

A neighbourhood approach to working class life and politics
in Barcelona, 1910-1923.

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by

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in Barcelona, 1910-1923

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DE LA CIUDAD Y SUS VECINOS

La ciudad está por descubrir
en sus barrios informes
donde mujeres de anchos rostros abren la puerta al visitante con un niño
en los brazos.

Nuestros amigos viven aquí
dispersos en casas de cemento
junto a largas calles grises y bares penumbrosos
y nuestra dirección sigue siendo anónima y secreta
y nuestros libros se han cubierto de polvo con el paso de los años.

Es necesario caminar lejos
hacia el centro
-donde lujosos almacenes y bancos de acero se elevan hacia el cielo-
subir escaleras y buscar la mesa en el café previsto
para gustar de un vaso en compañía
y traspasar muros y horizonte en las palabras del diálogo.

La ciudad está por descubrir
en sus barrios oscuros
a donde no hay necesidad de ir durante años cuando allí no se vive
porque las tiendas son estrechas y el pan duro
y no hay librerías
y son barrios distantes
en donde hace frío,

Nuestros pocos amigos allí
habitan en casuchas derruidas cuya difícil dirección ya olvidamos
Ellos forman un grupo aparte
y vienen de tarde en tarde a nuestra mesa
preguntan por trabajo con sonrisa crispada
nos hablan de esa búsqueda diaria
y de sus buenos amigos en el barrio lejano
posibles amigos nuestros
y cuyas direcciones
no deberíamos ignorar.

PREFACE

The research which has led to this thesis was begun in 1974. At the outset the intention was to study the Catalan nationalist movement and the attitude of the working class in Catalonia to it in the early twentieth century. Following a visit to Barcelona in May 1975, to check the availability of source material, and after discussion with Catalan historians, I decided to change the focus of the research.

There were two problems with the research that was originally envisaged. The first was that by 1975 the Catalan nationalist movement had been the subject of considerable research by Catalan historians, and this had led to a passionate and lively debate about the development of the movement and its significance, and I feared, perhaps wrongly, that an outsider to Catalonia might well lose his bearings in the debate and amongst the sources, and have little to contribute to it. Secondly I found that the history of the working class movement in Spain and Catalonia had been comparatively little researched, and I felt therefore that it might be better to study this subject, in order to establish a basic framework within which more monographic studies such as that on working class attitudes to Catalan nationalism might be made.

I realised however that there were several difficulties hampering a wide-ranging study. It was clearly impossible to cover all Spain, but it soon became clear that even Catalonia was too extensive and I decided to narrow the scope of the study to Barcelona. This was because there were significant differences in the type and size of industry in Catalonia, between the textile colonias of the interior and the more diversified factories of the coastal towns. Secondly the overwhelming importance of Barcelona in industrial and political terms meant that it would not be possible to exclude it. Finally I saw that archival

sources outside Barcelona were not easy to find, being dispersed in small municipal collections, mostly badly maintained and frequently guarded over by municipal officials imbued with Francoism, who jealously restricted access.

After finally deciding to limit my study to the early twentieth century working class movement in Barcelona, I moved there with my family and began research in 1976. In the summer of that year I entered into contact with the team of sociologists employed at the Fundació Jaume Bofill in Barcelona, to conduct research into present-day neighbourhoods in the city. Through them, and through the social geographers I met at the University of Barcelona I began the systematic study of a phenomenon which I had already observed in Barcelona, that of the importance of the neighbourhood in Catalan social life.

I reasoned that such a deep-rooted phenomenon could not be of recent origin, and my research seemed to confirm this and to suggest that the organization of the working class movement reflected it. Moreover I came to understand that the city in which these neighbourhoods had constituted themselves was no accidental development but rather had grown through the application of different technical and political criteria. I began therefore to investigate the role of town planning in the history of modern Barcelona, and was put in contact with Francesc Roca, who encouraged me to study the Lliga project for the city and the effects it had on working class neighbourhoods in the period I was studying. This then led me to changes in the organization of the neighbourhood-based working class movement, and finally to the writing of this thesis.

In all I spent four and a half years in Barcelona, though my research was effectively part-time only for much of the period since I had to work for a living, and I also had family responsibilities. Nonetheless I believe that I gained a great insight into Spanish and Catalan life

and views in that time, and my thanks go out to all those people in Barcelona and Catalonia who found the time to talk to me, and who directed me to a variety of sources. In particular I owe a great deal to the old men and women who recorded interviews with me.

I would like to thank the Fundació Jaume Bofill for funding part of the research. And finally I owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs. V. Perkins for typing the manuscript, to my father, Mr. R. Kelly, who helped check and collate the typed version, and to my wife and children for their understanding and encouragement throughout.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT, NOTES AND TEXTUAL APPENDICES

<u>AE</u>	<u>Anuario Estadístico de la ciudad de Barcelona</u>
B.	Barcelona (bibliography and notes)
C.	Elections to Cortes, Tables, Chapter 3
C.N.T.	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
C.R.T.	Confederació Regional del Treball
Cand. R.	Candidatura de Renovación
Coal. R.	Coalició Republicana
D. Social.	Defensa Social
E. Catal.	Esquerra Catalana
F.M.A.	Federació Monàrquica Autonomista de Catalunya

GEC Gran Enciclopedia Catalana

M.	Madrid (notes and bibliography)
M.	Municipal elections, Tables, Chapter 3
Mon.	Monarchists
P.R.C.	Partit Republicà Català
P.R.R.	Partido Republicano Reformista
P.S.O.E.	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
U.F.N.R.	Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana
U.G.	Unió Gremial
U.G.T.	Unión General de los Trabajadores
U.M.N.	Unión Monárquica Nacional

INTRODUCTION

The Spanish and Catalan working class movements have not been well covered in the historiography of twentieth-century Spain, and this neglect is evident when the first quarter of the century is covered. There is only one general history, that of Tuñón de Lara; covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it offers a provisional synthesis of work in the field as well as some original investigations. Recent work has tended to be monographic in character and with regard to Catalonia, recent studies by Balcells, Cuadrat, Lacomba, Lladanosa, Romero Maura and Ullman have, by casting light on certain main events, filled out somewhat the necessarily sketchy overview of Tuñón.⁽¹⁾ But Tuñón's view still holds good that:

el movimiento obrero reviste, por lo general, formas orgánicas; ello supone la existencia de una morfología del mismo. Pero sería grave error no estudiar esas formas orgánicas en una perspectiva dinámica, esto es en movimiento, en acción. Para decirlo de modo más preciso, no basta con estudiar las formas de agrupación de la clase obrera o del conjunto salariado sino que es preciso conocer su vida, su acción; asambleas y congresos, decisiones importantes de sus órganos directivos, prensa, diversas manifestaciones de propaganda, huelgas, acciones frente al Poder o de participación en el Poder; todo ello forma parte de la historia del movimiento obrero. Por el contrario, hay que deslindar de nuestro objeto de trabajo el estudio de las ideas - políticas, económicas, filosóficas - que inciden en al movimiento obrero.⁽²⁾

It is the intention here to give the history of the working class movement in the period 1910-1923 in Spain's largest industrial city, Barcelona, in the 'perspectiva dinámica' demanded by Tuñón, examining its actions, its organizations and the declarations of its thinkers, against the background of political, social and economic ideas and actions which operated on it, a background of ideas and actions which it in turn modified by its responses.

A brief overview of the general Spanish economic, social and political situation in the first part of the twentieth century, followed by an account of the development of the C.N.T., the Barcelona-based sindicato or syndicalist trade union map the background against which events in Barcelona moved. This is followed by an analysis of the development of the city of Barcelona according to the project of the Lliga Regionalista, the party representing the Catalan industrialists, and the implications this had for the urban environment and the social and cultural life of the Barcelona working classes are discussed. The conditions under which this working class lived are then analyzed and described and differences between the working class neighbourhoods identified. The implications these had for political action are analyzed through an account of the Setmana Tràgica of 1909. The political rejection of the Lliga project is then examined in an analysis of electoral patterns in the different districts of the city, which shows that the Barcelona working class rejected the official political system. The slow construction of their neighbourhood-based alternative, the C.N.T. is described, and the ideas of its supporters and theorists on its purposes and modes of action are discussed. A study of the 1917 crisis allows an examination of changes in both the Lliga and C.N.T. projects and the womens' strike of 1918 is analyzed for evidence of the growing ability of the C.N.T. to intervene in such traditional forms of protest. The change from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and industry organization is detailed in an account of the Congrès de Sants of 1918 and the results of this change are described in the analysis of the strike of La Canadenca in 1919.

The cultural project of the Lliga and the response of the C.N.T. are examined. In order not to overextend the scope of the thesis, the period of social unrest following the Canadenca strike and the repression suffered by the syndicates are not described here.

However the transport strike of 1923 is analyzed and it is concluded that, although the political programme of the Catalan industrialists had failed, their cultural project had been successful and allowed them to undertake the repression of the C.N.T.

An overview of economic, social and political developments in Spain and Catalonia in the first quarter of the twentieth century

The first quarter of the twentieth century in Spain which, with a little licence can be dated as running from the crisis of 1898, occasioned by the loss of the colonies, to the pronunciamiento of General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923, in an attempt to save the monarchy, was a period of intense social and political instability. The political system imposed at the Restauración of a monarchy ruling through the two political parties which alternated in power, basing their electoral results on managing the elections through the cacique system was falling into disuse. New groups were elected to the Parliament, some of them calling into question the existence of the monarchy, others attacking the model of agrarian liberal capitalism which had been the dominant model imposed throughout the nineteenth century. Socially, great changes were taking place as the agricultural crisis of the 1890's came to an end and the flight from the countryside to the towns became ever more marked. Not that Spain was anything more than an agricultural nation. The failure of industrialization to take off in Spain in the nineteenth century is shown by the fact that for every one person employed in mining, construction work or productive manufacturing there were four employed in agriculture.⁽³⁾ While industry was, to a certain extent, developed in the Basque Country and in Catalonia it should be observed that the predominant sector was that of textiles rather than iron and steel. This was industry based on consumption, not capital goods, and when the demand for the latter reached a peak

in the economic boom of 1917-18 brought about by the trading advantages resulting from Spanish neutrality in the first World War, Spanish industry had to go short of the necessary machinery. The boom of the war years allowed the entry of more countrymen into industry and this resulted in an increased immigration into the cities. The boom had various consequences including exceptional profits for a few years which could not however be reinvested in industry because of the doubts that the exceptional situation would continue.⁽⁴⁾ The lack of reinvestment made the ensuing crisis of 1920 even harder. The boom encouraged exportation of many products whose normal outlet would have been the interior Spanish market (while several markets which had traditionally received Spanish agricultural produce were closed). A consequence of increased exportation was a price rise within Spain. At the same time imports rose in price considerably, due to the difficulties caused to shipping by the actions of the warring nations. The result was an important inflation in Spain which the unions were able to affront to a certain extent in the period of expansion up until 1919-1920, but thereafter the crisis led to a closing of the ranks of the Patronal and a big relative fall in wages.

Within this framework events in this period in Barcelona, the leading industrial city of Spain, had a special significance both immediately and in the long term. Both the Barcelona bourgeoisie and its rural allies within Catalonia, and the Catalan working class movement which centred on Barcelona, the C.N.T., had aspirations towards leading renovation movements within the Spanish national context. However it is not the intention to examine these features at length in this thesis, except in so far as the project of the Barcelona bourgeoisie involved a radical restructuring of property and social relations in Barcelona, making it a centre for the reproduction of capital, and the way in which this project shaped the development of the Barcelona working class

movement. The almost wholly antagonistic relations of these two groups in the period 1910-1923 led to the tense years of 1919-23 in which the C.N.T. project was defeated, but only at the expense of the Catalan bourgeoisie abandoning its project and accepting Primo's version of the March on Rome.

An overview of the development of the Barcelona working class movement, in the first quarter of the twentieth century

The new urban project of the Catalan bourgeoisie and the industrial development it encouraged, coupled with the absolute failure of the anarchist directed general strike of 1902 led the Barcelona working class to seek a new kind of organization to represent their interests. The 1902 strike was the first major crisis of the twentieth century in Barcelona. It was supported by 100,000 workers, but failed to bring about the downfall of the prevailing economic and social system in the way that the anarchists had been preaching for years. Rather the 1,500 sackings that followed it showed that the prevailing system had considerable power during general strikes and the lesson was not lost, as was shown in the temporary flirtation of the working class with the Radical party of Alejandro Lerroux, and in the steps towards a new kind of syndicalism symbolized in 1907 by the creation of Solidaridad Obrera.

The judgment of Bonamusa that 'el movimiento obrero catalan se halla aferrado a la realidad social y económica, y es, generalmente, apolítico y federal',⁽⁵⁾ shows a perfect understanding of the creation of Solidaridad Obrera, which associated anarchists and socialists who shared the same vision of syndicalism. The new association was to be neutral regarding the political opinions of members and the positions of power within the organization were scrupulously shared between representatives of the different forces involved.

As Pere Gabriel points out this was an ambitious scheme, destined to marginalize the Unión General de Trabajadores (U.G.T.) in Catalonia. This explains the reticence towards the new organization shown by the central direction of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (P.S.O.E.).⁽⁶⁾

The new organization was soon to find itself involved in the second of the four great crises which occurred in Barcelona in the period 1906-1925. This was the so-called Setmana Tràgica, the Tragic Week which although it took place in the first decade of the twentieth century, was more akin to the romantic revolts of the nineteenth century. Organized initially by Solidaridad Obrera as a protest against the war in Morocco it rapidly developed into an insurrection in which the element of protest was diverted covertly by Lerroux's Radical Republicans towards the wholesale burning of religious institutions. The Setmana Tràgica had important repercussions; firstly many leaders of all tendencies had to leave Spain and therefore found themselves unable to influence events. Secondly the P.S.O.E. based in Madrid forced the Catalan socialists to leave Solidaridad Obrera, an act by which the socialists marginalised themselves in Catalonia for decades. Thirdly the remaining groups within Solidaridad Obrera agreed to form the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (C.N.T.) at a Congress held at the Palau de Belles Arts in Barcelona in October-November 1910.⁽⁷⁾ Despite the revolutionary anarchist aura which was later attached to the C.N.T., too much must not be made of this in considering its foundation for there was no clear predominance of anarchist ideas in the 1910 Congress.⁽⁸⁾ Rather the syndicalist idea prevailed, by which syndicalism was defined as a means towards revolutionary change resulting in the control of production by the syndicates. The general strike was reserved for this end, and it was specified that it was not a tactic for merely achieving small pay rises or less hours of work. Moreover a general strike should only be declared when it was certain that all the workers in the

country would stop work together. The lesson of the general strike of 1902 and of the Setmana Tràgica had definitely been absorbed.

Moreover the unceasing propaganda effort of men like Anselmo Lorenzo, Josep Prat, Josep Negre, Tomas Herreros in introducing the doctrines of French revolutionary syndicalism had brought about a change in attitude.⁽⁹⁾

The C.N.T., however, was hardly to have time to function. At the first Congress of the new body in September 1911 it was agreed to hold a general strike in support of the workers on strike in Bilbao, and in protest against the renewal of hostilities in Spanish Morocco. The Government did not hesitate to declare the C.N.T. illegal. Until 1913 the activities of the organization had to be carried out underground; there was a short lived attempt at reorganization in 1913, cut short by the textile strike of the same year. It was not until July 1914 that the C.N.T. was reauthorized and could begin its activities again in the open. In 1915, at the secret sessions of the banned Congreso Internacional Anarquista contra la Guerra held in El Ferrol, the principal anarchist leaders from all parts of Spain were able to meet for the first time since 1911. In discussion they agreed to promote the rapid organization of the C.N.T. throughout Spain. A new national committee was appointed with its seat in Barcelona. As a step in the new campaign an alliance was sought with the U.G.T., still superior numerically,⁽¹⁰⁾ and the two organizations collaborated in the one day protest strike against the rise in the cost of living of December 18, 1916. Intensive efforts were made in 1917, a year of general protest against the monarchy and its governments. The failure of the Asamblea de Parlamentarios seemed to show that revolutionary change would not come about through the politicians. However the Government was able to provoke a general strike before there had been time to coordinate planning between the

U.G.T. and the C.N.T. The result was the third great crisis, the failed general strike of August 1917 which led to many arrests.

The failure of the strike led to demands for a further reorganization of the C.N.T. and the decision to make radical changes was taken at the Congrès de Sants in 1918. The decision was to change the structure of union organization. Instead of the previous structure where each craft had its own union, with the sections loosely linked on a territorial neighbourhood basis, there was to be one big union for each industry, grouped through the local neighbourhood federation. The new organization was rapidly put into effect in such a way that the 73,860 workers represented at the Congrès de Sants had become 345,000 at the end of 1918.⁽¹¹⁾ Again the new organization was to face a stiff test almost as soon as it had come into existence, in this case the strike of La Canadenca⁽¹²⁾ the fourth great crisis. A strike over the dismissal of a few workers by the company, the main electrical power producer for the whole region of Barcelona swiftly developed into a general strike begun on 4 February 1919 and ending, in a modest victory for the workers, on 19 March. However one of the points agreed on in negotiation, the release of those imprisoned during the course of the strike, was not met by the authorities and the strike broke out again. This led to a general repression of the C.N.T. in Barcelona in the period April-August 1919, a repression that was repeated during the period January-May 1920 and from November 1920 until May 1922. The organization resisted the first wave of repression fairly well but not the second and third, when it became increasingly evident that there was a failure of organization and a corresponding decline in numbers. The Patronal, the representatives of Barcelona's industry, further pushed the offensive against the C.N.T. when a lock-out was declared, despite the C.N.T.'s previous acceptance of the constitution of a Comisión Mixta to settle labour disputes.

If to this repression is added the effects of the generalization of the atentado social in this period, especially after the founding of the Sindicatos Libres by the traditionalist Ramon Sales in late 1919, (these were an organized labour movement based largely on a certain kind of Catholic unionism, and were largely composed of non-Anarchist workers), with whom the C.N.T. was condemned to come to an understanding in some sectors, as well as the wholesale deportation of the main leaders to the Castillo de la Mola in Mao where they were kept until April 1922, some idea may be gained of the attack on the C.N.T.

During this period the apoliticism of the C.N.T., which was the product of a number of influences - the federalism which the Catalan worker had displayed since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the neutrality which Solidaridad Obrera had shown regarding the political opinions of its members, the disillusionment shown with Lerroux' Radicals when they refused to support the strike of 1911, the same disillusionment with the Asamblea de Parlamentarios - was brought increasingly into question over the issue of the Russian revolution. The highly enthusiastic reaction with which news of the revolution had been received in Spain and Catalonia (especially as the news arrived at a period of reorganization and growth) had led to the provisional adhesion of the C.N.T. to the Third International in 1919. It was decided to send a delegation to the Second Congress of the Third International, but only one member, Angel Pestaña actually managed to get there. Pestaña was unfavourably impressed by the Bolshevik repression of the Russian anarchists and by the attempts made to subject the syndical and trade union movement to the Communist International. However, on his return journey he was arrested in Italy, deported to Spain and imprisoned in the Castillo de Montjuich until the spring of 1922, and his report did not reach the National Committee of the C.N.T. until December 1921. In the meantime the

pro-Bolshevik element within the C.N.T. had been able to exercise a strong influence in the National Committee through Maurín, Nin, Arlandis and Jesus Ibañez. These were responsible for the adhesion of the C.N.T. to the first Congress of the Internaciónal Sindical Roja in Moscow, July 1921. The debate within the C.N.T. that this adhesion caused was only resolved when, with the arrest of Maurín in February 1922, the National Committee of the C.N.T. passed into the hands of the anarcho-syndicalists who, in the Conferencia Confederal of Zaragoza in June 1922, voted against the Internaciónal Sindical Roja, insisting that the C.N.T. should instead join in the preparations for the reorganization of the libertarian Asociación Internaciónal de los Trabajadores (A.I.T.). At this conference a resolution, the famous Mocion politica signed by Seguí, Pestana, Peiro and Viadiu was passed unanimously. The motion stated that while the C.N.T. was against the political parties and parliamentary action this did not mean that it did not have a political presence.

