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THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 'NEW WORLD ORDER': THE ISSUE OF VERY
SMALL AND MICRO - STATES REVISITED

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the "principle of universality" which should govern international organization in the present era.³

This is in marked contrast to the 1960's, when it was predicted that the last phases of decolonization would lead to an "invasion" of the United Nations by very small states. It was perceived, and noted by many observers that such a development would be detrimental to the organization, since it would "debase the coinage of membership". Many academics and government officials questioned the capability of such entities to fulfil the obligations of membership, and to contribute in a meaningful way to the international forum.⁴ Nonetheless, despite their less than enthusiastic welcome, many very small states were admitted to the United Nations during the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's, to the extent that by 1989, there were 37 states with populations under one million, and 36 with populations between one and five million⁵. In all, they constituted approximately 40% of the total membership. It may be partly due to their role as forerunners, partly due to the exceptional political circumstances currently prevailing in Eastern Europe, and partly due to the concern of many U.N. agencies in recent years to attain or maintain "universality", that an influx of small and very small states into the United Nations is now welcomed.

It is logical to examine the possible implications for the United Nations of its changing membership composition. There is considerable heterogeneity among the small state population, and smallness, by itself, does not constitute a unifying factor. Therefore, rather than a new concentration on the problems of smallness per se, one would expect to see a greater focus on developments in a particular region, where there may be a large number of small states. Initially, this is likely to be the case of Eastern and Central Europe. More generally, however, the United Nations may be faced in the future with various issues arising from its growing small state community. These would include new issues of peace and security, new dimensions of developmental problems and the need for the organization to reconsider its structures and operations, in order to better serve the needs of this constituency.

At present, as the United Nations system approaches its fiftieth anniversary, there is a debate about reform and restructuring, to more accurately reflect international political realities, and to respond more effectively to contemporary global priorities.

³. U.N. Chronicle, June 1992, p.39.

⁴. Examples of such views include E. Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options AEI for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., 1977; others are cited in W. Harris, "Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.9, No.1, 1970, pp.23-53.

⁵. See Appendix B.

states appeared in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific, their common characteristics being their colonial history and varying degrees of underdevelopment. The principle of self-determination, cited in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the U.N. Charter was further elaborated and interpreted in UNGA Resolutions 1514 and 1541 of December 1960. Most ex-colonies chose to exercise their right to self-determination by becoming sovereign states of the international community, and members of the United Nations.

During the 1960's and 1970's, a growing number of small territories with populations under five million began to apply for U.N. membership. The process culminated in the adoption by the United Nations of the category of "microstate", usually defined as having a population of less than one million. Prior to 1950, there had been only two such states in the U.N. system, namely Iceland and Luxembourg. By 1985, they comprised almost 25% of total membership.

This trend of ever smaller territories applying to join the organization was viewed askance by both the Secretary - General U Thant, and by some leading members of the organization.⁷ The United States, in particular, favoured an alternative to full membership for very small territories. As a result of the concerns expressed by the Secretary - General and the United States, the Security Council set up a Committee of Experts, representing all the memberstates on the Council at the time, to report on the issue and make recommendations.

The Committee met on at least six occasions, and submitted a draft report in June 1970.⁸ Discussions had revolved around U.S. and British proposals. The United States had proposed that microstates should be offered associate membership with no voting rights, or the right to hold office in the organization. They would be exempt from paying financial contributions, and would enjoy "appropriate rights of access" to the ECOSOC, regional commissions and other agencies, as well as access to U.N. developmental assistance. Britain presented a somewhat different proposal, under which microstates could have full membership, but would be encouraged to voluntarily renounce certain membership rights, notably voting and holding of office, they would pay a nominal contribution, and would benefit from the U.N. development programmes. Both the British and the American proposals sought to circumvent amendment of the Charter, arguing that such

⁷. See A/7601/Add.1 Introduction to Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization September 1969; A/8001 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization 16th June 1969 - 15th June 1970 Part One, Chapter IV S; A/8401/Add.1 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization September 1971.

⁸. See Yearbook of the United Nations 1970, pp.300-301.

organization. However, there has been an equally strong tendency towards their absorption by larger countries. Small size is often associated with lack of economic viability, heightened vulnerability, and security risks for the international system as a whole.¹⁴ It has sometimes been argued that very small states have correspondingly reduced conceptions of international responsibility. Their inability to defend themselves may draw larger states into conflict over them, thereby posing a threat to international stability. Finally, there was an underlying fear that the admission of very small ex-colonies would act as a Trojan horse for the further fragmentation of states in the international system, leading ultimately to demands for revision of borders and self-determination for minority groups within existing states.

The Record of Small and Microstates' Presence in the United Nations

Much of the debate on microstate entry into the U.N. at that time revolved around organizational and political considerations of the U.N. itself, and of its most powerful memberstates. However, one should also enquire why U.N. membership was so greatly sought after by small states.

In the first place, it was an invaluable official endorsement of their sovereign status. Given their limited defence capabilities, it served to reinforce the notion of their territorial integrity, was seen as a potential deterrent to would-be aggressors, and thus enhanced their security. U.N. membership gave diplomatic access to virtually the entire international community. For small, remote territories, a presence at the U.N. headquarters was the most cost-effective means of establishing and maintaining diplomatic contact with many countries. U.N. membership also constituted the only means of participating in international deliberations, decision-making and norm-setting on global issues like trade and economic development, environmental conservation questions, Law of the Sea and human rights. Moreover, these states gained access to the economic resources that were managed and distributed by the international financial agencies, and they participated directly in the development programmes of the specialized agencies. Such access was especially significant. Small territories had extremely open economies, and were usually highly dependent on foreign trade and external aid flows. Consequently, their foreign policies were heavily oriented towards ensuring their economic survival. Given the predominantly state-centric international system of the 1960's and 1970's, and the limited possibilities for having their interests adequately protected by a larger state, for most small territories there was no alternative to independence and U.N. membership. It represented an essential part of their overall survival strategy.

¹⁴. For an example of this approach, see M. Harden ed., Small is Dangerous: Microstates in a Macro World, Frances Pinter, London, 1985.

main focus of U.N. developmental activity has shifted away from such states.

Nonetheless, small states benefited generally from U.N. developmental facilities and the technical assistance programmes of the specialized agencies, in particular, the programmes of the FAO, the WHO regional offices, and U.N. disaster relief operations. There were some particularly useful initiatives. These include UNCTAD's studies on microstates and the developmental impediments of small size, carried out between 1979 and 1981. As a result of this work, many very small countries were included in the category of Least Developed, Landlocked and Island Developing Countries to which special attention would be paid during the Third Development Decade.¹⁸ UNCTAD also did considerable work on promoting and strengthening regional cooperation as a measure that could offset some of the constraints of small size. Another development that was potentially of great significance for small archipelagic states in particular, was the UNCLOS III treaty's concept of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. It expanded the space over which they could exercise sovereignty, and multiplied their access to economic resources. However, in order to enjoy the benefits, they had to have the means of policing the zones, exploiting the resources, and/or operating licence systems to enable other actors to do so on a legitimate basis.

Some U.N. organs and agencies have modified their organizational structures to accommodate very small members. This has happened in the case of regional commissions like the ECLA, which in the late 1970's, became the ECLAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), and set up sub-regional offices in the Caribbean to facilitate its communication with and services to those more recent memberstates. Similarly, in 1990, UNESCO established a Small States Directorate within the Secretariat. However, this was done during the organization's budgetary difficulties. Consequently, the department has never had the necessary staffing or financial resources to make an impact.

One of the main raisons d'être of the U.N. is the maintenance of peace and security. Undoubtedly, most small states viewed their participation in international organizations and their support for international law as a guarantee of their own security, a way of maintaining a congenial international environment. For a long time, the U.N. was not active in security operations in very small states, with the notable exception of Cyprus, where a U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP), has been stationed since 1964. However, in recent years, as peacekeeping activities have gained a new credence, the U.N. has also been engaged in supervising Namibia's elections and transition to independence in 1989-90,

¹⁸. Unctad Secretariat Ibid. p.119; see reference to UNCTAD's work in P. Hein, "The Study of Microstates", pp.3-13 in J. Kaminarides, L. Briguglio and H. Hoogendonk eds., The Economic Development of Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and Policies, Eburon Pubs., Delft, 1989.

On the other hand, examination of the broad outlines of U.N. priority programmes reveals some that are relevant to the needs and concerns of very small developing countries. The U.N.'s expanded peace and security activities could offer small states additional security guarantees and assist in building domestic stability. In December 1991, the General Assembly specifically requested the U.N. Secretary-General to monitor the security situation in small states, and explore ways of preserving their security. It was felt that the U.N. had a role to play in creating a supportive international environment, in which small states could operate²⁰.

The U.N.'s focus on environmental protection is also of great importance for most tiny states, whose survival depends on the preservation of fragile ecological conditions. Those whose economic base rests on tourism or fishing are extremely vulnerable to the hazards of marine pollution. The very existence of countries like the Maldives is threatened by global warming and rising sea levels. In international fora, small states have drawn attention to the issue of illicit disposal of toxic waste, particularly to attempts to dump consignments in the sea. Depending on the main focus and thrust of international cooperation, microstates may gain a lot from their participation in such programmes.

Another U.N. programmatic focus, closely linked to environmental issues is that of disaster preparedness. The incidence of natural disasters has risen sharply, due largely to environmental factors. The effect of a natural disaster on a microstate is particularly shattering, given its small physical size, limited population and resources. The current U.N. emphasis on strengthening its own coordination capabilities, and on building up national capabilities for prevention, damage limitation and effective local response is therefore very relevant.

There are two other areas which very small states might emphasize in their relations with the international agencies. The first concerns human resource development, a vital consideration for small populations. The main developmental agencies in the U.N. system are now restating the role of the state in human development and the need for public investment in people²¹. This offers an opportunity from which to launch renewed lobbies for

²⁰. An example of the thinking of very small states on the potential security role of the U.N. was evident during the 1991 General Assembly, when the Prime Ministers of Jamaica and Trinidad called for the U.N. to set up an international court to deal with narcotics trafficking. As many small states have become major trans-shipment points in the international drugs trade, this has had a destabilizing effect on their social fabric and security.

²¹. See World Development Report 1991, Oxford University press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington D.C., 1991, pp.4-11.

In the past, the United Nations' definition of self - determination was strictly limited to the acceptable context of decolonization. This was the only framework in which the organization would scrutinize state practice and extend recognition and support to the representatives of peoples seeking self - determination. In all other circumstances, the organization was constrained by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, and non-violation of the national unity and territorial integrity of countries ²⁵. Within the U.N. human rights machinery, the issues of minority rights and protection of minorities received muted attention, due to member states' reluctance to give the organization much leeway in such sensitive matters.

In the present international context, the principle of sovereignty seems to be increasingly open to questioning, erosion and gradual modification. The collapse of central authority and state fragmentation is one of the major causes of international instability today. Sovereignty is under threat from many other directions, as evidenced by processes of economic globalization, and the emergence and acceptance of non-state and substate actors at all levels of international relations.

The United Nations is already contributing to this transformation through its emphasis on the global management of issue areas, and the growing web of international legislation which transcends or challenges national jurisdiction. There is a new emphasis on its role in setting and monitoring the observance of international human rights norms. Finally, the U.N.'s most recent peace and security operations in Iraq, Cambodia and Somalia all contain strong elements of humanitarian intervention, which challenge traditional notions of national sovereignty.*

In this changing environment, the United Nations is faced with the issue of self - determination in two ways. On the one hand, it is conducting the last phases of the trusteeship and decolonization process, which involve 18 groups of small, oceanic islands. The Trusteeship Council has almost completely discharged its mandate, save for the Pacific Trust Territory of Palau, where the island's future status is still being decided. The U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization continues to meet, receive reports on the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories, and monitor their development and progress towards self-government.

In the other cases where self - determination may become an issue, the role of the United Nations is not as clearcut. These may well result from long, separatist struggles and considerable weakening of the central state authority. The U.N.'s involvement in such separatist conflicts would depend on a number of extenuating circumstances, including the scale, intensity and strategic location of the conflict, the positions adopted by the major powers and by regional states, and the stances of the various parties involved.

²⁵. Art. 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.

participation in international affairs by substate entities, such as provincial governments. The spread of such "constituent" or "para-diplomacy" is being increasingly documented by International Relations scholars, who view it as a logical consequence of processes of globalization and economic interdependence. International activity by subnational entities is particularly intense in the spheres of economic, social and cultural diplomacy. Most examples currently cited are drawn from Western industrialized states, and reflect their forms of government and economic organization²⁹. It is argued, however, that the process will continue to grow and coexist along with inter-state diplomacy.

Such arrangements are only workable if there is a national consensus on granting legislative and executive autonomy to substate entities, and on extending this autonomy to include their participation in particular areas of international affairs. The case can be made that, far from undermining or subverting the state, greater autonomy to the constituent parts can forestall separatist tendencies and present a more flexible option for domestic and international self - determination.

