

7.2 The evolution of the selection procedures in the Liberal parties

For the purposes of this paper Liberal Representatives will be divided into two categories: those who were selected through a pure poll procedure and those who were not. The non-poll procedures include selection through a "hors poll" placement, or through a congress of delegates of local party sections, who approve a list proposal compiled by the constituency committee.

TABLE III GOES ABOUT HERE

Once again a steady decline in the use of the poll system is noticable. Of Liberal Representatives elected in the 1958-1978 period only 24.5 % were selected through a poll (21). In the seventies, the proportion was less than 10 %. In most non-poll selection procedures, constituency party committees compiled the candidate lists. In some constituencies a relatively small group of people (a "comité des sages", or the head of the list at the previous elections) drew up the list. In general, these proposed list were approved by a constituency congress of local section delegates. In some cases, they were approved by a general assembly of members. Occasionally the "hors poll" method was used.

7.3 Causes and consequences of the different selection procedures

An important cause of the decline in use of the poll system in the Liberal parties during the sixties was the electoral strategy of Omer van Audenhove, the new national president. To attract middle-class and conservative Catholic voters to the hitherto anti-clerical Liberal movement, he wanted to place prominent Catholic political personalities on the Liberal lists. His efforts met practically no resistance in the smaller constituencies, where primaries according to the poll system had not been held in the past. But in the larger and politically more significant constituencies, such as Brussels and Liège, the poll system was still in use. It was unlikely that traditional party members, who harbored strong anti-

clerical sentiments, would support Catholic aspirants. After unsuccessfully trying to abolish the Brussels poll the president managed to reserve two safe places (the third and the sixth) on the Chamber list for Catholic candidates in the 1965 elections. Both candidates were elected. In 1968, safe places were not reserved for anyone, and both candidates had to compete in the poll on the same footing as the other aspirants. They ended up in unsafe ninth and eleventh positions with the result that only one of the candidates was re-elected (22).

As in the case of the Flemish Socialist Party, the leaders of the national Liberal Party viewed the poll as an obstacle blocking the expansion of the party's electoral base. "In their eyes, the major purpose of the party is to acquire as much political power as possible by attracting as many votes as possible. To achieve this goal, they argue, members must be excluded from the selection procedure" (23).

In a few constituencies, organizations of the Liberal movement played a prominent role in the selection process. For example, a safe place was reserved in some constituencies for candidates representing the Liberal health insurance organization. As it is difficult to ascertain whether this occurred only towards the end of the 20 year period examined in this paper, it is impossible to determine to what extent the growing influence of intraparty organizations is responsible for the decline in use of the poll system in the Liberal parties.

The predominance of mainly electoralist considerations in composing the Liberal lists explains some features of legislative role behavior of Liberal parliamentarians. Only a few Liberal MP's are devoted to their work in Parliament. These frontbenchers usually become ministers when the Liberal party joins the Cabinet, thus reducing the Liberal parliamentary group to a mere government-supporting voting machine. The Liberal backbenchers concentrate heavily on their constituency service and locally held offices, and participate extensively in the socio-cultural life of their constituencies. They do so in an effort to give this former "parti des notables" a more popular image and stronger electoral appeal.

8. Candidate Selection in the Smaller Parties

It is impossible to analyse candidate selection in the smaller parties as thoroughly as in the three traditional parties. First, data is more scarce. Second, the smaller parties had limited numbers of Representatives, so the effects of the procedures used in their selection on legislative role behavior cannot be determined.

8.1 Candidate Selection in the Volksunie

The constituency committees of the Volksunie (the Flemish-nationalist party) draw up candidate lists, which must be approved by a constituency congress composed of delegates of local sections. In the first round, approval requires a two-thirds majority. In the second round only a simple majority is needed. If the list is not approved, the congress must vote on each candidate separately. The candidate lists adopted by the constituency congresses must then be approved by the national Party Council, which is composed of delegates from each constituency. The Party Council can alter the candidate lists by a simple majority vote.

Incumbents are automatically assigned to the same place they held on the previous electoral list, unless two-thirds of the constituency congress vote otherwise.

The main reason why the Volksunie adopted from the beginning this somewhat oligarchic selection procedure was its flexibility. It enabled party leaders to put well known Flemish nationalist candidates from outside the party on the lists. One reason for the party's rapid electoral success (from one seat in the House in 1958 to a peak of 21 in 1971) has been its ability to recruit new candidates (often with a Catholic political background) with strong nationalist appeal. This would not have been as easy in a system of candidate selection in which all party members could participate. This is especially true since many early party members were right wing extremists, the inheritants of the pre-war fascist movements. These hard-liners disliked the recruitment of new candidates, and in particular of those candidates with center and center-left political opinions.

The oligarchic selection procedures also allowed party leadership to recruit highly technically skilled legislators. As a result the present parliamentary group of the Volksunie is one of the most active groups in the Chamber.

8.2 Candidate selection in the French-speaking federalist parties

The "Commission Electorale" of the Brussels "Front Démocratique des Francophones" (FDF) selects all candidates for the lists in the three constituencies of the Brabant province. The Commission includes three incumbent parliamentarians, two non-candidates, and a member of the "Commission des Présidents" (which is composed of all presidents of local party sections). The candidate lists must be approved by the "Comité Directeur" which includes all FDF parliamentarians, the presidents of some local sections, some local councilpersons, and the members of the "Bureau Permanent". The only conditions of eligibility in the FDF are party membership and an age limit of 65.

In the "Rassemblement Wallon" (RW), the ally of the FDF which participates in all other French speaking constituencies, the "Comité Directeur" of each constituency draws up a model list which must usually be approved by an enlarged "Comité Directeur". In some constituencies the lists need to be approved in addition by a general assembly of all members. The constituency parties have a great degree of autonomy in regard to candidate selection procedures.

As in the Volksunie, the national leadership of the FDF-RW wanted to keep their lists open for new candidates. In fact, most FDF-RW parliamentarians had already been politically active in the PSC, the PSB, the Parti Libéral, or in organizations belonging to the Catholic, Socialist or Liberal pillars. Some FDF-RW parliamentarians were former parliamentarians in one of the three major parties. They joined the federalist party because they disapproved of the unitarist policies of their former parties. In order to recruit these already well known politicians, the national leadership of the FDF-RW had to be free to offer them safe places on the FDF-RW lists. Oligarchic selection procedures made this easier (24).

8.3 Candidate selection in the Belgian Communist Party

The national charter of the "Parti Communiste de Belgique" (PCB) stipulates that the national Central Committee shall, after consulting the constituency party, make a final selection of parliamentary candidates proposed by the constituency parties.

In most constituencies the local sections propose one or more candidates. The Constituency Bureau then composes a list which is to be approved by a congress of delegates of local sections. In some constituencies the proposed list must be approved by a general assembly of members. The final selection made by the Central Committee usually follows the recommendations of the constituency parties.

9. Conclusions

In the sixties, the three major Belgian parties offered their rank-and-file members substantial opportunities to participate in and even determine the outcome of the selection process of parliamentary candidates. The poll selection method often made members, rather than leaders, choose the nominees.

In the eyes of the national and constituency party leaders this democratic mass participation had many deficiencies. It tended to overemphasize tensions between different intraparty factions (divided along social, religious, linguistic lines). It rendered the recruitment of locally less popular, but valuable, new candidates rather difficult, and it prevented the composition of optimally attractive electoral lists.

Therefore, party leaders gradually began to replace general member polls with more oligarchic selection procedures (the overall decline in use of the poll system for all parties taken together is illustrated by TABLE IV). Today rank-and-file members exercise only an indirect influence, if any at all, on the selection of their representatives in Parliament.

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- J. OBLER, "Intraparty Democracy and the Selection of Parliamentary Candidates: The Belgian Case", in British Journal of Political Science, 1974, 4, p. 163-185
- (2) Though case studies were published abundantly in the seventies, regarding candidate selection procedures within a single party, during a single election, a systematic overview of the changes did not appear until 1980. See:
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- (3) A. RANNEY, "Candidate selection", in D. BUTLER, H.R. PENNIMAN, A. RANNEY (eds), Democracy at the Polls. A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, 1981, p. 75-106
- L.D. EPSTEIN, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1980, p. 228
- R.E.M. IRVING, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, Allen & Urwin, London, 1979, p. 177
- (4) L. DE WINTER, "Het gebruik van de voorkeurstemmen by de parlementsverkiezingen van 8 november 1981", in Res Publica, XXIV, (1982), 1, p. 151-163
- (5) In Belgium there are two ways of casting votes: a list vote and a preference vote. A list vote is a general approval of the party's choices while a preference vote is a ballot cast for a particular candidate.
- (6) J. OBLER, loc. cit., p. 169
- (7) Of the 13 post-war elections only three were held at the end of the prescribed four year period
- (8) L. DE WINTER, "Twintig jaar polls...", p. 568
- (9) Ibid, p. 576-578
- (10) The linguistic cleavage also had an impact on the changes in selection procedures, but only in the bilingual Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde constituency. There, all the national parties faced the problem of establishing linguistically balanced lists. Participation of party members who were linguistically not representative of the party electorate, would not produce a balanced list. In the CVP-PSC the Flemish were overrepresented in the party membership. The French speaking population was overrepresented in the Socialist and Liberal parties. In order to present balanced lists the constituency party leaders had to resort to selection procedures other than the pure poll method. Usually the safe places were proportionally distributed between Flemish and French speaking candidates. But at the end of the sixties the linguistic intraparty antagonisms became so great that even these compromises were no longer acceptable. All parties began presenting separate linguistic lists, which contributed to the eventual overall split in these parties.

- (11) A. CLEYMANS, De Niet-Aanwezige Staatsburger "revisited". De non-participatie een tweede maal sociologisch in kaart gebracht, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 1984, p. 32-44
- (12) The distribution of parliamentary seats between these groups over time has been stable. For the distribution of seats and the organization of the intra party interest groups within the CVP and the PSC in the seventies, see:
J. SMITS, "De standenvertegenwoordiging in de Christelijke Volkspartij en de Parti Social Chrétien", in Res Publica, XXIV,(1982),1,p. 107-115
- (13) Data derives from interviewing 160 Representatives of the 1978-1981 legislative term. Since coding is just finished, and data are not entirely ready yet to be runned on the computer, the above conclusions are to be considered as tentative. But, since the interviews and coding were done by myself, I'm convinced that my tentative conclusions will be confirmed by subsequent analysis of the data.
- (14) In the Central Council for the Economy, the National Labor Council, the National Committee for Economic Expansion, the National Labor Conferences and the Employment Conferences see:
A. VAN DEN BRANDE, "Neo-corporatism and functional-integral power. A sociological explanation of recent changes in the Belgian Polity, (to be published this year).
- (15) J. SMITS, loc. cit., p. 79-107
- (16) J. CEULEERS, "De verruimingsgedachte in de BSP: de lokale weerstanden", in De Nieuwe Maand, XXIII,(1980),1,P. 36-40
- (17) L. DE WINTER, loc. cit., p. 570
- (18) The wide use of the poll system also affects the campaign opportunities of the Socialist party. Organizing and executing a poll usually takes a few weeks, so the aspirants and the constituency campaign staff must wait for the final poll results before they can start the campaign, while other parties have already started weeks before. Since most elections in Belgium are premature, with only forty days between the dissolution of Parliament and the new elections, organizing a poll might jeopardize the electoral performance of the party
- (19) For important clientelist transactions, such as the provision of government jobs, clients are usually asked to become party members.
- (20) F. VERLEYEN, M. REYNEBAU, "Het scheiden van de markt", in KNACK, 27 february 1985, p. 16
- (21) L. DE WINTER, loc. cit., p.571
- (22) J. OBLER, loc. cit., p. 183
- (23) Ibid., p. 184
- (24) Ironically, exactly the same strategy today is being applied in the 1985 elections, but this time in the opposite direction. The national leadership of the PS has recently offered safe places on their Brussels constituency list to well known left-wing incumbents of the FDF, in an effort to unite all leftist federalist political parties. The Brussels PRL similarly offered safe places to some right-wing FDF parliamentarians.

TABLE I: The selection of parliamentary candidates in the CVP-PSC in the 1958-1978 period

| Year | Total number of examined representatives (2) | Number of examined representatives (3) | % examined representatives (4) = $\frac{3}{2} \times 100$ | Pure Poll | | Modified model list | | Adopted model list | | No Poll | | Total Poll | |
|------|--|--|---|-----------|------|---------------------|------|--------------------|------|---------|------|------------|-------------|
| | | | | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| (1) | | | | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13)=5+7+9 | (14)=6+8+10 |
| 1958 | 104 | 99 | 95,2 | 14 | 14,1 | 5 | 5,1 | 73 | 73,7 | 7 | 7,1 | 92 | 92,9 |
| 1961 | 96 | 65 | 67,7 | 13 | 20 | 5 | 7,7 | 32 | 49,2 | 15 | 23,1 | 50 | 76,9 |
| 1965 | 77 | 63 | 79,7 | 5 | 7,9 | 15 | 23,8 | 20 | 31,8 | 23 | 36,5 | 40 | 63,5 |
| 1968 | 69 | 69 | 100 | 2 | 2,9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 67 | 97,1 | 2 | 2,9 |
| 1971 | 67 | 67 | 100 | 3 | 4,5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 62 | 92,5 | 5 | 7,5 |
| 1974 | 72 | 65 | 90,2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,6 | 62 | 95,4 | 3 | 4,6 |
| 1977 | 80 | 80 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 1978 | 82 | 82 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 9,8 | 74 | 90,2 | 8 | 9,7 |
| | 647 | 520 | 91,2 | 37 | 6,3 | 25 | 4,2 | 138 | 23,4 | 390 | 66,1 | 200 | 33,9 |

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TABLE II : The selection of parliamentary candidates in the Socialist parties in the 1958-1978 period

| Year | Total number Representatives | Number examined Representatives | % examined Representatives | Poll | | No Poll | |
|------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------|------|---------|------|
| | | | | Number | % | Number | % |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| 1958 | 84 | 73 | 86,9 | 66 | 90,4 | 7 | 9,6 |
| 1961 | 84 | 50 | 57,5 | 39 | 78,0 | 11 | 22 |
| 1965 | 64 | 38 | 59,4 | 28 | 73,7 | 10 | 26,3 |
| 1968 | 59 | 45 | 76,3 | 34 | 75,6 | 11 | 24,4 |
| 1971 | 61 | 61 | 100 | 30 | 49,2 | 31 | 50,8 |
| 1974 | 59 | 59 | 100 | 33 | 55,9 | 26 | 44,1 |
| 1977 | 62 | 62 | 100 | 28 | 45,2 | 34 | 54,8 |
| 1978 | 58 | 58 | 100 | 9 | 15,5 | 49 | 84,5 |
| | 531 | 446 | 84,0 | 267 | 59,9 | 179 | 40,1 |

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TABLE III : The selection of parliamentary candidates in the Liberal parties in the 1958-1978 period

| Year | Total number Representatives | Number examined Representatives | % examined Representatives | Poll | | No Poll | |
|------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------|------|---------|------|
| | | | | Number | % | Number | % |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| 1958 | 21 | 18 | 75 | 14 | 77,8 | 4 | 22,2 |
| 1961 | 20 | 13 | 65 | 8 | 61,5 | 5 | 38,5 |
| 1965 | 48 | 33 | 68,8 | 13 | 39,4 | 20 | 60,6 |
| 1968 | 47 | 35 | 74,5 | 13 | 37,1 | 22 | 62,9 |
| 1971 | 34 | 34 | 100 | 3 | 8,8 | 31 | 91,2 |
| 1974 | 30 | 30 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 100 |
| 1977 | 33 | 26 | 78,8 | 1 | 3,8 | 25 | 96,2 |
| 1978 | 37 | 33 | 89,2 | 3 | 9,1 | 30 | 90,9 |
| | 270 | 222 | 82,2 | 55 | 24,8 | 167 | 75,2 |



TABLE IV : The selection of parliamentary candidates in all parties in the 1958-1978 period

| Year | "Polled" Repres. in CVP, BSP, PVV | "Non-pol led" Rep in CVP, BSP, PVV | Number VU-Rep. | Number FDF-RW Repres. | Number PCB-Rep. | Repres. other parties | Total non-pol-led Rep. | Select. method unknown | Total Number Repres. | Total known cases | % "polled" Repres. | % "non-polled" Repres. | % known cases |
|------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8-3+4+5+6+7) | (9) | (10-2+8+9) | (11-10-9) | $\frac{2}{11} \times 100$ | $\frac{11-8}{11} \times 100$ | (14) |
| 1958 | 172 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 21 | 19 | 212 | 193 | 89,1 | 10,9 | 91,0 |
| 1961 | 97 | 31 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 43 | 72 | 212 | 140 | 69,3 | 30,7 | 66,0 |
| 1965 | 81 | 53 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 76 | 55 | 212 | 157 | 51,6 | 48,4 | 74,1 |
| 1968 | 49 | 100 | 20 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 137 | 26 | 212 | 186 | 26,3 | 73,7 | 87,7 |
| 1971 | 38 | 124 | 21 | 24 | 5 | 0 | 174 | 0 | 212 | 212 | 17,9 | 82,1 | 100 |
| 1974 | 36 | 118 | 22 | 25 | 4 | 0 | 189 | 7 | 212 | 205 | 17,6 | 82,4 | 96,7 |
| 1977 | 29 | 139 | 20 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 176 | 7 | 212 | 205 | 14,1 | 85,9 | 96,7 |
| 1978 | 20 | 153 | 14 | 15 | 4 | 2 | 188 | 4 | 212 | 208 | 9,6 | 90,4 | 98,1 |
| | 522 | 736 | 115 | 96 | 33 | 4 | 984 | 190 | 1696 | 1506 | 34,7 | 65,3 | 88,8 |



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**THE SELECTION OF PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES
IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND**

Michael Gallagher
Department of Politics
Trinity College
Dublin 2
Ireland.

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Selection in Comparative Perspective,
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The selection of parliamentary candidates in the Republic of Ireland

In the context of this workshop it is unnecessary to stress the importance of the topic of candidate selection. Its role in the political recruitment process can be as important as the role of elections. Pesonen (1968, p. 348) observes that 'the nomination stage eliminates 99.96 per cent of all the eligible people. The voters choose from only 0.04 per cent'. In addition, candidate selection has been identified as the key arena of intra-party conflict. According to Schattschneider (1942, p. 64), 'he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party', so that the nominating process 'is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party'. Ranney, too, emphasises the central importance of candidate selection, arguing that what is at stake in the process 'is nothing less than control of the core of what the party stands for and does' (1981, p. 103). One of the aims of this workshop will be to explore, in a comparative context, the validity of this viewpoint which accords major significance to the candidate selection process.

The aim of this paper is more modest. It will examine the process of candidate selection in the Republic of Ireland, at elections to the Dail (the lower house of parliament). First, it will outline the mechanics of candidate selection in Ireland, and attempt to identify the distinctive features of the process. Second, it will examine the causes of these features, by considering the impact of a set of factors which can be expected to have a major impact on the process in every country. Third, it will look for consequences of the nature of the candidate selection process, and finally it will attempt to draw conclusions about the salience of candidate selection.

1 The candidate selection process in Ireland

This section will first describe the way in which candidates are selected by the Irish parties, and will then seek to identify the features of the process which warrant emphasis in a cross-national context.

1.1 Candidate selection by the Irish parties

The mechanics of candidate selection in the main Irish parties are similar in essentials but differ in details [1]. The basic picture in each case is that candidates are selected at constituency level, by a convention consisting of delegates from all the party branches in the constituency. The party's national executive has the final say, by reserving the right to veto the candidate(s) selected; it also has, in most cases, the power to determine the number of candidates the convention may select, and the right to add a name to the panel selected locally.

1.1.1 Fianna Fail

Fianna Fail conventions are attended by three delegates from each branch in the constituency (the party has an average of about 70 branches in each of the 41 constituencies in the country). In addition, the constituency organisation itself (Comhairle Dailcheantair) sends two delegates, and each Comhairle Ceantair (an organisation based on the county electoral area, of

which there are on average about four per Dail constituency) also sends two delegates. The constituency youth organisation (Ogra Fianna Fail) sends two delegates. The average Fianna Fail convention, then, would have about 220 delegates. According to the most recent organisational figures available, the party's largest selection conference (in Clare) would have about 440 delegates, and its smallest (in Dublin South-East) only about 40. The convention chairman, who does not have a vote, is appointed by the national executive.

The national executive recommends the number of candidates to be selected by the convention (which sometimes does not heed its recommendation), and may stipulate that one or more candidates must come from a particular part of the constituency, as it sometimes does where a constituency is composed of readily distinguishable geographic units. Who is eligible to be nominated for a candidacy? Curiously, it is not necessary to be a member of the party, for the constitution states (Rule 2) that in order to become a member, one must either be accepted by a branch or 'be selected as a Fianna Fail candidate for parliamentary or local government elections and have signed the appropriate pledge'. The only requirement is that aspirants must be proposed and seconded at the convention by delegates [2]. For a proposal to be valid, aspirants must sign the 'pledge', undertaking, among other things, that, if elected to parliament, they will resign their seat if the National Executive, by a majority of two-thirds of its members, calls on them to do so. Aspirants may not be convention delegates, nor - a strange stipulation - may they even attend the convention until the selection has been completed.

When the proposals have all been made, the convention proceeds to the actual selection. Fianna Fail, unlike the other parties, uses elimination voting for each place on the panel. The names of all the aspirants are placed before the convention for the first place on the panel. If none wins a majority of the votes the lowest placed candidate is eliminated and a further vote takes place, and this process continues until one aspirant wins a majority of the votes. The remaining aspirants then go through the same process for each of the remaining places on the panel [3].

The names of the selected candidates are forwarded to the party's national executive, 'which shall consider whether the person or persons thus recommended are suitable to contest the election in the constituency, and if so satisfied, shall ratify their selection'. The constitution also empowers the national executive 'to add a name or names to the panel of candidates to be nominated', if it believes 'that such action is necessary in the best interests of the organisation'. In addition, the constitution gives the national executive power to by-pass the entire convention process if it sees fit. The national executive may, under Rule 46, insist on receiving suggestions direct from branches before the convention; it scrutinises the suggestions and may add a name or names to the list; and this list then goes before the convention. In exceptional circumstances, namely in a constituency where the national executive believes that 'the state of the organisation is not such as would enable a representative convention to be held' (Rule 52), the national executive receives suggestions from branches as under Rule 46 and then simply selects the candidates itself, without being confined to those suggested by the branches. There is no record of either Rule 46 or Rule 52 ever having been invoked.

The party constitution, of course, does not give a complete picture of what actually takes place at conventions. One important informal feature is that it is common at conventions, though not universal, for a proposal to be put and passed that incumbents be declared selected by acclamation, without needing to fight for a place. In addition, the constitution alone might give a misleading impression of the national executive's role, for its powers to conduct the selection itself and to compel deputies to resign their seats have always lain dormant, and it has very rarely vetoed a candidate. It does,

though, sometimes add candidates of its own to those selected locally, and there are signs that its interventions are on the increase. At the 1977 election it added sixteen candidates to the 116 selected at conventions (Marsh, 1981, p. 273), though in November 1982 it added only 3 to the 129 selected locally (the Fianna Fail general secretary commented that this showed how well the conventions went). Another token of the centre's increased interest in candidate selection came in July 1984, when it was announced that the party had set up a 'high-powered committee', under the chairmanship of the party leader, to identify strong potential candidates and attempt to promote their prospects, by discussions with the relevant constituency organisations, in advance of the selection conferences.

1.1.2 Fine Gael

The Fine Gael constitution spells out fewer details than Fianna Fail's, giving greater latitude to the national executive to make and alter the detailed regulations governing the nomination process. Fine Gael goes to greater lengths than its rivals to ensure that conventions are not 'packed' by supporters of a particular aspirant. When each branch is entitled to a fixed number of delegates, as is the case in the other parties, there is an obvious incentive for an aspirant to spread his support among as many branches as possible. If, for example, an aspirant knows he has the support of 100 members in and around his home base, his support at the convention is much greater if they are organised in ten 10-member branches than in one 100-member branch. He also has an incentive to bring his friends into the party and form them into acquiescent branches which will be entitled to convention votes. The consequence may be that areas around aspirants' home bases are heavily saturated with 'paper branches', inactive except at conventions, so that the party's organisation on the ground is much less effective than the high number of branches would suggest.

To avert this possibility, which is obviously dysfunctional for the party, Fine Gael devised in 1978 a 'model system' designed to render the creation of paper branches pointless. Each branch is deemed responsible for a part of the constituency, termed its 'functional area'. At the convention, the number of delegates awarded to a branch depends on the size of the electorate in its functional area. This is similar, but not identical, to the Norwegian system: the convention, write Valen and Katz (1964, p. 21), is 'composed of delegates from the individual communes in the constituency, the number of delegates from each commune being allocated according to the number of votes for that party at the preceding Storting election'. The consequence of Fine Gael's system is that ten 10-member branches in an area would receive in total hardly any more delegates than one 100-member branch covering the same area, since each would have a functional area a tenth the size of the 100-member branch's. This more or less removes any incentive to create paper branches, though, on the debit side, it could almost constitute a disincentive to extend and improve the organisation, as a branch in an area where the party is weak will receive more delegates than one in the party's strong areas, as the former's functional area will be larger. (The Norwegian system, in contrast, rewards the local organisation in areas where the party is strong, by linking the number of delegates to party votes rather than the size of the electorate.) Outside Dublin and Cork City, where the numbers are slightly different, a branch is entitled to a basic three delegates if its functional area is 500 or fewer, plus an additional delegate for every 250 electors in its functional area. Outside Dublin, each branch's functional area contains, on average, about 950 electors, so the average branch would send five members to the convention. Each convention, then, would have on average about 320 delegates, the range nationally being from approximately 120 to 450. As in Fianna Fail conventions, the number of aspirants is rarely more than four more than the number of candidates to be selected.

The national executive lays down the minimum and maximum number (which are almost always the same) of candidates the convention may select. As in Fianna Fail, the national executive may withhold ratification from a candidate or add a name to the list, and it may stipulate that one or more candidates must come from a particular part of the constituency. Aspiring candidates must take a 'party pledge', and must promise that, if elected, they will 'contribute to the Party such sums as the Parliamentary Party shall have determined or may from time to time determine' (Rule 45 (iii)). Voting at the convention is by the same electoral system as that used at national elections, i.e. the single transferable vote with multi-member constituencies, so that only one ballot is needed no matter how many aspirants there are, whereas a Fianna Fail convention might involve fifteen or even more. In Fine Gael there is no question, as in Fianna Fail, of incumbents being selected automatically; indeed, one of the main reasons behind the introduction of the 'model system' was precisely to prevent incumbents effectively controlling the nomination process via captive branches. Fine Gael practice resembles that of Fianna Fail in that while the national executive quite often adds candidates to a panel selected by a convention (in November 1982 it added 8 to the 107 picked by conventions), it rarely if ever vetoes a candidate selected locally.

The party has gone considerably further than Fianna Fail when it comes to central involvement in the process. After suffering a heavy defeat at the 1977 general election, Fine Gael embarked on a complete overhaul of its organisation, initiated and executed by the centre. Head office was expanded considerably and began to monitor constituency organisations closely. Before each of the three subsequent elections, it attempted to identify the key marginals where extra effort and attention was needed to save or win a seat. It has gone to the lengths of devising detailed tactics to apply to each such constituency, involving identifying strong potential candidates, working out the likely pattern of elimination of Fine Gael and other candidates, and engaging in 'vote management', which entails attempting to spread the party's voting support among its candidates in such a way as to maximise its return in seats. This is usually achieved by ensuring that the potential seat-winners each receive, as nearly as possible, about the same number of first preferences. Vote management can involve persuading incumbents to agree to some of their support being siphoned off to other candidates, and on the whole this has been successfully accomplished where it has been attempted. An important means of facilitating central intervention was the introduction of the post of constituency organiser (CO) in each constituency, an unpaid individual who liaises with head office and acts as its eyes and ears. The CO is ex officio ineligible to be a candidate at the next election, and is thus in a position to give relatively disinterested advice to head office about nomination strategies and about the merits of particular individuals.

1.1.3 Labour

Labour's candidate selection procedure is not specified in the party's constitution, which states merely that the national executive 'shall prescribe the procedure to be adopted for the selection of the party's candidates', and that all organs of the party 'must comply with the procedure so prescribed'. The entire system can thus be changed without the need, as in the major parties, to change the party constitution, which would require the consent of members at an annual conference.

Like those of Fianna Fail, Labour conventions are attended by a fixed number of delegates per branch. Each branch is represented by four delegates, so with an average of 12 branches per constituency, the average convention would be attended by about 50 delegates. More so than the major parties, Labour's strength is spread unevenly around the country. In several constituencies it has no organisation at all, and in a few others it has fewer than five branches, so selection conferences are attended by at most twenty

people. In one or two constituencies where the party organisation is strongest, the number might approach 200. Aspirants must have been party members for at least six months. Voting, as in Fine Gael, is by the single transferable vote. The number of candidates to be run is decided by the convention, rather than the national executive as in the other parties, but Labour's national executive has the same power to refuse to ratify a candidate and/or to add one to the panel selected. In July 1994, a new rule was introduced to allow the party leader (who is elected by the deputies) and the party chairman (elected by annual conference), acting together, to add candidates to those selected by a convention.

Labour differs from the other parties in that it has corporate members, namely those trade unions which are affiliated to the party. The unions do not directly control any candidacies via 'sponsored' MPs as they do in Britain, and there is no requirement in the party's rules, as there is in the British Labour Party (Ranney, 1965, p. 135), that a candidate be, if eligible, a member of a trade union. Even so, Labour aspirants are certainly helped by belonging to a union which is affiliated to the party, as their union will then make a contribution to the local campaign. The sum involved will not be large, perhaps around £2,000 or less, but this might still be significant given the fairly low sums involved in expenditure by the local organisation. Consequently, this may incline Labour conventions to favour a union member over a non-unionist, but only when other things are equal; the likely contribution of the respective aspirants towards winning a seat for the party would be the main consideration. In any case, this would help only individual trade unionists rather than the trade unions themselves; there would be no question, for example, of a local Labour organisation giving a nomination to a union and inviting it to fill it with the candidate of its choice.

1.1.4 Other parties

The only other parties in the state with pretensions to a nationwide organisation are the Workers' Party and Sinn Féin, both of which won about five per cent of the votes at the June 1984 European Parliament elections. These parties would very rarely nominate more than one candidate in any constituency.

The Workers' Party, in essence an Irish Eurocommunist party, has been through a prolonged process of transformation from the political wing of a military organisation, a role it abandoned in the early to mid 1970s, to a political party seeking power via elections. Consequently, its constitution still makes no detailed provision for certain unavoidable events, and candidate selection is among them. The constitution says only that candidates are to be nominated by constituency councils and are subject to ratification by the national executive; and that all candidates for any public office must meet certain criteria, namely 'continuous party membership of at least two years; active participation in internal education courses and a record of consistent and efficient work on behalf of the party'. The latter requirement, that candidates be immersed in the party subculture, appears to be characteristic of parties on the left, especially communist parties.

The lack of further detail creates a good deal of uncertainty, at all levels of the party, about exactly how candidates are supposed to be selected. Conventions are attended by delegates on the same basis as annual conferences: branches with up to ten members send four delegates, and those with over ten members send six. This results, with very few exceptions, in conventions of fewer than thirty delegates. In practice the absence of detailed guidelines causes few problems, because there are very few contests at the nomination stage. In most constituencies where it has an organisation, one individual is usually established as the Workers' Party's electoral flagbearer, and this individual is almost invariably unopposed at the nomination convention.

Sinn Fein is Ireland's only 'anti-system' party; it does not recognise the legitimacy of the Dublin regime, and although it sometimes nominates candidates at Dail elections, its policy is one of not taking any seats it wins. The detailed rules for nomination conventions are not part of the party constitution, which stipulates merely that 'only those whose membership of the Republican Movement exceeds 12 months shall be eligible for selection and nomination' as candidates (Rule 39). As in the other parties, candidates have to take a party pledge, which, in the light of Sinn Fein's role as the political arm of the IRA, exposes them to penalties more draconian than those the other parties impose for breaches of party discipline. They must undertake 'that, if elected, I will not sit in, nor take part in, the proceedings of any parliament, legislating or purporting to legislate, for the people of Ireland other than the Parliament of the Irish Republic representative of the entire 32 counties of Ireland', and affirm 'that I take this pledge voluntarily, of my own free will and in the full knowledge that any breach of [the above undertaking] ... will be regarded as an act of treachery, to be dealt with as such'. In practice it seems that the Sinn Fein national executive has greater power than other parties' executives to intervene in the process and, indeed, effectively to make the selection. This is because, with candidates pledged not to attend parliament, voting for Sinn Fein is essentially a symbolic act, and is not influenced greatly by the identity of the candidate or by such factors as whether he has local roots.

1.2 Irish candidate selection: an overview

From the above detailed accounts of the selection process in each of the Irish parties, what general patterns emerge? First, the qualities formally needed by aspirants vary somewhat: to be selected by one of the two major parties it is not even necessary to be a party member, but the smaller parties require membership of six months or a year. Second, although many of the formidable paper powers of the national executive lie dormant, it is clear that national headquarters in all parties, especially Fine Gael, are taking a closer interest in candidate selection. They are increasingly active at what might be termed the 'pre-selection' stage, to try to smooth the path for bright local prospects and to persuade local organisations to select them. While the national executives hardly ever veto candidates, they quite often add names to the panel selected locally.

Third, the informal traits needed to be selected do not vary much between parties. In each party incumbency is, almost invariably, a sufficient quality for selection; local roots are almost mandatory; and holding a local elective office, having polled respectably on a previous candidacy (which gives a candidate a headstart in terms of public visibility and campaign experience), and having a geographic base which is advantageous from the point of view of giving the party a balanced ticket, are all assets. This can be demonstrated by surveying the backgrounds of the selected candidates (see Table 1). Of the

(TABLE 1)

main parties' candidates at the November 1982 general election, over 80 per cent had had a previous candidacy, most held a local elective office, and most were incumbents (no incumbent failed to be reselected). Virtually all lived in the constituency for which they were selected. That parties aim to nominate a panel of candidates who between them cover the constituency, rather than candidates whose home bases are all close to one another, is clear from numerous convention reports. It is also evident from the backgrounds of those selected: Marsh (1981, p. 274) found that it was rare to find a clustering of candidates' home bases. Norwegian conventions also aim for geographical balance on the panel (Valen, 1966, pp. 128-9), but the other aspects of group representation which they and conventions in many other countries must bear in mind (occupational, cultural, religious, demographic and so on) do not have anything like the same salience in Ireland. Even though there is no information on unsuccessful aspirants with which these data can be compared, it

can hardly be doubted that the factors identified here are powerful assets for a would-be candidate. The only significant difference between the parties lies in the fact that Labour aspirants are helped by belonging to a trade union affiliated to the party, as described above.

The fourth point to note is that there seems to be fairly wide involvement of party members in the selection process, even though the great majority of party voters are excluded. Calculation of the proportions is difficult because of geographic variations, within a party, of the number of people who attend its conventions, and because the parties are unable to be precise as to how many members they have. Using the most realistic estimates produces the figures given in Table 2. This suggests that the proportion of party members

(TABLE 2)

who are entitled to attend selection conferences ranges from about a fifth to something over two-fifths, while the proportion of party voters is only 1 or 2 per cent. Fine Gael allows the widest involvement of members and voters, and Fianna Fail the narrowest.

2 Irish candidate selection: distinctive features

Before discussing the causes and consequences of the distinctive or unusual features of any country's candidate selection process, one must first be clear about what those features are. This is not easy given the lack of reliable multi-nation information which would make it possible to see which aspects of any one country's practices deviate from a norm. It is hoped that this workshop will go some way towards establishing just what these norms are.

Despite the absence, for the moment, of such reliably established general patterns, it will be asserted that candidate selection in Ireland deviates from the process in most countries in several respects. First, the involvement of party members is considerably wider than in most other countries. Second, local party elites, i.e. office holders in the local party organisation, have relatively little power, as the important local voices in the process are those of the incumbent deputies. Third, the parties' central organisations have in some senses more power than most of their counterparts elsewhere, but it is a power which is qualified by other factors.

The involvement of party members in the selection process seems to be relatively extensive by the standards of most competitive political systems, except for the invariably deviant case of the USA. At the other end of the scale, there are parties where the leader alone picks the candidates, as in the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi and, apparently, the major Greek parties (Palmer, 1971, pp. 121-3; Loulis, 1981, p. 71; Elephantis, 1981, p. 124; Kohler, 1982, p. 121). In the New Zealand Labour Party, a panel of only six members makes the selection (Jackson, 1980, pp. 101-2). Members' involvement is also, of course, low where the national executive selects the candidates. Even when the decision is an entirely local one, very few people may be actually involved. This is the case in Britain, as well as West Germany, where candidates for the single-member constituency seats are picked at conferences attended by on average only 50 to 100 delegates, amounting to about 3 per cent of party members and 0.09 per cent of party voters (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979, p. 93). In the New Zealand National Party, about 5 per cent of members are involved (Jackson, 1980, p. 102). In some countries, the process is widened by holding party polls, or primaries, in which all dues-paying members can participate directly in selection. The Belgian parties used to hold such polls, but turnout seems usually to have fallen short of half of all members, and to have represented usually no more than 2 or 3 per cent of party members (Obler, 1974, esp. pp. 174-5, 185). The figure here for party members seems no higher than that for Fine Gael at least. In any case, more recent research indicates that party polls are now little used by any of the Belgian parties

(Fitzmaurice, 1983, pp. 92-3, 153, 156-7, 161-2, 170, 176). In 1975 the Austrian OeVP used consultative polls to select candidates, open to all voters. This produced very high (by comparative standards) participation of party members and voters, but the experiment was not repeated in 1979 (Sully, 1981, p. 81). In the Australian Labor Party, too, plebiscites among all party members, once common, are now less so, though they are still used in the National Country Party, in New South Wales at least (Epstein, 1977, p. 26; Cribb, 1977, p. 151). In only two European countries, in fact, does participation seem to be much wider than in Ireland. Some (now perhaps outdated) research from Sweden (quoted in Epstein, 1980, pp. 227-8) suggests that the right-wing parties consult their entire local membership by mail ballot, although seemingly the final decision is made by a committee. And in Denmark, the Social Democrats' candidates, once selected, 'must be re-selected annually by a meeting at which all party members may attend and vote' (Fitzmaurice, 1981, p. 107).

The lack of power of a local party elite (i.e. office holders in the local party organisation who are not themselves aspirants) would certainly set Ireland apart from most countries, where it is accepted that this group makes the effective decision, even when a much wider group is involved in the process of selection. The general practice, according to Obler (1974, p. 163), is as follows: 'Extra-parliamentary party leaders usually pick the nominees in closed private meetings and then submit their choice to rank and file party members and/or delegates who nearly always grant their approval'. Epstein, too, states (1980, p. 225) that 'oligarchical control over candidate selection is usual, but it is not always managed in the same way'. This accurately describes the situation in Britain, where only a few people are involved anyway, and in Belgium, where even when party polls existed, the local elite controlled the process in the two main parties through such devices as model lists and strict eligibility requirements. Obler refers also (p. 181) to 'influential party figures ... who often informally control the votes of several hundred members'. Similarly, in Sweden, despite the provision for the entire membership to be consulted, Andren (1961, p. 33) states that 'the constituency party leadership remains on the whole in full control of the final draft of the list of candidates'.

The third distinctive feature of Irish candidate selection concerns the power wielded by the central organisation. This factor is, of course, extremely difficult to operationalise. One might count the number of times head office alters a locally-selected panel, either by adding or removing names, and indeed this indicator has some validity. But it must be borne in mind that the absence of such head office intervention might signify not powerlessness but satisfaction with the panel selected locally, as claimed by Fianna Fail in November 1982 (see above), or even successful head office intervention behind the scenes at the pre-selection stage. Alternatively, one could interview head office personnel and national leaders to find out whether they were dissatisfied with the extent of their power in the selection process. This too, though a useful exercise, is not entirely satisfactory, as the expectations of individuals in these roles may be unduly circumscribed by their perceptions of what is realistic in the given political system, and consequently head office personnel in one country may be satisfied with a degree of power which would not satisfy their counterparts in another country.

However, these difficulties have not prevented researchers from drawing conclusions about central power in different countries. The most common pattern, true of most countries, is that the central organisation has the right to veto candidates selected locally, but rarely uses it. There are some countries where the centre does not even have this formal power, such as Norway and Sweden (except for the Communist Party). The extent of involvement by the national executives of the Irish parties, certainly of Fine Gael, clearly exceeds that of their counterparts in these countries. Only a few countries

experience greater central involvement than Ireland. These include India and Greece, mentioned above, Israel and the Netherlands (where the existence of only one constituency encompassing the entire country necessitates central control), and the Austrian Socialist Party, the SPÖe (Sully, 1961, p. 55). New Zealand Labour Party candidates are picked by a six-member panel, three appointed by the central organisation and three by the local organisation. It seems safe to assume that in most Communist parties candidate selection is tightly controlled by the centre, in keeping with the general supremacy of the extra-parliamentary organisation over the parliamentary group. But in Ireland a distinction must be drawn between central involvement and central control: the former exists, the latter does not. Although the national executive and head office take a very active interest in selection in each constituency, and often add names to those chosen locally, they cannot impose whomsoever they wish on a constituency. They are constrained by the informal requirement that all candidates selected be local people (see Section 3.3 below). There is no Irish equivalent of the list of centrally 'approved' candidates kept by the head offices of the two main British parties.

3 Causes

In seeking to explain the distinctive features of candidate selection in Ireland, a number of possible causes are worth considering. These are legal provisions, the electoral system, political culture, political style and financial power.

3.1 Legal provisions

Legal provisions can immediately be dismissed as a cause of the nature of Ireland's candidate selection process, since there are none relating to it. Political parties are 'unknown to the law' in Britain, and in this, as in many other areas, Ireland has followed British practice. Its constitution makes no mention of parties, and its electoral system does not assume their existence. Only since 1963 have candidates' party affiliations even appeared on the ballot paper at elections. So, under Irish law, parties or other groups are free to select parliamentary candidates in whatever fashion they wish.

3.2 Electoral system

In all countries the electoral system will have an impact on the candidate selection process. For example, when a country has a list system with only one constituency, as in Israel, candidate selection must of necessity be centralised. The system used in Ireland, the single transferable vote in multi-member constituencies, has three main features:

- (a) Intra-party competition between candidates
- (b) Small territorial constituencies
- (c) Voters are permitted to vote across party lines

The first aspect, the fact that voters can choose between candidates of the same party, does not directly affect the candidate selection process, but, in conjunction with other factors, it seems to have an impact on Irish political style, which in turn leads to the creation by deputies of personal 'machines' within the party organisation (see section 3.4).

The second aspect, small constituency size, has an impact on the importance of candidate selection, and it too has a bearing on the style of politics. Constituencies are small with regard to both district magnitude (which averages 4 deputies per constituency) and the ratio of deputies to population (1:20,000, with a ratio of 1 deputy to every 14,000 electors). This also means that the number of votes by which the last seat is won is not large; at the most recent (November 1962) election, this margin was about 1,800 votes.

Consequently, it is important to pick the right candidates - even if one aspirant is going to draw in only a few hundred votes more at the election than another, this could still represent the difference between winning and losing a seat. This is especially important given that parliamentary majorities too are usually small; it is very uncommon for a government to have a majority of even as many as ten seats in the Dail. In addition, small constituencies make it possible for deputies to be known personally to some extent by their constituents, and if some deputies make the effort to get themselves known, the rest have to as well. At the November 1982 election, the number of first preference votes received by each deputy averaged only 7,265, which naturally encourages a close relationship between deputies and constituents. Under any electoral system, when constituency size is large it is reasonable to expect that party voters will be more likely simply to vote for their party's candidates in the order in which they appear on the ballot paper, be that a party-determined list order or (as in Ireland) alphabetical order. Certainly, in a large constituency, constituency activity alone will not be sufficient for a candidate to raise his profile significantly [4].

Third, the fact that voters can cross party lines under STV, unlike most preferential voting systems, also restricts the power of a selectorate by making it more important that the most electorally appealing ticket is picked. Indeed, voters need not vote along party lines at all, although most do. Under STV, every candidate needs direct personal endorsement in order to be elected, and in addition no vote can help a candidate unless it explicitly contains a preference for him or her. Under a rigid list system, though, party voters will almost invariably endorse the party list even if they dislike one of the candidates in a safe position. Under a preferential voting system with an ordered list, as in Belgium, a candidate high enough on the list will be elected even if unattractive to party voters. Even when the list is not ordered by the party, as in Finland, a candidate can be helped by voters who do not like him, since a vote in which any candidate on the list is counted as a vote for the entire list. Under a first-past-the-post system, of course, voting for the party and for the candidate are inseparable acts. Under all of these electoral systems, then, a voter cannot express disapproval of one of the party's candidates without deserting the party entirely, a step more drastic than most voters will wish to take unless their aversion to the nominee in question is vehement. Only panachage systems come close to allowing voters the same latitude as STV in this respect.

Under STV it is perfectly possible to express support for the party while withholding support from one of its candidates. For example, if the Fianna Fail party in one constituency nominates four candidates, a voter disliking one of them can give his first three preferences to the three acceptable candidates and the fourth and subsequent preferences to the most palatable of the other parties' nominees, missing out his bete noire. If he does so, then his vote can never be of any benefit to this candidate. Clearly, this consideration applies only to relatively weak party identifiers, as the strong ones would probably swallow their reservations and place attachment to their party ahead of dislike of one of its nominees. But when the number of votes separating victory from defeat is so small, even the weak identifiers, like the non-identifiers and the other parties' weak identifiers, cannot be ignored, as their support may be vital. Besides, it must be remembered that the two main parties in Ireland are very similar with regard to policy, so a weak Fianna Fail identifier confronted with what he regards as a gap in his party's ticket will probably have no difficulty in finding an acceptable Fine Gael candidate, such as one with a neighbourhood home base, to whom to give his next preference. But in a more ideological party system, it is less likely that a gap in a right-wing party's ticket can be filled, even in a weak identifier's case, by a left-wing candidate. This is a defect, but it is the freedom of manoeuvre of the selectors, and perhaps gives extra authority to those with demonstrated electoral popularity, such as the incumbents, although it is not

as significant a factor as deputies' dominance of the local party organisation (section 3.4).

At the same time, there is one aspect of STV which allows a greater role for the national executive than most electoral systems permit. This is that a name can be added to a locally selected panel without directly damaging any of those originally selected. This is not possible in single-member constituencies, where the national executive cannot put its own nominee on the ticket without displacing the local choice, or under an ordered list system, where giving someone a high place on the list means pushing everyone else down a place. But under STV, and where unordered list systems are used, the national executive can add a name without displacing anyone. If the local organisation protests, the national executive can point out that it is simply increasing the choice available to the voters, and that, after all, if party voters do not like its nominee, they can reject him or her. Excessive protests by any of the locally selected candidates may suggest fear that the new addition will prove more popular with the voters. Although there are dangers in a party nominating too many candidates (for discussion of whether there is an optimum number and, if so, what it is, see Katz, 1981; Gallagher, 1980, pp. 492-5; Lijphart and Irwin, 1979), and it is possible that two candidates will fail to win a seat between them where one would have succeeded, it is nonetheless unlikely in most circumstances that nominating, say, four candidates instead of three will have any adverse effects.

3.3 Political culture

Mention of what the voters want raises the question of just what voters' wishes are. From studies of Irish political culture there emerges a consensus that voters, particularly outside Dublin, have a very localistic political culture, and want to be represented politically by individuals who live in the constituency and, ideally, are active in community affairs and are members of a local elected body. The literature on the subject is by now considerable and its themes need not be expanded further here (Oax, 1976; Carty, 1981; Chubb, 1982; Sacks, 1976).

Hard evidence that this really is what voters want is difficult to find; indeed, it is not always clear what could constitute such evidence. One of the main problems in testing the belief lies in the absence of control cases - parties rarely nominate candidates who do not have a strong local connection, especially in rural Ireland, so it is not possible to compare their fortunes with those of otherwise similar local candidates. Marsh (1981) did not use local/non-local residence as a variable in his analysis of the impact of background variables on candidates' performances, since there were hardly any candidates without local residence. This means that it is, in theory, possible that voters are not particularly localistic, and that they vote for local candidates simply because they have no choice, as non-local aspirants never reach the panel. Therefore, the high proportion of locally-born deputies, sometimes cited as proof of voters' localistic attitudes, is not really evidence of this at all. It could be that candidate selectors have misread the voters' attitudes, or that they consistently select local candidates mainly because they want to reserve the prize of a nomination for a member of the local organisation.

Of course, given the competitiveness of the party system and the closeness of contests in most constituencies, it is unlikely that selectors would persist in sticking to local candidates if they were actually less popular with the voters than the right kind of non-local candidate (one of apparently ministerial calibre, for example). But it may be that local candidates are not per se any more popular than such non-local candidates, and that the aversion to outsiders comes from the selectors rather than the electors.

If this is the case, why does the national executive make so little use of its power to add candidates to a locally-selected panel, and why, when it does use it, does it add only local candidates, usually aspirants who were unsuccessful at the convention? There are two reasons. One, which applies only in certain cases, is that the imposition of such an outsider, warmly regarded by the leadership but unknown in the constituency, may have adverse electoral repercussions. If the newcomer really is unknown, he will have to be sold to the voters by the local organisation, and if they are so resentful at his imposition that they refuse to campaign actively for him, a seat could be lost. But this does not apply in non-marginal constituencies. When a party knows it will win n seats in a constituency, why does its national executive not direct the local convention to select $n-1$ candidates and then add a centrally-approved outsider, knowing that party voters will, because of the strength of their party identification, elect him, even if reluctantly? Why does it not do this even when an incumbent stands down in a non-marginal constituency, i.e. when a newcomer can be given a seat without displacing an incumbent?

The reason is that although this would be possible under party rules, it would violate the consensus on which parties operate. Such behaviour would cause resentment among party members. This resentment, if it is true, could probably be absorbed by the parliamentary party: it would not cost votes, and there is little that disgruntled members can do to deputies since the latter are not answerable to the membership except through the nomination process. Rush (1969, p. 276) comments of Britain that 'local autonomy over selection is the price which the national parties must pay for adequate local organisation', but it is increasingly argued that the development of mass media means that parties no longer need a sizeable number of members, who may be as much of a hindrance as a help to a vote-seeking parliamentary party (Epstein, 1980, pp. 233-60; Sjoblom, 1983). But party leaderships do not engage in this type of cost-benefit analysis. The reality is that the leadership does not wish to alienate the membership, not because the membership could take punitive retaliation, but because political parties are voluntary organisations inherent in whose very existence is the notion of a shared purpose. This entails a fundamental consensus which cannot be broken by the leadership except at the cost of openly converting the party into a vehicle for their political advancement. In almost all countries, the centre could potentially be far more assertive in the selection process than it chooses to be; it allows a high degree of local autonomy because the political culture of the party, which expects this, is stronger than a legalistic interpretation of the rules, which would allow central control. In many parties, and certainly in the major Irish ones, the membership has no effective say in the making of party policy, and its right to select candidates is the only real power it has. The centre in the major Irish parties is happy with the tacit consensus under which the membership selects candidates and policy-making is left to the parliamentary party. And in that, the Irish parties are not so different from many parties elsewhere.

This, together with whatever degree of localism may exist among voters, greatly restricts the power of the national organisation in imposing a candidate. It means that the national executive cannot add one of its proteges - an aide of the party leader, a head office researcher - to a locally selected panel, even though it has the right, under the parties' constitutions, to do so. The most that can be done by the central organisation is to give a boost to one local aspirant as opposed to another, and even this must be done sensitively. It must appear that the centre is attempting to win an extra seat for the party rather than simply helping a favoured aspirant at the expense of another. To some extent this is less true in Dublin, where local roots are not a *sine qua non* for election, but it is a serious constraint on the central organisation's power over most of the country.

3.4 Irish political style

Voters' problems in dealing with the bureaucracy, and the lack of satisfactory complaints procedures, together with the intra-party competition engendered by the electoral system, produce a style of politics which, while common across the world, is carried further in Ireland than in most countries. This involves a concentration by deputies on constituency work, involving intercession between constituents and government departments, mostly over matters like delay in payment of social welfare entitlements, eligibility for grants, and so on. This activity is generally regarded as brokerage rather than clientelism, as deputies do not build clienteles who are dependent on them, and do not have material resources ('first-order goods') at their disposal; instead, they control only 'second-order goods', i.e. access to those with the material resources, and cannot be certain that their work for any particular constituent will be rewarded by a vote at the next election (see Komito, 1984 and Roche, 1983).

The important consequence of brokerage in the context of candidate selection is that it leads to the creation by established and aspiring deputies of personal 'machines'. Carty (1981), outlining the process, explains how politicians aim to win control of the local party organisation by a variety of means, such as installing 'personally loyal supporters, including astonishing numbers of relatives, ... as local branch officers to solidify control' (p. 130). The personal machine provides 'a steady stream of gossip and information, allowing a politician to anticipate, as well as respond to, his constituents' needs. By seeing to it that specific requests for help are channelled to their leader, rather than one of his party competitors, these local contacts help reinforce and expand their sponsor's network of supporters' (p. 130). Documenting machine-building in one particular constituency, Carty relates (p. 132) how a new deputy developed 'a network of contacts reaching into each polling area'. These people, about 120 in number, formed the deputy's personal machine, assisting him in constituency work and steering constituents in his direction. Wherever possible they 'were integrated into the formal party organisation', reinforcing the deputy's 'influence and control over the constituency party'. The creation of personal machines is the weapon resorted to by all deputies in order to try to build up a strong brokerage base, partly to protect themselves against rivals in other parties but mainly to strengthen their position against rivals in their own party. Deputies in Ireland do not, and indeed cannot afford to, practise the lofty disengagement from local affairs recommended for British MPs (Barker and Rush, 1970, p. 208).

Consequently, a party's local organisation is very often, in effect, dominated by the local party deputy or deputies. The people who select the candidates at pre-elections conventions are, to a considerable extent, the very people installed by the deputy(-ies) in positions of power in the local organisation. This means that local deputies have a major say in candidate selection. It does not give them complete control of it, because the political machine-building process is not a static one, and a deputy can never rest secure in the knowledge that he controls the local party organisation. Other party deputies are seeking to carve out larger areas for themselves; aspiring deputies are struggling to build up their own machines; and even some of the key personnel in the deputy's own machine may nurture parliamentary ambitions, and may be judging when to make a move against the deputy. Deputies' political machines, as Carty observes (p. 133), are 'inherently unstable'. Nonetheless, while they last they are a formidable weapon, and they ensure that power in the local organisation rests with the deputies.

3.5 Financial power

It might be hypothesised that there is a relationship between the location of financial power within a party and the place where the effective decisions on candidate selection are taken. It has been observed, for example, that in West Germany, the fact that state funding goes to the central organisation has strengthened the parties' head offices, while in Sweden, because a sizeable proportion of the public funds received by the parties goes direct to the branches, these have become more autonomous relative to the centre (Leonard, 1979, pp. 51-2, 61-2). In theory, money might make local organisations subject to a central diktat or give them virtual autonomy in candidate selection, depending on who controlled the purse strings. In practice, it is doubtful whether money buys power in so direct fashion in any country, except perhaps the USA (Blank, 1980, pp. 442-3), though it has been alleged that sponsor associations of the right-wing parties in Germany and Japan had such power in the past at least (Heidenheimer, 1963, p. 804).

In Ireland, there is no evidence that money plays a role in candidate selection. It has never been suggested that, at local level, aspirants can smooth their path by donating large sums to the local organisation, as tended to be the case, at least up to the 1950s, in the British Conservative Party (Rush, 1969, pp. 29-31). The pledge demanded from Fine Gael aspirants that they will make payments to the party if elected (section 1.1.2) could be seen as favouring wealthy individuals, though in fact all the Irish parties, with the possible exception of Fianna Fail, demand dues from their parliamentarians, and this practice seems to be more characteristic of parties of the left than of the right. Nor is there any suggestion that any party's head office promises campaign funds to a constituency organisation if and only if a particular aspirant is or is not selected. In fact, party finance in Ireland is an under-researched subject; the parties publish figures only for their head office expenditure, and detailed information about how much money flows into the parties, and to and from whom it flows, is not available, though it is clear that most of the income finds its way into the parties' central rather than local coffers. In the absence of complete information, then, one cannot be certain about the impact of money on political power in Ireland, but in general there is no reason to believe it is a significant factor in candidate selection. The only exception occurs in the Labour Party, where, as described in section 1.1.3, aspirants with union backing have an advantage because of the financial contribution the union will make to their campaign.

4 Consequences

What are the consequences of the nature of the selection process in Ireland? The ramifications will be examined for the discipline of the parliamentary party; deputies' responsiveness to local activists; the survival rate of incumbents; the social background characteristics of deputies; and the nature of the parliament as an institution.

4.1 Parliamentary party discipline

Liberal democracy rests on the assumption that politicians' behaviour will be affected by the knowledge that they depend on the electorate for re-election, so presumably it will also be affected by the wishes of their selectorate. Other things being equal, one could expect to find a relationship between who selects candidates and the docility of the parliamentary group. Where nominations are controlled centrally, as in Israel, or at least by some organ of the party above constituency level, then one would expect to find that in parliament deputies follow the party line faithfully, as disloyalty will mean deselection. If they are selected by a local elite, then they could be expected to flout the whip occasionally if they are pulled in a different direction by local factors or the ideological views of local activists, as perhaps in Britain. If they do not depend on any elite for reselection, one

would expect to find only low levels of party bloc voting in parliament, as in the USA.

In Ireland, as we have seen, deputies depend for reselection on the local party organisation, which they come close to controlling. The central organisation, after all, may add a name to the ticket, but it is unlikely to veto a candidate, especially an incumbent deputy. Therefore TDs (Dail deputies) appear to be semi-independent, certainly not dependent on a central or local elite, and they could thus vote against the party whip in parliament without much fear of being deselected. Given the already mentioned importance of localism in Irish political culture, one might expect deputies to be very responsive to local pressures when it comes to voting in parliament. But in fact deputies vote solidly along party lines in the Dail, and defiance of the whip is very exceptional. Why is this?

One reason that might be suggested is a lack of ideological fervour on the part of deputies (and parties). Governments are usually centrist, and so they rarely do things which their own deputies find entirely unacceptable. Deputies are not, on the whole, issue-oriented, and are unlikely to feel strongly enough about most national issues to defy the whip. Such defiance tends to be occasioned only by issues related to the role of the Catholic church, such as contraception.

This, though, is not a satisfactory explanation. For one thing, even though stark ideological conflicts may arise only rarely, it is still the case that governments, especially during times of austerity, take many steps which their backbenchers are unhappy about. For another, it does not explain why there are few defections on purely local issues. Such issues - for example, the closing of a county hospital - arise infrequently, but when they do it is standard practice for the deputies concerned to voice their discontent but still vote with their party.

This points to a more fundamental reason for solid party voting in parliament, namely the salience of party in binding the parliamentary group together and in determining voters' behaviour. Deputies have a loyalty to their party, an emotional identification with it, and a disposition to respect the decisions it and its parliamentary group reach. Self-interest too is not absent from the equation. Deputies know that they have little chance of re-election if they lose the party label. Voting against the party in parliament is likely, certainly if it is persistent or if it occurs in a key vote, to lead to the loss of the party whip; it will also, of course, severely damage a deputy's prospects of promotion. Losing the whip does not necessarily involve expulsion from the party, but repeated infringements may invoke this penalty, in which case a deputy will not be eligible to seek selection as a party candidate. In this eventuality, his constituency work over the years will count for little, as all the evidence shows that this is useful primarily in attracting support only within the pool of party votes, so a deselected deputy running as an Independent will find most of his erstwhile support remains with the party. This, as Carty (1981, p. 135) points out, was well demonstrated in 1973, when a number of Fianna Fail deputies, some with very successful electoral records, broke with their party and ran as Independents. Only one was re-elected.

Moreover, a deputy's organisation, even if it is a personal machine, might be loyal to him only for as long as he remains within the party fold. Party members have a loyalty not only to their deputies but also to the party and its leader, and if the first loyalty comes into conflict with the others, many will find that the latter exert the stronger pull, and will refuse to back a deputy who has defied the leader and/or contributed to party disunity. Ambitious members of the deputy's machine will see in his expulsion an opportunity to advance their own political careers. It is also possible that a rebellious

deputy, even if he is not expelled from the party and is reselected as a candidate, might be refused ratification by the national executive. Although this has never happened in Ireland, it is the sort of situation which might prompt the national executive to exercise its rarely utilised veto power [5].

So, in Ireland, the importance of party as a voting cue, and as a unifying force for deputies and members, outweighs deputies' dominant position in the selection process, which might otherwise free them from party discipline in parliament. This cohesion is found in most countries except for the USA, and Ozbudun (1970, p. 339) concludes that 'central control of candidate selection is not a crucial, nor even a necessary, condition of party cohesion'. Epstein (1960, pp. 219, 225) emphasises the same point: because local parties 'want MPs loyal to the cause as defined nationally ... the absence of central control and the sharp limits on central influence are not politically crucial. The vital effect of centralisation is achieved without organisational centralisation ... The local party oligarchy has a built-in partisanship serving the national party without central dictation'. The nature of the candidate selection process in Ireland probably does work in the expected direction, but other factors outweigh its impact. This, if nothing else, shows that Schattschneider's famous dictum is an exaggeration; candidate selection may be important, but it is clearly not of supreme importance.

4.2 Deputies and local activists

Does the fact that nomination decisions are taken locally mean that deputies need to be responsive to the views of local activists? Cases of incumbents being threatened with deselection unless they adhere to a particular line are increasingly common in the British Labour Party, but are virtually unknown in Ireland. The motivations behind activists' joining and remaining within the British parties have not been studied in depth (though see Garvin, 1976), but activists do not appear to demand more of their deputies than conformity to the broad outlines of party policy; they are not fired by an ideological or utopian vision to which they insist the party's representatives adhere. Consequently, deputies have little to fear on this score provided they do not drift unacceptably far from the party consensus, a route few are ever likely to follow. Nor are activists likely to deselect a deputy on the ground that, by refusing to cross party lines in the Dail, he has not been sufficiently assiduous in defending local interests, as they understand the limits of what can realistically be expected.

Members are not, then, interested in the deputy simply as a tangible representative of an abstract philosophy; instead they usually have a personal regard for and loyalty to him or her. But this loyalty is not an unconditional one: members, like voters, combine loyalty to party with loyalty to a deputy, and might disown the latter if the two loyalties come into conflict. This could happen if, for example, a deputy was involved in an effort to displace the party leader. When a number of Fianna Fail deputies did attempt to unseat their leader shortly before the November 1982 general election there were rumblings among activists in some constituencies, and suggestions that more TDs would have voted for a change of leader had the crucial vote been a secret one; they feared to do so in an open vote, it was believed, because they might be deselected by the membership, who were generally reckoned to be strong supporters of the existing leader. Despite the discontent expressed by some activists, though, no deputy was deselected, and none was in serious danger of suffering this fate. Extensive participation by the local membership in the nomination process, then, far from turning deputies into puppets of local activists, scarcely restricts them at all, provided they keep within the broad confines of what is acceptable to the party.

4.3 The survival rate of incumbents

The dominant role in the nomination process by incumbent deputies would be expected to result in very few of them failing to win reselection. This proves to be the case. Instances of incumbents failing to be reselected are extremely rare, as, it seems, is the case in almost every country. The deselection rate is around one every three or four elections. Such cases are likely to arise only if a deputy has become old and tired and has no longer made the effort to keep his personal machine in good trim.

Sometimes TDs may hope to achieve more than merely get reselected; they may hope to use the candidate selection process to improve their prospects of re-election. This can be achieved by using their strength in the process to ensure that the ticket contains no-one whose electoral appeal could threaten their own position. For example, if the party has only one seat in a constituency, the deputy might ensure, through his supporters, that he is the only candidate selected, or, if the national executive is insisting on there being two candidates, that his running mate is a weak candidate who poses no danger to his own electoral position. In the late 1960s, when the Labour Party's central organisation decided that each of the party's outgoing deputies must be accompanied on the ticket by a running mate, most deputies complied, but in several cases the other candidate was clearly just a makeweight (Gallagher, 1980, pp. 498-9). Similarly, if the party is stronger and has two deputies, they could agree to throw their weight at the selection conference behind a weak aspirant for the third place on the ticket, or simply not pick a third candidate. At the November 1982 election, there was even a case (concerning Fine Gael in Cork North-Central) where one incumbent attempted to prevent another being selected. According to reports, the attempt succeeded at the convention, but the national executive immediately 'intervened' and the victim was declared selected anyway (see *Irish Press*, 9 November 1982). At the election, he headed the party vote. This type of 'talent suppression' may have consequences for the nature of the resulting parliament (see section 4.4 below). Where preferential electoral systems are in use, conflict between incumbents of the same party, and attempts by incumbents to keep attractive alternatives off the ticket, are presumably endemic, though there seems to be little reference to them in the literature (Loulis (1981, p. 73) mentions conflict between New Democrat MPs in Greece).

Do incumbents have a higher survival rate in Ireland than in most other countries? Table 3 contains some figures relating to their fate. Over the twelve general elections since the second world war, a little over a fifth of the members of one Dail have not become part of the next Dail. About a third

(TABLE 3)

of these non-survivors have opted not to contest the election; in hardly any cases was this brought about by deselection, and in few if any was retirement prompted by a fear of deselection. Of outgoing deputies contesting the election, fewer than a sixth have been defeated, so that about three-quarters of the members of each Dail were also in the previous Dail, and a fifth are first-termers. Extensive information from other countries is not available, but what data there are suggests that incumbents do better in Ireland than in most countries (see Mazey, 1979, pp. 250-1; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979, pp. 106-13). Even in the USA, where incumbents are generally regarded as almost invincible, the proportion of Congress members defeated at elections is about the same as that of Irish deputies.

It does seem, then, that Irish incumbents do have a high survival rate, especially when it is considered that the electoral system might be expected to lead to a relatively low incumbent survival rate compared with countries with non-preferential systems, where incumbents, once re-selected, have no challengers for the party vote. However, the low incidence of incumbent defeat, even in the face of an electoral system which delivers them a threat from within the party, cannot be attributed entirely to their machinations at the nomination stage. A major part of the explanation lies in the fact that

electoral volatility in Ireland is low, and so a relatively low proportion of seats changes hands between parties at elections. At each of the last two general elections, only 14 of the 165 contested seats (8.5 per cent) passed from one party to another.

Far from the survival rate of incumbents being high due to an absence of a genuine threat from running mates, in fact, it is high despite the genuineness of this threat. Analysing electoral turnover between 1948 and 1977, Carty (1981, p. 115) found that, for the two major parties, 'more seats are won from, and lost to, running mates than to nominees of any other party' [6]. Not other parties' candidates but 'fellow partisans constitute the single most important source of competition'.

The question can be examined more fully by looking at inter-party differences in incumbent survival rates over the three most recent elections, i.e. since Fine Gael adopted its new selection system. This system gives much less power to incumbents to determine the outcome than does the Fianna Fail system. Under the latter, all delegates vote for each place on the ticket separately, and so a bare majority, in the convention, can in effect ignore the will. If two incumbents between them controlled 60 per cent of delegates, they could ensure that the other place(s) on the ticket went to makeweights. But under Fine Gael's system, all places are voted on simultaneously, and so an incumbent's delegates have to use their votes to secure his selection; they cannot be reused en bloc to affect the other places. Thus, if talent suppression was uppermost in deputies' minds at convention time, one would expect to find that Fianna Fail deputies, who can take steps to minimise the threat, are less likely to be unseated by running mates than Fine Gael deputies, who cannot.

The reverse is the case (see Table 4). Of the 38 Fianna Fail incumbents to suffer defeat over the last three elections, over 60 per cent have been replaced by running mates, compared with 54 per cent for Fine Gael incumbents.

(TABLE 4)

This difference, as well as the fact that for both parties replacement by running mates accounts for over half of incumbent defeats, reinforces Carty's findings for the earlier period, and casts considerable doubt on the idea that incumbents' high survival rate is due to their ensuring that their own party ticket contains no serious threat. Either they do not attempt to keep attractive alternatives off the party ticket or, if they do, they are singularly unsuccessful in this endeavour.

Why is this? Are Irish incumbents, under their competitive exteriors, soft-hearted philanthropists, who nobly resist the temptation to stifle the upward progress of internal rivals? This is not the explanation. The fact is that while talent suppression unquestionably takes place, it is feasible only under certain circumstances. It becomes a dangerous tactic in a situation where the party would stand to win a seat in the constituency if it nominated a strong candidate as a running mate for the deputy (or deputies). In such a case, it will place the deputy in bad odour with the rest of the party if it appears that he put his own interests ahead of those of the party, and cost the party the chance of an extra seat in order to bolster his own position, especially if the missing seat would have had an impact on the parliamentary balance of power. It will alienate the suppressed aspirant's supporters among the local membership, who may not campaign for the panel selected. The deputy's prospects of promotion and preferment will be reduced, whereas a deputy who appears to put his own position at risk in the hope of gaining an extra seat for the party will enhance his standing in the party. From 1977 onwards, Fine Gael made a determined effort to tackle the first type of deputy, termed a 'quota squatter', and organisational reforms, such as the 'model system' outlined earlier, were introduced to open up local party organisation and take it out of the local deputy's hands. Deputies knew what the leadership

wanted, and this seems to have been a factor in inducing some to encourage the selection of strong rather than weak candidates as their running mates. Consequently, deputies in all parties, and especially in Fine Gael, will not necessarily regard the use of their strength in the nomination process to ensure that the rest of the ticket is weak as being a rational strategy from the viewpoint of their own self-interest.

4.4 The backgrounds of deputies and the nature of the legislature

Does the candidate selection process have an impact on the composition of the legislature? This subject seems to have received little attention, even in studies of candidate selection. Keynes, Tobin and Danziger (1979) find a relationship between the two, namely that the less open the nominating system, the more likely are legislators to have served in party and public offices. This finding probably has little applicability outside the USA, as virtually all other countries' nomination systems are 'closed' in American terms, in that they are controlled by the party organisation and exclude ordinary voters. Another American study, by Goodman, Swanson and Cornwell (1970), produces mixed findings, and concludes (p. 102) that perhaps, 'given provisions for popular election of some sort, outcomes are similar, regardless of structural differences'.

If candidate selection is an important factor in the Irish recruitment process, evidence of this should be detectable from scrutiny of deputies' backgrounds. This could emerge from analysis of inter-party differences in the Dail and from comparisons between the Dail and other parliaments.

As far as the former are concerned, it has been argued above that Labour's process gives an advantage to union-backed aspirants, while, although the two main parties have similar processes, Fine Gael's has greater involvement from the centre. The backgrounds of Labour's candidates and deputies strongly reflect this, as a high proportion are union members, and a substantial number are trade union officials. At the November 1982 election, 30 per cent of Labour candidates and 37 per cent of its deputies were trade union officials, who have been a strong bloc in the parliamentary group since the party's earliest days.

As for the two major parties, their deputies are very similar occupationally, and Fine Gael's greater centralisation does not show up in a lower proportion of deputies resident in their constituency since, as was argued in section 3.3 above, head office intervention can at most help one local aspirant vis a vis others, rather than help 'outsiders' win selection. There are, though, four differences between the major parties' parliamentary groups which may be related to differences in the extent of head office involvement. One, dealt with in the last two paragraphs in this section, concerns the number of women in the Dail. A second is that a higher proportion of Fine Gael deputies (30 per cent) than of Fianna Fail deputies (20 per cent) have never been local authority members, a possible manifestation of head office intervention on behalf of individuals who have not followed the traditional route of building up an organisational (and electoral) base by this means.