The advent of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera rendered futile any such motion. While there was at first no explicit declaration of illegality against the C.N.T., such a degree of harassment was maintained that the Barcelona local federation decided to go clandestine only a month after the coup d'etat, causing an acute internal debate with the secession of various syndicates which were not in agreement. The debate was only silenced when, because of the assassination by C.N.T. activists, of the Barcelona public executioner, the C.N.T. was declared illegal in the whole of Spain.

This short outline of the development of the C.N.T. in the period under study has been given because the history of the working classes of Barcelona is bound up with it. This protean organization, despite being declared illegal only a year after its foundation, maintained its

organization sufficiently to be able to take advantage of the return to legality and the war boom to win the adherence of large numbers of workers. The reorganization carried out in this period and the degree of discipline and enthusiasm shown during the strike of La Canadenca meant that the employers, faced with a situation of relative economic crisis, resorted to a thoroughgoing programme of repression, including the physical repression of opponents, enforced conversion to the Sindicato Libre and the reorganization of the Somatent, the armed middle and upper class vigilante body traditional to Catalonia. Thus the Sindicatos Libres enjoyed a brief period of large membership, the C.N.T. lost a generation of leaders through death or exile and yet, only a year after the establishment of the Second Republic, it had surpassed its 1919 membership figure.

While the chronological limit of this thesis only arrives at the beginning of the dictatorship, the above must be borne in mind when seeking to discover the process of organization which the Barcelona working class engaged in. In order to reveal the features of this process, and at the same time show the development of the most important organization which they evolved, the C.N.T., this thesis will examine the three great crises referred to earlier, as well as a number of less spectacular actions, and will analyze the organizational features and political aims which evolved with the development of the movement. In accordance with Tuñón's demand for a 'perspectiva dinàmica' these will be considered both in the national context and, more locally, within the framework of, and as a response to, the attempts of the Barcelona bourgeoisie to lead a national renovatory movement and to model the city of Barcelona in such a way as to provide the base for that movement. Barcelona was, throughout the period under study, a city in which the industrial bourgeoisie held power, and which it modelled and integrated through new techniques of town planning and

through the provision of a transport and services infrastructure. The working class response to the centralization and integration forced upon it was to adapt traditional territorial based forms of organization into the more coordinated model defined at the Congrès de Sants, to adopt new models of struggle, to attempt to create its own educational system, and slowly, to begin to analyze the changing environment in which its members lived and fought, in an attempt to find the institutions necessary to ensure the development of the class into one capable of running its own affairs and organizing production as it would do in 1936.

TWO PROJECTS: THE LLIGA AND THE C.N.T.

While it was observed earlier that the first quarter of the twentieth century began in Spain in 1898, it is perhaps more true to say that in Barcelona the first quarter of the new century can be dated as beginning in 1901. But not, as it should have done numerically on the first day of that year, rather on 10 November, when, in a three cornered contest in the municipal elections, the old dynastic, agricultural parties allied to the socio-political consensus of the Restoracion lost heavily to new electoral and social forces. The new Republican Coalition under Alejandro Lerroux took power after gaining a narrow victory over the newly formed party of the Catalan industrialists, the Lliga Regionalista. Although the Lliga would not finally defeat the Republicans in the Town Hall until 1915, its influence there and the fact that it was to hold power in the Diputacions, the four regional governments in Catalonia, from 1904 and would mould these into a Mancomunitat in 1914, would allow it to lay down the foundations for an ambitious development plan for Barcelona. This consisted in discarding the discredited Cerdà plan for the city and replacing it with one to transform the traditional city of the nineteenth century into an 'urban system' where the circulation of capital produced through urban renovation and development could be used to finance Catalan industry and hence make Barcelona the main articulating force, the powerhouse (in more senses than one, as will be seen below) for Catalonia. This was a step towards an assault aimed at gaining power within the Spanish state.⁽¹³⁾ After 1914 the pace at which these changes were brought about would be intensified when the Lliga became the dominant party in both the Town Hall, and in the newly formed Mancomunitat de Catalunya which replaced the Diputacions. At the same time the new economic conditions created by Lliga policies were bearing fruit with the electrification of Catalan

industry and paying huge profits due to the advantages gained by industry and commerce from Spanish neutrality in the First World War.

Roca, who has made a special study of the formation, development and policies of what he calls, following Gramsci, a new bloc urbà, makes the point that outside the concrete framework of the Spanish state, with courtly, bureaucratic Madrid as its characteristic capital, the project of the Lliga is incomprehensible.⁽¹⁴⁾ And this is true, as well, of the project of the C.N.T. which also developed from Catalan origins to become an attempt to gain hegemony within the Spanish working class movement, and ultimately within the Spanish state. The C.N.T. was also confronted by other forces within that state, most notably the Spanish Socialist Party, the P.S.O.E., (whose headquarters, it must not be forgotten, were in Madrid).

The point where the similarity between the two national projects diverges lay in the crucial crisis of 1917, when the Catalan bourgeoisie, abetted for once by the C.N.T., made its power bid against the old Restauración parties of the Spanish state. Its failure in the face of political and military pressures was counterpointed by the failure of the C.N.T. and Socialist uprising, and from this point on the Lliga would bide its time, throwing its energies into the creation of a wider base, applying its project for Barcelona to the whole territory of Catalonia, in an attempt to unify it through the concept of Catalunya-ciutat.⁽¹⁵⁾ As a part of this change in strategy it would attempt to defeat the C.N.T. whose power to articulate working class protest against Lliga policies threatened the success of the strategy. So the C.N.T., whilst still attempting a national strategy after 1917, would be confronted by repression in its home base, a repression directed by the Catalan industrialists with the aid of the Spanish state, which increasingly and paradoxically pushed the industrialists and their

party into dependence on the state. However the C.N.T. could not mobilize support from the Socialists and by 1923 the C.N.T. project would be unable to survive the repression directed against it. For these reasons then, the strategy and failure of the C.N.T. must also be seen, like that of the Lliga, against the national, as well as the local, framework.

Town planning and the city of capital/capital city

Town planning played two key roles in the articulation of the Lliga project, firstly that of securing economic efficiency and secondly in ensuring social well-being.

The emergence of the theory and practice of planning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has been examined by Sutcliffe.⁽¹⁶⁾ Planning developed as a response to the dysfunctions caused by industrialization and its concomitant urbanization. The industrialization process permitted a massive increase in the size of population which could live in towns, through dramatically increasing the productivity of human labour in manufacturing whilst better local transport allowed its concentration, permitting considerable economies of organization. Associated agricultural improvements generated surpluses of food, raw materials and labour, which all contributed to town growth. Moreover the attractions which brought people into the towns from the country tended to increase in strength in proportion to the size of the town. After the mid nineteenth century this tendency was especially marked, due to the role of the railways, since these accelerated and cheapened the movement of bulk goods. However the urbanization process did not solely consist of a transfer of population from country to town. Greater productivity allowed a marked relative increase of the birth and survival rate of the resident population

in the industrializing urban areas. Within these towns tertiary economic activities began to generate a rapidly growing proportion of total employment. As a result growing numbers of giant cities, of a size unequalled since the time of the Roman Empire, began to dominate the networks of urban development.

These new urban centres differed from those of pre-industrial Europe in more than size; they had a centrifugal dynamic of growth and they were divided into areas of distinct function. In the pre-industrial town the wealth generating institutions (trade, administration and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing) had tended to concentrate in the centre, in association with the homes of the most prosperous and powerful, whilst the poor tended to live on the outskirts. Division by area was known, but was usually based on the concentration of certain trades in certain areas: thus, in medieval Barcelona, the silversmiths were located in the Carrer de la Argenteria, the hatmakers in the Carrer de Sombreters, the glassmakers in the Carrer del Vidre, and examples such as these are familiar in most medieval cities.

Such pre-industrial towns were often surrounded by fortifications; little development tended to take place outside these, unless encouraged by commercial advantage (in the Spanish case, freedom from taxation outside the walls led to the establishment of many markets - zonas francas around Spanish towns in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries). Often in the case of important fortified towns like Barcelona, peripheral expansion was totally prohibited in the Zone of Fire or glacis for military reasons.⁽¹⁷⁾

This relatively static and functionally, if not socially, homogeneous pre-industrial model of the town was changed completely by the growth process and its associated areal division. There are different models of these two linked processes and two basic variants are

James Ronald KELLY, A neighbourhood approach to working class life and politics in Barcelona, 1910-1923
February, 1982 . II Vth.

buildings, leading to increasing morbidity and mortality, until around
the mid-nineteenth century when the fortifications either became

proposed by Sutcliffe: the British/North American model and the European model.

In the British model industrialization stimulated manufacturing and until at least the mid-nineteenth century manufacturers tended to locate in the central areas of towns. The disadvantages caused by this industrial concentration drove the middle and richer classes to the outskirts, leaving the manual workers to take up residence near their places of work. Later in the century improvements in urban transport allowed the generation of suburbs beyond the built-up outskirts and there was competition for land in this zone between the different socio-economic groups. Meanwhile the central land was also under competition for different uses - production, central business district, markets, administration. Thus segregation by use in the centre was paralleled by segregation by socio-economic category in the surrounding suburbs.⁽¹⁸⁾

On the continent of Europe the model, as hinted earlier, was different, due to the different physical character of urban expansion. There the old town centres were contained within old fortifications, and within them there were increasing densities of population and buildings, leading to increasing morbidity and mortality, until around the mid-nineteenth century when the fortifications either became disused or were removed. In general a new barrier to residential expansion was then encountered. This was the factory belt which grew up as a result of the rapid implantation of mechanized industrial developments served by the railways. This basic obstacle prevented the creation of suburbs for the rich and for the more prosperous middle classes and these groups preferred to keep their central residences and have a country house some distance away. Therefore it was only the lower middle classes and the manual workers who were the customers for

urban expansion, but, in general, the movement of population was too weak to break down the high residential densities which had built up during the first half of the nineteenth century and in most of the larger towns the majority of residents tended to live in flats or apartments. Vertical development of this sort complicated the emergence of socially differentiated areas, though did not ultimately prevent it.

Physical form and social differentiation may have differed in the two models; but in both old urban problems were intensified and new ones created. Traditional water supplies became exhausted or insufficient, whilst the sewerage systems proved inadequate, often leading to contamination of drinking water with the inevitable concomitant of epidemics (as late as 1914 there was a typhoid epidemic in Barcelona for this very reason).⁽¹⁹⁾ Overcrowding in housing became more common, and roads increasingly congested. These problems had economic consequences in that they restricted the creation of wealth both directly in terms of lost or inefficient production, and indirectly in that they set up barriers to the land market and the speculative process. Secondly, by making life insecure and unpleasant for certain groups or for all of the city's residents these problems could give rise to social problems (in the case of the typhoid epidemic in Barcelona in 1914 which was cited above, discontent in the poorer quarters affected was allayed only by the Catholic clergy staging special processions in the locality. But doubts about the hygienic conditions of the city were not always so easily allayed. During the city-wide influenza pandemic of 1918-19 it was impossible to contain discontent in this manner and criticism of the authorities was widespread and bitter).⁽²⁰⁾

Urban planning arose in the course of the nineteenth century as an attempt to resolve or at least ameliorate these problems. While individual effort was relied on as the most efficient and least objectionable way of securing a good urban environment, local authorities had traditionally held powers over certain aspects of town development where individual enterprise had not proved itself as securing the greatest well-being of the community. Sutcliffe names four of these: streets, sewerage, fire regulations and controls over atmospheric pollution, and a fifth could be added, that of control over markets.⁽²¹⁾ Urban authorities continued to regulate in these areas, but also began to intensify and extend public intervention through direct provision of facilities such as water and sewerage and, later, gas, electricity and public transport, and in this process town planning was instituted.

How far did the case of Barcelona meet this continental model of city development and town planning proposed by Sutcliffe? The answer is that Barcelona was a special case in that it was an administrative, financial and trading city, subject in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to an intensive industrialization process. True to the model it was walled in until 1854-9 when the walls were removed, and it was surrounded by an extensive zone of fire in which all building was prohibited. Inside the walls the old town was divided by function to some extent in that its main street, the Rambles, and the side street of the Carrer Fernando was the central business district (C.B.D.) and the well off whose businesses were located there lived in the neighbourhoods of La Mercé and La Ribera to the north of it (these areas were later incorporated into the new District III in the municipal reorganization of 1904).⁽²²⁾ To the south of the Rambles was the entertainment area around the Carrer del Comte del Assalt (later known as the Parallel after the new road driven along its perimeter which

was on the exact line of the 52nd parallel) and to the west was the Raval or industrial district, both of them later incorporated into District V. The limited space available for industrial enterprises led many industrialists to move out from the walled centre and they located their factories in the area surrounding the zone of fire, either creating new development where previously there had been none - in the new town of Poble Nou, where, apart from the weaving and dyeing industries located there from the mid eighteenth century, there was also a considerable steel industry (the Girona family chose to instal their Ferreria Barcelonesa there), or developing the villages of the periphery such as Sants (where the textile firm of La España Industrial moved to in 1842 from the Raval), Sant Martí de Provençals where the enlarged foundry of the Nou Vulcano was situated, or Gràcia, where a multiplicity of small textile firms were located. Some of these areas such as Gràcia grew considerably in the process - from 2,608 inhabitants in 1825 to 13,548 in 1850, the year when it was granted town status, to 19,969 in 1860, 45,042 in 1887 and to 61,935 in 1897, the year when it was annexed by Barcelona. Sant Martí similarly grew from 9,333 inhabitants in 1860 to 51,684 in 1897, and was known as the Manchester of Spain because, in the words of the AE for 1905, it was:

...el principal centro industrial del Reino, bastando sólo para comprender esta importancia, ver a determinada distancia las negras masas de humo que continuamente despiden las innumerables chimeneas de sus monumentales fábricas...(23)

These townships jealously guarded their autonomy against the inevitable encroachments of the Barcelona administration and politicians who tried repeatedly in the nineteenth century to extend their political control over these wealth producing areas. (24)

Thus in the case of Barcelona, development did not proceed on the lines of the old centre being surrounded by a factory belt which was in turn surrounded by suburbs for the well-off. Rather there was a grossly

overcrowded old centre, to some extent vertically integrated but possessing areas of distinct function, such as the C.B.D., the entertainment area and the manufacturing area of the Raval, surrounded by the empty space of the zone of fire, which in turn was surrounded by the old villages. Some of these had attained a considerable size by the second half of the nineteenth century, and contained large numbers of manual workers residing near their workplaces as well as the local middle classes and a not inconsiderable number of summer houses for the Barcelona middle classes, particularly in those areas such as Gràcia which were higher up and escaped the heat and, to some extent, the infectious diseases of the plain. The two railways in the city hardly presented barriers to expansion. One line entered the city from the north-east coast through Poble Nou, and only caused communication difficulties between the old centre and the fishing and port area of the Barceloneta. The other ran south-west across the city, along the centre of the later Carrer Aragó, in a cutting. This was bridged at frequent intervals and represented a certain hindrance to communications, but not a serious obstacle to urban extension. The only serious barrier was that of the site of the Ciutadella fortress which had been turned into a park and blocked the access from the old centre to Poble Nou and parts of Sant Martí; again this was more of a communications obstacle since urban extension had had continued far beyond the Ciutadella itself.

So, rather than being confronted with obstacles to its expansion, Barcelona had a huge territory to expand into, and the second atypical factor was that it possessed a comprehensive town plan for the overall development of that area from an early date. This was the Cerdà plan of 1859, which antedated any similar plan in Europe by over twenty years. It is not suggested by this that the sequence described by Sutcliffe of Industrialization-Urbanization-Town Planning did not apply

in the case of Barcelona. The evidence of Nadal shows that industrialization based on the cotton industry with its main markets in the Spanish American colonies, began in Catalonia in the late eighteenth century, suffered a crisis during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, and picked up again in the 1820's-1830's when large scale mechanization was carried out, and led to the expansion of many of the Catalan towns, and foremost among these, Barcelona.⁽²⁵⁾

Rather it is suggested that whereas town planning was only acknowledged as a science in England around 1910, Barcelona had by this time been developed in accordance with an overall plan whose limitations were increasingly apparent.⁽²⁶⁾ There was, therefore, an awareness of both the need for new plans and a consciousness of the possibilities offered by new planning techniques developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in particular in Germany. But before going on to this crucial step it would be advisable to examine the Cerdà plan and the limitations which led to its degradation.

The Cerdà plan

The Cerdà plan was produced by the civil engineer Ildefons Cerdà at a time of economic and political euphoria for the Catalan bourgeoisie (the Bienni Progresista), though it was not begun until 1866, at a time when the dramatic economic crisis of the cotton famine had momentarily sunk the Catalan economy. The underlying political and economic trends represented by these two factors conditioned both the initial scale of the plan and the subsequent problems in implementing it.

Basically the Cerdà plan was an attempt to link the old city with the industrializing villages and towns of the periphery through the development of the zone of fire area. Before drawing up the plan, Cerdà undertook an extensive survey of social conditions within the

walled city, producing a major demographic, economic and social analysis of each street and establishing the neighbourhood unit as the basis for social life within Barcelona (and by extension within all cities). His plan was therefore based on this social model and is remarkable for marrying such a complex social vision with advanced technical planning.⁽²⁷⁾

Thus Cerdà wanted to achieve rapid communications between centre and periphery and throughout the urban area, and he proposed a grid network of streets, of a minimum width of 20 metres, running north-north-west to south-south-east and south-south-west to north-north-east from the boundaries of the peripheral areas to the old town centre. For rapid communication through the centre, three major streets would be prolonged from the grid, two running 'perpendicularly' down to the sea, and one crossing the city 'horizontally'. Two major traffic carrying diagonal streets would cross the whole city, meeting at the Plaça de les Glòries Catalanes, the new central focal point designated by Cerdà.

All residential, commercial and industrial development was to be carried out within the blocks of 133.33 metres X 133.33 metres created by the grid system of roads and would consist of constructions on two sides of the block, which would be under 16 metres in height and surrounded by ample gardens. This generous allocation of space was further complemented by the eight public parks distributed throughout the area to be developed.

Although rapid communications were a surprisingly modern technical feature of the Cerdà plan, it must be emphasized that it was not the intention to allow the streets to become simply corridors for traffic and the block the standard residential unit. Rather Cerdà bore in mind the model of the neighbourhood unit which had emerged in his

analysis of the old city and tried to allow the creation of such units in the new area. This was to be achieved through the creation of a hierarchical system of communications. Pedestrian ways through the centre of each block would allow the segregation of people and traffic and would permit the establishment of communities larger than the individual block based on human interaction on a small scale.

Buildings within the block would be aligned in different ways, to create open spaces and focal points. In this way, then, differentiated groups of buildings could be created, skirted by the main traffic carrying roads and possessing their own internal communications and meeting points.

The Cerdà plan therefore represented an advanced social understanding and outstanding technical innovation typical of the mid-nineteenth century Catalan bourgeoisie, but the economic and political weaknesses of that same bourgeoisie meant that it lacked an adequate means of finance and access to the political institutions to enable the plan to be carried out.

The degradation of the Cerdà plan

Though they may express themselves differently, contemporary commentators, when discussing the failure of the Cerdà plan, are in basic agreement. When Bohigas says that 'no fossin suficientement coordinades les possibilitats urbanístiques amb les econòmiques', and Roca speaks of the 'relacions entre el sistema urbà i el capital', they are both talking about the failure of the large scale capitalist accumulation on the part of the Barcelona and Catalan bourgeoisie.⁽²⁸⁾ This structural failure meant that in Barcelona, unlike English cities, where, as was pointed out in note (26), finance was available for extensive town development, the Cerdà plan had to be financed in

piecemeal fashion, from the limited gains made by the small scale Catalan manufacturers during the cyclical boom of 1876-1886 known as the Febre d'Or or from individual development financed by the income arising from the development itself. The municipality was restricted to slowly providing the basic facilities of roads, water, sewerage and street lighting. In the case of privately financed development the result was the creation of individual, architect designed modernist masterpieces, expressing the growing strength and increasing consciousness of the bourgeoisie, which fitted badly in the overall scheme. In the case of self financing developments, poorer quality houses were constructed, with the developers trying to bend the building requirements as far as possible in order to make the maximum profit. Not surprisingly they campaigned with increasing success for these to be relaxed. Thus the maximum height of four floors in each block was increased and construction of all four sides of the block was allowed, resulting in the closure of most of the passageways designed to allow access to communal centres. As an indication of the space gained by developers in this way, the original Cerdà plan allowed for 67,208 cubic metres of building on each block. Filling in the other two sides of the block added another 52,864 cubic metres and a further 18,944 cubic metres were gained when a regulation of 1895 permitted building in the interior of the block up to first floor level.⁽²⁹⁾ In this way developers were able to finance the plan, at the expense of removing all possibilities for the creation of open spaces and gardens and the growth of the neighbourhood units envisaged by Cerdà.