Federalism and the granting of international powers to substate entities are primarily national prerogatives. What role, if any, could international organization, and specifically the United Nations, play in encouraging such processes as forms of self - determination? The U.N.'s role lies principally in the creation of a favourable international environment, in which respect for human rights, democratic institutions and the protection of minorities are more strongly advocated and observed. This is already the direction in which the U.N. human rights machinery and development policies appear to be moving. Increasingly, U.N. peace and security operations entail not only peacekeeping and humanitarian programmes, but the supervision of elections, the promotion of the rule of law and civilian administration, and monitoring national authorities' compliance with human rights norms. In the future, there may be the need for an organ with similar functions to those of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Over the years, it has held annual consultations on Non-Self-Governing Territories, and reported to the General Assembly. It has monitored the activities of administering powers, sending fact-finding missions and conducting plebiscites to determine the wishes of populations. It has ensured that the services of the specialized agencies reached dependent territories, and has pressured their administrations on the issue of the sovereignty of the territories over their own natural resources. For increased international surveillance of conditions in territories which are ethnically or regionally distinct, and

²⁹. See I. Duchacek, "Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations", in H. Michelmann and P. Soldatos eds. Federalism and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp.1-33. He lists the United States, Canadian provinces, the German and Austrian Lander, Swiss cantons, Belgian communities and Spanish regions.

the recognition needed to enable them to participate in international political, social and economic affairs, without the trappings of statehood. To a large extent, this depends on arrangements made and agreements reached at the national level, within the domestic political process. However, the United Nations can influence the formation of conducive international conditions, through fostering national reconciliation in its peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building operations, through the international protection of human rights, through support for equitable processes of national development, and through its policies towards the participation of non-state and sub-state actors in international consultations.

Box A.1 Basic indicators for economies with populations of less than 1 million

		GNP per capita ^a					Life expectancy at birth (years) 1990	Adult illiteracy (percent)		
		Population (thousands) mid-1990	Area (thousands of square kilometers)	Dollars 1990	Average annual growth rate (percent) 1965-90	Average annual rate of inflation ^a (percent)		Female 1990	Total 1990	
						1965-80				1980-90
1	Guinea-Bissau	980	36	180	54.4	39	76	64
2	The Gambia	875	11	260	0.7	8.1	13.8	44	84	73
3	Guyana	798	215	330	-1.3	7.9	25.5	64	5	4
4	Equatorial Guinea	417	28	330	47	63	50
5	São Tomé and Príncipe	117	1	400	19.9	67	..	33
6	Maldives	214	b	450	2.8	62
7	Comoros	475	2	480	0.4	55
8	Solomon Islands	316	29	590	..	7.7	10.0	65
9	Western Samoa	165	3	730	9.2	66
10	Kiribati	70	1	760	5.5	55
11	Swaziland	797	17	810	2.2	9.0	11.1	57
12	Cape Verde	371	4	890	9.8	66
13	Tonga	99	1	1,010	67
14	Vanuatu	151	12	1,100	4.9	65
15	St. Vincent	107	b	1,720	2.9	10.9	4.6	70
16	Fiji	744	18	1,780	1.9	10.3	5.4	65
17	St. Lucia	150	1	1,900	4.2	72
18	Belize	188	23	1,990	2.6	7.1	2.3	68
19	Grenada	91	b	2,190	70
20	Dominica	72	1	2,210	1.3	12.6	6.1	75
21	Suriname	447	163	3,050	1.0	..	6.4	68	5	5
22	St. Kitts and Nevis	40	b	3,330	6.5	70
23	Antigua and Barbuda	79	b	4,600	7.8	74
24	Seychelles	68	b	4,670	3.2	12.2	3.3	71
25	Barbados	257	b	6,540	2.3	11.0	5.4	75
26	Malta	354	b	6,610	7.1	3.5	2.0	73
27	Cyprus	702	9	8,020	5.7	77
28	The Bahamas	255	14	11,420	1.1	6.4	6.0	69
29	Qatar	439	11	15,860	70
30	Iceland	255	103	21,400	3.4	26.7	32.8	78
31	Luxembourg	379	3	28,730	2.3	6.7	4.2	75
32	American Samoa	39	b	c	72
33	Andorra	52	..	c
34	Aruba	61	b	d
35	Bahrain	503	1	c	-1.5	69	31	23
36	Bermuda	61	b	c	..	8.1	9.1
37	Brunei	256	6	c	-6.9	76
38	Channel Islands	144	..	c	77
39	Djibouti	427	23	e	48
40	Faeroe Islands	48	1	c
41	Fed. Sts. of Micronesia	103	1
42	French Guiana	92	90	d
43	French Polynesia	197	4	c	73
44	Gibraltar	31	b	d
45	Greenland	57	342	c
46	Guadeloupe	387	2	c	74
47	Guam	137	1	c	73
48	Isle of Man	69	..	c
49	Macao	459	b	d	72
50	Marshall Islands	34	0
51	Martinique	360	1	d	76
52	Mayotte	73	..	c
53	Netherlands Antilles	189	1	c	77
54	New Caledonia	165	19	d	69
55	Puerto Rico ^f	3530	9	c	76
56	Reunion	593	3	d	72
57	Virgin Islands (U.S.)	110	b	c	2.9	2.3	3.9	74

Note: Economies in italics are those for which 1990 GNP per capita cannot be calculated; figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. See the technical note for Table I. b. Less than 500 square kilometers. c. GNP per capita estimated to be in the high-income range. d. GNP per capita estimated to be in the upper-middle-income range. e. GNP per capita estimated to be in the lower-middle-income range. f. Population is more than 1 million.

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**How Political Culture
Affects the Political Agenda:
An Emphasis on the Minds of the Voters**

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"To say that political culture is important is not very informative; to say what aspects of political culture are determinants of what phenomena - what the significant political beliefs are, and how they are related to other aspects of politics - may be very important."

Sidney Verba

1. Introduction

Since the origination of the concept of political culture in Gabriel Almonds's essay "Comparative Political Systems" (1956), political scientists have been presented with a multitude of definitions, usages and functions for political culture (Lane, 1992:362). However, the definitional and methodological difficulties do not outweigh the advantages acquired in using the concept for political inquiry. As Ronald Inglehart states, "different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; ... these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and ... they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions" (1988:1203). But what does political culture mean? What are the characteristics which can define different groups, societies or nations? What is the connection between political culture and the political agenda? And finally, what process of change exists within political culture?

2. Problems with the Political Culture Concept

To use the concept of political culture to illuminate political consequences, one must provide a clear definition of the term as well as a proper methodology for research. This is no easy task. As discussed at a European Consortium for Political Research workshop in 1987, it was concluded that there is little agreement on the language and methods to be used for political culture study. The range of possible definitions includes: a) psychological accounts - emphasizing the individual's orientations, b) sociological accounts - including both

the individual's orientations and behavior to enact the orientations, c) objective definitions for culture in terms of consensual or dominant values, and d) heuristic definitions which provide ideal type constructs to explain partial phenomena (Gibbons, 1987:2-3). Agreeing with Gibbon's conclusions, Lane wrote in October 1992, "A major difficulty in achieving a clear overview of the field of political culture has been the fundamental failure to settle on an operational definition of the internal structure of political culture, that is, of the variables of which it is composed" (1992:363).

The methodological problems are just as vast and stem from the confusion over definition. Because political culture is a concept attributed to a collectivity, "it has required macrolevel theory and analysis to make it operational" (Gibbons, 1987:6). However, the relation between the macrolevel and the microlevel has not been clearly specified. Should mass surveys (to find dominant values) or in-depth interviews (to study psychological aspects) be used? And is it possible to apply the concept to whole nations? According to Bill and Hardgrave (1973), this practice has forced researchers into overly abstract conceptualizations and has thus weakened the explanatory power of the political culture concept (Lane, 1992:362). In addition, identifying, measuring and correlating the characteristics of political culture remains problematic. "What are the relations between culture and political culture, how can we determine the relationships between structure, behavior and culture...?" (Gibbons, 1987:6). On the one hand, political structures are seen as reflecting political culture, and on the other, they are seen as "givens", shaping the political culture (Pateman, 1971:292). Precise answers to these questions are not available in a methodological guide to the study of political culture. Political culture will fulfill its promise as a method for political inquiry "only if a determined effort is made to stop using political culture as a handy residual variable to explain phenomena we cannot think of other ways to deal with" (Lane, 1992:364).

3. Clarifying the Political Culture Concept

Various definitions and methodological approaches have been suggested in political culture literature over the years. After reviewing a few of the landmark works in the field, as well as some recent contributions, an attempt will be made to synthesize these ideas into a usable framework for defining and analyzing political culture.

Beginning with Almond & Verba's (1963) classic, *The Civic Culture*, we are introduced to the definition of political culture as cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations to

political phenomena which were distributed among national populations or subgroups. This definition was used to analyze the cultural properties associated with democratic stability in five countries based on survey data. The study primarily emphasized psychological aspects; political knowledge and skills, feelings and value orientations toward political processes - toward the political system as a whole, toward the individual as participant and toward political parties and elections (Almond & Verba, 1980:27).

Two years later, Pye and Verba's *Political Culture and Political Development*, continued in the Almond tradition of "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political actions" (Pye & Verba, 1965:7). In this text, the characteristic of "controlling guidelines" is added to the definition along with shared values. Pye wrote, "For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behavior, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic structure of values and rational consideration which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations" (ibid:7). Thus in combination, political culture is a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values defining the situation in which political action takes place (ibid:8). This definition moved beyond the psychological aspects presented in *The Civic Culture*, and placed more emphasis on the sociological aspects. Covering ten countries, as diverse as Ethiopia and Japan, the study classified political cultures according to four themes: 1) trust and distrust, 2) hierarchy and equality, 3) liberty and coercion, and 4) level of loyalty and commitment in parochial versus national identification (ibid:22-23).

Moving forward to the 1970's and 1980's, Pateman as well as Eckstein seem to continue with the idea of political culture as a pattern of orientations based on cognition, feelings and values, and they combine the psychological and sociological aspects. Pateman refers to Dawson and Prewitt's *Political Socialization* which states, "Political culture, conceptualized roughly, is the pattern of distribution of orientations members of a political community have towards politics" (1969:27). Orientations are understood to mean the various ways in which individuals view politics: the perceptions (cognition, knowledge), the affects (feelings and attitudes) and the evaluations (values and norms). Thus for Pateman, an investigation of political culture will include these three aspects of the citizen's relationship to politics (Pateman, 1971:293).

Eckstein's view in his article *A Culturalist Theory of Political Change* (1988) upholds the concept of political culture as orientations. "The touchstone of culturalist theory is the postulate of oriented action: actors do not respond directly to 'situations' but respond to them through mediating 'orientations' (Eckstein, 1988:790). He also follows the convention of

orientations having three components: "cognitive elements that...decode experiences (give it meaning); affective elements that invest cognition with feelings that 'move' actors to act; and evaluative elements that provide goals toward which actors are moved to act" (ibid:791).

Differing dramatically from the other works presented here, Elkins and Simeon postulate that culture does not explain the particular choices which individuals make (Elkins & Simeon, 1979). They do not accept the idea of a pattern of orientations, but rather, introduce the concept of political culture as defining "the range of acceptable possible alternatives from which groups or individuals may ... choose a course of action" (ibid:131). Choices are explained by factors other than culture, and these include personality, role, and self-interest among others. Thus, these authors break from the view that culture can be described in terms of behavior patterns, feelings or values. Instead, they suggest the following four assumptions which narrow the range of alternatives from which choices are made: 1) Assumptions as to what are the principal goals in life, 2) Assumptions as to who belongs to one's political community and what are the obligations to that community, 3) Assumptions as to what types of events or institutions are deemed political as opposed to economic or social, and 4) Assumptions about others in regards to their trustworthiness, sense of public responsibility and how to relate in society (ibid:132). However, it is interesting to note that Elkins and Simeon ignore the connection between their "assumptions" and "orientations" as discussed by other authors. Elkins and Simeon do not address the issue of where the assumptions originate. How can an individual determine "principal goals in life" if he does not have values and motivations? How can he make assumptions about membership and obligation in a political community if he does not have any feelings? And what role does cognition have in the formation of these assumptions? These questions are left unanswered, and as a result, Elkins and Simeon's concept of political culture as a range of alternatives based on assumptions is too unclear for inclusion in Figure One.

The last two authors to be reviewed, Wildavsky (1989) and Lane (1992) share many of the defining characteristics of political culture, and in addition introduce an element of "cultural rationality" (Lane, 1992). Wildavsky's cultural theory is based on preference formation. Preferences derive from the human activity of living with each other. "Support for and opposition to different ways of life, the shared values legitimating social relations ... are the generators of diverse preferences" (Wildavsky, 1989:21). Wildavsky argues that by "classifying people, their strategies, and their social contexts into the cultural biases that form their preferences, cultural theory attempts to explain and predict recurrent regularities and transitions in their behavior" (ibid:24). Thus, Wildavsky focuses on a sociological approach.

By answering two questions, "Who am I?" and "What shall I do?", Wildavsky believes that cultural identity can be discovered. The identity question reveals whether the individual is a member of a strong group, a collective, or is free to make choices for himself. The action question is answered by the individual either being subject to many prescriptions or tightly constrained (ibid:25). The ability of people to make preferences derives from their ability to figure out "their master preferences, as it were - who they are and are not, to what groups they do and do not belong" (ibid:28). Wildavsky argues that people do this in a rational way, that is, they support their own way of life. From this, they then know which culture (fatalism, individualism, collectivism or egalitarianism) they belong to and thus can sort their preferences. Cognition is not required for preference formation according to Wildavsky. People may know what they prefer without knowing much else. However, this raises the question of the applicability of preference theory to the political decision-making process since it is unclear how people translate their preferences into political attitudes and actions. Zaller contends that "the impact of people's value predispositions depends on whether citizens possess the contextual information needed to translate their values into support for particular policies or candidates" (Zaller, 1992:25). (This translation process will be reviewed in more detail in Section Four.)