The third is that Fine Gael deputies have received more education than other TDs: 44 per cent of them have degrees, compared with 33 per cent of other deputies. Within the Fine Gael party, those entering the party at or since the 1981 election, i.e. after the organisational reforms had taken place, are the best educated of all: exactly 50 per cent of them have degrees. This too could be seen as the fruit of head office efforts to secure the selection of people of parliamentary and ministerial ability in place of those oriented more towards constituency service. Fourthly, Fine Gael deputies are younger than other TDs: their mean age at the time of the election was 43.7 years, compared

with 45.1 for all deputies. Forty per cent of Fine Gael deputies were under 40, compared with only 27 per cent of other deputies. This is in line with the contention of Duverger (1964, p. 160) that the most centralised parties will have the youngest deputies, and again can be interpreted in terms of head office smoothing the path of young aspirants who might, if unaided, have lost out to older rivals with an established local base.

One other possible area of inter-party difference is difficult to quantify. The parties employ different formats for their conventions; in Fine Gael and Labour, aspirants usually address the convention, whereas in Fianna Fail, as noted in section 1.1.1, they are not even permitted to attend. Studying conventions in the British Labour Party, Bochel and Denver (1963, pp. 58-9) suggest that the convention format affects the outcome: highly educated middle-class aspirants are given an advantage over working-class ones by the importance attached to the quality of the convention speech. Fianna Fail's barring of aspirants, then, could be seen as likely to protect the inarticulate. Of course, given that in Ireland almost all aspirants are local people, they are probably known to the selectors in any case, but, even so, their respective abilities to address an audience may not have been tested before. But, deplorably, no researcher has yet addressed the hazardous but potentially rewarding question of whether Fianna Fail deputies are less articulate than other parties' TDs.

Carty argues that the impact of the selection process can be seen in the overall composition of the Dail, as a result of deputies using their powerful roles in candidate selection to minimise the internal party threat to their own positions. We have already seen that deputies have not by any means eliminated the threat from this quarter, but it could still be argued that the number of incumbents displaced by running mates is low in absolute terms, even if surprisingly high in relation to the number unseated by candidates of other parties. He says (1981, p. 137) that 'talent-suppression practices of this kind result in the promotion of decidedly mediocre individuals, handicapping the parties' ability to provide the system with effective political leadership'. It seems to follow from this that the Dail will contain a higher proportion of 'mediocre individuals' than legislatures in most other countries, where deputies have no incentive and/or less opportunity to indulge in talent suppression. It is not, unfortunately, quite clear how 'mediocrity' in this context is to be operationalised. Instead of confronting this question head on, it is easier to examine the backgrounds and attributes of deputies and to ask whether they could plausibly be regarded as manifestations of 'mediocrity'.

Analysis of Dail deputies' backgrounds shows that in some respects TDs collectively do indeed differ from deputies in most other countries. A very low proportion by cross-national standards (38 per cent in the current Dail) are university graduates; a high proportion (25 per cent) are small businessmen; a high proportion, about 25 per cent, were preceded into the Dail by relatives. The overwhelming majority of deputies had strong local roots before they were first elected, and most (78 per cent) are or have been local authority members, though these two characteristics are not especially unusual for parliamentarians.

If it could be assumed that deputies with these characteristics are necessarily less able than, say, well-educated deputies with a professional background, then the composition of the Dail could be seen as sustaining Carty's stress on the 'talent suppression' engaged in by incumbents. While keeping clear of the contentious area of whether, and in what way, background variables are related to a vaguely-defined 'ability', it is relevant to identify the attributes which the Irish political process itself values when it comes to promotion from backbencher to minister [7]. The backgrounds of ministers display a concentration of the characteristics which most deputies do not possess. Higher education is one: in the Dail produced by the most recent

general election (November 1982), most deputies (52.3 per cent) to have been ministers had a degree, against only 32.8 percent of other deputies, and this relationship becomes stronger when a control for seniority is introduced (Gallagher, 1984, p. 251). In addition, past or present local authority membership, part of the background of most deputies, is inversely related to the attainment of ministerial status. Thus it could be said that the recruitment process in Ireland produces deputies who are not, by the criteria applied in ministerial appointment, well qualified for government.

In addition, the composition of the Dail has a strong bearing on the way the institution works. All writing on the subject stresses the feebleness of the Dail as a legislature, and its neglect of its putative role of scrutinising the legislature. Ward (1974, pp. 241, 222), describing it as 'supine', observes that the Dail is excluded 'from any but the most nominal role in the formulation of public policy and the management of the state' and acts 'essentially as a rubber stamp'. Chubb (1982, p. 205) describes it as 'a puny parliament peopled by members who have a modest view of their functions and a poor capacity to carry them out'. He adds (pp. 222, 214) that it is 'badly organised and equipped and poorly informed', and that 'its procedures and techniques are archaic and ineffective'. The Dail's 'poor performance' derives from the fact that 'the education and experience of many members and the view that they have of their job ill equip them to make the kinds of enquiries that are necessary or to appreciate the kinds of data that ought to be made available in order to judge performance' (p. 214). Thus, according to this line of argument, from which few would dissent, the Dail is a weak parliament, and aspects of deputies' backgrounds, such as their low level of educational attainment and their strong local orientations, have a major bearing on this.

Can this be regarded as a consequence of the candidate selection process? Certainly it could not be said to reflect the decisions of the electorate, as there is no evidence that voters themselves penalise, through their use of preference votes, candidates of ministerial timbre and boost the success rate of candidates who have a local authority background and are non-graduates. It is true that nor is there any direct evidence that it reflects the selectors' values, in the sense that unsuccessful aspirants are more likely to possess 'ministerial' attributes than those picked. But it might be the case that since the selectors' values are so well known, those without the factors which make for success, such as holding a local elective office and having a base in the local organisation, do not even bother to seek a candidacy.

Finally, does the candidate selection process have any bearing on the number of women in the Dail? The November 1982 election returned 14 (8.4 per cent of the total), a fairly average proportion by the standards of most competitively elected legislatures outside Scandinavia. The reasons why women are under-represented in all parliaments are many and need not be elaborated here (see, for example, Randall, 1982, pp. 84-99, and, for Ireland, Gallagher, 1984, pp. 253-5). Clearly, they result from much more than the nature of the candidate selection process. Even so, this process may be an additional barrier in Ireland. The aspirants who are best placed to succeed are those who have spent some time building up a local base, both elective and organisational. The average deputy first stands for the Dail when aged about 36, which means that this type of self-establishment is best done in the late twenties and early thirties. This is just the period when women are least able to participate in a political career, which requires the freedom to take time off at irregular intervals, because of what Welch (1977, pp. 714-5) terms 'situational' factors. In other words, the persisting cultural norm that women should bear the prime responsibility for bringing up the children and running the home makes it harder for them to acquire crucial political contacts at this time. Thus women find it harder than men to win selection via the creation of a 'machine' within the local organisation.

This suggests that women might need, more often than men, to rely on central intervention to win a place on a party ticket. In 1977, this seems to have been the case: six of the 16 candidates added by Fianna Fail's national executive were women, compared with only six among the 116 selected locally (Marsh, 1981, p. 276). In November 1982, though, only one of the 11 candidates added by the two major parties' national executives between them was a woman, compared with 18 among the 236 selected locally. The proportion of women among Fine Gael TDs (13 per cent) is much higher than among Fianna Fail (5 per cent) or Labour (6 per cent) deputies. Like the younger average age of Fine Gael TDs, this may be related to the greater central involvement in candidate selection in Fine Gael. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the relatively high proportion of women among Fine Gael deputies is a very recent development. Up to and including the 1977 general election, only 5 women were ever elected for Fine Gael; that election returned just one. But since then there have been another nine, and all the female Fine Gael TDs now in the Dail have entered the house since 1977. Some of them have undoubtedly become candidates as a result of encouragement from the party leadership and, in some cases, pressure on the appropriate local organisation. But the other parties between them have no more women TDs now than were returned at the 1977 election (5 in each case), and, moreover, only two of these women have entered the Dail since 1977. In November 1984, the Labour Party took a step intended to increase the number of women among its elected politicians, when its national executive decided that at least one in every four Labour candidates at the 1985 local elections had to be a woman.

5 Conclusion

It has been argued above that in Ireland ordinary party members are quite widely involved in the selection process, but that powerful roles are played by the incumbent deputies and, within limits, the central organisation. Incumbents are almost certain of reselection, as in most countries, and they may be able to minimise the challenge from internal party rivals, although empirical evidence suggests that they cannot by any means eliminate the challenge. Party head offices have in recent years become increasingly active in the process, and often add names to those selected locally. This is made possible by the electoral system, and is accepted by the local membership provided the centre respects the informal principle that all added candidates be local people.

The lack of complete central control does not produce fissiparous parliamentary parties. On the contrary, deputies are for the most part as loyal to the party line as any leadership could want, as is true of many countries where selection is under the control of the local organisation. But this does not prove that the locus of control is unimportant, for even if the result in terms of legislative cohesion is much the same no matter who controls the process, there may be other consequences. It has been suggested in this paper that, at the nomination stage, the selectors, mainly local branch members, may introduce a specific set of values into the recruitment process. They may attach greater importance than the voters would to such factors as membership of the local party organisation and holding a local elective office, and less importance than the voters to factors like high education. Certain aspects of deputies' backgrounds, both collectively and with respect to inter-party differences, lend weight to this possibility, though they do not constitute firm evidence. If this suggestion is accurate, then the candidate selection process is more than simply an impartial transmitter of the electorate's values; it is a key stage, one with an independent effect of its own, which enables the selectors to inject their own values into the recruitment process. These values, in Ireland at least, concern candidates' backgrounds more than their views on policy matters, which suggests that the importance of candidate selection may lie more in its role in political

recruitment than in its being an arena of intra-party conflict.

Notes

1. [p. 1] The sources used for the following account are: Fianna Fail Constitution and Rules (Dublin: Fianna Fail, 1983); Fine Gael Constitution and Rules (Dublin: Fine Gael, 1982); Model System for conventions and AGMs (Dublin: Fine Gael, nd); Labour Party Constitution (Dublin: Irish Labour Party, 1979); Standing Orders for Dail Selection Conferences (Dublin: Irish Labour Party, 1973); Workers' Party Constitution (Dublin: Workers' Party, 1983); Sinn Fein Constitution and Rules (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1983).
2. [p. 2] In line with conventional practice, 'candidate' refers to an individual selected and 'aspirant' to an individual competing for a candidacy. 'Nomination' and 'candidate selection' are used interchangeably. 'Deselection' refers to an incumbent being denied renomination.
3. [p. 2] It should be emphasised that reference to first and subsequent places on the panel denotes only the order in which candidates are selected. This should not be confused with selection of candidates in countries where national elections employ a list system, where decisions must be made as to who receives which place on the party list. Under Ireland's electoral system, the names of all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, appear on the ballot paper in alphabetical order, so the order in which candidates are selected by the convention makes no difference whatsoever to the prospects of any of them. This means that there is no such thing as a 'safe', 'marginal' or 'hopeless' place on the ticket, so it is not possible, as it is in some countries, to compare the characteristics of individuals allotted to these three categories.
4. [p. 10] The European Parliament elections in Ireland, where constituency size is large (an average of about 160,000 electors per MEP) do not constitute a valid test of the proposition, as with only 15 seats at stake, most party candidates are high-profile politicians such as former ministers.
5. [p. 16] In the run-up to an important Dail vote in February 1985 on liberalising the law on the availability of contraceptives, two members of the Fine Gael national executive declared that they would vote at the next election to veto the ratification of any party deputy who was outside the parliamentary group as a result of losing the whip on the issue. It was not clear how widely this attitude was shared by other members of the executive. In the event, three Fine Gael deputies opposed the bill and lost the whip. At the 1979 European Parliament elections, the Fine Gael convention in one constituency selected as a candidate a deputy who had been expelled from the parliamentary party for defying the whip, though remaining a member of the party as a whole. The national executive refused to ratify him, and this did not lead to a significant adverse reaction among members.
6. [p. 16] This presentation is rather misleading, as for both parties, more seats were lost to all other parties' nominees collectively than to running mates, even though it is true that more seats were lost to running mates than to the nominees of any other specific party. From the figures presented by Carty (1981, p. 116), it can be calculated that between them incumbents of the two main parties sustained 42.3 per cent of their defeats to other candidates of the same party and the other 57.7 per cent to other parties' candidates.
7. [p. 20] Virtually all ministers are Dail deputies; although the constitution makes provision (in Article 28.7) for two ministers per government to belong instead to the Seanad (the upper house), there have been only two such ministers since 1937.

Table 1 [p. 6]

Backgrounds of parliamentary candidates at November 1982 election

| | Fianna Fail | | Fine Gael | | Labour | | All candidates | |
|-----------------------|----------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Incumbent deputy | 77 | 58.3 | 62 | 53.9 | 14 | 35.0 | 160 | 43.8 |
| Local elective office | 74 | 56.1 | 66 | 57.4 | 21 | 52.5 | 179 | 49.0 |
| Previous candidacy | 114 | 86.4 | 93 | 80.9 | 32 | 80.0 | 278 | 76.2 |
| Total | 132 | 100.0 | 115 | 100.0 | 40 | 100.0 | 365 | 100.0 |

Table 2 [p. 7]

Involvement of party members and voters
in candidate selection in Ireland

| | Average attendance at selection conference | As % of party members | As % of party voters |
|-------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Fianna Fail | 220 | 23 | 1.2 |
| Fine Gael | 320 | 44 | 2.0 |
| Labour | 50 | 34 | 1.3 |

Note: all figures are estimates.

Table 3 [p. 17]

Turnover at elections 1948-'982

| | | |
|--|---|------|
| As % of deputies at the time of the dissolution | Incumbents retiring | 7.4 |
| | Incumbents defeated | 14.7 |
| | Incumbents returning | 77.9 |
| As % of outgoing deputies standing in the election | Incumbents re-elected | 84.1 |
| | Incumbents defeated | 15.9 |
| As % of deputies in the new Dail | Deputies in the previous Dail | 77.3 |
| | Former deputies not in the previous Dail | 2.9 |
| | First-term deputies | 19.8 |

Note: The figures are the averages for the twelve general elections in this period.

Table 4 [p. 18]

Causes of major party incumbent defeats 1981-82

| | | 1981 | 1982-1 | 1982-2 | Total | |
|---|------------------------------|------|--------|--------|-------|------|
| | | | | | N | % |
| Ffanna Fail incumbents losing seat to | Another FF candidate | 6 | 9 | 8 | 23 | 60.5 |
| | Another party's candidate | 7 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 39.5 |
| Fine Gael incumbents losing seat to | Another FG candidate | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 53.8 |
| | Another party's candidate | 0 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 46.2 |

Note: The three general elections were fought on the same set of constituency boundaries. In only 2 of the 51 cases is there any difficulty in deciding who took the incumbent's seat; in these 2, a best estimate has been used.

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Nomination Strategies in Systems with Intraparty Preference Voting

Richard S. Katz

Department of Political Science

The Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

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Nomination Strategies in Systems
with Intraparty Preference Voting

A strategy is a plan of action pursued by an actor in order to achieve a desired result in, or contingent upon, specified circumstances. It is, in particular, its consciously purposive nature that distinguishes strategic from other patterned or regular forms of behavior. Within political science, then, the concept of strategy is the special property of that style of theory in which behavior is understood to be the immediate consequence of calculated choices, rather than of mechanical economic or social forces or of psychological processes, and motivated by the consciously perceived "personal" needs and desires of individual actors, rather than by some set of societal needs or ineluctable system maintenance functions and rather than by subconscious drives. This is not to say that questions of economics, sociology, or psychology are irrelevant to political behavior. Neither is it to deny that there are functions which must be performed and needs which must be satisfied if a political system is to be maintained (although it does deny the often tacit assumption of functionalists that system maintenance is inevitable or ipso facto desirable). A person's experience and position in the society and economy, as well as the other circumstances that contribute to the development of personality, may be important determinants both of his objectives and of his perception of the likely consequences of the choices he might make. The maintenance (or destruction) of the existing political system may be a consciously held objective of some

actors, and in any case their behavior will have an important bearing on whether and how the system does survive. In each case, however, the crucial nexus remains the strategic choice of the individual actor.

From this perspective, explanation of an act requires specification of three elements. First, one must identify the actors whose behavior is to be explained. Second, the goals that actors will pursue must be delineated. Finally, the characteristics of the environment in which the action takes place must be known. To suggest a relatively simple example, to explain the choice of Geraldine Ferraro as democratic vice-presidential nominee, one might refer to the person making the choice (Walter Mondale), his goals (to win the election), and his situation (well behind in the polls; perceived to be indecisive; pressured to show solidarity with many of the demographic groups leaning toward the democratic party, the largest of which was women). Thus, one could assert that Mondale chose Ferraro because he hoped that by taking a decisive and unprecedented step he would in general improve his chance of election and in particular cement his support among women and maximize the so-called "gender gap."

Explanation of the kind of social behavior exemplified by a party's nomination strategy, while structurally the same, is in practice far more complicated. In the first place, an actor ordinarily will have many goals, not all of which will be compatible with the others -- the winner take all, no second chances, nature of American presidential elections which can elevate the goal of immediate victory to the point at which no other goal matters is not typical of most political situations. In the second place, actual behavior is conditioned less by the real environment than by the

actor's perceptions of the environment; indeed, one could also argue that the Ferraro nomination was a mistake brought about by Mondale's failure to perceive accurately the impact that a female running mate would have both on male and female voters and by his failure to perceive at all the ethical concerns Ferraro's husband's business affairs and her own previous campaign finances would raise. In the third place, and most crucial, is the fact that more than one actor is involved in making most party decisions. Aside from the simple multiplication of the problem, the goals -- and consequently the behaviors -- of these actors are unlikely to be congruent. Moreover, the mutual interactions and reactions of other actors form part of the environment in which each actor performs.

My ultimate objective in this paper is to provide a framework for understanding nomination strategies in electoral systems characterized by multimember constituencies and some form of effective intraparty preference voting. In doing this, however, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of nomination strategy in simple list systems.

NOMINATIONS IN STRICT LIST PR SYSTEMS

Although the ultimate actors in elections are the voters, and although it is toward influencing the voters' reactions that much of the strategic activity attendant upon elections is directed, outside of the American direct primary system ordinary voters, qua voters, ordinarily are considered to play no direct role in nominations. Voters merely react to the nominations made by others, and in list PR systems without any form of personal preference voting, those reactions must be expressed purely in terms of party. Nominations remain important to electoral choice in the short term, because a party's meaning and

commitments may be inferred from the candidates it presents and because particularly popular candidates may be able to translate some of their personal appeal into appeal for the party that nominates them, and in the long term, because it is the successful nominees who will form the core of the party's leadership, but voters cannot be said in any meaningful sense to pursue a nomination strategy. (Strictly speaking, this is true in most systems with personal preference voting as well, since the choice allowed voters still is restricted to those previously nominated by the parties. In many such systems, however, a broad definition of "nomination" suggests that voters are involved in the nominating process, and in any case it is possible for voters to pursue a line sufficiently akin to a nomination strategy as to be relevant in this context.)

ACTORS AND GOALS

The principal actors in the nomination process are, of course, those party officials directly charged with establishing the final list of candidates in each constituency. (The term "official" is used loosely here, and could extend to include the party's entire active membership in a case in which nominations were decided by a poll of the members.) This, however, usually will be a diverse group. Normally, the "nominators" will be some form of constituency level party committee or convention, but this formally decisive body will be subject to "influence" from the national party leadership -- ranging from "suggestions," through the need for prior approval and/or subsequent ratification of its selections, ultimately to the possibility of having its decisions completely supplanted by an alternative slate imposed from above. Moreover, while in aggregate

embodying the constituency party as an organization, these nominators also represent the numerous interests that come together to form the party's coalition. Thus different ideological or policy views, the needs and aspirations of different localities, and the perspectives of different demographic groups and organized interests may find expression in the constituency nominating councils. To these actors (and the organizations and interests they represent) must be added, of course, the would-be candidates themselves.

The most obvious and commonly discussed goal of all these actors is to win elections, by which it is conventionally meant that the objective of nomination strategy is to maximize the number of members the party elects (Cohan and McKinlay, 1978; Kempf, 1972). This clearly is an important goal. A party's chances of forming a government or its influence and the number and quality of its ministerial portfolios in a coalition government, its representation on committees, and the general seriousness with which its positions and the interests it represents are taken all are expected to increase as the size of its vote and of its parliamentary delegation increase. Moreover, at least on its face and other things being equal, it is a goal which should be shared by all the party related participants in the nominating process. Still, put in such simple terms it would seriously distort the reality of nomination strategy to assert that this is the only, or even the first, goal of every actor in the process.

The assertion that the only goal of nomination strategy is to maximize the number of deputies the party elects in a single election is simply a specific application of the common Downsian assumption that politicians are single minded office seekers (Downs, 1959). Office for

its own sake can be a goal only for those who will actually enjoy its personal benefits, however. For others, electoral victory only can be an instrumental objective, presumed to be valued because it will aid in the achievement of some other goal. It would be strange indeed if actors other than would-be candidates or other recipients of the particularistic fruits of victory were prepared to sacrifice their other goals for what then would be a hollow or Pyrrhic victory. Indeed, even aspirants to office themselves rarely are motivated to bear the personal costs of a political career solely in the hope of receiving the pecuniary rewards of office. A reasonable understanding of the process of nomination thus requires that one consider a range of goals for each of the major actors involved that may supplement or supplant the simple and immediate goal of maximizing party representation in a single election (Katz, 1983c).

Additionally, in considering nominations in list PR systems, one must remember that the process involves not only the naming of a list of candidates, but also the ordering of that list. Since list order determines which particular candidates will be elected, not all nominations are equally desirable. Barring a cataclysmic electoral upheaval, a party's PR list can be conceived as having three parts. First, there is a top section consisting of candidates who are virtually assured of election. Third, there is a bottom section, including a (usually large) number of candidates who can have no reasonable hope of being elected. Second, there are between these two groups one or two candidates (or a few more in very large constituencies or if one includes those who, although not chosen at the time of the election, will succeed to seats left vacant by deaths or retirements) whose personal election in fact depends on their

party's level of success. Although even a bottom position may be valuable for an aspiring candidate as an opportunity to demonstrate his or her capacity as a campaigner or as an indication of preferment, in many respects only placement in the upper sections of the list can be considered nomination at all, and certainly is more valuable than placement with no chance of election.

(Being "promoted" to a more desirable list position after mounting a particularly effective campaign could, thus, be the equivalent of being selected for a safe seat after an impressive campaign in a hopeless constituency. Although I am not prepared to assert that this never occurs, however, inspection of recent election results from many European countries suggests that it is, at best, a rare occurrence. Instead, a low ranking list position appears to be either a duty of local party officials or a reward in itself for party activists.)

As I have suggested elsewhere (1985c), the goals of party actors can be categorized roughly into three groups. One of these groups is personal goals, primarily such individually oriented objectives as office for its own sake or for the status, income, or personal power that it affords. A second is political goals, such as the advancement of a particular line of policy or furthering the interests or representation of a favored group. Finally, there are organizational goals directed in this case towards the maintenance of the party. Although each type may be an instrumental goal as well as an ultimate goal (to give only one example, one might pursue organizational goals as a means of achieving office, and value office because of the opportunities it affords to advance a particular policy), it should be possible to assume that particular goals will have primacy for certain

groups of individuals in certain circumstances.

Looking first from the perspective of a would-be candidate, one can expect the primary goal in the nomination process first to be securing his or her own nomination and second to be obtaining a sufficiently favorable position on the list as to have a reasonable probability of election. This is, of course, the defining characteristic of a would-be candidate whether he or she desires office for its own sake or sees nomination as an effective means of pursuing other objectives. At the same time, however, one may also assume that would-be candidates will have preferences among or connections with the various currents that contribute to a party's coalition. Thus, for example, individuals on the left of their parties will not only want to be nominated and elected themselves, but also will want more rather than fewer other left-wingers to be nominated and elected as well.

For the constituency level nominators, one would expect the most immediate goals to be political, that is securing a favorable list position for candidates from the areas in the constituency they represent, the interests with which they are associated, or the policy positions they favor. A local representative may improve both the access of people in a particular area seeking "case-work" services from a member of parliament and the attention given to local needs in the making of policy and distribution of patronage. An additional voice in the parliamentary party may help to shift the balance of influence within it towards one particular way of thinking or towards a particular leader. Moreover, success in the nominating process will increase the individual party official's personal standing within the party as well as contributing to the provision of the resources

necessary to maintain local organizational vitality. In these respects, local nominators are in competition with one another, just as are the would-be candidates. At the same time, however, they also have a powerful incentive to cooperate. The size of the "pie" which they have to divide is not fixed; the more votes the party receives, the more desirable (first group) list positions there will be. This means that each local leader has an incentive to ensure that all the other leaders are sufficiently satisfied with the outcome of the nominating process that they work vigorously for the list as a whole in the general election.

The personal stakes in an election would appear to be greatest for the national party leaders who, in the event of victory, will form the core of the national government, although one might instead argue that the difference between leader of the government and leader of the opposition is rather less than the difference between member of parliament and unemployed politician. Similarly, as the people most continuously and directly involved with policy making, and as the people best positioned to do something about policy, one might expect national party leaders to give high priority to political goals. And for these people, the link between the balance of forces within the party and the attainment of their goals will be clear; no matter how strong his formal position, no party leader can be too far out of step with his or her parliamentary party and expect to remain in a position of leadership. Thus one would expect national party leaders, like all other participants in the party's nominating process, to be concerned with securing advantageous list positions for candidates with whom they are in agreement.

Nonetheless, within the context of the party nominating process, the best way in which national party leaders are likely to be able to advance either personal or political goals is by giving primacy to organizational goals (Obler, 1973). For the national leadership, more than for any other group, the achievement of personal or policy goals is directly tied to the victory of the party as a whole, rather than to the advancement of one section of the party relative to others. Beyond this, which would dictate an interest in securing the nomination of individuals who will be attractive candidates, national party leaders also must be concerned with securing the services in parliament and in the government of individuals who will be effective legislators and administrators. Moreover, the national orientation of national party leaders should lead to greater attention on their parts to goals such as "balancing" the party's lists overall, for example by securing the placement in favorable positions of a reasonable proportion of women or members of religious, linguistic, or other ethnic minority groups.

CIRCUMSTANCES

How these actors with their divergent goals interact, and the nature of the candidate lists at which they ultimately arrive, is determined by situational as well as by motivational factors. In detail, each situation is unique. One can, however, distinguish at least three interrelated sets of factors that should generally impinge on nomination processes.

The first of these is the electoral system, which can show considerable variation even within the category of list PR systems. In particular, there are two variables which can be singled out as potentially significant. The size of the districts, both physically

and with regard to the number of deputies to be returned, will bear importantly on list construction. Assuming momentarily a fixed party strength, the more deputies there are to be returned from each district, the more each party can expect to elect, and hence the more "favorable" positions there will be on its list. But the greater the number of desirable list positions, the easier it should be for local nominators to appeal to the principle of proportionality in reaching mutually acceptable compromises. At the other extreme, nomination for a party that expects to win only one seat is a winner-take-all contest, and even a party that can expect to win 50% of the vote may find compromise difficult in 4 or 5 seats constituencies. Increased physical size simply adds another complication to the problem. Where districts are very large, perhaps encompassing several counties or provinces, one would expect demands for geographic proportionality to be added to concern over distribution among policy or demographic groupings.

The other important aspect of the electoral system is the threshold of representation. One powerful incentive for those who are strong within the party to compromise with those who are weak is the (usually tacit) threat that the minority will, if pushed too far, somehow damage the party's (i.e., the party majority's) electoral prospects. Where the threshold of representation is high, dissidents have few options. Although they may decline to campaign for the party, or ultimately withdraw from it, at least in the short run these are masochistic strategies; a group that thinks it should have been given two desirable positions instead of one loses even the one it got by leaving the party. On the other hand, with a low threshold of representation, many disaffected groups could hope to win on their own

the representation that they feel they have been unjustly denied within the party. On one side, this may lower the level of dissatisfaction that intraparty groups are prepared to endure, and complementarily on the other side it should increase the willingness of more powerful groups to compromise.

The second set of factors concern the size and political position of the party. Large parties, and parties with governing potential, naturally find internal compromise easier for several reasons. First, large parties simply have more "goods" (in this case, safe nominations) to distribute. While they also have more claimants on these goods, the ease with which they may be divided among groups of claimants increases with the total stock of goods. Second, the value of avoiding schisms is greater for parties that may be included in the government. For them, not only the number of parliamentary seats but also the material rewards of ministerial office and the vastly greater policy influence of a governing party are at stake. On the other hand, whatever the threshold of representation, the chances that schismatics will be able to win independent representation in parliament is greater for large parties than for small simply because, for example, 5% of the party is a larger percentage of the electorate. Third, one would naturally expect actors within parties with government potential to be more accommodating than those in parties of permanent opposition, whether as a result of differential incentives, experience, differing patterns of recruitment, or a correlation between moderation in ideology and willingness to compromise in organizational matters.

The final situational factor is the organizational structure of

the party and the nature of its support coalition. Is the party socially homogeneous, or does it include elements of many social groups? Are the party's members in relative agreement on the major policy questions of the day, or is there significant diversity with regard to some of them? And if there is diversity of opinion on some issues, do the resulting lines of cleavage reinforce each other or cross-cut? Are there formal or informal ties between the party and other organizations, such as trade unions? Are there organized factions within the party?

The locus of the principal nominating decision and the character of the compromises effected will depend on the structure of the party's support. If the party is essentially a coalition of national groups, one would expect the overall parameters of its nomination strategy to be set at the national level. While the choice of particular candidates might remain in local hands, for example, the overall sharing of favorable list positions would be settled nationally. In particular, whatever norms of equity are agreed, one would expect them to address the national balance, rather than the balance in any particular constituency. On the other hand, where the primary organizational focus of the groups supporting the party is more local, such national compromises should be far less likely, as one local group will be unlikely to accept advantages won by its affiliates in other areas as adequate compensation for its own "unfair" treatment. In this case, one would expect the national role to be directed more toward maintaining internal harmony than toward actually reaching authoritative decisions.

CONCLUSION

The principal "conclusion" of this section is that nomination strategy is not simply an attempt by a monolithic party to maximize its vote, and thus its parliamentary representation, at every particular election. Rather, it is the result of complex interactions among many actors with many goals. Especially in list PR systems, in which shifts in vote totals of the magnitude that generally can be expected are not multiplied into much larger potential shifts in seats, maintaining the organizational harmony and stability of the party is likely to be a primary goal, especially for those already in positions of national leadership. For middle level elites, either at the national or local levels, both personal and policy goals are likely to be better advanced by improving one's relative standing within the party than by increasing the party's overall strength (although being seen to have done the latter will certainly help in doing the former). In part, this is only to say that short term victories may be forgone as the price of future success, but in part it is also to say that maximization of seats is not the only goal of party actors.

NOMINATIONS IN SYSTEMS WITH PERSONAL PREFERENCE VOTING

If nomination is the selection of which particular individuals will occupy the parliamentary seats awarded to a political party, then in the majority of European systems, intraparty preference voting plays a potentially significant role in the nomination process (Katz, 1985b). In all multi-member district systems, parties must nominate more candidates than they seriously expect to elect. In many list PR systems, this is necessary in order to provide replacements for elected members who die or resign during the parliament's term of office, but

even in systems which allow for by-elections to fill vacant seats a party must nominate sufficient candidates to allow for an unexpected increase in its popularity -- nothing could be more embarrassing to a party than to have enough votes to elect more candidates than it has nominated. But unless the party's list order strictly determines the order in which candidates are elected, the distinction between the three parts of a party list suggested above may break down, with some candidates from the third group -- those nominated only to fill out the list -- displacing those selected by the party organization for election.

Whatever the complexity of the nomination process in simple list PR systems, a further complication is added where voters are allowed to cast intraparty personal preference votes as well as votes for a party. (In one sense, to be discussed below, the introduction of personal preference voting actually may simplify the nomination process.) Firstly, preference voting increases the difficulty of negotiating compromises because no agreement reached by party leaders may be regarded as final and binding if the voters can overturn it. At the very least, this adds a new problem/goal to the nominating process -- minimizing the impact of preference voting or controlling its outcome. Secondly, preference voting raises the possibility or even the necessity for candidates to compete with their copartisans for personal votes. Again at the very least, this will occasion a shift of focus away from obtaining a "safe" list position toward being so situated as to campaign effectively for personal votes, and thus a shift of focus away from the party's nominators and toward the voters or leaders of organizations that can deliver voters. Thirdly, the overt intraparty competition which preference voting encourages or demands

exasperates the problems of party cohesion that competition for nominations naturally engenders and thus requires that additional attention be devoted to the problem of conflict management.

VOTERS AS ACTORS

Where personal preference voting is significant, voters become more significant actors in the nominating process in two respects. First, all of the other actors in the process need to take the likely reaction of voters more into account. On one hand, any decision made by party officials might be overturned by the voters, and so must be made with that fact in mind. On the other hand, to modify a party list is a far less drastic way of indicating displeasure with party nominating decisions than would be to abandon the party altogether. Thus, even if only a minority of voters are attentive enough to use the preference vote instrumentally, that attentive minority will not be deterred from doing so by party loyalty. Second, voters become active participants themselves -- in some cases able to add new names to the list of party candidates, but in all cases effectively making the real allocation of candidates to the three hypothetical sections of the party list.

Voters differ from other actors in the nominating process in at least three respects, however. First, they are unlikely to be motivated either by personal or organizational motives. Ordinary voters can have no hope of sharing in the personal benefits of office or from "success" in the nominating process; when they are motivated by particularistic concerns, these must be channeled through such political intermediaries as policy or group representation. Even loyalists are unlikely to have such concern for the organizational vitality of the party *per se*. Second, voters are unable to negotiate or make any deal or take any form

of collective action without the intervention of organization and organizational leadership. Third, most voters are unlikely to participate in the nominating process at all, unless the electoral system makes the casting of an effective preference vote a prerequisite to having one's party vote counted at all (e.g., as in Ireland or Finland).

This third means that the most important question regarding the impact of voters on nominations will be what motivates them to cast preference votes in the first place. Broadly speaking, one can suggest three possibilities. One is that the voter is self-motivated. Although many actors may attempt to influence the potential preference voter, he or she finally makes the choice of whether and for whom to cast preference votes individually and on the basis of his or her own concerns, be they policy, local loyalty, personal friendship, or what ever. The second is that the voter is motivated by the party as an organization. In this case, the casting of a preference vote is more an expression of party loyalty than it is of individual political preference. Finally, the third possibility is that the voter is motivated by some organization or group other than the party, so that preference voting is an expression of loyalty to that group.

DEVICES TO CONTROL THE PREFERENCE VOTE

Depending on the particular system of preference voting in force, parties can attempt to control the impact of preference voting in a variety of ways. In many systems, the personal vote exists more in form than in reality. In general, this occurs when votes not explicitly cast for a particular candidate are considered to be (or mechanically required or encouraged to be) cast for the party list in

the order submitted. For example, in the Netherlands, a party vote formally is a vote for the first candidate on the list, with all his/her preference votes in excess of those required for election automatically transferred to the next candidate on the list, and so forth. Thus, while it is theoretically possible for the party list order to be overturned, in practice the concerted action of so many voters would be required that it is virtually unheard of. Given this fact, very few Dutch voters actually cast votes for candidates other than those heading the lists, with the result that modification of the parties' list orders becomes even less likely. (See Table 1.)

A second formal possibility is open to parties in Denmark. With the so-called "usual" or party ballot structures, rather than all party votes counting as personal votes for the first candidate on the party's list, they are counted as votes for the candidate associated with the voters' particular nominating district within the larger constituency. While this means that all candidates may receive some "default" personal votes, by placing its favored candidates in nominating districts in which it is popular and/or which simply are large, the party can strongly advantage those individuals.

A third possibility arises in Switzerland. The Swiss national council is elected by PR with cumulation and panachage. Formally, the voter may cast a ballot with as many names as there are deputies to be elected from his/her canton. Seats are awarded to the parties in proportion to the number of votes cast for their candidates and to the candidates on each list in the order of their personal votes. Voters need not confine their choice to candidates of a single list (panachage) and, more significantly for our purposes, may vote for a

single candidate twice (but no more than twice). Roughly half the voters (55% in 1975) modify their party's official ballots. A party may attempt to maximize its control over the election by listing a candidate twice on its official ballot. In this case, all those who cast an unmodified party ballot will have given the maximum possible support to those candidates who are the beneficiaries of this "official cumulation." This device can be used differentially, to advantage some candidates over others, or as a blanket policy, in which case it simply halves the effective choice offered the voters. (In this case, a voter must indicate special support for one candidate by striking off the names of the others.) Notwithstanding the potential effectiveness of this technique, however, it is used relatively rarely. Among the parties with any chance of electing deputies, for example, it appears to have been used in 1979 only by the Liberals, Communists, and Radicals in Geneva. One indicator of its impact, however, is the fact that the rate of ballot modification in Geneva is among the lowest in Switzerland. One suspects that the internal costs of making choices to favor some candidates over others, or to limit the numbers given official candidacies, exceed the potential benefits in controlling the results. Thus "official cumulation" appears to be a technique primarily for the minor parties to fill out their lists.

The relative efficacy of these institutional devices to limit the effect of personal preference voting while still allowing it in theory is indicated by the data in Table 2, which shows the sources of interelection turnover in parliamentary parties in those European countries in which some form of preference vote is allowed. In this table, an electoral defeat is labeled as "intrapartisan" (columns 3 and 4) whenever a sitting deputy was defeated by a newcomer; intrapartisan

defeats were attributed to list order (column 3) when the challenger was listed higher on an ordered party list than was the defeated incumbent, and to preference voting (column 4) otherwise. Among these countries, Belgium and Norway have systems similar to the Dutch, and similarly show no intrapartisan defeats attributable to personal voting. There are some preference vote related defeats among Danish candidates with the party/usual list ballot form, but far more in those systems, including the Danish simultaneous list form, where personal voting alone determines the order of election.

In the Italian system, for example, each voter can give a candidate only one vote (although he/she can vote for more than one candidate), and only the preference votes explicitly cast for a candidate contribute to determining the order in which candidates are elected. An analogous situation applies in Ireland, where STV does not permit any institutionalized advantage to one candidate over another. In these "pure" preferential voting systems, a variety of techniques are still available to parties to try to influence the outcome.

One method is to indicate official support for some candidates. Many Italian parties, especially including the Christian Democrats, do this through the use of the structure and order of their lists. In general terms, these parties' lists are composed of three parts: a single candidate who heads the list (the so-called capolista); a group of candidates listed in the party's order of preference; and a group of candidates listed in alphabetical order. The total number of candidates usually equals the total number of deputies to be elected from the constituency, while the total of the first two groups ordinarily roughly equals the number of deputies the party expects to elect. Those favored

with positions in the top two sections are disproportionately likely to be elected. (See Table 3.) On the other hand, they also are disproportionately likely to be incumbents seeking reelection (Table 4). (On Italian list construction, see DiCapua, 1968.)

Instead of indicating differential support among candidates to the general public through its list order, the Italian Communist Party uses its members to control the result, with the vast majority of Communist incumbents listed in the third, alphabetical, section of their lists. Party loyalists in particular areas are instructed to vote for a particular candidate. By controlling the numbers of loyalists instructed to vote for each candidate, the party hopes to achieve three objectives. First, by creating a large gap in the number of preference votes between the weakest candidate that the party leaders want elected and the strongest candidate who is just filling out the list, the party hopes to prevent independent preference voters from being able to influence the result (Wertman, 1977). Second, by comparing the number of preference votes actually received with the number of loyalists instructed to vote for a candidate, the party hopes to assess his/her individual popularity with the uninstructed voters. As has been shown elsewhere, the party is not always effective, especially in its first objective (Katz and Bardi, 1980), although its pursuit has the additional effect of limiting the number of preference votes cast by Communist voters (Table 5). The third objective, in which the party appears to have been more successful, is to limit "unconradely" overt intraparty competition.

A preliminary indicator of the relative effectiveness of these two techniques can be seen in the relative success of the DC and PCI in increasing the size of their feminine contingents in parliament. The

figures shown in Table 6 suggest quite clearly that this always has been a greater concern for the Communists than for the Christian Democrats. They also suggest that each party decided to increase its female representation during the 1970s. The significant difference, however, is in the comparison between the trend for the Senate and the Camera. The Italian Senate electoral system allows the party to determine nearly completely which candidates will be elected; the system for the Camera, as just observed, does not. The greater Communist control over its representation in the Camera is shown by the fact that when the party more than doubled its proportion of female senators, its proportion of female deputies nearly doubled as well. When the DC did the same in the Senate, its proportion of female deputies actually declined.

Although Irish parties under an STV electoral system do not have ordered lists, they could pursue a strategy akin to that of the DC by listing candidates in a set order on their "how-to-vote" cards. They do not do so. On the other hand, they do, especially in the county constituencies, pursue a line similar to that of the PCI. Each constituency is informally divided into bailiwicks, with each candidate expected to confine his principal campaign to his own area (Sacks, 1976). These bailiwicks are not assigned by the party, however, but rather are the areas from which the candidates already draw their primary support, often as a result of service on local government authorities. The size of a candidate's bailiwick, thus, is determined by his or her personal standing, and over time can expand or contract with the candidate's reputation, the placement of other candidates, etc. In effect, then, the bailiwick system is a way of managing intraparty conflict rather than maintaining party control over elections.

STRATEGIC CHOICES

Systems with personal preference voting confront all the actors in the nominating process with a number of strategic choices. Although a full discussion of this topic would require far more space and research than currently is available, a few of these problems can be discussed briefly for illustrative purposes.

The first problem involves the number of candidates. In fact, in most PR systems, this is a non-problem. There is a natural upper limit to the number of candidates to be nominated, that is the number of deputies to be returned from the constituency as a whole. So long as the choice of candidate follows or necessarily entails a categorical choice of party, there is no incentive to nominate fewer than this number of candidates. The party can only hope that each additional candidate may bring marginal support which the party might have lost otherwise. Indeed, the possibility of preference voting only makes this more likely. Thus, there is no reason to turn any would-be candidate away except for one who would be more popular, and one would expect parties to nominate the maximum allowable number of candidates.

A partial exception to both these observations must be offered for the case of Switzerland. On one hand, the goal of assuring the election of a particular leader on occasion leads to official cumulation, with the consequence of limiting the number of candidates. On the other hand, a party may nominate two "conjoined" lists in a single canton. This often is done in cantons with a large city (in which case there will be separate "stadt" and "land" lists) or which are linguistically divided (Katz, 1984). In these cases, the party may nominate more candidates than there are deputies to be elected.

A further problem facing the Swiss is the possibility that a candidate who is unpopular with a segment of its electorate will be struck off the list by those voters and replaced by a candidate of some other party. In this case, not only is the candidate hurt, so too is the party, which thereby loses a fraction of the value of each of those votes.

This type of problem is especially pronounced in Ireland, however, where parties run the risk that votes will be lost to them altogether, either by being transferred to a candidate of another party or by becoming nontransferrable. The relationship between this problem and the optimal number of candidates has received considerable attention, and the debate need only be summarized briefly. On one side, nomination of superfluous candidates may increase vote loss (Cohan and McKinlay, 1978; Lijphart and Irwin, 1979). On the other, overnomination may increase the party's first preference poll, so that the votes apparently lost were not really party votes in the first place. Additionally, overnomination may be a way of displacing onto the voters the potentially disruptive problem of choosing among candidates (Katz, 1981). It is in general this possibility that suggests that preference voting may, in some cases, simply the party's nominating difficulties.

The problem of candidate number also interacts with the Irish bailiwick system. Manipulation of this system is one way in which individual candidates attempt to protect their own positions. Thus, each candidate can be expected to oppose the nomination of any other candidate, no matter how attractive for the party, who might cut into his own territory. The potential cost to the party of this becomes especially clear in cases of by-elections. Often, rather than supporting the strongest possible candidate, incumbent deputies would

prefer to lose the by-election than to have an additional incumbent of their own party on the ballot at the next general election (Gallagher, 1980).

A second problem involves the composition of the list. In all cases, this involves a balancing of groups. For example, even when a faction of the Christian Democratic party is dominant within an area, it does not exclude representatives of other factions from its list. In part, this is due to the pressure of the national party, but in part it simply reflects the good political sense that even the votes of a minority are valuable. The nature of the balance, however, depends on the nature of the party. In particular, where personal preference voting is dominant in determining the order of election, the general pattern of decision by the voters as actors in the nomination process becomes crucial. The PCI can afford to balance its list between men and women (or at least to dramatically increase female representation) because it does not have to be concerned about balance among organized interests within the party. Rather, voters are motivated primarily by the party, and so their choice can be guided by it. In the DC, however, voters are more generally stimulated to participate in the preference poll by organizations battling for influence within the party. Often, the DC is represented in parliament by individuals who owe their seats to the support of these groups in the party's parentela. Since they have an independent base of support, the party leadership (itself often representative of the same interests) has far less discretion in constructing its list.

In Ireland, more voters are self-stimulated to cast preference votes, probably because preference voting is an integral part of the

process of voting at all. Their primary direct concern appears to be geographic proximity, and the balance that must be struck in list composition is most obviously geographic, although religion may also be a factor in a few constituencies (Sacks, 1976). Geography is important in all systems, however, especially when constituency boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of important local government units. Thus, when Irish constituencies include areas from more than one county, or in Italian constituencies which include several provinces, geographic considerations are especially evident.

Finally, there is the question of list order. The key problem here is that ordering a list entails favoring some individuals over others. Thus, while the electoral law requires an ordered list, the structure of Italian DC lists may be interpreted in part as an attempt to treat all incumbents as equally as possible. In the PCI, this is carried even farther, usually with only a single capolista given favored treatment. Finally, in Ireland, where the independent position of candidates is probably strongest, no ordering of the list is attempted at all.

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Table 1: Percentage Counted as Voting for First Candidate on List,
Selected Dutch Parties, 1981 and 1982.

| | 1981 | 1982 |
|-------|------|------|
| CDA | 91.8 | 95.1 |
| PvdA | 88.8 | 93.6 |
| VVD | 94.4 | 91.9 |
| D '66 | 87.5 | 92.8 |

Table 2: Sources of Interelection Turnover Among Parliamentary Parties

| | Elections | Intrapartisan Defeat | | | | |
|--|-----------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | <u>Reelected</u> (1) | <u>Partisan Defeat</u> (2) | <u>List Order</u> (3) | <u>Preference Vote</u> (4) | <u>Not Candidate</u> (5) |
| Belgium | 1977-78 | 79.8 | 5.6 | 2.8 | 0. | 11.7 |
| Denmark simultaneous list party/usual list | 1977-79 | 64.6 | 3.1 | 0. | 6.9 | 25.4 |
| | | 46.5 | 11.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 37.2 |
| Finland | 1970-72 | 60.0 | 6.0 | 0. | 14.0 | 20.0 |
| Greece | 1974-77 | 55.6 | 14.2 | 0. | 17.0 | 13.2 |
| Ireland | 1969-73 | 82.0 | 7.9 | 0. | 2.9 | 7.2 |
| Italy | 1972-76 | 55.3 | 6.0 | 0. | 7.8 | 30.7 |
| Luxembourg | 1974-79 | 55.9 | 5.1 | 0. | 8.5 | 30.5 |
| Netherlands | 1981-82 | 80.5 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 0. | 6.0 |
| Norway | 1977-81 | 79.2 | 3.1 | 0. | 0. | 17.6 |
| Switzerland | 1975-79 | 68.9 | 3.6 | 0. | 3.1 | 24.4 |

Table 3: List Position and Election Result, Italian Christian Democrats, 1976.

| List Position | Result | |
|---------------|---------|----------|
| | Elected | Defeated |
| Capolista | 31 | 0 |
| Middle | 152 | 30 |
| Bottom | 81 | 328 |

Source: Katz and Bardi, 1980

Table 4: 1972 Election Result and 1976 List Position, Italian Christian Democrats.

| 1972 Result | 1976 List Position | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|--------|--------|---------------|
| | Capolista | Middle | Bottom | Not Candidate |
| Elected | 27 | 149 | 18 | 85 |
| Defeated | | 2 | 19 | 322 |
| Not Candidate | 4 | 31 | 373 | |

Source: Katz and Bardi, 1980

Table 5: Average Percentage of Available Preference Votes Used by Those Reporting to Have Cast Preference Votes, Italy 1972 *

| | Northwest | Northeast | Center | South and Islands |
|-----|-----------|-----------|--------|-------------------|
| PCI | 29 | 30 | 45 | 51 |
| PSI | 47 | 29 | 40 | 62 |
| DC | 66 | 51 | 58 | 66 |

* Figures are computed by dividing the aggregate proportion of possible preference votes cast by the proportion of survey respondents reporting to have cast preference votes. See Katz, 1985a.

Table 6: Percentage of Women in Italian Parliamentary Groups, 1972, 1979, and 1983.

| | 1972 | | 1979 | | 1983 | |
|-----|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Senate | Camera | Senate | Camera | Senate | Camera |
| DC | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 2.7 |
| PCI | 2.4 | 9.1 | 7.1 | 17.8 | 6.7 | 20.3 |
| PSI | 0 | 1.6 | 0 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 |

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CANDIDATE SELECTION IN THE NETHERLANDS

Ruud KOOLE

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Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse
Politieke Partijen
University of Groningen
Hoge der A 10
9712 AC Groningen
The Netherlands
tel. (0)50-115386



CANDIDATE SELECTION IN THE NETHERLANDS

I. introduction

In 1984/1985 the Dutch Second Chamber, the most important representative body in the Netherlands, was very much in discussion. A Parliamentary Commission had investigated the policies of successive governments for the shipbuilding industry. This investigation received much public attention. The huge Commission's report not only accused members of government and captains of industry of inadequate policies or managerial weakness, it also stated that the Second Chamber itself had clearly failed to fulfil one of its constitutional tasks: to control government. The quality of parliament and hence the quality of its members were at stake. This failure was mostly attributed to a changed political culture, with different political values and other decision-making processes, but also with different recruitment patterns of political personnel. These changes in recruitment occurred within the boundaries of the electoral system of proportional representation, which had hardly changed. Since the mid-sixties the "depillarization" of society in the newly established Dutch welfare-state and the efforts to "democratize" the political parties had left their marks on the formal procedures and informal processes of candidate selection within parties. These processes resulted in a more decentralized or "regionalized" recruitment on the one hand and in a more professionalized Second Chamber on the other hand. This paper will try to explain these phenomena.

II. the electoral system provides the setting

As in other countries the electoral system defines to a large extent the way candidates are selected. The Dutch system is mainly characterized by extreme proportional representation. There is no threshold like in West-Germany: some parliamentary parties even consist of one member for which in 1982 at the national elections 54846 votes, possibly scattered all over the country, were sufficient. The voter casts a single preferential vote for a politician of his choice from a list of candidates submitted by the respective parties. In 1970, compulsory attendance at the polls was abolished. Votes cast for the head-of-the-list are considered to be list-votes or party-votes, all the other preference votes. Elections for the Second Chamber are held at least every four years.



The entire country is one constituency, but is divided in 18 electoral subdistricts.(1)

In Dutch Electoral Law, however, parties do not exist as such. Formally Dfl. 1000 (ca. \$265) and 25 signatures of persons entitled to vote are sufficient to submit a list with a maximum of 40 names in one of the 18 subdistricts. Since 1956 the Electoral Law (art. G 13) allows that the name or symbol of the political grouping is printed on the ballot paper on top of the list of candidates. This provision is one of the few concessions to political practise, in which political parties instead of 25 individuals decide on the eligibility of candidates. The voters only decide on the strength of the respective parties. Due to a high "preference treshold" preference votes are almost irrelevant for the allocation of seats, although they may be interpreted as signals given by the voters to the parties, such as the relative preference for female and regional candidates.(2) The parties are predominant.

III. environmental factors: the changed society

As we will describe below, procedures for candidate selection within parties did change considerably during the two last decades. These changes took place against the background of profound changes in Dutch society. Most important of all seems to be in this respect the "depillarization". Until the mid-sixties the highly fragmented Dutch society was organized in four ideological groupings or 'pillars' on the basis of religious or socio-economic cleavages: Catholics, Protestants, Liberals and Socialists. The 'pillars' included not only political parties, but also all other forms of associations: from trade unions and employer's organizations to broadcasting systems or football-clubs. The pillars operated in isolation from each other. Only at the elite-level co-operation took place in order to guarantee a stable government. A rather passive electorate followed its leaders without too much contestation.(3)

'Depillarization' means that the links within the pillars were loosened, on a psychological level as well as on an institutional level. Owing to the development of the welfare-state and the arrival of television, the individual citizen was no longer obliged to follow traditional paths. This process occurred first - and with a vengeance - within the religious pillars (the deconfessionalization), but it also affected other pillars. This psychological process of depillarization, sometimes called the "decolonization of the citizen"(4), opened

the way for other ideas and new (political) values. On the political level this implied criticism of the old institutions and leaders, a call for a participatory democracy, the introduction of New Left - or post-material values and the foundation of new parties. It also meant a growth of the so-called 'floating vote' and hence more 'electoral nervousity'. Parties could no longer count on their electorate as automatically as before.

The institutional depillarization means that the ties between organizations within one pillar were reduced and sometimes completely eliminated. Whereas for instance, before the mid-sixties labour unions, the socialist broadcasting corporation (VARA) and the Labour Party (PvdA) held "quality seats" in the executive bodies of their "sister"-organizations, these organizations have stopped to do so since, although mutual sympathy continues to be present.

Both the psychological and the institutional disaggregation of Dutch society had their effects on the recruitment processes within political parties. First, the *political climate* changed. The call for a more participatory democracy implied politicization of the party-members and democratization of the internal organization. For some democratization became an end in itself. Elements of direct democracy were introduced in the structure of some parties. As we shall see below left-wing parties were more affected by these developments than right-wing parties. This democratization also implied new demands on the party leadership and the representatives in parliament. Candidates had to present themselves more than before in terms of respect for the wishes of the rank-and-file, which were not always compatible.

Second, the *recruitment reservoirs* altered and sometimes desiccated. The content of these reservoirs is limited by the number of partymembers. In the Netherlands only partymembers are allowed to participate in the nomination process. The number of partymembers rapidly decreased during the last decades. This was due to psychological depillarization, as described above, but also to opposite results of the call for more participation. Meant to lower the participation-threshold for the ordinary partymembers, it sometimes led to these opposite results, because of an extreme participation-load.

In 1980, for instance, the combined total membership of all parties participating in the national elections, was as high as the number of members of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) by itself in 1950: approximately 425.000. In 1982, only about 4% of the persons entitled to vote (somewhat more than 5% of the voters)

was a member of a political party. This tendency still exists, albeit with fluctuations as table 1 shows. Moreover, not even 10% of the partymembers is a partyactivist. Since only active partymembers participate in the candidate selection processes, this implies that only 0.5% of the electorate has a say in these processes.

Two more factors may explain the loss of members. The economic crisis: fewer people are able to pay the membershipfee. And the bureaucratic centralization of the parties: whereas the new political climate promoted a more decentralized decision-making structure, the bureaucracy became more professionalized and centralized. Hence the - still rather small - partysecretariats are able to calculate the exact number of members. In earlier days with less centralized and professionalized partybureaucracies these numbers often were inaccurate and almost always exaggerated. Although formally political parties do not receive statesubventions directly, the goal-oriented subsidies for affiliated organizations (research bureaus, youth and educational organizations) and for the assistance of representatives in Parliament that exist since about 1970, have exempted partysecretariats from several tasks; the small secretariats therefore could concentrate on bureaucratic organization.

Furthermore, recruitment reservoirs of political parties receive less influx from related organizations. Due to the institutional disaggregation parties cannot count as much as before on candidates coming from labour unions, employer's organizations, etc. This also means a loss of expertise built up in these organizations.

A last environmental factor that affects the outcome of recruitment processes is the changing composition of the (professional) population. If one states that the PvdA attracts fewer industrial workers than before, one has to bear in mind that the share of industrial workers in the entire professional population dropped from one half in 1970 to less than a third in 1984, whereas the proportion of the service sector increased from one third to two thirds in the same period.(5)

IV. internal formal procedures: dimensions of candidate selection

In the Netherlands political parties are free to organise the selection of candidates the way they consider appropriate. Political parties are treated as any other association by public law and therefore no special regulations regarding the nomination procedures exist. Often suggestions have been made to

table 1. political parties in the Netherlands: seats in parliament, number of members and members/voters-ratio

| parties | seats in Parliament (1982) | number of members | | | members/voters-ratio 1982 | |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------|---------|---------|------------------------------|-------|
| | | 1978 | 1980 | 1982 | | |
| Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) | 45 | 162.000 | 143.000 | 153.500 | 138.000 | 6,4% |
| Labour Party (PvdA) | 47 | 121.000 | 111.000 | 105.300 | 100.900 | 4,2% |
| People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) | 36 | 101.000 | 85.700 | 101.300 | 90.800 | 5,3% |
| Democrat's '66 (D'66) | 6 | 12.000 | 14.600 | 15.000 | 12.000 | 4,2% |
| Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) | 3 | 8.500 | 9.100 | 10.300 | 8.900 | 5,5% |
| Communist Party (CPN) | 3 | 16.100 | ? | ? | 1.000 | ? |
| Radical Political Party (PPR) | 2 | 12.500 | 10.500 | 9.500 | 8.900 | 7,0% |
| Evangelical People's Party (EVP) | 1 | | | 1.800 | 2.800 | 3,2% |
| Political Reformed Party (SGP) | 3 | 19.500 | 20.300 | 20.800 | 21.200 | 13,2% |
| Reformed Political Federation (RPF) | 2 | 3.500 | 5.500 | 9.800 | 9.300 | 7,9% |
| Reformed Political League (GPV) | 1 | 12.100 | 12.900 | 13.000 | 13.000 | 19,4% |
| Center Party (CP) | 1 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |

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source: Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties (DNPP) - University of Groningen - The Netherlands

regulate some aspects of the internal life of political parties, such as democratic stature, party finance and candidate selections.(6) But there has never been a majority in Parliament in favour of these suggestions. Hence selection procedures within parties vary considerably. It would consume too much space and time to describe the procedures of all parties in the Netherlands. Therefore we shall limit ourselves to the three main parties, CDA, PvdA and VVD, although some general remarks will be made about peculiarities of other parties.(7) Together, the three major parties won almost 83% of the popular vote in 1982, when the last national elections were held. (see table 1) A study on candidate selection in the Netherlands in 1963, based on party charters or constitutions concluded that political parties were highly centralized in this respect. Usually it was a small number of party leaders that made the selection.(8) The contemporary party constitutions, however, show a different picture. Of course, the central bodies still play an important role, but participation in the selection process is now less oligarchic and more decentralized, at least on paper.

In order to clarify the procedural differences between the political parties, I shall use the terms suggested by Ranney to describe the dimensions of candidate selection.(9) Ranney distinguishes three dimensions: *centralization*, *inclusiveness* and *direct or indirect participation*. "Centralization" stands for the degree of power over candidate selection by national agencies. He puts the Netherlands into the following category: selection by national agencies after serious considerations of suggestions by subnational agencies. "Inclusiveness" refers to the question how restrictive the qualifications for participation in the process are. "Direct or indirect participation" centers on the question of whether the party members qualified to participate do so directly by voting on the aspirants for candidacy or indirectly by electing delegates to the conventions or committees that select the candidates. I suggest to add a fourth dimension: *exclusiveness*. "Exclusiveness" refers to the obligations and qualifications the party imposes on the aspirant-candidates before they are put on the list of candidates. Sometimes these stipulations may be incompatible with provisions in the Constitution or with public law.

The foundation of the *Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)* in 1980 as a merger of two Protestant parties and one Catholic party, was a clear reaction to the deconfessionalization. What was considered to be impossible was brought about by the electoral losses of the religious parties: a fusion of organisations from

two different 'pillars'. In 1963 the three constituent parties still won 49.2% of the popular vote, in 1982 the CDA obtained only 29,3%. The speed of the electoral decline, however, was clearly slowed down by the federation of the three parties.

The first years after the foundation of the new party its selection of candidates was governed by a special agreement, the so-called 'fusion protocol', by which each of the four 'bloodgroups' (i.e. the former parties plus the group of new direct CDA-members) was entitled to a fixed number of eligible candidates on the partylist. This procedure was put into practise at the 1981 and 1982 national elections, but was abolished in 1984. Candidate selection for the 1986 elections will follow the stipulations of the party constitution, officially regardless of historical privileges. The foundation of the new CDA also provided an opportunity to adopt a completely new charter. This explains the relative 'modern' character of the selection procedures. 'Modern' means in this respect: a relatively low degree of *centralization*. Local party branches initiate the process of candidate selection by suggesting names of candidates. These names are put on an alphabetic roster. After consultations with the parliamentary party and advices from the party leadership, a special committee consisting of delegates of the regional party organisations (corresponding with the 18 electoral subdistricts) draws up an advisory list. Then the local party branches decide upon the definitive list of candidates. Only under special circumstances the party leadership can advise the party council (the delegates of the regional party organizations) to alter the list; this alteration has to be approved by a qualified two-third majority by the national party congress, that consists of delegates from the local party branches.

Thus, formally local party branches are decisive in the process of candidate selection within the Christian-Democratic Appeal. Party leadership, however, has various opportunities to influence this process by suggesting the order of the advisory list.

The fact that the local party branches are decisive also means that a high degree of *direct participation* is formally possible. This also affects the *inclusiveness* dimension: all partymembers are entitled to participate in the selection process.

The degree of *exclusiveness*, the fourth dimension, is rather high within the CDA. All aspirant-candidates have to sign a declaration of acceptance of their candidacy, in which they commit themselves to specified obligations. Of course

they must be party members and accept the party platforms.(10) But they also have to declare to be available for the entire parliamentary period; to give up their seats in parliament whenever they leave the (parliamentary) party or when they reach the age of 65 years; to accept the party leadership's judgment on questions like: what other functions can be fulfilled when representative or whether nomination through preference votes is acceptable; to promise to frequent (local) party meetings; etcetera. All these provisions may deter some categories of party members from presenting themselves as candidates. It is obvious that some provisions are not compatible with the Dutch Constitution. For instance, a party can never force a representative to give up his seat when he or she leaves the party, even after signing the declaration of acceptance. Officially, representatives are chosen without mediation of political parties and the only mandate they hold is that of the electorate, not of the party.

Next to the candidate-oriented stipulations the party charter also asks for a balanced composition of the parliamentary party. This consideration has to inspire the party leadership when giving its advice about the order in the list of candidates.

In the Netherlands, moreover, the Constitution forbids the combination of the membership of the Second Chamber with appointed public functions like Mayors, Commissioners of the Queen or Ministers; and in 1976 the Second Chamber decided to publish annually all secondary functions of its members.

The *Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid - PvdA)* introduced a very decentralized selection procedure in 1971. Before, the New Left within the party had very often criticized the rigid structure within the party. Discussions about internal party democracy were (and still are) very frequent within the PvdA and consequently procedures often changed. Whereas a referendum that concluded the selection of candidates was abolished in 1966 because not even 25% of the party members used their right to vote(11), the call for more participation led some years later to a more decentralized system. One tried to bridge the gap between voter and representative by bringing politics closer to the party member's homes. This also corresponded with efforts to democratize the party by fighting the power of the national party-oligarchy. Although several observers have warned against opposite results of 'overdemocratization'(12), the present system of candidate selection clearly is marked by the 'democratization wave' of the 1960's and 1970's.

Candidate selection within the PvdA is organized by an "independent" commission,

that was reinstalled in 1981. Six members of the commission are chosen by the party congress (delegates from the local party branches), the party secretary holds the seventh seat. Without suggesting names, this commission drafts a so-called 'profile' of the future parliamentary party; it does so in consultation with the incumbent parliamentary party. After approval by the party-council (delegates from the regional party organizations), this 'profile' is sent to the local branches, which then suggest names of candidates to the regional party organizations. These regional organizations ("gewesten") also receive suggestions from the independent commission as well as from the party executive and there upon decide the definite order of the list of candidates in their respective electoral subdistricts. There is only one exception: the head-of-the list, usually the same person in all electoral subdistricts, is appointed by a special party congress.

Thus the degree of *centralization* is low in the PvdA and the opportunities for the party leadership to influence the process are relatively few. *Direct participation* by party members, however, is restricted, because there is no referendum and the regional party organizations are decisive. All party members, except those proposed for election, can participate in the selection process; therefore the degree of *inclusiveness* is relatively high. This is also true for the fourth dimension: *exclusiveness*. As in the CDA, aspirant-candidates in the PvdA are forced to sign a declaration of acceptance of candidacy; otherwise they are excluded as candidates. They have to be a member of the PvdA and no member of another party; to agree with the party's platforms; to give up their seats whenever they leave the (parliamentary) party; after their election to be ready to move to the electoral sub-district where they are nominated; to contribute a certain percentage of their political income to the party chest after election; to answer to the party bodies for their political behaviour; and next to legal provisions on incompatibilities, to throw up the following other functions: membership of the European Parliament and membership of several party bodies (the so-called anti-cumulation rules).

The *People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)*, a conservative-liberal party, is more centralized than the CDA and the PvdA. An explanation for this phenomenon might be the fact that the VVD seems to be less affected by the 'democratization-wave' of the 1960's and 1970's than the other parties.

Local party branches may suggest names of candidates, but don't have any decisive influence on the selection process. This process is an interplay between regional

party organizations and the party leadership. After some consultative rounds a special election council, consisting of delegates from the regional party organizations, but presided over by the chairman of the party, meets to determine the order of the various lists of candidates in the 18 electoral subdistricts. It does so on the basis of proposals drafted by the party executive. Hence the party leadership (including the chairman of the parliamentary party) possesses an important tool to influence the process. For the 1986 national elections the party executive proposes to have the same three candidates heading the lists in all electoral subdistricts; the order of the next 20 candidates (of whom the nomination is considered "safe") may differ in the respective subdistricts; the order of the following 17 candidates (no. 24 to 40: the 'dangerous zone') is the same again everywhere in order to have a balanced composition of the parliamentary party; the "tail" of the list (ineligible places) may be decided on freely by the regional subdistricts.⁽¹³⁾ This strict proposal is a clear effort of the party executive to fight the problem of "regionalism", that was dominant in 1982. Thus the degree of *centralization* is fairly high in the VVD. As in the PvdA all party members, except those proposed for election, have the right to be *included* in the process. *Direct participation* of party members, however, is quasi-absent. The degree of *exclusiveness* in the VVD is, compared to CDA and PvdA, rather low. Of course every candidate has to be a party member and has to agree with the party platform, but other obligations are almost absent.

The different formal procedures of CDA, PvdA and VVD are summarized in a comparative way in table 2. One conclusion can already be drawn: central control is not greater in left-wing parties than in right-wing parties; on the contrary! The 'democratization-wave' of the 1960's and 1970's may explain this phenomenon.

table 2: dimensions of candidate selection according to the formal procedures of CDA, PvdA and VVD

| <u>party</u> | <u>centralization</u> | <u>inclusiveness</u> | <u>direct participation</u> | <u>exclusiveness</u> |
|--------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| CDA | ± | ++ | + | ++ |
| PvdA | - | + | - | ++ |
| VVD | + | + | - | -- |

++ = very high; + = high; ± = moderate; - = low; -- = very low.

Some peculiarities in the selection procedures of other parties are worth mentioning. Especially *D'66*, a progressive-liberal party founded in a year of much political turmoil (1966), shows a very high degree of direct participation. All party members have the right to be present and to vote at the national party congress. This congress chooses the head-of-the-list. The rest of the list of candidates is decided by a referendum, in which all party members can participate. The *Communist Party*, going through a late process of destalinization and modernization, had decided in 1982 that odd numbers of the list of candidates have to be assigned to women. Other parties, especially on the left side of the political spectre, also stress the need for more female candidates, but are less strict in this respect.

V. intraparty dynamics: candidate selection in real life

There has not been any systematic research done on candidate selection within Dutch parties.(14) However, one can gather a general impression about selection processes in real life from internal reports of the parties. In 1983 the *CDA* published a report about its internal party organization, drafted by a special committee.(15) The report described the internal party structure when it was still governed by special rules for a transitional period as laid down in the "fusionprotocol" (see section IV). These rules were criticized very much in the report because of their rigidity. According to the fusion protocol the seats in parliament as well as other executive posts, were to be allocated between the three constituent parties and the group of 'direct' *CDA*-members. The report stated that this agreement prevented recruitment of young and new members (including women) and pleaded for a faster "circulation" of the incumbent representatives. Moreover: "Generalists are too rare among the candidates; specialists or representatives of interest groups seem to be more in demand. Furthermore, regionalism plays too large a role at the national level, sometimes to the disadvantage of the best candidates." The parliamentary party of the *CDA* did not greet the report with great enthusiasm. Rejuvenation and 'feminization' would detract from experience and expertise. Discussions at the local branches resulted in qualifications of the report; On the one hand the "fusion protocol" was abolished in February 1984; on the other hand the party council of May 1984 decided that the "circulation" should not be an end in itself.

The *PvdA* has always devoted many publications to the question of its internal

democracy. Selection procedures are part of this question. Two important reports were published in 1979 and 1980 respectively. (16) The 1980 report indicated specifically the following problems: the gap between active party cadre and non-active members and the work overload of active cadre owing to internal democratization. This overload results in "large fluctuations in the willingness to participate, in an accelerated flow of members through party committees and in discontinuity with respect to decisionmaking processes". (17) Furthermore it may lead to onesided composition of the party bodies.

Of course these general features of internal party democracy had an impact on candidate selection processes. As we have seen, the selection system was decentralized in a period when the recruitment base was narrowed down. According to a PvdA report of 1978, the youth organization, trade unions and other social organizations no longer contributed candidates. (18) Strict anti-cumulation rules further restricted the recruitment reservoirs. Criticism of the recruitment system was sometimes put forward and concentrated on problems like the lack of know-how of the parliamentary party in certain areas, the 'regionalization' of candidates during election time, the lack of coherence of the lists of candidates, etc. However, when the party executive proposed to moderate the decentralization by allowing the party council the right to select a common top of five candidates for the lists in all electoral subdistricts, the party congress objected (October 1981). This same congress did approve of the independent commission, mentioned in section IV. It remains to be seen if this commission will be able to prevent the "hawking" about incumbent members of parliament to regional party organizations in the future. Regional lobbies and interest groups sometimes tend to neglect incumbents. The way some of them were treated at the selection for the European Parliament in 1984 indicates that the PvdA has not yet solved its problem.

At first sight the *VVD* does not seem to suffer too much from these problems. As we have seen above, its selection procedures have not been "democratized" to the same extent as those of PvdA and CDA. However, the report of a Commission on Candidate Selection (1982) informs us that there are also problems within this party. (19) The way the congress of July 1982 decided on the definitive list of candidates for the parliamentary elections of September 1982 confirmed the Commission in its conviction that the procedures should be changed. Some regional party organizations had argued before that these procedures promoted "narrow regionalism" by coordinated actions of several regional party organizations.

Also the party executive admitted that because non-incumbent candidates are unknown to most party bodies, "promoters" and "cliques" affect the listing in an arbitrary fashion.(20) These problems may have inspired the party executive to propose a more controlled candidate selection for the elections of 1986 (see paragraph IV).

If we compare the various reports of CDA, PvdA and VVD on candidate selections, it is clear that all three major parties struggle with *regionalism*, in spite of important procedural differences between them. The CDA is also concerned about the stagnation around the top - too few youngsters, women and "direct" members(21) - whereas the PvdA is more worried about the fast flow of active members. Furthermore, the PvdA perceives the one-sided professional and educational composition of its party committees as a problem. The CDA and the VVD do not discuss this in their reports.

Owing to its enormous electoral growth in the 1970's, the VVD has succeeded - in a simple way - in combining continuity with rejuvenation, that are problematic in the CDA and the PvdA. Yet stabilization or decrease of its number of seats, which is indicated by all opinion polls, may result in problems with stagnation or supersession within this party, too.