Thus the plan was completely degraded in its social aspects by the end of the century. The same was true of its technical aspects; it did not result in more rapid communications between the centre and the peripheral towns. This was because piecemeal development left in use

the old meandering channels of communication between the villages and towns of the periphery with the centre and eventually these were superimposed on the Cerdà grid plan, creating circulation problems. Moreover Cerdà's original intention that the city should develop towards the north-west where the Plaça de les Glòries Catalanes was to act as the new centre was belied by the drift towards the south-west. The Rambles remained the C.B.D., extending through the Plaça Catalunya and up the Passeig de Gràcia and the Rambla de Catalunya, and then over towards the west along the Diagonal.⁽³⁰⁾

The failure of the Cerdà plan to provide technical or social improvements was thus evident at the turn of the century and it also threw into relief the deficiencies of the municipal administration. The Lliga was to demand both changes in the Town Hall and a new plan which would ameliorate social problems and provide for the growth of Catalan industry, thereby creating a secure economic and social base for seeking political power on the wider Spanish stage.

The Lliga project

The new town plan demanded by the Lliga was a major part of the project it was engaged in. A number of elements flow together over time in this project and the identification of these and the interrelationships between them is a complicated task. In summary there were direct measures - the adoption of a new city plan to create new general conditions of production through increasing the circulation of capital by increasing collective consumption of services, using the income from land speculation and harnessing new energy sources - and indirect measures - to create a more educated and civic minded workforce.⁽³¹⁾

The project must be set against the economic background described earlier and certain features need to be picked out to explain the

adoption and success of the different elements of the project. Vilar, writing in 1929 on the development of Catalan industry identified these features as:

...besoins nouveaux, influence étrangère qui trouve a Barcelone l'intermediaire naturel entre l'Espagne et les puissances financières et industrielles internationales, effets de la guerre qui obligea la production barcelonaise a se diversifier en face de marchés et besoins nouveaux, électrification qui augmente ses possibilités productrices, développement urbain...(32)

To profit from these features Catalan industrialists had to find new ways of financing industrial growth. This was to be achieved through creating a city where mass consumption of land and services would make the circulation of capital into a motor for industrial growth. Increases in land values were to be obtained from harnessing the double demand for housing in the city, that of the immigrant workers drawn to Barcelona's factories and that of the middle classes who wished to leave the centre and the Eixample and who could invest in new peripheral development thanks to the profits they took from manufacturing. The types of development which resulted from this demand will be examined below in the case of La Torrassa-Collblanc and that of the garden city initiative, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the process was, once begun, self-sustaining; if industry was successful, then more workers were needed and would have to be housed and more profits would be available for the industrialists and middle classes. So a means of planning urban growth was needed and a succession of plans were to be produced, all of them inspired by the dominant model of the period, that of town planning in Germany. (33)

The attraction of the German model was that it was seen as having been the motor behind the success of the new German state, transforming a little unified latecomer to industrialization which was saddled with a backward agricultural sector and only a polarized industrial sector,

into an economically successful unified federation. Moreover Germany, like Spain, had a dual planning structure in which the lower level exercised great autonomy. The supporters of the German model in Catalonia hoped that its adoption in Barcelona would allow Catalonia and ultimately Spain to be revitalized in the same way.

The first steps in this direction were made with the announcement in 1903 of a competition for a new town plan, under the significant title of Concurs internacional d'avantprojectes d'enllaç de la zona d'Eixampla de Barcelona i els pobles agregats entre sí i amb la resta del terme municipal de Sarrià i d'Horta. To ensure that the municipal employees were capable of administering such a plan efficiently, new regulations for employees designed to improve conduct and to stamp out corruption were approved at extraordinary sessions of the council in 1902, along with a reorganization of the municipal administration which introduced new mechanisms to ensure that future municipal activity and its effects could be adequately monitored. Among these were the creation of the Negociado d'Estadística, Padrón i Elecciones under Manuel Escudé i Bartolí, which was charged with undertaking the statistical analysis of the city and producing the Anuario Estadístico, an annual summary. This scientific data-collection was expected to be of great value in policy making.

The results of the competition, judged by a jury of three municipal councillors (regidors) of whom two were from the Lliga, were announced in 1905, and soon afterwards the author of the winning plan, Leon Jaussely, was given a contract to draw up a definitive plan, and this was produced just under a year later.

The Jaussely plan and its successors

The main feature of the plan was that it adopted the German technique of zoning, by which different parts of the city were reserved for different functions.⁽³⁴⁾ Jaussely's proposals were that the old centre should be devoted to commerce, whilst industry would be situated to the north and south of the centre, in the Poble Nou and Sants areas which had relatively easy access to the port, in an area behind the mountain of Montjuich (which the Lliga later earmarked for a free port and industrial zone), and in the peripheral area of Sant Andreu. Some industrial development would be retained in Gràcia, though this area would also be used for residential purposes. Other residential development would take place in the higher lands towards the hills of Collserola, and hospitals and cemeteries would be situated beyond this. The residential areas were to be separated from the industrial areas by extensive parks, one on the mountain of Montjuich itself and the other beside the River Besos.

By locating industrial development away from residential development the plan split the nexus of home/workplace which had been the characteristic feature of working class life in the developments carried out during the nineteenth century and which had proved to be a potent source of solidarity during industrial disputes. It also established a series of hierarchies for land speculation since certain areas were now assigned particular uses, and it created the conditions for working class housing to become an object of mass consumption.

A second main feature of the plan was the importance given to new main roads, especially roads across the city from north-east to south-west, to ensure communications between the residential and the industrial areas and between these areas and the commercial centre. There was to be an inner ring road through the residential areas and an outer ring

road around these to ensure maximum communicability between them. The ring roads therefore defined concentric rings within which industrial and residential development was to take place, whilst radial roads were to bisect these rings. It was even proposed that electrified trains might be run along some of these.

The third main feature was the provision of two main parks separating the industrial areas from the commercial centre. These were intended to be more than aesthetic demarcations; they were to be centres of mass diversion. A similar third park was planned to the north of the city on the hills of the Guinardó. To the same end several sports grounds were included in the plan and, more sedately, the eternal Mediterranean delight in small places, town squares, was catered for by their liberal provision in the residential areas, where they would provide space for children to play and the older residents to congregate. The provision of a Passeig Maritim, running along the seafront between the Barceloneta and the Besos allowed for the indulgence of the Mediterranean passion for strolling by the sea.

Provision was made for the creation of an administrative centre around the Plaça de les Glòries and for public service points to be located in all the residential areas.

Finally new railway links were proposed, the lines to run along the centres of the main traffic arteries, and it was planned to build an impressive new railway station in a central location.

In some aspects the Jaussely plan might appear to be an extension of the Cerdà plan in the primacy it gave to communications and in its policy for public spaces. But it went far beyond its predecessor in the comprehensiveness of the road infrastructure it envisaged. In the matter of parks Jaussely chose marginal land for their sites, and

in the case of Montjuich, he chose the area occupied by the state fortress, one long demanded by the city, thus ensuring that there would be political support for park development and that the areas chosen were of less interest to developers.⁽³⁵⁾ Rather than simple green areas the parks were intended to be centres for recreation, with all the implications this had for mass consumption. Moreover in its other aspects the Jaussely plan went further than that of Cerdà. A clear policy for industrial development can be seen in the zoning proposals. Cerdà, who does not seem to have given the matter much thought, had only mixed small scale industry with residences (though given the transport technology of his day and its limited capacity to move masses of workers, it is difficult to see what else he could have done). Zoning also implied giving a new impetus to speculation and making changes in social structures.

For these reasons the Jaussely plan was bound, ultimately, to meet with approval from the Lliga and its allies. But first it would have to be properly digested and set against other trends in planning which were arousing interest among Lliga intellectuals, such as the Garden City movement. To this end the Lliga was able to ensure that some of its supporters employed at the Barcelona Town Hall were sent to Germany on study leave to investigate latest developments there.

The sheer expense of carrying out such a global plan was against its being adopted in its entirety, since no more means of finance were available in 1907 than had been available for the Cerdà plan nearly half a century earlier. As for getting parts adopted, the political situation was unfavourable. The Radicals were in charge of the Town Hall in 1907 and reinforced their control in 1909. Bitter wranglings over the Pressupost de Cultura (see Chapter 9) wrecked any possibility of an understanding. Finally the events of 1909-10 - the Setmana Tràgica and the ensuing repression - followed by the Radical victory in

the municipal elections of December 1909 pushed the plan into the municipal archives as far as the Council was concerned.

However the debate on the new plan continued on the part of the Lliga and the contemporary development of the plan for the Gross-Berlin excited much interest among the intellectuals of the party.

The Gross-Berlin plan and Catalan intellectuals

Berlin was by the first decade of the twentieth century the largest city in Europe after London, although no extension of the city boundaries had taken place since 1861 and, at the beginning of the century the Hobrecht development plan of 1861 was still in force. In consequence the development of working class housing had taken place outside the city boundaries and unbridled speculation had led to massive population densities there. Lack of provision of a proper road infrastructure had caused extreme traffic congestion. From the early 1900's a campaign built up to secure comprehensive planning of the whole conurbation and the two Berlin architectural associations set up an Association for the development of Greater Berlin, which proposed that such development should be based on a modern road and traffic infrastructure, zoning and the provision of parks, sports facilities, etc. In 1910 these two associations, in conjunction with the municipality, organized a competition for a plan for Greater Berlin. The competition produced the most impressive entries ever seen in Germany, some of them the work of multidisciplinary teams including economists and transport engineers, incorporating the proposals put forward by the Association. (36)

Interest by Catalan intellectuals and politicians in the situation in Berlin was stimulated by the study visits there in 1908-10 of the Town Hall employees and Lliga members M. Vidal i Guardiola, M. Raventós i

Bordoy and G. Graell i Moles, and by the later visit of Cebrià Montoliu in 1912. The earlier visitors, in letters from Germany, and through the talks they gave and the articles they wrote on their return, made known the ideas then current in Berlin. Montoliu's book gave an overall account and synthesized the plans which had been put forward in the competition. (37)

He emphasized the correlation between city growth and the overall development of the German nation, but demanded that such city growth had to be strictly controlled if it was not to result in a counterproductive chaos. With proper controls, however, the city could be used as an instrument for greater production, circulation and accumulation of wealth. This view of the city as a productive agent therefore led him to demand the creation of the necessary infrastructures, especially roads and transports, to create a mass consumption market for housing and public goods. (38)

The introduction of these latest German applications and the debate on them amongst the Lliga intellectuals and politicians led to the idea of a Gross Barcelona and this began to take shape when in 1914 the Lliga created the Mancomunitat and won control over it. (39) The party then began to consider the implementation of the Jaussely plan.

Among the proposals it considered was the suggestion made by its leader Cambó in 1908, of mounting an International Exhibition on the Montjuich site and thereby creating the park defined in the plan as a first stage in implementing the remainder of the plan. Such a development would not be subject to financial constraints and might be self-financing as well as providing a visible symbol of the new urban policy. Cambó had suggested that the exhibition should be devoted to Catalan industry, but significantly, in view of the development of the electricity supply industry in Catalonia (see below) it was now proposed to mount an Exposició de les Indústries Elèctriques, to take place in 1917. The

Lliga therefore set up a department of the Council to oversee the necessary Town Hall action and a team of its experts to consider a programme of short and long term activities within the framework of the Jaussely plan to be carried out for the Exhibition. The report of this group led to the Estudio de orientaciones para el plano de obras que convendría realizar en el Ensanche con motivo de la Exposición de Industrias Eléctricas in April 1914, which was adopted by the Barcelona Council later that month. (40)

The 1914 plan

The Plano de Obras drew on the programme prepared by the Lliga experts and had four main parts: the opening of new roads or prolongation of older ones on the model contained in the Jaussely plan, complementary activities to improve the urban area, principally the paving of roads, the provision of sewerage facilities, and of more open spaces; the conservation of those areas which were already in good condition; and the elaboration of an economic plan which would permit future rational planning through careful evaluation of proposed works, and would avoid the need for any deficit financing.

The plan, was intended therefore to improve communications within the city, in order that zoning could be carried out to the fullest extent, to provide for the collective consumption of housing and common goods such as open spaces, and to find a means of financing the project.

Finally, it was supported by the municipal department set up to revise and adapt the Jaussely plan, and the recommendations of this department were put on public view in the summer of 1917, and approved by the Council in October 1917, under the title of Plano general de la urbanización de Barcelona. (41)

The Plano General de la Urbanización de Barcelona of 1917

This was to be the definitive version of the pla d'enllaços demanded in the competition of 1903. Its essential elements were the final limitation of development on the Cerdà model to the remaining areas of the Eixampla, within the inner ring road. Beyond this new and varied models of planning were to be employed, with garden city developments for the bourgeoisie and middle classes, and tenement developments for the working classes.

The ring roads and the radial link roads were to become the framework for the development of the city, demarcating the zoning which was to take place, within the concentric rings so formed. The radials were to provide rapid transport from each district to its neighbours and to the centre. The classist nature of the zoning was emphasized by the proposals outlined for developing the peripheral neighbourhoods, for the industrial areas were to be provided with few amenities, whereas those favoured by the middle classes were to be given better communications and more green spaces.

The open spaces policy was extended by declaring all the Turons (the foothills of the Collserola chain behind the city), and the Collserola itself as open space on which only recreational facilities could be built.

Finally the plan opted to follow both the trend in development and the opportunities offered by the Exhibition (which because of the First World War had been cancelled) in displacing the centre which both Cerdà and Jaussely had placed at the Plaça de les Glòries, over to the south-west, to the zone of Passeig de Gràcia-Diagonal, where it still lies today.

After many vicissitudes, then, the Lliga had finally been able to produce a town plan which synthesized the proposals of the previous plans as well as modified others, based on the principles of German practice and strongly influenced by the model of the Gross-Berlin plan. The policies it laid down have lasted virtually to this day, for it was to be the only plan for Barcelona during the ensuing 35 years.⁽⁴²⁾

In summary this final plan, like its predecessors, shared the same characteristics: these were zoning with a consequent creation of differential land values, the encouragement of mass consumption of housing and services in order to speed the circulation of capital, the installation of civic centres and public service points to give a public image to the new policy (foremost among these were schools and these will be discussed in Chapter 9) and most importantly of all, improved communications.

The provision of main roads was, of course, only part of what was needed to ensure the mobility of the workforce. Parallel with these there needed to be an improvement in the urban transportation system, and this was achieved through the development of the tram network, and later, by the installation of the underground railway.

The development of both these systems of transport depended on a further element, the provision of electricity. This, too, was intimately linked to the fortunes of industry. Catalonia had little in the way of coal, and its steam machinery was fuelled by imported coal of good quality from Britain and of poorer quality from Asturias. The added costs this imposed on Catalan manufacturers were difficult enough to absorb, and once foreign enterprise stepped in with the capital which Catalan industry was unable to raise, wholesale electrification took place. The need then was to make Barcelona and its region a suitably attractive energy market to attract the foreign

investment to set up the electricity supply industry and in this urban transport systems offered a useful supplement to industrial demand.

BARCELONA AS POWERHOUSE: THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE BARCELONA REGION

Modest electricity supply undertakings such as the Barcelonesa de Electricidad were founded in Barcelona in the period 1900-1910, but these were not enough to satisfy the need of Catalan industry alluded to above, for a reliable and cheap energy source.⁽⁴³⁾ It was not until 1911, with the intervention of Frank Stark Pearson that this situation began to change.

Pearson was an American financier and engineer.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The inventor of an early electrical light system, he became a pioneer in developing hydroelectric schemes, founding the first hydroelectric companies in Brazil and Mexico, as well as the Electrical Development Company which used the flow of the river Niagara as motive power for supplying electricity to the American Lakes zone. Ever keen to find new markets, he enlisted the aid of Catalan engineers headed by Carlos Montañés in 1908 in a feasibility study of the possibilities for supplying hydroelectricity to Catalan industry, using as motive power the rivers issuing from the Pyrenees, the Ebro and its tributaries, the Segre and the Noguera Pallaresa. In 1911 he came to Barcelona to find out the position for himself, and in order to convince him that Barcelona and its industries could be a profitable consumer of electrical power, Montañés arranged for him to climb the Tibidabo and survey the city. In Montañés' own words:

Según lo convenido a las 7 de la mañana fuí a buscarle al Hotel Colon en mi coche descapotable Turicum matrícula B-730. Ascendimos sin prisa a la cumbre del Tibidabo...El día amaneció claro y transparente. Desde allí podíamos ver a nuestros pies el despertar de Barcelona. Al otro lado, Sabadell y Terrassa, en los extremos visibles del Valles. Mas al norte Montserrat y los Pirineos completamente nevados...Había dibujado en un plano de Barcelona y las zonas industriales adyacentes, una cuadrícula, y en cada cuadro detallaba la potencia que estaba instalada y que podía electrificarse...⁽⁴⁵⁾

Vilar, though he confuses Pearson's nationality describes the

revelation the view of the city must have been to Pearson:

Es l'existència del mercat de força barceloní que fa creure potser amb excès - en el futur de les forces pirinenques. Fou al cim del Tibidabo, i no a Tremp i Camarasa, on Pearson, l'hidraulicista canadenc, tingue la 'revelació' de l'obra que calia fer. El desenvolupament econòmic capitalista no es fonamentada pas sobre l'inventari racional dels recursos sinó en l'esperança despertada pels mercats existents. (46)

Only three months after his visit to Barcelona, Pearson founded an international holding company in Toronto, the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., to raise capital for enterprises to supply the Barcelona mercat de forces. The fact that it was registered in Canada gave rise to its popular name of La Canadenca in Barcelona, and the name stuck, even when control of the company passed to a Belgian holding, SOFINA, after the strike of 1919. (47) Within the holding, the Barcelona Traction itself was to supply electricity derived from the Segre and Noguera Pallaresa, whilst a filial company, the Ebro Irrigation and Power Company (later registered as a Spanish company under the title of Riegos y Fuerzas del Ebro) was to use the Ebro. The new holding absorbed the existing Barcelona companies, against local and national protest, but could not count on a wholly monopolistic position due to the formation in the same year of the Energía Eléctrica de Cataluña and the conversion in 1912 of the old established gas company, the Catalana de Gas, to the Catalana de Gas y Electricidad, producing electricity from coal. (48)

Swift development of the hydroelectrical potential of the Pyrenean rivers was realised; by 1915 the dam and station at Tremp on the Noguera was completed and in the same year the station at Seros on the Segre began to function. The dam at Tremp was the fourth largest in the world (82 metres high by 206 metres long) and held back 220 million cubic metres of water, producing 38,000 Hp per annum. The most important works, those at Camarasa, downstream from Tremp and

collecting the water used there, would not be completed until 1920, after the strike of La Canadencia. A lake thirteen metres long was contained by a dam of 84 metres in height and the total Hp produced was 100,000 per annum. If the 56,000 Hp of Serós and the 33,000 Hp of the Capdella dam on the Ebro belonging to La Energía Eléctrica are added to these figures, some idea may be gained of the immense potential of this original Catalan development. (49)

A major boost to the extension of the network was given by the difficulties encountered in importing coal and the consequent rise in its price, as a result of the German blockade of shipping during the First World War. (50) This resulted in the conversion of much of the steam machinery in Barcelona to electricity. (51) By 1920 90% of all Catalan electrical production was consumed within a 30 mile radius of Barcelona. Whereas in 1911 total production was 20,000 Hp per annum, in 1920 it was 265,000 Hp. Of this 70% was produced by the Barcelona Traction and its associated companies; it therefore supplied more than double the amount supplied by its rivals. (52) Nor was the company content merely to supply electricity for it had, at an early stage in its history, absorbed the main tram company in Barcelona and, a little later the electrified railway line from Barcelona to Sarrià, and it is to developments in transports that we must now turn.