Even more so than Wildavsky, Lane advocates the use of "cultural rationality". She believes "that the effective use of the political culture approach lies in operationalizing detailed models of political cultures and in integrating them with formal decision models." (Lane, 1992:364) Given this,

"a political culture model would be defined as a complex structure of logically linked belief variables, shared by most of a group's members, about what motivates people; how the group is organized; who should get what, when, and how; what roles each person is allowed or forced to assume; and how, overall, the group is to be organized." (ibid:365)

Thus, Lane's model, primarily sociological, would emphasize the content of various political cultures, showing how different norms and beliefs could be described to predict specific behavior patterns (ibid:365). In order to define political cultures, Lane advocates the study of the dimensions of the following beliefs: "the individual's supposed qualities, the relation of the individual and the group, the structure of the group... and the duties and rights associated with different social positions" (ibid:368).

CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL CULTURE							
Author	Pattern of Orientation	Controlling Guidelines	Pattern of Behavior	Property of a Collectivity	Cognition	Feelings	Values
Almond & Verba 1963	YES	NOT FOUND	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pye & Verba 1965	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pateman 1971	YES	NOT FOUND	NOT FOUND	NOT FOUND	YES	YES	YES
Elkins & Simeon 1979	NO	YES	NO	YES	NOT FOUND	NO	NO
Eckstein 1988	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wojdovsky 1989	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NOT FOUND	YES
Lane 1992	YES	YES	YES	YES	NOT FOUND	YES	YES

Table 1. Characteristics of Political Culture.

Table One presents the general characteristics of political culture according to whether the authors reviewed in this section included the characteristic (yes/no) or did not mention the characteristic (not found). Reviewing Table One, it appears that there actually is a moderate degree of consensus as to general, definitional characteristics of political culture. Most of the authors express political culture in terms of a sociological approach (which includes both the individual's orientations and ability to enact those orientations) combined with an emphasis on the dominant values. This consensus forms the basis for Figure One.




Figure 1. Formation of a Group's Political Culture.

Concentrating on political culture does not mean that other aspects of the political system are not important (Verba, 1965:514). As previously mentioned, one of the major criticisms against the political culture concept has been the confusing relationship between political structure and political culture. Drawing particular critique has been the implication of a causal relationship between culture and structure, the idea that culture produces structure (Almond, 1980:28). However, this causal relationship is not advocated by the authors presented in Table One. As Pateman points out, "one aspect which must be considered is the influence of the impact upon the individual of the political structure itself" (Pateman, 1971:296). The political structure can be viewed in terms of "power and authority" which can be "exercised non-consensually". This "places an external constraint on the

individual and influences his behavior and attitudes", thus helping to "shape the political culture" (ibid:296). As a result, Figure One displays a reciprocal relationship between political structure and political culture.

4) Political Culture's Affect on Political Agenda

According to Lane, the concept of political culture, when used in its fullest, "denote[s] an integrated constellation of ideas about not just government but about political life as a whole, from the meaning of social existence.... to social priorities... to actual policies" (Lane, 1992:381). Thus,

"the theory of political culture... connect[s] political culture values to political attitudes, ... connect[s] political attitudes to individual political behavior,... connect[s] individual behavior to social choices,... connect[s] social choices to political policies and institutions, and... connect[s] policies and institutions to social changes,..." (ibid).




Figure 2. Translation of Voter's Political Culture onto the Political Agenda.

Figure Two attempts to concisely depict the connections involved in the translation of the voters' political culture onto the political agenda. Most important in the study of political culture is its effect on and/or ability to shape citizens' attitudes.

In his book, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Zaller writes, "Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it" (Zaller, 1992:6). For Zaller, predispositions consist of a variety of interests, values and experiences that individuals possess. Note that Zaller's usage of predispositions is closely related to the perceptions, affects, and evaluations that form political culture in Figure One. These predispositions "regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication...[a] person receives", thus acting as "the critical intervening variable between the communications people encounter... and their statements of political preference" (ibid:22-23). Zaller believes that out of the various types of predispositions, values have "a stronger and more pervasive effect on

mass opinion than any other predispositional factors" (ibid:23).

But what is the difference between values and attitudes? What is the relationship among the two? Basically, what is the difference between Box 1 and Box 2 on Figure Two? Zaller answers:

"Values refer to 'general and enduring standards' that hold a 'more central position than attitudes' in individuals' belief systems (Kinder and Sears, 1985:p.674) and that lead us to take particular positions on social issues' (Rokeach, 1973:p.13)." (ibid)

To clarify this point, Zaller presents an example of a person strongly supportive of the value of economic individualism. This person would be more likely to be against higher taxes for social welfare programs when compared to an individual who had less support for economic individualism.

Like Zaller, Lane also discusses the relationship between values and opinions (attitudes) and provides a clear distinction (thus also explaining the relationship between Box 1 and Box 2 on Figure Two). For an example of a political opinion, we are presented with opposition to a specific land-reform proposal. For a cultural value/belief, we are given the belief that anything that limits the power of the rich is wrong. The opinion statement does not help to predict how the individual will act on other types of reform, however, the political value/belief contains many possible predictions: taxes on the rich will be opposed, social programs should be kept at a minimum, etc. Thus, the political value/belief example yielded various predictions from the premise that the place of the favored group, the rich, should be maintained (Lane, 1992:368).

However, there are problems with the current research and literature on values. As Zaller mentions, "current literature on values fails to take systematic account of the vast differences in political awareness that exist among citizens" (Zaller, 1992:24). As mentioned previously, this critique could be targeted towards scholars like Wildavsky who assert that cognition is not required for preference formation. Wildavsky may be correct regarding preference formation, but Zaller calls into question the supposed link between values and political behavior if cognition is absent. Citing a 1987 National Election Studies pilot survey on foreign policy issues, Zaller found that individuals who strongly valued military strength and opposition to communism, but who did not have knowledge of the Contra situation in Nicaragua, could not identify with the question "would you like to see spending for aid to the Contras in Nicaragua increased, decreased, or kept about the same?" (ibid:25). However, when the question was rephrased, making the value implications of the issue clear, to "Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops to Central America to stop the spread of communism?", individuals who

valued military strength and opposed communism could easily identify with the issue and answer the question (ibid:25). Thus, individuals do need certain levels of knowledge to translate values into attitudes. The concept of political culture, as presented in Figure One, therefore includes cognition and knowledge, and this is therefore a part of the translation process to the political agenda (Figure Two).

A second problem with current value research is the lack of explanation of different values to one another and to political ideologies. Zaller suggests that values should be defined as "domain-specified organizing principles, such as economic individualism, where each value dimension lends structure to public opinions within a particular domain" (ibid:26). Ideologies can then be viewed as a more general left-right perspective which organizes a wide range of disparate concerns, including various values. As a result, "ideology is no longer the strictly unidimensional concept that many discussions have considered it to be, but a constellation of related value dimensions" (ibid). If ideologies are defined as a "constellation of related value dimensions" then ideologies are naturally a part of political culture.

The similarities between the concept of political culture and the concept of ideology are extensive. In their chapter, *Ideological Conceptualization and Value Priorities*, Inglehart and Klingemann state that "Consistent with Converse we define an ideological mode of thought as a coherent world view, a comprehensive system of political beliefs in which political ideas are central" (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1979:205). They assert that this definition emphasizes "the idea of a frame of reference... that allows for a specific type of processing politically relevant information" (ibid:205). Notice the similarity of "frame of reference" to the use of "pattern of distribution of orientations" from the political culture concept (Figure One). Continuing, Inglehart and Klingemann advocate that political ideology should be "seen as a cultural product, propagated through organizational channels and learned by individuals who use it in their comprehension of the political world" (ibid).

There is, however, a very important clarification to make regarding ideologies and their relationship to political culture. As Inglehart and Klingemann state, an ideological view of the political world entails that a person has consciously taken over central political elements (such as "the common ownership of the means of production" or "individual freedom before the power of the state") and has integrated these into his comprehensions and evaluation of politics (ibid). Socialization may also produce a consistent pattern of political elements, but it does not necessarily mean that people understand how these elements are connected or what they mean. Therefore, a "consciousness of overarching principles" is

required for an ideological view of the political world (ibid:206). This consciousness requirement does not exclude ideologies from the definition/formation of political culture (Figure One), it merely allows for distinction between ideological beliefs and the unconscious beliefs/values derived from the experience of living in a society. Ideologies remain important to the study of political culture because they "determine whether a political situation or a political event is experienced as favorable or unfavorable, good or bad" (ibid:207).

From a methodological standpoint, Zaller highlights two practical implications that ideology has on the study of mass opinions and attitudes. First, he believes that one should use "domain-specific measures of political values, rather than a general measure of ideologies" (Zaller, 1992:27). He supports this suggestion with the explanation that "ideology, as a more general measure of left-right tendencies, is more likely to miss reactions to a particular issue than is an indicator that has been tailored to that issue" (ibid). However, it is not often that studies of mass opinion change can actually capture the value dimensions that influence the opinion change. And since values are to a certain extent organized by a person's ideological orientation, Zaller's second suggestion is to use, out of necessity, the general ideology measures to procure people's left-right value tendencies.

5. The Process of Change in Political Culture

Inglehart states that "the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life" (Inglehart, 1977:3). In addition, Inglehart believes that a shift is occurring in the distribution of political skills, with an increasing amount of the public participating in more active political roles. The change in values is reflected by the decline in legitimacy of hierarchical authority, patriotism, religion, etc., leading to lower confidence in institutions. The shift in political skills between the mass public and the elites is bringing new values to the political arena (ibid:4). These changes in values and skills can be identified as contributing to a change in political culture. But how do these changes occur?

To explain changes in political culture, both the political structure level and the individual level need to be considered. Modifying a model presented by Inglehart, these two levels will thus be considered within the framework of political culture.

To investigate the process of change, Inglehart suggests that analysis should move from the structure level to the individual level and then to structure consequences. One

would start with events in given societies, study their impact on what people think, and then review the consequences that the intrapersonal events may have had on a society. (Inglehart, 1977:4). The individual is placed in the middle of Figure Three, and is of central concern, but the economic, social and political structures can not be ignored. It cannot be taken for granted that if increasing numbers of people hold certain values, those values will automatically be transformed onto the political agenda. The level of political skill and the structure of the political institutions are very important (ibid:6). Returning to Figure One, the significance of political structure (the term here being used in a general sense, including economic and social structure) is clearly demonstrated by its reciprocal relationship to political culture.




Figure 3. Structure and Political Culture Changes (modified from Inglehart, 1977:5).

Inglehart's analysis, by beginning with structural events, is focused primarily on the economic, social, and political conditions in society. Naturally, this is one approach to the study of change in political cultures. However, it is possible to concentrate on identifying the perceptions, affects and evaluations of a society (recognizing that these have already been affected by the political structure). This approach to understanding change, by beginning with political culture, is advocated by Lane. Lane describes her model (Figure Four) as one of "rational adaptive choice, based on the diverse particularity of clearly defined political cultural beliefs" (Lane, 1992:377).




Figure 4: Lane's Model of Political Culture Change.

Lane's model begins with the identification of a particular group's political culture at a certain point in time. Point two is the intersection of a particular political culture with practical political circumstances. This point is not clearly explained by Lane, but it appears that this would include an evaluation of what is politically feasible and how decisions are made. Points three to five are the more observable elements of political life; the attitudes held, the political actions taken, and the physical and political changes made to the environment. Finally, in point six, a reevaluation of the political culture takes place, with the group analyzing whether their political culture led to acceptable changes. If not, the group will need to identify what aspects of the political culture led to non-acceptable changes, and will also need to decide upon an alternative political culture, if possible (Lane, 1992:377).

Combining elements from both Lane's and Inglehart's model, the following is a general model of the process of change for political cultures.




Figure 5: General Process of Change for Political Cultures.

6. Recent Studies Incorporating Political Culture Concepts

Feldman and Zaller, in their 1992 article, *The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State*, investigate the principles individuals use to justify their support for social welfare policies in the United States. Using open-ended survey questions, Zaller and Feldman demonstrate that most people readily identify with "values and principles central to the political culture when discussing their policy preferences" (Feldman & Zaller, 1992:268). However, the data revealed that a wide range of diverse values was held by the individuals, values such as individualism, humanitarianism and opposition to big government, which led to ambivalence when discussing issues and preferences. Feldman and Zaller conclude that the frequent reference to values while discussing policy questions confirms that "ordinary people view the world through the prism of a distinctive cultural bias" (ibid:292-293).

Another study based on the theories of political culture has recently been completed in Germany. Under investigation was the degree to which a market economy culture exists among citizens of the former GDR. Borrowing heavily from the defining characteristics of political culture, the study by Edeltraud Roller, defines market economy culture as the "existence of orientations and behavioral dispositions that are congruent with market economy structures" (Roller, 1992). Using survey data, two elements were studied; the achievement principle (regarding inequality and income levels) and the expectations of the role of government in various policy areas. The results showed support for the achievement principle to the same degree as West Germans, however expectations of the role of government were higher among the East Germans. Thus, the economic culture in East Germany is described as a mixed culture containing elements of both market and planned economies.

The last study to be mentioned here examined the values and attitudes of local leaders in Sweden. The major question under review was how tendencies towards decentralization, privatization, deregulation, and new forms of citizen participation influenced the values of local leaders between 1984 and 1991 (Szücs, 1993). Using a mail survey, approximately 700 leaders were questioned regarding their value priorities on what level of government (state, county, neighborhood, etc.) should have primary responsibility for different services in society. The data led to the general conclusion that a shift towards more liberal (decentralized, market economic) values had occurred among the leaders. Of course, this study represents an investigation of an elite group in society (the local leaders), but the

study's focus on values represents a part of political culture (Figure One) and the changed attitudes demonstrate a change onto the political agenda (Figure Two).

