Arxiu històric FUNDACIÓ JAUME BOFILL

International round table on the comparative study of the development of political science

The International Committe for the Study of the Development of Political Science

The Center of Political Science Fellrinelli

SETEMBRE 1987

FUNDACIÓ JAUME BOFILL

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REGIONE TOSCANA

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RAPPORTEUR FOR CORTONA CONFERENCE:

JOHN GUNNELL

Programme

Tuesday, September 22

Morning Session 1 — 9:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Chair: David Easton

Welcoming remarks:
Italo Monacchini, Mayor, City of Cortona
Luigi Graziano, Director, Center of Political Science, Feltrinelli Foundation

Hans Kastendiek Development of the Training Function of West German Political Science

Discussant: Jack Hayward

Jean Leca Political Philosophy, History, Theory and Empiricism in Contemporary French Political Science

Discussant: Erkki Berndtson

12:30 p.m. Lunch

Afternoon Session 2 — 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. Chair: Erkki Berndtson

William Andrews Impact of the Political Context on Political Science in the United States

Discussants: Adolf Bibič
Josep Vallès

John Trent, M. Stein The Interaction of Politics and Political Science: Generalization from the Canadian Experience

Discussants: Mario Stoppino
Adele Jinadu

Programma dei lavori

Martedì, 22 settembre

Mattino Sessione 1 — ore 9,30 - 12,30 Presiede: David Easton

Apertura dei lavori:
Italo Monacchini, Sindaco della Città di Cortona,
Luigi Graziano, Direttore, Centro di Scienza Politica presso la Fondazione Feltrinelli

Hans Kastendiek Sviluppo della funzione di formazione della scienza politica nella Germania occidentale

Controrelatore: Jack Hayward

Jean Leca Filosofia politica, storia, teoria e empirismo nella scienza politica francese contemporanea

Controrelatore: Erkki Berndtson

ore 12,30 Colazione

Pomeriggio Sessione 2 — ore 15 - 18 Presiede: Erkki Berndtson

William Andrews Impatto del contesto politico sulla scienza politica americana

Controrelatori: Adolf Bibič
Josep Vallès

John Trent, M. Stein Interazione fra politica e scienza politica: generalizzazioni dal caso canadese

Controrelatori: Mario Stoppino
Adele Jinadu

Wednesday, September 23

Morning 9:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.
Session 3 Chair: Luigi Graziano

Jack Hayward Cultural and Contextual Constraints upon the Development of Political Science in Britain

Discussant: Jean Leca

Josep Vallès Political Science in Contemporary Spain: an Overview

Discussant: Bolivar Lamounier

Adolf Bibič Conceptions of Politics in Political Science in Jugoslavia

Discussant: Giorgio Sola

12:30 p.m. Lunch

Afternoon 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Session 4 Chair: Adolf Bibič

Zheng-Yuan Fu Political Science in China

Discussant: John Trent

Adele Jinadu Political Science in Africa: Its Context and Developmental Logic in Comparative Perspective

Discussant: William Andrews

Bolivar Lamounier From State to System: Internal and External Factors in the Development of Brazilian Political Science

Discussant: Jacek Tarkowski

9:30 p.m. Concert

Mercoledì, 23 settembre

Mattino ore 9,30 - 12,30
Sessione 3 Presiede: Luigi Graziano

Jack Hayward Vincoli culturali e contestuali allo sviluppo della scienza politica britannica

Controrelatore: Jean Leca

Josep Vallès La scienza politica nella Spagna contemporanea

Controrelatore: Bolivar Lamounier

Adolf Bibič Concezioni della politica nella scienza politica jugoslava

Controrelatore: Giorgio Sola

ore 12,30 Colazione

Pomeriggio ore 15 - 18
Sessione 4 Presiede: Adolf Bibič

Zheng-Yuan Fu La scienza politica in Cina

Controrelatore: John Trent

Adele Jinadu La scienza politica in Africa: contesto e logica di sviluppo in prospettiva comparata

Controrelatore: William Andrews

Bolivar Lamounier Dallo Stato al sistema: fattori interni ed esterni nello sviluppo della scienza politica brasiliana

Controrelatore: Jacek Tarkowski

ore 21,00 Concerto di musica classica

Thursday, September 24

Morning Session 5 — 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 a.m. Chair: John Trent

Giorgio Sola Italian Political Science and the Liberal State (1861-1925)

Luigi Graziano Old and New Political Science in Italy

Mario Stoppino Mosca and Bentley: Reflections on Two Traditions of Political Science

Discussants: Giorgio Freddi
Renato Mannheimer
Giuliano Urbani

12:00 a.m. Lunch

Afternoon: Visit to Florence

Friday, September 25

Morning Session 6 — 9:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Chair: ~~Hans Kastendiek~~

Jacek Tarkowski Political Science and Sociology: Two Different Responses to the Polish Crisis

Discussants: Zheng-Yuan Fu
Luigi Graziano

John Gunnell Historiography of the Study of the History of Political Science

Discussant: Hans Kastendiek

12:30 p.m. Lunch

Giovedì, 24 settembre

Mattino Sessione 5 — ore 9 - 12 Presiede: John Trent

Giorgio Sola La scienza politica italiana e lo stato liberale (1861-1925)

Luigi Graziano Vecchia e nuova scienza politica in Italia

Mario Stoppino Mosca e Bentley: riflessioni su due tradizioni di scienza politica

Controrelatori: Giorgio Freddi
Renato Mannheimer
Giuliano Urbani

ore 12 Colazione

Pomeriggio: Escursione a Firenze

Venerdì, 25 settembre

Mattino Sessione 6 — ore 9,30 - 12,30 Presiede: ~~Hans Kastendiek~~

Jacek Tarkowski Scienza politica e sociologia: due diverse risposte alla crisi polacca

Controrelatori: Zheng-Yuan Fu
Luigi Graziano

John Gunnell Storiografia dello studio della storia della scienza politica

Controrelatore: Hans Kastendiek

ore 12,30 Colazione

Afternoon 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Session 7 Chair: David Easton

H. Kastenliek

Erkki Bemdtson The Development of Political Science. Methodological Problems of Comparative Research

Discussant: John Gunnell

General Discussion: Concepts and Strategies for the Comparative Analysis of Political Science

Saturday, September 26

Morning 9:30 a.m. - 12:00 a.m.

Co-chairs: David Easton and John Trent

→ Executive Session for Committee Members*

Afternoon

Departure of Participants

* The Committee will meet at the Hotel San Michele

Pomeriggio ore 15 - 18
Sessione 7 Presiede: David Easton

Erkki Bemdtson Lo sviluppo della scienza politica. Problemi metodologici nella ricerca comparata

Controrelatore: John Gunnell

Discussione generale: Concetti e strategie per l'analisi comparata della scienza politica

Sabato, 26 settembre

Mattino ore 9,30 - 12

Presiedono: David Easton e John Trent

Riunione dei membri del Comitato*

Pomeriggio

Partenza dei partecipanti

* La sessione avrà luogo all'Hotel San Michele

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Nuova Tipografia Sociale - Cortona

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Present Funding Request

The specific request of this proposal is for a grant of $XX,XXX.00 to hold a Conference of an international Collaborative Research Group which seeks to undertake a study of the development of political science in selected countries of the world.

The purposes of this Conference are: (1) to provide the opportunity for the members of the Collaborative Research Group to present and critically assess papers about the development of political science in various countries along the lines indicated in this proposal; (2) on the basis of the discussions so generated to formulate a common research design or set of guidelines for the continuation of the comparative study of the development of political science in pursuit of the objectives of the proposal elaborated below.

Summary of the Project

1. The General Proposal

The underlying assumption of the proposal is that it would be a valuable result of political inquiry if an internationally acceptable body of objective understanding of the way in which political systems operate should some day come into existence. To assess just where we are in the development of such a body of universal knowledge and why we are where we are, we are proposing a series of country-by-country studies capped by a comparative analysis of the findings.

Through such a study we would wish to learn how and why differences occur in the evolution of political science and the factors that contribute to or detract from the growth of an international body of knowledge about how political systems operate. We anticipate, ultimately, the construction of a qualitative explanatory model of the forces influencing the growth of such a body of objective knowledge. Not so incidentally, such a study would also provide the basis necessary for an attempt to assess the state of political science in the world today.

2. The Proposal in General

A. Country Studies

(1) A series of studies on the development of political science in each country. These would describe the history of political science as an intellectual discipline and as an educational movement and would cover past issues, present conditions and anticipated future problems. There might be one or more studies for each country depending on the history of political science in that country, the complexity of its evolution and the availability of resources.

(2) An attempt to account for differences in the development of political science in each country by reference to their different histories, socio-economic conditions, ideologies, structures of higher education, internal development of the discipline and international diffusion and exchange of ideas about the study of politics.

(3) Publication as part of an international publication series, an innovation in the publishing field perhaps, but one that should be

possible under the auspices of an appropriate international organization.

B. The Specific Content of Each Country Study (Dependent Variables)

(1) A description of the patterns of evolution of political science in each country, both as an intellectual tendency and as an educational movement, with major attention to the extent to which political science has emerged as a professional discipline.

(2) Descriptions of the way in which scholars in each country conceptualize what it is that is considered to be political (as against economic, cultural, psychological, etc.).

(3) The central assumptions (epistemological as well as ideological), conceptual tools, theoretical propositions (if any) that characterize the study of political science in each country.

(4) The uses to which political science has been put in each country and corresponding public and professional responses to political science as a discipline.

(5) The extent to which the study of political science has been self-generated (its inherent or internal logic of growth) and the extent to which it has been influenced by external factors within as well as beyond its national boundaries.

C. The Factors That Account for Country Differences and Similarities in the Emergence and Historical Development of Political Science (Independent Variables)

(1) The social environment: This involves such factors as social and specific political structures, nature of political discourse and

practices, ideological context, available resources for political research from public and private sources, nature of higher educational institutions,

(2) Diffusion of ideas (transfer of knowledge about politics, modes of understanding and methods of research): Here we shall try to account for the extent to which the study of political science has been self-generated through the inherent logic and relative autonomy of the development of political science as a body of ideas and the extent to which its presuppositions, concepts and theories have been influenced by other factors within and beyond its national boundaries.

(3) Institutionalization of political science: The extent to which the methods, concepts and substantive ideas of political science in a given country relate to the way political science has become institutionalized and organized as part of the general structure of higher education and of the overall development of the social sciences.

D. The Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies

(1) A qualitative developmental model: On the basis of completed individual country analyses we will then be in a position to compare the different methods, concepts and substantive conclusions, to identify similarities and differences as well as convergences and divergences still in process, and to help account for these national developments in political science. These data and analyses will provide the basis for an effort to construct a formal qualitative model to explain the development

of knowledge about politics. This will represent the major expected outcome of this study.

(2) Possibility of a universal body of political science knowledge: These analyses will also put us in a position to assess the extent to which a universal body of objective knowledge about political science is emerging or is likely to come into being and the nature of the facilitative conditions and the impediments relating to the development of such a corpus of knowledge. To the degree that such an assessement is attainable, it will represent a second major accomplishment of this study.

Background of the Project

During the past thirty years political science, as an academic discipline, has experienced an enormous growth throughout the world in the number of persons involved, in the research tools available to them and in the sheer volume of productivity. Since World War II, along with the other social sciences it has undergone what can legitimately be called an extraordinary expansionist revolution.

On an institutional basis, prior to World War II, while most industrialized countries, especially in the West, boasted a scattered, handful of scholars in the field, the United States alone had an established political science profession. In 1949 only four countries had political science associations that could join the newly founded international association. Today there are more than 50 national associations and the discipline is actively promoted in many more countries. The number of journals, books, conferences, and research institutes has multiplied many times over.

While this expansion has led to depth and diversity it has also fostered fragmentation, communication over-load, multiple approaches, conflicting schools, and, one suspects, considerable overlap and duplication. Political scientists as a whole are no longer as certain about their "progress" or as imbued with as confident sense of direction as they once were.

If for no other reasons, many scholars recognize the present as an opportune and legitimate moment to take stock of the process of development in our knowledge and objective understanding of the functioning of political systems, to assess our achievements to date, to

identify major current problems, and from this understanding to hypothesize about future orientations.

Against this background the broad outline of the steps that might be taken to understand and evaluate the development of political science was presented to the Executive Committee of the International Political Science Association in 1982. There followed a period of consultation and preparation. During 1984 and 1985 two preliminary steps were taken: first, a sub-disciplinary analysis of the development of political science in one domain (Ethnicity and Politics) during two sessions of the World Congress of Political Science (Paris, July 1985) and second, a joint IPSA-Finnish colloquium on the "Development and Institutionalization of Political Science: Centre-Periphery and Other Crucial Concepts" which was held in Helsinki in October, 1985.

Appendix A presents relevant documents on the Helsinki symposium. The "Call for Papers" for this symposium gives an update on recent research about the development of political science. The symposium also gave us an opportunity: a) to survey the state-of-the-art of current studies of development of the discipline; b) to witness the divergences of approach in the studies; and c) to put together an International Collaborative Research Group--the participants in the present research proposal--to carry out the Study of the Development of Political Science Project. This team includes Erkki Berndtson (University of Helsinki, Finland), Adolf Bibic (Edvard Kardelj University, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia), David Easton (University of California, Irvine, USA), John Gunnell (State University of New York, Albany), Luigi Graziano (Universita di Torino, Italy), Adele Jinadu (University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe), Hans Kastendiek (Free University of Berlin, FRG), John Trent (University of Ottawa, Canada).

Description of the Project

1. Objectives

A. General Research Objective

The general research objective of the project is to stimulate a worldwide comparative study for the analysis and explanation of the development of political science in various countries. The first step, for which we are presently seeking funding, is the holding of a small seminar of an International Collaborative Research Group. At this seminar formal papers will be prepared on the research design, detailed guidelines, methodology and research tools to be used in the comparative studies. We expect that these papers will themselves be of a quality that will merit publication. As noted in Appendix B, the present Collaborative Research Group is composed of scholars from many regions of the world and each of them is actively engaged in research and publication in the field of the development of political and social science.

As a sufficient body of country studies is being compiled, the second research objective will be to undertake a continuing comparative analysis of the findings of the ongoing case studies. The expectation is that as the exchange of ideas among those undertaking the country studies continues, a more explicit conception of the general forces at work in the development of political science will become increasingly apparent. This will then put us in a favorable position to formulate a general developmental model as an additional aid in the continuing country-by-country research.

B. Specific Research Objectives

The specific research objectives of the project and the contributions

it wishes to make include the following:

(1) An assessment of the current state of political science in each country.

(2) An analysis of the development of political science (central concepts, conceptual frameworks, theories, methodologies, institutions and personnel) in selected countries of the world in which political science has become an identifiable discipline.

(3) An explanation of the current state and past development of political science in each country:

:To what extent are they a function of the internal logic and inner dynamics of the discipline itself?

:To what extent and in what ways are the state and past development of political science a response to the social environment, both international and national?

:What have been the effects of the networks of international exchange and transfers of ideas in political science?

(4) An assessment of where we are in the development of an internationally acceptable body of objective understanding of the way in which political systems operate and an explanation of why we are where we are.

C. Supplementary Research Objectives

On the way to achieving these fundamental objectives, it is hoped the project will also make contributions to:

(1) the stimulation of self-reflection within the discipline during an epoch of considerable social fluctuations that are accompanied by symptoms of uncertainty (a) concerning main-stream philosophies

of what science is about, especially since the social, cultural and political restructuring after the 1970's and (b) concerning the preferred central theoretical and research directions of the discipline.

(2) an understanding of the ingredients necessary for a reassessment of new research tools, cognitive possibilities and moral responsibilities stemming from rapid technological and scientific advances and the impact of global issues;

(3) insights into the similar and different functions of the discipline of political science in different political, ideological and socio-economic settings, especially since at various times and places political science has not only been a political discipline but a political issue in itself.

2. Topic and Methodology - Country Studies

A. Description and Analysis of the Current State and Development of Political Science and the Effect on the Discipline of "Internal" Factors

As the project begins with the assumption that the present state and prospective course of political science have been and will continue to be shaped largely by specific national socio-political conditions and academic traditions, it is necessary to rely on analyses directed to an understanding of the present configuration of national disciplines and of the patterns of their development and change. Hence, to assure that the analytical framework aimed at will not be insensitive to national "cases" and their idiosyncractic character, the research plan takes as its starting point individual country studies. The goal is to allow each

country study to follow the logic of its own development, strongly guided, however, for ultimate comparative purposes, by a research design and overall conceptualization worked out by the Collaborative Research Group. Subject to revisions developed at the Conference for which funding is being sought through this proposal and to continuing revisions based on continuing discussion and research experience, our present intention is to address ourselves to issues of the kind specified below.

(1) How does political science emerge as a discipline in the specific country?;

:How has the discipline evolved in differing contexts?--the conditions favoring or hampering development; the degree of global unevenness in development of the discipline; the state of development of various subfields in political science and their different emphases and combinations;

:How, when and to what degree has political science become differentiated as a discipline?--the history of political science as a discipline, its status and autonomy; the logic of the developmental process in each country such as development by differentiation from traditional disciplines, by the introduction of a new kind of analysis or by a synoptic integration of "political aspects" formally treated by other disciplines;

:To what degree has political science developed an uncontested competence within various fields of analysis and teaching with a conceptual and theoretical profile of "its own"?-- stages and patterns of institutionalization; steps, forms and impacts of professionalization; conditions and modes of development

including research structures, the educational system, funding and hiring processes; the changing sociological profile of the members of the discipline.

(2) What is the current state of political science in each particular country?

:To what degree have laws or generalizations about political behavior and the operation of political institutions been discovered and what seem to be the circumstances related to such discoveries?;

:In what ways are research results formulated, communicated and used, if at all?

:To what extent have the research findings been complementary and cumulative, given the expected multiplicity of directions and approaches to an understanding of political phenomena?

:To what extent has method been treated as problematic and become the subject of specialized concern and training?

(3) How is political science conceptualized as an area of intellectual concern?

:description of the way in which each country conceptualizes what is considered to be political and what is thought of as political science; the central assumptions (epistomological and ideological), conceptual tools and theoretical conceptions which characterize the study of political science; their evolution over time and contemporary trends;

:the conceptions of philosophy of science on which political science is based--scientific "revolutions" and their implications for political science; recurrent reassessments of

the discipline's concept of objective and reliable knowledge or of science; the implication of methodological discussions for the inner structure of the discipline, its emergence and its development.

(4) What are the ways in which the functions of political science have been conceived and put into practice?

:the degree and manner in which political science is oriented towards roles in training and education, civics, critical analysis, social conflict and policy formation;

the impact of these functions on the development of the discipline, its sense of "moral" responsibilities, and policy analysis.

(5) What is the current position of political science in Academia?--in relationship to the total corpus of the social sciences, to the overarching educational structures and to the critical funding processes.

(6) What is the specific nature of the processes through which ideas in political science are generated (the inherent logic of the discipline or the internal factors)?

:the degree to which developments in the discipline have been inspired by its own internal history--the relative autonomy of the discipline; its response to its inner intellectual stimuli or logic. (NOTE: Inquiry into the internal logic of the discipline as a source of "autonomous" development will require an analysis of the criteria used by political science to collect, analyze and assess the validity of its data and interpretations, as, for example, in the use of the canons of

normal science, of descriptive historical methods, or of the empathic interpetative understanding. Internal history signifies a distribution of emphasis where the principal focus is on the intellectual dynamics that are indigenous to the discipline and its structure of discourse with an emphasis on theoretical claims, the evolution of criteria for the acceptance of evidence and other practices of inquiry.)

:the varying processes of recruitment and socialization of political scientists and their effect on the evolution of the discipline.

(7) What is the social impact of the discipline?

:Assessments of the current status of the discipline insofar as it relates to its impact on society;

:the degree to which the knowledge developed in the discipline is communicated, recognized and used both by political elites and in the formation of public opinion;

:current problems and issues in the relationships between the profession of political science and society.

B. The "External" Factors That Account for the Nature, Structures and Status of Political Science in Each Country

How have factors external to the discipline influenced its present state and past development? In general we shall examine the social conditions, broadly conceived (including economic, cultural, social structural, and modernizing factors) in each country to see the extent to which differences can be traced to variations in them.

It must be noted that this constellation of factors is of particular

political research (for example, the demand in some countries for the concentration of political science on the training of public officials); the failure of various practical orientations as found in one country to occur in others at about the same time;

(ii) responses by students of politics to nationalist sentiments and imperialism, the impact of decolonization, cultural receptiveness or resistance to ideas from abroad, effects of scholarly migration (for example, émigré German political scientists in United States), and centers of productivity in political science as magnets and models?

(iii) the relationship of political science to the dominant political philosophies within the society and to the ideologies of politicians, political movement and national cultural trends;

(iv) the interaction between the professional markets for political science and the other intellectual markets in a society and the impact of such arenas on the range of opportunities, demands and pressures within which political scientists and their professional orientations operate; the varying receptiveness of competing markets to the output of political science in terms of its knowledge, expertise and contributions to political activities; and the relationship of these as well as other factors to the recruitment and socialization of political scientists to their occupation;

(v) the impact of the general academic and educational structures on the organization of political science, its content and its curriculum;

(vi) the impact of the socalled information revolution and the

conflicts emerging between the highly specialized as against the integrative (holistic) approaches to social understanding; the ways in which interdisciplinary pressures have contributed, if at all, to the changing character of political science and its orientation to other disciplines;

(vii) the effect of sources and level of funding--private as against public, applied as contrasted with support for basic research.

(2) The extent to which developments have been inspired by ideas from beyond the national boundaries:

(i) the effects of the networks of international exchange and transfers of ideas in political science--the extent to which and the ways in which they have increased in quantity and density since World War II; the extent to which this has been related to the evocation of the issue of universalism versus indigenization of knowledge in political science; the kinds of mechanisms associated with the transfers of political science knowledge among countries, especially in relationship to phenomena such as dependence, interdependence and center/periphery relations; the kind of balance of effects among these various factors that has been evident historically; the direction and intensity of international transfers and diffusion processes (the effects of the barriers created by the language of the initial research product; wholesale as against selective reception of external ideas; flow of ideas, for example, from Europe to the United States at one historical point and their reversal at another);

(ii) the impact of modernization processes and the spread of

modern political culture--the well-known Galton problems about the possible diffusion of cultures and the factors that influence transfer, rejection and acceptance of cultural norms and practices;

(iii) the form of the relationships through which external relationships are mediated--for example, through scholarly interest, group affiliation, state or political intervention, educational structures, funding sources, ideological orientations or professional "biases".

3. Coordinated Research Methodology

As will be seen from the foregoing, there is at one and the same time, sufficient knowledge of the scope and factors in the analysis of the development of the discipline and also sufficient divergences and unanswered methodological questions to warrant a seminar on comparative research design. It is also clear that the major conceptual difficulty the research team will encounter will be the development of balanced research tools which will provide comparative rigor with the flexibility necessary to fully take into account the internal logic of development of the discipline in each country. We seek to identify similarities and differences as well as convergences and divergences in the process of analysing the factors that contribute to or detract from the growth of an international body of knowledge about how political systems operate. The objective of the Conference will be to have each participant present a paper analysing the problems and proposing methodological solutions for comparative research in this area, based on previous discussions and studies of the development of the discipline.

In each case the goal will be to develop a comparative framework,

define the domain of analysis, specify variables, and propose methods for the collection of data and their analysis.

Once a sufficient number of country studies have been under way and before completion we hope to be able to hold a number of additional meetings of the international Collaborative Research Group together with selected others as the occasion demands. These conferences will permit us to compare notes, while studies are still under way, on the different methods, concepts and substantive conclusions and to identify similarities and differences as well as the convergences and divergences still in process.

As stated at the outset, the country studies are an end in themselves to attain several of the objectives listed in the opening section. However, they are also to be seen as a step toward achieving the ultimate objectives of the Development of Political Science Project: an assessment of the extent to which a universal body of knowledge, about how political systems operate, is emerging or is likely to come into being and the nature of the impediments to the development of such a corpus of knowledge. The members of the research team are of the opinion that without adequate developmental studies any largely programatic statements about future orientations of political science would be in danger of being rather impressionistic and voluntaristic.

TO FOLLOW:

Budget

Appendix A: papers from Helsinki Symposium

Appendix B: Bio-bibliographies of members of Collaborative Research Group

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II: THE CASE OF SCANDINAVIA

Dag Anckar
(Åbo Academy)

Prepared for delivery at a seminar on "Intellectual Currents in Postwar Europe" (Sodanjälkeinen intellektuaalinen tilanne Euroopassa), organized by the Finnish Political Science Association and the Department of Political Science, Jyväskylä University, Jyväskylä 28-29.3.1987.

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II: THE CASE OF SCANDINAVIA

Dag Anckar
(Åbo Academy)

There is certainly much to be said for the thesis that the development and institutionalization of academic political science was in many countries strongly affected by the events and the end of World War II. Scientific communities that were earlier regarded as centres became peripheries, earlier peripheries became centres. Barriers to the growth of the discipline were removed; a casual reference can here be given to the case of India, where before 1947 the teaching of political science was not favoured by the British imperialistic order and the princes who regarded it dangerous to their interests and to the existence of their order (Rathore 1985, 6). Not only were barriers removed, incentives to stimulating political research ensued and were strenghtened. The interest orientations within political science changed and learned from the war experiences; the need for a science of politics that would help to avoid in the future the misuse of politics became more urgent and fostered initiations as well as re-arrangements of institutional and organizational networks and patterns. Following early initiatives of UNESCO, the founding of the International Political Science Association in 1949 led to the founding of several national political science associations and advanced political science throughout the world by promoting research as well as communication and contacts among political scientists (Trent 1978).

However, the impacts on the institutionalization and orientations of political science made themselves felt in different degrees in different countries. In some cases World War II triggered off the scientific study of politics, in others, maintaining protracted political science traditions, the changes were less drastic and perhaps sometimes even marginal. It is the aim of this brief review to give some notes and observations concerning the extent to which academic political science in Scandinavia took other forms and orientations in the aftermath of World War II. It needs firstly to be emphasized that the term 'Scandinavia' here covers the Scandinavian core countries, namely Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland and Iceland, two outlyers in the Scandinavian peripheries, are excluded from the review. This is for different reasons. Finland, who can be

said to have the longest Nordic tradition in the field of academic political science (Anckar 1987, 73), is excluded simply because developments in Finland will be treated at length in several other contributions to this seminar. It should also be noted, in passing, that there exist in Finland more than in the other Nordic countries several special studies of the historical development of the national political science discipline (e.g. Nousiainen & Anckar 1983, Paakkunainen 1985). Iceland is excluded because there is no link, direct or indirect, between the aftermath of World War II and Icelandic political science. When the discipline was established at the University of Iceland in 1970, it was without any roots in the Icelandic academic and social community; it had not even an acknowledged name in the Icelandic language. To quote an Icelandic writer: 'The entrance of political science into Icelandic academia was thus more akin to the landing of the first astronauts on the moon than to the slow advance of the settlers through the Wild West' (Grimsson 1977, 48).

This paper deals with two types of changes in Scandinavia and is consequently structured in two main sections. The first deals with institutionalization, the second with orientations. Institutionalization refers to structural and infrastructural changes in the administrative organization of political science, and under this heading I intend to dwell upon establishments of chairs in political science and of political science departments. The question to be answered here is to what extent changes in these respects are to be regarded as postwar outcomes and consequences. Orientation, on the other hand, refers to the study of politics and to the conceptual models and frames of reference employed in that study, and under this heading I intend to dwell upon dominating paradigms and scientific schools of thought. The question to be answered here is to what extent the study of politics changed its course in Scandinavia after the war.

POSTWAR OUTCOMES I: INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The emergence of a political science profession is in many countries a post-World War II phenomen. Sweden is certainly not among those countries. The Swedish political science tradition is namely, in a formal sense at least, centuries old. A chair, the Johan Skytte professor of Eloquence and Political Science, was established already in 1622 at the University of Uppsala. The first holders of the chair were however not active in the study and teaching of politics, and during the first 200 years of its existence the chair was foremostly responsible for the teaching of eloquence and rhetoric (Lewin 1985). It is therefore correct to say that political science has existed as an academic discipline in Sweden since about the 1840s. New chairs in political science were founded at the universities in Lund and Gothenburg around the term of the century and later on, in 1935, at Stockholm (Elvander 1977, 75). At the outbreak of World

War II, political science was thus represented at four Swedish seats of learning. The next chair was founded twenty years after the war, in 1965, at the University of Umeå. The founding of this university in the northern Sweden is however to be seen as an outcome of governmental efforts to cope with an increase in the number of students and as an outcome of regional efforts to stimulate economic innovation and cultural life (Lane 1983), and is not in any way related to the intellectual climate that ensued in the wake of World War II. In terms of political science institutionalization, Sweden was, by and large, left untouched by the warend. It is true that the Swedish political science departments expanded extensively during the postwar years; at one time the political science department in Stockholm was in fact second in size among all university departments in Sweden (Ruin 1986, 6). This expansion took however place in the 1960s and is rather irrelevant from the point of view of this review. Although the political science organization in Sweden today differs also in many other respects (differentiation of higher education systems, research funding, etc.) from the prewar and the immediate postwar situation, the war was no watershed as far as the general trends are concerned.

The situation was quite another in Denmark and Norway. In both countries political science was introduced as an independent academic discipline only after the war. This happened in Norway in 1947, as political science was then introduced as a subject at the University of Oslo, at that time the only university in the country. The subject was during the first decade teached in the Faculty of History and Philosophy and had no distinct teaching position of its own. A position as docent had been established already in 1949, but was kept vacant for some years due to a lack of qualified candidates. The position was later filled in 1957, when a department of political science was founded at the University. The subject was also in 1956 transferred to the Faculty of Law (Wyller 1986). The first regular chair in political science was not established until 1965. During the second half of the 1960s the discipline however expanded rapidly in Norway, as the new University of Bergen established a broad programme of teaching and research in the social sciences and political science (Kuhnle & Rokkan 1977, 66-67). It needs also to be emphasized that an independent academic research institution, the Institute for Social Research, was established in Oslo already in 1950 and was active in political research from the start, operating a distinct Division of Political Studies since 1955 (ibid., 65). The Norwegian Political Science Association was founded in 1956. During its first decade the Norwegian political science community created and activated a preliminary institutional framework and got into a starting position for the task of developing the discipline during years to come. Up to 1957, 42 persons graduated from the University at Oslo with a degree in political science (Wyller 1986, 31).

Like Norway, Denmark lacks a distinct national tradition in the field of

political science, and the relationship between modern political science in Denmark and its predecessors is, to quote one Danish observer, 'feeble, to say the least' (Nannestad 1977 b, 14). Political science is in fact a still younger enterprise in Denmark than in Norway. The discipline was formally established as an academic subject of teaching and study in the faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Aarhus in 1958, and one year later two chairs in political science were established at this university. Also in 1959, an Institute of Political Science was founded at this same university. A division of labour between the two chairs was introduced, as the one professor was expected to emphasize in his teaching the history of political thought, whereas the other was expected to concentrate on political institutions and the political structures of society (ibid.). At the University of Copenhagen, an Institute of Contemporary History and Political Science came into existence in the Faculty of Humanities in 1958 and became active in political science in 1964 (Nannestad 1977 a, 86-87; also Nannestad 1977 b, 14). The Danish Society of Political Science was founded quite early. Some fifteen years after the warend, Danish political science was however still, to quote one of the Danish political science pioneers, 'a new-born and distant asteroid looking for some centre or centres to gravitate towards' (Rasmussen 1985, 319). 'A comprehensive analysis of Danish politics has scarcely begun. Those, who try to find a way move forward with little guidance from previous analyses', wrote another of the Danish political science pioneers in a review, published in the late 60s. In the same review the author also emphasized the lack of manpower and the scarcity of resources available to political science in Denmark at that time (Pedersen 1967, 281).

The point to be made here is that the institutionalizations that we have briefly described are linked, directly or indirectly, to developments that are related to World War II and postwar climates and cultures. In Norway initiatives for introducing political science as an academic discipline had in fact been taken already in the late 1930s, as an university committee chaired by Frede Castberg, professor of Law, was appointed to review and plan the teaching of social sciences at the University of Oslo. The outbreak of the war removed the initiatives from the agenda, but when the issue was brought back after the war by Castberg and some other like-minded professors and when the plans were implemented, it soon became apparent that the warend had contributed to the creating of a basis for the new discipline of political science. There was a great and immediate enthusiasm for the subject and an influx of students which clearly exceeded the expectations (Wyller 1986, 23-24). Age classes deprived by the war of means for studying and postwar youth in a time of transition populated the lecture rooms, inspired by wishes to participate in the making of a better future. The situation is well described by Thomas Wyller, who was appointed to the first distinct political science position in Norway, and we shall quote the author at some length in his native language (ibid., 24):

> Noen med bakgrunn i fangenskap, motstandsarbeid, landflyktighet, andre - litt yngre - også på jakt etter personlig fotfeste i en verden som ikke hadde det. Mange var for lengst voksne både av alder og sinn. De skulle fylle års kunnskapstomrom. Lett var det ikke. Maskinpistolen kunne nok byttes ut mot stemmesedelen - slik sjargongen var - men ikke tilsvarende enkelt erstattes med et pensum. Mange var de som hadde irret omkring i ørkenen de første fredsårene; for dem kom det nye studietillbudet som manna fra himmelen. Gjennom det så de en mulighet for å løse samtidig et eksistensielt og et utdanningsmessig behov. De ønsket å studere sin samtid for selv å kunne ta del i den.

Besides securing a basis for a stabilization and a further expansion of the discipline, the student stream served to form its identity. The students were, Wyller tells us (1986, 24-25), clearly disappointed with the original supply of courses. The courses were on the one hand too scientific in nature and did not, in the students' view, answer to labour market requirements and expectations. On the other hand, the substance did not answer to the expectations of the students. There were no courses on political parties, political processes or political systems; the emphasis was instead on comparative law, international law and constitutional history. This provoked feelings of alienation and protests among the students; the learning of details and paragraphes about international law and constitutional orders was clearly not what the postwar students identified with politics and did not answer to their ambition to learn in order to work for a betterment of society (Berg 1984, 11). Attempts to change this state of affairs were made in the early 50s, but with little success. Later on, however, the discontent enforced reorientations and consolidations in terms of resources and positions. The reorientations were towards political history on the one hand, and a behavioralistic study of politics on the other, and it was this second orientation that came to mark Norwegian political science in the late 50s and the 60s. We shall return to this question in the next section of this paper. At this point it is sufficient to repeat Thomas Wyller's conclusion (1986, 34) that the coming and institutionalization of political science in Norway was largely an accidental occurrence, initiated by a handful of men and working within the frame of postwar rebuilding and isolation in the university life and social life in Norway.

In the case of Denmark, two factors may, according to Peter Nannestad (1977 b, 15) be singled out as decisive for the establishment of political science in the late 50s. The one was the almost universal thrust towards the development of a science of politics after World War II, manifested foremostly in the foundation of the International Political Science Association and in the activities of this organization. The second was a growing interest in a new educational basis for recruitment to the civil service. The first initiative to introduce political science at Aarhus was taken in 1949 by Max Sørensen, Professor of Public Law, and in his proposal to the university authorities we can find explicit references to these two factors, as Sørensen pointed out that the neglect of the

social sciences in Denmark was in bad agreement with current efforts, not least within UNESCO, to advance this field of science and that the study of politics could promote the recruitment to the central administration, foreign service, international organizations, political journalism, etc. (Rasmussen 1978, 342). To some extent Sørensen was certainly inspired by the corresponding initiatives in Norway; it is known that he at the time of his proposal procured informations and materials from Oslo and also from Stockholm about curriculums and courses (ibid.). In a manner of speaking the introduction of political science in Denmark is then to be seen as an outcome of two parallell diffusion processes: one working on a global level and reaching from UNESCO and the International Political Science Association to the coasts of Scandinavia, the other working on a regional level and reaching from Sweden and Norway to Denmark. The fact that almost a decade passed before Sørensens initiative materialized in terms of concrete political science institutionalizations was not due to any hesitation on the part of the University of Aarhus, which delivered a rcommending proposal to the Danish Ministry of Education already in 1950. The proposal was however forwarded to the University of Copenhagen which was asked to deliver an opinion, and several joint university committees considered during the following years the possibility to introduce the new discipline simultaneously at the two universities. The end result was however that political science was established only at Aarhus. The committee deliberations entailed several changes in the planned curriculum of the discipline, which comprised two parts, one composed mainly of elements borrowed from other studies such as law and economics, and one composed of political science subjects (ibid., 343).

Let us now summarize:

1. At the end of World War II political science was long since an established academic discipline in Sweden with a fully developed national tradition and a firm institutional basis. The postwar climate did not have any immediate effects on this basis. It has expanded and taken more diversified forms, but this development was not caused or markedly influenced by the war.

2. In Norway and Denmark academic political science is a postwar phenomen, initiated, in both countries, during the first postwar decade. The initiating agents were professors of the adjacent discipline of law, supported by relatively small circles of university people.

3. These agents acted in a climate which inspired such initiatives as well as prepared the ground for a favourable reception. This climate was marked by efforts to stabilize and promote the position of the social sciences, and must be regarded as one consequence of the war and the war experiences. The efforts had rapid results in Europe and in other parts of the world in terms of political science institutionalization, and this diffusion process also influenced Scandinavia, where it was promoted by the germinating postwar acknowledgement of the

usefulness of political science for the recruitment to civil service positions.

4. The fact that the political science discipline was long since established in Finland and especially in Sweden is no doubt a factor that added to the readiness of the university systems in Denmark and Norway to incorporate political science. The postwar years were years of rebuilding and developing university systems, and in these efforts the neighbouring Nordic countries provided models near at hand. Introducing political science was not, in a Nordic context, an epoch-making or a daring venture. It was entering a cleared road.

POSTWAR OUTCOMES II: ORIENTATIONS

In a recent essay on Swedish political science Olof Ruin declares that Swedish political science 'has naturally changed both with regard to the objects of study and the methods used' (1986 a, 4). He however points out that the process of change has been continuous and has not been attended by internal conflicts. The best example of the capacity of Swedish political science for peaceful change in content and perspective is, according to Ruin, the integration of a behaviouristic approach to the study of politics, which started in the 1950s. Ruin also points out that the relation between Swedish political science and the outside world was in 1940-60 characterized by greater introspectiveness than in the decades preceding and following, and he offers several explanations for this introspectiveness, one of which is that Sweden was cut off from foreign impulses during the war years. The most important explanation is however, he argues, 'that Swedish political science had a tradition of its own to fall back on and thus did not feel as strong a need to keep itself oriented on the international currents of the time as political scientists in countries in which the subject had just been established' (ibid., 9). According to Ruin this same factor also explains the smooth integration of the behaviouristic wave in Sweden and the fact that the behaviouristic approach had its breakthrough relatively late in Sweden. It is often, he states, 'easier for a university discipline with a comparatively long tradition to incorporate new objects of study and new methods than a more recently established discipline. There is a greater feeling of self-assurance within such a discipline' (ibid., 6).

The conclusion to be drawn from this description of Swedish political science is that the orientations of the discipline did not change to any remarkable extent as a consequence of the war, and that the existence of a national tradition contributed to this state of affairs by smoothing out and balancing postwar impulses from abroad. This assertion can to some extent at least be tested empirically within the frame of a study of Swedish doctoral dissertations in political science, published some years ago by Leif Johansson (1980). The study covers all dissertations presented during the period 1890-1975, and the disser-

tations are classified and described in terms of a large set of variables, the results being summarized in some 70 graphs, reporting percentage distributions.[1] The following tableau is based on a compilation of findings from Johansson's study, and reports major changes in dissertation characteristics. The comparison is between the time periods 1930-49 on the one hand and 1950-63 on the other. The cutting point does not fully answer to the requirements of this review, as it does not cut precisely between prewar and postwar years, but it comes sufficiently near a perfect fit to suit our purposes. The total number of dissertations is 42, of which 28 were presented during the first period and 21 during the second. Major changes are operationally defined as divergences between values for 1930-49 and 1950-63 that exceed ten percentage points.[2]

The list of findings from Johansson's study must be evaluated against the background of later developments in Swedish political science. In another review essay, dealing with political science research in Sweden between 1960 and 1975 Ruin has maintained that the general lines of development in Swedish political science resembled trends in the discipline in the Western world, and that this resemblance indicates that international influence has been an important factor determining the development of the discipline. 'Swedish political scientists have largely worked within the same frames of reference as political scientists in other countries; they have tended to be influenced by and refer to the same theoretical works', Ruin concludes (1977, 163). This conclusion is well substantiated by Ruin's thorough survey of Swedish research, which suggests that Swedish political science, for better or for worse, has lost much of its own national identity and tradition. In the first of the two essays we have quoted here, Ruin sees a tendency 'to ignore and forget the special history of the discipline' as one consequence of this integration of Swedish political science in a common international political science community, and he finds that this neglect 'illustrates to some extent that a periphery, precisely by being a periphery, tends to forget its own past' (1986 a, 10). The point to be stressed here is however that the integration process to all appearances started already in the years of introspectiveness and despite this introspectiveness.

The changes that are enumerated in Table 1 namely suggest that Swedish political science changed its profile in many respects during the postwar years and through the 1950s. The legal and the historical perspectives were eclipsed by contemporary, international and mass data perspectives, which encouraged a rapprochement between political science on the one hand and sociology and economics on the other hand. The level of methodical and technical consciousness and sophistication became higher; it needs however to be pointed out that this consciousness did not reach to the level of methodology in a strict sense. There were, in fact, more conceptual analyses in the Swedish dissertations during 1930-49 than during the following period, and for both periods Johansson reports

Table 1. Swedish Political Science Dissertations in the years 1950-63: Differences When Compared to Dissertations in 1930-49.

Issue Area
Less emphasis on the study of parliamentarism, more on the study of other aspects of constitutional life and of international relations.
Level of Analysis
More emphasis on the international level.
Time Dimension
More emphasis on contemporary events, less on the nineteenth century.
Theory and Method
More emphasis on discussions of methods, more emphasis also on quantitative techniques and the use of numerical tables.
Sources and Literature
Less emphasis on the presentation and discussion of source materials, less emphasis on memoirs as sources. More emphasis on survey data. Less emphasis on references to political science and history journals, more on references to sociological and economic journals.
International Orientation
More references to American literature, less to English literature. More dissertations in the German language.
Integration
More emphasis on motives for choice of topic, less on presentations of earlier research.
Pedagogic Form
More emphasis on problem clarifications. More use of graphs, summaries and indexes.

an almost total lack of research designs that systematically employ hypotheses, models and theories (1980, 14). The English reference literature was falling off, the American reference literature came into favour. There was also a noticeable decline in the use of French reference literature, although this decline does not meet our definition of a major change (ibid., 20).

However, to focus on changes only may distort the picture. For the majority of variables measured by Johansson, no significant changes can be disclosed. There are remarkable changes in Johansson's findings between the 1930-49 period on the one hand and the 1964-69 period on the other, but these changes are far less discernible in the postwar years in between. The general impression is therefore one of change as well as continuity. Swedish political science was Americanized during the postwar years, but the change was not sudden or in any way revolutionary. It was incremental and gradual, moderated by the bonds to the past and by the relative isolation of the Swedish political science community. In the late 40s and early 50s a generation shift took place in Swedish political science, as all four professors then retired from their positions. With one exception the new chairholders were however scholars who were socialized to earlier trends and traditions. The exception was Jörgen Westerståhl, appointed professor at the University of Gothenburg in 1951, who initiated large-scale projects on political behaviour and mass media and was the most prominent representative of the behaviouristic wave during the postwar years. It is typical of the Swedish political science climate that he and his endeavours were not frozen out from the scientific community (Ruin 1986 a, 6). They were integrated as precursors and as presages of changes that were yet to come.

In Norway the somewhat fumbling beginning during the first political science decade ended in concentrated programs of research on parties and elections. The efforts were launched by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo; later on the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen joined the program, which started as a set of field studies of the 1957 parliamentary election in Norway (Valen & Rokkan 1967, 294-295). The person who in the 1950s more than others worked to orient Norwegian political science towards the empirical study of political mass mobilization and political mass behaviour was Stein Rokkan, the eminent Norwegian social and political scientist, who died in 1979. Rokkan started out in the field of political philosophy, but soon became a pronounced internationalist in the fields of sociology and political science. Between 1948 and 1950 he spent a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation at Columbia and in Chicago; in 1950-51 he worked for a period at the London School of Economics and in 1951 he became associated with the Institute for Social Research in Oslo. In the late 50s he moved to a Research Professorship at the Christian Michelsen Institute (Daalder 1979, 338-339). His interest orientations predestinated to bridge-building positions between political science and political sociology,

and these positions brought effectiveness and cogency to his bridge-building efforts. He was in 1951-53 Secretary General for the International Sociological Association, which had been established some years earlier, and he played already in the 1950s an active role in the International Social Science Council. In the late 50s he became Secretary of the International Committee on Political Sociology, originally affiliated to the International Sociological Association, but later a joint research committee under this organization and the International Political Science Association.

Rokkan has himself given unreserved acknowledgement to the inspiration from the United States. 'I learned my trade as a sociologist and a political scientist from the extraordinary group of survey enthusiasts at Michigan', he wrote, in 1969, in his preface to Citizens, Elections, Parties, the well-known collection of his writings through the 1960s (quoted here from Daalder 1979, 340). 'Our initial work at the Oslo Institute was largely inspired by visitors from Ann Arbor and a number of us were intensively trained, if not indoctrinated, at the Mecca of empirical research, the Survey Research Center' (ibid.). However, it needs to be emphasized that Rokkan's research designs and research programmes from the very beginning included a comparative aspect (Kuhnle 1986, 52-53), and thus attributed a mark to the Norwegian assumption of American behavioralism which was and has remained special in a Scandinavian context. It should also be emphasized that there was in Norwegian political science almost from the very beginning a clear consciousness about the need to come to terms with the data-theory dialectic and to bring the accelerating production of new data under conceptual and analytical control (Kuhnle & Rokkan 1977, 130-133). In this sense political research in Norway professed itself an early adherent of the two corner-stones in the behavioral doctrine: reliance upon mass data on the one hand, theory construction on the other.

In a review essay on the development of Norwegian political science, Stein Kuhnle depicts the year 1957 as the beginning of a decade imprinted by expansion, innovation and differentiation (1986, 48). This differentiation also included the study of international politics, which was institutionally organized in the late 50s and the early 60s (Underdal 1986, 91). The somewhat late secession strengthens for its part the impression that Norwegian political science did not dart out from the war issues and was not decisively influenced by them. The focus of research was on processes of change in the Norwegian society and on political effects of these changes; the time researched was the years since World War II. Later on the programme broadened in terms of historical depth and expanded to cover the early development of party alignments and the spread of political innovations from the central to the peripheral parts of the nation (Kuhnle & Rokkan 1977, 135-137). The main orientation was towards a better understanding of the Norwegian society and Norwegian politics, not towards solutions to the great issues of the time.

The course of events in Denmark resembles closely the development in Norway. Danish political science, like political research in Norway, started out in the spirit of behavioralism. Looking back on the early years of Danish political science, Erik Rasmussen remembers that 'we simply had to find out for ourselves what political science is about or, better, what we found it ought to be' (1985, 319). Rasmussen reminds us of the fact that Denmark is peripheral with respect to several centres and that it therefore is a customary Danish way of life to look around and choose. The cultural choice was however in this context easy and evident:

> As regards political science, in 1959 there was no question that America was the centre, presenting just at that time with Messianic zeal the gift of behavioralism like some sort of Marshall aid to behind-lagging Europe, including quite undeveloped Denmark. We accepted the gift, greedily, for what it was worth, wondering perhaps a bit about its universal applicability (ibid., 320).