THE TRAM NETWORK: SYMBOL OF THE NEW CITY

Just as the history of the electricity supply industry to the Barcelona area is intimately bound up with the name of one man, Frank Pearson, so the history of the Barcelona tram network is bound up with another, Mariano de Foronda.⁽⁵³⁾ Following a typical model of European tramway development which has been analysed by McKay, the electrified tram network in Barcelona arose haphazardously as a result of the desire of private developers to make profits, leaving parts of the city with no service, whereas other parts had several lines, sometimes even of different gauges, running along the same streets.⁽⁵⁴⁾ It was Foronda who took the initiative of merging most of the small companies into a larger holding creating a rational and uniform tram network, and ensuring a regular and reliable service through the exercise of a strong internal discipline over the workforce.⁽⁵⁵⁾ His achievement, therefore, was to provide the Lliga with the transport infrastructure it needed for its project of the Gross-Barcelona.

The first horse-drawn tram service in Barcelona was inaugurated in June 1872 and various lines using this method of traction were inaugurated during the next decade. The 1890s saw the introduction of steam powered trams by companies exploiting longer lines like those from Sarrià and La Sagrera to the centre, but these enjoyed little favour among the customers. From La Sagrera there was a prolongation line to Horta, and the fact that beside the waiting room at the Horta terminus the company had provided a chapel led to cynical remarks that such provision had been made so that intending passengers could settle their affairs with the Almighty before setting out on what could well prove to be their final journey!⁽⁵⁶⁾

Around the turn of the century there came to Barcelona what McKay has called the 'revolutionary breakthrough' in urban transport, the

introduction of overhead electric traction. First perfected in the United States in 1888, the new method of traction had swept across America in the early 1890s and across Europe in the later part of the decade.⁽⁵⁷⁾ The speed of adoption of the new technology was due to the role of foreign capital, seeking new opportunities in all countries, and 'electrificación' in Barcelona was no exception to the rule. Already in 1899 the Circunvalación line belonging to the English owned company Los Tranvías de Barcelona (known as La Companyia Anglesa) had electrified. Similarly the Barcelona-Gràcia line, owned by a company with joint English-Belgian capital, the Tranvías de Barcelona a Ensanche y Gràcia, was electrified in the same year. In 1901 the steam-powered Barcelona-Sants line, owned by the Banca de Villanueva, was bought up by German investors and converted to electricity under the name of the Compañía General de Tranvías (usually referred to popularly as La Alemana). The line from Barcelona to Sant Andreu was electrified with Belgian capital invested in the new company S.A. Tranvías de Barcelona a San Andrés y Extensiones from 1901 onwards. Some shorter electric lines were financed by Catalan capital. The S.A. 'El Tibidabo' was constituted in 1898 to build an electric tramway up the Avinguda del Tibidabo to allow access to the mountain for recreational purposes; a first stage into making the mountain into a leisure area in the same way as Montjuich would later be converted. Despite this, the main impulse came from foreign investment, with companies engaged in aggressive competition, sometimes overdeveloping the new opportunities offered them.⁽⁵⁸⁾ When in 1904 Belgian shareholders in two of the then nine companies existing in the city decided to amalgamate their two companies, the way was opened for rationalization. The new company, Les Tramways de Barcelona, was to be run by the former director of the larger of its constituents, Mariano de Foronda. It possessed some 22½ kilometres of lines when Foronda took over and he set out to extend this by both extending

existing lines or building new ones, and by taking over other companies. In 1906, by the end of its first year of operations the new company already possessed 45½ kilometres of lines and by 1911, when it completed the process of taking over all the Barcelona companies, apart from the Tibidabo line, it had arrived at a total of 103½ kilometres. (59)

Parallel with this aggressive expansion policy Foronda maintained an uncompromising and paternalistic attitude to the companies' workforce. Internal unification of the enterprise was attained through the creation of standard job descriptions, ranging from the humble limpia-vias to the jefe de servicios y de parada and the duties of each category were laid down in detail. Any transgressions were met with a financial sanction. (60) Those considered troublemakers were dismissed and replaced by immigrants brought in from Foronda's home village (these were later referred to contemptuously as 'los indios de Foronda' by the militants of the C.N.T.). The workers were given winter and summer uniforms, and when these were changed, the worker who had kept his in best condition was rewarded with an 80 peseta suit. Christmas parties were given for employees' children, and in 1913 a Caja de Retiros was instituted with an initial endowment from the Company, which also paid one third of the worker's subscription. (61)

By this policy Foronda was able to create a docile and manageable workforce which remained aloof from the working class movement until an intense campaign by the C.N.T. brought about the foundation of the tram union in 1918. The inability to stop the trams by pulling out the tram workers would occasion violence in 1909 and again in 1917, an indication of how much their importance was perceived by the working class, and this theme will be returned to again in discussion of the events of 1909, 1917 and 1919.

Finally Foronda, having created his empire and his subjects, sought to secure his supply of power. In 1906 the Tramways de Barcelona entered into a contract with the Barcelonesa de Electricidad; in 1907 it installed its own electricity generating plant, and in 1909 it increased the capacity of the plant. Finally in 1913 the Company entered into contract with the Barcelona Traction, and Foronda became the only Spanish member of the Consejo Administrativo Conjunta formed between the latter and the tram company. The new contract doubled the capacity on which the company could call, and left the way clear for further expansion and for intensification of traffic.⁽⁶²⁾ Thus the 366 vehicles in service in 1913 increased to 637 in 1917 and to 760 in 1923. New radial lines connecting the centre to the periphery were created by the new line to La Bordeta (1916), the extension of the Sants line to Collblanc (1916), the Sarrià line to Pedralbes (1920), and the remaking of the line from Rambla Catalunya to Sant Martí with a branch line to El Clot. Connections via the periphery were extended by the line from Bonanova to Pedralbes, and finally a new branch was built to Montjuich via the Carrer Tamant.⁽⁶³⁾

There are, unfortunately, no readily available statistics for the number of persons travelling on Barcelona's trams, apart from the years 1918-20. In 1906, in the first year of operation of Les Tramways de Barcelona, 41,954,658 passengers were carried, though no details are available for the other companies. In 1912 80 million passengers were estimated. In 1917 it was estimated that about 100 million passengers used Barcelona's trams, and in 1918 about 142 million, rising to about 175 million in 1920.⁽⁶⁴⁾

Finally, towards the end of the period under study, diversification of the transport system began. The first motor buses in Barcelona had been used since 1906, replacing the horse-drawn rippers of the La

Catalana coach company, along the short route from Plaça Trilla in Gràcia to the Plaça Catalunya, but this presented no real competition to the tram route between the same points. However in 1922 a new company, the Compañía General de Autobuses obtained a licence from the Town Hall to exploit two transversal lines across the city (from Provença to the Estació de França and from Sants to Sant Martí) entering into considerable competition with Les Tramways de Barcelona. The tram company complained to the Town Hall and obtained the right to run buses of its own. 1923 saw increasing competition between the two companies and in 1924 the tram company entered into an agreement with the bus company, acquiring a considerable participation in its shares. (65)

Whereas buses were, in essence, complementary to the tram network, the plans advanced from 1920 for the construction of underground railways were the basis for a new system which would ultimately replace much of the tram network altogether, with a fast, efficient system capable of transporting greater numbers of people longer distances, and much less liable to disruption. (66) The first company which was formed to construct a 'metro', was the Ferrocarril Metropolitano de Barcelona, S.A. with capital from Les Tramways de Barcelona, and Foronda on the board of directors. It was intended to construct a transversal line from Fabra y Puig in the North East to La Bordeta in the South West, and the first section was completed in 1926. A second company, founded in 1921, the Gran Metropolità de Barcelona, S.A. intended to construct a line from Gràcia to the port, and the first section, from Gràcia to the Centre had been completed by 1924. (67)

Progress on the new metro system would continue to be slow, and the network would not be complete until the 1970s. It would be a technical transformation of the transport revolution brought about by the tram system, not a revolution in itself. (68) That transport

revolution was the most visible symbol of the Lliga's new policies for Barcelona, and the rapidity with which it was accomplished is tribute both to the working of the Lliga project and to the ability of two men to take the opportunity offered; Pearson (whose achievement was honoured by having a garden city development named after him - La Florida-Pearson) and Foronda (who did not attain such an honour, though the popular song of the cupletista, Pilar Alonso 'Les Tramvies d'en Foronda' reflected popular consciousness of his importance).⁽⁶⁹⁾

New town plans, electrification and transports, then, were all parts of the Lliga project to change the general conditions of production which could be achieved through direct intervention. But the acceptance of all these parts of the new project depended on the goodwill of the workforce. To achieve this the Lliga hoped to use the new town plan to create good material conditions of life for its workers, thereby removing a potent focus of discontent. Secondly, it hoped by more indirect means to persuade the working class into accepting its aims and values. This was to be achieved through education and propaganda for the new Barcelona. In any case the needs of industry for a better trained, more skilled workforce demanded the creation of new educational opportunities. But parallel with these would be an inculcation of civic values, civisme by which the worker would be encouraged to identify himself or herself with the values of the new Barcelona and so could be incorporated into the political system. Moreover he or she would seek to improve him or herself through gaining better qualifications and could therefore be incorporated into a series of job hierarchies, with all the implications this had for encouraging social stability through the formation of a social ladder. The dramatic confrontation of workers versus 'burgés' would be defused leading to negotiation of differences rather than confrontation.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The provision of schooling for all was therefore a major objective, along with provision for higher education, and this will be dealt with in Chapter 9. Equally there would be a flourishing of groups to complement such education - such as the Lliga del Bon Mot, to discourage bad language and the Pomells de Joventut, to incorporate the youth of Catalonia in a spiritual and civic movement, as well as a plethora of religious and charitable organisations.

This, then, was the Lliga's plan for Barcelona. The effects it had on the working class life will be examined in Chapter 1; and after this, an analysis of the Setmana Tràgica, the crisis of 1909, will be undertaken, to show the state of working class thought and action in Barcelona at the outset of the period under study here.

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CHAPTER 1

NEIGHBOURHOOD AND WORKING CLASS LIFE IN BARCELONA

INTRODUCTION

In the Introduction it was observed that Cerdà's plan for the extension of Barcelona, based on his study of social life and conditions within the walled city, proposed both the creation of an extensive, well communicated zone, the Eixample, and within it the development of neighbourhoods.

The degradation of the Cerdà plan meant that much of the infrastructure proposed by its author was never carried out, and to this day the Eixample is more homogeneous than the old centre and the peripheral areas.⁽¹⁾ Map 1.1 of the areas covered by the Associacions de Veïns in 1975 shows this, as well as the survival of neighbourhoods in the greater part of the city from the period when Cerdà analyzed them to the present; and it is the contention here that the neighbourhood has represented a fundamental base for the articulation and organization of working class protest throughout this period.

This protest has had different objectives in different periods. In the years under study here it was directed primarily against the social and economic conditions arising out of the Lliga project. In the thirties the greater extent of the split between place of work and place of residence made the neighbourhood less of a base for economic protest. Simultaneously massive immigration was causing severe social problems. The percolation downwards of the Lliga's ideas of civisme and the incorporation of the working classes into the political infrastructure meant that the neighbourhood became the basis of the civil integration of the working class into official politics through the neighbourhood branches of the political parties. During the Civil War the breakdown of that political structure and the social revolution in Barcelona meant that the

neighbourhood became the basis for working class control of production and consumption.⁽²⁾ The disarticulation of civil and political life following the Civil War, the overwhelming immigration and the structural changes in the city prevented a resumption of the activities of the thirties and it was not until the mid-sixties and early seventies that neighbourhood organization, in the form of the Associacions de Veïns became a vital factor in popular protest against the environmental and social consequences of the anarchic development of the Franco period.⁽³⁾ Following the restoration of local democracy in 1979 the neighbourhoods appear to have again taken on the role they played in the thirties.

A definition of the nature of the neighbourhood must, therefore be undertaken, and since the early seventies a number of studies of the urban neighbourhoods of Barcelona have been produced, coinciding with the growing popular, administrative and academic interest in the subject awakened by the neighbourhood movement.⁽⁴⁾ In the search for new democratic structures following the end of the Franco regime, a wide ranging debate has been conducted between residents, neighbourhood activists, administrators, politicians and academics about the definition and importance of the neighbourhood.⁽⁵⁾

THE DEFINITION OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Many of the studies mentioned above, as well as much of the posterior debate, have lacked a firm theoretical approach to the problem of the neighbourhood, but can be divided into those which follow a voluntarist approach by which the opinion of residents about the limits of their neighbourhoods is the determining factor, and those which follow a functional approach, defining neighbourhoods by their place within the economic and social structure of the whole city, and those which identify neighbourhoods according to their physical and social characteristics.

Typical of the first category is the pioneering work of Fabre and Huertas Clavería, who began reporting the growing neighbourhood protests of the late sixties and early seventies, and through this discovered the continuing existence of the city's neighbourhoods. They then went on to produce an ambitiously entitled series of popular guides to the neighbourhoods of Barcelona - Tots els barris de Barcelona, basing their division of the city on the limits which the Associacions de Veïns had defined for themselves. Unfortunately their approach has lacked an overall theoretical perspective and is marred by an unsystematic and anecdotal attitude to historical development, perhaps understandably in view of the colossal task they had set themselves. (6)

The second and third approaches were typified by the work of geographers from the Universitat Central de Barcelona who analyzed certain neighbourhoods, studying the productive activities, physical characteristics, and provision of services within them. (7) The third approach was exemplified by the work of the sociologists Bonal and Costa, who undertook a number of studies of individual neighbourhoods, usually at the request of the Associació de Veïns for the area, and went on to produce a classification of the city's neighbourhoods, identifying and describing them according to their physical, and to a lesser extent,

their social characteristics.⁽⁸⁾

The new city administration, elected in 1979, has undertaken studies of the third type in order to elaborate a more adequate administrative and electoral division of the city than the existing one. The statistical analyses and proposals which have been advanced, like those of Bonal and Costa, have been criticised as being too reliant on administrative enumeration districts for data collection.⁽⁹⁾ They therefore tend to give a spurious reality to these units, despite the fact that there is no a priori reason for attributing such units with any social meaning.⁽¹⁰⁾ They also tend to over-emphasize differences between areas and to assume greater social homogeneity within them than does, in fact, exist. This criticism illustrates a main defect in the social area approach to defining neighbourhoods, and an analysis of the origins and development of this approach will illustrate its theoretical weakness.

Social area analysis and neighbourhoods

The use of statistical indicators to describe urban social areas began with the Chicago school of sociology. Chicago, as a city, grew very rapidly from the 1890's, absorbing successive waves of European immigrants, who settled in a number of distinctive neighbourhoods.⁽¹¹⁾ The urban patterns which evolved engaged the interest of Park, Burgess and their colleagues. Using data on population characteristics, ethnic composition, housing types, and employment, they carried out a social area analysis to study the overall pattern of the neighbourhoods of the city, defining the social characteristics of the individual areas, and from this analysis they then derived theories about the nature of cities. Burgess, following the functional theories which were being elaborated in Europe, notably in Berlin, believed that cities were formed of concentric rings around a central zone, and that each of these areas had a specific function; the central zone was the C.B.D. with all the commercial, social

and administrative buildings: around it was a transitional zone shared uneasily between smaller offices which could not afford to set up in the C.B.D., and the residences of newly-arrived immigrants, and beyond that was a ring of working class residences. Outside this was the ring of middle class residences and finally in the outer area poorer immigrants lived alongside the roads to the city. This model was complemented by Park, with his theory that urban settlements developed in spatial patterns determined by biology, like plants and animals, human groups invaded the territory of others, struggled to achieve domination, and once dominant, became invaded in turn. The city was therefore a slow-moving mosaic of 'natural areas'.⁽¹²⁾

The type of social analysis pioneered by the Chicago school remained dominant in urban studies until the Second World War, despite criticism that the theories were merely rationalizations of empirically derived factors rather than the products of theoretical reasoning.⁽¹³⁾ The school of social ecology survived until some twenty years after, employing more sophisticated statistical methods in the style of Shevky, Williams and Bell to derive constructs of social differentiation.⁽¹⁴⁾ Studies produced tended to show that North American and Australian cities fitted the Shevky method better than European cities, confirming criticism of the Chicago school and social ecology theories.⁽¹⁵⁾ As a method for explaining general urban development, social area analysis has therefore been a limited tool, based on developing theoretical understanding by inductive reasoning.

The role of history in defining the neighbourhood

In the Introduction theories of urban development were examined and a theory for the development of Barcelona introduced, in which the development of the city was seen as part of a project carried out by a politico-economic group seeking to change the general conditions of

production within the city in order to increase capital circulation and increase the fortunes of Catalan capital, in order to allow it to gain hegemonic political power within the Spanish state. This theory owes much to the debate which has been carried out among architects in Barcelona, a contribution to the debate on neighbourhoods which has been deliberately omitted above as it partly responds to other preoccupations.

Through their collective organization, the Col·legi d'Arquitectes, Barcelona architects have contributed individually and corporatively to the debate over the anarchic growth and remodelling of the city during the last forty years, and have produced theoretical works reflecting on the processes at work.⁽¹⁶⁾ More importantly for our purposes here there have been two important debates centred around two major exhibitions: the centenary of the death of Cerda and the fiftieth anniversary of the 1929 Exhibition (which replaced the cancelled Exhibition planned for Montjuïc by the Lliga described in the Introduction).⁽¹⁷⁾ All the debates maintained by the architects were heavily influenced by the work of the Italian architect, Rossi, and break away from social area analysis to a more scientific and theoretically informed version of the approach adopted by Fabre and Huertas Clavería.⁽¹⁸⁾ Rossi claims that the development of the city is instrumental in creating the neighbourhood and that it is the task of the historian to analyze this process, since, alone of all the disciplines which take the city as their subject matter, only history can undertake the total study which is required.⁽¹⁹⁾ The neighbourhood is defined in this process of development:

El barrio se convierte, por ello, en un momento; un sector, de la forma de la ciudad, intimamente vinculado a su evolución y a su naturaleza, constituido por partes y a su imagen. De estas partes tenemos una experiencia concreta. Para la morfología social, el barrio es una unidad morfológica y estructural; está caracterizado por cierto paisaje urbano, cierto contenido social y una función propia; de donde un cambio de uno de estos elementos es suficiente para fijar el límite del barrio. También hay que tener en cuenta aquí que el análisis del barrio como hecho social fundado en la segregación de clases o de razas y en la función económica, o en todo caso en el rango social, corresponde indudablemente al mismo proceso de formación de la metrópoli moderna...⁽²⁰⁾

Carreras, following Rossi argues that:

En primer lloc cal insistir sobre la importància de la història a l'hora de definir el barri. La importància de la història entesa com el procés dialectic a través del qual les classes i fraccions de classe diferents han establert unes relacions de domini i d'hegemonia determinades. Es evident que en la conformació d'aquestes relacions socials, cal tenir present el que s'esdevé en la formació social concreta en que s'han produït, però no cal perdre de vista que poden tenir a nivell de barri una concreció particular específica, la qual seria justament l'element clau definidor i diferenciador alhora... El peculiar bloc de classes establert, que cal considerar de manera dinàmica i canviant, es el que ha produït la morfologia que pot ésser característica relativament d'un barri i alhora es el que explica el seu contingut [underlined in original] social. En definitiva, només a través de les relacions socials historicament produïdes entre les classes i fraccions de classes pot explicar-se el concepte i l'esperit de barri de que tan es parla. (21)

It will not be the intention here to carry out the type of analysis demanded by Carreras, as such a task for all the neighbourhoods of Barcelona is beyond the possibilities offered by this thesis. Rather the intention here is to identify the characteristics, the 'contingut social' of the neighbourhoods of Barcelona in the period under study and to examine the way in which they served as a base for working class politics and organization in the years 1910-1923.

To identify these characteristics it is necessary to undertake some statistical analysis of the available data, drawing on the techniques of social area analysis, to discover differences between areas of the city and to classify neighbourhoods according to their social condition, as well as to describe the conditions of working class life within them.