Research need to be done, however, in order to understand more precisely why certain categories of party members do not present themselves as candidates, why other categories do not manage to win seats and what the exact behaviour is of functional, regional and categorial lobbies.(22)

VI. results of candidate selection

The outcome of selection processes is the result of three interfering sets of variables: environmental factors, formal procedures and intra-party dynamics. In the Netherlands these provoked a rapid change in the composition of the active party cadre and of the Second Chamber of Parliament. Recently research has been done at both levels. In 1978/1979 congress delegates of CDA, PvdA, VVD and D'66 have been questioned(23) and in 1982/1983 studies have been published about the composition of the Second Chamber.(24)

Although the research on *congress delegates* only shows the situation at a specific moment, it may help to clarify the one-sided composition of the party cadre. As table 3 indicates the active party cadre is highly educated, often engaged in education or in civil service, rather young, and overwhelmingly

table 3: composition of party congresses; some data (in percentages)

| | <u>CDA</u> | <u>PvdA</u> | <u>VVD</u> |
|--------------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| - age | | | |
| <i>under 35</i> | 20.7 | 43.3 | 22.8 |
| <i>35-60</i> | 71.3 | 53.4 | 67.1 |
| <i>over 60</i> | 8.0 | 3.3 | 10.2 |
| rounded average age | 44 | 37 | 44 |
| - sex | | | |
| <i>percentage of women</i> | 12.2 | 18.5 | 16.2 |
| - education (school last attended) | | | |
| <i>elementary + lower</i> | 20.1 | 24.8 | 3.6 |
| <i>secondary</i> | 19.6 | 13.9 | 27.6 |
| <i>tertiary</i> | 59.4 | 58.7 | 68.2 |
| - subjective social class | | | |
| <i>upper</i> | 30.2 | 19.1 | 29.0 |
| <i>middle</i> | 67.7 | 70.8 | 70.4 |
| <i>lower</i> | 2.1 | 10.1 | 0.6 |
| - branches of economy | | | |
| <i>primary (agriculture/fishery)</i> | 6.1 | 1.8 | 3.3 |
| <i>secondary (industry)</i> | 8.3 | 14.6 | 16.7 |
| <i>tertiary (services)</i> | 27.4 | 18.2 | 41.3 |
| <i>education/public service</i> | 51.4 | 55.0 | 32.7 |
| <i>other</i> | 12.1 | 10.3 | 6.0 |
| - respons rate | 32 | 61 | 61 |
| - N | 338 | 367 | 167 |

N.B. for the sake of convenience the category of 'no answer'/'missing data' is left out

masculine. Some differences between the parties are not surprising. The highest rate of low-educated delegates can be found in the PvdA, although a majority is very well educated. The VVD counts more delegates from the sector of commercial services, whereas a majority of CDA and PvdA delegates is professionally linked with public services and education.

It is obvious that these social backgrounds may play an important role in the candidate selection process. On the one hand preferences for candidates might correspond in general terms with the social composition of the selecting party organs (see also figure 1). On the other hand active party cadre tends to become more and more the only recruitment reservoir - as we have seen. Of course, one has to bear in mind that congress delegates are only a part of all the active party members, but their social backgrounds are illustrative.


A further analysis of the data of the congress delegates learns how the institutional depillarization has affected these party echelons. Only 19.9% of the PvdA-delegates held an executive function in a societal organization, apart from their professional function. 22.7% of the VVD-delegates held such a function. Of the CDA-delegates 34.3% was active in the executive of a societal organization; more than in the PvdA and in the VVD, but relatively few if one considers the traditional strong position of christian-democrats in this kind of organizations. The data throw a light on the participation-load in the three parties: 63% of the PvdA-delegates spent more than 20 hours per month on the party, 41% of the CDA- and 48% of the VVD-delegates did the same. About 25% of the PvdA-delegates worked more than 50 hours per month for the party! This overload of participatory duties explains to some extent the one-sidedness of the composition of the congress-delegates. It favours participation of persons with a high education a great freedom to map out the day and other political resources: the so-called "Nieuwe Vrijgestelden" or "logocrats". (25) This category corresponds with the high percentage of delegates working in the public service or in education.

The *social composition of the Second Chamber* is governed by the same societal changes as the composition of the intra party bodies. It is more onesided than before and hence the Second Chamber is getting more isolated from the rest of society. But the recruitment of Members of Parliament is also characterised by a tendency of "professionalization". Van den Berg attributes this tendency not only to the "depillarization" of society, but also to the fact that in 1968 a new system of payment of Members of Parliament was introduced. Whereas in 1967

only 35% of the members of parliament was a full-time representative, in 1980 this percentage had risen to almost 90%. (26)

The effects of institutional disaggregation can be seen in figure 1, derived from a thorough study by Van den Berg. The category of societal or political organization became drastically less important as a recruitment reservoir, whereas the importance of the education sector rapidly grew.

figure 1: categories of last held occupations of Members of Parliament before entering the Second Chamber (in percentages)



source: J.Th.J. van den Berg (1982), p. 9.

The rest category includes housewives, students, unemployed persons, etcetera. Industry and commercial services, not mentioned in figure 1, have always been moderate suppliers of representatives in the Second Chamber; their share slowly declined to about 15% in 1980.

Van den Berg also observes the constant high percentage of university trained representatives (about 65%), a growing percentage of women (from about 10% in the period 1956-1972 to 20% in 1982), and a declining average age. A professionalized, but isolated Parliament, concludes Van den Berg.

conclusive remarks: the predominance of political parties in a more autonomous political sphere

The recruitment of members of the Dutch Second Chamber has changed considerably over the last two decades. Party control over representatives grew, while the social composition of political parties and Parliament became less representative, or should we say: less democratic. This situation, exactly the opposite of what the "call for a participatory democracy" had intended, is the result of profound changes in Dutch society.

The psychological and institutional "depillarization" have isolated the political sphere from other spheres in society. Efforts to lower the threshold for participation in parties very often led to opposite results: only professionals or special categories of party members were able to meet the high demands of democratized decision-making procedures within parties. Only one category seems to have profitted from the "democratization-wave", though not without difficulties: women. But their number in politics is still relatively low. Whereas before the mid-sixties 'pillarization' compensated to some extent for the absence under a list system of personal links between the voters and the elected, the institutional disaggregation cut those fragile ties. In order to bridge this gap between the electorate and their representatives the degree of centralization was decreased, more in the left-wing PvdA than in the right-wing VVD. But this did not bring about more participation in political parties; it only strengthened the position of the local and even more the regional party oligarchy. D'66 has often argued to reintroduce a district system, but failed to win a majority for this idea. More recently the idea of a referendum has been put forward, but risks the same fate.

Although the electoral system has not changed, stricter party regulations have increased the party's grip over the representative. These regulations themselves are the results of a changed political climate, "carried" by the active party cadre that forms only a fraction now of the total electorate (less than 0.5%). Notwithstanding the perceived rigidity of the party structure a new generation of active party members emerged in the 1960's, and thereupon changed the procedures according to its participatory ideas. That means that new procedures are the consequence rather than the cause of a changed climate. But they can reinforce new rigidities.

A different candidate selection process, therefore, is at the same time the result

of interfering changes in society, procedures and intra-party dynamics and an illustration of the evolution towards a more autonomous political sphere.

notes

1. At the 1986 national elections there will be 19 sub-districts as the so-called "IJsselmeerpolders" (land detracted from the former Zuyderzee) from then onwards will be treated as a distinct sub-district.
2. see: R.A. Koole, "Voorkeurstemmen en politieke praktijk" in: *Intermediair*, 17 augustus 1984, p. 19-21; and: Ruud Hensing, *Bij voorkeur: Een onderzoek naar het gebruik van voorkeurstemmen*. (Master's thesis, University of Leiden, 1984).
3. Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968); H. Daalder, *Politisering en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek*. (Assen, Van Gorcum, 1974).
4. An expression introduced by the journalist H.J.A. Hofland.
5. source: Paul Frissen en Gerard Metselaar, "De PvdA en de problemen van een verzorgingsmaatschappij", in: *Socialisme en Democratie*, 41 (1984), no. 1 (January), pp. 3-11.
6. see: D.J. Elzinga, *De politieke partij en het constitutionele recht*. (Nijmegen, 1982); see for an introduction into the debate on this matter: G.G.J. Thissen, "Politieke partijen en recht: discussie zonder einde?", in: *Jaarboek DNPP 1982*. (University of Groningen), pp. 203-225.
7. see also: R.A. Koole, "Recrutering van leiderschap binnen partijen", in: *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 1984/7-8, pp. 214-222.
8. I. Lipschits, "De politieke partij en de selectie van kandidaten" in: *Sociologische Gids*, (1963), pp. 273-281.
9. Austin Ranney, "Candidate selection", in: David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, *Democracy at the Polls: a Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections*. (Washington/London, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), pp. 75-106.
10. Dissident opinions about a certain item in the election platform are sometimes permitted, but have to be accepted in advance by the party leadership.
11. J.P. Kruijt, "Interne partijdemocratie", in: *Socialisme en Democratie*, 23 (1966), pp. 731-739.
12. for instance: B. Tromp, "De Partij van de Arbeid in de jaren tachtig", in: *Beleid en Maatschappij*, oktober 1981.
13. *Vrijheid en Democratie*, February 19, 1985, pp. 4-5.
14. An exeption is a special report on women in political functions: M.H. Leyenaar and B. Niemöller, *De helft als minderheid*. ('s-Gravenhage, 1983); chapter 4 deals with candidate selection, especially on the provincial and the local level.
Recently, a special research-project on the subject of intra-party decision-making processes (including candidate-selection) had been started on the initiative of the University of Leiden.

15. *Appel en weerklank*. (Den Haag, CDA, 1983).
16. *Eindrapportage van de commissie Meerjarenramingen en Partijorganisatie*. (PvdA, 1979) and *Rapport van de Commissie interne partijdemocratie*. (PvdA, 1980). See also: G. Heyne den Bak, *Democratie in problemen. Participatie en besluitvorming in de PvdA*. (WBS, 1982); and B. Tromp, "Participatiedemocratie en participatie: vermeende oplossingen en echte problemen", in: *Socialisme en Democratie*, 37 (1980), 4 (april), pp. 159-165.
17. 1980-report (see note 16), p. 47.
18. *Partij, parlement, activisme*. (Kluwer/WBS, Deventer, 1978).
19. *Advies van de commissie kandidaatstelling en technisch advies*, in: *Vrijheid en Democratie*, 1276 (November 30, 1982), pp. 24-28.
20. *Ibidem*.
21. It remains to be seen whether the abolition of the so-called "fusionprotocol" in February 1984 will improve the situation. In the newly elected party executive (April 1984) 27 seats were allocated to representatives of the regional party organizations: 23 of them had been members of the constituent parties. Four of those 27 representatives were women; the majority consisted of elderly men (see the daily *Trouw*, April 6 and 10, 1984).
22. This kind of research has recently been started (see note 14)
23. This project formed a part of an international research project on Middle Level Elites, initiated and coordinated by the University of Mannheim (FRG) and sponsored by the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, the European Parliament and the European Commission. A working group of the University of Groningen carried out the Dutch part.
24. Based on material of the Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, University of Leiden. The principle publications are: J.Th.J. van den Berg, *De toegang tot het Binnenhof: de maatschappelijke herkomst van Tweede Kamerleden*. (Weesp, 1983); and: J.Th.J. van den Berg, "Geïsoleerd op het Binnenhof", in: *Socialisme en Democratie*, January 1982, pp. 3-16; see also: M.P.M.C. van Schendelen et al. (ed.), "*Leden van de Staten-Generaal...*" (The Hague, 1981).
25. The term "Nieuwe Vrijgestelden" was first introduced by Hans Daalder; the term "logocrats" is proposed by Paul Lucardie in: "De nieuwe middenklasse in de marxistische sociologie", *Sociologische Gids*, 29 (1982), 2, pp. 129-146.

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
WOMEN
TO
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

A study of the process of
recruitment and selection
of women to executive office

Drs. [Name] and [Name]

Department of Political Science
University of London
Hugo House, Gower Street 27a
231E
The Netherlands

Paper presented at
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WOMEN'S ROUTES

TO

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

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Drs. M.H. Leijenaar

Department of Political Science
University of Leiden
Hugo de Grootstraat 27a
2311 XK LEIDEN
The Netherlands

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INTRODUCTION

One common feature of western democratic political systems is the limited political organization and political participation of women, a feature, which until the beginning of the seventies had largely been ignored by theorists and empirists studying the political system. Thus democracy theorists were engaged in normative discussion about the quality of a democratic political system when in practice it appeared that its citizens showed very little interest and did not participate in political activities. Representation, a government consisting of periodically elected offices, was viewed by many theorists as a solution to this paradox. But the fact that women were not part of these representative governments was not considered to be a threat to the democratic value of that political system. Discussions on the 'openness' of the system brought forward in system-analytical approaches to the political process and in the agenda-building approach, also more or less ignored the position of women in this process.

Luckily this lack of attention in political science has substantially changed. A number of studies on the role of women in politics have appeared over the last decade.¹ But despite this, in many approaches in political science the variable, sex, is still not seen as relevant: in studies on politics women are not treated as a group with its own interests, issues and organizational support.

There are of course many lines of approach for studying women's role in politics. One can focus on the input side of the political system and study the mobilisation and organisation rate of women. Or one can devote time to researching women - or their absence - in the political elite. Thirdly one can restrict oneself to the effects of this absence on policy making and therefore focussing on the output of the system.

This paper concentrates on the elite level and more specifically on the

absence of women in elective office. In the first section the problem itself is discussed. What exactly does this under-representation of women mean for the functioning of a political system? Having concluded that women holding public office are not only a worthy object for study, but also that it is to be expected that more women participating, would change the decision-making process and policy outcome, I devote the second part of this paper shedding some light onto the reasons behind this minimal representation in the political elite. I restrict this to one phenomenon of the political process: the recruitment and selection of women candidates for elective offices. Drawing on the literature available I present a model of factors relevant to the process of recruitment and selection of women.

PART ONE: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN

It is well accepted that in modern political systems, where due to size and complexity direct political participation is simply impossible, a system of political representation by means of periodical elections still guarantees the democratic character of the system. Although it is acknowledged that there are many different sorts of interests to be represented, such as the interests of groups, social categories, but also ideologies and even interests of specific industries, the idea is that the mechanism of the political process sees to a fair treatment of all interests. The openness of a democratic political system and the absence of formal inequalities make certain that, when a specific interest is valued important by a person or group of persons, in the end it will come to the attention of the decision makers. But not only people on the input side of the political system articulate interests. Also the decision makers themselves play an important role in setting the political agenda. The democratic character of a political system and hence its legitimacy is not only guaranteed by the 'openness' of the system in terms of 'interestflow', but also by the degree of accessibility of the decision making bodies.

Naturally the political elite need not be a mirror image of the people who are governed. Nobody will deny the statement that politicians do not have to be representative samples of the population in terms of their colour of hair, size and accent of speech, or, more relevant, their level of expertise with respect to governmental affairs. The line is drawn at characteristics of which an unequal division between the categories would have some kind of political effect (Thomassen, 1981, p.160). The question now is whether sex is such a characteristic. Should women be regarded as a politically identifiable group, which should be represented in politics?

Discussing the political representation of women, the following must be considered. First, there is the implicit assumption that as a consequence of women's under-representation the relevant issues for women will be less often selected and discussed and less seriously defended.

In clarifying this assumption it is necessary to define the concept of 'women's interest'.

Secondly, there is the question whether or not the female electorate looks upon elected women officials as their representatives for these issues and interests and whether they judge male politicians incompetent to defend women's interests.

Finally, there is the question whether or not women politicians view themselves as articulators and defenders of women interests.

With regard to the conceptualization of women's interests Sapiro (1981) concludes that, since divisions of labor and stratification in public life defines group interests in politics, the same case can be made for gender divisions of labor in private life and stratification within the family. A valid conclusion because these 'private arrangements' are (partly) determined by public policy or affect subjects of public policy and policy debate. So her conclusion is that women are in a different social position from that of men and therefore have their own interests to be represented (Sapiro, 1981, p. 704). Her argumentations why there are women's interests I accept as valid. However, to find out what happens with these interests in the political system, it is necessary to present criteria with which it is possible to distinguish women's interests from others. It is beyond the context of this paper to elaborate on this.²

Women as voters

In respect to the second point, the attitude of the female electorate towards representation, I have referred to indicators used in voting studies. Koopman and Leijenaar in their study on the electoral behaviour of women and men in the Netherlands in five national elections find no substantial differences in turnout and party choice (Koopman and Leijenaar, 1983, p.248,249).

However, in this and in other studies a significant difference is found in issue orientations: women are more interested in and discuss more often than men issues such as the abortion legalisation, the (paid) job opportunities for married women, the enlargement of school classes and the care of aged people. (V.d. Eijk, p. 31 and Koopman and Leijenaar, 1984, p. 14, 15). In short, issues oriented on the private sphere - which are more in line of the roles and experiences of most women - are more often valued as relevant by women than by men. Since no systematic sex differences can be found in party choice, there seems to be no direct linkage of issue orientation with party choice in a sense that women prefer parties sympathetic to women's issues.

It appears that the position of parties on women's issues is not a valuable variable to predict women's voting.³

A contrary situation can be found in the USA where recently the concept of "gender gap" has come to both public and scientific attention. The "gender gap" refers to differences between women and men in political attitudes and voting choices and has been apparent in voting behavior, party identification, evaluations of Ronald Reagan's performance as President and attitudes to various public issues. Various polls conducted in 1980 showed a "gap" larger than ever before in voting choices between the sexes with 6-9% fewer women than men voting for

Ronald Reagan and again this difference showed up in the 1984 elections: 4-9%, depending which poll. American researchers connect this difference in party preference with the existing political differences between the democratic and republican parties on various issues ranging from women's issues like the Equal Rights Amendment, and abortion legalisation to issues such as the environment and the growth of nuclear power (women are more favor of measures to protect the environment and to check the growth of nuclear power) and issues on social welfare (women are more often supportive of programs which would help the economically disadvantaged) (CAWP newsletter 1984). Thus in the United States women's issues and the way the Government c.q. the Republican Party handle them are a factor of demonstrated relevance to voting behavior.⁴

A second indicator to measure the feeling of representation could be the number of votes, cast for women candidates. The Dutch electoral system allows for a candidate - not ranked for a safe seat - to be elected with preferential votes. Very few members of parliament have been elected in the past by such votes. The electoral tradition in the Netherlands is such that both women and men choose to support a party rather than a specific person. In national elections an average of around 90% of the voters cast their ballot for the first candidate on the list.

A second reason for the relatively low number of preferential votes for women as well as for men is the voters estimation of the very small chance a candidate has of becoming elected by preferential votes. Election regulations dictate that a candidate needs at least 40.000 votes to get elected this way. Thirdly, the electorate generally has no information on the separate candidates, which makes it difficult to select a candidate because of his or her standpoint on certain issues. During elections the media tends to cover dissimilarities between political parties in terms of policy preferences and does not pay a lot

of attention to the separate candidates running on the party lists. The number of preferential votes appears not to be a good indicator for the feelings of representativeness.

Women as politicians

Do women politicians view themselves as representatives of the female population in particular? Women parliamentarians have never been asked directly whether in their opinion they represent women. Therefore to answer this question we can only use indicators such as group performance of women politicians on certain issues and some general differences between men and women politicians in performing their task. First, their attitude and actual behavior concerning womens' interests. In a survey in 1980, 1065 council members in the Netherlands were asked how often they had raised women's issues at council meetings. Table 1 shows the results.

Table 1: Raised women's issues (percentages)

| | (often)1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (never) | |
|-------|----------|------|------|-----|-----------|-------|
| women | 3.6 | 23.7 | 38.4 | 8.0 | 25.2 | N=537 |
| men | 1.1 | 9.1 | 35.4 | 8.0 | 46.2 | N=498 |

Source: Janssen and Leijenaar, 1981, p.80

Almost 50% of the male councillors leave women's issues alone and about one fourth of the female representatives promote women's issues in the council on a more regular base. In the same survey another question was whether men politicians were capable of articulating women's interests

equally as well as women politicians.

Table 2: Are male politicians capable of articulating and defending women's interests equally as well as women politicians?
(percentages)

| | <u>women</u> | <u>men</u> |
|----------------|--------------|------------|
| agree | 37 | 55 |
| agree/disagree | 28 | 27 |
| disagree | 35 | 18 |
| | N=559 | N=490 |

Source: Janssen and Leijenaar, 1981, p.83.

Again a significant difference in opinion: more men than women report that male councillors are equally as good in the defending of women's interests.

As a third indication one can look at the performance of women politicians as a group. Lately there has been growing coöperation among women politicians. At the local level women councillors have been found to have voted in favor of women's issues, contrary to the wishes of their political parties.⁵ Different women's organisations within the parties presented their common agenda on women's concerns during the formation of the new cabinet in 1981 as well as in 1982. Since 1982, the women members of parliament have come together every six weeks to discuss political issues. They are particularly attentive to analyzing the impact of policies on women. For most of them the point of view of the party still prevails, but these discussions can be viewed as a first step to a united performance on women's issues in the parliament.

Fourth, data on the performance of women and men politicians shows that women spend more time in preserving contacts with electoral supporters, in answering correspondence and in arranging meetings with various organizations (Leijenaar and Niemöller, 1983, p.27,28). Hence, more than men politicians they are concerned with the electorate and the representative role of elective officers.

Summarizing we can conclude that the discussions on the conceptualization of women's interests and women's issues needs to continue, while these are key concepts in the study of women's participation in the political process. Second, we found no strong correlation between party choice and women's orientation towards certain issues. With regard to the opinion of women politicians on representation, there is evidence that women politicians bring forward issues relevant for women more often than men. Besides this there is a tendency for women politicians to identify themselves as a group and perform as such, breaking through the party lines. Finally it appeared that women members of parliament are more responsive to the electorate than their male colleagues. However, no data is available about the direction of this responsiveness: more to women or to men? Further research focussing on the differences in performance and attitudes between men and women in politics will answer these questions.

Women's under-representation: a problem?

In discussing the implications of women's under-representation, three related functions of representative government can be distinguished:

- authoritative allocation of values for a society;
- providing the necessary legitimacy for such allocations, and
- selection of issues, which merits governmental attention and/or action,

Up till now only the second function has been commented on. I argued that if women are recognized as a group with a collective identity and collective interests the absence of women in the political system should be regarded as a threat to the democratic character of that system and hence its legitimacy. But this is not the only implication.

Widely acknowledged is the function of governments to allocate values in making decisions which involve everyone in society. Political decision making not only shapes policies, but in doing so also selects the people who are going to benefit from it. Participation at the elite level represents influence on the allocation of government output. The absence of women means that their voices remain unheard in shaping and implementing policies affecting their lives.

The third implication is related to the selection of issues and the formation of the political agenda. The current situation is such that as far as they conflict with women's interests, men's interests have a better chance of being articulated. When politicians claim to represent common interests, without acknowledging possible contradistinctions between women and men, de facto, the current situation will be viewed as the natural situation and hence more 'favourable' to men's interests.

The overwhelming predominance of men in decision making bodies suggests a system which favours that group, probably at the expense of women. One can say that the absence of women politicians and the relatively meagre attention to women's issues indicates a mobilisation of bias. By this I mean the existence of a "set of predominant values, beliefs and rituals and institutional procedures that operate systematically and constantly" (Schattschneider, 1960) to the benefit of men at the expense of women.

Concluding remarks part one

The foregoing section is an attempt to define the problem of the limited participation of women in the political decision making process. The current composition of the political elite means that the majority of the population is not involved in the allocation of government output. The utmost consequence is that - in imitation of the Declaration of Sentiments in Seneca Falls (1848) - women, since they take no part in making, are not submitted to laws and policies. The legitimate value of the products of political decision making is not the same for both sexes (Van Maarseveen, 1984, p.715).

The under-representation of women in the political elite can therefore be viewed as a threat to the democratic value of a political system, which makes it a very worthy object for study for political scientists. But there are other reasons for bringing more women in public office. Because of their own experiences as women in our society, female officeholders have perspectives which are different from those of men. An increase of the number of women in politics should lead to public policy which is more responsive to women's special needs and issues ranging from domestic violence and child care to unemployment and education. Moreover it will help insure that proposed legislation on everything from foreign aid to transportation policy will be scrutinized and analyzed with respect to its likely impact on women as well as on men.

PART TWO: WOMEN'S ROUTES TO ELECTIVE OFFICE

For some people it will be surprising in this era of women's movement, anti-discrimination and equal pay, when women have formally had equal political rights for over sixty years, that in western democracies only an average of around 20% women holds political office.⁶ Table 3 shows the percentages of women in the elected assemblies of 15 Council of Europe countries.

Table 3: Percentages of women in the elected assemblies of Council of Europe countries

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Lower Chamber</u> | <u>Regional Assembly</u> | <u>Local Council</u> |
|----------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Sweden | 28.0 | 31.1 | 29.8 |
| Norway | 25.8 | 28.8 | 22.8 |
| Denmark | 23.4 | 7.6 | 21.0 |
| Netherlands | 18.0 | 16.0 | 12.5 |
| Austria | 9.8 | - | - |
| Luxembourg | 10.2 | - | - |
| Switzerland | 11.0 | 10.1 | 14.3 |
| Portugal | 8.0 | - | - |
| West Germany | 9.8 | 8.5 | 11.4 |
| Italy | 8.4 | - | 8.3 |
| Belgium | 5.6 | 8.0 | - |
| France | 5.9 | 3.8 | 14.0 |
| Iceland | 15.0 | - | 12.0 |
| Ireland | 8.4 | - | - |
| Spain | 5.7 | 5.6 | 7.8 |
| Greece | 3.7 | - | - |
| United Kingdom | 3.5 | - | - |
| Turkey | 3.0 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 2.8 | 0.2 | 1.3 |

Source: Council of Europe, the situation of women in the political process in Europe, Strasbourg, 1984, p. 11.

However, this minimal participation of women in the political elite is not so surprising, when we take into account that a political system is biased in ways which promote the continued tenure not only of power, but also of individuals who are in a position of power.

The above mentioned mobilisation of bias includes the way in which candidates for the political elite are evaluated, recruited and selected. This makes it necessary to study the process of recruitment and selection of candidates separately for both women and men.

This doesn't mean, of course, that many of the factors that make seeking and winning difficult for women are not the same for men. However, it is to be expected that women also face many barriers which are different from, or more severe than those for men. The same is probably true of factors that facilitate entry into elective office. I shall concentrate, in this section, on those factors that stand in the way or lead to the success of women who want to become part of political decision making.

A model

The electoral system in the Netherlands is such that the political parties play the major role in recruitment and selection of political leaders. The ballot contains the names of candidates competing for seats, grouped by party. The number of seats a party acquires is proportional to the share of the total, valid vote. The order of the candidates on the party list, which is specified by the parties themselves, determines the persons to be elected. If a party after the election is entitled to 20 seats in parliament, usually the first 20 candidates on the party list will take these seats. However, I mentioned it before, if a large number of voters cast their vote for a specific candidate, he or she can be elected irrespective of his or her rank on the list. The fact that parties rather than the electorate decide on the candidates to be elected, means that the actual power struggle for political offices happens within the parties. So both recruitment and selection take place by or in the political party. In this context recruitment is the process by which people (mostly party members) get

involved in party activities leading to an actual candidacy for representative bodies. Selection on the other hand is the process of being named for a list of candidates up to the actual nomination for a safe seat on the party list.


Although in both processes the same factors can be involved, it is possible to make a further distinction between the two phenomena. For, in time, recruitment takes place before selection and influences the process of selection and not vice versa. Further the process of recruitment is less clear and predictable because contrary to the process of selection it is not strictly regulated by formal party procedures.

The role of political parties as recruiting agents implies the importance of party culture, party procedures, but also the parties' view of women in society. But other factors too influence the process of recruitment and selection of potential women candidates. A considerable amount of literature has been produced explaining why there are so few women in political offices.⁷ These studies provide a survey of many different variables affecting political recruitment of women. Summarizing and ordering these variables, a first distinction is between individual factors and societal factors. For example at the individual level the most important factor is the difference in socialization between women and men. Socialization or sex role stereotyping has a substantial impact on political attitudes (such as competence and interest) and on political participation. The second category are factors related to the present organization of society. The way our society is organized causes societal constraints, which, directly or indirectly, restricts the opportunities for women to leave home and enter public life. Individual and societal factors can be further categorized in structural, situational and psychological factors.

Structural factors relate to the characteristics of the society as a

whole. With situational factors I refer to barriers or opportunities related to the present sex segregated division of labor. The third category focusses on the psychological consequences of sex role socialization and the organization of our society. The distinction between structural, situational and psychological factors is of course an analytical one, since many factors are interrelated and sometimes fit into two categories at the same time.

Sketching the relevant factors in the process of recruitment and selection we get:



The dotted line means that the relative weight of the cause-effect relation is expected to be less in the case of selection than in recruitment.

In the next section the five categories outlined above will be further explained by providing examples.

Structural factors

Examples of structural factors are:

- laws and regulations affecting women's societal position

- availability of child care facilities.

In the Netherlands the organization of society is such that the existing unbalanced division of labor (men participate in paid labor and women in unpaid labor, housework or voluntary activities) is being consolidated and reinforced. This forms an obstacle to bringing more women into public office.

Examples are the present laws with regard to unemployment benefits and taxation. Both carry the assumption that men are breadwinners and women housewives. As a consequence, an unemployed married man receives unemployment benefits for a period of two and a half years, whereas a married woman is entitled to such benefits for only six months.

Laws such as these reinforce traditional role patterns and inhibit attempts to change roles or to share the work inside and outside the home. Another example is the lack of childcare facilities (Sociale Atlas van de Vrouw, 1983, p. 178). Both factors influence the process of recruitment, because they maintain the sharp distinction between private and public spheres and form obstacles for bringing more women into politics.

Situational factors

In the Netherlands more than in other Western European countries there is a sharp sex segregated division of labor.

In the Netherlands 35% of the employed population is female. The majority of women are not engaged in paid labor, but work inside the home and are volunteering in community or women's organizations. And often, when women are employed outside the home, they continue to bear the primary responsibility for housework and childcare. (Sociale Atlas van de Vrouw, 1983, chapter 5). This situation influences both positively and negatively the chances of women being recruited. Relevant situational variables are:

- possession of political assets such as education, professional

- career and income;
- presence of children and the age of the children;
- spousal support;
- activities in voluntary and women's organizations.

As a consequence of sex role stereotyping women and men differ in education, professional experience and income, factors decisive for the opportunities of being invited and selected for elective office.

Studies of the educational level of Dutch politicians are very convincing. Especially among the parliamentarians, but also local and provincial councillors are well educated compared with the population. Large majorities of women and men holding office at all levels have some schooling beyond high school. (V.d. Berg, 1983, p.121; Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.33). Women and men politicians do not differ very much in this aspect and recent figures of the educational level of the population show that women have more or less caught up. (Sociale Atlas v.d. Vrouw, 1983, chapter 3). The level of education does not form a sex-specific barrier anymore for entering politics, but sex-differences still exist in type of education. Occupation and certain professional careers are also viewed to enhance the chances of being recruited and selected. A professional career often provides one with useful contacts, but also with skills such as negotiating and managing. In addition, having worked in certain professions can be an asset when that kind of a profession is viewed as electoral increasing appeal. For example a party member who worked for a trade union is supposed to attract other union members. Experience gained by doing housework and taking care of family members is not considered as a valuable asset for political officeholding. A related problem is the existing job segregation. Women often focus education and career development on the so-called nurturing professions. Besides the fact that these experiences are less valued by recruiting

party leaders, it is also true that women are often concentrated in occupations with little autonomy to decide on leaves of absence and work hours. In the Netherlands women more often than men are employed in the field of nursing, teaching, services, retail, cleaning and clerical work, occupations which do not generally leave much room for flexibility. And holding an elective office often means rearranging work schedules to accommodate the officeholding activities. The paucity of women in jobs with flexibility undoubtedly results in fewer women who are in a position to seek office.

The third often mentioned political asset, income, is not so relevant to discussion of recruitment in the Netherlands. Because of the fact that campaigning occurs within the party, a potential candidate does not have to spend a great amount of money on the public media. Money comes in handy, for example, to be able to pay babysitters, but besides this it does not have a large impact on one's chances of being recruited.

The second example of a situational factor influencing the process of recruitment, is the presence of young children. Many women, officeholder or not, are mothers. Women's responsibility for children can form a serious impediment in seeking access to political office. As several authors point out the most crucial factor is "spare time" (see for example Lee, 1975). Not only have mothers less spare time than men have - their work is never finished - but also they are often not able to control the allotment of their time. In interviews with women-councillors from the south of Holland, the timesetting of the council meetings was often criticized. It seemed that the male members of the council preferred meeting hours from 17.00 - 19.00 hrs, right after their work. For mothers, however, this appeared to be an impossible time considering the hungry stomachs of their children. The care for children is of course more restricting when children are of a young age. Studies of officeholders in both the USA and the Netherlands

report that women politicians are notably less likely than male officeholders to have young children (CAWP, 1983, p.27 / and Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.37).

Being a mother of grown up school going children (12 years and older) can also have a positive impact on the decision to seek political office. Especially at the local level where the job of councillor is not full time, women councillors often mentioned that they had more time to read the documents of the meetings and to talk with the bureaucracy or citizens. (Leijenaar and Niemöller, 1983, p.27).

One last aspect related to motherhood of young children is the rather isolating position of many housewives, which generally has a negative impact on the development of political attitudes (Anderson, 1975).

The third important factor in this category is spousal support. A distinction between materialistic and psychological support is warranted. The latter kind will be discussed in the next section. Materialistic support is the often needed care for the children - for example when there are meetings starting at 5 o'clock - but also sharing household duties. The double burden - and sometimes triple when women politicians maintain their job while serving in public office - in combination with the necessary flexible hours makes materialistic spousal support indispensable.

A fourth example of a situational factor determining the opportunities of recruitment for political office is the participation of women in all kinds of voluntary organizations and traditional women's organizations. Again this variable is especially important at the local level. Party leaders often turn to these voluntary organizations in their search for candidates. As a result of the activities within these organizations, many women are very well known within the community and hence attractive to voters, which is one of the reasons why they are asked for a candidacy. (Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.52).

Psychological factors

In this category I focus on the psychological consequences of sex role socialization and of the social system. The most important ones are:

- political attitudes, such as political interest and competence.
- psychological support
- values and qualities associated with politics and expected of politicians.
- fear of sex discrimination.

Many authors argue that sex differences in degree of political participation have their origin in (early) childhood experiences and are related to differences in the process of socialization of men and women. Both psychoanalytical and sociological theories of socialization have been used to explain the differential development of specific psychological and social capacities and attitudes which enable individuals to participate in public life. In short it is argued that girls do not get as much politically involved as boys, because they experience at an early stage that politics is a men's world and as a consequence develop a non-political orientation. It appears that women who do get involved with politics often have a stimulating political background, e.g. parents who were politically active. (Laijenaar, et al, 1983, p.31; CAWP 1983, p.25). It seems that on the average it is less likely for women to get involved in politics than it is for men.

Another variable related to self concept is the feeling of competence. Many women lack confidence in their own political capabilities. The moment of realization that women are just as capable of holding office as most public officials appears to be crucial in the decision to run for office. As a consequence in the process of becoming politically active and overcoming feelings of incompetency, psychological support

not only from spouse and children, but also from women's organizations (often within the party) can be decisive for potential candidates. Asked to evaluate spousal support, a majority of both men and women politicians report that their spouses are very supportive. However, in both Dutch as well as in American surveys, the majorities are much larger among women than among men, which indicates the greater need for psychological support for women politicians (CAWP, 1983, p.26; Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.125).

Support from women's organizations can also play a crucial role. The supportive role is often performed by members of the women's organization from the party the potential candidate belongs to. In the Netherlands many political parties have a separate women's organization. Two of the functions of these women's organizations are important in this discussion for the recruitment of women candidates. First, their active role in recruiting and selecting candidates, on which I will elaborate further in the next section, and second it is said that women's organizations lower the entry barriers for women. It often happens that women join a political party by becoming acquainted with the women's organization and as a consequence spend their first years in the party solely with women party members and in doing activities for the women's organization. These two functions - the training ground and the formal recruiting role - make support from these women's organizations both important and necessary in the process of nomination. The third set of psychological variables has to do with the values and qualities associated with politics. The characteristics that are most valued in political leaders, aggressiveness, forcefulness, dominance, competitiveness and composure - are those that traditionally are associated with the male sex. Traditionally female characteristics - warmth, compassion, submissiveness, nurturing and emotionality have been viewed as inconsequential to, if not inconsistent with, political

leadership. It is to be expected that these beliefs carry on in the evaluation of potential candidates by the recruiting party leaders.

The last more or less psychological example is the existing fear of being discriminated against. Women who fear that they may not have the inner strength to deal effectively with any discrimination they might face, will be reluctant to seek public office. The bare fact that on the local level potential women candidates are often confronted with the fact that they will be the first and only woman in the council, will reinforce this fear. Especially because many women realize that political acceptance of women in general will also be dependent on her performance.

Recruitment

Up to now only factors which indirectly or directly influence the process of recruitment have been dealt with. In this section I comment on those variables connected with the most important factor in this process: the political party. Examples of relevant variables are:

- party experience;
- political culture;
- quota's.

Like education and professional experience, political experience in terms of years of active membership, influence the chances of being recruited positively. Especially for offices at the national level it is desirable that potential candidates are well known within the party. A long, outstanding party career not only brings this necessary reputation, but it is also valued as a sign of strong party affiliation and therefore trustworthy to represent the party. Due to several previous mentioned factors women party members tend to have less party experience than men do, which can hinder their ambitions in becoming a politician.

Second, given women's late entrance into politics, they are more often newcomers and therefore competing for seats with men who have already been serving for a number of terms. Many of the special offices such as aldermen or chairman of a committee have already been taken by experienced men. This forms a structural barrier to the inflow of women into these positions.

The second relevant factor is the political culture. Commenting on recruitment of women candidates, the general willingness of a party to nominate women has to be taken into account. Therefore it is important to understand the parties' views of women in society. It is beyond this context to elaborate widely on the position of women in the liberal, conservative, socialist and confessional ideologies. But about the three main parties in the Netherlands - the Social Democratic Party (PvdA), the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) and the so-called Liberal Party (VVD) it can be said that the CDA - being a party based upon religious persuasion, has traditionally been reluctant to value positively women's participation in the public sphere more than the other two.⁸ The religious parties always had the lowest percentage of female elected representatives: till 1970 in the four representative bodies an average of 5% against 10% for the social democratic PvdA and 13% for the liberal VVD (Leijenaar en Janssen, 1979, p.18).

But as in most western democracies these percentages rapidly increased during the seventies. The women's liberation movement of the 1970's has had a large impact on the parties' attitude toward women. During preceding decades, the parties generally ignored women's issues and had at best their token women in government and parliament. Since the mid-seventies, however, the situation has changed dramatically: of the party policy programs at least one chapter concerns emancipation and other women's issues and party leaders do recruit women candidates. In this the women's organizations within the parties play an important

role. For example, the women's organization of the PvdA demanded in 1977 that the party adopt a policy of working to assure that at least 25% women are represented in both party committees as well as in the representative bodies.

Quota setting, the third factor, is one of few examples of direct actions to increase women's involvement in politics. Although the Labour Party is the only party where quota's are formalized, other parties, especially for nomination for local or provincial government, do reckon with women. Some of the smaller, leftist parties in the Netherlands have adopted informal rules to nominate at least 40% women on the party lists. Other examples are to keep half of the safe seats for women or to rank men and women candidates alternately.

Presumably the increase of women politicians is partly an effect of affirmative action procedures such as these. Remarkable is, that a majority of the women politicians, asked for suggestions to enlarge the share of women in political bodies, were not in favour of these kinds of actions. They expressed their fear that, when women candidates were not chosen for their abilities but for their "woman-being" there would be a lowering of quality standards. In the long run this would be used against the candidacy of women. They also pointed out that quota's are often used as a maximum instead of a minimal percentage, which again can affect the nomination of women in a negative way (Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.54). In the same study the women politicians were asked whether their being a woman had an impact on their nomination. Of the 92 women 65% answered positively. In this context it is also significant that 72% of the interviewed women reported having been invited for her nomination, another indicator of the 'eagerness' of party leaders to nominate a woman.

Summarizing, the recruitment of women for nomination seems to be an

effect of three related trends. Firstly, it is more acceptable for women to pursue a political career. Secondly, women's organizations use their resources and network to lobby for women candidates. Thirdly, the nomination of women is a way for the political parties to express their 'pro-emancipation' attitude towards the electorate.

Selection

When the selection process starts, the potential candidate has more or less decided to run for a nomination on the party lists and is ready for the competition for safe seats. Relevant factors in this process are:

- electoral system;
- party procedures for selection;
- (party) support;
- electoral chances.

First, it is often reported that a system of proportional representation, such as the Dutch electoral system, would be more favourable to women's selection, than a system with singular constituencies.⁹ When only one candidate is to be selected out of many, women candidates normally have less chance of being elected. For example Great Britain has, in comparison with other western European countries, the lowest percentage of women representatives in parliament: 3%, and the same is true for the USA: 2% women in the Senate; 4.5% in the House. This factor has to be taken into account in cross-cultural studies on women and politics. In such a study with data from 19 countries, Rule found that nonproportional representation explains 23% of the variance in women's representation in parliament (Rule, 1978, p.20).

The second relevant factor is the regulations and procedures a party has

to structure the process of selection. In the Netherlands, most political parties distinguish different stages in the selection process, in which different participants are able to influence the selection process. In this context an interesting question is whether certain selection procedures offer better chances for women's nominations than others. For example the Dutch Democratic Party (D'66) operates with a 'one person - one vote' system, i.e. every member of the party is contacted with by mail and asked to rank the proposed candidates. This is contrary to most other parties, where a delegated body decides upon the ranking. In the 20 years of its existence, D'66 always had more women than the other parties (almost 50%) on their party boards and in elective offices. But since many other factors have probably influenced the participation of women in D'66, such as the time of emerging (1966) and its attractiveness to well-educated, progressive people, we still do not know how much is explained by the specific selection procedure.

The third factor, worth focussing upon in the process of selection, is support. Support also plays an important role in the process of recruitment. The knowledge that the women's organization, the professional organization or other party organizations support her, will influence a potential candidate in her decision to run in a positive way. But the actual support, the lobbying for votes happens at a later stage.

So not only the candidates, but many other people participate in the competition for a safe seat and the chances of becoming nominated for a safe seat are enhanced, of course, by the number and power of the supporters. For women candidates it is often the women's organization of the party which supports them fervently. Men politicians are reported to be supported by unions and/or other occupational organizations (Leijenaar et al, 1983, p.56).

Finally, I mention the electoral chances as an influential factor on the number of women selected. It is often suggested that demands for representation for example in public offices, are more easily met, when the people already occupying the seats do not have to leave their position. (Gamson, 1975). In the hypothetical situation that the Second Chamber in the Netherlands were to be enlarged from 150 seats to 300, one could expect not just a redoubling of the number of women representatives, but probably four times as many. In other words in parties which are expanding, there is relatively more room for women candidates than there is in diminishing parties.

Concluding remarks part two

The above sketched model of factors relevant in the process of recruitment and selection, can be used as an agenda for research. Like with so many other aspects of the political system, recruitment and selection is often studied without realizing that this process is different for women and men candidates.

The examples given in this section hopefully point out other, also relevant, factors. Research on recruitment and selection of women can also be useful in defining strategies for changing the under-representation of women legislators.

It is beyond the context of this paper to lay out a strategy for changing the present organization of our society in such a way that differences between women and men in socialization and societal positions disappear. But I do like to present some suggestions to change the "rules of the game", the process of recruitment and selection.

The political system is biased in ways which promote the continued tenure of groups and individuals who are in positions of power. For example, incumbents are very difficult to defeat and open seats for

high-level offices are rare. Further the characteristics that are most valued in political leaders are associated with the male sex. Similarly, the standards by which qualifications for public officeholding are evaluated, are defined by men's experiences. A background in law or business, more common for men, is seen as more appropriate than a background in teaching or social work, more common for women. Unpaid volunteer experience, of which women often have great deal, is not accorded the same importance as paid, vocational experience, of which women often have less than men.

These "rules of the game", the ways in which candidates are evaluated and politicians are selected, have to change fundamentally to bring more women into elective office. A suggestion is to place an upper limit on the number of terms an individual could serve in offices now characterized by a low turnover. Also, a broadening of the range of characteristics parties look for in political leaders, to include warmth and nurturance as well as aggressiveness and forcefulness, would help to bring more women into public office. Parties should also consider to attach value to a broader set of backgrounds and experiences in judging candidates. At the same time political parties as well as the women's organizations should provide training facilities to get more women interested in political office and recruit women in a more personal way, convincing women partymembers of their ability to serve as politicians. A final strategy could be the changing of the formal election and selection procedures. For this, however, we need more insight in the advantages and disadvantages of the different electoral systems as well as the selection procedures for women candidates.

NOTES

1. For a review article on the study of women and politics by political scientists I refer to Githens (1983) .
Nelson's bibliography (1984) includes over 1600 citations to books, articles, reports and public documents, emphasizing studies on women and politics published between 1970 and 1982.
2. In a forthcoming paper I develop criteria for distinguishing women's interests from men's and give an empirical definition of a "women's issue".
3. In Dutch National Election Studies respondents were asked to point out the most relevant characteristics of specific parties. The coded answers show that a parties attitude towards women's interest is hardly ever mentioned.
4. The existence of this so-called "gender gap" did have an effect on the number of women in government. In 1982 when the gender gap received a lot of attention in relation to the overwhelming victory of the Democratic Party in the elections for the House, Reagan appointed two female secretaries of state in an attempt to satisfy the women of the Republican Party (Breslin and Hammer, 1984, p.152).
5. I refer to a situation in the citycouncil of Amsterdam where in 1982 all women councillors voted in favor of government aid on behalf of an organization which helped women in their mid-life crisis.

6. Universal suffrage for men and all women, without any restriction was granted in:

| | |
|----------------|------|
| Sweden | 1921 |
| Norway | 1931 |
| Denmark | 1915 |
| Netherlands | 1919 |
| Austria | 1918 |
| Luxembourg | 1919 |
| Switzerland | 1971 |
| Portugal | 1976 |
| West Germany | 1918 |
| Italy | 1945 |
| Belgium | 1948 |
| France | 1944 |
| Iceland | 1920 |
| Ireland | 1922 |
| Spain | 1931 |
| Greece | 1952 |
| United Kingdom | 1928 |
| Turkey | 1934 |
| Cyprus | 1960 |

7. idem note 1

8. Even though the VVD is self-described as liberal, it contains strong conservative overtones reminiscent in certain policy areas of the British Conservative Party.

9. For example, M. Duverger (1955), *The political role of women*, Paris, Unesco.

I.N. Means (1976), *Political Recruitment of Women in Norway* in: *Western Political Quarterly*, 25, pp.491-521.

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**NOMINATING UNATTRACTIVE CANDIDATES:
SMALL BUSINESSMEN IN IRISH POLITICAL RECRUITMENT**

Michael Marsh

**Department of Political Science
Trinity College
Dublin**

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Comparative Perspective, Barcelona, 25-30 March, 1985

NOMINATING UNATTRACTIVE CANDIDATES:
SMALL BUSINESSMEN IN IRISH POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

A striking feature of Irish candidate selection is the abundance of nominees with a background as small businessmen. Auctioneers, publicans, shopkeepers and other small businessmen comprise almost a quarter of all candidates selected since 1948. Such candidates are also a prominent group in the Dail (lower house of Irish parliament), but it is the contention of this paper that the electoral success of such candidates is much less than might be expected from such an over-represented group. Small business candidates receive less votes, on average, than others. Why then are so many selected? And what are the implications of this for our understanding of Irish political selection and candidate selection more generally?

The selection of Irish Dail candidates is quite decentralised, being made at constituency level by a committee elected - by branch organizations - for that purpose. The process is broadly based with, in some cases hundreds of activists representing local branches taking part. The constituency is technically free to elect anyone as a candidate. The national central party organization provides a chairman for the meeting and lays down party policy on how many candidates are to be selected. It also has the direct power to refuse to ratify candidates selected by constituencies, and to impose candidates. Refusals to ratify are quite rare, frequently cause considerable friction and may be circumvented by the individual involved who may well run - perhaps successfully - as an independent (cf. Gallagher, 1980). Imposed candidates have become more common since 1977 (Marsh, 1981b); but the party executive adds no more

than one candidate to a list already chosen by the constituency. Such candidates still constitute a small minority of all candidates but, together with other features, represent a significant intrusion by the central party into the selection process, even though it is, in most cases, in cooperation with the local party.

In most countries, selection effectively determines election, with the electorate deciding only how many of a party's candidates should be successful. The Irish electoral system of Single Transferable Vote (STV), however, concedes a more significant role to the voter by allowing the electorate to decide in each constituency not only how many of a party's nominees are elected but also which ones. In Duverger's words, "the choice of deputies is restored to the voters", although the party retains indirect control, by providing the list from which the choice is made. Recruitment thus results from the cooperation of voters and parties (Duverger, 1964: 369). Electors can indicate an ordered preference between all candidates - not just those of one party - and it is this which determines a candidate's success or failure. There is no formal mechanism by which a voter can "opt out" and cast a single list vote; candidates stand or fall by their attractiveness. Much of their appeal results from their party label, and party is easily the most important factor structuring electors' preference orderings, but the ordering of preferences between candidates of the same party must be explained by other more personal factors.

SELECTION STRATEGY

It might be expected that the biases of selectors and voters would be in broad agreement, that electors would prefer the type of candidate most attractive to the electorate. The important

reason for this is the party's concern to win seats; picking the most electorally attractive candidates would appear to be a sound strategy. A strong argument for decentralised campaign control - including candidate selection - is the greater awareness of local party organization as to what strategy will maximize electoral chances. As Eldersveld points out,

"the desperate need in all parties for votes, which are scarcely mobilisable at the apex of the hierarchy, results in at least some, if not pronounced, deference to the local structural strata where votes are won or lost" (Eldersveld, 1964: 9)

The assumption that parties respond to the constraints of electoral success underlies some of the justification for preferential voting. Without it the preferential vote contributes little to democratic control.

Yet some qualifications on the constraining power of the vote can be suggested. Candidates may be nominated who will maximise the party's vote, rather than be most successful individually. This entails them bringing in support that might not otherwise be attracted, and focusses attention on the list of candidates nominated rather than the individuals (cf. Ranney, 1981: 100-101). Under STV, this strategy is more uncertain than it might be in most other electoral systems because personal support does not necessarily help the party. Transferred votes do not necessarily follow party lines. The hope must be, in such a situation, that a balanced list helps the party's image, enabling it to raise its overall level of support. Parties may also respond in their candidate selection to markets other than the electoral one (Seligman, 1971: 15). The need to maintain party morale may necessitate the nomination of local activists,

for whom nomination is a reward for party service. Mishler argues that when there is little patronage available, nominations may supplement other rewards for party service. Moreover, in the context of the need for voluntary support, long service earns particular gratitude and is thus likely to be awarded consideration in the selection process (Mishler, 1978: 582-83). Parties who value ideological purity above electoral success will hardly be bound by the latter and neither will electorally oriented parties in situations where the marginal vote is not highly valued. Safe or unwinnable seats may leave parties more free to respond to other pressures - with respect both to recruitment and to ideological appeal (Seligman, 1961). It must also be recognised that good candidates are not always available. The rewards of contesting a seat vary according to factors such as the opportunities for advancement within a party and the likelihood of the seat being won. Before examining the value of such explanations in the Irish context it is necessary to examine the discrepancy between selector and elector preferences.

SMALL BUSINESS OVER-REPRESENTATION

Most studies of representation in Ireland have commented on the over-representation of small businessmen. Chubb notes that 31.3% of Oireachtas (Parliamentary) members in 1977 were from industrial and commercial backgrounds, primarily shopkeepers, publicans and family businessmen. This category contains only 5.1% of the population according to the 1971 Census (Chubb, 1982: Table 5.5). Table 1 shows the proportion of small business candidates at general elections since 1948 for the three major parties¹, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour. Overall, 23.1% of candidates are drawn from small business backgrounds. The grouping is made up of shopkeepers, auctioneers, and publicans,

together with insurance agents, salesmen and other small businessmen: printers, garage owners, electrical contractors and so on. Little trend is evident amongst candidates as a whole but amongst new candidates, and within the group of small businessmen, changes are apparent. Amongst new candidates the proportion of small business candidates has fallen to below 20% over the last three elections after rising to almost 30% in 1961. Within the group, auctioneers have replaced shopkeepers as the typical small businessman; salesmen and others have increased while the number of publicans fluctuates.

Such candidates are more common in Fianna Fail and Fine Gael than in Labour, comprising 26% of candidates in the former and only 13% in the latter. They are also more characteristic of rural constituencies. Outside Dublin and Cork city, over 26% of candidates have small business backgrounds compared with 17% in the more urban locations. Despite these variations, the over-representation of such candidates must be seen as widespread and relatively consistent. Why is this?

The prevailing explanation is that such people are particularly well suited to a political career in Ireland, and that it holds particular attractions for them. The rewards of a political career are particularly significant for small businessmen, according to Bax. Salary is paid on top of earnings, which continue for the typically family-run business. Success too can help a business through reputation and the direct use of information about public contracts, land deals and so on (Bax, 1976). In addition to social position explaining motivation, it also provides resources helpful to making the political career successful. In particular, there is a widespread view that small businessmen are "centrally located in

a rural communications network" (Bax, 1976) which makes them easily accessible to supporters and those wanting help, and well informed on local affairs (cf. Gallagher, 1984; Collins, 1980). Small businessmen have the time and money required to launch their careers and their social status is not too high. Bax argues (cf. Chubb, 1982) that voters do not want social elites representing them but ordinary people (Bax, 1976). An additional factor said to be important is debt-bondage, utilised particularly by small shopkeepers in some areas in the west of Ireland (Gibbons and Higgins, 1974; 75: 34-26).

These several factors come together to make the small businessman candidate successful in a political system where voters seek a deputy who will look after their personal and local interests, acting as an intermediary between them and the state. It is arguable that the process reinforces itself. The broker role attracts a certain sort of politician who builds a career on such activities. The combination of real and spurious brokerage is attested to by most authorities, with politicians pretending to get benefits for people which they would have received anyway.

In the light of this argument, that small businessmen are good at being the sort of politician people want, it is significant to find that in some respects such people are not electorally successful - at least relative to other occupations. At first glance this is not apparent. Together with professional people, small businessmen provide the most obvious case of over-representation in the Dail, with over 22% of deputies in the post-war years. This, however, is due more to their numbers as candidates for successful parties than any particular electoral attractiveness.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Electoral attractiveness can be carefully assessed through multiple regression techniques (Robson and Walsh, 1974). Simple comparisons of candidate-deputy profiles, while interesting, can be misleading because of the many obscuring factors such as party, constituency size and so on. Regression coefficients can be seen as indicating the number of extra votes according to candidates by virtue of particular attributes and by using multiple regression the influence of other attributes can be controlled. Tables 2 shows the regression equation for all major party candidates,² 1948-February 1982. A number of variables are included: situational factors, defining the context in which the vote was cast, other candidate attributes considered to be important (Marsh, 1981a), and occupation, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the candidate was a small businessman. The coefficients indicate that small businessmen perform significantly worse than other candidates, a finding more striking in the light of expectations that they would do better. The disadvantage of -337 votes is comparable in size to the benefits of Senate membership (the Senate is the upper House of Parliament) and the disadvantage of being third, rather than first amongst a party's candidates on the ballot paper, to name two attributes generally felt to be important (Chubb, 1982).

The disadvantage survives a considerable amount of sub-group analysis. It holds for incumbents and non-incumbents, in urban and rural constituencies and across the three major parties. It also holds for occupations within the grouping. For all major party candidates slopes are: auctioneers -13, shopkeepers -310, insurance agents/salesmen -380, publicans -388 and others -420. In all of these cases, although slopes are not always

significant, none are positive. Only when trends are considered does the pattern change, with small businessmen relatively successful, amongst non-incumbents in the period 1948-61 (Table 3). This apparent advantage is not strong and never significant but the evidence of some change in fortunes in the 1960s is quite convincing, moreover the small business disadvantage in recent elections becomes more striking.

The data for non-incumbents is particularly interesting. Incumbents are clearly much more likely to be successful than other candidates and their re-election is rarely problematic. Not so non-incumbents. Yet whilst small businessmen non-incumbents enjoyed a slight advantage in 1948-61 of 166 votes, their disadvantage after that is -416 votes, and this modern disadvantage can be seen in all parties and in both urban and rural areas. Why then are so many selected?

Before examining the relevance of the exceptions outlined earlier it is worth considering the form of analysis used. What is tested is whether or not small businessmen are successful if many other factors are held constant. Yet it may be the linkage between small business and other factors which makes such candidates attractive. The obvious case is local council membership/experience. A causal model of recruitment could plausibly place local council membership as an intervening variable between occupation and vote, not as a control variable testing for spurious relationships between occupation and electoral success. In controlling for local government membership, perhaps, the path to success is removed.

Little support could be found for this argument which was tested on non-incumbents. It is true that the zero-order correlation between occupation and vote alters from .02 to -.02 when local council membership is controlled amongst non-

incumbents; and the local council membership correlates with vote and with a small business occupation. Even so, this change is slight. Moreover with situational controls (really necessary if vote is to be sensibly interpreted) the correlation between small business and vote is also negative. Removing local council membership from the regression equation makes little difference to the slopes, the general negative pattern remains. Including an interaction term for local government/small business occupation fails to produce a significant slope.

SOME EXPLANATIONS

It seems clear then that small business candidates are not relatively attractive to the electorate. It would be interesting to know why this should be so (cf. Marsh, 1981a) but the concern here is with the implications of this unpopularity for our understanding of candidate selection. Some general reasons for nominating less electorally attractive candidates were considered earlier. How plausibly can these account for what is found here?

The "balance of the ticket" argument may account for something, but it is uncertain what is being balanced. There is no evidence that parties feel the need to appeal to any significant electoral constituency of small businessmen. Parties are not structured internally in such a way as to give small business activists a special voice. What might occur is that small businessmen tend to be the sort of candidate who can balance a ticket in the way most observers feel they must be balanced - this is, geographically. Several studies have drawn attention to the way candidates win particular support from "home" areas (Sacks, 1976; Parker, 1982) and it can be shown that candidate lists are constructed in a way that gives a geographical spread to the selection (Marsh, 1981b). Perhaps

small businessmen are the typical local politicians who can attract a local, personal vote to the party. Even if they are less successful across the constituency than other candidates, they may push up the party's vote more effectively. Such an argument is purely speculative - no evidence is provided here for its validity. It would, I think, be difficult to provide such evidence.

A second argument is that parties might respond to organizational necessity and be swayed by a record of party service. I have no evidence that small businessmen are particularly prevalent among activists, but the arguments put forward earlier to explain why small businessmen made good candidates could also serve to explain high levels of activity. There is no research on candidates' party record, and it is not known how many were local party officers before their selection. Again then, the systematic evidence does not exist to deal with this point thoroughly. Yet some evidence is suggestive. Bax, for example, argues that many future deputies once served as "brokers' brokers", a role of intermediary between voter and politician, part of a vast pyramidal network of client relationships. In this role, the aspirant builds his own network, eventually enabling him to succeed or supplant the incumbent.

Bax (and others) see rural electoral success as explicable in terms of votes exchanged for services. A recent article drawing on research in Dublin challenges the validity of Bax's model in describing the electoral situation but accepts it as valid for parties. Komito (1984) argues that political services to electors have to be given on trust; moreover relatively few electors avail of them as individuals, or through organizations.

Deputies can build a reputation for effectiveness and hard work which may be rewarded but this does not involve a particularistic exchange. However, within parties where the scale of operations is smaller and support more observable, clientelism is rife. It seems plausible to argue that the small businessmen's particular mix of motivation and resources is effective in this context, if not in the wider electoral arena.

Service on a local representative body may be seen as a manifestation of local party activism for which small businessmen may be better equipped. Certainly their success on that stage helps later selection. It is notable that more small businessmen have served on local elected bodies. Amongst non-incumbents the figure is 72%, compared with 64% for other occupations.

Another explanation may lie simply in the particular motivations of small businessmen. It was suggested that the rewards of politics were particularly attractive to them. Perhaps there are so many of them as candidates because so many want to become candidates and their disadvantages are relatively slight? This implies that such candidates are chosen really in the absence of other candidates. Competition for nominations appears to be keen; selection conferences almost always vote on the merits of several aspirants. It would be interesting to know what sorts of aspiring candidates fail at this hurdle.

The other explanations seem less useful in an Irish context. Safe seats are more difficult to define than in most other countries. Party seats may be safe - but for which candidates, whilst vote distributions and transfer patterns can easily upset calculations of party marginality. Some candidates are undoubtedly chosen to be "also rans" (although they may turn out to be more than that) but that would be difficult to establish simply from the results of the previous election. It may be that

a disproportionate number of small business candidates are chosen in such circumstances but this hardly accounts for their predominance. The real answer probably lies in the combination of several factors, no single explanation being in itself.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper raises the question of unattractive candidates. The ubiquitous small businessman candidate in Irish politics is not electorally attractive. The large number of such politicians in the Dail is due more to the decisions of selection committees than of ordinary voters. This lack of symmetry between the views of selectors and electors is surprising in the Irish context because of the existence of an electoral system which encourages such agreement.

Small businessmen are shown to be over-represented amongst Irish candidates, and this can be explained by their high degree of motivation and apparent suitability. Suitability, however, implies electoral attractiveness but a lack of this can be demonstrated. Other candidates seem to obtain more votes, even when a number of circumstances are taken into account. Consideration was given to why selectors might nominate such candidates, given their lack of electoral attractiveness. Particular attention was paid to the set of candidates selected and to the activities and strength of small businessman politicians within parties. No single argument is convincing but it is suggested that taken together they could provide a more satisfactory account.

The significance of the analysis for Irish politics, and for Irish candidate selection in particular, is to focus particular attention on candidate selection as the crucial phase in Irish

recruitment. At a time when the necessities of the electoral system are held responsible for so many negative features of Irish politicians, it is important to show that selection is not simply constrained by what electors want. Parties are responsible for those they select. "Vote maximisation" is not a skeleton key to political understanding even in "catch-all" party systems like the Irish one. Arenas other than the electoral one have significance.

Yet the analysis also indicates that the ubiquitous character of the small businessman/politician may be fading and that this is in part due to electoral pressure. New candidates in recent elections are less likely to be from such backgrounds. The stronger electoral disadvantage since 1969 may be having an impact. Auctioneers have replaced shopkeepers as the typical small businessman and they perform rather better. Small businessmen are less common in urban constituencies, where they are even less attractive, and these constituencies are becoming more numerous. In the Dail of November 1982 deputies elected for the first time after 1980 were only half as likely to be from "commercial" backgrounds than those elected before 1973 (Gallagher, 1984: 249). The day of the small businessman may be drawing to an end. Even so, twilight in this region of the world is often protracted, and it would be unwise to expect the disappearance of such candidates from the ballot papers in the near future.

NOTES

1. The data for findings described below are based on the elections of 1948, 1954, 1961, 1969, 1977, 1981 and February 1982. This list comprises alternate elections 1948-77, plus the next two following elections but does not include the most recent election of November 1982. Occupational and other data were obtained from newspapers, local and national; notices of polls; the political parties and from directories: Thom's Directory, Nealon's Guides (the series culminating in Heaton and Brennan, 1983), Browne (ed.), 1981, Knight and Baxter-Moore, 1973; and the Official Results of the 1974 and 1979 local elections. Voting figures are from the official results.

The occupations of politicians are difficult to code. Many appear to have more than one occupation, many are essentially professional politicians. Following Marsh, 1981a, a two-fold strategy was employed. First, those who appear to be professional politicians were placed in categories appropriate to their earlier employment. Secondly, up to three occupations were coded for each candidate. The small businessman category used here does not cover all those in commerce and business. An attempt was made to separate the more substantial businessman from the auctioneers, publicans and shopkeepers. Those with several shops or pubs, for instance, are not classified as small businessmen. Most of the vaguely identified "company directors" or "managing directors" are also otherwise classified. Whilst the dividing line is not a clear one, those above it, the larger businessmen, do win more votes, which provides some basis for thinking that something is being measured. When the analysis described below was substantially replicated, using all businessmen, there was still a generally negative performance, although slopes were less pronounced.

2. Since intra-party choice is being considered solitary candidates are excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 1

Proportion with Small Business Backgrounds
amongst Major Party Candidates, 1948-82

| | 1948 | 1954 | 1961 | 1969 | 1977 | 1981 | Feb. 82 | All |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Auctioneers | 2.3 | 5.3 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 10.2 | 9.5 | 7.6 |
| Publicans | 1.8 | 5.3 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 |
| Shopkeepers | 14.0 | 10.5 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 7.4 |
| Insurance Agents | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 1.4 |
| Salesmen | 0.5 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Others | 0.9 | 0.9 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 2.7 |
| All * | 19.9 | 23.2 | 26.5 | 26.6 | 21.0 | 22.2 | 21.8 | 23.1 |
| N | 221 | 228 | 226 | 346 | 300 | 324 | 284 | 1929 |
| Missing Data | 23 | 14 | 12 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 56 |
| New Candidates | 23.4 | 23.3 | 28.4 | 24.1 | 15.9 | 18.0 | 20.8 | 21.6 |
| N | 94 | 60 | 67 | 175 | 113 | 133 | 48 | 689 |

* less than sum of the individual occupations due to multiple coding

TABLE 2

Multiple Regression of Various Factors on Vote for
Major Party Candidates, 1948-82 (Solitary candidates excluded)

| | |
|--|--------|
| <u>Situational Factors</u> | b |
| Fine Gael | -896* |
| Labour | -2731* |
| Valid vote | .06 |
| N of candidates of party | -427* |
| N of incumbents of party | -425* |
| <u>Other Controlling Factors</u> | |
| Incumbent | 2194* |
| Previous campaign | 734* |
| Senator, or former senator | 390* |
| Local councillor, or former councillor | 149 |
| Relative of a previous incumbent | 506* |
| First name on ballot | 551* |
| Last name on ballot | 293* |
| Ballot position within party | -116* |
| Male | 897* |
| SMALL BUSINESS OCCUPATION | -337* |
| Constant | 3969 |
| R ² | .53 |
| N | 1764 |

* significant at .05 level

TABLE 3

Multiple Regression Slopes* for Small Business Candidates
at Various Elections, 1948-82

(Major party, non-solitary candidates only)

| | 1948 | 1954 | 1961 | 1969 | 1977 | 1981 | Feb. 8 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| All | -278 | 97 | 121 | -400* | -707* | -876* | -424 |
| (Constant) | (5803) | (3610) | (4532) | (4147) | (4644) | (4875) | (5039) |
| Non-Incumbents only | 199 | 143 | 370 | -148 | -529 | -806* | -541 |
| (Constant) | (2746) | (5351) | (4349) | (4784) | (4638) | (4257) | (3613) |

* significant at .05 level

+ for full list of variables, see Table 2

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**WOMEN'S ROUTES TO NATIONAL LEGISLATURES:
A Comparison of Eligibility and Nomination
in the United States, Britain and Sweden**

**Diane Sainsbury
University of Stockholm**

**WORKING DRAFT
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According to Nancy Astor, the first elected woman to sit in Parliament, Winston Churchill once remarked to her: 'When you entered the House of Commons I felt like a woman had entered my bathroom and I had nothing to protect myself with except a sponge.'
(King & Sloman 1973:55)

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I. Introduction

In the early 1980s women's representation in national legislatures in Western democracies ranged from a mere 2 per cent to slightly over 30 per cent (Haavio-Mannila et.al. 1983:81). Differences in women's representation thus constitute one of the most striking variations in the outcome of the candidate selection processes in these countries.

The point of departure for this paper is the desire to explore a set of explanations of the varying success of women in becoming members of national legislative assemblies. The set of explanations focuses on the routes to political office and the recruitment process.

The paper provides a detailed comparative case study of political recruitment in three countries - the United States, Britain and Sweden. The countries represent polar extremes in women's representation with Britain and the US as examples of extremely low representation and Sweden as an example of high representation (comparatively speaking but not in terms of adequate representation). This choice of countries has at least two major advantages. First, several of the most comprehensive and interesting comparative studies of women's representation have treated subunits within a single country or countries with similar institutions (Diamond 1977, Eduards 1980, van der Ros Schive 1981, Haavio-Mannila et.al. 1983). By contrast, the sample of countries here allows us to compare more closely the operation and effects of dissimilar candidate selection processes. It also allows a comparison of the influence of the two most common types of electoral systems, viz. plurality systems and proportional representation. Second, by including two countries with a similar electoral system, we can 'hold this variable constant' and search for other important factors in the recruitment process which enhance or inhibit women's possibilities of gaining office.

II. The Recruitment Process: Eligibility, Nomination and Election

In his highly useful overview of political recruitment, Moshe Czudnowski writes: 'The study of recruitment conceptualizes the pathways to political office as consisting of successive interactions between individual-level variables, social screening processes, political organizations and systemic institutions, norms and issues' (Czudnowski 1975:158). Recruitment conceptualized in this way is indeed an exceedingly complex phenomenon, and it is necessary to adopt some sort of simplification. The approach adopted here views recruitment to elected office as consisting of three phases: eligibility, nomination and election (Cf. Foverskov 1978, Wallin 1981:59).

Eligibility. The term eligibility is used in this paper in a narrower sense than in many other studies. Eligibility here refers to the possession of recruitment-relevant attributes for candidacy for the national legislature. I assume that eligibility is an important variable in the selection of candidates. First, recruitment-relevant attributes may vary across countries. Second, women's ability to acquire recruitment-relevant attributes may differ from country to country. An especially interesting question concerns the effects of recruitment-relevant attributes. A particular combination of attributes may tend either to disqualify women or to favour their recruitment.

Nomination. In contrast to eligibility, which centres attention on potential candidates and individual-level variables, the focal point of nomination is the recruiting agencies. In examining this phase of recruitment, it is important to consider the composition of the selectorate as well as the criteria and procedures employed in selecting candidates.

For the purposes of the paper, two variables are of major interest. The first is the degree of control over nominations exercised by parties. The second variable is the degree and manner in which women are integrated in party organizations. Expressed, somewhat differently: do parties and their followers exclusively comprise the selectorate? and does the inclusion of women in the selectorate make a difference? The latter question may seem to be a loaded one. However, much research argues that a male dominated selectorate does not account for the small number of female


candidates who stand for election to national legislatures (e.g. Bochel & Denver 1983, Mellors 1978). Other scholars point to evidence that women on selection bodies are not especially favourably disposed to picking a woman rather than a man as a candidate (e.g. Hills 1981a, Stacey & Price 1981, Rasmussen 1981). Election. The analysis of recruitment ought to look explicitly at the election phase and the effects of different electoral systems, along with other features of elections to national legislatures. In the case of female representation in national assemblies, Duverger already in the 1950s called attention to the importance of different electoral systems for women's recruitment. He concluded that 'the "party ticket" system, and proportional representation in particular, seemed to make it easier for women to get into elected assemblies, while the "single member" system did not' (Duverger 1955:79-80). Subsequent studies have repeatedly substantiated Duverger's conclusions (e.g. Means 1972, Rule 1981, Castles 1981, Haavio-Mannila et.al. 1983). To do justice to this phase, however, would require an entire paper. Thus it is only touched upon in the concluding remarks.

III. Eligibility and Nomination in Comparative Perspective

Female representation in the national legislatures in the three countries merits closer inspection. Figure 1 plots the trends in female representation by indicating the proportion of women members after each post-war election. Immediately after the Second World War, women's representation in the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, did not stand out in an international context; however, it was higher than that in Britain and the US. Four decades later, Sweden together with the other Nordic countries (excluding Iceland) had substantially outdistanced other Western democracies in terms of the proportion of women MPs. During the same period the proportion of women elected to the national legislature had virtually stood still in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

What features of the recruitment process have assisted Swedish women and have hindered Anglo-Saxon women in achieving representation in parliament? Below eligibility and nomination are described for each country and compared. This procedure may not provide a particularly coherent picture of the recruitment process in the individual countries. This format

Figure 1. Percentage of Women in National Legislatures in the US, Britain and Sweden



of comparison, however, does have the advantage of highlighting similarities and differences between the countries - and thus facilitates attempts to identify differences which might affect women's representation.