As far as Europe was concerned, the German Staatslehre was, according to Rasmussen, clearly outdated. From other European centres and quarters much was to be learnt. But:

> Still, a European map of political science around 1960 bore resemblance to the map of Africa a hundred years before, while the Americans seemed to be on their way to penetrate or eliminate all black areas, riding high on the tidal bore of behavioralism and welcomed by forerunners like Stein Rokkan of Norway and Erik Allardt of Finland (ibid.).

American behavioralism thus, to use Rasmussen's words, 'contributed heavily to moulding our answers as to what political science is and ought to be' (ibid.). The main answers were that political science had to be an empirical venture, producing precise information about political phenomena by utilizing refined research techniques, and that political science was to be guided by a thrust for theory (ibid.). The most important single lines of influence were in the writings of Arnold Brecht and David Easton, Brecht being attractive because his meta-scientific writings agreed with philosophical doctrines in the Danish universities, and Easton being attractive because his conception of politics and the task of political science agreed with pecularities of Danish political life (Nannestad 1977 a, 90). The shibboleths of value relativism and authoritative value allocation were acquired quite early, and they dominated Danish political science through the 1960s, being seriously questioned and attacked only towards the end of that decade, when a line of demarcation between behavioralists and Marxists was established (ibid., 90-92). This conflict is however clearly outside the time span of this review, and we shall not dwell upon it here. The central observation to be made here is that political science came to Denmark in the guise of behavioralism and was imported from America. Danish political science became a branch of American political science.

I shall summarize this section by adding a few general remarks:

In his trend report on postwar political science in Western Europe, Jan Barents notes that 'in many countries political science got both a shock and a new start from the Second World War, and in some other countries the end of the war meant the very beginning of political science, at least under that name' (1961, 6). Barents however also admits that he has had some difficulty in gauging the impact totaliarianism and war have on political studies as well as the degree of living relations between political science and the great issues, like a political temper of Western Europe (ibid., 6-7). Our three Scandinavian cases can be related to both these statements. The cases do not exemplify countries in which political science got a shock or a new start, but for Denmark and Norway the end of the war did mean the beginning of academic political science. Furthermore, the observation that the war issues influenced only marginally the content of political science is true for all our cases. While some traces of influence certainly can be found, Scandinavian political science did however not, on the whole, reorient itself towards new issues, brought to the fore by the war. In Denmark and in Norway the first more ambitious research investments were in the field of domestic politics and aimed at the extracting of scientific knowledge about the way the own political system operates; this emphasis was of course quite natural for political science communities that were new-born and unexperienced. Neither was there any dramatic shift in the Swedish orientation, although, for instance, the prewar preoccupation with the 1809 Form of Government Act and its sources did not survive the war years. The contribution of Swedish political research to the study of international politics increased to some extent, but remained rather meager up to the 1960s when it came into a fuller swing (Ruin 1977, 180).

To repeat, this introspectiveness was not an unique feature, characterizing Scandinavia alone. Postwar European political science was, according to Barents, strongly national in outlook. Barents offers several explanations for this, such as linguistic barriers, differing patterns of political science connections with related subjects, and the fact that in many countries political studies originally centred round the national system of government (1961, 18-19). Barents however also notes 'that it is as if the national systems of political studies are gradually absorbing interesting points of view and ways of approach from other nations' (ibid., 20). In Denmark and in Norway this happened, as we have seen, right from the beginning, and to a large extent Scandinavian political science therefore appeared double-faced: the discipline was national in terms of topics and research interests, it was international in terms of theoretical and methodical moods and tools. Political science was, in Denmark and in Norway more than in Sweden, the use of imported energy to refine domestic raw materials. This is , by the way, still true to some extent at least. The Nordic

political science communities have remained rather ethnocentric as far as research topics are concerned, and they have paid less attention to comparative research than one would expect, considering the many cultural, social and political similarities between the Nordic countries (Anckar 1987, 78-79). In this sense has the postwar situation become petrified to form a rather debatable tradition. The fact that Norway is ahead of the other Nordic countries as far as the emphasis on comparative research is concerned (ibid., 79), is quite compatible with this tradition, as the Norwegian lead origins already from the early years of the Stein Rokkan era.

It is only natural that research on the learning history of science focuses on transit periods and the great conflicts, issues and actors of such periods. One striking feature of postwar Scandinavian political science is however the absence of severe conflicts concerning institutionalization and orientation. The initiatives to introduce political science in Norway and Denmark did not give cause to persistent opposition and severe criticism, although, on the other hand, the supporting enthusiasm hardly reached irrepressible proportions. Neither did the subsequent behavioral onrush, more pronounced in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden, arouse much antagonism. Although many factors may have contributed to this almost idyllic state of affairs, one factor, mentioned by Johansson in his study of Swedish dissertations (1980, 31), deserves close attention. Johansson refers to the very small size of the Swedish political science community, and suggests that this small size was in itself a circumstance that fostered consensus rather than conflict. His argument is that tradition prevails when the few are replaced by the few, and that revolution starts when the few suddenly become many. This observation can presumably be generalized to cover the political science communities in Denmark and Norway as well. They were small in the postwar years, utterly small, and they were dominated by a few leading scholars who were adherents of the doctrine of behavioralism and remained unchallenged by the handfuls of fellow political scientists.

NOTES

1 For some odd reason Johansson has left out numerical data from his report, and the readers are therefore reduced to using graphical illustrations alone. The rather blurred quality of the graphs has in some cases made the interpretation of percentage points difficult.

2 Not all major changes are listed in the tableau. Some changes that relate to socio-economic categorizations of dissertation authors and some other changes that must be regarded irrelevant from the point of view of this report are left out.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
Methodological Problems of Comparative Research

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1. INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE STUDY OF SCIENCE

The new interest in the study of science in the last twenty years has given birth to different perspectives on the development of science. Generally these historical studies can be divided into "historical writing" and "theoretical research on history" (Lepenies 1983).The basic difference is that the former looks at history as a continuity and is written in a narrative form; theoretical research in history, on the other hand, tries to reconstruct different stages in history. While the former tries to present history "as it happened", the latter claims that it is impossible to present everything in writing. However, there are many who have clearly used a narrative form stressing that theirs is only a partial picture and the whole is impossible to attain (e.g., Ricci 1984; Seidelman 1985). In that sense the difference is relative.

Without even trying to construct a definitive list of the approaches in the study of science and their applications to the history of science, one can refer at least to the following:

1) "Histories". Most discipline histories come under this heading. Usually they have been written in order to legitimize the present (cf. Lepenies and Weingart 1983), or they are accounts of the history of the discipline in order to introduce it to someone (students, general public, colleagues of other countries), or they are case-studies of "important" figures in the history of the discipline.

2) Critical "histories". Sometimes these are written in the form of the history of "losers", i.e., the history of forgotten scholars and ideas (e.g., Palonen 1978).

3) Philosophy of science
 a) The analyses of the growth of science inspired by Karl Popper (Popper 1968)
 b) Anarchistic theory of knowledge (Feyerabend 1975).

4) Sociology of knowledge inspired by Karl Mannheim (Mannheim 1960).

5) Sociology of science

a) The analysis of external and internal factors affecting the development of science (e.g., Merton 1968)

b) Science as a bureaucracy. The classical analysis is of course William H. Whyte's "The Organization Man" (1956: 190-223)

c) Science as a market. The foremost representative is Pierre Bourdieu and his analysis of science as a field where scientists try to add to their academic capital (Bourdieu 1979).

6) Psychology of science (e.g., Bärmark 1971).

7) Empirical analyses of science inspired by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962).

8) Theory of science which tries to synthesize the philosophical analysis of science with more sociological aspects of reality. Håkan Törnebohm's model of the growth of science is a good example in this category (e.g., Törnebohm 1973).

9) Political science of science

a) Dominance-models explaining the development of science, e.g. center-periphery relations (Galtung 1981)

b) Analyses of science policies and their impact on the development of science (e.g., Andersson 1971); economics of science could also be placed in this category, because in spite of the utmost importance of economics, it is usually linked to the problems of science policy (or to the sociology of science as an economic factor) (e.g., Elzinga, ed. 1971).

10) Hermeneutical studies on science which try to understand the texts on their own terms (e.g., Ricoeur 1981).

11) British intellectual history (e.g. Skinner 1969; 1971-72) inspired by the works of R.G. Collingwood, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch.

12) Semiotics of the text which reconstruct the meaning of the text (e.g., Eco 1981).

13) Archaeology of knowledge inspired by the studies of Michel

Foucault (Foucault 1973; 1974).

14) Marxist analyses of history of science which can also be divided at least into three subcategories

a) Marxist-Leninist historical materialism which does not differ much from the traditional sociology of science. The main difference is that historical materialism uses as independent variables class relations and relations of production (e.g., Wiatr 1978; Gulijew - Löwe - Röder 1978)

b) Marxist structuralism explicated above all by Louis Althusser's analysis of the development of Marx's thinking (Althusser 1970), and applied to the analysis of whole disciplines, e.g., by Göran Therborn (Therborn 1974)

c) analyses inspired by the capital-logical school of Marxism which often stand near functionalism by trying to give different functions to different existing disciplines (e.g., Nielsen 1975).

15) Theoretical treatises which use history to substantiate their arguments (e.g., Parsons 1937).

These approaches may be applied to different aspects of scientific enterprise: disciplinary growth, problem areas, theories, concepts, individual scholars, or they may even try to understand science as a whole. Of course, it is also possible to "cross-fertilize" these approaches with each other, producing countless species. This being the case, the possibilities for the study of the development of political science seem to be nearly infinite. It is easy to agree with David Ricci that no one has yet invented a way of studying entire disciplines. These studies must always be selective, and the only thing one can do, is to select a perspective from which to look at the given discipline (Ricci 1987).

2. STUDIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In writing history or doing theoretical research on the development of political science one can be, for example:

-a scholar trying to legitimize the hegemonic paradigm of the discipline or,

-a researcher trying to convince financiers of the mightiness of

political science or,
-a professor writing an introductory chapter to his/her "Introduction to Political Science" or,
-a critic trying to reorient the study of politics or,
-a student of intellectual history trying to interpret history as well as possible or,
-a social theorist trying to formulate a theory of politics by reconstructing the historical modes of thinking in society.

Possibilities are many and all have been used when writing the history of political science. Of the various approaches outlined in the previous chapter, political science has witnessed almost all of them, too. Works representing "histories" are the largest group also in political science, from "Contemporary Political Science" (UNESCO 1950) to "International Handbook of Political Science" (Andrews, ed. 1982). More thorough writings dealing with the history of one country are studies such as, e.g., Dwight Waldo's essay "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise" (1975) or the APSA's collection of articles "Political Science: The State of the Discipline" (Finifter, ed. 1983). Biographies of political scientists are also well represented either in the form of different articles (e.g., Rogow, ed. 1969; Beale, ed. 1954) or monographs (e.g., Karl 1974; Wiener 1971). Legitimation histories are well represented in this category, the prime example being Albert Somit's and Joseph Tanenhaus's "The Development of Political Science" (1967).

Kuhn has been clearly overused. It is a peculiar historical phenomenon that Kuhn's book came out at a time when there was a need for the analysis of the development of science, but few had done it empirically. As a result also political scientists were eager to adopt his ideas (e.g. Truman 1965) and he was soon co-opted into the mainstream of political science (Ricci 1984: 199-201).

Critical analyses of the history of political science have also appeared in many forms. Bernard Crick's "The American Science of Politics" (1959) is one of the best examples of the critical reading of the history of political science, although it is

difficult to say what is its methodology (cf. Crick 1980). However, it does not matter, if it is an example of early British intellectual history or a piece of unconscious hermeneutics, it is a brilliant analysis in any case. Of the "what went wrong"-tradition, the classic work is "Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics" (Storing, ed. 1962). The sociology of science (e.g, Petras 1967) is also well represented among the critical analyses, as are the Marxist critiques from the scholars of the socialist countries (e.g. Kalenski - Mocek - Löwe 1971). David Ricci's "The Tragedy of Political Science" (1984) applies different perspectives to the critical analysis of political science from the analysis of bureaucracy to the philosophy of science.

There are also good examples of other categories. British intellectual history is well represented in "That Noble Science of Politics" (Collini, Winch & Burrow 1983). A classic theoretical treatise which uses history as a help in constructing a framework for the theory of politics is David Easton's "The Political System" (Easton 1971).

What then is missing? It depends how one interprets the situation, but one could claim that those studies are few that apply hermeneutics, semiotics and/or the archaeology of knowledge in the study of the development of political science (see, however, Ahonen 1984; Berndtson 1983). Clearly also missing are comparative analyses of the history of political science. In fact, there have been no comparative studies, except short articles dealing with limited areas (e.g., Anckar 1987).

The situation poses many problems for the comparative study of the development of political science. However, it would not be very fruitful to analyse different approaches listed at the beginning of this paper and to evaluate them by using some metatheoretical standard, and as a "solution" present some own methodological construction. At this embryonic stage of the study of the history of political science one should be humble. The following analysis begins by taking a look at some recent general articles. In the next chapter I try to focus on problems which the comparative study of the development of political science has

to deal with. At the end of the paper some tentative proposals are made for the future study of the history of political science.

3. COMPARATIVE NOTES ON THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE

It is difficult to tell when political science was taught for the first time in the universities, so different names have been given to the chairs which have been attributed to the teaching of politics. Swedes usually refer to the fact that already in 1622 there was established the Johan Skytte professorship of discourse and politics at the University of Uppsala, although the scholars holding the chair did not concentrate on the study of politics until the 1840s (Ruin 1982:299). However, at the same time there were similar chairs also at the Dutch universities, sometimes called politica and retorica (Hoogerwerf 1982:227) and politics was at the same time taught under different labels also in other countries (e.g., Haddow 1939).

Many have argued, however, that political science is a peculiarly American discipline (e.g., Friedrich 1947: 978; Crick 1959). As Alexis de Tocqueville already pointed out, "a new political science is needed for a world itself quite new" (de Tocqueville 1966: 6). The widening of democracy with its problems clearly was a prerequisite for the emergence of political science as a distinct discipline in the United States at the end of the 19th century (cf. Berndtson 1983), at the same time when the flexible American university system made this possible (Veysey 1965).

In this vein the development of political science in contemporary meaning can be understood as an Americanization process after the Second World War, where the founding of the International Political Science Association in 1949 was an important event. Many articles in "International Handbook of Political Science" (Andrews, ed. 1982) illustrate this plainly. The argument can also be substantiated by referring to evidence given by some close observers of the process. Quincy Wright, the first President of the IPSA, wrote in 1949:

"One difficulty of course is that social science is a very recent growth and few people really believe in its possibilities. I was impressed at the recent meeting to form an International Political Science Association in Paris with the lack of political science associations in the world and the lack of belief among many people that a political science was possible. Really as disciplines seeking to utilize so far as possible the objective methods which have developed in the natural sciences, social science comes near to being an American phenomenon of the last fifty years. Little as there has been to spend on social sciences in the United States there has been infinitely more than in any other country. One of the tasks of the international associations in the social sciences therefore is to try to spread what we know about social science in the United States to the rest of the world". (Wright, 1949b)

Canada was one of the first countries to introduce political science on the model given by the United States. Although the Canadians have not usually seen that their discipline of political science has been imported from the United States (pointing to the domestic and British roots of the discipline in Canada), there have been, however, many who have been worried about the americanization of the country's political science. This has been explained by factors such as, e.g., proximity to the United States, a common language for English-speaking Canadians, the extensive resort to American graduate schools, widespread use of American textbooks and the presence of American graduate students and American faculty (Cairns 1975; cf. Trent 1987).

If one takes a look at the institutionalization of the modern political science after the Second World War in Western Europe, several mainlines of the development may be noticed. First, socio-economic development which is linked to democratization and modernization (or a wish to modernize the political system) has been an important factor in many countries. This can be seen, for instance, in the cases of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

Although an intense debate on politics and the Theory of the State had already emerged in Germany between 1890 and 1933 (Palonen 1985), the conditions for a distinct discipline of political science did not exist at that time (its seeds, however, could be seen in the founding of Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in 1920). After the war the emergence of political science as an independent academic discipline was due to the specific political

constellation: the failure of the Weimar Republic, the experience of National Socialism and World War II, the collapse of the German state and the political development in a divided country which became involved in the Cold War (Kastendiek 1987). The task of political science was explicitly defined as "to build up democracy", and the support for the new discipline came from Social Democrats while resistance to it among the established sciences was considerable. Resistance arose among the conservatives because of their aversion to the 'science of Re-education' sponsored by the American occupation forces (von Beyme 1982: 169). In the case of West Germany one may clearly see what the spreading of the American political science to other countries meant in reality. One may again refer to a letter by Quincy Wright:

"At Paris we organized an International Political Science Association but discovered there were few national associations to organize....Apparently political science as an academic discipline has been dead in Germany for a generation, but this group was anxious to reestablish it. Our colleague Karl Lowenstein of Amherst had organized the meeting under the auspices of the Military Government and emphasized the importance of creating an understanding in Germany of what we mean by political science." (Wright, 1949a)

In post-war Italy the social and economic conditions affected the development of political science in another way. "Scientific realism" was needed as an instrument for reform (voiced e.g. by Norberto Bobbio) and for the modernization of the political system (voiced e.g. by Giovanni Sartori) The development of political science was due to several factors: socio-economic needs, changes in the Italian university structure, the external influences (the impact of American behavioralism) and the role of certain individuals. American funds and institutional cooperation seem to have been also readily available for introducing new methods and themes of investigation (Graziano 1987).

Political scientists in Italy had to face, however, a war at two frontiers. Together with other social sciences they had to fight first against history and legal studies. The second frontier was formed against sociology that presented itself as a general science of society. It is interesting that the problems of Italian political science seem to have been quite common also

elsewhere. In Canada this "war of two frontiers" was waged already in the 1940s and 1950s (Cairns 1975:196) and, e.g., in Finland in the 1950s and 1960s (see especially, Jansson 1966).

The linkage to democratization and modernization processes is quite evident in the cases of Italy and the FRG, two major European countries emerging from fascism to democracy. France and United Kingdom, however, would have had all the prerequisites to develop a distinct discipline of political science already earlier, except, it seems, the right kind of university system. Pierre Favre writes about France:

"For a number of reasons political science could not appear in France at the end of the nineteenth century. Sociology, born in the Faculty of Letters, too absorbed in its conquest of legitimacy through its combat with philosophy and the humanities, left political science to the jurists at the very time that the latter were bringing the science of the state back to pure and simple study of juridical standards." (Favre 1982: 154)

The French intellectual tradition remained relatively isolated from foreign influences, while, on the other hand, the seeds of "American" political science" were already contained in the French political sciences. Constitutional studies consisted of the comparative study and classification of political regimes and the functioning of political institutions, as well as the analysis of political doctrines, projects for the reform of the state and so forth. Electoral studies also had their own tradition of French electoral geography or sociology. In this context "French political scientists find their scientific serenity with difficulty, for they constantly encounter philosophers, sociologists, and historians who publicly announce their own claim to talk about politics and to talk about it with incomparably greater explanatory power." (Favre 1982: 164)

Traditions of the study of politics and the system of higher education seem to have been also in the United Kingdom a hindrance to the emergence of "modern" political science. The founding of the London School of Economics and Political Science at the end of the 19th century could have been a beginning, because the Webbs, Graham Wallas and Harold Laski had many common interests with the American political scientists. However, in the strongholds of the English academic world, in Oxford and in

Cambridge, the philosophical and traditional study of politics was favored and after the Second World War the British response to the American behavioralism was either lukewarm or outright critical. The "modern" political science did not really develop in the United kingdom until 1965 (Hayward 1982).

The development of political science in the four major European countries has been different from each other. This heterogeneity of paths leading to a distinct political science discipline in different countries can be seen by taking a look also at smaller European nations. For instance, the Nordic countries were all eager to adopt the new American science of politics, but the development was also in these countries dependent on political constellations, scientific traditions and systems of higher education. Among these countries Finland was the first to develop a modern political science discipline (Anckar 1987). The key for this may be the internal political situation in Finland which was susceptible to the influence of American political science. Finland's internal political problems (a struggle between the Right and the Communist Party) and her external problems (relations with the Soviet Union) made political scientists to turn to the United States. The scientific relations were eagerly used as a way to form political ties to the West (Paakkunainen 1985).

Finland may be compared with Switzerland, where political science has actually developed only in the 1960s:

"How can this lack of interest be explained in a country where it is well known that politics is everybody's affair?...To their eyes, practical experience made scientific analysis quite useless. Many saw in political science a passing fashion from abroad and held it in suspicion. There was a fear that the study of politics would lead to a politicization of science or to the "scientification" of politics. It was considered unacceptable that politics which was everybody's affair, would become that of a few specialists, even if they were political scientists....the stability of the Swiss political system is another factor which accounts for the retinence of the Swiss toward political science....Until very recently, law was considered a discipline both necessary and sufficient for a good understanding of Swiss politics." (Wemegah 1982: 327)

4. PROBLEMS OF (COMPARATIVE) RESEARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

4.1. "Variables" as a Problem

To compare is to play with differences and similarities. The subject matter of the comparative historical research is always full of choices, from concepts to cases. The more general the concepts are the more cases one can subsume under them, but then the clarity of the analysis is in danger. On the other hand, the more narrow the concepts are, the clearer one can see, but the range will be smaller.

Proximity to the United States, a common language, a resort to American graduate schools, widespread use of American textbooks, the presence of American graduate schools and American faculty are important factors in studying the development of political science in Canada, but possibilities to use them in explaining the development in other countries are clearly limited.

Political constellations, the need for democratization and modernization of the political system, the usefulness of political science in the eyes of authorities, and the role of individuals, seem to be more general factors. The same seems to be the case with factors that have hindered the institutionalization of political science: the stability of the country (there has been no need for political science), the intellectual tradition (e.g., isolationism), organization of academic disciplines in universities (conservatism of scholars from other fields, intellectual traditions concerning discourse on politics). Some of these factors seem to be also relevant for the study of the development of political science in Non-European countries. For instance, in Nigeria the country's statist political economy and the logic of colonial nationalism have been important factors influencing the development of Nigerian political science (Jinadu 1987).

However, for comparative purposes, these factors may be too general, and, on the other hand, their influence has obviously been different in each country, as the "summary of the develop-

ment" in the previous chapter clearly points out. Furthermore, more possible "factors" influencing the development of political science could easily be invented (e.g., Trent 1987).

It is also difficult to judge the nature of these factors. They cannot be measured exactly, and it is also often impossible to say, if they are dependent, independent or intervening "variables". The americanization of the study of politics in Europe may have been the result of a conscious effort on behalf of the Americans, but it may also have been due to the changes in the style of politics in these countries, to the "americanization of politics".

The logical conclusion seems to be that the development of political science must be analysed in each country's own cultural context using methods of historical and cultural studies (cf. Jones 1983). It is important that there are concepts and "variables" to guide the research, but these must be used with care or else earlier studies too easily influence the results of the later ones.

A good example of the meaning of the cultural context is David Ricci's book "The Tragedy of Political Science" (1984) that deals with the development of political science in the United States. Ricci uses a model (that he constructed not before, but during his research) drawn from five different sources: studies dealing with the nature of organizations, history of education, the liberal tradition, the philosophy of science and the notion of tragedy (see also Ricci 1987). These five perspectives are, however, suitable only for the study of the history of American political science; there are countries where the application of the model would be totally misleading.

4.2. Influence as a Problem

In spite of the differences between countries, the americanization of political science has evidently spread from Iceland to South Korea, which can be witnessed by reading "International Handbook of Political Science" (Andrews, ed. 1982). There is a clear difference to the articles in UNESCO's "Comparative Poli-

tical Science" (1950).

However, the process seems to have been more complex than it has usually been understood. One of the major criticisms against the Americanization of political science has been, that using American theories and concepts makes one to define his/her own political system with concepts developed out of American political experience. In analysing this kind of dominance of a country's scientific community on others, sometimes use has been made of the concepts of center and periphery borrowed from theorists of imperialism, who have themselves used them in the study of science (Galtung 1981).

The framework of center-periphery relations cannot, however, explain the spreading of theories and their reception. Political science communities tend to import only some chosen theories and approaches from other countries. There are many different kinds of "americanized" political science communities in the world. For instance, David Easton's systems analysis was accepted as a theoretical framework in Finland in the 1960s. At the same time hardly any Finnish political scientist referred to Robert A. Dahl's studies of power, although community studies were under a heated debate in the United States at that time.

It has also been argued that the perspective of center-periphery relations proceeds from a subjectless perspective. That is why it should be concretized by taking a look at individual scholars as paradigmatic examplars or carriers connecting the center and the periphery (Stolte-Heiskanen & Heiskanen 1985: 166-167). However, political scientists are linked to other countries in different ways. French-Canadians may be more interested in the work of French political scientists than in the work of American political scientists, Swedish-Finns in the Swedish political science than in the Finnish, British feminist political scientists in the feminist political theory in Italy than in British electoral research and Australian marxists in German Marxism than in Australian administrative studies. If one focuses on countries only as a single unit, important features will be unnoticed. One should study subcultures and their linkages to other countries (e.g., Laponce 1987).

In addition, it is important to notice that theories and ideas often change in content (through active subjects) when they are transferred to other cultural contexts (Kanerva & Palonen 1987). The influence may be direct or indirect (for the latter, see Gunnell 1987), but in the case of the intellectual development of science, it is seldom direct, because that would deny the creativity of thinking.

There are reasons to believe that the americanization process of political science must be analyzed from different perspectives. One of the best articles, dealing with the issue, is Alan C. Cairns's "Political Science in Canada and the Americanization Issue" (1975), where Cairns writes:

"One of the major factors contributing to tension in Canada, as elsewhere, has been what Shils labels the institutionalization of the social sciences. By this term Shils refers to the creation of specific structures by means of which the intellectual activity of the particular discipline takes place, its intellectual products are disseminated, its standards are maintained, new recruits are socialized, and incentives and disincentives are systematically given to intellectual work in accordance with evolving criteria of quality. The relevant structures include courses, departments, libraries and undergraduate and graduate programs which give recognition and support to particular disciplines. To these university aspects of structure must be added professional journals, learned societies, publishers, funding agencies, and the "invisible college" of colleagues working on related problems who use these instrumentalities to co-ordinate their efforts and to transmit cues to each other. In these terms it is clear that political science is far more institutionalized in the United States than in any other country, a fact possessed of crucial intellectual consequences." (Cairns 1975 :203)

The message of Cairns's article is that the institutionalization and size of the American political science has had a mass-effect in moulding the political science communities of other countries. There has been no way of not taking into account the American political science. The dominance of American political science in the world has been due mainly to the degree of institutionalization.

Because of the smallness of other political science communities, the American political science has determined much that has been known about politics around the world. There are, for

instance, many developing countries that have had no political scientists of their own. Many times the interpretations concerning the politics and society in those countries have been made by American scholars. This is a prime example how the politics of those countries have been defined by American concepts and interests even to the inhabitants of those countries themselves. The situation has varied, of course. It may have been totally different in countries where the United States has had a real interest (in developing countries, in major Western European countries) than in some peripheral countries. However, even in the former group the situation has varied according, e.g., to the amount of political scientists, the length of the political science tradition, and the capability to stand against foreign intellectual influences.

The imitation of the American political science in smaller countries has led also to other negative consequences. The flexibility of the American university system has made it possible to expand into hitherto unknown territories. The system has had a capacity to specialize and to form heterogenous research groups with meetings and journals. Specialization in other countries has, however, often led to an unstable situation and changing fads, leaving many problems untouched. A good example is the spread of behavioralism. It led to a situation where the basic structures and formal features of the political system were left unexplored in many countries, because young scholars were eager to follow international trends, not the needs of their own country.

However, the americanization of political science may have had also a positive side. In countries with only a few political scientists the development of political science has been sporadic in any case. Many interpretations have been unchallenged for long periods of time and many features of the political system have not been touched, because there have not been enough scholars. In this situation it has been possible to learn from the American political science.

From this follows two conclusions for the study of the development of political science. First, the Americanization of poli-

tical science is a factor which is of the utmost importance in comparing the development of political science in different countries. However, the American influence must be critically evaluated case by case. Secondly, the process must be looked from many angles and no simple theories of influence can be used. There are too many dependent, independent and intervening variables.

4.3. Political Science as a Problem

There is an institutional "bias" in the analysis of the development of political science. Because political scientists are political scientists they tend to overlok certain factors. For instance, other disciplines have been seen in histories of political science mainly as competitors. The struggle against jurists, historians and sociologists is a good example. However, there has often also been cooperation between political scientists and scholars from other fields (e.g., sociologists) that has been fruitful for the development of political science.

This "bias" arises from the socialization process of political scientists. Few of them are even ready to study rationally their own behavior. Students of the history of political science have not usually applied to themselves the methods they may otherwise use in research. Some have applied class analysis (or even generational analysis) to explain the development of political science, but psychoanalysis or theories of political clientilism have hardly been used.

However, to understand the nature of political theories and the role of political science in different countries, it would be necessary to know what kind of personalities political scientists have possessed. Personalities have been important for the development of political science in the countries where there have been few political scientists. Even if there have been, say, one hundred of them in some country at a certain time, individuals have still been important, because not many of them have been influential scholars. Although American political science is an exception because of its size, the different personalities have also in the United States evidently had an effect

on the nature of political science (Berndtson 1987: 97).

This leads to the problem of the recruitment of political scientists. Actually there are at least three connecting problems. First, what kind of people start to study political science, and secondly, how are they socialized into the discipline, i.e., what political science as a discipline teach them to do and how. And thirdly, who are recruited into the profession. Different generations also have their own motives and concerns (compare the conformists of the 1950s with the rebels of the 1960s!). It is difficult to say if there are any general motives among political scientists, but it seems that at least money and fame are not usually among the prime ones. Instead there may be a fascination with power or a strong motive for reforming the system.

Pierre Bourdieu has claimed that many sociologists have started to study sociology because the discipline offers a possibility not to think of one's own social position. Sociologists are necessarily utopians trying to place themselves above social hierarchies. It is an interesting question if they really are equipped to understand society better than some other professions (Bourdieu 1979: 596; cf. Stinchcombe 1984). The same kind of questions should also be posed in regard to political science. It is an interesting fact from the recent history of the social sciences, that, for instance, when Marxism was revived in the 1960s, sociology students all over the world were usually more radical than students of political science. An explanation may be that these disciplines attract different personalities and, on the other hand, socialization processes within them are different due to the different histories of the disciplines.

During the socialization of political scientists certain rules are learned on what it means to be a good political scientist. These rules include also, what to study, how to argue, to whom one should refer, and how to write in general ("introduction, theory, methods, data, conclusions"). The understanding of these rules would be of utmost importance for the study of the development of political science, because through them the discipline is linked to other disciplines and to the history of knowledge in

general (Foucault 1974; cf. also Ostrom 1987). These rules affect also scientists' evaluation of the usefulness of their own discipline ("it must be useful because we are on it"). Few political scientists would be ready to deny themselves, to demand an end to political science.

Because of the socialization process the institutionalization of political science is poorly understood. Writing history of a given discipline from the present will direct the attention of a researcher only to certain questions and the questions which would break the positive narrative are often tacitly ignored (Collini, Winch & Burrow 1983: 4-5). A lot of pseudo-literature on the concept of politics and political science has been published because one has to legitimate one's position. A good example is that the concept of politics became a problem only when political science was established as a science. These invisible rules will determine the study of the development of political science, if one is not ready to admit that political science as a distint discipline is only one possible discourse on politics, and not necessarily even the best one.

The problem is repeated if one cannot take a look at the development of political science also from the perspective of future possibilities (Heiskanen 1987). History is usually explained from the past or from the present. A third way is to try to understand it from the future. Political science was born as an American discipline and its history has been dependent on its role in the division of labor between different social sciences. However, as the relations between nations change at the same time.when the internal structures of society (from the industrial society to the information society) and social values (from modern to postmodern?) change, social science disciplines will also be rearranged (cf. Lyotard 1984). The globalization of political science is already transforming political science into new directions. There is a trend towards a new kind of fragmentation and disintegration at the same time when the criticism against the discipline has taken new forms (e.g., Ricci 1987; Palonen 1987; Heiskanen 1987). If this transformation will change the nature of political science drastically, there is no use to study the history of political science from the discipline's present

status. If the possible future transformations of the discipline are not understood, its past will not be understood either.

5. SOME TENTATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

5.1. A Need for a Multi-Level History

To study the development of political science is to study something fuzzy and abstract. There are various aspects and countless possibilities what the object of research can be. The institutionalization of political science in different countries and its growth afterwards is one starting-point. This means differentiating political science from the study of politics in general. The second possibility is to study what political science has produced: what it has studied, what are its main results and what kind of theories one has been able to construct.

Of course, the goals of the study determine what to study. If we want to understand the institutionalization process of political science, we should study: how the first chairs in political science were founded, what social conditions have been behind the institutionalization, and how the American political science has influenced the development in different countries. However, it is already more difficult to study what areas of politics have been studied, because then one has to decide if the research on politics in other disciplines is of any interest to the study of the history of political science or not.

The concrete description of the development is still relatively easy, but the more abstract the aspects we are trying to analyse, the more difficult our task will be. There are thousands of articles and books trying to tell what some scholar is saying or what some theory really means. To compare the achievements of political science communities in different countries is still more difficult. In case of theories this may be quite impossible or at least totally futile. In the comparative study of political ideologies or scientific theories "one cannot hope to approach a psychological reality without going down to a level where universal scientific categories lose most of their sharpness. Fabian

ideology or Russian nihilism are clearly very specific trends, not to be evaluated with objective measures..." (Dogan and Pelassy 1984: 108).

From the scientific point of view this complexity of problems raises at least three questions: how to write "good" history of political science, is there a possibility to use the history of political science as a help in constructing a theory of politics and what is the role of comparative research in this undertaking.

To write as good history as possible, the only solution seems to be a multi-level research on the development of political science. Empirical surveys dealing with the organizational history are needed as well as case-studies on prominent scholars in the field. Intellectual history, the analysis of discursive practices, semiotics of the text or the hermeneutical interpretation of the text can then be used according to the situation (cf. Berndtson 1983). It is simply preposterous to think to attain all the possible aims using only one method. To try to combine them into one coherent approach would, on the other hand, be meaningless.

A good example is that of the role of individual scholars in the history of science. History ~~is always~~ the history of men trying to find in their existence, and in the theories explaining their existence, a basic unity through which they can organize heterogenous ingredients (whether in life or in texts) into an intelligible totality. Men are both subjects in history and objects of the currents, institutions, functions and structures (Ricoeur 1983: 180). Because of that there have been different attempts in the study of the development of science to face the problem of individuals as subjects and/or objects.

For instance, Quentin Skinner (1969; 1971-72) argues that in the historical study of ideas one should always study the intensions of a scholar by taking into account both the social and intellectual conditions of the idea. One must analyse ideas as answers to specific questions in society. On the other hand, this is not enough, because the earlier writings on the subject must also be consulted in order to understand the theoretical context.

It is important also to study the literature of an era as a whole, not only those works which have remained known to posterity. One should not study only the works of Machiavelli and the social context he lived in, but also the Ars dictaminis-literature and the works of e.g., Filippo Beroaldo and Vespasiano da Bisticci should be consulted. For Skinner the history of ideas is not a narrative containing different and contradictory answers to the same and always actual questions, but a narrative containing answers to always different questions. In that sense, the intellectual history tries to take into account both the role of individuals and social structures, while some intellectual historians have even stressed the necessity of dealing also with the sensibilities of the authors, their aesthetic emotions and their feelings towards contradictory pressures in work (Collini, Winch & Burrow 1983: 5-6).

On the other hand, it is quite legitimate also to leave the subject out totally, if the goal to write the history of science is some other. As Michel Foucault wrote:

"I do not wish to deny the validity of intellectual biographies, or the possibility of a history of theories, concepts, or themes. It is simply that I wonder whether such descriptions are themselves enough, whether they do justice to the the immense density of scientific discourse, whether there do not exist, outside their customary boundaries, systems of regularities that have a decisive role in the history of science. I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and overwhelm them." (Foucault 1973: xiii-xiv)

5.2. A Need for Ideal Types

A multi-level history helps to understand the development of political science, but it does not necessarily offer possibilities to compare the development in different countries. Neither does it necessarily offer possibilities to understand politics that the history of political science should be a description of. To compare theories or empirical results of political science in different countries does not help very much. Already the basic concepts of political science (e.g., politics and state) have different connotations in different languages (Heidenheimer

1982), while the theories also deal with very different conceptions of temporality. Furthermore, the development of political science does not deal directly with reality; the object of the history of science is a symbolic world representing the real world. This is the reason why one must first understand the meaning and nature of the texts, before one can start to compare the development or to try to construct a theory of politics.

One possibility to approach these aims is to try to disperse the accidental from the history by constructing a concept or concepts which can also be used as a means of comparison. Max Weber's method of ideal types is clearly one way to do that. As Weber wrote:

"An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality,...." (Weber 1969: 90)

How to construct these ideal types for the comparative study of the development of political science is another matter. One possibility to do it is through texts. There are different possibilities even for this undertaking, from Louis Althusser's strategy of "symptomatic reading" by finding the crucial breaks (epistemological breaks) in the problematic of different sciences (Althusser 1970: 249-257) to Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutical reading of the texts (Ricoeur 1981).

For example, to apply Ricoeur's analysis to the reading of the texts would mean that the texts would have to be taken as different possible "worlds". How we, as readers, interpret the texts and the "worlds" need not be contingent upon the author's original intentions. The texts are always open to different readings and the reader always reconstructs his own meanings and makes guesses. These guesses, however, are not arbitrary, because the texts tehemselves delimit the field of possible interpretations and the reader assumedly follows the logic of

probability. Consequently the reader's preunderstanding, his "theory", gives the reading necessarily subjective factor, and affects the interpretation of the text as a whole. On the other hand, the reading of the parts of a text (or a larger textual unity) offers procedures for testing and falsification. If a part of a text (or a text in a textual unity) does not "fit" into the whole, the reader must reconsider his interpretation of the whole (cf. Whitaker 1982). There is no ready method or theory one can use in reading the texts. Although the reading of the texts is always related to different political and theoretical struggles in those texts, and through them, in society (cf. Althusser 1970), imagination has its own autonomy.

In the comparative study of the development of political science the problem is what texts to read. Because of the historical dominance of the American political science, one possibility would be to construct an ideal type of an American political science and use it to compare the development of political science in other countries. This would mean a construction of American political science, e.g., as a science of democracy with certain basic concepts and research areas (Berndtson 1983). To resort to the American political science in constructing an ideal type of the development of political science and not to political science in general is due to the idea of Weberian ideal types which is to make explicit not any average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena (Weber 1969: 101). From this comparison one could then approach the possibilities of constructing a theory of politics. This undertaking would, however, still need other ingredients, mainly to understand the logic of political science in the development of society's quest for knowledge.

5.3. A Need for the Study of the Relations Between Scientific Disciplines

Many have claimed that it is impossible to study the development of a single discipline in isolation from other disciplines (Collini, Winch & Burrow 1983: 4; Foucault 1973) and a prerequisite for understanding the nature of scientific growth would be to construct a theory of relations between scientific discip-

lines with a search for common thematic categories in them (Lepenies 1977: 59-60). This task is also a prerequisite for understanding the nature of political science and its role in society as well as it is a prerequisite for understanding the logic of political science. Following the notion of political science as an American discipline, the following analysis looks mainly at the developments in the United States.

The early phase of American social science is an example of the many intertwining influences of different traditions in science. At the beginning of its evolution American social science was based as much on French system building (Comte) and English evolutionary empiricism (Spencer, Booth) than on German sociology and psychology. When the ideas from these sources were applied in the United States, American pragmatism emerged, on the one hand, and a Comtean positivism reinforced with a developing science of statistics, on the other hand. In the same way, it is impossible to understand the development of American political science if one does not consider developments in other sciences, e.g., in psychology and statistics (cf. Jensen 1969b). Furthermore, history and also geography were important for the development of all social sciences at that time. Frederick Jackson Turner's use of statistical graphs, for instance, helped to spread the use of statistics into social sciences (Jensen 1969a: 232-235).

When one looks at the history of political science as an institutionalized discipline worldwide, one finds a general pattern of political science emerging from constitutional law, history and philosophy (the history of ideas) (cf. Andrews 1982: 2). This has been the case, for example, as well in Sweden (with three traditions before 1945: constitutional law, represented by Fredrick Lagerroth; history, represented by Axel Bruzewitz; and philosophy, represented by Herbert Tingsten) (Ruin 1982: 299-300) as in the Netherlands (e.g., "In the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century political phenomena were studied within the framework of disciplines such as public philosophy, constitutional law, and history", Hoogerwerf 1982: 227).

The same was also the case in the United States. It must be remembered that the first scientific journal in political

science, The Political Science Quarterly, founded in 1886 in Columbia University, was a review devoted to the Historical, Statistical and Comparative Study of Politics, Economics and Public Law. Even more clearly the intertwining of public law, history and philosophy can be seen in the works of the first generation of American political scientists (John W. Burgess- public law, William A. Dunning- history and political philosophy, Woodrow Wilson- history). In that sense the early phase of American political science was not much different in content than the European study of politics at that time. Besides, many American political scientists did not yet adhere to the notion of science in the study of politics (e.g., Wilson 1911).

But why did political science in the United States begin to develop in the direction it increasingly did from the 1920s onwards? Evidently one must look for the answer in practical demands of the American society. For instance, Hans J. Morgenthau has already claimed that the first departments of political science in the United States tried to satisfy practical needs that other academic disciplines refused to meet. Law schools would not deal with public law, neither any department with instruction in journalism or municipal administration. There was, however, a demand for these and subsequently they were made part of the curriculum of political science (Morgenthau 1955: 436-437).

However, there is still a basic problem: why was political science needed as a special discipline? Why law schools did not deal with public law or why it was the Faculty of Political Science that was established in Columbia University in 1880 and not the Faculty of Sociology? The answer to these questions may be found in the changing relations between scientific disciplines, in which case a look at the situation in the 19th century Europe is needed.

In his book "Science, Class and Society" (1974) Göran Therborn claims that sociology was born after the French Revolution mainly as a study of politics. Sociology did not belong into the world of the Enlightenment, it was only after the French Revolution that it began to develop focusing on new kinds of social inter-

action. There was a need to find an explanation for a new political form of society and give reasons for its justification. It is interesting that Auguste Comte, a "founder" of sociology, tried to develop above all the positive science of politics. He used the concepts of "social science", "sociology", "political philosophy" and "political science" as synonyms.

Therborn claims that before sociology there existed two specialized discourses on society, political economy and political theory (philosophy) and that "political theory seems to be the intellectual background against which sociology's claim to represent a new science of society should be analyzed." (Therborn 1974: 96) The role of ideas in social change needed its legitimation and it was sociology as a science of norms and values that became a critique against the structural and materialist approach in political economy. An important figure behind the rise of sociology was Montesquieu whose influence on Saint-Simon and Comte and later on Durkheim was crucial.

American social science was still heavily influenced by European social thought in the 19th century. In that sense the above development affected also the development in the United States. However, there the development of society made the quest for knowledge on politics different than in Europe. According to an American sociologist Scott Greer, the end of classical political economy at the end of the 19th century signified the birth of economics and political science as separate disciplines. Economics was purified from politics and political science became a symbiosis of constitutional law and a doctrine of "good state" (political philosophy). However, these two specialties left a great deal of social behavior out of the picture when a bridge no longer existed between them. The situation created a need for the establishment of sociology to fill the "empty" space as a general science of society (Greer 1969: 52).

Although Greer's interpretation is too simple, it gives a new dimension to Therborn's argument. The social sciences were born in the United States at the end of the 19th century with the formation of the modern society. In the realm of politics this was linked to the rise of a new American state (Skowronek 1982)

and the democratization of society. Following heuristically the logic of the three interests of knowledge by Jürgen Habermas (1966), it can be argued, that the dissolution of political economy and political theory led to the birth of economics (to take care of the problems of work and production), sociology (to study the problems of language via interaction and norms) and political science (to study the problems of power and governing in the modern state). Political theory had contained both an explanatory and ideological discourse on politics. The explanatory part was taken over by sociology and the remaining ideological part was introduced into the discipline of political science. When at the same time the central core of political science dealt with the study of constitutional problems and because there was also a need to educate people, this explains "the unholy alliance" of constitutional studies, history and political philosophy in the first phase of American political science.

However, the change in American political science began in earnest at the beginning of the 20th century. History, jurisprudence and philosophy were no longer alone adequate discourses on politics. Relations between the social science disciplines began to change again. Political science became more like sociology at the same time when the interest of sociologists turned more into apolitical problems. Charles E. Merriam had listened Franklin H. Giddings's lectures in Columbia University and often referred to Giddings's teaching in his early writings, either defending American imperialism (Merriam 1903: 328) or talking about the relationship of democracy to freedom and social laws. At the University of Chicago Harold F. Gosnell, on the other hand, used in his election studies ideas from sociologists' studies on city (Faris 1970: 53).

However, although the different social sciences began to differentiate more and more in their research areas, there seems to have prevailed still many common thematic categories. For instance, in the 1920s there was a clear ideological standpoint from which they focused on people: the intelligent, non-deviant, good citizen. Intelligence was the central category in psychology (Ash 1983), in sociology it was success as a positive category

and deviant behavior as a negative one (cf. Vidich & Lyman 1985), and in political science, yes, a good citizen which used his or her vote (e.g., Merriam and Gosnell 1924). This logic from the 1920s still seems to prevail in the social sciences today, although there are clear signs of it breaking down. What the above argumentation should point out, however, is that the relations between different social science disciplines are not eternal; they are changing as the society changes.

6. CONCLUSION

The proposals for the study of the development of political science presented in this paper are not so radical as they may seem at the first reading. They only urge to take the study of the history of political science seriously. The argumentation is based on the belief that the development and growth of science can be studied rationally. I do not believe in Popper's "World 3" or the thesis of the ultimate illegibility of texts advanced by Jacques Derrida (e.g., Derrida 1981). Neither do I believe in mechanic explanations of the development of science by external or internal factors, whether they are "class relations" or "scientific crises". There are causes that affect the development of political science, but one cannot analyse the history of science directly but through texts. These texts, as life in general, are full of heterogenous ingredients that a reader must make sense of. For that task he/she needs a multi-level cultural, historical and institutional approach in the comparative study of the development of political science.

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OLD AND NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE IN ITALY

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Paper prepared for the International Round Table on the Comparative Study of the Development of Political Science, Cortona, Italy, September 21-26, 1987

Introduction

Over the last three decades Italian political science has experienced a remarkable growth after a period of decline and neglect during and after Fascism. There are many signs of this growth. For one thing, the discipline has made much progress in terms of academic institutionalization. Hardly present in the Italian academia prior to 1970, and with only one chair in political science at the time (Sartori's in Florence), the discipline has found since then a firm foothold and a growing role in the Italian university structure. The organization of the profession was put on firmer ground with the foundation in 1981 of the Italian Association of Political Science, a much more professional body than the previous association[1]. The number and quality of the research as well as the publications have grown enormously over the last twenty years, as several recent surveys testify (La scienza politica in Italia, 1984; Repertory of Empirical Research Projects and Files, 1984; Repertorio delle ricerche empiriche e dei files, 1986). Finally and perhaps most significantly, the discipline has achieved cultural recognition, and a contribution from members of the profession is increasingly seen as useful towards the solution of the most pressing problems of the country, from institutional reform to the various problems stemming from the crisis of the Welfare State.

Along with this 'success', what needs to be explained is the relative lateness of its development, in particular the fact that Italian political science developed much later than in other European countries, as in Germany (Von Beyme, 1982; Kastendiek, 1987), Britain (Hayward, 1982) or France, a country in which the discipline had to overcome somewhat similar problems as in Italy (Leca, 1982; Favre, 1982). Which barriers, cultural and institutional, had to be removed for such a growth to occur? And which factors have helped the discipline to regain cultural legitimacy and a more solid scientific identity?