STATISTICAL SOURCES FOR THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF BARCELONA AND THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE BARCELONA WORKING CLASSES

Several statistical sources are available for the study of the social division of Barcelona and the conditions of working class life in the city, though the fact that they overlapped in their reliance on municipally gathered statistics means that the single most important source is the Anuario Estadístico de la Ciudad de Barcelona.⁽²²⁾ As was noted in the Introduction, this was a product of the reorganization of municipal services carried out in 1902, following the political changes occasioned by the municipal elections of 1901. The individual sources are briefly analyzed below; the main drawback common to all of them, reflecting their dependence on the AE, was that in most cases the lowest level at which data is aggregated is that of the municipal district, though Medicina Social occasionally presents data for streets. Barcelona was divided into ten heterogeneous municipal districts following the agregació of the surrounding townships in 1897, and the division was slightly modified in 1904 when Horta was incorporated.⁽²³⁾ The division was purely administrative and perhaps electoralist in that the surrounding townships were divided amongst several of the new districts. Thus Sant Marti was split between districts I, IX, and X while the southern part of Gracia was incorporated with the Eixample districts IV and VI. Map 1.2 shows the municipal districts and the names of the different neighbourhoods have been added to it.

The Anuario Estadístico de la Ciudad de Barcelona

Massana and Tatjer Mir have studied the AE and its usefulness for social analysis.⁽²⁴⁾ Unfortunately they have accepted it at face value and gone too little into the deficiencies it exhibits, both in data collection and in presentation. Nor have they examined the relationships

between the Negociado de Estadística and other municipal departments which fed it with its data. For example we know nothing about the working links between the Negociado and the 4^o Seccion Médico Municipal which was responsible for the Demografía Estadística y Padrón Sanitario and as such supplied the information on population movements for the AE. (25)

In 1920 the 4^o Seccion, Cuerpo Médico Municipal became the Institut de Demografía, and Raduà, Director of the new institute, gives the following picture of how the former Sección of the Cuerpo had worked, in his introduction to its first publication:

Fou a l'any 1908 i sots el nom de 'Alrededor de la Estadística' que foren començades unes memòries [in a footnote he refers to La fiebre tifoidea en Barcelona en 1907] que tingueren d'interrompre's per la constant fluctuació del personal d'oficines i tota la mala fi de penalitats que pesaven sus el servei. L'esforç continuat, el sacrifici personal posat a tota mena de probes fins arribar a l'econòmica, ja era per si sol fort obstacle a vencèr. I amb tot, mes encara que en aquestes coses, hom topaba amb la greu dificultat que representa el treballar amb personal no especialitzat, havent d'ensistir-lo pacientment, i el qual, per qualsevolga causa desapareixia, donant lloc, si la vacant arribava a omplir-se, a l'entrada de gent nova i per tant desconeixedora en absolut de les més elementals tasques pròpies d'aquesta mena de treballs.

Tambe altra de les més greus dificultats es la desproporció del numero d'empleats en relació a la tasca a fer, no sent possible d'aquesta faisó, llençar-se a tasques de grossa volada. (26)

Apart from the reservations expressed above about the use of the municipal district as the basic statistical unit in the AE, it would seem then, that this basic statistical source for Barcelona in the years 1902-1920, was based on the collection of statistics by a body of untrained staff, constantly changing and few in number in relation to the work to be done. These facts in themselves suggest that the AE statistics must be used with care and, as will be seen, a number of other factors, such as a refusal on the part of the public to register births and deaths, the existence of a large floating hospital population and the lack of certain basic statistics means that any interpretation must be regarded as

indicative rather than conclusive.

Medicina Social

Medicina Social, which was published between 1911 and 1919, was founded and edited by the indefatigable Raduà.⁽²⁷⁾ Its objectives were laid down in its first number as awakening the doctor from his 'letargo sacerdotal' and making him take part in solving the discords and problems which made up the social question. It contained basic statistics from Raduà's department relating to demographic developments and to morbidity, as well as articles on social problems such as domestic workshops and insanitary housing.

The Museu Social

The Museu Social has been studied by Rovira Roses and by Roca.⁽²⁸⁾ It was first proposed in 1907 by Ramon Albó, a catholic, who had made a special study of charitable organizations in Barcelona.⁽²⁹⁾ His intention was to follow the model of the Musée Social de Paris, created according to the ideas of Le Play. Jointly financed by the Barcelona Town Hall and the Diputació it was brought into being in 1908 and opened to the public in 1911. Its objectives were to promote social harmony and industrial progress, and its activities were threefold: a permanent exhibition of Econòmia Social i d'Higiene i Seguretat del Treball, coupled with two temporary exhibitions on El Treball a Domicili and Construcció Cívica, and the publication of a regular bulletin and an annual statistical survey.⁽³⁰⁾

Monografía estadística de las clases trabajadoras de Barcelona

This text, modelled on Cerdà's survey of 1856 of the living conditions of the working classes in the walled city, was produced by Escudé i

Bartolí in 1917, in an attempt to give an account of the economic condition of the Barcelona working classes in response to the housing crisis which will be studied below.⁽³¹⁾ It does not include an up to date census of the working class. However it contains useful statistics on salaries and on the cost of living of the working class family.

CONCLUSION

These latter statistical sources, then, are a useful supplement to the data contained in the AE; they share with it the disadvantage alluded to earlier of being based on municipal districts. Further problems are presented by there being some doubt as to the exact population of the city in the years under study here, and by the lack of information on the age structure of the population. Most crucially there is no data on industrial location in the city, no census of the working class in the period under study and no series of data relating to conditions of work. Despite these problems, the statistical sources described can be used to analyse the physical and social aspects of the districts of Barcelona, and in conjunction with contemporary descriptions, allow a classification of the neighbourhoods of the city, and of conditions of life within them which will serve as a basis for the analysis of working class political behaviour.

THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF THE DISTRICTS AND NEIGHBOURHOODS OF BARCELONA

The physical structure

The ten municipal districts of Barcelona were described above as heterogeneous; their topography was however basically that of the pla of Barcelona, though District V contained part of Montjuïc and District VIII was situated on the foothills of Tibidabo. District I was a port district and District X had a long sea frontage.

Table 1.1 illustrates differences between districts in physical extent and population in 1910 and 1920, the last year for which data is available. Figures are also given for the number of inhabitants per hectare in each of them; these figures should be qualified by stating that several districts - IV, VII, IX and X - still possessed large areas of vacant land and this can be seen clearly in map 1.3 which shows the built up areas of Barcelona in 1910.⁽³²⁾ Unfortunately no comparable map exists for 1920 or for any date shortly afterwards, nor is there any convenient data on the extent to which land within each district had been built up since 1910.⁽³³⁾

Better measures for the concentration of population in each of the districts are afforded by the data given in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, of the percentage of buildings in each district classified by the number of storeys they possessed and of the number of buildings in each district and the number of flats and residents they contained. In both tables the data is taken from the latest year for which such data is available.

Table 1.2 is expressed graphically in Figs. 1.1 to 1.11.

This data shows that Barcelona was primarily a city of one and two floor buildings; however districts differed widely. Districts II, III, IV, V and VI had a considerable proportion of high buildings - 72% in District II

were of five storeys or more, 76% in District III, and 67% in District V - whereas Districts I, VII, VIII, IX and X had a predominance of one and two storey buildings - 86% in the case of District IX. District X had 45% of its total buildings with one or two storeys and 50% with three, four or five storeys.

As for the number of people in each building, Table 1.3 shows that, as might be expected, the districts with taller buildings had most dwellings. However when the number of residents in each dwelling are considered, it can be seen that Districts I and X crowded the most people into each flat. In District I, however, 55% of these dwellings were in one and two storey buildings, against 45% in District X. The former was therefore less densely populated vertically, whereas the latter, given that much of the area remained to be developed, had a high degree of vertical concentration. The reasons are largely historical. The main residential area in District I, the Barceloneta, was developed in the eighteenth century on the low rise model then prevailing.⁽³⁴⁾ District X had been developed in the nineteenth century when techniques permitted higher buildings and developers wished to make maximum use of sites.⁽³⁵⁾ The main areas of vertical concentration were the old town areas of Districts II, III and V, and the Eixample Districts IV and VI. The least concentrated was District IX. In the case of the latter, the figures in Table 1.3 for population per building and per dwelling are so close as to suggest that, in contrast to all the other areas of Barcelona, the dominant mode of residence there was the one-family house.

Of course the above statistics only give a part of the picture; the total area occupied by each dwelling would be the next most important statistic for assessing the concentration of population, linked as it is to the type and quality of housing. However there is no series of data available on this, and it will be gone into below in the section

on living conditions in the working class districts of Barcelona.

A further statistic that it would be useful to have in order to describe the physical framework of the city would be that of the degree of industrial development of each district. Again this data is not available.⁽³⁶⁾

In conclusion, then, the degree of urban concentration was heaviest in the districts of the old city, II, III and V, followed by the Eixample districts of IV and VI. Districts I, XII and X were less densely populated and VIII and IX were relatively sparsely populated.

The social framework

The physical framework characterized above had important effects on the social framework in the different districts. To begin with the overall population, however, the heterogeneity of the districts has already been observed in Table 1.1. Before proceeding with the analysis of population, however, it is necessary to discuss the problems alluded to earlier of the accuracy of the population statistics for Barcelona.

The population of the city

Taking an accurate figure for the population of Barcelona in the years under study represented a considerable problem for the authorities because Barcelona attracted a large floating population, and because there was evasion of the census and a failure to register births.

The floating population

Barcelona, as one of the great ports of the Mediterranean, and as the main railway terminus for France, had a continual to-and-fro of travellers, sailors, military elements embarking for Africa, emigrants

leaving for the Americas and immigrants arriving by sea from Valencia and ports south. The size of this mobile population is difficult to estimate though it seems to have been considerable. Escudé i Bartolí gave a figure of 16,000 persons entering Barcelona by rail every day; some of these passengers were immigrants to Barcelona, but 'la mayor parte del contingente entra y sale diariamente de Barcelona y constituye la población transeunte, cuya gran cuantía le da el aspecto de populosa ciudad'.⁽³⁷⁾ By sea there were perhaps a thousand entries and departures every day. Naturally such a large population, even though it was only counted in the quinquennial census, was bound to leave its traces in the annual statistics of births, deaths and marriages. It will be seen later that the figures for one particular municipal district, District I, the port area, were considerably distorted by the existence of this population. For other districts the distortion was less, since the figures involved were smaller.

A further element in this floating population was the hospital population, whose existence was revealed in the series of answers by respondents to the questionnaire on 'La mortalidad en Barcelona', in a Barcelona periodical devoted to social issues.⁽³⁸⁾

Dr. L. Verdereau, in the first article to be published in the series⁽³⁹⁾ pointed out that the mortality figure was too high, because it included a large number of transeuntes, i.e. non residents, who should not be considered as part of the population. Barcelona, as was natural in a city of its size, had many private hospitals and clinics which took in clients from all over Catalonia, who wanted operations and health care which were unobtainable outside the capital. Deaths among these groups were registered as occurring in Barcelona whereas this shifting group often did not figure among the statistics of residents of the city.

Evasion of the census

A further problem in establishing the true population of Barcelona was indicated by Verdereau in his article, that of the great number, as he put it, of persons who did not fill in census forms in order to escape local taxes (it will be seen in Chapter 3 that men refused to fill in electoral register forms for the same reason). Presumably there was also a number of individuals who, whilst staying in the city for a considerable time before moving on, did not consider themselves residents.

In an article in the same series, Escudé i Bartoli described the difficulties of taking the census.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Bandos giving instructions were published beforehand and notices put up in the working class areas inviting residents to register. Forms were then distributed to all households on the last day of the year, and were collected a day or so afterwards. Despite this considerable effort there were many households to which repeated visits had to be made to retrieve the forms. Eight years later Escudé returned to the theme in another article and an extract from it is reproduced in Appendix I.I. He believed that a lack of culture among the inhabitants of the city led them to negligence, dishonesty or, at best, passive resistance to filling in the census forms. The same faults also made it difficult to maintain the civil register. The problem was neatly highlighted by the fact that:

De cada 100 defunciones no constan empadronadas al año siguiente de la formación del padrón el 48, al año siguiente el 51 y al tercer año el 54. Verdaderamente son extraordinariamente elevadas esas cifras y se han comprobado repetidamente, no pudiendo explicarse sino por las malas condiciones del padrón municipal. Ellas han inducido a calcular que la población de Barcelona es casi el doble de la empadronada, lo que es absurdo.⁽⁴¹⁾

Escudé based his opposition to the claim that the real population of Barcelona should be twice as much as the registered population of the city on the grounds that this would give natality and mortality rates for the city which would be amongst the lowest in Europe. He proposed

instead that the probable population of Barcelona could be measured by calculating the number of new buildings erected since the turn of the century, subtracting those demolished and multiplying the result by the average figure of thirty persons per building. This gave a population increase of 226,650, which when added to the 533,000 inhabitants of 1900 gave a population of 759,650 in 1919. This figure gave natality and mortality rates of a little over 19 per thousand, which seemed more reasonable.

Raduà, writing in 1921, claims that the population of Barcelona in 1920 was at least 901,000 inhabitants and goes on to state that such a population does give satisfactory birth and death rates.⁽⁴²⁾ Although the birth rate of 18.23 seemed low compared to the average for all Spanish cities of 26.33, he put forward evidence of high under-registration due to 'ocultació', based on the creation of a number of checks on the entries made at the jutjats and comparing them with the official statistics. Thus in 1920 some 253 births were found to have been registered for that year when they had, in fact, occurred in previous years. Furthermore, in a check on infantile mortality among Barcelona born children, 1920 showed there to be 307 deaths in the first year of life for which the corresponding registration of birth had not been made. Evidently persistent under-registration of births occurred, reducing the birth-rate figure, and invalidating Escudé's claim that the population of Barcelona could not be higher than the census figures showed.

But it was not on the birth-rate that Raduà based his claim for a population of almost a million in 1920. It was the nuptiality rate which was the key. Nuptiality, he observed, was in decline throughout Europe, and only a few foreign cities exceeded the rate of 7.10 per 1,000 inhabitants which was the average rate for all Spanish capitals in 1916. The Spanish rate, then, was high, yet the rate for Barcelona in 1920 was 10.78 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants, which Raduà could not bring himself to believe. Evidently the population figure on which it was based was

too low. By multiplying the number of marriages for 1920 by the average of 7.10, the population should be 1,078,000 persons, and by using the average Barcelona figure for the decennium 1907-1916, the latest years for which there was data, of 8.49 the population should be 901,000 inhabitants. For Raduà, then, the population given by Escude and by the AE could not be right;

Al nostre entendre, ni les 368[000] ni les 191,000 ànimes de ocultació que en numeros redons (sic) representarien respectivament les xifres de població acceptant els totals asenyalats, no son cosa inversemblant com ho es l'assignar a la ciutat de Barcelona una població de 709,000 habitants.(43)

As further evidence that there was serious under-registration Raduà pointed to the data on the size of family and the number of persons per flat. In districts II, IV and V the average family was formed by 4.26, 4.56 and 4.26 persons respectively, yet the number of persons per flat was only 3.71, 4.00 and 3.82.

And there the matter must be left. Lacking further data there is no clarification to be made on the size of the population of Barcelona in the years under study. It would seem that the city was already near the million mark at the end of the period under study, even though the official acknowledgment would not be made until near the Exhibition of 1929. Again it must be emphasized that the official statistics have to be treated with caution, and any deductions made from them regarded as indications of tendencies, not as hard and fast facts. Bearing this in mind various trends in the districts of the city can now be examined.

Male, female and total population by districts, 1910-1915-1920

The existence of the transient population in Barcelona has already been noted and it would seem worthwhile to produce population figures for the districts which subtract this sub-population. Similarly, although the AE gives figures for the ratio of women to men in the districts it would

seem better to recast this data and to present the relationship between the sexes in the form of relative percentages of the total population, rather than retain the male-centred approach adopted in the AE. This data is presented in Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6.

The percentage of the population which was classed as transient at census time was small in most of the districts. For Barcelona as a whole it was 1.68 in 1910, 1.28 in 1915 and 1.06 in 1920. In only three districts was it over 2% in 1910 and 1915, and in 1920 in only two. However, in one district, District I, it was a figure of importance. In 1910 the transients and the military formed 11.29% of its population, though this figure had dropped to 5.62% in 1915 and 4.47% in 1920. The reason for this concentration is that District I contained the port and the railway terminus. Thus these figures represent the coming and going of the emigrants for America and the immigrants from Valencia and other regions of the southeast.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The decline in 1915 and 1920 may reflect the drop in emigration recorded during this period. Also the military and naval population of 1,850 persons in 1910 was somewhat enlarged as a consequence of the Setmana Tràgica and the figures for 1915 and 1920 were about half. The removal of this almost exclusively male population from the data for District I allows major corrections to be made to the data on the relative ratios of men and women in this district.

With regard to the male and female population of the city as a whole, throughout the period 1910-1920 there were more women than men in the city and the percentages for men and women remained constant in the three censuses. In 1910 women represented 52.81% of the population, in 1915 52.68% and in 1920, 52.72%. The corresponding figures for men are 47.19%, 47.32% and 47.28%. However at district level there were considerable differences in these percentages, and these are shown in Figs. 1.12-1.14. In these figures the trend of the censuses is reflected clearly. There are four districts where there were far more women than men, districts III,

IV, VI and VIII. District IV shows the greatest disproportion, there being consistently 12% more women than men; the lowest disproportion recorded in the other three is 8.28% in District VI in 1915. All the other districts had a much more balanced population; one, District V, even had marginally more men than women in 1920.

What were the reasons for this imbalance between sexes and districts, given that more boys than girls were born in the city in all districts? The AE, 1913 gives two reasons.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The first is industry 'que con miras interesadas da empleo a la mujer'. The anonymous author goes on to say that the immigration into Barcelona, unlike other centres of attraction, is made up of both men and women, and states that, as a further peculiarity, many of the men go on to the republics of Latin America in search of work. Whole families come from Aragon and Valencia, the wife finds work in Barcelona more easily than the husband but her wage is not sufficient to maintain the family and so the husband emigrates to America for a time. This may well have been the case in some instances - however it is not reflected to any noticeable extent in the statistics for the industrial areas of the city. The second reason which the AE, 1913 gives - domestic service - is certainly reflected in certain areas, Districts III, IV, VI and VIII, the areas which were the bourgeois zones of residence. It may well be that the phenomenon was increasingly under-registered in the censuses - 'cada vez aumenta el contingente de sirvientas que abandonan sus casas solariegas para venir a Barcelona en busca del pan que no encuentran en sus pueblos' says the AE, 1913. But as Escudé i Bartoli pointed out 'Muchos omiten empadronar con su familia el personal doméstico que tienen a su servicio.'⁽⁴⁶⁾ Further attention will be given to the phenomenon of domestic service in the section below on occupational structures by district.

Growth in the city and districts, 1910-1920

The growth of the city was constant in the years under study; from 1910 to 1915 it ran at 1% per year (the total increase for the period 1901-1915 was 15.2%), but in the years 1916-1920 there was a 17% increase i.e. over 3% per year. Unfortunately the figures for the three years after 1920, i.e. until the end of the period under study are lacking. However, by referring back from the next available set of census figures, those of 1930, the average increase for these years had augmented to 4%.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The constant increase, as Escudé i Bartoli pointed out, was due almost wholly to immigration to the city.⁽⁴⁸⁾ He further contended that deaths generally exceeded births in the city and that large differences between the two were the result of high mortality due to epidemics.

Later analysts have coincided with Escudé. Nonetheless they have insisted on some precisions in the birth and death rates for these years. Alzina Caules⁽⁴⁹⁾ finds that the death rate for Barcelona, 1901-1910 was normal for those years, i.e. before the reduction effected by the advances in medicine, surgery and child care, and in particular, the widespread use of antibiotics. Recolons, whilst recognizing that the province and city of Barcelona showed the highest mortality rate of the four Catalan provinces, points out that the figure is still inferior to the average for Spain.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Raduà, as has already been seen, contended in 1920 that the death rate for Barcelona was artificially high, due to the defects in the census making the population smaller than it was in reality.

In fact, if the difference between the mortality and birth rates is calculated, district by district, year by year, it can be seen that in most districts the mortality rate is lower than the birth rate. Escudé made the mistake of only using the total rates for the city, not discounting from the rates the births and deaths in hospitals. When

this is done, as can be seen from the Table 1.7, Natality and Mortality by Districts, 1910-1920, the balance is negative in only one year, 1918, the year of the flu, when mortality exceeded natality in all Barcelona. In fact the excess of deaths over births of 12.59 per thousand inhabitants in 1918 was the highest figure for the first 40 years of the century, being exceeded only in 1938, when the circumstances were exceptional.