7. Future Research Project: Comparative Political Cultures

A research project to identify aspects of the political culture of Sweden and the United States is planned. In order to accomplish this, both quantitative data and qualitative data will be collected. It is intended that quantitative data can be collected from the National Election Studies and the Society, Opinion, and Mass Media studies which have been conducted for many years at Göteborg University. Similarly, the US data will be collected from the US National Election Studies program. At this point, it is envisioned that the Swedish Parliament election in September 1994 and the US House and Senate elections in October 1994 could be appropriate sources of data. Comparative studies of the US and Sweden are nothing new. An analysis of the political structure's relationship to the political culture was undertaken by Granberg and Holmberg (1988). Using election studies data, Granberg and Holmberg analyzed the effect of the different political systems on social psychology and voter behavior. Their study focused on areas such as: ideological placement and its coherence and stability, perceptions of political issues and party positions, as well as constraint among issue attitudes and attitude stability.

However, as previously mentioned, the study of political culture involves the study of feelings and values, which may be difficult to capture using mass survey data (Zaller, 1992 & Klingemann, 1979). Thus, the research plan includes the collection of qualitative data, to be acquired through focus groups and interviews. This will allow the interviewees to articulate how they are thinking and what they are feeling. In addition, the researcher will be able to carefully structure and control the conversation so that underlying assumptions and values can be ascertained. The participants for the focus groups and interviews will be university students in both Sweden and the US. An attempt will be made to control for education level and age, in hopes of limiting differences of political awareness. Of course, awareness differences can vary from individual to individual, and this will be noted, particularly in the focus groups and interviews. Efforts will be made to eliminate value identification problems resulting from lack of awareness of particular political situations (refer Zaller's example on the Contras in Nicaragua).

Given that political culture is closely related to one's experiences of political structure and socialization, another goal of the research project will be to identify what happens when

individuals are exposed to "foreign" political cultures. Do any changes take place in their perceptions, affects and evaluations when such exposure occurs? Does this eventually led to changes on the political agenda? In regards to these questions, Edeltraud's paper on East Germans' adoption of market economic principles mentions some relevant concepts. Of particular interest is the theory of the inside cultural learning model and the outside cultural learning model suggested by Weil. Some of the University students participating in the focus groups and interviews will be selected because they have been on a "study abroad program" or have had some similar foreign experience. This will allow for comparison between those who have experienced a "foreign" political culture and those who have not. Thus, an effort will be made to identify and explain any relationship between those students exposed to an "inside cultural learning model" and those exposed to an "outside cultural learning model" and how this affects their political culture.

8. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to present the concept of political culture in a synthesized manner by concentrating on the general definitional characteristics agreed to by a range of authors on political culture theory. To assert that there is a rather pronounced degree of consensus on the definition of political culture seems to contradict the currently accepted opinion that political culture as a theory is poorly defined. However, such an assertion is here made. By concentrating on an acceptable definition, it is possible that political culture will not continue to be used as a "residual variable" (Lane, 1992:364). Because political culture theories are most illuminating when related to the political environment, the connection between political culture and political agenda has been highlighted. Thus, this paper has concentrated on the sociological aspects of political culture, i.e. how individuals, in relating to one another and their society, acquire and apply the various aspects of political culture.

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CO-PRODUCING DATA PROTECTION:
THE ROLE OF THE STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MARKET

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theft and other damage by 'cyberpunk' hackers or saboteurs. Issues concerning personal privacy or data protection have, however, come into greater prominence in Britain in early 1993 with press stories about the breach of confidence concerning details of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's credit card account, and about British Airways' alleged 'dirty tricks' in seeking to win over Virgin Airways passengers by obtaining computerised information about their travel arrangements. Another story concerned the trial and acquittal of a computer hacker who had got inside many sensitive files; although this case was not brought under specific data protection legislation, hacking raises cognate questions of security and the possibility of breach of privacy. The long-running issue of journalistic invasions of the privacy of prominent people as well as ordinary members of the public has placed the issue of privacy protection high on the political agenda, beyond the grievances of specific episodes, and has engendered a public debate about the propriety and methods of controlling such behaviour.

Although only some of these episodes involve data protection in the conventional and legislated sense, they serve to draw attention to the general area of privacy, openness and disclosure of personal information, and perhaps also the implications of advanced, technological surveillance techniques for human values (Bennett, 1991). On the other hand, the apparently successful use of video cameras in public places in apprehending the alleged killers of a small child, coupled with the increasing forensic and deterrent use of these devices in crime control, provide counter-examples of the information-gathering potential of sophisticated technology. Public discussion of this rarely, if ever, juxtaposes incidents in which personal information is implicated for one purpose or another, whether beneficial or harmful. Thus it is difficult to shape a comprehensive but multidimensional concept of 'information privacy' in the public domains of debate and discourse. This has consequences for public policy, and for the way in which regulations are framed to deal with the normative and practical issues involved, whilst the use of personal data, whether handled by computers or through other technologies, increases all the while. This fragmentation of the subject has a certain depoliticising effect which remains underexplored by social scientists.

With the exception of lawyers and computer scientists, academics have rarely devoted attention to data protection and correlative topics of information privacy, although there is a vein of philosophical and sociological writing in which the wider question of privacy is examined (Schoeman, 1984; Bok, 1984), along with related issues of secrecy, confidentiality, and the openness of information. Data protection has to do with *information* privacy, and whilst attention normally turns to the question of

instruments of information technology greatly expand the possibilities of such practices, and make new policies feasible through the increased processing speed, transferability, and volume of data involved. In addition, the decentralised dissemination of personal data, the ease with which they can be assembled, matched or combined to create new information, and translated into different technical forms for storage and transmission, make accountability and transparency extremely difficult.

Addressing these problems with regulatory policy is complicated by this sophistication, complexity, diversity and dynamic change in information technology and in its application in information systems. Other factors are important as well (Bennett, 1992; Raab, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). One is the unclarity of the basic concept, 'privacy', which is defined in a wide variety of ways, with little agreement amongst philosophers, sociologists or lawyers. This has made 'data protection' a misleading surrogate term for 'privacy' in many countries and has inhibited debate and action concerning the protection of individuals rights, or claims to rights. Second is the cross-cutting alignment of interests amongst individual members of the public, commercial organisations, government agencies, and others who cannot be simply construed only as either beneficiaries or as victims of the use of personal data, and therefore who cannot be simply seen as only the losers or the gainers from regulation. The public has an interest in governmental and commercial efficiency; commerce and government have an interest in legitimacy and in maintaining public trust.

Third, the sporadic and unconnected way in which information privacy issues emerge into (and fall out of) public awareness, as mentioned above, and their relatively low political salience. Few votes are won or lost on these issues, even though privacy concerns rank highly in surveys of public opinion and there is plenty of personal experience as well as saloon-bar retailing of incidents in which privacy has been invaded. It is true that, in some countries, privacy protection has become politically important, leading to policy and legislative change (e.g., Germany, the United States), and there is a growing network of activist organisations that draw attention to these issues. However, other projects involving the use of information systems attract greater resources of public support, official backing, and resources: for example, crime control, efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services and, in the private sector, the ease and convenience of electronic money transfers, travel bookings, and shopping from home.

In part owing to these factors, data protection policy is typically seen as involving a 'balance' between privacy and other interests, a doctrine that has shaped legislation and

Policy Instruments: The State, Civil Society and the Market

Three related instruments---licensing, registration and the establishment of a data commissioner---might be seen as examples of a state-centred approach to data protection. Licensing, of which Sweden is an example, requires that an authority established by the state grants licenses to applicants that permit them to use personal data on condition that they fulfil certain requirements, which may be specifically designed. Licensing means registration, but goes beyond it. This may be an excessively bureaucratic method of regulation, and may break down in practice. In Sweden, it has become modified in practice towards the second model of state regulation, that of registration as such, of which those of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Austria are only a few examples amongst many. In this system, data users must register their existing information systems with an agency according to a standard set of characteristics. This too may be very burdensome, as it has proved to be in the United Kingdom, but it is possible, as in Ireland and in certain British proposals for modification of the existing system, to reduce it in scale and scope whilst still preserving essential qualities of data protection, still within a state-centred model.

Bennett's (1992) data-commissioner model, of which Germany manifests one version, involves a public authority whose rationale does not depend upon these two devices, but is more akin to an ombudsman who not only reacts but may take the initiative to advise as well as to supervise data users, and otherwise exerts pressure upon data users where strong powers may be absent. Commissions and commissioners vary in structure, function and nomenclature. The particular features of the German commissioner (*Bundesbeauftragte*) should not obscure the fact that equivalent role-holders in other countries may wield different or more extensive powers, perhaps especially where they can deploy other state-based instruments as well, such as registration and legal powers of enforcement. In addition, the data protection agencies of many countries, as in Germany, may develop a host of relationships throughout the political and administrative systems, and in society at large. This makes their position crucial for an analysis of the networks of data protection that transcend the distinction between the state, civil society and the market.

A fourth policy instrument, voluntary control, involves self-regulation by organisations that use personal data. This comes closest to the concept of civil society, but is not so easily mapped onto it. There is no difficulty where it involves self-regulation by data users in organisations of the private sector, but is conceptually

to provide it for themselves through their initiatives. In addition, data protection is not in limited supply, and neither data users nor data subjects are in competition with each other on either side of the trading counter. Where data protection plays a small part in individuals' decisions to purchase goods or services, as for example in retail shops or banks, the 'market' for data protection operates less in favour of privacy than where the passage of information is more obvious, as in the case of mail-order purchases, in which customers may be concerned about what happens to their personal details and where firms may think their business interests are better served by giving assurances of confidentiality. In any case, there is sufficient resonance between subject control and market-based solutions to give confidence in the mapping.

Data Protection as Co-production

The instruments outlined above were viewed through lenses that highlight certain defining properties, rather than describe the details of reality. It is obvious that most, although perhaps not all, of these instruments can be found in use to one extent or another in every system of data protection, and that they are therefore best seen as variables rather than as items. Putting it the other way round, every system will exhibit its own combination of modes or instruments; moreover, these may change over time. Already implied in these types were relationships between the persons, roles or institutions that take part in the system of data protection, although these of course also vary across systems and even across sectors within a system in ways that demand a comparative study; but all these points must be left for future work. These patterns and relationships make the analytical problem more complicated, but more interesting in that they lend support to a view of data protection as an area of regulation that cannot be seen in terms of only one vantage point, that of the 'top', which is often privileged in law- or administration-based studies, or of one time-point, which is again a consequence of certain formal approaches. Data protection is statutory public policy, but the route to its achievement runs through inter-organisation relations and implementation networks that must be examined.

A proper political science or policy studies approach explores the interactions and phases, and searches for explanations. This cannot presently be done exhaustively or systematically; however, a closer look at state, civil-society, and market actors may contribute to this, even without consistent reference to any particular empirical system. The outlines of data protection as co-production can be sketched very briefly, leaving

particularly the ability of commissioners to enter the market on behalf of a particular individual in a specific case, beyond their general educative and promotional activities.

Turning to the institutions of civil society, here one can consider the important part played by data users, their organisations and 'peak' organisations in the implementation process. Of course, these bodies' interests may be adversarial to those of commissioners and individual data subjects. They will seek to influence policy, to minimise the effects of the implementation of data protection on their personal-information activities, and perhaps turn data protection to their advantage where they can; for example, compliance and a reputation for good practice may confer useful legitimacy on a data user. Therefore, one should not construe these civil-society participants blandly as consensual helpers whose goals are the same as the regulators'. Co-production does not necessarily imply ideological alignment, warm feelings, or sweet reason; data protection is about information conflicts (Burkert, 1981). Nevertheless, practical working relationships develop in networks within civil society and between it and both the state and individuals. Data users, whether singly or collectively, interact frequently with commissioners and may be part of regular consultative procedures for specific or general issues. Peak organisation and industry-wide associations are instrumental in developing codes of practice and conduct, which have been important adjuncts of data protection in a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, but especially in the Netherlands (Hustinx, 1991; Ziegler-Jung, 1991). In that country, codes have a major and quasi-official role in the system of data protection, and the commissioner's office (*Registratiekamer*) plays a central part in their adoption and promulgation.

If these are neo-corporatist phenomena, it would be expected that the representative bodies that produce codes should be able to enjoin compliance upon their member-organisations, and that the state should have some way of ensuring this as well. Such compliance work is therefore also a matter for intra-civil society action, as well as involving the state. It should also be borne in mind that codes of practice may exist within the state amongst its data users, as for example the police, local government and health services; this poses a category problem for analysis. Of course, codes send signals to data subjects in the market, for their terms include undertakings or guarantees of good performance to those who, whether voluntarily or under legal obligation, furnish information about themselves, or whose details are gathered without their knowledge or consent. It is worth noting that the question of consent is one of the thorniest problems in data protection, and is currently at issue in the European

This is as far as the investigation needs to be taken for the present. In provisional and illustrative terms, the three dimensions as well as their inter-relationships can be described for systems of data protection. Previous analysis draws attention to data protection in terms of governance, steering and learning (Raab, 1993a, 1993b), and it is not proposed to rehearse those discussions. Interactive 'communicative' steering or governance in other fields, such as environmental management (de Bruijn & Lulofs, 1991), has been reported, indicating strategies similar to those in data protection where similar conditions present themselves. The general subject is explored in a variety of other fields of governance (Kooiman, 1993), and in more specific terms with reference to regulatory policy (Mayntz, 1978; Hanf, 1982; Hancher and Moran, 1989). Policy studies employing network approaches are also germane to the discussion of interactions such as those involved in data protection (Jordan & Schubert, 1992).