These are some of the questions to be answered in any analysis of the development of political science in post-war Italy.

Another set of issues has to do with the problem of evaluation, that is, of how to evaluate, and on the basis of which criteria, the over-all development of a field of knowledge. Here characteristic problems include first the relationship of theory to research, that is, of how much attention has been paid over the years to theory and theoretically oriented studies as compared to empirical research, secondly among which subfields and themes of investigation has research been focussed, and thirdly to what degree academic institutionalization has affected the redefinition of the field and "learned" conceptions of politics.

Some of these questions were investigated through surveys which I have illustrated elsewhere (Graziano, 1987). Suffice it to say that, not surprisingly and partly due to the impact of behavioralism on Italian political science, thus far most research has centered on parties, elections and electoral behavior, political values and attitudes, that is, the input side of politics, while little represented are studies in such areas as public policy, international relations and comparative politics.

As for other aspects, we simply lack adequate evaluative criteria. One reason for this is that most of the available analyses on the development of political science in Italy dated mainly from the Sixties, when the problem was largely one of academic autonomy vis-à-vis older disciplines (law, history, etc.), a discussion very alive at the time in the context of the debate on the reorganization of the Facoltà di scienze politiche and the role of political science in such departments. These analyses, some of which were to play a key role in the process of relegitimation of the discipline after 1945 (see below), predated, however, the reawakening of political research which we have witnessed in Italy after that time. Today, after a considerable accumulation of studies and empirical research, a discussion on standards of evaluation by which to measure the over-all development of the discipline can no longer, I believed, be postponed.

I shall analyze some of these criteria in Part I of this essay, before turning in Part II to a discussion of the pattern of development of Italian political science in the 1960's and 1970's, both as a learned profession and a field of knowledge.

1. History of the discipline and criteria of evaluation

One criterion is academic institutionalization, which defines the role of the discipline within the division of labor in the field of science and at the same time the "boundaries" of a profession. More specifically, the concept of institutionalization refers to the position a discipline is able to secure for itself within the institutional structure, especially in the university system, on the basis of a conception of any specific science shared by the members of the profession. In order for the process of institutionalization to materialize, a discipline must develop a cultural as well as an operative identity. Its members must specify what constitutes scientific inquiry, and which areas and methods of investigation one can "legitimately" pursue in order to qualify as "practitioner" in the eyes of the profession.

The definition of a discipline's identity is effected through the selection of the variables which fall within its scope of interest. As Sartori (1970 : 13) who has made a basic contribution to the definition of the field of political science has noted, in the light of such a strategy any discipline sets aside a great number of variables by treating them as 'presuppositions', that is, as factors taken as generically known (or unknown)". The point here is twofold. On the one hand, any definition of the object of a science is to some extent arbitrary and in any case revisable -- it is never decided once and for all. On the other hand, any such definition is by its nature selective and restrictive. The process of institutionalization, while strengthening a discipline by identifying its "field", defines at the same time selectively the permissible range of research areas and methods. It also carries with it a redefinition of "discours savant" and "academic discourse", culture and science, so that not all that is permissible and even valued in everyday, unspecialized discourse is recognized as pertinent to scientific knowledge.

Last but not least, academic institutionalization has very important implications for the selection of academic personnel, in that it establishes the requirements one is supposed to fulfill in order to enter the university system as members of the profession.

Once the concept clarified, one should add that from this point of view Italian political science has made important progress. From being a marginal specialization and a tiny group of scholars -- in the 1960's there were only two university courses in political science, one taught by Bobbio in Torino and the other by Sartori in Florence --, political science has evolved into a profession which is well represented in the Italian academic system [2] (although less so in institutions like the CNR* granting research money), which shares relatively homogeneous methodological and substantive orientations and has gained external recognition. The launching in 1984 of a graduate programme in political science, which involves six universities and some 15-20 students, in addition to a smaller PhD course in international relations, is another step in the same direction, affecting the process, which is central to institutionalization, of the formation of future teachers and scholars.

Other criteria of evaluation have been worked out by students of the history of sociology and historical sociology, and may be usefully adapted to the history of political science (Barbano and Sola, 1985; Barbano, 1985). Barbano has suggested among other criteria the notions of periodization, duration or the time span which characterizes the history of any one field, and the important distinction between diffusion and development. By 'development' of a discipline is meant "a) critical-theoretical growth productive of both substantive theory and sociological critique, and b) the discovery and refinement of research methods and techniques". 'Diffusion' is defined as cultural diffusion of a field of knowledge, including its eventual institutionalization as part of the division of labor in the field of science (Barbano, 1985 : 15; Barbano and Sola, 1985 : 141 and foll.). One way to distinguish diffusion from development is to look at the respective role of theory and empirical research. According to the proposed definition, development requires both, it cannot consist merely in the accumulation of empirical investigations.

The diffusion-development dichotomy warns us against the danger of mistaking the accumulation of research for the development of a discipline. It also allows us to better appreciate some pecu-

* Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche : the most important institution in Italy granting research money.

liarities in the history of Italian political science, especially when compared to other fields like sociology. The case Barbano has studied in particular and from which he has drawn the said distinction is the case of Italian sociology in the age of positivism, which he views as an instance of diffusion without development. He argues that although Italy witnessed at the time a massive growth of social research in response to a great variety of societal problems and needs (cf. Sola's bibliography for the years 1860-90, Barbano and Sola, 1985), this did not translate either theoretically, that is, in terms of theory-building, nor academically into true sociology. One should add that a somewhat similar pattern seems to have characterized the revival of sociological studies in post-1945 Italy. Arguably, recent Italian sociology has been more concerned with the investigation of problems generated by a fast-changing society (Southern Question and research on the South, industrialization, emigration, etc.), than with theory formation (Barbano, 1985, chps. III-IV; Quaderni di Sociologia, 1985).

The vicissitudes of Italian political science have been at least in part different. Political science could count on "founding fathers", scholars like Mosca and Pareto, who had not only worked out substantive theories like elite theory, but also provided the discipline with a more general methodological-theoretical foundation. As Giorgio Sola (Barbano and Sola, 1985 : 155) commenting on the state of the social sciences in Italy in the last decades of the 19th century has noted, "Positive political science is characterized not only by the choice of a field of investigation, but by the type of perspectives in terms of which political phenomena are analyzed". One perspective, he argues, is the distinction between civil society and political society, the latter being defined as the sphere marked out by the use of coercion and the institutionalization of power relations, while the other perspective would consist in an empirical-realistic approach as opposed to philosophical and legalistic conceptions of politics (Barbano and Sola : 155).

Unlike the case of sociology, then, there was in the tradition of Italian political science an important methodological-theoretical orientation, which Bobbio, much to his credit, was

to bring to the attention of scholars in the 1950's and '60's, from which to move in the reconstruction of the discipline. The most well-known aspect of this tradition, although perhaps not the most important at least in the case of Pareto (see below), was elite theory, internationally recognized as one of Italy's most distinguished contributions to the field of political studies. In this context, it is quite significant that the first important initiative on the international level of post-war Italian political science after decades of almost total eclipse, was to center on the theme of political elites. In 1959, as part of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology (Milano-Stresa), an important session was organized under the chairmanship of Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves (Le elites politiche, 1961), attended by Bobbio, Sartori, Catlin and Meisel, among others, on a theme in which Italy had excelled in the past, and which had given Italy for once the role of center in a sector of international social science.

The second and related trait of political science as it emerged in the post-war period, has been insistence on method, in the double sense of procedures which connote scientific knowledge when applied to the field of politics, and methodological rules of empirical research. Arnold Brecht (1959 : 5), in what remains today one of the most lucid writings on the introduction of the scientific method in the social sciences, wrote that "it is not saying too much that ours has become the methodological century in the social sciences". The general orientation in Italy has been quite in keeping with such a trend. As we shall see, in his interpretation of the "classics", especially Pareto, Bobbio laid particular stress on the methodological side of their work, which he thought provided the foundation for a positive science of society. Similarly, Bruno Leoni (1960), in a noted article on the backward state of Italian political science, after listing a number of themes and areas constitutive in his view of the field, added that "it is precisely the latter [methodology] which makes knowledge into 'science'". Lastly and most importantly, in 1959 there appeared

in the form of university lectures a text by Giovanni Sartori (1959), to which I shall return at some length later in this paper, whose very title - Questioni di metodo in scienza politica - pointed to one of the basic themes and concerns in Sartori's entire work.

This intense effort at methodological and theoretical reflection has had, however, only a limited impact on the discipline. To cite just one example, elite theory had had no true followers on the plane of research, with the partial exception of Maranini's work (1967) on the history of political power in Italy, explicitly inspired by Mosca, of the research by Sartori and collaborators on the Italian parliament meant to delineate the "over-all pattern of 'circulation of parliamentary elites'" since the Chamber of 1909 (Somogyi et al., 1963 : 3), of Farneti's work (1971) on political representation in liberal Italy, and a few other studies by younger scholars. Broadly speaking and partially as a result of the impact of behavioralism, the trend has been mainly in the direction of empirical research -- an option, I should add, not without justification as a strategy of concentration of scholarly efforts in the few years (ten-fifteen years) in which the events here recounted took place.

One further criterion is, as I said, periodization. Just as scholars refer to an "earlier" and a new sociology, it seems appropriate to distinguish an 'old' political science from the one that emerged in the post-war period, and above all investigate their relationship in terms of continuity/discontinuity. As I noted, my impression is that the classics have played a greater role in the relegitimation of the discipline, than as inspirers of problématiques and modes of research. To illustrate, it has been noted by Runciman (1969, ch. II) that Mosca's theory of "juridical defense" prefigures a theory of social pluralism and social checks exercised by authoritative groups in society via-à-vis state power, thus providing an indispensable complement to electoral control; but such a cue has scarcely been followed through, as the paucity of studies on groups in Italy testifies.

Perhaps a measure of continuity between old and new political science may be detected with respect to the social function of science. In either case, political science has come into being as a science which has been strongly critical of Italian culture and society. Generally speaking, the Italian context, unlike for instance American political science, has not been one of a broadly shared democratic system which was the task of science to strengthen and root in the masses through mass education. Rather, the realism underlying the new science of politics came either in the form of conservative realism (Mosca) with occasionally a reactionary or counterrevolutionary tinge, as in the case of Pareto, or, especially in the years of the "renaissance" of the discipline after World War II, as reformist realism. Much more rare, at least in academic political science, has been the third type of realism identified by Bobbio (1969), one purporting radical or revolutionary change.

According to Mosca, the "mission of political science" consisted in erecting a barrier against "social democracy", which was thought to be lethal to liberty because it widened and made more dramatic the hiatus between the "political formula" and laws of politics, thus opening the way to all sort of manipulation of the masses. To fight the evil, it was imperative for Mosca to proceed in such a way as to counterpoise "a whole positive system to a whole metaphisical system /the democratic-socialist ideology/" (Mosca, 1982b : 925), precisely the kind of 'scientific politics' he and others were busy constructing in those years. Precondition for a successful challenge to socialism, was the renovation of the elite, especially a heightened role for the economically self-sufficient middle classes.

The problem of the elite and their renewal is also central to the work of the so-called "democratic elitists" (Dorso, Burzio, Gobetti; cf. Bobbio, 1969; Le elite politiche, 1961), as it is prominent in Sartori. In Sartori's view (1970), the practical problem to which political science could make an important contribution was that of malgoverno, that is, the need "to obviate the 'common evil' which consists in being...governed by a mediocre political class made up of incapable and incompetent politicians". The goal was to introduce a measure of competence in a government

tradition long dominated by ideology and improvisation, through a reform of the elite's political culture which if successful would orient the latter towards the empirical and pragmatic outlook of the new science. For other authors still, the problem was a reform which would have made a reality of the democratic potential of Italy's new republican regime.

The other and symmetrical theme which runs through Italian political science is that of political opposition. For Mosca and Pareto the rechange of the elite was a prime imperative; yet neither one came up with a scheme contemplating the possibility of alternation in power of distinctively alternative forces. What is more, "political elite" is by its nature a unitary concept; as has been noted (Le elite politiche, 1961), to pluralize the concept would deprive it of most of its analytical leverage, since the power of the elite comes precisely from their being a group which is both small and internally united. Mosca does make an important distinction between political elites and groups in society, with the latter performing the function of counterpower vis-à-vis the state (Mosca, 1982b : 693). Yet, with regard to the turnover of political personnel, his is a model of cooptation (Pizzorno, 1972). As for Pareto, certainly the least 'pluralist' of the two, the change in personnel would occur "either by infiltrations (circulation of elite), or...through revolution" (Pareto, 1964 : par. 2227). Tertium non datur.

Finally, it is well known that the problem of opposition is a key element in Sartori's theory of "polarized pluralism", a reflection of a historical experience in governing which seems to oscillate between various forms of trasformismo and the impossibility or difficulty for minority groups to perform the role of opposition within the system.

The purpose of the preceding discussion has been simply to draw attention to the importance of "standards of judgment" by which to appraise and have better cognition of the history of the discipline. The discussion is illustrative rather than systematic, much less exhaustive. It seems to me, however, that some of the criteria analyzed -- academic institutionalization, develop-

ment and cultural diffusion, periodization and the social function of science --, when properly refined could provide useful tools for analysis, especially in the comparative study of the discipline in the various national contexts.

2. The "rebirth" of Italian political science (1960-70)

Any attempt to reconstruct the processes which led to the reawakening of interest in a science of politics in Italy in the 1950's and 1960's, should take into account in my view four clusters of factors. The first factor has to do with the conscious effort by a number of authoritative scholars to rescue political science from academic oblivion, and reestablish it as a distinct field of study, methodologically and substantively autonomous from older disciplines such as public law, historiography and political philosophy.

The second factor is linked to the economic and social development of post-war Italian society, and the processes of political democratization, economic rationalization and the secularization of society which accompanied the modernization of the country. The impact of these transformations on culture and the cultural debate in Italy has been of profound significance (Asor Rosa, 1975; Bobbio, 1955). As Bobbio (1961) has noted and as we know from the sociology of knowledge, one prerequisite for the emergence of a scientific point of view in the culture sciences is the decline of ideology and greater realism, which set more propitious conditions for the scientific study of society, most important among these a new role and greater "neutrality" on the part of the intellectuals as a social group (Mannheim, 1957, ch. III).

The third factor consists in the push from the outside, especially the impact of American political science and the behavioral movement. As LaPalombara (1986) has documented, several American institutions, both government agencies and private foundations, played a decisive role in spreading to Italy new research methods and themes of investigation through the funding of research and other forms of institutional collaboration. That the American presence, besides scholarly influence, has been instrumental in helping a still weak profession to gain access to the

Italian academic system, speaks to the crucial importance of this external input.

The fourth and last factor has to do with changes in the university structure, especially the reorganization of the Facoltà di scienze politiche and the institution of new Facoltà (1968-69) and the availability ——————→ of more teaching positions in political science.

Here I can only touch upon a few aspects of a history which remains to be written, aspects dealing mainly with some of the problems and arguments raised in the context of the debate on the autonomy and identity of the discipline. Special attention will be devoted to Sartori's work and methodological writings, which have been of great importance in the formative years of the profession.

2.1 Autonomy and Identity

By the end of the Fifties and in the early Sixties, a series of initiatives and the works of individual scholars were setting the scene for a debate on a science of politics -- its almost total absence in Italy, its raison d'etre and potential role. By that time, most of the negative repercussions of Fascism on political studies had faded away. It should be recalled that four of the five Faculties of Political Sciences then in existence had been set up under Fascism[3], which helps to explain the aura of suspicion and prejudice which for a number of years surrounded political studies in Italy, and why there existed the threat in 1944-45 to suppress such Faculties. Only the Istituto Cesare Alfieri in Florence, which predated Fascism[4], did not have a suspect origin, and was promptly reopened and reorganized by the Allied Military Government (Spreafico, 1964; Firpo, 1970).

In the 1960's, the obstacles were different but no less serious. Bobbio (1961) in a survey of the state of political studies in Italy, noted how political science born on "solid ground" through the work of Mosca and Pareto soon clashed with a hostile, essentially anti-empirical cultural environment, which was to marginalize the discipline. Mosca's Elementi (1896-1923), Bobbio (1961: 216) added, appeared at a time when "the

juridical theory of the state was on the way to become dominant in the Italian universities...as the only 'pure' and 'objective' manner to approach the facts of politics and...of the state". As for Pareto, an even more serious obstacle to the reception of his writings was the strict positivist method of this author, who despite an enormous accumulation of historical material paid very little attention to history and the cultural orientation of men (see below). As Croce (quoted by Bobbio, 1961: 217) once remarked, expressing a view which amounted to a slashing criticism of the new science[5] :"Which sort of empirical science of politics would be that which instead of serving historical knowledge and availing itself of its results...placed itself above history as a castle of abstractions and generalities, preconceptions and prejudices?".

Thus, both in the case of law and philosophy political science was reduced, in the best of cases, to an auxiliary science: subsidiary to law according to the jurists and subsidiary to historiography in the view of the historians.

This was the general cultural setting against which to prove the plausibility of a scientific study of politics. The other obstacles, although important especially at the academic- institutional level, were really a consequence of this basic orientation. This was the case for instance of a statement made in 1964 by an influential scholar, Francesco Vito (Gli studi politici e sociali, 1965), which echoed a widely shared view, according to which the tradition in Italy was one of "political sciences" (in the plural), as a pluridisciplinary approach within which there was room for a science of politics but without giving this discipline any autonomous status. The same may be said of a government-inspired project for the reorganization of the Faculties of Political Sciences and of their curricula, the so-called Progetto Ciasca (mid-1960's), that did not contemplate the teaching of political science either as a compulsory or an optional subject of instruction. Although the battle had to be fought on many fronts, there was no doubt that the problem was first and foremost cultural.

An essential step came with Bobbio's reconsideration and reinterpretation of the "classics" of Italian political science. Between 1957 and 1968 Bobbio published a series of essays on Mosca, Pareto and other elite theorists (later collected in Bobbio, 1969), both lucid and innovative, and explicitly designed to start a critical debate with neighboring disciplines.[6] In the best known of this series of articles published in 1963 under the title "Italian political science: teaching and disciplinary autonomy", which retrospectively may be read as a sort of manifesto for the new field of study, Bobbio (1969, ch. 1) drew a clear line between political science and law, on the one hand, and political science and history, arguing that while in the first case the distinction was one of points of view from which the two disciplines were looking at a largely similar object, the study of the state, political science as a nomothetic science and history differed essentially in point of method.

If these were some of the arguments advanced in the course of the debate, in establishing the contours of the field Bobbio drew most of his substantive categories and methodological principles from Mosca and Pareto. I shall return in a moment to this aspect of his work. In completing the picture, I should add that the other key contribution toward the relegitimation of the discipline came from Sartori, whose writings provided the profession with what I have called an operative identity (see below). A third major figure, less known and whose role has been I believe more important than is generally recognized, is Bruno Leoni. Prestigious scholar, founder in 1950 of one of the oldest Italian journals of political science, Il Politico published in Pavia, and a prominent member of the Centro di studi metodologici in Turin (see below), Leoni gave an important contribution to the definition of the object of the discipline and its theoretical orientation (Leoni, 1960; 1962; 1980 and 1968 which contains the bibliography of his writings).

As for the institutional and geographic setting of the debate under review, I would simply note that the discussion involved essentially three university centers, namely Turin (Bobbio's Faculty), Pavia where Leoni taught and Florence (Sartori). But equally important has been the role of certain institutions formally outside of the university structure, such as the Centro di studi metodologici in Turin, an interdisciplinary group of

eminent scholars, and the Centro di difesa e prevenzione sociale in Milan, one of the organizers in 1959, besides many other meetings, of the seminar on elites to which I referred earlier.

Let us now turn to those aspects of Bobbio's reading of the classics relevant for our discussion. It is first of all significant that although he wrote extensively on both authors, Bobbio has shown greater and more consistent interest in Pareto than in Mosca[7]. The reason for this lies, I believe, in the different complexity and scope of the work of the two. While Mosca has essentially fathered one substantive theory, the theory of the classe politica, of which Bobbio stressed the objective value well beyond the ideological persuasion of its inventor (he devoted a number of studies to the so-called 'democratic elitists' - Gobetti, Dorso, Burzio - who had carried on Mosca's line of investigation from a different ideological angle), in Pareto we find a general theory of action and a much broader methodological framework. The joint contribution of the two had laid the "ground for the empirical study of politics" (Bobbio, 1961: 215; 1986).

With reference to Pareto, to whom for brevity's sake I shall confine my remarks[8], Bobbio's contribution consisted in my view in shedding light on two points. First, he provided a new key for interpretation centered on the notion of ideology rather than that of elite, which had long been the ⟶ dominant view ⟶ of Pareto's sociology. Secondly, he showed that quite apart from the substantive validity of Pareto's theory of action, with its emphasis on psychology and irrationality and much disregard for history, there was in his work a fundamental methodological lesson which Bobbio thought to consist in a theory and critique of the sources (the "facts" of social science). As he wrote (Bobbio, 1969: 77), he intended to draw attention "to the heuristic procedure rather than [Pareto's] findings", pointing out to a new generation of readers that "only he who approaches the Trattato through this interpretative scheme will realize...that it is still an unexplored mine". Let us briefly look at some of the arguments advanced to back such an interpretation.

In an article meant to introduce Pareto to an audience of philosophers, Bobbio (1969, ch. III) noted that Pareto's critical reception in philosophic studies was partly due to a reductive reading ⟶ of his sociological work. That is, Pareto had been mainly read as a theorist of the elite, but an empirical theory of the elite "could not but be of limited and indirect interest to philosophy" (Bobbio, 1969: 83). This, moreover, was a misleading interpretation. Bobbio could easily show, texts in hands, that "the most substantial part of the Trattato ...refers to neither the elites nor to social equilibrium", adding that "the core of the book lies in the analysis of man as an ideological animal".

The upshot of the argument was that Pareto was to be seen as a theorist whose work, not unlike Marx's, mainly consisted in an attempt to unmask man's ideological practice. As such, Bobbio concluded, his writings could not but be of interest to philosophy.

One more point stressed by Bobbio was the distinction, already present in Les systèmes socialistes (1902-1903), between "objective" and "subjective phenomenon"; namely the idea, central to Pareto's theory of action and methodology, according to which man's verbalized activity is best understood in terms of three distinct criteria: whether a statement corresponds to truth, that is, to ascertainable facts (objective aspect), whether it is persuasive and has practical efficacy on men's conduct (subjective aspect), and in terms of social utility for the general equilibrium of the system. Since the three criteria and spheres of man's action were thought to operate independently of each other (what is scientifically true may be of no consequence for men's conduct etc., a finding incidentally which explains Pareto's skepticism as to the practical efficacy of science; see below), it followed that one basic task of social inquiry was the differentiated analysis of social action from all three points of view.

Bobbio's argument, explicitly meant to expound on the strength of classical political science the rationale and some basic canons of an empirical science of politics, did not have, and perhaps could not have in the cultural climate of the Sixties, immediate repercussions on the development of the discipline.

Yet, the "rediscovery" of the classics and what was alive in their theories helped to set the terms of the debate and to establish the credibility of a science of politics within a culture and/academia which had long been hostile to this field of study. Equally important, it allowed Bobbio to point out to a whole new generation of scholars the ideal and some of the methods of a positive science of society, based on facts and immune from idle ideological disputes. This at a time when other currents of thought working through different channels, especially behavioralism, were pointing in the same direction, enriching Italian culture with a new empirical and pragmatic ethos.

The debate continued on a somewhat different plane, centering mainly on the definition of the object of the discipline and its methods of investigation. In a well-known article published in 1960, which is a remarkable statement of what a science of politics should be by scope and method, Bruno Leoni (1960: 33, 36-37) identified six subfields pertaining to political science as an "experimental and observational science". They are the study of 1)the parliamentary system; 2)administrative system and the bureaucracy; 3)political parties; 4)pressure groups; 5)electoral systems and voters' motivations; 6)methodology, to which he assigned a special role, as I have noted earlier. The list was quite similar to the one suggested by Bobbio (1961), except that Leoni added the crucial theme of public administration.

Leoni returned on the subject in a paper presented at a conference organized by the Center of Methodological Studies in Turin in October 1962, which marks an important event in our story. Organized by Bobbio as chairman of the Center, the meeting was presented in the Center's Bulletin as a "first exchange of opinions about the method and object of political science and its teaching in /Italian/ universities" (Centro di studi metodologici, 1963: 4). The key speakers were Leoni (1962), who presented a paper on "Object and Limits of Political Science" and Sartori, whose paper entitled "The Methodology of Political Science" has not to my knowledge been published.

Leoni's presentation insisted on a number of points, which

strike us for their insight and topicality: 1)assumption of rational behavior as that which best allows the elaboration of a reconstructive theory of political action (on the pattern of economics); 2)the heterogeneity of sources (classified as documentary texts on political decisions, studies on group activity, and factors and motivations in voting behavior); 3)role of theory; 4)the approach which Leoni called "exchange of powers", as the most appropriate for the study of politics, as compared to other approaches (group, power, decision-making, etc.).

Despite these various efforts, the climate remained on the whole hostile to the discipline, as shown ——————> by the course of the discussion at the Turin conference of '62 and the views expressed on that occasion by historians, jurists and sociologists (Meynaud, 1963). The same may be said of other meetings, more and more numerous in the course of the Sixties as the idea of reorganizing the Faculties of Political Sciences gained ground.

Two more exchanges are worth recalling, the first of which took place in the context of the Fourth National Congress of the Italian Association of Political and Social Sciences held in Rome in March 1964. The general introductory statement by Professor Ciasca reported on a project for the reorganization of the Facoltà di scienze politiche which as I have noted did not contemplate political science among the courses of instruction. The course of the debate (Gli studi politici e sociali, 1965), largely devoted to the problem of whether to separate the courses in political sciences from the Faculties of Law and the transformation of Facoltà di scienze politiche into Faculties of Political and Social Sciences, was to show that with the exception of a few sociologists the advocates of political science were an isolated minority.

Perhaps the most insidious critique advanced at the Rome Congress, in addition to the general objection that the Italian tradition was predicated on a multidisciplinary rather than specialistic approach to political studies (see above), was the one raised in connection with the question of prediction. As one

scholar , F. Vito (Gli studi politici e sociali, 1965: 162) put it, "The main reason for doubting that a science of politics is feasible is that in order to achieve this goal we should be able to make a minimum of prediction". One further objection raised by Gianfranco Miglio, a teacher as was Vito at the Catholic University in Milan, pertained to the no less serious question of value-free science. In Miglio's view, the safest way to preserve objectivity in political science was to make it de facto identical with the teaching of political doctrines, to "limit onself to the historical analysis of ideologies" (Gli studi politici e sociali, 1965: 146).

One rejoinder to these critiques came from Sartori, who presented a paper on the teaching of political science, pointing out that political scientists, far from pursuing the old naturalistic ideal of "laws", confined themselves to the formulation of propositions of the if-then type. Sartori's defense led to important changes in the final motion of the Congress through the adoption of a clause which strssed "the importance...of courses of a sociological nature, especially Sociology and Political Science and the other disciplines necessary for the full development of such courses" (Gli studi politici, 1965: 203).

The other and final debate I would like to recall in this rather sketchy review of the institutional history of the discipline is the intervention again by Sartori at a meeting on "The social sciences, university reform and Italian society" held in Milan in 1967. After noting the sorry state of Italian political science - "In the year of our Lord 1967 we have yet to begin or are just beginning" (Sartori,1967: 4) -, he covered three points: the central branches of the discipline which he thought to consist in international relations, administrative science and comparative politics, the function of science, and its potential users. Political science's ——→ function he thought consisted in the attempt "to make public opinion aware...of the existence of a measure of judgment and comparison" by which to evaluate political performance, adding that "a 'recognized' and well-developed political science...would certainly be in a position to effectively influence the 'style' and 'formulation' of political debate". As for

the users, politicians were one group which was the task of science not so much "to train" (politicians are "an 'accident' who nobody knows where they come from and succeed for reasons that have very little to do with cognitive knowledge", Sartori, 1967: 14), as "to immerse" in a pragmatic political culture capable of conditioning their behavior. Other potential users were members of the bureaucracy and specialists in political science.

By 1970 the phase of "rebirth" of Italian political science may be said to have come to an end, in the sense that the discipline had acquired by that time a theoretical-methodological foundation, and had achieved some important institutional goals. For one thing, that year witnessed the publication of Sartori's Antologia di scienza politica (Sartori, 1970), the first systematic presentation of mainstream, mainly American political science to the Italian public. In the introduction to the book, Sartori provided the operative definition which was to orient the research of a whole generation of scholars. Once the debate had been engaged with the older disciplines and some measure of recognition gained for the new field, what remained to be done was to define its object with respect to the one social science, namely sociology, which had experienced the fastest growth. Sartori (1970: 15) suggested that the difference between the two fields lay in the fact that "first, to a large extent the independent (or causal or explanatory) variables of the sociologist are not the independent variables...of the political scientist, and second that in any case the independent variables of the one are changed into the dependent variables of the other".

Also, significantly 1970 was the year in which the first concours for university chairs in political science was being organized, thus providing institutional recognition to a process of development begun some ten years earlier.

2.2 Science and the function of science in Sartori's methodological writings

So far I have analyzed some of the factors and scholarly contributions which helped to establish the identity and autonomy of political science within Italian culture and academia. ——→ Of particular importance in this process, I noted, has been the role of such scholars as Bobbio, Leoni and Sartori. The significance and scope of Sartori's works, however, are such as to deserve further comments, in addition to what I have said about his contribution to the institutional history of the discipline.

Of Sartori's writings, of particular relevance here are those bearing on problems of methodology and the definition of the field, which have been mainly collected in the volume La politica. Logica e metodo nelle scienze sociali (Sartori, 1979)[9]. We will leave aside from our discussion both Sartori's works on democratic theory and parties, and substantive theories such as that of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1982), which have exercised a great influence on the course of Italian political studies and should be included in a more systematic discussion on this author.

Sartori's conception of politics as both practical activity and as a science, may be reconstructed on the basis of the following notions and propositions: 1) the conception of man as "symbolic animal", who reacts less to facts than to the interpretation and evaluation of facts; 2) a definition of the social sciences as sciences which, for what has been said sub 1), cannot derive their methods and type of explanation from the natural sciences; 3) the proposition that political discourse and language are central to the definition of the various forms of political knowledge, hence to the definition of 4) political science conceived as "applicable knowledge" (sapere applicativo), distinguished as such from both philosophy, which is meta-empirical knowledge and ordinary discourse, which does not qualify as science. In addition, 5) applicable knowledge ("a tool to intervene in the real world") poses as central the question of the relationship of theory to practice, in particular 6) of science's "neutrality" and its efficacy on society as well as 7) of the traits of a type of conduct molded on the canons of an empirical science of politics.

It would be neither possible nor useful to dwell here on all the passages of this complex argumentation. I shall confine my remarks to some key elements in Sartori's scheme, especially the notions of political discourse and applied science, and the channels through which science may have an influence on society. The starting point is the idea of man as a "symbolic animal", that is, as an actor who "does not react to events as things that have actually happened, but to 'expectations' of things to happen"(Sartori, 1979: 53). Man may create - Sartori notes - the "causes" of his behavior, thus inverting the cause-effect chain and making impossible any significant assimilation of the social sciences to the natural sciences. In the former disciplines, causation cannot but be probabilistic and "indeterminate". The upshot of all this is a conception of science radically different from the naturalistic model of Pareto, but paradoxically more ambitious in its pratical implications. The postulated role of "will" and "reason" as active principles of behavior, and not self-deception as Pareto essentially thought, while making an "exact" science of politics more difficult, broadens the scope of its potential influence on society (see below).

Symbolic activity manifests itself through language, "a very essential attribute...which charac-terizes man" (p. 7)+. According to our author, man is "constituted" neither by a mixture of natural inclinations and ideology, as Pareto thought, nor in the last analysis by "interest" as Marx believed; "man is constituted by the communication he receives and the communication he sends out" (p. 7), a central point in Sartori's conception of politics (politics as political discourse) which to my knowledge has not been subjected to as thorough a scrutiny as it merits. One peculiarity of political discourse, unlike for instance the language of physics or other sciences, is that it has not come into being as a specialized language, but as a discourse on a matter of everybody's common interest. In political discourse are joined in fact three distinct types of discourse which are described in synoptic form in the following table.

+ Unless otherwise specified reference is to Sartori, 1979.

Types of Political Discourse

Types of language	Political philosophy	Political science	Ordinary discourse
Use of language	Logical	Logical	Emotional-ideological
Terminological specialization	Specialized	Specialized	Unspecialized
Method of concept formation	Speculative	Descriptive-observational	Imitative (concepts received from learned parlance)
Aim	Ultimate knowledge of reality	Causal knowledge of facts	Communicative function
Relation of knowledge to practice	Non-applicable knowledge	Applicable knowledge	Persuasion with a view to action

This typology calls for some observations. Firstly, an empirical science of politics is the last-born of a genre of discourse whose historical referents are on the one hand the meta-empirical and speculative discourse of philosophic inquiry, and on the other the everyday discourse on politics. It must then extricate itself from a discourse traditionally dominated by normative arguments and ideological disputes by working out its own secondary language, its own concepts and methods of investigation. Secondly, Sartori goes to great pains to point out that among the various forms of specialized knowledge there is no hierarchy but complementary functions; philosophy and science are to be thought of as levels of truth which serve different cognitive needs, the search for the ultimate meaning of things in the one case, and the knowing of actual reality and its functioning in the case of empirical science. What is more, without placing itself outside of empirical reality and raising inquiry to the level of 'problematization' typical of philosophical discourse, an empirical science would be blind and condemned to dwell on inessential problems.

Thirdly and more importantly, Sartori views the three species of political discourse as both types of knowledge (lato sensu) and as symbolic referents for action, in that they provide guidance to actual political behavior. What is being hypothesized here is that the conduct of a man who draws inspiration from a philosophic mode of reasoning would be different from that of the actor who has internalized canons of an empirical science, and different yet from the behavior of the man in the street who talks of politics. An important part of Sartori's work (1979, ch. V; 1958) on which I cannot dwell here, aims precisely at delineating the features of a "political judgment" inspired by empirical criteria. He defines it as conduct that takes into account the calculus of means, that is, congruence of means with the ends to be pursued, and the potential occurrence of opposite and unexpected outcomes, a danger quite real in the realm of social behavior. So that, Sartori (pp. 8-9) writes by way of conclusion, "to the question 'What is politics' ...I intend to answer by enumerating the principal 'symbolic matrices' from which spring our conscious political attitudes".

Let us look more closely at the notion of applicable knowledge and the criteria by which we can establish the truth of an empirical proposition. First of all, empirical knowledge requires a special type of language and special concepts, on which Sartori never tires of insisting throughout his work. In the relation of one term to its referent which defines the meaning of a word, the referent must be a real, observable and describable thing, not a concept without empirical grounding. Words must mean what they represent and reflect with precision the differentiated reality they connote, unlike the speculative terms of philosophy which Sartori calls "ultrarepresentative", in that they embrace all the potential manifestations of a phenomenon of which they want to penetrate the ultimate meaning. Language molded on reality allows us to answer the problem, which is central to empirical knowledge, of how reality operates and can be transformed, whereas philosophy asks questions on why things are the way they are without any immediate practical goal.

Several other consequences follow from this close link of theory to practice, which is one of Sartori's central themes. One has to do with the criterion by which to judge the truth of a proposition. Empirically speaking, "truth" is not simply correspondence to facts, as Pareto believed; it consists rather in ascertaining whether a proposition, once applied to practice, works

and is productive of effects congruent with the goal being pursued, according to one of the classic canons of pragmatism. Secondly, ——→ scientific knowledge must be capable of being translated at least in principle into common knowledge, and of finding the channels to do so. Lastly, science must be seen as possessing the prerogative of objectivity and impartiality in order for the various groups in society to perceive it as the truth of experts rather than as a partisan truth.

Here Sartori runs into some of the problems that Pareto had encountered and answered in the skeptical manner to which I have referred, and the no less serious questions posed by the sociology of knowledge with respect to scientific objectivity. The author lucidly recognizes the dilemma when he writes (p. 65), "How can we make political knowledge and science so specialized as to make it inaccessible to laymen?", adding: "Especially when we live in a democratic system, what is the sense of dealing with political discourse in...terms which are incommunicable to the non-specialists?". Sartori's conclusion is that as scientists we cannot but take the "longest route", refusing to come to terms with ideological discourse and instead "operate on the cultural matrices from which ideologies originate". Let us see how and through which channels.

Sartori (pp. 77-83) deals with Pareto in connection with the authors who had postulated a radical discontinuity between theory and practice in the realm of social behavior. Pareto (1964: par. 1788) had expressed his view on the matter in his usual sharp manner: "practice is all the better the more it is practical; theory, the more it is theoretical". Generally, of the worst kind are theoretical practice and practical theory". Much better was a genuine empiricism of the sort that had inspired medieval artisans and many of their admirable works (Pareto, 1964: par. 1785). For this view, there were two reasons. One had to do with the persistent state of backwardness of the social sciences, too weak to provide good guidance to action. The more basic reason was that the logical-experimental principles of scientific discourse have little or no hold on that mixture of faith, passion and ideology which seems to motivate the common man and ordinary discourse. What is true is not necessarily persuasive or useful to society (see above).

In Sartori's view, Pareto's error had been to confound a factual occurrence with a question of principle, that is, the practical inefficacy of theory with the impossibility of an applied social science, whereas the two aspects had to be kept separate and examined distinctly. The real problem was to find out whether or not there are experts with good prescriptions for society (p. 79). I should add that ——→ Pareto had been on this point less "confused" than consistently elitist, as evidenced by this important passage in the Trattato (par. 1786), where Pareto explicitly links his theory of knowledge to the theory of the elite:

> Non é la sola difficoltà della materia che /ci/ allontana /dalla possibilità che la teoria dia utili prescrizioni/, ma anche l'invasione della metafisica...ed il fatto singolare che tale invasione ha la sua parte di utile; perché il ragionamento con derivazioni metafisiche...é il solo che molti uomini sono capaci di fare e di capire. Qui appare bene spiccato il fenomeno del contrasto tra il conoscere e l'operare. ... Qui appare pure un altro fenomeno importante, cioé quello della efficacia, per sciogliere tale contrasto, della divisione della collettività in due parti, di cui una, nella quale prevale il sapere, regge e dirige l'altra, nella quale prevalgono i sentimenti; per modo che, in conclusione, l'operare é ben diretto e forte.

Thus, for Pareto the impossibility of an applied social science was relative rather than absolute; it referred to the common people and the illiterate, and not to the elite.

To go beyond Pareto's elitist position one needed to criticize his notion of human nature and of the nature of human will (as it has been noted, Pareto's sociology may be said to rest on a non-voluntaristic theory of action; Stark, 1965: 54). This is indeed the direction in which Sartori seems to move, half way between the intellectualistic conception of will, purporting that will is responsive to reason, and Pareto's anti-intellectualistic theory stressing will's rebeliousness to reason, thus postulating the plausibility of a reasonable conduct carried out in conformity with the canons of science.

An additional insight into science's influence on society and the modes of such an influence may be derived from Sartori's critique of Mannheim. Mannheim (1957) had pointed to two basic traits of politics which explained why from one of man's fundamental activities had never emerged a science of politics. One difficulty stemmed from the nature of politics as "creative activity", that

is, as a process "in which each event generates a unique situation, and from which /science/ tries to single out something of a permanent value" (Mannheim, 1957: 126). In this, politics sharply contrasted with what Mannheim called "administration", defined as regulatory activity which operates on the basis of pre-established and shared rules, a sphere of predictable and "rational" behavior and as such a potential object of science.

The second and related obstacle had to do with the fact that politics feeds on struggle and coercion, elements around which "crystallize those other profound irrational elements that we usually call emotions" (Mannheim, 1957: 127). Whereas it is unlikely for a person to become emotionally "involved" in an act of the administration, whose outcomes are pre-established and in any case predictable, it is difficult not to get involved in that open -ended struggle that is the political struggle. Hence the observer's involvement and the "law" according to which "the qualitative sciences more or less closely correspond to the social and historical situation of the groups in which the social classes are divided" (cit. by Sartori, 1959: 127).

To the rule of the ideological conditioning of social thought there was, as Mannheim himself had pointed out, one important exception represented by the class of modern intellectuals. It was precisely the existence of a "socially independent intelligentsia", a typical product of a common education and a complex and pluralistic society, informed and aware of the findings of the sociology of knowledge, which ——————→for the first time in history had created the conditions for a "scientific" science of politics. But the very fact that the "law" did not apply to those responsible for the "production" of culture, was such as to undermine in Sartori's view the whole validity of the theory.

So much on the question of science's autonomy and objectivity. Things were different with regard to the diffusion of scientific thought in society. Here the sociology of knowledge had been right. That is, Mannheim's law would hold good if one were to differentiate the various levels of discourse, the ordinary or acritical discourse of the "receivers" of culture (the masses), from the critical discourse of the "inventors of culture" (the intellectuals). Although it did not apply to the genesis of learned and scientific

thought, Mannheim's principle did apply to the reception of science among the masses and the criteria by which the masses determine their options and orientations (pp. 139-140) -- a view quite close to the sort of "dualism" which is characteristic of the elitist tradition (see above). Here lay, Sartori concluded, "the true merit of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge".

These are the modes and channels, which in part remain to be explored, through which political science exerts its influence on society. Two additional factors limit the social impact of science. Firstly, there are at work mechanical, unconscious and inertial factors, such as fear, which in Sartori's over-all model of the political system and its mode of operation play a great role in keeping the system together, quite apart from the conscious volition of its members. Secondly, human conduct is influenced by other types of political discourse in addition to political science, especially philosophic discourse. That philosophy despite its being meta-empirical knowledge exerts a practical efficacy which "has been and probably will continue to be much greater than that... of political science" (p. 243), is a paradox that may be explained by philosophy's aptitude to work out ideal goals and an over-all conception of the world, a basic need of man which science by its nature cannot satisfy.

One final specific reason for the practical weakness of political science has to do with the separation of the scientist from the practitioner or power-holder, which is constitutive of this science but largely unknown to others. Political science deals with the very delicate sphere of the manipulation of men, and it is not clear how much power it would be appropriate to confer on those who know and pursue the scientific investigation of such mechanisms. Without sharing Pareto's skepticism, who confessed that he wrote the Trattato knowing "that because of the limited number of readers.../the/ book could do no harm", but would have abstained from writing it had he "thought...that /the/ work might become a book of popular culture", it is clear that for Sartori too, prudence in the sphere of politics is never too much.

2.3 Dependence and Interdependence

No study however sketchy of Italian political science can leave aside the fact that the "rebirth" of the discipline has occurred in a context marked by the growing internationalization of science. To a large extent and more significantly than in other countries, for instance France, Italian political science has started on its new course as a behavioral science. The priorities and methodological canons of behavioralism, such as insistence on empirical research and field studies, quantification of data, etc., have become an integral part of the discipline and perhaps its dominant trend, one which has shaped the development of whole new departments (as in the case of Catania in the early 1970's). In a relatively short period of time, the interview, the survey and participant observation have become privileged tools of analysis, innovating both traditional methods and the definition of the areas of study.

The modalities and institutional channels of such an influence have been analyzed by LaPalombara (1986) on the basis of three distinct indeces (translation of American works, exchange of personnel, and training). Suffice to note here that American social science has exerted a profound impact not just on research and the literature, overwhelmingly American[10], which has inspired most of post-war political studies, but also on the training of personnel (Graziano, 1987). One is left with the impression that this powerful external factor has been filtered less by Italy's weak institutional and academic structure, than by the critical reception of individual scholars.

In view of such external input, would it be appropriate to refer to Italian political science as a case of dependent development? Is the center-periphery concept, recently evoked in connection with the study of the development of political science in "peripheral" countries[11], an adequate metaphor for understanding the sense of direction and pattern of interaction in the Italian case? Yes and no (cf. Von Beyme, 1986; Sartori, 1986). For one thing, there is little doubt that a hegemonic science, as American political science has been in the past and to a large extent continues to be, tends to impose itself as a model, pointing to themes of investigation and modes for their analysis, approaches

and organizational patterns in teaching and research which originate from its own specific historical experience.

Secondly, an external influence represents an important conditioning factor in the sense that the timing in the development of one discipline in the various national contexts is not necessarily the same. Thus, behavioralism which by its nature is an interdisciplinary movement common to the whole of the social sciences, was to reach Italy precisely at a time when political science and its practitioners were led to emphasize, rather than attenuate, the boundaries among disciplines. More importantly, in terms of substantive orientation the behavioral approach tended to give less importance to factors, such as force, the role of the state and the specific nature of political power, which had been central to European historical experience as well as to the works of the classics, and in Italy to the writings of the elite theorists.

Lastly, the relevance of the concept of "peripherality" unmistakingly emerges frm any international bibliography of political science. Not only is the number of Italian authors generally negligible, but the few works listed are much more typical of what I have called the "tradition" than of the course of studies which has come to characterize contemporary Italian political studies. One illustration among many of this state of things is Karl Deutsch's review of post-war political science in Andrews' (1982) International Handbook of Political Science, which among some 400 entries lists the works of three Italian authors, namely, Mosca, Mussolini and Pareto.

The other side of the coin shows that, at least in the case of the best among Italian scholars, the reception of behavioralism has been selective and anything but acritical. Sartori (1979: 239 and foll.) among others, has addressed that movement a number of widely shared critiques. One was aimed at the behavioral view of politics, which "dissolved" political science into sociology through a "diffuse" and "horizontal" conception of politics and its ample recourse to socio-economic data, which tended to result in sociological and economic explanations of political phenomena. The other critique was that behavioralism largely neglected the

study of institutional mechanisms and public policy, resulting in - a critique which summarizes the whole argument - "the disappearance of what is political " (Sartori, 1979: 231-245; 1986).

In another important respect, namely, the relationship of political science to history, the reception of external influences has been no less cautious and selective. Behavioralism and the various approaches linked to it, by drawing attention to the study of social activity and the functioning of the system make for a style of analysis which tends to disregard the historical factors in the genesis and development of political systems. In the Italian case, such a link with history, although certainly weakened and in need of a serious reappraisal, has not been lost completely. It is noteworthy that some of the most notable theoretical contributions of contemporary Italian political science, such as Sartori's theory of polarized pluralism, are based on a combination of theoretical approaches (in Sartori's case, spatial modelling of party competition) and an accurate understanding of some basic structural traits of Italian politics (Daalder, 1986)[12]. History plays an equally important if not greater role in another noted contribution, and that is Farneti's (1971) proposed definition of political system as a process of historical emancipation from civil society, a sort of meeting ground and synthesis of the theories of civil society and elite theory.

Italy's exposure to international currents of thought would deserve a more detailed analysis than is possible here, including the institutional and cultural factors which have made Italy receptive to external trends (cf. Barbano, 1985: 98-102 on the "Americanization" of Italian sociology in the 1950's). What is certain is that such a brassage has generated stimuli and conceptual borrowings without which the development of Italian political science would not have been the same. At the same time interaction has given rise to problems, contradictions and discontinuities which would require careful scrutiny in order for the profession to gain better cognition and awareness of the course of the discipline in its various stages of development.

Notes

1) Before 1981 Italian political scientists were represented by the Associazione italiana di scienze politiche e sociali, within which in the mid-1970's they had founded a section of political science

2) There are at present in Italy thirty full professors of political science and related subjects, forty associate professors and about as many with the official status of university researchers.

3) The Facoltà di scienze politiche set up under Fascism were that of Perugia, Pavia, Padova and Rome.

