas un discours régionaliste traditionnel, conditionnement d'une certaine mobilisation, discours qui viserait notamment à reporter les divisions régionales internes à une frontière régionale extérieure, à ramener les contradictions internes à un adversaire extérieur commun.

Or l'identification d'un tel "ennemi" n'est guère possible au travers de l'allemand, car historiquement la langue germanique a constitué aux yeux des Romanches la langue confessionnellement "neutre". D'autre part, la langue germanique n'a jamais été imposée de manière violente, à la suite d'une occupation territoriale par exemple. Enfin, le fédéralisme contraint à une lutte à un niveau cantonal, dans un premier temps du moins (voir à ce propos la question jurassienne), puisqu'elle met d'abord en cause la souveraineté d'un ou de plusieurs cantons. Dans une telle hypothèse, "l'adversaire" ne pourrait être que la communauté germanophone des Grisons, provoquant une lutte fratricide, en quelque sorte, comme entre une population bretonne et gallo par exemple. Les Romanches se veulent avant tout grison et ce n'est là pas le moindre des paradoxes de cette région (51).

NOTES

- (1) Art. 46 Constitution du canton des Grisons
- (2) Nous utiliserons "collectivité" pour qualifier un ensemble suffisamment large et concentré géographiquement, pour qu'une communication entre les membres existe et présente des caractéristiques telles qu'ils puissent être différenciés. "Communauté" sans autre mention sera utilisé dans une conception plus large. Selon nous les Grisons sont constitués de 3 communautés qui présentent des différences nationales ; elles recouvrent à peu près les différences linguistiques.
- (3) A ce propos voir J.J. Furer, La menace sur le romanche et la création du "romuntsch grischun" comme élément pour la conjurer. Exposé du symposium de l'Université Jagellone de Cracovie 1984, à paraître.
- (4) A ce propos R. Villeta "Die Rätromanen. Geduldetes Relikt oder gleichberechtigter Teil der Eidgenossenschaft" in Minderheiten in der Schweiz, Zurich, NZZ Verlag, 1984, pp. 95-134
- (5) Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de prendre position dans le débat langue/Nation ; nous ne désirons pas plus soulever le problème déjà ancien du rapport entre Nations et classes sociales qui a agité le courant marxiste au cours de ce siècle, voir à ce propos G. Haupt, M. Löwy, C. Weill. Les marxistes et la question nationale, 1848-1914, Paris, Maspéro, 1974. Notre idée est plutôt de comprendre comment s'exerce la domination linguistique. Pour ce faire, nous nous inspirons des travaux d'A. Meillet Linguistique historique et linguistique générale, Klincksiek, 1936. J.B. Marcellisi et B. Gardin, Introduction à la sociolinguistique. La linguistique sociale, Paris, Larousse, 1974. M. Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969.
- (6) Cette définition de la culture est inspirée de B. Badie, Culture et politique, Paris, Economica, 1983.
- (7) F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Paris, Payot, 1973, p. 43.
- (8) Habermas, cit. in Quéré "changer de (la) langue", Pluriel, 31, 1982, p. 17.
- (9) C. Lefort, Les formes de l'histoire, cité in Quéré, op. cit. p. 21.
- (10) Quéré, op. cit., p. 21
- (11) Les travaux de M. Foucault, de Laing, Baudrillard, etc. peuvent être mis en convergence dans l'analyse de ces descriptions.

.../...

Nous ne traiterons que peu du problème de l'idéologie car la situation aux Grisons est de ce point de vue complexe. Elle est interaction entre une situation régionale et le niveau helvétique. Nous avons déjà abordé le problème de la formation de l'idéologie helvétiste au XIXe siècle en Suisse. Traiter ce sujet serait une étude en soi : travail qui dépasse notre but présent.

Pour ce qui est de l'idéologie, disons que nous sommes proches de la position exprimée par R. Fossaert (La Société. Les idéologies, tome VI pp. 47 à 56) qu'il serait trop long de développer ici dans toutes ses nuances. Disons pour situer le problème que pour Fossaert "l'idéologie n'est pas une dimension superfétatoire ou subsidiaire de l'organisation sociale. Qui plus est l'idéologie se révèle présente et efficace, bien avant que la maturation du pouvoir et de l'Etat s'accomplisse. S'il faut attendre qu'elle prenne d'autres formes et que son efficacité se modifie en se mêlant à la domination étatique, il n'en reste pas moins que l'idéologie ne pourra jamais être tenue pour ce reflet d'une puissance enracinée ailleurs. Les croyances et les obligations qu'elle véhicule existent et agissent par elles-mêmes".

R. Fossaert, op. cit., p. 121

- (12) A. Obershall "Une théorie sociologique de la mobilisation" in P. Birnbaum et F. Chazel, Sociologie politique. Textes, Paris, Armand Colin, 1978, pp. 231-241.
- (13) Le concept a été introduit par Ascoli qui a tenté de démontrer l'appartenance du Frioulan, du Ladin (Dolomites) et du romanche grison à une même famille linguistique, Ascoli Graziado Isaia, Saggi Ladins, Milan, 1873.
- (14) Ascoli, op. cit.
- (15) Pour plus de détails sur ce processus d'idiosyncrasie, voir P. Liver, "Die Bündner Gemeinde" Bündner Monatsheft, janvier 1941, et "Alplandschaft und politische Selbständigkeit", Bündner Monatsheft, janvier 1942.
- (16) Les communes prirent le nom de "Juridiction". Il est étonnant de voir que ce système d'utilisation communautaire de biens s'est maintenu jusqu'au XIXe siècle dans certaines régions de Suisse ; 1865 au Val Calanca aux Grisons par exemple.
- (17) Voir B. Barber, The death of communal liberty, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 3-47.
- (18) R. Billigmeier, A crisis in Swiss pluralism. The Romansh and their relations with the German- and Italien-Swiss in the perspective of a Millennium, The Hague, Paris, New York, Mouton, 1979, p. 21.
- (19) Nous utilisons ce terme comme synonyme de "collectivité". Ce sont pour nous des ensembles humains qui possèdent une homogénéité certaine du point de vue socio-culturel.




- (20) Billigmeier, op. cit., pp. 34-48.
- (21) P. Ariès, L'invention du territoire, Grenoble, PUF, 1980, p. 100.
- (22) Conseil tutorial mis en place à la suite du désintérêt de l'évêque Hartmann pour les problèmes de l'évêché. L'évêque résidait en effet plus souvent à la cour des Habsbourgs qu'à Coire. Voir Barber, op. cit., pp. 35-37 et Dictionnaire historique et biographique de la Suisse, Neuchâtel, Attinger, 1926, vol. III, pp. 562-563
- (23) Le développement de Ligues n'a rien de particulier à la Rhétie ; il est commun à une grande partie de l'Europe. Il s'est cependant surtout développé dans le monde germanique. Que l'on pense à la rheinische Bund (1254), Löwenbund, Schwabische Städtebund (1331), Goldener Bund (1586), etc.
- (24) La diète était l'organe de décision commun aux 3 Ligues. Elle est restée sans pouvoir réel jusqu'à la transformation de la République en canton en 1803. Elle a notamment dû subir les atteintes destabilisatrices des familles patriciennes qui menaient sur le plan de la politique extérieure leurs propre affaires. Ces familles constituèrent des organisations défendant les intérêts des puissances étrangères telles que l'Espagne, la France ou l'Autriche, lesquelles puissances cherchaient à profiter de la position stratégique que représentait alors la Rhétie.
- (25) L. Liver, Die subordinierenden Konjunktionen im Engadinische sechszehnten Jahrhunderts. Ein Betrag zur Frühgeschichte der rätoromanischen Schriftsprache. Berne, Francke, Romanica Helvetica, vol. 78, 1969.
- (26) Sur le rôle des humanistes, G. Mutzenberg, Destin de la langue et de la littérature rhéto-romanes, Lausanne, Age d'Homme, 1974.
- (27) J.J. Furer, op. cit., p. 25
- (28) R. Billigmeier, op. cit., pp. 63-64
- (29) Dictionnaire historique et biographique de la Suisse, op. cit. p. 583.
- (30) Pour des développements plus amples, idem, pp. 601-605
- (31) Sur la description de la transition, F. Pieth, Bündnergeschichte, Coire, Schuler, 1945.
- (32) Barber, op. cit., pp. 218-219
- (33) C. Hilty "Vergangenes", Politisches Jahrbuch der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 1907, cit. in Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 108
- (34) Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 119

- (35) Le courant d'inspiration française prônait la centralisation et la mise en oeuvre des "idées nouvelles". Libéral d'inspiration, ce mouvement se battra contre le maintien du romanche dans l'enseignement et pour une école laïque.
- (36) Lettrés à Grégoire sur les patois de France 1790-1794, suivies du Rapport de Grégoire à la Convention. Genève, Slatkine Reprints, 1969.
- (37) Paru dans l'"Helvetischer Volksfreund", cit. in R. Tönjachen "La fundaziun, ils fundatuors e l'istorgia da la Società Retorumantscha" in Annalas da la Società Retorumantscha, vol. 51, p. 3, traduction libre.
- (38) Dans le but d'anéantir le patois et de tenter de mesurer l'impact d'une telle opération, Grégoire avait fait parvenir un questionnaire aux notables de provinces en combinant des observations sur les moeurs des campagnes à une enquête sur le patois. Il s'agissait entre autres de faire correspondre les "maux" de la campagne avec l'usage du patois. La volonté de différencier les langues et de montrer la supériorité du français, langue nationale était affichée. (Voir M. de Certeau, D. Julia et J. Revel, Une politique de la langue - La Révolution française et les patois. Paris, Gallimard, 1975. Toutes proportions gardées et les circonstances différant, le parallèle entre ces deux situations, fort différentes, mériterait d'être poussé.
- (39) Cit. in Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 127
- (40) Le bilinguisme concerne un niveau individuel, non un comportement social. Le bilinguisme présuppose également une égalité entre deux langues (même prestige par exemple). Le concept de diglossie recouvre la superposition entre un langage utilisé dans les communications formelles, et une langue "déclassée" se limitant à des situations plus conviviales. Voir à ce propos J. Fishman, Sociolinguistique, Bruxelles/Paris, Labor/Nathan, 1971, pp. 87-102.
- (41) Sur les problèmes scolaires, G. Deplazes, "Geschichte der sprachlichen schulbücher in Romanischen Rheingebiet, Kulturgeschichtliche Darstellung", Arbeiten zur Psychologie Padagogik und Heilpadagogik, Lucerne, Caritas, 1949, ainsi que les chapitres 7 et 14 de Billigmeier, op. cit.
- (42) J.J. Furer, op. cit. remarque 16.  
En 1880 pourtant la nouvelle Constitution avait reconnu le romanche comme langue officielle des Grisons, à côté de l'italien et de l'allemand. Il faut voir cette reconnaissance comme le résultat du mouvement de revivification du romanche. Les conséquences en furent cependant négligeables puisque l'allemand était devenu langue de chancellerie et même si un Romanche peut écrire dans sa langue à l'administration, il doit forcément être bilingue pour vivre aux Grisons.


- (43) Au début des années 30, le régime mussolinien avait formulé des prétentions irrédentistes envers le Tessin italoophone et les Grisons romanches. Il y a eu dans la décision hâtée des autorités cantonales et fédérale l'expression d'une réelle crainte. A.-L. Sanguin, La Suisse, essai de géographie politique, Gap, Ed. Ophrys, 1983, pp. 123-125.
- (44) Sur le sutsilvan, J.J. Furer, op. cit., pp. 27 - 30.
- (45) "Dimensions of state formation and nation-building : a possible paradigm for research on variations within Europe, University of Bergen, avril 1971, et S.M. Lipset et S. Rokkan, Party systems and voters alignments, New York, The Free Press, 1967.
- (46) S. Rokkan, Citizen, Elections, Parties, Oslo, U. Forlaget, 1970
- (47) A. Pichard, Vingt Suisses à découvrir, Lausanne, 24 Heures, 1975, p. 204.
- (48) E. Weibel, "Notes de recherches concernant le pluralisme grison", in Annuaire suisse de science politique, 16/1976, pp. 126 et 127.
- (49) Le parti Démocrate fusionnera avec l'Union Démocratique du Centre (agrariens suisses), voir E. Weibel, op. cit.
- (50) Disons à ce propos que la segmentation verticale a été combattue en Suisse et dans les Grisons, par la création de nombreuses sociétés patriotiques, culturelles, sportives, chargées de diffuser une idéologie "helvétiste". Sur ce thème, Ulrich Imhof et Nicolaï Bernard, "Les relations des communautés linguistiques au sein des associations nationales suisses avant la création de la Confédération de 1848", in Pierre du Bois, Union et division des Suisses, Lausanne, Aire, 1983, pp. 9-24
- (51) Université de Neuchâtel, présentation des résultats provisoires d'une recherche concernant le statut de la minorité rhéto romanche, A.S.S.P., Congrès de Jongny, juin 1983.

Répartition des idiomes rhétoromanches




tiré d'Alain Pichard, *Vingt Suisses à écouvrir*, op cit

Répartition des confessions vers 1650




trié de l'Atlas historique de la Suisse, op cit

Peuplement Walser




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


La République des Trois Liges tiré de l'Atlas historique de la Suisse, par H. Amman & K. Schib, Aarau, Sauerländer, 1958

de 1512 à 1797



Rhaetia vers 1200



L'extension territoriale des 3 Ligues tiré de l'Atlas historique de la Suisse

Elisabeth u. Bruno Meyer-Marthaler, Frauenfeld

Répartition des sièges au sein du législatif cantonal grison

	1937	1945	1957	1967	1977	1983
PDC	28	32	32	40	41	36
PR	29	13	28	29	27	28
UDC	-	-	-	-	43	43
P Dém	33	43	33	38	-	-
P Soc	6	7	7	6	7	9
Autres	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	99	98	103	113	120	120

*faute de place nous ne donnons que quelques résultats d'élections se déroulant tous les deux ans*

Répartition des sièges au sein de l'Exécutif cantonal grison

	1936-1942	1942-1963	1963-1975	1975-
PDC	2	2	2	2
PR	2	1	1	1
UDC /				1
P Dém	1	2	2	
P Soc				1

Répartition des sièges à l'Exécutif grison par groupe linguistique

	rhétoromanches	italophones	germanophones
1894 - 1949	49,5 %	7 %	43,5 %
1949 - 1969	40,0 %	9 %	51,0 %

1)

1) Tableaux tirés de Weibel, op cit, p 133 et complété avec l'aide de renseignements de l'Année politique suisse, Berne, Centre de recherche sur la vie politique suisse





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PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM AND STATE POLICY IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN

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European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops,  
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France and Britain are often held up as two of the earliest 'nation-states' of Europe, models of Political integration and successful nation-building. Yet, in the Post-war years, they, like several other European states have witnessed a reaction to the assimilationist trends which once appeared inexorable, in the form of a reassertion of the submerged nationalities or regions. It is usual to identify three elements in the Politics of Peripheries: cultural values and their reassertion in the face of the assimilationist Pressures of modern capitalist development and of the state; a sense of economic grievance finding expression in territorial as opposed to purely class or sectoral terms and focussed initially on the state itself; and a movement for Political autonomy or 'home rule'. There is frequently (Smith, 1981), a progression on the part of regionalist movements from traditionalist, often backward-looking cultural concerns to a concern with contemporary economic Problems. This itself may, at least initially, take a defensive form, seeking protection for activities threatened by industrial modernisation; or it may give birth to modernising forces seeking economic transformation. We can trace a further progression, from a strategy of territorial lobbying focussed on the central state to one of autonomism as movements have gained in maturity and confidence and the expectations raised by the central state have been dashed. The relationship amongst the cultural, economic and Political aspects of regionalist movements is complex and often bewildering. Rokkan and Urwin (1983, p.134), after stating that backward and declining regions are not the home of the outstanding territorial Problems, comment that 'no matter what their cultural strength, economic weakness can easily provide the basis for arguments against the

credibility and viability of self-sufficiency. In Purely nationalist terms, certainly, one might expect declining regions, needing state help to rescue their economies and Preserve living standards, to favour centralised government combined with redistributive regional Policies. In Particular, one would expect this demand to be taken up on the left, with its commitment to Progressive redistribution and equity; and to a great extent this does happen. However, the regionalist dynamic set in train by redistributive economic demands can and does fuel autonomist Political movements, Paradoxical though this may appear (LijPhart, 1977). A key factor in this is the attitudes and Policies of the state itself. In many western European countries, the Post-war Period has seen the development of national 'regional' Policies geared at once to the attainment of national economic development goals and to satisfying the demands of the Periphery. The use of the region by the state itself as a basis for Planning and development Policies may serve to increase regional consciousness and, as disillusionment sets in, spark off autonomist demands.

The autonomist dynamic can in turn accrue to the benefit of regional or separatist Parties or be absorbed within the national Parties themselves. A successful regional Party needs to integrate these various elements into a mobilising ideology based upon the claims of a territorial or ethnic group, underpinned by a convincing economic strategy. In mainland France and Britain, as we shall see, regionalist and nationalist movements have had varying degrees of success in integrating the elements and relating them to identifiable territories. Consequently, autonomist movements have often been weak and ambiguous in their aims, unable to develop economic and Political strategies which could convincingly be Presented as alternatives to the centralisation of the state or modern capitalism, or to sever the

Partisan and clientilistic links tying the Peripheral regions to metropolitan Politics.

Where the impetus of Peripheral nationalism is absorbed by the 'national' Parties, these must be able to reconcile their support for Peripheral autonomy with their overall Policy Package, at least when in Government (in Opposition a greater degree of Policy dissonance is possible). In Britain and France, the impetus has to a large degree been absorbed by the Parties of the left, though not without considerable cost in terms of the ideological coherence of their Programmes and intra-Party conflict.

General theories of Peripheral nationalism, by concentrating on common factors across a range of cases have frequently neglected the inter-relationship of the factors which, in any given case explains its peculiar nature and the state Policies which form such a vital part of the environment in which it develops. This Paper explores the conditions for the emergence and decline of Peripheral nationalist movements through a study of France and Britain and, within these, the cases of Brittany, Languedoc, Scotland and Wales.

#### State Building in France and Britain

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Republican France inherited from the monarch a tradition of centralisation and uniformity which was to lend itself as well to the revolutionary ideology of liberty, fraternity and equality as to the despotism of the Bourbons. Indeed, by transferring sovereignty from the monarch to the People, the revolution depended on the concept of a unified 'French People' so that the 'Jacobin' tradition, unlike the British-American liberal tradition, sees centralisation and democracy not as incompatible but as closely linked (Mény, 1974). The third republic consolidated the nation-state, its politicians seeing the

Provinces as hot beds of reaction, clericalism and royalism, a view sustained by the attitudes of many contemporary regionalists. The association of Provincialism with traditionalist and anti-republican values was strengthened between the wars and during the Vichy regime while Post-war governments sought to remove all traces of regionalism from French Political and administrative life, leaving only the approved republican institutions of the commune and the département. So the legitimacy of the centralised state was firmly grounded in democratic theory and popular sovereignty.

In fact, the French 'Jacobin' myth was just that for there exists an elaborate system of territorial representation sustained by the cumul des mandats whereby Political leaders accumulate office at both central and local levels. Yet this system, based on the notables, was equally hostile to regionalist claims which threatened its monopoly. The term notable, like so many pejorative appellations, covers a variety of types but Grémion's (1976, p.167) description conveys well the attitude of established territorial representatives to proposals for reform. 'The notable . . . is a man who disposes of a certain power to act on the apparatus of the state at certain privileged levels and who, by a reverse effect, sees his own power reinforced by the privileges which these contacts confer, as long as they are sanctioned by results.' So, while the notable might rail against centralisation, in practice they are its most fervent supporters.

British constitutional development was, of course, more pragmatic and evolutionary. Celtic languages and culture were forcibly suppressed from time to time with the support of the Anglicising elites of Scotland and Wales themselves who saw these as backward and threatening but, to a large extent, when not posing a threat to the metropolitan order, the periphery was left to its own devices. A unitary Parliament provided the ultimate seat of sovereignty.

enabling the British to sidestep the issue of whether sovereignty had a popular basis. There was no attempt to build a centralised bureaucracy; instead, the Periphery was governed through trusted local elites (Bulpitt, 1983). The system came under severe pressure in the late nineteenth century when, under the influence of Irish ideas, radicals began to question the foundations of the state and push for Home Rule in Scotland and Wales as part of a general programme of democratisation and modernisation but the system was able to ride out not only this but also the rise of the Labour movement. The accommodation of the Labour Party within a constitutional system inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth century oligarchy ended all serious challenge to the form of the state for a long time (Jones and Keating, 1985). Conservatives saw in the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty a safeguard of the existing social order; radicals saw in it a reservoir of power which could be mobilised for change as soon as they occupied the government benches. Acting on this belief, the Post-war Labour government built its welfare state and its programme on nationalisation and economic management on a rigidly centralised basis.

Territorial representation in Britain has always been weaker than in France, despite the constituency system for Parliamentary elections though, as we shall see, there is an echo of the French notable in the attitudes of Scottish and, to a lesser extent, Welsh MPs and territorial administrators. These have similarly sought the maximum devolution of power to themselves within the apparatus of the unitary state.

The Survival of Peripheral Identity

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Neither in France nor in Britain did the emergence of the modern state efface all traces of distinctiveness in the Periphery and it is the survival of territorial identity which is the first requirement for Peripheral mobilisation. In our four cases, this survival took very different forms.

Brittany, formerly an independent duchy annexed to France in 1532, has a language and culture of its own and, as a Peninsula, a clear territorial identity. Traditionally, it has been a very Catholic region and has voted overwhelmingly with the right, though, with the decline of religious observance, both of these characteristics are changing (Johnson, 1981). By 1950, Breton nationalism, discredited by the wartime collaboration of some of its activists, was at a low point. It was in this year, however, that the CELIB (Comité d'études et de liaison d'intérêts bretons) was founded by modernising forces vives, to press for the adoption and financing by the Government of an Plan for Brittany. So the Breton issue was brought back onto the agenda in a respectable form, tied to the needs of economic development. CELIB's strength and its weakness was the broad base of its support, from local government, members of Parliament, industrialists, trade unions and farmers. Regional solidarity was forged around a series of battles, starting with the campaign for the regional Plan and continuing with the long struggle to keep open the Forges d'Hennebont and the successful fight to force the nationalised railways to withdraw a proposed tariff change which would have disadvantaged Breton traders (Dulong, 1975). The high point of CELIB's influence was in 1962 when it succeeded in extracting from most of Brittany's candidates in the general election a pledge to put the interests of Brittany above those of Party (Hayward, 1969). The election, however, resulted in a large Gaullist majority in still conservative Brittany and the reverse occurred; René Pleven, the



President of CELIB, accepted government office. The establishment of the CODER in 1964 largely succeeded in its aim of emasculating the movement, channeling regional energies into a centralist device subordinate to the new regional Prefect. These developments led Michel Phlipponeau, a Rennes Professor and leading Breton activist, to conclude that the only hope for the Breton movement was to throw in its lot with the left. In 1965 he joined Gaston Defferre's abortive campaign for the Presidency, inserting into his programme a pledge on regional reform. Unable to persuade the movement as a whole to join him and excluded from the CODER in 1964, Phlipponeau resigned from CELIB in 1967. In 1972, the CGT trade union left and the inter-class lobbying strategy gave way to a more politicised movement, as we shall see.