Eligibility Compared

First, and more generally, what attributes are relevant to recruitment to the national legislatures in the three countries? Second, and more specifically, what positions constitute apprenticeship positions? * The answers to these questions require an examination of the attributes of members of the legislative assemblies. Initially we shall look at the membership as a whole without reference to gender. Subsequently we shall deal with the pattern of attributes and career paths among men and the pattern among women. This examination casts light on the extent to which women possess similar attributes and, equally interestingly, the extent to which they have different attributes. It also enables us to speculate about the degree to which certain attributes may impede or promote women's representation in national legislatures.

* Since this study relies on publicly available biographical data, discussion is confined to social background factors and prior political experience as recruitment-relevant attributes.

The United States

Major components of eligibility in the US are high educational and occupational status. These attributes are typical of members of the US Congress - both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Although the Senate is the more prestigious of the two houses, individuals without academic training or from lower status occupations appear to have equally little chance of being elected to the House of Representatives. This generalization is borne out by the educational and occupational backgrounds of members of the House of Representatives in the 1940s and early 1950s (Matthews 1954:29-30), the mid-1960s (Fishel 1973:20-22) and the early 1980s.

Education. Members of the House of Representatives in the 97th Congress (1981-82) were highly educated.* As can be seen in Table 1, nearly 90 per cent of the Representatives were college graduates. Even more striking is the high proportion with post-graduate degrees - over 60 per cent (and 30 per cent possessed a doctorate degree). By contrast, a mere 3 per cent had only secondary education or less.

Table 1. Education of US Representatives Elected in 1980

| | All | | Women | |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| High school | 3 % | 12 | - | - |
| Attended college | 8 % | 34 | 21 % | 4 |
| College graduate | 89 % | 387 | 79 % | 15 |
| No information | | 2 | | |
| Total | 100 % | N=435 | 100 % | N=19 |
| Post-graduate degree | 63 % | 272 | 37 % | 7 |
| Law (L.L.B.) or Master's degree | 33 % | 143 | 26 % | 5 |
| Doctorate degree | 30 % | 129 | 11 % | 2 |

* The analysis of the members of the House of Representatives in the 97th Congress is based on biographical data in the 1981 Official Congressional Directory and Who's Who in American Politics 1981-1982. The data have been compiled for elected members irrespective of subsequent changes in the membership of the 97th Congress.

The table also presents separate information on the education of female Representatives. As distinct from their male colleagues, all the women had attended college. On the other hand, a somewhat lower proportion - around 80 per cent - were college graduates, and discrepancies are sizable with respect to the overall proportion holding a post-graduate degree (women 37 %, men 61 %) and those possessing a doctorate degree (women 11 %, men 31 %). The educational gap is not as wide, however, in the case of law degrees (L.L.B.) and master's degrees (women 26 %, men 33 %).

Occupational Background. The principal occupations of the Representatives reveal a similar high-status pattern (Table 2).* In the early 1980s approximately 60 per cent came from professional

Table 2. Principal Occupation of US Representatives Elected in 1980

| | All | Women |
|-----------------------------------|------|-------|
| Professions: | | |
| Lawyer | 45 % | 21 % |
| Educator | 10 % | 32 % |
| Other | 4 % | 5 % |
| | 59 % | 58 % |
| Business | 23 % | 16 % |
| Farmer | 4 % | - |
| Publisher/ journalist | 5 % | 16 % |
| Miscellaneous | 4 % | 5 % |
| Housewife | - | 5 % |
| No information, unclassifiable | 5 % | - |

* This analysis has attempted to identify the principal occupation of the Representatives. This is no easy task, and in some instances the selection may be rather arbitrary. The difficulties can be illustrated by one case out of many. One congressman listed under occupation: rancher, real estate broker and lawyer. In fact, it may be that multiple occupations is a recruitment-relevant attribute. There are indications, however, that being a member of congress opens new occupational opportunities, thus contributing to the phenomenon of multiple occupations.

backgrounds, and the professions together with business careers accounted for over 80 per cent of the Representatives. Lawyers continued to be the single most dominant career in the House.* In fact, it is noteworthy that of the professions only two stand out in the careers of the Representatives - lawyers and educators. The few members with low prestige occupations are included under 'Miscellaneous'. Salaried employees and manual workers are conspicuous through their virtual absence. Finally, it should be pointed out that the percentages of educators, farmers, business careers, and media-related occupations would increase, if the analysis were not confined to one principal occupation. The major difference, if several occupations were included, would be an appreciable rise in the proportion of Representatives engaged in business and banking (Cf. Statistical Abstract 1984:258).

Table 2 also affords the possibility of inspecting women's occupational backgrounds. The proportion of women in the professions was nearly identical to that of men. However, a smaller percentage were lawyers and a larger percentage were active in the field of education. Of the women classified here as educators, none was a college professor, while a majority of men in this category were. Women were less frequently drawn from business than men, and the women in this category were mainly owners of small businesses. An additional dissimilarity concerns media-related occupations where the proportion of women was larger. Of final interest, only one woman lacked professional or business experience.

Apprenticeship Positions: Routes to the House of Representatives

The biographical data of the Representatives reveal six distinct types of apprenticeship positions. Possession of one of these types of positions has been sufficient to achieve election to the House in a number of cases. Of course, the career paths of many Representatives have combined two or more of these types of positions, but none displays a career path which is a combination of all six.

* The percentage in Table 2 is lower than those for the late 1940s and mid-1960s (Cf. Matthews 30 and Fishel 20), and it suggests a glacier-like erosion in the prominence of lawyers in the House.

State Legislator (46 % = N 199). The most common route to the House is via the state legislature. Slightly less than half of the Representatives had previous experience in the state legislature. This proportion is somewhat higher than that reported in a study of members entering the House during the period 1949-1967 (Mezey 1970:568). This earlier study found that 36 per cent had been state legislators. Nonetheless, both in that study and the data here, the proportion entering the House via the state legislature greatly exceeded the proportion arriving by any other type of apprenticeship position. In the early 1980s, each of the remaining five routes accounted for the apprenticeships of roughly 10 per cent of the Representatives.

Local Elective Office (13 % = N 55). The next most common route is via local elective office. Local office includes a wide variety of political posts at the city or town level as well as the county level, viz. members of city councils, town aldermen, mayors, members of county boards, county commissioners, and county freeholders. For many members of the House, local elective office has been a stepping stone to the state legislature but more than 10 per cent of the members moved directly from a local position to Congress.

Aides (10 % = N 44). One out of every ten Representatives entered the House after a position as an aide or special assistant to an elected official (congressman, governor, president, or cabinet official) or a congressional committee or government agency. A dozen or so Representatives of the 97th Congress had been aides to a congressman whom they directly or eventually succeeded. A particularly interesting feature of this route is the age of these Representatives. Several of the youngest members entered the House after an apprenticeship as an aide. Despite some exceptions, this route appears to be the shortest one to the House.

Lawyer (10 % = N 44). Obviously lawyers form a sizable contingent among state legislators, local elected officials, and aides. This category, however, refers to Representatives whose prime qualifications derive from a career in law. It is possible to be elected to the House on the basis of a long distinguished or even a promising legal career - without having held public office. More frequently, however, the legal route does involve a public position as city solicitor, public prosecutor, district attorney, or a ju-

dicial post.

Party Activist (8 % = N 33). The apprenticeship of a relatively small group of House members has consisted of party activity rather than public office. Party activists are defined here as persons who have been ward or district leader, chairperson of a local party committee, member of a state and/or national party committee, delegate to a national convention, or campaign manager or organizer for a candidate for statewide or national office.

Local Notable (10 % = N 44). A final type of apprenticeship is based on neither public office nor activity in a political party. Instead these Representatives are organizational joiners. They have acquired local 'visability' through multiple memberships and prominent roles in civic, professional, charity, religious or cause organizations in the community.

Before proceeding to a comparison of women's and men's apprenticeships, one point should be mentioned. As is evident in the case of local notables, party activists and in some instances lawyers, prior experience of political office is not necessary for election to Congress. Earlier studies have found that as many as one-third of the members of the House had not held political office (e.g. Mezey 569). Of the Representatives to the 97th Congress a larger proportion had experience of political office. Nevertheless, around one-fourth were elected without prior experience of political office, and approximately two-fifths had not served in elective office before entering the House of Representatives.

To what extent do women's routes to the House resemble or differ from men's? Table 3 displays the percentages of women and men for each category of apprenticeship. Percentages in four categories suggest differences between women's and men's routes to the House. First, the frequency of women entering the the House via the state legislature was only about half that of men. This is not surprising in view of the relatively small numbers of women in the state legislatures during the 1970s (around 4 per cent at the beginning of the decade and 9 per cent in 1978). But women's mobility from state legislatures to Congress appears to be singularly impeded. One reason is that in several states with the highest percentages of women state legislators, members of Congress are not typically re-

Table 3. Apprenticeship Positions of US Representatives by Sex.

| | Women | | Men | |
|-----------------------|-------|---|------|-----|
| | % | N | % | N |
| State Legislator | 26 % | 5 | 47 % | 194 |
| Local Elective Office | 26 % | 5 | 12 % | 50 |
| Aide | - | - | 11 % | 44 |
| Lawyer | 16 % | 3 | 10 % | 41 |
| Party Activist | 5 % | 1 | 8 % | 32 |
| Local Notable | 11 % | 2 | 10 % | 42 |
| Other | 16 % | 3 | 3 % | 13 |

cruited from the state legislature. (In the 1980s Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming and Arizona are examples of this phenomenon.) Furthermore, as Wilma Rule has pointed out, several factors favorable to women's recruitment to state legislature are negatively related to women's election to Congress (Rule 70-72). Second, women more frequently than men moved directly from a local post to the House of Representatives. Third, of the women elected to the 97th Congress, none had served as an aide. Fourth, there is a notable disparity among women and men in the category 'Other'.

The three women in this category arrived in the House via 'widow's succession', that is they were elected to fill vacancies created by the deaths of their husbands.* From 1917 to 1970 slightly over 40 per cent of the women entering the House did so via 'widow's succession' (Bullock & Heys). In recent decades, however, this route has diminished in importance, as indicated by the percentage in Table 3.

The number of women in Table 3 is quite small. Furthermore, the women in the House in the early 1980s differed from women in the House in the early 1970s on several counts. As a result, the question arises as to how typical the career paths of the women are in the table. This question can be answered by examining the

* For a clarifying discussion of the 'widow's succession' route, see Diane D. Kincaid, 'Over his Dead Body: A Positive Perspective on Widows in the U.S. Congress', Western Political Quarterly, 1978, pp. 96-104.

apprenticeship positions of all thirty-seven women who have entered Congress since 1970. This larger number, which also includes two Senators, provides a firmer foundation for analysis and generalizations concerning women's routes to Congress.

In several respects the analysis of this larger group confirms the results in Table 3, but important differences also emerge. The first is that we find a number of women with apprenticeships as aides.* A second difference is that the percentage of female notables declines. I shall return to this aspect and speculate about its causes in the discussion of the nomination phase of recruitment. Lastly, a scrutinization of career paths which combine various types of apprenticeship positions discloses that a substantial proportion of women have been party activists - a larger percentage than men.

In summary, a comparison of women's and men's apprenticeships indicates a shortfall of women among state legislators. A shortage of women among local notables is also evident when the analysis is extended to all women entering Congress since 1970. In this larger group, the percentages for women in the case of lawyers and aides are fairly similar to those for men in the 97th Congress. Although there is little difference in the percentages of women and men whose route to the House is based exclusively or overwhelmingly on party activities, party activities figure more prominently in the career paths of women than those of men. Local elective office is also of greater significance as a direct route to the House for women.

Britain

Educational attainment and a prestigious occupational background are also important components of eligibility in Britain. In fact, the long-range trend in the post-war period has been an increase in their importance and a narrowing of the recruitment base of MPs in terms of education and occupation (Mellors 1978, Chapters 4 & 5). Despite this trend, the educational backgrounds and, in particular, the occupations of British MPs in the early 1980s displayed greater diversity than was the case for US Representa-

* The most notable example is Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum. In addition, three women who had held positions as aides entered the House in the 98th Congress (1983-84).

tives. This diversity, of course, is the result of the differing recruitment bases of the two major parties.

Education. The educational backgrounds of MPs elected in the 1983 general election are shown in Table 4. In the 1983 House 63 per cent of the MPs were university graduates, and more than one-third were graduates of 'Oxbridge'. By way of comparison, 44 per cent of the MPs elected in 1945 were graduates and around one-fourth were alumnae of 'Oxbridge' (Mellors 41). Although MPs with only an elementary or secondary education have declined in numbers over the years, they still constitute a substantial group - a much larger group than in the US House of Representatives. *

Table 4. Education of MPs Elected in 1983

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-------|---------|------|
| Elementary only | 2 % | 12 | 4 % |
| Elementary + | 2 % | 15 | |
| Secondary only | 10 % | 67 | 31 % |
| Secondary + | 10 % | 62 | |
| Public school only | 11 % | 70 | |
| Secondary/university | 24 % | 153 | 63 % |
| Public school/university | 39 % | 250 | |
| No information | 3 % | 17 | |
| | 101 % | N = 650 | |

Source: Adapted from Butler & Kavanagh 1984:235.

Comments: The categories 'elementary plus' and 'secondary plus' refer to MPs who after leaving school have received additional technical or adult training.

* Although certain broad parallels possibly can be drawn, comparisons of the educational attainment levels of MPs and US Representatives (as well as members of the Swedish Riksdag) are hazardous and most likely misleading because of differences in the educational systems of the countries. One major inequivalency results from dissimilarities concerning professional training and whether this sort of training is included within the universities (as in the US) or not. This means that in some cases persons in the category 'Secondary plus' in Britain and Sweden would be classified as 'College graduates' in the US. A further difficulty is created by cross-national differences in access to higher education. It is entirely possible that the lower proportion of university graduates among British MPs actually represents more exclusive educational backgrounds in relation to their electorate than does the higher percentage of university graduates among US Representatives.

A separate breakdown for women MPs is not included in Table 4 because of incomplete information about their education. However, it would seem that a smaller percentage than usual were university graduates (a reflection of Conservative gains?). Fortunately more detailed data comparing the education of female and male MPs exist for the period 1945-1974. These data reveal two parallels with the education of women in the US House of Representatives. First, women MPs were less frequently university graduates than their male colleagues (43 % compared to 52 %, calculated from Mellors 111). Second, the education of women members tends to cluster at the intermediate levels of attainment. Fewer women are found in the groups with the poorest or the best educational backgrounds.

In spite of the fact that a university degree has increasingly become a vital credential for recruitment to Parliament in both the Conservative and Labour parties, major differences reflecting the traditional recruitment bases of the two parties persist. The differences are perhaps most clearly illustrated by the percentage success rates of candidates with various educational backgrounds. As can be observed in Table 5, prestigious educational backgrounds are related to high success rates for Conservative candidates. On the other hand, no such relationship exists for university graduates who are Labour candidates. Instead elementary education is associated with higher success rates.

Table 5. Percentage Success Rates of Candidates with Selected Educational Backgrounds

| | Feb. Oct. | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1951 | 1955 | 1959 | 1964 | 1966 | 1970 | 1974 | 1974 | 1979 | 1983 |
| <u>Conservative</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 'Oxbridge' | 84 | 73 | 70 | 61 | 55 | 68 | 67 | 65 | 74 | 79 |
| Public school | 65 | 67 | 69 | 54 | 49 | 66 | 60 | 54 | 65 | 76 |
| Eton | 79 | 80 | 81 | 72 | 65 | 86 | 76 | 65 | 85 | 83 |
| <u>Labour</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Elementary | 63 | 60 | 61 | 71 | 81 | 79 | 79 | 72 | 81 | 60 |
| University | 47 | 44 | 42 | 49 | 58 | 45 | 45 | 49 | 43 | 31 |

Sources: Mellors 57, Butler & Kavanagh 1980:286, Butler & Kavanagh 1984:235.

The differences between the parties have interesting and ironic implications for women. In the Labour party a larger proportion of women MPs have a university degree than is the case in the Conservative party, but the success rates of candidates with a university education are lower in the Labour party. The pattern is the reverse for the Conservative party. Candidates with a prestigious educational background stand a better chance of election, but women candidates in the Conservative party tend to lack such a background.

Occupational Background. British MPs elected in 1983 came largely from the professions and business, although the combined predominance of these two categories was not as overwhelming in the House of Commons as in the House of Representatives (Table 6. Cf. Table 2). Primarily professionals did not account for as large a percentage in the House of Commons. Nor, as shown in Table 6, do lawyers have the same high concentration as in the House of Representatives. The striking feature of Table 6 is not the somewhat lower propor-

Table 6. Occupations of British MPs*

| | All in 1983 | Men 1945-1974 | Women 1945-1974 |
|--------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Professions: | | | |
| Lawyer | 16 % | 16 % | 5 % |
| Educator | 13 % | 10 % | 24 % |
| Other | 14 % | 14 % | 11 % |
| | 43 % | 40 % | 40 % |
| Business | 25 % | 25 % | 9 % |
| Farmers | 3 % | 6 % | 3 % |
| Publisher/ journalist | 7 % | 6 % | 14 % |
| Miscellaneous | 8 % | 11 % | 11 % |
| Housewife | 1 % | - | 13 % |
| Manual workers | 11 % | 11 % | - |
| No information | 3 % | 1 % | 11 % |

Sources: Butler & Kavanagh 1984:236-7, Mellors 112.

* Occupation refers to 'first or formative occupation'.

tion of MPs drawn from the professions but rather the diversity of MPs' occupations (and also professions) compared to the occupational backgrounds of US Representatives.

Again, as in the case of education, it is necessary to rely on comparative data on the occupations of female and male MPs for the period 1945-1974, and these data are presented in Table 6. The gender pattern of occupations of British MPs is very similar to that found for US Representatives. In both Britain and the US there is little gender difference in the total percentages of professionals, although in Britain the percentage is lower for both men and women. Women MPs are also mainly located in education and media-related occupations, and underrepresented in business.

Apprenticeship Positions: Routes to the House of Commons^{*}

Social background factors, such as rank, education and a distinguished career, seem especially important in determining eligibility in Britain. In any event, specific apprenticeship positions appear less decisive. But in some cases these positions are very significant inasmuch as they serve as an alternative or a compensatory factor for aspirants who lack the preferred social and educational credentials.

Local Councillor. Prior experience of elective office is even less of a prerequisite for election to the House of Commons than to the House of Representatives. In the period 1945-1974 only around one-third of the MPs had held elective office prior to their election (Mellors 91). There are, however, sharp differences between the Conservatives and the Labour party with regard to elective office as an apprenticeship position. A much larger proportion of Labour MPs have been local councillors, and membership of a local council has served as a stepping stone towards Westminster (45 % compared to 26 % for Conservative MPs during 1945-1974).

Party Activist. Party office and activities do not seem to constitute a major apprenticeship. Studies of candidate selection in the 1950s and 1960s found that the vast majority of Conservative and Labour candidates had no experience of party office. Nor did party officeholding substantially enhance a candidate's chan-

* This discussion is not based on biographical data as is the case for the US and Sweden. As a result, it is rather impressionistic and spotty.

ces of securing nomination in a winnable constituency (e.g. Ranney 1965:108, 197-8). As for party activity, only around 40 per cent of the MPs in the 1970 parliament had been party workers (Hills 1981a:25).

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An examination of women's routes to Westminster reveals three key apprenticeship positions, but none of the three seems to be a requisite qualification for nomination or election of MPs in general. Perhaps the most significant apprenticeship for women MPs is local government office. The success rates of women candidates with local government experience are much higher than for female candidates lacking such experience (Hills 1983:39-40). Furthermore, a larger proportion of women MPs have been local councillors than their male colleagues have, and there is some indication that the gap might have increased. During the period 1945-1974 43 per cent of the women MPs had served in local government but only 35 per cent of the men had done so (Mellors 109). The disparity was much larger, however, among members elected in 1970 and 1974. In the 1970 House, for example, 62 per cent of the women compared to 31 per cent of the men had held local government office (Hills 1981 a & 1983). Lastly the contrast between women and men's holding local office is greater in the Conservative party. As in the case of education, Conservative women face a 'Catch-22' situation. Local government experience was more common among Conservative women MPs than among Labour women MPs, but local government service is not a merit required for candidacy in the Conservative party.

Party activity also appears to play a larger role in the career paths of women MPs. In the 1970 House 92 per cent of the women compared to 38 per cent of the men had been active party workers (Hills 1981 a & 1983).

A similar parallel can be observed with regard to work in voluntary associations. Currell has noted the importance of voluntary work in the political careers of women MPs (Currell in Mellors 110). However, a conclusion which can be drawn from Ranney's study is that prominence in civic and religious organizations was not a principal criterion of eligibility.

In sum, the recruitment-relevant attributes of women do not carry much weight in the selection of candidates. This is especially true for local government experience in the Conservative party. Prior officeholding experience is generally a more relevant qualification in the Labour party, and it is a particularly relevant attribute in the case of union-sponsored candidates. However, women have fared even more poorly in being adopted as union-sponsored candidates than unsponsored candidates.

Sweden

Neither impressive academic credentials nor prestigious occupational background play as significant a part in establishing eligibility in Sweden as in Britain and the US. The Riksdag contains substantial numbers of members with low educational attainment and low occupational status. Instead the crucial determinants of eligibility are political in nature.

Education. The educational backgrounds of members of the Riksdag * exhibit two notable differences in comparison with those of British MPs and US Representatives (Table 7). The first is the lower proportion of university graduates. Only a little over one-fourth of the Swedish MPs possess an academic degree, but around one-third have received some university training. The second dissimilarity is a fairly heavy concentration of MPs with 'elementary' or 'elementary plus' backgrounds. The large group in the category 'elementary plus' is also testimony of the importance of various forms of adult education - the 'people's high schools', trade union courses, labour market training programmes, and municipal adult education.

Nor does the gender pattern of the educational backgrounds of Swedish MPs conform with what we have found earlier for the US and Britain. In the Riksdag the percentage of female members with a university degree is actually higher than the percentage for male members. (For post-graduate degrees, however, traditional gender differences reassert themselves.)

* Biographical information in Riksdagen 1982-85, Biografiska uppgifter om ledamöterna provide the data for this analysis.

Table 7. Education of Swedish MPs 1982-85**

| | All | | Men | | Women | |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Elementary only (folkskola, fortsättningskola, grundskola) | 7 % | 28 | 9 % | 24 | 4 % | 4 |
| Elementary + (includes vocational schools, lower secondary school = realskola, people's high schools = folkhögskola, and adult education courses) | 35 % | 131 | 41 % | 110 | 19 % | 21 |
| Secondary only (gymnasium or comparable, higher certificate) | 12 % | 44 | 9 % | 25 | 18 % | 19 |
| Secondary + (university studies or professional training, such as teaching or nursing) | 18 % | 68 | 14 % | 36 | 30 % | 32 |
| University Graduate | 27 % | 100 | 26 % | 69 | 29 % | 31 |
| No information | 1 % | 4 | 1 % | 3 | 1 % | 1 |
| | 100 % | N=375 | 100 % | N=267 | 101 % | N=108 |

* Error due to rounding.

** Includes replacements.

Occupational Background. Table 8 offers an overview of the occupational composition of the Riksdag. Several contrasts between the occupational backgrounds of Swedish MPs and their British and US counterparts are immediately apparent.

Table 8. Occupations of Swedish MPs 1982-85*

| | All | Men | Women |
|--------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Professions: | | | |
| Lawyer | 2 % | 3 % | 2 % |
| Educator | 16 % | 12 % | 22 % |
| Other | 12 % | 11 % | 15 % |
| | 30 % | 26 % | 39 % |
| Business | 9 % | 12 % | 1 % |
| Farmer | 9 % | 12 % | 2 % |
| Publisher/ journalist | 5 % | 5 % | 6 % |
| Miscellaneous: | | | |
| Party function- ary | 10 % | 11 % | 8 % |
| Union official | 6 % | 7 % | 6 % |
| Other | 19 % | 13 % | 33 % |
| | 41 % | 36 % | 56 % |
| Housewife | 1 % | - | 3 % |
| Manual worker | 10 % | 13 % | 2 % |
| No information | 1 % | 1 % | - |

* Occupation refers to occupation at the time of election to the Riksdag and MPs include replacements.

The most frequent occupations in the British and US Houses - the professions and business careers - are less common in the Riksdag. These categories account for about 40 per cent of the members. In particular, MPs coming from business backgrounds constitute a considerably smaller segment of the membership of the Riksdag. The overrepresentation of the professions is also less skewed, and lawyers comprise a tiny fraction. In fact, MPs in every occupational category in the Table, except housewives, outnumber the few lawyers in the Riksdag.

On the other hand, farmers and a wide range of white-collar occupations both in the lower and middle echelons (in the category 'Miscellaneous') are more numerous among Swedish MPs. A further distinction concerns workers' representation. The proportion of MPs with a manual occupational background is also higher in Sweden

than in Britain. Utilizing the 'first or formative occupation', as has been done in the British case (Table 6) instead of occupation at the time of election to the Riksdag, the proportion of workers among Swedish MPs increases to approximately 30 per cent. Union officials, many party functionaries, and a number of MPs who currently have white-collar jobs were previously employed in manual occupations. Finally, 'political' occupations - specifically party functionaries, union officials and journalists (many journalists and editors have been employed by publications associated with the parties) - comprise a larger section of Swedish MPs compared to British MPs.

The gender pattern of occupations of members of the Riksdag also differs from that of British MPs and US Representatives. Firstly, in contrast to Britain and the US, the proportion of women with professional backgrounds is larger than that of men. Secondly, the roster of women's occupations is more extensive than in Britain and the US. The occupations of women in the Riksdag come closer to mirroring the structure of female employment. Many women - professionals and otherwise - are employed in the service sector and in care-related occupations. The subcategory 'Other' in Table 8 includes occupations, such as secretaries and office workers, sales clerks, nurses, and hospital workers. It is also worth noting that differences between the sexes are fairly small with respect to 'political' occupations.

Apprenticeship Positions: Routes to the Riksdag

The career paths of Swedish MPs are characterized by more uniformity than the apprenticeships of legislators in Britain and the US. The standard route to the Riksdag is via local elective office. As distinct from British MPs and US Representatives, over 80 per cent of the members of the Riksdag have previous officeholding experience in local and regional government. Prior elective office is the single most important apprenticeship position for election to the Riksdag.

In addition, however, the vast majority of Swedish MPs - again around 80 per cent - held party office prior to their election. An extremely common career path is a combination of a post (or posts) in local government and local party office. Party officeholding is important in another respect. Most of the MPs without local government experience have entered the Riksdag as holders of inter-

mediate-level or high-ranking party office.

Organizational affiliations are also a recruitment-relevant attribute. However, judging from the career paths of current Swedish MPs, organizational affiliations in themselves are seldom a sufficient credential for election to parliament. Only 3 per cent of the MPs' laurels rested on organizational ties without party or local government office.

Uniformity in the career paths of Swedish MPs is also reflected in the absence of major variations in the routes to the Riksdag of members from different parties. Since several Conservative MPs rank as social and professional notables, one might expect to find the qualification of prior officeholding (both in local government and the party) to be of much less significance. Contrary to this expectation, the career paths of Conservative MPs do not deviate from the average.

Similarities rather than differences also characterize the apprenticeship positions of female and male members of the Riksdag. In comparing the routes of women and men, we discover virtually identical proportions of local officeholders, party activists, and organizational activists (Table 9). One difference,

Table 9. Apprenticeship Positions of Swedish MPs by Sex

| | Women | N | Men | N |
|------------------------------|-------|----|------|-----|
| Local Elective Office | 81 % | 87 | 81 % | 216 |
| Party Activist | | | | |
| Only party | 31 % | 86 | 81 % | 216 |
| Party & women's organization | 36 % | | | |
| Only women's organization | 13 % | | | |
| Organizational Activist | 32 % | 35 | 32 % | 86 |
| Only organizational activist | 5 % | 5 | 3 % | 7 |

of course, is that the women's organizations of the parties provide an additional channel for the advancement of female party activists. The extent to which this channel has figured in the career paths of women MPs can be observed in the Table. Although relatively few

are active only in the women's organization of the party, around half of the women MPs held office in these organizations. The significance of these organizations for women's representation in parliament will become clearer when their role in the nomination process is discussed.

Eligibility Compared: Discussion and Conclusions

The social composition of the national legislature is indicative of the social parameters of the political opportunity structure in a society (Cf. Fishel 16). In all three legislatures members are disproportionately recruited from the upper social strata and the highly educated. Despite this common characteristic, the preceding analysis has uncovered substantial differences in recruitment-relevant attributes of the legislators. A major distinction is the extent to which social or political criteria determine eligibility. Both in the US and Britain social attributes conferring prominence and high status carry more weight. Individuals with the 'proper' social and educational backgrounds but who lack officeholding experience may secure nomination and election. By contrast, political qualifications are more important in Sweden. Prior officeholding is virtually a prerequisite for election to parliament. Educational attainment and professional status are obviously assets to a candidate, but they are by no means essential. In fact, the overriding nature of political credentials is even discernible in the occupational composition of the Riksdag.

These differences have important implications for women. To the extent that impressive academic credentials and a business or professional career enhances a candidate's likelihood of selection or verges upon being a requirement for election, women are at a disadvantage. They lack parity with men in terms of prestigious educational and occupational backgrounds.

Perhaps the clearest example is the legal profession and its prominence in Congress. In 1970 only 3 per cent of the lawyers in the US were women (Welch 1978:374). Although their share had grown to 15 per cent in the early 1980s, the legal profession continues to have one of the most unfavourable ratios of women to men. This disadvantage is not an insurmountable barrier as shown especially by the women elected to the 93rd Congress (1973-4) -

half of whom were lawyers. Nevertheless, the odds are extremely uneven, and the pool of eligible women is seriously restricted.

Turning to the implications of political criteria, we can note that elective office at the local level is often a congenial point of entry into politics for women. The issues of local politics - community amenities, school policies, programmes affecting children, social and health services - have traditionally been concerns of women. In all three countries local elective office is an important apprenticeship position in establishing a pool of eligible women. The difference is that local elective office does not constitute the main route to the national legislature in the US and Britain, whereas it is precisely that in Sweden.

Nomination Compared*

Nomination processes in the US, Britain and Sweden are vastly dissimilar. Candidate selection in the US is generally decided through primary elections. In almost all the states the party caucus or convention, as the selectorate, has been either enlarged or replaced by the direct involvement of loosely identified party voters. In the process the former control by parties over nominations has been reduced to endorsement and sponsorship. By contrast, candidate selection in Britain and Sweden is the sole prerogative of the parties, and the task is mainly entrusted to influentials and activists in the constituency organizations. However, the electoral systems - the plurality system in Britain and proportional representation in Sweden - create very different sets of conditions which affect nomination procedures.

What effects do these different candidate selection processes have on women's representation? This comparison of candidate

* This comparison is hampered by huge gaps in the literature on candidate selection. The gap is most serious in the case of the US. Until recently (Jacobson 1980, Maisel & Cooper 1981, Hinckley 1981) congressional elections have been a neglected area of research. Unfortunately the selection of candidates running for Congress remains largely unexamined. For Sweden two major studies of candidate selection to the Riksdag are available. The first deals with the 1948 and 1952 elections and the second with the 1970 election. The British literature is more extensive but much of the material refers to conditions two decades in the past.

selection focuses on the composition of the selectorate and its effects on women's candidacy. More specifically, I am interested in the extent and manner in which women are incorporated in the selectorate. Of further interest are features of the processes which might enhance or hinder the selection of women candidates.

Sweden: The Selectorate Replicates Itself

In Sweden candidate selection is primarily the task of the constituency party organizations. The national party organizations' placement power is limited to suggestions and requests, and in general the national organizations play less of a role than in Britain. A more important contrast, however, is that the constituency organization selects several candidates which form the party list.* In other words, the constituency organization is responsible for putting together a 'balanced' ticket which represents the various groupings among the party's members and voters. Equally important, the major groupings are included in the selectorate. To a large extent, the party list mirrors the selectorate.

Very schematically, candidate selection can be divided into three stages: 1) the putting forward of names of potential candidates 2) the screening and ranking of nominees which results in a draft party list 3) the adoption of the party list (Brändström 1971. Cf. Sköld 1958). The first phase is important but the drafting of the party list is the decisive stage. Adoption of the party list occurs at a selection conference which may make some modifications. But for the most part the conference approves the proposed list.

The party women's organizations** are involved in the three phases in varying degrees. Available data indicate that the organizations are most active in the initial stage but they are also included in the second stage in the Centre and Conservative parties

* The number of fixed seats per constituency ranges from two (Gotland) to thirty (Stockholm County), and the average number of fixed seats is eleven. In addition to the 210 fixed seats, there are 39 'floating' seats apportioned so as to increase proportionality.

** With the exception of the Communist party which does not have a women's organization.

and sometimes in the Social Democratic party. In the case of the Conservatives, however, the practice of 'party primaries' (provval) as a ranking mechanism seems to have reduced women's chances of receiving a winnable place on the party list, at least in the early 1970s (Brändström 35. 46. 49. 69. 71, 73, 88, 97, 103-4, 132, 135). Incorporation of the women's organizations appears greatest in the Centre and Social Democratic parties.

Both the degree of women's incorporation in the selectorate and the strength of the women's organizations (Cf. Valen 1966: 132-3) are factors contributing to the proportion of female candidates gaining a winnable position on the party list. A third factor of significance is an emphasis on social representation, as distinct from individual representation. The Centre party (formerly the Farmers' Alliance), the Social Democrats and the Communists have strong traditions emphasizing social representation, whereas the Conservatives and Liberals lay stress on individual representation. A final contributing factor is the polling strength of the individual parties. Women's representation tends to increase when a party makes electoral gains, and it tends to decline when the party experiences losses at the polls (Table 10).

An inspection of Table 10 reveals a large discrepancy between the total percentage of female candidates and the percentage of women MPs in the 1952 and 1970 elections. These discrepancies indicate the extent to which women have been nominated for a position on the party list where chances of electoral success are marginal or nil. Sizable variations between the parties can also be observed. In general, the discrepancy is larger among the non-socialist parties. In a cross-national perspective, two features in the Table deserve to be mentioned. The first is that party differences with respect to women's representation in parliament have diminished. In the 1970s it was no longer the socialist parties which had the largest proportion of women MPs. Second, women's representation in all the parties generally reached a level of 20-25 per cent in the late 1970s.

Candidate selection procedures have not changed appreciably during the 1970s. What, then, accounts for the significant rise in women's representation in the Riksdag from 14 per cent in 1970 to 28 per cent in 1982? One crucial factor has been a mobilization of women within the political parties. Al-

Table 10. Percentage of Female Candidates and Elected Female MPs by Party. Selected Years

| | 1952 | | 1970* | | 1973 | | 1976 | | 1979 | | 1982 | |
|------------------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | % candi- dates | % MPs | % candi- dates | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs | % MPs |
| Conservatives | 17.9 | 12.9 | 21.5 | 9.8 | 15.7 | 16.4 | 21.9 | 24.4 | 23.7 | 23.7 | 27.9 | 31.3 |
| Liberals | 17.3 | 13.8 | 18.9 | 8.6 | 14.7 | 23.1 | 23.7 | 14.3 | 21.7 | 27.3 | 21.5 | 26.4 |
| Centre | 17.4 | 0.0 | 23.7 | 12.7 | 24.4 | 27.9 | 31.3 | 32.1 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 21.1 | 21.1 |
| Social Democrats | 14.9 | 13.6 | 22.1 | 17.2 | 22.4 | 21.7 | 27.3 | 30.1 | 27.3 | 27.3 | 21.7 | 21.7 |
| Communists | 14.9 | 20.0 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 21.1 | 23.5 | 25.0 | 20.0 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 21.1 | 21.1 |
| All parties | 16.9 | 12.2 | 21.3 | 14.0 | 21.1 | 21.5 | 26.4 | 27.5 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 21.5 | 21.5 |

Sources: Sköld, 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, Brändström 54, 79, 108, 145, 163, Haavio-Mannila 262, 91.

* Comment: The 1970 election marked the transition from the bicameral to the unicameral Riksdag. The number of seats in the Riksdag decreased from 384 to 350. As a consequence of the reform, the Communists were the only party with the prospect of increasing its seats, whereas all the other parties faced reductions.

though women's membership in parties trailed behind men's at the close of the 1970s, the gender gap was less with respect to party office and active participation. Of the women and men who were party members, equal proportions held party office, and a slightly larger percentage of women members reported active participation compared to men (Sainsbury 1983:8). Longitudinal data (1968-81) also indicate an upswing in women's membership and participation (Szulkin 1984:250-51).

Since party merits (membership, active participation and party office) are qualities generally required for candidacy for local and national elective office (for their importance at the local level, see Barkfeldt et. al. 1971:119-124, Wallin 79-80), this mobilization has increased the pool of eligible women. In turn, the increasing proportion of women serving in local and regional government has also expanded the ranks of women qualified for national office.

Another trend of significance is women's activity both in the women's organization and regular party channels. This is evident in the career paths of current female MPs. Table 9 shows that the arena of the bulk of women party activists was the regular party but a large group combined activities in both the party and the women's organization. In many instances, women have strengthened their claim to a winnable place on the party list through their achievements outside the women's organization.

Lastly, through the years the women's organizations of the parties have generally acted as internal pressure groups attempting to bring more women into office. In the late 1960s and during the 1970s women's issues moved to the top of the political agenda, and all the parties endorsed the principle of greater equality between women and men (Eduards 1981:213-4, Haavio-Mannila et.al. Chapter 1). In this favourable climate, the women's organizations and female party members intensified their efforts, and the inclusion of women in the selectorate provided them with a position of leverage.

Britain: The Selectorate Chooses The Candidate *

As in Sweden, candidate selection rests with the constituency party organizations, and within certain bounds the constituency organizations are more or less free to choose whom they please. The national party organizations, however, maintain lists of suitable candidates and make recommendations. Inclusion on the list of the national organization is a requirement for candidacy in the Conservative party, and to some extent this appears to be a screening or selective device. The Labour party has two lists, both of which are consultative in nature. The A list consists of possible candidates nominated by the trade unions, and the B list contains the names of those nominated by the constituencies. The unions also provide financial contributions to cover the campaign expenditures of the nominees on the A list. In this respect, the trade unions function as a part of the selectorate by accrediting certain candidates and increasing their attractiveness through financial support.

The selection process can be described in terms of three stages. First, a person must present herself or himself as a candidate. In the Conservative party the aspiring candidate must be placed on the list of the national organization. In the Labour party the candidate must be formally nominated by one or more of the affiliate organizations of the constituency party. The second stage consists of getting into the pool of candidates under consideration by a constituency and being put on its 'short-list' - a list of final contenders. In the Conservative party, a selection committee (generally comprised of the principal officers of the association and influential members) interviews the most likely candidates and on this basis it draws up the short-list. In the Labour party the executive committee of the constituency is responsible for the short-list. Third, a selection conference of varying composition and size chooses the candidate from the contenders on the short-list. At the selection conference each of the contenders holds a ten to fifteen minute speech, which is followed by a period of questions and answers. In many instances, the speeches and performance of the

* This discussion deals with only the two major parties.

contenders is quite important in influencing the selectors' choice.

To what extent and in what manner are women included in the selectorate? Unfortunately a definite answer cannot be given to this question. It is only possible to point to fragmentary bits of information. As intimated above, the executive bodies of the constituency organizations play a substantial role in candidate selection, and the women's sections of the parties are represented on these bodies. Existing information does suggest, however, that the proportion of women in the selectorate of both the Labour party (Denver in Hills 1981a) and the Conservatives (Hills 1981a) is somewhat lower than the proportion of female party members. Furthermore, there is little indication that the women involved in the local selection process are more inclined to favour women candidates or to work for their selection. Bochel and Denver, for example, found no difference between female and male Labour selectors with regard to a desire to select more women candidates (1983:55). The impression of inertia at the constituency level is reinforced by the fact that most of the initiative encouraging the selection of women candidates have come from the central organizations of the parties - and in the 1983 general election also from an all-party group. Finally, in the case of union-sponsored candidates, women do not seem to carry much weight. In 1983 seven out of the 154 union-sponsored candidates were women, i.e. 4.5 per cent, whereas the total percentage of female candidates for Labour amounted to 12.3 per cent (Vallance 1984, Butler & Kavanagh 1984: 240).

The overall trend is that both the Labour and Conservative parties are now fielding a larger number of female candidates than previously but without an accompanying increase in the percentage of women elected to Parliament (Table 11). Compared to the 1945 general election, the number of female candidates for the two parties has more than doubled, rising from 56 to 119 in 1983. Still women's representation as a percentage of MPs was slightly less in the 1983 House than in 1945 (Cf. Vallance 1984:304). As can be seen in Table 11, the percentage of female candidates for the two major parties has generally exceeded the percentage of elected women.

Table 1f. Percentage of Female Candidates and MPs by Party, 1945-1983.

| Year | Conservatives | | Labour | | All Parties | |
|----------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| | % candi- dates | % MPs | % candi- dates | % MPs | % candi- dates | % MPs |
| 1945 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 7.5 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 3.8 |
| 1950 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 6.8 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 3.4 |
| 1951 | 4.7 | 1.9 | 6.3 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 2.7 |
| 1955 | 5.3 | 2.9 | 6.9 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 3.8 |
| 1959 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 4.0 |
| 1964 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.6 |
| 1966 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 4.1 |
| 1970 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 5.4 | 4.1 |
| 1974 Feb | 5.3 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 4.3 | 6.7 | 3.6 |
| 1974 Oct | 4.8 | 2.5 | 8.0 | 5.6 | 7.1 | 4.2 |
| 1979 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 8.2 | 4.1 | 8.2 | 3.0 |
| 1983 | 6.3 | 3.3 | 12.3 | 4.8 | 10.7 | 3.5 |

Sources: Stacey & Price 192, Vallance 1984:303.

The root of this discrepancy are the difficulties of women being adopted as candidates by winnable constituencies. Prior to the recent redrawing of constituency boundaries, around two-thirds of the constituencies were safe seats of one of the major parties (Vallance 305). It is a unanimous finding in studies of candidate selection in Britain that very few of the safe seats have gone to female candidates. Instead women are disproportionately selected for hopeless or marginal seats. A variety of measures* all indicate the severe disadvantages of women candidates.

To sum up, women have slimer prospects of election than men. In addition, because they are often selected for marginal seats, women face unfavourable odds in securing re-election (e.g. Rasmussen 1981:609-10). The outcome has been stagnation in women's representation in Parliament and shorter tenure in office once they have achieved election.

* These measures included the size of the deficit in the party vote during the previous election in constituencies where women have run (Currell in Rasmussen 1981:606-7), the percentage of women candidates adopted for safe seats (Charlot 1981, a success index (Rasmussen 1977, 1981), a women's handicap ratio (Hills 1981a), the percentages of female and male candidates elected to Parliament on their first try versus four or more attempts (Rasmussen 1981).

The United States: The Selectorate Enlarged

Since the direct primary is the means of selecting or nominating party candidates, the selectorate is no longer restricted to organized party activists. Instead the selectorate is composed of voters entitled to participate in the primary, but primary systems differ considerably with regard to definitions of who may vote. The basic distinction is between 'closed' and 'open' primaries. The closed primary limits participation to registered voters or voters who declare their party affiliation on or prior to election day. Open primaries require no such declaration and any voter eligible to participate in a general election may vote in the primary. During the past two decades the trend has been in the direction of increased 'openness' in primaries (Epstein 1978:357, Jewell & Olson 1978:129).

Besides enlarging the selectorate, the primary system encouraged candidate-centred politics and put a premium on the candidate's ability to gain the backing of supportive groups with resources. Sponsoring external to the parties may be decisive to winning the primary. To some extent, sponsoring groups can be viewed as constituting an informal selectorate.

A third major effect of the primary system has been to alter the role of the parties in the nomination process. Although the parties no longer control nominations, they may influence or attempt to influence candidate selection through preprimary endorsements. The importance of party endorsements varies. In a few instances where strong parties exist, endorsement can be tantamount to nomination. In other cases endorsements may have a screening effect.

In its broadest outlines, candidate selection is comprised of two stages. The first consists of getting on the primary ballot. In most states, this is a relatively simple procedure. In a limited number of states, however, endorsement by the party usually in a convention is a condition for getting on the ballot, and in other states endorsement provides certain advantages. The second stage is campaigning and winning the primary, assuming that it is a contested primary.

What implications does this system of candidate selection have for the nomination and election of women to the House of Representatives?

The enlargement of the selectorate through primaries ought to mean that women and men participate in the selectorate on roughly equal terms. Unfortunately we know very little about who participates in primaries or the rate of participation in primaries. However, gender differences in voting participation in national and local elections are negligible (Evans 1981:40, CAMP 1984), and there is little reason to believe that gender differences in voting in primaries should be larger.

Despite the strong likelihood of similar participation rates between women and men in primaries, relatively few women are nominated. During the period 1970-74 only around 4 per cent of the candidates were women (calculated from Darcy & Schramm 1977:3), and only around 10 per cent of the congressional districts nominated a woman (Darcy & Schramm 7). The small number of female nominees raises two questions. Firstly, how decisive is the primary - or when is it of importance - in candidate selection? Secondly, what other features of the candidate selection process might impede the nomination of women?

In two situations the primary is of little significance. The most extreme case is when an incumbent seeks re-election. The effects of incumbency in elections to the House of Representatives are renowned. Of the incumbents who sought re-election from 1956 through 1976, 92.2 per cent were successful. The effects of incumbency in primaries are even more impressive. An infinitesimal 1.7 per cent of the incumbents lost primary contests during these years (Jacobson 1980:1). Accordingly, challengers face bleak prospects of unseating an incumbent in the primary or the general election. Given the current imbalance of the sexes in the House, incumbency effects tend to work against women's representation. However, once elected women also enjoy the advantage of incumbency (Darcy & Schramm 4, Hinckley 1981:90-91).

Primaries are also of marginal significance for the minority party in states with a dominant party or in districts which are safe constituencies of the opposing party. Participation in these primaries tends to be low, and to the victor goes the dubious prize of fighting a hopeless battle. It would be most in-

teresting to know if women are more 'successful' in winning nomination in primaries of this sort. The findings of Robert Darcy and Sarah Schramm suggest this was the case for Republican women during the period 1970-74. They found no appreciable differences in the electability of female and male candidates to the House of Representatives. But they did discover dissimilarities in the vote-getting ability of women Republican and women Democratic candidates - dissimilarities which were largely attributable to the fact that Republican women were nominated in districts where the party's electoral support was exceptionally weak (Darcy & Schramm 5, 7-9). It is also worth noting that three of the four women (all Republicans) entering the House in the 97th Congress ran against male incumbents and won (Hinckley 158).

Conversely, the stakes are high in primaries when there is no incumbent and the politics of the district are characterized by two-party competition. The stakes are perhaps highest in a primary of the dominant party when the incumbent retires. Do women win the party nomination for open-seat contests? In 1978 only about 3 per cent of nominations to these winnable seats went to women candidates. And only 10 per cent of the female non-incumbents compared to 20 per cent of the male non-incumbents were not running against an incumbent. Women's ability to secure nomination in open-seat contests in the 1980 election appears to have been even less successful. Thus, one obstacle to women's election to the House seems to be difficulties in becoming the nominee in races where there is a reasonable chance of winning.

A number of special difficulties also arise from candidate-centred politics where the aspirant to office must develop her own resource base. In this connection, membership and support of organizations can be a valuable asset. A possible liability for women is their lower membership rates in business and professional organizations.* These organizations have often been

* A comparative study of female and male state legislators found that women were less likely than men to be members of occupation-related organizations. Moreover, smaller percentages of female state legislators compared to male legislators reported that the support of occupation-related organizations and other organizations (excluding women's organizations) as one of the most important factors affecting their decision to run for office (Carroll & Strimling 1983:99,105).

major sponsoring groups of candidates, as indicated by the pattern of organizational memberships of US Representatives, and the local notables in particular. As noted earlier, there is a shortfall of women who have entered the House since 1970 via the route of the local notable. This shortfall may be related to women's patterns of organizational memberships.

More serious is the problem of campaign financing. Unlike Britain and Sweden where campaign funds are channelled through the parties and are not the worry of party nominees, fund raising is a basic concern of candidates in the US. Moreover, party committees are usually only a marginal source of financial assistance (Jacobson, Chapter 3, esp. 89-97). A candidate's ability to secure contributions is largely shaped by two factors: the degree of competition in the contest and incumbency status. Challengers have a hard time raising money, and they received the smallest contributions. Three circumstances - previous elective office, a vulnerable incumbent, and popular sentiments favouring the challenger's party - may, however, help the challenger in gaining contributions (Jacobson 105-10).

Several aspects of this system of financing campaigns create hindrances for women candidates. First, a larger share of women candidates have been challengers, which is a major handicap in raising money (for an extreme example, see Jacobson 125). Second, women less frequently than men enjoyed the advantage of having held previous elective office. Third, in 1976 around 10 per cent of the money received by congressional candidates was in the form of loans or direct gifts from the candidates themselves (Jacobson 97). Women's incomes are smaller which affects their ability to contribute to their own campaign. In short, candidate-centred politics seem to provide few advantages for women.

Nomination Compared: Discussion and Conclusions

This cursory comparison of the nomination phase of recruitment suggests a number of handicaps for women in the US and Britain which have no counterpart in Sweden. It also points to a difficulty shared by women candidates in all three countries. The effects of this difficulty on women's representation, however, vary and its effects are particularly detrimental in the British case.

One hurdle facing candidates in the US is attracting sufficient funding. The problem is probably most acute in primaries and when women are challengers. Women who have won the party nomination in open-seat contests do not seem to lack financial backing. In 1978, for example, the three women nonincumbents who ran in open-seat contests won, and all three spent more than their opponents in the campaign (Hinckley 91).

A second possible disadvantage in both the US and Britain is the stress on campaigning qualities in candidate selection rather than other political skills (Cf. Duverger 79). Furthermore, the assessment of campaigning skills in the British case is based on the aspiring candidate's performance during a twenty to thirty minute period of the selection conference. In the US the period of assessment is the primary campaign.

A third difficulty in both the US and Britain has been women's exclusion from the informal selectorate. In the US business and professional organizations have been important sponsoring groups, and women are less frequently members of these groups. In the 1970s cause organizations, including women's caucuses became important sponsoring groups. And Democratic women candidates have tended to rely on feminist organizations to support their nominations (Darcy & Schramm 8, Carroll & Strimling 105). An increasing role of women's organizations and other cause organizations as sponsoring groups might offset women's disadvantage with regard to membership in business and professional associations.

In Britain the unions are a major sponsoring group, and until recently women were not included on the A list of the Labour party (Denby 1977:188). Thus the fact that seven women were union-sponsored candidates in the 1983 general election actually represents an improvement. Nevertheless, male preponderance is greater among union-sponsored candidates than among unsponsored candidates, and the success rates of union-sponsored candidates are higher than those of other Labour candidates.

A shared weakness of women candidates in all three countries has been the 'ability' to gain nominations in situations offering smaller prospects of election. In the US women have not been

nominated for open-seat contests to the same extent as men. In Sweden the discrepancies between the percentages of female candidates and women MPs indicate the extent to which women have obtained more than their fair share of hopeless or marginal positions on the party lists. In Britain women have been disproportionately adopted as candidates in hopeless and marginal constituencies. The consequences of selecting women for these types of seats are most serious in the British case. It not only impedes women's entry into Parliament, it also shortens their tenure in office.

In sum, nomination appears to be the crucial phase in recruitment to national legislatures. In party list systems without preferential voting, electability is mainly determined by the candidate's position on the list. Party and issues shape electoral choice, and the personal characteristics of individual candidates are of little consequence. In the US a determinant of voting - especially in presidential elections - is candidate appeal. However, comparisons of female and male candidates in elections to the House of Representatives provide no evidence that sex is a component of candidate appeal. Despite popular beliefs to the contrary, these comparisons show that gender is not related to electability. Women incumbents have as high success rates as men incumbents, challengers - irrespective of sex - do poorly, and women's ability to win open-seat contests is on a par with men's. In other words, electability is largely a function of securing the party nomination in open-seat contests. Similar comparisons of the performance of female and male candidates in Britain fail to reveal evidence that gender has any substantial impact on voting (Hills 1981b & Rasmussen 1983). The electorate seems less likely to penalize a candidate for being a woman than the selection conferences of the two major parties. In Britain nomination in a safe constituency is equivalent to election, and candidacy for a hopeless seat is tantamount to defeat. Thus nomination plays a decisive role in the electoral fortunes of women candidates in all three countries.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Of the three phases of political recruitment, the discussion in the literature has focused on the election phase and its implications for women's representation, and one aspect in particular has been singled out. Many authors have pointed to the effects of electoral systems. Countries with party list systems of proportional representation consistently have higher proportions of women members in parliament compared to plurality systems. Nonetheless, variations in women's representation in countries with proportional representation are considerable, ranging from 7 to 31 per cent in the early 1980s (Haavio-Mannila et.al. 81). In other words, a proportional electoral system currently appears to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition in facilitating women's representation. The preceding analysis suggests two paths of further inquiry in explaining variations in women's representation among countries with proportional electoral systems. An examination of eligibility and candidate selection processes in these countries may provide valuable insights into the mechanisms favouring or hindering women's representation in national legislatures.

Secondly, the analysis of Sweden and Britain offers a clear illustration of the impact of the electoral system on candidate selection. It underlines the difficulties of considering one phase of the recruitment process in isolation and the necessity of devoting more attention to the dynamic interplay between the three phases of recruitment. An equally important task is to attempt to disentangle the effects of each stage.

Thirdly, it can be rather misleading to discuss the effects of different electoral systems on women's representation without an empirical examination of the nomination phase, especially since our knowledge of candidate selection is quite limited. Vernon Bogdanor's comments on electoral systems and women's recruitment, in part inspired by an article by Francis Castles, are a case in point. Bogdanor argues that 'in party list systems it is the party which plays the dominant role in deciding which candidates are to be elected to the legislature'. He goes on to quote Castles: 'Under lists systems, the percentage of women representatives will be a reflection of the elite po-

litical culture, whereas in other systems it is more likely to reflect mass political culture.' Bogdanor then concludes that in plurality and majority systems if attitudes towards women's participation in politics were to change, this change would be rapidly reflected in the legislature (Bogdanor 1983:249-50).

The assumptions underlying Bogdanor and Castles' discussion need to be clarified and, I would argue, revised. A major difficulty derives from drawing too sharp a dichotomy between control by the national party in party list systems and local electoral sovereignty in plurality and other systems where the voter chooses between candidates (Castles 24-26).

To begin with, the generalization that plurality and other systems, as distinct from party list systems, are characterized by local electoral sovereignty is not as tidy and clear as it may first seem. Local electoral sovereignty refers to at least two dimensions. The first dimension is territorial: local vs. national. The second is direct intervention of the electorate through individual voter choice of candidates vs. non-intervention. However, as Castles notes, individual voter choice can be combined with party lists. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the effects of direct intervention of the electorate can be minimal or non-existent, for example, in safe constituencies. The existence of safe constituencies in plurality systems (excluding the US) means that the party plays just as dominant a role in deciding which candidates are to be elected to the legislature as the party in list systems.

The dichotomy also assumes that national party control is an intrinsic feature of party list systems, and certain aspects of the electoral system such as large constituencies and some form of national allocation of seats will further augment party control. Hence it is postulated that in party list systems, and especially those with a large number of seats per constituency and a system of national distribution of remainders, the national party hierarchy will be involved in the selection of candidates and their ordering on the list. In a similar vein, constituencies representing large populations are assumed to rely less on local channels of recruitment - the local party, local unions and local government (Castles 25). However, Sweden with its party list system relies almost entirely on local channels of recruitment. As we have

seen, the standard route to the Riksdag is via local government office and local party office. Additionally, candidate selection is under the firm control of the constituency organizations, and the placement power of the national party organizations is similar to that in Britain. National party control might be a crucial variable but it is not an intrinsic feature of party list systems.

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CANDIDATE SELECTION IN JAPAN

--- LOCALISM, FACTIONALISM AND PERSONALISM ---

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Rei Shiratori

Department of Government

and

Centre for the Study of Contemporary Japan

University of Essex

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If we describe the whole process of candidate selection in the form of a mathematical equation the independent variables which determine the result of the candidate selection are 1) the electoral system, 2) party organisation, 3) political culture, 4) political situations, 5) candidate traits. The dependent variable is of course whether a candidate is nominated as an official party candidate or not.

The electoral system constructs the framework within which the whole process of candidate selection is carried out and in that sense it has the most significant influence upon the whole process. The party organisation is also influenced by the electoral system but at the same time it is much influenced by the party's ideology and the characteristics of its supporters. Party organisation is also influenced by the history of the development of the party and to some extent by the style and nature of the leadership.

Political culture influences candidate selection mainly because it influences the patterns of the voting behaviour of the electorate. Political culture, which is considered to be, as G. Almond pointed out, an expression of the pattern of the electorate's psychological orientation towards a political object, sometimes influences not only through the patterns of the electorate's voting behaviour, but also influences candidate selection by deciding the process of selection itself.

Political situations, by which I mean the dynamic trends of all political changes, also affect candidate selection. When a party's influence is growing, the party would like actively to establish a greater number of candidates, whereas a party in decline will generally try to limit the number of candidates to the minimum. In that sense the political situation will influence candidate selection mainly through the control of the number of candidates nominated as the official party candidates.

Candidate traits also affect the result of the selection of candidates, but candidate traits cannot change the whole process of the selection system. The traits of each candidate in that sense can only affect the result of that particular candidate. If we consider the whole system of candidate selection as it is described in Fig. 1 it might be better to start the examination of the whole process of candidate selection by investigating respectively those independent variables in the candidate selection equation.

I The Electoral System

According to the Japanese Constitution which was promulgated on 3rd November 1946 and enacted on 3rd May 1947, Japan's National Diet is defined as "the highest organ of State power, and shall be the sole law making organ of the State" (Article 41). This Diet is bicameral and consists of the House of Representatives (Shuugi In) and the House of Councillors (Sangi In).

The Constitution also says that "both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people, the number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law" (Article 43). The term of office of the members of the House of Representatives is four years, although the term can be terminated before the full term has expired if the House of Representatives is dissolved by the Cabinet through the Emperor. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors is six years, with half the members elected every three years.

Public Office Election Law (Koshoku sen kyo ho) fixes the number of members of the House of Representatives at present at 511, chosen by 130 constituencies, each returning between three and five members according to population, using a single non-transferable vote and simple majority system. The number of members of the House of Councillors is 252 and among them 100 members are elected in one nationwide national constituency under a proportional representation system with lists of candidates ranked by parties. A further 152 members are elected in 47 prefectural constituencies, each of which returns between one and four members through a single non-transferable ballot with a simple majority system.

The House of Representatives has a superior position to the House of Councillors in decision making, for example, in passing bills (Article 59), passing the budget (Article 60), ratifying treaties (Article 61) and designating the Prime Minister (Article 67).

The electoral system which elects between three and five members to the House of Representatives is usually called a middle-sized constituency system (Chu-Senkyoku Sei) in Japan in contrast with the single-membered constituency system and nationwide constituency system. In the case of the election of the members of the House of Representatives, 47 constituencies are three-seated, 41 constituencies are four-seated, 41 constituencies are five-seated and one constituency is rather exceptionally single-seated (see Table 1).

Even in the case of the House of Councillors, four constituencies are three-seated and two constituencies are four-seated (Table 2).

Because the proportion of the LDP votes among total votes cast in four successive recent elections in the Lower House is between 42 and 48 percent (41.8% in 1976, 44.6% in 1979, 47.9% in 1980 and 45.8% in 1983), the LDP can expect a substantial possibility of their multiple candidates being elected not only in four or five-seated constituencies but also even in three-seated constituencies.

In reality, in the last general election of the House of Representatives, in 27 three-seated constituencies, out of a total of 47, two LDP candidates were elected, and in 2 three-seated constituencies the LDP monopolised all three seats. The average ratio of the LDP winners in different types of constituencies in the election of the House of Representatives is shown in Table 3. Even in three-seated constituencies the average number of LDP candidates elected is 1.7.

Consequently it is natural for the LDP to set up multiple candidates in almost all constituencies including three-seated constituencies. In the 1983 election, the LDP ran 339 candidates in 130 House of Representative constituencies, which shows an average of 2.6 LDP candidates in one constituency.

The number of LDP supporters, even if they are over 40 percent, is, however, limited, while the multiple candidates have to fight under the same party flag and with the same party programmes. In urban areas, where the conservative supporters are comparatively small in proportion (see Table 4), if one of the multiple LDP candidates acquires an unbalanced, large number of votes, the other candidate will inevitably fail to be elected. It might be said, therefore, that the real competition lies not between the LDP candidates and other opposition parties' candidates, but between the LDP candidates themselves.

In order to get more votes than his fellow LDP candidates, every LDP candidate has to distinguish himself from other LDP candidates in some way. He may need the support of some nationally famous leader who will make a speech specifically in his support, or he must obtain extra campaign money over and above the campaign money given by the party because his colleagues are also fighting under the same party name and with the same party programmes. This is the main reason why almost all candidates in the LDP belong to a particular faction (Table 5).

At the same time, it is quite natural that there is no constituency where the multiple candidates belong to the same faction within the particular constituency. Consequently the leaders of factions in the LDP must have at least two kinds of capability, i.e. (1) the capability of gathering a large amount of political money from the business world to finance the campaign costs of his followers (Table 6), and (2) the capability to attract a wide range of the public by his speeches or appearances, as well as (3) the capability to organise the control his fellow members of the Diet.

It is wrong to say the factions inside the LDP are organised only because of the necessity to collect extra political money. The factions of the LDP certainly have a rather vague particular political posture or, more precisely, the particular priority of their policy orientations.

The Ikeda-Suzuki faction has always been more economy orientated than politically orientated, while the Kono-Nakasone faction has constantly been more politically orientated in its political posture. The Miki faction has constantly advocated dis-armament and an anti-trust economic policy.

Perhaps those rather ambiguous political postures were formed as a result of the history of the establishment of the LDP. When the LDP was established in 1955, it was formed by the amalgamation of the two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party. Furthermore, the Japan Democratic Party had contained two groups of members who each came from the Japan Progressive Party or the Japan Conservative Party. Those two parties were established in 1945 after the end of World War II. It is natural, therefore, even after the amalgamation into one unified conservative LDP that each group should try to retain its original grouping and its original political posture.

In a short-lived socialist government headed by Tetsu KATAYAMA, the President of the Japan Socialist Party, which survived from May 1947 to March 1948, for example, the Democratic Party sent seven ministers, the Cooperative Party sent two ministers while the Liberal Party was the Main Opposition under the socialist cabinet. The Miki faction inherited the tradition of the Cooperative Party and the Ikeda-Suzuki faction inherited the tradition of the Liberal Party headed by Mr Yoshida.

In spite of the fact that the total number of LDP votes had declined constantly during the 1960s and 1970s (See Fig.2), each faction leader continued to try to increase the number of candidates of his own faction in order to increase the numbers of members of the Diet of his own faction and to have a greater chance of becoming President of the LDP. Since the LDP retained the absolute majority in both Houses up to the middle of the 1970s, faction leaders are more concerned about the factional balance inside the LDP than the political balance between the LDP and other parties.

Even after the middle of the 1970s when the LDP's absolute majority in both Houses became endangered, the fact that too many candidates were set up in any type of constituency has never proved to be the cause of the decrease in numbers of the elected LDP members and has encouraged the factional leaders to set up new candidates. As it is shown in Table 7, in the 1983 election of the House of Representatives, the LDP lost the greatest number of seats in the constituencies where the LDP had set up an equal number of candidates to the number of incumbent members of the House of Representatives, while the LDP lost the smallest number of seats in constituencies where the LDP had set up three more candidates than incumbent members although all of them were given official nomination as LDP candidates.

The LDP faction leaders consider that the severe competition of the intra party candidates among various factions will increase the total number of votes cast for the LDP in the end, even if the number of elected members of the LDP are temporarily decreased. When the faction leaders have enough money and can find a hopeful candidate, therefore, they will openly recommend him to run for election and they will publicly support the candidate even if he is not nominated as an official LDP candidate. The LDP factions in this sense act rather independently in setting up candidates in the elections of the House of Representatives.

Because of this independent activity of factions in setting up candidates, the LDP always experiences great difficulty in selecting the official candidates among those informal LDP candidates in the elections of the House of Representatives. The fact that each candidate, rather than the LDP branch in the constituency, establishes his own organisation of supporters (Koem Kai), exacerbates the disordered way in which the LDP runs elections.

In the case of the elections of the House of Councillors in 1983, because 26 constituencies out of 47 prefectural constituencies were one-seated constituencies, the LDP could select its official candidates rather easily because the LDP nominated the incumbent members automatically and won in 24 constituencies. In the case of 15 two-seated constituencies, the LDP made every effort in 1983 to set up two candidates in those constituencies where there was a possibility of two members being elected. Consequently, the LDP set up two official candidates in 9 constituencies and occupied two seats in 3 constituencies. In these two-seated constituencies also, the selection of the official candidates was not so difficult because the incumbent members were automatically selected and because not so many prospective candidates appeared in the two-seated constituencies due to the difficulty of electing two LDP members.

In the election of the House of Representatives, apart from some exceptional constituencies such as Kyoto 1 and Kyoto 2, constituencies where the JCP (Japan Communist Party) set up two candidates, only the JSP was able to set up multiple candidates as shown in Table 8, although the JSP could set up candidates in 125 constituencies out of 130 constituencies. It is a well known fact that the JSP has also suffered from factions which are organised around various ideologies. At present the balance inside the JSP is shown in Table 9.

The problem in connection with the candidate selection in the JSP is that the balance of factions among JSP members of the Diet and the balance of factions among the members of the Party are different from each other. First, among the members of the National Diet the number of right wing members, especially in the House of Representatives, is greater than the number of left wing members while at the rank and file level, the left wing militant members outweigh in number the right wing moderate members. Second, the Shakaishugi Kyokai (Socialist Association), which advocates an orthodox Marx-Leninist socialism and insists on socialist revolution by direct action, is the most influential group among ordinary members although it only has two members in the National Diet. Because of these differences in balance between right wing and left wing socialist members of the National Diet and rank and file members, a serious problem arose in the elections, as I will discuss later.

In the case of the Japan Socialist Party, the prefectural branch nominates the candidates in both Upper House and Lower House elections. Consequently since the hegemony and the majority of the party bureaucrats at the prefectural level and at the rank and file level are left wing, the candidates chosen by the prefectural branch are always ex trade union leaders and figures of a rather rigid left wing ideology. It is necessary, however, for the JSP to attract a wider range of the electorate in order to ensure the election of those candidates in their constituencies, but those left wing ex trade union leaders are too rigid in ideology.

At the same time, when they are elected as members of the National Diet, it is necessary for the JSP to influence decision making in the National Diet where the LDP has almost the absolute majority, by making compromises rather flexibly in day to day negotiations with other parties. It might also be appropriate to add here that those ex trade union leaders have usually lost their energy after being elected as Diet members because they now consider that they have reached the last stage of their lives and feel in a sense that they are now retired.

The reason why the LDP has constantly kept an absolute majority might also be attributed to the JSP's lack of active attitude in running candidates for national elections. In spite of the fact that all constituencies elect between three and five members of the House of Representatives with one single-seated constituency, the JSP has never set up candidates in all 130 constituencies. In the case of the 1983 election of the House of Representatives, for example, the JSP established only 144 candidates altogether which means even if all the candidates had been elected, they would consist of only one fourth of the total number of members of the House of Representatives in spite of the fact that the JSP has always claimed to be the major opposition.

II Party Organisations

Although some analysts of Japanese politics regard the LDP as more of a coalition of parties than as a single party composed of a number of factions, because the existence of factions and the competition among factions are so apparent, I think this evaluation exaggerates the reality of the LDP. In spite of the fact that each faction tries hard to increase its own financial resources, the total amount of political money collected by various factions in the LDP has never exceeded 45 percent of the political money officially collected by the LDP headquarters. It is also true that the LDP as a party has its party organisation as shown in Appendix C.

In September 1979, Mr Ohira who became Prime Minister in November 1978, dissolved the House of Representatives in order to consolidate his premiership by re-establishing the absolute majority of LDP seats in the House. Contrary to his intention, however, the number of LDP seats decreased by one from 249 to 248 in the election held on 7th October (see Appendix A). Fukuda, Miki and Nakasone blamed Ohira for the result of the election and asked him to resign. After 40 days of confusion when the extraordinary session of the Diet was opened to designate the Prime Minister on 6th November, the LDP set up two candidates, Ohira and Fukuda, for Prime Minister. In the first vote, Ohira acquired 135 votes and Fukuda gained 125 votes, neither and neither of them gained an absolute majority due to the opposition parties' votes for their own leaders. In the second vote, when only their top two candidates in the first vote stood for election, Ohira received 138 votes against Fukuda's 121 votes and was designated Prime Minister. In spite of the fact that the LDP had set up two candidates for Prime Minister, none of the LDP members left the party after the designation of the Prime Minister.

Then on 16th May 1980, when the JSP proposed the vote of no confidence in the incumbent LDP Ohira Cabinet and when all other opposition parties, i.e. Komei, DSP, JCP, NLC and USD supported this bill, the four anti main-current factions (Fukuda, Miki, Nakasone and Nakagawa) tried to exploit this occasion to increase their influence upon decision-making inside the LDP and started negotiations with Prime Minister Ohira by asking him to change his political attitude to the introduction of the purchase tax system to improve the financial situation. While the factional leaders of the anti main-current factions gathered in a room in the National Diet Building and continued to negotiate with Prime Minister Ohira by telephone, the bell which signalled the opening of the plenary sitting of the House of Representatives rang to introduce the members in the House. This incident angered the anti main-current factional leaders.

Although the LDP retained the absolute majority of 256 seats in the House of Representatives (510 seats plus the Speaker) at that time, the vote of no confidence was passed by 243 votes for and 187 votes against. The LDP members who were consciously absent from voting numbered 69 (Fukuda faction 34, Miki faction 25, Nakagawa faction 8, Nakasone faction 2). Prime Minister Ohira dissolved the House but he never expelled the absent members from the LDP. Furthermore, he officially nominated those absent members as official LDP candidates in the election which followed the dissolution of the House of Representatives. At the same time, those absent members did not leave the LDP and accepted the nomination by Mr Ohira as the LDP candidates.

In this election, which was held simultaneously with the election of the House of Councillors, on 22nd June 1980, the LDP acquired 284 seats and recovered the absolute majority again although Prime Minister Ohira himself died during the election campaign.

These two incidents which occurred under the Ohira Cabinet between 1979 and 1980 showed the strength of the powers of factions and their limit in the LDP. Factions inside the LDP can freely act for themselves and overthrow the incumbent. Factions cannot, however, split the party under normal political conditions.

It is true that the factions in the LDP function as organs of recruitment when the LDP selects the President, important party officials and even Cabinet ministers. Originally the President of the LDP was elected by the Party Congress where (1) the members of the National Diet and (2) forty-seven representatives each elected from one of forty-seven prefectures. Even after the introduction of a primary election which selects two candidates for the Presidency by direct voting of all the members of the LDP, the members of the two Houses of the National Diet vote to decide on the President of the LDP. The factions which support the incumbent President form the main current while the defeated group of factions are called anti main-current factions.

Beside the President, the LDP has several significant offices which exercise powerful control over party administration; Vice President, Secretary General, Director of Executive Committee and Director of Policy Research Affairs Council. Because the President of the LDP is inevitably elected as the Prime Minister in the National Diet, the Vice President is de facto leader of the party. The Secretary General controls all the administrative staff and party money. The thirty member Executive Committee is the most important party organ which takes decisions on daily matters and the Director of the Executive Committee chairs the meeting. The Policy Affairs Research Council recommends legislative policy decisions and the Director of the Policy Affairs Research Council chairs the meeting. All these important offices are usually scattered among the various factions in order to retain the balance inside the party.