Clearly, deducting the figures for hospital births and deaths, while correcting one source of error, the attribution of births and deaths of outsiders in the hospitals to the city, causes another, since some of the births and deaths in the hospitals were due to city inhabitants. But deduction is probably the lesser evil.

Escudé therefore was both right and wrong. Mortality does not generally exceed natality in the city as a whole, and in the majority of the districts. Districts III and V generally had a negative balance, but not in all years. Large differences between the rates were caused by the mortality of epidemics, the typhoid of 1914 and the flu of 1918-1919 being the most important in the period. The birth rate, however, did not exceed the mortality rate to a significant degree in most of the districts, and while the evidence for under-registration of births given by Radua must be borne in mind, Escudé i Bartoli's conclusion that the increase in population was due to immigration to the city cannot be disagreed with.

Natality

In Table 1.7, Natality and Mortality by Districts, 1910-1920, the data for natality for the districts, the city including hospitals and the city minus hospitals is presented. The primary sources from which this data has been drawn are the AE and Medicina Social. Although the figures given in the two periodicals often differ, though never to any great extent,

the figures given in the AE, have been preferred on the grounds that these were always published longer after the event than those in Medicina Social and were therefore more elaborated.

There is, however, a grave problem associated with the basic statistics, which Raduà pinpointed when referring to the birth rate in Barcelona in 1910.⁽⁵¹⁾ The figure obtained by dividing the number of births by the total number of inhabitants (in the article he is referring to the city as a whole) is no guide either to the increase in population or to changes in fecundity. He goes on:

Así procediendo, puede darse y seguramente se da el caso de decrecer la natalidad cuando mayor es la fecundidad de las mujeres, y de aumentar ficticiamente aun decreciendo la fecundidad cuando en una urbe es la mortalidad exagerada o la emigración persistente. (52)

And, if we insert 'distrito' instead of 'urbe' the quotation sums up the problem for the districts of Barcelona. In fact, as Raduà goes on to recognise, the birth rate should be obtained by using the figures of the number of births and the number of females in the population who are in the age groups capable of conceiving children. And the statistic relating to the female population is one which we do not have. Raduà, at the time of writing his article, only had the figure for all women of all ages living in the city, which gave a birth rate of 46.82 per thousand (cf. the 22.79 per thousand inhabitants given in the AE for 1910).⁽⁵³⁾ Both these figures include transients, military population and births in hospital.

Apart from tabulating the birth rates per 1,000 inhabitants which are given each year in the AE, in Table 1.8, Natality per 1,000 Inhabitants the figures for live births are also calculated against the female population of each district for the census years, having first deducted the transient female population and second, that female population associated with the military population and these are given in Table 1.9, Natality per 1,000 Women by Districts.

The results of the two different calculations do not in fact show great differences as regards the relative ranking of districts. Nor is there any great variation in the three census years, for which the results have been mapped (Figs. 1.15-1.20). Districts II, III, IV, VI and VIII are seen to be areas of low natality whilst Districts I, V, VII, IX and X have higher indices with I and X being the leaders.

Mortality

Whilst the low birth rate in Barcelona, and in Catalonia as a whole, continued to concern doctors and politicians, a far greater concern was shown over the mortality rate for the city. It has already been mentioned that there was a diversity of opinions over exactly how high the mortality rate was, and that, in the absence of reliable population figures it is impossible to be more precise. It has also been observed that the inclusion of deaths in hospitals in the statistics falsifies the mortality rate for the city as a whole by 2-3 more deaths per thousand inhabitants. And if this falsification increases the mortality rate for the city as a whole it also diminishes the mortality of the districts since it includes the deaths of persons from all over Barcelona.⁽⁵⁴⁾ This latter fact needs to be borne in mind when analyzing the death rates by districts. (See Table 1.7, Natality and Mortality by Districts 1910-1920).

The data for mortality in Table 1.7 is expressed in graphical form in Figs. 1.21 and 1.22. From these it can be seen that Districts I, V, VII and IX had the highest mortality in the years under study, apart from the epidemic years of 1914 and 1918, whereas Districts IV and VI had the lowest. However, when attempting to analyze causes of death a further complication occurs.

Firstly while there is data for causes of death throughout the whole of

our period there is practically no supporting data, for example age at death by district. Paradoxically there is data combining cause of death and age at death for the city as a whole, and also occupation and age at death, but since this data does not allow any further understanding of the social division of the city it has not been reproduced. This lack of complementary information particularly affects our understanding of infantile mortality. From various articles in Medicina Social it is known that infant deaths were a sizeable proportion of all deaths - Radua claimed in 1916 that they accounted for a third of the whole.⁽⁵⁵⁾ But, the AE offers very little; the only infant deaths which it describes as such are those from diarrhoea under 2 years old, and for such diseases as measles, scarlet fever, there is no indication given of age at death. Figs. 1.23 and 1.24 give some indication of mortality due to diphtheria and measles in 1910. They show that Districts I, V, VII, IX and X were worst affected by both diseases.

Apart from the unusual circumstances of widespread epidemic such as the typhoid epidemic of 1914 and the 'Spanish flu' of 1919, the great killer of adults was the group of respiratory diseases and among them the most important and the most feared was tuberculosis. Balcells affirms that:

En Barcelona morían anualmente en las primeras décadas del siglo XX, 2,000 personas de tuberculosis, y se daban hacia 1912, 6,000 casos de afectadas por esta fatal enfermedad. De estos 6,000, 4,200 eran de las clases sociales bajas y el Museo Social afirmaba que el número de obreras tuberculosas en la ciudad superaba a las 2,500 de las cuales 1,600 eran obreras de la confección.⁽⁵⁶⁾

The geographical distribution of the disease, despite the masking effect of the ill drawn district boundaries reflects a quite clear distribution of the disease within the city. In Figs. 1-25-1.29, covering the years 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914 and 1917, the only years for which data is available it can be observed that the area which had most deaths per thousand inhabitants from this disease was consistently District V, followed by Districts I, VII, VIII and IX. District X seems to have been relatively

free from the disease perhaps because of its small population in relation to the other districts and the relative lack of construction; however the districts with considerably lower mortality due to tuberculosis were Districts II, III, IV and VI, highly concentrated areas.

It may be argued that these maps reflect not so much the tendency of certain social classes to contract tuberculosis as the greater access to hospitals and sanatoriums of those who lived in areas such as Districts II, III, IV and VI. As the table in note (54) shows, the percentages of deaths proceeding from these areas which took place in hospitals are higher than for the other districts except for the moribund District V which presumably accounted for most of the charity hospital patients. However one would expect people living in intensely built up areas such as District V, with their narrow streets and tall buildings blocking the sun, inadequately clothed and working long hours in unhealthy surroundings to be more susceptible to such diseases. The two factors presumably operated together - all contemporary witnesses coincide in classifying certain areas of Barcelona as areas in which tuberculosis was more widespread and more easily contracted than in others, while the statistical evidence shows that a very high number of deaths from the disease occurred in hospitals - 28.5% in 1911, 27% in 1914 and 35% in the first eleven months of 1919, deaths which cannot be ascribed to any district. In any case, whether the real situation was one where relatively poor people were more likely to die of tuberculosis than relatively rich people, or whether the situation was one where the chances of contracting the disease were more or less the same for all the inhabitants of the city, but only the better off could afford to die in hospital, the figure is, like the mortality figures in general, an indicator of great use for deciding the social division of the city.

Immigration

It is not possible to study immigration into the districts of Barcelona in the years 1910-1920 because the data is not available. It is possible to gain some idea, however, of the position at the turn of the century, using the data analyzed by Riquer. Although this data was probably subject to change in quantity, especially in the period of rapid immigration after 1915, it probably did not change in kind. It is reproduced in Table 1.10, and shows that Districts II, III, VIII and IX had the lowest proportion of non-Catalan population, whereas higher proportions were found in I and V, bearing out what was said earlier about District I being a reception area for immigrants and suggesting that V may have fulfilled the same role.

Education and literacy

The AE for 1912 declared that 39% of the population of Barcelona was illiterate; this statistic was calculated on the basis of the whole population and was very high (if the pre-school population was known accurately it would probably, according to the same source, reduce the figure to a more reasonable 31%). The same source named the areas where illiteracy was highest, basing itself on the 1910 census data given in the AE, 1910.⁽⁵⁷⁾ This data is reproduced in Table 1.11. Districts I, V, VII, IX and X are shown to have the highest percentages of illiteracy. The AE, 1912 ascribed this to two general causes: immigration - 62% of the illiterate were born outside Barcelona - and deficient school provision. Table 1.11 illustrates the latter claim, showing the number of pupils per municipal school and the population per school (both municipal and private) in each district. The number of pupils per private school are also shown; there were generally more pupils per school in the more illiterate districts, though the pattern is not as uniform as for the municipal schools. Overall the AE, 1912 calculated

that the population between the compulsory school ages of four and twelve should be 74,353; the actual numbers attending schools was in fact 62,597, meaning that 11,756 children went without schooling. By 1916 this figure was estimated to have increased to about 20,000, and the measures taken by the Lliga to reduce it are detailed in Chapter 10.⁽⁵⁸⁾ That some success was attained in this field is shown by the claim in AE, 1918-19-20 that the number without schooling had reduced to some 5,000 pupils.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Nonetheless the pattern throughout the period under study here is of widespread illiteracy in certain districts and this again is a distinguishing feature in this social analysis.

Occupational structures

Two social features remain to be examined before attempting a classification of the districts of Barcelona. Unfortunately the data for both comes from well before 1910, but, since it is all that is available, it is included here. These features are occupational structure and taxpayers in the districts. The original data, respectively from AE, 1902 and AE, 1905, has been elaborated by Riquer and Tables 1.12 and 1.13 reproduce his findings.⁽⁶⁰⁾

Riquer used the 1900 'Estadística de las profesiones de los habitantes de Barcelona', aggregating the data given into four groups - proletarian activities by manual workers, transport workers, etc., the liberal professions - doctors, architects, lawyers, etc., domestic staff such as servants, cooks, nurserymaids, etc. and commercial activities such as shopkeepers and allied workers. Using this classification it is possible to identify the most and least represented activities in a district and to establish its social composition. Table 1.12 shows that Districts I, VII, IX and X had a greater active population than the average and that this largely undertook proletarian activities, whilst the proportion of liberal professions was very small. In Districts III, IV and VI the percentage of

active proletarian workers was relatively small, but the liberal professions were highly represented. The percentage of domestic staff was very high in these areas - confirming the supposition advanced earlier that the predominance of women in these same districts was because so many were employed in domestic work. The number of shopkeepers and commercial workers was also superior to that of the proletarian areas. Districts II, V and VIII show higher proletarian activities than III, IV and VI, but had considerable proportions of domestics and commercial workers, as well as a relatively high proportion of liberal professions. They would seem therefore to be interstitial.

Finally Table 1.13 shows that the greater part of the major taxpayers lived in Districts III and IV, followed by VI and II.

Conclusion: districts and neighbourhoods in Barcelona

The social area analysis carried out above allows the districts of Barcelona to be classified in three main groups; working class districts, petty-bourgeois districts, and middle and upper-class districts⁽⁶¹⁾.

Such an analysis, following Rossi and Carreras, must be complemented by an historical analysis, and a brief survey will be carried out here.

The working class districts are primarily classified by their occupational structure; Districts I, VII, IX and X showed a marked predominance of proletarian activities. Commerce accounted for only a small part of the active population, and the liberal professions hardly existed in these areas. Domestic servants were also absent.

Natality and mortality were higher in these districts and they showed a greater tendency to epidemics. Despite this, population growth was greater than in other areas, suggesting that immigration was an important factor in such growth. The high incidence of illiteracy in all these

districts is a confirmatory element in this hypothesis (immigrants to the city generally showed higher illiteracy).

Two clear examples of petty-bourgeois districts are found in II and VIII. District II was part of the old city and contained the C.B.D., before this vital sector began to move northwards to Passeig de Gràcia and the Diagonal. District VIII largely comprised the former township of Gràcia. These were old, densely populated districts, with high buildings.

These districts had an active commercial sector, and in the case of Gràcia, an artesanal tradition. In both the index of liberal professions was halfway between the working class and upper class districts. Their index of proletarian activities was higher than that in the upper class districts. Their inhabitants enjoyed the attentions of the relatively high number of servants. The percentage of their inhabitants born in Catalonia was high, though did not reach that of the middle and upper class districts.

One district, V, was halfway between the working class districts and the petty-bourgeois areas; its proletarian population was higher than the other two, but it matched them in other occupational fields. It was high rise, densely populated, and had a dangerous record of infectious diseases. Its illiteracy rate was high and its Catalan population was smaller. Other evidence, discussed below, suggests that it was an area which was split between commerce, entertainment and poor immigrants.

The middle and upper class districts had a low percentage of their population engaged in proletarian activities, a strong commercial sector and group of liberal professionals, and high figures for domestic service. The districts exhibiting these features, III, IV and VI comprised the central part of the old town and the Eixample areas. These had high rise, densely populated housing, yet had a low index of infectious diseases. The proportion of their population born in Catalonia was significantly

higher than in the other areas of the city.

This broad classification of districts is not intended to give a spurious impression of physical and social uniformity; the neighbourhoods within each district exhibited their own patterns of urban, social, and political development. A brief survey of the more important features of each of the working class neighbourhoods will illustrate this.

It seems logical to begin with District I, which was small and densely populated. It contained an area of Poble Nou, but its main nucleus was the Barceloneta. This was perhaps the sole example of a physically defined neighbourhood within Barcelona.⁽⁶²⁾ Built on a small triangular piece of land bordered on two sides by the sea and cut off on the third by the railway and gasworks, its urban structure was unique in the city. The houses were constructed according to a plan drawn up by military engineers in 1753, of uniform rectangular one-storey blocks, with long narrow streets leading to the sea. In 1838 permission was granted for the construction of second storeys; by the time Cerdà surveyed the area in 1859, third floors had been added to over half the houses, and in 1872 the municipal regulations were changed to permit the addition of fourth floors. Parallel to this vertical concentration was the horizontal concentration achieved by subdividing the floor areas in two and then in four, producing the typical quarts de casa which still exist today.⁽⁶³⁾ The result of this process was the transformation of the original one-family houses into densely populated blocks of flats.

This urban concentration was caused by the industrialization of the neighbourhood. In its origins the Barceloneta was a port area whose inhabitants were engaged in ship-building, sail making and other associated work, as well as fishing. The movement of industry out of the walled city in the first half of the nineteenth century found an important site here; it rapidly became the centre of the Catalan

metal-working industry with a dominant enterprise, the Maquinista Terrestre i Marítima which by 1886 employed 1,200 workers.

The problems of urban concentration - the Barceloneta was regularly visited by epidemics throughout the nineteenth century, the storms which wreaked havoc and the constant accidents in the port and in the heavy industry installed there meant that this was a combatative area. The politics of its inhabitants were republican, though the continued arrival of immigrants from poorer, more backward areas meant that other, less advanced political movements found a hearing.

To the west of the Barceloneta was District V, classified earlier as petty-bourgeois, but which contained important working class areas on the Montjuich side of the Paral.lel, the Hortes de San Beltrán, Can Tunis and Poble Sec. The Hortes, built on the site of earlier market gardens, was not primarily residential. It contained warehouses and other buildings connected with the port, particularly the coal wharf as well as a range of bars and cheap cafes. Because of the coal handling activities the whole area was black with coal dust.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Further south, to the rear of Montjuich was Can Tunis, an isolated residential area built on swampy ground. The Tramvia del Morrot did not connect it with the city until 1903 and the road there was not paved until 1913.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Can Tunis stretched to the Llobregat, where the lighthouse was situated; around this lighthouse was an area of barraques occupied by fisherfolk.

To the north of the Hortes was the area of Poble Sec, constructed between 1856 and 1867, on the side of Montjuich and outside the Cerdà plan. It had high houses, narrow streets, and suffered from a lack of amenities and infrastructure. Further north again was La França, an area of barraques occupied by immigrants. Poble Sec and La França, because of their proximity to the Paral.lel, had many cinemas and theatres, which were often used for meetings by the sindicats. They were deprived areas, and because

of the lack of hygiene in the area, suffered epidemics, including bubonic plague in 1905.⁽⁶⁶⁾

After crossing the Gran Vía into District VII, the next neighbourhood encountered was that of Hostafrancs, situated around the c/. de la Creu Coberta which ran from Barcelona to Sants. It was administratively part of the latter area, and many of its residents worked there, but it had its own separate identity. From four hundred houses in 1853, just before the demolition of the walls around the old city, it had grown to have 54,000 inhabitants in only 2,762 houses in 1905, and was therefore one of the most densely populated areas of Barcelona. This growth occurred because it was a commercial zone, free from the municipal taxes of Barcelona in the nineteenth century. For many years the burots - a kind of customs post on the Barcelona boundary - were situated in what was to become the Plaça Espanya, and collected taxes on all materials entering the city; Hostafrancs was therefore the nearest area free from these taxes and manufacturers and traders were quick to exploit this advantage. Apart from commerce the main industry was ceramics and tile making, and this caused a major influx of immigrants specializing in such work from the Castelló area near Valencia. In the twentieth century many of these factories worked for the nascent electrical industry, manufacturing insulators and ceramic fuse boxes.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The immigrant population may explain the Radical tradition of this area.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Sants, to the southwest of Hostafrancs, was an old agricultural area which had undergone rapid industrialization in the early nineteenth century, when the textile manufacturers moved their factories out of the crowded walled city. The most important of these industries was the Espanya Industrial, established there in 1849, and instantly named the Vapor Nou, in contradistinction to the other steam-powered textile factory in the area, the Vapor Vell, established by the Guell family. Associated with the textile industry was the chemical industry, and, as in Hostafrancs,

there was a ceramics industry which later turned to electrical ceramic production, whose main representative was Lamparas Z. The proliferation of industry provoked population growth; in 1849 Sants had 3,391 inhabitants, but by 1910 it had arrived at 31,146. To the west of Sants was La Bordeta, a poor rural zone whose only industry was a button factory employing three hundred women.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Sants was a republican area and a fiercely independent township; an attempt by its Ajuntament to join Barcelona in 1883 raised such protests that it was set aside by Royal order the following year, and despite the aggregation of 1897 its independent spirit remained alive until well into the twentieth century.⁽⁷⁰⁾

North of Sants, and still within District VII was Les Corts, an area whose development had been the reverse of Sants, although both had begun industrializing at the same time. Whereas Sants had prospered, Les Corts had declined and lost the industries which had set up there. By 1895, when the largest factory, that of the Batlló family closed down, there were few factories left and the area had become one of hospitals and religious houses, which had moved there because land and taxes were cheaper than in Barcelona. Its industrial decline was mirrored in its population growth, from 360 persons in 1846 to 8,634 in 1910.⁽⁷¹⁾

Beyond Les Corts to the north was Sant Gervasi, in District VIII, an area of summer houses for the Barcelona bourgeoisie, and further north was Gràcia, which had a large share of similar summer houses. But Gràcia, characterized earlier as petty-bourgeois, was in a state of change to a much more mixed district in the course of the nineteenth century. From a rural township of 2,600 inhabitants in 1848 it grew to 62,000 inhabitants in 1897 and 70,000 in 1905, occupying 5,000 houses.⁽⁷²⁾ Its population consisted of self employed menestrals, engaged in the woodworking trades and in jewellery and tailoring. There was also an important number of textile workers employed in small factories in the area known as Camp d'en Grassot.⁽⁷³⁾ Gràcia was an intensely republican

area and had led the fight against the Quintes in 1845 and for the Republic in 1874.⁽⁷⁴⁾ The annexation to Barcelona was resisted until well into the twentieth century.

Beyond the hills of the Muntanya Pelada, with the summer houses of La Salut and Guinardó was District IX, a sprawling semi rural area which contained the townships of Horta, Sant Andreu and its suburb, Santa Eulàlia, and a part of the former municipality of Sant Martí de Provençals, El Camp de l'Arpa.