The micronationalism of Occitania or Languedoc is even more diffuse and fragmented than that of Brittany. There is endless controversy, indeed, over what the boundaries of Occitania are or should be; confusion was further heightened when the regional reforms of 1963 and 1972 created the region of Languedoc-Rousillon, combining parts of historic Languedoc with French Catalonia and areas of Provence but allocating Toulouse, historic capital of Languedoc to the region of Midi-Pyrenees. Occitania is distinctive culturally, with its own language, a romance tongue considered by its supporters to be 'purer' than French, with its Germanic influences. Economically, the most distinctive part is the vine-growing area of the south where a clientilistic political system had developed by the early twentieth century. Economically conservative but politically left-wing, the traditional wine-growers relied for the survival of their small holdings on the co-operative wineries and the support of the state. The notables of the old socialist party, the SFIO, whose mainstay were the peasant farmers, saw to it that state support and

protection from foreign competition were maintained. Consequently, dependence on the single crop increased as did overproduction, until the 1970s, when the state, tied by EEC regulations, dug its heels in. A series of riots over imports of Italian wine in 1975 left two dead. Other economic grievances have centred on the plight of declining industries, unemployment, forced emigration and resentment at centrally-imposed regional development measures. A cultural movement emerged from the Resistance after the war in the form of the Institut d'Etudes Occitanes, though initially it was little interested in politics.

In Wales, the main bearers of identity have been the Welsh language and the non-conformist tradition of radical dissent though the former is a profoundly divisive issue within Wales itself, with only some 20% of the population of the Principality speaking the language. Culturally, there is a large gulf between the Welsh-speaking rural areas of north and west Wales and the English-speaking industrialised south. Though there were moves in the late nineteenth century to forge a Welsh Parliamentary Party on the lines of Parnell's Irish Party, its leaders were soon absorbed into the mainstream of British political life. In the twentieth century, the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the dominant force in Wales and, after the second World War, extended its grip to the rural Welsh-speaking areas as well as the English-speaking industrial south so that, by 1966, with 32 of the 36 seats, Labour could claim to be truly a national party of Wales. Centralist in belief and practice, Labour preached that the advance of the Welsh masses depended on access to London, with a Labour government to deliver the goods, though a powerful minority continued to adhere to the old radical traditions. The decline of indigenous Welsh industry and the old heavy industries as a whole reinforced Welsh dependence and

strengthened Labour's argument that there was no realistic alternative to centralised Policies.

In Scotland, the historical memory of independent statehood is a major influence on Political attitudes. The union of 1707 left intact many of the institutions of civil society, notably the legal system, the education system, Scottish banks and the Church. Scots culture before 1745 was as profoundly divided as that of modern Wales but the suppression of the clans and the taming of the symbols of Highland culture to the service of British imperial regalia in the nineteenth century emptied this issue of its Political potential. For a time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sectarianism threatened to be a major divisive force but the emergence of the Labour Party as the dominant Political force in the west of Scotland provided the minority Catholic community with an avenue to Political power. Like our other areas, Scotland has suffered a relative economic decline in the twentieth century, with the collapse of indigenous Scottish capitalism after the first World War and the run-down of the traditional heavy industries after the second. Like its economy, Scotland's Politics have developed in a highly dependent mode. The existence of a separate Scottish legal system means that a great deal of legislation and administration has to be provided separately for Scotland, creating a Political arena and a strong sense of Political identity, though without substantial Political autonomy (Keating and Mindwinter, 1983). For a hundred years, there has been a Secretary of State for Scotland with a substantial devolved administration whose role is to temper British Policy lines to the needs of the Scottish environment and to act as a lobbyist for Scotland within the Cabinet. Two levels of Politics have developed as a result - the Scottish level, where there is a fairly vigorous Political life centred on those aspects of Politics devolved (within

the limits of British Policy) to the Secretary of State, and the UK level which includes most economic Policy matters. For a long time, a consensus prevailed among Scottish Politicians that this was a system which gave Scotland the best of all worlds - a (weak) degree of informal autonomy in social and environmental matters together with privileged access to the centralized economic sphere and UK resources. [The style is represented to the point of caricature by the fiercely anti-devolution Labour MP who in 1973 demanded that only Scottish MPs should be allowed to vote on proposals to change Scottish divorce laws or the equally anti-devolution Conservative MP who joined in the same filibuster to stop Scottish divorce reform, having himself used his London domicile to obtain a divorce under the more liberal English law (Keating, 1975).

At the same time, these Scottish Politicians remained the major channel of access to the centre. After effectively abandoning its old Home Rule Policy after 1924, the Labour Party became an enthusiastic supporter of this line, particularly when it had established itself as the dominant party in Scotland after 1959. So, although opinion polls consistently showed a majority of Scots in favour of Home Rule, the main Political Parties were able to argue that, by putting at risk the position of the Secretary of State and the privileged access to the centre, this would be economically disastrous.

### The Politics of Regional Development

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In the last twenty years, both France and Britain have seen the development of centralized regional development policies which have simultaneously tried to accommodate the needs of national modernisation and growth and satisfy demands stemming from the regions themselves. In both countries, regional development policies

were seen as being in the national interest by bringing into employment resources which would otherwise be idle and increasing international competitiveness. Indeed, the national goals of regional Policies were constantly being emphasised by Politicians. At the same time, however, there was a need to involve Peripheral elites in the implementation of regional development strategies and ensure that regional initiatives did not cut across national Priorities. This gave a Profoundly ambiguous character to the Politics of regional development.

In France, the 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of modernising forces vives, new, dynamic social groups including industrialists, trade unionists, modern farmers, Professionals, Public servants and academics, who began to organise themselves in comités d'expansion économique. Challenging the traditional notables and the centralising state, these organised themselves on a regional basis. While the Fourth Republic Governments had broadly welcomed this development, the reaction of the Gaullist state was to try and control them, to subordinate them to national Policy (Hayward, 1969). Commissions de développement économique régional (CODER) were established in 1964 as advisory bodies, bringing together local councillors, interest group representatives and government nominees. The attempt to co-opt the forces vives to the service of the state largely failed and many of them resigned from the CODER when they became aware of their impotence. Following de Gaulle's abortive regionalisation measure of 1969, the Pompidou government set up indirectly elected regional councils in 1972, comprising Members of Parliament and Senators together with representatives of local councils, thus effectively excluding the forces vives. Regional boundaries followed closely those of the former circonscriptions d'action régional, deliberately drawn so as not to correspond to cultural identity or historic

Provinces - Brittany, notably, was cut in two. Nor, for that matter, did they correspond well with the technical needs of economic and Physical Planning.

Regional Policy initiatives, too, were developed in a highly centralised way which merely served to heighten regional consciousness without increasing the legitimacy of the central state. In 1963, the Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale (DATAR) was established to give a regional dimension to national Planning and encourage the dispersal of industry to the regions. Regional development became a favoured phrase and was used to justify a variety of projects. But, as Tarrow (1978) comments, 'when regionalism as ideology is used by Political elites to justify policies that have little to do with regional equality, regional Political defence - in part touched off by the ideology - may result.' Grémion and Worms (1975) similarly comment that regional Policy may have 'contributed to an increase in regional consciousness which is at the outset awareness of frustration.' The case analysed by Tarrow (1978), was the notorious Fos Project undertaken through DATAR for a steel complex at Fos near Marseille. Although justified by reference to the needs of regional development, the Project was ill integrated into the local economy or the environment. Its execution was kept under tight central control, with local Political figures excluded from any role in the development. The result was a coalition of regional defence, comprising local Politicians, territorial administrators, environmentalists and trade unionists in opposition to the scheme. Similarly, the massive tourist developments on the Mediterranean, undertaken through the Parisian ministries and mixed Public-Private companies, while they have generated employment, have not been viewed as an unmixed blessing. Local Politicians have complained that the Profits have gone to outside Property companies

and there is some animosity to the annual influx of strangers <sup>13</sup>  
(Ardagh, 1982). There is resentment, too, about the seasonal nature  
of the work and the subservient attitudes

associated with the tourist trade. These attitudes have fed a feeling that the region is being exploited by the state for its own ends and to call for more decentralised and Planning, sensitive to local needs.

British regional development Policies similarly took a centralised form. From the early 1960s, a system of regional industrial incentives was put in place, to induce investors to move from the 'congested' regions such as the English South-East and West Midlands, to the development areas of Scotland, Wales and the North of England. The theory was that diversionary regional Policy was a zero-sum game in which the donor regions would win through relief of congestion, the recipient regions through new employment and the national economy through relief of inflationary pressures and extra output. At a time of growth and full employment, the argument appeared convincing.

As in France, there was a series of one-off industrial developments in the Periphery, based on a similar theory that they would generate 'spin-offs' into the local economy. One can cite the vehicle plants at Linwood and Bathgate in Scotland, the 'integrated' steel works, split at the last minute between Ravenscraig in Scotland and Llanwern in Wales, the smelters at Anglesea and Invergordon. These were certainly welcomed at the time but failed to generate complementary industries and the 1980s recession has seen the closure of Linwood, Bathgate and Invergordon and a large question mark over the future of Ravenscraig and Llanwern.

In 1965, regional Planning machinery was set up in the form of Economic Planning Councils and Boards. The councils, modelled on their French counterparts, grouped representatives of local authorities, industrialists, trade unionists and independent experts; the boards consisted of civil servants from the main economic departments. In Scotland, the machinery was placed under the



Secretary of State and in 1964 a Secretary of State for Wales was appointed to perform a similar role to his Scottish counterpart. The task of the councils and boards was to produce regional economic plans to fit into the National Plan of 1965. The early failure of the National Plan deprived them of much of their *raison d'être* but, in any case, there was a profound ambiguity in their role. If, as was made clear, the councils were there simply to execute national policy, then the representation of local politicians is puzzling unless one assumes a natural consensus on the needs of regional development. Alternatively, the members may simply have been there to legitimise central policies as applied to the regions. In the event, many members of the councils resigned in disillusionment when they discovered their impotence but not before the issue of regional development had become politically live.

### The Politics of Autonomy

We have examined the survival of territorial identity in our four case study areas, the development of dependent political structures and the growth of national regional policies seeking to integrate regional demands with the needs of national development and modernisation. The next stage is to examine the emergence of autonomist political movements and the reaction of the central state.

Brittany in the late 1960s saw the CELIB continuing to put its faith in a strategy of non-partisan pressure on the central state, while other sections of the Breton movement veered to the left, a shift which was accelerated by the events of May 1968 when the anti-state protests struck a familiar chord in Brittany and by a series of industrial struggles. In 1972, a strike at the Joint Francais for,

among other things, parity in wage rates with the Parisian workers of the same firm, generated a considerable amount of regional solidarity (Berger, 1977); but it was a solidarity of the left rather than the cross-class mobilisation represented by the CELIB. Other movements around the same time, included a protest by small milk producers against their co-operative which they saw as treating them as would any capitalist dealer, and the demonstrations against plans for military bases.

The Breton cultural movement, too, saw a revival in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with an increase in interest in the language and of Breton Publishing. None of this, however, amounted to a national revival. Numbers studying Breton remained tiny in proportion to the total population. While this may have been a weakness from the point of view of Breton micronationalism, it did ensure that the emphasis of the movement remained on economic affairs and thus in the political mainstream. A heavier emphasis on language could have been divisive, as in Wales. More significant at the popular level was the revival of Breton music and its translation into modern idiom by singers such as Alan Stivell whose electric folk-rock is used to convey his Pan-celtic and Breton message. The folk revival in Brittany, as elsewhere, had particular appeal to the young.

This was the background to the development of a more politicised Breton nationalism, aiming at decentralisation and home rule. As early as 1956, the Mouvement pour l'organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) had been formed, calling in a manifesto signed by several thousand for decentralisation of the French state, a special statute for Brittany with an elected assembly, as well as immediate economic measures. Some of its members were elected to municipal councils in the 1950s (Stephens, 1976). In 1963, it split following the defeat of a conference resolution calling for Algerian independence, to give

birth to the Union démocratique bretonne, a Political Party, socialist and internationalist. Campaigning on the internal colonialist slogan 'The Breton worker is doubly exploited; he is exploited as a Breton and as a worker', and calling for a European federation of regions, the UDB formed tactical alliances with other left wing Parties and several of its members were elected to municipal councils on union-of-the-left lists (Guillouel, 1981). The UDB, however, was not to be entirely successful in marrying socialist and regionalist ideologies and even less so in building a mass base. In 1968 it expelled those members sympathetic to the violent FLB and in 1970, after moving to a strict Leninist line, expelled its gauchiste libertarians and aligned itself with the Communist Party. Nevertheless, by the 1970s there was a firm association of Breton regionalism with the left, given added force by the advance of the Socialist Party in Brittany, using as one of its weapons a firm commitment to decentralisation.

By the 1970s, the Politics of most Breton activists were within the democratic socialist fold, enabling them to contribute to the realignment of the left. Political clubs such as the Bonnets rouges and Bretagne et Démocratie and conferences on the lines of the Grenoble assises of 1966, at Saint Brieuc and elsewhere (Philipponeau, 1982) paved the way for the adoption of regionalism by the new Parti Socialiste, as we shall see. From the agreement on the Common Programme of 1972, the main effort of the Breton regionalist movement was channeled into the Parties of the left, which had taken on board the substance of their demands for regional government, local economic powers and protection of Breton culture. This accommodation to Breton regional interests coincided with a steady advance for the left in Brittany, from 26% in the legislative

elections of 1967, to 33% in 1973 and 43% in 1978 (Frears, 1978; Rogers, 1984). At the legislative elections of 1981, the left won 15 of the twenty five Breton seats.

The Occitan cultural renewal emerged from the Resistance after the war in the form of the Institut d'Etudes Occitanes. Campaigning essentially for the revival of Occitan culture within the French nation, it was initially divided on its political aims (Touraine, 1981). Certainly, it had a more modernist image than the old Félibrige, which it saw as provincialist, conservative, clerical and defeatist; the Félibrige in turn accused the IEO of being Marxist and revolutionary (Stephens, 1976). At the same time, there was something of a revival of Occitan poetry and song, though little by way of prose or drama.

In 1959 there was the beginnings of a politicisation of the movement. A small group broke away to form the right-wing Parti Nationaliste Occitan, while the mainstream of the IEO moved left, adopting a policy in favour of political decentralisation. In 1961, a strike by miners at Decazeville against a closure threat generated considerable regional solidarity and gained the support of the IEO. A new movement, the Comité Occitan d'Etudes et d'Action (COEA) emerged, bringing together the cultural and economic themes in an 'internal colonialist' interpretation of Occitania's plight. The internal colonialist theme had first been developed by Robert Lafont and others in a manifesto of 1961. As later elaborated (Lafont, 1967), it saw Occitania as exploited by central capital, to which the native bourgeoisie had sold out in the nineteenth century. The state's regional strategy of aménagement du territoire was seen merely as a means of keeping the south in a state of permanent dependence and under-development. The analysis may be unconvincing

economically and historically but its ideological significance is considerable for it allowed the Occitan movement to deny the need for dependence on central regional Policies and to advocate instead federal government. COER gained the support of a number of left-wingers who despaired of achieving Power at the national level and in 1964 it was one of the founders of Francois Mitterrand's Convention des Institutions Republicaines (CIR). May 1968 sparked off a new cultural movement linked to the more anarchic sections of the left and uniting Peasants, intellectuals, gauchistes, trotskysts, ecologists, Pacifists and anti-imperialists (Touraine et.al., 1981). In 1971, this led to the dissolution of COER in favour of Lutte Occitane, a more militant group which had effectively taken over COER and which led to series of protests against the Larzac military base in 1971-2. In 1974, a new campaign of agitation was being planned when the death of President Pompidou provided a political opportunity. Lafont was put forward as Presidential candidate of the 'minorities and regions' but his nomination was rejected by the Constitutional Council. With the opportunity to enter the Partisan arena thus closed off, the movement aligned itself with the existing parties of the left. The slogan of Lafont's abortive campaign Volens Viure al Pais (VVAP), became the name of a new organisation, favouring regional decentralisation within the French state and giving general support to the parties of the left. By the late 1970s, it had persuaded both the Parti Socialiste and the Communists to support its main demands, though their local notables are not always so favourable (Barelli, 1980).

This was made easier by changes within these parties themselves, especially the renewal of the old SFIO as the Socialist Party. A new generation of younger activists, professionals and public sector workers especially, were coming to challenge the power of the old

notables and gaining election to local councils in the 1970s. While the old notable might declaim against the state in the name of the locality, his relationship with it was in fact symbiotic, his Power deriving from his role as the privileged channel of access. Now this role was being undermined by the inability or unwillingness of the state to deliver the traditional goods and by the emergence of the new breed of activist more committed to genuine decentralisation and a more politicised mode of decision-making. The Communist Party, traditionally very centralist, changed tack during the 1970s. While rejecting the 'internal colonialist' argument as unmarxist (Giard and Scheibling, 1981), it has supported Occitan cultural ventures and taking a strong line in favour of vine-growers and against EEC enlargement.

Though Touraine et. al. (1981) describe the Occitan movement as a social movement, it is clear that it is a fragile and divided one. It lacks the business and union leadership which marked the Breton revival and, while there is an ideology of indigenous economic development, the main economic motor is provided by negative protests against central policy and the protection of out-dated and uneconomic vine-growing. In the absence of significant forces vives amongst economic elites, the movement is one of intellectuals with an ability to mobilise peasant resistance and attract the support of sundry categories of political 'have nots'. It has failed to develop a clear political programme, confusing economic and cultural and political demands, with its supporters favouring degrees of autonomy stretching from mild decentralisation to separatism for a territory which remains as difficult as ever to define. The weakness and lack of integration of the movement also helps to explain the relative ease with which the parties of the left were able to take on board its main demands, though the change of thinking which this required,

especially on the part of the Communists, should not be underestimated. In the 1980s, while the Occitan cultural movement has continued to flourish, the Political movement has been quiescent, most of its activists and the modernising forces generally having put their faith in the decentralisation proposals of the Socialists in 1981.

The rapprochement of the left and the regionalist movements was a gradual process from the early 1960s. Modernisation and secularisation were beginning to break down the old view of the provinces as hotbeds of reaction and clericalism and by 1965 Gaston Defferre and Francois Mitterrand were both making favourable noises about regionalism. The mainstream left, however, grouped around the old SFIO, was caught at a loss by de Gaulle's regionalisation proposals of 1969. Its demise and the realignment of the left with the emergence of the new Parti Socialiste (PS) presented an opening to various sections of the non-traditional left including the various regionalist movements.

At its 1971 congress at Avignon, the PS adopted a regionalist resolution, confirmed when the Convention of Surènes included the commitment in the Programme of the new Party (Mans, 1974). The commitment was refined and strengthened in the course of the 1970s, receiving its fullest expression in the 1981 document La France au Pluriel. This, in a remarkable revision of traditional thinking on the French left, recognised the need for centralisation under the Third Republic to protect the revolution and extend democracy, human rights and public services but condemned the increasing centralisation of the twentieth century which it blamed on the natural tendencies of capitalism. Regional cultures and languages had been suppressed and swamped in the same way as French was being swamped by the English language and American culture. Centralised

regional Policies unbalanced local economies. Local businesses had gained little from the tourist developments on the Mediterranean; local cultures had been devalued to tourist spectacles and holiday homes had pushed up land prices. The Party espoused the slogan Volem viure al País (I want to live in my own country) but this required that people should have work. The Socialists believed that this meant industrial work because of the fragility of the tertiary economy and because a region cannot live by management and services alone.

Specifically, the Socialists proposed the direct election of the regional councils, whose boundaries would be redrawn to reflect more accurately regional loyalties. There would be a reform of finance to increase the resources available to the regions. Regional investment banks would be established and the national economic Plan reformed to allow more regional influence. Regional languages would be encouraged in schools. The Programme for the 1981 elections also promised a special statute for Corsica and a separate département for the Basque country. It was a Programme of cultural, economic and Political measures which would satisfy the demands of most regional activists, few of whom were seriously pushing for separatism or even federalism, leaving the remaining separatists Politically isolated.

In Scotland, a separate nationalist Party has existed since 1928, when nationalists finally gave up hope in the major British Parties but the modern revival dates from the early 1960s. In 1962, the Scottish National Party did surprisingly well at the West Lothian by-election and in 1967 won the formerly safe Labour seat of Hamilton. The reaction of the then Labour Government was to promise Scotland more of the traditional medicine in the form of regional aid and to set up a Royal Commission on the Constitution. Labour MPs and ministers were overwhelmingly against any concession on the issue of Home Rule, arguing that Scottish nationalism was purely an expression



of economic discontent which would subside once Labour's economic policies began to work. Only centralised government with the presence of Scottish MPs at Westminster and the Secretary of State in the Cabinet could guarantee the material welfare of Scotland. This argument received a rude shock in the 1970s with the discovery of North Sea oil which at a stroke undercut the very basis of the Scottish political structure. It would be naive to think that the discovery of North Sea oil created Scottish nationalists overnight but Miller's (1977) argument is persuasive, to the effect that oil removed the constraint previously preventing voters expressing their Scottish identity electorally. At the same time, the decline of the British two-party system presented an opportunity to a nationalist party with a reasonably well-organised machine and a cross-class appeal (Brand, 1978). The SNP were careful not to push issues which might be divisive within Scotland either on class or cultural matters, presenting themselves as a modern catch-all party aiming only for independence, after which socio-economic issues could be resolved by Scots for themselves.

It was in fact the Conservatives who made the first moves towards an elected Scottish Assembly with a curiously contrived scheme for an assembly to take the committee stages of Scottish bills which would complete their course at Westminster. It fell to Labour, however, to respond to the election of seven, then eleven nationalist MPs (with 30% of the vote) at the two elections of 1974. It could adopt one of three courses: to concede the constitutional question and establish a Scottish assembly; to make no constitutional concession but to channel extra economic goods to Scotland; or to suppress the Scottish question by stressing British class issues. The third course was impossible amongst other reasons because of Labour's own past role in stressing Scottish issues and its own unique ability to deal with

them. The second was tried but, with North Sea oil, the SNP was able to outflank them. So the third strategy was adopted but in the form of 'devolution', a scheme whereby wide areas of Scottish social and environmental Policy, already handled by the Scottish Office, would be devolved to an elected assembly while economic affairs remained largely the Preserve of Westminster. The Secretary of State and the full complement of Scottish MPs would remain and the sovereignty of Parliament be Preserved intact. This was a Profoundly ambiguous Project, at once centralist and decentralist, an attempt to graft an elected assembly onto the Present arrangements without disturbing these. It was consequently easy to attack in the 1979 referendum, having already been undermined by the lack of support in Parliament from the Labour Party itself many of whose members remained deeply opposed to any concession to Peripheral nationalism.