By considering concepts of the state, civil society and the market, a different conceptual apparatus is brought to bear upon these analytical strategies, and on the empirical subject matter in which they are employed. A preliminary step involves clarification of the concepts themselves. There are many ideas of the state (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987), as well as of civil society and the market, and choices from among their variety, and the variety of their juxtapositions, may be important in determining the usefulness of the framework. Another step involves the re-working of existing material in terms of the conceptual framework, but here the question is whether this amounts merely to a re-labeling exercise rather than an advance on other ways of seeing. This cannot be pre-judged and requires more systematic efforts than that essayed in this paper. However, it is possible that new insights are gained through such exercises, although it would be necessary to generate hypotheses about the relationships involved among the three dimensions, such that the tool becomes useful in comparative and historical study. To do this, broader conceptions of the state may be necessary, thus avoiding the equation of state and government, and avoiding any assumption about the homogeneity of either. Then, too, more subtle aspects of civil society need to be considered, drawn from sociological and legal perspectives, in order to avoid equating civil society merely with groups. The market also needs more sensitive handling, to avoid simplistic considerations of supply, demand, and other parameters. This paper has not presumed to attempt these tests of the validity and usefulness of the approach. On the other hand, by considering data protection as an innovatory policy field in which the state, civil society and the market can be approximated for research purposes, some progress may have been made in teasing out relationships that seem to exemplify the co-production of policy and its implementation. Explanation, however, is something else again.

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European Political Integration and Social Democratic Parties in Britain, France, Germany and Spain

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Abstract: This paper takes the form of a research outline for a project in its embryonic form. A great deal of attention has been focussed on moves towards political integration in Europe, primarily around the institutions of government at the level of the European Community. However, very little consideration has been given to the consequences of such developments for political parties in the states concerned. This paper aims to offer a research framework on that issue. The research focusses on social democratic parties in Britain, France, Germany and Spain, and seeks to examine issues raised for those parties at both the national and transnational level by European Community institutional integration. These questions are set out in a more general research framework in this paper within the context of traditional and recent academic work on cleavages and party formation, and on party organisation. It is not the intention here, therefore, to offer a detailed resume of social democratic parties in the four states. Instead, against the background of academic theory, the paper seeks to identify a range of questions and issues which need to be addressed by politicians within the process of European integration.

Introduction: Political Parties and the "legitimacy deficit"

There can be little doubt that the debate on the issue of European union has revealed a chasm between electors and elected. This has especially been the case on that part of the process represented by the Maastricht Treaty. A legitimacy and credibility gap between politicians as decision makers and their electorates has made the treaty's ratification passage a stormy one in many of the states which form the European Community (EC).

Given these problems it is quite remarkable how little consideration has been given by both politicians and academics to the consequences of the process of European integration for political parties in the EC states. After all, electorally competing political parties are, together with interest groups, the most important and enduring forms of collective political action in western liberal democracies. Their role has traditionally been portrayed as acting as a form of transmission belt for citizen's concerns, desires and aspirations. In the modern age they have operated, to a large extent, as organisational units through which the demands of groups of citizens in society can be represented, and hopefully, articulated.

The role of political parties in producing a politically integrated Europe founded on the notion of a common European citizenship and a "community" identity for the people of Europe will be a key one. It would seem, therefore, that in the light of the apparent chasm between electors and elected over Maastricht, and European integration in general, more attention should be paid to institutions

Indeed, it is the contradiction between integration and national specificities which is at the heart of the issue areas this paper seeks to identify. If, as Lipset and Rokkan assert, social divisions within societies produce certain party system forms, which in turn condition electoral choice, how can EC wide political integration be married to national cleavage patterns and party forms in individual states? (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) Equally, what form could party organisation take at EC level, and what will the relationship of any such organisation be to existing national party structures? These issues need to be addressed by academics and politicians alike.

Overall, the paper questions the viability of European political integration without the development of a European citizenship identity and a community culture. It sees fully democratised political parties, organisationally and politically "converged" at European level, as key actors in that process through their ability to bridge the present legitimacy and credibility gap between electors and elected at EC level. The paper identifies a framework of issues which need to be addressed if political parties (of a social democratic type) are to fulfil that role.

The Four Parties

At various times in their history the four parties which form the subject of the research upon which this paper is based have been referred to as both socialist and social democratic parties. Without entering into an extensive discussion and analysis (for it is not within the remit of this paper to do so, nor is it necessary for its content to do so - although for the research project a more detailed analysis will be undertaken) for the purposes of this paper the four parties will be referred to as social democratic parties.

The British Labour Party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (the Social Democratic Party of Germany - SPD), the Parti Socialiste (the French Socialist Party - PS), and the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party - PSOE) have all at times in their past been described as socialist parties, and, indeed, have all had their marxist elements. The ideological shifts of the four parties have occurred in different ways and at different times. In West Germany, the long period of opposition following the second world war, and the success of the

are they to accommodate the integrated European political market?

Kirchheimer's 'catch-all' thesis has been the subject of much discussion and debate. However, it does offer a useful theoretical frame for the proposed research in two respects. Firstly, in terms of the nature of the four parties to be studied. Secondly, in relation to their role in, and the challenges they face from, European integration. Indeed, Kirchheimer's comparison of, and contrast between, the functions which parties of mass integration and 'catch-all' parties fulfil, offers an indication as to why politicians are experiencing problems "selling" European integration to large sections of their electorate.

For Kirchheimer, parties of mass integration were "the product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures", which attempted "the intellectual and moral *encadrement* of the masses" (Kirchheimer, 1966: 184). As such they fulfilled vital expressive and integrative roles. However, as these parties transformed themselves in the post-war period into 'catch-all' parties they abandoned these processes and turned "more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success" (Kirchheimer, 1966: 184).

This appeal to a wider electorate is a consequence of 'catch-all' party preoccupation with gaining office and governing. Recruitment of leaders and the legitimisation of authority become priority aims in the relentless pursuit of votes. This is not to say that Kirchheimer sees 'catch-all' parties as ineffective in aggregating citizens' immediate demands. However, he argued that parties should function more as organisations which can produce closer voter integration into the system and express demands for fundamental change. Kirchheimer's concern was that 'catch-all' parties would be "too blunt" to perform either of these functions (Kirchheimer, 1966: 200). It is this danger of 'catch-all' parties failing to integrate voters more closely into the system which has most relevance for the proposed research project.

As Mair has pointed out, Kirchheimer related changes in party ideology and organisation to changes in the way in which parties appeal to voters, and drew attention to the effect this has on the link between electors and elected (Mair, 1989). Kirchheimer argued in the 1960s that voters had become distant from political parties

competition at EC level will be developed by national party elite competition elevating itself to the EC arena. This approach suggests it is elite behaviour, and not parties as expressive and integrative vehicles, which will facilitate supranational integration within the EC. If, however, this is the case, the neo-functionalist competition between elites at EC level offers very little in terms of a democratic relationship between electors and elected, and may go some way to explaining the current "legitimacy deficit" dilemma faced by politicians throughout the EC.

Cleavage Structures and European Political Integration

Ideological shifts and organisational change in political parties are not unconnected to changing social patterns. Consequently, an examination of the issues raised for the four parties in the study by European integration has to address the question of the relationship between the parties and their social alignments. Questions raised about any common base for integration must relate to cleavage structures in the four states.

This area cannot be examined without reference to Lipset and Rokkan. Their assertion that one role parties fulfil is "as alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic" raises a whole range of issues for investigation in the context of European integration (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 5). Just how, for example, are the "alliances...over policies and value commitments" to be constructed "within the larger body politic" of the EC? What party organisational structures will need to be assembled for this process? In the context of the proposed research project, can such alliances be constructed, or will they be hindered by peculiar specific factors bearing down on social democratic value commitments and policies in each of the four states?

Lipset and Rokkan have shown that variations within states have produced variable outcomes in party forms. They pointed to the way differing "attitudes of the established and the rising elites to the claims of the workers" in Europe in the later years of the nineteenth, and early years of the twentieth century, affected the development of parties of the left (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 21). In Britain (and the Scandinavian countries) the open and pragmatic attitude of the elites, with little or no direct repression, produced "the largest and most domesticated Labour parties in Europe"

proposed project, and their social cleavage bases, will be expected to adapt and adjust to European political integration. However, rather than the process Lipset and Rokkan identify applying, it appears that politicians within the states that form the EC are presently attempting to reverse the process. There is a danger that electoral choice in an integrated political Europe may well be determined at a central level, and that this then presumably will influence the form of Europe-wide party system which develops. If this is the case it is by no means clear how this will relate to social divisions and cleavages across Europe. It is the matching up of these social divisions and cleavages with a Europe-wide party system within an integrated Europe which is the greatest test for politicians.

As Gallagher et al have pointed out:

"The first reason why cleavages persist is that they concern people who are divided from one another on the basis of real and enduring issues. As long as workers continue to feel that they have a common interest that is distinct from the interests of employers, or farmers, or Catholics, or those who speak French, for example, and as long as this remains relevant at the level of politics and government, the cleavage around which workers are aligned is likely to persist." (Gallagher et al, 1992: 97)

It is the contention of this paper (and of the research project it premises) that cleavages are very "relevant at the level of politics and government" in the construction of an integrated political Europe, particularly in terms of the development of a Europe-wide party system. To date their relevance in these processes has largely been ignored.

Party Organisation

The relationship between cleavages and party systems is one that party managers have to acknowledge if they are serious about their organisational response to greater political integration within the EC. Internal, national and transnational party organisation will be influenced by this relationship, and hence, will also form a key part of the study of the four social democratic parties in the proposed research project.

5. less emphasis placed on ideology and believers within the organisation, and a stress on issue and leadership appeals.

For Panebianco these processes lead to the emergence of the electoral professional party, which does not "organise stable collective identities", unlike the old mass bureaucratic party (Panebianco, 1988: 268). Hence, traditional integrative and expressive functions performed by political parties are marginalised. Here again, these arguments have relevance in terms of political parties and European integration. Consequently, Panebianco's thesis also suggests some useful areas of investigation, and a framework within which to assess party organisational change and European integration.

The Party of European Socialists

In terms of transnational integration of social democratic and socialist parties some developments have already occurred. The Party of European Socialists was founded at the Hague in November 1992. Article 3 of the statutes of the new party states that "The Party shall have as its aims:

- to strengthen the socialist and social democratic movement in the EC and throughout Europe;
- to develop close working relationships between the national parties, the national parliamentary groups, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament and the Party;
- to define common policies for the European Community;
- to prepare structures for an ever closer collaboration between European socialist and social democratic parties;
- to engage parties' members in activities of the Party;
- to guarantee close cooperation with the Socialist Group of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
- to ensure close collaboration with the Socialist International;
- to promote exchanges and contacts with European trade unions, professional organisations, associations and cooperatives;
- to adopt a common electoral programme for European parliamentary elections."

The initial impression of this development is that it appears to be very much based on elite action, and as such may face many of the problems outlined in this paper regarding the distance between electors and elected, and between party leaders and national party

European integration cannot be achieved without a European "sense of community" and citizenship, and that integrated European political parties have a key role to play in developing that culture in the people of Europe.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to identify a range of issues raised for political parties by European integration, in order to construct a research agenda for investigation into the effect of this process on social democratic parties in four European states. The research project will consist of empirical research around the four parties and EC institutions (interviews with key party and EC actors), and analysis of organisational and political developments within a theoretical framework defined by traditional and contemporary key academic texts on political parties and party systems. Within this format the project will address four areas:

1. the nature of the four social democratic parties within their own states and political systems, with reference to Kirchheimer's 'catch-all' thesis;
2. against the background of the Lipset-Rokkan thesis, cleavage patterns within the four states and their relationship to:
 - a) party form in each of the four states
 - b) party cooperation across the four states
 - c) party system in an integrated Europe;
3. internal, national and transnational party organisation, with reference to both Kirchheimer's thesis and Panebianco's 'organisational' development of it;
4. the four parties' role in producing a European sense of community and citizenship, referring to Deutsch and Tassin's arguments, amongst others.

The projects main argument will be that the legitimacy and credibility gap between electors and elected is fuelled by moves to 'catch-all' party form, and by changes in party organisation identified by Panebianco's thesis. It will suggest that political parties are key actors in producing a European "sense of community" and citizenship, and that if European political integration is to be achieved these are vital necessary ingredients. Overall, the project will attempt to draw attention to the link between the decline in member involvement and democratic participation inside the four

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“Identité régionale et sentiments d'appartenance”

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Workshop
“New Patterns of local politics in Europe”
Leyden University (The Netherlands), 2nd-8th April 1993**



Introduction

L'analyse de l'identité régionale et du sentiment d'appartenance, consacrée à la région Rhône-Alpes, trouve son point de départ dans un projet de recherche soutenu par le Programme Rhône-Alpes de Recherches en Sciences Humaines (PPSH) en 1991-1992. C'est ainsi qu'un questionnaire a pu être élaboré¹ et publié dans deux quotidiens régionaux : **Le Progrès** (le 5 octobre 1991) et **Le Dauphiné Libéré** (le 15 octobre 1991). Ce questionnaire, auto-administré par les lecteurs de ces deux quotidiens, a permis de recueillir les opinions, les sentiments et les jugements des habitants de Rhône-Alpes les plus intéressés par les questions régionales. Au total, 1.604 réponses ont été obtenues, permettant de mieux cerner et mesurer les diverses dimensions sociologiques et politiques de l'identité régionale.

Le profil socio-politique des répondants fait apparaître des caractéristiques bien précises. Il s'agit d'un échantillon plutôt masculin (trois quart d'hommes et un quart de femmes) et relativement âgé : plus d'un quart (26,7 %) a plus de 65 ans et seulement un sur sept (16,4 %) moins de 34 ans.

Dans ses grandes lignes, les réponses provenant de chacun des deux quotidiens régionaux se conforment à cette sur-représentation des classes d'âge plus élevées, avec toutefois quelques inflexions notables : les lecteurs du **Dauphiné Libéré** sont sensiblement plus jeunes (17,6 % sont entre 18 et 34 ans) que ceux du **Progrès** (13,9 %).