4) The Istituto later Facoltà Cesare Alfieri in Florence had been founded in the last decades of the 1800's on the pattern of the Ecole Libre de Sciences Politiques in Paris, which also served as a model for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

5) Although generally unreceptive to the idea of a science of politics, Croce was more critical of Pareto than of Mosca. Cf. Croce's review of Mosca's Elementi printed as a preface to the fourth edition of the book (Bari, Laterza, 1947).

6) Bobbio's articles appeared mainly in journals of philosophy and culture.
Besides the role played by Mosca and Pareto via Bobbio, some reference should be made in a more extended discussion of the subject, to Michels, whose influence was important with students of political sociology in the 1950's and '60's.

7) In 1964 Bobbio edited the Trattato di sociologia generale, the first Italian edition since its appearance in 1923, and a selection of writings from the Trattato with Sansoni in 1973. From Mosca's writings, he selected and edited an anthology of chapters from the Elementi under the title La classe politica (Mosca, 1966). Cf. Norberto Bobbio (1984).

8) For Bobbio's interpretation of Mosca cf. Bobbio (1969; 1986).

9) Sartori (1979) includes a revised version of the lectures originally published in 1959 (Sartori, 1959).

10) The bibliography appended to Sartori's lectures of '59 (Sartori, 1959) is of no mere bibliographical interest. With rare exceptions (Duverger, Meynaud, B. Crick), all the works listed are by American authors, in particular all the works listed as "representative and critical" writings basic to the new science (Wallas, Bentley, Catlin, Merriam, Lasswell, Easton, Morgenthau, etc.).
On the fortune of Duverger in Italy cf. Belligni (1984).

11) The reference is to the Symposium on "Development and institutionalisation of Political Science: Center-periphery Relationships and Other Concepts", Helsinki, October 1985.

12) One may criticize Sartori's model as being too static an interpretation of Italian history, especially with respect to the evolution of the PCI and its position within the political system. There is little doubt, however, that the model shows a great understanding for some basic structural characteristics of Italian politics.

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Cultural and Contextual Constraints upon the development of Political Science in Britain

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'Scepticism about the possibility of political science is deeply rooted in the British intellectual tradition, represented notably by the University of Oxford. Writing in 1932, R.B. McCallum accurately conveyed both the prevailing attitudes and the state of affairs when he described the study of politics in Oxford in these disenchanted terms. 'The subject is taught by a very few specialists and a large number of philosophers and historians who approach it with varying degrees of enthusiasm or disgust.'[1] The belief that a liberal elite education could best be acquired through an acquaintance with the political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, coupled with a knowledge of the history of the political systems of Athens and Rome, survived the Second World War. It is captured by Alfred North Whitehead (a then celebrated but now forgotten philosopher who had moved from England to America) in his rearguard assertion that 'as a training in political imagination, the Harvard School of Politics and of Government cannot hold a candle to the old-fashioned English classical education'.[2]

Such defensive complacency, prompted by the emerging challenge of American political science, reflected a tradition going back to Aristotle's conception of politics as the master science, in which 'science' was conceived as synonymous with philosophy or systematically ordered knowledge. By the eighteenth century knowledge was conceived as being either psychological or historical. Human nature provided the

enduring element while history provided the element of change; together they were the sources of the statics and dynamics of politics. On the basis of such knowledge, in which 'facts' and 'values' were inextricably intermingled, educated citizens would be able to take part in deciding the affairs of their society, armed with the insight provided by the integrating discipline of the applied master science of politics. 'The ultimate purpose of any science of politics remained that of its earliest cultivators, namely to furnish prudential maxims, draw practical inferences, and formulate clear criteria for judging the fitness of laws and institutions which could guide the conduct of wise legislators ...'[3]

This entrenched historico-philosophical tradition successfully resisted the nineteenth century attempts, made apparently with more success in economics and sociology, to develop politics into a rigorous science with a pretence to formulate experimentally tested axioms. The imperial claim to order all knowledge within the social sciences became impossible to sustain once the master's servants acquired their independence. Those academics who taught and wrote about politics had belatedly and reluctantly to seek through specialization to sustain a professional authority to which they laid a contested claim. In Britain, the most striking manifestation of this urge to break with the gentleman-amateur Oxford tradition at the end of the nineteenth century occurred with the creation of the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1895. Graham Wallas, its first Professor of Political Science, declared that its founders - Sidney and Beatrice Webb - had adopted the Paris Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques as their model. However, their prime motivation as Fabian socialists (while sharing the meritocratic inspiration of their French predecessors) was

to develop research because 'reforming society is no light matter, and must be undertaken by experts specially trained for the purpose ...'[4] But how was the London School of train experts without people who were themselves masters of a science capable of application? Beatrice Webb confided her frustration to his diary in 1896: 'Advertised for a political science lecturer - and yesterday interviewed candidates - a nondescript set of university men. All hopeless from our point of view - all imagined that political science consisted of a knowledge of Aristotle and modern! writers such a De Tocqueville - wanted to put the students through a course of Utopias from More downwards ... one of them wanted to construct a "Political Man", from whose imaginary qualities all things might be deduced ... Finally, we determined to do without our lecturer - to my mind a blessed consummation. It struck me always as a trifle difficult to teach a science which does not yet exist.'[5] Graham Wallas, whose pioneering book Human Nature in Politics (1908) was still endeavouring to base political science on the 'facts' of human nature, thought his successor Harold Laski's Grammar of Politics (1925) was a great advance upon Henry Sidgwick's Elements of Politics (1891), no general British textbook on political science having been published in the interim. Wallas pilloried Sidgwick for declaring: 'My deep conviction is that it [political science] can yield as yet little fruit of practical utility ... still, man must work and a professor must write books.'[6] Whilst some might praise Sidgwick for his becoming humility and think that little has changed in a hundred years, the Fabians were understandably impatient with those who did not do the useful comparative research into electoral and taxation systems on the basis of which reforms they desired could be proposed and implemented.

With the failure to create in the London School a true replica of Sciences Po in Paris, with its practical concern to train an elite to serve the state (albeit endowed with a radical zeal) the next attempt came with the 1930s creation of Nuffield College in Oxford. The inspiration here was Sandie Lindsay, Master of Balliol College from 1924-49 and the mind behind the creation of the innovative University of Keele in 1950. A teacher of politics in the traditional, classicist manner, Lindsay was concerned to overcome the separation between theory and practice by creating not a Brookings-style institute but a postgraduate college in which there would be a meeting of minds between social scientists and men of action - central and local government officials, politicians and businessmen. Lindsay was convinced that if the traditional separation of political actors and political analysts was breached, this 'could revolutionize the study of contemporary society in England, not only through the high standard of applicable knowledge which it would produce, but even more by the effect it would have in making the theorist and the practical man accustomed to helping and consulting one another.'[7]

Although another political scientist, G.D.H. Cole, tried in the early 1940s to develop Nuffield College as a centre for research into the problems of post-war reconstruction, he was frustrated in particular by the British disease of official secrecy, which prevented senior civil servants playing any part in this work.[8] We meet here one of the bottlenecks preventing the development of an empirical British political science - lack of access to essential information and the segretation of those who know but do not write from those who write but do not know. (We shall return to this later.) So the Oxford socialist reformists, Lindsay and Cole, like their London predecessors, the Webbs, failed to

institutionalise an applied political science, partly because the acknowledged expertise did not exist on the basis of which they could overcome entrenched official and academic hostility. Not even the upheaval of a world war, in which some of the few teachers of politics acquired first-hand experience in government, was able to destroy the barrier between those whose vocations were the activities of public administration and political service and those whose vocation was the study of politics and administration. As so often happens in Britain, it was a response to external - in this case primarily American - pressure that changes occurred within the academic sphere.

The Muted Impact of American Political Science

In 1962 former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that 'Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role'. British political science seemed to be acquiring an empire but remained uncertain about its purpose. It could be argued that during the 1960s, when the teaching and study of politics was to commence an unprecedented expansion in British universities, the full brunt of developments in a self-confident American political science was felt at a time when there was uncertainty about what to teach and how to study the subject. With the increasing introversion of philosophy in linguistic preoccupations, while logical positivism pronounced a metaphysical political philosophy as clinically dead, the traditional concern with the history of political ideas was left in a residual and debilitated state. The description of political institutions had not fundamentally changed since Bagehot (of the English Constitution, not the would-be scientistic

Physics and Politics). This meant that academic specialists in politics had rather dubious claims to a professional monopoly of a particular branch of knowledge, while not possessing Bagehot's gift for penetrating aphorism.

Before considering the cool reception afforded the methodological and substantive advances made by American political scientists, mention should be made of the emergence of an organised profession under the stimulus of UNESCO. The creation of a Political Studies Association in 1950, after the (relatively) high tide of official interest in the social sciences during the Second World War from which the economists principally profited, meant that there was at last an institutional umbrella under which a variety of allied subjects could shelter. They were loosely enumerated as 'Political Theory and Institutions, Government and Public Administration, Constitutional and Administrative Law, International Relations, International Law and similar subjects.'[9] The product of an uneasy compromise between the founders - with William Robson from the London School and Norman Chester of Nuffield College, Oxford, playing the leading roles - these categories of potential members partly overlapped. In some cases, notably in the instance of the administrative, constitutional and international lawyers, they were - unlike Continental Europe - never to become part of the political studies community. Furthermore public administration and international relations were in an ambiguous situation, partly sub-sections of a broad-based political studies community and partly autonomous, specialist communities of their own, often with better links to practitioners. The diffident approach of the founders was evident from the recruiting circular sent out in 1949: 'It is not suggested that the Association should immediately embark on any ambitious functions or

projects.'[10] Members were reassured that they would not be expected to do very much: an annual meeting 'ought to be possible' and 'publication ... perhaps even of a journal' would be considered, the latter coming into existence in 1953. It was this rather relaxed community of about a hundred scholars, who formed the membership of the Political Studies Association in 1950, which largely ignored transatlantic developments as long as it could. By the end of the decade, this was becoming increasingly difficult and the negative response in the shape of Bernard Crick's The American Science of Politics appeared in 1959. It has not really been improved upon since then.

To understand Crick's negative response - a more articulate and thought out repudiation but representative of the majority allergy to the abstract scientism of the methodologies propounded - it is necessary to read his subsequent tract In Defence of Politics, with its vehement reassertion of a liberalised version of the Aristotelian conception of the study of politics. In it he protested against the fact that 'in recent years the growing tendency in the university study of politics has been to make the criteria for research and study not political importance, but various notions of methodological impeccability'.[11] Ironically, given our earlier quotation from Beatrice Webb on the reasons for the London School's failure to appoint to a Lectureship in Political Science in 1896, it was as a Lecturer at the London School that Crick championed Aristotle and Tocqueville against those who wished to substitute predictive scientific laws for understanding.[12] However, to demonstrate some of the weaknesses of American political science was not to vindicate the strength of British 'political studies' and by 1975

Crick was to confess 'I am a bit fed up with political science' and suggested that it was time to accept the interdisciplinary implications of being parasitic upon history and philosophy.[13]

However, despite this sweeping call to turn away from a behaviouralism that was already in partial retreat in the USA, British political studies had meanwhile begun to adopt in a piecemeal and incremental fashion many of the theoretical, quantitative and substantive concerns of American political scientists but without their concomitant theoretical self-consciousness. 'New perspectives may have had to burst through the more established interpretations, but this does not mean that they burst them apart. Quite the reverse. New approaches and perspectives were slowly absorbed and accepted precisely because they could be integrated so as to sustain the credibility of the core assumptions integral to the earlier accounts and to the tradition of understanding as a whole.'[14] The British response to American political science has thus been a classic case of dynamic conservatism: changing enough so as to keep things basically the same.

In terms of the context of what has been taught to students of politics, despite Crick's clarion call there has been a decline in the importance of both history and philosophy, whether in the study of political thought or of political institutions. This has been especially marked in the Polytechnics, where there has been more innovation and experimentation in teaching, partly because there has been less pressure to undertake research than in the universities. Particularly when it was associated with a roseate view of the working of the British political system - a view encouraged by much American political science writing into the 1960s - the emphasis upon how

successful the pragmatic British capacity for gradualist compromise was in ensuring that 'the more things change, the more they remain the same', gave way by the end of the 1960s to attacks on 'pluralist stagnation'.[15] The pervasive 'What's wrong with Britain' syndrome, based upon its relative economic decline and its loss of great power status internationally, meant that a certain style of teaching that exuded a sense of political legitimation rather than critical political analysis, ceased to be fashionable first in higher education and then in the schools. Comparative studies first of political sociology, then political development, later of political economy, were clearly less concerned with celebrating consensus and instead highlighted social divisiveness, stagnation and poor economic performance.

Before the establishment of the Social Science Research Council in 1965, British political science research was essential artisan-like, usually done by an individual on a diminutive budget. Until the squeeze upon its capacity to offer financial support from the late 1970s, the SSRC encouraged the development of both the number of research students and of team work on 'big budget' projects. This resulted in a massive increase in political science publications, both in the form of articles in the new general and specialist journals that were established. This phenomenon was also reflected in the number of books on political science, attested by the inflation in the size of bibliographies provided for the increasing number of undergraduates who were their major market.[16] However, one of the most remarkable growth areas has been work that can be done on low or no budgets in political theory. Ironically it was an Englishman, T.D. Weldon, who had seemed to sentence political theory to death in his Vocabulary of Politics (1953), while it was an American John Rawls, who seemed to revive it with his A Theory of

Justice (1971). The problem had not been so much the positivist rejection of normative theory as the fact that so little political theorising had been taking place, other than critical commentary upon old theories, with a few conspicuous exceptions such as Brian Barry's Political Argument (1965).[17] Setting aside the scientistic exhortations of behaviouralism, the revival of empirical theory was actually encouraged by the behavioural emphasis upon the need for explicit theoretical frameworks to guide reseach by pinpointing the problems to be investigated and the kinds of data whose collection would be required. While such normative and empirical theorising has reinvigorated the study of political theory, it has nevertheless not displaced traditional work on the history of political thought, both as a field for scholarly work and as part of the undergraduate curriculum.

The Political Scientist and the World of Politics

Despite the de facto separation of the academic study of politics from its active practitioners, which is particularly marked in Britain, its failure to acquire acknowledged scientific status has meant a certain failure to distinguish politicians and political scientists, amounting to 'confusing the denizens of the zoo with the zoologists.'[18] However, because of the obsessive addiction to official secrecy which in Britain denies the academic access to much of the basic information - especially as it relates to government decision-making - political scientists are dependent upon the spasmodic insights afforded by the revelations of investigative journalism or the open conspiracy against official confidentiality lauched by a self-styled 'lifelong political scientist' such as Richard Crossman in The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister.[19] If we are to understand the constrained context within

which British political science has had to work, we must examine the secretive Whitehall culture that made possible and seeks to perpetuate an institutionalised conspiracy of silence.

It is especially through the eyes of American political scientists, coming from a political culture where norms of openness rather than secrecy prevail, that we can best appreciate the abnormality of a British preoccupation with preserving the system of reciprocal trust among decision makers from inquisitive outsiders such as political scientists. In comparing 'White House and Whitehall' in 1965, Richard Neustadt wrote: 'Those who govern Britain mostly keep their secrets to themselves ... Least of all are they inclined to satisfy curiosities of academics, especially not English academics ... kept at bay by those three magic words, "Official Secrets Act". Why not? Nothing in the British constitution says that anyone outside of Whitehall needs an inside view. Quite the reverse. If academics knew, then journalists might learn, and even the backbenchers might find out. God forbid! That could destroy the constitution. Government is meant to be a mystery.'[20] A decade later, two more leading American political scientists, Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, showed that it was possible to break through the barriers surrounding the administrative holy of holies (the Treasury) but commented: 'That political administrators find secrecy useful is understandable; that citizens and social scientists should acquiesce is less so. Academic reservations are clearly marked out - voting, parties, interest groups, parliament - but the Executive fortress is proclaimed sacrosanct. Those inside who do not wish to be seen make common cause with those outside who could try to see but do not. THE CONSTITUTION is their common pretense'.[21] It was entry into the Cabinet in 1964 of Richard Crossman, committed to the role of

participant-observer, combining his skills as journalist and political scientist with access to the 'Inside View' - the title of his Godkin Lectures of 1972[22] - that challenged the key constitutional fiction of collective ministerial responsibility. This was to answer Neustadt's ironic remark quoted earlier that those outside Whitehall did not need the 'inside view'. In the process, Crossman stirred up an instructive public controversy.

In contrast to the self-serving writers of most political memoirs, upon which political scientists were usually condemned to rely, Crossman's detailed diaries of the day-to-day doings of British executive government was meant as a deliberate challenge to another of Neustadt's quoted remarks - that 'Government is meant to be a mystery'. In his 1963 introduction to a new edition of Bagehot's The English Constitution, Crossman had in advance clearly indicated his demystifying intentions. 'The decline of the Cabinet had been concealed from the public eye even more successfully than its rise to power in Bagehot's era. Here was a secret of our modern English Constitution which no one directly concerned with government - whether minister, shadow minister, or civil servant - was anxious to reveal. Yet, despite the thick protective covering of prerogative and constitutional convention under which our government is still conducted, there must come occasions on which the drapery is whisked aside and the reality of power is revealed.'[23] Anticipating his future role, Crossman noted 'how little is normally revealed of what goes on in the modern Cabinet, and how much information is available about these secret proceedings, if only someone who knows the truth can be stimulated to divulge it'.[24] He was to be that person himself from 1964-70.

Lord Gordon-Walker, a former teacher of history and politics at Oxford, recalling a letter sent in 1880 by one future Conservative Prime Minister to another on the doctrine of ministerial collective responsibility being a 'constitutional fiction', argued that 'An element of concealment was inherent in the very concept of collective responsibility. The doctrine that the Cabinet must appear to be united presupposed Cabinet divisions that had not been reconciled. Ministers must in the nature of things have differences but they must outwardly appear to have none. Collective responsibility must therefore to some extent be a mask worn by the cabinet.'[25] However, whereas Gordon-Walker subscribed to the view that the fiction was constitutionally indispensable, Crossman was determined to unmask the illusion of governmental unity. Crossman wanted to show that the reality of fragmented decision making meant that the function of the Cabinet was to give a spuriously collective constitutional legitimacy to piecemeal departmental, interdepartmental, Cabinet committee or Prime Ministerial decisions. 'Unattributable leaks' of inside information had become an increasing feature of government life for a century but Crossman wanted this selective revelation, aimed to deliberately mislead, to be corrected by general access to as full information as possible. As Gordon-Walker had shown, 'the doctrine of collective responsibility and the unattributable leak grew up side by side as an inevitable feature of the Cabinet', the leak being 'paradoxically necessary to the preservation of the doctrine of collective responsibility. It is the mechanism by which the doctrine of collective responsibility is reconciled with political reality. The unattributable leak is itself a recognition and acceptance of the doctrine that members of a Cabinet do not disagree in public.'[26]

Nevertheless, a Labour Attorney General in 1975 sought to obtain an injunction to prevent publication of Crossman's Diaries, the report of his opening statement containing the kernel of the traditional argument for secrecy. 'The present proceedings had been brought primarily to protect the public interest in good government, of which collective responsibility was a major pillar ... Intercourse in government between minister and minister and Cabinet and departments was intercourse between officers of the Crown in the affairs of the Crown. If such occasions understood to be confidential were not confidential, good government was not possible.'[27] Despite the failure of such arguments to prevent the publication of The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, nothing has changed fundamentally in Whitehall attitudes. This is evidenced by the subsequent court cases in which British governments have sought to conceal partisan or mendacious accounts of public affairs - the Cabinet Secretary's phrase about 'economising on truth' in 1986 deserves immortality - in the name of serving the national or public interest. It continues to be extremely difficult if not impossible for 'outsider' political scientists to acquire the 'insider' information, without which much academic 'research' ceases to be meaningful. The untimely death of John Mackintosh, who promised to provide more political scientist participant-observation in the Crossman tradition, was a serious blow. A self-inflicted blow was the forced resignation of Dr. Bernard Donoughue from the London School on the ground that his unpaid leave of absence to head the Prime Minister's Policy Unit could not be extended! This demonstrates that the separation of the world of politics and administration on the one hand and political science on the other is not attributable only to the exclusiveness of the former; it is also to be blamed on the universities' refusal to accept a pantouflage that has been practiced with benefit in many other countries.

Despite the efforts of bodies like the Royal Institute of Public Administration and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) to develop mutually useful links between the academic world and the home civil service and the diplomatic service, domestic and foreign policy makers, one has to admit that the impact of each on the other has usually been fairly modest. On the relatively rare occasions when there appears to have been some influence of academic debate upon public administration practice, it has been argued that 'one is more likely to find evidence of American managerial thought in many of the initiatives adopted since the 1960s than of British academic public administration.'[28] A survey of five British academic journals which publish articles dealing with the senior civil service over the quarter century 1961-1981 shows that 39 per cent were written by non-academic authors. They were much more willing to offer prescriptive advice (25 per cent of their output as against 7 per cent for academics). They were also, obviously, in a far better position to offer 'inside dope' than are academic political scientists, although the latter devoted over half their articles (53 per cent) to narrating a story which 'insiders' would have been in a far better position to recount, if they were allowed to do it.[29] They eschewed theory altogether and in this they remained loyal to the view that public administration is 'an esoteric and flexible task which proceeds in mysterious ways (the anonymity convention) and which can hardly be taught because its content is always shifting and because ultimately only Ministers can decide - and no one can foretell what their decisions will be. There is thus no theory or even discussion within the Civil Service of the role and purpose of central government. Indeed this question is generally regarded by civil servants as improper and useless ...'[30] Hence the impact of the 1968, partly political science-inspired Fulton Report on the reform of

the Civil Service[31] and its offspring the Civil Service College, was predictably limited in a system in which muddling through was the height of official ambition. At the more modest level of local government, there has been a much greater involvement of the Birmingham University Institute of Local Government Studies (created in 1963) in promoting corporate management and planning as part of the reform of local government in the 1970s, as well as the greater tendency for political scientists to serve on local councils than in Parliament. Political scientists were less effective in shaping the proposals for Scottish and Welsh devolution that developed in the 1970s but which failed to secure sufficient public support in the referenda of 1979.

Because of their greater openness, Parliament and the political parties provide, within the field of national politics, opportunities for political science that are largely absent in the case of central government. The tendency towards self-adulatory praise of the 'Mother of Parliaments' went into steep decline in the 1960s, partly as a consequence of the sense that in Britain, as in most countries other than the USA, representative assemblies were being by-passed in favour of extra-parliamentary forms of representation. The Study of Parliament Group built a bridge between official insiders and academic outsiders. Following in the wake of earlier reformist campaigns by Harold Laski and others, a book by a leading member of the Group, Bernard Crick's The Reform of Parliament (1974), helped put the establishment of specialist committees on the agenda and it was Leaders of the House of Commons Richard Crossman and Norman St. John Stevas - both commentators on Bagehot - who played the major part in their creation despite

conspicuous government reluctance. The use of foreign parliamentary experience in the best style of comparative politics was a useful antidote to the traditional insularity that had hitherto predominated.

As far as political parties and elections are concerned, the major academic impact of political science has been achieved through the work of a Canadian Robert McKenzie in British Political Parties (1955), of Sammy Finer in Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform (1974), as well as in the part played by political scientists in designing and interpreting public opinion polls, which have become an increasingly popular way of testing and disseminating some of the basic hypotheses of political sociology. More recently, Richard Rose's Do Parties Make a Difference? (1980) challenged another piece of conventional wisdom and like the books by McKenzie and Finer has had an impact beyond the academic audience upon the understanding and behaviour of those involved in the political process.[32] It is a mark of the propensity of homegrown political scientists not to question the fundamental assumptions of the British political process that two out of these three iconoclasts started their academic careers in North America.

With only a modest impact upon those in power - although there is plenty of consultation of academic experts on foreign countries by insular, ill-informed ministers, senior civil servants and parliamentary committees -and with only a few academics being invited for comments on current affairs on the mass media, some attention has been paid to political education in the schools. There has never in Britain been the connection with civic education for democracy which played such an important part in the early development of American political science, or to some extent in Third Republic France, though in the latter it was

secondary in importance to the connection with elite education. The foundation of the Politics Association in 1969 by school teachers of politics has had to overcome two traditional objections to the political education of teenagers. Firstly, there is the fear of indoctrination. Secondly, characteristic of British culture, there is the 'long-held assumption that appropriate political knowledge, skills and attitudes are somehow absorbed by the pupil in the course of the traditional school curriculum.'[33] In an attempt to reassure objectors, ' political literacy' has been defined to incorporate a generous infusion of rationalist and pluralist liberal values: 'the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to make a man or woman informed about politics, able to participate in public life and groups of all kinds, both occupational and voluntary, and to recognize and tolerate diversities of political and social values.'[34] Despite the support of political scientists such as Bernard Crick and Fred Ridley, the Politics Association has made only modest headway, so that political science lacks the mass audience socialised at school to think in politically literate terms, as well as not enjoying the sympathetic ear of the political and administrative elites.

Conclusion

As Trevor Smith has pointed out: 'It is common enough for disciplines to split into opposing camps from time to time but such divisions are rarely polarised on national lines.' Because of the split between American, British and Continental European approaches to the study of politics, 'British political science was largely bereft of any strong feeling of being part of an internationally cohesive discipline of the kind most other academic vocations enjoy.'[34] While this assessment may exaggerate the degree of cohesion enjoyed in its sister

social sciences of economics and sociology, nevertheless it is correct to point to the culture-bound character of much political science, except where the weakness or non-existence of an indigenous tradition has meant that there has been little resistance to the absorption of a foreign methodology and set of assumptions.

Despite the endeavours of the International Political Science Association and the European Consortium for Political Research, insularity has continued to be a feature of British political science, apart from the homeopathic doses of American political science it has absorbed. Jonathan Swift summed up the situation in 1726 when he sarcastically referred in Gulliver's Travels to the people of Brobdingnag's 'Ignorance, they not having reduced Politicks into a science, as the more acute wits of Europe have done.' To mask an uneasy feeling of possible intellectual inferiority, there is an anti-intellectual recourse to scepticism about relying upon something other than commonsense and practicality. So the King of Brobdingnag 'gave it for his opinion, that whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass, to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of Mankind, and do more essential service to his Country than the whole Race of Politicians put together.'[35] As long as it is the general view in Britain that practical men of affairs have little if anything useful to learn from academics in political matters, Swift's speciously persuasive dictum will continue to inhibit political science being taken seriously by others and promote paralysing self-doubt even among its practitioners. A culturally induced intellectual inertia and a contextually crippling denial of access to indispensable information have seriously constrained the twentieth centry development of British political science.

NOTES

1. Oxford Magazine, 1931-32, Vol. L, pp. 360-1, quoted by Norman Chester, Economics, Politics and Social Studies in Oxford, 1900-85, 1986, Basingstoke, p. 48.

2. Essays in Science and Philosophy, 1948, London, p. 33, quoted in Chester, op.cit., p. 1.

3. Stefan Collini, Donald Winch and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics. A study in nineteenth century intellectual history, 1983, Cambridge, pp. 14-15.

4. Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, 1948, London, p. 86.

5. Ibid, p. 94.

6. Manchester Guardian, 10 August 1925, quoted in Collini et al, p. 369; cf. 370. On Sidgwick, see Collini et al, chapter 9.

7. Drusilla Scott, A.D. Lindsay. A Biography, 1971, Oxford, p. 235; cf. 233-4. See also Chester, op.cit., pp. 68-77.

8. Chester, op.cit., pp. 111-113.

9. Norman Chester, 'Political Studies in Britain: Recollections and Comments,' Twentity-fifth Anniversary issue of Political Studies, XXIII, June-Sept 1975, p. 152.

10. Ibid. See also Jack Hayward, 'United Kingdom' Chapter 28 of William G. Andrews (ed), International Handbook of Political Science, 1982, Westport, pp. 355-63.

11. Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, 1962, 1964 Pelican ed., Harmondsworth, p. 190; cf. 23, 171.

12. Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, 1959, London, pp. 224-6.

13. Bernard Crick, 'Chalk-dust, Punch-Card and the Polity', Political Studies, XXIII, June-Sept, 1975, p.180.

14. John Dearlove, 'The Political Science of British Politics', Parliamentary Affairs, XXV/4, Autumn 1982, p. 438.

15. Dennis Kavanagh, 'An American Science of British Politics', Political Studies XXII/3, Sept 1974, p. 264.

16. Dennis Kavanagh and Richard Rose, New Trends in British Politics. Issues for Research, 1977, London, pp. 19-20.

17. See Michael Freeman and David Robertson (ed.) The Frontiers of Political Theory. Essays in a revitalised discipline, 1980, Brighton, Introduction, p. 3-6, 11, 14 and Brian Barry, 'The Strange Death of Political Philosophy', Government and Opposition, 1980, Nos. 3-4, pp. 276-88.

18. Jack Hayward, 'The Political Science of Muddling Through: the de facto paradigm?' in Jack Hayward and Philip Norton (eds) The Political Science of British Politics, 1986, Brighton, p. 18.

19. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, I, 1975, London, p. 13.

20. Reprinted in Anthony King (ed), The British Prime Minister. A Reader, 1969, London, pp. 131-2.

21. Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money. Community and Policy inside British Politics, 1974, London, p. 341.

22. Richard Crossman, Inside View. Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government, 1972, London. The first draft of these lectures was prepared by John Mackintosh, former Professor of Politics and then Labour Member of Parliament.

23. R.H.S. Crossman's Introduction to Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 1867, 1963 Fontana ed., London, p. 64.

24. Ibid, p. 55 footnote.

25. Patrick Gordon-Walker, The Cabinet, 1970, Revised ed. 1972, London, pp. 27-8. The reference in the text is to an 1880 letter from Lord Salisbury to Arthur Balfour, quoted from A.J. Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography, 1930, London, p. 131.

26. Gordon-Walker, op.cit., p.32.

27. The Times, 23 July 1975.

28. E.C. Page, 'Ministers, Ministries and Civil Servants' in Jack Hayward and Philip Norton (eds), The Political Science of British Politics, op.cit. p. 139.

29. Ibid, pp. 142-3.

30. Peter Self, 'The Purposes of Civil Service Training', in R.A.W. Rhodes (ed), Training in the Civil Service, 1977, London, p. 20.

31. Report of the Committee on the Civil Service, HMSO, Cmnd. 3628, 1968, London.

32. Dennis Kavanagh, 'Changes in the Party System', in Jack Hayward and Philip Norton (eds), op.cit., pp. 98-100.

33. John Sutton, 'Parliament, the Public and Political Eduction', Appendix 5 of Bernard Crick and Alex Porter (eds), Political Education and Political Literacy, 1978, London, p. 248; cf. 246-7.

34. Trevor Smith, 'Political Science and Modern British Society', Government and Opposition, XXI/4, Autumn 1986, p. 425.

35. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels and Other Works, 1726; 1890 ed. London, pp. 166-7.

THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEST GERMAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A DISCIPLINE OF ACADEMIC TEACHING

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Political Science as a Discipline of Academic Teaching

In this paper, my intention is not to specialize on the teaching performance of West German political science as it has developed since the late 1940s. There are now about forty departments, sub-departments, institutes or sub-institutes of political science, scattered over the eleven federal states of West Germany (Berlin-West included). The discipline is institutionalized and organized in quite different ways, and so are the respective study schemes and examination regulations which differ from federal state to federal state and from university to university. In addition, although the controversies of the seventies have calmed down, the discipline itself is highly fragmented into different, if not diverging or even opposite, 'camps', schools, theoretical approaches

and thematic orientations - a fact which is mirrored in the teaching arena, of course. To review the development of these complex patterns and to survey the present situation would require a high investment of time, also because the qualitative data on the teaching side of West German political science are rather incomplete, if not poor. Furthermore, a report on the discipline's teaching performance would require, for the purpose of our mutual information, a display of the specific characteristics and linkages of the West German education and employment systems. In short, to cover these aspects sufficiently would require a highly specialized contribution -·and result in a rather long paper.

According to these points (and at this stage of our committee discussion) I shall address the teaching aspect of West German political science in a more general way, trying, however, to include as much information on basic patterns and development patterns as possible. But although much of my argument will be presented in rather general terms I shall discuss a specific problématique: the role of teaching for the development of political science. I think it is fair to say that in most contributions to the analysis of political science teaching is regarded as a function of the discipline, as one of its 'manifestations'. Sometimes teaching is taken as an indicator of developmental trends, sometimes it is included into development reports or statements on 'the state of the art' just to get 'the full picture'. By this, teaching is ascribed a secondary status both in general substantiations of the discipline and in day-to-day

professional performance. Leaving out the latter abuse, my point of concern in this paper is the function teaching has had for the foundation and the development of political science. To sharpen the point and to formulate my main thesis: Political science, at least in the case of West Germany, was founded to perform a specific teaching function and became established because of the expectations linked to its teaching capacity. There are some indications that the present status of West German political science within the system of higher and academic education might be threatened/reduced because it is notably its teaching function which has come under attack (under the present conditions of fiscal crisis, increasing academic unemployment, resurgent resentments about the social use of social sciences).

In the next sections, I shall elaborate on the development of West German political science to demonstrate and to discuss my interpretation/thesis. After that, I shall try some conclusions which might be drawn from the West German case (and possibly from similar ones) for a revision of conventional conceptions of (political) science. If teaching is not just a function of, but also a constituent element for the development of political science the prevailing debates on 'the object and the method' which have dominated so many attempts for the legitimation and self-identification of political science should be complemented and, by this, partly re-directed. If the argument proves reasonable in our discussion it might also affect our projected analyses.

The Role of Teaching for the Emergence of West German Political Science

Like political sciences in other countries the West German discipline has often been at pains to map out and to define its field of topical responsibility and analytical competence vis-à-vis its academic neighbours and competitors (for this common search for 'identity' cf. Andrews 1982, Introduction). But without neglecting the respective efforts and endeavours we may say that neither the foundation nor the progression of West German political science were decided and promoted on these grounds of argument. The discipline got its thrust and motive power as an educational 'movement', and it was the teaching argument which paved the discipline's way and provided it with academic citizenship. West German political science was developed as a discipline of academic teaching, and it developed its research capacity from the institutional basis designed for teaching purposes. Academization was, in the first instance, the building-up of full study schemes; in the second instance, however, the discipline became 'academized' in the sense of transformation to a discipline which strives for scientification. It was only in the seventies that academization in the second sense became a dominant motif. Whether this was a consequence of West German political science approaching the status of 'a mature discipline' or a departure from its original teaching objectives is a point to be discussed later. In any case, by devaluating its teaching role the discipline lost the driving force of its development. In the retrospect, this was a crucial

shift. Today, West German political science might have to face a major set-back as an academic discipline because it became questioned as a discipline of academic teaching. This rough account should not be read, however, as if this course of (unexpected) events has mainly resulted from the discipline's 'own faults'. The scope for deliberate orientation and reorientation was, from the beginning in the late forties, very much determined by external conditions (cf. Kastendiek 1977 and Mohr 1985).

The institutionalization of West German political science as a university discipline was a result of the deep ruptures of German politics and society, and the course of the discipline has been largely shaped by the development of West German sociopolitics since 1945 (for a summarizing account cf. Kastendiek 1987; also Günther 1985). The call for a genuine political science to be introduced into the academic system was, firstly, a response to the failure of the First Republic (1919 - 1933), to the perversion of German politics and society during the "Third Reich" (1933 - 1945), and to the breakdown of the German state in 1945. Secondly, the discipline's foundation was claimed to be a vital contribution to building up a truly democratic order. Both the retrospective and the prospective lines of argument were directly applied to the political-academic field: for the proponents of a new political science discipline, the German academic system in general and the social and political sciences in particular had been co-responsible for the German catastrophies and thus could not be trusted to be promoters of democratic

change. Very clearly, the plans and demands to create a new and special "science of politics" were advanced as a major contribution to a necessary reform of the academic system. The problem was not if and how "politics" could be a matter of academic concern; the objective was to guarantee a responsible and competent concern with"politics" and to secure that academia would not hinder or even counteract democratic development again. From the very beginning the attempts to establish the new discipline were staged as a deliberate challenge to the existing academic disciplines. Self-confidently, political science was conceived of being, of having to be, an oppositional discipline and not just another complementation to an expanding circle of political and social sciences.

This self-confidence rooted in several convictions and was supported by several factors. The founders and promoters were convinced that to build up the new discipline did not mean to introduce a new science still to be substantiated. For substantivation they referred to occidental and European as well as German traditions of political analysis, to the development of academic political studies in other countries, notably the United States, and especially to advancements in the conceptualization and theorization of politics achieved in Germany until 1933 and continued,under the conditions of emigration, by German scholars who, in many cases, were able to contribute substantially to the progression of political science abroad. Reference to political science abroad played a dominant role but, in the view of the proponents, the argument that the West German dis-

cipline could build on outstanding former works of German scholars was even more important. The fact that many of these scholars had been, in the German academic community until 1933, in a rather peripheral position, and all the more the fact many of them finally were forced into emigration, without any remarkable resistence by the universities, strengthened political science promoters after 1945 in their conviction that the foundation of the discipline would be much more an institutional reform of faculties and universities than merely an academic event of theoretical discourse and progress. At the same time, this reform was seen as a precondition to break the established rules, conventions and informal networks which had dominated recruitment and promotion until 1933/45 and did not cease thereafter. Also in personnel terms, the new political science discipline was to be an alternative! (And, in fact, the discipline's staff since the late 1940ies can hardly be blamed for the NS-personnel continuities from 1933/45 which occured heavily in many other disciplines, to some extent even in sociology which, like political science, claimed to be a distinct "discipline of and for democracy" after 1945; for pol.sc.cf. Buchstein/Göhler 1986 in their detailed criticism of Weyer 1985; see also Kastendiek 1987, pp. 30 -31).

Initially, the efforts for building up a special political science were favoured by the socio-political and educational-political constellations of that time but very soon the emerging discipline had to face serious obstacles (cf. Kastendiek 1977, pp. 152 - 184, and 1987, pp. 31 - 34). The academic pro-

university level and the foundation of academies (or colleges) for politics outside and below the academic status of universities. Some of the new chairs were decided already in the late forties when there was much concern to induce universities to develop programmes for a more comprehensive civic education. Initially, the proponents of a political science claimed "politics" to become a compulsory element in the study course of each student whatever his or her main subjects. At least, "politics" should be assigned a prominent role in all sorts of a "studium generale", an objective which followed from the general argument for a political science mentioned earlier but also an objective which reflected the factual performance of "studium generale" in the immediate postwar years. (Arno Mohr who deserves well of having collected many empirical data on the foundation years of West German political science gives evidence that, between 1946 and 1950, only 11 % of "studium generale"-lectures etc. did refer to political topics in a strict sense; Mohr 1985, p.56). To the best of my knowledge, this did not change significantly in the 1950ies, the less so since,in many cases,it took several years to get the new chair-holders appointed. As time passed by, the general motivation of universities to promote a "studium generale" also had calmed down. Political science at universities now had to (and could) wholly concentrate on the development of its still rudimentary institutional shape. For substantiation of this objective, however, the major non-university academy for politics, the Hochschule für Politik at Berlin, should prove to be the pace-maker. It was its integration into Free University of Berlin which finally

established West German political science as an academic discipline of equal rank to other social and political sciences.

The German Academy for Politics which was re-founded in 1948 and started its work early in 1949 began as an institution for what might be called higher adult education, however on the basis of a regular study scheme (full studentship required participation in lectures/classes on every working-day's evening during four semiannual terms, leading to a diploma examination). But what had started as an offer for further education soon developed into a truly academic institution: by stages the study scheme was extended to 4 years, and the examinations provisions subsequently were adapted to university standards; consequently the Academy's graduates became accepted by Free University as doctoral students. When, in 1959 , the Academy was transformed into an institute at this university, it not only could add a full-fledged study scheme to the latter but also could provide the emerging discipline of political science with a standard model of an academic teaching programme and a shining example for academic recognition. Apart from that quality aspects the new university institute provided the discipline with quantity, so to speak, with regard both to students and to staff numbers. In 1960/61 the institute contributed 202 students of political science to a total of 316 at all universities (Mohr 1985, pp. 277-78), and 10 professoral chairs to a total of 24. Whereas, at other universities, in each instance the number of students and professors was rather small, Berlin clearly was able to demonstrate the potential of the new discipline.

To some extent, the Berlin institute's departure from further education and the academization of its study scheme were due to a propensity, both of staff and students, to gain a university-like status in the first place, then a university status, for themselves (for a striking parallel cf. the development of the "old" Hochschule für Politik from 1920 until the early thirties; see Kastendiek 1977, pp. 132 - 140, and Kastendiek 1987, pp. 29 - 30)(1). But the course of events also followed from deliberate policies to promote the establishment of the discipline within the university system (cf. Hartung et al. 1970, pp. 41 - 45). The founders of the Berlin Academy had been, from the late forties onwards, most vigorously engaged in the propagation of a new "science of politics" (cf. Kastendiek 1977, pp. 171 - 180; Mohr 1985, pp. 139 - 142; Kastendiek 1987, pp. 32 - 33) and played a dominant role in the foundation of the "Association for the Science of Politics" in 1951 and in the activities of this organisation which later was called "German Association of Political Science" (cf. Mohr 1985, pp. 199 - 230; Mohr 1986, pp. 69 - 73). For them, and also for the other proponents, it was quite clear that the new discipline, apart from its contributions to the "studium generale", had to constitute itself via the development of comprehensive teaching programmes and examination schemes

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(1) To the best of my knowledge there is only one special study on the former Academy for Politics: Steven D. Korenblat, The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany, 1920 - 1933, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978. Unfortunately, I did not succeed yet to get a copy.

(cf. Mohr 1987). As Ernst W. Meyer, political science professor at Frankfurt, put it in 1952: "In Germany, political science stands and falls with the introduction of a diploma examination and of doctoral graduations" (quoted from Mohr 1987, p. 81).

The "founding fathers"(1) soon recognized that the original general educational thrust of the new discipline had to be complemented by, if not changed towards, specific references to the training aspect of the teaching programmes, i.e. to the employment prospects of future graduates. This would not have been such a problem if graduates had been anticipated to add new positions to the labour market, e.g., as party and trade union functionaries or as teachers in adult education, or to add new qualifications to professions which traditionally do not have a structured profile in terms of recruitment like journalism. In these cases, training could be expected to occur mainly "on the job". And there was no problem with regard to those students (notably in the discipline's early years) who studied the subject for further education, to complement their professional knowledge for jobs already taken. In fact, for these professions and cases, a comprehensive teaching programme would have sufficed even if it did not develop towards university standards. But, as mentioned earlier, the intentions of the new discipline were much more ambitious. In particular, politi-

(1) There were no "founding mothers", indeed. In this respect of "equal opportunities", the composition of staff also in political science (not only in West Germany) deserves much criticism up until today.

cal science graduates should contribute to breaking the traditional predominance of jurists in the upper ranks of the German civil service, an objective to transform the 'legalistic' attitude patterns of state bureaucracy and to dissolve the traditional power of the jurist profession in German society and politics in general. As this profession had been, on the whole, rather conservative, if not reactionary, to break the "jurists' monopoly" was a concern which had clear political motives and was expressed quite explicitely. Similar criticisms and objectives were advanced with regard to the professions of school teachers, especially to Gymnasium teachers (secondary schools, similar to the British grammar schools). At the best, teaching politics had been neglected, but far too often it had been misguided. Participation of the new discipline in teachers' training schemes would be indispensable.

In both cases, political science was fighting on two fronts, against the vocational professions and against the academic disciplines in charge of the training of these professions. In the first case, political science lost. Surely, it did not break the "jurists' monopoly" in public administration; on the contrary, the percentage of, e.g., Berlin graduates appointed to civil service posts, declined steadily in the 1950ies (cf. table 6 in the statistical appendix to this paper). And those who succeeded to enter the civil service mostly did not so via normal recruition procedures. At the end of the fifties the German Association for Political Science became resigned to press this case (Mohr 1987). However, later on, some of the federal states offered economists, sociologists and political scien-

tists special training programmes to make them 'compatible' with civil service (jurists') jobs. But the number of entrants has always been rather small ((for illustration a single case which might not be representative: at Berlin, there were five programmes of this kind since 1970 with 48 social science graduates (economists included) of whom 20 were political science graduates; the annual recruition numbers for academically trained persons in the branches of general administration at Berlin are 15 to 20; information by Mr Schmidt from the ministry for the interior of Berlin (West)) . Only the University of Konstanz which developed an integrated study scheme for political science/social science/public administration may claim success (cf. table 4). In the second case, with regard to teachers' training, the record of political science was, at least for some time, much brighter. Already in the fifties, in some of the federal states, political science was granted co-responsibility for the training of Gymnasium teachers, i.e. for those teacher students who wanted to obtain the faculty for teaching social studies/civic education/politics or whatever the term in the respective federal state. After some struggles with other teachers' professions (history, geography) and with other academic disciplines (history, geography, sociology), not to forget with state ministers for education and cultural affairs, political science was finally accepted as a teachers' training discipline during the late sixties (I shall return to this later).

Thus, in the fifties and early sixties, the emerging discipline had spent much time for and invested much energy into its establishment as a discipline of academic teaching. Its claims

were permanently-insistently challenged by the established disciplines, and by preference they did so in terms of academic conventions that each new discipline had to legitimize its case by giving evidence on "its (specific) object and its (specific) method(s)". The most prominent answer on this was, at that time, the conception of political science as "integration science" (Fraenkel) respectively of political science as a "synoptic science" (A. Bergstraesser), but it did not convince the sceptics from other disciplines. Neither did it provide political science with a basis of common understanding and identification, as could be seen only a few years later (cf. Kastendiek 1977, pp. 185 - 303). This did not prevent political science to emerge in the fifties and to flourish from the sixties onwards, notably in the seventies. Clearly, the new discipline had achieved its substantiation not in terms of academic conventions, mentioned above, but in terms of a 'really existing discipline of academic teaching'. It had been the academization of study schemes by which the discipline had achieved academic recognition. It did not materialize all its objectives, e.g., breaking the "jurists' monopoly", but these objectives had been a driving force to developing a genuine teaching programme.

The academization should pay off in the sixties and seventies, but it also had its price. As discussed in some more details elsewhere (Blanke et al. 1975; Kastendiek 1977 and 1987) the new discipline became caught by the course of socio-political events since the forties and became changed itself, by losing much of its original impetus to perform as an 'oppositional

discipline' within academia and as a 'discipline of democratic control' vis-à-vis socio-political restoration. This interpretation was recently challenged by Berthold (1987) who argues that the discipline's socio-political integration has to be seen in the continuity of positions already developed in the Weimar period until 1933 and then in emigration or 'inner emigration'. In any case, the combination and mutual reinforcement of socio-political adaptation and academization since the forties should have very much contributed to the recognition success of the new discipline in the late fifties and early sixties.

The Expansion of West German Political Science as a Discipline of Academic Teaching: Consequences and New Intricacies

In quantitative terms, the development of West German political science from 1960 onwards is a story of outstanding success. Students numbers exploded: from 300 in 1960 they climbed up to roughly 1500 and 3500 in 1965 and 1970, reached about 8000 between 1975 and 1980, and again increased significantly until 1985, now up to 13000 (and even more when we include students who study political science as a secondary subject; cf. tables 2, 3.1. and 3.2.). This expansion was paralleled by an increase in political science professorships (cf. tables 2 and 7). What had been an "orchid discipline" in the fifties (as we call, in German, small and peripheral disciplines because in our country orchids are rather rare species) has developed to a "mass discipline".