The Election Steering Committee which directly controls the selection of candidates in national elections consists of (1) President (2) Vice President and (3) 12 members who are appointed by the President. In the nomination of the 12 members, however, the leadership of the President is limited because here again he must consider the balance among factions. As his leadership as Prime Minister is limited in his nomination of ministers (in the past decade the allocation of 20 ministers of the LDP cabinet has mostly taken place in this way: to the Tanaka faction three or four ministers, to the Ohira-Suzuki faction three, to the Fukuda faction three, to the Nakasone faction two, to the Miki-Komoto faction two, to the Upper House members three, to independent LDP Lower House members three or four), he can only allocate the number of members to each faction inside the Election Steering Committee, taking into account the balance among factions. The names of the members are usually put forward by each factional leader (in the case of the nomination of ministers, the Prime Minister can select the names of the list of candidates proposed by factional leaders).

The usual process of candidate selection in the LDP starts from the prefectural branch. Taking each constituency's situation, each prefectural headquarters proposes the name of candidates to the national headquarters, i.e. to the Election Steering Committee. If they have problems in selection, the prefectural headquarters usually sends all names of candidates to the national headquarters and asks them to select those who should be the official LDP candidates.

The Election Steering Committee sends its decision to the Executive Committee which "decides the important matters related to the management of the party and the activities in the Diet" (Article 36 of the LDP Constitution). The Executive Committee consists of 30 members (15 members of the House of Representatives, 7 members of the House of Councillors and 8 members appointed by the President). Here again, the balance among factions is considered when the LDP members select the members of the Executive Committee. The candidates are nominated by the President after recognition by the Executive Committee of the proposed list drafted by the Election Steering Committee.

The LDP invented several devices to solve the problems which often occur in the selection of candidates. First, the LDP issues a certificate of LDP membership (Toseki Shomei) to the candidates who are members of the LDP but who are not selected as official LDP candidates. Secondly, immediately after the election, the LDP automatically nominates the independent candidate who is a member of the LDP and who is elected. The date of the nomination is retroactive to the beginning of the election. Thirdly, the LDP headquarters carries out public opinion polls when it encounters difficulty in selection and tries to increase the persuasive power of the selection done by the headquarters.

In the end, if they cannot find agreement even at the Executive Committee on the nomination of official candidates among rival factions, the Executive Committee simply adopts a resolution that "the selection of official candidates in the particular constituency should be done by senior officers (San Yaku) of the party, i.e. the President, the Vice President, the Director of the Executive Committee and the Director of policy affairs research council". Because those senior offices are scattered among four factions, those office holders bargain for the nomination of official candidacies between factions by giving one to faction A in one constituency and by giving one to faction B in another constituency.

In the case of the JSP the selection of candidates does not become a serious problem so frequently. The JSP has only 65,000 members in spite of the fact that it gained 11 million votes in both Upper and Lower House elections. At the same time, the main organisation which supports the JSP, i.e. General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) had 4.5 million members and 6,800 trade unions in 1983 (see Table 10).

When the prefectural headquarters select the official candidates, therefore, they cannot ignore these two facts. In order to carry out the campaign, the JSP must have both the financial and physical support of grade union members because the number of JSP members is so small. The result is usually the selection of left wing candidates rather than right wing or moderate candidates and the selection of ex trade union leaders as official JSP candidates.

In the case of the JSP, the prefectural headquarters propose the nomination to the national headquarters and the central Executive Committee finally admits the proposal (see Appendix D).

Although the JSP gains a higher proportion of votes in rural areas as shown in Table 4, because even in rural areas the trade unions of civil servants usually have the initiative in political manoeuvring, the selection of candidates does not become a serious matter. The fact that the JSP sets up multiple candidates only in 20 constituencies out of 130 constituencies (see Table 8) and the fact that the JSP was successful in electing multiple candidates in only 8 constituencies in the election of the House of Representatives, as well as the fact that the JSP cannot set up candidates in all 130 constituencies, also shows the reason why the selection of candidates is not so serious a problem in the JSP. For the JSP, recruiting a greater number of candidates is a much more serious (and difficult) problem.

In the case of the DSP, because the possibility of candidates being elected is less than that of JSP candidates, the support of the trade unions becomes more important. In reality, with a few exceptions, the DSP sets up candidates only in those constituencies where there are some big trade unions which belong to the Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei). In those constituencies candidates are supported both financially and physically not only by the trade unions but also by companies because the trade unions which belong to Domei are usually non militant, economy-orientated trade unions. It might be appropriate to add here that almost all Japanese trade unions are vertically organised on the base of individual companies and not on the base of industry in a horizontal way.

In the case of both Komei and the JCP, the characteristics of those parties are solid and centralised organisation and tight control by the centre over the members, although the reasons for the solid organisation of each party are very different. Komei is religion and JCP is ideology. In both parties, the supporters devote themselves whole heartedly to their party activities. Komei had 167,000 members in December 1982 and the JCP had 480,000 members in May 1984.

Komei had always set up candidates from members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist organisation, which publicly supports the Komei Party and which claims to have 750,000 devotee households and 16,622,000 believers. However, Komei, astounded the public by making a list of candidates which consisted entirely of non members of Soka Gakkai in the 1983 Upper House elections after the introduction of the proportional representation system. Because of the constant setting up of Soka Gakkai members as candidates in the elections of the House of Representatives, although Komei has the election Steering Committee as party organ (see Appendix E), the candidates proposed by the President have always been approved by the Central Executive Committee and subordinate organs such as the prefectural headquarters, the general branches and the branches were informed of this from the top of the party organisation.

The strong devotee attitudes of the members of the Soka Gakkai and the tightly controlled and centralised organisation of the Komei party enable Komei to assess easily the votes they can obtain in a particular constituency. The ratio of those elected among the candidates in national elections are, therefore, always high. It was 98.3 percent in 1983 Lower House election (see Table 11).

This strong devotee attitude of the believers of Soka Gakkai can be partly attributed to the nature of Soka Gakkai. Soka Gakkai claims to succeed to the creed created by Nichiren who lived in the Kamakura period (AD 1192 - 1339). It was the period when Japan was faced with a critical external threat to its very existence as an independent state because the Mongol Emperor Kubilái Khan sent great armadas against Japan twice in 1274 and 1281. Nichiren, living in this critical period, appealed to the people to realise the importance of the independence of the nation.

Soka Gakkai, which claims to be an orthodox successor to Nichiren's appeal, is very much politically orientated and nationalistic. When the Soka Gakkai established the Komei Party as Komei Seiji Renmei (Association of Clean Politics) in 1961, Soka Gakkai advocated the principle of Ohbutsu Myogo which means combining political power (Oh - King) with the creed of Buddhism (Butsu-Buddha).

The Komei Party, which adopted the present name in 1964 from Komeiseiji Renmei, after having been criticised for combining state power with religion which is unconstitutional as defined in Article 20 "No religious organisation shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority" publicly abolished this Ohbutsu Myogo idea. It still advocates a Buddhist welfare society which it calls "human socialism" and is very nationalistic. Because Komei has organised, as a religious party, the most deprived people in society, handicapped people and unorganised labour, sometimes it shows a very radical standpoint in an ideological perspective although it is conservative as a religious party. Because it organised the bottom strata in society, it stressed that they represent the materialistic interests of the people while appealing to spiritual values as a religious party. In all these points, the Komei Party received solid support from the believers of Soka Gakkai although it might be politically opportunistic.

This opportunistic political nature of the Komei Party, however, makes its selection of candidates quite flexible so that the Komei Party will select members of the Soka Gakkai as candidates in the elections of the House of Representatives and non-Soka Gakkai intellectuals as candidates in the elections of the House of Councillors in the future as it did in 1983. By organising the candidate selection in this way, the Komei Party also tries to solve the problem of appealing to a wider section of the ordinary electorate. Although they have a hard core of strong devotees, the Komei Party is disliked by the second highest number of the electorate (see Table 12).

The Japan Communist Party advocates the most flexible type of Euro-communist type of ideology. It extinguished the word proletarian "dictatorship" from its constitution and changed from cells, as basic organs, to branches. The JCP, however, has never loosened the tight control of the central committee over the various organisations inside the Party, advocating their control of the party as "centralised democracy" (see Appendix F). Although the delegates of the legislative organs are elected by the subordinate legislative organs, when once the central committee is established, it dominates the whole party and in the case of the selection of candidates it usually nominates the official candidates one-sidedly. However, we can know that the JCP makes serious efforts to nominate the candidates who have some connection with local affairs. The JCP is, beside the LDP, the only party which sets up candidates in all 130 constituencies in the election of the House of Representatives.

The New Liberal Club and the United Democratic Socialists are new parties. The NLC was established on 25th June 1976 when 6 members of the LDP (one of them was a member of the House of Councillors) left the party after the Lockheed scandal was disclosed in February. Those six ex-LDP members strongly attacked the corruption inside the LDP and a "gerontocracy" which was "bent on backroom power struggles" ("Statement of the split of the Party").

With one exception all members who left the LDP at that time were younger politicians who had started their political careers after the end of World War II and three were in their thirties at the time of the split. They considered that the post World War II democracy which they consider to be valuable was in crisis when they saw that the incumbent Prime Minister Miki, who was considered to be the most active in reforming the LDP, was forced to resign by the old conventional faction leaders. They considered there was no longer any possibility of reforming the LDP.

Consequently their new party, the New Liberal Club, advocated (1) ethics in politics (2) re-vitalisation of democracy by destroying the LDP-JSP two party system which they considered to be out of date and no longer able to respond to the quickly changing public opinion and (3) disarmament and non-nuclear policy to prevent the revival of the pre-World War II militarism in Japan.

There is no doubt that the NLC is a conservative party. They publicly advocate a free market economy although they insist on improving the system to realise a much fairer society. The NLC publicly announced that they had 20,000 members and 40,000 associated sympathisers in June 1984.

In spite of their assertion that "gerontocracy" should be abolished, we cannot see any drastic change in NLC party organisation and party administration (see Appendix G). Although it has the Election Steering Committee, because the size of the party is so small (it set up only 17 candidates in the 1983 Lower House election) almost all party management including the selection of candidates is decided in the Standing Executive Committee which consists of 17 members and is then ratified by the National Executive Committee. In reality, the majority of the NLC's candidates are old LDP candidates who could not get official nomination as LDP candidates.

The UDS was established on 26th March 1977 when the right-wing leader of the JSP left the party and formed a coalition organisation with leaders of the citizens movement. Although the UDS is very interesting in the sense that it tries to establish a loose organisation which is different from that of conventional parties and that it attempts to bring the citizens movement, which tries to attain their goals outside the parliamentary system through direct action, into the framework of the parliamentary system, its results have not as yet proved successful. It has never been successful either in recruiting the leaders of the citizens movements as candidates, with one exception in Tokyo. It might take some time for us to assess correctly any innovations in this party, including the selection processes of the candidates.

III. Traits of Candidates

It is generally said in Japan that what is needed for the candidates to be successful in elections are three traits; Jiban (ground of power), Kanban (advertisement hoarding or well-known name) and Kaban (bag or campaign money). These three traits are also the main criteria when the party organ selects its own official candidates in the LDP, the JSP, the DSP and the NLC.

Jiban is especially important in Japan because the candidate's connections with the local community are especially appreciated among voters. For example, the ratio of the members of the House of Representatives who are brought up in the same prefecture as the one they are elected in now reaches 91.8% in the LDP, 84.6% in the JSP, 80.0% in the DSP although the ratio is 60.0% in the Komei Party and 43.6% in the JCP (Asahi Nankan 1975).

In the LDP (and in the JSP) the locality is especially important because these two parties set up multiple candidates in the same constituency. The special local connections of a candidate, and the fact that he has a special area where he can obtain an overwhelming number of votes due to his connections, give him an extra strength because he need not worry about that area but can concentrate his campaign outside the area to cultivate new support.

In the LDP and the JSP candidates carry out their campaign on an individual base rather than a party base. Usually the candidate undertakes his own organisation to secure his votes. This kind of individual candidate's organisation is called Koenkai (supporting association). The candidate tries to keep this organisation solid by having regular meetings or by organising trips of sightseeing groups to hot-spring resort areas. In such cases the cost of food and travel of Koenkai members is subsidised by the candidates.

We can classify the organisation of Koenkai into two types. First, some candidates try to organise the members of the prefectural council and the city mayors or village masters (see Fig.3). Because those local politicians have their supporters, the national candidates can indirectly recruit the support of the electorate in this hierarchical type of organisation. In the case of Mr. Matsuno, a member of the House of Representatives, he organises 12 members out of 21 prefectural council members and the majority of city mayors and village masters in Kumamoto the 1st constituency. In the case of indirect control Koenkais, because the prefectural headquarters consist of prefectural council members, the candidate can easily get the proposal of his nomination as the official candidate of the LDP for national elections.

Secondly, some candidates organise the mass electorate directly. A candidate forms a small group of his supporters in a narrow area, then he combines these groups into some large organisation. In this way he organises the mass electorate directly. One of the reasons why Mr. Tanaka, the ex Prime Minister who was involved in the Lockheed scandal, still gets overwhelming votes in his constituency is that he has a solid organisation of voters of this type there. He often visits the basic small group and keeps direct contact with them. He tries to fulfil all the electorate's demands by retaining direct contacts. These two types of Koenkai are shown in Fig.3.

It might be said that the LDP (and also partly the JSP) is a kind of coalition of those individual candidates' Koenkais. In this sense, although the LDP had 2,478,000 members in September 1983, those members are the members of the individual candidates' organisations and not the members of the LDP as a party.

Once the LDP official publication admitted the fact there was no member of the LDP per se and wrote "the organisations which support the parties are ultimately the following three organisations; first the individual Koenkais which support the LDP members in various levels of the legislative bodies. Secondly, the civil service system which has close relations with the LDP as ruling party in the parliamentary system. Thirdly, in connection with the bureaucratic system, there are many organisations and corporations which exist under governmental control....These are not our own party's organisations, but the pseudo-organisations of the LDP" (the LDP "Soshiki Koho" (Organisational Report) 1st June 1970)

The existence of the individual Konkais is one of the reasons why we have "Nisei" (second generation) members of the Japanese National Diet. It is the safest way for the electorate and the party to set up the eldest son when the incumbent member of the Diet dies because by doing so the electorate can retain the organisation which represents their interests to the National Diet. The Koenkai in this way become a solid organisation of the "Gesellschaft" type which functions as an expression of interest organ towards the outside world while it retains the nature of "Gemeinschaft" in its interior. The Nisei members in the House of Representatives totalled 96 members out of 250 members (38.4%) in the case of the LDP and 122 members in total among 511 members (23.9%) in the election of 1983 (see Table 13). It is also a fact that around 30% of the incumbent LDP members of the Diet wish to bequeath their Jiban to their sons or grandsons, see Asahi Shimbun "Jiminto-Hoshu Kenryoku No Kozo" (The LDP - the Structure of the Conservative Power) 1970 pp 262-263.

The increase of the Nisei statesmen implies the decrease of the possibility of ordinary young ambitious people running for election as official party candidates. It is quite natural, therefore, that some very serious antagonistic feeling occurs between the Nisei candidate who succeeds his father's Jiban and the rival candidate who has been secretary to the same person and wishes to succeed to the same Jiban. Because quite a number of secretaries to the members of the Diet have political ambitions and because the ratio of ex-secretary members is large and ranks third, as shown in Table 14, this kind of struggle between the Nisei candidate and the ex-secretary candidate arises quite often.

In the House of Representative election in December 1983, when Mr Ichiro Nakagawa, the leader of one faction in the LDP, committed suicide on 9th January 1983, both his eldest son, Mr Shoichi Nakagawa and his chief secretary, Mr Muneo Suzuki, tried to run for election and wished to succeed to the late Nakagawa's Jiban in Hokkaido 5th constituency. His son insisted "he is the only orthodox successor to the late Nakagawa's political will because he is the eldest son", while Mr Suzuki insisted, "Being the secretary to the late Nakagawa he knows best what the late Nakagawa's intended, and as an experienced politician he can best represent the local interests." Mr Suzuki also added, "it is almost impossible for an inexperienced new person who knows nothing about politics to know how to realise local interests in central politics".

In a sense these two candidates advocated two different types of legitimacy in seeking the nomination as the official candidate of the LDP. One insisted on the primacy of blood, like the monarchy, and the other insisted on "virtu" (power) in the Machiavellian sense as the source of legitimacy in politics. The Hokkaido prefectural headquarters could not decide who should be the official candidate of the LDP and sent a message to the central headquarters which said "the three new candidates should be equally treated".

The LDP central headquarters, however, gave the official candidacy to Mr Shoichi Nakagawa. The Hokkaido LDP prefectural headquarters made the other two new candidates, including Mr Suzuki, as "the candidates officially recommended by the Hokkaido LDP headquarters" after receiving the decision from the central headquarters and asked every LDP member possible to openly support Mr Suzuki. The result of the election is shown in Table 15. Due to severe competition between Mr I. Nakagawa and Mr Suzuki, the total LDP votes among the electorate increased from 41.9% in 1980 to 52.7% in 1983 although the number of seats decreased from three to two. Both Mr I. Nakagawa and Mr Suzuki were elected.

It is a well known fact that a large proportion of members in the National Diet are ex-civil servants, as shown in Table 14. This occurred because (1) senior civil servants in central government have to resign rather early although the legal retiring age is 65, (2) the central government controls and roles in decision making are fairly strong in comparison with other highly industrialised countries' central governments, (3) there is no legal prohibition to stop ex senior civil servants running for national election. Because after the merger of the LDP in 1955 the LDP has constantly been in power, ex senior civil servants ususally run for election as LDP candidates, exploiting the connections which were established while they were in central government.

The interesting fact is that we can classify the factions into two types, "Kanryo Habatsu" (civil servants factions) and "Tojin Habatsu" (politicians factions) on the basis of the ratio of ex civil servants members (See Table 16). The Suzuki and Fukuda factions belong to the former, and the Komoto and the Nakasone factions belong to the latter. As ex civil servants' statesmen were rather cautious at the time of the normalisation of Japan-

China diplomatic relations, Kanryo Habatsu are rather cautious in the initiation of new dimensions in politics, and Tojin Habatsu are more active in the initiation of new policies.

Because senior civil servants have close contacts with party leaders and because they can secretly prepare for their elections by investing public financial resources in their future constituencies the ratio of ex senior civil servants candidates being selected as official party candidates and their electoral success is higher than the average ratio of new candidates. This second aspect explains why the senior civil servants of the Ministry of Treasury occupy the largest ratio among ex civil servant members of the Diet (See Table 17).

Another interesting fact is that many non ex civil servants statesmen are now considering how they can retain control over the civil servants who are very powerful in policy formation and political decision making because they know the techniques of solving the societal problems administratively. One response we can see on the side of statesmen is their efforts to specialise in a particular sphere by remaining in one particular standing committee. By doing so, they can also accuire the support of various organisations in that sphere.

Another response was the introduction of the proportional representation system into the national constituency in 1983 with the party lists of ranked candidates. The politicians tried to control the senior civil servants by threatening them that party leaders will degrade those disobedient senior civil servants in the list of candidates. Tlthough these efforts by politicians in the introduction of the proportional representation system were unsuccessful in the end because it resulted a greater increase in ex civil servant members of the House of Councillors in the LDP, these efforts show us that there is an increase in tension between the ever-increasing ex bureaucrats and University of Tokyo graduate members of the Diet and non bureaucrat politicians (See Table 18).

IV The Future

What are the results of these candidate selections Japanese style? How do they influence the future of Japanese politics?

First, the intervention of factions in candidate selection in "the middle sized constituencies" will cause a gradual but steady disintegration of the two major Japanese parties, the LDP and the JSP. The LDP will suffer more deeply than the JSP. Already the LDP passed a no confidence vote against its own Prime Minister in 1979 in spite of the fact that it had absolute majority, and set up two candidates for Prime Minister in the Diet. The recent quick expansion of the Tanaka faction and its policy to set up the own candidate in any constituency where it is possible in the Lower House election will produce more friction inside the LDP.

Secondly, personal allegiance will become more important in Japanese politics in the future. Professor Robert E. Ward writes:

"There are two major types of political allegiance, programmatic and personal. Programmatic allegiance is based on considerations of policy; personal allegiance on affection for or loyalty to a particular political leader. ... Classifying societies in terms of the degree to which their members' political allegiances are determined by programmatic or personal considerations, Japan would rank toward the personal end of such a scale." ("Japans Political System" second ed. 1978, p.69)

This tendency of Japanese politics to stress increasingly personal allegiance might make Japanese statesmen pay less attention to the public good of society. It might also cause Japanese politicians to neglect the necessity of paying attention to the international situation. Those common interests in both domestic and international society will be taken care more by civil servants in the future. Japanese politics, therefore, is shifting towards the non political bureaucratic society where the role and influence of the civil servants dominate the whole decision making systems.

Finally, the candidate selection now taking place in Japan will increase localism in Japanese politics. People will choose the candidate who gives

greater consideration to local problems rather than to the problems of the nation. The increase of localism in Politics and the more central organising of civil service system in Japan will increase the tension between politicians and civil servants in the future and create some kind of political discrepancy in the Japanese political system.

Perhaps the quick adaptability of the Japanese nation and high sensitivity which comes from the traditionally high standard of education in Japan will solve, I hope, the problems in this rather unstable period of Japanese parliamentary democracy we are approaching.

Fig. 1 Process and Factors of Candidate Selection




Table 1

Types of Constituency in the House of Representatives

| Types | Number of Constituencies | Total number of seats |
|----------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 3 seated | 47 | 141 |
| 4 seated | 41 | 164 |
| 5 seated | 41 | 205 |
| 1 seated | 1 | 1 |
| | Total | 511 |

Table 2

Types of Constituency in the House of Councillors

A Prefectural Constituencies (47)

| Types | Number of Constituencies | Total number of seats |
|----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 seated | 26 | 26 |
| 2 seated | 15 | 30 |
| 3 seated | 4 (Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, Fukuoka) | 12 |
| 4 seated | 2 (Hokkaido, Tokyo) | 8 |

B National Constituency

$$76 \times 2 = 152$$

$$50 \times 2 = 100$$

$$\text{Total} \quad 252$$

Table 3

Average Ratio of LDP Winners in Various Types of Constituency

| Types of Constituency | | Number of LDP Winners |
|-----------------------|------|-----------------------|
| Three-seated | (47) | 1.7 |
| Four-seated | (41) | 2.0 |
| Five-seated | (41) | 2.4 |

(1983 House of Representative Elections)

Table 4

Proportion of Votes by Parties and by Areas
(1983 House of Representatives)

| | Nationwide Average | Area (A) High population density areas | (B) | (C) | (D) Low population density areas |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|------|--|
| LDP | 33.3 | 18.9 | 33.9 | 43.2 | 50.0 |
| JSP | 13.4 | 10.5 | 14.5 | 15.1 | 15.6 |
| KOMEI | 7.0 | 11.6 | 7.3 | 3.4 | 1.5 |
| DSP | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 3.0 |
| JCP | 6.5 | 9.0 | 6.5 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| NLC | 1.6 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 0.3 | - |
| UDS | 0.5 | 0.8 | - | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| Others and Absent | 32.7 | 40.7 | 30.6 | 28.2 | 25.1 |

Source: "Asahi Senkyo Taikan" by Asahi Shimbun

Notes : 1) The Areas A,B,C and D are classified by the degree of population density.

A - Metropolitan areas contain 128 seats.

B - Metropolitan suburbs and big local cities which contain 116 seats.

C - Local Prefectural capitals and big city suburban areas which contain 186 seats.

D - Rural areas which contain 81 seats.

2) Independent candidates who are affiliated to parties are classified as the candidates of the related parties.

3) The proportion of votes is shown as the percentage among the total electorate.

Table 5

Number of members by Factions in the Liberal Democratic Party
(in December 1983)

| | House of Representatives | House of Councillors | Total |
|----------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| Nakasone | 41 | 7 | 48 |
| Tanaka | 62 | 51 | 113 |
| Suzuki | 50 | 27 | 77 |
| Fukuda | 40 | 25 | 65 |
| Komoto | 28 | 8 | 36 |
| Nakagawa | 6 | 1 | 7 |

Table 6

Political Finance by Parties in 1982


 Total amount of political money 109.4 (billion yen)

| | | |
|----------|----------|------|
| Parties | JCP | 21.7 |
| | LDP | 12.7 |
| | KOMEI | 8.8 |
| | JSP | 5.0 |
| | DSP | 1.6 |
| | ----- | |
| Factions | Nakasone | 2.0 |
| | Komoto | 1.2 |
| | Fukuda | 1.1 |
| | Tanaka | 0.7 |
| | Suzuki | 0.6 |
| | Nakagawa | 0.6 |

Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs
 "Report of Political Money"

Note : It is generally considered that the amount of political money the LDP and the LDP's factions collect is double or triple the amount which appears in official reports.

Fig. 2 Polling Score of the House of Representatives since 1960



LDP Liberal Democratic Party
 JSP Japan Socialist Party
 Komei Komei (Buddhist) Party
 JCP Japan Communist Party
 DSP Democratic Socialist Party

Table 7

Number of Candidates and the results of the election of
the House of Representatives (the LDP in 1983)

| Number of Candidates | Number of Constituencies | Number of incumbent members | Number of candidates | Number elected | Difference |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Equal number) to the incum-) bent members) | 59 | 142 | 142 | 121 | -21 |
| One more) candidate) than) incumbent) members) | 41 | 90 | 131 | 83 | -7 |
| Two more | 22 | 45 | 89 | 42 | -3 |
| Three more | 8 | 16 | 40 | 15 | -1 |
| Total | 130 | 293 | 402 | 261 | -32 |

Source: "Asahi Senkyo Taikan", Asahi Shimbun

Note : Number of candidates includes independent LDP
candidates who are not selected as official LDP
candidates.

Table 8

The Results of Multiple Candidacies of the JSP
in Various Types of Constituency

| Types of Constituency | Number of JSP Candidates | Number of JSP elected | Number of constituencies |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Three-seated (47) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 |
| Four-seated (41) | 2 (8) | { 2 (2) 1 (6) | } 8 |
| Five-seated (41) | 3 (1) 2 (10) | { 3 (1) 2 (5) 1 (5) | } 11 |
| Total | (130) | 144 | 20 |

Note: In 5 out of a total of 130 constituencies the JSP could not set up any candidate.

Table 9

Factions inside the JSP (1984)

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Sei Koh Ken (Right) | around 50 |
| Seisaku Kenkyukai (Katsumata) (Centre-left) | around 15 |
| Shakaishugi Kenkyukai (Left) | around 15 |
| Shinsei Kenkyukai (Young Left) | around 20 |
| Seisaka Kondankai (Left) | around 8 |
| Shakaishugi Kyokai (Left-Leninism) | around 2 |

Table 10

MAJOR LABOUR FEDERATIONS IN JAPAN (JUNE 1983)

| | No. of Unions | No. of members (1,000) |
|--|---------------|------------------------|
| General Council of Trade Unions of Japan | 6,786 | 4,508 |
| Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei) | 6,102 | 2,193 |
| National Federation of Industrial Organisations (Shin Sanbetsu) | 79 | 64 |
| Federation of Independent Unions (Churitsu Roren) | 969 | 1,480 |
| Others (including non-federated) | 20,918 | 4,839 |
| Total | 34,539 | 12,520 |

Note: The members of unions belonging to more than one national federation are double-counted. Therefore, the sum total may not match the overall total.

Table 11

NUMBER OF TOP UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES BY PARTIES
(1983 House of Representatives)

| Party | No. of Candidates | No. of Elected | Ratio % | No. of top unsuccessful candidates |
|--------|-------------------|----------------|---------|------------------------------------|
| LDP | 339 | 250 | 79.7 | 61 |
| JSP | 144 | 112 | 77.8 | 19 |
| KOMEI | 59 | 58 | 98.3 | 1 |
| DSP | 54 | 38 | 70.4 | 11 |
| JCP | 129 | 26 | 20.2 | 24 |
| NLC | 17 | 8 | 47.1 | 4 |
| UDS | 4 | 3 | 75.0 | 1 |
| Others | 102 | 16 | 15.7 | 9 |

Table 12

THE PARTY WHICH IS DISLIKED THE MOST

| | Never support % | Will not support % | Total % |
|-------|-----------------|--------------------|---------|
| LDP | 6 | 16 | 22 |
| JSP | 8 | 32 | 40 |
| KOMEI | 23 | 35 | 58 |
| JCP | 36 | 31 | 67 |
| DSP | 10 | 29 | 39 |
| NLC | 10 | 28 | 38 |
| USD | 11 | 32 | 43 |

Source: NHK Public Opinion Poll, national samples July 1983.

Note: Ratio shows the proportion among the total electorate.


Figure 3

TWO TYPES OF KOENKAI

Source: R. Shiratori ed. "Nihon No Seito Chizu" 1980 p.122
(Japanese Party Map)

A Direct Control Type

- case of Etsuzan-Kai (K. TANAKA) -



B Indirect Control Type

- case of R. Matsuno Koenkai -




Table 13

NUMBER OF SECOND GENERATION (NISEI) MEMBERS
WHO SUCCEEDED TO THEIR FAMILY'S POLITICAL CAREER
(ELECTION OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1983)

| Party | Number of <u>Nisei</u> | Number of seats elected |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| LDP | 96 | 250 |
| JSP | 11 | 112 |
| KOMEI | 2 | 58 |
| DSP | 6 | 38 |
| JCP | 0 | 26 |
| NLC | 5 | 8 |
| USD | 1 | 3 |
| Independent | 1 | 16 |

Table 14

CAREER PATTERNS OF THE CANDIDATES IN THE 1979 ELECTION OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

| <u>Total</u> | | No. of candidates | Ratio |
|--|-----|------------------------------|-------|
| Career | | | |
| 1. Local politicians | | 209 | 23.5% |
| 2. Party senior members | | 140 | 15.7 |
| 3. Trade Union leaders | | 112 | 12.6 |
| 4. Journalists, lawyers etc. | | 101 | 11.3 |
| 5. Civil servants | | 93 | 10.4 |
| 6. Secretaries of the members of National Diet | | 93 | 10.4 |
| <u>LDP</u> | | | |
| 1. Local politicians | 29% | 1. Trade Union leaders | 52% |
| 2. Civil servants | 22 | 2. Local politicians | 26 |
| 3. Diet members' secretaries | 18 | | |
| <u>Komei</u> | | | |
| 1. Local politicians | 45% | 1. Senior party members | 53% |
| 2. Senior members of party and Soka Gakkai | 39 | 2. Lawyers, Journalists etc | 18 |
| | | 3. Trade union leaders | 15 |
| <u>DSP</u> | | | |
| 1. Local politicians | 30% | 1. Local politicians | 23% |
| 2. Trade union leaders | 17 | 1. Diet members' secretaries | 23 |
| | | 1. Journalists, lawyers etc. | 23 |

Source: "Nihon No Seito Chizu" (Political Map of Japan)
ed. by R. Shiratori p.117

Table 15

The Result of Election of the House of
Representatives in Hokkaido 5th Constituency
(Five Seated Constituency)

| June 1980 | | December 1983 | |
|------------------|---------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1. I. Nakagawa | 145,801 | → | 1. S. Nakagawa 163,755 |
| | | → | 4. Suzuki 67,436 |
| | | → | Takebe 61,762 |
| 2. Yasuda | 95,919 | → | Yasuda 61,762 |
| 4. Kitamura | 84,314 | → | Kitamura 64,866 |
| LDP Total 41.91% | | LDP Total 52.72% | |
| Absent 22.09% | | Absent 18.50% | |
| 3. Okada | 92,464 | → | 3. Okada 71,643 |
| 5. Shimada | 78,606 | → | 2. Shimada 71,955 |
| Shimmura | 77,515 | → | 5. Shimmura 65,151 |
| JSP Total 31.94% | | JSP Total 26.22% | |
| Shibata | 31,578 | → | Shibata 20,478 |
| JCP Total 4.06% | | JCP Total 2.56% | |

Note: Ratio is the proportion of votes among the total electorate.

Table 16

EX CIVIL SERVANTS IN LDP FACTIONS (FEB. 1984)

| | House of Representatives | House of Councillors | Total | Ratio % |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------|------------|
| Suzuki | 18/49 | 12/28 | 30/77 | 39.0 |
| Fukuda | 15/42 | 10/25 | 25/67 | 37.3 |
| Tanaka | 14/62 | 20/52 | 34/114 | 29.8 |
| Komoto (Miki) | 5/28 | 2/8 | 7/36 | 19.4 |
| Nakasone | 6/49 | 1/7 | 7/56 | 12.5 |
| Ishihara (Nakagawa) | 0/6 | 0/0 | 0/6 | 0 |
| Independents | 4/22 | 6/16 | 10/38 | 26.3 |
| Total | 62/258 | 51/36 | 113/394 | 28.7 |

Table 17.

EX CIVIL SERVANTS IN LDP BY MINISTRIES (FEB 1984)

| Ministry | House of Representatives | House of Councillors | Total |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|------------|
| Treasury | 19 | 6 | 25 |
| Construction | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| Agriculture | 4 | 8 | 12 |
| Home Affairs | 5 | 6 | 11 |
| Labour | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| Industry & Trade | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Police Agency | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| Transport | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Posts | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Foreign Affairs | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Welfare | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Defence Agency | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| National Rail | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Education | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Prime Minister's Office | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Management & Coordinate Agency | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Economic Planning Agency | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Science & Technology Agency | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Others (Pre War Ministries) | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 62 | 51 | 113 |

Table 18

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL DIET BY UNIVERSITY (1983)

| | LDP | | JSP | | KOMEI | | DSP | | JCP | | OTHERS | | TOTAL |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|-------|
| | H.R. | H.C. | H.R. | H.C. | H.R. | H.C. | H.R. | H.C. | H.R. | H.C. | H.R. | H.C. | |
| University of Tokyo | 77 | 43 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 156 |
| University of Waseda | 39 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 77 |
| University of Chuo | 26 | 8 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 61 |
| University of Keio | 25 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 44 |
| University of Kyoto | 6 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 36 |

THE RESULTS OF ELECTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AFTER THE MERGER OF THE LDP


Appendix A

- A Number of seats elected
- B Number of candidates
- C Number of votes cast
- D Proportion of votes cast (Proportion of votes cast as a percentage of the total electorate)


D Proportion of votes cast (Proportion of votes cast as a percentage of the total electorate)

| Serial number of election | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Name of cabinet | Kishi | Ikeda | Ikeda | Sato | Sato | Tanaka | Miki | Ohira | Ohira | Nakasone |
| Date of election | 22.5.58 | 20.11.60 | 21.11.63 | 29.1.67 | 27.12.69 | 10.12.72 | 5.12.76 | 7.10.79 | 22.6.80 | 18.12.83 |
| Total number of seats | 467 | 467 | 467 | 486 | 486 | 491 | 511 | 511 | 511 | 511 |
| Total electorate | 52,013,529 | 54,312,993 | 58,281,678 | 62,992,796 | 69,260,424 | 73,769,637 | 77,926,588 | 80,169,924 | 80,925,034 | 84,252,608 |
| Turnout rate | 76.99 | 73.51 | 71.14 | 73.99 | 68.51 | 71.76 | 73.45 | 68.01 | 74.57 | 67.94 |
| A | 287 | 296 | 283 | 277 | 288 | 271 | 249 | 248 | 284 | 250 |
| B | 413 | 399 | 359 | 342 | 328 | 339 | 319 | 322 | 310 | 339 |
| C | 22,976 | 22,740 | 22,423 | 22,447 | 22,381 | 24,563 | 23,653 | 24,084 | 28,262 | 25,982 |
| D | 57.8(44.2) | 57.6(41.9) | 54.7(38.5) | 48.8(35.6) | 47.6(32.3) | 46.8(33.3) | 41.8(30.4) | 44.6(30.0) | 47.9(34.9) | 45.8(30.8) |
| A | 166 | 145 | 144 | 140 | 90 | 118 | 123 | 107 | 107 | 112 |
| B | 246 | 186 | 198 | 209 | 183 | 161 | 162 | 157 | 149 | 144 |
| C | 13,093 | 10,887 | 11,906 | 12,826 | 10,074 | 11,478 | 11,713 | 10,643 | 11,400 | 11,065 |
| D | 32.9(25.2) | 27.5(20.0) | 29.0(20.4) | 27.9(20.4) | 21.5(14.5) | 21.9(15.6) | 20.7(15.0) | 19.7(13.3) | 19.3(14.1) | 19.5(13.1) |
| A | | | | 25 | 47 | 29 | 55 | 57 | 33 | 58 |
| B | | | | 32 | 76 | 59 | 84 | 64 | 64 | 59 |
| C | | | | 2,472 | 5,124 | 4,436 | 6,177 | 5,282 | 5,329 | 5,745 |
| D | | | | 5.4(3.9) | 10.9(7.4) | 8.5(6.0) | 10.9(7.9) | 9.8(6.6) | 9.0(6.6) | 10.1(6.8) |
| A | | 17 | 23 | 30 | 31 | 19 | 29 | 35 | 32 | 38 |
| B | | 105 | 59 | 60 | 68 | 65 | 51 | 53 | 50 | 54 |
| C | | 3,464 | 3,023 | 3,404 | 3,636 | 3,660 | 3,554 | 3,663 | 3,896 | 4,129 |
| D | | 8.8(6.4) | 7.4(5.2) | 7.4(5.4) | 7.7(5.3) | 7.0(5.0) | 6.3(4.6) | 6.8(4.6) | 6.6(4.8) | 7.3(4.9) |
| A | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 38 | 17 | 39 | 29 | 26 |
| B | 114 | 118 | 118 | 123 | 123 | 122 | 128 | 128 | 129 | 129 |
| C | 1,012 | 1,156 | 1,646 | 2,190 | 3,199 | 5,496 | 5,878 | 5,625 | 5,803 | 5,302 |
| D | 2.6(1.9) | 2.9(2.1) | 4.0(2.8) | 4.8(3.5) | 6.8(4.6) | 10.5(7.5) | 10.4(7.5) | 10.4(7.0) | 9.8(7.2) | 9.3(6.3) |
| A | | | | | | | 17 | 4 | 12 | 8 |
| B | | | | | | | 25 | 31 | 25 | 17 |
| C | | | | | | | 2,363 | 1,631 | 1,766 | 1,341 |
| D | | | | | | | 4.1(3.0) | 3.0(2.0) | 3.0(2.2) | 2.4(1.6) |
| A | | | | | | | | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| B | | | | | | | | 7 | 5 | 4 |
| C | | | | | | | | 368 | 402 | 381 |
| D | | | | | | | | 0.7(0.5) | 0.7(0.5) | 0.7(0.5) |
| A | 13 | 6 | 12 | 9 | 16 | 16 | 21 | 19 | 11 | 16 |
| B | 178 | 132 | 183 | 151 | 167 | 149 | 130 | 129 | 103 | 102 |
| C | | | | | | | | | | |
| D | 6.7(5.2) | 3.2(2.4) | 4.9(3.5) | 5.7(4.3) | 5.5(3.7) | 5.3(3.8) | 5.8(4.2) | 5.0(3.4) | 3.7(2.7) | 5.0(3.4) |


- Note 1 From left to right the figures in each election express the number of votes cast, the proportion of the votes, the number of candidates and the number of seats elected.
- Note 2 The symbol N means the national constituency and L means the local (prefectural) constituency. In the case of the national constituency the proportional representation system was adopted from the 13th House of Councillors' election which was held on 26.6.83.
- Note 3 The symbol (1) shows the number of candidates and (2) shows the number of seats elected.
- Note 4 In the case of the 12th election which was held on 22.6.80, because a candidate of the DSP died within three months of the election, a candidate of the USD took over his seat.




ORGANISATION OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY




* Organisation of Central Headquarters



ORGANISATION OF THE KOMEI PARTY




ORGANISATION OF THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY



Note 1) Cells as basic organisations were abolished and branches were adopted

Note 2) -----> Election
 —————> Selection
 —————> Appointment

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CONSORTIUM EUROPÉEN DE RECHERCHE POLITIQUE
WORKSHOP : CANDIDATE SELECTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

BARCELONE, 25-30 MARS 1985

LA SELECTION DES CANDIDATS AUX ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVES EN FRANCE

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Le développement des partis politiques a introduit un intermédiaire dans le processus électoral entre l'électeur et l'élu, entre le représenté et le représentant, qui modifie beaucoup la nature de leurs rapports. Avant d'être choisi par les électeurs, l'élu est d'abord désigné par un parti politique et les électeurs ne font que ratifier ce choix. L'élection proprement dite est précédée par un mécanisme au cours duquel le parti procède à la désignation du candidat qui affrontera ensuite les électeurs. Cette remise en cause du schéma classique de la représentation pose plusieurs problèmes que nous analyserons en confrontant la préparation des élections législatives françaises depuis 1958 et plus particulièrement celles de 1978 et 1981 :

- Le premier problème est constitué par l'influence des partis politiques dans le processus de choix des candidats, c'est-à-dire par l'existence ou non d'un monopole partisan et par le maintien ou non de candidatures individuelles.

- Le second problème concerne les techniques de choix au sein des partis politiques, et notamment la part des dirigeants nationaux, des dirigeants locaux ou des groupes de militants qui se manifestent dans ce processus.

- Le troisième problème est celui des atouts sociaux et politiques dont doivent bénéficier les candidats pour réussir à surmonter l'ensemble de ces mécanismes.

I. - LE MONOPOLE PARTISAN DE LA SÉLECTION DES CANDIDATS

Selon M. Duverger, il existe plusieurs degrés d'intervention des partis politiques dans la désignation des candidats (1). Mais, alors que certains pays accordent aux partis politiques un monopole absolu ou relatif dans la désignation des candidats, d'autres pays connaissent une liberté plus grande dans le sens où un candidat peut affronter librement le suffrage des électeurs sans patronage partisan. La France connaît une situation de ce type. Tout citoyen, remplissant les conditions légales, est libre de se présenter aux élections législatives sans mentionner une étiquette politique et sans être affilié à un parti. Mais dans la réalité, les partis politiques exercent un quasi-monopole sur la sélection des candidats. L'expérience de la 5^{ème} République montre d'ailleurs que seuls les candidats investis par des partis politiques ont des chances d'être élus.

Des contraintes pénalisent les candidats indépendants. Ces derniers sont d'autant plus isolés, qu'ils ne peuvent se réclamer d'aucun courant national, d'aucun programme connu. Leur propre espace de référence est la circonscription législative et non le territoire national, alors qu'on assiste surtout depuis 1967 à une nationalisation des configurations politiques. Les candidats indépendants sont donc de plus en plus rares. A titre d'exemple, dans la région Nord - Pas-de-Calais, le nombre des candidats se présentant sans investiture ou soutien et donc en dehors de toute attache

partisane tend à décroître, comme en témoigne le tableau suivant :

**NOMBRE DE CANDIDATS SANS ATTACHE PARTISANE
DANS LA REGION NORD - PAS-DE-CALAIS**

| | 1958 | 1962 | 1967 | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 |
|-----------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Valeur absolue | 22 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| % des candidats | 12,09% | 5,92% | 8,23% | 5,63% | 4,37% | 1,39% | 3,45% |

(Source : A. Laurent : *Espace et comportement électoral. Thèse de doctorat de 3ème cycle, mars 1983, p. 216*).

La monopolisation des candidatures par les partis politiques a été plus lente à se développer à l'occasion des élections présidentielles. Les candidats aux premières élections se sont présentés individuellement et indépendamment des appareils partisans, même s'ils cherchaient ensuite à imposer leur candidature à un parti (2). Mais progressivement, les partis politiques ont repris le contrôle du processus (3). Désormais, certains partis se constituent et s'organisent autour de futurs candidats présidentiels (4). Mais la volonté de se présenter en-dehors et au-dessus des formations politiques subsiste encore. Cette personnalisation de la candidature marque, à l'heure actuelle, l'action de M. Raymond Barre (5).

En revanche, les candidats partisans, investis ou soutenus par les formations politiques, constituent l'immense majorité des candidats aux élections législatives. Cependant, un phénomène intéressant est apparu : alors que le nombre des candidats des grandes formations politiques se stabilise, celui des représentants des petites formations a fortement progressé (6). Si bien qu'au total, depuis le début de la 5ème République, on a assisté à une augmentation considérable du nombre de candidats à l'occasion des élections législatives. Avec 4268 candidats à la députation, les élections de 1978 ont établi un record absolu de la 5ème République et ont ainsi fixé à 8,7 le nombre moyen de candidats par circonscription. Lors du scrutin législatif de 1968, il n'y avait que 2314 candidats. Ce qui représente une progression de quatre candidats par siège à pourvoir en 10 ans.

**EFFECTIF DES CANDIDATS AUX ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES
SOUS LA 5ème REPUBLIQUE**

| | 1958 | 1962 | 1967 | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Nombre de candidats | 3018 | 2228 | 2258 | 2314 | 3087 | 4268 | 2742 |
| Nombre moyen par circonscription | 5,5 | 4,6 | 4,6 | 4,8 | 6,3 | 8,7 | 5,5 |

(Source : J.R. Frears, J.L. Parodi : *War Will Not Take Place. The French Parliamentary Elections, March 1978 (1979), p. 32*).

Ce mouvement inflationniste s'explique essentiellement par la progression du nombre des candidats des petites formations politiques, qui semble avoir une double cause :

- Un cautionnement de 1000 francs est exigé des candidats. Il leur est remboursé s'ils obtiennent au moins 5 % des suffrages exprimés. Le coût financier d'une déclaration de candidature est réduit, car il n'a jamais été réévalué depuis 1958. Ce qui permet aux petites formations politiques de multiplier le nombre de leurs candidats sans trop de difficultés financières, même si aucun ne dépasse le seuil des 5 %.

- Une loi du 19 décembre 1977 règlemente la campagne radiodiffusée et télévisée pour les partis politiques représentés par des groupes parlementaires à l'Assemblée Nationale, mais aussi pour les partis non représentés par un groupe et présentant au moins 75 candidats. Toutes les petites formations politiques ont cherché à atteindre ou à dépasser ce seuil pour avoir droit chacune à une durée totale d'émission de 7 minutes au premier tour et de 5 minutes au second, seul moyen pour elles de s'adresser librement à un vaste public.

Les petites formations politiques, sans grands moyens financiers et avec pour seul objectif de faire connaître leur programme, ont donc présenté de nombreux candidats. Dans ce mouvement inflationniste, l'extrême-gauche se taille la plus grande part avec 1046 candidats en 1978 : un des courants les plus minoritaires de l'opinion est ainsi celui qui présente le plus de candidats.

Un frein important dans la progression constante du nombre des candidats des petites formations politiques a cependant été enregistré en 1981 à la suite de la précipitation des élections provoquées par la dissolution de l'Assemblée Nationale. Le tableau suivant du nombre de candidats présentés par les grandes et les petites formations politiques en France métropolitaine permet d'observer cette réduction.

CANDIDATS DES GRANDS PARTIS ET DES PETITS PARTIS

| <u>GRANDS PARTIS</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|--|-------------|-------------|
| Parti communiste (PCF) | 470 | 474 |
| Parti socialiste (PS) | 442 | 455 |
| Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) | 387 | 273 |
| Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) | 401 | 289 |
| <u>PETITS PARTIS</u> | | |
| Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG) | 121 | 61 |
| Extrême-Gauche dont | 1.046 | 498 |
| . Lutte Ouvrière (LO) | 468 | 158 |
| . Front Autogestionnaire (PSU) | 221 | - |
| . Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) | 187 | 36 |
| Ecologistes | 223 | 172 |
| Gaullistes de Gauche | 98 | - |
| Extrême-Droite | 246 | 169 |
| Divers Droite | 241 | 135 |

Cependant, l'opposition entre candidats désignés par des partis politiques et candidats individuels sans attache partisane est beaucoup trop simple. C'est ainsi que M. Duverger propose de distinguer beaucoup de situations intermédiaires (7). Il montre que la sélection des candidats peut d'abord être le résultat d'une désignation unilatérale par le parti politique, impliquant des rapports de subordination et de dépendance du candidat vis-à-vis du parti. Mais elle peut être aussi le résultat d'une négociation et d'un accord, générateur d'une situation plus égalitaire, impliquant une dépendance plus ou moins forte du candidat vis-à-vis du parti selon l'origine de l'initiative : soit l'initiative vient du parti plutôt que du candidat et, dans ce cas, le parti prend le dessus ; soit le candidat sollicite le parti qui lui accorde ensuite son patronage et, dans cette hypothèse, c'est le candidat qui prend le dessus. La désignation peut aussi être le résultat d'une ratification pure et simple : le candidat ne sollicite pas le parti qui lui accorde cependant son patronage, ce qui implique une indépendance du candidat vis-à-vis du parti. Enfin, la dernière situation est représentée par le candidat individuel qui sollicite les suffrages des électeurs en dehors de tout appareil partisan.

Ces différentes situations correspondent mieux à la pratique des partis politiques français. On trouve la dépendance la plus forte pour les candidats du parti communiste. En effet, ces derniers sont des militants chevronnés, très au fait des thèses du parti et aguerris dans leur fidélité à ce dernier. Ils occupent des postes de responsabilité à tous les échelons de l'appareil du parti. Environ 30 % de l'ensemble des candidats communistes sont des "permanents", membres des instances nationales ou secrétaires fédéraux (8). Le Parti Communiste accorde rarement son investiture ou son soutien à des candidats non-communistes (9). La dépendance est moins forte pour les candidats du parti socialiste, mais elle existe aussi. Les statuts imposent en effet trois années consécutives de présence au parti avant de recevoir l'investiture, ce qui donne une garantie de fidélité aux options du parti. Mais cependant, le Parti Socialiste ne s'interdit pas d'investir des personnalités proches ou simplement de les soutenir (10).

Les partis politiques français de droite ne connaissent pas de règles comparables à celles qui figurent dans les statuts des Partis de gauche. Ils accordent en règle générale leur investiture à des candidats membres du parti, mais ils acceptent aussi facilement de donner leur investiture ou de fournir un soutien à des candidats qui n'appartiennent pas au parti, mais qui sont susceptibles de le représenter valablement en raison de leur notoriété au niveau national ou de leur qualité de notable au niveau local (11). La procédure de soutien constitue la manière habituelle des partis de droite de résoudre le problème d'investiture au profit d'un candidat beaucoup mieux implanté que celui que le parti aurait pu désigner dans ses rangs.

II. - LA TENDANCE À LA DÉCENTRALISATION DU PROCESSUS DE SÉLECTION DES CANDIDATS

Le processus de sélection des candidats au sein des grands partis politiques français a connu une évolution depuis le début de la 5e République. Jusqu'en 1967, en tenant compte des clauses statutaires et de la pratique, les appareils locaux de ces partis (sauf l'UNR en 1958 et le PC) jouaient un rôle prédominant dans le processus de désignation des candidats.

Depuis 1967, le poids de ces appareils locaux subsiste, mais le contrôle des appareils nationaux s'est accru. Ces derniers se sont donnés des pouvoirs plus grands d'intervention pour imposer leur choix dans certaines circonstances. C'est pourquoi il est possible de parler d'une tendance à la centralisation du processus de sélection des candidats. En fait, ce mouvement vers la centralisation est le résultat cumulé de deux facteurs :

- Le système électoral, d'abord. Le scrutin uninominal majoritaire à deux tours, qui avait dominé la 3ème République, a été instauré au début de la 5ème République. En principe, le scrutin uninominal majoritaire permet une relative liberté de candidature, surtout s'il coïncide avec des circonscriptions petites (13). Non seulement, un candidat peut se présenter individuellement et refuser une étiquette politique, mais il peut aussi se maintenir contre l'avis d'un parti. Cependant chaque élément du système électoral doit être pris en compte, c'est-à-dire non seulement la nature du scrutin et la taille des circonscriptions, mais aussi le nombre de tours. Alors que le premier tour permet une offre illimitée des candidatures et comporte une tendance à la multiplication des forces politiques, le second tour présente un caractère réducteur. Or, ce caractère réducteur *"joue d'autant plus que le système de partis est structuré et bipolaire, qu'il tend à homogénéiser sur tout le territoire les affrontements politiques, enfin que l'intensité des clivages n'est pas assez grande pour susciter des configurations de nature triangulaire"* (14). Or, à partir de 1967, l'existence d'un enjeu gouvernemental, la structuration du système de partis dans le sens d'une bipolarisation et la nationalisation de la vie politique ont privilégié les coalitions et les alliances et donc une simplification du jeu électoral français.

- La bipolarisation, ensuite. La dominante bipolaire du second tour dans le cadre du système majoritaire français s'est donc traduite, à partir de 1967, par une simplification d'autant plus grande du jeu électoral que la présence d'enjeux nationaux a nationalisé effectivement les principaux clivages. Ceci s'est manifesté par la constitution de coalitions et par la conclusion d'accords électoraux entre formations politiques voisines. Ces alliances sont une obligation du mode de scrutin. Or, l'existence de ces coalitions et de ces accords électoraux a influencé profondément le processus de sélection des candidats lors de deux moments décisifs de la compétition électorale : d'abord, avant le premier tour, lors du choix initial du candidat, ensuite, dans les cas où il y a un second tour, lors des désistements ou des retraits. Ces coalitions et ces accords ont donné naissance à des procédures particulières d'arbitrage entre partis alliés, qui ont accru de façon importante les prérogatives des appareils nationaux dans le processus de sélection des candidats. Un certain nombre de pratiques en marge des mécanismes officiels se sont développées, qui contribuent à renforcer l'influence des dirigeants nationaux. Ces mécanismes jouent d'abord au sein de chaque parti avant d'apparaître au niveau des marchandages entre formations politiques alliées.

Depuis 1967, les élections législatives comportent un enjeu constitutionnel, à côté de l'enjeu électoral habituel. Les résultats des élections sont susceptibles de modifier la pratique de la constitution et de remettre en cause les pouvoirs du Président de la République. Ces enjeux expliquent que les appareils nationaux des partis politiques ont été conduits à contrôler de très près la désignation des candidats, circonscription par circonscription, à écarter certains candidats pour leur en préférer d'autres pour des motifs d'efficacité électorale et à se réserver un pouvoir souverain d'intervention pour imposer leurs décisions. D'autant plus que beaucoup de circonscriptions sont des lieux où les écarts de voix sont assez faibles. Un faible déplacement de voix suffit à les faire basculer dans un camp ou dans un autre (15).

Cette tendance à la centralisation de la prise de décision se manifeste dans tous les partis politiques. Au sein des RPR le processus de choix des candidats manifeste la prépondérance des instances nationales qui détiennent l'essentiel du pouvoir de décision à l'égard des propositions qui leur sont faites par les fédérations départementales (16). Le travail de préparation est réalisé à l'état-major du parti sous la direction du délégué national aux élections, avec l'assistance du président du groupe parlementaire. C'est ainsi que M. Jacques Toubon, l'actuel secrétaire général du RPR, a joué un grand rôle lors des élections législatives de 1978 et 1981. Le Parti Républicain (PR), parti giscardien créé en 1977, laisse une certaine liberté d'action au niveau local, comme c'est le cas en règle générale dans ce type de parti de notables, mais les instances nationales se réservent la décision finale. Le Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS), créé en 1976, donne des droits plus vigoureux et plus impératifs aux instances nationales et s'éloigne donc de la tradition décentralisatrice du Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), alors que les statuts de celui-ci disposaient que seules les fédérations départementales pouvaient donner l'investiture aux candidats, la commission exécutive nationale se limitant à la ratification. Le regroupement de ces deux derniers partis (PR et CDS) au sein de l'Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) en 1978 a maintenu cette tendance à la centralisation (17).

La même évolution touche le Parti Socialiste, même si les fortes tendances décentralisatrices du temps de la SFIO y subsistent. En effet, les candidats aux élections législatives sont d'abord désignés par l'ensemble des sections de la circonscription électorale. Ensuite les candidatures sont ratifiées par la fédération départementale. Mais, alors que le poids de certaines fédérations dans les décisions d'investiture était très lourd dans la SFIO, le comité directeur a maintenant l'autorité suffisante pour régler les conflits et pour s'opposer éventuellement à la résistance de toute fédération ou de tout courant qui menacerait la cohésion du parti. Il est bien armé pour connaître et réprimer toute dissension. Mais un tel processus de centralisation entraîne inévitablement des réticences accrues par les conflits de courants au sein des fédérations et des sections. Lors de la préparation des élections législatives de 1978, les délégués de la convention nationale chargée de valider les investitures ont ratifié les votes de la base dans l'immense majorité des cas. Cependant, dans deux circonscriptions (Haute-Vienne 1ère et Seine-Saint-Denis 9e), la désignation d'un candidat membre de la minorité du PS (CERES) a été annulée au profit d'un membre de la majorité. La direction du PS faisait valoir qu'elle y était majoritaire. Le vote des sections a également été annulé en ce qui concerne la 2e circonscription de la Loire-Atlantique où un conflit existait au sein de la majorité du PS, entre les amis de M. Poperen et ceux de M. Mauroy. C'est le maire de

Nantes, ami de M. Mauroy, qui a finalement été préféré (18). Lors de la préparation des élections de 1981, de nouveaux conflits sont intervenus et la convention nationale s'est prononcée sur les cas litigieux. Les représentants du courant de M. Rocard ont vu dans la désignation de certaines candidatures une manière détournée d'éliminer les candidats qu'ils soutenaient (Pyrénées-Orientales 1ère et Pyrénées-Atlantiques 2e). Le cas litigieux de la 3e circonscription de l'Essonne a été tranché au profit d'un membre du bureau exécutif, alors que les militants de la circonscription lui préféreraient un candidat issu du CERES. Dans plusieurs circonscriptions, de nouveaux votes ont été demandés aux sections (cas de la 1ère et de la 6e circonscription du Morbihan, où les candidats désignés par la base n'ont pas obtenu l'investiture de la direction nationale, car ils avaient parrainé la candidature de Mme Bouchardeau à l'élection présidentielle). Les sections ayant confirmé leurs votes, la direction nationale a accordé son investiture officielle à d'autres candidats. Dans la 3e circonscription de la Côte d'Or, la convention nationale a accordé son investiture à un candidat MRG (radical de gauche) et désavoué le maintien d'un candidat socialiste (19).

(fait exception)
Le Parti Communiste, l'appareil central y contrôle l'ensemble du processus de désignation des candidats et ne laisse investir par les fédérations que les candidats qu'il a d'avance accepté ou choisi. Ce mécanisme de désignation relève du centralisme démocratique et constitue une véritable procédure cooptative (20).

Mais cette tendance à la centralisation se manifeste surtout par la constitution d'alliances et par la conclusion d'accords électoraux entre formations politiques alliées à partir de 1967. La nécessité de procéder à des arbitrages entre ces formations a donné naissance, au niveau le plus élevé, à des procédures et à des organismes nouveaux de coordination et de décision propres à chaque coalition, qui ont accru, de façon importante, les prérogatives des instances nationales dans le processus de sélection des candidats. Un certain nombre de pratiques en marge des mécanismes officiels se sont développées qui contribuent à renforcer l'influence des dirigeants nationaux. Ces mécanismes nouveaux résultent de l'appartenance à une coalition. Ils ont produit une simplification et une nationalisation du jeu électoral, au sein de la droite et de la gauche non-communiste, par la présentation de candidats communs et donc par la réduction du nombre de ces candidats, ainsi que par l'adoption de règles de conduite pour les retraits et les désistements du second tour. L'évolution des partis de droite sur ce problème a d'ailleurs été la plus symptomatique.

En 1967, lorsque le concept de majorité a été mis en oeuvre pour la préparation des élections législatives, le principe de l'unité de candidature a été retenu par le Premier Ministre de l'époque, Georges Pompidou, véritable chef de la majorité. Un comité de liaison de la majorité s'est constitué sous sa présidence. Ce comité était composé de 31 membres, comprenant 11 ministres, 10 représentants de l'U.D.R., 5 représentants des républicains-indépendants et 6 représentants d'autres tendances. Il se divisa en 3 commissions dont l'une, présidée par M. Olivier Guichard, était chargée des investitures. Cette commission procéda à l'analyse de l'ensemble des circonscriptions. Cet examen permet d'arriver à un accord sur une candidature unique de la majorité de l'époque dans la plupart des circonscriptions où un député sortant se représentait, ainsi que dans beaucoup de circonscriptions où la gauche était prépondérante. Une cinquantaine de circonscriptions firent problème. Les cas litigieux ont été tranchés directement par le Premier Ministre. Le principe de l'unité de candidature s'est parfaitement appliqué (21). Lors des élections anticipées de 1968, la discipline

majoritaire s'est relâchée. Certes, le principe de l'unité de candidature a été maintenu, mais des affrontements entre candidats rivaux de la majorité, qu'on appelle en France des "primaires", ont été organisés dans 50 circonscriptions.

En 1973, la procédure utilisée a été identique. La majorité, formée des gaullistes de l'U.D.R., des républicains indépendants et de certains centristes (CDP), a constitué un nouveau comité de liaison de la majorité sous la présidence du Premier Ministre de l'époque, M. Messmer. Ce comité a investi, sous le sigle de l'U.R.P. (Union des Républicains de progrès), 405 candidats uniques et des "primaires" ont été organisées dans 61 circonscriptions. Un accord sur les candidatures uniques a été réalisé rapidement dans la plupart des circonscriptions tenues par des députés sortants ou considérées comme perdues d'avance. En revanche, les négociations ont été plus difficiles pour les circonscriptions restantes. Elles ont parfois conduit à des conflits avec les fédérations locales par refus du candidat présenté par Paris et par volonté d'un proposer un autre (22).

Pour la préparation des élections législatives de 1978, le comité de liaison de la majorité comprenant les représentants des 4 formations de la majorité (RPR, PR, CDS, CNIP) s'est réuni à de nombreuses reprises, d'abord pour élaborer un pacte électoral de la majorité, signé le 19 juillet 1977 (23) et renforcé le 19 octobre 1977 (24), ensuite pour examiner la situation des circonscriptions. Le comité de liaison a cependant adopté une tactique électorale inverse de celle qui avait été mise en oeuvre lors des élections législatives précédentes. C'est le pluralisme des candidatures qui a prévalu pour la grande majorité des circonscriptions. Mais, en fonction de ce choix, ce sont les différents partis qui ont, chacun, publié leur liste de candidats (25). Le Premier Ministre de l'époque, M. Raymond Barre, n'est intervenu à aucun moment. Son rôle a été simplement de pousser à la clarification entre les partis non gaullistes de la majorité (PR, CDS et Parti Radical) afin d'éviter une dispersion excessive des candidatures face au RPR, de parvenir à ce que les non-gaullistes ne soient représentées que par un seul candidat aux côtés de celui du RPR dans chaque circonscription (26).

Ce processus a mis en évidence la part directe et importante prise par les acteurs institutionnels (M. Barre et certains conseillers du Président de la République, notamment M. Riolacci) dans le processus de désignation des candidats, à côté des responsables partisans de la préparation des élections du PR, du CDS et du Parti Radical (MM. Soisson, Lecanuet et Servan-Schreiber). Après avoir discuté pendant plusieurs semaines, centristes, giscardiens et radicaux ont décidé de présenter des candidatures communes, puis de placer leurs candidats sous le sigle de l'Union pour la Démocratie Française (U.D.F.) (27). Par mesure de représailles contre la publication de ces listes de candidats non-gaullistes, le RPR a décidé de présenter des candidats supplémentaires dans des circonscriptions où des non-gaullistes étaient jusque-là candidats uniques de la majorité (28). Finalement, des "primaires" ont été organisées dans 344 des 474 circonscriptions de la France métropolitaine et des candidats uniques de la majorité ont été présentés dans seulement 130 circonscriptions (29).

Lors des élections législatives de 1981, la tactique électorale a été fixée dans les journées qui ont suivi la victoire de M. Mitterrand. M. Lecanuet, président de l'UDF, préconisait des "primaires" généralisées au sein de la majorité sortante contre M. Chirac, président du RPR, qui proposait au contraire une candidature unique. Mais la position initiale

des dirigeants giscardiens sous-estimait le désir unitaire des députés sortants UDF. Réunis le 12 mai, les députés UDF imposent à leurs dirigeants la concertation avec le RPR. Aussi, la nécessité de l'union l'emporte sur les rancœurs causées par la défaite de M. Giscard d'Estaing. MM. Chirac et Lecaunet signaient le 15 mai 1981 un pacte "d'union pour la nouvelle majorité" (30). Cette Union pour la nouvelle majorité (UNM) investissait finalement 387 candidats uniques en métropole (au lieu de 110 seulement en 1978), ne laissant ainsi place qu'à 86 "primaires" entre les candidats de la majorité sortante (31). La majorité parlementaire sortante n'allait donc pas au combat sur le même schéma tactique qu'en 1978. C'est un choix qui a été plus dicté par les circonstances que prémédité dans les états-majors. En effet, au lendemain de l'élection présidentielle, beaucoup estimaient que les divisions de la majorité avaient provoqué la défaite. La candidature unique répondait à ce refus des divisions.

Cependant, les investitures et les décisions de l'UNM n'ont pas été appliquées partout avec la même discipline. On comptait, en effet, une cinquantaine d'infractions à l'accord. Parmi ces manquements à la règle établie par les deux partenaires de l'UNM figuraient des candidats du RPR qui se présentaient contre des candidats uniques de l'UNM appartenant à l'UDF (32). A l'inverse, des candidats RPR, seuls à bénéficier de l'investiture UNM, étaient concurrencés par des giscardiens (33). Ces actes d'indiscipline s'expliquaient par le fait que l'efficacité de la tactique des candidatures uniques était contestée. De plus, dans certaines circonscriptions, les fédérations départementales n'acceptaient pas de laisser sans contrepartie l'avantage accordé à une formation politique alliée certes, mais concurrente aussi.

Parfois ces actes d'indiscipline marquent ^{au} tout un département ou même toute une région. Dans l'Orne, l'UNM avait décidé d'accorder son investiture aux trois seuls députés sortants RPR et UDF. Or, ces derniers ont été concurrencés. Dans les deux départements d'Alsace, bastions les plus fermes du giscardisme lors de l'élection présidentielle, la majorité sortante ne se sentait pas menacée et donc les cas d'indiscipline se sont multipliés. Aussi, dans huit des treize circonscriptions alsaciennes, des actes d'indiscipline ont remis en cause le consensus établi par les états-majors parisiens (34).

Une même simplification du jeu électoral est intervenue également au sein de la gauche non-communiste. La coalition des partis de la gauche socialiste et radicale a pris successivement la forme de la FGDS (Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste) pour les élections de 1967 et de 1968 (35). En 1973, le PS et le MRG ont été amenés à mettre en place l'UGSD et à la doter de structures départementales et d'un bureau national, créant ainsi entre les deux formations un lien constant, identique à celui qui existait à l'époque de la FGDS. La mise en oeuvre de ce bureau avait, en outre, permis d'associer à la direction des partis de la gauche non communiste un certain nombre de personnalités. En 1978, l'UGSD a disparu et l'accord national entre socialistes et radicaux de gauche n'est plus global, mais partiel. En contrepartie des 30 circonscriptions que le PS abandonnait, dès le premier tour, à ses alliés, ceux-ci lui garantissaient qu'ils ne le concurrenceraient pas dans 183 circonscriptions. Dans les autres, il revenait aux fédérations départementales de se mettre d'accord et d'organiser éventuellement des "primaires" (36).

Lors des élections législatives de 1981, les délégations du PS et du MRG ont abouti à un nouvel accord en ce qui concerne les candidatures. Le PS ne présentait pas de candidat dans les 10 circonscriptions où le député sortant était MRG. De plus, il accordait son investiture à un radical de

gauche dans 3 autres circonscriptions (Côte d'Or 3e, Eure 3e et Corse du Sud 2e). En contrepartie, les radicaux de gauche ont accepté de ne pas présenter de candidats dans 15 circonscriptions. Ce dernier point de l'accord a été obtenu difficilement, le MRG estimant disposer d'une assez bonne implantation dans plusieurs de ces circonscriptions. Des "primaires" entre les deux partis devaient se dérouler, en revanche, dans 61 circonscriptions. Les radicaux de gauche, qui présentaient donc, au total 75 candidats, ont affronté une nouvelle fois la fermeté de leurs interlocuteurs (37).

III. - LES ATOUTS POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX DANS LA SÉLECTION DES CANDIDATS

A côté des mécanismes formels de sélection des candidats, il existe des mécanismes informels de nature politique et sociale. En effet, lors de la distribution des candidatures, les partis politiques consacrent la reconnaissance d'atouts politiques et sociaux, avec bien entendu des différences intéressantes suivant les partis politiques. Les atouts essentiels sont constitués d'abord par le statut social et culturel, mais aussi par la détention de mandats locaux. Ce dernier atout constitue une des caractéristiques de la situation française. Lors de la distribution des investitures aux élections législatives, les partis consacrent la reconnaissance d'une autorité locale, mais ne secrètent pas un personnel politique propre (38).

L'âge est le premier facteur à prendre en compte. La moyenne d'âge pour l'ensemble des candidats des grandes formations politiques était de 45 ans et 1 mois en 1978. Cependant, la moyenne d'âge des candidats des partis de l'opposition était inférieure à la moyenne totale (PC : 43 ans et 1 mois, PS : 43 ans et 9 mois, MRG : 44 ans et 11 mois). La moyenne d'âge plus grande des candidats des partis de la majorité (RPR : 47 ans et 6 mois, PR : 47 ans et CDS : 46 ans et 10 mois) reflétait la grande proportion de députés cherchant une réélection. En 1981, la même différence se maintenait mais avec un vieillissement général en raison de la tendance à privilégier les élus sortants et les candidats déjà présentés (39).

Le sexe est le second facteur. Les partis politiques n'apportent qu'une place réduite aux femmes parmi leurs candidats. Ce phénomène est surtout remarquable en ce qui concerne les grandes formations politiques. Ces dernières n'ont présenté en effet qu'un effectif de 122 et de 118 candidates en 1978 et en 1981. Elles ne représentaient donc que 6,7 % et 7,4 % du total des candidats de ces grandes formations politiques. En 1981, la moitié de ces candidates était présentée par le PC (54,2 %). L'ensemble des formations de gauche présentaient à elles seules 87,3 % des candidates (40). Les Communistes sont d'ailleurs le seul parti à présenter un pourcentage honorable de femmes parmi les candidats. Le PS ne respecte même pas le quota de 20 % de candidates prévu par les statuts du parti. Lors des élections de 1981, une quarantaine de femmes ont été investies par le PS, dont près de la moitié à Paris et dans la région parisienne (41)

Les candidatures féminines des grands partis politiques

| | <u>1978</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| . PC | : 13,3 % | 13,5 % |
| . PS | : 5,9 % | 8,0 % |
| . MRG | : 3,7 % | 6,7 % |
| . PRS | : 4,4 % | 4,5 % |
| . CDS | : 4,4 % | 5,1 % |
| . PR | : 5,0 % | 2,7 % |
| . RPR | : 2,9 % | 2,0 % |

(Source : G. Fabre-Rosane- A. Guédé, art.cit. p. 849-852 ; A. Guédé - SA. Rozenblum, art.cit. p. 989-990).

Il faut toutefois remarquer que les petites formations politiques présentent un nombre plus important de femmes. Ces organisations en ont présenté 557 lors des élections législatives de 1978, parmi lesquelles il faut compter les candidates du mouvement d'extrême-gauche Lutte Ouvrière, ainsi que les 43 candidates du mouvement féministe Choisir. Dans une région comme le Nord - Pas-de-Calais, alors que les grands partis ne présentaient que 7 candidates, Lutte Ouvrière en comptait à elle seule 15 et, de façon surprenante, l'Action Républicaine, Indépendance et Libérale (ARIL), formation régionale d'extrême-droite, 14 (dans les 37 circonscriptions de la région) (42). Les grands partis politiques préfèrent souvent présenter des femmes comme candidates suppléantes. Ainsi, en 1978, à côté de 64 femmes candidates titulaires, le PC présentait 117 suppléantes. La convention nationale du PS du 26 mai 1981 recommandait également, de façon pressante, aux membres socialistes du gouvernement qui étaient candidats de choisir une femme comme suppléante.