The smallness of the majority which the Scotland Act received at the referendum is testimony to the weakness and division of the Home Rule movement in Scotland. The diverse elements of separatists, federalists and devolutionists failed to coalesce around an agreed Project which could convincingly be Presented to the electorate. Labour, in Particular,

insisted on tying the assembly Policy to a centralised economic and financial system, confusing the voters still further.

After 1979, there were three possibilities for the nationalist movement in Scotland. It could disappear for a generation, as it had in the Past; it could continue to find expression through a substantial SNP; or it could be accommodated within the Labour Party. To a considerable degree, this last has happened. Labour has strengthened its relative position in Scotland, though in absolute terms it has lost support. There are no doubt many reasons for this but from our point of view it is significant that it has begun to identify more strongly with Scottish issues and to convince itself of the merits of its own devolution Policy. There are still firm anti-devolutionists but the mainstream of the Party is committed to the Policy, making it difficult for the SNP to outflank them except with an openly separatist appeal. At the same time, in the recession, Scottish Political development has taken a step backwards, with the emphasis in Political debate now being placed on lobbying central government over matters such as industrial closures, regional aid and public expenditure cuts. In these circumstances, Labour is able to resume its traditional role of defender of Scottish material interests at the centre while continuing to put forward a devolution Policy essentially the same as that of 1979 - economic affairs for the centre, social affairs for the assembly. Although some of the more nationalistic Labour MPs have tried to push the Party into a more aggressive stance, challenging the Conservative mandate in Scotland, the leadership has so far been able to restrain them. In opposition, such a strategy can be sustained indefinitely, as Labour showed with its old Home Rule Policy up to 1945 (Keating and Bleiman, 1979). In government, however, the Party could be faced with intolerable strains.

Meanwhile, the SNP has been locked in its own disputes, on two dimensions, between those who want to have nothing to do with half way houses such as devolution and insist on independence or nothing and between left and right. The left, who tend also to be the more moderate on the independence issue, do not believe that the constitutional issue alone is sufficient to mobilise support and wish the Party to move left to capture the support of the Labour-voting working class of west central Scotland. The analysis is debatable - the west of Scotland working class adherence to Labour probably has little to do with socialism - but it does illustrate the difficulties of a nationalist Party confronted with socio-economic cleavages in the nation to which it is appealing. Labour had long ridiculed the Nationalists for implying that the oil revenues would benefit everyone from the Duke of Buccleuch to the unemployed of Glasgow. Given the difficulty of sustaining political life on a diet of independence and Scottish oil, the Party has had to face up to some of the divisive socio-economic issues. Recently, for example, there has been some bitter argument over the Party's attitude to the miners' strike. We must conclude that the SNP, though the most successful of the movements which we are examining, has failed to integrate the various elements of peripheral nationalism into a convincing political package.

Wales, too, has had a nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru, since the 1920s but the modern revival again stems from the 1960s, when Plaid won the 1966 Carmarthen by-election. Although the seat was lost in 1970, the 1974 elections saw the election of three Welsh nationalists. Apart from some local government successes, however, Plaid's advance was largely confined to the Welsh-speaking heartland and the Party's share of the vote remained around 11% throughout the 1970s. Nationalism became a divisive force, the hostility of the

English-speaking majority being increased by the success of the Welsh lobby in gaining concessions in the form of broadcasting time, education in Welsh and the reservation of jobs to Welsh speakers. Language was not the only obstacle to the advance of Plaid Cymru. Its ideology has been based on 'small is beautiful' principles, with the maximum decentralisation within Wales and cooperative enterprise as the basis of the economy. Such a vision has more appeal in the rural and small town areas of north and west Wales than to the unionised working class of the large industries of the south, where earlier anarcho-syndicalist ideas had died by the mid twentieth century.

The Labour Party, in contrast to Scotland, had begun to move away from its old centralist positions as early as the late 1960s, with proposals for an elected Welsh assembly to build on the Welsh Office of 1964. The national party leadership, having stamped on these ideas up until then, reversed its position in 1974 as a result of its need to do something about Scotland. Consequently, Welsh devolution came to legislative form as an afterthought to the Scottish proposals, portrayed as a concession to nationalism. Seen in this light, they were extremely unpopular in Wales and suffered an overwhelming defeat at the 1979 referendum. Subsequent general elections have seen the two remaining nationalist MPs strengthen their grip on the Welsh speaking constituencies while Plaid has declined elsewhere in Wales. More recently, Plaid has moved further to the left, with strong support for the striking miners and the election of the left-wing Daffyd Ellis Thomas as Party President, though without any impact on its level of support.

Labour, having moved ahead of public opinion on devolution, suffered a major reverse in the 1979 referendum which has been followed by a dramatic reversal of its electoral fortunes to the benefit of the Conservatives. 'British Wales' (Balsom and Jon ..

1984) has been extending at the expense of the 'Welsh Wales' of the Labour dominated valleys, while in the 'Welsh heartland' Plaid has consolidated its position. The prospects for a renewed national movement in these circumstances are not favourable. On the other hand, Welsh institutions, though still much less developed than their Scottish counterparts, have continued to grow since 1979, with enhanced powers for the Welsh Office and a Parliamentary select Committee on Welsh affairs (Balsom and Jones, 1984). It is possible that in the future these could encourage the development of a Welsh political life and identity and allow the development of a national movement less divided between Welsh and English speaking cultures.

#### Conclusions

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We have traced the rise and fall of peripheral nationalist movements in four areas. In all four, the traditional pattern of territorial representation has been broken by the emergence of the new movements. The politics of dependence have been confronted with an autonomist alternative and the state's own regional policies have been shown wanting. The peripheral movements themselves have had varied degrees of success in forging political strategies based on the integration of cultural, economic and political demands. The most successful electorally has been in Scotland where cultural divisions are largely unimportant, economic credibility for a time was provided by North Sea oil and political credibility is provided by the tradition of independent statehood and the survival of much of the infrastructure of statehood. In none of our cases, however, has a peripheral nationalist party succeeded in making itself the dominant force in its area or in extracting major constitutional concessions from the state.

In the recession, constitutional issues have receded in importance while in both France and Britain much of the impetus of peripheral nationalism has been absorbed by the Parties of the left. In both the Parti Socialiste and the Labour Party there have been significant moves away from the old centralised ideology and, in particular, towards a more tolerant view of decentralised economic policy initiatives. Partly, this has been a matter of necessity as, in the recession, diversionary regional policies have become more difficult to sustain. In opposition, French socialists before 1981 and British Labour councils since 1979 have sought to exploit the potential of local government to make up the deficiencies of national spatial policy. In both Parties, however, the dominant view of economic management remains the centralist one, based on nationalisation and state macroeconomic control [I have discussed this in greater detail elsewhere (Keating, 1984) and in my forthcoming book with Paul Hainsworth on Decentralisation and Change in Contemporary France]. In opposition, Labour is able to play both the centralist and decentralist line. In France, the Socialist Government has taken some steps towards regional power but the direct elections of regional councils have repeatedly been postponed and regional economic powers run parallel to rather than substituting for national policies. In the event of a right-wing government after the next elections, the Party could well identify itself with a renewed regional mobilisation. For peripheral nationalists, the decision whether to mobilise in separate Parties or work through sympathetic Parties of the centre remains as agonising as ever.

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31

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THE IDEOLOGY OF CATALAN NATIONALISM

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The Ideology of Catalan Nationalism

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The concept of a Catalan nation or, more generally, a political movement termed Catalanism, has emerged, survived and reappeared once and again throughout history under diverse formulations and projects as an alternative response to the insufficiency of the prevailing concept of a Spanish nation or fatherland or, simply, of Spain, to win for itself wide social acceptance.<sup>1</sup>

Spanish nationalism, the prevailing variety of which has shown a markedly mystical, Castilianistic and integrationistic character, has been the ideological expression of a long, gradual and, to a certain extent, unsuccessful attempt at building a unitarian Spanish state which began with the union under one crown five hundred years ago and, in particu-

lar, with the command over a centralistic, uniformistic and authoritarian state machinery strengthened throughout the last century and a half. The relative historical weakness of the concept of a dominant Spain has thus been indicative of the weakness of the Spanish state.

The failure of Spain as a nation was an expression of the failure of national unification which the union of the diverse medieval crowns of the Iberian peninsula under the absolutistic monarchy of the 16th century seemed to foreshadow. Along with the feebly integrated economy of a territory understood as an intimately interrelated market and the remarkable structural unbalance among the regions, a series of phenomena have contributed to this failure: a state machinery which showed little adequacy in settling the conflicts of everyday life among the classes and social groups under its sovereignty; the educational and linguistic unity which for many decades only slightly permeated immense sectors of the population; and the initiative in foreign policy which was lost with regard to other states (as revealed by the colonial crisis and the opportunity which Spain missed in the distribution of influence zones throughout the world on the part of the great powers during the 20th century, and thoroughly explained in the case of both World Wars from which Spain was absent). These weak-

nesses constitute, or define, the failure of Spanish national unity.

The failure of the modern Spanish nation and state is the characteristic that best describes the unsuccessful attempt of the traditionally dominant Spanish classes at achieving social hegemony (a fact which implies coercion but, also, the consensus of the people). Thus their recurrent need to resort to domination methods based on clear violence and, also, the success of the concept of "The Two Spains." Especially weak, on certain occasions, has been the articulation of interests shared by both the hegemonic groups of the dominant classes of central Spain and the more influential of the bourgeois sectors of Catalonia. Consequently, the ascendancy of those dominant classes over the whole of Catalan society has been likewise feeble.

The characteristics of Spanish nationalism in the 20th century must be understood in the context of this historical frustration and, when seen in perspective (for instance, in relation to similar unification processes such as the French), they cannot help but reveal, despite their aggressive boasting and expansionistic rhetoric, a certain general tone of defensiveness and defeat.

A brief characterization of traditional Spanish nationalism may be established as follows:

a) The concept of an orthodox, Catholic Spain as opposed to a heterodox "anti-Spain", according to the phrasing inspired by Menéndez y Peláez. Reactionary xenophobia in an early stage as a hatred of Janzenism, (nationalistic) philosophy and (liberal) masonry; and, in the 20th century, of Marxism and masonry, also, to a lesser extent, Judaism<sup>2</sup>.

b) Identification of Spain as Castile, as theorized, for instance, by Unamuno's "good bredism", Ortega's exclusivistic concept of awarding Spain "only to Castilian heads" or Menéndez Pidal's argument on the tendency towards peninsular unity since Visigothic times. A "self-searching" attitude (Maetzu), developed in literature following the example set by the Generation of '98, that was an indication of the withdrawal brought about by the series of unsuccessful projects of the Spanish nation throughout the 19th century. A mythicization of the Reconquest and the Hapsburg Empire as the prime, example-setting forms of national unity.<sup>3</sup>

c) A mystical conception of the Spanish genius as a spiritual entity which implies a certain "sense of life", "frame of mind" and "national character" (theorized yet by Lain Entralgo, for instance)<sup>4</sup>.

d) A vision of Hispanicness as a spiritual communion in a series of traditional values, -paramount among which are Catholicism and the Spanish language- reaching out to include the overseas territories of the 16th-18th-century Spanish Empire.<sup>5</sup>

Franco's rule was at the same time the maximum expression of this conception and the evidence of failure regarding its future applicability. The General's regime can be said to have fostered the concepts of Spain and Fatherland (and even empire during the early postwar years) in the sense of a sentimental and irrational adherence to a series of traditional values or symbols and to a caudillo (or an army) over the concept of nation, which is doctrinally closer to naturalism and to the idea of sovereignty.<sup>6</sup>

It was on the basis of this feeling of failure at attempting to build a modern Spanish state and nation that Catalanism proposed the erection of an alternative Catalan nation. Thus, from an early reaction or resistance to a Spanish state under construction, a new alternative construction of a Catalan nation was devised.<sup>7</sup> Both when it was put forward at the close of the 19th century and early 20th as well as during its anti-Franquist revival, this project was proposed in historicist terms of reconstruction, recuperation and recovery of what had long been lost.

The following may be said to be the main ideological elements of Catalan nationalism worthy of note:

- a) A mythicized projection / in the past of a natural Catalan nation, particularly defined by a mystical conception of oneness with

the land of one's forefathers and by the belief that language has the capability of transmitting a particular understanding of the world. An exaggeration of the difference between natural nation and State, and a reconstruction plan for the former with no regard to the sphere of political relationships and social structures shaped by the machinery of the state.

b) An idealized recollection of Catalan history based on a medieval nation which ought to be reinstated. Exaltation of Aragonese imperialistic expansion throughout the Mediterranean; glorification of the stratified medieval "democracy". Interpretation of the history of Catalonia as the display of a national entity when confronted with foreign disturbances which are factors disruptive of nationality aided by betrayals at home and insufficient "Catalanesque" morale in certain Catalan sectors (batiflers=traitors)<sup>8</sup>.

c) Existence of a national spirit or soul (and sometimes even a race whose origins are lost in the depths of time) which serve as the inspiration source for the art, law, mores and, especially, language that make up the Catalan sense of nation.<sup>9</sup>

d) Definition of the concept of Catalanness by the use of the language in a sphere of Catalan lands coinciding with the Catalan-speaking areas of the former Kingdom of Aragon.<sup>10</sup>

These concepts have not been exclusive to any particular ideological tendency but have been--and are--more or less shared



by diverse doctrinal stands.

The doctrinal code of Prat de la Riba enjoyed widespread recognition during the first half of the century. This was based on the Germanic theory of a national spirit (Volksggeist), romantic historiography and rural Catholic traditionalism. Some elements of his ideological syncretism were widely used not only by conservative regionalists but also by many liberal republicans and some socialists and communists in the 1930s.

Its disrepute was nourished, on the one hand, by the racist and authoritarian exacerbation which the concept of Volksggeist took on under the German nationalism defeated in 1945; on the other, by the criticism of the myths of romantic historiography promoted by the historian Jaume Vicens Vives and carried on by his followers.<sup>11</sup> The economic changes of the 1960s also contributed to the erosion of the social basis of traditional rural values.

In turn, Marxist arguments, which had shown remarkable influence over the sentiment against Franco, basically reproduced Stalin's didactic formulation of nation as a composite of objective elements from which politics was absent. But the emphasis on economic elements (whether the market or structural homogeneity), a common language and culture, or collective psychology-

logy in order to define, as indicated by Stalin's 1913 item list, a Catalan nation was nearly always out of context. Actually, the Georgian Bolshevik had only made a not-quite-brilliant abstraction of the elements shared by the great European nation-states which rose in the 18th and 19th centuries under bourgeois hegemony. In the 1920s Stalin himself had stated that following the Russian Revolution of October 1917 and the changes on the European map after World War I (as prescribed by the "principle of nationalities"), the question of nation was reduced to a mere colonial question, i.e., the creation of new states by the peoples of the Third World. Thus, attention was shifted away from the theater of new European national states.<sup>12</sup>

Relying on the lasting continuity of history as an argument for the determination of a national character could be said to be a characteristic of both Catalanness and Hispanicness, regardless of the mutual give-and-take effect. In any case, the Stalinist concept of a nation as a lasting stable community (which could not avoid entering into direct contradiction with his own characterization of nation as belonging to a period of rising capitalism and bourgeoisie) fundamented in part a view of the Catalan nation as a reality which survived through historical change: a nation that falls only to rise again in an age-long process.<sup>13</sup>

Basing all authority on Stalin's very reference to the possi-

bility of having different social classes steering the course of the nationalist movement one after another, as well as other texts, some Catalan Marxist fractions in the mid-1970s gradually turned to a concept of nation primarily related to a political goal or state.<sup>14</sup>

That the concept of an idealistic or naturalistic Catalan nation, as put forward by romantics or by Marxists, was promoted mainly by incitations into political conflict may also be supported by comparison with other contemporary historical processes.

In this sense, the 19th-century cultural movement of the Felibridges -which were in possession of a medieval history and a literary tradition largely comparable to Catalan history and tradition, and perhaps even under better auspices- did not give rise to a nationalistic movement in Languedoc which could oppose the efficiently unitarian post-Revolutionary French state.

Contrariwise, the economic and structural differences between Northern and Southern Italy, the lack to a unitarian context prior to the formation of the state (there was not even a medieval precedent), the regional particularities, and the very linguistic and cultural differentiation among the regions (a fact which has led some Italian scholars to speak of "the aspects and elements of a nationality conflict" in the 19th century) did not

hinder the formation of an Italian state based on the peripheral hegemonic thrust which generated and consolidated national unity.

Whether negatively or positively, in both cases the political fact or the goal of a state appears to be the decisive requirement for the formation of modern nations. Likewise, in both the Spanish and Catalan cases, the political factor is currently, and was originally, the decisive element for the conception of a Spanish or a Catalan nation.

As two opposing nationalisms usually lead to a dead end, some ground for compromise had to be found. A political alternative means to reach several different agreements between Catalan nationalists and Spanish conservatives throughout history has been encountered in the field of specific programmatic points or, in practical terms, opportunistic negotiation of areas of Catalan self-government with the rulers of the state.

From this vantage point political, or merely administrative, Catalan autonomy is regarded as one particular alternative, regardless of whether it may give rise to a general formation of a state or not. Catalan nationalists have actually preferred not to witness such a formation of a state in order to secure a larger share of fringe benefits for Catalonia.

Whenever there has been an attempt at a deeper theorization of this pragmatic attitude, it inevitably has led to a doctrinal approach of German origin and medieval inspiration which states that a separate nation reaches a bilateral agreement with the state (considered as alien) on a particular kind of mutual relations.

This philosophy would justify an attitude of permanent negotiations and transactions which profits from whatever favorable political circumstances there may be at a given time. In return, support to the central government may be granted when necessary. The state is thus seen as a centuries-long, virtually unchangeable entity from which benefits ought to be obtained in compensation for past offense. Nationalistic struggle is considered almost an unsolvable historical calamity.

In other cases, Catalanism has devised a own state's project accompanying the concept of Catalan nation, as an alternative to the existing Spanish state. This can be a catalan state or, as is more widely accepted, a new sort of Spanish state where the contradictions peculiar to Catalan society may be given free expression to. The possible forms of political organization range from decentralization or a concentration of decentralized affairs within the scope of Catalan institutions, to a federal state, to a confederation of states. Whereas throughout his-

tory a tendency towards independence has prevailed in Basque nationalism (even among the ideological sectors in favor of a bilateral agreement with the Spanish state), in Catalan nationalism--marked from the start by a strong federalist philosophy--proposals for an independent Catalan state have always found only sheer minority support. Furthermore, they have been nearly non-existent except as a desperate reaction at times when attempts at a ~~federalist~~ <sup>or autonomist</sup> reform of the Spanish state have been thwarted and, even then, in many cases with the connotation of a possible confederacy of peninsular states.

During Franco's stay in power the uniformistic and authoritarian centralism of the machinery of the Spanish state and the integrationist character of Spain as the prevailing ideal were particularly emphasized. Thus, a more or less categorical expression of Catalanism always went hand in hand with all forms of democratic opposition to the regime. However, the existing unitarian Spanish state provided the setting for a process of industrial development, economic growth and social change which substantially altered the forms and structures within its territory and contributed to increase ethnic, linguistic and cultural pluralities among the population living within the Catalonia's land.

At the end of Franco's regime the attempt at building a new

democratic Spanish state capable of winning wide social support had to cope with a series of circumstances shaped by history. Among these was the deep ~~desires~~ feeling by large fractions of Catalan -and Basque- society of having a distinct collective personality expressed through a will for political autonomy; and, also, a series of objective ties to Spanish unity tighter than those which at other historical periods had been insufficient to carry out fully any of several attempts at building a modern Spanish state.

Though counting with strong Catalan participation and initial impulse while in the making, the Constitution of 1978 devised a Spanish state which, on the one hand, sets up a general and homogeneous system for autonomous regional government and, on the other, acknowledges a diversity of autonomous rights and competences. Thus the oneness of the state does not incompatible with the expression of the in diverser Plurality lands and, consequently, with the self-government by the several different peoples of Spain.

What this Catalan contribution promoted in the political arrangement found in the Constitution was not a shift of hegemonism from the traditional center to the periphery, but an extension of the Catalan desire for their own autonomy to the remaining peoples of Spain. This proposal cleared the way for a new form of state.

It seems logical to think that the scope of this project should cover the creation of a new feeling of solidarity among the diversity of peoples and a new desire shared to live together within the frame of a new state representing a new concept of a plural Spain which would be, as has sometimes been said, "a nation of nations".



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PERIPHERALITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:

THE CASE OF PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN

by

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### Peripherality

According to two recent writers (Rokkan and Urwin 1983), the concept of peripherality can be analysed along two dimensions. 'Horizontal' peripherality refers to the geographical distance, economic backwardness, and political marginality of a given region in relation to the 'centre'. 'Vertical' peripherality refers to groups who have the least influence, irrespective of where they are placed spatially, on the central decision-making structures. Thus vertical peripherality denotes those groups, whether or not they be distant from the centre, who lack influence on the state's political and economic 'core'. These two dimensions of peripherality interact so that, within the geographical periphery, there are wide variations among groups with respect to their ability to constrain, or command attention from, the central authorities. Likewise, at the centre, there may exist groups (one thinks of West Indian communities in London), whose impact on central policy-making is noticeably less incisive than some other groups.

Rokkan and Urwin (1983) identify the three characteristics of peripherality as being distance, difference, and dependence:

A periphery is located at some distance from the dominant centre or centres, and its transactions with the latter are fraught with costs. A periphery is also different from the central areas on one or more scores: while the degree of disynctiveness will vary, being to some extent a function of distance and dependence, there will invariably be some minimum level and sense of separate identity. Finally, a periphery is dependent upon one or more centres in at least one of the three domains of behaviour mentioned earlier: in political decision-making, in cultural standardisation, and in economic life. Together, the three characteristics of a periphery can interact to generate uncertainty, ambivalence and division within its population. These people are part of a system, yet are marginal to it. (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, 5).