Impressive, as these figures are, they are less exciting, however, when correlated with the expansion of academic education as a whole. The real breakthrough of political science as a discipline of teaching, at least in terms of students numbers, was in the sixties and early seventies (cf. table 2), whereas, in the case of all university students, the most remarkable upswing in numbers had already occured in the late fifties (cf. table 1.1.). Seen in this way, the quantitative success of political science was rather a "pull up" with other disciplines. Since 1970, the proportion of political science students, compared to all students, has been oscillating between 1 and 1.5 per cent (cf. table 2). This is not to question the discipline's good results but to state that the rise of students numbers and professorships was very much favoured by general trends. Political science participated in West Germany's efforts to make up with other countries' "investments into the education system" (in the late fifties and early sixties there was an intensive public debate on a West German "education catastrophy"). The former academization efforts of the new discipline now secured that political science became well represented at a whole series of new universities, founded especially between 1965 and 1975, and, at the same time, the discipline also profited from the growth of the old universities. As a result of both tendencies not only the total number of professorships heavily increased between 1967 and 1985 but also the number of political science departments or institutes with a quite reasonable staffing (cf. table 7). In these terms, political science became an essential part of West German universities.

Consequently, from the middle of the sixties onwards, the 'output' of graduates reached numbers which surely should have been unbelievable a few years ago (on total numbers cf. table 4; for illustration of the trends cf. table 5.1. on graduates of the department at Berlin). As the expansion of student numbers indicated further increases there was some concern: could school-leavers really be advised to take up a study of political science and to rely on a job perspective? Although a survey on the vocational 'whereabouts' of Berlin graduates from 1951 to 1968 gave some warnings the general evidence led to some optimism (cf. Hartung et al. 1970). Graduates in political science surely could not rely on clear labour market and recruitment patterns but, in general, they seemed rather well equipped to get into adequate employment (cf. table 6). This optimism was backed by several factors. At that time, West Germany (like other countries) experienced an era of politicization, i.e. of increasing political mobilization and participation. Simultaneously (in coincidence with that point) social sciences, generally, could win considerable public interest and became increasingly acknowledged by social and political institutions and organisations. For political science these observations were reinforced by the extension of social studies in school education and by its subsequent recognition as a discipline of teachers training in this field. Political science, it seemed, was paving its way to become a discipline which could offer its graduates an extending range of job perspectives, and the expansion of its staff would secure a training scheme which should be based on a comprehensive qualification in political science but not on

special training programmes for specific job orientations. It was up to the students to organize their personal course of studies and contacts to chosen employment fields, with the exception of teachers students who had to follow the guide-lines of fairly structured study, training and examination schemes.(1)

At the beginning of the sixties, a "Memorandum on the State of Sociology and Political Science" (Lepsius 1961) had argued that political science, after its re-introduction into the university system, had reached a phase in which it could and should concentrate on its inner consolidation and secure conditions for its full development. The rapid expansion of that decade seemed to promote this objective. The "second generation" of chair-holders, in contrast to the "founding fathers", had been trained as political scientists, a kind of "professionalization" which surely contributed to the shift from the teaching of politics to the training in political science that became strengthened in the sixties (for the discipline's 'self-recruitment' cf.

(1) Here I should add that West German students, in general and especially in the social sciences and the arts, are not guided, tutored, helped and 'controlled' like students in many other countries. From the first term onwards, they have to be 'responsible for themselves'; until their examinations they enjoy (and suffer from) 'academic freedom'. Mostly, e.g., there are no courses organized like classes or so. Students, at least in the subjects mentioned, have to design their programme for each term and the programme of their study as a whole - and to find out themselves how many years they shall be (can afford to be) students. The same procedure for the next stage, for postgraduate studies! (For comparison, we can not avoid to include information on patterns like these, I think.)

table 6). The academization of the study organization of the fifties now became complemented by a gradual academization of the subject-matter. Thus, it was no accident that discussions on the object and the methods as well as on the purpose and the functions of political science intensified (cf., e.g., Schneider 1967; Schmidt 1967). In the first place, discussions seemed to follow the lines prepared in the preceding fifteen years (cf. the two volumes just mentioned). But very soon, they became changed considerably - by the socio-political and politico-cultural transitions, if not ruptures, of the late sixties and early seventies.

For this period, again I may refer to accounts I tried elsewhere (1977, pp. 238 - 303; 1987, pp. 36 - 38). Although, in these accounts, I argued that it would be rather misleading to pay all the attention to the concussions the discipline experienced by the students movement and by the re-emergence of marxist oriented social science approaches, notably these two events have to be emphasized in the context of this paper. Obviously, for many political scientists it was a rather painful experience that also their discipline and also they themselves had become addressees of students' criticisms. For the former, the foundation and progression of political science were still regarded as achievements of practical reform of West German academic organization and performance, and many of them showed quite conflicting reactions and attitudes to the students movement, vacillating between sympathy for many of its concerns and contra-positions. For political science members of the student movement, however, it was the actual performance of the disci-

pline as a whole which came under attack. Many students as well as younger assistants and assistant professors (in British terms: temporary lecturers and senior lecturers, with contracts strictly limited to five or six years) turned towards critical theory (Frankfurt School) and marxist theory. As, from the early seventies onwards, the number of appointments in these staff categories was largely extended to cope with the series of students waves which reached universities (and political science), also the personnel preconditions for a partial thematic and theoretical reorientation of the teaching programme improved because many of the appointees had been shaped by the protest movement. These changes, at least in some of the institutes of political science, only to small degree had been initiated from within the discipline respectively by its professoral representatives; they originated from other disciplines and/or from the political unrest in the discipline's environment. But when introduced to political science they caused alarm, inside and outside the discipline.

Because of similar changes in other disciplines the measures for university reform which had been a political answer to the students protests but also had facilitated the changes mentioned became reconsidered as soon as they had been implemented, and the initial and partial toleration of these changes was quickly revoked, also in political science. After a liberal professor of the "second generation" had conceded that some criticism of students and leftist members of the profession should be acknowledged as reasonable and understandable (Sontheimer 1970) Ernst Fraenkel, one of the "grand old men" of West German poli-

tical science, blew him up and accused him to have neglected, especially with regard to the discipline's new responsibility for the training of teacher students, that under the impact of marxists political science departments were endangered to become real centres of an epidemic(Fraenkel 1970).

Students, however, did not fear 'infection'. In spite of the clashes within the profession of West German political science and in spite of the general 'identity crisis' which marked the discipline's internal situation all over the seventies, students number continued to climb up. Whatever the uncertainties on "the object and the method" - the discipline continued to be rather productive, in terms of teaching and research. Students numbers increased steadily up to the early eighties (cf. tables 3.1. and 3.2.), and, as illustrated by the figures for the political science department at Berlin which continually counted for 20 to 25 per cent of diploma and M.A. students, so did the numbers of graduations (cf. tables 5.1.; 5.2. and 5.3.). At this department, also the opportunity to qualify for teacher jobs was well accepted by students (cf. table 5.2.). My statement on the research record is a very impressionistic one, as I have to concede, but to my observation the expansion of personnel numbers in the seventies and the competitive climate, so to speak the positive side of internal clashes, were two sources of occasionally rather exciting progress in the research field (for trend reports on some research areas cf. von Beyme 1986). The other side of the coin, however, is an increasing specialization, if not disintegration, of the discipline which

seems to develop towards a conglomerate of sub-disciplines and working-fields, the particularization of policy- and politics-studies being one of the urgent new problems (and discussed in Hartwich 1985). These developments, in turn, may have contributed to the calming down of open polarization (cf. von Beyme 1982, p. 174) but surely there is still a latent conflict constellation (cf. Greven 1987, p. 102).

The shift from internal (and external) polarization to a more or less "peaceful co-existence" might be welcomed as an emerging pluralism or as a growing tolerance within the academic profession of political science but this would be a perception of a rather "aseptic" kind. Apart from the fact that this shift has resulted from massive political-administrative interventions as well as from internal policies of "containment" (cf. Kastendiek 1987, p. 39) there were other prices to be paid. The discipline, to my impression, has lost its driving force again. There might be a parallel situation to the period from the forties to the midsixties. In the course of that period political science (however risky it is to talk of the discipline as a whole) had gradually abandoned its initial objectives and became domesticated both in political and academic terms. It were only the socio-political and politico-cultural changes since the late sixties which gave a fresh impetus when political science had to face new problem constellations in socio-politics and was confronted with students and young lecturers who questioned the discipline's performance. Admittedly, occasionally the turbulences of that time were rather hair-raising but they were also 'modes of innovation'. Within a few years,

at some places at least, West German political science had changed a lot. In the following process of their implementation, however, especially in the course of their introduction to institutional patterns and formal procedures many of these changes became either blocked or distorted, not just because of "counter-action" but also because of their own contradictions. Thus, not only external pressures but also internal intricacies stirred up new conflicts which seemed to have exhausted both the "innovators" and their academic opponents, i.e. the discipline as a whole. As a result, political science became domesticated again.

This general argument can be "nicely" demonstrated, I think, in the field of study reforms. Again, I may refer especially to the department at Berlin which is a significant though not a representative case. At this department, already in 1968, the first major reform model was developed in response to the students protest movement and in accordance with the body of students (cf. Schwan/Sontheimer 1969; Zeuner 1984; Wildermuth 1986), and here study reform had been a major theme of the debates on the performance of political science, i.e. one of the main fields on which general disputes got a concrete shape. It would take a paper of its own to describe the course and the implications of this study reform in adequate details. What is important for my argument in this paper is that the reform started with an explicite politico-academic statement on the purpose of (teaching and studying) political science and ended with a study scheme which is rather formal, i.e. rather indeci-

sive in substantial terms. Although committed "to elaborate on the pre-conditions for an extension of freedom and self-determination in all spheres of society" (statutes as confirmed, in 1968, by nearly all members of the department which then still was an institute of Free University) staff members and students could not transform this objective into the study scheme, because of external pressures and internal divisions. Even more, the codified teaching programmes avoided any thematic specifications. Partly, this was a deliberate departure from former regulations which had fixed a rather closed programme for students in their first and second year as well as for the compulsory half-time examination. But also it was a mechanism to evade internal conflicts and external interventions. All this, however, coincided with a general shift in attitudes: from subject-matters to methods and theories, from teaching and learning facts to problematization. For different reasons, 'former political science' became regarded as insufficient both by scientist oriented and marxist oriented staff members and students. As a result, the teaching schemes as well as the examination schemes predominantly emphasized the claim that students had to acquire methodical, analytical and theoretical skills; the subject-matters, however, which might be indispensable for a study of politics became handled with in a fairly general way, by reference to very broadly defined problem fields. I should add, at once, that - for the third and fourth year of study - the teaching programme includes specialization courses on more concrete topics as well as project courses related to potential employment fields, and I should also add that the

study scheme on the whole surely delivers a framework for orientation both for teaching and studying (in this context please remind the note on p. 19). The study scheme at Berlin should be one of, if not the most developed in West German political science but as such it also demonstrates very clearly the general features mentioned above, especially the shift towards an academization of teaching in the sense of theorization and scientification which cannot conceal the lack of substantial agreement on the purpose and objectives of the discipline.

This is, of course, a point which has been stated for most phases of West German political science, and in each phase there have been warnings that the discipline might be at stake. So far, this has always been proved to be a dramatization. In recent years, however, there has been developing a growing concern that this time things may turn to the negative. To be sure: in terms of students numbers the discipline has expanded steadily up until 1985/86 (cf. table 3.1.). Numbers of <u>first term</u> students, however, decreased considerably from 1983/4 to 1985/6 (cf. table 3.2.). It is difficult to assess whether this, finally, reflects a remarkable detoriation of employment chances for graduates which can be traced back to the seventies (cf. table 6), already because graduates from other disciplines are facing the same problem. But this detoriation has added to external suspicions on the performance of social sciences in general and political science in particular. Also in West Germany, under conditions of fiscal crisis, increasing unemployment and conservative change, the climate for social sciences

has become fairly rough. Denounced, e.g., as being nothing but "discussion sciences" (a leading West German Christian Democrat), they already lost some ground to other disciplines, notably to natural and technical sciences. Even more, political science is also endangered to lose ground to another "discussion science": in the field of teachers training, i.e. in the only field where political science could offer its graduates access to a structured labour market. Apart from generally high numbers of unemployed teachers (which have led to an immense reduction of first term students, cf. table 3.2.) political science is confronted with attempts of being played off against other disciplines responsible for social studies as a school-subject, notably against history and geography. In those federal states which are governed by conservative parties, these disciplines could already gain from conservative policies of change.

The problem is that political science is at pains to respond to these challenges in a coordinated, self-confident and convincing way. This has become quite obvious in a recent and surely ongoing debate if, how and how far as well as to what purpose the discipline should engage in changes towards a "professionalisation" of its teaching programmes in the sense of developing study schemes which are oriented on certain problem and employment fields (i.e. accept responsibility and claim capability for the training of students in a more direct job perspective). So far, the debate has not reached any clear conclusions which could claim/to constitute a broader consensus within the academic profession of political science (cf. Greven 1984 a + b;

Körnig/Kipke 1984; Seidelmann 1984; Rothe 1984; Wittkämper 1986; Hartwich 1987). The subtitle of the latter reference, a conference reader on this debate, indicates the range of taken positions: "teaching and studying (political science) between professionalisation and scientific immanence (Wissenschaftsimmanenz)". Since the forties West German political science has been covering a long distance...

Conventional Wisdom on the Substantiation of Academic Disciplines and the Case of West German Political Science (Concluding Remarks)

This paper was designed to explore if and how far inquiries into political science as a discipline of academic teaching provide us with points of topical and analytical access to the study of the emergence, institutionalization and development of our discipline. In doing so, I did not pay, in this presentation, special attention to political science as a body of theoretically based knowledge and understanding. Already because of this, deliberately advanced, one-sided argument I shall refrain from any attempt to play off the teaching function against the function of research and theory building. Nevertheless, I think, the case presented here gives some evidence that much of the conventional wisdom on the substantiation of academic disciplines has to be questioned.

Academic conventions define, as we know, science mainly as the collection and production of systematized and theorized know-

ledge, define the genesis of new disciplines as a process and then as the result of topical differentiation and analytical specialization, and define progression of science or of a discipline in terms of methodical and theoretical progress. By this perception of science and scientific development academia, of course, declares itself to be a societal instance of refined distinction. As could be seen in this paper, even emerging disciplines which initially challenged these conventions and perceptions have been endangered, in their strife for academization, to become 'truly academic'. There has been a very strong bias to analyze and discuss political science predominantly

- as a set of theories and concepts
- as a body of knowledge and understanding
- as a discipline responsible for the analysis of a distinctive field of societal organization

and, needless to say, in all this the discipline was propagated mainly as a research enterprise.

My argument is, not at all, to deny reflection and analysis on these points, be it in epistemological and/or normative terms. What I am pleading for, is at least the same emphasis on socio-political analyses on the development of (political) science. And for this, we have to ask how to conceive the object of our studies. Even the term which might appear not to be problematic is a tricky one: what do we mean by an academic discipline? It makes a difference whether we define a discipline

in terms of academic conventions mentioned above, or whether we define a discipline in terms of a branch within the academic system as an institution within the societal organisation, i.e. whether we define political science as a social arrangement serving social needs, being paid by social revenues, dependent on social and political developments, and being an addressee of social and political demands (and pressures).

For further attempts to promote studies on the discipline of political science in the second way my paper may suggest that we should very much be concerned with investigations into its emergence and development as a discipline of academic teaching. This could, at the same time, provide us with further points of access to analyses on the relationship between socio-political and political science developments as this relationship, I would assume, has been most concrete in this respect.

Appendix

Statistical Data

Tables

Note/Warning

Data/tables are drawn from sources based on differing compilation criteria. Therefore a comparison of individual tables shows some inconsistencies. For further use, the tables have to be checked through thoroughly. But even in their present form they should indicate general trends.

Table 1.1.

University Students in West Germany

Year	Population (in mio.)	University Students	Univ. Studs. per 10.000 Inhabitants
1950/51	51.032	79 770	15,6
1955/56	53.199	85 914	16,1
1960/61	55.435	161 792	29,2
1965/66	59.012	206 275	35,0
1970/71	60.651	273 228	45,0
1975/76	61.829	439 254	71,0
1980/81	61.566	586 452	95,3

Note: Data refer to universities in "the old sense", only, teachers training colleges etc. being excluded.

Source: Ellwein 1985

Table 1.2.

All students (universities, academies, colleges etc.)

Year	Population (in mio)	All students	All students per 10.000 inhabitants
1960/61	55.435	189 368	34,2
1965/66	59.012	241 516	40,9
1970	60.651	348 076	57,4
1975	61.829	541 198	87,5
1980	61.566	729 089	118,4
1984/85	61.024	999 017	163,7

Source: Mohr 1986

Table 2

All Students, Political Science Students, and Professorships in Political Science

Year	All Students		Pol.Sc. Students		Pol. Sc. Students/ All Students in per cent	Prof.ships in Pol.Sc.	Studs./ Prof.in Pol.Sc.
	nos.	increase in per cent	nos.	increase per cent			
1960/61	189 368	-	316	-	0,2	24	13
1965/66	241 516	27,5	1.496	373,4	0,6	51	29
1970	348 076	44,1	3.354	124,2	1,0	63	53
1975	541 198	55,5	8.079	140,9	1,5	133	60
1980	729 089	34,7	8.364	3,5	1,1	201	41
1984/85	999 017	37,0	13.483	61,2	1,3	278	48

Source: Mohr 1986

Table 3.1.

Number of political science students from 1974/75 to 1985/86

	1974/75	1979/80	1981/82	1983/4	1985/86
1. Diploma students pol.sc.; pol./soc.sc.; pol./publ.adm.	3.609	4.617	5.822	7.239	7.799
2. M.A. students pol.sc. as the main subject	797	1.709	3.105	4.569	6.250
Diploma and M.A.studs. pol.sc. as main subject (= 1 + 2)	4.406	6.326	8.927	11.808	14.049
3. Pol.sc. as a secondary subject	1.516	2.243	3.614	4.976	7.478
Pol.sc. as main or secondary subject (mainly diploma and M.A. study schemes)(1 - 3)	5.922	8.569	12.541	16.784	21.527
4. Teacher students (1981 and 1985) pol.sc. as main or secondary subject			10.322		6.132
Number of all pol.sc. students 1981 and 1985 (1 - 4)			22.863		27.659

Source
Cordes 1987

Note
Data basis of this compilation is partly incomplete

Table 3.2.

Number of first term students in political science from 1974/75 to 1985/86

	1974/75	1979/80	1981/82	1983/84	1985/86
1. Diploma students pol.sc.; pol./soc.sc.; pol./publ.adm.	433	403	1.114	1.323	971
2. M.A. students pol.sc. as the main subject	165	232	747	1.092	935
Diploma and M.A.students pol. sc. as the main subject (1 + 2)	598	635	1.861	2.415	1.906
3. Pol. sc. as a secondary subject	14	191	544	792	935
Pol. sc. as main or secondary subject (mainly diploma and M.A. students) (1 - 3)	612	826	2.405	3.207	2.815
4. Teacher students (1981 and 1985) pol. sc. as the main or a secondary subject			1.257		445
All pol. sc. students 1981 and 1985			3.662		3.260

Source
Cordes 1987

Note
Data basis incomplete

Table 4

Graduates in Political Science ((Magister(MA) and Diploma))

University (or aquivalent)	Period	Graduates
a) Magister (MA)		
Aachen	1975 - 1984	66
Augsburg	1981 - 1983	7
Braunschweig	1972 - 1984	21
Bonn	1965 - 1984	169
Eichstätt	1982 - 1983	1
Erlangen	1960 - 1984	43
Freiburg	1963 - 1983	147
Gießen	1967 - 1983	107
Hamburg	1962 - 1984	38
Kiel	1970 - 1984	34
Mannheim	1971 - 1983	18
Marburg	1966 - 1984	92
München	1969 - 1983	323
Regensburg	1969 - 1984	31
Trier	1973 - 1984	31
Tübingen	1970 - 1984	96
Würzburg	1977 - 1984	1
b) Diploma		
Berlin (Free Univ.)	1963 - 1984	2.541
Duisburg (Soc.Sc.)	1977 - 1984	53
Hamburg	1966 - 1984	370
Konstanz (Publ.Adm.)	1971 - 1984	495
Marburg	1969 - 1984	200

Note

The data were collected in 1984 by the office attached to the national commissions on study reform; some universities did not contribute to the attempt to compile the data, several of them having no data available; others are not included because, in their study and examinations schemes, political science has the status of a secondary or supplementary subject.

Source

The tables are taken from Studienreformkommission 1985, pp.146-7

Table 5.1.

Graduates in Politics/Political Science at Berlin (West)
Diploma examination

Number of graduations per year (spring & autumn)					five years periods
1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1951-1955
8	29	45	60	28	170
1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1956-1960
35	21	38	42	23	159
1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1961-1965
32	22	29	25	32	140
1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1966-1970
93	86	131	148	151	609
1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1971-1975
135	124	75	80	110	524
1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1976-1980
107	109	108	92	121	537
1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981-1985
130	136	135	133	137	671

Sources

Hartung et al. 1970; Frerk 1982; for 1976 onwards: information supplied by Th. Schön, examination office, Department of Pol.Sc., Free University of Berlin

Note

The data refer to the German Academy for Politcs, founded in 1947/48 as a non-university institute, integrated into Free University in 1959 and transformed into the Department of Pol. Sc. in the early seventies

Table 5.2.

State Examinations in Political Science at Berlin (West): School Teachers' Faculty in Politics/Social Studies

Successful Examinations per Year					five years periods
				1970	-1970
				10	10
				7	7
				17	17
1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1971-1975
19	18	13	11	18	79
21	30	36	62	110	259
40	48	49	73	128	338
1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1976-1980
25	16	12	24	(24)	101
87	117	108	99	(99)	510
112	133	120	123	(123)	611
1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981-1985
(31)	31	5	13	17	97
(96)	96	66	46	51	355
(127)	127	71	59	68	452

Note

First entry refers to political science as first subject; second entry to political science as second subject.

Source

Information provided by M. Haußknecht, statistical office, Free University of Berlin

Note

Data for 1980 and 1981 are not available. For the purpose of this table data are assumed to be the same as those for the previous respectively for the following year (1980 = 1979; 1981 = 1982).

Table 5.3.

Diploma and State Examinations in Political Science at Berlin (West)

	1951-55	1956-60	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85
Diploma	170	159	140	609	524	537	671
State Exam. Pol.Science as 1.Subject	-	-	-	10	79	101	97
Subtotal	170	159	140	619	603	638	768
State Exam. Pol.Science as 2.Subject	-	-	-	7	259	510	355
Total	170	159	140	626	862	1.148	1.123

Note

For data on state examinations for 1976-80 and 1981-85 cf. second note to table 5.2.

Table 6

Employment fields of diploma graduates at Berlin (West) 1951 - 1980

	Survey 1968/69 708 graduates 565 addressees 497 respondents 402 in occupation					Survey 1977/78 1.016 graduates 951 addressees 542 respondents 470 in occupation	Survey 1980/81 564 graduates 441 addressees 266 respondents 205 in occupation
	1951-57 %	1958-63 %	1964-66 %	1967-68 %	1951-68 total n (%)	1968-76 n (%)	1974/75-1979/80 n (%)
civil service	33	19	10	5	83(20,6%)	65 (13,8%)	28 (13,7%)
business & industry	16	8	12	6	40(10,0%)	? ?	5 (2,4%)
mass media	12	8	15	12	46(11,4%)	37 (7,9%)	9 (4,4%)
political parties	3	3	2	5	13(3,2%)	16 (3,4%)	6 (2,9%)
trade unions interest ass.	9	7	7	3	28(7,0%)	8 (1,7%)	5 (2,4%)
university & research	13	18	31	55	99(24,7%)	155 (33,0%)	57 (27,8%)
adult education	5	19	16	5	46(11,4%)	51 (10,9%)	? ?
school teachers	4	10	-	3	19(4,7%)	30 (6,4%)	? ?
others	5	8	7	6	28(6,9%)	108 (22,9%)	95 (46,3%)

?2 ??

Sources

For 1951 - 1968: Hartung et al. 1970; for 1968 - 1976: Frerk 1982; 1974/75 - 1979/80: Ebbighausen et al. 1983

Notes

1. All data in this table refer to persons in employment!

2. Graduates from 1951 - 68: About 4 % of respondents declared to be "redundant"; the conductors of that survey estimate hidden unemployment for about 2 - 3 % of respondents.

3. Graduates from 1968 - 1976: 70 out of 542 respondents had not been employed, yet. 36 noted that they were actually non-employed but had had a job before.

4. Graduates from winter 1974/75 - winter 79/80: 13 out of the 266 respondents (= 4,9 %) declared to have no job at all; 48 were engaged in further qualification (= 18 %). Out of the remaining 205 respondents only 125 worked in a position adequate to their academic degree and to their training in a social science discipline; 31 could apply their academic qualification but had very poor earnings and/or were employed below academic position; 12 got jobs on academic standards but outside their qualification field; finally 37 were employed neither adequate to their academic degree nor to their subject of study.

5. As a result, there is much evidence that the term "adequate" is losing, in the real world, its former sense. Consequently, the category "others" in the table, which formerly was one for residual entries, became the dominant one. Graduates still get access to jobs which for long were regarded as "normal" jobs for political science students but their increased number is not accepted by the employment system.

Political Philosophy, History, Theory and Empiricism in Contemporary French Political Science

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This paper's title may look like a bit of a jumble to the reader. None of the necessary ingredients of a perfect intellectual Irish stew seems to be missing. What would a decent political science be like without a slice of political philosophy, a good deal of history, thick layers of theory (whatever it is, empirical, formal, historicist, interpretive, critical), and, last but not least, a sizable amount of hard labour to work out interesting empirical data? The troubles begin when we try to combine and articulate these various activities, a not so easy task, as any individual scholar realizes when he sits down to work. But the issue is not mainly an individual one; it is also collective, since it has to do with the existence of subfields within a given scientific community. Ideally, either the so called "subfields" merge or ally to constitute a new discipline, or they spring from the process of differentiation going on within an already constituted discipline. In each case, the subfields, once constituted, communicate (or do not), cooperate (or do not), but they are clearly recognized as dependent on the whole "field": the control exerted by the discipline is a necessary condition of its autonomy vis a vis the other fields.

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Admittedly, things are never as simple as that, and a "subfield" may be also a part of an other field, and even a field of its own [1]. Moreover, whether it is a process of aggregation or differentiation, the development of a discipline is seldom a purely endogenous process dependent on some would-be "laws of evolution" governed by the logic of Reason in a Comteian or Hegelian fashion. It is not at all certain that contemporary political science (supposing it is an autonomous and unified discipline endowed with the same basic characteristics throughout the whole world, which I feel inclined to doubt) is the "natural" offspring of the "noble science of politics" pictured by a careful historian of science [2]. The mere existence and organization of a discipline depend on complex socio historical processes [3], and so does its eventual decay or withering away. Nobody will deny the fact that a scientific development is a social development, but with due respect to that triviality, nobody will question, either, the simple fact that a discipline, (whatever the arbitrary bases of its constitution) cannot exist as a social organization unless its members, regardless of their specific subfields, feel compelled to acknowledge their belonging to the same all-encompassing community. It is not necessary that they share the same paradigms, nor even the same concerns, but they should at any rate recognize the relevance of the topics and issues, considered as the "common good" of the whole commmunity. A discipline can afford mavericks, and "dual citizens" whose presence is always a good remedy against routine and sclerosis, but if it ceases to maintain a minimal control over the various subfields, each of them becomes dependent on outsiders' appeals, and the progress of knowledge may be put in jeopardy more certainly than by an excess of routinized control.

I have tried in an earlier paper [4] to deal (in a rather cursory way) with the sociological causes of such a situation. I have argued that French political science exists as a profession but not as a socially legitimate discipline [5]. Political science is not perceived as autonomous vis a vis the "political knowledge" that any well informed citizen (newspapermen, high civil servants, novelists, members of other academic disciplines) is supposed to be able to display. There are no sharp nor even loose boundaries between political science and political discourse (or more precisely any discourse about politics and society at large) Three examples

may be presented as cases in point:

1) The prestigious newpaper Le Monde has specific sections for the reviews of specialized books in "Philosophy" "Economics", "History" but none in "Political Science". Small wonder: Le Monde is full of "political science", since the common political knowledge is perceived as political science; so what could a special review article be for?

2) The only subfield the members of which are labelled "political scientists" by the media, is the study of voting behaviour, and for only one reason: they are able to legitimize, through their technical expertise the estimates on which all the election night political talk shows are based. But is it political science, actually? the "political scientists" are there to guarantee that the outcomes of the voting process, although not officially known nor recognized, are reliable enough to be taken for granted by the political actors. This is not unimportant: "political scientists", by their mere presence and the legitimacy attached to their existential statements ("It is highly probable that the party X has won or lost") prevent the politicians from telling sheer lies. But they are themselves, kept from exhibiting a more detailed scientific knowledge, since it is always risky to utilize sociological laws to explain a specific event, "on the spot"; and anyway nobody (politicians, newspapermen and ordinary citizens) would give a damn. So, in that case, "political science" is reduced to a mere gimmick [6].

3) The last example is not as anectodical as it might appear at first glance: whenever the government (any government) wishes to reward the services of an intellectual who has been a loyal adviser to a minister, and who wants to retire for a time from the vicissitudes of the political turmoil, it has to provide him with a safe job. This is one of the unwritten rules that govern bureaucratic politics; supposing that the intellectual does not hold a position already (as a civil servant) or is not powerful enough to get a position in certain safe places (Conseil d Etat, Cour des comptes, Musees nationaux, big corporations), the government turns towards the university and proposes the usual trade off: I'll give you some money if you accept my "protege". Four times out of five, the political scientists are kindly solicited to appoint the new comer. They are supposed to be more receptive to the offer, not because they are more corrupt, but simply because, in the opinion of the officialdom, any kind of

involvement in politics is considered as sufficient training to apply for a position in political science. I do not intend, by recalling that example, to emphasize once again the patrimonial and clientelist dimension of any political process, rather, beyond such a triviality, I wish to pinpoint the specific situation of political science. It is supposedly easier to implement this type of decision with a discipline considered as not"dense" enough to control the recruitment of its members.

This conclusion might be extended and substantiated: the other disciplines have a strong incentive to "take over" political science. Not out of any ideologically conscious plan (although there is a lingering suspicion among certain lawyers, who think that political science should not exist other than as a subfield of legal science, so much so that political scientists are too leftist to their taste...) but more often as a mechanical outcome of "demographic" pressures: it is always attractive for a "Patron" who is afraid that his client or pupil will not be recruited in History, Sociology, Literature, Law (sometimes in Economics) to send him to Political science. Sometimes it is a good strategy and the young scholar may reveal himself a good political scientist: for once it is consoling to see a basically perverse process bringing about good unintended consequences. The process is nonetheless still perverse, since knowledgeable people deduce that a political scientist does not need any specific training. In this respect, French political science is not a wissenschaft yet, if a wissenschaft's basic character consists in being transmitted through specific training processes. Maybe such a situation is due to (good) epistemological reasons: if political science is a "crossroad-science" ("science carrefour"), no core of knowledge is needed, all you have to do is to master one of the roads leading to the crossroad. Question: How are you going to recognize that you have reached the crossroad? [7].

A discipline lacking sufficient autonomy is unlikely to be able to recognize or control autonomous subfields, which is, by the way, a hindrance to the students who cannot get a complete training, and to the young scholars who have still to work out by themselves some viable device to use and combine the resources provided by the various subfields to achieve their specific research. But there may be more serious consequences. I will mention one of them without dealing with it at length in this paper: the only subfields not likely to be questioned are the

research areas which are imposed on scholars, from the outside: Latin American politics, Eastern European politics, Arab politics, French politics, International politics, etc..., the result being that we are always on the verge of forgetting what comparative political analysis is about, and that we run the risk of taking for granted the practical paradigms imposed on us by the "native" actors [8]. There is no sound scientific reason to legitimize such subfields only because they need specific cultural and linguistic pre requisits ("International politics" being the only possible exception.)

In this paper, I will try to focus on another kind of consequence. A small and frail discipline has a natural tendency to tighten up its ranks; to avoid a process of segmentation it will pretend to ignore the lines of cleavage that divide up and oppose different possible subfields [9]. So we do not recognize that political philosophy is not the history of ideas, that the history of a specific sequence of events is not the same thing as the production of a comparative analytical framework of explanation (a "Skocpol-like" endeavour [10]), that the comparison of political regimes does not belong exactly to the same parish as the study of indonesian politics (for a reason beyond my understanding the study of foreign regimes is considered as a part of comparative politics, even if the scholars dealing with them do not do any comparative analysis, whereas "French politics" stand alone, whether it is comparative or not-most of the time, it is not.) The result is that any possibly interesting and attractive subfield is liable to be "swallowed" up by an other professional (or more broadly "cultural") field which may impose its own rules of the game. This situation may by no means be specific to France, but France seems to me, for the sake of my too provocative argument, a paradigmatic case in point. In itself, it is neither "good" nor "bad": after all it is quite possible that a professional political science is an hindrance to the noble science of politics (it comes sometimes to my mind that Leo Strauss was not completely wrong in his attack against the "new science of Politics"). Specifically, I intend to show how the situation I have outlined induces (or may induce) specific biases in the study of politics, making political science less germane than it should be for the intellectual debates of our time. Before going through these biases, I will present a few remarks on the notion of intellectual debate and on the ideal characters political science should display, in my opinion.

I Intellectual debates and the "ideal" political science

A. On the idea of an "intellectual" debate

The picture I am going to draw is obviously very subjective and for a good reason: I am not even sure there is something like intellectual discussion currently going on within the French intelligentsia, at large, with respect to politics and political knowledge. There are of course a few on going discussions within and between tiny subgroups of professionals, on specific methodological issues, eg how could we sort out "strategic" voting from "sociological" voting or how could we define the concept of the "intellectual" in the "Muslim world" If we want to make some sense of what is happening in the "religious field" ("Muslim world" and "religious field" have to be defined accordingly) and so on, and these arguments are generally linked to the discussions going on in the international professional milieu. There is also a considerable amount of purely ideological arguments [11] within the intelligentsia about such issues as: should humanitarian aid be granted to Third world countries regardless of their domestic politics? What could "liberalism" be like today? How can we interpret "social movements" such as the students' demonstrations of December 1986? What's the meaning of citizenship and nationality today? and so on. But these debates are seldom linked to a body of well controlled knowlege which could be used to propose authoritative interpretations and well grounded arguments, (although not specific definitive "solutions"). There are of course obvious exceptions, whenever the debates are linked to historical issues, for example about the interpretations of the French Revolution, (although I am still waiting for something which could look like the papers generously supplied by the American Embassy in Paris about the current interpretation of the Philadelphia convention and of the American constitution, but we have still two years to make up for lost time), and to a lesser extent, to socio-economic issues (about the future of the social security system but this central debate does not appeal to most of the intellectuals), But political knowlege (when available) is not taken into account: the debates about immigration and citizenship seldom go beyond a few glaring statements opposing individual rights to an imaginary organic "French" community, without looking at the social conditions of the formation of national communities; the debates on humanitarian aid are not grounded in any coherent theory of rights. As for the debates about biology and genetic manipulations, the interesting thing is not that the biologists display a tremendous lack of knowlege in political theory and

history[12], (why should they be knowledgeable in everything?) but that other pieces of knowledge are not used or even considered.

To sum up, in this kind of debate, everything is a matter of opinion, a few fragmented pieces of knowledge being used here and there, without any concern for detailed and consistent argument. Once again there are obvious exceptions (scholars like the late Raymond Aron, or Alfred Grosser and Michel Crozier, Quarterly Reviews like Commentaires, Le Debat or Esprit) but the quality of most of the debates in the daily newspapers and weekly magazines (not to mention French TV) is appallingly low: France has no equivalent to the Times Literary Supplement or the New York Review of Books [13].

I am conscious that the line of argument I am developing here may sound too "elitist" and may be stigmatized as the display of an outmoded faith in the Enlightenment and Reason. This may be, although I do not believe that political and social conflicts should be solved by resorting to an almighty Reason,whose leading exponents would be some "Mannheimian" intellectuals devoid of any particular social interest and class position. I don't go for the government of "true scholars", I even suspect too many French intellectuals of caressing the hope of being the new "abbes de Cour", that is of being entitled to give advice to a benevolent Prince without assuming the responsibility that seemingly innocuous activity entails. I am pleading for intellectual debates, and, as Tocqueville would have put it, for the concern for truth rather than for novelty and ingenuity.

B. A bit of cursory normative epistemology

What sort of political science is needed to nourish a real intellectual debate in France today? What can be expected of political scientists? and how are their concerns and accomplishments (if any) perceived by the French intelligentsia? I won't go through all the classical and much discussed problems, such as "normative" (or critical) vs. "value free" science, "interpretive" against "explanatory" science, "relevance" against "scientific purity", "internationalization" against "national paradigms", and so on. I'll content myself with emphasizing a few basic features which should guide us in our research and intellectual arguments.

In some repects, doing political research is like holding opposite ends of the same rope, so I'll present the characteristics of political science as a set of couples which should be kept together depite their seemingly contradictory components.

The "inside - outside" couple means that the political scientists cannot take the "outsider view" and look at their "object" as a purely scientific product of the mind; it is not only that they are "part" of their object (which is the case for all scientists) but that their object "speaks" by itself and for itself, and cannot be easily silenced. The "political object" produces "theories" which are not only subjected to research agenda and hypotheses, but which are in some sense interacting with the scientist's theories, even though they do not always belong to the same world view. Hence the necessity to get rid of a purely objectivist conception of science. But the "insider's" view (which presupposes that the political scientist must always speak from within the political world) is equally questionable insofar as it would come to mean a purely perspectivist view which would make the possibility of political analysis dependent on a specific political perspective (whatever that perspective might be: professional actors', rulers', exploited classes' etc...). Understanding the actor's perspective is one thing, taking one of them for granted for the sake of scientific knowledge and considering all others as illegitimate [14], is another thing. The political scientist should take care not to move from the first to the second posture without clearly saying what he is doing [15].

I admit that it is not easy to reach a balanced position between the pure outsider's and the pure insider's view. The first one is commendable, within reason: for example, public law should not be treated as the scholar's paradigm (a trap into which many political scientists trained in public law readily fall) but as the cultural crystallization of specific social processes (which does not amount by any means to reduce it to an "ideology"); like-wise nothing is more disconcerting than to watch political scientists (or more often sociologists) take part in ideological debates by mixing up their position as citizens and their position as scientists in such a way that the reader gets the impression that an outsider's view (with all the legitimacy attributed to scientific expertise) becomes an insider's view: there is usually a shift in the use of certain words when the norm expressed in the discourse ceases to belong to

the"ought" and becomes a product of "scientific" observation [16]. For this and other reasons, an insider's view is equally commendable, once again within reason: not only because it is indispensable to understand (at least in a vague way) what the actors mean, but above all because the political scientist is concerned with... politics, that is a range of actions, strategies, discourses having something to do with the making of (and resistance to) authoritative decisions, sanctioned by the use and control of collective violence, and that this process cannot be deduced from sociological, philosophical, economic or even historical premises, so we have to know from the inside (as much as possible, which does not lead us very far in many cases) what it is to play politics in various cultural and institutional settings. With due respect, Machiavelli and even Locke's Second Treatise (about which Peter Lasslett has made it clear it was a work in political theory and not in political philosophy) are more interesting to the political scientist than Hegel's Philosophy of Rights (paradoxical example of an outsider's philosophical -"scientific" view) To sum up, an outsider's view is useful since it never takes for granted the self images produced by the actors; it is perverse if it considers these self images as irrelevant fancies the scientist need not bother to scrutinize, or as evidence of the actors' "false consciousness" (as if the scholar himself was completely free from his own self image and miraculously protected from any kind of "false consciouness") Conversely, an insider's view is necessary to understand what politicians are after and to assess how politics intersects with knowledge; it is perverse if it leads us to hold that only the insider (the actor or the "committed" individual) has the right and ability to unveil a particle of truth.

Political science is a search for explanation and for better grounded argument. "Explanation" means to make things explicit (a not so easy task in a matter where the strategies and the passions urge the actors to play with words, as Hobbes noticed long ago, and not only with words,) and explicable, the "factors" [17] worked out by the scientist being neither only the intentions of the people involved in the process, nor the justifications they propose. "Argument" is not only "scientific", it is also the search for "prudence and sapience"; we know that everything cannot be a matter of rational discussion, but the task of reasonable people is precisely to lay bare the non rational bases of many political fights and to put them within a proper perspective, without disparaging them for all that. "Non. rational" often points at the absence of a common framework of

reference and at the everlasting persistence of basic conflicts of interests and rationalities; accordingly it would be unreasonable to rely on reason to settle such conflicts. Enlightened reason must know its limits, but as Sir Isaiah Berlin pointed out with his characteristic brilliance "we may be conditioned to believe what we believe irrationally, by circumstances mainly beyond our control, and perhaps beyond our knowledge too. But whatever may in fact causally determine our beliefs, it would be a gratuitous abdication of our power of reasoning-based on a confusion of natural science with philosophical inquiry- not to want to know what we believe, and for what reason, what the metaphysical implications of such beliefs are, what their relation is to other types of beliefs, what criteria of value and truth they involve, and so what reasons we have to think them true of valid. Rationality rests on the belief that one can think and act for reasons that one can understand, and not merely as the product of occult causal factors which "breed" ideologies and cannot in any case be altered by their victims".[18]. In this respect, all of us are "philosophers" (or theorists) when we get involved in an argument in so far as we do not use this label to do away with explanation.

The other "couples" need not be expanded upon at great length. Political science should be both "ethnology" (ie the study of specific processes to stress the differences and singularities) and "anthropology" (ie the search for common properties, or processes, or -why not- "laws") I would not dare to mention such a common place character, if some upsetting symptoms were not surfacing in France; namely to consider that "ethnology" means "history" (which excludes any attempt to compare processes since, as Paul Veyne puts it, History is "the inventory of differences" - true enough, provided that "difference" implies comparison, and not parochialism) and "anthropolgy" means broad and sweeping philosophical generalizations drawn from commentraries on Heidegger, Nietzsche, or even Arendt. I'll return to that later. Let's mention too that political science is the study of actions (choices and strategies) and of constraints (material, structural, organizational, linguistic and so on). It would not be worth recalling, if the label "political sociology" had not been attacked, under the guise of "sociological reductionism" or of "sociologism" (Pierre Bourdieu being the official target) and if a ridiculous quarrel had not evolved opposing "political sociology" to "political philosophy" The quarrel is not completely meaningless, partly because, in a world of scarcity, everything goes to provide jobs to one's own friends and

clients and therefore to make the ground slippery under the feet of other clients. There are more serious reasons, too: after all the Straussian persuasion is very vivid. However the problem is that political sociology is not always "reductionist" and "sociologist" and that political philosophy may not be interested in actions. So the quarrel seems fuzzy, even to the fighters'eyes [19]

Finally, let me mention the "whole-part" couple Modern politics should be construed both as a basic dimension of "society" as a whole, and as a distinct subsystem the elements of which are specific interactions taking place in specific "scenes", between specific "actors" (the "professional" or the "political entrepreneurs" to paraphrase Weber). In the intellectual field, professional political scientists are often reproached with not paying enough attention to the social processes that maintain domination without any observable"political" interaction, and to the social struggles around the politicization of a given issue (or more accurately the "construction" of an issue). Nothing really new in this respect, and the French political scientists who may have forgotten Marx and Weber or ignored Bachrach and Baratz or Steven Lukes, have in any case learned a good deal from Pierre Bourdieu, and even from Raymond Boudon (whose last book "L'ideologie, deals with "the origins of ideas we take for granted" and has a good deal to say to political scientists even though Boudon never talks about political ideologies, nor even politics [20]. The problem lies elsewhere, namely political scientists are also found at fault on quite a different ground. Several influential intellectuals (among them Jean Francois Revel, a former philosopher, now a leading exponent of the anti totalitarian ideology) criticize them for not dealing with what occurs within the political "subsystem", for example the policy making process. The two reproaches converge when a third group of intellectuals worry about the political scientist's disdain for the big issues [21]. (for example "totalitarianism" revived by the philosophers and the "witnesses", "the crisis of the welfare state" scrutinized by economists and civil servants [22]). It looks as if French political science had some trouble asserting its identity (as a part of the intellectual world) and being recognized by the others. The fact that we are subject to contradictory criticisms does not prove that we are perfect middle of the road people, but rather that our intellectual profile is more or less blurred. As usual, when a group is not strong enough to maintain a coherent image, it is subjected to certain "biases" (I would not go as far as to say

"debasements") caused by the social pressures put on it both from inside and outside.

II French political science's induced biases

I am not saying that the biases I am going to expose are entirely despicable. Far from it. Properly mastered, they might serve to rejuvenate our discipline. I am not going to discuss the most usual biases, either; everybody knows that French political science is subject to two oft commented upon biases, the "institutional" and the "journalistic" ones. I do not think it is true any longer. On the contrary most of the professional political scientists (with important exceptions such as Jean Louis Quermonne, Francois, d'Arcy, Pierre Avril or Evelyn Pisier Kouchner, Alfred Grosser) do not take public law seriously enough, and it is high time to have a fresh look at the legal process and outcomes as an autonomous topic of research [23]. As for the Journalistic bias, it has been fought off so adamantly that it is hardly possible to find a book written by a french political scientist which displays the usual characteristics of the category [24]: elegant style, flippant opinions, interesting little anecdotes, collected from the horse's mouth etc... In a sense, it is a pity since we are accused of yielding up ponderous books, full of "jargon" and of useless empirical documentation, addressing irrelevant issues and so on. Fair enough; we cannot have it both ways, be "scientific" and "attractive". The real issue is that political scientists cannot master the channels through which their concerns (and possibly their findings) are "popularized" (the only significant exceptions being the studies of voting behaviour and the endless debates about the "correct" interpretation of a few articles of the constitution of 1958), with the ensuing consequence that very few political scientists can be considered as influential members of the"intelligentsia" at large (Maurice Duverger and to a lesser extent Alfred Grosseer being the towering exceptions). Hence the temptation to borrow from disciplines which seem to have succeeded in addressing larger audiences: History, Philosophy, Economics.

A) The historical bias.

It has repeatedly become fashionable to insist on the necessity of "returning to History". In the late sixties the point was made by marxist

scholars eager to take issue with the structural-functional (or developmentalist) perspective, to emphasize that all the concepts were "historical concepts", and finally to dissociate themselves from a specific breed of "structuralist marxism" exemplified by Louis Althusser's, Etienne Balibar's and Nikos Poulantzas's works. As a matter of fact, some marxists whether or not espousing historicist views, have turned to detailed studies of forgotten historical processes: for example what did nineteenth century French manual workers or small entrepreneurs actually think? [25]. What did the planners have in mind from 1945 to 1970? [26]. But curiously enough this movement did not give rise to any specific French school of historical sociology. The most interesting works came from non marxists such as Pierre Birnbaum, Bertrand Badie and Guy Hermet [27]. But in spite of their efforts (and mine) the influence of Theda Skocpol, Perry Anderson, Charles Tilly, Eric Hobsbawm, not to mention Stein Rokkan, Reinhard Bendix or Barrington Moore Jr. does not go very far, even though several of their books have been translated into French [28].