Il n'en demeure pas moins que la part des femmes parmi l'ensemble des candidats a tendance à s'accroître. Cette progression s'est même accélérée lors des dernières élections.

Evolution des candidatures féminines depuis le début de la 5ème République

| | Total des candidatures | Dont femmes | % de candidates |
|--------------|------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| . 1958 | : 2809 | 64 | 2,3 % |
| . 1962 | : 2172 | 64 | 2,9 % |
| . 1967 | : 2190 | 52 | 3,4 % |
| . 1968 | : 2265 | 75 | 3,3 % |
| . 1973 | : 3121 | 210 | 6,7 % |
| . 1978 | : 4268 | 679 | 15,9 % |

(Source : G. Fabre-Rosane- A. Guédé, art.cit, p. 851).

Mais les femmes sont rarement présentées dans des circonscriptions où elles ont des chances réelles de succès. Si l'on prend en considération les derniers scrutins législatifs, on observe que le taux de réussite des candidates a même subi une baisse sensible. En 1958, 69 % des femmes qui s'étaient présentées ont été élues. Elles n'étaient plus que 48 % en 1968, 22 % en 1973, en 1978 et en 1981.

Les données socio-économiques permettent de constater des différences sensibles entre les candidats des grandes formations politiques (voir tableau) :

CATEGORIES SOCIO-PROFESSIONNELLES DES CANDIDATS (en %) DES GRANDS PARTIS POLITIQUES

| | RPR | | PR | | CDS | | PRS | | MRG | | PS | | PC | |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 |
| Hauts fonctionnaires | 10,4 | 10,6 | 10,6 | 8,5 | 7,9 | 12,3 | 13,7 | 13,7 | 2,8 | 3,8 | 4,3 | 2,7 | 0 | 0 |
| Chefs d'entreprise | 12,2 | 16,3 | 13,1 | 11,3 | 10,5 | 12,3 | 18,3 | 21,2 | 13,8 | 9,4 | 3,4 | 4,2 | 0,2 | 1 |
| Cadres supérieurs | 15,9 | 16,3 | 12,1 | 15,1 | 15,8 | 12,3 | 4,5 | 15,2 | 14,7 | 15,1 | 8,9 | 12,0 | 0,8 | 1,3 |
| Professions libérales dont avocats médecins | 21,8 4,7 10,6 | 21,2 5,3 7,8 | 28,8 9,6 13,6 | 24,5 10,4 9,4 | 27,2 10,5 6,1 | 17,8 8,2 2,7 | 36,4 9,1 22,7 | 15,1 1,5 9,1 | 29,3 16,5 5,5 | 33,8 13,2 15,1 | 11,3 3,4 5,4 | 11,6 4,2 5,4 | 1,9 0,2 1,3 | 2,8 0 1,9 |
| Ingénieurs | 5,2 | 3,5 | 5,1 | 1,9 | 2,6 | 13,7 | 4,5 | 3 | 5,5 | 0 | 4,8 | 4,5 | 1,9 | 1,5 |
| Cadres moyens | 15,1 | 12,7 | 11,1 | 14,1 | 9,7 | 12,3 | 9,1 | 13,7 | 14,7 | 15,1 | 17,7 | 18,0 | 19,5 | 17,3 |
| Enseignants dont professeurs instituteurs | 10,2 10,2 0 | 9,9 8,8 0 | 8,6 8,6 0 | 12,3 12,3 0 | 11,4 11,4 0 | 9,6 9,6 0 | 4,5 4,5 0 | 9,1 9,1 0 | 9,2 6,4 2,8 | 7,6 5,7 0 | 39,8 33,9 5,9 | 39,7 31,2 5,8 | 27,5 17,3 10,2 | 30,4 16,9 12,2 |
| Commerçants, artisans | 3 | 3,5 | 4 | 3,8 | 3,5 | 2,8 | 0 | 3 | 8,2 | 3,8 | 0,9 | 0,2 | 1 | 3,6 |
| Agriculteurs | 3,5 | 3,2 | 3,5 | 5,7 | 5,3 | 2,8 | 4,5 | 3 | 0 | 1,9 | 2,3 | 1,1 | 2,3 | 1,5 |
| Employés | 2,2 | 0,3 | 0,5 | 0,9 | 4,4 | 1,3 | 0 | 0 | 0,9 | 0 | 4,1 | 2,9 | 11,3 | 12,3 |
| Ouvriers | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,9 | 1,1 | 0,7 | 33 | 27,3 |
| Autres | 0,5 | 2,5 | 1,6 | 1,9 | 1,7 | 2,8 | 3 | 4,5 | 0,9 | 7,6 | 1,4 | 2,4 | 0,6 | 1 |

(Source : G. Fabre-Rosane et A. Guédé, art.cit, p. 814 ; A. Guédé et S.A. Rosenblum, art.cit, p. 994).

- les partis de droite, ainsi que les radicaux de gauche, recrutent leurs candidats de 1978 et 1981 de façon dominante dans les catégories sociales aisées (hauts fonctionnaires, chefs d'entreprises, cadres supérieurs, membres de professions libérales). L'élément le plus remarquable est la proportion relativement élevée des hauts fonctionnaires, notamment des anciens élèves de l'ENA, ce qui traduit l'atout prédominant que constitue l'appartenance aux partis du pouvoir pour les membres de cette élite administrative. Des modifications dans les caractéristiques sociales des candidats de ces formations sont cependant intervenues entre 1978 et 1981. Un accroissement du nombre des chefs d'entreprise, mais aussi une baisse de celui des cadres moyens et des employés ont caractérisé le RPR. Quant au PR, il a connu une diminution du pourcentage des catégories socio-professionnelles les plus aisées (hauts fonctionnaires, chefs d'entreprise, professions libérales) au profit d'autres couches moins aisées (cadres moyens, enseignants, agriculteurs). Ce qui a caractérisé l'évolution des autres formations de la majorité est surtout la chute du pourcentage des professions libérales parmi les candidats du CDS et, en revanche, son augmentation parmi les radicaux de la majorité.

- les socialistes recrutent leurs candidats parmi les membres des professions libérales (11,3 % en 1978 et 11,6 % en 1981), les cadres moyens (17,7 % et 18 %) et surtout les enseignants (39,8 % et 39,7 % des candidats socialistes exercent des fonctions d'enseignement, dont 33,9 % et 31,2 % de professeurs de l'enseignement supérieur ou secondaire et 5,9 % et 5,8 % d'instituteurs). La proportion des hauts fonctionnaires parmi les candidats socialistes est beaucoup plus faible (4,3 % et 2,7 %).

- le PC est le seul parti à investir de nombreux candidats de la classe ouvrière (33 % et 27,3 %). Ses candidats qui exercent des fonctions d'enseignement sont des professeurs (17,3 % et 16,9 %), mais aussi des instituteurs, en nombre plus élevé (10,2 % et 12,2 %). En 1981, ils constituaient d'ailleurs la catégorie sociale la mieux représentée parmi les candidats communistes (30,4 % contre 27,3 % de candidats ouvriers). Le PC ne présente aucun haut fonctionnaire parmi ses candidats.

Dans le processus de sélection des candidats, les partis politiques se réfèrent également à des atouts de nature politique. C'est ainsi que tous les partis politiques ont tendance à renouveler leur confiance aux députés sortants. Mais cette propension est toujours plus forte à gauche, comme le montre le tableau suivant :

Les candidatures de députés sortants des grands partis

| | <u>1978</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| . PC | : 78 % | 100 % |
| . PS | : { 76 % | 86 % |
| . MRG | : { | 100 % |
| . PRS | : { 62 % | 100 % |
| . CDS | : { | 83,3 % |
| . PR | : 74 % | 83,1 % |
| . RPR | : 69 % | 83,0 % |

(Source : A. Guédé- SA. Rozenblum, art.cit. p. 984).

En 1981, la quasi-totalité des députés sortants sont réinvestis. Cela tient au caractère précipité de cette élection législative, qui a découragé toute volonté de relève. Dans un combat qui s'annonçait difficile, la majorité sortante comptait surtout sur l'expérience et l'enracinement des députés sortants pour faire obstacle aux ambitions socialistes. C'est pourquoi la plupart se représentaient comme candidats uniques. Seuls huit d'entre eux affrontaient des "primaires" (42).

La grande majorité des députés sortants non-investis ne sollicitent pas volontairement le renouvellement de leur mandat et renoncent à poursuivre leur carrière politique dans le cadre de leur mandat parlementaire. Certains ne se représentent pas comme titulaires, mais deviennent suppléants. En revanche, l'élimination de certains députés sortants est beaucoup plus rare. C'est ainsi que les sections socialistes des 7e et 8e circonscriptions du Nord ont éliminé deux députés sortants (MM. Desmulliez et Clérambaux) qui pourtant étaient candidats à la candidature aux élections législatives de 1978 (44). L'origine de l'élimination est donc ici à la base, conformément à la tradition décentralisatrice des socialistes. Mais elle provient aussi du sommet, notamment au sein du RPR. En 1978, des députés sortants ont fait part de leur irritation concernant certaines décisions d'investitures pour les élections législatives. Ils reprochaient à l'équipe dirigeante du parti, d'avoir procédé à des "parachutages" sans reconnaissance préalable de la circonscription, d'avoir manqué de considération pour certains élus anciens, d'avoir un peu trop précipité le changement de génération. Ainsi, le député RPR sortant de la 2e circonscription de Charente-Maritime a refusé de devenir le suppléant du nouveau candidat RPR désigné, qui était l'ancien directeur de cabinet de M. Jacques Chirac. Le député sortant s'élevait contre ce "parachutage" et décidait de se représenter comme candidat indépendant (45). De la même façon, c'est contraint et forcé que M. Maurice Druon, député sortant, a laissé sa place ^{en 1981} au secrétaire général du RPR, M. Pons, dans la 22e circonscription de Paris (46).

Mais l'investiture accordée aux députés sortants n'empêche pas les formations politiques de procéder à un renouvellement plus ou moins ample de leurs candidats selon les élections. En 1978, 61,6 % des candidats sont des candidats nouveaux qui n'étaient pas présents en 1973. Mais ce renouvellement affectait différemment les partis politiques. C'étaient le MRG, le parti radical et le PR qui présentaient le plus fort pourcentage de candidats nouveaux (respectivement 75,2 %, 73,5 % et 71,2 %). En revanche, le taux de renouvellement le plus faible se rencontrait au sein du PC, du RPR et du CDS qui affichaient une attitude beaucoup plus prudente à l'égard des candidats nouveaux (respectivement 54,5 %, 58 % et 58,8 %).

Candidats nouveaux des grands partis politiques

| | <u>1978</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| . PC | : 54,5 % | 21,2 % |
| . PS | : 63,7 % | 40,1 % |
| . MRG | : 75,2 % | 60,4 % |
| . PRS | : 73,5 % | 45,5 % |
| . CDS | : 58,8 % | 42,3 % |
| . PR | : 71,2 % | 26,8 % |
| . RPR | : 58,0 % | 36,6 % |

(Source : A. Guédé- SA. Rozenblum, art.cit, p. 985).

Lors des élections législatives de 1981, la proportion de candidats nouveaux accusait une nette diminution. Les partis politiques n'ont pas voulu prendre de risques et ont présenté des hommes qui disposaient d'une certaine notoriété du fait de leurs candidatures précédentes. C'était encore le PC qui se montrait le plus timide en présentant peu de candidats nouveaux (21,2 %). La présentation de nombreux "permanents" explique le faible taux de renouvellement des candidats du PC. En revanche, le PR, qui avait fortement favorisé les hommes nouveaux en 1978, a cette fois marqué une pause (26,8 %). Les deux partis radicaux ont cependant poursuivi leur effort de renouvellement (MRG : 60,4 % et PRS : 45,5 %).

Mais l'atout politique dont les partis tiennent le plus grand compte lors du processus de sélection des candidats est l'implantation locale des candidats. Plus un candidat détient des fonctions locales, plus sa notoriété et son influence s'accroissent et plus grandes sont ses chances de succès (47). Un candidat dispose d'un avantage électoral à être un leader local bien implanté (48). Le scrutin uninominal dans le cadre d'une circonscription étroite n'est certainement pas étranger à ce phénomène. La recherche de la notabilité locale est donc un élément très important du processus de désignation des candidats. La plupart des formations politiques choisissent des élus locaux pour défendre leurs couleurs. La proportion d'élus locaux est donc importante parmi les partis qui disposent d'une bonne implantation locale depuis le début de la 5e République : le PS (65,3 % de ses candidats exerçaient déjà au moins un mandat politique local en 1978 et 1981) et le CDS (67,6 % en 1978, mais seulement 59 % en 1981). Cette proportion restait majoritaire pour le PC (63,2 % et 62,4 %), le PR (55,6 % et 70,5 %) et le RPR (58 % et 62,4 %). Le choix de la candidature unique en 1981 expliquait l'augmentation du pourcentage des élus locaux parmi les candidats du PR et du RPR. Ces formations ont privilégié par cette tactique les candidats qui disposaient du plus de chances d'être élus, ceux qui bénéficiaient d'une solide implantation locale. En revanche, les deux partis radicaux étaient les seules formations où les élus locaux restaient minoritaires parmi les candidats (47,1 % et 45,4 % pour le PRS, 50,5 % et 46,6 % pour le MRG) : *"le vieux radicalisme dominé par les notables locaux n'est décidément plus ce qu'il était"* (49).

Un candidat dispose d'un avantage électoral encore plus considérable s'il cumule plusieurs mandats locaux. Les partis politiques préfèrent donc encore investir des candidats qui disposent de plusieurs mandats locaux. En 1978, le CDS et le PS arrivaient en tête avec respectivement 37,6 % et 37,4 % de candidats cumulant plusieurs mandats. Mais ils étaient talonnés par le RPR (35,2 %). Les autres partis étaient beaucoup plus loin derrière et confirmaient une plus faible implantation. En 1981, on constatait une augmentation sensible dans toutes les formations politiques, sauf au CDS et au PC qui enregistraient une baisse sensible d'implantation.

Les mandats locaux des candidats des grands partis politiques (en %)

| | RPR | | PR | | CDS | | PRS | | MRG | | PS | | PC | |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 | 1978 | 1981 |
| Un mandat local | 58 | 62,4 | 55,6 | 70,5 | 67,6 | 59 | 47,1 | 45,4 | 50,5 | 46,6 | 65,3 | 65,3 | 63,2 | 62,4 |
| Plusieurs mandats locaux | 35,2 | 40,4 | 29,2 | 39,2 | 37,6 | 28,2 | 19,2 | 31,8 | 23,8 | 29,4 | 37,4 | 36,2 | 25,8 | 23,8 |
| Aucun mandat local | 42 | 37,6 | 44,4 | 29,5 | 32,4 | 41 | 52,9 | 54,6 | 49,5 | 53,4 | 34,7 | 34,7 | 36,8 | 37,6 |

(Source : A. Guédé et S.A. Rozenblum, art.cit, p. 991).

Dans la plupart des pays, la carrière des individus intéressés par une activité politique commence par la détention d'un mandat politique local avant d'atteindre une fonction électorale nationale. Cependant la France présente quelques particularités. L'homme politique qui y poursuit une carrière politique nationale n'abandonne pas ses mandats locaux. Il cumule les mandats locaux et nationaux. L'influence dans la vie politique nationale est souvent basée sur l'influence locale (exemples de J. Chaban-Delmas à Bordeaux, P. Mauroy à Lille, G. Defferre à Marseille).

C'est pourquoi, les candidats ne disposant d'aucun mandat local sont minoritaires dans la plupart des formations politiques, sauf dans les deux partis radicaux. Mais, parmi ces candidats, il faut donner une place spéciale à la pratique du "parachutage". Dans ce cas, l'implantation locale n'existe pas, même si le candidat "parachuté" s'adjoint un suppléant qui dispose d'une bonne implantation locale. La technique du "parachutage" a été surtout remarquée par l'emploi qu'en a fait le mouvement gaulliste dès le début de la 5e République. Elle s'est faite au profit de ministres ou de secrétaires d'état qui ne possédaient pas de circonscriptions et n'étaient donc pas députés au moment de leur entrée en fonctions. Ils ont été amenés à briguer un siège de député avec plus ou moins de succès, le plus souvent dans des circonscriptions pourtant jugées favorables (50). Le "parachutage" a également bénéficié à de jeunes éléments du mouvement ou à des membres influents de cabinets ministériels dans des circonscriptions jugées perdues d'avance, mais où il fallait faire acte de présence malgré la faible implantation du parti gaulliste (51). Mais cette pratique n'était pas un phénomène spécifique à la majorité de l'époque. Elle a joué également au profit de certains candidats socialistes (52).

En 1978 et 1981, la pratique du "parachutage" subsistait encore malgré la volonté des partis politiques de privilégier les candidats déjà bien implantés. Un certain nombre de candidats tentaient leurs chances dans une circonscription où ils n'avaient jamais fait campagne auparavant. Il s'agissait essentiellement de candidats de la majorité sortante (53). En revanche, à gauche, le véritable "parachutage" est plus rare. Le candidat nouveau, "parachuté" dans une circonscription, s'implante d'abord localement avant de tenter sa chance

lors d'une consultation nationale (54).

CONCLUSION

Enfin, le processus de sélection des candidats aux élections législatives sous la 5e République montre le quasi-monopole des partis politiques dans ce processus. Ces partis recrutent leurs candidats suivant des mécanismes formels dont l'évolution marque une tendance des appareils centraux à contrôler de façon plus étroite les choix des appareils locaux, sous l'influence de la structuration du système de partis dans le sens d'une bipolarisation et de la nationalisation de la vie politique. Mais ce mouvement vers la centralisation s'accompagne toutefois d'une autre tendance à privilégier les candidats déjà bien implantés localement. La sélection des candidats est donc le résultat de mécanismes étroitement imbriqués de nationalisation, mais aussi de localisation.

Jean-Louis THIEBAULT,
Maître-Assistant à l'Université
de Lille II.

NOTES

- (1) Maurice DUVERGER : Les partis politiques. A. Colin, Paris, 1951, 9ème édition 1977, p. 389-390.
- (2) Jean-Louis QUERMONNE : "Pouvoir présidentiel et pouvoir partisan sous la 5ème République", *Projet*, n° 150, décembre 1980, p. 1177-1188.
- (3) "Ce n'est donc qu'à partir de 1974 que les appareils des partis politiques commenceront à jouer un rôle décisif dans la désignation des candidats, sans oser encore se placer d'emblée au-devant de la scène", J.L. QUERMONNE, *art.cit.*, p. 1179.
- (4) Hugues PORTELLI "La présidentialisation des partis français", *Pouvoirs*, n° 14, 1980, p. 97-106.
- (5) M. Raymond Barre affirmait le 29 avril 1984 au Club de la Presse d'Europe I "S'il advenait que je doive être candidat à l'élection présidentielle, je ne serais pas candidat comme émanation d'un parti ... L'élection présidentielle est une affaire de confiance entre un homme et les Français" (*Le Monde*, 2 mai 1984).
- (6) Jean-Luc PARODI : "L'échec des gauches", *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, n° 873, mars-avril 1978, p. 11-12.
- (7) Maurice DUVERGER : Les partis politiques, *op.cit.*, p. 390-391.
- (8) Chiffre fourni par Jean-Claude MASCLLET : Le rôle du député et ses attaches institutionnelles sous la 5ème République. Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1979, p. 25.
- (9) Il faut noter cependant qu'à l'occasion des élections législatives de 1978, le Parti Communiste était absent de 4 circonscriptions (Alpes-Maritimes 2e, Rhône 6e, Yvelines 4e et Val d'Oise 1ère), où il soutenait deux gaullistes de gauche et deux candidats du PSU.
- (10) Plusieurs personnalités indépendantes ou proches du PS ont été investies lors des élections de 1978 (MM. Cornut-Gentille : Alpes-Maritimes 5e et de Chambrun : Lozère 2e) et de 1981 (MM. Max Gallo : Alpes-Maritimes 1ère, Cornut-Gentille : Alpes-Maritimes 5e, Dabezies : Paris 2e, Thibau : Paris 15e et Mmes Halimi : Isère 4e et Bouchardeau, secrétaire nationale du PSU : Loire 1ère).
- (11) Quelques exemples à la fois en 1978 et en 1981 parmi les personnalités les plus connues : MM. Barre (Rhône 4e), Royer (Indre-et-Loire 1ère), Audinot (Somme 5e), Hunault (Loire-Atlantique 5e).
- (12) J.C. MASCLLET, *op.cit.*, p. 42-50
- (13) Maurice DUVERGER : *op.cit.*, p. 392.
- (14) Jean-Luc PARODI : "Les règles du scrutin majoritaire", *Projet*, n° 122, Février 1978, p. 193.

- (15) Guy CARCASSONNE et Olivier DUHAMEL : *"La défaite de la gauche dès le premier tour : une analyse quantitative et ses limites"*, Pouvoirs, n° 6, 1978, p. 149-158. Ils dénombrent 103 circonscriptions incertaines en 1978, c'est-à-dire des circonscriptions où théoriquement la gauche et la droite sont susceptibles de gagner le siège de député.
- (16) Michel OFFERLE montre que l'article 24, alinéa 2 des statuts du RPR centralise le processus des investitures législatives (*"Transformation d'une entreprise politique : de l'UDR au RPR (1973-1977)"*), Pouvoirs, n° 28, 1984, p. 15.
- (17) Article 20 des statuts de l'UDF : *"L'investiture des candidats pour les élections ou le soutien de l'UDF sont accordés par le Bureau exécutif sur proposition ou avis du Conseil Départemental et du Conseil National"*.
- (18) Le Monde, 9 novembre 1977.
- (19) Le Monde, 26 mai 1981.
- (20) Denis LACORNE : Les notables rouges. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1980, p. 68.
- (21) Jean-Claude MASLET, op.cit., p. 44-45.
- (22) Jean-Claude MASLET, op.cit., p. 46.
- (23) Le Monde, 21 juillet 1977.
- (24) Le Monde, 21 octobre 1977. Cet accord prévoyait les éléments suivants :
- en cas de candidature unique, le candidat reçoit automatiquement le soutien des formations de la majorité autres que celle qui lui a donné son investiture.
 - lorsqu'une candidature unique a été décidée et enregistrée au procès-verbal, on ne peut revenir sur la décision que dans le cas où il y aurait changement de candidat.
 - lorsque le comité a constaté qu'il y aurait primaire, le nombre de candidats n'est pas limité, sous réserve d'information réciproque et de la signature, par chaque candidat, du pacte de majorité.
 - en cas de primaire, les soutiens de formation à formation font l'objet d'une information du Comité.
 - tout candidat se réclamant d'une formation de la majorité, sans en avoir reçu l'investiture, est aussitôt et publiquement désavoué par sa formation.
- (25) Le Monde, 22 octobre 1977, 16 décembre 1977, 24 décembre 1977.
- (26) Cf. les déclarations de M. Barre à Antenne 2, Le 11 janvier 1978 : *"Les formations m'ont demandé, en tant que premier ministre, de les aider dans cet effort de clarification électorale. Je l'ai fait parce qu'elles me l'ont demandé, parce que c'est un des aspects de ma tâche du moment qu'on me le demande"* (Le Monde, 13 janvier 1978).
- (27) Le Monde, 15-16 janvier 1978, 3 février 1978.

- (28) Le Monde, 20 janvier 1978, 23 février 1978.
- (29) J.R. FREARS - Jean-Luc PARODI : *War will Not Take Place. The French Parliamentary Elections March 1978. C. Hurst and Co, London, 1978, p 33*
- (30) Le Monde, 15 mai 1981 et 16 mai 1981. Le communiqué affirmait que l'entente des deux formations politiques "s'exprimera par un accord électoral qui tiendra compte des réalités de chaque circonscription, soit par une candidature unique, soit par deux candidatures. Dans ce cas, chacun des deux candidats devra s'engager :
- à ne se livrer entre eux aucune polémique
 - à se désister automatiquement en faveur du candidat placé en tête par le suffrage universel
 - à participer activement à la campagne du second tour en faveur du candidat unique".
- (31) Le Monde, 26 mai 1981 et 10 juin 1981.
- (32) Allier 4e, Bouches-du-Rhône 2e, Lot-et-Garonne 2e, Nord 5e, Haute-Savoie 3e, Somme 1ère, Tarn-et-Garonne 2e, Haute-Vienne 1ère, Seine-Saint-Denis 7e (Le Monde, 10 juin 1981).
- (33) Alpes-Maritimes 4e, Ardèche 2e-3e, Doubs 3e, Ile-et-Vilaine 2e, Pyrénées-Atlantiques 4e, Rhône 1ère, Rhône 3e, Paris 22e, Paris 23e, Hauts-de-Seine 9e, Nord 12e (Le Monde, 10 juin 1981).
- (34) Le Monde, 10 juin 1981.
- (35) Jean-Claude MASCET : op.cit, p. 47-48.
- (36) Le Monde, 6-7 novembre 1977. *A côté des 30 candidats communs PS-MRG, le MRG présentait 32 candidats*
- (37) Le Monde, 22 mai 1981.
- (38) Véronique AUBERT, Jean-Luc PARODI : *Le personnel politique français. PROJET, n° 147, juillet-août 1980, p 797*
- (39) Les articles de Gilles FABRE-ROSANE, Alain GUEDE "Sociologie des candidats aux élections législatives de mars 1978", Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 28, n° 5, octobre 1978, p. 840-858 ; Alain GUEDE, Serge-Alain ROZENBLUM "Les candidats aux élections législatives de 1978 et de 1981. Permanence et changements", Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 31, n° 5-6, octobre-décembre 1981, p. 982-998, nous ont fourni l'essentiel des données.
- (40) Gilles FABRE-ROSANE, Alain GUEDE, art.cit, p. 849-852 ; Alain GUEDE, Serge-Alain ROZENBLUM, art.cit, p. 989-990.
- (41) Par exemple, Mme Lalumière (Gironde 3e), Mme Questiaux (Paris 13e), Mme Cresson (Vienne 2e), Mme Avice (Paris 16e), Mme Gaspard (Eure-et-Loire 2e), Mme Mora (Indre-et-Loire 3e), Mme Neiertz (Seine-Saint-Denis 5e).
- (42) Sylvie JACQUEMART : les candidatures féminines aux élections législatives dans la région Nord - Pas-de-Calais depuis 1958. Rapport CRAPS - Université de Lille II, 1978.

- (43) Aube 3e, Corse du Sud 1ère, Eure 3e, Eure-et-Loir 2e, Finistère 5e et 7e, Loire 1ère, Hauts-de-Seine 2e (Le Monde, 10 juin 1981).
- (44) Le Monde, 7 octobre 1977.
- (45) Le Monde, 8 novembre 1977.
- (46) Le Monde, 31 mai - 1er juin 1981.
- (47) J.R. FREARS - Jean-Luc PARODI : War Will Not Take Place. The French Parliamentary Elections. March 1978. C. Hurst and Co, London, 1979, p. 36-38.
- (48) Lors des élections législatives de 1978, 109 maires des 221 villes de plus de 30.000 habitants étaient candidats (Le Monde, 22 mars 1978).
- (49) Gilles FABRE-ROSANE et Alain GUEDE, art.cit, p. 847.
- (50) Exemple de M. Messmer, d'abord candidat sans succès dans la 5e circonscription du Morbihan en 1967. puis candidat dans la 8e circonscription de la Moselle, où il est finalement élu.
- (51) Exemple de M. Chirac, candidat avec succès dans la 3e circonscription de la Corrèze en 1967.
- (52) Exemples de MM. Hernu (*Loire 2e*), Mermaz (Isère 5e), Dumas (Corrèze *2e*) Fillioud (Drôme 3e) en 1967.
- (53) Exemples de MM. Barre (Rhône 4e), J.F. Deniau (Cher 1ère), Stoleru (Vosges 2e) Haby (Meurthe-et-Moselle 4e), Bigéard (Meurthe-et-Moselle 5e), Pons (Essonne 8e), Seguin (Vosges 1ère) et Mme Saunier-Seïté (Moselle 2e) en 1978 et de MM. Fourcarde (Lot-et-Garonne 2e), Mestre (Vendée 1ère), Toubon (Paris 19e) et Mme Palletier (Eure-et-Loir 1ère) en 1981.
- (54) Exemples de MM. Fabius (Seine-Maritime 2e) et Rocard (Yvelines 3e) en 1978, mais respectivement adjoint au maire de Grand-Quevilly et maire de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine depuis 1977.

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SELECTION OF CANDIDATES AT NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN NORWEGIAN PARTIES

By

HENRY VALEN
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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The problem.

The following question will be the main concern of this paper: Which evaluations and political considerations determine the selection of nominees at national (Storting) elections in Norwegian parties?

Suppose a Norwegian party leader was asked: What is generally required of a person seeking nominations on the party's lists at Storting elections? Almost invariably his answer would be: 'political competence'. In addition he might mention a few other personal characteristics, like honesty, integrity, and voter appeal. On this general level the responses would not differ much from one party to another (Valen 1966: 124).

The term 'political competence' has no precise meaning defined by some norms or standards shared by the political community. But it may serve a symbolic function of legitimizing decisions on leadership recruitment. Anyhow the term is frequently applied in debates in all parties on nominations at Storting elections.

A closer look at what actually goes on during the nomination^{process}/reveal quite a few interesting variations among the parties. Available research suggests that candidate selection is not necessarily determined by evaluations of personal abilities of prospective candidates (Valen & Katz 1964; Valen 1966; Hellevik 1969; Skard 1980). The nomination process is characterized by competition between subgroups or factions within the respective parties. Their purpose is apparently to promote candidates who share their own interests and political views. Aspiring candidates have to rely upon the support of some specific group(s). It is, of course, an open question to what extent individual nominations are determined by considerations of personal abilities and charisma of aspiring candidates. But previous research suggests that the strength of supporting subgroups as well as alliances between such groups are of great significance for the final outcome (Valen & Katz

1964). Consequently, the character of group competition within parties ought to be given high priority in the study of nominations. We may expect substantial variations from one party to another owing to the fact that they differ with regard to social composition, organizational structure, policy and ideological outlook. However, at this point I am unable to spell out in more detail what such expected party difference should be like.

The ideal way of investigating nominations would be an interview study with people who have been directly involved in the process. Previous efforts suggest that it is most fruitful to inquire which group activities and other considerations have been at work regarding the nominations of individual candidates (Valen & Katz 1964). As an alternative approach an attempt has been made to study general evaluations and political considerations within political parties related to the nominations at the forthcoming Storting election of 1985. At the end of October 1984, in the middle of the nomination process, a mail questionnaire was sent to members of nomination committees of the seven parties in all constituencies.¹⁾ The present paper is intended as a preliminary report on this study. The paper will focus upon party differences with regard to the following themes:

- evaluation of groups representation within parties,
- types of conflicts seen as most important for individual parties
- required stand of candidates towards salient issues,
- internal communications in parties concerning the selection of candidates.

Before presenting the data a brief account of nomination procedures seems required.

The nomination system.

The present nomination system dates back to 1920 when proportional representation was introduced. The country is divided into 19 multimember constituencies, varying from 4

to 15 mandates. Each party list includes a number of candidates corresponding to the total number of mandates from the respective constituencies, and in addition until 10 'reserve' candidates. The parties rank the candidates in the order they want to see them elected. Obviously, only a few candidates on the top of the list have a chance of being elected as representatives or alternate representatives. It should be observed that the nomination process is exclusively limited to the party organization. At elections the voters have only a choice between different party lists. They cannot effect the choice of candidates on the respective lists.

The nomination procedures inside the parties follow a pattern rather similar to the American 'convention system'. The list is established by a convention arranged by each party in each constituency. Delegates to the conventions are elected by local meetings in each commune in the respective constituencies. Only dues-paying party members are permitted to participate in the local meetings as well as in the conventions, and only dues-paying members can be nominated on the lists. Several months before the convention the respective province party organizations will appoint a nomination committee, of normally 5 - 15 members. Proposals for nominations by local organizations are sent to this committee who will register all names proposed. A list proposal by the committee will be presented at the opening of the convention and form the basis of the convention's deliberations. Thus the nomination committees, to whom we have addressed our attention, play a strategic and crucial role in the nomination process.

The conventions make the final decisions about the lists. Thus the central leadership of the respective parties cannot change the lists, whether they like them or not. In general, the nomination process seems to be highly decentralized, but conceivably national leaders may have some indirect influence in the selection process. 2)

Internal communication.

Nomination committees who reportedly reflect major

interests in their respective province party organizations, are presumably located at the center of communications in the nomination process. What is the communication network like? Our respondents were asked: "Of course, a lot of discussion takes place in the party these days about the selection of candidates. We would like to know by whom you have been contacted about these questions. Please indicate your answers for the listed categories." Table 1 confirms our general assumption that the process is highly decentralized. Very few have mentioned national party leaders and members of the present Storting, although the latter category might well mean members from own constituency. One out of four have mentioned aspiring candidates. Interestingly enough this response has been given most frequently by parties on the rightwing, the Conservatives and the Progress party. Promotion of own political career is considered bad taste in Norwegian politics. The referred tendency in table 1 may suggest that this norm is not quite accepted on the right wing of the system. However, most of the communications have been going on between the committee and constituency leaders; 8 out of 10 respondents report they have been contacted by province and local leaders of their respective party organizations, with practically no variations from one party to another. Furthermore, 4 out of 10 have been contacted by mayors or others holding elected office in local or provincial bodies. Since the three smallest parties, Liberals, Socialist Left, and the Progress party have relatively few office holders, it is not surprising that respondents from these parties have been less inclined than others to mention this category. Quite a few respondents have mentioned some categories not included in the list. The overwhelming part of these references are for community leaders.

Table 2 presents frequency and character of contacts which the respondents have initiated. With few exceptions the pattern is similar to that of table 1. It should be observed, however, that communications with aspiring candidates and members of the Storting are more frequent in table 2.

Required characteristics of candidates.

Our respondents were asked: "Here is a list of characteristics which candidates at Storting elections may have. Which one of these characteristics do you personally consider as most important?" This question was asked separately for top candidates on the list and for lower candidates. The results have been presented in tables 3 and 4. The respondents tend to put most emphasis upon the confidence that prospective candidates enjoy within their own parties. Platform abilities have been mentioned as the second most important. However, surprisingly few have mentioned various kinds of group representation. Control interviews which have been conducted, suggest that competition between internal subgroups has been as important in 1985 as ever before. Apparently, in order to obtain sufficient information concerning group conflicts within parties, it is necessary to focus upon individual candidates and their challengers. The present study has to be supplemented in this direction.

Perceived conflict dimensions.

The respondents were presented with a list of seven types of conflicts and asked which one was most important. The data have been presented in table 5. Two cleavages, between men and women, and between those working in private business versus those in public employment, are hardly mentioned at all, although they have both been rather prominent in public debate in recent years. Two of the conflicts included in the list, between social groups and classes, and between left and right, are indeed important for our respondents. Actually they both refer to the left-right division, and it is not surprising that they are most frequently mentioned by the socialist parties and by the two parties on the right wing, the Conservatives and the Progress party.

The parties at the center of the system, which are less concerned with the left right differences, tend to relate themselves to their own specific cleavages. Thus respondents

of the Christian People's party have been strongly inclined to mention differences with regard to Christian faith and moral. The center-periphery division is most important to the Agrarian party. The profile of the Liberal party is least distinct. But the two cleavages most frequently mentioned are conflicts between social groups and classes and growth versus non-growth in the economy, actually growth versus protection of the environment.

Policy positions.

The tendencies emerging from table 5 are even more clear when we turn to policy positions of aspiring candidates. The respondents were presented with a number of policy statements, and they were asked if it would favour or disfavour a possible candidate that he advocated the respective positions. The data have been presented in tables 6a - 7. Without entering into a detailed analysis of this material it should be observed that the seven parties are very distinct ideologically. And the data suggest that the policy-position of individual candidates do matter at the nominations.

Future work.

The main research problem of this project may be stated as follows: Does it matter who the individual candidates are? More specifically it is a question of the role of the individual representative in the policy-making process. When we learn that a number of subgroups tend to compete for nominations, it must be a general assumption that candidates with a background in a given group will promote the interests of this group if he manages to be elected.

The data presented tell about substantial variations in policy positions between parties. A closer look at the material also suggests variations inside individual parties. The present study does not give sufficient information concerning the character of internal group competition in relation to nominations. An additional interview study will hopefully remedy this weakness. However, the linking between nominations and policy making can only be achieved by studying the behavior

of the elected representatives when they take their seats in the Storting. This will be the second and perhaps most important part of the project.

Notes:

- 1) The questionnaire was sent to some 1200 party leaders. So far only 400 or about one third have responded. The response rate is highest in the Labor, Conservative, and Socialist Left parties. Recent efforts to improve the response rate are likely to be successful, at least in the larger parties.
- 2) The decentralized character of the process was clearly demonstrated when we organized the present study. The national party headquarters did not know who were the members of the nomination committees in the various provinces, and they refused to inquire about it, assuming that the respective province parties might be distrustful concerning the purpose of such an inquiry. In organizing the study we had to deal directly with the province organizations.

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TABLE 1

PERSONS/GROUPS WHO HAVE CONTACTED NOMINATION COMMITTEE; BY PARTY

IN PERCENT

| PERSONS/GROUPS: | SOCIALIST | | LABOUR | | LIBERAL | | CHRISTIAN | | AGRARIAN | | CONSERVATIVE | | PROGRESS | | TOTAL |
|--|------------|--|--------|--|---------|--|----------------|--|----------|--|--------------|--|----------|--|-------|
| | LEFT PARTY | | | | PARTY | | PEOPLE'S PARTY | | PARTY | | PARTY | | PARTY | | |
| ASPIRING CANDIDATES | 18 | | 28 | | 15 | | 14 | | 11 | | 41 | | 64 | | 26 |
| MEMBERS OF PRESENT STORING | 5 | | 20 | | 0 | | 14 | | 4 | | 31 | | 12 | | 14 |
| MAYORS AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICE HOLDERS | 15 | | 53 | | 27 | | 38 | | 40 | | 54 | | 30 | | 39 |
| NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS | 14 | | 1 | | 15 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 15 | | 8 |
| LOCAL AND PROVINCE LEADERS OF PARTY-ORG. | 82 | | 84 | | 77 | | 78 | | 81 | | 87 | | 91 | | 83 |
| EXTERNAL LEADERS OF GROUPS AND ORG. | 17 | | 34 | | 15 | | 17 | | 13 | | 16 | | 9 | | 19 |
| OTHERS | 32 | | 24 | | 15 | | 21 | | 28 | | 23 | | 27 | | 25 |
| N* | 66 | | 79 | | 34 | | 58 | | 47 | | 71 | | 33 | | 388 |

* PERCENTAGES ADD TO MORE THAN 100 - BECAUSE QUESTION CALLED FOR MULTIPLE ANSWERS

TABLE 2

PERSONS/GROUPS CONTACTED BY NOMINATION COMMITTEE, BY PARTY

IN PERCENT

| PERSONS/GROUPS: | SOCIALIST | LABOUR | LIBERAL | CHRISTIAN | AGRARIAN | CONSERVATIVE | PROGRESS | TOTAL |
|--|------------|--------|---------|----------------|----------|--------------|----------|-------|
| | LEFT PARTY | PARTY | PARTY | PEOPLE'S PARTY | PARTY | PARTY | PARTY | |
| ASPIRING CANDIDATES | 52 | 34 | 50 | 38 | 40 | 58 | 67 | 47 |
| MEMBERS OF PRESENT STORING | 37 | 9 | 9 | 24 | 13 | 49 | 24 | 26 |
| MAYORS AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICE HOLDERS | 15 | 47 | 35 | 50 | 53 | 52 | 24 | 41 |
| NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS | 18 | 8 | 21 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 21 | 12 |
| LOCAL AND PROVINCE LEADERS OF PARTY-ORG. | 80 | 79 | 88 | 79 | 83 | 90 | 85 | 83 |
| EXTERNAL LEADERS OF GROUPS AND ORG. | 14 | 23 | 12 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 9 | 15 |
| OTHERS | 27 | 17 | 12 | 19 | 19 | 16 | 30 | 20 |
| N* | 66 | 79 | 34 | 58 | 47 | 71 | 33 | 388 |

* PERCENTAGES ADD TO MORE THAN 100 - BECAUSE QUESTION CALLED FOR MULTIPLE ANSWERS

TABLE 3 PARTY AND REQUIRED ABILITIES OF TOP CANDIDATES IN PERCENT

| REQUIRED ABILITIES: | IN PERCENT | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY | LABOUR PARTY | LIBERAL PARTY | CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY | AGRARIAN PARTY | CONSERVATIVE PARTY | PROGRESS PARTY | TOTAL | | |
| Platform abilities | 35 | 13 | 47 | 9 | 43 | 44 | 52 | 31 | | |
| Enjoy confidence in party | 49 | 58 | 38 | 72 | 43 | 41 | 36 | 50 | | |
| Supported by important external organisations (E.g. trade unions, religious org.) | 3 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | |
| Active in party organisations | 5 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | | |
| Experience as member of the Storting | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | |
| Experience from other public positions in state, province or communes | 1 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | | |
| Represents specific part of the constituency | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Is a woman/man | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Independent in relation to organized interests | 0 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 3 | | |
| Represents the youth | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | |
| Associated with specific occupational groups | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | |
| Don't know | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Total | (99) | (101) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (100) |
| N | 66 | 79 | 34 | 58 | 47 | 71 | 33 | 388 | | |

TABLE 4

PARTY AND REQUIRED ABILITIES OF LOWER CANDIDATES

IN PERCENT

| REQUIRED ABILITIES: | PARTY AND REQUIRED ABILITIES OF LOWER CANDIDATES | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|---|--|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY | LABOUR PARTY | LIBERAL PARTY | CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY | AGRARIAN PARTY | CONSERVATIVE PARTY | PROGRESS PARTY | |
| PLATFORM ABILITIES | 20 | 19 | 29 | 12 | 26 | 44 | 27 | 25 |
| ENJOY CONFIDENCE IN PARTY | 29 | 39 | 24 | 47 | 40 | 31 | 39 | 36 |
| SUPPORTED BY IMPORTANT EXTERNAL ORGANISATIONS (e.g. TRADE UNIONS, RELIGIOUS ORG.) | 12 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| ACTIVE IN PARTY ORGANISATIONS | 15 | 11 | 6 | 16 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 12 |
| EXPERIENCE AS MEMBER OF THE STORTING | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EXPERIENCE FROM OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN STATE, PROVINCE OR COMMUNES | 0 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| REPRESENT SPECIFIC PART OF THE CONSTITUENCY | 5 | 4 | 15 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 12 | 6 |
| IS A WOMAN/MAN | 11 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| INDEPENDENT IN RELATION TO ORGANIZED INTERESTS | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| REPRESENTS THE YOUTH | 0 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS | 6 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| DON'T KNOW | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| TOTAL | (101) | (101) | (101) | (101) | (99) | (100) | (99) | (101) |
| N | 66 | 79 | 34 | 58 | 47 | 71 | 33 | 388 |

TABLE 5

PARTY AND CONFLICTS SEEN AS MOST IMPORTANT

IN PERCENT

| PERCEIVED CONFLICTS: | PARTY AND CONFLICTS SEEN AS MOST IMPORTANT | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|---|--|--------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY | LABOUR | LIBERAL PARTY | CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY | AGRARIAN PARTY | CONSERVATIVE PARTY | PROGRESS PARTY | |
| BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| CONCERNING CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 2 | 0 | 6 | 76 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 14 |
| SOCIAL GROUPS AND CLASSES | 70 | 35 | 32 | 0 | 15 | 7 | 6 | 26 |
| CENTER VERSUS PERIPHERY | 2 | 6 | 15 | 5 | 60 | 18 | 3 | 14 |
| LEFT AND RIGHT | 21 | 27 | 15 | 7 | 4 | 51 | 39 | 27 |
| GROWTH VERSUS NON-GROWTH | 5 | 13 | 27 | 5 | 11 | 17 | 27 | 13 |
| EMPLOYMENT - | | | | | | | | |
| PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1 |
| DON'T KNOW | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| TOTAL | (102) | (100) | (101) | (100) | (100) | (100) | (99) | (101) |
| N | 66 | 79 | 34 | 58 | 47 | 71 | 33 | 388 |

TABLE 6 A

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY.

IN PERCENT

(N = 66)

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | | | IN PERCENT | DON'T KNOW | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------|------------|-------|-----------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | BOTH - AND CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 0 | 5 | 30 | 15 | 49 | 2 | (101) | + 59 |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 79 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 99 |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 27 | 39 | 24 | 2 | 3 | 5 | (100) | 61 |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 0 | 3 | 14 | 32 | 52 | 0 | (101) | + 81 |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 92 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 98 |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 99 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 100 |
| CUT TAXES | 0 | 0 | 41 | 30 | 27 | 2 | (100) | + 57 |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 62 | 30 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 92 |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 40 | 41 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 2 | (101) | 81 |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21 | 76 | 2 | (101) | + 97 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 52 | 47 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 99 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 46 | 50 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | (101) | 96 |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 0 | 2 | 15 | 36 | 44 | 3 | (100) | + 78 |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 50 | 32 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 2 | (102) | 66 |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 64 | 32 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | (101) | 96 |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 21 | 47 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 3 | (100) | 68 |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 64 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 94 |

TABLE 6 B

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY LABOUR

IN PERCENT (N = 79)

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | IN PERCENT | | STRONGLY | | DON'T KNOW | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|------------|------------------------|------------------------|----|------------|-------|-----------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | AND | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 14 | 22 | 42 | 14 | 4 | 5 | (101) | 18 | |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 38 | 49 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | (99) | 85 | |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 17 | 34 | 30 | 8 | 4 | 8 | (101) | 39 | |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 4 | 9 | 35 | 22 | 11 | 19 | (100) | + 20 | |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 65 | 33 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 98 | |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 53 | 28 | 11 | 3 | 1 | 4 | (100) | 77 | |
| CUT TAXES | 3 | 5 | 25 | 30 | 32 | 5 | (100) | + 54 | |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 62 | 35 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | (99) | 97 | |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 41 | 42 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | (101) | 83 | |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 1 | 3 | 9 | 34 | 47 | 6 | (100) | + 77 | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 11 | 52 | 27 | 4 | 0 | 6 | (100) | 59 | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 19 | 49 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 3 | (100) | 68 | |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 3 | 9 | 14 | 33 | 37 | 5 | (101) | + 58 | |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 63 | 27 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | (101) | 79 | |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 68 | 24 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | (99) | 90 | |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 10 | 37 | 41 | 4 | 1 | 8 | (101) | 42 | |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 27 | 65 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | (100) | 90 | |

TABLE 6 C

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY LIBERAL PARTY

IN PERCENT

(N = 34)

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | IN FAVOUR OF | | BOTH | | DISFAVOURING | | DON'T | | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|------|-------|--|-------|--------------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | CANDIDATE | CANDIDATE | - AND CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | KNOW | | | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 6 | 21 | 41 | 18 | 12 | 3 | (101) | + 3 | | | | |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 62 | 32 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 94 | | | | |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 9 | 38 | 24 | 18 | 0 | 12 | (101) | 29 | | | | |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 9 | 12 | 24 | 32 | 15 | 9 | (101) | + 26 | | | | |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 59 | 41 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 100 | | | | |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 82 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 100 | | | | |
| CUT TAXES | 0 | 0 | 18 | 47 | 35 | 0 | (100) | + 82 | | | | |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 24 | 62 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 3 | (101) | 86 | | | | |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 38 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 100 | | | | |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 0 | 0 | 21 | 32 | 47 | 0 | (100) | 79 | | | | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 94 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 97 | | | | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 59 | 27 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 86 | | | | |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 0 | 6 | 50 | 27 | 18 | 0 | (101) | + 39 | | | | |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 24 | 41 | 18 | 9 | 9 | 0 | (101) | 47 | | | | |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 29 | 41 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 3 | (100) | 67 | | | | |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 9 | 32 | 41 | 12 | 0 | 6 | (100) | 29 | | | | |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 27 | 65 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (101) | 92 | | | | |

TABLE 6D

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

IN PERCENT

(N = 58)

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | | | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE | | |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | BOTH AND CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | | | | |
| | STRONGLY DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | DON'T KNOW | | | | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 10 | 62 | 17 | 2 | 3 | 5 | (99) | 67 |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 16 | 47 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 7 | (101) | 63 |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 2 | 5 | 10 | 47 | 28 | 9 | (101) | + 68 |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 81 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | (101) | 97 |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 38 | 48 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | (100) | 86 |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 19 | 12 | 38 | 12 | 5 | 14 | (100) | 14 |
| CUT TAXES | 2 | 10 | 57 | 16 | 7 | 9 | (101) | + 11 |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 24 | 57 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 7 | (100) | 81 |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 22 | 55 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 5 | (99) | 77 |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 0 | 3 | 35 | 38 | 12 | 12 | (100) | + 47 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 5 | 47 | 33 | 5 | 2 | 9 | (101) | 45 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 45 | 40 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 7 | (101) | 85 |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 3 | 26 | 52 | 7 | 2 | 10 | (100) | 20 |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 14 | 16 | 31 | 24 | 5 | 10 | (100) | 1 |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 3 | 24 | 45 | 14 | 3 | 10 | (99) | 10 |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 7 | 19 | 38 | 24 | 0 | 12 | (99) | 2 |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 3 | 16 | 40 | 28 | 5 | 9 | (101) | + 14 |

TABLE 6E

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY AGRARIAN PARTY

IN PERCENT

(N = 47)

| POSITION INDICATED: | STRONGLY | | | | | DON'T KNOW | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------|-------|-----------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | BOTH - AND CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 34 | 45 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 4 | (100) | 79 |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 30 | 45 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 6 | (100) | 75 |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 2 | 4 | 21 | 45 | 15 | 13 | (100) | + 54 |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 15 | 49 | 21 | 9 | 0 | 6 | (100) | 55 |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 38 | 53 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | (99) | 89 |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 32 | 15 | 26 | 15 | 4 | 9 | (101) | 28 |
| CUT TAXES | 0 | 11 | 45 | 36 | 2 | 6 | (100) | + 27 |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 28 | 62 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 2 | (101) | 90 |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 62 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 2 | (100) | 92 |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 0 | 11 | 19 | 32 | 30 | 9 | (101) | + 51 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 28 | 55 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 4 | (100) | 83 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 11 | 40 | 30 | 9 | 2 | 9 | (101) | 40 |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 11 | 17 | 57 | 11 | 2 | 2 | (100) | 15 |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 9 | 32 | 21 | 15 | 6 | 17 | (100) | 20 |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 13 | 26 | 36 | 19 | 0 | 6 | (100) | 10 |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 4 | 6 | 45 | 28 | 9 | 9 | (101) | + 27 |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 2 | 23 | 40 | 23 | 2 | 9 | (99) | 0 |

TABLE 6f.

REQUIRED POLICY POSITIONS BY CONSERVATIVE PARTY

IN PERCENT

(N = 71)

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | | | DON'T KNOW | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|-------|--------------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | BOTH - AND CANDIDATE | STRONGLY DISFAVOURING CANDIDATE | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 62 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 100 |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 9 | 55 | 31 | 3 | 3 | (101) | 61 |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 0 | 4 | 1 | 24 | 70 | (99) | + 90 |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 6 | 55 | 34 | 6 | 0 | (101) | 55 |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 6 | 56 | 34 | 3 | 0 | (100) | 59 |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 10 | 7 | 20 | 25 | 34 | (100) | + 42 |
| CUT TAXES | 48 | 42 | 10 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 90 |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 16 | 38 | 42 | 3 | 1 | (100) | 50 |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 9 | 31 | 42 | 9 | 4 | (101) | 27 |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 21 | 44 | 25 | 9 | 1 | (100) | 55 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 1 | 28 | 52 | 14 | 0 | (99) | 15 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 3 | 17 | 51 | 16 | 9 | (102) | + 5 |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 49 | 35 | 11 | 1 | 3 | (99) | 80 |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 0 | 7 | 13 | 31 | 45 | (100) | + 79 |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 0 | 3 | 20 | 38 | 39 | (100) | + 74 |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 4 | 14 | 56 | 16 | 7 | (100) | + 5 |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 0 | 14 | 42 | 37 | 7 | (100) | + 30 |

| | POSITION INDICATED: | | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF BOTH DISFAVOURING | | STRONGLY DISFAVOURING | | DON'T KNOW | TOTAL | OPINION BALANCE |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|---|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|-------|-----------------|
| | STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | IN FAVOUR OF CANDIDATE | - AND CANDIDATE | CANDIDATE | CANDIDATE | CANDIDATE | | | |
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 82 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | (100) | 94 | |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 3 | 6 | 70 | 9 | 12 | 0 | (100) | + 12 | |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 76 | 0 | (100) | + 100 | |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 27 | 30 | 39 | 3 | 0 | 0 | (99) | 54 | |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 9 | 18 | 46 | 18 | 6 | 3 | (100) | 3 | |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 9 | 0 | 18 | 24 | 42 | 6 | (99) | + 57 | |
| CUT TAXES | 94 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 100 | |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 21 | 27 | 39 | 6 | 0 | 6 | (99) | 42 | |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 6 | 12 | 30 | 36 | 15 | 0 | (99) | + 33 | |
| ABOLISH STATE REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 79 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 97 | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 12 | 18 | 58 | 12 | 0 | 0 | (100) | 18 | |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 0 | 0 | 6 | 27 | 67 | 0 | (100) | + 94 | |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 85 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | (100) | 88 | |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 6 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 70 | 0 | (100) | + 88 | |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 0 | 0 | 6 | 24 | 67 | 3 | (100) | + 91 | |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 0 | 6 | 42 | 33 | 18 | 0 | (99) | + 45 | |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 0 | 0 | 6 | 27 | 64 | 3 | (100) | + 91 | |

TABLE 7

PARTY AND MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE

IN PERCENT

| | SOCIAL LEFT PARTY | LABOUR PARTY | LIBERAL PARTY | CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY | AGRARIAN PARTY | CONSERVATIVE PARTY | PROGRESS PARTY | TOTAL |
|--|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|-------|
| MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG DEFENSE | 5 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 37 | 24 | 13 |
| CONTINUED EQUALIZATION BETW. MEN & WOMEN | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| ABOLISHMENT OF GRADING SYSTEM IN SCHOOLS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| STRENGTHEN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL | 0 | 1 | 3 | 78 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 13 |
| MORE EQUALITY BETW. SOCIAL GROUPS/CLASSES | 20 | 29 | 12 | 7 | 17 | 4 | 0 | 14 |
| BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF NORWAY | 59 | 22 | 32 | 2 | 15 | 9 | 6 | 21 |
| CUT TAXES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 8 |
| LOWER INTEREST RATE FOR DWELLING MORTGAGES | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| INCREASED STATE SUBSIDIES FOR PERIPHERAL REGIONS | 0 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| ABOLISH PUBLIC REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 15 | 3 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT MEASURES | 2 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| STOP GROWTH IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 17 | 6 | 4 |
| BAN ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| CREATE MORE JOBS BY EXPANDING PUBL. SECTOR | 15 | 25 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| STATE SUBSIDIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE BIG CITIES | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NURSERY SCHOOLS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DON'T KNOW | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| TOTAL | (101) | (99) | (100) | (100) | (98) | (99) | (100) | (100) |
| N | 66 | 79 | 34 | 58 | 47 | 71 | 33 | 388 |

The Advocacy Explosion: Its Origins and Effects

Virginia Gray
Visiting Professor
University of Oslo

Professor
University of Minnesota

Papa 9

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ABSTRACT

The Advocacy Explosion: Its Origins and Effects

Virginia Gray

University of Oslo
and
University of Minnesota

The "New Politics" is widely accepted as descriptive of certain changes in American political parties, electoral campaigns, and interest groups. In this paper we discuss the evidence for such changes in the United States and Western Europe and outline the major explanations for the alleged explosion of interest groups. We select the state of Minnesota as a likely site for the advocacy explosion and search for changes in selected indicators of group and PAC activity. Overall, few measures indicate that an advocacy explosion has occurred in Minnesota. In fact, preliminary data suggest that few other states have experienced the advocacy explosion either. Some alternative explanations are proposed instead.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted that an "advocacy explosion" has occurred in recent years: a dramatic increase in the number of politically active interest groups seemingly has taken place in a number of countries. This development poses two questions that beg for scholarly explanation: why has it occurred and what are its effects? And the explosion offers one somewhat overlooked descriptive question: have the numbers of interest groups really increased or does it just seem that way?

This paper attempts to document empirically the alleged explosion in one American state, the state of Minnesota. In addition, we present evidence testing the major explanations for an expanded group universe. We pay particular attention to the possible relation between political parties' decline and group proliferation. Finally, we link the assumed changes in interest representation to policymaking, an area in which group changes are purported to have had great detrimental effects. Throughout we will point out the commonality in recent years between the American experience and the European experience. We begin with an overview of major changes that have been observed in U.S. interest groups.

THE ADVOCACY EXPLOSION

In the 1970s a new type of politics began to emerge in the U.S.: simply put, political parties lost influence and interest groups gained influence. Both linkage mechanisms underwent fundamental changes that may significantly shape political outcomes in the future. Though different observers point to various manifestations of this fundamental shift, most commentators agree that the decline in political parties is linked to behavioral changes on the part of American voters: a decline in partisanship, an increase in issue voting, a decline in voter turnout, and a mounting lack of trust in parties. Moreover, the parties' decline had electoral components as well: new campaign techniques (direct mail, targeting etc.), candidate-centered appeals rather than party-centered campaign efforts, greater use of the media and of polling consultants, all of which led to increased campaign costs. The growing importance of political action committees aided and abetted these changes; PACs in fact symbolize the "New Politics".

Toward the end of the 1970s, significant new features appeared on the interest group scene. There seemingly was a proliferation of interest groups, particularly from previously unrepresented segments of the population. Instead of the usual business, labor, and farm organizations, citizen groups and public interest groups appeared to balance the representation (Berry, 1984). A new type of group emerged from an issue-based politics, the single-issue group. These groups judge

candidates on the basis of only one issue and tend to inject negativism into campaigning. Groups as a whole expanded their tactics from legislative lobbying to the lobbying of other governmental targets, to the molding of public opinion, and the stimulation of grassroots lobbying (Ippolito and Walker, 1980). Many groups set up their own PACS in order to make direct campaign contributions, i.e., to lobby before the election as well as afterwards. Both PACs and single-issue groups fostered a concern for narrow issues and an individualistic approach to politics.

To most observers, the decline of parties and the rise of interest groups in the U.S. are related phenomena. Some (Cigler and Loomis, 1983: 20) have argued that party decline left a vacuum groups moved into. Others merely say that groups generally benefitted from party decline. At the sub-national level, the "vacuum theory" has long been advanced to explain patterns in interest group strength: political party strength is thought to be inversely related to interest group strength in the 50 states (Zeigler, 1983; Morehouse, 1981). In any case it is hard to imagine that the present configuration of political influence could have occurred if American political parties had remained strong and vital organizations.

Both the interest group and parties components of the "New Politics" have been documented by scholars. There is general agreement that interest groups in Washington, D.C., have proliferated (Ippolito and Walker, 1980: 281; Hrebemar

& Scott, 1982: 257; Cigler and Loomis, 1983: 10; Berry, 1984: 18; Salisbury, 1983: 357; Schlozman, 1984: 13). Walker (1983: 395) in the most extensive research on the topic concludes: "Despite these reservations about each source of data, all available evidence points in the same direction, namely that there are many more interest groups operating in Washington today than in the years before World War II." In addition to his own survey of interest group formation, Walker mentions an increase in the number of groups listed in Washington Representatives. Moreover, the popular press routinely asserts that interest groups have grown in alarming fashion (e.g., Newsweek, 1978). No analysis of interest group growth outside of Washington has been done but it is assumed that a concomitant increase has occurred elsewhere in the United States (Olson, 1982).

There is also widespread agreement that the number of citizen groups has increased. Again Walker (1983: 394) has documented their growth in Washington: "There is no doubt that the number of citizen groups has grown rapidly during the past twenty years in several policy areas." Jeff Berry's survey (1977) of public interest groups offers corroborative evidence. Berry adds (1984: 22) that "the growth of citizen group politics is surely even greater at the local level than in Washington." Single-issue groups, so maligned in the popular press (e.g., Newsweek, 1978), are a subtype of citizen groups as are the older public interest groups. Clearly both subtypes have contributed to the increase since single-issue groups were almost unknown before the mid-1970s and PIGS

before the late 1960s. More generally, most scholars agree (e.g., Ippolito and Walker, 1980: 18; Hrebemar and Scott, 1982: 256) that interest representation is now more balanced. Business has to share its access to lawmakers not only with labor but also with the New Right, citizen groups, single-issue groups, PIGS, and professional associations.

An important exception to this general statement is provided by Kay Schlozman (1984) who found that while many new public interest groups were born during the 1960s and 1970s, many also died. The high rate of attrition among public interest organizations means that they actually constituted a smaller proportion of the group universe in the 1980s than they did in the 1960s. The relative stability of business organizations meant that they, in contrast, were an even more dominant interest in the 1980s than in the 1960s, according to Schlozman's data. Given the paucity of data from the earlier era, it is difficult to tell whether her figures are more accurate than Walker's. But her results do suggest the necessity for working from a complete historical record when making empirical estimates.

Other scholars and journalists have written about party decline (e.g., Broder, 1972; Burnham, 1970; Crotty and Jacobsen, 1980), drawing upon evidence that partisan identification, voter turnout, and confidence in parties have declined as the same time that issue voting has increased. The impact of PACs upon party decline has received the most attention from U.S. scholars. At the federal level political action

committees continue to grow in number, in the total amount of money contributed to campaigns, and in the proportion of total campaign receipts contributed by PACs (Sorauf, 1984: 37-39). Less is known about the operation of PACs within states but evidence from Wisconsin (Sorauf, 1984: 39) and California (Patterson, 1983: 146) indicates that PACs are also growing at the state level. Their impact upon state political parties may be somewhat mitigated in the 15 states which offer public financing of elections.

The Advocacy Explosion outside the U.S.

In the European context the recent proliferation of groups almost appears to be a truism as well. For example, Richardson, Gustafsson, & Jordan (1982) assert: "It is not difficult to show that the number of interest groups seeking an active role in policy-making, at both national and local levels, has increased very considerably." They cite evidence of an increased number of groups in the United Kingdom, West Germany, Denmark, France, and Sweden. Of course, in some of these countries, especially the Scandinavian democracies, the interest group system was already much more extensive than in the United States so that great percentage increases over a decade are not possible.

The Western European "advocacy explosion" has taken two forms: first, a surge in "unconventional" forms of participation: sit-ins, demonstrations, protests and other channels of direct action. This phenomenon has not been a part of the U.S. experience in the 1980s. A second characteristic of the recent "advocacy explosion" in Western

Europe has been increased activity and demands from existing groups. In Sweden, for example, long-established organizations have become more active participants (Ruin, 1982). This characteristic has been noted in the U.S. as well. Schlozman & Tierney's survey of Washington pressure groups found that 88% had become more active in recent years (1983: 359). Interestingly, they had increased their use of all lobbying techniques, both old and new devices. Hence, increased activity is part of the phenomenon everywhere. Now we turn to an examination of the alleged effects of the advocacy explosion, again starting with the U.S.

The Effects of the Advocacy Explosion: the U.S. case.

The increase of interest groups and of PACs and the decline of political parties have been generally viewed as having negative effects. Journalistic accounts of single-issue groups (e.g., Newsweek, 1978) are full of negative perceptions, especially from politicians frightened or defeated by single-issue tactics. Scholars have mentioned a number of negative effects as well. First, interest groups are blamed for our economic woes. Mancur Olson (1982) argues that interest groups are responsible for reducing efficiency, aggregate income, and economic growth while increasing regulation and the role of government. He tests his thesis, in part, by comparing membership in special-interest organizations with rates of economic growth in the American states. Olson finds a negative relationship, thus confirming this thesis.

Second, the recent changes in representation are said to increase the overall influence of interest groups in the legislative process either by the influx of PAC campaign funds or by fear of retribution at the polls. There is little definitive research on the question of group influence upon public policy in the U.S. Congress or state legislatures. Certainly there are well-known examples (the used car dealers and the Federal Trade Commission for example) but no conclusive study.

Third, interest groups and their PACs are thought to have undue influence in American elections: by favoring incumbents rather than challengers, by increasing the importance of money in winning elections, by negative campaigning, and more generally by putting victory or defeat in the hands of group organizers rather than party leaders. Money was found to be the critical variable in contests between incumbents and challengers, according to Jacobson's (1980) analysis of congressional elections. When this finding is coupled with the fact that about 2/3 of PAC contributions go to incumbents (Sorauf, 1984: 45), then it is plausible that PACs do affect electoral outcomes.

The Advocacy Explosion's effects outside the U.S.

The primary focus of scholarly attention toward European interest groups has been their corporatist structure (see for example Schmitter & Lehbruch, 1979; Lehbruch & Schmitter, 1982). Corporatism presupposes a high level of interest organization so by extension, group proliferation would tend

to accentuate most effects of corporatism. Indeed, overcrowded policy communities are often identified as one of the main reasons for overloaded government (Richardson, Gustafsson, & Jordan, 1982). It is increasingly difficult to govern as more and more groups must be accommodated in decision-making. Increased participation slows down decision-making and reduces the political system's ability to respond quickly.

These concerns are shared by Gais, Peterson, & Walker (1984) who see some of the same problems developing in the U.S. They argue that the decline of traditional subgovernments and the expansion of groups has produced a fundamental shift in American politics. Now the policy making system is "conflictual, permeable, and unpredictable", hard to govern in other words. They view the president and Congress as overwhelmed by group demands and ideological conflict, unable to achieve consensus.

One specific effect of group proliferation has received special attention: economic growth. Mancor Olson (1982) argues that interest groups are responsible for the differential growth rates experienced by developed democracies since World War II. In his view, older stable societies will foster more groups who will inevitably slow down economic expansion. Countries in which group life has been destroyed by war or revolution will enjoy greater subsequent economic growth. Due to the small number of countries involved, Olson does not attempt cross-national empirical verification of his thesis. Rather, as mentioned above, he tests his thesis on the American states.

Finally, an interesting attempt at combining corporatist and "Olsonian" analysis is Paloheimo's study of labour dispute activity in 18 countries (1984). He reasoned that the negative conflictual effects Olson feared would be controlled by the corporatist mode and would be given free rein in pluralist societies. Indeed, he confirmed his theory: distributive conflict as measured by strikes was lower in nations classified as corporatist and higher in those deemed to be pluralist. Thus, overall, there is considerable evidence in European nations that group intensification is producing identifiable policy effects.

Origins of the Advocacy Explosion

We turn now to an examination of the origins of the advocacy explosion. The major explanations will be discussed only for the U.S. experience as they are fairly distinct from explanations of corporatist development. Probably the major explanation is postindustrialism. A large group of scholars (Bell, 1973; Benjamin, 1980; Ladd, 1978; Morehouse, 1981; Cigler and Loomis, 1983) accepts the proliferation of groups and their new forms as a natural consequence of America's becoming a postindustrial society. In their view, rising affluence and changes in class structure led to rising expectations and divisive conflict which cannot be accommodated within traditional political parties. Interest groups with their narrower concerns can better represent the issues generated by postindustrial conflict. In particular, affluence lowers the cost of mobilizing individuals, thereby facilitating group formation, especially that of expressive groups. Thus, from the postindustrial perspective, the

current level of group activity in the U.S. is inevitable, even though it may be lamentable.

A second partially related explanation for the explosion of interest groups is a reaction formation theory: groups produce other groups. According to this view, a participation explosion began in the United States in the 1960s with the civil rights and anti-war movements. The successes of these movements stimulated new social movements among women, minorities other than blacks, and homosexuals. Similarly, the success of one public interest group, Common Cause, fostered many other such noneconomic groups. Federal requirements for citizen participation in over two hundred programs mobilized countless others new to political activity. Then counter organization set in. By the end of the 1970s numerous New Right groups had been formed in reaction to the liberal mobilization just described. The success of the Right in the 1980 national elections then spurred new counter-organization on the Left.

What differentiates this theory from Truman's (1951) equilibrium theory is the crucial role of affluence. Affluence accounts for the timing of the current group explosion. The validity of this explanation is shown by Walker's (1983) finding that large numbers of groups received start-up funds from outside sources, a generosity made possible by affluence. Indeed, 89% of the citizen groups in his survey received such assistance. Walker (1983: 404) concludes that group patrons largely determine the composition and number of interest groups in the American political system. From this perspective, increased group activity may be beneficial if the represen-

tation of interests is balanced.

A third explanation of the current advocacy explosion in the U.S. is a state-centered one. Government has contributed to organizational growth by changing campaign finance laws to facilitate PAC formation, by mandating citizen participation in poverty programs, and by promoting labor unions in a variety of ways. More generally, the expansion of government's scope has led to organizations mobilized around each federal benefit program. Government also partially funds some organizations, particularly professional ones.

At the same time, governmental actions provoke group activity in opposition. The expansion of governmental regulation is often given as a reason for a business joining an interest group or starting a PAC (Sorauf, 1984: 67; Berry, 1984: 36; Schlozman & Tierney, 1983: 367). Thus, in intended or unintended ways the state may spur the expansion of interest groups. According to this view, the excesses of individual groups as well as the total number of groups could be curbed by government.

Still another way in which the national government has provoked change among interest groups is the change in Congress itself. Schlozman & Tierney (1983) report that 28% of their respondents mention this as the reason for their increased activity. The expansion of subcommittees, open meeting requirements, greater turnover among members, and overall "democratization" all mean more work for lobbyists. They can no longer just contact a few powerful chairmen to make their case.

In summary, Washington's advocacy explosion is a well-

delineated concept. Several scholars have documented the empirical dimensions of increased interest group activity. Journalists, politicians, and political observers believe even more firmly in the existence of an interest group explosion. Moreover, there is a widely-shared, if not well-documented, view that the explosion's effects upon American democracy have been deleterious. Several distinct explanations for the growth in interest groups have been offered, though not fully tested. A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred in many Western European nations as well.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADVOCACY EXPLOSION

Throughout the discussion we have seen that most observers notice the same trends at the state level in the U.S., perhaps even more clearly than at the national level, though no systematic examination has been undertaken at the subnational level. There is every reason to believe that interest group and PAC activity has increased in state capitols. First, many of the group sectors exhibiting the greatest increases nationally function mainly at the grassroots level: single-issue groups such as anti-abortion, anti-gun control, and anti-ERA groups; neighbourhood and citizen groups; feminist and gay rights groups. All of these have made numerous appearances before city councils and state legislatures. Second, interstate and regional competition for business and industry provides a state locale for much private sector lobbying. Tax and regulatory policy are a significant focus for much state level lobbying. Thus, private sector lobbies should be at least as active today as in the

past. Historically, by far the largest proportion of lobbyists at the state level has represented business (Zeigler, 1983: 99). Third, as President Reagan attempts to shift governmental functions to the state level, lobbying activity should increase concomitantly.

In addition to changes in the level of activity, there is another reason for studying state level lobbying. State legislatures are often thought to be dominated by interest groups, even more so than the Congress. This is to be expected because lobbyists are usually more influential in less professional legislatures (Zeigler, 1983: 121). Many, perhaps most, state legislatures are less professional than is the U.S. Congress.

So for all these reasons a study of interest group activity in the states should be a useful endeavor. For such a study we need either to study all fifty states comparatively or to study a state which a priori exhibits a high level of interest group organization. Since historical data is not available nationwide, we have chosen the state of Minnesota as the research site. We will supplement that study with reference to other states where possible.

Why Minnesota?