### Northern Ireland

This tripartite characterisation of peripherality offers us a useful framework for a discussion of Northern Ireland as a peripheral region within the United Kingdom. In the first place, the stretch of sea between Ireland and Britain accentuates the geographical isolation of the region as compared with more distant mainland areas. Thus, although Belfast is nearer than Glasgow or Edinburgh to the centre (i.e. London) as the crow flies, communications between the centre and the two Scottish cities more than compensate for their distance from the capital. So, although Northern Ireland is not the most distant region of the United Kingdom, it is certainly the most different. This can be indicated in a number of ways. Historically, it has never been absorbed either culturally or politically into the United Kingdom as effectively as Wales or Scotland. In 1920, it might have departed from the United Kingdom, along with the rest of Ireland, had it not been for the determination of the majority of its inhabitants to remain part of a British state. The result was a messy compromise (a devolved government) which pleased no-one. Catholics felt aggrieved at being trapped within a 'Protestant state'; the Protestants felt aggrieved that their region was being placed 'at one remove' from London; and the British Government felt less than pleased at being unable to offload responsibility for the region onto a government in Dublin. There developed, secondly, a party system within Northern Ireland that has remained quite separate from the party system in the rest of the state. The regional political system has been rooted in the basic constitutional disagreement between most Catholics who want to change the status quo, and most Protestants who want to maintain it.

Since neither 'unionism' nor 'nationalism' in Northern Ireland have any relevance for the wider party system in the United Kingdom ( a system that is broadly based on conflicting socioeconomic interests), and the region has only 17 seats in the United Kingdom Parliament of 650 seats, the politics of the region are clearly 'peripheral' to the politics of the centre. Thirdly, political peripherality is reinforced by cultural distinctiveness and economic marginality. Formal church allegiance is stronger than in most of Western Europe; the school system is segregated along religious lines; and a strong moral ethos pervades legislation regarding such matters as abortion, Sunday drinking, and Sunday observance more generally. The banking system, the legal system, and civil service are all formally separate from (although in practice linked to, and modelled upon) their counterparts in the rest of the United Kingdom.

The region is obviously different and dependent in economic terms. In this context, peripherality has several aspects. The region has a long record of being the least affluent part of the United Kingdom and, even in EEC terms, it is one of the Community's five 'priority regions'. In two key respects, Northern Ireland has been consistently worse off than the rest of the United Kingdom: income per capita and unemployment. In 1978, for example, GDP per capita in the region was 77% of the United Kingdom level, and personal income per head of population was 80% of the national figure. Northern Ireland has been an unemployment 'black spot' for fifty years, and has always been the region with the worst unemployment in the United Kingdom. In the last ten years unemployment rates have jumped in step with rates elsewhere in Western Europe, from 7% in 1975 to 10% in 1977, to 22% today. However, the 'gap' between the regional unemployment rate, and the rate for the United Kingdom has actually narrowed during the same period so that the former is now less than twice the latter for the

first time.

The corollary of this disparity between the region and the state generally is a high level of government spending. This expenditure underlines the dependence of the region, and further emphasises its peripherality. Although the region's population is 2.7% of the United Kingdom's total, government spending in the period 1973-8 in the region averaged 3.4% of the national total. This proportion has generally increased during the past ten years so that public expenditure per capita is now 30% higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom (even allowing for added costs of security). There is a high degree of dependence on social security payments and on public sector employment (higher in both cases than in the rest of the country). The fact that the region takes so much more out of the national economy than it puts in is a further reflection of its peripherality.

The region suffers from a number of disadvantages when it comes to trying to attract foreign investment, or even investment from the 'centre' of the state. Higher unemployment rates are therefore likely to continue. Higher energy costs, distance to the principal markets, a lack of raw materials, and political instability, all conspire to discourage the foreign investor. Emigration from the region, often involving those with technical skills and entrepreneurial talent, further drains the region of one of its greatest assets: its educated workforce.

#### Peripherality within Northern Ireland

Having satisfactorily established, it is hoped, the peripherality of Northern Ireland as a region in the United Kingdom, we now proceed to a discussion of peripherality within Northern Ireland. Again, the two dimensions of peripherality, suggested by Rokkan and Urwin, 'horizontal'



and 'vertical', provide a framework for the analysis. Taking vertical peripherality first we can assess the extent to which the Catholic population remains peripheral to the region's economic and political life. There is a high degree of overlap between religious affiliation and party political identification with the result that the 'minority' parties (being overwhelmingly Catholic) are excluded from political life. The reluctance of the 'majority' (mainly Protestant) parties to countenance any 'partnership' or 'consociational' solution to the region's political dilemma, has alienated the two Catholic parties from the political process. It has been estimated (Moxon-Browne 1983) that 99% of Protestants vote for 'unionist' parties and that the majority of Catholics vote for 'nationalist' parties (i.e. the SDLP and Provisional Sinn Fein). Since 1922, the unionists have steadfastly refused to allow nationalist parties to share meaningfully in regional government on the grounds that, to do so, would lead to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland being undermined. The two Catholic parties are presently boycotting the regional Assembly with the result that they are denied, and are denying themselves, the opportunity of participating in the various committees that scrutinise legislative proposals that are relevant to the region. The peripherality of the Catholic community (about 36% of the population) to the political process is compounded by the peripherality in other key state agencies e.g. the police (with about 12% Catholic representation), the civil service where a recent report showed that 'Roman Catholics are not adequately represented at the key policy-making levels of the Northern Ireland Civil Service' (FEA 1983, 65), and in the judiciary where only 2 judges out of a total of 8 are Catholics.

More crucially, perhaps, much of the Catholic community remains marginal to the region's economic life. Auger has shown that 'there is a marked tendency for Protestants to dominate the upper occupational classes while Catholics are found predominantly in the lower classes' (Cormack and Osborne 1983, 25-41). Auger also found that Catholics are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than Protestants. Catholic men are



Fig.1. Areas in Northern Ireland where Roman Catholics constitute more than 50% of the population.






Fig.2. Unemployment levels in Northern Ireland.

Over 25%   
 Under 11% 

particularly badly affected. They constitute less than 21% of the economically active population, but 44% of the unemployed. Within 'work contexts', Protestants are more likely to be found in supervisory or high status positions than are Catholics. Thus, in the medical sector for example, 21% of doctors are Catholics but 43% of nurses. In education, Catholics have 15% of the administrative jobs, but 39% of those in teaching. The rather high proportion of Catholics in non-manual occupations is attributed by Aunger to the need for the Catholic community to 'service' itself. Thus teachers and clergymen account for one-third of Catholic non-manual occupations while the equivalent figure for the Protestant community is 19%. In a highly segregated society, the existence of a Catholic middle class, whose primary role is to cater to the needs of its own community, does little to mitigate the marginality of Catholics in the economy generally.

'Horizontal' peripherality within Northern Ireland is, to a large extent, a reinforcer of vertical peripherality. This is due to the demographic fact that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is higher in the west of the region than in the east. Thus the core-periphery syndrome affecting the United Kingdom as a whole is reproduced within Northern Ireland. In Fig. 1 the areas of the region that have more than a 50% Catholic population are shown. In Fig. 2 areas of the region having unemployment levels of under 11% and over 25% are shown. Note that the regional 'capital' Belfast is at the heart of the regional 'core' area with unemployment levels that are actually lower than the United Kingdom average while the two areas with very high unemployment are clearly peripheral within our peripheral region.

It can, of course, be argued that as relatively more Catholics live

in the peripheral areas of the region and as unemployment tends to be higher as one moves away from the eastern core (for economic reasons) there is nothing surprising or sinister in the fact that Catholics are more affected by unemployment. Doherty (Boal and Douglas 1982, 236-8) has attempted to disentangle the various factors that might account for relatively greater unemployment among Catholics in Northern Ireland. Is it due, he asks, to their religious affiliation? Is it the mainly unskilled social status of Catholics, or is it the peripheral and rural location of Catholics in Northern Ireland? His conclusion, that social class and geographical location are more important predictors of unemployment opens up the question as to why Catholics predominate in rural, peripheral and unskilled sectors of the economy. When Doherty looks at the city of Belfast he finds a microcosm of the whole Northern Ireland pattern replicated on a small scale. Catholics in the city are concentrated in a wedge-shaped area in the west of the city. High unemployment levels are also found in this area (See Fig.3 and Fig.4). The Belfast case removes geographical peripherality from the list of possible causes of Catholic unemployment. Within the city there is a high correlation between low social status and high unemployment, but religious affiliation now becomes as important as social status. Doherty thus concludes (Boal and Douglas 1982, 242) that there is a 'significant relationship between Roman Catholic religious affiliation and male unemployment, when the effect of... intervening variables is controlled for'. Various studies have attributed this phenomenon to a number of factors: among them Catholic attitudes towards work, lower educational achievement among Catholics, and discrimination. Work by the Fair Employment Agency (FEA 1978, 1978) has removed many of the hypothetical explanations with the result that discrimination against Catholics (both conscious and unconscious, direct and indirect) remains an important factor.




Fig. 3. Belfast: areas where Roman Catholics constitute more than 87% of the population




Fig. 4. Belfast: areas where unemployment is higher than 11.9% of the population.

Thus far, we have discussed Northern Ireland's peripherality within the United Kingdom, and the peripherality of the Catholic community within Northern Ireland. We turn now to consider the political implications of Catholic peripherality in the regional context. As already intimated above, there is a high degree of congruence between religion and party political identification in Northern Ireland. The vast majority of Catholics vote for either the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) or the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) party. A tiny proportion of Catholics vote for the Alliance Party (APNI). The APNI is virtually unique in Northern Ireland in that it attracts equal proportions of Catholic and Protestant voters. However, its impact is marginal in that it polls about 6% - 10% of the total vote in elections. It represents a central strand in the political system; it advocates partnership in government between the two communities; but it belongs to the 'unionist' family of parties inasmuch as it advocates no constitutional change to Northern Ireland's position until a majority wish for such a change. The APNI recipe for Northern Ireland is therefore of a 'consociational' type (Moxon-Browne 1983). In terms of centre-periphery relations it represents the cooperative end of the spectrum. The SDLP is the biggest party on the Catholic side. It represents a mid-point on the continuum between conflict and cooperation in the context of centre-periphery relations. The party advocates not only partnership within the regional government of Northern Ireland but also an 'Irish dimension' i.e. an institutionalised framework for cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. It has one representative in the British Parliament in London, but its members boycott the regional Assembly on the grounds that it is merely consultative, and makes no attempt to incorporate an 'Irish dimension'. The PSF represents the conflictual end of the continuum in core-periphery relations. The party now contests elections but refuses to take its one seat in the London Parliament and its five seats in the regional

Assembly. Its policy is to detach the periphery from the central state by calling for a withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland. Its rationale is that there can be no 'justice' for Catholics (and especially the Catholic working class) until Britain ceases to support a sectarian (i.e. Protestant-dominated) administration in Northern Ireland. As will be shown later the PSF party represents the periphery-within-the-periphery and its opponents are both the British central state and its proxies in Northern Ireland. The political activities of PSF are supplemented by their equivocal attitude towards violence and, as a party, they are seen as the 'political wing' of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In particular they condone attacks on members of the security forces (including the British Army; the locally-recruited and predominantly Protestant regiment, the UDR; and the police) even in the rare cases when these personnel happen to be drawn from the Catholic community.

Within the Catholic community there is an electoral struggle in progress between the two major parties, PSF and the SDLP. In the regional Assembly elections in 1982 the PSF and the SDLP split the Catholic vote 35:65; in the national election (1983) the split was 43:57; but in the European Parliament election (1984) the PSF share fell back slightly to 38%. Much interest therefore focusses on the local government elections in 1985 when the PSF is hoping and aiming to become the majority party within the Catholic community.

The rapid rise of the PSF party dates back to the hunger strikes of 1981. These hunger strikes, staged by IRA prisoners claiming political status resulted in ten deaths. The British Government resolutely refused to make any concessions and this obduracy - the obduracy of the centre in face of a political-symbolic challenge from the periphery - led to the politicisation of a dormant republican (i.e. extreme nationalist) vote. Although most Catholics felt that the hunger strikers were using the wrong methods at the wrong time in the service of the wrong cause, the vast majority became alienated by the

unyielding attitude of the British Government; and there was a widespread feeling in the Catholic community (a feeling that has been slow to dissipate) that the British Government has failed to redress a number of genuine grievances e.g. the conduct of the security forces, the operation of the judicial system, the allocation of jobs and housing, inadequate recognition of Irish national identity. Although the Government viewed the hunger strikes as the IRA 'playing its last card', the leader of the SDLP has correctly retorted that the Government, in fact, had '~~dealt~~ them a full hand which they've been using ever since'. The hunger-strikes therefore acted as a catalyst. Long-simmering frustration, and a feeling that even the non-violent constitutional nationalism of the SFLP was failing to get a response from the British Government, have increased the appeal of the PSF whose ambivalence towards violence, and more forthright condemnations of Britain seem appropriate responses to those who have nothing to lose, and possibly something to gain, by rejecting the status quo.

The ambivalent attitude towards violence adopted by PSF is an important ingredient in its electoral appeal. Although not all PSF voters agree that violence is necessary or desirable, most sympathise with the party's view that the cause of the violence is the presence of British troops and the maintenance of sectarian institutions in the region. If Britain departed, the IRA would vanish overnight, but the contrary case is not so clear: thus runs the argument of Gerry Adams the PSF leader. There is a widespread belief among PSF voters that violence is sometimes justifiable - if for no other reason than the lack of alternative channels for bringing about change.

The intensity of Catholic feelings is all the greater due to the problem of being 'doubly peripheral'. The Catholic community is peripheral within Northern Ireland, and within the United Kingdom - an explosive mixture of vertical and horizontal peripherality. The experience of relative deprivation



along a number of dimensions has resulted in a sense of 'alienation' from central state authority. This alienation is undoubtedly exacerbated by the proximity of a chosen reference group i.e. the Protestant community. Work by several authors has examined the impact of relative deprivation. The basic argument is that frustration results not from absolute levels of dissatisfaction, but relative levels. As we have seen, Aunger has shown the extent to which Catholics are relatively less well off than their Protestant counterparts in employment. Birrell (1972) has shown that, in many respects, Catholics see themselves as less well off than their chosen reference group (Protestants) i.e. in matters like housing, jobs, and political representation. He has extended his investigation to demonstrate that there is some correlation between indices of deprivation and 'high' levels of violence e.g. in border towns like Strabane and Newry (each, incidentally, the worst 'black spots' for unemployment in Northern Ireland). A glance at Fig. 5 shows that areas with a 'high' incidence of violence are characteristic of the peripheral zones of this peripheral region as well as of Belfast where the whole regional pattern is again reproduced in miniature (Boal and Douglas 1982, 318).

An added twist to the intensity of feeling in Northern Ireland, is provided by the feelings of peripherality experienced by the Protestant community in relation to the central state. Core-periphery tensions are less amenable to remedies because of the bifurcated pressure being exerted from the periphery. The subordinate community in the periphery tries to improve its position vis-a-vis the superordinate community at the same time as the superordinate community not only tries to prevent this but is trying to improve its own position vis-a-vis the centre (Moxon-Browne 1983, 170).

Divided identity in the periphery is, according to Rokkan and Urwin, likely to add to its problems:

The stance of the centre seems to be less important than the structure of the periphery. While it might be argued that the intransigence by London and Madrid contributes to the high level of violence in the Basque provinces and Northern Ireland, the one major common problem relates to the divided nature of the provinces. (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, 150).

#### Provisional Sinn Fein : a portrait

We now focus on the political party that is most peripheral in the United Kingdom. What is the nature of its support ? Why do voters choose it in preference to the SDLP ? In which parts of Northern Ireland is support for PSF strongest ? How do Sinn Fein supporters view the use of violence as a tactic ?

The geographical areas where the support for PSF is strongest are shown in Fig. 6. Here we can see that, on the basis of the 1983 general election results, the party's greatest strength lay in the west of the region, and in the west of the city of Belfast, areas that we have shown already to be ethnically most Catholic and economically most peripheral in terms of a major indicator i.e. unemployment. These areas also, as can be seen from a glance at Fig.5, sustain the highest incidence of violence.

The answers to our other questions about PSF can be obtained from an opinion survey carried out by MORI in June 1984 (shortly after the European Parliament election). Comparisons with the SDLP are instructive. PSF is a young party and it is also firmly based among working class voters. According to the MORI survey, 50% of PSF support comes from Catholics under 34, whereas only 29% of the SDLP support comes from the same age group. One fifth of PSF support comes from non-manual socioeconomic groups, while one-third of SDLP support does. 31% of PSF supporters are unemployed but only 13% of

Fig. 5. Areas in Northern Ireland with a 'high' level of violence.





Fig.6. Areas of Northern Ireland (and Belfast) where support for Provisional Sinn Fein is over 20% (1983 general election).



SDLP supporters. Asked what the cause of the Northern Ireland problem is, PSF supporters are more likely to see it as a clash of national identity, and less likely to see it as a problem of 'terrorism' than are SDLP supporters. On the key question of how well the centre has handled the problems of the periphery, both Catholic parties claim to be dissatisfied, but the dissatisfaction is much stronger among PSF voters. Asked why they support their party, SDLP voters tend to mention 'good policies', 'good leaders' and 'the hope of a solution to the troubles'. PSF voters faced with the same question about their party responded most strongly (84%) for the idea that the party 'makes the British take notice of the views of the nationalists'. On the crucially contrasting factor between the two parties, the justification of violence for political objectives, SDLP voters are much less prone to support the use of violence than PSF voters. 70% of PSF voters believe that 'violence can sometimes be justified to bring about political change' (SDLP voters 7%) and 29% of PSF voters 'strongly agree' with this proposition (SDLP 1%).

What these attitudes suggest is that both parties are rooted in the peripheral political culture of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The disillusionment with the centre's handling of the region's problems evidenced in the PSF, and the readiness of the party to condone the use of violence for political objectives, indicate the difficulty that the central authorities have in responding adequately to the demands of the periphery in this case. The SDLP, itself a party of the periphery, has been forced to be more extreme than it was formerly, and less open to compromise than its instincts would naturally lead it. On its flank, it is being challenged to resist the attempts of the centre to accommodate group demands so that territorial concessions - the ultimate concession being a united Ireland - become irrelevant.

### The central response

In this final section, we examine the response of the central state authorities to the challenge from the periphery. This response can be categorised under three headings: economic, political and security. Under the heading of the economic response, we can point to the large amount of public money that the British Government has channelled towards such areas as job creation, job maintenance, infrastructural improvements, housing, and the subsidisation of energy costs.

In the political field, the Government has attempted to construct a framework within which devolved government could be revived in Northern Ireland on a basis acceptable to both Catholic and Protestant: something which has not yet been achieved. The brief power-sharing experiment in 1974 lasted five months but was eventually wrecked by Loyalist (i.e. extreme Protestant) reactions to the proposed North-South Council of Ireland which would have been seen by them as weakening the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The current 78-man Assembly in Belfast is simply the latest experiment. Its role is purely advisory and consultative and the intention is that powers should be devolved to only when there is trans-community agreement to this. At the moment this seems very unlikely as the two main Catholic parties, the SDLP and the PSF, are boycotting the Assembly on the grounds that it does not include an 'Irish dimension' or even any real acknowledgement of 'Irish national identity' among Catholics in Northern Ireland. As a mechanism for reconciling the centre and the periphery, the Assembly looks ill-fated. The introduction of proportional representation in local elections in Northern Ireland in 1973 (an innovation in the United Kingdom) was intended to enhance the influence of the minority in political affairs and strengthen the moderate centre elements in both communities. While the former goal has been partly achieved, the latter appears not to have been.

Instead, the two confessional blocs have split and extremist elements in each community now have a party to themselves: the Democratic Unionists on the Protestant side, and the PSF on the Catholic side. The opportunities for compromise between the two more moderate parties (the Protestant Official Unionists and the Catholic SDLP) are now reduced since each party has to look over its shoulder at the more militant policies of the party on its flank.

Security policy has succeeded in its primary aim: the reduction of violence. In 1972 over 400 people died in the region; now the annual total is less than 100. However, the cost in terms of alienating the Catholic community has been high. Special legislation allowing the police to interrogate suspects for weeks without charging them; the long periods of remand (in some cases a year or two); the abolition of juries for most terrorist offences; the use of 'informers' to incriminate suspects on a grand scale; the apparent immunity from conviction of soldiers or policemen who kill civilians; and the overwhelmingly Protestant composition of the security forces: all these features of security policy have conspired to minimise the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Catholic community. The policy of 'Ulsterisation' - the policy whereby the British Army is being reduced in numbers while locally recruited soldiers and police fill the gap - has done little to allay fears in the Catholic community that law and order will not be administered in an impartial manner. The policy of 'criminalisation' - whereby terrorist offences are deemed to be criminal rather than politically-motivated - has many practical benefits in terms of de-legitimising the acts of the terrorist but the acts, nevertheless, are widely seen as politically-

motivated.

As far as specific policies towards PSF are concerned, the central government appears to be following a 'twin-track' policy of (a) ostracism and (b) trying to drive a wedge between the SDLP and PSF. Some PSF leaders have been banned from entering the mainland United Kingdom despite the fact that one of them, Gerry Adams, has been elected a member of the British Parliament at Westminster. Within Northern Ireland, Ministers have, on occasion refused to receive delegations of elected politicians if PSF members are among the group. The rationale for this policy is the refusal of PSF to condemn acts of violence by the IRA. The purpose of the policy is to bolster the legitimacy of the SDLP - a party that opposes violence. Except for one or two small gestures (the financing of an Irish speaking school in West Belfast, and a blind eye turned to the flying of the Irish flag in some strongly nationalist areas), the Government has done little to give expression to its declared policy of recognising 'Irish national identity' within Northern Ireland. Certainly, not enough has been done to satisfy SDLP expectations in the political, cultural, judicial, or security arenas; and it follows from that <sup>that</sup> the more militant PSF is distinctly unimpressed.

Interestingly, however, the PSF makes full use of the mechanisms of the central state. PSF 'advice centres' have flourished in their task of helping PSF supporters to exploit to the full the social security system, and the bureaucracy that allocates housing. Full participation in the electoral system and participation in local government (but not in the regional assembly or United Kingdom Parliament) has meant a big campaign to register voters in areas where, formerly, apathy, alienation and abstentionism were the order of the day.

Rokkan and Urwin conclude that the centre has two extreme political responses - to accept secession by a periphery or to resist it totally. In practice, in Northern Ireland, neither solution is practical. The peripherality of the Catholic community is only partly a territorial peripherality; and total

suppression of demands is too costly a course to take. In practice, the Government tries to accommodate conflicting demands by defusing them within the present boundaries (Rekkan and Urwin 1983, 179). In the awkward choice between accommodating either groups or territory, Britain is caught in a dilemma, since neither option is a panacea. On the contrary, the divided nature of the periphery makes politics a zero-sum game. Concessions to one side are seen as defeat for the other side. The only policy that is likely to succeed is for the central state to recognise in symbolic and practical ways the divided character of the region's cultural and political ethos. Paradoxically, perhaps, tying the periphery to the centre may not necessarily be the worst way of ensuring that the ethnic divisions within the periphery are given full recognition.