Actually, the movement toward History came from elsewhere, namely from the stronghold of French economic history, the Annales, school. At first glance, that seems logical enough. But let's be careful to note that this movement has coincided with deep transformations in the orientation and outlook of this school. The original impulse given by Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, then Ernest Labrousse, was oriented towards a kind of "motionless history" ("l'histoire immobile" to quote Braudel): such a history should have been a history of basic economic structures the rythm of which was supposed to be far slower (and in any case basically different) than the rythm of political history. So the Annales courteously ignored (and secretly despised) the history taught at the "ecole des Sciences politiques" and in particular political and diplomatic history. Even Alexis de Tocqueville was not held in high regard given his interests in cultural and political factors. Ironically enough Braudel's legacy has been enhanced in political sociology by Immanuel Wallerstein, while most of the members of the former Annales (Georges Duby, J. le Goff, E. Leroy Ladurie) have been moving toward cultural and political history. A case in point is Francois Furet whose book Penser La Revolution Francaise [29]. played a decisive role not only in renewing the endless arguments about the historical meaning of the Great Revolution, but above all in giving new luster to the study of political interactions as part of a new kind of causal network and not as the mere "reflection" of

underlying socio-economic processes. F. Goguel, R. Remond, J. Touchard, R. Girardet were in some sense retrospectively praised (they did not need it, to tell the truth, having their own audience and their own scholarly network) Even diplomatic history (rechristened "history of international relations") was granted full citizenship, and "biography" (a long time contempted historical activity [30]) began to be recognized as a true scholarly endeavour and not as a piece of entertainment for the "Grand Public".

Such a greening of cultural and political history, as testified by the success of Claude Nicolet's L'idee republicaine en France or of the volumes edited by Pierre Nora Les lieux de memoire, brought about various consequences: a few political scientists have been strengthened in their belief that the only political science is political history, while historians have begun to deal with political science issues (for example how did political representation evolve? What changes took place in the processes of political recruitment? etc..), while retaining their basic interests and methods as historians, and in particular maintaining that any sequence of events (the "plot" to quote Paul Veyne once again) is unique and must be studied in itself without any reference to an overall framework of explanation drawn from sociological generalizations. To be more specific, historical generalizations are accepted as necessary hypotheses (for example Tocqueville's "providential" trend towards democracy and individualism) but not the sociological ones (for example Durkheim's or Parsons's hypotheses, on division of labor, social differentiation, or individualization) [31].

The problem is that History as History, has to tell stories about something unique which cannot be replicated or utilized as a "crucial experiment" carried out to test a tentative generalization (I wish to avoid the terribly loaded term "law") Almost everybody readily agrees on the logical impossibility of anything like "laws of History" while holding at the same time that "History is the Great Teacher", but the "lessons of History" are construed as lessons of wisdom, reliable as far as prudence and art are concerned, not to be used for the sake of science. So far so good, but why should such a view (sensible enough in my opinion) keep us from using comparative history 1) to elicit and elucidate many tricky and

vague concepts such as elite, ideology, dictatorship, empire, nationalism civil society, intellectual, civil religion etc... (I am mixing up on purpose "historical" and " a historical" concepts) [32]. 2) to test particular and partial "laws" bearing on micro behaviour or macro structures? [33]. Admittedly, concrete societies, are not "systems", but combinations of various processes the overall outcome of which cannot be forecast (even though probabilistic predictions should not be forbidden) but it is not a sufficient reason for renouncing any attempt to build up a science of comparative poltics of some sort.

Two footnotes should be added to conclude my remarks on this topic.

1) some younger scholars or advanced students are tempted to turn towards, the social history of tiny areas (for example a village, usually "their" village, in the 1860's, or the voting behaviour in small neighbourhoods in the early twentieth century) This is not entirely new, of course (nor fruitless: after all the anthropologists learn a great deal from a balinese cockfight, or from patron-client relations in small villages in Jordan or Malta) but I suspect this infatuation may be caused by the success of Leroy Lodurie's Montaillou (not to mention a discreet nostalgia for the long lost "gemeinschaft") Once again, nothing wrong with that, at first sight. But, as the German social historian Jurgen Kocka has put it: "A price....has generally to be paid for this kind of micro history; the renunciation of a recognition of connections, the ignoring of the "big questions" of state and class formation, of religion and churches of industrialization and capitalism... A great part of our politics, and with it the setting of the trends that affect individual persons and the smallest groups necessarily takes place above the local and regional level...Partiality in historical understanding...an identification with the little space by means of blacking out the connections, is not intellectually satisfying and in the long run is politically problematical" [34]. Such a trend should not be encouraged since it is conducive to a subtle kind of parochialism if the scholars are not very well trained, in particular in anthropology: using as a framework of analysis the native cultural framework of the period (and the area) they are studying, they lose sight not only of the "big issues" Kocka mentions but also of the general questions raised in the scientific international community; hence forth either they'll go on doing research nobody cares about or they'll be utilized

by a clever international entrepreneur who will provide the theoretical and methodological hypotheses and will ask the native scholar to fill in the blanks by supplying a bit of fresh information. The latter eventuality may not be so bad if the young scholar is able to learn something from this unequal exchange, which I am inclined to doubt.

2) Curiously enough the History of ideas (as distinguished from political theory and political philosophy) has not benefitted to the same extent from the new spell of history. Most of the political scientists are more interested in commenting upon one or several "Great thinkers" than in reconstituting the intricate social network that makes up the context of a "political thought". The methodological issues raised by Weber, Lovejoy, Elias, Oakeshott, Skinner, among others, are not taken really seriously, even though most of them are known. Only Pocock seems to exert some influence through the scattered articles of Miguel Abensour. Most surprisingly, the marxist persuasion (Gramsci, Lukacs, Goldman, Alhusser as the author of Montesquieu) seems-provisionnally- in decline. When it subsists, it is through Jurgen Habermas's works (a kind of star for a part of the intelligentsia, which comes up as a mystery since I guess that less that fifty persons have ever been able to go over everything this outstanding scholar has written so far), but Habermas is far more appreciated as a social philosopher than as a scholar who has shed some light on the History of ideas (l'espace public is less often used than Connaissance et interet or Theorie et pratique [35]. The same could be said regarding Hanna Arendt's legacy. When her works are discussed, it is almost invariably for their contribution to political philosophy and seldom as an example of historical interpretation (about the comparison of French and American revolutions, or the evolution of imperialist and nationalist ideas) Likewise Leo strauss is seldom commented upon for the questionable history of ideas he had put forth in his criticism of "the new science of politics", or for his interesting comparison between ancient and modern liberalism, but he is praised (or criticized) as the representative of classical political philosophy. Even though the problem of interpretation is far from being ignored (Gadamer is frequently cited), it is not part of a coherent program of research in the history of ideas. Likewise the social explanation of the emergence of a given "constellation" of ideas is not dealt with adequately. As usual, there are significant exceptions [36]. (Claude Lefort's thesis on "Machiavelli: le travail de l'oeuvre" (on the interpretation of Machiavelli). Bernard Lacroix's work on

Durkheim et le politique and above all various works in progress on the relationships between the history of science and the history of political ideas (M. Pollack, P. Favre, P.A. Taguieff). but one cannot say yet that the history of ideas has found its contemporary Siegfried or even its Elie Halery. I hypothesize that such a situation has something to do with a second induced bias, the "philosophical"one.

B) The "philosophical" bias

Social interests and specific strategies do not explain everything. However, it may be useful not to ignore them. A specific state of affairs makes the treatment of the philosophical bias difficult and almost impossible; the swords and guns are always at hand and as during the Dreyfus affair, when the best friends have "talked about it" - "ils en ont parle" - they are likely to be angry at each other for a very long time. A number of young philosophers, disappointed by the very limited job opportunities offered by the "agregation de philosophie" (usually teaching philosophy twenty four hours a week, in an obscure "Lycee de province" to teen agers who do not give a damn about Plato, Hegel, Heidegger), and conscious that the university departments of philosophy are overcrowded with people working twenty years on a thesis on a tiny point of interpretation of Kant or Descartes, have made a move towards political science, considered as more open to new talents. Ironically, political philosophy has never been an important subfield of French philosophy (nor was political sociology within sociology): there are very good books written by scrupulous philosophers, about, say, Descartes et l'ordre politique, (P. Guenancia, Paris. 1983) but they do not address specific issues of political philosophy (Guenancia considers that Descartes negates any kind of political philosophy), there are also philosophers either involved in politics or thinking that their work carries out important political consequences (Sartre's legacy); and finally there are philosophers who fancy that, as "everything is political", it is enough to talk about an hospital, a spanking, or the way people take care of their body, to make a significant breakthrough in the understanding of politics (Foucault's legacy). But for all that there are actually very few political philosophers in the French tradition (Eric Weil being almost the only - but outstanding-exception) [37]. Hence the intellectual importance of this new mood. But it makes it more difficult for things to evolve in a sensible way: as there is no specific tradition of political philosophy or political theory,

a majority of political scientists feel threatened by new and more attractive competitors; by the same token it is also very difficult to voice criticism against a philosophical bias without appearing to some as simply jealous and mean. Several real intellectual debates are smeared by this underlying resentment.

There are many philosophical biases. To be quite clear I would like to discard at least one (unfortunately it is precisely the one which is most commonly mentioned): I do not think that political philosophy has nothing to do with political knowledge and should be considered as a fancy, the topics of which should be studied as "ideologies", so becoming a part of the"social history" of ideals;[38]. philosophical works should of course be scrutinized as ideological rationalizations, too, but so is (or ought to be) the case with "scientific" works and empirical findings, and in both cases there is more than that in their respective endeavours. Admittedly some philosophers come very close to deserving this kind of sweeping rebuke. Nobody has made the point more clearly than Hegel himself: starting at the outset with the claim that "the task of a writer, especially a writer in philosophy may be said to lie in the discovery of truth... the dissemination of truth and sound concepts" [39], he goes on to mock many philosophers of his time "busybodies [who] talk as if the world had wanted for nothing except their energetic dissemination of truths, or as if their "rechauffe" were productive of new and unheard of truths and was to be specially taken to heart before everything else today and every day"; hence the widespread contempt for philosophy, "everyone is convinced that his mere birthright puts him in a position to pass judgment on philosophy in general and to condemn it. No other art or science is subjected to this last degree of scorn, to the supposition that we are masters of it without ado." Without going into any detailed argument about the Hegelian theory of knowledge (I myself happen to feel much more "Kantian" than "Hegelian" and I do not go for the scattered critiques leveled by Hegel against Kant in the "preface"), it should be recognized that Hegel's quotations vividly remind us of the endless quarrels opposing a few current philosophers to their scientist critics. Besides these ongoing (and not really serious although sometimes bitter) quarrels, there are more serious issues at stake. From the more pedestrian to the more sophisticated ones, let's sort out three of them

1) Philosophy as a commentary of previous philosophers. I do not know whether or not this is a French national sporting game (I guess not)

but it may be worrying to see so many books commenting upon say, Hegel, Arendt, Weber, Fichte, etc... I am not in the least claiming that such works are useless, It is always fruitful to have fresh accounts and interpretations of great or even "minor" thinkers, either put within their contextual historical framework or studied in and for themselves (Too many outstanding examples come to my mind to be worth quoting) But it is only a small part of political science and even of political theory. It is time to recall old Hobbes's admonitions "For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the many of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero or a Thomas, or any Doctor whatsoever, if but a man" [40]. Political science (and political theory as well) is about"first hand issues" imposed by real historical life and constructed by the scientist and the theorist, and not primarily about"second hand issues" already mediated by a "covering work". I am quite aware of all the relevant debates about"normal science" and I fully acknowledge that any intellectual activity must start somewhere and build upon a foundational paradigm. I would even go so far as to admit Kuhn's observation (in the Copernican Revolution) that seemingly endless, scholastic and sterile commentaries may help to bring a given paradigm to exhaustion (but I strongly doubt it can be so with great philosophical works). In any case, commentaries (which, once again, are useful in themselves) cannot substitute for some hard thinking about what "is (or has been) going on". I would like more people to work like Michael Walzer (for example), to think seriously (with the help or relevant empirical findings) about such issues as racial justice, ethnic conflicts, corporations or whatever. To be sure, there is the risk of being accused of"preaching" (paradoxically a deadly sin in the country of Bossuet, Rousseau, Saint Just, Comte, Michelet and Sartre, all of them nice figures of "preachers") But as Albert Hirschman has put it, it may be permitted to dream of a social science in which we could alternatively shift from preaching to proving, and vice versa, provided that we do it consciously and in the open.

2) But is it not precisely the case? Are not French philosophers politically "committed" (engages)? After all, the two old buddies, Sartre and Aron are in this repect, still very much alive, Is not philosphy a commentary on reality? There is certainly nothing wrong with that. Merleau - Ponty or Foucault are cases in point, not to mention the whole "Frankfurt School" But we ought to keep in mind that detailed and

sophisticated social scientific knowledge, backed when possible, by numbers, can deepen the way we address philosophical questions If philosophy is divorced from empirical knowledge, an unintended consequence ensues: not only, as Robert Dahl pointed out long ago, modern political philosophy (or a part of it) is no longer able to entail any empirical knowledge (after all, this is not an unintended consequence since many philosophers ridicule empiricism as false and unwarrantable knowledge) but, above all, when talking about something "going on" (even the most sophisticated "abstract" philosopher has to address common sense issues) some philosophers take things (an historical event, a social movement, a cultural trend) for granted and start interpreting them without making sure that this "reality" may be relied upon [41]. There is something of a paradox in that attitude: the "data" produced by empirical political science are sometimes (not always) neglected or looked down upon(as "ideological" "irrelevant" etc...), but unchecked data (provided by what the newspapers report, or what the intellectual has experienced at a specific moment) take revenge and impose themselves on the philosopher (and his readers) seemingly unaware of his own previous epistemological caveats.

It should be made clear that such a statement is by no means a rejoinder to the philosophical criticisms of empirical sciences (criticisms the usefulness of which is beyond question). Nor do I mean to imply that philosophy should from now on be the servant of the social sciences, waiting humbly for the sunset before spreading diffidently its wings. I am not even sure that "philosophy is... the service of history" as Marx would have it [42]. Finally as Charles Peguy used to remind us with his usual pungency, (in his polemics against "scientific" history) the philosopher is quite at liberty to use his memory, regardless of historical records: to keep a vivid account of what occurred to a living person may trigger philosophical reflections, whereas "to be surrounded by documents" may be just a factor of sterility. For all that is it unfair to ask the philosophers not to forget or spurn the help that they themselves can get from the existential statements (and hopefully the empirical generalizations and tentative sociological "laws") issued by social sciences?

3) The last bias worth mentioning consists in using philosophy as a denial of politics. I do not mean the familiar search for a "prepolitical"

stage from which the basic components of a "political society" should be deduced (e.g. a part of the contractualist tradition) nor the classic marxian distinction between the "state" and the "Political state", (although there may be some remnants of marxist thinking in this) What I have in mind is the propensity to consider everything as "political", whether or not this "political" should be construed as a gigantic "system of domination" or just as scattered and uncoordinated "power machines". Four distinct intellectual sources may be spotted. First a Nietzschean influence (coming form the Genealogy of Morals) pervades the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, combined with a peculiar interpretation of Freud. Second, Erving Goffman may also be cited; even though Goffman is by no means a philosopher, his books Asylums and Stigma have been quoted and interpreted far beyond their original intent and actual contents; third, the later Wittgenstein and his "language games" are making their way among certain philosophers; and, last but by no means the least, Michel Foucault (and particularly L'Archeologie du Savoir and Surveiller et punir) has fascinated philosophers, historians and even a significant number of political scientists in such a way that there was a time (the late seventies) in certain university departments when it was as impossible to escape his spell as it was not to revere Althusser in the late sixties. [43].

The only feature common to all these influences is the tendency to neglect or demean politics proper. By dint of insisting on the "social" (cultural or symbolic etc..) dimension of political domination, those currents end up emphasizing the "political" dimension of any kind of social interaction. For example linguistics (or the sheer study of literature) have been used and rightly so to stress the manipulation of linguistic codes involved in "totalitarianism" (e.g. Jean Pierre Faye's Langages totalitaires), and then any kind of linguistic code has been labelled "totalitarian". The basic problem is not that there is some sophistry there (Charles Lindblohm played the same kind of trick when he labelled "the market as a prison"): after all it is just a matter of conventional language games [44]. The main trouble is that the political issues may be neglected, by dint of calling every issue "political" The issues involving the use of coercive power (and physical violence, and the struggles to control it), the authoritative allocation of ressources, the institutional constraints imposed on these processes, the ways in which collective actions are managed and collective choices made, are downgraded, and too much emphasis may be put on "impersonal" or "structural" processes (or "systems") of domination.

I do not pretend to ignore Marx's warnings: the principle of politics is will, and the essence of "political mind" is to be blind to the will's material and moral limits. It is common sense scholarly knowledge by now. Likewise, I am quite aware of the familiar Weberian- Bourdieuan thesis on the "modern mode of domination", impersonal, objective, routinized and "machine like" and finally we should not forget that one of the most interesting Tocquevillean intuitions was to construe "democracy" not as a political regime but as a societal process encompassing many different spheres of life. But all this is not a sufficient reason for overlooking the political object by immersing it in the whole societal process. This approach is crippled by two methodological drawbacks [45]. 1) a kind of "sublimation of politics" to quote Sheldon Wolin (out of his context since his critique was levelled at the behavioralist revolution and at the organizational theories) Instead of analysing, say, political language as a specific class of language derived from natural language [46] the philosopher intoxicated by Roland Barthes, will decree that any natural language is political, which is quite plausible when Louis Marin studies La Logique de Port Royal but a bit farfetched should the same attempt be made with Mallarme's poetry or impressionist painters [47]. Citizenship and government no longer have any autonomous meaning since they are confused with any kind of membership and directiveness "Conformity" and "Power" are everywhere, and so are "politics", without any useful distinction between various kinds of "politics" [48]. 2) a near impossibility of making sense of comparative politics: either, nothing is comparable since each historical society has its own way of articulating knowledge, power, language and behaviour (and at the very end you cannot talk about British social policy if you do not know in great detail how Wimbledon's lawn is mowed and kept in its glorious shape), or everything is comparable since everything is the same, from the point of view of the philosophical "concept" [49] As, in most of the countries we usually deal with, there are over lapping processes linking family, corporations, bureaucracy, police, welfare, art, science, whatever, making up something in which it is very difficult to tell the "public" from the "private", the "economical" from the "cultural" etc... it may sound attractive to declare that there is no significant differences between such political regimes as pluralist democracies, socialist states, military regines, nor between more specific political structures and processes (Elite recruitment, legislative behaviour, judicial behaviour etc...)

C) The "economical" bias

I will not expand in great details on the third bias, First, it is most familiar to the political scientists of the Anglo Saxon persuasion and almost everything has been said about this issue. Furthermore the overwhelming majority of French political scientists, lacking an adequate training in micro-economics and formal theory, do not go for the sophisticated exercises familiar to certain among their European and American colleagues: the "prisoner's dilemma," the "tragedy of the commons", the Arrow theorem of impossibility, the cooperations games and many other jewels are known, taught, sometimes discussed, but I have some difficulties citing a single work as a significant follow up. The same could be said regarding policy or strategic studies. The leading works have been written in various fields, by professional economists (for example Xavier Greffe, Guy Terny, Alain Wolfelsperger or the maverick Serge-Christophe Kolm) but practically none of them is interested in what the French political scientists have to say (if they have anything to say) On the other hand, the only "economic" works really popular in French political science are Olson's Logic of Collective Action and Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty, but I suspect that the latter is popular precisely because it is supposed to be free of any economical bias... and also because it can be easily understood in a non technical fashion. Let us recall too that the former book has been translated into French (towards 1978 or 1980) thanks to the efforts of the sociologist Raymond Boudon. Some political Scientists are quite willing to utilize deep economic analogies, following the Weberian and Schumpeterian paths. It is apposite to speak of political "entrepreneurs", political"markets", political goods" and so on [50]. But they are keen on emphasizing that this "economical"analysis is a remote cousin of the "economics of politics" practised by the neo-classic economists. The reason why Hirschman is appreciated is that he is supposed to deviate from the basic standards of economic analysis.

Unlike the philosophers, none of the young scholars well trained in economics have moved into professional political science: at the "Concours d'agregation de science politique" no candidate selects as a first choice the examination in "formal models and theories." Economists have enough job opportunities not to need to get entangled with a group of scholars whose status...and wealth are not so promising. There is, however,

something akin to an economic bias: it affects less the professional political scientists than a fraction of the intellectual world, and it has a distinct ideological flavor, namely an "ultra liberal" one. Any kind of political process can allegedly be explained and assessed by using the categories and concepts of the Virginia School, such is the creed of the "new economists" (why "new"? because of the"new"philosophers, of course, and may be of the huge success of "La nouvelle cuisine") [51]. In their opinion, actual political history is interesting and even amusing as a fairy tale but it should be discarded as long as it cannot be utilized to work out abstract processes which can be subject to modelization and "scientific" tests leading to deductions, predictions...and advice for a systematic set of policies. Political sociology, on the other hand, is useless, since it is neither scientific nor individualist enough (it is worth noting that the "individual" and his absolute "autonomy" have become almost the only ideological flag of the conservative camp in France, no wonder that the "Front National" and the far right attract new supporters: they are able to mobilize the old political repertoire-community, tradition, authority-abandoned by the moderate right. But nothing is simple; a few "new economists" belong or are close to the Front National, and help to cook a new ideological recipe, combining traditional communitarian political values with individualist economic values)

The problem is not the existence of this science, which is neither "new" nor "scientific" (or at least no more scientific than, say, the marxist political economy which flourished in the 1970's after the "althusserian revolution", when some marxist-or even non marxist-economists saw the light reading "Lire le Capital") The real problem is that political scientists are not equipped to utilize their own knowledge to confront the views exposed by the new economists. For example we are not able to assess correctly what Buchanan really means[52]. We do not know the economics of institutions, we lack the usable knowledge which would enable us to make significant connections between institutions, behaviour and policy outcomes, French political science has focused so far on the study of institutions (from a legal-formal standpoint), behaviour and social structures. It is powerless when challenged by people holding that specific institutions are liable to produce specific policy outcomes. We have good reasons to be sceptical about this kind of construction; apart from certain overall statements (for example "a monolithic institution is more likely to "tell" than to "ask", a pluralistic one is likely to do the

opposite" etc...) we hold that political institutions are more "grown" than "designed" and, as they have not a single end and do not perform a unique function, they can produce quite unintended outcomes. But we cannot argue on the ground imposed by the economists: We have-for the moment-to reconcile ourselves to "telling stories", i.e. laying out specific historical sequences and processes to prove that in certain circumstances the "economic" theory was not upheld. But it is not enough: as everybody know, "facts" never disprove a theory. In this respect the challenge of the new economists has not been met satisfactorily. It is a pity that France, once considered as the stronghold of "constitutional" studies, has not been the source of any significant comment on Buchanan's "constitutional level" of analysis: several political scientists would agree on what Vincent Ostrom calls "a key element in Buchanan's heuristic... taking the perspective of hypothetical individuals as the motors that drive human societies, [those individuals being] conceived as acting in relation to structures of incentives established by the way that rules and material conditions are interrelated to create opportunities and constraints in what might be called the logic of situations"[53]. But the job has been done so far (and very insufficiently) by a few economists devoid of constitutional literacy, and no one has filled the vacuum.

Once again, to return to my original statement, such a situation may be due to the absence of an autonomous subfield labeled "institutional economics". That shortcoming explains the lack of contributions by political scientists to such issues as public finance, fiscal policy, and even (in spite of some good sociological works) social and health care policies. Instead of being used to rejuvenate the discipline and open up new areas of resarch, the economic bias is viewed as a hindrance to the current political science. The same could be said (with proper nuances and for different reasons) of the two other biases.

To finish in an optimistic mood, let's assume that this is a temporary situation: as soon as our officialdom is convinced that political science is worth a try (and if political scientists are ready to assert themselves), things may change and the prospects will look brighter.

NOTES

1) see for example Gunnell (John) "Political Theory: the Evolution of a Subfield" in Finifter (Ada) ed Political Science: the State of the Discipline. A.P.S.A. 1983.

2) Collini (Stefan) That Noble Science of Politics N.y. Cambridge a.u. 1983.

3) Pierre Favre, Professor at the Institut d'etudes politiques de Paris, is completing a book on the history of French political science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

4) "La Science Politique dans Le Champ Intellectuel Francais" Revue Francaise de Science politique 1982 pp.653, 678.

5) I am not using the terms in the usual sense of the sociology of professions: "profession" does not entail here any sense of social status and prestige. "Profession" means that within the university, there are certain scholars who are labeled "professors of political science" or "chercheurs en science politique" and that their recruitment and career depend on specific committees labeled "political science committees". But even in that acceptation, our profession is a slender one: there are only six "Instituts of political Studies" (most of their courses are not about political science, not even about "government"), one department of political science, and about fifteen teams of scholars involved in research (five or six with a significant number of scholars). A perverse effect ensues: as there are very few research centers, most of the professors try to join the universities where those centers are located. Henceforth there is a concentration of teachers in these departments, that look overstaffed to the university managers and the ministry's bureaucrats; so, when a

professor retires, he cannot be replaced, the regulations granting the board of any university the power (within limits) to recruit somebody belonging to an other discipline. The young professors cannot join the departments where they would find a suitable intellectual environment, and they have to content themselves with staying in a position of estrangement in an university (often dominated by lawyers) lacking any intellectual and material infrastructure. So they usually commute. Which makes them look still more remote from the university where they are supposed to teach as full time professors.

6) Needless to say, actual studies in voting behaviour exhibit quite different features. See Leca (Jean) " Le desenclavement des etudes electorales en France" Revue Francaise de Science Politique Octobre 1987 (forthcoming). I am just interested here in pointing out the differential social uses of a vocable: on "election nights", anybody wanting to speak-legitimately-on TV has to be 1) politician, 2) or newspaperman, 3) or "political scientist "It is exhilarating to watch people, who, in other arena, would be delighted to be labelled "professor of History", or "sociologist" quite eager to be labelled "political scientist" (or better "professeur a'sciencespo") in these specific circumstances. But the same concrete individual labelled "political scientist" on election nights, is quick to claim his title of Historian when he writes a paper for a weekly review on the political fate of the IVth Republic, Just as a young "political scientist (for the sake of being selected by the PS committee of the CNRS) is quick to put on the suit of "political philosopher" when he gives a lecture at NY university.

7) These issues are not at all abstract. As a member of the political science committee of the National Center for Scientific Research, I can testify that we are faced with them several times during a session. It is sometimes difficult to convince the other members that it is not enough to do a good legal (or historical, or literary) analysis of a "political institution" to do a good job in political science; and it takes a lot of time as well to convince the same people that somebody working on the internal politics of a corporation (or a factory, or an interest group) may be a political scientist. Likewise, nearly ten years have been necessary to have the "policy studies" recognized as a part of political science, distinct from the catch-all havoc named

"science administrative" (all at once a "cameral science", a study of the officialdom monopolized by the high civil servants, a description of institutional mechanisms, a sociology of bureaucracy etc...)

8) I wil return to that point in a different context when dealing with the "historical bias". Let's make it clear that the native paradigms are of the utmost importance to fully comprehend the working of any kind of social system. May be they are the only viable paradigms from the point of view of a "verstehen" science, but, to the very least, those questions should be open to discussion.

9) In vain, since, by the same token, it is almost impossible for a small group living out of precarious and scarce resources, to escape the sectarian predicament. But the fuzziness of the boundaries between subfields transforms the legitimate conflicts between interest groups into obscure quarrels, too easily labelled "personal". As the groups are blurred, they refuse to appear in the open as "groups" (as everybody knows, everyone pictures himself as a "species being" dedicated to universal values...) and they are perceived by the others as "clans".

10) Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions has been translated into French thanks to Pierre Birnbaum's efforts, for almost no avail. Neither Reinhard Bendix nor Stein Rokkan were ever translated. Barrington Moore and Perry Anderson have been translated, due probably to their marxian flavor. Out of print, Barrington Moore's Social Origins had to wait ten or twelve years for a new printing.

11) I am not using "ideological" in a derogatory way, but to point at debates with immediate "relevance": in such debates, what is needed by the public is a quick answer to the question "What is the fashionable opinion to be held?" For this reason many debates die within three weeks and are continuously revived without any significant progress.

12) Such a distinquished scholar as professor Ruffie, a leading authority in biology, held (in 1986!) that pluralist democracy is a fair approximation of evolutionary genetics...

13) Whenever I have inquired about the causes of that disastrous state of affairs, I have been given the same dreadful answer: "there is no public for such a weekly newspaper" (as it is testified by the financial troubles of the Nouvelles Litteraire's, and even of the monthly Magazine Litteraire. As for l'Evenement du Jeudi, it remains to be proved that it can keep an acceptable level of quality)

14) The political scientist is quite at liberty to consider that a lot of perspectives or practices of the actors are simply crazy, but he is not, for all that, authorized to adopt, as a scientific perspective, the actor's view point which seems more reasonable to him.

15) I have dealt more fully with these issues (I can only touch on here) in my chapter "La theorie politique" (in Grawitz Madeleine, Leca Jean ed Traite de Science Politique Paris Presses universitaires de France 1985 Vol I Chap. 2), in particular with respect to the problems of interpretive and critical theories and of the opposition between the "reconstructionist" and "the essential contestability" theses.

16) Max Weber has already said everything I am trying to convey in my clumsy way, in Essais sur la theorie de la Science Paris. Plon 1965.

17) I am using this neutral and unsatisfactory term to avoid the important and lengthy discussions about the "causal" and "functional" explanations. I just wish to emphasize that the political world is neither a chaos nor a realm beyond the reach of man's reason. Like in mathematics, political actions and processes are "products" of various factors which can be elicited.

18) Berlin (Isaiah) "Does political theory still exist?" (1961) in Concepts and Categories New York Penguin 1981 p. 172.

19) There is a different version: political sociology is sometimes accused of being interested in "trivial" constraints, the "big variables" gender, class, age, generation, ("trivial" because too evident), and of not paying enough attention to the historical moments which trigger the actions and change the course of events; it is also suspected of ignoring "values" or of reducing them to social products. It is a very old quarrel which surfaces time and time again. My

opinion is that the dividing line passes within the community of political sociologists and not between the "sociologists" and the "philosophers".

20) Boudon (Raymond) L'ideologie Paris P.U.F. 1986.

21) See on this situation the debate between Paul Thibaud (director of the Review Esprit), Georges Lavau, Evelyne Pisier. Kouchner and myself in Esprit July 1986.

22) This attitude is not without recalling the critiques levelled in the sixties by people like Christian Bay against the " Behavioralists" suspected of being interested only in "pseudo politics", that is the activity concerned with promoting private or interest group advantages, exclusive of "authentic politics", the activity aimed at improving condition for the satisfaction of human needs and of universalistic demands ("Politics and Pseudopolitics: a Critical Evaluation of some Behavioural Literature" APSR 59. 1. March 1965 pp. 39, 51) The comparison sounds funny since French political science was always considered, in the international professional milieu, as not behaviouralist enough.

23) See for example the interesting however debatable thesis of a philosopher, Francois Ewald on the socio-political interpretation of the development of social laws (L'Etat Providence Paris 1985) In other directions see the use of legal documentation made by Blandine Barret-Kriegel in L'Etat et esclaves Paris 1982 or Bertrand Badie Les deux Etats Paris Fayard 1986.

24) The last important example I am able to recall is L'Etat Spectacle (1979) by Roger Gerard Schwarzenberg who is now a relatively influential politician belonging to the tiny "radical de gauche" party.

25) I am thinking of the interesting books by Jacques Ranciere (la nuit des proletaires) and Alain Cottereau (le sublime).

26) See les comptes de la puissance written by a group of ex-maoist marxists I am unable to recall the names on the moment.

27) Birnbaum (Pierre) Badie (Bertrand) Sociologie de l'Etat Paris Fayard 1979. Badie (Bertrand) op-cit Hermet (Guy) Aux frontieres de la democratie Paris Economica 1982. Sociologie de la Construction democratique Ibid. 1986. I would not forgo the opportunity of mentioning the good pieces of historical sociology written by Guy Hermet on franquist Spain Alain Rouquie on military dictatorship in Argentina, or M. Pecaud on Colombia.

28) Only Stein Rokkan's and Reinhard Bendix's books are not available in French. Tilly's works have been widely discussed, in particular by historians but La France Conteste (Paris Fayard 1987) has not been extensively reviewed so far and Tilly and Shorter's Strikes in France was never translated, nor the detailed studies carried out by American historians on social movements in nineteenth century France either (I am thinking of Sewell and Aminzade, among others)

29) Paris Gallimard 1978

30) In this respect, France stands in a sharp contrast to the British tradition, in spite of scholars such as Jean Favier or Jean Tulard. Sartre's l'idiot de la Famille stands apart as a monstrous attempt to supply a total explanation and understanding of a single historical individual (Flaubert).

31) It is not entirely surprising that Marx and Weber stand in between, sometimes neglected, sometimes used as "founding fathers" by political scientists and by historians as well. But when Paul Veyne (comment on ecrit l'histoire Paris Seuil 1971) cites Weber, he hastens to specify that Weber was a social historian and not a social scientist -see also his cursory and somewhat unfair critique of Eisenstadt's The Political System of the Empires

32) Maurice Duverger has been trying for some time to bring together leading historians and political scientists to carry on ambitious projects about "Empires", "dictatorship" etc... but the results do not look convincing, at least for the moment, may be owing to the lack of detailed historical knowledge displayed by the latter ones, but most certainly because of the aloofness of the former ones.

33) Good examples of such an endeavour are provided by Badie and Birnbaum among others. See also Michel Dobry's theoretical essay Sociologie des Crises Politiques Paris Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques 1986, which tries to avoid the traps of a "scientist" (in the French meaning of the term: Concrete historical societies seen as the mere application of a single number of general laws which would explain any particular outcome) view of history, without giving up determinist explanations of specific processes. Needless to say, I myself am greatly indebted to the works of so different scholars as R. Bendix, Ch Tilly and A. Giddens, but it is too bad that French historians, given their enormous influence in the scholarly field, pay too scanty attention to them (with a few exceptions). Raymond Aron's teachings seem to be forgotten.

34) Quoted by Gordon A. Craig "Getting along with Hitler" New York Review of Books XXXIV. 12 July 16, 1987 p. 32.

35) This is an example of the French craze: The most questionable part of Habermas's work is glorified but K.O. Apel is less well known and H. Albert is almost ignored.

36) It is apposite to recall Jean Touchard's great book La Gloire de Beranger, scandalously forgotten.

37) I should also mention that significant contributions to political philosophy have been made. by "general" philosophers, such as Jacques Maritain, Francois Chatelet and Paul Ricoeur. Sometimes Claude Levi Strauss comes very close to be a political philosopher, "en passant" in particular when he comments off handedly on Rousseau.

38) The only philosophies to be granted some legitimacy by several tough minded scientists are the philosophy of mind and the philsophy of language (what some computer scientists call with reverence "real technical philosphy") Better late than never: this kind of philosophy deserves certainly better than mere lip service, but it is difficult to understand the craze that drives some people to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

39) Philosophy of Right - Preface- translated by T.M. Knox London Oxford

University Press (paperback) 1967 p2. Later on (p.11) Hegel emphasizes that "this book ... as a work of philosophy... must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a state as it ought to be" It is one of the most popular misconceptions among political scientists (and sometimes among philosophers as well) that political philosophy, having something to do with argument and values, is a purely normative activity.

40) Leviathan chapter IV "Of Speech" edited by C.B. Macpherson. Penguin Books 1981 p. 106. Also chapter V "of Reason and Science" "To forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by generall sentences lead in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly and generally scorned by the name of pedantry" (p. 117).

41) As it is useless to get personal, since the problem has less to do with subjective qualities (honesty, fairness, good faith) than with objective intellectual biases (by no means irresistible, though), I will content myself with evoking Sartre's les communistes et la paix and his "Preface" to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, and more recently the interesting philosophical-historical "interpretation" of the iranian revolution supplied by Foucault in 1979 (in Le Monde): a completely new form of politics was allegedly emerging, and, gallantly enough, Foucault, regardless of what was actually happening-and in particular the fierce struggles within the revolutionary movement -named it "political spirituality"; the disenchanted world has some interesting backlashes.

42) Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right :Introduction in Robert Tucker (ed) The Marx-Engels Reader 2d edition N.Y. Norton 1978 p. 54.

43) Admittedly, Foucault's influence was not limited to France and in particular certain american scholars were as spellbound as their French colleagues. But I do not know in France of any thorough critique addressed to Foucault from the standpoint of political philosophy (and not of history or sociology) Nobody has done a job comparable to Michael Walzer's or J.G. Merquior's (The lack of time does not enable me to find out the exact references of these texts). Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut have done something similar in La pensee 68 (Paris PuF

1985) but, in my opinion, with too much flippancy.

44) This does not imply that I approve of such a practice. What Sartori calls "the brave new thought that words have arbitrary meanings" should be adamantly combated (The Theory of Democracy Revisited Chatham (N.J.) Chatham House Publishers 1987 vol I p. IX)

45) For a more sweeping critique, see Eulau (Heinz) "The Politicization of Everything" in Van Dyke (V) ed Teaching Political Science. N.Y. Humanities Press 1977 pp. 55, 59.

46) or, more accurately, as a specific class of ideo-systems (this class could be named "ideology") within a larger class of ideo-systems derived from natural language. See Bon (Frederic) "Langage et politique" in Grawitz (Madeleine), Leca (Jean) op cit Vol,III chapter 8.

47) This is not to deny the many linkages existing between the various networks of meaning (and power) called "languages" ("Scientific", "aesthetic", "political" etc...) but we must start with some distinctions if we want to highlight these interlocking networks with reasonable accuracy.

48) The only distinctions to be readily admitted are based on macro-historical criteria (e.g. "classical", "feudal", "patrimonial" "modern" politics) It is seldom made use of structural criteria to sort out various politics within a single polity (eg. "corporation", "trade-union", "government" politics) I am not saying that the first kind of distinction is irrelevant, which would be preposterous, but that is not a reason for blurring the other kind of distinction which has been the core of political philosophy from Aristotle to Hanna Arendt. With this respect, the "return to Arendt" we have been noticing for some time (e.g. Andre' Enegren La pensee politique de Hanna Arendt Paris PUF 1984) may be considered as a way toward recovery.

49) The bizarre outcome of such an approach is that certain philosophers use the concept "totalitarianism" as an all-encompassing notion whereas others subsume it under an even more general "philosophical" concept (The "State" as a philosopheme, as Jacques Derrida puts it)

allegedly relevant to all the contemporary states. I do not think that by doing so they clarify any issue.

50) See for example Gaxie (Daniel) ed Explication du vote. Paris Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques l985.

51) It would be tedious to supply a detailed list of references, all the more so that it is difficult, for a non specialist, to tell the really serious and innovative contributions from the more repetitive and sometimes nonsensical ones. We may cite a leading promoter of the new economy, very skillful to put together, summarize and simplify the other's findings. Lepage (henri) Demain le Capitalisme Paris Le Seuil l980 Demain le liberalisme idem l983

52) It is likely that many French economists (and political scientists as well) would be surprised at Vincent Ostrom's assessment: "If Buchanan's basic conjectures have merit, we might anticipate major shifts in the practice of doing political science, economics, sociology and related forms of inquiry. Rather than assuming that human societies can be explained by simple concepts like states and markets [it is precisely what several economists claim j.L.] an emphasis upon multiple levels and foci of analysis drives to the presupposition of ordered complexity... It is possible that the work of both Buchanan and Simon will then [in 2087] be seen as pioneering a new thrust in the development of both the economic and political sciences. If such a course of development were to occur, the efforts to build a "new political science" and a "neo classical economics" are likely to be viewed as intellectual efforts which were marked by strong degenerative tendencies associated with a quest for excessively simplified explanatory efforts" "Buchanan and the Constitutional bases of Political Decision Making" in P.S. (APSA) Spring l987, XX 2 pp. 244, 245.

53) Ostrom (Vincent) op cit p. 242. This type of approach is very congenial to Raymond Boudon's analyses, but the French sociologist stays too far away from political analysis proper. Jean Luc Parodi is currently working along parallel lines (without any specific reference to Buchanan) but his work is still in progress.

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ITALIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1861-1925)

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CONTENTS:

Paper prepared for the International Round Table on the Comparative Study of the Development of Political Science, Cortona, Italy, September 21-26, 1987.

1.. Before embarking upon the summary relative to the origin and development of Italian political science in the period which elapses between national unification and the advent of Fascism, it is opportune to linger over some problems of a methodological nature. The first problem concerns the meaning of the expression "political science" in the years in question; the second regards the identification of its followers and principal protagonists; lastly, the third, implicates the subdivision of the total period into a variety of significant moments.

What is meant by political science? Following N.Bobbio and G. Sartori, one can single out two meanings of this expression. Taken in sensu latu it is used to denote any study of phenomena, structures and political behaviour. Managed with systematics and rigour, on the basis of a wide and accurate examination of facts, such a study is expounded with rational arguments and by resorting to an almost technical language which is distinguished by the ambiguity and evaluation connotations of the common language. Used in sensu strictu, the expression indicates an orientation of specialized and institutionalized studies, cultivated by scholars united amongst themselves who resort to a conscious, critical and specialized language. Synonymous with empirical political analysis, this type of study uses the methodology of the most developed sciences which follows the cadences of the process: descriptive surveying, causal explanation and theoretical arrangement.

Political science taken in this way, includes the following operations: the construction of empirical concepts, the tendency towards classifications and taxonomies, the formulation of laws of tendency and probabilistic uniformities, the construction of theories understood as a body of generalizations interconnected in an ordering and unifying conceptual scheme.

The study of the Italian politological tradition in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of this century, allows one to establish that the expression political science is especially diffused in the first meaning. The term "science" is substantially used as the opposite of the term "opinion". Such a distinction, on the one hand, allows one to concern oneself with politics not taking into consideration and sometimes putting oneself at odds with the common sense and beliefs of the people; on the other hand, it allows one to separate the <u>being</u> from <u>having to be</u>, both in its dimension of appearance and in its prescriptive valency. Given this connotation, Italian political science is fundamentally symbolized as an exercise disciplined by realistic observation, and is separated from constitutional law in the measure in which this is presented as a formal study of the State and by the relationships of power (appearance of power). It is then differentiated from political philosophy taken as a consideration of political relationships in evalutative and prescriptive terms (having to be of the power).

In conclusion, political science is asserted and characterized by the choice of three prospectives which lead to the analysis of political phenomena. Such prospectives regard: 1) the distinction between <u>civil society</u> and <u>political society</u>; 2) the distinction between <u>ideals</u> and <u>reality</u>; 3) the distinction between <u>forms</u> and <u>practice</u>.

The first distinction underlines the necessity of coneptually separating the civil society from the political society, or rather of conferring a scientific quality to those dichotomies which, in everyday experience, were commonly presented as the contraposition between "individual" and "State" and between "real country" and "legal country". If, in fact, in the Old Regime, society and State could have seemed to be coincident, given the rigid superimposition between social and political hierarchies, the "artificial" origin of the unitarian State and the consequent formation of a new ruling class, helped to evidence a sector of the social structure peculiarly reserved for the practice of force and institutionalization of relationships of power.. On the basis of this dichotomy, political science is differentiated significantly from sociology. The latter in fact assumes as its object of inquiry the social universe, the civil society and the society for antonomasia; it considers the variety of connections, pausing in particular over the processes of division of work and the formation and structurization of the classes and professional categories. Viceversa, political science is concerned with the political universe, the political society, the State, and studies the functionality and organization of the institutions and structures of power and authority, placing in the centre of its inquiry the fundamental political decisions and preactices of administration.

The second distinction, between reality and ideals, allows one to understand what the difference is between science of politics compared with the philosophy of politics. From the first studies, which appeared already following national unification, positivist scholars of political phenomena are characterized by the vivacity and sureness with which they underline the empirical-realistic character of their discip-

line. They are not interested in the political system in its "essence" or in its prescriptive shape, but on the contrary, in how it is structured and how it "works". Lastly, to the consideration of the State as a judicial arrangement, political scientists oppose the image of the State as a structure of relationships of power: "The whole State", writes Sidney Sonnino in 1880, "considered as a whole in its arrangements, is based on a minority of the nation and only this minority protects and defends".

Such a realistic conception of politics is often translated as declared intolerance in the regards of various doctrinarianisms and contrasting ideologies which try to conceal the emptiness of forms and judicial institutes.

For a political science which no longer asks "which is the best form of government?" but "of whom is the political class composed and how is it chosen?", the adoption of a realistic prospective is almost automatically translated into a recognition of all those situations in which a prevalencecof local interests as regards general ones and personal interests over collective ones shows itself. In this way, political science demystifies the ideologies and formúlas which, while they promise rights and guarantees for the entire nation, in reality are worth concretely and exclusively to protect the privileges of a restricted class which continues "to enjoy itself and live at the expense of others". The sacred and high-sounding terms of post-unitarian political formulas are revealed after all as "the phantasmagoria of a doctrinarian freedom".

With the distinction between practice and form, political science then matures its separation from constitutional law introducing into the analysis the prolific distinction between

power of fact or substantiality and power of law or formality. The point of departure is once again constituted by recognition of the "dephasures", not occasional or of little worth, between the dictation of judicial formulations and its concrete degree of actuation: the widest and freest declarations of the Code or constitutional Charter can coexist with an effective condition of oppression of class over class or of some groups of individuals over others.

2.If one refers to a political science taken in its widest sense, to single out its protagonists becomes a difficult and complex operation. Above all because its history and the history of its followers intertwine irremediably, and very often prolifically, with that of other analogous disciplines like the history of doctrines, political thinking and economy.

Viceversa, if one follows the second meaning, the history of political science and its exponents results confined in a necessarily more restricted field which only considers those analyses which are carried out according to a procedure which can be considered scientific in order of its formulation and in order of its results. In this case, one must take into account a cumulative knowledge which codifies and institutionalizes scientific knowledge, systematically selecting theories and concepts of the past with the measure of their empiric verification.

Following the latter prospective, it is undoubtable that from Italian political science one can establish exactly the date of birth, let alone mark surely, the principal evolutionary stages. The origin of a denotative and / or connotative political science coincides in fact with the publication in 1896 at the publisher Bocca in Turin, of "Elementi di Scienza

Politica" by Gaetano Mosca. Before this work, political science had not had in Italy, and maybe not in Europe either, a well-defined name and neither a recognized statute, nor a content of precise outline.

In this way, other scholars who can be made to enter into this tradition up to the outbreak of the second world war, are eminently two: Vilfredo Pareto and Roberto Michels. Whilst, concerning the period of revival after the second world war there are four names to be remembered: Guido Dorso, Bruno Leoni, Norberto Bobbio and especially Giovanni Sartori. Only if one introduces the distinction between "majors" and "minors" can one recover alongside the previously mentioned: G. Ferrero, A. Loria, L. Einaudi, P. Gobetti, F.S. Nitti and A. De Viti. De Marco.If one then refers to a tripartition which distinguishes between founders, continuators and specialists, one can also propose and give prominence to the more or less isolated contributions of S. Scolari, G. Ferrari, C. Soro Delitala, A. Brunialti,and C. Ferrari; the sociological-political school of Science of finances of Pareto's students: R. Murray, G. Borgatta, G. Sensini, A. De Pietri Tonelli; the eminently methodological studies of L. Minguzzi, G. Cimbali, A. Argentino and especially Ludovico Limentani, who in 1907 published a book of more than 400 pages dedicated to the "Previsione dei Fatti Sociali".

If, viceversa, one makes reference to a definition in sensu latu which allows a symbolization of a descriptive and / or explicative science, the number of scholars who through observation and experience are concerned with the "effectual reality of politics", increases dramatically to include, only in the period of time considered, a list of about fifty followers: M. D'Azeglio, S. Jacini, R. Bonghi, A. Scialoja,

S. Sonnino, E. Morpugo, P. Ellero, P. Villari, M. Torraca, G. Ferrari, N. Marselli, Z. Zini, S. Spaventa, M. Minghetti, A. Majorana, P. Turiello, L. Palma, L. Miraglia, D. Zanichelli, G. Arcoleo, B. Brugi, B. Federici, F. Contuzzi, G. Jona, G. Fortunato, V. Miceli, I. Santangelo Spoto, P. Rossi, C.F. Ferraris, L. Ratto, N. Colajanni, G. Salvemini, M.A. Vaccaro, S. Sighele, C. Lombroso, A. Vadala Papale, G. Rensi, G. Papini, G. Prezzolini, E. Corradini, A. Labriola, V. Racca, E. Leone, A. Rocco, A. Lanzillo, A.O. Olivetti, S. Panunzio, E. Morselli, A. Reale, E. Rignano.