La provenance régionale des répondants est très forte : plus des deux tiers (68,1 %) sont nés en Rhône-Alpes. Cet ancrage régional est accentué lorsqu'on sait que 60 % des parents et plus de 53 % des grands-parents en sont également originaires. Près d'un tiers seulement des répondants est donc né en dehors de Rhône-Alpes. En tête des autres provenances, on trouve l'Ile-de-France (5,4 %), puis Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (2,9 %) et la Bourgogne (2,3 %). La quasi-totalité des répondants habite la région Rhône-Alpes, ce qui s'explique aisément, puisqu'il s'agissait de répondre à un questionnaire publié par les deux grands quotidiens de la région. Un quart des répondants habite l'Isère, près d'un sur six le Rhône (16,8 %), un sur sept la Haute-Savoie (14,9 %) et près d'un sur dix la Drôme (8,9 %) et la Loire (8,2 %). Une moitié de l'échantillon habite une ville de plus de 50.000 habitants, et plus de 80 % une agglomération de plus de 100.000 habitants.

¹ Voir le questionnaire en annexe.

— 1ère partie — Espaces privés : les attaches

La prépondérance de l'existence personnelle sur l'existence civique se manifeste avec force, tant dans les choix directement opérés par les 1.604 répondants que dans les explications qu'ils ont facultativement données à propos de maints sujets. Ils sont plus de 80 % à dire que les milieux auxquels ils appartiennent le plus fortement sont ceux qui constituent le petit monde de la famille, des amis et du voisinage.

— Tableau 1 — Appartenance

	Appartenance classée première		Appartenance classée seconde	
	Pour soi actuellement	Pour les jeunes demain	Pour soi actuellement	Pour les jeunes demain
Cercle de famille et amis	67,4	42,8	15,6	3,3
Voisinage, quartier, commune	13,2	8,7	33,1	5,6
Territoire plus grand	3,7	19,3	9,4	5,8
Milieu de travail	8,0	5,4	18,1	4,5
Autre milieu ou collectivité	3,1	6,7	0,9	1,6
Aucun milieu	1,7	1,1	2,4	0,4
N.R.	2,9	21,7	14,8	78,9
"Les milieux auxquels j'appartiens le plus fortement sont ..."				

Afin de pénétrer dans ce phénomène des appartenances, nous étudierons successivement l'enracinement familial et de naissance, les liens de sociabilité, l'attachement au cadre de vie et enfin les noeuds de la vie de travail.

I — Enracinement familial et de naissance

Le désir massif, à plus de 90 %, des répondants de rester en Rhône-Alpes corrobore l'attachement prioritaire, pour plus de 80 %, au cercle de proximité, et revêt une dimension ancestrale certaine lorsqu'on scrute leurs origines.

— Tableau 2 — Origines rhônalpines

des répondants : 68 %	
de leurs ascendants	
Du côté paternel : Père : 60,4 % Grand-père : 54,7 % Grand-mère : 53 %	Du côté maternel : Mère : 61,3 % Grand-père : 54,9 % Grand-mère : 54,1 %

des réponses, reprenant l'image de la souche ("de vieille souche savoyarde", avons-nous vu précédemment) pour la retourner, en faire non pas leurs arrières mais un point de départ.

Quelques-uns semblent être venus en Rhône-Alpes pour "rejoindre les enfants", "tous mes enfants s'y sont fixés" ; il se peut même que certains éprouvent la nostalgie de leur région d'origine et y retourneraient volontiers, mais ce qui prévaut, et bon gré mal gré, les enracine, c'est de "rester auprès des enfants".

C — Enracinement par le conjoint

De même que certains ont poussé leurs "racines" à travers leur progéniture, d'autres les ont poussées à travers leur conjoint : "je n'envisage pas de quitter la Région : c'est le pays de mon épouse", "je suis mariée à un artisan qui est né et qui mourra en Savoie".

D — Regroupement familial

Que ce soit pour quitter Rhône-Alpes ou, plus souvent y demeurer ou se déplacer à l'intérieur de la Région, plusieurs répondants ont simplement et laconiquement expliqué qu'ils voulaient "être près", "se rapprocher de", "vivre avec" la famille, sans qu'il soit possible de savoir les situations concrètes (frères ou soeurs ? parents ? cousins, etc.) auxquelles ils se référaient. Ce qui importe, pour nous, c'est la relation étroite, et, à leurs yeux, impérative qu'ils établissaient entre lieu de résidence et lien de parenté.

En définitive, l'attachement au pays fonctionne selon trois modes principaux : je suis de ce pays : a/ parce que ma famille en est ; b/ parce que j'y suis né ; c/ parce que ma famille y est. Certains peuvent participer des trois modes à la fois, avec des intensités diversement réparties ; d'autres relèvent de deux ou d'un seul mode, avec des intensités également variables.

II — Liens de sociabilité

Les appartenances autres que familiales ou professionnelles n'ont été privilégiées que par une petite minorité (tableau 1). Essayons d'opérer quelques distinctions :

A — Les amis

Les appartenances au cercle de famille et les appartenances au cercle des amis avaient été regroupées dans la question dont rend compte le tableau 1. Cette question comporte déjà six rubriques : l'amélioration méthodologique consistant à séparer famille/amis, de même que voisinage/quartier ou commune aurait eu pour contrepartie d'allonger encore la liste des choix et de rebuter davantage de répondants potentiels ; toutefois, à travers les

a/ "J'aime ses gens"

Au cours de l'énumération (jamais en solo) des facteurs qui donnent envie de rester en Rhône-Alpes, quelques répondants ont dit "les gens" ; d'autres réponses ont une signification approchante, par exemple "il fait bon vivre parmi les Drômois" ou encore, de la part de quelqu'un revenant de la région parisienne, "Rhône-Alpes est plus humaine". Enfin, il y a des qualités que l'on aime chez les Rhône-Alpins ce qui est une autre manière de dire qu'on les apprécie.

b/ "La mentalité"

Cela est beaucoup moins personnalisé, donc plus global, que les jugements précédents ; malheureusement, nous ne disposons pas d'une grande richesse d'épithètes : quelques répondants ont simplement usé du substantif, sans le qualifier, et quelques autres ont utilisé une même expression : "mentalité agréable".

A contrario nous savons de manière un peu plus précise ce qu'il est reproché à la "mentalité" du crû. "Rhône-Alpes, ce n'est pas très gai", dit un répondant ne se contentant pas de déclarer, comme deux ou trois autres, "je ne me plais pas ici". Au-delà nous tombons dans le règlement de compte local : "mentalité snob à Thonon", les Grenoblois qui ne sont "plus intéressants depuis les Jeux Olympiques", ou l'Isère où "l'accueil n'est pas gracieux comme en Savoie"...

c/ "La qualité des relations"

Cette expression revient à quelques reprises, de même qu'elle avait été utilisée au sujet de la vie professionnelle et qu'elle est implicite dans l'expression "relations plus humaines" ou "gens plutôt sympathiques".

d/ "Le bon accueil" des migrants

Une dizaine de répondants souhaitent rester en Rhône-Alpes, où ils sont arrivés adultes et quelquefois à un âge assez avancé, parce qu'ils s'y sont sentis bien accueillis par les Rhône-Alpins. Cela constitue une petite minorité parmi les non-natifs mais, d'un autre côté, aucun de ces migrants ne s'est plaint d'un mauvais accueil.

L'idée d'adoption est exprimée à plusieurs reprises : "nous avons été tout de suite adoptés en Haute Savoie", disent une Lorraine et un Parisien, "bonne adoption", constate un Charentais. C'est à peu près la même chose qu'expriment d'autres mots : "je m'y sens bien intégré", "bien accepté", "c'est devenu ma région".

III — Attachement au cadre de vie

En cercles concentriques, les media de l'appartenance sont la maison, le quartier (ou la petite commune) et un environnement de qualité.

— Tableau 3 —

Appartenances objective et appartenance subjective à l'agglomération de résidence

	Taille indiquée par le répondant				
	+ 100.000	50 à 100.000	10 à 50.000	2 à 10.000	- 2.000
Taille réelle (1) :					
— + 100.000	58,3	12,9	12,3	14,6	1,3
— 50 à 100.000	3,7	36,1	35,2	22,2	2,8
— 10 à 50 000	0,4	1,2	65,0	26,1	6,6
— 2 à 10.000	0	0,8	1,7	86,0	10,7
— - 2.000	0	0	0,7	7,6	91,4

(1) Catégorie d'agglomération selon INSEE/recensement 1990 ; dans l'ignorance ou dans le doute nous nous sommes rangés à l'évaluation du répondant.

On voit que plus de 41 % de ceux qui habitent, selon les critères de l'INSEE, dans une agglomération de plus de 100.000 habitants se placent dans une catégorie d'agglomération plus petite (de moins de 10.000 habitants pour 16 % d'entre eux !).

Dans les questions ouvertes, le thème du pays aimé revient très fréquemment et il est chanté de bien des façons. Une première variation est celle de la possession : "c'est ma ville", "c'est ma région", "c'est chez moi", "je suis dauphinois, je ne quitterai pas mon pays". Seconde variation, celle du lien que l'on ne peut pas ou ne veut pas dénouer : "j'y ai mes attaches et je l'aime". Deux thèmes complémentaires viennent se greffer sur ces déclarations d'amour :

a/ ne pas partir : "je n'ai pas l'âme d'un déraciné", "je suis trop bien installé, incrusté", "naître, vivre et mourir dans sa région", "partir ? non. Mes racines sont là".

b/ revenir : on l'a vu à l'occasion de la retraite, mais le thème du retour "au pays" surgit en bien d'autres circonstances : fin des études, changement d'emploi, mariage, etc. "j'ai eu la chance de pouvoir y revenir : mes racines sont là".

Troisième variation, celle du choix : les non-Rhônealpins de naissance ne sont pas en reste de protestation d'attachement, d'admiration et de fidélité ; "j'ai préféré cette région à bien d'autres", dit un Belge ; "je l'ai choisie, j'y vis, j'y mourrai", proclame un Marseillais de 44 ans dans une formulation tout à fait symétrique du "j'y suis né, j'y vis, j'y mourrai" de la variation précédente. "C'est devenu notre Région, nous l'aimons".

Enfin il faudrait énumérer toutes les affirmations selon lesquelles tel ou tel pays (Péage de Roussillon, le Bugey, la Drôme, Annecy, etc. etc.) n'a pas son pareil au monde et ne

— Tableau 4 — Cadre de vie et insertion

	Cadre de vie de Rhône-Alpes	
	Mieux qu'autres régions	Pas mieux qu'autres régions
Tout à fait chez moi	N = 936 → 75,4 ↓ 82,4	N = 249 → 20,0 ↓ 62,7
En train de faire mon trou	N = 83 → 65,4 ↓ 7,3	N = 41 → 32,3 ↓ 10,3
Pas vraiment chez soi	N = 108 → 50,0 ↓ 9,5	N = 99 → 45,8 ↓ 24,9
"Dans cette agglomération je me sens :"		

Les qualités de la région, avancées par les répondants en justification de leur refus (à plus de 90 %, rappelons-le) d'envisager de quitter Rhône-Alpes, peuvent être analysées comme suit :

a/ Eloge général.

Un groupe nombreux et vibrant chante les louanges de "sa" région en des propos aussi appuyés qu'indéterminés : "on s'y sent bien". En conséquence, notre hypothèse d'un éventuel départ est vivement écartée : "jamais de la vie".

b/ Qualité de la nature

Le thème de la beauté de Rhône-Alpes, "la plus belle région de France", ne s'applique pas nécessairement qu'à la nature (il pourrait viser ses monuments, voire ses habitant(e)s ; toutefois, lorsque les compliments deviennent plus spécifiques, c'est presque tout le temps, de beautés naturelles qu'il s'agit ; au premier chef, des montagnes, "je ne pourrais pas me passer de ses montagnes" ; puis de l'eau, "torrents, rivières, lacs", "le Rhône si beau", "l'alliance eau-montagne" ; la simple campagne, la forêt sont peu mentionnées.

Un des sous-thèmes importants de la beauté, c'est la diversité : "variété de la nature", "les beautés de cette région", "je veux en poursuivre l'interminable découverte". Lorsque, un peu plus loin dans le questionnaire, il sera demandé de désigner un lieu typique de Rhône-Alpes, cela sera souvent refusé au nom justement de cette diversité, de ces complémentarités. Pour le moment, on constate déjà que l'une des qualités les plus appréciées de la Région, c'est la variété de ses terres, de ses paysages, de ses climats, et que c'est l'ensemble qui constitue un objet d'admiration et d'affection, "j'aime ses huit départements, sa diversité".