In terms of social and economic conditions, Minnesota is fertile territory for interest groups. First, by most measures Minnesota qualifies as a post-industrial state. Its share of manufacturing employment is smaller than the national average, and its share of service employment is larger. Moreover,

Minnesota's manufacturing employment has declined more dramatically (from 26.5% in 1953 to 21.0% in 1979) than the national average, and its growth in service employment has increased faster (from 12% in 1953 to 20.0% in 1979) than the national average (Minneapolis Tribune, 1984: 16).

A closer look at labor force composition shows Minnesota's post-industrial nature more clearly. Its high-technology employment is well above the national average (32% versus 28%). The Tribune in a thorough report on the state's economy summarized as follows: "...Minnesota is to the rest of the nation what highly developed Japan is to poorer, low-wage areas of the Far East. Like Japan, Minnesota is shifting away from basic manufacturing in such areas as clothing and electronic assembly. Like Japan, it is moving more into high-tech production or so-called knowledge industries, which require skilled workers and professional people as well as the taxes to educate them and assure them an attractive quality of life" (Minneapolis Tribune, 1984: 3). The governmental sector also exhibits the characteristics expected of a post-industrial state: Minnesota is among the highest expenditure states, usually 7th or so in terms of per capita expenditures.

Turning to the second explanation of group formation -affluence-, Minnesota is relatively well-off, ranking 18th in per capita personal income in 1981 (Statistical Abstract, 1982: 427). It had relatively few families (7.0%) living below the poverty line in 1979, the sixth best record of any state (Statistical Abstract, 1982: 443). Also Minnesota

ranks above average in the proportion of citizens completing college.

The third explanation also appears plausible in the case of Minnesota. The state may provide an occasion for political organization since the scope of government is broad and since regulations are many. In recent years, business lobbies have been active in fighting the alleged "bad business climate." In the oft-cited Alexander Grant report, Minnesota's business climate ranked 43rd (out of 50) in 1984 (quoted in National Journal, 1984: 1270). Hence, there is plenty of reason to expect both beneficiaries and opponents of government programs to organize.

Moreover, the general political climate is one that has long nourished group activity. Minnesota's politics has been classified as issue-based since Fenton's study (1966) of Midwest Politics. Its political culture is described by Daniel Elazar as moralistic (1984), a subculture in which politics revolves around the betterment of the commonwealth. In such subcultures political parties are less important and other organizations take over their functions. In addition, Minnesotans are highly participatory: their voter turnout is traditionally among the highest in the nation. Thus, its citizens have a habit of participating regularly in politics in an independent issue-oriented manner.

When we turn to gross indicators of interest group activity in Minnesota, we find the expected: Minnesota has a rich group life. In 1980 there were 687 groups registered to lobby the legislature (Gray and Wall, 1982: 25). Only the states of Texas, California, Florida, and Pennsylvania

had more groups registered. When one considers Minnesota's small population of four million people, this level of group activity is remarkable indeed.

Minnesota also has a diverse array of interest groups. Compared to other states, it has a small proportion of business groups, 52.6% in 1980. In particular, Minnesota has a reputation for single-issue politics, centering around the gun control and abortion issues (Halva-Neubauer, 1981; Merrick and Frank, 1980). Minnesota also has other kinds of citizens groups: environmental, MPIRG (a Nader organization), gay rights, nuclear freeze, feminist groups, etc.

Thus, Minnesota would appear to be a good place to trace the growth and diversity that has seemingly characterized organizational life in the last decade. Fortunately, for our purposes Minnesota has long required registration of lobbyists and has records going back to 1963. The original documents are filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives; the clerk's office generously allowed us to use these records. Since 1980 the state Ethical Practices Board has published summaries of these documents. Beginning in 1976, political action committees were allowed by state law; reports on their activities have been published by the Ethical Practices Board since 1978. In both cases, compliance with the registration requirements seems high, and the record-keeping appears quite good. As a result, the quality of the data should be high.

The data base for this study then consists of lists of organizations that had registered lobbyists from 1963-1983

and organizations that had registered political action committees from 1978-1983 in Minnesota. Under Minnesota law, a lobbyist is any individual who spends more than five hours in any month or more than \$250 in any year for the purpose of attempting to influence legislative or administrative action. The group is the unit of analysis in our study rather than the lobbyist because we are interested in group structure rather than the act of lobbying per se. Excluded are state agencies and private individuals lobbying for themselves. We believe that the resulting lists represent the universe of politically active groups in Minnesota over the past 20 years.

A PAC, on the other hand, refers to Minnesota's political funds. They are associations of two or more persons that accumulate dues or voluntary donations for the purpose of influencing elections. Also registered are political committees, primarily units of political parties. Our list does not include the latter organizations. Since both candidates and PACs must report disbursements and expenditures, even if there is no activity, the incentive for compliance is high. Again, we think the list includes all donors active in Minnesota campaigns over the past six years.

Both the PAC and interest group data were coded in similar ways by the same person. When the nature of the group could not be ascertained from its name, every effort (e.g., consulting political experts and politicians) was made to find out the group's purpose. Still, a few unknown groups remain, particularly from the early years.

Both sets of organizations were coded according to the same two-dimensional typology. This is a departure from the usual single dimension coding scheme (see Morehouse, 1981; Zeigler, 1983) which tends to mix substance with several other dimensions. Each of our dimensions has several major categories and each of these in turn has several subcategories. The subcategories can then be aggregated in a variety of ways according to the analytic purpose involved.

The first dimension is type. It includes the following major categories (and their associated subcategories): business (single businesses and trade associations), labor unions (both public and private employee unions), professional associations (professionals employed in either the public or private sectors), farm groups, local government (governments, associations of governments, and school districts), and citizen groups (service clubs and cause groups).

The second dimension is called content and includes 26 substantive subcategories. They are aggregated into the following broad categories: industrial (manufacturing, construction, transportation), postindustrial (banking, insurance, law, health, communication, servicing other firms), retail (small business or retail, hotel or restaurant, liquor), issues (religion, welfare, women, taxes, good government, environment, property rights, politics), intergovernmental (education, police, fire, general local government), and energy-resources.

The first dimension-type-allows investigation of the traditional view that business dominates state politics versus

the view that the rise of citizens groups has brought diversity (Zeigler, 1983: 99). The second dimension allows evaluation of hypotheses about postindustrialism and the issue content of politics (Morehouse, 1981; Benjamin, 1980). In addition, the subcategories can be recombined into other categories as the investigation dictates.

Data Analysis

First, we examine the generally accepted notion that the number of interest groups has increased dramatically in recent years. Figure 1 displays the total number of registered groups in Minnesota. While an upward trend is evident for Minnesota interest groups, what is more striking is the variability over time. The number of groups peaked in 1973 with over 800 registered, then fell to about 650 for several years, finally reaching nearly 800 again in 1983. These data suggest that the steadily increasing trend most people have in mind is not the case in Minnesota. Rather group activity waxes and wanes from one session of the legislature to the next. None of the theories examined earlier can account for this variability.

Next, we examine the growth of specific kinds of groups. According to Figure 1, Minnesota business groups experienced a big jump in 1973 and have continued to rise more moderately since then. Other kinds of groups also experienced a rise in 1973 but in contrast to business, they declined thereafter. The drop was particularly sharp for governmental groups. Labor unions and citizens groups sunk to a lower plateau in the post-1975 period. Professional groups (not pictured) have begun to recover from their falloff and have entered a new

plateau. Still none of these sectors has recovered the vigor of the early 1970s. Thus, it appears that the advocacy explosion benefitted the private sector, not Minnesota's public sector.

An analysis of the relative market shares of each sector can further illustrate this point. Here the focus is on the diversity and balance in the configuration of groups rather than their absolute numbers. In Figure 2 we contrast the proportion of groups from business, the proportion from citizens organizations, and the proportion from the public sector, including public unions, public professional associations, local governments, associations of local governments, school districts, and universities. In Minnesota, business groups are the dominant type, just as they are in all states. The relative size of the business lobby in Minnesota has risen over time with the biggest increase coming in 1975, as public sector groups were declining. Prior to 1975 business groups amounted to less than 50% of all groups; since that time they have accounted for over 55% of the group universe.

This proportionate increase seems to have come at the direct expense of groups representing the public sector. The latter declined sharply between 1973 and 1975 and has only recently begun to rally. Citizen groups are interesting because they have changed very little. In 1963 they accounted for 10% of the total universe, slowly moved up to 16% in 1975, and then settled back down to 14%. This is unexpected, since citizen groups are the sector perceived to have experienced much growth nationwide.

Still another way to explore the group universe is to look at the economic content of organizations. Accordingly, we array groups by whether they represent the postindustrial sector or the industrial sector in the case of economic groups or whether they focus on issues in the case of noneconomic groups. We anticipate, on the basis of Benjamin (1980) and Morehouse (1981), that the postindustrial sector will exhibit growth over time as will the issues component. Figure 3 partially confirms this view. The number of groups from post-industrial firms (e.g., banking, communications) has been growing since 1971. After 1973 the industrial sector declined and now has 150 groups as compared to postindustrial's 230. Contrary to expectations, however, groups focusing upon issues have not demonstrated growth since 1973. Rather, they have been on a long-term plateau. Thus, it appears that Minnesotans did not increase their attention to issues perhaps because their politics has long been issue-oriented. The sectors of the economy which mobilized politically did change. The fact that postindustrial firms increased and industrial firms did not suggest that mobilization might be characteristic of younger industries, perhaps seeking protection from their state government. More mature industrial firms, for whatever reason, do not organize to cushion their sector's decline.

Besides lobbying the legislature, an interest group may seek to influence the outcome of an election, typically by forming a PAC. Thus, just looking at registered lobby groups may no longer describe the entire picture. Figure 4 shows that like registered lobby groups, political action committees

have also increased in Minnesota. In the first year of reporting there were 166; by 1983 there were 255 registered. Thus, the growth in PACs conforms more to the theories cited than does the trend in lobby groups.

Over time the composition of the PAC universe has become somewhat more balanced, as seen in Figure 5. Initially PACs were a labor union phenomenon in Minnesota as they were everywhere; but labor PACs have declined from over 50% of the funds to less than 40%. This decline has been picked up by each of the other sectors: business now has slightly over a quarter of all PACs (even though corporate PACs are illegal in Minnesota), citizens' groups about 15%, and professional associations about 11%. Hence, the PAC landscape is different from the registered lobby scene where business dominates, although neither fits the usual expectation for citizens' groups. Overall, the PAC structure is smaller and more balanced than is the group structure.

The Minnesota situation is in contrast to the continuing increase in national PACs, both affiliated and unaffiliated ones. It has been argued that PACs are formed by businesses to fight regulation (Sorauf, 1984) or by extremist groups (Gais, 1983). Not so in Minnesota where PACs are sometimes employed by business and rarely employed by ideological groups.

Now we turn to an evaluation of the strategies of political organizations. Although we have not uncovered a recent interest group explosion, perhaps it is the case that more groups are forming PACs, and PACs are more noticeable to the general public. For this analysis we merged the two data sets

to produce a cross-listing of all politically active groups and PACs in Minnesota from 1980-83. From this cross-tabulation we had a total of 1383 active groups that could be coded. Of this total, 80.5% were lobby groups only, 12.4% were PACs only, and 7.2% were organizations with both a lobbying arm and a PAC. Therefore, the PAC strategy is one that established Minnesota groups choose infrequently. Most groups still approach their tasks in the traditional way; few are affiliated PACs; fewer still use a mixed strategy.

A final possibility that can be explored in an effort to find the advocacy explosion is to use the lobbyist as the unit of analysis instead of the group. Maybe observers see more individual lobbyists trying to influence the legislature and infer that new organizations are being formed. For selected years in Minnesota we were able to reorganize the data so as to extract the number of individuals registered to lobby. Figure 6 gives this information. The number of lobbyists increased from 1963 to 1973 when it peaked. Since then the numbers have declined. Thus, the trend is much like Figure 1's trend for the numbers of groups except that the number of lobbyists continues to decline. For this reason the data on lobbyists give even less evidence of an advocacy explosion than do the group data.

Minnesota in Perspective

Although we cannot look at other states in historical detail, we can compare Minnesota to other states today. This will give us the parameters of the advocacy explosion in the

50 states. Unfortunately we will not be able to tell how much group structure has changed over time nor how different sectors are represented over time.

First, we examine data on PACs registered in the capitols of 38 states; the remainder either do not allow PACs or do not make their lists available (Interstate Bureau of Regulations, 1984). Figure 7 shows that California has 1938 PACs, Texas is second with 1165, followed by Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Colorado. Minnesota is in the next tier of states, those with 200-300 PACs. (Note that some states include party unit committees in their list of PACs; this inflates their totals compared to Minnesota where they were excluded). Thirteen states have 100-200 PACs, and fourteen have less than a hundred. Thus, at least by 1983 the PAC explosion had reached only a handful of states, those which are populous and which have powerful economic interests. Whether PACs will eventually take hold and increase no one knows but currently they are not a frequently recurring phenomenon in most states.

In terms of traditional interest groups, Minnesota is toward the top of the scale. Figure 8 displays these data in the same format as Figure 7. As of 1980, Florida had over 800 groups registered; California, Pennsylvania, and Texas had between 700 and 800; then Minnesota with 685, followed by five states with 400-500. Most states had fewer groups, clustered in the 200-400 range, with some states having only a little over a hundred groups. So even if the latter set

of states has experienced an advocacy explosion in the 1970s as compared to earlier times, their legislatures are not over-run by lobbyists. The "advocacy explosion" would not appear to be an appropriate description for any but the largest states. The level of interest representation, whether by traditional interest groups or especially by PACs, is modest and proportionate to the size of the state's population.

CONCLUSION

We began this discussion by describing the advocacy explosion and associated components of the "New Politics" in Washington, D.C. After noting its similarities to Europe, we then searched for evidence of this explosion in a likely spot, the state of Minnesota. We found little indication of great increases in Minnesota's group life, either in the aggregate or within selected sectors. Nor do we see evidence of the outcomes predicted by the "New Politics" argument when we look at state-by-state data on groups or PACs. Rather, the picture that emerges is one of political stability, with the changes occurring either too early, in the case of Minnesota interest groups, or too modestly, in the case of Minnesota PACs, to be labelled an advocacy explosion.

We regard these findings as suggestive, rather than definitive for a number of reasons. First, our research focused on changes in group composition in a single state. Minnesota, like its Scandinavian birthplace, has a rich group life. Perhaps other states with undeveloped group systems would exhibit different patterns. Second, we have studied only the numbers of registered groups. We have not attempted to study the power groups derive from membership, economic resources, leadership skill etc. It is possible that interest groups have become more powerful even though not more numerous.

Despite these caveats, we would argue that our findings

and perhaps those of Schlozman (1984) at the national level suggest that more evidence of an advocacy explosion must be produced before its existence is accepted. While it "seems like" there are more groups everywhere today, we need to do the historical research before we can say for sure. While it "seems obvious" that the group system is now more balanced, both our research and Schlozman's shows that business is at least as dominant as before. So the traditional call for more research is especially appropriate here.

We suspect that the key to understanding the impact of the purported explosion is to be found in an analysis of the institutions groups lobby. Schlozman & Tierny (1983) showed that Congressional reforms generated unanticipated increases in lobbying activity of all kinds. Likewise, there have been numerous reforms in state legislatures across the country. For instance, the trend toward full-time professional legislators (with no other job to fall back on) may dispose incumbents to be more receptive to group pressure. All these changes need to be considered in a full explanation of the advocacy explosion.

Fig. 1. Number of Interest Groups in Minnesota, By Type




Fig. 2. Percentage of Interest Groups in Minnesota, By Type




Fig. 3. Number of Registered Groups in Minnesota, By Content




Fig. 4. Number of PACs in Minnesota




Fig. 5. Percentage of PACs in Minnesota, By Type




Fig. 6. Number of Registered Lobbyists in Minnesota




Fig. 7. Number of Registered PACs by State, 1983





Fig. 8. Number of Registered Lobby Groups, By State, 1980



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MILITANTISME ASSOCIATIF

ET

CARRIERE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE

Daniel GAXIE

Michel OFFERLE

Université de Paris I

Département de Science Politique

Centre de Sociologie Politique

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ECPR Workshop "Voluntary associations

in the democratic system"

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Ne pas citer

Le changement * de majorité intervenu en France au printemps 1981 a attiré l'attention des commentateurs politiques sur quelques uns des attributs les plus apparents du personnel politique renouvelé : jeunes, barbus, naïfs et enseignants à l'Assemblée nationale; joyeux pagailleurs et irresponsables dans les cabinets ministériels : "Voilà la France transformée en un vaste C.E.G. fraternel (...). Inscrivez-vous au club Léo Lagrande de la Ve bis ! (...)" "Fin du protocole, on se tutoie. Le style militant protégeant des formalismes inhibants, entretient la foi démocratique : on discute passionnément dans les cabinets (...). Les lampions de la fête s'éteindront. Le style militant PS restera. Avec ses pesanteurs bon enfant : le temps perdu en d'interminables palabres héritées des réunions syndicales dans les arrières-salles de bistrot" (1).

Et de fait l'alternance apparaît bien d'abord sous cet aspect : ramené au grossissement et la simplification qu'apporte toute opération de désignation, il semble bien que les militants ont chassé les énarques. D'abord parce que quelques trajectoires typiques s'imposent comme mode de lecture de la situation nouvelle .

Pierre Mauroy nommé Premier ministre n'est-il pas un pur produit de cet itinéraire militant : membre des jeunesses socialistes, puis du Parti socialiste, secrétaire général du Syndicat national de l'enseignement technique de la Fédération de l'Education nationale (FEN), fondateur des clubs Léo Lagrande, il accède au secrétariat fédéral du département du Nord après 17 ans de militantisme diversifié.

* Nous tenons à remercier Michèle DOUGÉ pour l'efficace collaboration qu'elle a bien voulu nous apporter au cours de cette enquête.

(1) Jacqueline REMY, "Le style François 1er", L'Express, 25.9.1981. L'article rend bien compte à titre d'illustration de l'ironie amusée avec laquelle une bonne partie des commentateurs a stigmatisé l'intrusion des agents des coulisses sur la scène pour reprendre l'expression de E. GOFFMANN (La mise en scène de la vie politique. La présentation de soi) Paris, Minuit, 1973.

Symptomatique : l'accession au poste de ministre du Temps libre d'André Henry ^{qui} après 20 ans de militantisme dans la FEN, en était devenu le secrétaire général en 1974.

Révélatrice : la nomination de Jeannette Laot, ancienne ouvrière des tabacs et membre de la direction de la Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), à un poste de chargée de mission au Secrétariat général de la Présidence de la République.

Caractéristique également l'arrivée des magistrats "contestataires", tel Louis Janet (Secrétaire général puis président du syndicat de la Magistrature) auprès de Pierre Mauroy ou Hubert Dujardin conseiller au Cabinet de Robert Badinter ministre de la Justice, et aussi de Gérard Monatte gardien de la paix honoraire, policier syndicaliste, fondateur de la Fédération Autonome des Syndicats de police, appelé auprès du directeur de la police nationale puis du secrétaire d'Etat chargé de la Sécurité Publique.

Cette ascension de dirigeants syndicaux n'est pas seulement recon- nue ou stigmatisée par les commentateurs politiques, elle est aussi mise en valeur par les intéressés eux-mêmes qui soulignent dans leur biographie tout ce qui peut rappeler l'origine de leur "vocation" d'homme politique : caractéristique ainsi l'article consacré à Michel Lambert professeur de philosophie, député de la IIIe circonscription de l'Orne : militant d'abord à l'Union nationale des étudiants de France (UNEF) il enseigne ensuite dans une institu- tion privée : il adhère au syndicat CFDT de l'enseignement privé et participe à la fondation d'un Comité d'entreprise. Conseiller municipal de Flers en 1977 puis adhérent du Parti socialiste, il déclare se sentir avant tout "militant

syndical" (2).

Enfin, le développement du poids des appareils syndicaux et de la mouvance associative (3) est également relevé par le premier ouvrage à prétention explicative consacré au renouvellement du personnel politique : avec mesure quant à l'évaluation quantitative du phénomène, mais avec démesure quant à son explication. M. Dagnaud et D. Mehl ont ainsi suggéré que "le souffle cédétiste" avait pénétré le sérail gouvernemental, que la CGT avait fait une "incursion discrète" et que nombre de "juges rouges" avaient peuplé "les cabinets roses" (4). L'apparition d'un tel personnel politique - parmi les ministres, les députés et les membres des cabinets ministériels, a donc été interprété comme l'une des novations importantes de la situation inédite créée par les résultats électoraux de 1981 : ce sont ces principes d'interprétation que nous voudrions interroger.

Il s'agira donc ici d'analyser les propriétés, les mécanismes de recrutement et de carrière de la fraction du personnel politique en place depuis 1981 qui est issue des syndicats et des organisations collectives.

En délimitant tout d'abord un objet d'étude mieux définissable : l'impression vague de militantisme associatif ou syndical n'est pas une catégorie opératoire. Nous y reviendrons d'ici peu.

En soulignant que ce type d'insertion dans le champ politique et dans

(2) Voir Un jeune loup socialiste dans le bocage, Le Monde, 27.6.1981

(3) M. DAGNAUD, D. MEHL L'élite rose, Ramsay, 1982, p 153.

(4) Ibidem, p. 160, 168 et 176

le champ du pouvoir politique n'est ni spécifiquement français, ni totalement nouveau en France.

En effet, sans entrer dans un comparatisme qui irait au-delà des limites de cette recherche, on peut toutefois évoquer la présence de responsables syndicaux parmi le personnel politique dans nombre de pays et notamment en Grande-Bretagne où 14 % des membres de l'actuel groupe travailliste aux Communes sont des permanents syndicaux stricto sensu (5).

On peut également rappeler qu'un certain nombre de parlementaires ou de ministres MRP (P. Bacon, J. Catoire, H. Meck, A. Pailleux (6)) SFIO (A. Gazier, G. Pineau) ou PCF (A. Croizat, M. Paul, C. Tillon) ont accédé à la carrière politique à la suite d'un itinéraire syndical.

Si cette histoire reste à faire, on s'efforce d'en donner ici les premiers linéaments en essayant de retracer les étapes de notre recherche.

Partis d'une définition limitée et indigène du syndicalisme, nous avons cherché à déterminer un ensemble de propriétés qui pouvaient être au principe d'un type particulier de carrière politique ou d'insertion dans le champ du pouvoir politique.

(5) Mary ROSSELIN, Sociologie des élus depuis 1955, Colloque international: les élections législatives britanniques de 1983 reprographié 1983. Le pourcentage était de plus d'1/3 dans les années 1970

(6) Voir sur ce point G. ADAM La CFTC A. Colin, Presses de la FNSP, 1964.

Partis à la recherche des "facteurs syndicaux" de la carrière politique, nous avons construit progressivement une catégorie permettant de rassembler des titulaires de propriétés apparemment dissemblables. Nous avons été ainsi amené à l'idée, comme nous allons le montrer, que rien ne justifiait d'écarter des agents ayant accumulé du capital dans des "associations" alors que nous retenions ceux qui avaient acquis du crédit dans des "syndicats".

En effet, l'autorité politique dont un agent est le dépositaire peut reposer sur l'accumulation primitive, soit de capitaux personnels (attachés à la personne, incorporés et reconnus par des attributs et des titres socialement pertinents) soit de capitaux collectifs (délégués temporairement par une organisation dont l'agent singulier est le porte parole).

Les agents en compétition pour l'obtention de trophées politiques peuvent donc investir dans cette concurrence ces deux formes idéales ^{typiques} de capital politique : du crédit personnel ou du crédit collectif, étant entendu que ces formes ne se retrouvent jamais à l'état pur, chaque agent étant dépositaire en des proportions variables de chacune de ces espèces de capital politique.

De manière patente, la possession de capital syndical paraît avoir été privilégiée lors du changement de majorité : comme nous l'avons relevé ci-dessus, un certain nombre de syndicalistes ou d'anciens syndicalistes ont été présentés à la candidature et élus, ou ont été nommés à des postes de responsabilité politique.

Mais cette catégorie "syndicaliste" tirée de la pratique, ne

présente aucune véritable garantie pour l'analyse : si l'adoption du label "syndicat" (et non du label "amicale" ou "association") est bien le signe de la revendication d'une certaine forme de répertoire d'action, elle ne doit pas faire oublier que les intérêts que les syndicats produisent, représentent et défendent, peuvent l'être également sous des formes différentes : une association d'anciens élèves d'une grande école organise et défend tout autant qu'un syndicat les intérêts professionnels de ses membres, même si elle le fait avec des moyens dissemblables et même si ses membres disposent d'autres moyens personnels pour le faire.

En second lieu, si le terme de syndicat est associé spontanément à une certaine légitimité (défense des intérêts des plus défavorisés) ou à une certaine illégitimité (défense des droits acquis, "corporatisme") il convient de ne pas oublier que les intérêts que les syndicats de salariés mettent en scène ne sont pas différents du point ^{de vue} de l'analyse sociologique (mais d'un point de vue éthique et politique) de ceux qui forment l'objet de l'intervention des organisations de commerçants, de médecins, de chefs d'entreprise ou d'agriculteurs.

Pourquoi ne pas retenir dans notre échantillon Marc Bécam, agriculteur membre de la direction administrative de la Fédération départementale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FDSEA) du Finistère puis suppléant, député, secrétaire d'Etat et sénateur (UNR - UDR - RPR) alors que nous aurions inclus Paul Bladt, ouvrier ajusteur aux houillères de la Marne, responsable CFDT, représentant cette centrale du Conseil économique et social de Lorraine et député socialiste depuis 1981. Même si l'on est en présence de deux types différents de capital collectif, l'exclusion du premier eu égard à son appar-

tenance politique et syndicale ne saurait être sociologiquement justifiable. Au contraire, la réunion dans une même catégorie de ces deux types d'agents, différents sous d'autres rapports, permet justement de produire une autre vision et une autre division de l'espace politique inaperçue si l'on se contente de reprendre à son compte les catégories indigènes qui structurent les principes de classification pratique.

De la même manière, l'on ne voit pas quelle situation étanche on pourrait instituer, sous le rapport qui nous intéresse, celui de l'accumulation de capital collectif, entre les postes qui peuvent être occupés dans les diverses instances des syndicats patronaux ou de médecins et les sièges qui peuvent être occupés par tel ou tel agent dans les institutions officielles ayant un statut public ou para-public : ordre des médecins, chambre de commerce.

Enfin, l'on ne comprendrait pas pourquoi l'on devrait, de notre point de vue, reprendre les typologies demi-savantes qui répartissent les groupes de pression en "organisations professionnelles et en groupements à vocation idéologique" (7), en groupes d'intérêts intéressés et en groupes d'idées désintéressés.

Ces distinctions à connotation éthique reposent sur une confusion : en réduisant l'intérêt à sa seule signification matérielle, ces auteurs s'interdisent de comprendre que tous les groupes "intéressés" ou "désintéressés" supposent des agents intéressés par les profits qu' ils procurent et four-

(7) Voir par exemple Jean REYNAUD Les groupes de pression, A. Colin, Presses de la FNSP 1960, p. 13-14

nissent comme par surcroît des sous-produits externes (8).

Aussi de notre point de vue, les titres et capitaux que peuvent fournir les "groupes non économiques" doivent être placés sur le même plan que ceux qui sont accumulables dans d'autres ~~groupes~~. Bien entendu, il conviendra de rendre compte de leur inégale valeur, en les confrontant à l'état de distribution des divers capitaux, dans une conjoncture spécifique et sur un marché déterminé : sur le marché intérieur d'un parti, sur le marché politique - local ou national - ou sur le marché du pouvoir politique.

Si un attribut "syndical" peut être a priori un meilleur facteur d'ascension en ce qu'il garantit des dispositions militantes et une "clientèle" plus nombreuse, un attribut "associatif" moins institutionnalisé peut s'avérer plus rare localement (cf. l'investissement de Ch. Josselin et L. Le Pen ~~et~~ dans la renaissance du régionalisme breton), mieux ajusté au poste à pourvoir (cf. Janine Chevillard présidente d'association de parents d'élèves puis conseillère conjugale à l'Ecole des parents, appelée au Cabinet du ministre délégué à la Jeunesse et aux Sports) ou plus symbolique (cf. Le siège réservé à l'Assemblée à Gisèle Halimi avocate et dirigeante d'associations féministes et la nomination de Simone Iff, ancienne présidente du Mouvement pour le planning familial, auprès du ministre délégué chargé des droits de la femme) (9).

(8) Voir sur ce point M. OLSON Logique de l'action collective, traduction française 1978 p. 161-162 et p. 184-185 où l'auteur hésite à assimiler les "lobbies non économiques" aux "lobbies économiques"

(9) Il est à noter que les agents délégués de capital accumulé dans les "associations" disposent également de capitaux personnels beaucoup plus importants que ceux que possèdent les responsables des syndicats de salariés.

En définitive, nous avons considéré que, quelle que soit la forme juridique des organisations, quel que soit leur secteur d'activité, pouvaient faire partie de notre échantillon tous les agents issus d'associations ou d'entreprises collectives de représentation pouvant délivrer un crédit susceptible d'être mis en valeur sur les marchés politiques (10).

Il va sans dire que notre définition pose un dernier problème puisque nous n'aborderons pas ici l'ensemble des capitaux collectifs pertinents : en effet, l'accumulation de capital collectif dans les organisations partisans strico sensu (au sens courant du terme) n'a pas été pris en compte et ce, pour deux raisons : d'abord, parce que, dans le cadre de la division du travail introduite dans la recherche en cours concernant les élites en France depuis 1981, ce travail ne nous était pas imparti.

Ensuite, parce que l'affiliation politique de nombre de membres de cabinets ministériels est difficile à connaître sans une enquête approfondie : alors que les titres associatifs de tous ordres, surtout dans la conjoncture de l'année 1981, sont par de nombreux agents valorisés et valorisants : l'appartenance partisane étant au contraire considérée comme du domaine de la vie privée.

Reste à savoir à présent quels critères nous avons retenus pour constituer notre population parmi l'ensemble des responsables politiques qui

(10) Précisons ici, afin de nous démarquer une fois pour toutes des modèles naïfs et cyniques d'une certaine forme de sociologie economiciste ou néo-individualiste, que les agents qui sont titulaires de responsabilités collectives "n'accumulent pas du capital collectif pour", ils ne "cherchent pas à le rentabiliser" : ce n'est qu'une reconstruction théorique qui n'est pas superposable à la maîtrise pratique des agents, qui permet de comprendre comment des capitaux qui sont des indicateurs de dispositions, sont ou non ajustés à une position disponible dans une certaine logique de situation. Les titulaires de ces capitaux ont donc milité et ils ont acquis telle position et pour pour acquérir telle position.

peuvent avoir des liens avec la multitude d'organisations que nous avons évoquées ci-dessus : c'est-à-dire quel échantillon disposant de "capital associatif" (11) nous avons sélectionné pour les ministres, les députés, les sénateurs et les membres des cabinets ministériels, en prenant comme dates de référence, arbitrairement fixées, mai 1981-30 juin 1983.

En premier lieu, nous avons exclu de notre échantillon tous les agents dont le "capital associatif" apparaît lié statutairement à leur fonction et ne constitue pas une ressource pertinente dans leur volume global de capital possédé : un député est ainsi amené à adhérer à de multiples clubs et associations : ces adhésions renforcent son enracinement local et multiplient les interrelations avec d'autres agents délégataires de capital collectif, mais ne sont pas au principe de la carrière politique du député. Ainsi Jean Rigaud, maire d'Ecully et député UDF du Rhône appartient-il à notre échantillon, non pas parce qu'il est membre de "presque toutes les associations de sa commune, mais surtout à titre honorifique (association sportive, amicale, laïque, la Fraternelle association des familles etc...) (12), mais parce qu'il a été président des Scouts de France (1945-1950) et de l'association sportive d'Ecully (1961-1971) : les notices du journal Le Monde (rédigées à partir des renseignements fournis par les intéressés) sont un premier indicateur de l'importance que les agents accordent à leurs antécédents associatifs : celle de Jean Rigaud insiste bien sur le fait qu'il "est venu tardivement à la politique par le biais de mouvements associatifs et sportifs" (13).

(11) C'est ainsi que nous désignerons de manière cursive le type de capital collectif que nous entendons mettre en évidence

(12) Correspondance avec le secrétariat de Jean RIGAUD

(13) Le Monde, juin 1981

En second lieu, nous n'avons pas retenu les agents qui, membres d'associations ou de syndicats, n'y avaient pas exercé de fonctions (locales, régionales ou nationales) que l'on puisse corrélérer avec leur carrière ultérieure.

Même si Pierre Joxe revendique toujours avec ostentation une adhésion à la CGT (14), il n'apparaît pas dans notre échantillon, car au vu de l'ensemble de ses attributs, il ne semble pas que cette identité revendiquée soit initialement constitutive d'un capital pertinent dans l'ensemble des ressources qu'il a investies dans la compétition politique, même si les profits de distinction qui peuvent être tirés de cette appartenance ne sont pas insignifiants. De la même manière nous avons écarté tous ceux qui, cumulant du capital collectif avaient acquis du capital associatif postérieurement à leur adhésion militante à un parti ou à leur première entrée en politique : Si Georges Marchais est d'abord chronologiquement un militant syndical et figure de ce fait dans notre échantillon eu égard à cette antériorité d'engagement et aux responsabilités syndicales qu'il a exercées, Charles Fiterman, en revanche, en est exclu car la filière politique (certes collective) prime par rapport à l'accumulation préalable de capital associatif (ici syndical).

De la même manière, Roger Quilliot animateur d'associations et notamment de ciné-clubs, postérieurement à son élection au conseil municipal d'Angers n'y figure pas, alors que Paul Guillard qui a été président départe-

(14) Télévision française FR3, 8.2.1985 "Je suis syndiqué à la CGT. Je n'ai pas encore repris ma carte cette année, il faudra que j'y pense".

mental de la Mutualité agricole puis vice-président de la Chambre d'agriculture avant d'être élu sénateur indépendant de la Loire Atlantique y est inclus.

Toutefois, ce double critère - importance des responsabilités et antériorité du capital associatif par rapport au capital politique personnel ou collectif n'a pas été appliqué mécaniquement - Des affiliations n'impliquant pas un haut degré d'investissement militant, mais se caractérisant par leur rareté relative peuvent se révéler dans une conjoncture déterminée d'une assez forte rentabilité : l'appartenance à la CFDT n'est pas, à soi seul, susceptible d'ouvrir les voies d'accès à un cabinet ministériel ou à la députation ; mais le fait d'avoir été élève de l'ENA et d'y avoir pris une carte CFDT peut, après 1981, permettre d'accéder à certains postes . Il va sans dire que le capital associatif n'est ici qu'un complément - certes indispensable pour comprendre la trajectoire des agents - au capital global personnel dont ils disposent -

C'est donc souligner que le concept de "capital associatif comme forme" de capital politique collectif ne saurait être utilisé de manière décontextualisée . D'une part, il existe deux structures contrastées de ressources : soit ce capital constitue pour l'agent le seul bien rare dont il puisse faire état pour fonder une autorité politique ; soit ce capital représente un atout supplémentaire lui permettant de maximiser les autres biens rares dont il dispose . D'autre part, la rentabilité de ces deux types de capitaux collectifs ne peut être comprise qu'en référence à un espace de concurrence et dans une conjoncture déterminée.

En fait, la possession d'une carte ou l'exercice de responsabili-

tés associatives avant l'entrée en politique ne doivent pas être fétichisées : elles ne sont que l'indicateur de certaines dispositions ou propriétés que cette possession et cet exercice garantissent.

En ce qui concerne les agents eux-mêmes, l'accumulation primitive de capital associatif leur permet d'acquérir un certain nombre de propriétés distinctives et constitutives d'un habitus secondaire militant. L'exemple des responsables de l'UNEF est assez symptomatique à cet égard : sur les 11 présidents nationaux de 1956 à 1965, 6 se trouvent dans notre échantillon ; au total ce sont 29 personnes (14 députés, 13 membres de cabinets et 2 ministres) qui ont commencé par cette filière : le passage par l'UNEF a contribué à l'acquisition d'un savoir faire organisationnel et à l'apprentissage de technologies indispensables à l'exercice du travail politique : prise de parole, rédaction de tracts, maîtrise des techniques de contrôle et de manipulation d'assemblées, accoutumance à la discussion avec des responsables administratifs ou politiques... et a enraciné un sentiment de compétence politique.

Cet apprentissage précoce a également favorisé l'incorporation d'une prédisposition à une vision militante du monde, à une valorisation de ce principe de vision et, plus généralement, à un investissement dans l'univers de l'action collective : une étude systématique réalisée sur l'ensemble du personnel politique pourrait sans doute montrer que l'attention portée à tel ou tel enjeu est partiellement explicable par le type de filière suivie pour l'entrée en politique (15).

(1) Voir sur ce point la comparaison impressionniste qu'établit N. WAHL entre la carrière de F. MITTERRAND (Président au début de sa carrière d'une association de prisonniers) et P. MENDES-FRANCE Le Monde Dimanche

Enfin, le militantisme étudiant a contribué à leur faire acquérir un réseau de relations susceptibles d'être mobilisé en de multiples circonstances. En faisant la sociologie des dirigeants de l'UNEF, on pourrait évaluer dans quelle mesure l'investissement militant a pu se révéler rentable sur le champ politique comme sur le champ de la presse, voire sur le champ universitaire. Elle permettrait aussi de souligner les propriétés de ceux qui ont accédé au champ politique et au champ du pouvoir politique après un long détour. Le capital ainsi accumulé dans l'UNEF qui nous a servi d'exemple, est semblable sous bien des aspects au capital collectif associatif dans son ensemble, mais à deux distinctions près : d'une part, il est associé à un capital scolaire qui le renforce (16), mais d'autre part, il est beaucoup plus labile et éphémère que d'autres types de capitaux collectifs : la faible **durée** des mandats étudiants et la faible autorité déléguée dont disposaient les présidents, ont imposé, à ceux qui se sont trouvés engagés dans une carrière politique, de payer de leur personne et de reconvertir leur savoir faire dans de multiples organisations et dans des partis politiques.

Toutefois, quelle que soit l'organisation considérée, le capital associatif doit être reconverti en capital proprement politique par un travail de longue haleine, à moins que l'impétrant ne soit appelé à un poste de responsabilité comme délégué de l'organisation à laquelle il appartient. C'est ainsi que dans notre échantillon, une douzaine de personnes ont été nommées dans des cabinets ministériels après que le ministre concerné se fût adressé à une organisation pour lui demander de lui fournir un **responsable**

(16) Mais qu'il peut tendre à dévaluer en dehors des conjonctures favorables

compétent pour le secteur considéré : c'est ainsi que quelques syndicalistes de la CGT et de la CFDT ont pu accéder à des responsabilités dans des cabinets ministériels.

Mais l'immense majorité des membres de notre échantillon étaient déjà intégrés du fait de leur multipositionnalité dans un réseau d'inter-connaissances politico-intellectuel ou étaient déjà engagés dans une carrière politique.

Enfin, comme nous le verrons, l'appel à des délégués de capital associatif se révèle être, même dans une conjoncture apparemment favorable, doublement marginal : quantitativement tout d'abord puisque comme le montrent les chiffres ci-dessous, les possesseurs d'un capital associatif brut ou reconverti en capital politique se révèlent minoritaires parmi l'ensemble des titulaires positions envisagées ;

Délégués de capital associatif

| | |
|--|------|
| Sénateurs N 308 | 12 % |
| Députés N 491 | 14 % |
| Membres de cabinets ministériels N 540 | 15 % |
| Ministres N 58 | 22 % |

qualitativement aussi car les attributions de ces agents sont la plupart du temps inférieures à celles des agents avec lesquels ils sont en concurrence et dont l'ascension a été favorisée par la possession d'autres types de capitaux.

En effet, les délégués de capital associatif, même s'ils disposent d'une expertise spécifique attestée par une trajectoire, même si

leurs dispositions militantes garanties parfois par des épreuves et des sanctions certifient leur fermeté idéologique, même si l'apport du réseau de leurs relations peut asseoir l'autorité d'un ministre (17) et même si leurs titres associatifs peuvent assurer l'appui d'une partie mobilisable de l'électorat, subissent les effets des lois générales qui sont au principe de la concurrence pour la distribution des postes politiques.

Comme l'indique le schéma n° 1, l'accumulation de capital associatif n'est qu'une voie d'accès au marché politique central et au champ du pouvoir politique : porte étroite qui, comme nous le verrons, peut permettre à certains agents d'accéder à ces positions sous certaines conditions et dans certaines circonstances alors même que les capitaux dont ils disposent n'auraient pas pu, en règle générale, leur en ouvrir l'accès.

Il reste en dernier lieu à préciser la portée générale de notre étude. Si nous pensons avoir pu faire ressortir certains mécanismes qui sont au principe de l'accès à certaines positions politiques en montrant les propriétés des agents qui ont suivi ces trajectoires et en soulignant la place dominée qu'ils occupent dans les champs dans lesquels ils opèrent, il convient également de rappeler que les circonstances dans lesquelles s'est déroulée cette enquête, n'ont pas permis d'arriver à l'exhaustivité que nous nous étions fixée comme objectif au début de notre recherche.


Nous avons en effet dû travailler sur des biographies pré-constituées à partir des notices individuelles du Who's Who des fiches Bérard Quélin

(17) Sur les principes généraux du choix des collaborateurs des ministres sous les précédentes présidences, voir E. Suleiman Les hauts fonctionnaires et la politiques, Paris, Seuil, 1976

et Paul Dehenné et des biographies publiées dans la presse nationale française. Des renseignements complémentaires ont pu être obtenus par voie écrite et orale auprès de certains intéressés. Ceux qui disposent comme capital essentiel d'un capital associatif sont amenés à le valoriser : tel Louis Moulinet, ouvrier tourneur permanent de la JOG puis de la CFTC et de la CFDT qui, lors d'une récente émission de télévision, s'est prévalu, sans avoir été sollicité, de sa double qualité, rare affirma-t-il au Parti socialiste, d'ouvrier et de responsable syndical. Aussi, la mise en valeur par certains de leur titre n'implique pas que d'autres, qui peuvent avoir moins intérêt à en faire état, n'eussent ~~pas pu~~ faire partie de notre échantillon. De plus, l'investissement associatif qui peut être le ressort essentiel ou important de carrières d'abord locales est souvent difficile à repérer et à apprécier. Enfin, et c'est le troisième biais de notre échantillon, il ne nous a pas été possible de prendre en compte les effets de l'appartenance à une organisation spécifique dont on ne saurait ni exagérer naïvement l'importance ni ignorer l'existence : la franc maçonnerie qui pour certains agents constitue bien une source importante de multiplication des capitaux personnels initiaux.

Toutefois, en dépit des trois principaux biais que nous venons d'évoquer, nous pensons que les mécanismes que nous avons contribué à dégager, peuvent permettre d'engager une réflexion plus approfondie sur les ressorts de la carrière politique et sur les types de capitaux qui peuvent s'y investir (18).

(18) On trouvera en annexe une présentation descriptive de notre échantillon : origines associatives et syndicales, types de responsabilités exercées dans ces organisations, répartition par partis politiques des agents ayant accumulé du capital associatif.



Les filières d'accès au marché politique central

1. Les caractéristiques socio-démographiques du personnel politique
d'origine associative et syndicale

L'accès des dirigeants des partis de gauche aux positions de pouvoir politique central a-t-il favorisé un renouvellement des élites politiques ?

Les députés élus en 1981, les membres des gouvernements Mauroy, les membres des cabinets des ministres de gauche sont-ils différents de leurs prédécesseurs ? Sont-ils moins souvent issus des milieux sociaux élevés ? L'emprise sur l'exécutif de "l'establishment" d'origine sociale élevée, habitant les beaux quartiers parisiens, passé par les grandes écoles et, notamment, par l'ENA, appartenant souvent aux grands corps de l'Etat a-t-elle été remise en question ?

La question mérite d'être posée puisque les observateurs ont souligné la présence dans les rangs des parlementaires de gauche et, surtout, des nouveaux ministres et de leurs conseillers, de responsables connus des milieux syndicaux et associatifs.

Pour apprécier le renouvellement des gouvernants après 1981, et pour vérifier si la victoire électorale de la gauche a favorisé l'arrivée aux sommets de l'Etat d'agents issus de catégories sociales traditionnellement exclus des lieux de pouvoir, il faut donc procéder à une analyse des caractéristiques de ce nouveau personnel politique issu des organisations collectives.

Il importe de voir non seulement si l'élite politique dirigeante de la gauche diffère de celle qui occupait les positions de pouvoir avant 1981 mais, aussi, si l'arrivée remarquable de dirigeants syndicaux et associatifs dans les cercles dirigeants a réellement favorisé le renouvellement des élites politiques. Pour cela il faut tout d'abord se demander si le recrutement de ce type de personnel est particulier à la gauche. Or s'il n'a pas été possible dans le cadre de cette recherche d'apprécier le poids des élites issues des organisations collectives dans les gouvernements et les cabinets des septennats précédents on s'est efforcé de repérer leur présence parmi les groupes parlementaires des deux assemblées.

On constate alors que, au sein de l'Assemblée Nationale, les élites d'origine syndicale et associative siègent principalement dans les rangs des partis de gauche. Sur les 68 députés de notre échantillon 52 appartiennent au P.S., 6 au P.C., 1 au M.R.G., 5 à l'U.D.F. et 4 au R.P.R.. Au total 87 % des députés issus des syndicats et des associations appartiennent à la majorité de gauche. Par contre, au Sénat, sur 38 sénateurs dont l'ascension a été favorisée par une activité militante dans les organisations collectives 21 % seulement sont membres des partis de gauche (3 au P.C., 4 au P.S., 1 au M.R.G.) et 71 % sont dans l'opposition (22 à l'U.D.F. et 5 au R.P.R.).

Le recrutement d'élites issues des associations et des syndicats n'est donc pas un trait spécifique aux partis de gauche même si, comme on le verra, ces élites diffèrent (mais aussi d'une certaine manière présentent des traits communs) selon le parti auquel elles appartiennent.

Analyser les caractéristiques de ce type particulier d'hommes politiques c'est prendre en considération non seulement les représentants des partis de gauche mais également ceux des formations de l'opposition, non seulement les députés mais aussi les sénateurs.

Si tous les observateurs ont été frappés par l'apparition au premier plan de la scène politique d'hommes et de femmes issus des syndicats et des associations, il convient en second lieu de se demander s'il s'agit d'un phénomène nouveau pour les partis de gauche ou, au contraire, d'un procédé habituel de recrutement de leur personnel dirigeant.

On constate alors que 52 des 68 députés de l'échantillon (77 %) ont été élus pour la première fois en 1981 dont 46 sont socialistes. Ainsi 88 % des députés issus des organisations collectives qui sont entrés pour la première fois à l'Assemblée Nationale en 1981 sont socialistes et 88 % des députés socialistes issus de ces organisations ont accédé pour la première fois au mandat de député en 1981.

En ce sens le recrutement d'élites syndicales et associatives est plus traditionnel au sein du Sénat (16 % des Sénateurs qui ont suivi ces filières sont entrés au Sénat en 1980, 50 % ~~siègent~~ siègent depuis plus de 10 ans) (cf. tableau).

Paradoxalement l'accès d'élites d'origine syndicale ou associative à des positions de pouvoir politique central est un phénomène plus récent pour le (nouveau) parti socialiste que pour les autres partis y compris les partis conservateurs.

Ce phénomène n'est pourtant pas le signe d'une modification des mécanismes de recrutement et d'ascension au sein du parti socialiste. Tout se passe en réalité comme si une conjoncture électorale exceptionnellement favorable au parti socialiste avait permis :

- 1) l'accès au parlement de candidats présentés dans des circonscriptions difficiles qui se trouvent être aussi, souvent, des militants issus des organisations collectives
- 2) à des dirigeants de premier rang du parti socialiste (et du parti communiste) d'accéder au gouvernement et à leur suppléant, qui se trouve être aussi, souvent, issu de ces organisations (9 des 46 nouveaux députés de l'échantillon sont des suppléants), d'accéder à la députation.

On mesure ainsi l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à comparer le personnel au pouvoir depuis 1981 d'une part avec le personnel dirigeant des septennats précédents, d'autre part avec le personnel dirigeant du parti socialiste (et secondairement du parti communiste) dans l'opposition. Il faudrait également comparer les élites d'origine syndicales et associatives aux autres membres des syndicats et associations dont elles sont issues pour repérer si ceux des membres qui ont mis en valeur le capital social collectif de l'organisation sur les marchés politiques ne présentent pas des caractéristiques atypiques. En l'absence de données immédiatement exploitables et devant l'ampleur des recherches que leur recueil supposerait on a dû renoncer à ces comparaisons.

C'est donc en opérant une mise en relation systématique des propriétés des hommes politiques dont la carrière a été favorisée par le passage dans des associations ou des syndicats et de celles des hommes politiques occupant des positions nominalement identiques que l'on a

cherché dans le cadre de ce travail à faire ressortir l'originalité des premiers.

Car, décrire, par exemple, les caractéristiques des députés d'origine associative et syndicale en elles-mêmes n'a pas grande signification. C'est à travers la comparaison des caractéristiques de ces députés et de celles de l'ensemble des députés que l'on peut prendre la mesure de cette origine apparemment atypique. En même temps du fait que 1) le parti socialiste est majoritaire dans l'Assemblée Nationale élue en 1981 et que 2) ce parti entretient des relations étroites avec divers syndicats et associations, la plupart des députés d'origine associative sont socialistes (52 sur 68 dans notre échantillon). En comparant les députés d'origine associative à l'ensemble des députés, on risque donc d'imputer à une carrière politique favorisée par le militantisme syndical et associatif des propriétés qui sont en fait celles des députés socialistes.

Il importe donc aussi de comparer les députés d'origine associative appartenant à un parti donné à l'ensemble des députés de ce parti. Comme les effectifs concernés sont faibles pour la plupart des partis sauf pour le parti socialiste (1) on limitera ici la comparaison à ce parti. De même faut-il comparer les sénateurs d'origine associative à l'ensemble des sénateurs. Mais comme la plupart de ces sénateurs (22 sur 38) appartiennent à l'U.D.F. il faut comparer les sénateurs U.D.F. d'origine associative à l'ensemble des sénateurs U.D.F.. Et dans la mesure où, là encore, les

(1) On dénombre six députés d'origine syndicale et associative dans le le groupe communiste, un pour le M.R.G., cinq pour l'U.D.F., quatre pour le R.P.R. et cinquante deux pour le parti socialiste.

effectifs des autres forces politiques sont trop réduits (1) on se limitera pour le Sénat à cette comparaison au sein de l'U.D.F..

Dans la même logique, il faudra encore mettre en relation les membres du gouvernement et des cabinets ministériels d'origine associative à l'ensemble des membres du gouvernement et des cabinets.

On voit que pour savoir si les élites d'origine associative présentent des caractéristiques socio démographiques particulières, il faut procéder à une série de comparaisons, peut-être fastidieuses, mais certainement indispensables.

L'hétérogénéité des mécanismes de recrutement des députés, des sénateurs, des conseillers ministériels et des membres du gouvernement interdit d'opérer une comparaison globale entre le personnel politique institutionnel et la fraction particulière de ce personnel dont l'ascension a été favorisée par une activité militante dans les syndicats et les associations.

Il importe donc, dans chaque cas, de distinguer les diverses catégories d'élites selon les institutions auxquelles elles appartiennent et de procéder à des comparaisons multiples selon la logique résumée ci-dessous :

(2) On dénombre 3 sénateurs communistes d'origine syndicale et associative, quatre pour le parti socialiste, un pour le M.R.G., cinq pour le R.P.R., trois pour les non inscrits et vingt deux pour l'U.D.F..

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| Elites d'origine syndicale | SENAT | ASSEMBLEE | GOUVERNEMENT | CABINETS |
| ou associative appartenant | | NATIONALE | | MINISTERIELS |
| au → | | | | (1) |

seront comparées avec
l'ensemble des membres du →

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Elites d'origine syndicale | Groupe | Sénateurs |
| ou associative appartenant | socialiste | appartenant |
| au → | de | à l'inter- |
| seront comparées avec | l'Assemblée | groupe |
| l'ensemble des membres du → | Nationale | U.D.F. |

(1) Faute d'avoir pu mener une enquête systématique auprès de la population des membres des cabinets ministériels nous nous sommes référés aux données de Monique Dagnaud, Dominique Mehl, L'élite rose, Paris, Ramsay, 1982 bien qu'elles ne soient pas toujours parfaitement compatibles avec nos propres données.

1.1. Le sexe

Le personnel politique d'origine syndicale ou associative ne présente guère de spécificité sous le rapport de sa féminisation. Le pourcentage des femmes est tout juste un peu plus élevé parmi les députés, notamment les députés socialistes et parmi les membres du gouvernement (tableau 1).

1.2. L'âge

On n'enregistre pas non plus de différences très significatives sous le rapport de l'âge (tableau 2). Les hommes politiques issus des organisations collectives semblent seulement un peu plus jeunes en moyenne (à l'exception des membres des cabinets) que leurs pairs. Cette précocité relative est peut-être le signe à la fois d'une ascension plus rapide mais aussi d'une certaine marginalité dans le champ politique. On peut en tout cas se demander si la mise en valeur sur les marchés politiques de ressources collectives dont certains agents peuvent bénéficier du fait de leur appartenance à des syndicats ou associations n'est pas un élément qui vient accélérer la carrière de ces agents. Cette accélération semble d'autant plus forte que les agents disposent de ressources personnelles venant compléter les ressources collectives qu'ils s'approprient.

Ainsi, parmi les députés socialistes de l'échantillon, ceux qui ont occupé des positions sociales élevées dès leur entrée dans la vie professionnelle apparaissent un peu plus jeunes que ceux qui ont d'abord appartenu aux classes moyennes ou populaires (tableau 3).

Tableau 1. Degré de féminisation des élites politiques associatives

(Pourcentage de femmes parmi)

| | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| Les membres de l'Assemblée Nationale élue en 1981 N = 491 5 % | Les membres du groupe socialiste à l'Assemblée Nationale élue en 1981 N = 272 7 % | Les membres du Sénat en 1983 N = 308 3 % | Les sénateurs de l'inter-groupe U.D.F. N = 142 1 % | Les membres des cabinets ministériels (1981) N = 514 15 % | Les membres du gouvernement (1981-1983) N = 58 12 % |
| Les membres de l'Assemblée Nationale élue en 1981 issus des syndicats et des associations N = 68 10 % | Les membres du groupe socialiste issus des syndicats et des associations N = 52 10 % | Les sénateurs issus des syndicats et des associations N = 38 3 % | Les sénateurs UDF issus des syndicats et des associations N = 22 0 % | Les membres des cabinets ministériels (1981-1983) issus des syndicats et des associations N = 95 14 % | Les membres du gouvernement issus des syndicats et des associations N = 13 15 % |

| | Total Députés N=491 | Députés Associa- tion N=68 | Députés socialis- tes N=272 | Députés socialis- tes Associa- tion N=52 | Total Sénateurs N=308 | Sénateurs Associa- tions N=38 | Sénateurs UDF N=142 | Sénateurs UDF Associa- tion N=22 | Ensemble membres cabinets N=514 | Membres cabinets associa- tion N=95 | Ensemble membres gouver- nement N=58 | Membre gouver- nement associa- tion N=13 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--|---|--|---|
| Moins de 30 ans: | 0,2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11 | 3 | - | - |
| 30 ou 35 - 39 ans | 14 | 15 | 18 | 17 | 1 | - | - | - | 48 | 31 | 5 | - |
| 40-49 ans | 35 | 50 | 47 | 55 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 32 | 40 | 33 | 46 |
| 50-59 ans | 26 | 26 | 22 | 25 | 31 | 39 | 26 | 41 | 9 | 17 | 43 | 46 |
| 60-69 ans | 21 | 7 | 10 | 2 | 37 | 37 | 46 | 41 | | 9 | 14 | 8 |
| 70 ans et plus | 5 | 1 | 2 | - | 23 | 18 | 25 | 14 | - | - | 5 | - |
| TOTAL % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 2 - L'âge des élites politiques associatives.

Tableau 3. Age, diversification des ressources et carrière politique

| Députés socialistes issus des syndicats et associations | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Position sociale de départ élevée (appartenance aux classes supérieures dès la première profession exercée) N = 29 | Position sociale de départ moyenne ou basse (entrée dans la vie professionnelle dans des positions de classes moyenne ou populaire) N = 23 |
| Moins de 40 ans | 14 % | 22 % |
| 40-49 ans | 72 % | 35 % |
| 50- 59 ans | 14 % | 39 % |
| 60 ans et plus | - | 4 % |
| Total | 100 % | 100 % |

C'est surtout lorsque l'on tient compte de leur trajectoire sociale, que le personnel politique étudié dans le cadre de cette recherche présente les spécificités les plus accusées.

1.3. La trajectoire sociale

C'est le cas tout d'abord pour ce qui concerne son origine sociale mesurée ici à la profession du père.

1.3.1. L'origine sociale

Conformément à une loi générale désormais bien établie, plus le rang des positions de pouvoir politique dans la hiérarchie des honneurs s'élève, plus s'accroissent les titres et les ressources de toutes natures personnellement détenus par le titulaire de la position.

Les hommes politiques sont donc d'une origine sociale d'autant plus élevée qu'ils occupent des positions plus prestigieuses dans la hiérarchie des honneurs.

Cette loi est à l'oeuvre dans tous les partis politiques. On constate par exemple que les membres du gouvernement de gauche depuis 1981 sont d'origine sociale plus élevée que les députés socialistes.

En même temps, il existe des mécanismes objectifs de sélection propres à chaque parti. Les dirigeants du parti socialiste sont par exemple d'une origine sociale moins élevée que ceux des partis conservateurs. Il en résulte que l'origine sociale des députés socialistes et, par contrecoup, l'origine des députés de l'Assemblée Nationale élue en 1981 et

TABLEAU n° 4 - L'origine sociale des élites politiques associatives et syndicales

| | Total députés n = 491 | Députés association n = 68 | Députés socialistes n = 272 | Députés socialistes association n = 52 | Total sénateurs n = 308 | Sénateurs association n = 38 | Sénateurs UDF n = 142 | Sénateurs UDF association n = 22 | Total membres cabinets n = 514 | Membres cabinets association | Total membres gouvernement | Membres gouvernement association |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Industriels - gros commerçants | 9 | 3 | 2 | - | 19 | 24 | 21 | 15 | | 18 | 13 | |
| Professions libérales | 7 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 9 | 5 | | 12 | 4 | |
| Cadres supérieur privés | 5 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 5 | - | | 12 | 13 | 8 |
| Haute fonction publique | 7 | 2 | 4 | - | 3 | - | 0 | - | | 12 | 9 | |
| Fonction publique sup. | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | 6 | - | | 3 | 2 | |
| Professeurs | 2 | 0 | 2 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | | 3 | 7 | |
| Professions intellect. | 1 | 3 | 0,5 | 2 | 4 | - | 6 | - | | 3 | - | |
| Total classes supérieures | 34 | 25 | 20,5 | 22 | 44 | 33 | 48 | 20 | | 63 | 48 | 8 |
| Petits commerçants, artisans | 11 | 12 | 13 | 11 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 5 | | 18 | 7 | 8 |
| Cadres moyens privé | 7 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 5 | | 6 | 2 | |
| Cadres moyens public | 3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 2 | - | 1 | - | | 3 | 2 | |
| Instituteurs | 4 | - | 5 | - | 5 | - | 4 | - | | 3 | 9 | 8 |
| Employés privé | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | - | 2 | - | | 3 | 7 | 17 |
| Employés public | 7 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 4 | - | 1 | - | | 3 | 9 | 25 |
| Total classes moyennes | 35 | 32 | 45 | 35 | 26 | 6 | 23 | 10 | | 33 | 36 | 58 |
| Classes populaires | 18 | 28 | 20 | 28 | 9 | 9 | 4 | - | | 3 | 13 | 25 |
| Agriculteurs | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 21 | 52 | 27 | 70 | | - | 2 | 8 |
| Total général | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % |
| | N = 377 | N = 60 | N = 203 | N = 46 | N = 222 | N = 33 | N = 109 | N = 20 | | N = 33 | N = 45 | N = 12 |
| Absence d'informations | 114 | 8 | 69 | 6 | 86 | 5 | 33 | 2 | | N = 62 | 13 | 1 |

par le groupe socialiste, est en moyenne plus basse que celle des sénateurs (qui appartiennent en majorité aux partis conservateurs) ou, a fortiori des sénateurs U.D.F.. Mais on constate aussi que pour chaque catégorie ainsi distinguée (députés, députés socialistes, sénateurs, sénateurs U.D.F., membres du gouvernement (1)), le personnel politique issu des organisations collectives est, en moyenne, d'origine sociale plus basse que les autres membres de la catégorie (tableau 4) (2).

Cette origine atypique prend des formes variables selon les partis. Pour le parti socialiste donc pour les députés, les députés socialistes et les membres du gouvernement, elle se mesure principalement à l'origine plus souvent populaire des hommes politiques issus des syndicats et des associations. Pour les sénateurs et notamment les sénateurs de l'U.D.F. cette origine atypique est d'abord une origine paysanne (tableau 4).

L'origine sociale plus basse du personnel politique particulier qui est étudiée ici se double d'une position sociale de départ (mesurée à la première profession exercée) également plus basse.

1.3.2. La position sociale de départ

Car les relations dégagées ci-dessus à propos de l'origine sociale se retrouvent quand on prend en considération la première profession exercée. Elles subissent simplement une translation vers les positions hautes de

(1) Ces conclusions semblent également s'appliquer au cas particulier des membres des cabinets bien que les données de Monique Dagnaud et Dominique Mehl ne soient pas complètement comparables avec nos propres chiffres.

(2) Cette relation est encore attestée par le fait que les hommes politiques étudiés ici sont un peu moins souvent nés à Paris. Par contre, ils ne semblent pas se caractériser par une naissance en milieu rural plus fréquente (cf. tableau 8).

TABLEAU n° 5 - La position sociale de départ des élites politiques d'origine associative ou syndicale

| | Total députés n = 491 | Députés association n = 68 | Députés socialistes n = 272 | Députés socialistes association n = 52 | Total sénateurs n = 308 | Sénateurs association n = 38 | Sénateurs UDF n = 142 | Sénateurs UDF association n = 22 | Total membres cabinets n = 514 | Membres cabinets association | Total membres gouvernement | Membres gouvernement association |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Industriels - gros commerçants | 4 | - | 0,4 | - | 12 | 16 | 17 | 14 | - | - | - | - |
| Professions libérales | 15 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 22 | 5 | 21 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 8 |
| Cadres supérieurs privé | 7 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 8 |
| Cadres supérieurs public | 15 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 11 | - | 11 | - | 60 | 52 | 20 | 15 |
| Professeurs | 20 | 21 | 31 | 27 | 6 | - | 5 | - | 20 | 9 | 29 | 23 |
| Professions intellect. | 7 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 5 | - | 6 | - | 6 | 10 | 10 | 8 |
| Total classes supérieures | 68 | 50 | 66 | 56 | 64 | 29 | 69 | 24 | 91 | 75 | 81 | 62 |
| Petits commerçants, artisans | 0,2 | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cadres moyens privé | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | - | 2 | 2 | - |
| Cadres moyens public | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | - | ? | 4 | 2 | - |
| Instituteurs | 15 | 22 | 19 | 21 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 15 |
| Employés privé | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | - | 5 | - | 5 | 8 |
| Employés public | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8 | - | 8 |
| Total classes moyennes | 25 | 32 | 31 | 31 | 18 | 13 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 24 | 16 | 31 |
| Classes populaires | 5 | 18 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 5 | - | - | - | 2 | 3 | 8 |
| Agriculteurs | 2 | - | 0,4 | - | 16 | 53 | 22 | 68 | - | - | - | - |
| Total général | 100 % (488) | 100 % (68) | 100 % (271) | 100 % (52) | 100 % (302) | 100 % (38) | 100 % (138) | 100 % (22) | 100 % (437) | 100 % (91) | 100 % (58) | 100 % (13) |
| Absence d'informations | 3 | - | 1 | - | 6 | - | 4 | - | 77 | - | - | - |

l'espace social du fait que les populations étudiées sont, globalement mais inégalement selon les agents et les partis, en ascension sociale.

En même temps la position sociale de départ s'élève avec la position dans la hiérarchie des honneurs. Elle est également plus basse, en moyenne, pour les membres du parti socialiste que pour ceux des autres partis (PC excepté). Aussi, bien que la position sociale de départ s'élève quand on va des députés aux membres du gouvernement, on enregistre des différences notables dans les trajectoires des membres des gouvernements avant et après 1981.

Les membres des gouvernements de gauche ont par exemple plus souvent appartenu aux classes populaires ou moyennes au début de leur activité professionnelle que les membres des gouvernements des septennats précédents (1).

Enfin, pour chaque position de pouvoir politique (sénateur, député, membre d'un cabinet ou du gouvernement) les titulaires de la position issus des syndicats et des associations ont occupé les positions de départ (première profession exercée) sensiblement plus basses que les autres (tableau 5). Ils ont moins souvent appartenu aux classes supérieures, notamment au pôle économique dominant (Industriels, gros commerçants, professions libérales, cadres supérieurs des entreprises), et plus souvent aux classes moyennes ou populaires. Cette relation se vérifie quel que soit le parti et se retrouve aussi bien au sein du groupe socialiste de l'Assemblée Nationale que dans les groupes sénatoriaux de l'U.D.F. (2).

(1) cf. Daniel Gaxie, "Facteurs sociaux de la carrière gouvernementale sous la Ve République, 1959-1981", Revue Française de Sociologie, XXIV-3, juillet-septembre 1983, pp. 441-465.

(2) La relation est moins nette qu'il n'y paraît dans ce dernier cas, car une partie des sénateurs U.D.F. ayant commencé leur activité professionnelle dans l'agriculture sont en fait de "gros agriculteurs" spécialement les membres du groupe des Républicains et Indépendants.

Bien que globalement plus basse, la trajectoire des élites politiques originaires des mouvements sociaux est cependant variable selon les partis. Pour les membres des partis de gauche (ici les membres des gouvernements Mauroy et les députés socialistes issus des associations, tableau 5) ces positions de départ plus basses sont plus souvent des positions salariées, notamment dans le secteur public, situées au bas de la hiérarchie sociale (par exemple des positions d'ouvriers mais rarement des ouvriers non qualifiés), ou au bas de la hiérarchie des professions intellectuelles (instituteurs). Par contre les membres des partis conservateurs dont la trajectoire sociale apparaît atypique (ici les sénateurs U.D.F. issus des associations) ont proportionnellement occupé davantage de positions basses (relativement) dans les milieux économiques (cadres moyens du secteur privé par exemple) et surtout dans les milieux des professions indépendantes (le plus grand nombre ont d'abord été des agriculteurs).

Même lorsque les élites politiques d'origine syndicale et associative ont appartenu aux classes supérieures dès leur entrée sur le marché du travail, elles y ont en général occupé des positions (localement) dominées.

Alors qu'elles sont proportionnellement moins nombreuses à avoir appartenu à la bourgeoisie économique (10 % pour les députés issus des associations ont été industriels, membres d'une profession libérale ou cadre supérieur d'entreprise contre 26 % pour l'ensemble des députés, 8 % pour les députés socialistes issus des associations contre 19 % pour l'ensemble des députés socialistes, etc...), on n'observe guère de différences (apparentes) pour les positions de professeurs (21 % contre 20 % pour les députés, 27 % contre 31 % pour les députés socialistes) ou de cadre supérieur du secteur public (10 % contre 15 % dans le premier cas,

13 % contre 10 % dans le second). En fait une analyse plus fine montre que lorsque ces élites d'origine associative ont appartenu à la fonction publique supérieure c'est plus souvent dans les corps situés au bas de la catégorie A de la fonction publique (inspecteur des PTT, ingénieur de l'école spéciale des travaux publics à la direction départementale de l'équipement, inspecteur des impôts, contrôleur financier au C.E.A.) souvent dans des fonctions d'études (chargé d'étude au ministère de l'Urbanisme, chargé de mission à la direction générale d'E.D.F., ingénieur économiste à la Société Centrale d'Equipement du Territoire).

Bien que les trajectoires de ces élites atypiques soient très diverses, elles présentent donc une unité qui tient aux relations d'homologie qu'elles entretiennent les unes avec les autres. Qu'il s'agisse de positions situées au bas de la hiérarchie sociale globale (ouvriers), de la hiérarchie des classes moyennes (employés), des hiérarchies académiques (instituteurs) ou administratives (agents publics de catégorie B, voire C et D) ou dans les fractions intellectuelles (principalement des enseignants du secondaire) ou administratives (le plus souvent au bas de la hiérarchie des corps de catégorie A) des classes supérieures, les positions de départ sont des positions dominées dans des espaces ou des sous-espaces sociaux.

Ces relations apparaissent d'ailleurs encore plus nettement si l'on examine la principale profession exercée par les diverses catégories d'élites politiques avant leur professionnalisation dans le champ politique ou leur entrée sur le champ du pouvoir politique.

1.3.3. La position sociale avant l'occupation des positions de pouvoir politique

Comparée à la position sociale de départ, la position sociale occupée avant l'exercice d'une activité politique confirme la trajectoire sociale ascendante des élites politiques. Mais ce déplacement structural d'ensemble des populations étudiées laisse intactes les relations précédemment observées : 1) la position sociale s'élève avec le prestige des positions occupées ; 2) le personnel dirigeant du parti socialiste se caractérise par sa position sociale plus basse et par son appartenance au secteur public et aux milieux intellectuels ; 3) un ensemble systématique et convergent de différences sépare les hommes politiques issus des associations et des syndicats de leur pairs (tableau 6). Ces hommes politiques occupent plus souvent des positions au sein des classes populaires ou moyennes (souvent dans le secteur public pour ceux qui appartiennent aux partis de gauche ou dans le secteur privé principalement agricole pour les membres des partis conservateurs) et moins souvent des positions de classes supérieures. Quand ils occupent des positions de classes supérieures, ils appartiennent moins souvent à la fraction économique dominante et plus souvent au secteur public, au sein duquel ils occupent proportionnellement davantage des emplois de la petite fonction ou para fonction publique supérieure situés au bas de la catégorie A, et aux milieux intellectuels, dans lesquels ils se situent là encore au bas des diverses hiérarchies (ils enseignent plus souvent dans le secondaire que dans le supérieur et, quand ils enseignent dans les universités c'est avec le rang d'assistant ou de maître-assistant) (tableau 6).