3. With regard to the description of the evolution of the discipline in the period of sixty years considered, one needs to explain two things. The first consists of establishing the beginning point and the end. The second of seeing if one can sub-divide the whole period into a variety of significant moments or "seasons".

This second problem in its turn presents a double solution according to whether one chooses a period centred on the most eminent figures or, viceversa, if one takes into account the relationships between analyses and political situation and the progressive specializations of the discipline follow. The first solution has as an exclusive reference the theoretical-conceptual patrimony of a political science taken in a sensu strictu. The second takes into account the total tradition of political analysis based on a realistic and empiric observation.

Choosing here the first prospective, the period 1860-1925, one can articulate into three differnt "seasons" which are partially superimposed amongst themselves. Each one can be considered marked by the presence of a prominent figure of scholar or researcher. Thus the eras of Gaetano Mosca

Pareto and Michels are distinguished.

The era of Mosca starts from the date of appearance of "Teorica dei governi", 1883, in which for the first time the theory of the political class is formulated. It has its apogee in the publication of "Elementi di scienza politica", 1896, and ends with the analysis of the unions and mass parties and the formulation of the theory of "functional feudalism", presented in a series of articles in "Corriere della Sera" between 1904 and 1907.

The era of Pareto can be taken to begin with the publication of the long article "Un' applicazione di teorie sociologiche", which appeared in the "Rivista italiana di sociologia" in July 1900, in which the methodological canon which is at the base of the major works, the distinction between between objective and subjective phenomena which constitutes the theory of derivations and the law of circulation of the elites are all simultaneously proposed. This "season" reaches its greatest splendour in concomitance with the publication of "Trattato di sociologia generale, 1916 , and ends with "Fatti e teorie", 1920, and "Trasformazione della democrazia", 1921, volumes which collect a series of articles which Pareto dedicated to the Italian political society immediately after the war.

Lastly, the third era is identified with Roberto Michels. This can be seen to begin in 1912 when the first Italian edition of "Sociologia del partito politico" appeared and ends with the publication of "Nuovi studi sulla classe politica", 1936. The most significant moments of this "season" include the "Corso di sociologia politica", 1927, the "Saggio di classificazione dei partiti politici", 1928, the "Prolegomena sul patriotismo" and the "Studi sulla democrazia e sull' autorità", 1933.

This last era is extremely significant for two other reasons: the first within the development of the discipline and the second related to the transformations present in the country.

Under the first aspect, it must be noticed that in these years, the institutionalization of Italian political science is consolidated. Already in 1924 the high schools of political and social sciences of Pavia and Padua started; the following year, the Faculty of Political sciences in Rome was set up, where G. Mosca taught (history of institutions of political doctrines) and R. Michels (sociology and science of politics) in the same period of time. Two years later, at Perugia, the Fascist faculty of political sciences was instituted where the professors were the same Michels, Sergio Panunzio, Giuseppe Maranani, Carlo Curcio and Giuseppe Perticone.

But under a different heading, this is the era which coincides with the end of the Liberal State and the advent of the Fascist State. The six years from 1919 to 1925 see progressively the birth of the Fascist party in March 1919, the concession of proportional electoral law from 15 August of the same year, the march on Rome in October 1922, the approval of the Acerbo electoral law and the successive elections of 6 April 1924, which attributed 70% of the seats to the Fascists; Mussolini's speech of 3 January 1925 which sanctioned the alteration of the Italian political system in an authoritarian and dictatorial sense, the publication of the law 24 December 1925 on the attributions and prerogatives of the head of government which marks the beginning of subordination of all the powers and organs of the State to the hegemonic will of the ruling party.

The establishment of Fascism represents a true and proper watershed between a political science which exists defending the parliamentary regime, which had also contributed to delegitimate and a political science which instead will become dominant, turning itself to the study of the conditions of mass democracy and legitimation of the corporative State up to the point of assuming the outlines of the so-called "Doctrine of the State".

Along this watershed are placed the three great protagonists of Italian political science who live as contemporaries the years of the advent of Fascism, even though in different eras and with different feelings.

On the one hand, one places Mosca, whose "Elementi di scienza politica" published in its second edition in 1923, contains, among other things, an accurate revaluation of the representative regime, "the only one which has made it possible to almost all the political forces, or rather almostcall the social values, to participate in the political direction of society", and an accurate diagnosis of the dangers and damage which the substitutive political forms present, identified in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the bureaucratic military dictatorship and in the syndicalist State.

On the other hand, Michels, who already in 1922 in the article "Der Aufstieg des Faschismus in Italien", which appeared in "Neue Zurcher Zeitung", and especially in 1925 in "Sozialismus und Faschismus in Italien", conjugates the theory of the elites with the Weber concept of the charism for analyzing but also for justifying, the relationship there is between the "duke" and the masses.

In the middle of the two, there is Pareto who dedicates the last years of his life to the research of the historical verifications of the theories and uniformities expressed in "Trattato", treating what he calls the "shattering" of the Liberal State, or rather the progressive decline of parliamentary powers and the growing action of disintegration of the central sovreignty by the unions.

In January 1922, Pareto explicitly dedicates an article to the phenomenon of Fascism. Widely based on a work of a little before of Mario Missiroli (Il fascismo e la crisi italiana", 1921), which constitutes the first attempt of historical-sociological analysis of the origins and social bases of Fascism, Pareto's brief essay is characterized by a greater accentuation of the political elements recognized in the use of private violence, which at times opposes and at other times substitutes the public powers, and in accepting the nationalistic myth. Having been named senator a few months before his death, by Mussolini, in January, April and July of the same year, Pareto published in "Gerarchia", the magazine founded by the same Mussolini and Margherita Sarfatti, three articles: "Paragoni", "Legalità" and "Libertà" in which he arrives at the conclusion that "Fascism is not an exclusively Italian phenomenon, it is only a more intense manifestation in Italy than elsewhere of a feeling which appears a bit everywhere and which the more it grows the greater the problems of parliamentarianism and mischief of the demagogic plutocracy will become".

Moreover, the contradictory relationship between the political science of Pareto and Fascism records a further episode which annuls every too hasty evaluation. A few days before his death, Pareto wrote an article, published post-humously, "Pochi punti di un futuro ordinamento costituzionale", in which he proposes the conservation of the parliamentary institute, the reinforcement of the senate, the introduction of "a discreet use of the referendum", the limiting of executive power in economic matters and the concession of "a wider freedom of the press".

As a political witness of a scientist, the article opens with an affirmation that goes beyond the contingent moment and can serve to characterize the inspiring line of all Italian political science in the period considered here: "what follows," writes Pareto, "is like an index of propositions deducted from historical experience and of the possible applications to present cases. The model is the Principe by Machiavelli".

4. With regards to the subject of Italian political science, one can say that it studies the body of relationships which pass between power, institutions and ideology and which, assuming as a fundamental process of political life, the mechanisms of production, possession, reproduction and legitimation of power on behalf of an organized minority, finishes by articulating into two principal parts: the poltical theory and the study of public administration.

One is concerned with behaviour, relations, individuals, groups and classes in whatever way, title, degree

and level involved in the problems of power; the other considers instead institutions and structures, bureaucracy and proceedures, systems and hierarchies.

That which unifies the works of Mosca, Pareto and Michels, what links the studies of Ferrero, Loria, Einaudi and Gobetti, what allows one to recover a unitarian scientific tradition the reflections of Jacini, Sonnino, De Viti De Marco, Fortunato and Vitti, are the answers given to the following questions: 1) who holds the power, over whom and what? 2) how are the relationships of power institutionalized and how are the structures of authority consolidated of changed? 3) how is the practice of power legitimated and how does one obtain the consent?

The first question, relating to who governs, is usually resolved starting from the observation of the unequal distribution of political power at the interior of political society and arriving at the shape of a structure of dichotomic minoritarian power of a pyramidic trend. At the top of this pyramid is localized the elite of the power identified , at times, more properly, with the governing class, at times, with the wider political class and other times, by some authors, who have under their noses a regime of restricted suffrage, with the whole electoral body. To ask oneself "who governs?" is the same as asking which individuals or groups make the fundamental political decisions and in the interests of which classes. Likewise, it is equivalent to exploring the relationships passing between who makes the laws, who takes care of their execution and who administrates justice. Lastly, it is equivalent to singling out the canals of formation and selection of the power elite and the mechanisms based on which it changes and renews itself.

The second question regards how one governs. With what formulation one confronts the theme of the working modalities of power, of the techniques and instruments of its practice. In considering the ppoceedures, norms and values which condition and discipline the relationships between the rulers and the ruled, Italian political science arrives at the construction of a typology of regimes, prevailingly founded on the combination of three criteria of differentiation: a) the number of people who occupy the most important political offices, b) the degree of legitimacy of the holders of authority and therefore of adhesion to the government shown by the citizens, c) the degree of concentration and / or diffusion of political power let alone the number of undersystems and the degree of independance which they make use of.

Finally, the third question, complementary to the other two, regards more properly the distinction between coercive power and power by mutual consent.

In asking what are the values, real or presumed, what are the ideals which inspire, condition and control on the one hand, the political participation, the Italian politologista, and among them, especially Mosca, Pareto and Ferrero, take into account the ideologies and political formulas, and more generally, the doctrines which constitute the source of legitimization of authority. In some ways it is the object of this inquiry to evaluate in what measure the great political ideals of the last century are effectively and completely realized: freedom, equality, representation and proper sovreignty. In other ways one tries to verify empirically how far some elements

peculiar to the modern State, which usually show themselves in the contrast between elites and democracy or between participation and power, are consistent and compatible.

After all, it seems one can conclude that Italian political science presents three big areas of interest; to which correspond as many pre-eminent theoretical areas: the theory of the political class, which has as its object the study of political forces; the theory of political formula, which is concerned with analyzing the incidence and diffusion of political formulas and ideologies; the theory of the institutional framework of the practice of power, which assumes as a focal point of inquiry the relationship between forces and political forms, in the light of the correlation with the formulas which both seem to inspire.

With the theory of the political class, completed by the study of the institutional framework of the practice of power, the relationships between forces and political forms on the one hand and forms and political formulas on the other are seen in a new light. The political analysis "hits the mark" on the process of institutionalization of dominion and shows the opportunity of distinguishing, at all times and in all places, the existence of a double structure of power: that of its formal practice and that of its effective possession. Italian political science reaches the conclusion that power tends to be stabilized, structuring itself in an

apparatus of formal, nominal, legal and apparent dominion which commonly takes the name of "government" but also that in every society and in every age a structure of power of fact, substantial, effective and often hidden exists simultaneously and parallelly, which remains not formally institutionalized. A power of the first type is practised by one person, at the time a monarch, or by a group of people who are at the top of a hierarchy, by means of orders or explicit and legitimate commands. A power of the second type subsists by the fact that a person or a group hold, in a consistent measure, the resources on which the same power is based, or that they occupy a particular position in the economic structures of the civil society and condition the action of other people and groups by means of influence and pressure not necessarily legitimate and, above all, not immediately visible.

The singling out of two types of power finds an important form of codification in the so-called "sociological theory of the economic constitution of society and power", which , above all, through the works of Achille Loria disproves the theory of autonomy of the politician all in favour of the close dependance of this from the economic power held by the proprietors of the means of production.

5. Having individualized the pre-eminent sectors of political analysis, traditionally proposed in the language of the time, under the trinomial forces - forms - formulas, the question arises in what way, that is, according to what expressive canons, the political science under examination usually presents the results obtained in the course of its inquiries.

It is just the case to underline how the visual angle of positivism, dominant up until 1915, firmly turned towards the research of the inter-relations between events, to the identification of causal sequences, the discovery of the "universals" inherent both in the organizational structures and in behaviour, inevitably finishes by privileging those forms of expression, which if on the one hand allowed one to trace classifications and typologies, on the other hand, flowed especially in the formulation of generalizations and of true and proper laws.

In a climate of continuous and exasperated confrontation with natural sciences, it is not surprising that for many politologists, the research of laws finishes by becoming the research of only one single law. Very many scholars, influenced especially by the works of Spencer or Darwin, set to work with tenacity about the formulation of one law of political evolution; at times presented as a law of progress and development, at other times as a law of conservation or reformation.

That does not take away the fact that in so doing they dragged the discipline into conceptual "shallows" of hypostatics and reductionism, and found themselves as tenacious supporters of a positivism intended as a method and not as a system or doctrine, the most important results of which should have been presented in the form of explanations and causal generalizations empirically founded.

A representative of all these exponents of this second group of scholars is Angelo Messedaglia, who, in the course of his academic opening addresses dictated in the 1870's, fixed the most refined epistemologic canons of sociological and politilogical positivism, distinguishing between absolute laws - usually connected with the physical world - and statistical laws, whose whose peculiar characters were indicated by the fact of being:"1)empiric laws, of pure actual fact, positive; 2) limited and relative , not generally aad absolutely fixed, for the most part approximate:- simple regularities, as others prefer to say, of uniformities; and as such of state, develppment or causality, as they could be distinguished; 3) collective laws, or of a body, group or mass, as some like to call them; and so also of an average value or resultant, not also and generally individual, or rather individual by individual, or case by case, singularly".

In as much as follows the indications traced by

Messedaglia - among these not by chance is Gaetano Mosca, his pupil in the course of perfectioning in political and administrative sciences at the University of Rome - political science expresses its knowledge through two types of law.

On the one hand, the laws of an objective - structural character, which codify the tendencies which rule the organization of human societies. On the other hand the laws of a subjective - psychological nature, which instead show the tendencies obtained from the study of human psychology and point out the constants which are revealed in behaviour. The first refer back to the political system as an organization and are based on observations turned to specify their nature, the articulations, functionalities, ends and proceedures. Instead, the laws of a behavioural nature aim towards a treatment of the political nature of man; are based on the study of individual and collective psychology, take into consideration the interests, aspirations, needs, passions, instincts and feelings, and everything which can be summed up as motivation of social and political action.

6. But, political science does not only produce typologies and laws. There is another way of expressing and revealing the results obtained which are peculiar to it and do not contribute only to differentiating the Italian tradition from the European one, but to distinguishing it once again from the neighbouring social sciences.

This way of expressing and revealing consists of a balanced intertwining between points of observations and descriptive expedients, and between analytical prospectives and explanatory modalities. Usually, the Italian political analysis, at least in its major followers, resorts to a canon of reading, an analytical paradigm, which is articulated along the triple distinction between real and apparent, visible and hidden, formal and substantial. Applied, for example, by Mosca, to the electoral process, the canon in question brings one to the following results: apparently, elections are won by the majority of the electors, but in reality, it is not a heterogeneous and dispersed majority which is imposed, on the contrary, it is an organized, co-ordinated minority, an oligarchy of "great electors" which generally manages to make the candidate most congenial to the defence of its interests, triumph. It follows that, while, visibly, the citizen-elector seems to be the principal protagonist in the process of selection of political leaders, the real depository, even though hidden, of the power of choice is the great elector who collects and exchanges votes in exchange for favours and advantages of a clientary nature. After all, even if the electoral process is formally presented as the most important channel of political participation and as the instrument most in accordance with the manifestation of popular sovreignty, substantially it is shaped as an arena of exchange between supports and favours whose eminent protagonists are on

the one hand, the elected, and on the other hand the interest and pressure groups.

Likewise, if the political class is considered in the light of the indications reported above, one obtains: apparently, the political system is structured according to the criteria and values of a democratic nature, but in reality, it is only an oligarchy of which, with regard to the past, the criteria of selection and number of members are partially changed. The new State, concludes among others Pasquale Turiello, referring to the recent process of national unification, is organized in such a way as to confer the "greatest authority and competence to a few elected by only one class" and to leave "minimum the effective freedom to the individual and minimum the interference of the most in local administration".

The distinction visible - hidden throws a particular light on the relationships of dependence, dominion and exchange which pass between political power and economic power, and most times, establishes the existence of a link of subordination of the governing class with regards to the economically dominant class. In this way, the plans of the parties and groups which often seem to prefer the "lobbies" rather than the "parliamentary halls" as seats of competition, are explained. Likewise, are explained the relationships of clientele which finish by entangling those who, staying in the shadow, in the wings, as one says resorting to a theatrical metaphor, try to orientate such decisions for the satisfaction of personal and immediate ends. Consequently, the distribution of the right of political powers, as foreseen

and sanctioned by constitutional charter, or judicial order, hardly ever coincides with the distribution of fact. Nominally, the structure of authority will be presented according to a certain hierarchical arrangement, but, im practice, it is flanked, when not substituted even, by an informal and effective hierarchy whose different levels are occupied by holders of economic and social resources.

7. It remains to ask oneself at this point if political science places particular normative objectives and if it has any declared programmatic tasks.

The affirmative answer certainly is not surprising, since it is well-known that in a cultural climate permeated by positivism, the scientific character of a discipline is also evaluated on the basis of its major or minor applicability to real life. It is not surprising then that the declared and shared end is almost unanimously shown in the elaboration of a true and proper scientific politics.

In trying to realize this practical vocation, which in the end is made to coincide with the accumulation of a baggage of ideas and experiences such as to progressively restrict the quota of irrationality present in political behaviour and to allow the abandonment of improvisation and to reduce casuality in political questions, political science does not entirely mean to confuse itself with political skill instead defined "the study of means of arriving in power and keeping it". As Brunialti remarks on the subject, as science, politics propose to

"investigate, perfect and suggest the most suitable norms to good government of States", whilst as skill, it "places attention above all on immediate success, and pursues determined aims: the development of a political institution, the good outcome of a negotiation and the reform of a law". Political skill, observe both Mosca and Pareto, is usually translated in the formulation of a series of precepts which can usefully be put into practice by those who aspire to reaching the highest parts of the political hierarchy and to staying there as long as possible. Viceversa, political science proposes the knowledge of "intimate causes of progress and decline of great States and great civilizations", and researches the objective laws of functioning, structurization and development of political organizations. Political skill, therefore, is a microphysics of power and has as its main receiver the single person, the ambitious individual who wants to ascend the steps of the political hierarchy. Political science, on the contrary, is a macrophysics of power, having the political class as interlocutors and the intellectual class as objective, according to Gaetano Mosca's classic formulation "to avoid the violent clashes and sudden revolutions and to effect with strong substance those slow, gradual improvements of the social organism which up to now are the only ones which have known how to last and which ordinarily are not resolved in a day's orgy, in transient appearances or soap-bubbles".

In trying to realize its practical vocation, political science researches and reveals the truth even when that is unpleasant and contrasts the common opinion. It opposes and tries to demolish prejudice, aprioristic beliefs, the metaphysics relating to power and its holders, brings to light the real result in the political struggle of group and class interests, showing most times that they are masked by formulas and ideologies or by judicial-formal architectures.

After all, positivistic political science, when it slides from the descriptive - interpretative dimension into the prescritive - normative one, assumes three connotations which can be respectively indicated as pedagogic, demystifying and reformist.

Under the first profile, political science proposes to practise a function of political education not only with regards to the ruling classes, but also the ruled classes: "poltical science is not necessary only to form wise governments, but to illuminate and direct the public opinion of the governed". With regards to the ruling classes it proposes to correct their irresolution and to attenuate the insensibility with regards to the most important social and political problems of the time; with regards to the ruled, it aims to break up the resignation and apathy with which they seem to suffer the unlimited influence of the petty politicains and to provide them with the knowledge of the most suitable mechanisms to select and control the members of the political class.

In as much as it declares to assume the evaluativity as regulating if not constitutive principle, political science often makes itself be evaluated by placing itself in an optics of demystification of traditional political doctrines, not least of those most recent ones. It therefore measures itself against all those formulas which intend to "explain or uphold or oppose by means of a rational theory or a supernatural belief the form of existing government", and in doing this, on one hand it tends to demonstrate the impossibility of a restoration of the Old Regime, but, on the other hand, does not hesitate to describe in strongly critical terms, the functionality of the new representative institutions and of democracy in general. If it is true that in this dimension, political science is inclined to show preference for certain forms of order and refusal of others, and especially to condemn without remedy, revolutionary socialism, it is also true that under a different heading, it proposes to increase the space which is owed to personal merit in the attribution of political offices and does not hesitate to engage in battles against "all the different adversaries of modern freedom", as shown by the critics of Fascism and the syndical State in the 1920's.

Lastly, political science, in setting about devising what Pasquale Turiello (Governo e governati in Italia, 1882), had defined as "the new discipline of society

by the Nation in the State", is mobilized to correct the tendency of an abstract character by national legislation, borrowed from foreign models, and therefore incapable of adhering to the manifold variety of the real Italy. In pursuing this objective, it subjects the functionality of institutions and efficiency of administrative structures to an accurate analysis, and does not hesitate to devise and propose a series of remedies which should bring the various parts of the State to assume an aspect which is more corresponding to their ideal shape ans should transform them, and if it is the case, substitute them with others more in accordance to ensure "justice, freedom and well-being, in the greatest part of the population". Moving in this direction, political science decisively assumes an ideologic and prescriptive dimension. According to a programized declaration, once again dictated by Attilio Brunialti, in far off 1884, it comes to constitute the premises necessary for the start of what, even today, is called "politics of reforms". Political science in the Liberal State, writes Brunialti, "does not hamper and does not stop any reform; rather it makes them all opportune, prolific and suitable for the temperament of the nation. It is of little importance if one of these reforms flatters us or appears easy, popular or very useful: it is necessary to see what results it has given to other nations, what part of it it owes to the intrinsic excellence of the reform; to then look into our history, our character and our environment if those conditions exist, if and how they can be produced, moderated and developed or how that reform must be corrected or modified so that it results fully suitable for us".

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Sirio Sola

1871 - 1920

1) PROSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE vs. other disciplines perspectives

civil society	political society
ideals	reality
forms	practice

2) AREAS OF INTEREST

theory of the political class

theory of political formula (ideology)

theory of the institutional framework

3) ANALYTICAL PARADIGM OF POWER

real	apparent
visible	hidden
formal	substantial

Versió

ANGLESA

(Draft- Not for publication or quotation)

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN : AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.-

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Prepared for delivery to the Conference on the Comparative Study of the Development of Political Science (IPSA-Fondazione Feltrinelli), Cortona, Italy, September 21-26, 1987.

This paper will trace the development of political studies in contemporary Spain, with special emphasis on the years since 1940, when the Civil War of 1936-39 came to an end and the dictatorship of General Franco began. The paper will attempt to situate the various stages in the evolution of scientific political studies within the framework of the evolution of Spanish society in general and its political evolution in particular.

The paper is deliberately limited to a description of the situation in Spain and makes no attempt to be a theoretical or comparative study of the development of political science as a discipline. The current state of political science in Spain and the available bibliography are such that it is difficult to advance much beyond this descriptive stage, although inevitably there will be some explanatory hypotheses or references to a more general model of the discipline.

I. INTRODUCTION.-

1. The first attempt at liberal political organization in Spain took place in the period 1810-1814 and contemporary Spanish politics can be said to date from that time. Since then, the history of Spanish politics has been one of rupture and discontinuity.

The very instability of the model of political organization meant a permanent and deep disagreement about how this model had to gain its legitimacy. Both the lack of continuity in Spain's institutions and the on-going controversy about how to justify conflicting models had notable repercussions on the scientific definition of politics as well as on the official poistion of political studies.

Therefore, this paper will briefly trace the evolution of political studies, identifying the sociopolitical moment in which they took place, the principal subjects examined and methods used, and the leading authors of every stage.

The paper will examine four major periods of Spanish history and will conclude with some considerations on the current problems of political science in Spain.

The dividing of history into periods is always open to discussion. It is even more arguable when attempts are made to combine events and scientific and cultural movements in specific categories. Although this approach certainly has its drawbacks, it is nonetheless useful in terms of a discussion and comparison of our subject here.

A final remark. In many occasions, I have deliberately used the term "political studies" and avoided the reference to "political science". I feel that the broader term is more suitable when attempting to trace the historical evolution of the field in the Spanish context. I have pinpointed the moment as of which one can legitimately refer to political science as such, regardless -or in spite of- the official denominations given to these studies at the time.

2. The following periods will be briefly examined:

-- 1. 1810-1898: Political studies and the struggle to legitimize a Liberal State.

-- 2. 1898-1939: Political studies and the crisis of Liberal democracy.

-- 3. 1940-1975: Political studies in a Conservative Dictatorship.

-- 4. 1975-... : Political Science "besieged"?

Each period is relatively long and could easily be divided into subperiods, to which I will refer when necessary, although I fell that the subject will be more readily understandable at this point if contemporary history is divided into more general periods.

II. 1810-1898 : POLITICAL STUDIES AND THE STRUGGLE TO LEGITIMIZE THE LIBERAL STATE.--

During the XIXth century the Spanish Liberal State remains a very fragile organization. It was struggling against the diehards of the "Ancien Régime" and was simultaneously under pressure from radical democrats anxious to turn liberalism into democracy. This resulted in three civil wars.

Political studies of the time mirror the Liberal State's problems in gaining its legitimacy. This fact can explain the ambiguous position of these studies, carried out by Faculties -Graduate Schools of Law-, but not very juristic in nature and approach.

Politics were studied as part of Legal Philosophy and of Political Law. When they were a subject in Legal Philosophy, emphasis was on political and social theory, with a strong ethical accent. When they were examined in courses of Political Law, the emphasis was on the history of political institutions.

It is important to remind that until quite recently "Political Law" (Derecho Politico) has been in Spain the official name for

what in most Western countries was known as Constitutional Law. The reason for this can be traced back to the weak position of the Spanish Liberal State of the XIXth century, and can be interpreted as the result of a compromise between the partisans of Absolutism -opposed to the legitimacy of political liberalism- and the moderate version of this very liberalism, which finally prevailed over more radical versions.

During this period, there were three relatively distinct tendencies in political studies. The first was inspired by German-speaking legal historicism. Works by SAVIGNY, BLUNTSCHLI and STAHL were translated and used in University courses. Its political orientation was clearly conservative and occasionally downright antiliberal. E. GIL Y ROBLES[1], a catholic professor of Political Law, was its leading representative.

The second school or tendency was the socalled "Krausism", which developed a organicist social theory rooted in neokantian philosophy[2]. Some of the Krausist political scholars showed in their analysis of political institutions a partly socioeconomic slant. Critical of the existing situations, the Krausist political stance was radically democratic. Among its representatives or sympathizers we can mention G. DE AZCARATE (1840-1917)[3] and J. COSTA (1846-1911)[4].

Finally, a third school -highly eclectic- emphasized the positivistic legal aspects of organized politics. It fitted into the

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[1]GIL ROBLES E. 1899-1902 : Tratado de Derecho Político según los principios de la filosofía y el derecho cristianos, Salamanca. (3 ed.)

[2]K.H. KRAUSE (1781-1832) and his disciple H. AHRENS (1808-1874) were translated and introduced by J. SANZ DEL RIO (1814-1869), Philosophy Professor at the University of Madrid. His interpretation of KRAUSE's Kantism stressed the ethical aspects and was a loose intellectual system that inspired an active group of scholars and scientists of politically radical and socially reformist orientation. La "Institución Libre de Enseñanza" -founded in 1876- worked as their institutional basis and exerted a strong influence -academic and political- until the Civil War.

[3]El self-government y la Monarquía doctrinaria (Madrid, 1877); El Poder del Jefe del Estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos (Madrid, 1878); El régimen parlamentarios en la práctica (Madrid, 1885); Relaciones de la política con los problemas económicos (Madrid, 1890); Tratado de Política (Madrid, 1897). Sobre Azcárate, cfr. GIL CREMADES (1967); TORRESROSA, J.R. (1964): El pensamiento político de don Gumersindo de Azcárate, in Revista de Estudios Políticos, nn. 135-136, pp. 121-134.

[4]Colectivismo agrario en España (Madrid, 1898); Crisis política de España (Madrid, 1901); Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la actual forma de gobierno de España (Madrid 1901-1902).

framework of the moderate liberalism prevalent at that time. M. COLMEIRO [5] and V. SANTAMARIA DE PAREDES [6], two professors highly influential in academic circles, were among the better known representatives of this tendency.

However, political studies were not appropiated by Constitutional or positivistic Public Law as they were in other countries, as one typical way of legitimizing the Liberal State of Law. But neither did "social positivism" flourish, which could have been a viable alternative. Krausism was probably the closest thing to social positivism, although by definition it was openly inspired by a humanistic moral philosophy.

Some historians consider that Spain at the end of XIXth was a Liberal State and Society, "unfinished" in both political and economic terms. It would appear that this weakness was linked to the failure to shape an academic and scientific framework to justify the very existence of the political organization, and this situation become increasingly more complicated as the most powerful European countries began reexamining their liberal constitutionalism in the light of the radical changes taking place in their economies, politics and culture.

iii. 1898-1939 : POLITICAL STUDIES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY.-

1.- The historical background.-

During the final decade of the XIXth century, a series of movements and events took place, that marked the beginning of a new period in Spanish history. 1898 -the year of the Spanish-American war of 1898, which brought about the loss of the last Spanish colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) and a deep social and cultural crisis- is taken as a conventional milestone in Spanish contemporary history.

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[5] *Elementos de Derecho Político y Administrativo* (Madrid, 1857); *Derecho Político según la Historia de León y Castilla* (Madrid, 1873).

[6] *Curso de Derecho Político según la Filosofía Política moderna, la Historia General de España y la legislación vigente* (Madrid, 1880-81). The long title is a clear expression of the eclectic approach of the author.

In this new period, which lasted from the beginning of the century until the Civil War of 1936-39, the Spanish political system was in a permanent state of crisis, that the European doubts about democratic liberalism made still worse. Political studies were influenced -in its approach and organisation- by this atmosphere.

2.- The development and orientation of political studies.-

a) The three schools or tendencies mentioned above -conservative historicism, Krausist social organicism and eclectic legal positivism- were still in evidence in the 1898-1939 period. But they became less clearly defined as they were exposed to other European influences, which were then facing the crisis of individualistic liberalism.

Furthermore, some changes were made in the academic by-laws governing the discipline and this also affected the development and orientation of political studies of the time.

b) The leading representative of this new situation -when differences between schools become less clear- is A. POSADA (1860-1944). Professor of Political Law, prolific author and the guiding light of a number of journals and publications, Posada -with all his virtues and limitations- was far and away the most active and influential academic of the time.[7]

Though Posada had his roots in Krausism, his approach to political studies -under the traditional label of Political Law- was heavily influenced by the work of positivist sociology and even by some of the early authors of US political science. Among the authors cited by Posada in some of his recommended bibliographies are Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Gumplowicz, Giddins, Burgess, Bryce or Dicey.

Posada affirmed that it was impossible to analyze Constitutional Law without applying a Theory of the State which had a definite sociological slant. "Theory of the State", he wrote, "can be considered to be a Political Sociology"[8]. As a consequence, Political Law was for Posada a combination of Theory of the State and Constitutional Law, backed by Political Sociology.

Latter day observers disagree about the value of Posada's approach with its broad focus and its somewhat eclectic refusal to give a more precise definition to what in other countries were

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[7]As the most representative work, see Tratado de Derecho Político (Madrid, 1915, 2 ed.).
[8]POSADA (1915): vol. I, p. 55.

already becoming autonomous disciplines. Some feel that it ius this very broad eclecticism that gives Posada"s positions its value because it sacrifices none of the facets which are present when politics are manifested in society. However, others feel that this broad approach is at the roots of the scientific weakness of an academic denomination -"Political Law"- which they feel is a juxtaposition of disciplines which has made it impossible either to develop Constitutional Law and Political Science as clearly defined independent disciplines.

c) Posada's attempts to redefine the contents of Political Law came just as Spain began receiving the impact of the trends reflected in the legal-political studies of a Europe where the institutions and the legitimacy basis of the Liberal State were in crisis. Furthermore, this was a time of cultural ferment in Spain and; after centuries of isolation, the country was wide open to the influence of scientific and cultural trends from abroad.*

And so G. JELLINEK's revision of legal positivism [10], M. HAURIOU's neo-Thomistic inspired institutionism [11], H. KELSEN's normativism [12] and also H. LASKI's [13] social approach to politics made their way into Spanish university circles.

None of these trends had a predominant or decisive influence. But they served in some way to increase the scientific perplexity of

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*J. ORTEGA Y GASSET (1883-1955), professor of Metaphysics at the University of Madrid, must be mentioned as one of the most active intellectual figures of this time. His approach to social and political subjects was influenced by Simmel and Spranger.

[10] Teoría General del Estado (Madrid, 1914). This translation of the Allgemeine Staatslehere is due to F. DE LOS RIOS, a professor of Political Law, bred in the Krausist tradition and evolved towards a non-marxist socialism. He was an active member of the Socialist Party (PSOE) and one of the redactors of the Republican Constitution of 1931.

[11] Principios de Derecho Público y Constitucional (Madrid, 1927), translated by C. RUIZ DEL CASTILLO, a conservative professor of Political Law.

[12] Compendio de Teoría General del Estado (Barcelona, 1934); Teoría General del Estado (Madrid, 1934). KELSEN's work was introduced by L. RECASENS SICHES, professor of Legal Philosophy. He was, however, a critical introductor who opposed a sociological and ethical approach to the Kelsenian "pure theory of law" and its political consequences.

[13] El Estado moderno. Sus instituciones políticas y económicas (Barcelona, 1932). This is the Spanish translation of the original Laski's A Grammar of Politics. The translator is T. GONZALEZ, professor of Political Law.

Spanish scholars, fully aware that the Liberal model -which had never been solidly implanted in Spain- was now in a state of general crisis. This was dramatically underscored by the military uprising of 1936 and the Civil War of 1936-1939, which led to a lenghty conservative dictatorship.

3.- Conclusion.-

During the 1898-1939 period there were no major alterations in the institutional position of political studies, which continued to be attached to the Faculties -Graduate Schools- of Law. Emphasis on the "non-juridical" approach increased to a certain point. And this underscored a paradoxical state of affairs: the institutional relationship with the Faculties of Law coexisted with an increasing reluctance of the socalled "Political Law" to accept a strictly juristic approach to the issues it entailed.

The crisis of the Liberal State and the openly declared loss of confidence in the ability of law to settle social conflicts in the interwar period in Europe probably exerted a decisive influence. And Spanish scholars of Political Law became increasingly reluctant to be assimilated as a strictly juristic discipline.

But this reluctance did not produce any clearcut alternative nor was it strong enough -perhaps for institutional reasons, perhaps for lack of historical opportunity- to relocate political studies in another sphere or to view them under a new approach.

IV. 1940-1975 : POLITICAL STUDIES UNDER A CONSERVATIVE DICTATORSHIP: THE SLOW BIRTH OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.-

1.- The historical background.-

The military victory of the conservative alliance led by General Franco had -as is well known- long and important effects on the Spanish political and social organization. A new political cycle which lasted nearly forty years began in 1939.

However, if we follow the social and economic evolution of the country, we observe the succession of two great periods. Particularly with the beginning of the sixties, Spanish society underwent strong mutations: general industrialization, urban expansion, cultural secularization and a general rise in the standards of education. We could dare to say that there lies a greater distance between the Spain of 1950 and the Spain of 1970 than between the Spain of 1850 and the Spain of the 1950.

Such course of events had its obvious impact on scientific and cultural fields, including social and political studies. It is not easy to synthetize and read into the evolution of this period as ambiguity or wavering of the personal paths and the lack of perspective make it more difficult.

2.- The orientation and development of political studies.-

In which way did Civil War and a dictatorial system of government affect political studies? We must differentiate the two great periods which we have just referred to.

A) In the first stage of the period -which continues till the end of the 50's-, the direct impact of the new political situation on political studies is very apparent.

a) From an institutional perspective, one must first point out the rigid control, exercised initially by the Francoist regime over scientific and academic institutions, especially those which affect the mechanisms of social and political legitimation.

As a brutal result of this control, many of the authors and professors active in the previous period disappeared physically or professionally, either obliged to leave the country in exile or condemned to intellectual exile in their own country, as they suffered imprisonment, expulsion from the University or were relegated to secondary posts.

Second, we observe an attempt to systematize and diffuse an official "political doctrine", in the style of the Nazi or Fascist ideology. With that aim, "nacionalsindicalismo" or "doctrina del Movimiento Nacional" was introduced as an academic subject in the programmes of university Faculties and other education centres.

This attempt did not altogether succeed, because of the varied ideological support -orthodox catholicism, the "Falange" local version of Fascism, traditional monarchists, etc.- of General Franco's dictatorship and also, probably, because of the pragmatism of the dictator himself, who did not go into theoretical constructions which tended to be too complex.

Nevertheless, this doctrinal project is important in another aspect: the creation fo new institutions primarily devoted to the elaboration and diffusion of this "doctrine", namely the Instituto de Estudios Politicos y la Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Económicas in the University of Madrid (1943).

-Outside the University system, the **Instituto de Estudios Políticos** was regarded as an organism devoted to research and teaching on political studies. The **Instituto** was directly attached to the only authorized party -**Falange Española**- and its minor associated groups. The function of the **Instituto** was to bring about doctrinal support for the new regimen and to contribute to its legitimation. As I will point out further on, it has had an important role in the later evolution of political studies in Spain.

-The **Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Económicas** in Madrid was the first University centre which had as a direct objective the formation of graduates in Politics and Economics, future high "State servants", either through Public Administration or trough the political apparatus of the regime.

From this moment, formal studies on political sucjects developed simultaneously in the Law Faculties and in this new Faculty of Madrid, which till 1985 -when a second one was created in Barcelona- stood as the only University centre devoted to political disciplines.

Even so, the naming of the Chairs related to political studies still lacked explicit reference to Political Science. In the Faculties of Law, the traditional **Derecho Político** -or Political Law- went on being used. In the new Faculty of Political Sciences, different denominations will be successively. When special Faculties of Economics are created in the late 50's, **Teoría del Estado** -State Theory- is the official name of a course on politics. Only after the 1973 reform a course titled "Introduction to Political Science" appeared in the Madrid Faculty of Political Sciences.

b) Focussing on contents, the postwar political studies were centered around the crisis of the Liberal-Democratic State, moreover of the State as political organisation, both at a national level -Francoism speaks as well about the need for a **Nuevo Estado**- and at an international one. But this confirmation of rupture did not lead to new paths. It led to the readoption of two already well-known approaches:

1) persistence in the criticism of legal positivism, following the work of some important foregin scholars which had been translated in the previous years to the Civil War. The view of political studies as a "Theory

of the State" -or of its crisis!- was, then, reinforced

under the influence of C. SCHMITT's decisionism[14] and of the sociological approach of H. HELLER [15].

2) reinforcement of the axiological emphasis of conservative catholicism, inspired in the moral and political philosophy of Thomas Aquinus and the Spanish authors of the XVIIth century -Vitoria, Báñez, Suárez, Molina-, whose influence was emphasized by the nationalistic aspects of the Francoist regime.

Therefore, in a fully anti-liberal climate and far from any positivistic legal approximation -which had no object of its own within a political system with no formal Constitution-, political studies wavered between two poles. On one side, a political theory -or State Theory- of a relatively "sociologistic" tone and often compatible with the justification of an authoritarian political system. On the other side, the moral-philosophical approximation of the catholic neo-Thomist school.

Within the most representative authors of this moment, we must quote F.J. CONDE [16], I.de LOJENDIO [17] or E. GOMEZ ARBOLEYA [18].

We should also add -in a transition towards later periods- the names of L. SANCHEZ AGESTA [19] and C. OLLERO [20], who -from initial positions not far from the ones mentioned before- will gradually incorporate some elements of political analysis that were being carried out in the United States and in Western Europe.

A continuity feature with the previous period could be the mistrust for legal positivism, and -except for the catholic

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[14] Teoría de la Constitución (Madrid, 1934) is the translation of SHMITT's Verfassungslehre.
[15] Teoría del Estado (México, 1942) is the translation of his Staatslehre of 1934.
[16] Introducción al Derecho Político actual (Madrid, 19420
[17] Régimen político del Estado español (Barcelona, 1942).
[18] Estudios de Teoría de la Sociedad y del Estado (Madrid, 1962) is a collection of essays published between 1940 and 1956, dealing with Heller's Staatslehre, the Spanish Political Philosophers of the XVIIth century and positivistic sociology in Europe.
[19] Lecciones de Derecho Político (Teoría de la Política y del Estado) (Granada, 1943).

[20] Introducción al Derecho Político (Barcelona, 1940); Ensayos de Ciencia Política (Madrid, 1956).

neo-Thomists- this tradition gives way to the scepticist assertions of a "realist political theory" [21].

c) But -as I have mentioned before- this permanent withdrawal from a legal approach to politics, did not open the door to other alternatives, such as those that were being offered by the US well established political science. With some excepetions, this aperture did not occur till a later date, when some of its dominant currents had already entered in crisis.

How is this withdrawal to be explained? A first reason may lie in the isolation suffered by the Spanish academic world till the end of the fifties, when official political relationships with the Western and Eastern world were rare and even hostile.

A second reason lies in the difficulty of applying certain positive analysis to a political system which hides beneath the "opacity" of its decision-making process and the denial of freedom for public political action and expression.

Finally, we must not forget the weak Spanish tradition with regard to social positivism, be it due to a lack of research resources and organisation or be it due to a preferance for approximations of a theoretical and philosophical character.

B) The situation outlined in the previous section was partially modified towards the end of the sixties, when Spanish society came under important social and economic changes. At that moment, added to the legitimation basis of a military triumph was the argument of the regime's modernizing and developing capacity.

The parafascist and/or catholic conservative ideologists were gradually replaced by "technocrats" -economists, engineers- not bothered about formal ideology, and given over to the launching of the socalled "social and economic development plans". Repercussions of these changes can be seen in different ways.

First of all, a greater recognition of social sciences in general began, be it because they were regarded as auxiliary to a "developist" official policy, be it for their critical capacity as means of criticism and opposition to the political regime. Economics and Sociology stood out as "fashionable" disciplines, produ-

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[21] T. FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, El problema político de nuestro tiempo (Madrid, 1950); N. RAMIRO RICO, El animal ladino y otros estudios políticos (Madrid, 1980) is a collection of essays written between 1949 and 1974.

cing a rise in the creation of new Faculties of Economics, chairs of these disciplines and public and private research centres.

Second, we assist to a greater aperture of contacts and exchanges with the international scientific community, thus allowing the reception of the great trends in social sciences: logic positivism, functionalism, neomarxism, behaviourism,-, which till that moment had had almost no presence in Spain.

This aperture also implied that a greater number of Spanish graduates and scholars traveled abroad -especially to France and the United States- to extend their education in social sciences.

In a more specific way, what happened with political studies? First, they also benefited from the global movement of attention to the processes of social and economic change: the gains refer to a relative rise in the institutional side, to a closer relationship with the international state of the discipline and to a slight increase in the number of Spanish scholars with foreign degrees.

a) But concerning the rise in institutional presence, the most apparent signs are the foundation of a professional association and the expansion of publishing.

1978

- The **Asociación Española de Ciencia Política y Derecho constitucional** includes Political Law and State Theory professors and assistants of the Spanish Universities. The association's denomination avoids the traditional labels of University courses, and Political Science and Constitutional Law appear as distinct but interrelated disciplines. The goal of the Association is scientific discussion, limited to an annual conference and some specific workshops. There are no professional or corporatist activities or services, as University teachers are considered civil servants, with its rigid recruiting system.

- Referring to publishing activity, the appearance of new journals devoted to political studies must be mentioned, as well as the apperance of book collections which publish

original works -mainly University textbooks- or foregin translations.[22]

b) Concerning contents, political studies receive the varied influence of theories and approaches currently prevailing in other Western countries, thus relegating the philosophical outlines of the previous period to residual positions.

In an attempt to group the general tendencies, we could quote the following trends:

-the study of foreign political systems, with a fundamentally institutionalist approach and a "realistic" kind of analysis, that it is not applicable to the present Spanish political regime [23]. Two authors must be mentioned because of their influence: M. JIMENEZ DE PARGA [24] and P. LUCAS VERDU [25].

-the reception of critical theory and neomarxist political analysis in its different versions: Gramsci, French marxism--structuralism, Anglo-American new left. It is applied to State and social theory, based upon the concept of conflict and class antagonism [26].

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[22]To the Revista Española de Estudios Políticos -published by the Instituto- we must now add other journals devoted -mainly or partially to political studies- whose titles are a good expression of the discipline's indefinition:

-Boletín Informativo del Seminario de Derecho Político (Salamanca);
-Boletín Informativo de Ciencia Política (Madrid);
-Papers (Barcelona)
-Revista de Derecho Político (Madrid);
-Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Madrid);
-Sistema (Madrid)
-Estudis Electorals (Barcelona)

[23]Some foreign influences must be mentioned here. First, the 1954 French reform of Law studies, with the inclusion of Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel and Sociologie Politique, as core or elective courses. BURDEAU, DUVERGER and A. HAURIOU will be translated in those years. On the other hand, the approach to institutional analysis of C.J. FRIEDRICH and K. LOWENSTEIN will also influence -via translation- this approach.

[24]Los regímenes políticos contemporáneos (Madrid, 1960); Las monarquías europeas en el horizonte español (Madrid, 1966).

[25]Principios de Ciencia Política (Madrid, 1969-71, 3 vol.); Curso de Derecho Político (Madrid 1972-76, 3 vol.).

[26]Among its representatives, E. TIERNO GALVAN, R. MORODO, J.A. GONZALEZ CASANOVA, J. SOLE-TURA, I. MOLAS o J. PEREZ-ROYO.

-finally, the growing empirical research on social and economic opinions and attitudes of the Spanish society, as political affairs continue to be a risky research subject. J.J. LINZ [27] and F. MURILLO FERROL [28] must be mentioned here.

However, the three groups are not totally closed, so the connections between one another are quite frequent, as when some of them are able to adopt a critical theory prospective and develop an empirical research [29].

Likewise, this diversity of tendencies fits into the official denominations of "Political Law" and "State Theory". In the programmes of these courses we can find , for example, political theory and history of political ideas, marxist State theory, compartive government and Spanish social structure analysys. This enables a well-known professor to define Political Law of this period as a "hydra of many heads and a universal master card" [30].

3.- Conclusion.-

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We could conclude that the "prehistory" of Political Science ends between 1965 and 1975, when political studies in Spain start to approach the main trends of the field in the Western scientific community.

Yet Political Science as an autonomous discipline does not manage to clearly define a scientific and institutional area in order to become decisively legitimated within the field of social sciences.

-A first reason for this relative frailty may be found in the diversity of theoretical definition of the discipline, once "behaviorism" ceased to be the identification signpost that -for good or bad- had been till the late fifties. This situation gives way to an increase of perplexity among Spanish "latecomers" to the discipline.

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[27] See, for instance, Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España 1975-1981. IV Informe FOESSA (Madrid, 1981).
[28] Estudios de Sociología Política (Madrid, 1965).
[29] This summary classification is certainly unfair to some of the discipline scholars. Such would be the case of M. GARCIA PELAYO, who has spent much of his academic life in Latin America but has exerted an importante influence in some Spanisch circles trough his work on comparative government, political theory and contemporary State theory.
[30] RAMIRO RICO (1980): 105.

This lack of selfconfidence grows with the administrative adscription of political studies to the Faculties of Law or Economics, where the traditional labels of Political Law or State Theory still are used to organise the faculty recruitment system of public competition (concurso-oposición).[31]

-A second explanation is based on the political environment. I have already pointed out that social sciences became -towards the end of the 60's and trougheut tha 70's- into instruments for socioeconomic "modernisation", but also into weapons for radical criticism and sociopolitical opposition. While certain economics and sociology approaches could analize Spanish reality bordering on the fringe of the vetoed territory of political affairs, Political Science did find greater difficulty in reaching its own object, to which it had to refer trough allusions or comparisons, either with other countries systems, or with Spanish historical past [32].