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The Increasing Saliience of the  
Centre-Periphery Dimension in  
the Federal Republic of Austria

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## INTRODUCTION

On the 10th of September 1979, in Vorarlberg, the westernmost of Austria's nine "Lander", the launch took place of a group known as the "Pro-Vorarlberg Movement", which presented to the parliament of the Land a petition for a popular referendum. The question to be posed in this referendum was whether or not the voters of the Land wanted their government to undertake negotiations with the Federal Government in Vienna with a view to achieving for Vorarlberg a special statute giving it greater autonomy within the federal state. The referendum eventually took place on the 15th of June 1980 and on a turnout of 91% a total of 69.3% voted in favour of the proposal.

On the 17th of November 1979, in the Tyrolean capital city of Innsbruck, the first draft of a petition was presented to the public by a group calling itself "Pro-Tirol: Fur ein Osterreich der Bundeslander". It too called for a referendum to be held on whether or not the Land should fight for greater local autonomy for all Austria's Lander<sup>2)</sup>. To this end, signatures were being collected. However, it soon transpired that the Tyrolean constitution made no provision for such a referendum and so Pro-Tirol re-worked their submission into a second draft. This was presented to the Tyrolean Landtag two days before the Vorarlberg referendum and called upon the Landtag to pass a resolution instructing the Land Government to enter into negotiations with the Federal Government with a view to substantially altering the power relations within the federation in favour of the Lander.

Elsewhere, this author has examined in some detail the content of these petitions and their impact upon the Austrian political system. For our purposes it will suffice to note that both petitions were fashioned around the key principle of subsidiarity<sup>3)</sup> and that the effects upon the federal political system have been tangible, albeit as yet limited. The aim of this paper is not to examine these two movements of peripheral protest themselves, but to focus instead upon a number of the most important factors which have contributed to reviving centre-periphery conflict in Austria. We shall look at the relevance of the state-building processes, the significance of the geographical location of Vorarlberg and Tyrol as well as at important economic developments. Thereafter, the paper will discuss the socio-political dimension and the party system. In the final section some tentative explanations

will be offered as to the timing and nature of the mobilization of the movements of peripheral protest outlined above.

#### STATE BUILDING

As a number of scholars have demonstrated,<sup>4)</sup> an examination of the processes of state-building can be very informative regarding the sources and nature of contemporary political cleavages. This is certainly true for Austria, which can be said to have undergone state-building (or re-building) on two occasions in the twentieth century, namely in 1918/20 and 1945<sup>5)</sup>.

Before proceeding to consider these periods, it might be useful to recall briefly some of the events of the nineteenth and early twentieth century which were instrumental in shaping Tyrol and Vorarlberg's self perception. The first of these were the 1809 uprisings against Bavarian occupation. Though the initial successes of the uprisings proved to be ephemeral in both Lander, the struggles provided symbols of their resistance to arbitrary external rule. To this day Andreas Hofer, leader of the Tyrolean uprising, is venerated as the epitome of Tyrol's independent spirit.

Though it was returned to Austria in 1814, Vorarlberg's fate was hardly that which it expected, being subordinated in 1849 to the Imperial Governor of adjacent Tyrol. Though it eventually received its Landtag back in 1861, the latter's demand in 1871 that Vorarlberg be accorded a status within the Empire analogous to that of Hungary,<sup>6)</sup> fell on deaf ears. During the last fifty or so years of the Monarchy, both Tyrol and Vorarlberg were vociferous advocates of a decrease of centre power. While the other German-speaking Crown Lander supported centralization of power in Vienna, Vorarlberg and Tyrol sided with the transleithanian Lands of the Empire in their demands for a federal structure.

Bearing these views in mind, it should come as no surprise that during the process of state-building in 1918/20 Tyrol and Vorarlberg were, to say the least, unwilling participants in the establishment of the German-Austrian state. Though not alone in doubting the viability of the proposed state, Vorarlberg and Tyrol were distinctive in the extent to which they actively pursued alternative options. For its part, Vorarlberg was engaged in serious negotiations aimed at joining the Swiss Confederation.

The arguments advanced in favour of this "Anschluss" were couched in terms of linguistic, cultural and geographical proximity to the Swiss, but there can be little doubt that one of the most attractive, though least articulated, prospective advantages of such a union was avoiding some of the adverse consequences of military defeat. Meanwhile, Tyrol was one of only two extant Lander to decline the invitation to write a letter of accession to German-Austria. Instead, it was weighing up the relative merits of independent statehood as a means of avoiding the loss of South Tyrol, or, as a second best, union with Germany. There was even discussion about the establishment of a clerical state.

Both Lander held a referendum on their proposed alternatives. In May 1918 over 80% of Vorarlbergers voted for incorporation into Switzerland. In May 1921 no less than 98% of the voters in a Tyrolean referendum signalled their desire for an Anschluss with Germany<sup>7)</sup>. Feeling itself in a strong position because of the popular vote, the Vorarlberg Landtag decided in June 1919 to petition the German-Austrian government in Vienna to grant the Land its right of self-determination. In the event, neither land was allowed to do so, since the Allies had decided against permitting the fledgling state to disintegrate.

In October 1918 Austria had been declared a unitary state with a system of unicameral parliamentary sovereignty. Considering events in Tyrol, Vorarlberg and elsewhere, this declaration was little more than a constitutional fiction. De facto power lay, if anywhere, with the Lander. This became evident during 1919 and 1920, when they embarked upon a series of Lander conferences which forced the centre to recognise that to insist upon a unitary state was not credible. The Tyrolean Landtag and Mayr, a Tyrolean member of the National Council, were very active in hammering out a compromise. The 1920 Federal Constitution that emerged was far more centralised than Tyrol or Vorarlberg would have wanted. That it did not satisfy their wishes and that the 1929 reforms reduced the Lander powers further, suggests that the process of state-building was far from perfect.

It is important to remember that the 1920 constitution was designed not only to accommodate territorial groups, but other, albeit to some extent related, issues. These included clerical-anti-clerical, urban-rural and party political cleavages. The constitution failed in this respect also. Street fighting turned into Civil War and the 1934 Standestaat replaced the First Republic. State-building in the absence of even a modicum of national integration had proved futile.

There are some similarities between 1918/20 and the re-building of the Austrian state in 1945. On both occasions the powers which the centre claimed for itself overstated the true extent of its competence. For the government in Vienna to declare itself in possession of sovereign powers throughout the territory of the state was rather meaningless in view of the fact that Austrian soil was divided between the Allies. The territorial authority of the central government was initially only accepted in the Soviet Zone, while in Vorarlberg and Tyrol - located as they were in the relatively advantaged French Zone - the implementation of all decisions was dependent upon French approval. A second factor in common between 1918/20 and 1945, was the existence of resentment between the centre and the two westernmost Lander. Tyrol and Vorarlberg were suspicious of all attempts by the centre to go beyond its powers, as enshrined in the 1929 constitution. Thus the Provisional Tyrolean Land Assembly declared on the 8th October 1945 that it

...and the Tyrolean people, having shaken off the yoke of centralist Prussian absolutism, will never ever permit the Land of Tyrol then to have the yoke of a centralised government imposed upon it<sup>9)</sup>.

Moreover, the fact that the centre was located in the Soviet Zone, from whence Soviet propoganda was regularly broadcast to the west, merely furnished proof, if that were needed, that Vienna was ultra-red. A third factor common to the two periods of state-building was the important role played by the Lander in re-establishing and legitimising the central authority. In fact Penthaler (1979) goes so far as to suggest that on both occasions it was the Lander that created the centre. Finally, on both occasions the state-building process involved both the accommodation of territorial units (via the federal structure) and of the two main "Lager". In 1945 these two groups were entrenched into the system by means of the "Proporz", which was launched at the Lander conference.

There were of course differences between 1918/20 and 1945. While on the former occasion Vorarlberg and Tyrol were seeking futures outside Austria, in 1945 there was a widespread commitment to reverting to the 1929 constitution. This suggests a second and significant difference, namely that in 1945 Austria was a last witnessing the beginnings of the national integration it so patently lacked during the First Republic<sup>10)</sup>.

When seeking to identify some of the main implications for centre-periphery relations in contemporary Austria of the state-building processes discussed above, we believe that two matters must be remembered. First, the Austrian federal system was established in response to significant differences between the Lander and between them and the centre. Just because territoriality appeared not to be the prime divisive factor during the First Republic does not mean that territorial differentiation has not been important; it has. Furthermore, merely because territorial divisions have been relatively absent for most of the Second Republic, again does not indicate either that there are no such cleavages, nor that such clearages will never emerge. A second and related fact that the state-building process shows is that the federal "contract" in Austria was on both occasions territorial and party-political.

Until at least the mid 1960's the Proporz structure rather than the territorial structure was the vehicle for the articulation of demands within the system. However, as the Proporz decreases in terms of its significance for conflict resolution, one might well witness increasing emphasis upon the articulation of anti-centre sentiments through the territorial structures.

We shall return to this issue later in this paper. At this juncture we shall, however, proceed to consider in what way the geographical location of Vorarlberg and Tyrol might have influenced their perception of the centre.

#### GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

A glance at Figure one will show how remote from Vienna Tyrol and especially Vorarlberg are. Vienna is further from Bregenz in mileage terms than Bonn and only fractionally nearer than Brussels or Paris. Approximately 80% of Vorarlberg's border is shared with Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Germany, while both Vorarlberg's road and rail links with these foreign states are better than those which traverse the Arlberg mountains, connecting her with the rest of Austria. In fact the Arlberg road tunnel, built to ensure continuous communication throughout the winter months, was opened only as late as 1978. Accordingly, Zurich and Ulm are both closer to Bregenz in terms of travelling time than even Innsbruck, let alone Vienna. For its part, Tyrol also boasts

a high percentage of foreign border and lies astride one of Europe's major north-south transit routes: the motorway from Germany via Kufstein and the Brenner into Italy. Travellers from Innsbruck to Lienz (East Tyrol) are thus more likely to elect to journey through Italy than via Salzburg.

There is more to Vorarlberg and Tyrol's relationship with the foreign states with whom they share their borders than mere geographical proximity. An inspection of Table 3 shows that the commuting patterns in Tyrol - and especially in Vorarlberg - are significantly different from those of Austria's other Lander. Tyrol and Vorarlberg have the lowest relative number of workers who cross into other Lander to go to work. Conversely, however, their figures for commuters travelling abroad to work are the highest. A full 8% of the Vorarlberg workforce travels abroad to work, while Tyrol has the next highest percentage, namely 2.6.

The extent to which the two Lander look out beyond Austria is demonstrated by their membership of the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Alpenlander" (Arge-Alp), established in Tyrol in 1972. The Austrian participants are Vorarlberg, Tyrol and Salzburg; the Italian members are South Tyrol, Trentino and Lombardy, while Germany and Switzerland are represented by Bavaria and Graubunden respectively. All the members, with the exception of Lombardy, have conservative governments and even Lombardy was governed by conservatives when the Arge-Alp was founded. Apart from political interests, the members have regional/economic interests in common and it was in order to foster cross-border co-operation within these spheres that the association was set up. For Tyrol there is of course the additional attraction of improving communication with its former fellow countrymen in South Tyrol. It has in fact been suggested that contacts between the two Tyrols have been more intense than those between Austrian Tyrol and Vienna<sup>12)</sup>. Interestingly, the text of the Pro-Tyrol movement, unlike that of Pro-Vorarlberg, lays emphasis upon regionalism, arguing that Europe is much more likely to develop into an association of equal regions, rather than a United States of Europe. One can speculate that these ideas were influenced by the attractiveness for the signatories of a re-united Tyrol<sup>13)</sup>.



### ECONOMIC FACTORS

Figure 2 depicts the changes since 1955 in three of the major indicators of Austria's national economy. That the rate of unemployment was relatively low in the ten years preceding the launch of Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol in 1979 is a reflection of the fact that successive post-war Austrian governments have adopted Keynesian policies of employment protection<sup>14)</sup>. Though rates of economic growth in Austria have been much higher than in many other industrialized western countries, the period from 1970 to 1979 (with the exception of 1976 and 1977) witnessed a general decline in growth. Meanwhile, the level of inflation soared in the mid 1970's to levels unheard of since the reconstruction period of the late 1940's and early 1950's<sup>15)</sup>.

It is, however, necessary to examine not only these national statistics, but also to look at returns for the individual Lander in order to appreciate the Vorarlberg and Tyrolean perceptions of economic trends. As Table 2 shows, the populations of Tyrol and especially of Vorarlberg have grown tremendously during the second Republic, both in absolute terms and relative to the Austrian total. With the exception of Vienna, Vorarlberg has the smallest primary sector of all Austria's Lander, while Tyrol's location astride a major European transport artery and its appeal to tourists contribute to making it the Land with the largest tertiary sector (56.7%). Within the Tyrolean economy the following industries are the largest employers: trade and warehousing (14.3%), building and construction (13.2%), transport and communication (12.2%) business services (10.5%) and hotels and catering (9.8%). Together they employ 60% of the Tyrolean labour force<sup>16)</sup>. A further breakdown of the distribution of employment in Vorarlberg reveals the importance of metal and textiles, which employ 16% and 14.3% (i.e. a total of just over 30%) of the workforce in the Land<sup>17)</sup>. The metal industry is a large-scale employer in other Lander, notably in Styria and Upper Austria, where it accounts for 19.2% and 22% of the respective labour forces. However, there is one very important difference between these metal industries. While that of Vorarlberg is a light industry, those of Upper Austria and especially of Styria are heavy industries. A greater proportion of employment in these Lander is in nationalized industries. As the world market has slumped, the Federal Government has responded with Keynesian techniques geared towards the maintenance of employment. This has meant large-scale subsidies, which have been resented by Vorarlberg and Tyrol.

There were at least two other ways in which the increased economic growth was felt by some in Vorarlberg to have had undesirable consequences. The first of these was the environmental impact of greater industrialization and the concomitant population increase. Concern with environmental pollution is especially high in Vorarlberg, where in one survey, 11% of respondents cited this issue as the most important then facing Austrian politics. Some 13% gave it as the second most important issue<sup>18)</sup>.

At the national referendum in November 1978 on whether or not the nuclear plant at "Zwentdorf" should be put on stream, the voters of Vorarlberg and Tyrol proved to be the most opposed, with 84% and 66% respectively voting against the plant<sup>19)</sup>. This sympathy for "Green" issues in Vorarlberg was demonstrated once more in the 1983 General Election, when the Austrian Green and Alternative Parties received their largest relative vote in that Land<sup>20)</sup>.

It was, however, not merely the numerical increase in the populations of Vorarlberg and Tyrol that was a cause of concern, but also the fact that a large proportion of the new residents were "Gastarbeiter" (foreign workers). Dr Grabherr, the key figure in Pro-Vorarlberg, has argued that the "excessive" immigration had led not only to overpopulation, but to an overforeignization ("Überfremdung") which would be aggravated by the foreigners' propensity to bear more children<sup>21)</sup>. Grabherr's claim that, relatively speaking, Vorarlberg had the largest number of foreign workers, is substantiated by Leitner, (in Steiner 1974, 75ff) who says that in the peak year of 1973 Austria had approximately 205,000 foreign workers, mainly of Yugoslavian and Turkish extraction, and that this constituted some 8.7% of the total labour force. However, it is also important to be aware of the geographical distribution of these workers. Although Vienna had the largest number, they only amounted to 12% of the Viennese workforce. In Vorarlberg they constituted a staggering 23%, while in Tyrol they made up 9.1% of the total number of persons employed. Though there has been a considerable decrease in the number of foreign workers since, (Leitner gives a total figure of 158,800 for 1978), Vorarlberg still has quite a high concentration, as is suggested in Table 4, which shows that in 1981 the Land had the highest relative number of followers of Islam.

This brings us to another aspect of the economic situation which helps explain the emergence of peripheral protest in Vorarlberg and Tyrol, namely regional disparities in economic growth. According to Wohlschlagl, during the period from 1955 to 1977 the contribution of the eastern Lander of Vienna, Lower Austria, Burgenland and Styria to Austrian GNP decreased from 65.9 to 59.2%, while that of Tyrol and Vorarlberg increased from 13.2% to 17.9%<sup>18)</sup>. The significance of these changes may briefly be summed up as follows: while the economies of Vorarlberg and Tyrol were making increasingly important contributions to the nation's wealth, the two Lander felt that their political influence had not witnessed a commensurate increase, but had in fact declined. For some in Vorarlberg and Tyrol who were later to be active in Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol, it was clear that only greater control by the Lander of their own resources could stop what they saw as the distant Viennese bureaucracy's expropriation of the Lander's hard-earned money. These monies were in their opinion being squandered in the subsidy of outdated industries and the construction of prestige projects in Vienna<sup>19)</sup>.

### SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

Thus far, this paper has attempted to show that Vorarlberg and Tyrol do indeed have distinctive identities within the Austrian state and that these identities are in part a consequence of their experiences during the processes of state-building, their geographical location and some concomitant international loyalties, as well as their different economic situation. The means by which the two Lander have attempted to press their case viz-a-viz the centre will be discussed later in the paper. Our intention at this stage is to elude to a number of other matters which we feel to have been important in furthering - or at least in manifesting - Vorarlberg and Tyrol's self-identity<sup>22)</sup>.

The cartoon on the cover of this paper captures very succinctly the belief, widely held in Austria, that the further west one travels in the country, the greater is the degree of discontent with the centre. It therefore came as a considerable surprise to many observers when an article in 1977 suggested anti-centre sentiments were stronger in Burgenland than in either Tyrol or Vorarlberg<sup>23)</sup>. A 1973 opinion survey (IFES, op cit) produced a series of at times apparently contradictory responses, the interpretation of which is rather difficult. Thus when asked how important they felt it was for the Lander to have their own governments, Burgenland and Carinthian respondents were more inclined to say it was very important (79 and 72% respectively) than respondents from Tyrol and Vorarlberg, of whom only 66% and 63% gave the same answer. When asked for their opinion on how important it was for each Land to be able to protect its own distinctive characteristics such as dialects, popular art, customs and music, the responses were different. 84% of Carinthians felt this to be very important, followed by 80%, 79% and 67% of the respondents of Vorarlberg, Salzburg and Tyrol respectively. The main consistency in the studies of Engelmann and the IFES is the negative conclusion that respondents from Vienna, Upper Austria and Lower Austria usually express greater attachment to the centre and are less convinced of the importance of their own Land governments.

The greater importance which the people of Tyrol and Vorarlberg attach to their Land Governments is a reflection of their belief that the Lander do have indigenous qualities worth preserving. In Vorarlberg, reference is often made to the fact that the native population is not of the same ethnic or "Stamm" origin as the Austrians east of the Arlberg, who are mainly of Bavarian extraction. Instead, the Vorarlbergers are of Allemanic stock,

a factor which certainly helps account for a distinctive dialect that has much in common with Swiss German. Many Vorarlbergers would go further and claim that this different ethnic background explains why they are, in contrast to many other Austrians, industrious and clean-living. Within both Lander there are attempts to project an image of pastoral, alpine provinces full of rustic virtues. While such portrayals are obviously advantageous for the tourist industry, they are hardly accurate, especially in respect of highly industrialised Vorarlberg, whose population density is second only to Vienna (see Table 1). One can speculate, however, about the extent to which these images, initially created primarily for external consumption, have become internalised by the Vorarlbergers and Tyroleans themselves<sup>24)</sup>. There are, however, less speculative and more tangible aspects of Tyrolean and Vorarlberg culture to which reference must be made. One of the most important of these relates to the nature and role of religion. For historical reasons, it is not at all surprising that the religious denomination of the overwhelming majority of Austrians is Roman Catholic. But even in this respect there are regional differences. While Tyrol has the largest percentage of Roman Catholics (91%), Vienna has the lowest, with a mere 71%. Probably at least as significant are the figures for persons with no denominational affiliation. More than twice as large a proportion of Viennese (13.5%) come under this rubric than is the case in any other Land<sup>25)</sup>. Conversely, with the exception of Burgenland, Vorarlberg and Tyrol have the lowest percentage of such persons (1.6% and 2.2% respectively). The proportion of persons of Islamic faith in Vorarlberg is over four times the national average, something no doubt due to the large number of foreign workers. If one disregards "Islamics" and "Others", then the Roman Catholics in Tyrol amount to 93% and in Vorarlberg to 92% of the population.

Details of denomination are notoriously poor indicators of the impact of religion. Table 5 is a useful adjunct, since its measurement of church attendance allows us to draw some conclusions about religiosity in the various Lander. The table shows the highest rates of church attendance to be in Burgenland, Vorarlberg and Tyrol, while the lowest are in Vienna. Non-attendance is - like the above mentioned absence of denominational affiliation - also an important factor. Here we see that a mere 1% of Vorarlbergers and only 7% of Tyroleans said that they never went to church. These figures are substantially lower than all the other Lander bar Burgenland, while a full 49% of Viennese respondents either declined to answer or said they never attended church.

Catholicism can be shown to have effected political matters in Vorarlberg and Tyrol in a number of ways. First, social catholicism has influenced labour relations in both Lander, being one of the main reasons why trade unionism is relatively weak<sup>25)</sup> and why the Chambers of Labour in Vorarlberg and Tyrol are the only ones in the whole of Austria in which the Christian Democratic "Osterreichische Volkspartei" (OVP) has been able to dominate<sup>26)</sup>. Second, the response of Vorarlberg and Tyrolean citizens to a number of specific issues shows the widespread acceptance of certain Catholic beliefs. In 1975, for example, a petition against the Austrian Socialist Party's (SPO) law liberalizing abortion received 32.7% of all its signatures from Vorarlberg and 31.8% from Tyrol<sup>27)</sup>. A third and institutionalized expression of the influence of Catholic values has been the OVP itself. It would exceed the scope of this paper to examine in detail the political ideology of the party. Sufficeth to say that it is permeated by Catholic social theory and the latter's key principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and personalism<sup>28)</sup>. Also worthy of note is the very decentralised nature of the OVP, which allows the Land parties a latitude which the Vorarlberg and Tyrol parties regularly avail themselves

The hegemony of the OVP in the two westernmost Lander can be surmised from Tables six and seven. These show that the local party systems have, throughout the whole of the Second Republic, been dominated by the OVP. Yet, in accordance with the Austrian principle of Proporz, the SPO has until recently consistently been represented in the Land Governments. While this practice has continued in Tyrol, the absence from its Land Government of the SPO since 1974, makes Vorarlberg unique in Austria and perhaps indicates the assumption of a more assertive, conflictual style. The ramifications of the SPO exclusion upon the reception of the Pro-Vorarlberg Movement are interesting. For while a Proporz government in Tyrol was able to adopt the Pro-Tirol petition with relatively little party political conflict, that was not so in Vorarlberg. In the latter case the Pro-Vorarlberg Movement was regarded by the local SPO as but a thinly veiled OVP proxy intended to promote the party's prospects at the forthcoming Landtag election in particular and its longstanding campaign for federal reform in general<sup>29)</sup>.