Tableau 6 - Position sociale comparée des élites politiques d'origine associative et syndicale.

| | Total Députés N=491 | Députés Associa- tions N=68 | Députés socialis- tes N=272 | Députés socialis- tes Associa- tion N=52 | Total Sénateurs N=308 | Sénateurs Associa- tion N=38 | Sénateurs UDF N=142 | Sénateurs UDF Associa- tion N=22 | Total membres cabinets N=97 | Membres cabinets associa- tion N=79 | Total membres gouver- nement N=87 | Membres gouver- nement Associa- tion N=23 |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Industriels, Gros commerçants | 7 | 1,5 | 1 | - | 18 | 21 | 25 | 18 | 1 | - | 3 | - |
| Prof. libérales .. | 15 | 6 | 11 | 4 | 21 | 5 | 19 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 8 |
| Cadres sup. Privé | 8 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 8 |
| Haute fonction publique | 11 | 1,5 | 6 | 2 | 4 | - | 4 | - | 66 | 38 | 16 | 8 |
| Fonction publique supérieure | 5 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 16 | 9 | 15 |
| Enseignants sup. | 9 | 10 | 15 | 13 | 2 | - | 1 | - | 2 | 7 | 22 | 15 |
| Enseignants sec. | 12 | 13 | 19 | 17 | 5 | - | 6 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 10 | 15 |
| Prof. intellect. | 5 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 16 | 11 | 10 | 8 |
| Total Classes sup. | 72 | 59 | 71 | 59 | 66 | 42 | 74 | 42 | 97 | 79 | 87 | 77 |
| Petits commerçants et artisans | 0,2 | 1,5 | - | - | 0,3 | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cadres moyens privé | 4 | 4,5 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 1 | - | ? | 1 | 2 | - |
| Cadres moyens publ. | 4 | 4,5 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 3 | - | ? | 1 | 3 | 8 |
| Instituteurs, prof. intellectuelles .. | 12 | 19 | 15 | 17 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 13 | 5 | 15 |
| Employé privé | 0,2 | - | 0,4 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | - |
| Employé public | 0,4 | 1,5 | 0,4 | 2 | 0,3 | - | - | - | - | 5 | - | - |
| Total Classes moyen. | 21 | 31 | 27 | 33 | 17 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 4(?) | 20 | 10 | 23 |
| Classes populaires | 4 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | - |
| Agriculteurs | 2 | - | - | - | 16 | 45 | 22 | 54 | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL GENERAL | 100% (488) | 100% (68) | 100% (271) | 100% (52) | 100% (303) | 100% (38) | 100% (139) | 100% (22) | 100% (437) | 100% (94) | 100% (58) | 100% (13) |
| Absence d'infor... | 3 | 0 | 1 | - | 5 | - | 3 | - | ? | 1 | - | - |

Ainsi le pourcentage des hauts fonctionnaires (grands corps techniques et emplois principalement pourvus par l'E.N.A.) passe de 11 % pour l'ensemble des députés, 6 % pour les députés socialistes, 1,5 % pour les députés issus du mouvement syndical ou associatif et 2 % pour ceux d'entre eux qui sont socialistes. De même, il y a 4 % de hauts fonctionnaires parmi les sénateurs, 4 % parmi les sénateurs U.D.F. mais on n'en recense aucun dans le rang des sénateurs issus des organisations collectives (tableau 6).

Dans la même logique le pourcentage des professeurs d'université parmi les professeurs (au sens de l'I.N.S.E.E.) passe de 19 % pour l'ensemble des députés à 10 % pour les députés socialistes et 0 % pour les députés issus des associations et syndicats.

Par contre les fonctionnaires situés au bas de la catégorie A sont proportionnellement plus nombreux dans les populations étudiées dans le cadre de cette recherche : on en compte 5 % parmi les députés, 7 % parmi les députés socialistes, 12 % parmi les députés issus des associations et 13 % pour ceux qui sont socialistes.

Des relations identiques peuvent être observées pour les membres des cabinets ministériels. Comparés aux conseillers des ministres des septennats précédents, les membres des cabinets des gouvernements Mauroy sont moins souvent des hauts fonctionnaires et plus souvent des permanents de partis ou d'associations, des enseignants et des intellectuels. Quand ils sont hauts fonctionnaires, ils appartiennent moins souvent aux grands corps. Ces relations mesurées pour l'ensemble des membres des cabinets se trouvent encore davantage accusées lorsque l'on examine ceux dont la nomination a été favorisée par le passage antérieur dans les syndicats et

associations. Ces derniers ne sont plus en effet que 54 % à appartenir à la fonction publique supérieure (contre 66 % pour l'ensemble des membres des cabinets) dont 38 % à la haute fonction publique et 6 % aux grands corps de l'Etat.

Tout indique que ces fonctionnaires occupent des positions marginales dans la fonction publique et/ou dans les services particuliers où ils sont en poste.

Ils appartiennent fréquemment à la petite fonction ou para-fonction publique supérieure (inspecteur des impôts, de la S.N.C.F., de la Jeunesse et des Sports, receveur des impôts, directeur régional de la S.C.E.T., ingénieur E.D.F.), souvent dans des fonctions d'études (chargé de mission au commissariat général au plan, à l'I.N.S.E.E., chef du service de documentation au Conseil Economique et Social) parfois comme contractuel.

S'ils appartiennent à la haute fonction publique, c'est, dans les deux tiers des cas, dans des corps spécifiques - la magistrature et ^{le} corps diplomatique - occupant des positions périphériques dans le champ du pouvoir politique central. Divers signes permettent en outre de se demander si ces membres des cabinets passés par les syndicats n'occupaient pas dans ces corps spécifiques des positions marginales.

Ainsi les magistrats sont-ils tous membres du syndicat de la magistrature. Plusieurs ont été sanctionnés et ont défrayé la chronique. L'un de ces magistrats a été détaché en qualité de conseiller du Président de la République de Djibouti avant de devenir conseiller technique, chargé des relations avec le Parlement au cabinet du Secrétaire d'Etat chargé des

immigrés. D'autres sont entrés dans la magistrature assez tardivement après avoir été avocat, attaché d'administration centrale ou instituteur. De la même façon la moitié des membres du corps diplomatique de la population étudiée sont entrés dans la carrière après avoir été admis au concours pour l'emploi de secrétaire adjoint des affaires étrangères, donc sans passer par l'E.N.A. (l'un d'entre eux au moins ayant été admissible au concours d'entrée à l'E.N.A.). Ceux de ces membres des cabinets qui sont anciens élèves d'une grande école semblent avoir suivi des trajectoires moins "brillantes" que celles qui sont habituellement offertes aux possesseurs du titre.

Ainsi les polytechniciens de la population étudiée ont-ils été affectés à l'I.N.S.E.E., au service exploitation du réseau nord de la S.N.C.F., ou à l'Institut géographique national.

Ces carrières atypiques (relativement) conduisent ces fonctionnaires dans les plus intellectuelles des fonctions administratives (I.N.S.E.E., Plan, Direction de la Prévision) et dans des services généralement considérés comme moins prestigieux.

Un inspecteur des finances est d'abord affecté à la direction de la prévision puis à la S.C.E.T. avant de devenir chef de la mission économique et financière auprès de l'ambassade de France en Algérie. Un autre inspecteur des finances est détaché au plan, puis en qualité de professeur associé à l'I.E.P. de Grenoble, avant de devenir président de la Maison de la Culture de cette ville et président de l'Union Nationale des Maisons de la Culture.

Sur cinq anciens élèves de l'E.N.A. administrateurs civil au Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances qui accéderont aux cabinets après avoir été syndiqué à la C.F.D.T.-E.N.A. deux ont été nommés à la direction de la prévision et un troisième détaché au ministère de la Santé peu après leur sortie de l'école.

Les élites politiques issues des syndicats et des associations occupent donc bien des positions globalement ou localement (parfois très localement) dominées dans l'espace social. En ce sens leur recrutement est à la fois homogène et hétérogène.

Homogène dans la mesure où les positions qu'elles occupent sont toujours des positions basses dans une hiérarchie ou une sous hiérarchie sociale. Hétérogène puisque ces positions sont très dispersées dans l'espace social.

Ce sont dans certains cas des positions des classes populaires ou moyennes d'autant plus rares qu'on avance dans le cycle de vie des individus observés (dans la mesure où ils sont pour la plupart en ascension sociale) et que les positions politiques occupées sont plus élevées. Ce sont le plus souvent des positions dominées dans la structure des classes supérieures (comme l'indique la proportion élevée d'enseignants, de professions intellectuelles et de petits cadres supérieurs du secteur public parmi les populations étudiées) et/ou dans la haute administration. Ces ressemblances et ces différences sont particulièrement frappantes si l'on examine le capital scolaire de ces élites.

1.4. Le capital scolaire

Dans un état de la distribution des titres scolaires et du champ politique central caractérisé par le fait que la très grande majorité des hommes politiques ont suivi des études supérieures et, par conséquent, que la possession de titres universitaires tend à devenir l'une des conditions implicites de l'accès aux positions de pouvoir politique centrales, les hommes politiques issus des syndicats et des associations se caractérisent tout d'abord par un niveau d'étude systématiquement inférieur à la moyenne du personnel politique. Variable selon la position occupée dans la hiérarchie des fonctions politiques, le pourcentage de ceux qui font état d'études primaires, professionnelles ou secondaires est toujours plus élevé que celui des hommes politiques de même rang mais dont l'ascension s'est opérée par d'autres voies (tableau 7).

De même, quand ils ont suivi des études supérieures, ils sont moins souvent anciens élèves des grandes écoles et, plus nettement encore des très grandes écoles, et plus souvent anciens étudiants des universités. Quand ils sont anciens étudiants des universités ils sont moins souvent dotés des titres les plus légitimes (Doctorat, CAPES, Agrégation) mais proportionnellement aussi nombreux et parfois plus nombreux à avoir interrompu leurs études à la fin du deuxième cycle (licence, maîtrise) ou avant.

Les élites politiques issues des organisations collectives sont donc non seulement moins scolarisées, moins souvent passées par l'enseignement supérieur, moins titrées scolairement, mais, de plus, quand elles possèdent des titres scolaires, ces titres sont en moyenne moins légitimes.

L'exception apparente que constitue le pourcentage plus élevé d'anciens élèves des grandes écoles parmi les sénateurs ou les sénateurs U.D.F. issus des organisations collectives (tableau 7) disparaît quand on sait que dans la grande majorité des cas il s'agit en réalité d'anciens élèves de petites grandes écoles d'agriculture (tableau 7).

Cette moindre légitimité des titres universitaires possédés apparaît encore à travers le type de formation plus souvent scientifique et surtout littéraire et moins souvent de type juridique ou surtout politico économique (tableau 7).

Non seulement les titres universitaires possédés par les hommes politiques étudiés ici sont moins prestigieux, mais la formation reçue s'éloigne du type de compétence tacitement exigée des hommes politiques en l'état actuel des champs politiques et rend plus improbable la possibilité de la ^{mettre} en valeur pour en retirer des profits politiques.

Par leur trajectoire sociale comme par leur formation les élites politiques issues des associations et des syndicats sont donc liées au champ intellectuel comme l'atteste encore le fait qu'elles sont proportionnellement plus nombreuses à avoir publié au moins un ouvrage (ouvrage à caractère professionnel, ou à caractère politique ou autres) (tableau 9).

Augmentant avec la position de la fonction occupée dans la hiérarchie des honneurs publics, la publication apparaît ainsi comme une condition tacite de l'ascension politique. A position politique égale, elle constitue aussi un indice de proximité par rapport aux milieux intellectuels. Si ces publications sont évidemment plus fréquentes parmi les enseignants et

TABLEAU n° 8 - Origine géographique des élites politiques syndicales et associatives

| | Total sénateurs n° 308 | Sénateurs association n° 38 | Sénateurs UDF n° 142 | Sénateurs UDF association n° 22 | Total députés n° 491 | Députés association n° 68 | Députés socialistes n° 272 | Députés socialistes association n° 52 | Membres cabinets | Membres cabinets association n° 95 | Membres du gouvernement n° 58 | Membre du gouvernement associatif n° |
|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <u>Lieu de naissance</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Paris | 9 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 12 | 7 | 10 | 8 | | 18 | 21 | 15 |
| Banlieue parisienne | 1 | - | - | - | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 2 | - |
| Villes province | 33 | 37 | 32 | 36 | 42 | 51 | 43 | 54 | | 40 | 41 | 31 |
| Rural | 54 | 55 | 56 | 55 | 40 | 35 | 41 | 33 | | 13 | 34 | 54 |
| Etranger | 3 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | - |
| Absence d'information | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | | 26 | - | - |
| Total | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % | | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % |

TABLEAU n° 9 - Rapport au champ intellectuel

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|--|------|------|------|
| Ont publié un livre | 9 % | 8 % | 9 % | 9 % | 22 % | 24 % | 21 % | 29 % | | 29 % | 48 % | 69 % |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|--|------|------|------|

les professions intellectuelles elles débordent cependant ces catégories comme l'atteste le pourcentage élevé pour les membres des cabinets. Elles confirment alors que les agents qui ont accédé à des positions de pouvoir depuis 1981, sont dans une relation d'appartenance, de proximité ou d'homologie par rapport au pôle intellectuel des classes dominantes.

Les élites politiques dont l'ascension a été favorisée par le militantisme dans des organisations sociales présentent donc des propriétés spécifiques qui sont autant de handicap à surmonter dans le déroulement de leur carrière politique.

On sait en effet que l'aptitude à triompher de la compétition politique et à progresser dans la hiérarchie des honneurs suppose (entre autres choses) des ressources personnelles de toutes natures qui sont liées à l'origine, la trajectoire, la position sociale ou au niveau de diplôme. Ces ressources à mettre en oeuvre pour l'emporter dans le jeu politique sont d'autant plus importantes que l'enjeu de la compétition s'élève et, par exemple, que le poste convoité est plus prestigieux.

D'origine et de position sociale plus basses, moins scolarisées, dotées de titres scolaires moins prestigieux, les élites politiques étudiées dans le cadre de cette recherche se trouvent donc objectivement confrontées à des obstacles sociaux à leur entrée et à leur progression dans les champs politiques.

Tout se passe donc, comme si l'accumulation d'un capital de pouvoir, d'autorité, de relation, et d'information dans un syndicat et/ou dans une ou des association(s) constituait un mécanisme compensatoire permettant à des agents dépourvus ou insuffisamment pourvus de capitaux propres de

participer avec succès à la compétition politique.

Les agents dépourvus de ressources personnelles sont donc de facto condamnés à l'exclusion et, d'abord à l'auto-exclusion, de la compétition politique sauf dans les cas où l'appropriation d'un capital social collectif vient compenser l'insuffisance ou l'absence des ressources personnelles.

Ayant dû payer les coûts de l'action collective ces agents en retirent aussi d'éventuels bénéfices, par exemple lorsqu'ils reconvertissent et mettent en valeur pour eux-mêmes le capital collectif d'une organisation sur les marchés politiques. Par contre les agents d'origine sociale plus élevée peuvent se dispenser de payer les coûts d'une action collective extérieure au champ politique (qui viennent se surajouter aux coûts de l'action collective dans le champ politique) pour se lancer directement dans la compétition politique.

Comme Michels l'avait pressenti l'organisation est bien entre les mains des "faibles", une arme de lutte contre les "forts".

Reste à savoir si les ressources collectives appropriées par des agents du champ politique ont la même valeur que les ressources individuelles des autres agents.

Le personnel politique issu des organisations collectives s'analyse comme une élite atypique occupant des positions politiques improbables. On peut dès lors se demander si ces positions ne sont pas aussi plus fragiles.

2. Capital associatif et réussite politique

Il convient à présent de mesurer le degré auquel les agents de légataires de capital associatif réunissent dans les divers champs où ils sont en concurrence avec d'autres agents.

Pour ce faire nous avons utilisé un ensemble d'indicateurs permettant de les situer dans leurs hiérarchies respectives c'est-à-dire de les comparer avec les agents occupant les mêmes positions qu'eux. Ainsi pour les députés et les sénateurs avons-nous cherché à déterminer leur implantation et partant leur chances différentielles de poursuivre une carrière politique en établissant la durée d'occupation du mandat, la possession préalable d'une charge élective locale et, pour les députés seuls, l'écart de voix qui leur a permis d'obtenir leur siège. Nous avons en outre repéré les responsabilités occupées par ces parlementaires à l'intérieur du Parlement et dans le cadre de leurs partis respectifs afin de souligner la place éventuellement spécifique qu'ils occupent dans les hiérarchies partisanes et parlementaires. Nous avons en outre calculé pour les députés socialistes de notre échantillon un indice de réussite ministérielle.

En analysant tout d'abord les tableaux concernant les députés, nous constatons que, lorsque l'on va de l'ensemble de l'Assemblée Nationale en passant par l'ensemble des députés P.S. puis par l'ensemble des députés de notre échantillon pour aboutir aux députés P.S. de notre échantillon, on s'aperçoit que décroissent les indicateurs qui permettent de mesurer l'implantation des députés et la probabilité qu'ils ont de se maintenir sur le champ politique ainsi que leur degré de réussite politique.

Alors que 81 % des députés élus en 1981 exerçaient au moins un mandat local lors de leur élection, seuls 71 % des députés de notre échantillon avaient alors des responsabilités (tableau 10). Alors que 53 % de l'ensemble des députés ont été élus au 1er tour ou avec plus de 60 % des suffrages exprimés, seuls 31 % des membres de notre échantillon (et 23 % des socialistes de notre échantillon) sont dans ce cas. Plus de 50 % des députés socialistes de l'échantillon ont été élus avec une marge très faible de 0,1 à 5 % des suffrages exprimés (tableau 11) aussi n'est-on pas étonné de constater que plus des trois quarts de notre population (87 % pour les socialistes) ont été élus pour la première fois à l'assemblée alors que les nouveaux élus ne représentent que 38 % de l'ensemble des députés (tableau 12).

Implantation récente, fragilité de la position caractérisent bien les propriétés d'un personnel politique porté par une conjoncture spécifique et dont la **carrière** politique future s'avère largement compromise.

Cela est confirmé par l'analyse des filières d'entrée dans le champ politique : l'ensemble des membres de notre échantillon a dû accumuler dans des proportions considérables du capital militant (associatif et partisan) : 83 % des députés P.S. de notre échantillon ont été des "militants de base" contre 41 % pour l'ensemble des députés P.S.. L'obtention de mandats locaux comme premier pas vers une carrière politique est beaucoup moins importante également pour notre population. Les chiffres sont trop faibles pour que l'on puisse ici en tirer des analyses. Cependant certains dirigeants associatifs ont pu, telle Gisèle Halimi, accéder directement à des charges centrales sans avoir à payer le coût de l'action collective partisane (tableau 13) (1).

(1) Dans ces quelques cas le capital personnel important, renforcé par le capital associatif peut permettre d'en faire l'économie.

| | Total Assemblée Nationale N = 491 | Ensemble des députés PS N = 272 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 68 | Députés PS échantillon N = 52 |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Exercent au moins un mandat local : | | | | |
| OUI | 81 % | 82 % | 71 % | 71 % |
| NON | 19 % | 18 % | 29 % | 29 % |

Tableau 10- Détention d'un mandat local avant l'élection -
Assemblée nationale.

| | Total Assemblée Nationale N = 491 | Ensemble des députés PS N = 272 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 59 | Députés P échantillon N = 43 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Elus au premier tour | 32 | 18 | 14 | 7 |
| Elus avec plus de 60% des SE | 21 | 26 | 17 | 16 |
| Elus avec 60-50% des SE | 17 | 22 | 20 | 23 |
| Elus avec 55-50% des SE | 30 | 34 | 48 | 53 |
| SE=suffrages exprimés | 100 | 100 | 99 | 99 |

Tableau 11 - Modalité de l'élection à l'Assemblée Nationale

| | Total Assemblée Nationale N = 491 | Ensemble des députés PS N = 272 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 68 | Députés P échantillon N = 52 |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1er mandat | 38 | 61 | 77 | 87 |
| 2ème mandat | 21 | 18 | 12 | 11 |
| 3ème mandat | 16 | 13 | 4 | 2 |
| 4ème mandat et plus | 25 | 8 | 7 | - |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 12 - Ancienneté du mandat (Députés)

| | Total Assemblée Nationale N = 464 | Député P.S. N = 256 | Ensemble échantillon N = 68 | P.S. échantillon N = 52 |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Militantisme (1) | 36 | 41 | 74 | 83 |
| Mandat local | 72 | 78 | 50 | 52 |
| Accès au centre (3) | 12 | 6 | 16 | 11 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 13: Types de filières d'entrée dans le champ politique

Assemblée Nationale

inconnus exclus ; totaux supérieurs à 100 en raison de codages multiples

- (1) militantisme de base et résistance
 (2) responsabilités directes dans un cabinet ministériel ou dans les instances dirigeantes d'un parti. Obtention directe d'une charge parlementaire ou ministérielle

Les places que les membres de notre échantillon occupent dans les hiérarchies parlementaire et partisane accentuent leurs caractéristiques de personnel politique de passage. En effet si ceux qui ne sont titulaires d'aucune responsabilité parlementaire sont en nombre comparable dans notre population et dans l'ensemble de l'Assemblée Nationale, notre échantillon ne comporte cependant aucun député ayant une quelconque responsabilité importante à l'Assemblée (présidence de groupe, de commission..) : les postes qu'ils y détiennent sont des positions intermédiaires (bureau de commission ou de groupe, secrétaires ou questeurs de l'Assemblée) destinés à rétribuer les "back benchers" actifs du pari majoritaire (tableau 14). En revanche leur place dans la hiérarchie partisane est encore plus caractéristique de leur situation dominée (tableau 15) : s'ils occupent tous des responsabilités au niveau de leur fédération, rares sont ceux qui siègent dans les instances dirigeantes de leur parti (comité directeur, bureau exécutif, secrétariat pour le P.S..

nationales

Cependant ceux qui ont eu des responsabilités dans les organisations collectives dont ils sont issus sont dans une situation bien différentes puisque 44 % des socialistes de notre échantillon ont des responsabilités parlementaires (21 % pour l'ensemble des députés P.S.) et 31 % (contre 16 %) des responsabilités partisans (tableau 16) sans que l'on puisse affirmer si c'est la quantité de capital collectif accumulé qui est au principe de la réussite politique ou si leur réussite politique présente et leur réussite associative antérieure est à corrélérer avec la possession de capitaux personnels importants (voir notamment le cas des anciens présidents de l'U.N.E.F.).

Si l'on réserve ces cas minoritaires et divergents, tout se passe comme si, cette population socialement et politiquement atypique et

| | Ensemble des députés N: 491 | Ensemble des députés PS N: 272 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N: 68 | Députés PS échantillon N: 52 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Absence de responsabilités | 78 % | 79 % | 76 % | 77 % |
| Responsabilités intermédiaires | 22 % | 21 % | 24 % | 23 % |
| Responsabilités de 1er plan | | | 0 % | 0 % |

Tableau 14 - Responsabilités parlementaires - Assemblée Nationale

| | Total Assemblée Nationale N = 491 | Ensemble des PS N: 272 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N: 68 | Députés PS de l'échantillon N: 52 |
|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Exercent des responsabilités de premier plan dans leur parti | | | | |
| OUI | 21 % | 16 % | 13 % | 10 % |
| NON | 79 % | 84 % | 87 % | 90 % |

Tableau 15 - Responsabilités nationales exercées par les députés dans leur parti respectif

| | Ont eu des responsabilités associatives nationales | | N'ont pas eu des responsabilités associatives nationales | |
|--|--|----------------------------|--|----------------------------|
| | N = 20 Echantillon | N = 16 Echantillon P.S. | N = 48 Echantillon | N = 36 Echantillon P.S. |
| ont des responsabilités parlementaires intermédiaires et partisanes de leur plan | 25 | 25 | 4 | 3 |
| ont des responsabilités parlementaires intermédiaires | 20 | 19 | 14 | 11 |
| ont des responsabilités partisanes de leur plan | 10 | 6 | 2 | - |
| n'ont aucune responsabilité | 45 | 50 | 80 | 86 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 16 : Carrière associative et carrière politique

Députés

dominée avait pu accéder à un mandat politique national grâce à une conjoncture tout à fait spécifique : élus dans des départements dans lesquels les socialistes se sont implantés depuis peu (Ouest, Est, région Rhône Alpes, région parisienne) les députés socialistes de notre échantillon ont été confrontés à une concurrence interne au parti socialiste beaucoup moins sélective que dans d'autres circonscriptions plus sûres. Ils ont pu investir une activité militante d'autant plus valorisée que le parti socialiste y a été reconstruit par le biais de groupes associatifs (1) (syndicaux, régionalistes, culturels). S'ils ont été pour une part d'entre eux présélectionnés dans leur parti du fait de la possession d'un capital associatif encore existant (2), on peut aussi se demander si la mobilisation de leurs attributs associatifs n'a pas constitué un des ressorts de leur succès, notamment en face du parti communiste, puisque nombre de leurs sièges ont été obtenus après qu'ils aient devancé au premier tour un candidat communiste qui habituellement arrivait en tête des partis de gauche.

Si une certaine situation a pu valoriser certaines dispositions, ces dispositions sont toutefois insuffisamment légitimes pour pouvoir permettre à leur titulaire de prétendre à une position autre que dominée dans les sous-champs partisans et dans le champ politique, sauf après qu'ils aient pu, à l'issue d'un long et patient travail d'accumulation et de conversion de capital, transmuier un capital associatif, multiforme en capital collectif politique puis en capital partiellement personnel : mais l'exemple de Pierre Mauroy que nous retrouverons ci-dessous n'est que l'exception conforme à la règle.

- (1) 23 % des députés P.S. de notre échantillon ont appartenu au P.S.U. qui était bien souvent le centre de ce tissu militant
- (2) Comme nous l'avons vu précédemment le capital associatif peut renvoyer soit à l'incorporation des dispositions à militer soit à la création d'un réseau d'interrelations (il faut à cet égard mesurer la force des amitiés militantes constituées dans l'orbite P.S.U.-U.M.E.F. Chrétiens en recherche) soit à la possession continuée d'un capital associatif délégué. Il conviendrait ici de mesurer l'impact exact qu'ont eu en 1977 les ralliés des Assises du socialisme auxquels une bonne partie de notre échantillon (P.S. députés) appartient.

L'indicateur de réussite ministérielle permet d'ailleurs de montrer que les dépositaires de capital associatif ont une probabilité plus faible d'accéder à un poste de ministre : alors que $\underbrace{12,1}_{(N = 329)}$ % des députés appartenant à la majorité parlementaire ^{entre} sont devenus ministres \surd 1981 et 1983, seuls 8,9 % des députés de la majorité appartenant à notre échantillon ont accédé à cette fonction ; alors que 12,9 % des députés P.S. ont obtenu un portefeuille ministériel, seuls 10 % des députés de notre échantillon ont été appelés à cette charge.

En ce qui concerne les sénateurs de notre échantillon, qui appartiennent pour la plupart d'entre eux à l'actuelle opposition, le problème se pose en des termes différents : leur position apparaît en effet paradoxale. S'ils sont beaucoup moins favorisés sous le rapport des capitaux qu'ils possèdent, que l'ensemble de leurs pairs ils ne présentent pas, comme les députés de notre échantillon, des caractéristiques négatives quant à leur réussite politique. Ils ont détenu, dans des proportions identiques, au moins un mandat local avant leur élection (92 %), ils disposent d'une ancienneté comparable à celle de l'ensemble des sénateurs (50 contre 54 % tableau 18) et très dissemblable de celle des députés de notre échantillon (88 % de nos députés sont élus depuis 1981 contre 16 % de nos sénateurs). Les responsabilités qu'ils assument au Sénat ou dans leurs partis respectifs sont semblables à celles qu'exercent l'ensemble des sénateurs (tableaux 19 et 20). La seule différence pertinente que l'on puisse noter concerne notre sous-échantillon U.D.F. dont les membres apparaissent en situation plus basse sur le plan parlementaire par rapport à l'intergroupe U.D.F..

La trajectoire sociale de nos sénateurs permet de comprendre l'apparent paradoxe de leur position parlementaire : ils sont issus dans une larg.

| | Total Sénat N = 308 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 32 | Ensemble des sénateurs UDF N = 142 | Sénateurs UDF de l'échantillon N = 22 |
|--|------------------------|--|--|---|
| Exercent au moins leur mandat local | | | | |
| oui | 92 % | 92 % | 94 % | 95 % |
| non | 8 % | 8 % | 6 % | 5 % |

Tableau 17: Détention d'un mandat local avant l'élection

Sénat

| | Total Sénat N = 305 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 38 | Ensemble des sénateurs UDF N = 142 | Sénateurs UDF de l'échantillon N = 22 |
|--------------------|------------------------|--|--|---|
| Elus en 1980 | } 46 | 16 | | 9 |
| Elus en 1977 | | 21 | 37 | 27 |
| Elus en 1974 | | 13 | | 14 |
| Elus avant 1974 | 54 | 50 | 63 | 50 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 18: Ancienneté du mandat - Sénateurs

| | Ensemble des sénateurs N = 308 | Ensemble échantillon N = 38 | Sénateurs UDF N = 142 | Sénateurs UDF N = 22 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Absence de responsabilités | 72 % | 66 % | 61 % | 73 % |
| Responsabilités intermédiaires | } 38 % | 29 % | } 39 % | 18 % |
| Responsabilités de 1er plan | | 5 % | | 9 % |

Tableau 19. Responsabilités parlementaires. Sénateurs

| | Total Sénat N = 308 | Ensemble de l'échantillon N = 38 | Ensemble des sénateurs UDF N = 142 | Sénateurs UDF de l'échantillon N = 22 |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Exercent des responsabilités de premier plan dans leur parti | | | | |
| oui | 11 | 13 | 13 | 14 |
| non | 89 | 87 | 87 | 86 |

Tableau 20. Responsabilités nationales exercées par les sénateurs dans leur parti respectif

proportion des milieux agricoles ; le capital associatif qu'ils accumulent sous forme de postes dans la hiérarchie de la F.N.S.E.A. ou des organismes spécialisés et de mandats électifs (chambre d'agriculture) constitue pour eux une ressource supplémentaire qui vient entériner une assise sociale pré existante (il s'agit souvent de grands agriculteurs) ou renforcer une implantation locale conjointe. Parmi ces agriculteurs et ces chefs d'entreprise, rares sont ceux qui ne disposent que de leur capital associatif pour fonder leur autorité : leur carrière politique n'a pas été uniquement favorisée par le militantisme puisque comme le montre le tableau 21, seuls 18 % des membres de notre échantillon et 14 % du sous-échantillon U.D.F. sont entrés dans la carrière politique par cette voie (contre 74 % pour les députés de notre échantillon).

Alors que, pour les députés, l'accumulation du capital associatif peut s'analyser comme un substitut à la possession de capitaux personnels, cet investissement présente chez les sénateurs d'autres caractéristiques. Si ce capital permet à des candidats à la députation relativement dépourvus de capitaux pertinents de réaliser quand même une carrière politique il leur interdit de prétendre, dans une conjoncture routinisée, pouvoir en tirer de grands profits. Au contraire le capital associatif des sénateurs est d'autant moins un handicap qu'il constitue un bien rare dans une assemblée comme le Sénat, qu'il est conforté par d'autres ressources et bien souvent reconverti en capital personnel par une pratique prolongée des mandats électifs.

favorisées
Alors que nos députés sont des exceptions, par une conjoncture spécifique, nos sénateurs, qui ont été à un moment de leur carrière délégués de capital associatif ne sont pas en position de porte à faux au sein

| | Total Sénat N = 291 | Sénateurs UDF N = 131 | Sénateurs échantillon N = 38 | Sénateurs UDF échantillon N = 22 |
|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Militantisme (1) | 21 | 15 | 18 | 14 |
| Mandat local | 84 | 88 | 80 | 91 |
| Accès au centre (2) | 8 | 8 | 16 | 9 |

* inconnus exclus

Totaux supérieurs à 100 en raison des codages multiples

Tableau 21. Types de filières d'entrée dans le champ politique *

Sénat

- 1) Militantisme de base et résidence
- 2) Responsabilités directes dans un cabinet ministériel dans les instances dirigeantes d'un parti. Obtention directe d'une charge parlementaire ou ministérielle

Sénat, même s'ils sont dominés dans le champ politique comme le sont une large partie des sénateurs. Il conviendrait pour mieux rendre compte de l'ampleur de ces phénomènes de mesurer si cette source traditionnelle de recrutement des sénateurs a connu des évolutions significatives liées à certaines conjonctures. En tous les cas, l'année 1981 voire l'alternance ne sauraient être ici considérées comme des scissions pertinentes.

Pour repérer la place des membres de notre échantillon dans les cabinets ministériels, nous avons calculé la fréquence d'occupation de positions hautes (directeur, directeur adjoint, chargés de mission, hors hiérarchie), le nombre de postes occupés dans les ministères les plus importants (Premier Ministre, Economie et Finances, Affaires étrangères, Défense Nationale, Justice et Industrie auxquels nous avons joint la Présidence de la République) et auprès des dirigeants les plus importants (Premier Ministre, Ministres d'Etat, Ministres auxquels sont rattachés au moins deux secrétariats d'Etat, dirigeants de partis (P.C. - M.R.G.), chefs de courants du P.S. et présidence de la République).

Nous avons en outre cherché à définir la durée de la présence dans les cabinets, comme indicateur de l'adéquation des dispositions à l'occupation légitime de telles positions. Mais faute d'avoir pu trouver des éléments de comparaison et faute d'avoir pu tester empiriquement ce que l'ensemble des membres de notre échantillon avaient fait de leurs positions et ce que leurs positions avaient fait d'eux, les renseignements que nous avons pu tirer de cet indicateur se sont révélés fort décevants. Nous n'avons pu en effet que constater que 75 % des membres des cabinets de notre échantillon, nommés au début de notre période, sont encore en place deux ans plus tard.

En règle générale, qu'ils soient délégués par la direction de leur organisation (cas de M. Atlan pour la C.G.T. ou de J. Laot pour la C.F.D.T.), où qu'ils doivent leur poste à leur insertion antérieure dans un réseau politico-intellectuel auquel ils ont pu accéder en partie grâce à leur capital associatif, les positions occupées par les membres de notre échantillon apparaissent moins élevées que celles qu'occupent les autres membres des cabinets. Comme le montre le tableau 22), ils sont sous-représentés par rapport à ces derniers dans les postes les plus élevés (14 % contre 20 %) dans les ministères les plus importants (22 % contre 33 %) et auprès des ministres de premier rang

(28 % contre 43 %). Si 11 personnes de notre échantillon ont été directeurs d'un cabinet aucune ne l'a été dans un ministère important auprès d'un dirigeant politique de premier plan. Cependant la répartition des agents dotés de capital associatif ne se fait pas au hasard : si le Président de la République et certains ministres n'ont fait appel à eux que de manière très marginale (Laurent Fabius, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Charles Hernu, Pierre Mauroy, Michel Jobert ou Jacques Delors) d'autres ont au contraire largement mobilisé un réseau d'interrelations préexistant.

Au vu du tableau 23, il semble que plusieurs logiques aient présidé à la constitution des cabinets ministériels : pour faire pièce à l'hostilité latente de la haute administration d'un ministère, certains ont pu faire appel à des réseaux déjà constitués susceptibles de fournir un personnel à la fois compétent et capable d'organiser l'acceptation de la nouvelle politique suivie (C.F.D.T.-E.N.A., C.F.D.T. Quai d'Orsay, C.G.T. impôts, Syndicat National de la Magistrature), alors que d'autres pondéraient leur équipe en fonction des responsabilités qu'ils avaient à assumer (des féministes au ministère des droits de la femme, des syndicalistes au

| | Ensemble des membres des cabinets ministériels N = 623 | Membres des cabinets ministériels possesseurs de capital associatif N = 95 |
|---|--|---|
| occupent une position dirigeante dans le cabinet | 20 % | 14 % |
| occupent un poste dans le cabinet d'un ministère de premier rang | 33 % | 22 % |
| occupent un poste dans le cabinet d'un ministre de premier rang | 43 % | 28 % |

Tableau 22. Position dans la hiérarchie des cabinets ministériels

| | |
|----------------------|-------|
| Huguette Bouchardeau | 100 % |
| Edwige Avice | 71 % |
| Anicet Le Pors | 64 % |
| Georgina Dufoix | 50 % |
| Raymond Courrière | 50 % |
| Claude Cheysson | 46 % |
| Jack Lang | 33 % |
| Joseph Franceschi | 33 % |
| Michel Rocard | 31 % |
| Pierre Bérégovoy | 29 % |
| Jack Ralite | 29 % |
| Jean Auroux | 27 % |
| Max Gallo | 25 % |
| Robert Badinter | 24 % |
| André Chandernagor | 23 % |
| François Autain | 22 % |
| Louis Mixandeau | 20 % |
| Yvette Roudy | 20 % |
| Charles Fiterman | 20 % |
| Catherine Lalumière | 18 % |
| André Henry | 18 % |

Tableau 23 : Pourcentage des membres des cabinets ministériels
ayant du capital associatif par rapport à l'ensemble
des membres des cabinets des ministres concernés (1981-1983)

ministère du Travail, des responsables de mouvements de jeunesse au ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports) et de leur propre capital de relations personnel (interrelations UNEF-PSU, CGT-PC)...

Seule une étude approfondie pourrait montrer que le choix des collaborateurs des ministres a dû être constamment inscrit dans le dilemme suivant : fidélité à l'ethos militant de nombre de ministres des gouvernements Mauroy et donc appel privilégié à des proches issus du parti ou d'associations voisines, ou recherche de professionnels de l'administration pouvant mettre, sous conditions, à la disposition du ministre leur crédibilité et leur propre capital d'inter connaissance et d'inter reconnaissance. Toutefois comme le montre le tableau précité, s'il apparaît bien que les ministres les moins dotés de capital politique personnel ont suivi leur pente militante et ont recruté d'abord dans leur propre réseau, tous n'ont pas agi ainsi : certains ont pu chercher un temps à s'attacher les compétences d'agents dotés de capitaux plus légitimes dans le champ de l'administration (A. Mauroy), d'autres enfin ont suffisamment reconverti et consolidé leur capital associatif initial pour pouvoir n'en être qu'indirectement tributaire (Jacques Delors, Pierre Mauroy).

En dernier lieu, nous avons cherché à repérer la place qu'occupaient les ministres de notre échantillon dans la hiérarchie gouvernementale : en établissant leur rang dans la liste des ministres (1), en relevant leur nombre de participations gouvernementales, et en spécifiant les caractéristiques de leur carrière ministérielle, ascendante (lorsque leur rang s'élève stable, descendante ou irrégulière (lorsque leur attributions décroissent ou sont instables : par exemple un secrétaire d'Etat promu ministre puis

(1) sur la base du plus haut poste occupé

redevenant secrétaire d'Etat).

Les caractéristiques de nos sénateurs

se révèlent être contradictoires et ne renvoient pas aux positions marginales que nous avons décelées pour les députés et les membres des cabinets de notre échantillon (1). En effet si les ministres de notre échantillon se situent dans la hiérarchie ministérielle à des rangs comparables à ceux des autres ministres (23 % contre 24 % de ministres de 1er rang, tableau 24), s'ils ont participé dans des proportions presque identiques aux 3 gouvernements Mauroy (54 % contre 50 %, tableau 25), d'autres indicateurs font apparaître des différences significatives.

Leur carrière est légèrement plus irrégulière que celle des autres ministres (tableau 26) ; ils appartiennent rarement à la direction supérieure du parti socialiste, ils ont une assise locale plus restreinte (54 % d'entre eux possédaient un mandat local avant leur nomination contre 69 % pour l'ensemble des ministres), ils disposent d'un mandat parlementaire dans une proportion beaucoup plus faible (tableau 27) et sont donc plus tributaires d'autres agents pour leur maintien en fonction.

Si ce personnel politique a pu accéder à ces fonctions en dépit de la possession d'un capital personnel (économique, culturel, social) moins important que celui de leurs pairs, c'est grâce à la possession d'un type de bien rare qui a pu leur permettre de faire carrière, d'abord dans certains secteurs spécialisés du parti socialiste (culture, droits de la femme....) (2) et d'y apporter leur savoir faire

(1) Le faible nombre de ministres de notre échantillon (n = 13) doit inciter à la prudence dans les interprétations

(2) L'importance de l'investissement militant que le tableau 28 fait apparaître est à cet égard très révélateur.

| | Ensemble des ministres N = 58 | Ministres de l'échantillon N = 13 |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Secrétaires d'Etat | 31 % | 23 % |
| Ministres délégués | 12 % | 15 % |
| Ministres | 33 % | 38 % |
| Ministres d'Etat et ministres de premier rang* | 24 % | 23 % |

* classés parmi les 10 premiers sur la liste hiérarchique du ministère.

Tableau 24. Classement hiérarchique des ministres

| | Ensemble des ministres N = 58 | Ministres de l'échantillon N = 13 |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Participation à | | |
| 1 gouvernement : | 24 % | 23 % |
| 2 gouvernements : | 26 % | 23 % |
| 3 gouvernements : | 50 % | 54 % |

Tableau 25. Nombre de participations gouvernementales

| | Ensemble des ministres N = 58 | Ministres de l'échantillon N = 13 |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Carrière ascendante | 3 % | 8 % |
| Carrière stable | 59 % | 46 % |
| Carrière descendante ou irrégulière | 38 % | 46 % |

Tableau 26. Types de carrières ministérielles

| | Total Ministres | | Ministres de l'échantillon | |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------|----------------------------|--------|
| | N = 58 | N = 45* | N = 13 | N = 7* |
| 1er mandat | 12 | 16 | | |
| 2e mandat | 21 | 28 | 31 | 57 |
| 3e mandat | 21 | 28 | 23 | 33 |
| élus avant 1973 | 21 | 28 | - | |
| non élus | 24 | - | 46 | |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Tableau 27. Détention d'un mandat parlementaire avant la
nomination à un poste de ministre

* non élus exclus

| | Ministres | Ministres échantillon |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| | N = 58 | N = 13 |
| Militantisme | 43 | 77 |
| Mandat local | 45 | 38 |
| Accès au centre | 47 | 16 |
| | ➤ 100 | ➤ 100 |

Tableau 28. Types de filières d'entrée dans le champ politique

Ministres

* totaux supérieurs à 100 en raison des codages multiples

et leur réseau de relations associatives. C'est ainsi parce que certains d'entre eux ayant multiplié les investissements militants et électoraux ont pu acquérir un capital politique personnel suffisamment important pour les rendre indispensables dans une conjoncture où la possession d'un capital collectif longuement accumulé pouvait avoir valeur de référence et de symbole : en l'occurrence Pierre Mauroy et Jacques Delors pouvaient jouer à la fois de ces deux types de capitaux entremêlés et apparaître comme les figures emblématiques du changement de politique.

L'accès des dirigeants des partis de gauche aux principales positions de pouvoir politique a-t-il transformé les mécanismes de recrutement du personnel "dirigeant l'Etat" ?

A-t-elle mis fin au monopole politique des catégories sociales dominantes et à l'exclusion des lieux de pouvoir des autres catégories sociales ?

L'accès aux sommets de l'Etat d'un personnel politique nouveau issu des syndicats et des associations peut-il être tenu pour un indice d'une transformation des catégories dirigeantes ?

La réponse à ces questions est certainement ambiguë. La victoire électorale des partis de gauche marque incontestablement l'apparition d'un personnel politique d'un type nouveau. Les positions conquises par ce personnel sont quantitativement limitées mais réelles et probablement sans équivalent dans l'histoire politique de la Vème République. Dans ces limites, l'ascension de ce personnel marque aussi une modification du recrutement social des catégories dirigeantes. D'origine et de position sociale plus basses, moins scolarisé ce personnel doit davantage son ascension au militantisme à la base et à l'accumulation d'un capital de pouvoir dans des organisations sociales qu'à la mise en valeur de capitaux propres. En même temps, cette "démocratisation" du recrutement trouve d'autres limites dans le fait que ce nouveau personnel politique est plus souvent issu de positions localement (ie. dans la structure des classes supérieures) que globalement dominées. Il provient moins souvent des catégories sociales les plus défavorisées que de sous catégories défavorisées de milieux sociaux plutôt favorisés.

De plus les positions politiques conquises par ce personnel sont rarement des positions de premier rang et tous les indices montrent la fragilité de cette conquête.

Pénétration marginale dans des positions marginales et fragiles d'un personnel marginal mais moins marginal sans doute qu'il n'y paraît donc.

Mais présence d'un personnel d'un type nouveau pourtant. Alors cette présence a-t-elle produit des effets ? A-t-elle affecté les politiques suivies, le fonctionnement des relations de pouvoir ?

Ces questions supposeraient des travaux qui sortent du cadre de la présente recherche.

Quelques interviews menés auprès de membres de cabinets ministériels permettent de dire que la présence de responsables issus des associations ou des syndicats n'est peut-être pas sans conséquence. Leur compétence technique a souvent été reconnue et sollicitée. Leur expérience des questions traitées leur a permis d'introduire un point de vue pragmatique souvent favorable aux catégories dont ils sont issus. Connaissant aussi la réalité des situations ils se sont opposés et d'autres se sont opposés en se réclamant de leur avis autorisé à des revendications jugées illégitimes.

Tout porte à croire aussi que l'accès aux lieux de pouvoir de diverses catégories de syndicats et d'associations a été favorisé après 1981. Notamment là où ce nouveau type de conseiller ministériel était

présent. Mais ces organisations sont aussi dans la mouvance des partis de gauche et il n'est peut-être pas nécessaire que certains de leurs militants accèdent au pouvoir pour qu'elles soient entendues.

On voit qu'aucune conclusion ferme ne peut être dégagée sur ce terrain. Les sciences sociales savent bien désormais analyser les mécanismes de recrutement du personnel dirigeant. Elles sont encore désarmées pour apprécier dans quelle mesure et comment les propriétés de ce personnel influent sur les politiques suivies.

C'est sans doute l'une des pistes de recherche les plus prometteuses des prochaines années.

Annexe : Présentation descriptive de l'échantillon

| | Sénateurs | Députés | Membres de cabinets ministériels | Ministres |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|-------------------------------------|-----------|
| <u>Lieu d'accumulation du capital</u> | | | | |
| Associations | 15 | 28 | 18 | 8 |
| Syndicats | 31 | 50 | 77 | 9 |
| Multi-appartenance | 11 | 17 | 16 | 7 |
| <u>Syndicats</u> | | | | |
| - patronaux et assimilés | 8 | 2 | 1 | - |
| - agricoles et assimilés | 19 | - | 1 | - |
| - salariés spécialisés | - | 1 | 18 | - |
| - C.F.T.C. | 2 | - | - | - |
| - F.E.N. | - | 10 | 5 | 3 |
| - F.O. | - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| - C.F.D.T. | - | 14 | 31 | 1 |
| - C.G.T. | 2 | 9 | 16 | 2 |
| - U.N.E.F. et associations étudiants | - | 14 | 13 | 2 |
| <u>Associations</u> | | | | |
| - Féministes | - | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| - Ecologistes | - | 1 | - | - |
| - Familiales | 1 | 6 | 1 | - |
| - Parents d'élèves | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| - Consommateurs | - | 1 | 1 | - |

| | Sénateurs | Députés | Membres de cabinets ministériels | Ministres |
|--|-----------|----------|-------------------------------------|-----------|
| - Catholiques | 6 | 9 | 5 | - |
| - Loisirs jeunesse | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| - Mutuelles | 4 | 1 | 3 | - |
| - Culturelles | - | - | 3 | 3 |
| - Clubs | - | 4 | 4 | 6 |
| <u>Responsabilités dans les associations et syndicats avant l'entrée dans le champ politique</u> | | | | |
| - Responsabilités intermédiaires | 24 | 26 | 10 | 2 |
| - Expertise | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 |
| - Responsabilités nationales | 12 1 | 20 21 | 40 37 | 8 2 |
| - Absence de responsabilité | 1 | 21 | 37 | 2 |
| <u>Appartenance politique</u> | | | | |
| - sans affiliation, divers et absence d'information | 3 | - | 63 | - |
| - P.S.U. et extrême gauche | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| - P.C. | 3 | 6 | 7 | 1 |
| - P.S. | 4 | 52 | 24 | 11 |
| - M.R.G. | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| - U.D.F. | 22 | 5 | - | - |
| - R.P.R. | 5 | 4 | - | - |



ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM

THE POLITICAL ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DUTCH HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS

by

M. van Giessen/L.G. Gerrichhauzen

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I. Introduction

Housing associations form a particular case within the Dutch voluntary association movement. The first housing association were founded during the second half of the nineteenth century. Their building activities were not particularly important but they played a far more significant role in the policy process leading to the so-called Housing Act (Woningwet) of 1901.

The Housing Act, which still exists, was a breaking-point in the history of housing in the Netherlands. The liberal government Goeman-Borgesius (1897-1901) acknowledged state-responsibility for the (poor) housing circumstances of those days.

Housing associations and municipal building institutions were able to build dwelling for the lower classes through government subsidies. However, those subsidies were granted on a fairly modest scale. Until the second world war the housing sector remained primarily in the hands of business. The second world war led to conditions of extreme shortage and the government was forced to freeze the rent for a rather long period. Housing construction was no longer an interesting investment, so the big corporations left the social housing sector.

By leaving the social housing market the corporations forced the government to step in. The so-called 'social rent sector' began to develop and the most prominent role in this sector was played by the municipalities.

The housing associations took their part in building and managing of dwellings but played a minor role when compared with their municipal counterparts. This changed in the sixties. The Housing Act was changed in 1962 and parliament introduced a preference treatment for the housing associations. Municipalities were no longer allowed to build unless the housing associations were not able or willing to do so. From then on the housing associations play a dominant political role in the public housing sector.

In this paper we will analyze the political role and function of the Dutch housing associations in the social housing sector and make a comparison with other voluntary associations in the Netherland.

However, as the strong political position of the housing associations is a direct consequence of the pillarization period in the Dutch political history, we will start with a historical sketch of the position of the housing association movement.

2. Housing associations before the Housing Act of 1901

The first association where sole purpose was to build houses was the 'Vereniging ten behoeve van de arbeidersklasse' (Association for the working class), founded in Amsterdam in 1851. The initiative was taken by some members of the bourgeoisie with a paternalistic mode of control which often specified that the housing constructed was only for the diligent and well-behaved members of the working class.

Associations similar to the one in Amsterdam were founded in Amsterdam in 1853 and in the Hague in 1854. By 1870 there were thirty of these associations. Most of the housing associations were founded by the bourgeoisie, and were based on a mixture of economic and philanthropic motives. For example, the Arnhem association, Vereeniging tot het verschaffen van geschikte woningen aan de arbeidende klasse (Association for the provision of suitable dwellings to the working class) paid a 4 percent dividend to its shareholders, with the additional possibility of capital gains. A few years later the dividend limit was raised to 6 percent.

The housing production by these associations was not particularly important. They built between 1850 and 1900 some 5000 dwellings, hardly more than 1% of the total housing production.¹ Far more important than their building activities was the fact that the early housing associations made it clear to public opinion and the government that the housing conditions of the working class were miserable and had to be changed. Pressure to build on a large scale decent dwelling also came from health organizations and some liberal pressure groups, e.g. the Maatschappij tot nut van 't algemeen (Society for the general welfare). This society published a report 'Het vraagstuk der Volkshuisvesting' (The Question of Social Housing) in 1896. This report recommended the lending of capital at low interest to building associations, the provision of cheap land to the associations, the establishment of general

building ordinances and the use of land expropriation powers to facilitate the clearance of new dwellings.²

These proposals were based on the results of a number of investigations that had been made shortly before in the Netherlands and on the English 'The Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890'.

2.1 The Housing Act

This law was introduced in the Second Chamber in 1899 by the liberal government Goeman Borgesius (1897-1901). In 1901 the law was passed almost unanimously in the Second Chamber and by 25-19 in the First Chamber. The Housing Act was a product of socially concerned political liberalism and was not the result of agitation by the working class and their political party, the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP, Social Democratic Labour Party).

The provision of the law related to actual dwellings required that the municipalities established building regulation which eventually resulted in improved standards throughout the country. As to the production of dwellings at low rents, the law authorized the Crown to recognize building associations whose sole purposes were to build housing. These associations were able to obtain mortgages from the State through the municipalities.³ It was the intention of the liberal government Goeman Borgesius that the housing associations should become financially independent organizations, a goal which was never met. The Housing Act laid the foundation for the development and growth of the housing association movement. It opened up the possibility for these organizations to social housing construction through government loans for a rather vaguely defined target group. At the same time the Housing Act meant the disappearance of independent voluntary association in the housing sector. The state and the housing association became mutually dependent upon each other.

2.2 A short prosperity period (1918-1922)

It was not until 1904 that the first housing association was admitted by the Crown and during the first decade after 1904 the number of housing associations grew rather slowly. The reasons for this slow

development are manifold. Among the most important is the fact that the municipalities were reluctant to lend money to the housing associations. Conservative municipal policy and the fact that it was the municipality, and not the state, that took the financial risks made them not too eager to lend large sums of money to housing associations. And the central government itself was not either particularly willing to spend money for social housing purposes. Although almost every government after the liberal government of Goeman Borgesius was dominated by confessional parties, this did not mean that the liberal influence disappeared. The economic way of thinking was a liberal one and in those days that still meant that the state should play a modest role and should not intervene too much in social and economic affairs. Housing construction was largely a business affair, a situation which did not change until the first world war. During that war and immediately after it, the housing association movement flourished. The number of admitted associations raised sharply and their share in the total production of houses raised accordingly (see table 1 and 2)

Table 1 Number of admitted housing associations

| Year of admission | <u>number of housing association</u> | | Total on |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|----------|
| | <u>admitted</u> | <u>dissolved</u> | |
| 1904 | 3 | - | 3 |
| 1905 | 12 | - | 15 |
| 1906 | 14 | 1 | 28 |
| 1907 | 16 | - | 44 |
| 1908 | 30 | 1 | 73 |
| 1909 | 29 | - | 102 |
| 1910 | 21 | 2 | 121 |
| 1911 | 39 | - | 160 |
| 1912 | 66 | 2 | 224 |
| 1913 | 78 | 1 | 301 |
| 1914 | 81 | 3 | 379 |
| 1915 | 34 | 1 | 412 |
| 1916 | 61 | - | 473 |

see next page

| Year of admission | number of housing association admitted | association dissolved | Total on |
|-------------------|---|--------------------------|----------|
| 1917 | 80 | 3 | 550 |
| 1918 | 106 | - | 656 |
| 1919 | 261 | - | 917 |
| 1920 | 376 | 1 | 1292 |
| 1921 | 44 | - | 1336 |
| 1922 | 10 | 5 | 1341 |
| 1923 | - | 24 | 1317 |
| 1924 | - | 14 | 1303 |
| 1925 | 3 | 9 | 1297 |
| 1926 | 6 | 7 | 1296 |
| 1927 | 4 | 190 | 1110 |
| 1928 | 7 | 34 | 1083 |
| 1929 | 4 | 33 | 1054 |
| 1930 | 7 | 3 | 1058 |
| 1931 | 8 | 2 | 1064 |
| 1932 | 4 | 6 | 1062 |
| 1933 | 7 | 2 | 1067 |
| 1934 | 2 | 9 | 1060 |
| 1935 | 7 | 2 | 1065 |
| 1936 | 6 | 3 | 1068 |
| 1937 | 3 | 3 | 1068 |
| | 1429 | 361 | |

Table 2 Number of houses built in the Netherlands

| Year | Total housing | Build by (in %) | | |
|-----------|---------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| | | Business organi- zations | Municipal building organizations | Housing associations |
| 1905-1910 | + 124.000 | 98.0% | - | 2% |
| 1911-1915 | + 98.000 | 87.6% | 0.7% | 11.7% |
| 1916-1920 | + 66.500 | 25.5% | 19.0% | 55.5% |
| 1921-1925 | 220.000 | 61.5% | 11.2% | 27.3% |
| 1926-1930 | 245.000 | 85.0% | 5.0% | 10.0% |
| 1931-1935 | 234.000 | 89.5% | 2.9% | 7.6% |

Source: W.C. Dijkhuizen, L.G. Gerrichhuizen and M. van Giessen (eds.):

Documentation on Housing Associations, VUGA, Den Haag, 1985.

However, this period of prosperity was to be a rather short one. The housing association movement owed their flourishing not so much to changed economic and social views by the confessional governments but to the exceptional circumstances of the first world war. As a direct result of this war, a shortage of capital and goods, business enterprises no longer invested in housing. Government was forced to appeal to the housing association movement and municipal building organisations to maintain a sufficient level of housing production. Although this was not achieved completely, the housing associations increased their share in housing production during the period 1916-1920 to nearly 56%. Almost immediately after the end of world war I, the economy recovered and business enterprises were willing again to invest in housing production.

Succeeding confessional cabinets reduced the loans to the housing associations as a result of which a long period of decline began. During the period 1923-1929 there disappeared a total number of 311 housing associations, against 24 newly admitted housing associations.

This decline of the housing association movement is a remarkable phenomenon when compared to the fate of other voluntary organizations. Between 1917 and 1967 the Dutch political system is generally described in terms of political pillarization. The main elements of this political system were as follows.

At the mass-level there were four different population groups: catholics, protestants, socialists and liberals. The first two groups had in common that they possessed a confessional orientation (though not the same confession) and their members thus a mixed socio-economic position. Liberals and socialists had in common a non-confessional orientation but differed in respect to their socio-economic background. These four groups, or so-called 'pillars', had their own culture and structure. Interactions between members of the four different pillars were scarce. Social activities took place within the own group (e.g. marriage, school-visiting, and sporting). Citizens identified themselves primarily with their own pillar and only secondarily with the national political system. Subsequently, political activities at the mass-level such as voting and membership of political parties were

highly pillar tied and stable in time.

These four pillars were kept together by their political elites. The leaders of the four different pillars negotiated with each other and made political compromises. The political elites maintained political stability in the political pillarization system.⁴ The foregoing short sketch of the Dutch political system suggests that the political elites of the four pillars ruled the country.⁵ This picture is not accurate. The confessional political elite dominated cabinet and parliament.⁶ The liberal pillar never evolved, in this period, towards a mass movement and the socialists were excluded from government until 1945.

The relevance of all this for our subject is that it were the confessional parties and the church who stimulated and protected the voluntary association movement.⁷ The beginning of the so-called pillarization period is usually dated in 1917 when, among other things, total financial equality was approved for both public education and religious schools. This support by the state brought about a dramatic shift in the proportion of pupils attending religious schools. Before 1917 only 20% of the children attended a religious school. In 1917 40% and in 1945 no less than 70% attended a religious school. State aid was gradually extended to all other health, welfare and cultural activities.

Thus a highly complex networks of private agencies (particulier initiatief) emerged in the Netherlands, organized along denominational lines and responsible for the provision of virtually all social services.⁸ The voluntary association movement in the housing sector formed an exception of this overall picture.

Despite the fact that the housing association movement received a strong impetus during the period 1918-1922 the movement did not succeed in maintaining their position afterwards. Let alone to expand further. One of the reasons for this failure is the weak position of the confessional pillars within the housing association movement (see table 3).

Table 3 Housing associations according to their denominational
line

Source: W.C. Dijkhuizen, L.G. Gerrichhauzen and M. van Giessen (eds.):
Documentation on Housing Association, VUGA, Den Haag, 1985.

Whatever the reasons were for this weak representation of the confessional pillars in the housing association movement, they were thus not able to muster political support from the confessional parties for financial aid by the state.

And the confessional housing associations were weakly organized. The catholic housing associations did not have a national federation to represent their interests in parliament, cabinet and the relevant department. Nor did the protestants had a national federation. The

only national federation was de Nationale Woningraad (NWR) founded in 1913. This federation represented housing associations of social-democratic and liberal origin. Their influence on the policy-making process was very limited as is shown by a parliamentary debate concerning some changes of the Housing Act. A few social-democratic members of parliament remarked that the housing association movement was not given any opportunity to express their opinion on the proposed changes of the Housing Act. Changes that had very negative effects for the housing associations. In reply to this remark the government Colijn (1933-1935) made it very clear that the housing policy of the government was not something to discuss about with the concerned housing associations.⁹

Beside this lack of strong political support for their cause the housing association movement had to cope with an ideological problem. Housing production was considered to be an economic and not a social affair. And when it came to economic affairs things were only seen from a liberal point of view.

Housing production was thought to be only possible through the mechanisms of a market economy and in the twenties and even thirties business enterprises produced enough housing to render this view credible. According to some specialists in housing there was no shortage of housing in 1930 and the years thereafter.¹⁰

2.3 1945-1977: towards a dominant position

The second world war and its direct consequences led to a housing shortage. It has been estimated that some 80.000 houses were destructed and some 40.000 were heavily damaged. As there was an extreme shortage of capital, labour and goods, housing production did not really start until 1947. During those years the demand for housing increased sharply as a result of the number of marriages and the return of the colonists from Indonesia. Meanwhile business enterprises had left the social sector. As a result of a number of government measures investment in the social housing sector was no longer profitable. As the government wanted to do something to the housing shortage they had no other choice then to subsidize part of the housing production. It was not

the housing association movement which profited most from the large governmental financial aid. The municipal building organizations collected most of the state loans and built more dwelling than the housing associations (see table 4).

Table 4 Number of houses constructed by

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Housing associations</u> | <u>municipal organizations</u> | <u>business</u> | <u>total</u> |
|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1945 | 7% | 10% | 83% | 389 |
| 1946 | 10% | 28% | 62% | 1593 |
| 1947 | 24% | 47% | 29% | 9243 |
| 1948 | 32% | 52% | 16% | 36391 |
| 1949 | 33% | 43% | 24% | 42791 |
| 1950 | 26% | 39% | 35% | 47300 |
| 1951 | 27% | 43% | 30% | 58666 |
| 1952 | 27% | 36% | 37% | 54601 |
| 1953 | 31% | 36% | 33% | 59597 |
| 1954 | 31% | 31% | 38% | 68487 |
| 1955 | 24% | 29% | 47% | 60819 |
| 1956 | 28% | 24% | 48% | 68284 |
| 1957 | 27% | 27% | 46% | 88397 |
| 1958 | 27% | 31% | 42% | 89037 |
| 1959 | 27% | 30% | 43% | 83632 |
| 1960 | 26% | 24% | 50% | 83815 |
| 1961 | 20% | 22% | 58% | 82687 |
| 1962 | 21% | 18% | 61% | 78375 |
| 1963 | 24% | 20% | 56% | 79523 |
| 1964 | 24% | 21% | 55% | 100978 |
| 1965 | 26% | 23% | 52% | 115027 |
| 1966 | 27% | 25% | 48% | 121699 |
| 1967 | 31% | 26% | 43% | 127433 |
| 1968 | 33% | 24% | 43% | 122773 |
| 1969 | 32% | 18% | 50% | 123117 |

This situation remained until 1956. From 1956 until 1962 municipal housing organizations and the housing association movement built more or less the same proportion of housing, a situation which changed from 1962 onwards to the advantage of the housing association movement.

Because of their better organization and, of course, municipal backing the municipal housing organizations formed a preferred partner for the central government. The housing association movement was not able to build on a scale as large as the municipal organizations because of their small scale and lack of professional staff. However, the housing association movement gradually strengthened their position during the fifties. The Catholic housing association movement founded a national federation in 1948, the Catholic Institution for Housing. (KIV, Katholiek Instituut voor Volkshuisvesting). The Protestant housing association movement did the same, they founded in 1951 the Union of Christian Housing Associations (Verbond van Christelijke Woningbouwverenigingen en stichtingen).

The initiative for founding the KIV was taken by the Catholic Labour movement, the initiative for the Union of Christian Housing Associations by the Protestant Labour movement. A nice example of pillarization. KIV, the Protestant Union and the NWR began a lobby to secure more advantages from the state for their members. The NWR published a report in 1955 which was a plea for a more independent position of the housing associations towards central and local government. A few years later (1957) was brought out a report by the 'Centrum voor Staatkundige vorming', the scientific office of the Catholic Party (de Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP).

This report was based on the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity, a doctrine which held that it was a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed by smaller and lower bodies. (To be found in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in 1931). The message was clear. Housing associations should have a preference treatment when it comes to social housing construction. The report insisted on a legal status for this preference treatment in the Housing Act.

In 1958 the minister of Housing and Construction (Witte, KVP) installed a statecommission to investigate the position and the future relationship of the housing association movement with the local and central government. The minister wished to restore the subsidiary doctrine in the housing sector.

In 1962 the majority of the state commission came with a number of proposals to improve the position of the housing association movement. The most important of these proposals were:

- to strengthen the financial position of the housing association;
- to diminish local governmental influence upon the housing associations;
- to reinforce the position of the national housing federations.¹¹

The lobbying by the confessional and social-democratic pillar on behalf of their housing associations proved to be very successful. The confessional-liberal cabinet de Quay introduced a bill to revise the Housing Act. During the parliamentary debates an amendment was introduced by the catholic member of parliament, Van Helvoort. The amendment led to a very strong position for the housing association. They got a monopoly in the social housing sector with the exclusion of the municipal housing organisations. According to article 61, paragraph 2 of the Housing Act municipal housing organizations were not allowed to build houses unless the housing associations did not or could not do the job.

The new Housing Act was not immediately implemented until 1969 when the minister of Housing (Schut, ARP) issued a circular which reaffirmed the preference treatment for the housing association movement. It was as good as impossible for municipal housing organizations to obtain financial aid from the state unless they could show that the local housing association(s) was called in but renounced their responsibility. Since 1969 the housing association movement has a dominant position in the social housing sector, a position that got its finishing touch in 1977 when the last legal details concerning their status and position was brought about.

The municipal building organizations were the big losers. Their share in the production of housing diminished rapidly after 1969 and their present financial position is rather gloomy.¹²

3. The political role and functions of the Dutch housing associations.

3.1 Some facts and figures

In 1983 there were 870 housing associations. More of these organizations employ activities in the housingsector only at the local level. Housing associations have as sole purpose to perform activities in the housing sector and are admitted by the state as much if they comply to the legal rules concerning their position structure and functioning.

They own most of the rented houses in The Netherlands as can be seen in table 5.

Table 5 Distribution of rented houses to owncategory

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Housing associations | 1.483.000 | (51%) |
| state and municipalities | 424.000 | (14%) |
| Other institutions | 285.000 | (10%) |
| Total non-profit sector | 2.192.000 | (75%) |
| <hr/> | | |
| Private persons | 383.000 | (13%) |
| Investment trusts | 347.000 | (12%) |
| Total privately rented sector | 730.000 | (25%) |

Source: Woningraad nr. 8., 1984

On January the first of 1984 the total housing stock was 5.173.000 dwellings, so the at the moment the housing associations has a share of 28.6%

The housing associations are organized in two national housing federations, the already mentioned Nationale Woningraad (NWR) and the Nederlandse Christelijk Instituut voor Volkshuisvesting (NCIV). The NWR is by far the largest organization, about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the housing associations are member of the NWR. The rest, some 300 housing associations, are affiliated to the NCIV.

As to the denominational lines, most housing associations have no longer a religious or political affiliation, as in shown in tabel 6.

Table 6. Housing associations with a religious or political affiliation

| | Abs. | % |
|-------------------|------|-------|
| Catholic | 14 | 13.1 |
| Protestant | 15 | 14.0 |
| Social-Democratic | 4 | 3.7 |
| Other | 6 | 5.6 |
| None | 67 | 62.7 |
| Non-response | 1 | 0.9 |
| Total | 107 | 100.0 |

Based on a survey by C.A. Huisman and H. Wester, *Bewonersparticipatie bij het beheer in woningcorporaties*, RIW, Instituut voor volkshuisvestingsonderzoek, Delft, 1983.

Until this paragraph housing associations were mainly treated with regard to their role in housing production. However, this is not their only task. They fulfil two other important tasks in the social housing sector.

First of all, the housing associations play an important role in the allocation of dwellings.

Since 1947 there exists a law which regulates the allocation of dwellings. According to this law every municipality has to issue local rules for the allocation of dwellings in her territory. Since the sixties this law no longer applies for about half of the municipalities which should give more room to the housing associations to allocate dwellings to households according to their own criteria. In practise however, housing associations work closely together with local authorities when dealing with potential households.

The third important task of housing associations consists of administrating their housing stock. Most of their dwellings are administrated by the housing associations themselves, as is shown in table 7.

Table 7 Number of owned dwellings by housing associations,
subdivided by way of administration.

| year | administered by housing associations | administered by others | total |
|------|---|---------------------------|---------|
| 1980 | 1.247094 (99,3 %) | 7925 (0,7 %) | 1255019 |
| 1981 | 1.283806 (99,3 %) | 8798 (0,7 %) | 1292604 |
| 1982 | 1.342719 (99,3 %) | 9558 (0,7 %) | 1352277 |
| 1983 | 1.418936 (99,2 %) | 10178 (0,8 %) | 1429114 |

Source: Monthly review of financial statistics, CBS, 1984

The administration of dwellings encompass among other things the following activities:

- buying and selling dwellings;
- the maintenance and improvement of dwellings;
- the demolition of dwellings;
- fundraising.

Buying, selling and demolition of dwellings is not, when compared to housing construction, the most important activity of housing associations, though its importance should not be underestimated. In the near future these activities will become more and more important as the housing production is expected to diminish gradually. Table 8 gives an indication of these activities for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982.

Table 8 Development of the dwelling stock owned by housing associations

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Increase of dwelling stock; | 35209 | 52276 | 67225 |
| by housing production; | 5605 | 9855 | 7825 |
| by purchase; | 1485 | 1338 | 1247 |
| Decrease by selling; | 1744 | 1672 | 1124 |
| Decrease by demolition; | - | 522 | 4158 |
| Other mutations; | | | |

Source: Monthly financial statistics, CBS, 1984

Maintenance and improvement are important for the quality of the housing stock. On the whole the quality of dwellings of housing associations is good. See table 9.

Table 9. Repaircosts, ownercategory and housing quality

| owner category | no repaircost (in %) | % dwelling with small repaircosts | % dwelling with large repaircosts | % to be demolished |
|----------------------|-------------------------|---|---|-----------------------|
| owner occupation | 31 | 42 | 25 | 2 |
| municipality | 21 | 52 | 20 | 7 |
| housing associations | 32 | 46 | 21 | 1 |
| institutional | 29 | 41 | 26 | 4 |
| privately rented | 11 | 34 | 42 | 13 |
| other | 29 | 41 | 25 | 5 |
| Total | 27 | 43 | 26 | 4 |

Source:

Since 1973 housing associations pay more attention to improvement of their housing stock, as can be seen from table 10.

Table 10 Number of improved dwellings per year (the figures represented here apply only to the so-called *Woningwetwoningen*, that is those dwellings that are financed according to the *Woning Act*)

| Year | total number of improved dwellings |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 1970 | 5131 |
| 1971 | 4059 |
| 1972 | 5779 |
| 1973 | 9495 |
| 1974 | 12583 |
| 1975 | 16403 |
| 1976 | 21684 |
| 1977 | 19419 |
| 1978 | 19108 |
| 1979 | 24423 |
| 1980 | 24933 |
| 1981 | 31325 |

Source: J. van der Schaar, Housing associations and non-profit rent, 1983

How do the housing associations finance all these activities, housing construction, repair, improvement etc.? An exaggerated answer though not far beyond the truth, would be: they don't. More of these activities are financed by the state. Housing construction is almost wholly financed through government loans. To finance the housing construction of the so-called *woningwetwoningen* the Ministry of Housing lended some 6 billion guilder to the housing association movement 1984. The maintenance of their housing stock is financed by the housing associations themselves through a Maintenance-fund. This fund is fed by a fixed amount of the received rent by the housing associations. If this fund is not sufficient to cover the maintenance costs the housing associations are obliged to use their general reserve fund (*Algemene Bedrijfsreserve*) to fill up the gaps.

The finance the repair of their housing stock a differentiation has to be made between repairment of dwellings builded before the second World War and builded afterwards. In the first case the government subsidizes for 100%. In the second case the working expenses are filled up for 50%

The political role and genielous of the housing association movement

The housing association movement fulfil a dual political role. On the one hand they act as a interest group towards the government, on the other hand they act as a decisionmaker on their own; they allocate values authoritatively for (a part of) a society.¹³

Housing associations are a particular form of the Dutch voluntary association movement. A voluntary association movemant that is generally known under the Dutch name '*particulier initiatief*', that is a 'non-governmental nonprofit social service organization'. As already mentioned housing associations have as role purpose to perform only activities in the housing sector and are admitted by the state as such if they comply to the legal rules concerning their position; structure

and functioning. This circumscription makes it clear that the housing association movement is closely connected with the government at the national (and local) level. Housing associations and the national government are however not the only relevant political actors. The most relevant actors in the social housing sector are graphically represented in figure 1.




Figure 1. Relationships between the relevant political actor in the social housing sector.

(Source: L.G. Gerrichhauzen en M. van Giessen, the dual political role of housing associations, 1983)

The relationship between the relevant political actors in the social housing sector are rather complex, as should be clear when are realizes that there are 870 housing associations and approximately the same number of municipalities.

In the rest of this paper we will concentrate on relationships 1,2 and 3, and in a lesser degree on relationships 4 and 5.

The relationship between the central government and the housing association movement is one of mutual dependency. The central government, evgv, needs the housing associations for implementing their housing policy. The housing associations need financial aid from the government for their housing construction. The strong financial relationship exists also for the maintenance and improvement activities of the housing associations. The two national federations (NWR and NCTV) play a