This "ban on contemporary political subjects" could also explain the paradoxical fact that part of the best academic (non strictly political) Sociology has been developed by Political Law professors. Many of the best-known to-day Sociologists did actually start their careers in Political Law or State Theory Departments and Chairs.

-A third motive could be found in the field of professional alternatives, in other words, the social legitimation of the "political scientist". In many countries, two major professional fields -together with research and University teaching- have been opened to political scientists: public administration and secondary teaching. In Spain, however, political science hs not gained access to secondary education -partly because of political control reasons, partly because of the monopolistic position of History and Geography teachers-. On the other hand, political scientists have not been significantly incorporated into public administration, still held under the hegemony of lawyers and -as a new and recent development- of a growing number of economists.

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[31] In this respect, the analysis of the reports -memorias- that candidates to a Chair have to present shows the limits of this situation. In these reports, we find highly refined conceptual exercises in order to make compatibble the traditional denominations -Political Law, State Theory- with contents such as political systems analysis, behaviorist research, marxist social theory or positive Constitutional Law.

[32] Studies on the political institutions, pressure groups, parties and elections of the Second Republic period (1931-1936) have been undertaken in the 60's and 70's by young scholars like M. RAMIREZ, I. MOLAS or J.R.MONTERO, among others.

Because of the professional orientation of the Spanish University education, political studies -without a big enough professional impact- do not obtain a clearcut social legitimation. This also affects the academic situation of the discipline.

-A final reason may be found in the institutional weakness of political science, regarding teaching and research. We have already mention the fact that only two publicly supported bodies -the Instituto and the Facultad in Madrid- have been till very recently the only special centres devoted to political studies.

The denial of the Francoist education authorities to multiply the centres of political studies is probably based on the negative experience of the these two institutions, which became a focal point of reaction and opposition to the regime.

This particular situation has weakened, in my opinion, the diffusion and strengthening of both the discipline and the profession, when in dialogue with other scientific and institutional actors, within the University itself, with public administration bodies and with other social actors like the media, the non-profit making organisations or the business community.**

IV. 1975-... : A "BESIEGED" POLITICAL SCIENCE ? .-

1.- The political background.-

The death of General Franco (1975) expressed the political exhaustion of the dictatorship and forecasted democratic changes demanded by three main factors: the needs of the economic and social system, the aspirations of a a majority sector of the elites (economic, intellectual, working, professional) and the pressures coming from countries such as the U.S. or Federal Germany, both with important strategic and/or economic interests in contemporary Spain.

The socalled "political transition" resulted from an agreement between reformist sectors of the Francoist regime and the leaders of democratic opposition parties, clandestine trade unions and nationalist -Catalan and Basque- movements. The 1978 Constitution

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**As an interesting contrast, the evolution of the institutional position of Sociology is also significative. Since 1973, the University of Madrid can give Sociology degrees. But academic Sociology has also expanded troughout some Faculties of Economics, where a special Sociology section exists. This situation has increased the number of teaching positions for sociologists and the number of graduates as well.

legally records this transaction, carried out without breaches or depurations: the State services (Army, police, Courts, high civil servants) are left intact, and the political class is renadue to the recognition of party pluralism and competition.

Democracy opens new perspectives for political studies, as transparence actions and decisions of political actors becomes greater. At the same time the smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy becomes an attractive subject for foreign and national political scientists.

2.- The development and orientation of political studies.-

How have political studies evolved under the new political situation? We will examine again institutional and more substantial aspects of this evolution.

A) From an institutional point of view, the creation of new Faculties of Political Sciences and Sociology, the administrative creation of a "Political Science area" in the organization of University professorship are relevant data and the revision of programmes leading to University degrees.

a) The Faculty of Madrid has lost its monopoly in 1985, when two new Faculties were created -one at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the other at the UNED (Open University)- and the creation of a third one has been announced.

This greater institutional presence of Political Science studies at the University level may strenghten its position.

b) On the other hand, one of the provisions of a recent University Reform Bill (1983) establishes the organizing of University teachers by scientific areas. The old labels such as Derecho Político or Teoría del Estado have been replaced by two others: Derecho Constitucional and Ciencia Política y de la Administración.

Education authorities have, therefore, taken the responsibility of solving the old scientific debate about the nature of "Political Law". Professors of this old discipline have been forced to adopt a choice between the two new areas. After a weak movement of resistance, the result of this choice has been that those adopting the option of Derecho Constitucional surpass those who opt for Ciencia Política in a proportion of 4 to 1.[*4]

[*4]The present number of active Professors (Catedráticos) of Political Science is 8. Associate Professors (Titulares) are about 30.

All in all, the debate still goes on. Many of the faculty members who have opted for "Constitutional Law" had mainly worked in the fields of political theory, comparative government or political behaviour. The personal decision has come about, in many cases, as an tactical answer to needs related to the recruiting processes for new teachers. Thus, the result of the dynamics opened up by this event is still to be seen.

c) In the general University reform, the revision of programmes leading to University degrees has also started. In this process, the presence of different disciplines in every one of the grades administered by the Faculties is being worked out.

As far as Political Science is concerned, its old and relatively solid de facto position in the Faculties of Law is now being seriously threatened. The present trends point towards its being substituted by Constitutional Law. Thus, there is a risk that its institutional locus might be limited to the specific Faculties of Political Sciences and Sociology. Given the minority situation of these Faculties with regard to the large number of Faculties of Law, what can be gained in scientific coherence may mean a loss in institutional and personal resources.

d) As a last point, another result has been the greater connection of Spanish political scientists with the international scientific community, by means of their scientific cooperation in joint research with foreign scholars interested in Spanish politics or by means of their more active participation in organisms such as IPSA or ECPR.

B) Concerning contents, two facts related to orientation of political studies must be pointed out.

a) The first one is the great impulse received by the legal approach to politics, due to the importance which the interpretation and implementation of the new Constitution of 1978 have received.

After nearly half a century without a formal object of analysis, the labour market has considerably increased its offers for specialists in Constitutional Law. Thus the previously quoted constitutionalists "conversion" of some poli-

tical scientists of the previous years can be partially explained.[35]

But from a more substantial point of view, it can be said that there is now a better definition of two differents forms of political analysis. In this sense, we could affirm that the reappearance of Constitutional Law as a strong scientific discipline favours a better delimitation of Political Science field, relieving it of the complicated exercises on definition to which I referred before.

b) The second important fact is the curiosity stirred -in Spain and abroad- by the working of new democratic institutions and the question about continuity and change in the country's "political culture": political parties, unions and interest groups, elections, local government, political attitudes, etc.

As an eleeent characteristic of the Spanish political scene, the phenomenon of nationalism, its origins, forms and performance also gains special relevance.

From a "scientific division of labour point of view", these subjects are being worked on, not only by political scientists coming form the old "Political Law" chairs, but also by a sector of sociologists which regard now political facts as an object of analysis without the risks or limitations suffered in the previous period.

In this way, sharing -or fighting for- the new political reality as a scientific subject can revive the old debate about the respective identities of Political Science and Political Sociology.

c) The strong "ekocentered" focus of to-day's Spanish political science stands out at a first glance. The attention given to our own political evolution in recent years has relegated other fields such as political theory or comparative government to a minor position.

Attention has been given to aspects such as the process of political transition itself[36], electoral behaviour[37],

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[35]The old **Instituto de Estudios Politicos** -which in the last years played an active role in supporting Political Science research and activities- has also been "renamed" as **Centro de Estudios Constitucionales**, as an expression of the above mentioned trend.

[36]LINZ, MARAVALL, MORODO, SANTAMARIA

[37]CAZORLA-BONACHELA, LINZ, LLERA, MONTERO, VALLES, VIROS.

political parties[38], political attitudes and opinions[39] and nationalism[40], among others.

The theoretical framework on which these analyses are based is often unstable. Sociopolitic critical theory of Marxist inspiration -which developed spectacularly in the years immediately before the democratic transition- is rarely applied, save in some marginal sectors or individualities.

In the analysis of the transition process, political culture and public opinion lean upon a schematic functionalism, with a greater or lesser accumulation of historical explanations.

Concerning data selection and research techniques, the development of quantitative techniques applied to the analysis of electoral or opinion data is impressive[41]. Contributing to this rapid development, we find the fast assimilation of political mass-communication, based more on advertising and audiovisual media than on political parties or organisations.

Even so, this abundance of opinion studies and polls rarely give way to interesting interpretations, because of an absence or weakness of previous theoretical framework or a sound enough later exploitation. This is due to the fact that such research often responds more to well-timed requests of the political market -pre or post electoral polls demanded by parties or media- than to research programmes. Thus, a "vulgar positivism" prevails, and with it also the risk of identifying political science with the unhappy -and sometimes journalistic - treatment of a specific field such as the analysis of opinion and behaviour.

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[38] ESTEBAN-LOPEZ GUERRA, GARCIA COTARELO, MORODO, DE VEGA, MOLAS, MARCET, BOTELLA, TEZANOS...
[39] LOPEZ PINTOR, MARAVALL, SANTAMARIA
[40] COLOMER, GARCIA FERRANDO, DE BLAS, CARMENDIA, SOLE-TURA...
[41] One of the most active centres is the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, attached to the Spanish Government, and the best equipped social research body in the country. In the commercial side, there is a full range of more or less credited poll and survey organisations.

3.- Conclusion.-

The evolution of political science since 1975 hinders an easy characterization: the provisional balance has an indefinite sign.

Speaking in global terms, we can point out as positive aspects

- the improved political conditions concerning the environment for its development, once a political system based on public freedom and political pluralism seems to be consolidated;

- some institutional gta, as are the constitution of a political science official area, the cretion of new Faculties and the stronger relationship of Spanish political scientists with the international academic world.

Political Science in Spian also faces some negative aspects as

- a less favourable general attitude -coming from public opinion and decision centres- towards social and political sciences, differing greatly from the situation in the 50's and 60's;

- the absence of widely accepted paradigms which, in other times, had a "securising" effect on the discipline and its followers;

- within the field of political science itself, a weak legitimation in a greatly reduced labour market, where it competes with stronger corporations such as Law professionals, sociologists and even journalists.

We could thereby refer -exaggerating somewhat and making a parody of a classical article- to a "besieged political science": Spanish political science of the 80's has succeeded in conquering its own field -even if somewhat small-, but a series of circumstances -institutional as well as scientific- appear to be limiting its chances for an easy and immediate expansion.

DRAFT--NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

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The Impact of the Political Context on Political Science in the United States The Formative Years

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I. Introduction

In the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century when political science emerged as a profession, the United States was adolescent. Its youthful innocence had been engulfed by the torment of Civil War, the torrent of westward migration across the continent to fulfill its self-proclaimed Manifest Destiny, and the growth of manufacturing. The great struggles over slavery, the Bank, and territorial expansion that had marked its early decades had ended. New issues of industrialization, immigration, and relations between races and among nations were being raised and confronted.

As with most adolescents, the American nation was seething with energy and enterprise, but wracked by self-doubt and uncertainty. It knew what it had been. It realized that sweeping change was underway. It could not know what was coming. The old America that was eastern, English, agricultural, and internationally isolated was gone forever. The emerging America seemed likely to be continental, multicultural, industrial, and internationally involved. The political and social behavior and institutions that had grown up around the old America were

being questioned and attacked, but noone could say with confidence what they should or would become.

One of the institutions in ferment during that period was American education, especially higher education. The old system of higher education had been small, classical, heavily theological, and elitist. Graduate education had been almost non-existent in the form it has today. The Morrill Land Grant Act that launched public higher education and the discovery of European, especially German, education by Americans after the Civil War--as well as the more general social and political changes--altered that character dramatically.

The impact on social science education was especially great. In the forty years after the Civil War, all of the major social sciences appeared as separate disciplines. All of them underwent sweeping changes in conception, research methodology, scope, approach, pedagogy, and size.

Political science was no exception. However, unlike history, economics, geography, psychology, and--to a lesser extent--sociology, political science had no necessary logic to its separate existence. That is, it had no distinctive methodology. Neither did it have a clearly-defined subject matter that could not be encompassed within one or more of its sister disciplines. Its various parts could have survived simply as political history, political sociology, political geography, political philosophy, and political psychology--subfields in the other disciplines. Other parts could have remained constitutional law, public law, and international law. Indeed, they have done so. Each of the other social science disciplines claims a piece of

political science. Politics and government could have continued to be studied (as well?) without its own institutional foundation.

This paper reports the preliminary results of a study into the question of why political science did, indeed, emerge from the primeval social science swamp between 1880 and 1906 and claim its own piece of academic turf. Why were the American Academy of the Political and Social Sciences and the American Political Science Association established? Why were the *Political Science Quarterly* and the *American Political Science Review* founded? Why did separate political science schools and departments come into existence in the burgeoning graduate schools of the country? Especially, it asks what role the political context played in that process. To what extent does the autonomy of political science have *political* roots, as opposed to scientific or educational roots?

The answer that this preliminary paper proposes preliminarily is that politics was the principal motivating factor for that autonomy movement. In particular, reform politics was the activating force. Most of the founders of the political science discipline in the United States were committed partisans of various political and social reform movements and saw a separate political science profession as means to serve that commitment. Most of the activities that they institutionalized in the new discipline, especially in their journals, were designed to advance the same goals.

Those reform activities took place in a political context that was very supportive. The period under review was probably more thoroughly permeated by an ethos of political reform than any other in

American history. This was a time of civil service reform, reform in the relationship of government to business and to agriculture, suffrage reform, banking reform, the beginnings of reform in international relations, etc. The Greenbackers, the Populists, the Progressives, the Prohibitionists, the Socialists, and a myriad of smaller groups appeared as reformist political parties. Labor unions and all sorts of social reform organizations were founded and became important. The political reform pot was bubbling everywhere. The political science discipline was simply one of the bubbles.

In order to show that impact of the political context on the origins of political science, this paper takes a biographical approach. Political science did not simply spring forth from the brow of some 19th century neo-classical god. Human beings created it. Fortunately for our purposes, those human beings can be identified easily because of their formal association in the leadership organs of the institutions that became the foundation of the discipline. Also, basic biographical information on most of them is fairly readily available. Of course, not all of the founders so identified were equally influential. However, no attempt is made in this paper to sort out the relative amounts of influence.

The method of analysis of that information has been simply to review it for characteristics that seem pertinent and that are sufficiently common to suggest generalizations. Ways that those characteristics seem to relate to the political context are proposed.

II. The Founding Fathers of Political Science

A. The Founders Identified

Although instruction in various aspects of politics and government had been offered in American institutions of higher education from the beginning, the founding of political science as an academic discipline is usually dated from the establishment of the School of Political Science at Columbia University in 1880.[1] The conclusion of the founding phase seems logically to be the publication of the first issue of the *American Political Science Review* in 1906, because it became the standard publishing medium in the profession. Between those two dates, the principal steps in the institutionalization of the profession seem to be the establishment of the *Political Science Quarterly* in 1886 and the founding of the American Political Science Association in 1903. The following categories of people seem to form, then, the Founding Fathers of the discipline:

1. The faculty of Columbia's School of Political Science during this founding period. The original faculty consisted of John William Burgess, the school's founder; Edmund Munroe Smith; Clifford R. Bateman; and Richmond Mayo-Smith. Other names were added to that faculty during the founding years. They were Frank Johnson Goodnow, Edwin Robert Alexander Seligman, William Archibald Dunning, John Bates Clark, James Harvey Robinson, John Bassett Moore, William Milligan Sloane, Franklin Henry Giddings, Herbert Levi Osgood, and William R. Shepherd.[2]

2. The editorial boards of the *Political Science Quarterly*. The original membership, as listed in the first issue in this order

was Burgess, Archibald Alexander, Mayo-Smith, Smith (managing editor), Goodnow, George H. Baker, and Seligman. Later additions during the founding period were Theodore W. Dwight (1887), Frederick W. Whitridge (1888), William A. Dunning (1890), Herbert L. Osgood (1891), John Bassett Moore (1892), Franklin H. Giddings (1894), John B. Clark and James Harvey Robinson (1896), William M. Sloane (1897), and Henry R. Seager and Henry L. Moore (1902). Of course, some of the later additions were replacements, until, by 1903, only Burgess, Smith, and Goodnow remained from the original board.

3. The "committee of fifteen representative political scientists which was empowered" by a meeting on December 30, 1902, "called primarily to consider the feasibility of creating a society of comparative legislation" "to enter into communication with such individuals and associations as should be thought likely to be interested" in forming a national political science association.[3] The work of this committee led directly to the establishment of the American Political Science Association. Its members were J. W. Jenks (chair), Simeon E. Baldwin, E. Dana Durand, J. H. Finley, W. W. Howe, H. P. Judson, M. A. Knapp, C. W. Needham, P. S. Reinsch, L. S. Rowe, F. J. Stimson, Josiah Strong, R. H. Whitten, Max West, and W. W. Willoughby.

4. The original officers and executive council of the American Political Science Association as elected at the founding meeting on December 30, 1903. Its members were Goodnow (president), Woodrow Wilson (vice president--declined), Paul S. Reinsch (vice president), Baldwin (vice president), Willoughby (secretary and treasurer), Andrew

D. White, Jesse Macy, Judson, Rowe, Albert Shaw, Bernard Moses, J. A. Fairlie, William Augustus Schaper, C. H. Huberich, and Herbert Putnam.[4]

5. The original editorial board of the *American Political Science Review* as published in its first issue in 1906. Its members were Fairlie, Goodnow, John Holladay Latané, Charles Edward Merriam Jr., Reinsch, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Eugene Wambaugh, Whitten, Willoughby (managing editor).

B. The Founders Categorized

Analysis of the available biographical information on the founders of the political science discipline as listed above suggests the following generalizations that seem relevant to an understanding of the character of the profession during its formative period. Complete information is not available on all subjects.

1. All forty eight of the founders were male.

2. Calvinism seems to have had an extraordinary influence over them.

Information on the religious background or practice or both is available for 30 of the founders. Twenty-three of them (76.7%) were associated with Calvinist denominations (Presbyterian, 9; Congregationalist, 11; or Huguenot 2). Of the 18 on whom no information on religious affiliation is available, seven were descended from old Yankee families. It seems likely that those seven also had been heavily influenced by Calvinism. The addition of them to the Calvinist total would raise the percentage to 81.1. The other

denominations identified were Episcopalian 4; Lutheran 2; Quaker, Methodist, Baptist, and Jewish, 1 each.[5] The proportion of all Americans around 1900 who were Calvinist was several times lower. [I intend to include statistics to support this statement in my final draft.]

3. A grossly disproportionate share of the founders were descended from old Yankee families.

Information is available on the ancestry of 37 of the subjects. Twenty four of them (64.9%) were descended from English settlers in New England before 1675.[6] The others were Scottish (6), German (4), French (2), and later English (1). Nowhere near two-thirds of Americans could claim old Yankee ancestry at the turn-of-the-century.

4. More than half of the founders had studied in Europe.

At least 25 of the 48 had done graduate study in Europe, usually in Germany. Also, a substantial number of them had studied at the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques* in Paris. Indeed, that school had ~~been Burgess's model~~. He and Mayo-Smith spent two months there in 1880 studying its operations, immediately before founding the school at Columbia.[7]

5. Most of the founders of the political science profession were not political scientists.

Although more (12) of our subjects had political science as their primary occupation than fell into any other occupational category, nevertheless they represented a minority (26.1%) of the 46 founders whose occupations are known. In fact, the law--jurists (4), lawyers (7)--provided nearly as many founders as did political science. The

other principal occupations were historian (7); economist (5); librarian, statistician, and journalist (2 each); and philosopher, sociologist, clergyman, and planning consultant (1 each). Especially notable is the clear lead of the law over history as the basis of the discipline. Secondly, the eclectic character of the origins of political science is evident.

6. The occupations of the fathers of the founders have certain distinctive characteristics.

Information is available on 36 of the 48. Those 36 came overwhelmingly from family backgrounds that seem to have been comfortably middle or upper class. Seven of their fathers were farmers (including a slave-holding plantation owner). Perhaps most remarkably, five of their fathers were manufacturers (one of railway cars) and two were railroad developers. Seven of the fathers were importantly involved in politics. Other categories were clergyman (5), physician and banker (4 each), educator and merchant (3 each), attorney (2), druggist, book publisher, and army officer (1 each).[8]

7. These early political scientists seem to have been extraordinarily active in practical politics.

Because the available biographical information is sketchy for many of the founders, this survey of political involvemment may be incomplete. Nevertheless, it shows quite an impressive amount of political activity. The most conspicuous example was, of course, Woodrow Wilson, governor of New Jersey and President of the United States. However, his predecessor as president of the American Political Science Assn., Simeon Eben Baldwin, nearly rivaled him.

Baldwin was chief justice of the Connecticut supreme court for 17 years, state governor for four years, and Connecticut's favorite-son candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912 until he withdrew in favor of Wilson.[9]

They were among the few founders who succeeded at elective politics. Charles Merriam was an elected Chicago city alderman, but lost a celebrated mayoralty race, Fairlie was an alderman in Urbana, and Andrew D. White was elected to the New York State Senate. Fairlie was also a delegate to the Republican convention in Michigan and White was a delegate to two Republican national conventions. Dwight was elected to the New York State constitutional convention and Stimson was elected to several state and national Democratic conventions from Massachusetts. Others active in elective politics included Clark, Macy, Seligman, and Shaw.

The founders were more successful at being appointed to office than at winning elections. At least 31 of them were named to various governmental positions of all sorts at all levels.

8. The politics of the founders tended to take a strongly reformist bent.

Many of the early political scientists seem to have been thoroughly caught up in all aspects of the political, economic, and social reform movement that swept the country in the decades at the turn of the century. Incomplete information indicates that at least thirty of the 48 were involved significantly in one or more formal reform activities. Some of them played important roles in several different areas. A partial tabulation of political, governmental and

social reform movements in which they were involved produces the following list:

Education -- Baldwin, Burgess, Finley, Goodnow, Macy, Robinson, White, Wilson

Legal -- Baldwin, Rowe, Stimson, Wilson

Taxation -- Baldwin, Seligman

Prison -- Baldwin, Dwight

International Law or organization -- Baldwin, J. B. Moore, Rowe, Shaw, White, Wilson

Anti-trust -- Clark, Durand, Jenks, Shaw, Strong, Wilson

Peace -- Clark, J. B. Moore

Municipal government -- Dwight, Fairlie, Goodnow, Merriam, Seligman, Shaw, White, Whitridge

Social Welfare -- Dwight, Finley, Goodnow, Latane, Mayo-Smith, Seligman, Strong

State government administration -- Fairlie, Howe, Wilson

National government administration and civil service -- Goodnow, White, Wilson

Administrative law -- Goodnow

Constitutional -- Dwight, Fairlie

Banking or Currency -- Jenks, Seligman, Wilson

Immigration -- Jenks, Shaw, Strong

Transportation regulation -- Knapp, Seligman

Foreign policy -- Latane, J.B. Moore, Reinsch, Rowe, Shaw, Wilson

Public archives administration -- Osgood

Political -- Mayo-Smith, Merriam

Census--Mayo-Smith

Electoral--Merriam, Wilson

Planning--Merriam, Whitten

Public library administration--Putnam

Labor legislation--Seager, Seligman, Shaw, Stimson, Wilson

Conservation--Seligman, Shaw

Race relations--Seligman

Agricultural--Shaw

Indian rights--Stimson

Tariff--Wilson

9. Some of the founders expressed quite directly their belief in the desirability of using political science for reformist political ends. One of the more interesting of them appears in the obituary for Clifford Bateman, one of Burgess's protegés at Columbia, who died at the age of 29. It included the statement, "At a time when thinking men are beginning to perceive that our methods of administration are no longer adequate to the task imposed upon our national, state, and local governments, the importance of the work in which Professor Bateman was engaged can hardly be overestimated".[10]

An especially significant case, of course, is that of Burgess himself. In his memoirs, he wrote about a night of sentinel duty after an all day skirmish by his Union Army unit during the Civil War. It deserves quotation in full:

> It was still raining in torrents; the lightning shot its wicked tongues athwart the inky sky, and the thunder rolled and reverberated like salvos of heavy artillery through the

> heavens. With this din and uproar of nature were mingled the cries of wounded and dying animals and the shrieks and groans of wounded and dying men. It was a night of terror to the most hardened soldiers. To one so young and sensitive as myself it was awful beyond description, and it has been a hideous nightmare in my memory to this day [70 years later!]. It was, however, in the midst of this frightful experience that the first suggestion of my life's work came to me. As I strained my eyes to peer into the darkness and my ears to perceive the first sounds of an approaching enemy, I found myself murmuring to myself: "Is it not possible for man, a being of reason, created in the image of God, to solve the problems of his existence by the power of reason and without recourse to the destructive means of physical violence?" And I then registered the vow in heaven that if a kind Providence would deliver me alive from the perils of the existing war, I would devote my life to teaching men to live by reason and compromise instead of by bloodshed and destruction.[11]

Thus, the seed for the political science profession was planted on the bloody battlefields of the American Civil War. Nor was Burgess the only pioneer political scientist to have been influenced deeply by Civil War experiences. Woodrow Wilson was a boy of eight when Sherman's army marched past his hometown in Georgia. Macy, a Quaker, served in the Union Army in non-combatant duty and as a result of that experience "resolved to devote himself to the political reconstruction of his country" (DAB).

Several of the founders expressed directly their commitment to

using political science for political reform purposes:

Macy (who did not participate actively in reform movements)--believed that it was "his duty to use every endeavor toward the attainment of a more righteous order in the state and in society" and that the scientific spirit and method which had accomplished so much in science "would be even more benificent when applied to political science".--DAB

Merriam--Science was the servant of democratic politics, never its master.--DAB.

Robinson--Was committed to using teaching "to bring about great change in human control of the human environment" (DAB)

Seager--In all these varied activities he had one purpose: to better social conditions within the framework of *laissez-faire*--DAB.

Stimson--Most of Stimson's...legal writing, celebrated the values of an earlier America. He sought...to maintain, in an industrialized and heterogeneous nation, the values and perspectives of an aristocrat reared in the 'true democracy' of the New England town.--DAB.

III. Conclusions

Any conclusions based upon the information and analysis presented above necessarily simplifies greatly. Nevertheless, some interesting generalizations seem justified. Political science seems to have emerged as a profession in order to serve as a reform tool in the hands of American men whose ancestry was rooted deeply in the earliest New England settlements; who were imbued with the Calvinist doctrine of "good works"; who came from comfortable, middle-class families; and whose lives had been marked by the disruption of the Civil War and

the demographic, social, geographic, political, and economic transformation of America that followed.

They were neither conservatives nor revolutionaries. In a very real and ironic sense, they were reactionary reformers. They had little truck with such "un-American" doctrines as Marxism, but neither did they welcome the rampant capitalism that seemed to be the engine of change. They seem to have seen government as a means to curb the excesses of the Gilded Age and to retain and restore as much as possible of the America of their youth and of their ancestors. They strove to take the modernism of the movements that were "making a mess" of their America, especially their scientific approach, and to use it to thwart them.

They were heavily influenced by the political reform movements of that period, especially Populism and Progressivism, and, in turn, exerted considerable sway over them. In that sense, the American political context of the period from about 1875 until the Administration of President Theodore Roosevelt (one of the first products of the American political science profession) certainly had great impact upon the early political science discipline.

FOOTNOTES

1. Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1967, 220 pp., p. 8.

2. John W. Burgess, *Reminiscences of an American Scholar: The Beginnings of Columbia University*, Columbia U. P., New York, 1934, 430 pp., pp. 195, 225, 244 (reprint ed. AMS Press, New York, 1966).

3. Herbert L. Osgood, "The American Political Science Association", *Political Science Quarterly*, 1904, p. 109.

4. *Ibid.*,p. 110.

5. These figures total 51 because Mayo-Smith and White were Congregational by background, but Episcopalian by practice, and Macy was reared a Quaker but converted to Congregational.

6. Including one person (H. L. Moore) descended from English settlers in Virginia before 1635.

7. Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-194. The influence of the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques* on early American political science deserves closer study. The *Ecole* was designed to train high civil servants. The French political science profession remains centered on the successors to the *Ecole* in that mission, the *Instituts des sciences politiques*. This contrasts to the general, liberal arts orientation that has characterized American political science throughout its history.

8. The total exceeds 100 percent because some of the fathers pursued more than one occupation.

9. Burgess wrote of another early political science student, a member of the first class at Columbia's School of Political Science, who missed his chance to be among the founders of the profession: "The boy fascinated me from the first, and I marked him for a future colleague. But it was not to be so. He was destined for greater

things. He was taking part in practical politics during the first year of his studies at Columbia, and at the beginning of the second year he was elected a member of the legislature of New York." The "boy" was Theodore Roosevelt. *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

10. *New York Times*, February 7, 1883, p. 5. The obituary appears to have been written by Burgess.

11. *Op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

8/10/87

APPENDIX

Biographical Notes
Principal Founders of the American Political Science Profession

(Compiled from Dictionary of American Biography, National Cyclopedia of American Biography, and Who Was Who in America)

This list includes 1) the members of the faculty of the Columbia University School of Political Science, 1880-1906, (indicated by / in the left margin); 2) the members of the editorial board of Political Science Quarterly, 1886-1903, as published in the PSQ (*); 2) the members of the exploratory committee of 1902-03 that recommended establishment of the American Political Science Assn. (#) and 3) the members of the first executive council of the APSA (+) as listed in W. W. Willoughby, "The American Political Science Association", Political Science Quarterly, 1904, pp. 107-111; 4) the original editorial board of the American Political Science Review (=); and 5) the authors of pre-1880 textbooks mentioned in Somit and Tanenhaus, Development... (-). Those men for whom no information is given were not mentioned in either of the reference sources consulted. Unless otherwise indicated, all material was drawn from DAB, NCAB, and Who Was Who.

*1. Archibald Alexander, ca. 1853-1890s, philosopher--from "well-known family of scholars and teachers"; studied Princeton, Germany, Austria; taught Columbia U. 1878-89 (Burgess 215, Butler 67, 160) probably Presbyterian

*2. George Hall Baker, 4/23/50-?, librarian, Columbia U.--b. Ashfield, Mass; studied in Germany 1874-77; lectured in School of Political Science on biblio

#+3. Simeon Eben Baldwin, 2/5/40-1/30/27, jurist, governor--b. New Haven; father was US Sen and Gov, grandfather was MC and state sup ct just, great grandfather signed Dec of Indep & Const assoc justice and chief justice Conn Sup Ct 17 yrs; gov 4 yrs; a founder and later pres of ABA; on faculty of Yale Law School 1869-1919; Republican; old "Independent" opposed to Blaine in 1884; Dem cand for Gov 1910, pres. 1912, US Sen 1915; pres Amer Soc Sci Assn 1897, Internatl Law Assn 1899, AHA 1905, others; apptd to many commissions, etc.; Yankee family 1640; Congregational moderator

/*4. Clifford Bateman, ca. 1853-2/6/1883, political scientist; b. Ill.; father studied for ministry, active in Republican politics, elected State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Pres Knox College; studied Amherst, Columbia Law, Germany, Ecole libre des sciences politiques; specialist in science of administration; Republican; Presbyterian (NYT 2/7/83)

/*5. John William Burgess, 8/26/44-1/13/31, historian--b. rural Tenn.; father was plantation owner; displaced from Tenn to NY; family of unionist slave owners; fled Tenn 1862, served in Union army; law degree; studied in Germany; impressed by Ecole libre des science politiques; feared tyranny of the masses, opposed increased govt powers; govt protects order and liberty; nationalist, germanophile: impressed by Civil War of futility of armed conflict; took scientistic approach to study of politics; in 1863 "amid the horrors of nature and of war, I first resolved to consecrate my life's work

to substituting the reign of reason for the rule of force" (Burgess 197); apparently no participation in public affairs, except public opposition to the League of Nations; old Yankee family 1630; Presbyterian (Burgess 16)

/*6. John Bates Clark, 1/26/47-3/21/38, economist--b. Providence; father was manufacturer of machinery; mother was cousin of Colfax and granddaughter of one of Wash's gens; studied Germany, Switzerland; tried to apply principles of physics to pol economy; pres AEA 1893-95; a founder of AEA; critic of laissez faire economics; Christian socialist; organized professors to support Cleveland 1892; urged anti-trust laws; pacifist; directed Carnegie Endowment for Internatl Peace project; old Yankee family; both grandfathers clergy (Congregational?)

/*7. William Archibald Dunning, 5/12/57-8/25/22, historian, educator--b. Plainfield, N. J.; father was manufacturer; studied Germany; Columbia BA 1881, MA 1884, PhD 1885; a founder of AHA, pres 1913; rewrote history of Reconstruction; stressed scholarly detachment; great-grandson of Scottish immigrants 1785; Presbyterian?

#8. Edward Dana Durand, 10/18/71-?, statistician, census director--b. Romeo, Mich.; father was a farmer; displaced Mich to SD 1882; official in census office, corporations office 1903-; French stock 1750; Huguenot?

*9. Theodore William Dwight, 7/18/22-6/29/92, lawyer, educator--b. Hartford; father was physician and merchant; founded and operated law school attached to Columbia U.; mem NYS const conv; Republican; prison reform; NYC municipal reform; vp state board of charities; mem NYS commission of appeals; old Yankee family 1630; Presbyterian

+-10. John Archibald Fairlie, 10/30/72-?, political scientist, educator, author--b. Glasgow; father was druggist; displaced Glasgow to NYC/Fla, orphan at 16; secy NYS Canal Commission, del Mich GOP state convention, apptd various govt commissions, Urbana alderman 6 yrs, municipal reform specialist; old Scottish landed family; Presbyterian

#11. John Huston Finley, 10/19/63-3/7/40, journalist, educator, editor, author--b. rural Ill.; father was farmer; ed State Charities Record, State Charities Review, Harper's Weekly, World's Work; prof pol Princeton; pres CCNY; NYS Comm of Educ; assoc ed ed-in-chief NYT; worked with many charitable assns; Scots-Irish 1734; Presbyterian

/*12. Franklin Henry Giddings, 3/23/55-6/11/31, sociologist, educator--b. Sherman, Conn.; father Congregational clergyman; newspaper editor; introduced scientific methods to sociology; Spencerian; Democrat; a founder and Annals editor 1890-94; AEA publs ed 1891-93; 1st US "prof of sociology"; no European study; old Yankee family 1635; Congregationalist

/*+-13. Frank Johnson Goodnow, 1/18/59-11/15/39, pol scientist, univ pres.--b. Brooklyn; father was a manufacturer; studied Ecole libre des sciences politiques and Berlin; many govt appmts on reform matters, esp. municipal and administrative law; helped draft Chinese const; prime mover in founding APSA; close friend of Taft; Republican; old Yankee family 1638; Congregationalist

#14. William Wirt Howe, 11/24/33-3/17/09, jurist, soldier--b. Canandaigua; father was school principal; apptd judge, dist atty by GOP pres; municipal, civil service reformer; ABA pres 1897; Episcopalian; old Yankee family 1630

+15. C. H. Huberich, 2/18/77-6/18/45, lawyer--b. Toledo; studied in Germany; taught PLS and law, 1900-05, law thereafter

#16. Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, 9/2/56-8/24/29, economist, educator, author--b. St. Clair, Mich.; ancestors had been manufacturers; Halle PhD; trust buster; apptd various govt commissions; teaching inspired "to active efforts for civic usefulness"; "His public service as expert adviser to various legis and exec bodies has probably exceeded that of any other living economist" NCAB; main interest was practical application of econ theories to the solution of current political problems; 1st Amer economist of academic tng and connections to devote a large part of his life to service on govt bds and commissions; old Yankee family 1629

#+17. Harry Pratt Judson, 12/20/49-3/4/27, political scientist, educator--b. Jamestown, N.Y.; apptd to various govt commissions; 1st dean and pls chmn UChi; exec cttee League to Enforce Peace; devout Baptist; old Yankee family soon after 1630

#18. Martin Augustine Knapp, 11/6/43-2/10/23, jurist--b. rural NY; father was farmer; ICC mem 19 yrs; judicial apptmts; no acad apptmts; Republican

-19. John Holladay Latané, 4/1/69-1/1/32, historian, educator--b. Staunton, Va.; father was reformed Episcopal bishop; study of HST was means to solve present problems or plot future courses; advocate for League of Nations; anti-child labor; various govt apptmts; APSR ed 1906-12; "a fighting liberal"; Presbyterian elder; Huguenot family 1701

+20. Jesse Macy, 6/21/42-11/3/19, political scientist, philosopher, educator--b. rural Ind.; father was farmer; family in Underground rr; after Civil War service, "resolved to devote himself to the political reconstruction of his country" DAB, esp through application of scientific method to PLS; 3 sojourns in Europe for graduate study; active in local politics, polemical reformist writing; pioneer in civic education in schools advocated League of Nations; old Yankee family 1635; devoutly Quaker family since 1675, he became Congregationalist in 1870

/*21. Richmond Mayo-Smith, 2/9/54-11/11/01, statistician, economist--b. Troy, O.; father was railway car mfr.; studied in Germany; introduced scientific study of statistics to US; a founder of AEA; wrote "one of the first systematic applications of statistics to social problems" NCAB; led drive for permanent census bureau; preferred articles for PSQ "that had relation to existing problems"; Democrat; old Yankee family "some years before" 1641; Episcopalian from 9 generations of Puritans

-22. Charles Edward Merriam Jr., 11/15/74-1/8/53, political scientist--b. Hopkinton, Ia.; father was merchant, politician, postmaster; family prominent in Republican politics; studied in Germany, Paris; 1st political scientist at UChi; a founder of APSA; heavily involved in Chi reform politics; elected alderman, mayoral cand; various important apptmts to govt admin jobs at natl

level; saw science as servant of democratic politics; Republican/Progressive; Scottish Covenanters

*23. Henry Ludwell Moore, 11/21/69-4/28/58, economist--b. Moore's Rest, Md.; founder of econometrics; studied in London; attempted to make economics more scientific in order to apply it better to actual affairs; "a growing liaison between econ theory and the known facts of concrete econ happenings" NCAB; old Virginia family 1635

/*24. John Bassett Moore, 12/3/60-11/12/47, jurist, diplomat--b. Smyrna, Del.; father was physician and state legis; clerk in State Dept; combined public diplomatic service with acad career; nominal Democrat, but more influential under McKinley, TR, & Taft than Wilson; leader in peace organizations; 1st Amer on World Court; family in Delaware before the Rev

+25. Bernard Moses, 8/27/46-3/4/30, pol scientist, historian, educator--b. Burlington, Conn.; studied in Germany and Sweden; apptd to various govt commissions; old Yankee family 1631;

#26. Charles Willis Needham, 9/30/48-?, lawyer, university president--b. rural NY; father was farmer; apptd as govt del to various intl confs; old Yankee family 1652

/*27. Herbert Levi Osgood, 4/9/55-9/11/18, historian--b. rural Me.; father was farmer; studied in Germany; strove to apply tools of scientific method to study of American colonial history; "chiefly responsible for reforming the archival administration" of NYS, otherwise no public service; old Yankee family 1638

+28. (George) Herbert Putnam, 9/20/61-8/14/55, librarian, lawyer--b. NYC; father book publisher; 40 yrs head of Lib of Cong; US del to various confs; old Yankee family before 1641; probably Congregational

#+=29. Paul Samuel Reinsch, 6/10/69-1/24/23, pol scientist, economist, diplomat--b. Milwaukee; father was govt official in Milwaukee for many yrs; studied in Berlin, Rome, Paris; apptd to various diplomatic missions; adviser to Chinese govt; 1st vp of APSA; opposed imperialism; father came from Germany 1860; father Lutheran clergyman

/*30. James Harvey Robinson, 6/29/63-2/16/36, historian--b. Bloomington, Ill.; father was banker; studied in Germany, Freiburg PhD; committed to using teaching "to bring about great change in human control of the human environment"; advocated social science approach to history; politically liberal; leaned toward "cultural engineering"; conceived of New School Mayflower descendant; agnostic, but probably reared as Congregationalist

#+31. Leo Stanton Rowe, 9/17/71-12/5/46, pol scientist, dipl, pub. official--b. McGregor, Ia.; father was prosperous merchant; Halle PhD; interested in municipal reform and international law; apptd to various diplomatic missions; son of German immigrants; Lutheran?

+32. William August Schaper, 4/17/69-?, univ. prof.--b. La Crosse, Wisc., studied Berlin; taught PLS, finance; specialist on tax systems

*32. Henry Rogers Seager, 7/21/70-8/23/30, economist--b. Lansing, Mich.; father was atty.; studied in Germany and Austria; apptd to various govt posts in labor relations; "actively interested in the reform movements of the day" NCAB; "in all these varied activities he had one purpose: to better social conditions within the framework of laisez-faire" DAB; Methodist?

/*33. Edwin Robert Alexander Seligman, 4/25/61-7/18/39, economist--b. NYC; father was wealthy banker and railroad developer; studied in Germany, Geneva, and Paris, incl ELSP; advocated tax reform, ICC, Fed, housing, race relations, labor conditions, academic freedom; co-founder of AEA active in NYC and NYS politics as reformer and conservationist; German Jewish family 1837

-34. Benjamin F. Shambaugh, 1/29/71-4/7/40, political scientist, univ prof--b. Elvira, Ia.; entire career teaching PLS U Iowa, specializing on Iowa politics & govt

+36. Albert Shaw, 7/23/57-6/25/47, journalist, reformer, author--b. Paddy's Run, O.; father was physician and GOP politician; study tour of European cities; municipal reform activist; rural education improvement; League of Nations advocate; founder-owner Review of Reviews; pol ally of TR; Republican, then Progressive; old Yankee family 1630s; Congregationalist

/37. William R. Shepherd 6/12/71-6/7/34, historian--studied Columbia; rep US govt on missions in Hispanic America /

/*38. William Milligan Sloane, 11/12/50-9/11/28, historian, educator--b. Richmond, O.; father was Presbyterian clergyman, educator, and theologian; Leipzig PhD; helped revive Olympic games; grandson of Scottish Covenanter immigrant

/*39. Edmund Munroe Smith, 12/8/54-?, lawyer, educator, author--b. Brooklyn; Göttingen JUD; me PSQ; old Yankee family before 1675

#40. Frederic Jesup Stimson, 7/20/55-11/19/43, lawyer, diplomat, author--b. NYC or Dubuque; father was physician, banker, and railroad president; anti-Progressive reformer; "sought..to maintain, in an industrialized and heterogeneous nation, the values and perspectives of an aristocrat reared in the 'true democracy' of the New England town; worked for Indian rights, anti-imperialism, anti-trust, labor law reform, anti-big government; delegate to GOP convention, asst atty gen Mass, ambassador; novelist; chmn Mass Dem conv 2x, del natl Dem conv Republican, then Mugwump, then Gold Democrat; old Yankee family 1635; Episcopalian

#41. Josiah Strong, 1/19/47-4/28/16, clergyman, social reformer, author--b. Naperville, Ill.; sought "to awaken the churches to a recognition of their social responsibility and to unite them in common labors for the common good"; best-selling pamphleteer; old Yankee family 1630; Congregationalist clergyman

-42. Eugene Wambaugh, 2/29/56-8/6/40, lawyer--b. rural O.; father a clergyman; apptd various govt commissions; intl law specialist

#43. Max West, 11/11/70-?/?/09, economist--b. St. Cloud, Minn.; father army capt., various prof govt apptmts

+44. Andrew Dickson White, 11/7/32-11/4/18, historian, univ pres., diplomat--b. Homer, NY; father wealthy banker and businessman; grandfather was assemblyman; studied in Paris, Berlin, attaché in St Petersburg; state senator, wrote NYS educ code, founded Cornell U; apptd to natl govt commissions, diplomat, del natl GOP conv; civil service reformer; 1st AHA pres; international arbitration; abolitionist; municipal and public education reform; endowed "Andrew D. White School of History and Political Science"; TR Republican; old Yankee family before 1650; mother had revolted against Calvinism to become Episcopalian and had converted her husband

*45. Frederick Wallingford Whitridge, 8/9/52-12/30/16, lawyer--b. New Bedford, Mass.; studied at Berlin; municipal civil service reformer; ambassador; TR Republican; old Yankee family 1635

#-46. Robert H. Whitten, 10/9/73-6/6/36, planning consultant--b. South Bend; various apptmts to planning posts

#+-47. Westel Woodbury Willoughby, 7/20/67-3/26/45, political scientist, publicist--b. Alexandria, Va.; father was lawyer and judge; adviser to Chinese govt; 1st ed APSR; reformer of study of pol theory, esp on sovereignty; old Yankee family "early in 17th cent"

+48. Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 12/28/56-2/3/24, political scientist, univ pres.--b. Va.; father was Presbyterian clergyman; lived in South during Civil War; reform Democrat; paternal grandfather emigrated from Scotland 1807, mother immigrated from England 1836; Presbyterian elder

Some other early leading political scientists who are not included in the statistical analysis for this article because they played no official role in the PSQ, APSA, or APSR during the period under review

1. Charles Kendall Adams, 1/24/35-7/26/02, historian, university pres.--displaced from Vermont to Iowa at 21; studied Germany, France, Italy 1867-68; not much on PLS, no political activity; old Yankee family 1635

2. Henry Carter Adams, 12/31/52-8/11/21, economist, statistician--studied in Germany and France; professor and head of stat dept of ICC 1888-1911: defiant abolitionist as u/g; pioneer critic of laissez-faire, a founder of AEA (anti-laissez faire); adviser to Chinese govt; old Yankee family 1628; Congregational

3. Herbert Baxter Adams, 4/16/50-7/30/01, educator, historian, author--studied at Heidelberg; "more of a political scientist than historian"; stressed Germanic influence on American political development; initiated AHA, 1st AHA secy: wrote monographs for U. S. Bur. of Educ.; "pioneer of the new school of scientific historians"; old Yankee family 1634; Presbyterian

4. James Burrill Angell,1/7/29-4/1/16, journalist, college pres., diplomat--

attended Quaker school; grandfather was JP; town mtgs and justice ct. held in his tavern/home; studied 2 yrs in Paris & Munich 1851-52; ed Providence Journal 1860-66, supporting Lincoln; pioneer critic of laissez-faire role of State in educ; min to China under Hayes, Arthur; Repub; other diplomatic missions under Cleveland, McKinley; a founder of AHA; old Yankee family 1631

5. Albert Bushnell Hart, 7/1/54-6/16/43, historian--abolitionist, Free Soil mem.; friend and classmate of TR; Freiburg PhD, Ecole libre des sciences politiques; AHA pres 1909; mem school board, Mass const convention, 1912 GOP convention, helped found Progressive Party, returned to GOP with TR; interested in "Negro advancement"; traditional in historiography; old Yankee family; staunch Congregationalist

6. Francis Lieber, 3/18/00-10/2/72, publicist, educator--b. Berlin; Waterloo; Jena PhD; persecuted in Germany for liberalism; joined Greek revolution; founded Encycl Americana; author of "first systematic works on PLS that appeared in America" DAB; penal reformer; taught U of SC 21 yrs; various apptmts to govt commissions, esp mil law; liberal Episcopalian

7. Abbott Lawrence Lowell, 12/13/56-1/6/43, university pres.--studied in Paris; failed lawyer; elected to Boston School Committee; Essays on govt defended US institutions over Brit; advocate of Progressive policy reforms; campaigned vigorously for League of Nations; advocated use of experts by govt; independent Republican; old Yankee family 1639; Unitarian

8. Theodore Dwight Woolsey, 10/31/01-7/1/89, scholar, university president--studied in Paris, Germany; his book, Political Science, was unscientific, based on theological principles; old Yankee family 1623; trained as Presbyterian minister