Le climat, mentionné dans une quarantaine de réponses, donne lieu à toutes sortes de nuances qui ne sont pas toutes attribuables à la diversité rhônalpine : par exemple, la Haute-Savoie (où l'on pourrait valablement faire état de variations internes mais nous

où, avec, en prime, aucun respect de l'environnement". Leur conclusion, semblable à celle des répondants dénonçant la pollution, est de chercher à s'en aller de Rhône-Alpes.

c/ toute une gamme d'activités

Lorsqu'on passe de "l'activité", sous-entendu : économique, aux "activités", sous-entendu : non-professionnelles, on aborde un champ extrêmement vaste ; plaçons-y quelques jalons :

- les activités **sportives** arrivent nettement en tête du panégyrique de la qualité de vie en Rhône-Alpes "région sportive". Bien entendu "la neige", "les sports d'hiver", "le ski", "les stations de ski alpin" tiennent la place d'honneur.
- les activités de **loisirs** en général, tantôt distinguées du sport, comme dans l'expression plusieurs fois utilisée "sports et loisirs" et tantôt l'englobant, trouvent aussi en Rhône-Alpes un terrain privilégié : "d'importantes possibilités de loisirs", "tout ici pour mes loisirs" ; on retrouve, à plusieurs reprises, l'accent mis sur la diversité de ce que la région a à offrir à cet égard.
- les activités **associatives** doivent recouper, pour une part, ce qui vient d'être décrit concernant le sport et les loisirs : par exemple, ce retraité, animateur passionné d'un club de pétanque qu'il ne quitterait pas pour un empire, relève aussi bien d'une rubrique que des deux autres ; mais on peut gager que la personne qui évoque de "nombreuses activités bénévoles" ou celle qui veut devenir "active dans des associations, dans ma ville" réfèrent à tout autre chose qu'aux deux rubriques précédentes. On remarquera que, malgré la renommée de plusieurs villes... et campagnes de cette Région au sujet de leur vie associative, cette catégorie d'activités n'a été indiquée que dans un très petit nombre de réponses.
- les activités **culturelles**, elles aussi, peuvent se confondre en partie avec les activités des rubriques précédentes (par exemple, beaucoup de clubs de randonneurs visent autre chose que la performance physique). Une réponse cite "le dynamisme culturel" de Rhône-Alpes (au regard de la centaine qui a cité son dynamisme économique c'est peu) et quelques réponses incluent, sans davantage de précision, le mot "culture" parmi les facteurs les attachant à Rhône-Alpes : pour nos répondants, la culture n'apparaît pas comme un cheval de bataille de leur Région ou de leur patriotisme régional.

IV — Les liens tissés par le travail

D'un côté, une appartenance première au milieu de travail est peu répandue parmi nos répondants, mais d'un autre côté, la plupart donne une grande importance au travail, tant pour scander les étapes de l'existence que pour décider des localisations.

L'expérience des vingt dernières années, depuis la crise dite pétrolière, a plus marqué les nouveaux venus sur le marché du travail qui ont ressenti, de ce fait, que leur région bénéficiait d'un marché de l'emploi relativement privilégié. Et malgré tout, l'écart d'appréciation entre les plus âgés et les plus jeunes n'est que de 13 points, n'entachant jamais le caractère positif du jugement. Les choses sont beaucoup plus tranchées lorsque l'on considère les évaluations faites dans chaque département ; les écarts sont considérables entre deux groupes de département (nous prenons ici les jugements négatifs "Rhône-Alpes n'est pas un endroit de travail mieux que les autres") :

Départements en crise :	Loire	45,5 %
	Ardèche	34,1 %
	Drôme	33,1 %
Départements optimistes :	Hte-Savoie	12,6 %
	Ain	13,7 %
	Isère	17,1 %

la Savoie (avec 20,2 %) et le Rhône (24,4 %) constituant un groupe intermédiaire dans lequel on aurait pu inclure l'Isère, située à égale distance de l'Ain que de la Savoie.

B — Le travail, facteur dominant

Rester en Rhône-Alpes ou partir ? Quelle que soit la position adoptée, ce sont les explications liées à l'activité professionnelle qui sont les plus souvent données ou qui viennent en tête des justifications multiples (comme, par exemple, dans cette réponse archétypique "j'y ai mon travail, ma famille, ma maison, et ce département est le plus beau de France"). Positivement ou négativement, la vie professionnelle scande, pour beaucoup de répondants, leur vie tout court, qu'ils soient des jeunes qui débutent, des adultes cherchant à améliorer leur situation ou à sortir du chômage, ou même des "anciens" qui vont terminer ou ont terminé leur vie de travail ; et cette dépendance vis-à-vis de l'emploi et de la localisation de l'emploi sera, de l'avis de plusieurs, encore plus forte dans l'avenir, même si, on l'a vu, le sentiment d'appartenance au milieu de travail y est prévu plus faible.

C — La situation professionnelle commande

Les 90% de Rhônalpins qui n'envisagent pas de quitter leur Région témoignent d'un jugement généralement très favorable sur son activité économique, mais les positionnements individuels ressortissent de perceptions et de stratégies autrement plus diverses et complexes. Nous proposons de distinguer, selon les évaluations faites du marché du travail en Rhône-Alpes, les attitudes suivantes :

— **“Ce serait dommage d'avoir à quitter Rhône-Alpes”**

Certes, l'on ira sans grande hésitation là où il y aura du travail ou du meilleur travail, mais l'on aurait préféré pouvoir rester et, souvent, on projette de revenir. “Si professionnellement j'y suis contraint, je le ferai”. Malheureusement plusieurs constatent que leur spécialité va les mener à s'éloigner : fonctionnaires pour lesquels “le passage par Paris est inévitable”, formations non adaptées à Rhône-Alpes, firmes envoyant systématiquement à l'étranger, etc. ; ils partiront donc ou sont prêts à partir mais ont préalablement tenu à affirmer qu'ils seraient “heureux de rester” et à ajouter qu'ils espéraient bien qu'il s'agirait d'une “expatriation temporaire” et pourraient “y revenir le plus tôt possible”.

— **“La Région n'a pas d'importance”**

“L'emploi est plus important que l'endroit où il est exercé” ; cela peut conduire à une sorte d'indifférence à l'égard de la localisation : “mon parcours professionnel décidera”. Et alors que la catégorie précédente devait surmonter son attachement à Rhône-Alpes, celle-ci marque au contraire son détachement : “j'accepterais facilement d'autres Régions”, ou son opportunisme : “je reste en Rhône-Alpes parce qu'elle est plus compétitive pour le moment”.

— **“Aller voir ailleurs, pour une expérience professionnelle élargie”**

Indépendamment de leur attitude vis-à-vis de leur Région, quelques uns ont tenu à recommander la mobilité à un moment où à un autre (“pas pour l'instant”, “plus tard” ont précisé plusieurs) de la vie professionnelle : par exemple, “la montée à Paris reste utile”, il ne faut donc pas s'en priver. Cette catégorie signale, de façon beaucoup plus positive que la catégorie I-c surtout soulagée d'être de retour, que l'une des caractéristiques des Rhônalpins c'est de savoir sortir de Rhône-Alpes.

— **“Content de quitter Rhône-Alpes”**

Quelques répondants ont manifesté leur désir de partir travailler ailleurs mais n'ont pas exprimé de grief à l'égard de leur situation professionnelle ; l'un, fonctionnaire, ira chercher une promotion, une autre moins de pollution qu'à Lyon ; un autre veut partir dès qu'il aura “la possibilité d'exercer (sa) profession dans un poste équivalent”.

c/ Rhône-Alpes mauvais marché du travail

C'est sur les doigts d'une seule main que l'on peut compter ceux qui mettent en cause leur Région, encore le font-ils restrictivement, en disant “dans ma spécialité”, “dans mon cas” ; il n'y a pas, dans les 1 604 réponses, une seule généralisation telle que “les Rhônalpins sont bien obligés d'aller chercher du travail ailleurs parce que ça ne va pas dans leur Région”. Mais on se souvient que l'optimisme était souvent mitigé : “en Rhône-Alpes c'est plutôt moins mauvais qu'ailleurs”. Dans la présente catégorie on va trouver quelques chômeurs, ce qui signifie que la plupart des chômeurs qui ont répondu à l'enquête se trouve dans les catégories A ou B. et quelques cas individuels

b/ "Au moment de la retraite"

La retraite est un cap important, un tournant, dans la vie de nombreux répondants, particulièrement s'agissant de leur localisation :

— "Enfin revenir en Rhône-Alpes"

Après des exils souvent moins longs que celui de ce savoyard qui, entre 18 et 60 ans, a travaillé hors de Rhône-Alpes, un certain nombre de répondants ont regagné leur pays natal le jour où ils ont cessé de travailler, parfois après avoir minutieusement et longuement préparé leur ré-établissement. C'est parmi eux que l'on trouve certains de ceux qui considèrent comme une hérésie de penser à quitter Rhône-Alpes "puisque'ils y sont à la retraite".

— "S'installer en Rhône-Alpes"

Tel a été le but, la terre de prédilection, de quelques répondants qui ont quitté leur pays d'origine (région parisienne, Alsace, etc.) ou d'activité professionnelle pour venir vivre dans les montagnes ou les parties méridionales de Rhône-Alpes au moment où la retraite leur donnait la possibilité d'organiser un nouveau mode de vie.

— "Bouger de place en Rhône-Alpes"

Lyon est la principale pompe refoulante de retraités, généralement vers leur Ain, Ardèche, Loire natales, mais d'autres villes parfois même toutes petites ont été pareillement désertées par ceux et celles qui n'avaient plus à y travailler, et allaient finir leur jours dans des endroits plus calmes, plus verts et souvent pas très lointains, avec lesquels on a l'impression qu'ils n'ont jamais cessé d'entretenir des contacts. Cette savoyarde qui a travaillé 37 ans au coeur de Lyon mérite bien que l'on cite son dicton, "pays de naissance, pays de plaisance".

— "Quitter Rhône-Alpes"

Eh ! oui, malgré le dithyrambe ambiant, certains répondants attendent le moment de leur retraite pour plier bagage. Comme beaucoup de Rhônalpins, ils tiennent à retourner à leur pays d'origine ("rejoindre mon Hérault natal") ou à retrouver leur famille ("je serais heureux de rester si les miens y étaient aussi"), mais l'on constate aussi un certain héliotropisme : souhait de prendre sa retraite "dans le midi", "au soleil", "dans un climat meilleur", ce qui montre que Rhône-Alpes attire des retraités venus de régions moins clémentes et perd certains de ses retraités à la recherche de ciels encore plus doux.

On notera enfin que quelques répondants refusent le dilemme immobilité-rupture, et signalent qu'ils sont heureux de rester et de partir, et concilient les deux grâce à des migrations saisonnières ou "en gardant une maison en Rhône-Alpes" ou en refusant tout caractère définitif à leur actuel domicile.

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— 2ème partie —

Espaces publics : les citoyennetés

L'analyse des attaches aux milieux et lieux de vie que nos correspondants se reconnaissent comme ancrages personnels privilégiés permet une première délimitation des territoires identitaires des Rhônalpins : elle esquisse les contours de leurs espaces privés d'appartenance, au sein de l'univers familial, de l'environnement immédiat, où se situe leur existence quotidienne.

Une autre approche doit la compléter pour permettre d'articuler ce "premier cercle" des appartenances des individus sur un "deuxième cercle" qui le complète, celui des espaces publics de référence des citoyens : l'analyse des liens qu'ils se reconnaissent avec les collectivités publiques dont ils relèvent.

Car l'une des dimensions-clé de l'identité des habitants de la région Rhône-Alpes, comme de n'importe quelle autre région française, réside dans leur citoyenneté politique, c'est-à-dire dans la façon dont ils perçoivent, conçoivent et expriment, personnellement et concrètement, leur relation à chacune des collectivités publiques institutionnalisées dont ils sont les ressortissants : du niveau local au niveau supra-national, la Commune, le Département, la Région, l'Etat et l'Europe — les cinq principaux étages de cette pyramide institutionnelle qui constitue l'armature du système politique dont ils sont à la fois sujets et agents. Un système qui contribue dans une large mesure à structurer les rapports identitaires de chacun d'eux aux espaces de la vie publique, puisque son fonctionnement les implique nécessairement, ne serait-ce qu'à ces deux titres : d'une part, la pluralité des instances de pouvoir territorialisées que ce système articule procède de leur choix de citoyens (directement par leur élection ou indirectement par leur contrôle) et d'autre part, la multiplicité des décisions et actions qu'il impulse concerne et affecte leur existence quotidienne (de la ponction fiscale opérée sur leurs ressources à l'infrastructure des communications ou aux équipements socio-culturels mis à leur service).

Comment les Rhônalpins qui ont répondu à notre enquête appréhendent-ils ce système politique ? Comment évaluent-ils la répartition des compétences, des ressources et des pouvoirs entre ses cinq niveaux d'institutions ? Et surtout, quelles sont leurs dispositions et leurs attentes personnelles à l'égard de chacun d'eux — la confiance qu'ils leur accordent, la vocation qu'ils leur assignent, les perspectives qu'ils leur dessinent ?

— Tableau 1 — Confiance envers les 5 niveaux d'institutions


Niveaux d'Institutions	Commune	Département	Région	Etat	Europe
Taux de confiance exprimée	%	%	%	%	%
Ensemble	34,7	13,7	24,4	13,3	6,5
Hommes	35,5	13,0	23,6	13,9	6,4
Femmes	32,6	15,6	27,2	11,6	6,7
18 - 34 ans	26,6	18,6	26,6	14,8	9,5
35 - 64 ans	34,6	13,3	25,0	14,0	5,8
65 ans et +	40,2	11,4	22,4	10,3	6,3
Salariés en activité	33,4	15,5	21,7	16,2	6,8
Travailleurs Indépendants	32,8	14,8	32,8	5,5	5,5
Chômeurs	20,3	13,6	28,8	23,7	6,8
Retraités	39,0	11,7	23,7	11,3	6,0
Femmes au foyer	43,3	10,0	26,7	6,7	3,3
Etudiants	15,4	16,9	40	13,8	12,3
Agglomération Lyonnaise	34,4	6,7	29,0	18,3	5,4
Agglomération Grenobloise	34,0	13,5	17,2	16,3	9,3
Agglo. + 100 000 h.	35,4	10,2	22,3	16,4	7,0
Agglo. de 50 à 100 000 h.	35,2	14,8	21,3	8,3	13,0
Agglo. 10 à 50 000 h.	37,0	12,5	30,4	12,5	3,5
Agglo. de 2 à 10 000 h.	33,5	14,9	25,2	11,2	5,0
Agglo. — 2 000 h.	31,6	21,6	24,9	10,3	7,0
Bien intégrés localement	37,0	13,8	24,3	12,5	5,4
En voie d'intégration locale	31,5	11,8	29,9	15,7	7,9
Peu ou pas intégrés localement	24,1	13,9	21,3	17,1	12,5

S'agissant des autres institutions, on peut observer que la taille de l'agglomération de résidence et le sentiment d'y être plus ou moins bien intégré exercent également des effets notables sur le crédit qui leur est accordé.