Horta was small and predominantly agricultural. Its population was 1,855 in 1846 and in 1910 only 6,035. It possessed tanning and ceramic industries, but the most important activity in the area was that of the bugaderes or washerwomen. This industry employed about 2,000 women in 1914 and was highly organized on a household basis. Curiously it had grown up in an area without surface water (all the water used had to be drawn from wells) and lacking proper drainage.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Sant Andreu and Santa Eulàlia was another rural township, and had, to judge by the housing statistics analysed earlier, retained its rural aspect with its low one-family houses.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Nonetheless it housed some 150 factories in 1902, including one of the most important textile factories in Catalonia, that of Fabra i Coats, largely owned by the Scottish manufacturers J. and P. Coats. It was run on British lines and worked the setmana anglesa, by which the workers had Saturday afternoons off. It had a high proportion of British senior managers, remembered by one respondent as wobbling around on their bicycles, and always wearing their bowler hats to go out in, whatever the weather.⁽⁷⁷⁾ These staid outsiders were responsible, together with the Germans who worked in the chemical industries serving the textile industry, for the introduction into Catalan working class life of an increasingly important factor of social cohesion in their own countries, football.⁽⁷⁸⁾

Sant Martí de Provençals was a vast municipality covering thirteen square kilometres down the northern side of Barcelona. It therefore fell, almost in its entirety, within the Cerdà plan. It grew from 25,000 inhabitants in 1883 to 70,000 in 1910, and had almost a thousand factories in 1902.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Its sprawling area contained a number of separate neighbourhoods, separated by agricultural and market gardening areas. The less important of these neighbourhoods were Camp de l'Arpa and La Sagrera, and the other two, El Clot and Poble Nou, were mutual rivals.

Camp de l'Arpa, an area to the north of the Ferrocarril del Norte, was situated in District IX in the municipal reorganization after annexation. It was a low-rise rural area, but by 1910 development of the Cerdà blocks to the south and west had left it isolated, as it remains today.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Its industries were small scale workshops.

La Sagrera was included in District X in the reorganization. It was the oldest part of Sant Martí and bordered on Sant Andreu. Its industries served the textile factories of that neighbourhood, and Fabra i Coats installed a branch there, La Española, dedicated to finished goods.

El Clot, which lay to the south, in the narrow zone between the Ferrocarril del Norte and the Ferrocarril de Francia, had become rapidly industrialized as a result of the coming of the railways. Its largest industry was the vast railway works of the M.Z.A. company, installed in 1853 and supplied by a number of local ancillary mechanical factories. There were also textile factories here, in particular the chemical and dyeing industries of Ram de l'Aigua. Clot was a fiercely Radical area and a centre of working class organization; its Agrupación Obrera housed dozens of syndicates and was a cultural centre of considerable importance.⁽⁸¹⁾

Poble Nou, the rival neighbourhood to El Clot, was the area of the former Sant Martí which had been most industrialized and transformed.

Originally known as Taulat, it was a low marshy area, where heretics condemned to death by the Inquisition were burned in the Middle Ages. Chosen as the site for the Barcelona cementery in 1822, it began to be developed shortly afterwards, and this process was encouraged by the installation of the railway station in 1845. Another huge railway works, that of the Material para Ferrocarriles y Construcciones was installed here. The spate of building led to the area being christened Poble Nou by its inhabitants, though the Cabetians, who tried to set up a colony here, attempted to call it Icària.⁽⁸²⁾ It grew rapidly with the installation of other mechanical and steel working industries, as well as the textile industry. Its urban conditions were deplorable and it also housed some of the worst barraques in Barcelona, along the coast, whose inhabitants lived by fishing. They were situated in three distinct locations; near the Besòs was a group, huddled around the military firing range of the Camp de la Bota, and returning towards Barcelona were Somorrostro and Pekin.⁽⁸³⁾ The existence of these areas, together with the high percentage of illiteracy confirm the likelihood suggested by the low figures for those of Catalan birth in District X that this was a neighbourhood of high immigration. Its politics were Radical and it was a centre of the working class movement.

A final area remains to be considered, that of District V. According to the social indicators this was a district half way between working class and petty-bourgeois. It was industrialized in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and possessed many small textile factories, as well as being a centre of the garment industry. The substantial working class districts on the Montjuïc side of the Paral.lel have already been described. On the other side of the Paral.lel two neighbourhoods could be distinguished; in the southern part was the Barrio Xino, a centre of the entertainment industry, of prostitution and of petty crime, and north of it the Raval, which was newer and more industrial. Urban conditions were deplorable in both areas.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Large numbers of immigrants lived in

this district. It had a long tradition of urban revolt and, because of its central position, many sindicats and working class centres were situated there.

In the above analysis, the working class neighbourhoods of Barcelona have been identified and their historical development briefly described. It now remains to examine working class life in these areas, and to discover the effects which the Lliga project for Barcelona had upon it.

WORKING CLASS LIFE IN BARCELONA, 1910-1923

INTRODUCTION

The difficulties observed in the first chapter, with regard to the worth and usefulness of the available contemporary statistics relating to the population and the city of Barcelona, are equally evident when investigating the numbers, wages, work conditions and general situation of the working class of the city. Complaints were made by contemporary investigators such as Marvaud and are echoed by modern historians.⁽⁸⁵⁾

Despite these difficulties, a certain picture may be drawn of the condition of the working class of the city during the period under study, and while it will be incomplete in many respects - the most notable failure of the available statistical information being that, since it almost always refers to the city as a whole, it is difficult to distinguish between the different neighbourhoods of the city - it will suffice to give an idea of the changing condition of the workers of the city which will be of value when attempting to understand their political aspirations and actions.

Numbers, occupations and the sexual division of labour of the Barcelona working class

Our knowledge of just how many workers there were in Barcelona during the period under study is very inadequate and based on the most insufficient statistical foundations. Two generalizations stand out from the data however; the active population of the city was high and, as a reflection of this, the percentage of women to men was superior in the numerically most important sectors.

There are three censuses of the workers of the city available to the

investigator studying the years 1910-1923, of which only one, which is chronologically the last and qualitatively the worst, was taken within the period.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The difficulties of quantifying the workers of Barcelona are amply detailed in the introductions to these censuses.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Of these, apart from the problems of obtaining the information and of nomenclature, the most important was the problem of quantifying the women workers of the city, a significant problem given the importance of womens' work in Barcelona industry and one which will be returned to in the section dealing with the work of women.

For the purposes of this thesis further problems are caused by the different sectorial classifications used in the three censuses and because the censuses of 1905 and 1919 give global totals at city level while that for 1900 breaks down the information to district level. This information, as re-elaborated by Riquer, has already been reproduced in Table 1.12. The information from the 1919 census is reproduced in Table 1.14 in descending order of numerical importance.

The active population of the city

Table 1.15 shows the varying proportion of the active population of Barcelona according to the data given in the three censuses mentioned earlier. As Jutglar notes, this proportion is extremely high, especially if the number of persons disqualified from being considered as part of the active population is taken into account.⁽⁸⁸⁾ A higher proportion is observed in the 1919 census despite the non-inclusion of juvenile and child workers in this census.

Womens' work in Barcelona, 1910-1923

The question of womens' work in Barcelona has not been much studied.⁽⁸⁹⁾

Yet the numerical importance of women in the production system of the period and their economic contribution to working class living costs cannot be doubted.

The 1919 census does not differentiate between men and women, so the major source is that of 1905. Of the 155,822 manual workers in the city, 44,129 were women, a little over 28%.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Within the most important industries of the city women were in a majority; in textiles in 1905 there were 16,466 women and 3,195 girls, and only 5,111 men and 2,197 boys. The cotton industry employed 11,372 women and 1,327 girls and only 3,412 men and 1,780 boys. In garment making there were 10,230 women and 2,140 girls as against 7,465 men and 644 boys.

This numerical superiority did not mean, however, that women enjoyed equal conditions and remuneration to men. The prevailing bourgeois masculine values meant that both working class women and men saw women's wages as supplementary to those of men, and moreover that if a woman had to make a substantial contribution to the household economy, that the man was subtly dishonoured, confirmed in his poverty. Yet it was precisely because of the insufficiency of mens' wages that women had to work. At work, then, women were less likely to make themselves visible and to pursue better conditions; at the beginning of the period under study women workers were almost completely unorganized. Nor, despite some remarkable strikes, and the formation of the textile union La Constància, did they emerge from the ghetto that male ideology had closed them in. In the three congresses of the C.N.T. studied in Chapters 4 and 7, not one woman attended as a delegate.

Women, therefore, were intensely exploited in manufacturing industry in capitalistic fashion. Their low wages kept costs down for the manufacturer and, as mechanization placed less and less of a premium on strength in most manufacturing processes, he was able to progressively

substitute women for men. Moreover the fact that women had internalized an ideology of meekness guaranteed less conflict at the workplace and little possibility of wage rises.

Women were also in the majority in two other important fields of employment representing pre and early capitalist development - domestic servants and domestic production. No figure for servants is given in the 1919 or 1905 census, but in 1900, some 14,000 women were employed in this sector. Little information is available on working conditions but there is no reason to suppose that, as in the rest of Europe, the hours were long and irregular, the pay small, and the treatment by the family arbitrary and unjustified, though no doubt there were exceptions. This was an area in which organization was impossible, and conditions remained the same until the employing classes came to realize that their insufficient liquidity and the development of labour saving devices made it possible to dispense with servants.

Domestic production in most fields was increasingly suppressed in the process of capitalist concentration. In certain industries, however, the invention of small machinery like the sewing machine, and the distribution of energy allowed a dispersal of work back into the home. The Museu Social identified a number of fields in which such conditions prevailed, notably personal linen, embroidery, garment making, knitting, typing, and cardboard box-making and packing.⁽⁹¹⁾

The number of women employed in this work has been estimated at about 8,000 in 1916-1917.⁽⁹²⁾ The Museu organized research into the subject and eventually mounted an important Exhibition and Congress. This work was fundamental in bringing about the change in attitudes remarked by Balcells. Early in the century domestic production was seen as a good thing, keeping women out of the factory and preserving the family structure. By 1912 conservatives such as Elias de Molins were prepared

to admit that in fact long hours had to be worked for tiny wages and that all the costs of production, apart from the raw material had to be met by the worker, and that it was not, therefore quite such a good thing. The conclusion of the congress organized by the Museu was that minimum wages should be established. As Roca sardonically points out this meant that this mode of production was forced to become more capitalist since increasing wage costs would lead to a demand for more capital by the entrepreneurs. (93)

Women, then, in the period under study, were an important and badly treated part of the Barcelona working class.

Wages and hours of work

Tuñón has given an overview of changes in wages and hours of work in the period under study, basing his assertions on various partial sources and on the data published by the Ministerio de Trabajo from 1914. (94) He shows that, although wages increased slightly more than prices to 1914, after that date they lagged behind price rises to the end of the period, with the exception of 1921.

At the outset of the period under study, wages in Barcelona were, in general, the highest in all Spain, being slightly higher than those in Madrid. Real wages had risen since the 1890's, though the expenses of the working class had risen, particularly as regards clothing, shoes and rents. The increasing use of the tram had also added a new expense which had not hitherto existed. The average national daily wage was between 3.25 and 4 pesetas for men; for women it was under 3. In Barcelona the metalworking and construction workers earned about 5 ptas. a day, whilst the predominantly female workers of the textile industry earned 2.50. Hours of work varied from industry to industry; in Barcelona the average was 10 hours but in the textile industry it was 11. There were increasing

demands for the eight hour day, to increase the hourly rate of wages, reduce unemployment and in order to leave some time for rest and instruction.

Between 1910 and 1914 there was a small general rise in real wages in all Spain. The average daily wage was 4.15 ptas., and in Barcelona it was nearer 5. Women still only earned about half this sum. Hours of work did not change very much, though certain industries won reductions, generally after organized action. Thus the textile workers of Barcelona won the ten hour day after the strike of 1913.

The economic boom of the war years noted in the Introduction brought a modest nominal increase in wages to 1917 which was outstripped by prices. After that date wages rose dramatically and in 1921 overtook price rises, because the workforce organized and won increases. The data of the Ministerio de Trabajo is broken here and calculation of the average daily wage is less accurate; nonetheless it would seem to have been around 6.50 ptas. a day for male workers and still half that for women. Hours of work went down to 8 per day as a result of the strike of La Canadenca in 1919.

During the post war crisis there was an attack on wages and these remained virtually static until the end of the period studied, despite the price rises of 1921-1922.

As with the national statistics, there is a corresponding difficulty in finding comparable statistics for wages in Barcelona. Whereas there is information on prices in almost all the volumes of the AE, presented in relatively uniform fashion, there is unfortunately much less information on wages, making it more difficult to formulate generalizations about the state of the latter.⁽⁹⁵⁾ The available information is reproduced in Tables 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18, under the heading 'Wages in Barcelona', 1905, 1912 and 1917 respectively. They are difficult to use for comparative purposes because of differences in the classifications employed and in

their scope - the tables for 1905 and 1912 are much wider than that for 1917.

In any case, the wide variety of modes of work and of payment complicates any comparisons. Thus one of the two lists for 1905, 'Los salarios en Barcelona en 1905' gives details of maximum and minimum payments for each sector by the day, week or month, with the rates for men, women and children, commenting on whether or not piecework is the mode of working. Where piecework was prevalent the list gives the average daily payment taking into account conditions, hours of work etc. Sometimes a comparison with the second list for 1905 - 'Duración de la jornada y precios medios por días y por horas' - aids in calculating certain piecework rates. For example, in the first list, among the various kinds of type-setters those who were paid by piecework received 87 centimos for every 2,000 letters. On checking the second list, apart from finding that the price for 2,000 letters has become a peseta, the figures for the hourly wage are given as 60 centimos, and for the daily wage, 5 ptas. When, in a particular job, both modes of payment were to be found a comment is made, comparing the rates. When board and lodging was provided a note was sometimes made (for example, in the case of head cooks; whereas the entry for servants on the same page makes no mention of it). Where tips were a normal part of the salary some estimate is made of their value.

The list for 1912, while following the same division by sectors does not always specify the same jobs in each sector. Furthermore it only gives weekly salaries, both maximum and minimum, and states the length of the working day. As an innovation there is a list of work done at home by women in the sector of 'ropa blanca' (linen-making, but the list also includes shirts, aprons, slippers etc.), which gives piecework prices by the appropriate units and also the average salary per day and furthermore specifies when assistants had to be employed. This information was not

presented in the same way in the AE, 1905, the various types of work being entered in different industrial sectors and not all of them mentioned.

Nor is such detailed information available for 1917 where, apart from the section detailing wages in the textile industry, only wages for men are given for other sectors; a section on 'Trabajo Femenino' at the end covers clothes making, embroidery, sail-making - i.e., the arts of the needle - and also mentions kitchen maids and shop assistants. A final brief note on work at home gives daily general wages and mentions that, in general, the work is paid for at piecework rates.

Despite these difficulties the tables do show clear increases in wage rates over the period studied, though these varied according to the industry concerned. Thus in the textile industry the wages of male hiladores went up from a minimum of 20 ptas. weekly in 1905 to 36-40 in 1912 and a minimum of 35 and maximum of 90 at piecework rates in 1917. The comparative rates for women hiladoras were respectively 12-15 in 1905, 17-19 in 1912 and 12-19 in 1917. In the construction industry bricklayers wages rose from 4.50 ptas. per day in 1905 to 5 in 1912 and 6-6.50 in 1917. In metal-working, a furnaceman's daily wages rose from 3.50 in 1905 to 5-6.50 in 1917.

Such figures alone cannot provide an indication of the economic condition of the working class of Barcelona. They must be set against what they could buy.

Prices

As has been observed, information on prices is more readily available than information on wages. The trend of prices in general, throughout the period, was one of inexorable rise, the increase being in the order of 90% in Barcelona in the period from 1913 to 1920 alone, arriving at

virtually 100% by 1923 as shown in the table 1.19 taken from the Butlletí de l'Institut d'Investigacions Econòmiques.

This table shows that the real rise in prices took place from September 1917 and went on steadily before prices stabilised in 1922. Unfortunately the table does not cover the years 1919 and 1920 which were difficult years of adaption to the post war world for Catalan industry with, in consequence, an unparalleled increase in prices.

A comparison of the indices of day wages and prices given in Table 1.20 shows that wages consistently lagged increasingly behind prices until the hard struggles of 1919-1920 improved the picture. Even then, women's wages were still some 25% behind and mens' 12%. Table 1.21 details these differences.

But, while the outlines of the relationship of wages to prices can be seen from data such as that quoted above, the real index is that of how adequately members of the working class were able to cope on their incomes. A price list, even when it is a list of subsistències is solely a part of an equation, the other parts being the cost and quality of the objects in the list which had to be bought by the working class and the other costs which had to be met, the most important of which was rent, followed by clothing, heating, medical care and education.

Cerdà, in the mid-nineteenth century, had already shown the imbalance between the needs of the worker and his or her salary,⁽⁹⁶⁾ and his calculations showed that only the most skilled workers received sufficient wages to be over the average yearly expenditure for a married, working class couple, and even then only while there were no children. Vicens Vives and Llorens state that the relationship between salaries and prices had not improved by the end of the century, giving wage rates from an important Barcelona firm and quoting the price of 'una alimentació regular per a una

família de quatre persones'.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The wage range was from 10 to 17 rals a day, whereas the cost of food was 14.50 leaving very little, if any, for housing and clothing (a ral was a quarter of a peseta).

Given that food represented such a large part of the worker's expenditure, the continual rise in food prices in the early twentieth century made the difference between the worker's income and his spending even more marked.⁽⁹⁸⁾

In April 1914, the delegates to the Congreso Obrero Metalurgico, in the Palau de Belles Arts, discussed the need for a minimum wage; they produced figures for the minimum daily diet for a working class family with two children in Barcelona, costing 3.97 ptas. Lighting, heating and rent accounted for a further 0.80 ptas. daily, so the minimum daily requirement was 4.77 ptas., or annually 1,741.05 ptas. Another 237 ptas. had to be added to this for clothing and footwear, tobacco and personal services such as haircutting, resulting in a yearly minimum requirement of 1,978.05 ptas. This figure did not include money for emergencies nor for entertainments, nor the inevitable 'gastos de solidaridad' associated with being a syndicalist. If this sum was compared to the average wage in the metal-working industry of 25 ptas. a week, which after allowing for the due number of unpaid holidays, resulted in an annual wage of 1,250 ptas., the deficit was the staggering amount of 728.08 ptas.⁽⁹⁹⁾

Writing in 1915, Prades, after giving a list of prices of 29 subsistències in 1895 and 1915, commented that all items, except for chickpeas and beans, had suffered increases of between 8 and 110%.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Concern at the price rises was not restricted to the working class and left political movements. It became an increasing preoccupation of the Lliga, who saw the problem of the insufficiency of salaries as one which could cause immediate problems in industrial relations and which had a longer term effect on the reproduction of the labour force, and could

seriously curtail the Lliga project.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Escudé, the head of the municipal statistical service, was asked to produce a study of the economic situation of the Barcelona working class. His report, published in the AE, 1917, confirmed that food prices had risen some 10-20% in the period from the beginning of the century to 1913, but in the following four years, coinciding with the Great War, the rise had been virtually 100%.⁽¹⁰²⁾

At the same time, Escudé also pointed out just how big the gap was between the workers income and his necessary expenditure. The Monografía contained a section, 'Balance Económico de la Clase obrera de Barcelona', explicitly based on Cerda's monograph in which he attempted to define the expenses of the worker, incurred each week in the acquisition of food and other necessities. The information he gives is almost all presented in tabular form but, despite its arid appearance, is extremely valuable for understanding what kinds of food and drink, and in what quantities, were consumed by the Barcelona working class, what clothes and household goods were considered essential and what the other necessary social costs were. These features will not be analyzed here; rather the main interest lies in analyzing the comparative table of the domestic budget of the working class of Barcelona from 1860 to 1919 (Tables 1.22 and 1.23), which gives a clear picture of the increases which had taken place, increases which were far in excess of the purchasing power of the worker. As Escudé, in pleading for the establishment of a minimum wage for the working classes pointed out, wages were quite inadequate:

En nuestro humilde concepto, el salario en Barcelona ha de ajustarse a los gastos indispensables en la actualidad para la vida de familia. Si en la mitad del siglo anterior el coste de la vida de una casa obrera fue poco mas de 3 pesetas diarias y de 4 en 1900, hoy día el salario mínimo no puede ser inferior a 10 pesetas. Dejamos cómo margen de mejoramiento social, de ahorro y previsión posible, cuanto aporte al presupuesto familiar la esposa y los hijos, aunque aspiramos al ideal de que solo trabajen fuera del hogar y proveen los gastos del presupuesto doméstico el padre y los hijos mayores de 14 años.⁽¹⁰³⁾

Given that practically no job is cited in the wage tables of the same monograph as paying more than 10 pesetas daily and that other wages were

grouped into a relatively high pay rate of 6-8 pesetas daily and a relatively low rate of 2.50-5 pesetas daily, it can be seen that the Barcelona worker's income was below, and generally far below his or her needs. How then did they cope?