One response of the left in Vorarlberg was to set up, as a counter to Pro-Vorarlberg, a group that called itself Pro-Austria. It attacked Pro-Vorarlberg for being particularist, racist, inimical to the unity and general welfare of the Austrian nation and for its elitist origins<sup>30)</sup>.

### THE PARTY SYSTEM

What these events tell us is how important the party political dimension is for an appreciation of the self-identity of and tensions within the two Lander. However, from a centre-periphery perspective, it is the symmetry or asymmetry of the local and national party systems and loyalties that provides an essential clue to understanding the conflict between Vorarlberg and Tyrol on the one hand and the centre on the other. One means of examining the degree of symmetry is by dichotomising voting behaviour into socialist and non-socialist. Figure 3 does this in respect of all National Council elections since 1919, and depicts graphically the disparity between the levels of non-socialist voting in Tyrol and Vorarlberg and those in Austria as a whole. Examination of the diagram shows that the extremely high values in Tyrol and Vorarlberg during the First Republic have, with the exception of Vorarlberg's 1949 value, not been repeated. Up until the mid 1970's there had in fact been a general decline in non-socialist voting that, roughly speaking, paralleled the national trend. However, the returns since 1979 tell a different story. The rise at the 1979 National Council election of non-socialist voting in Vorarlberg transpired at a time when the national trend was the reverse, and though the national value for non-socialist voting moved in an upward direction in 1983, it did so by a mere three points, while the Vorarlberg increase at the same election was eight points<sup>31)</sup>.

Since the object of the comparison is to highlight the disparity in voter alignments and not merely absolute levels of non-socialist voting, reference to Figure 4 should prove interesting. This graph illustrates the changes in the disparity between the returns in Vorarlberg and Tyrol and those nationwide. At least three points need to be made. First, Vorarlberg has, with the exception of 1920 and 1945, consistently demonstrated a higher degree of deviation from the all-Austrian levels than Tyrol.

Indeed, at times the differences have been huge (e.g. 53 points in 1923). Second, the Second Republic peaks of 1945-53, 1966 and 1979-83 coincide respectively with the time of greatest propaganda output by the Soviet Occupation Forces in Vienna, with the election immediately following the "Fussach" incident<sup>32)</sup> and with the elections either side of the launching

of the Pro-Vorarlberg Movement. Third, while the graph shows the disparity between non-socialist voting in Tyrol and Vorarlberg and nationwide returns, this does not tell the full story, for the centre is not seen in terms of an arithmetic average for the whole of Austria. Instead, it is usually equated with the city - "Land" of Vienna. Since the latter has always been a bastion of SPO support, Vorarlberg and Tyrol's perceptions of their distance from the centre are even greater than these diagrams would suggest. An alternative way of identifying the centre has been to see it as synonymous with the Federal Government and/or its bureaucracy. Since they are both located in Vienna, they are susceptible to being labelled guilty by association. However, the extent of Tyrol and Vorarlberg's hostility has been substantially influenced by considerations of the party-political composition of the government. In short, as soon as the OVP was no longer represented in the Federal Government an important factor mitigating the dissonance between the centre the westernmost Lander was removed, resulting over time in a considerable increase in tension.



THE MOBILIZATION OF PERIPHERAL DISCONTENT

In this paper, we have so far identified a range of factors that have contributed to Vorarlberg and Tyrol's perceptions of having interests distinct from - and often in direct conflict with - those of the centre. The importance of the processes of state-building have been mentioned, as have Vorarlberg and Tyrol's enduring economic, ethnic and other ties with communities outside the Austrian state. Under the rubric of economic factors we have endeavoured to show how the growing contribution of Vorarlberg and Tyrol to the G.N.P. has heightened the Lander's sense of political impotence, since they see themselves as powerless to determine how the greater wealth which they have created is spent. This has increased calls for a redistribution of political power from the centre to the Lander in general and to Vorarlberg and Tyrol in particular.

Reference has also been made to environmental pollution and "overforeignization". These two unwelcome fellow travellers of high rates of economic growth are seen as threats by many Vorarlbergers and Tyroleans, including those wishing to portray the Lander as havens of rustic virtues. The importance of Catholicism in Vorarlberg and Tyrol was also stressed. In addition to the effects already outlined above, it is worth noting that Catholic social theory lends itself very well - via the principle of subsidiarity - to arguments favouring limitations upon central powers. It is no coincidence that this principle was to constitute the linchpin of the demands of both Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol. Indeed, Dr. Grabherr told this author that subsidiarity was the crux of the petition and the rest merely detail relating to its application<sup>34)</sup>. In the immediately preceding discussion we focussed upon the way in which centre-periphery incongruence has been paralleled by, or mirrored in, the asymmetry of the party system.

Our intention in this concluding section is to generate some tentative hypotheses as to why it was that the peripheral discontent in Vorarlberg and Tyrol was mobilised in 1979 and why it took the form of the Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol Movements. Within the federal political system of Austria there are, broadly speaking, three formal channels

this meant in the 1970s was that there was an increasing reluctance on the part of the SPÖ to grant the ÖVP its "share" of influential posts in the consociational structure. There was, however, a second and perhaps more fundamental reason why the corporate or consociational channel was increasingly unlikely to be an effective tool to achieve peripheral demands. Put bluntly, consociationalism had more and more come to signify immobilism. It was simply no longer an effective means of conflict resolution, especially because of the very requirement that all agreements be made on the basis of amicable agreement rather than majoritarianism. This problem can be illustrated by reference to Länder demands for federal restructuring. As early as 1956, in the middle of the Grand Coalition period, Vorarlberg and Tyrol had been influential in setting up, via the Landesamtsdirektorenkonferenz, the so-called "Committee of Four" to look into ways of counteracting the increasing centralization of political and economic power in Vienna<sup>36)</sup> It took eight years for the first programme of demands ("Forderungsprogramm") to emerge, six further years for the second draft and another six years until the 1976 version saw the light of day<sup>37)</sup> This inordinate delay in the Länder's attempts to defend themselves against central encroachment demonstrated how useless the corporate channel was for such purposes.

The third possible channel for pressing Länder discontent with the centre was the Bundesrat. In most other federal systems this would be the obvious forum for the constituent units of the federation to air their grievances and to seek redress. But the Austrian Bundesrat has never been an effective vehicle for Länder interests. It has only very limited powers which amount, at best, to a suspensive veto. It is indirectly elected, which helps to make it

through which the peripheral interests of Tyrol and Vorarlberg might have hoped to have influenced the centre. These are the electoral channel, the "corporate" channel and the formal institutional forum for the articulation of Lander interests: the Bundesrat. We shall now consider whether working through these three channels really did offer genuine prospects of resolving the peripheral discontent outlined earlier.

Throughout for the first twenty five years of the Second Republic the electoral channel served the OVP well. For most of this period it dominated Grand Coalition governments and from 1966 to 1970 formed the first single-party administration. Though the powers of the Lander tended to decline during these years, the existence of a Federal Government greatly influenced by their party colleagues, mitigated the anti-centre sentiments of OVP - dominated Vorarlberg and Tyrol. However, the victory of the SPÖ at the National Council elections of 1970 signalled the start of an as yet unbroken period of Socialist government. Since 1970, the electoral channel has therefore not held out much hope as a mechanism for promoting policies more sympathetic to Vorarlberg and Tyrol.

Though the term "corporate channel" can be variously interpreted, what we have in mind here is the whole panoply of public corporations, committees and extra-constitutional bodies that together constitute what has come to be described as the "consociational" system. This would include the extra-constitutional Landesamtsdirektorenkonferenz and the Landeshauptmännerkonferenz<sup>35)</sup>. The application of the principle of Proporz to both the political executive and the wider administrative branches, as well as to nationalized industries, etc., had made this channel more important than the electoral channel. However, at the same time that the OVP was replaced by the SPÖ as the single-party government of the centre, the corporate channel was also becoming less effective a medium for the OVP. There were at least two reasons for this. First, majoritarian principles were slowly coming to replace those of proportionality, a change greatly furthered by the OVP's own decision in 1966 to set up the first one-party administration. What

more of a party-political than a territorial chamber. Moreover, since Länder representation in the Bundesrat is based upon size, Vorarlberg and Tyrol are allowed merely 3 and 5 members respectively out of a total of 65. Partly as a consequence of this political impotence, the Bundesrat is held in very low esteem and is not at all a credible channel even for the effective articulation of peripheral discontent, let alone its resolution.

In sum, there was no realistic prospect of redress of Vorarlberg and Tyrol's grievances against the centre via the main institutional channels. One response to this sense of exclusion from the political system was the attempt to win over public opinion for the cause of reforming power relations within the federation in favour of the Länder. In 1975 the governments of Vorarlberg and Tyrol set up the Institute for Federal Research in Innsbruck, through whose endeavours they aim to increase public knowledge of and sympathy for federalism. The output of the Institute has been prolific, including more than thirty monographs and numerous reports. Publicity has also been sought by means of countless public meetings, conferences and similar events at which the virtues of the Länder and of decentralized decision-making have been stressed. There is no doubt that all this activity made the issue of centre-periphery relations one of the major talking-points in Austrian politics.

Yet though the debate rumbled on, no substantive alterations had taken place in what Tyrol and Vorarlberg continued to regard as their increasingly intolerable subordination to the centre. It was then that the ÖVP lost its third consecutive National Council election. Confronted with no prospect of the ÖVP resuming power at the centre for at least four years and exasperated by the snail-like progress of the Forderungsprogramm, two mutually independent groups formed in Vorarlberg and Tyrol. Out of them came Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol, perhaps the two most visible symptoms of the far greater importance for Austrian politics assumed by the territorial dimension. Pro-Vorarlberg and Pro-Tirol constitute a populist response to the perceived inadequacies of the formal channels of influence as vehicles for the processing of Länder demands. The Movements

were conceived as agents of popular mobilization and - via their proposed referendums - of the legitimization of peripheral protest. The aim was to cut through the immobilism of consociational red-tape, circumvent the formal national electoral channel and to use the popular referendum in order to oblige the Federal Government to act on the demands of the Länder in general and Vorarlberg and Tyrol in particular. Central to the two groups demands was constitutional change to upgrade the Länder's representation in the federal structure. Thus Pro-Tirol placed great emphasis upon enhancing the role of the Bundersrat as a forum for the defence and promotion of Länder interests. One specific proposal was to give the Second Chamber the right to veto National Council decisions. Though the amount of substantive change achieved is limited, there have been some important moves in the direction of upgrading territorial representation in the Austrian political structure<sup>38)</sup>.

We believe that the developments outlined in this paper raise some interesting issues. First, it appears that the perception of Austria as a highly integrated, homogenous society requires modification. We have shown that the Federal Republic of Austria has, since its very inception, had to attempt to reconcile the interests both of its Lager and of its territorial units. While the Federal Republic was designed to mitigate both these cleavages, this was done more by the consociational than the territorial structure. Proportionality having been replaced by majoritarianism and the relevant structures being dominated by the SPÖ, Tyrol and Vorarlberg increasingly came to articulate the merits of territorial representation.

Second, the fact that Austria is a federal state (albeit, as many have argued, one in which territorial representation has traditionally been very weak) has clearly facilitated Tyrol and Vorarlberg's case. It provided the two peripheries with an institutional framework through which they could direct their campaign as well as a specific focus for their reform proposals. Moreover, the principles of federalism which the Länder articulated are intrinsically legitimate in a federal political system. There

is, however, a paradox here and one which those states contemplating federation as a means of resolving centre-periphery conflict might wish to bear in mind. That is that federal systems, once established, by their very nature provide a legitimate defence structure for the peripheral protest which they were often initially created to accommodate and reconcile. This is precisely what Elazar had in mind when he wrote that a federal political structure provides

.... a continuing seminar in governance

.... a constant stream of constitutional questions that require public attention....

[generating] a continuing referendum of first principles<sup>39)</sup>.

It remains to be seen whether a return of the "ÖVP to federal political office will reduce centre-periphery tensions in Austria and bring a halt to demands for territorial reform. It might well be that the momentum achieved by Vorarlberg and Tyrol's "continuing seminar in governance" is now too great to be halted.

21

FOOTNOTES

1. This is a substantially modified version of an earlier paper given at the ECPR in Aarhus, Denmark in April 1982, entitled: "Federalism From the Standpoint of the State Federated: The Case of Vorarlberg, Austria". That paper was redrafted to form the basis of a chapter in Burgess, M. (Ed.) "Comparative Federalism and Federation", Sage, Forthcoming. The cartoon on the title page stems from Die Unabhängige Zeitung für die Universität Innsbruck und Westösterreich, Vol II/6-7, 30.1.1980.
2. Note that the call was for greater autonomy for all Lander. This was done to avoid the charge of particularism levelled against Pro-Vorarlberg. Hence the subtitle: "For on Austria of the Federal Lander". For the text of the petition see the newspaper cited above. The Pro-Vorarlberg petition was printed in the Vorarlberger Nachrichten of 11.9.1979 and is also in 7. Beilage im Jahre 1979 zu den Sitzungen des XXVIII. Vorarlberger Landtages.
3. This principle was stated most explicitly in Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical "Rerum Novarum". Its basic assertion is that what a smaller community is able to perform effectively, a larger collectivity has no right to arrogate to itself. See this author's papers cited above.
4. E.g. Tilly, L. (Ed) (1975) The Formation of National States in Western Europe Princeton; Tivey L (Ed) (1981) The Nation-State. The Formation of Modern Politics, London; Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. (Ed) (1982) The Politics of Territorial Identity, Studies in European Regionalism, London; Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York.
5. We deliberately avoid reference to 1934 and 1938, since the changes that took place then were hardly of the same type. On 1918/20 and 1920 see especially Penthaler, P. (1979) Die Staatsgründungsakte der österreichischen Bundesländer. Eine staatsrechtliche Untersuchung über die Entstehung des Bundesstaates, Vienna, or Altenstetter, C. (1969) Der Federalismus in Österreich, Heidelberg.

- 6. Interview with Dr. Elmar Grabherr, Bregenz 17.7.198.
- 7. On development in Vorarlberg at this time see Witzig, D. (1974) Die Vorarlberger Frage, Basel/stuttgart, or Ender, O. (1952) Vorarlbergs Schweizer-Anschluss Bewegung von 1918 bis 1924, Dornbirn, or Zuderell, I (196) Die Anschlussbewegung Vorarlbergs an die Schweiz 1918-1921, PhD Innsbruck, or Cohen, H. K. (1975) The Vorarlberg Question 1918-1922: Failure of the Movement for Union with Switzerland, PhD Cambridge.  
  
Re: Tyrol see Arbeiter Zeitung of 2.6.1979, "Tiroler 'Anschluss' Versuche".
- 8. Pernthaler (1979), 79) op cit.
- 9. Roughly speaking, this refers to the principle of proportional rather than majoritarian representation in the executive. It has also been extended to include a wide range of non-governmental forums such as public corporations. On "Proporz" and "consociationalism" see for example McRae, K. (ed) (1974) Consociational Democracy. Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, Toronto
- 10. On Austrian national integration see Bluhm, W. T. (1973) Building an Austrian Nation, New Haven
- 12. Interview with Professor Pernthaler, Innsbruck University, 7.7.1981.
- 13. Unfortunately, the author's interview with Pro-Tirol on 16.7.1981 was not able to pursue this potentially very interesting line of speculation.
- 14. For a recent article on economic policy in Austria see Chaloupek, G. (1985). 'The Austrian Parties and the Economic Crisis', in West European Politics, VIII/I, 71-81.
- 15. It is again important to note that although 9.5% is a peak rate which many other western countries would consider low, it was high for Austria.  
Note that Figure 2 does not include details of post 1981, since when there has been a significant decline in inflation, an increase in unemployment and increase in economic growth.



- 23
16. see Wohlschlagl, H. (1981) 'Austria: Landscape and Regional Structure', in Steiner, K. (Ed) Modern Austria, Palo Alto. p72 f.n. 8.
  17. Interview with Dr Grabherr, op. cit and Pro-Tirol, op. cit.
  18. Institut fur empirische Sozialforschung (IFES), (1973) Politologische Studie zur Frage des Federalismus, Vienna. p16f. Respondents from other Lander rated this issue much lower 0-4% on the first and 4-9% on the second question.
  19. Bretschneider, R. (1980) 'Wahlen und Wahler in Osterreich 1978/79' in Kohl, A and Stirnemann, A. (Eds.) Osterreichisches Jahrbuch fur Politik, 1979, Vienna 1980, p6. The next highest opposition came from Salzburg with 56%. Note that to some extent this was also a vote against the SPÖ centre of Luther (1982) op. cit.
  20. 4.65% cf Plasser, F. and Ulram, P. A. 'Die Nationalratswahl 1983...', in Osterreichische Monatshefte, 1983/4, 127-135.
  21. Grabherr, E. (1981) Vorarlberger Land, Bregenz, p53.
  22. Separating dependent from independent or intervening variables is clearly very problematical, especially with regard to the development of peripheral identities. Moreover, it is a problem we do not claim to be able to resolve.\*
  23. Engelmann, F. C. (1977) 'Das osterreichische Bundessystem aus der Sicht der Bevolkerung', in Journal fur Angewandte Sozialforschung, 1-9.
  24. In a very stimulating and controversial little book, Bichsel (1969) has argued that this is precisely what has happened in Switzerland. The Swiss have, he claims, fallen for their own propaoganda. c.f. Des Schweizers Schweiz, Zurich
  25. This is very largely due to large numbers leaving the Roman Catholic Church in response to the declaration in 1927 by the Christian Social Prime Minister and prelate, Ignaz Seipel, that no mercy would be shown to persons convicted of a riot. Thus these figures are often indicative of anti-clerical sentiment.

\* An initial caveat has to be made about the following material: conclusion about Vorarlberg and Tyrolean self-identity and attitudes to the centre are severely hampered by the paucity of relevant data. The few data that do exist are hardly conclusive. One is thus obliged to resort to analyses based not upon quantitative data, but on other sources of information.

26. Of the IFES survey respondents (op cit, p 15), 93% of Vorarlbergers and 86% of Tyroleans said they were not union members.
27. Interview with Pernthaler, op cit
28. Sully, J. (1981) Political Parties and Elections in Austria, London, p165.
29. See Luther (1982) and forthcoming.
30. See Austrian press after 10.9 1979, especially the Wiener Zeitung and Furche.
31. See 9. Beilage im Jahre 1980 zu den Sitzungen des XXVIII. Vorarlberger Landtages.
32. The figures for 1983 exclude the returns for the two "green" parties, which polled a total of 3.29% overall, 4.65 in Vorarlberg and 2.69 in Tyrol. This was done because of difficulties in their location in terms of the socialist/non-socialist dichotomy. Even if their voters had been included on the socialist side of the equation, the overall picture would be little different. The indices of non-socialist voting for Austria as a whole, Tyrol and Vorarlberg would be 3.18, 23.76 and 35.06 respectively, instead of 0.11, 26.45 and 39.71. This would indicate an insignificant decrease in comparison with 1979 of non-socialist voting overall, with an equally miniscule increase in comparison with 1979 of non-socialist voting overall, with an equally miniscule increase in Tyrol's figure, while Vorarlberg's non-socialist voting in 1983 constitutes an increase of 2.76 points.  
The sources of the data for figures 3 and 4 are as follows:  
re: 1919-30 correspondence from Austrian Central Statistical Office. Re: 1945-79 cf Osterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, (Ed) Die Nationalratswahl vom 6 Mai 1979, Vienna 1979, p54, Re: 1983, cf Plasser; F & Ulram, P. 'Die Nationalratswahl 1983: Dokumentation, Analyse und politische Konsequenzen', in Osterreichische Monatshefte, 1983/4, p 130.

- 25
33. On the occasion in 1964 of the christening of a new ship on Vorarlberg's Bodensee coast by an SPÖ Federal Minister, a spontaneous protest forcibly prevented the ship being named Dr. Karl Renner after the SPÖ's famous ex-leader and Prime Minister. Instead, an impromptu ceremony gave the ship the name "Vorarlberg".
  34. Interview previously cited.
  35. The former is the meeting of all the heads of the civil services of the various Länder. The latter is the meeting of all the heads of the Land governments and is thus analogous to the West German Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz. Both meetings are extra-constitutional, but Pro-Tirol advocates their formal incorporation into the constitution as an adjunct to the Bundesrat.
  36. It is perhaps worth noting that the venue for the meeting establishing the Committee was Bregenz and that Vorarlberg's representative was none other than Dr. Elmar Grabherr, who was nearly 13 years later, to play a leading role in Pro-Vorarlberg.
  37. On the Forderungsprogramm see Pernthaler, P. (1980) Das Forderungsprogramm der Bundesländer, Vienna
  38. Since Sinowatz took over in 1983, a Bill has been introduced into the National Council. Its proposal include granting the Landeshauptleute the right to participate in the discussions of the Bundesrat, as well as the important proposal that any legislation seeking to reduce Länder powers be subject to Bundesrat consent. The Bill also includes a reduction in the Federal President's powers to dissolve a Landtag.  
cf. Bundesgesetzblatt No. 74, 22.3 1983.
  39. Elazar, D. J. (Ed)(1979) Federalism and Political Integration, Jerusalem, p44.

TABLE 1

	A		B	C			D
	RESIDENT POPULATION (1981) ABSOLUTE % OF TOTAL		POPULATION DENSITY 1979 PER KM <sup>2</sup>	EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE 1981 (IN %)			UNEMPLOYED 1981 (%)
				I	II	III	
BURGENLAND	269,800	3.57	66.6	14.8	47.3	37.8	2.0
CARINTHIA	536,200	7.09	55.3	12.5	38.7	48.6	4.2
LOWER AUSTRIA	1,428,000	18.89	72.9	15.7	41.1	43.3	2.4
UPPER AUSTRIA	1,270,000	16.80	103.7	15.0	51.8	33.1	2.2
SALZBURG	442,000	5.85	60.4	10.8	33.8	55.5	3.1
STYRIA	1,187,000	15.71	72.3	16.5	45.7	37.7	2.9
TYROL	586,000	7.76	46.1	12.5	30.8	56.7	3.2
VORARLBERG	305,200	4.04	116.1	7.0	48.6	44.4	1.6
VIENNA	1,531,000	20.26	3,788.0	2.4	51.3	46.4	4.5
AUSTRIA <sup>1)</sup>	7,555,900	100	89.5	9.2	47.4	43.4	3.0

## NOTES

- A Calculated from raw data supplied by Austrian Central Statistical Office in March 1985 and drawn from 1981 Census taken 12.5.1981.
- B As cited by Wohlschlägl, H. 'Austria, Landscape and Regional Structure', in Steiner, K. (1981), p.25.
- C Source as A. Primary sector includes agriculture and forestry; energy and water supply; mining, soil and stone excavation. Secondary sector encompasses manufacturing industry and processing, including construction. Tertiary (services) sector includes trade and warehousing.
- D Source as A.
- 1) Note that the figures for Austria as a whole are greatly affected by discrepancies of size, especially between Burgenland or Vorarlberg and Vienna.