D'une part, s'opposent en effet aux "citadins" de la métropole lyonnaise et des agglomérations de plus de 100 000 habitants les "ruraux" résidant dans des communes de moins de 2 000 habitants : les premiers sont les plus confiants envers l'Etat (16,4% pour les habitants des agglomérations de plus de 100 000 habitants, 18,3% pour les Lyonnais) et les moins confiants envers le Département (10,2%) ; les seconds affirment des priorités exactement inverses (21,6% pour le Département et 10,3% pour l'Etat). Symétrie qui fait écho au clivage typique du système politico-administratif français opposant centres (urbains) et périphéries (rurales), mais qui ne concerne cependant pas la Commune puisque les ruraux lui font moins confiance (31,6%) et les citadins un peu plus confiance (35,4%) que la moyenne des enquêtés.

— Figure 3 —

Confiance envers les 5 niveaux d'institutions pour les politiques culturelles




Dans le domaine du **développement de la vie culturelle**, c'est la même distribution des jugements de confiance qui prévaut (Figure 3) : la préférence est donnée à la Commune (35,5%) puis à la Région (26,2%) et au Département (21,4%), trois niveaux de “pouvoir proche” jugés plus aptes à intervenir à bon droit et à bon escient dans cet autre champ de la vie sociale au quotidien que les instances plus lointaines et peut-être jugées moins légitimes de l'Etat (8,4%) ou de l'Europe (5,9%).

Dans le domaine de la **lutte contre le chômage** en revanche, la primauté de la Région (38,3%) et de l'Etat (29,3%) s'impose très nettement, au détriment du Département (10,8%), de l'Europe (10%) et surtout de la Commune (5%) (Figure 4). Il est donc clair aux yeux des citoyens qu'en cette matière —capitale pour leur existence quotidienne comme pour leur avenir— les niveaux de pouvoir déterminants se situent au-delà des institutions qui leur sont les plus familières, échappant en particulier à la Commune. La consécration de la Région sur ce terrain d'action “sensible” des pouvoirs publics vaut également d'être soulignée : elle peut apparaître d'autant plus surprenante que les lois de décentralisation de 1982-1983 n'ont donné à cette institution aucune compétence directe dans ce domaine, qui demeure pour l'essentiel du ressort de l'Etat.

Confirmation de ce plébiscite en faveur de la Région, les préférences des citoyens pour l'affectation de la majeure partie de leurs impôts (Figure 6) : 33,7% souhaitent qu'elle aille à la Région ; mais c'est ensuite à la Commune (26,4%) et au Département (18,8%) plutôt qu'à l'Etat (13,4%) ou à l'Europe (2,5%) que celle-ci devrait bénéficier. Ici encore, il faut relever que le "consentement majoritaire à l'impôt" exprimé en faveur de la nouvelle institution régionale fait contraste avec la réalité de ses pouvoirs : elle n'a à sa disposition que les ressources d'une fiscalité résiduelle.

— Figure 6 —

Préférences pour l'affectation des impôts aux 5 niveaux d'institutions



II — L'influence sur les pouvoirs

Sur l'échelle de la confiance, l'espace public de prédilection du citoyen de Rhône-Alpes s'articule donc sur les deux pôles complémentaires de la Commune et de la Région, entre lesquels il partage ses options et ses préférences selon les domaines d'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans sa vie quotidienne. Mais sur l'échelle de l'influence qu'il pense être en mesure d'exercer sur ces pouvoirs dont il dépend, son espace public d'intervention s'articule sur le seul pôle de la Commune (Figure 7) : 71,3% s'accordent à juger qu'ils peuvent avoir le plus d'influence à ce niveau, alors qu'ils ne sont que 4,8% à estimer peser le plus fortement sur la Région, le Département (8%) et l'Etat (7,9%) leur paraissant même plus accessibles que celle-ci ! Une telle discordance entre confiance exprimée et influence perçue manifeste à l'évidence que l'investiture de la nouvelle institution régionale dans l'univers politique des citoyens est un processus (bien) engagé mais non encore achevé. Déjà inscrite dans les structures de pouvoir, ainsi que dans les options de valeurs des citoyens de Rhône-Alpes, la Région ne leur est cependant pas

— Tableau 2 — Influence sur les 5 niveaux d'institutions


Niveaux d'Institutions	Commune	Département	Région	Etat	Europe
Influence exercée	%	%	%	%	%
Ensemble	71,3	8,0	4,8	7,9	0,8
Hommes	71,2	8,4	4,7	8,3	0,8
Femmes	71,3	6,9	5,2	6,9	1,0
18 - 34 ans	77,2	6,5	4,6	5,3	1,1
35 - 64 ans	70,8	7,9	5,2	9,1	0,6
65 ans et +	69,9	9,1	4,2	6,5	1,2
Salariés en activité	71,7	6,9	4,9	9,4	0,3
Travailleurs Indépendants	75,0	9,4	3,9	2,3	1,6
Chômeurs	64,4	3,4	10,2	16,9	1,7
Retraités	69,7	10,0	4,6	6,8	1,0
Femmes au foyer	76,7	3,3	1,7	10,0	1,7
Etudiants	76,9	9,2	6,2	4,6	—
Agglomération Lyonnaise	68,8	4,9	7,6	9,8	0,9
Agglomération Grenobloise	70,2	7,9	5,1	9,3	0,9
Agglo. + 100 000 h.	67,9	7,9	5,7	9,7	0,9
Agglo. 50 à 100 000 h.	72,2	8,3	2,8	10,2	1,9
Agglo. 10 à 50 000 h.	75,5	7,4	4,3	7,4	—
Agglo. de 2 à 10 000 h.	72,3	8,7	4,1	6,2	0,4
Agglo. — 2 000 h	75,7	8,0	4,7	5,0	1,3
Bien intégrés localement	73,9	8,1	4,5	6,9	0,7
En voie d'intégration locale	66,9	7,9	6,3	11,8	—
Peu ou pas intégrés localement	59,5	7,9	6,0	11,6	1,9

III — L'équilibre des pouvoirs et l'agencement des institutions

Les jugements de nos correspondants sur ces deux points permettent de confirmer la signification du constat de discordance établi entre leurs sentiments de confiance et leurs sentiments d'influence vis-à-vis des institutions dont ils relèvent, en signalant sans aucune ambiguïté les rectifications et rééquilibrages de pouvoir qu'ils souhaitent voir opérer entre les différents niveaux du système politico-administratif (Figure 8) : c'est en effet d'abord la Région qui leur paraît ne pas disposer aujourd'hui d'un pouvoir suffisant (35,1%, alors que 5,3% seulement jugent qu'elle en a déjà trop), puis la Commune (19,8%, 3,3% à peine soutenant l'avis inverse), ensuite le Département (14,8% contre 9,4% d'opinions contraires) et enfin l'Europe (11,3% contre 7,9% de jugements opposés). Et en regard, c'est l'Etat qui polarise les critiques pour excès de pouvoir (57,3%, moins de 2% soutenant au contraire qu'il n'en a pas assez). Au total, 94,8% jugent qu'un niveau institutionnel au moins est trop faible et 97,8%, qu'un au moins est

communautaires affirmé par 62,1% de nos correspondants offre un indice probant des dispositions pro-européennes de la majorité des Rhônalpins, qui approuveront à 54,4% la ratification du Traité de Maastricht lors du référendum de septembre 1992 : les plus attachés à la construction européenne sont les citoyens en voie d'intégration locale (69,3%), les Lyonnais (70,1%) et les étudiants (76,9%), trois catégories où se recrutent aussi les plus fervents soutiens à la cause régionale.

— Figure 9 — Préférences pour la suppression d'un des 5 niveaux d'institutions



Au total, les lignes de force de l'opinion des citoyens de Rhône-Alpes sur leur rapport au système politique apparaissent donc très claires : entre les deux pôles institutionnels plébiscités de la Commune —foyer toujours vivant de socialisation et de participation civique— et de la Région —aujourd'hui promue au rang de médiateur politique-clé, en lieu et place d'un Département sur le déclin, entre celle-ci et les centres de pouvoir étatique et européen plutôt tenus en suspicion—, elles dessinent les contours d'un espace de vie publique "à taille humaine" qui semble correspondre au modèle de citoyenneté de prédilection de notre échantillon de Rhônalpins. Serait-ce là le terrain (et le terreau) propice à cette revitalisation de la démocratie qui paraît aujourd'hui s'imposer comme une urgence aux yeux des acteurs comme des observateurs du système politique français ?

En tout cas, ces mêmes lignes de force de l'opinion majoritaire de nos correspondants permettent aussi d'esquisser les traits dominants et les caractères saillants d'un groupe de citoyens qui se signale à l'observation par l'affirmation d'une "conscience civique" régionale particulière.

8. Ce qui me situe

- dans une agglomération de plus de 100.000 hab. ☐
- dans une agglomération entre 50 et 100.000 hab. ☐
- dans une agglomération de 10 à 50.000 hab. ☐
- dans une agglomération de 2 à 10.000 hab. ☐
- dans une agglomération de moins de 2.000 hab. ☐

9. Dans cette agglomération, je me sens :

- Tout à fait chez moi ☐
- En train de faire mon trou ☐
- Pas vraiment chez moi ☐

10. Parmi les différents milieux dans lesquels je vis, les deux auxquels j'appartiens le plus fortement sont (*merci de mettre le chiffre 1 pour marquer l'appartenance la plus forte et le chiffre 2 pour l'appartenance que vous classez en second*) :

- le cercle de famille et d'amis ☐
- le voisinage, le quartier, la commune ☐
- un territoire plus grand ☐
- S.V.P., précisez ☐
- le milieu de travail ☐
- un autre milieu , une autre collectivité ☐
- S.V.P., précisez..... ☐
- Aucun ☐

11. Et pour les jeunes, demain, quelle sera à votre avis

l'appartenance la plus déterminante (*cocher une seule case*) :

- le cercle de famille et d'amis ? ☐
- le voisinage, le quartier, la commune ? ☐
- un territoire plus grand ? ☐
- S.V.P., précisez ☐
- le milieu de travail ? ☐
- un autre milieu , une autre collectivité ? ☐
- S.V.P., précisez..... ☐
- Aucun ? ☐

- plutôt les très jeunes (18 à 24 ans : 68,8%) et les plus âgés (jusqu'à 72,1% pour les plus de 75 ans) ;
- plutôt les Rhônalpins bien intégrés localement (67,2%) que ceux qui ne s'y sentent pas vraiment chez eux (56,5%) ;
- plutôt les plus attachés au milieu associatif (73,5%), au voisinage ou au quartier (70,8%) que les plus liés au cercle de famille et d'amis (64%) ou au milieu de travail (62%) ;
- plutôt des artisans et commerçants (83,6%), des retraités (72,2%), des cadres (69,6%), des chômeurs (67,8%) et des étudiants (67,7%) que des employés (57,5%) et des ouvriers (54,8%), les professions intermédiaires se situant à la moyenne (65,5%) ;
- plutôt les résidents de l'agglomération lyonnaise (69,2%), ceux des villes entre 10 000 et 50 000 habitants (68,5%) et entre 2 000 et 10 000 (66,9%) puis ceux de l'agglomération grenobloise (66,5%) ;
- plutôt les habitants des départements les plus prospères ou les plus dynamiques de la région —Isère (68,7%), Ain (68,4%) et Rhône (68,1%)— que ceux des départements moins favorisés ou moins bien intégrés —Ardèche (60,2%), Drôme et Loire (60,6%)—, les habitants de la Savoie (65,6%) et de la Haute-Savoie (62,3%) paraissant osciller entre la position des premiers, dont leur situation socio-économique les rapprocherait, et celle des seconds, vers laquelle la revendication traditionnelle de leur fort particularisme pourrait les incliner.

19. Vous semble-t-il qu'il y a un niveau qui a actuellement trop de pouvoir par rapport aux autres ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

Si oui, indiquez lequel ?

Comm. Dept. Rég. Etat Europ.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

20. Y-a-t-il un niveau qui, au contraire, n'a pas assez de pouvoir ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

Si oui, indiquez lequel ?

Comm. Dept. Rég. Etat Europ.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

Si, pour simplifier la vie politique et administrative, il fallait supprimer un ou plusieurs niveaux, proposeriez-vous :

21. De supprimer le niveau communal ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

22. De supprimer le niveau départemental ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

23. De supprimer le niveau régional ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

24. De supprimer le niveau national ?

— Oui

☐

— Non

☐

31. Les divers lieux, pays ou espaces qui composent Rhône-Alpes sont-ils :

- Plutôt semblables les uns aux autres ? ☐
- Plutôt différents les uns des autres ? ☐
- Trop différents pour pouvoir s'entendre ? ☐

32. Choisissez parmi ces pays, territoires ou lieux qui composent Rhône-Alpes celui qui semble le plus caractéristique de la Région Rhône-Alpes ?.....

33. Et lequel de ces pays, lieux ou espaces, est le plus différent des autres ?

.....

34. Ce pays, lieu ou espace est-il si différent que sa place serait plutôt dans une autre Région, existante ou à créer ?

- Oui ☐
- Non ☐

35. Et si l'on pouvait ajouter d'autres éléments dans la Région Rhône-Alpes, à quel espace, pays ou lieu feriez-vous volontiers appel ?