TABLE 2

POPULATION DEVELOPMENT IN VORARLBERG AND TYROL IN ABSOLUTE TERMS AND AS % OF TOTAL AUSTRIAN POPULATION								
DATE	VORARLBERG			TYROL			AUSTRIA	
	ABSOLUTE	1910 = 100	% OF AUSTRIA	ABSOLUTE	1910 = 100	% OF AUSTRIA	ABSOLUTE	1910 = 100
1910	145,408	100	2.19	304,713	100	4.58	6,648,310	100
1923	139,979	96	2.14	313,888	103	4.80	6,534,742	98
1934	155,402	107	2.34	349,098	115	5.16	6,780,233	102
1939	158,300	109	2.37	363,959	119	5.47	6,652,720	100
1951	193,657	133	2.79	427,465	140	6.16	6,953,905	104
1961	226,323	156	3.19	463,899	152	6.54	7,073,807	106
1971	271,473	187	3.64	540,771	177	7.25	7,456,403	112
1979	301,519	207	4.03	583,548	191	7.77	7,503,314	113
1981	305,200	210	4.04	586,700	192	7.76	7,555,900	114

Source: *Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Bevölkerungswissenschaften* 1979.

Vienna 1982, p. 99. Note source as Table 1, note A.

TABLE 3

## COMPUTING PATTERNS (1981)

LAND	TOTAL GAINFULLY EMPLOYED	NON-COMMUTERS OR COMMUTERS WITHIN COMMUNE OF RESIDENCE (%)	COMMUTERS WITHIN LAND (%)	COMMUTERS BETWEEN LANDER	COMMUTERS TRAVELLING ABROAD
BURGENLAND	115,653	45.5	26	28	0.6
CARINTHIA	217,854	61.8	30.7	5.5	2.0
LOWER AUSTRIA	629,720	50.1	28.6	20.7	0.6
UPPER AUSTRIA	568,600	57.3	37.1	3.4	2.1
SALZBURG	200,745	66.0	28.7	2.9	2.3
STYRIA	504,477	59.4	34.8	4.7	1.1
TYROL	247,425	58.9	36.3	2.2	2.6
VORARLBERG	138,572	56.5	33.8	1.7	8.0
VIENNA	689,318	27.8	67	4.7	0.5
AUSTRIA	3,312,362	50.6	39.9	7.9	1.5

Source: Raw data supplied by Austrian Central Statistical Office in March 1985 and drawn from 1981 Census.

TABLE 4

## RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION (%)

	ROMAN CATHOLIC	LUTHERAN	CALVINIST	OLD CATHOLIC	JEWISH	OTHERS	NONE	UNKNOWN	ISLAMIC
BURGENLAND	84	14	0.6	0.04	0.01	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.1
CARINTHIA	83	11	0.1	0.2	0.002	0.8	4.3	0.6	0.1
LOWER AUSTRIA	90	3	0.1	0.2	0.02	1.0	3.9	0.6	0.8
UPPER AUSTRIA	88	5	0.1	0.1	0.004	1.1	4.3	1.0	0.6
SALZBURG	85	5	0.1	0.3	0.02	2.2	5.3	0.8	1.0
STYRIA	87	5	0.1	0.2	0.01	0.6	5.7	1.6	0.1
TYROL	91	2	0.1	0.1	0.01	1.4	2.2	0.7	1.3
VORARLBERG	87	2	0.3	0.2	0.004	3.1	1.6	0.6	4.7
VIENNA	71	6	0.6	1.0	0.4	3.2	13.5	1.6	1.8
AUSTRIA	84	5	0.2	0.3	0.1	1.6	5.6	1.0	1.0

Source: Calculated from raw data supplied by Austrian Central Statistical Office in March 1985 and drawn from 1981 Census.

(Note that "Old Catholic" refers to a sect that split from the main Catholic faith in response to the declaration of Papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council of 1869 - 70.)

TABLE 5

RELIGIOSITY MEASURED IN TERMS OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE

	A	B	A + B	C	D	E
	ONCE OR MORE A WEEK OR NEARLY EVERY WEEK	ABOUT ONCE A MONTH		ON MAJOR RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS ONLY	NEVER	D/K NO RESPONSE
BURGENLAND	57	25	82	17	1	-
CARINTHIA	24	17	41	37	21	1
LOWER AUSTRIA	38	13	51	30	17	2
UPPER AUSTRIA	41	12	53	23	22	2
SALZBURG	17	17	34	27	30	9
STYRIA	22	22	44	29	21	6
TYROL	55	15	70	20	7	3
VORARLBERG	44	21	65	31	1	3
VIENNA	12	9	21	30	42	7

Source: Institut für empirische Sozialforschung (IFES)  
 Politologische Studie zur Frage des Föderalismus, Vienna  
 June 1973, p. 40.  
 The figures are based upon responses to a question on  
 frequency of church attendance.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS  
 AND MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS IN VORARLBERG

	1945		1949		1954		1959		1964		1969		1974		1979	
	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M
ÖVP	19	5	16	5	16	5	21	5	20	5	20	5	22	6	22	6
SPÖ	7	2	4	1	7	1	10	1	10	1	9	1	10		10	
FPÖ			6	1	3	1	5	1	6	1	7	1	4	1	4	1

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS  
 AND MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS IN TYROL

	1945		1949		1953		1957		1961		1965		1970		1975		1979	
	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M
ÖVP	26	6	24	5	23	5	23	6	23	6	25	6	23	5	24	6	24	6
SPÖ	10	2	8	2	9	2	11	2	11	2	10	2	12	2	11	2	10	2
FPÖ			4	1	4	1	2		2		1		1		1		2	

P = Parliamentary (Landtag) Seats


M = Ministerial Portfolios

Source: Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer (21.) Die  
 Zahlen in den Bundesländern seit 1945,  
 Nationalrat und Landtage, Vienna 1981, s. 34f.

Figure 1.




Figure 2. MAJOR INDICATORS OF THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL ECONOMY



Source: Osterreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1983, Vienna 1984, p. 844f

Figure 2.

Index of non-socialist voting.




V = Vorarlberg

T = Tyrol

A = Austrian national average  
(including V and T)

Figure 3.

Distance on the index of non-socialist voting as between Tyrol and Vorarlberg and Austria







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INSTITUT DE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE ET EUROPEENNE  
(I.P.I.E.)

ANALYSE DES RAPPORTS CENTRE/PÉRIPHÉRIE

LE CAS DE LA BRETAGNE

communication présentée par Hervé GUILLOREL

European Consortium for Political Research (E.C.P.R.), Barcelone (Espagne),  
25-30 mars 1985. Workshop/Séminaire: Centre-periphery structures and the  
revival of peripheral nationalism in Western democracies (dir. Anna Melich  
and Daniel-Louis Seiler).

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## INTRODUCTION

Le thème du "renouveau" actuel des mouvements régionalistes/autonomistes en Europe Occidentale est de plus en plus fréquemment abordé dans la recherche en sciences sociales (et notamment en sciences politiques). Ce renouveau est expliqué par l'idée d'une "réactualisation" des clivages territoriaux décrits en termes d'opposition entre centres et périphéries, et renvoyant généralement à des discriminants ethniques, linguistiques, et religieux. Ce renouveau est d'autant plus souligné qu'il va à l'encontre des modèles classiques du développement sociétal dans les pays "développés", modèles selon lesquels on assisterait à la substitution rapide et définitive des clivages de classe au détriment des autres clivages (ethniques, religieux, etc...). De nombreux auteurs se sont penchés sur cette question, notamment Stein Rokkan.

Les pays concernés par ce renouveau sont de plus en plus nombreux: Grande-Bretagne, Espagne, Belgique, notamment. La France semble très en retrait de ce mouvement (en termes d'importance quantitative, de succès électoraux, etc...) et elle présente une configuration d'organisations régionalistes très particulière, notamment le fait que l'on retrouve dans une périphérie donnée, la même structure de partis que celle du centre, signe qu'une culture politique périphérique (= régionale) peut être fortement imprégnée par la culture politique de l'ensemble auquel elle appartient.

Cette situation de la France est d'autant plus intéressante que l'Etat français englobe des espaces possédant les mêmes caractéristiques que des espaces qui, dans d'autres pays, ont vu fleurir des organisations régionalistes structurées et importantes: parmi ces caractéristiques, nous citerons l'existence d'une langue distincte de celle du centre (breton, occitan, basque, corse, etc...), l'importance qualitative et/ou quantitative d'une religion, une culture spécifique, une situation de sous-développement (ou de sur-développement) socio-économique résultant d'une différenciation inégale de l'espace étatique français. Pour expliquer cette quasi-non-existence et/ou cette faiblesse des mouvements régionalistes, il y a deux premières hypothèses complémentaires:

1/ les revendications de type "territorial" sont véhiculées d'une autre façon: elles peuvent être véhiculées dans le champ politique et électoral par des partis "étatiques" disposant de bastions régionaux, c'est-à-dire exprimant des clivages surreprésentés au niveau régional; elles peuvent être aussi véhiculées hors du champ partisan et électoral, notamment à travers des groupes de pression ou des institutions, etc...: le corporatisme paysan, l'Eglise catholique, la violence, le champ culturel, etc...

2/ l'histoire propre de ces espaces et de leur intégration (réussie ?) au sein de la France expliquerait cette situation.

Pour tester certains aspects de ces hypothèses, nous avons choisi d'analyser le cas de la Bretagne; ce choix répond à plusieurs motifs :

\* la Bretagne a toujours été "perçue" comme une des régions les plus "originales" de l'Etat français.

\* la Bretagne est, parmi les espaces régionaux français, celui qui a connu le mouvement régionaliste le plus ancien et le plus structuré (l'Alsace-Lorraine constituant un cas marginal du fait de sa position géo-politique dans le cadre des divers conflits franco-allemands).

Notre démarche s'appuiera donc sur le cas de la Bretagne, cas analysé dans le cadre de la typologie des clivages proposée par Stein Rokkan (ROKKAN, 1970 et travaux ultérieurs). Dans un premier temps, nous "isolerons" pour des raisons de démarche analytique, chacun des clivages principaux retenus par Rokkan (centre/périphérie, Eglise/Etat, rural/urbain, possédants/travailleurs); Dans un deuxième temps nous étudierons l'articulation spatio-temporelle de ces divers clivages (renforcement réciproque, chevauchement partiel, exclusion, etc...) tant au niveau structurel (synchronique) qu'au niveau des processus (genèse, cristallisation, ossification, dissociation, etc...).

Nous nous interrogerons pour terminer, sur la nécessité de relier ce type de démarche à une analyse théorique plus globalisante (analyse marxiste, théories de la dépendance et du colonialisme interne, etc...), nécessité déjà soulignée dans les travaux de Daniel-Louis SEILER (SEILER, 1980).

Cette première communication constitue donc une analyse historique permettant d'expliquer et de décrire l'articulation spatio-temporelle des clivages qui se sont succédés dans l'espace que nous avons choisi d'étudier, la Bretagne. Notre deuxième communication situe les composantes principales du mouvement breton par rapport à l'évolution historique de ces clivages.

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### Plan/

- Chapitre 1 : la Bretagne: échec de constitution d'un centre/ accentuation de son caractère périphérique.
- A/Le processus d'édification étatique
    - le processus d'autonomisation vis-à-vis des centres extérieurs.
    - le processus de centralisation interne.
  - B/Le processus d'édification nationale
  - C/L'échec de la Bretagne à se constituer comme entité stato-nationale facteurs explicatifs et conséquences.
- Chapitre 2 : "La Bretagne,.. ce pays catholique entre tous les pays du monde" ou les vicissitudes du clivage Eglise/Etat.
- Chapitre 3 : les clivages rural/urbain et possédants/travailleurs.
- Chapitre 4 : l'articulation spatio-temporelle des clivages.

CHAPITRE PREMIER / LA BRETAGNE: ECHEC DE CONSTITUTION D'UN CENTRE / ACCENTUATION DE  
SON CARACTERE PERIPHERIQUE.

Lorsque la Bretagne est intégrée juridiquement dans le royaume de France (1532), elle a connu plusieurs étapes d'un processus d'édification étatique voire d'un processus d'édification nationale, processus qui a avorté en raison d'une série de facteurs dont certains tiennent aux caractéristiques originelles de la formation de l'Etat breton. Il nous semble utile ici de distinguer entre les aspects du processus d'édification étatique (section A) et ceux du processus d'édification nationale (section B), pour nous interroger ensuite sur les raisons et les conséquences de l'échec partiel de ces deux processus (section C).

SECTION A / LE PROCESSUS D'EDIFICATION ETATIQUE EN BRETAGNE.

Dans le processus de désagrégation de l'Empire romain, et mis à part les tentatives franques de reconstitution à leur profit de cet Empire, la péninsule armoricaine, caractérisée d'une part par sa position géostratégique périphérique, et d'autre part par l'immigration de peuplades celtiques chassées de (Grande) Bretagne par les invasions anglo-saxonnes, va se constituer en principauté territoriale autonome. Ce processus d'édification étatique se retrouve pour de nombreux espaces issus du morcellement féodal et, pour chacun d'entre eux, recouvre deux étapes concomitantes: une étape d'autonomisation vis-à-vis de centres extérieurs: centres territoriaux concurrents, centres idéologiques (et temporelles) supra-étatiques (Eglise catholique=Rome, centre "symbolique" que représente le Saint Empire romain germanique) et une étape de centralisation interne comprenant la soumission des concurrents territoriaux "inférieurs", le développement d'appareils institutionnels, le contrôle des structures ecclésiastiques.

§1 - Le processus d'autonomisation vis-à-vis des centres extérieurs.

Pour de nombreux auteurs, la Bretagne se constitue véritablement lorsque les différentes vagues d'immigration celtiques en provenance d'outre-Manche s'installent en Armorique, y apportant notamment des caractéristiques jugées comme étant les critères fondamentaux de la "nationalité" bretonne: la langue celtique et la religion chrétienne (dans sa version celtique, en opposition avec le caractère païen des populations autochtones. Au delà des controverses sur les dates et les singularités de cette invasion (voir infra), une chose est certaine! très rapidement, le conflit s'engage entre les Bretons et les Francs, conflits incessants émaillés de courtes trêves, notamment le

traité de 497 par lequel les Francs, ne pouvant assurer leur victoire, concèdent aux Armoricains et aux Bretons l'exemption du tribut, une certaine autonomie, un territoire accru, en échange de quoi, ceux-ci reconnaissent la suprématie des Francs et acceptent de s'allier avec eux; mais le conflit se rallume bientôt. Charlemagne réussira un moment à soumettre indirectement la Bretagne (notamment à travers l'organisation d'une Marche de Bretagne destinée à contenir les poussées bretonnes). Au 9ème siècle, l'empereur Louis le Pieux, pour apaiser l'hostilité des Bretons, met à leur tête, comme gouverneur, en qualité de duc de Bretagne, un de leurs compatriotes: Nominoé. Ce dernier refusa de reconnaître le successeur de Louis le Pieux, Charles le Chauve, et en 845, il triompha des troupes franques à Ballon. Les historiens nationalistes bretons considèrent Nominoé comme le père de la patrie bretonne et estiment que c'est au cours de la bataille de Ballon que naît véritablement la conscience nationale bretonne: nous verrons plus loin la pertinence de ces affirmations.

Nominoé et des successeurs affirment leur indépendance en étendant leur territoire jusqu'aux limites actuelles de la Bretagne (région administrative + département de la Loire-Atlantique), et prennent le titre de roi.

Les dissensions internes et les invasions normandes provoquent l'effondrement de ce royaume breton.

La renaissance de la principauté territoriale bretonne sera effectuée successivement par la dynastie des Plantagenêts et par une branche de la dynastie capétienne: et déjà, on peut souligner deux caractéristiques de la Bretagne féodale: son "encadrement" tant géostratégique qu'institutionnel (au niveau des emprunts) par deux centres territoriaux concurrents: le royaume anglais et le royaume français (même si, nous le verrons, la Bretagne est autonome au niveau institutionnel), et le fait concomitant, que le processus d'édification étatique de la Bretagne s'est déroulé essentiellement au détriment de ce que de nombreux auteurs estiment être les critères de la nationalité bretonne (langue et religion). Nous reviendront sur cette question ultérieurement mais nous pouvons affirmer dès maintenant que la Bretagne présente un cas intéressant d'une certaine contradiction entre le processus d'édification étatique et le processus d'édification nationale.

La Bretagne va donc constituer un enjeu dans le cadre des rapports conflictuels entre l'Angleterre et la France: cette situation ne l'empêchera pas de s'ériger en Etat autonome, mais l'existence d'un parti pro-anglais et d'un parti pro-français, provoquera des guerres civiles et constituera un obstacle au processus d'édification nationale. Le royaume capétien, dans sa politique d'expansion territoriale, cherchera toujours à annexer la Bretagne; ses tentatives ont pris plusieurs formes: argumentation juridique prétextant des soumissions antérieures des Bretons vis-à-vis du royaume franc, royaume franc dont les capétiens s'estiment les légataires, ce à quoi les ducs de Bretagne répondront, utilisant la même argumentation que les rois de France vis-à-vis du Saint Empire Romain Germanique, que "le duc de Bretagne est roi en son duché", stratégies matrimoniales, expéditions militaires, soutien d'un parti pro-français, alliance avec

la Papauté et le clergé: ce dernier point est très important. La Bretagne, comme les autres principautés de l'époque féodale, tente de se rendre autonome vis-à-vis de Rome, en tant que centre supra-étatique. Pour de nombreux Etats de l'Europe du Nord, ce souci d'autonomie religieuse se traduira par le schisme protestant: dans le cas de la Bretagne, il se concrétisera par la signature d'un Concordat et par le fait que la Bretagne entretient des relations directes avec le Saint-Siège, de la même façon qu'elle constitue un acteur autonome en termes de relations internationales. Cependant cette reconnaissance de l'Etat breton par Rome tenait aussi au désir conjoncturel de la Papauté d'isoler le royaume capétien. En réalité, la Bretagne a souvent souffert de l'alliance entre les royaumes francs puis capétiens et la Papauté: la question de la métropole de Dol-de-Bretagne en est le meilleur exemple. Les rois bretons, soucieux d'obtenir une véritable autonomie ecclésiastique, réussirent un temps à obtenir leur propre métropole située à Dol-de-Bretagne: cette décision a toujours été combattue conjointement par l'archevêché de Tours, de qui dépendaient les diocèses bretons, et par les rois capétiens, soucieux là encore de mieux contrôler certains territoires en reprenant à leur compte les divisions territoriales mises en place sous l'Empire Romain et notamment les structures territoriales chrétiennes. Après avoir reconnu un temps la métropole de Dol, la Papauté donna finalement raison à Tours, contrôlée par un clergé pro-français, privant ainsi la Bretagne de son autonomie ecclésiastique. Cette question de l'alliance privilégiée de la Papauté avec certains centres territoriaux au détriment d'autres centres, alliance par laquelle la Papauté "justifiait" certaines prétentions et conquêtes territoriales, sous prétexte que les espaces convoités constituaient des lieux favorables aux hérésies, peut être illustrée par d'autres exemples: lutte contre l'ensemble des chrétientés celtiques (Bretagne, Pays de Galles), lutte contre l'hérésie cathare vs. croisade contre les Albigeois.

## §2 - le processus de centralisation interne.

Aux 14<sup>e</sup> et 15<sup>e</sup> siècles, le pouvoir des ducs de Bretagne s'affirme à l'encontre des seigneurs bretons et du clergé breton.

On retrouve ici les étapes classiques du développement étatique qui font qu'on peut parler à la fin du Moyen-Age d'un véritable Etat breton dirigé par un duc, véritable souverain, dont le pouvoir se transmet à titre héréditaire, Etat comportant une série d'institutions analogues à celles des centres territoriaux en formation à la même époque en Europe: une dualité exécutif/législatif (Conseil Ducal, Conseil Privé, Chancelier, Etats de Bretagne), un organe judiciaire (Parlement de Bretagne, dont la création en 1485 visait à la fois à améliorer les institutions du duché et à affirmer l'indépendance de la Bretagne vis-à-vis de la France), organe financier (Chambre des Comptes), administration militaire.

Cette volonté de centralisation a été une source de conflits souvent violents avec certains seigneurs bretons et une partie du clergé: les premiers acceptaient mal de voir leurs prérogatives fiscales, juridictionnelles, militaires, réduites au bénéfice du pouvoir central ducal; quant au second, il s'opposait au désir du duc de Bretagne d'avoir un clergé à sa solde. Cette situation était d'autant plus problématique qu'elle interférait avec la situation internationale délicate de la Bretagne, enjeu stratégique entre l'Angleterre et la France. Le fait que le clergé, en lutte contre les ducs de Bretagne, cherchera appui auprès de Tours (favorisant par là-même les visées du royaume de France) et l'existence d'un parti anglais et d'un parti français, montrent clairement que les étapes importantes franchies par le duché de Bretagne dans son processus d'édification étatique, n'ont pas forcément impliqué le développement d'une conscience nationale bretonne suffisante pour "parfaire" ce processus.

#### SECTION B / LE PROCESSUS D'EDIFICATION NATIONALE EN BRETAGNE.

A en croire les historiens nationalistes bretons, c'est grâce à Nominoé et à sa victoire de Ballon que la Bretagne a pu devenir indépendante, a pu constituer un véritable Etat, une Bretagne caractérisée par une langue propre et par une religion chrétienne précoce. Nous citerons ici l'historien Arthur de La Borderie qui affirme:

"Sans l'émigration bretonne, la péninsule armoricaine aurait été un pays de langue latine, province banale du royaume des Francks, languissante, inculte, désolée, longtemps encore souillée de paganisme. L'émigration bretonne lui a donné un peuple nouveau, de race et de langue celtique, peuple fier, énergique, indépendant, qui l'a défrichée, fécondée, christianisée, en un mot qui en a fait la Bretagne" (cité p.38 in POISSON, 1959).

Ces affirmations nous renseignent plus sur l'idéologie nationaliste bretonne de la fin du 19ème siècle que sur l'existence même et la teneur d'une conscience nationale bretonne contemporaine de la constitution d'un Etat breton. En réalité, une étude minutieuse de l'histoire de la Bretagne nous montre que si, effectivement, la dynamique première de la principauté bretonne est fondée sur une immigration de peuples parlant une langue celtique (critère linguistique) et converties plus précocément que d'autres à la religion chrétienne (dans sa version celtique), il n'en reste pas moins que cette immigration a été "imposée" brutalement aux populations armoricaines et/ou dirigée en partie par l'Empire romain (§1), que l'Etat breton s'est développé soit en ignorant les critères premiers de la nationalité bretonne soit en luttant contre eux (§2), c'est-à-dire que les caractéristiques nationales contemporaines de l'Etat breton à son apogée (§3) ne sont pas forcément les mêmes que celles avancées par les historiens nationalistes bretons du 19ème siècle, c'est-à-dire que les critères



d'une nationalité "ascendante", i.e. associée à un Etat en voie de structuration, ne sont pas forcément les mêmes que ceux d'une nationalité en situation périphérique au sein d'un Etat qui l'englobe: il s'agit là d'une hypothèse à travailler.

§1 - La thèse classique élaborée à la fin du 19ème siècle soutenait que les immigrants bretons s'étaient installés de façon pacifique, dans une péninsule presque déserte d'où la langue gauloise avait complètement disparu: trois arguments visant à mieux renforcer l'originalité de la Bretagne, en gommant ses contradictions internes et en accroissant la distance (historique, linguistique, etc...) avec la France, double processus classique des idéologies nationalistes. Affirmer le caractère pacifique de l'immigration et l'aspect quasi-désertique de la péninsule armoricaine, c'était à la fois tenir compte d'une dualité ethno-linguistico-religieuse originelle et fondamentale, tout en accordant la prééminence à l'élément celtique. Affirmer la disparition complète du gaulois lors de l'arrivée des Bretons, c'était supprimer radicalement l'hypothèse d'un continuum entre langue gauloise et langue celtique, hypothèse utilisée par les historiens nationalistes français pour à la fois accorder une place à la Bretagne ("petite patrie") dans l'ensemble France, tout en attribuant à la première, parmi l'ensemble des provinces françaises, le coefficient d'archaïsme le plus élevé (voir notamment la démarche "organiciste" de Michelet). On voit ainsi comment une question linguistique peut constituer un véritable enjeu idéologique: la Bretagne était d'autant plus originale, différente de la France, qu'elle n'avait aucune filiation linguistique (en termes de pratiques linguistiques humaines) avec la langue gauloise (Gaule=France). Cette thèse a été battue en brèche sur tous les points précités. Pour certains, l'immigration bretonne aurait constitué un véritable "génocide culturel" à l'encontre des populations armoricaines, affirmation rendant caduque la thèse d'une coexistence pacifique de la Bretagne bretonnante et de la Bretagne gallo; d'autre part, les travaux de F. Falc'hun avancent l'hypothèse selon laquelle une partie de la péninsule armoricaine parlait encore le gaulois lors des premières vagues d'immigration: il n'y aurait donc pas un fossé linguistique aussi net entre la "nouvelle" Bretagne et la Gaule, ancêtre de la France.

§2 - L'Etat breton s'est développé en ignorant et/ou en luttant contre les critères originels de la nationalité bretonne.

\* l'ignorance de la langue bretonne: l'Etat breton (entourage ducal, personnel administratif) et les classes supérieures de la société bretonne ont été très rapidement attirés dans l'orbite culturelle française; cette attirance tient à plusieurs facteurs: proximité du royaume capétien, filiation capétienne des ducs bretons, existence d'un parti pro-français, nécessité pour les étudiants bretons de quitter la Bretagne faute d'Université jusqu'à la fin du 15ème siècle, et surtout existence au sein même de l'Etat breton d'une entité non-bretonnante (Bretagne gallo) qui va devenir en fait (à travers Nantes et Rennes) le centre de gravité politique, institutionnel et culturel du duché.

\* la lutte contre le caractère celtique de l'Eglise bretonne: les immigrants bretons apportaient avec eux une version celtique de la religion chrétienne (plus grand rôle des femmes, divergences liturgiques, et surtout prééminence des liens personnels avec les abbés sur une structure de type territoriale). Ces caractéristiques ont été combattues très tôt par la Papauté, soucieuse de mieux asseoir son pouvoir par une plus grande centralisation territoriale et une plus grande homogénéité culturelle. L'Empereur Louis le Pieux avait déjà tenté de réduire le particularisme religieux de la Bretagne: or, une fois maître de la Bretagne, Nominoé va continuer cette politique de manière à récupérer à son profit les vertus centralisatrices du modèle romain. Nominoé, le "père de la patrie bretonne" a donc été le fossoyeur des particularités celtiques de l'Eglise bretonne.

§3 - En fait, le "nationalisme" breton des 14ème et 15ème siècles est essentiellement un nationalisme diffusé par l'entourage des ducs pour mieux fortifier leurs prétentions à constituer un Etat breton indépendant: ce nationalisme "institutionnel", commun à d'autres Etats en formation à la même époque, ne se base pratiquement jamais sur les caractéristiques celtiques de la Bretagne: la raison, nous l'avons vue, en est très simple: L'Etat breton s'est constitué contre les éléments celtiques constitutifs du duché de Bretagne: ce n'est que plus tard, dans une situation historique très différente, que ces éléments seront mis en valeur par un autre type de nationalisme breton.

#### SECTION C / L'ECHEC DE LA BRETAGNE A SE CONSTITUER COMME ENTITE STATO-NATIONALE.

Les facteurs explicatifs de l'échec du processus d'édification étatique et nationale en Bretagne peuvent être répartis en deux groupes:

\*les raisons fondamentales tiennent aux caractéristiques de la "fondation" de l'Etat breton.

- dualité ethno-linguistique
- caractéristiques géostratégiques.

En reprenant les recherches de Pounds, nous dirons que la Bretagne n'a jamais constitué un véritable noyau attractif central ("core-area") au même titre que ceux ayant donné naissance à l'Angleterre et à la France: elle est marquée dès le début par une dualité linguistique coupant un territoire assez vaste, territoire privé ainsi de deux des caractéristiques relevées par Pounds: la compacité et l'homogénéité culturelle, ce qui explique l'existence de clivages internes importants.

\*les raisons dues à l'environnement géopolitique et géoéconomique: existence de centres extérieurs symboliques et de centres territoriaux concurrents (avec collusion entre les deux), place de la Bretagne dans la division de l'économie au niveau européen voire mondial (thèses de Wallerstein).

Cependant, lorsque la Bretagne est incorporée dans le royaume de France, elle possède déjà (encore) des caractéristiques propres même si certaines de ces caractéristiques ont joué un rôle certain dans son échec à se constituer comme Etat/Nation. Il est

donc faux d'affirmer, avec les historiens nationalistes français, qu'à partir de 1532 l'histoire de la Bretagne se "dilue" dans celle de la France, de la même façon qu'il est faux de penser, à l'instar des historiens nationalistes bretons, que la Bretagne est demeurée identique à elle-même: dans les deux cas, nous avons affaire à une vision linéaire, a-historique et non dialectique de l'histoire. Comment, dès lors, peut-on caractériser le devenir de l'espace breton au sein de l'espace français, en termes de "division spatiale" de l'économie, mais aussi de la religion et de la politique ?

C'est continuer à s'interroger sur l'histoire de la Bretagne en termes de rapports centre/périphérie, rapports déjà étudiés plus haut puisque nous avons en fait décrit les processus d'interaction (avec domination progressive) entre deux espaces: nous avons étudié la tentative de constitution d'un Etat breton et d'une nation bretonne autocentrés, tentative qui s'est traduite par un échec, mais tentative dont les justifications et les caractéristiques ont renforcé en partie la distance entre le centre vainqueur (royaume de France) et le centre perdant (en voie de "périphérialisation" ultérieure). Ces caractéristiques sont de deux ordres: caractéristiques ethnolinguistiques dont nous avons vu qu'elles renvoient à une dualité de la Bretagne, dualité préexistant aux empiètements progressifs du centre français; caractéristiques institutionnelles.

#### \*le maintien et l'érosion des caractéristiques institutionnelles.

Le traité de 1532 est conclu entre deux espaces, dont l'un, la Bretagne, centre perdant, est cependant assez forte pour "monnayer" le prix de son rattachement à la France. C'est ainsi qu'il était prévu de maintenir une spécificité institutionnelle de la Bretagne dans les domaines suivants:

- impôts: aucune imposition nouvelle ne pouvait être faite sans le consentement des Etats de Bretagne.
- service militaire: les Bretons ne pourront être appelés à faire leur service militaire hors de Bretagne.
- justice: sauf cas d'appel, la justice sera rendue par les institutions judiciaires bretonnes, et notamment, en dernière instance, par le Parlement de Bretagne (l'idée étant de respecter la Coutume de Bretagne).
- religion: les bénéfices ecclésiastiques seront attribués par le roi de France à des Bretons exclusivement.

En fait, la Bretagne conserve ses Etats, son Parlement, son autonomie administrative.

Malgré ces garde-fous, la Bretagne sera progressivement intégrée, en douceur ou par la force, dans le processus de centralisation entrepris par la monarchie française, processus qui aboutira à la suppression complète de son originalité institutionnelle, pendant la Révolution Française.

Nous avons là un exemple intéressant de contrôle progressif de l'appareil institutionnel d'une périphérie par un centre.

Dès le départ, les rois de France, soucieux de ne pas favoriser les penchants autonomistes de la Bretagne, contrôlent étroitement la composition et les actes des institutions de la nouvelle province. L'exemple le plus typique en est la distinction entre "originaires" et "non-originaires" faite parmi les membres du Parlement de Bretagne: par crainte d'un retour de l'esprit d'indépendance provinciale, le roi de France, Henri II avait établi une distinction entre deux catégories de magistrats: les Bretons ou "originaires" (de Bretagne) et les Français ou "non originaires", se réservant le droit de pourvoir l'office de Premier Président, office qui devait rester exclusivement français. Autres exemples significatifs: la nomination d'écclésiastiques français, l'effacement progressif de la Coutume de Bretagne (avec un contrôle de plus en plus étroit du Parlement de Paris).

Toute l'histoire des relations entre la province bretonne et l'Etat français est marquée par des atteintes diverses et répétées à l'autonomie institutionnelle de la Bretagne (nomination des bénéficiaires, introductions de nouveaux impôts), atteintes provoquant des résistances de nature diverse: résistance "monnayée" des Etats de Bretagne, du Parlement de Bretagne, révoltes du Papier Timbré vs. des Bonnets Rouges, etc...: mais le report de forces évoluera néanmoins, de façon incrémentielle ou par ruptures, au bénéfice du pouvoir central (nomination d'un Intendant, etc...)/Cela dit, on peut affirmer que la Bretagne sera une des provinces les plus récalcitrantes et les plus tardivement atteintes par les processus de centralisation.

Nous terminerons cette description du clivage centre/périphérie en mentionnant deux points:

\* le thème de la défense des droits de la Bretagne à l'encontre des empiètements du pouvoir central, a été véhiculé essentiellement par l'aristocratie bretonne, c'est-à-dire que la défense du sigle idéologique "Bretagne" équivaut à la défense des intérêts de la noblesse bretonne. Néanmoins, en 1789, la noblesse n'est pas seule à vouloir le maintien d'une spécificité institutionnelle bretonne: l'analyse des Cahiers de Doléances montre qu'une partie du Tiers-Etat, tout en décrivant les abus nombreux de l'aristocratie, ne cherche pas pour autant à supprimer l'autonomie de la Bretagne car cette autonomie, même fortement dépréciée, procurait encore certains avantages (moindre imposition): le problème était donc plus, dans un premier temps, celui d'une réorganisation des rapports de force au sein de la Bretagne. La suppression de toutes les entraves (institutionnelles, fiscales, etc...) à l'unification tant politique qu'économique ou culturelle, du "marché" français, mettra fin à la question.

\* En ce qui concerne l'originalité linguistique de la Bretagne, il n'y a pas à proprement parler de politique volontaire de lutte contre la langue bretonne poursuivie par la monarchie française. Il faudra attendre la rupture révolutionnaire pour voir l'Etat français entreprendre une stratégie de lutte contre les langues

minoritaires, stratégie dont les effets s'ajouteront à ceux nés des processus d'industrialisation, de développement des voies de communications, de scolarité et de service militaire obligatoires, d'émigration (voir WEBER, 1976).

Le volontarisme et l'âpreté de la politique d'unification linguistique des révolutionnaires français ne se "comprennent" que si on analyse l'interaction du clivage centre/périphérie avec les clivages Eglise/Etat et rural/urbain, renforcés par le clivage monarchie/république.

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## CHAPITRE SECOND/ "LA BRETAGNE...CE PAYS CATHOLIQUE ENTRE TOUS LES PAYS DU MONDE"

### OU LES VICISSITUDES DU CLIVAGE EGLISE/ETAT.

Au moment où la Bretagne est juridiquement intégrée dans le royaume de France, la situation religieuse globale est la suivante:

+ le traité d'Union prévoyait que les bénéfices ecclésiastiques de Bretagne seraient réservés à des Bretons.

++ la Bretagne n'échappe pas à la "décadence" des structures et de la pratique religieuses qui affecte l'ensemble de l'Europe.

+++ la religion chrétienne est plaquée très souvent sur un vieux fond païen.

Le premier problème recouvre deux aspects: celui, déjà évoqué, du non-respect de la clause du traité, du fait de la nomination d'évêques non originaires, et celui de l'adaptation du personnel et des structures religieuses à la dualité linguistique de la Bretagne, question soulevée bien avant 1532 puisque, nous l'avons vu, l'attraction de la Bretagne dans l'orbite culturelle française était bien antérieure. Dans ce domaine, on assiste à un double mouvement significatif: la règle d'idiome "imposée" par l'Eglise, règle selon laquelle le personnel religieux doit connaître la langue de ses fidèles, ne concerne en fait que le bas-clergé séculier confronté quotidiennement à la situation linguistique bretonne. On trouve ici déjà une distinction fondamentale entre bas-clergé et haut-clergé. D'un autre côté, les établissements religieux fondés du 16ème au 18ème siècles, notamment les collèges jésuites, vont jouer un rôle important dans la diffusion de la langue française: certains prétendent que la langue française parlée à Vannes était une des plus pures (à comparer avec la langue anglaise parlée à Dublin).

Les établissements jésuites ont joué un rôle important d'intégration culturelle. Nous retrouvons derrière ces faits la prise en compte d'un clivage important: le clivage rural/urbain. Derrière l'opposition entre d'un côté le bas-clergé séculier bretonnant et de l'autre le haut-clergé et les établissements religieux d'enseignement, nous retrouvons l'opposition ville/campagne.

Il ne faut pas oublier enfin que la question linguistique bretonne, au-delà des nécessités pratiques du culte quotidien, ne constitue pas encore une source de conflit avec le pouvoir central monarchique et catholique.

Les deux autres caractéristiques de la situation religieuse bretonne (décadence des mœurs religieuses et persistance d'une certaine forme de paganisme) vont entraîner un processus de "rechristianisation" ou plutôt de "recatholicisation", car le protestantisme ne prendra pas, processus dont les conséquences sont fondamentales puisqu'il fera de la Bretagne un des bastions principaux du catholicisme.

#### SECTION A / L'ÉCHEC DU PROTESTANTISME EN BRETAGNE.

Les causes du protestantisme furent à peu près les mêmes dans toute l'Europe occidentale chrétienne: causes intellectuelles (Renaissance), causes morales (mœurs dissolues) et causes politiques (souci de se soustraire au pouvoir de la Papauté). En Bretagne, malgré l'adhésion au protestantisme de certains membres de la haute noblesse, cette nouvelle religion ne fit que peu d'adeptes. Les raisons invoquées pour expliquer cet insuccès sont nombreuses: toutes n'ont pas le même poids mais toutes sont intéressantes à mentionner car elles nous renseignent déjà sur certains points forts des idéologies en jeu.

##### §1 - la première raison invoquée tient aux caractéristiques de la foi catholique (chrétienne) des Bretons.

Cette foi, naïve, imprégnée de réminiscences païennes, était qualitativement et quantitativement suffisante pour s'opposer à la diffusion du protestantisme, malgré le fait qu'une partie de la noblesse ait opté pour cette solution religieuse. On retrouve là un thème intéressant: celui de la "trahison des élites" et de l'insuccès de cette trahison grâce au bon sens du peuple; dans le cas breton, le "bon sens" chrétien était incompatible avec l'intellectualisme et le rationalisme des thèses protestantes (on voit affleurer ici encore le clivage ville/campagne).

##### §2 - la deuxième raison invoquée est aussi très significative: l'échec du protestantisme tiendrait en grande partie à la barrière linguistique constituée par la langue bretonne.

Cet argument est intéressant à un double titre: d'une part, il recouvre une certaine part de vérité car la diffusion du protestantisme a été accélérée par l'usage des langues vulgaires (usage justifié par cette religion) et par l'imprimerie: cela a joué au bénéfice de la langue française. D'autre part, cet argument forme un élément-clé de l'attitude du clergé catholique à l'égard de la langue bretonne: cette dernière commence à être perçue comme un "rempart" efficace contre la pénétration d'idéologies jugées dangereuses pour l'ordre établi, idéologies religieuses ou autres.

Dans le cas présent, il s'agissait de conserver la Bretagne dans la mouvance catholique; nous verrons plus loin que le même argument sera repris pour justifier aussi le maintien d'autres sortes d'ordres établis.

Pour une étude plus détaillée des rapports entre Eglise et langue bretonne, voir GUILLOREL, 1985, à paraître.

Pour terminer ce point sur la question fondamentale de l'articulation entre clivage religieux et clivage linguistique (i.e. défense de la langue bretonne), nous mentionnerons l'absence "logique" d'une traduction de la Bible en langue bretonne au 16ème siècle. Pour certains, cette lacune expliquerait en partie le devenir ultérieur de la langue bretonne (situation non dynamique, sur la défensive, recul de la langue), argument renforcé à la fois par le contre-exemple du Pays-de-Galles et par la situation en partie similaire (tout en étant moins catastrophique) de la Cornouailles britannique.

§3 - la troisième raison est la suivante: la Bretagne n'étant pas autonome ne pouvait pas opter pour la solution protestante: elle le pouvait d'autant moins qu'elle constituait un enjeu stratégique important.

On assiste même à une situation inversée significative: à l'époque des Guerres de Religion, lorsque le pouvoir royal français sera momentanément occupé par un roi protestant (Henri IV), la Bretagne, sous la conduite de son gouverneur, tentera une stratégie de sécession catholique, stratégie rendue vite inopérante par la conversion du roi au catholicisme. Mais là encore, derrière cet épisode historique, nous trouvons une thèse importante: la thèse selon laquelle la Bretagne, de part ses caractéristiques propres (religieuses notamment) représente un certain ordre établi, des valeurs fondamentales. (Sur ce dernier point voir GUILLOREL, 1981).

#### SECTION B / LE PROCESSUS DE RECHRISTIANISATION.

Dans les pays où le protestantisme a échoué, on assiste à une série de "réformes" catholiques (la Contre-Réforme résultant notamment du Concile de Trente), ayant pour but de remédier à la situation tenue pour responsable de l'éclosion et des succès du protestantisme: affaiblissement de la foi, dissolution des moeurs, mauvais encadrement ecclésiastique, etc... L'abbé H. Poisson, dans son Histoire de de Bretagne résume très bien la situation:

"A la fin du XVIè siècle, le peuple, mal instruit par un clergé défaillant, avait oublié les principes essentiels du christianisme et était tombé dans les superstitions les plus absurdes. La noblesse ne se distinguait du peuple que par la licence de ses moeurs. Dans beaucoup de paroisses on aurait eu de la peine à trouver quelques personnes connaissant leur religion. Les évêques, trop souvent absents de leurs diocèses, ne faisaient pas de visites pastorales régulières"

(POISSON, 1959:252).

Sans vouloir entrer trop dans le détail de ce processus nécessaire de rechristianisation et de renaissance religieuse, nous mentionnerons deux points importants: les succès de cette rechristianisation qui feront de la Bretagne la terre d'élection du catholicisme (§1) et le rôle du clergé dans l'évolution de la langue bretonne (§2).

## §1 - les succès et les conséquences de la "renaissance" catholique.

Chacun s'accorde à dire que le processus de rechristianisation fut particulièrement fructueux en Bretagne: ce renouveau catholique s'exprima particulièrement à travers les missions bretonnes de Michel Le Nobletz et de Julien Maunoir (17ème siècle) et par l'établissement de nouvelles congrégations.

Commentant la carte de la pratique religieuse en France (pratique catholique), le chanoine Fernand Boulard s'interroge sur les raisons qui font que, avant même la Révolution Française, certaines régions étaient plus religieuses que d'autres: selon lui, "On croit cependant constater que ces régions exceptionnelles ont été solidement et récemment évangélisées: aux XVIIè et XVIIIè siècles. Le clergé ne s'y est pas alors contenté de la pratique religieuse, mais une évangélisation profonde y a été menée à bien. On a voulu des chrétiens à la fois instruits de leur religion et qui vivent leur christianisme dans toute leur vie humaine: familiale, professionnelle, sociale"

(BOULARD, 1954:57).

La Bretagne correspond exactement à cette situation, si bien que bien avant 1789, elle constitue un bastion du catholicisme: cette situation sera encore plus affirmée à la suite de la Révolution. Pourtant, dans un premier temps, l'Eglise (au niveau du bas-clergé) avait accueilli plutôt favorablement la Révolution mais le vote en 1790-1791 de la Constitution Civile du clergé et surtout l'obligation du serment provoquent une cassure nette, et poussent le clergé dans le camp de l'aristocratie légitimiste, ce qui aura pour effet de mobiliser la classe paysanne dans le camp contre-révolutionnaire, car, comme nous le verrons plus tard, celle-ci va également entrer en conflit avec le pouvoir central.

Au 19ème siècle, la Bretagne joue un rôle très important dans l'approfondissement et le renouveau de la foi catholique. "Terre des prêtres", elle deviendra encore plus qu'auparavant le symbole de la tradition catholique, à tel point qu'on associe souvent les deux expressions: "Bretagne et Catholique", soit pour défendre l'association des deux termes (par exemple comme mot d'ordre électoral mobilisateur dans les professions de foi) soit pour la dénigrer.

Cette prédominance du catholicisme dans la Bretagne (rurale) explique en partie les succès des deux principaux partis démocrate-chrétiens qui se sont succédés en France: le Parti Démocrate Populaire (P.D.P.) dans l'entre-deux-guerres et le Mouvement Républicain Populaire (M.R.P.) à partir de 1945, auquel a succédé le Centre Démocrate et aujourd'hui le Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (C.D.S.). Cette constatation est très importante car elle montre que la mobilisation politique (et notamment électorale) d'une grande partie de la population bretonne a été faite par le biais catholique, avec cette particularité fondamentale d'une association entre la défense d'une religion donnée (catholicisme) et la défense d'une certaine spécificité territoriale (la Bretagne). Il est donc important de montrer ici qu'une grande partie de la population bretonne a été et demeure mobilisée sur la base du clivage religieux (à travers l'Eglise catholique et des partis démocrate-chrétiens), mobilisation par rapport à un clivage qui affecte l'ensemble de la France et qui fait référence à l'existence d'un centre idéologique supra-étatique: cette caractéristique a empêché une solution de type "Eglise nationale", telle qu'on la trouve par exemple au Pays-de-Galles (avec le "disestablishment").