Vicens Vives' and Llorens' description of how the worker in Barcelona survived at the turn of the century is also valid for the period under study: 'No menjar carn més que en les festes assenyalades, ajudar-se amb el treball de la dona i dels fills, malviure en un racó de pis rellogat...', (104)

The work of women and children was therefore necessary for maintaining the economic balance of the working class family, and it was for this reason that the active population of Barcelona was so high. (105) The mention by Vives of the sublet flat ('el pis rellogat') introduces the other problem faced by the working class in its daily struggle for survival, that of housing. This too was a problem for the Lliga project.

Housing

In the Introduction, the Lliga project for Barcelona was described, and it was noted that housing was an important element for that project; by harnessing the demand for housing in the city, the Lliga hoped to increase the circulation of capital and use this to generate industrial growth. The demand for housing was to be met by new developments and a determined effort was made by Lliga intellectuals to ensure that this should be on Garden City lines. Unfortunately such development entered into contradiction with the Lliga project as it failed to ensure the generation of the profits required, except in the case of housing for the middle classes.

The Garden City movement

In Catalonia this movement was an offshoot of the Museu Social and its main promotor within that organization was the librarian, Cebrià Montoliu. He encouraged the formation of a Societat Cívica La Ciutat-Jardí under the tutelage of the Museu Social in 1912. Its aims were to promote the redevelopment of towns according to the principles of the Garden City movement, and to encourage the construction or improvement of working class dwellings or neighbourhoods on the same lines, to preserve or create open spaces in cities and towns and, in general, to promote the well-being of their inhabitants. Its committee included many of the important names linked with the Lliga project, and it laid down the following lines of action to be taken: the collection of information and the preparation of plans, the provision of courses and talks, a regular publication and efforts to apply and improve existing legislation to meet the aims of the society.

The society undertook two developments on land belonging to its members, Torre Baró and Pedralbes, and the buyers came from the same sector of society as the members, the middle classes. This fact shows the limitations of the idea; how were such projects to be financed on a mass scale where land was the subject of speculation? Montoliu's own idea, as indicated in the Introduction, was that the model of the Gross-Barcelona should serve to reconcile the interests of capital with the collective interest, but when it became evident that the conditions of social unrest brought about by the price rise caused by the First World War boom, and the housing crisis would not allow that plan to be carried out, he lost interest and eventually, at the end of 1919, went to live in the United States, where he hoped to put his ideas into practice in constructing the city of Fairhope, financed through applying the land tax ideas of Henry George.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ His departure threw the society into crisis, and, after the election of a new committee, it began a second, more limited stage,

advocating the incorporation of a regulated barraquisme into the formal mechanisms of house provision, in order to meet the housing shortage, thereby entering into total conflict with the Lliga project.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The Garden City movement, then, remained solely for the middle classes, and failed to provide housing for the working classes. It was left to new development of the type found in La Torrassa, as well as subletting and barraquisme to make up the deficit.

The housing crisis

The housing crisis brought about by the First World War arose solely in the sector of working class housing. It was due to a number of factors - the increase in demand brought about by immigration into the city due to the boom, the rise in transport costs and in the price of raw materials, and the rise in interest rates as capital went into industry in search of quick profits.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

The result was that landlords attempted to recoup new investment and to bring their profits up to the level of industry through a rise in rents which was prejudicial to the working class economic balance, and through increasing the density of occupation of housing, by creating smaller flats, cutting down on open space, and allowing subletting. This development preoccupied the Lliga, for like the price rise it could provoke unrest - the development of sindicatos de inquilinos in 1918 was evidence of organization over this matter - and because it affected the project for the development of Barcelona.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Escudé's survey therefore also covered the question of the housing crisis in Barcelona. Before analyzing the types of housing available in the city and the problems which had arisen, he discussed the importance of the home, not only as a necessary shelter against the elements, whose conditions directly affected the health of its inhabitants and hence their fitness for work, but also

as a 'medio social' for family life, one of the pillars round which the ideological aspects of the Lliga project revolved.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

Contemporaries echoed Escudé's view that bad housing would lead the worker and his family into staying out of the home as much as possible, leaving them open to the disturbing life of the street and the tavern.⁽¹¹¹⁾

Escudé then went on to discuss the conditions essential to good housing. Regarding the building itself, the important features were its construction and orientation, and the ventilation and illumination both of the house and of its individual units. Furthermore, general urban conditions had to be taken into account - the relationship of the building to its neighbours, and of its height to the width of the street, the existence of made up roads, sewers, areas without building, general physical conditions of the area, etc.

Using these criteria Escudé identified three different areas of working class housing - the old town (el casco de la antigua urbe),⁽¹¹²⁾ the area of expansion (the Eixampla of Cerdà) and the suburbs. Within these areas there was, however, great diversity in working class housing and it is necessary to make a deeper analysis of working class housing in the city. Furthermore, both the physical and urban features must be described and an analysis must be made of a social relationship ignored by Escudé, that of renting and subletting, including the housing of those who did not live in families.

Within the Casc Antic Escudé found tightly bunched blocks of houses, separated only by narrow streets, the consequence of the vertical concentration which had taken place in the walled city in the eighteenth century.⁽¹¹³⁾ The height of the buildings kept the sun from neighbouring houses and from the streets and prevented their adequate ventilation. Because the ground in this area was, in general, low-lying and marshy, damp

was a permanent feature. The streets presented a sad aspect because of their darkness and dampness, worsened by the blackened facades of the buildings and by the almost complete lack of open spaces.

Going on to describe the houses themselves Escudé recognized that there were differences between the different districts which were contained in the Casc Antic. Whilst buildings in the area generally occupied only a small area, those in Districts II and III were remarkable for their very reduced sites and great height. These districts within the walls were the oldest of Barcelona and their houses, as was pointed out by Pere Casals, were built to take advantage of all the available space on their sites:

Són, doncs, les construccions d'aquesta zona totes elles de plantes désiguals i petites amb patis inferiors, que més aviat semblen tubus de ventilació, de tant estrets. Els pisos, fins els més alts, són foscs i humits, son comptats els que veuen el sol. Els que millor situats estan tenen vista al carrer; els altres son com cataus ficats entre el celobert, el pis de davant, i les parets d'altres cases. (114)

Confirming these features, Escudé also described the inside of these flats, pointing out that they were divided excessively, in function of the number of rooms, disregarding the conditions of the rooms so created. (115) Casals gives a scale plan of a floor of a house in the Carrer de Fonollar in District II, which confirms this subdivision (see Fig. 1.30).

Where subdivision was really pushed to a limit was in parts of District V, the Raval, and in part of District VI. (116) These areas, which were the industrial expansion of the eighteenth century, contained more modern housing and hence should have presented better living conditions than those to be found in Districts II and III. Casals states that this was true for the streets of Ponent, Tallers, Bonsucés, Carme, Fortuny, Doctor Dou, Angels, Hospital, Mendizabal, Sant Pau, Unió and the Carrer Nou or Comte de l'Assalt. In these areas there lived a mixed population: there were some palaces belonging to owners of factories in the area, and some middle class homes,

as well as housing for menestrals and workers.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Also, in certain streets, and most notably in Comte de l'Assalt, there were to be found boarding-houses for the theatre artists of the Paral.lel. The proximity to one of the main centres of entertainment meant that there were a considerable number of bars and of places to pick up prostitutes, as well as rooming houses to which the clients were taken. Despite these features dependent on the nearness of the entertainment world, Casals claims that these streets bordering the Rambles had a certain 'pretensió'; however, this was not the case in streets which bordered the Paral.lel like Valldonçella, Tigre, Paloma, Ferlandina, Dulce, Botella, Cera, Aurora, Carretas, Bomba, Cires, Arc del Teatre and Migdía. Here the inhabitants lived piled into flats, for the reason that rents were high and so the tenants, in order to meet them, sublet their already small flats.

The term 'subletting' covered various practices. Firstly there was the sharing of a flat by two or more families, as described fictionally by Vidiella and more scholarly, if no less vividly by Aiguader.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ It was highly practised in the centre and in some of the suburbs. There is no data as to whether it was a more common practice among immigrants, especially the non-Catalans, to the city. It would seem reasonable to assume that the mechanism of present-day immigration from country villages to the cities in Spain as described in Tax Freeman⁽¹¹⁹⁾ by which immigrants, newly arrived in the city, stay with family or villagers already established there, until able to find a place of their own, must also have been current at the turn of the century. If so, it would seem reasonable to assume that families of immigrant origin in Barcelona were more likely to be found subletting.⁽¹²⁰⁾

The practice, as Aiguader reported, usually led to rows and an eventual end to the arrangement, often because one of the parties involved went to live in the barraques which will be described below.

A further practice which can be qualified as subletting was that of taking in lodgers. Valdour tried this several times and it seemed to work fairly well. The prices he quotes were relatively low and likely to be within the reach of many workers.⁽¹²¹⁾ It would be interesting to know if many lodgings were available to workers - from the lack of advertisements in the newspapers of the period it seems likely that few Barcelonins wanted the bother and trouble of a paying guest in their homes.

Rather than live in lodgings, the poor used 'pensions'. Again the best source is Valdour who experienced and described two in the centre, and pointed out that they were better in the suburbs.⁽¹²²⁾ Neither of the two pensions - one was in Sant Pau and the other in the Calle del Teatro - were particularly agreeable or comfortable. The first cost a peseta for a single room though a bed in a 'cabinet' or in an 'alcove obscure' could be found for one, two or three rals. The second pension cost two rals a day.

Previous to entering the second pension, Valdour had sought a bed for the night in 'une maison qui offrait des "camas para dormir"' at 25 centims a night. Here, however courage failed him:

Je me suis adressé d'abord a une maison qui offrait des camas para dormir a vingt-cinq centimes. (Dans une autre de ces maisons, il y a des lits depuis vingt centimes). Du débit qui occupe le rez-du-chausée, on accède par un étroit escalier a un entresol obscur, sorte de palier occupe par un lit là, une petite échelle aboutit a un trou carre percé dans le plancher de l'étage superieur; en surgissant de cet orifice, on aperçoit plusieurs lits dans une piece, puis on traverse plusieurs chambres contenant chacune de quatra a huit lits places côte a côte. Je demande un cabinet: il n'y en avait qu'un, avec un seul lit, éclairé et aeré seulement par une petite ouverture munie d'un treillage et donnant sur l'un des dortoirs. Le courage m'ayant manqué de prendre gîte en ces lieux, je me suis rendu dans un hotel meublé voisin...⁽¹²³⁾

The casa de dormir was the last resource for the poor wanting a bed for a night. Vidiella describes one called Los Tres Ochos because it operated three shifts a day, from six in the morning until two in the afternoon,

from two until ten at night and from ten until six. Payment was at the rate of a ral for eight hours, and if the sleeper wished to continue sleeping after his eight hours were up he had to pay a further turn. Unhygienic and unhealthy, these Casas de dormir, like the municipal Asilos were habituated by workers as well as by the vagrants and minor criminality of the city. (124)

There remains a form of subletting which, on the surface, may not seem to have been such, but which since it involved the lodging of persons in rooms not their own and not directly rented or let to them, can be considered as being within the practice. This was the régim d'internat practised in some forms of work, notably among shop assistants. These were lodged in their master's premises, normally in the shop or the warehouse, sometimes with the counter for a bed. Since these were premises not intended to be used as residences they were often badly ventilated and heated, creating worse conditions still for the workers in this already tuberculosis prone trade. (125)

Subletting therefore was a relatively frequent evil to be found in the centre of the city and most especially in the District V. It has already been seen that the overcrowding in this area was reflected negatively in the mortality rate, giving this district the highest mortality rate of all Barcelona. Aiguader claimed that the Junta del Foment i Millora de la Casa Obrera had found, through a survey which was very incomplete, many houses in District V with a mortality rate equivalent to 100 per thousand annually, some with a rate of 150 per thousand, and a few which offered the staggering rate of 200 per thousand.

Cada any maten aquestes cases una cinquena part dels seus habitants; en cinc anys, si no es renovessin, els hauria liquidat tots; pero es renoven, hi han empenyes per a ocupar ell (sic) lloc del mort. (126)
[Underlined in original]

Not all the inhabitants of the old town were immigrants. In the Districts

to the right of the Rambles, districts with a much lower mortality rate, Aiguader found the general urban conditions and the type of housing to be very similar to District V.⁽¹²⁷⁾ However the population here was cleaner, more civic minded, because it was 'més nostra'.

The Catalan worker, according to Casals preferred the outlying districts to the centre and constituted the majority of the inhabitants of Gràcia, Sant Andreu, Horta, Sant Marti and Sants.⁽¹²⁸⁾ In these areas, as was seen in the earlier statistical section, there were still many single family dwellings, expecially in Sant Andreu and Horta. However in some parts of the old town centres such as Gràcia there were to be found houses with a high number of persons living in them. As Escudé pointed out, living conditions in these areas were not much different to other Spanish towns.

Where there should have been a marked difference was in the Eixampla, an area which Cerdà had intended to be wholly residential, a condition which was not respected. Furthermore, as detailed in the Introduction, the whole project had undergone a massive densification through the actions of landowners, constructors and speculators. The idea of Cerdà, complained Escudé, of single family dwellings surrounded by gardens had not been respected: ...se han convertido en casas de vecindad que constituyen verdaderos acuartelamientos, en que hasta se aprovecha el piso superior para construcciones sobre terrado destinadas a viviendas de familias modestas.⁽¹²⁹⁾

Constructions on the roof, often of a temporary nature which were not confined to the Eixampla, were perhaps, the most extreme form of barraquisme, the erection of shanty dwellings. There were several shanty towns in Barcelona, growing in number and size throughout the period, especially towards the end. According to Pere Casals they housed some 3,000 persons in 1915 and some 15,000 to 20,000 in 1924

according to Pons i Freixa and Salvat Navarro. Contemporaries were horrified at their growth. Casals claimed that:

Aquestes barriades no eren conegudes temps passat. Avui sembla que's produeixen per generació espontània, com les males herbes. Son aquestes barriades una vergonya per a Barcelona, i una infàmia la llur subsistència. Es d'aquelles coses que justifiquen l'incendi purificador. Tot el que's digui es poca cosa per a donar a entendre el que son. (130)

More moderately, Aiguader reported that from before the study of Pons i Freixas there was a generalized acceptance of the need to demolish the barraques. Although Escudé does not mention this type of housing in his work on the 'Habitación del obrero', contemporary accounts claimed that their population was predominantly made up of workers and their families. Aiguader found that it was increasingly composed of workers, put into the street by the rise in rents, or so that the landlord could improve the houses. Many, as was observed above, were the result of failed attempts at sharing flats.

The main areas of barraquisme, as was seen earlier, were to be found along the coast, and included the older established neighbourhoods of Somorrostro, Pekín, Sant Carles and the areas behind the old cemetery, all to the north of the city. On the coast to the south was the neighbourhood around the lighthouse of the Llobregat and the Bany's Zoraya. Inland, behind Montjuïc, were a whole string of barraques which were to constitute the main growth point of this form of housing in the twenties, the Font de la Mamella, l'Animeta and, just beyond Gran Vía, Magòria, and the barraques of the Passeig de la Creu Coberta. On Gran Vía itself, there was a site recorded, no. 318, which was only a block away from the site of the future Plaça d'Espanya and where there was a dungheap on one side and thirty barraques on the other. Nearer to the town centre and in the Eixample was another site at Entença 109. However, perhaps the largest of these areas was to be found on the other side of Gran Vía, on the site bounded by the Paral.lel, Floridablanca, Vilamari and Entença, described

graphically by Valles i Pujals.⁽¹³¹⁾

The majority of the population of these areas worked close to their residences. A fair proportion in the coastal areas were fishermen. Others in the areas to the north of the Port were engaged in the transport and dock industries associated with the port. Others in these areas worked in the factories of Sant Martí. Molers from the quarries on the mountainside which supplied the stone for the Eixample of Barcelona, lived in the sticks and tin-can barragues of Montjuich. And many worked for themselves as ragmen, umbrella repairers, estanya-paelles. For these poor with few resources the barraca offered a home, a place for tools and storage of materials and a place to work. And, of course, a certain proportion of their inhabitants were persons with no apparent means of subsistence.⁽¹³²⁾ The temptation is to assume that this population was made up of immigrants, newly arrived from other areas but the available evidence shows that its composition was of longer established immigrants. The reception area for new immigrants was the centre of the city where there were large numbers of immigrants and where the boarding houses were to be found, and which was best situated for finding work in any area of town. The later difficulties encountered by the immigrant in finding a flat for himself and his family because of the high rents and those posed by living as subletters brought him to autoconstrucció.

The barragues were constructed from any material to hand and presented the appearance of the shanty town which has been widely diffused through the photographs of similar areas in the Spain of the post Civil War and of areas around cities in the underdeveloped world. Describing the erection of a barraca in Magòria, Aiguader says:

En efecte, en poc temps, els homes a les festes i quan plegaven del treball havien construït la barraca. Era com totes les de la part costeruda; de fusta i maons vells la façana, el marge fent de paret al darrera, de cartró pedra i fustes el sostre; rés d'enrejolat, fustotes i borrasses per a fer dos compartiments i una cuina; una

figuera raquítica a un costat, el que donava al camí la façana donava damunt la taulada del veí de sota-, quatre ceps malalts, darera; gàbies per a conills, per a gallines, un gos tinyós; heus aquí la felicitat d'una família.(133)

The barraques were of the most reduced dimensions. Casals describes them as being, at most, fifteen square metres, and this is confirmed by the two ground plans he gives, which are reproduced in Figs. 1.31 and 1.32. The smallest could only be compared to the Eskimo's igloo in size, or to a dog's kennel. The occupant of this particular barraca had to enter it on his hands and knees. Aiguader also cites a case of a small barraca, taken from Doctor Mira, which was rented by a couple. A single bed just fitted in this dwelling and at night the wife got undressed on the bed while the husband waited his turn at the door.(134)

Despite these features of reduced size and autoconstrucció in marginal areas it must not be assumed, however, that the barraques provided free housing. Rent was paid for them, sometimes to the landowner, and sometimes because even the barraca was a sublet. The pre-war generation of barraquistes often had paid no rent and had established property rights so that they were able to demand rent from later arrivals. As Aiguader pointed out, because the authorities affected to ignore the barraques and because the barraques were necessary, exploitation was easy and he cites Pons i Freixas' claim that in one area the revolver was used as the ultimate method of persuasion. Generally rent was paid by months and sometimes by weeks, but in some cases like the Passeig de la Creu Coberta the pre-war custom of payment by days was maintained. As well as rent a deposit was often charged, some of 500 pesetas, again according to Dr. Pons i Freixas. Further payments had to be paid for water - no water was supplied to the barraques and so it had to be obtained from the nearest sources to hand, which despite being infected wells were exploited by their owners.(135)

Another type of housing for the working class were the agrupaments-pati

found in Sants, Gràcia, Sant Martí and Les Corts. These were houses constructed around and fronting onto, a central courtyard in which the toilet and water facilities were to be found. The yard was also the play area for children, the place for hanging out the clothes and the run for domestic animals. The reduced size of the houses and the enforced community life were reminiscent of the barragues though at least these houses were constructed of bricks and mortar, albeit cheaply. Their landlords claimed that they were constructed for altruistic reasons and although rents were fairly low - twelve to thirteen pesetas, the interest they returned on the capital invested was high. It would seem that they did not house a significant number of persons.⁽¹³⁶⁾ See Fig. 1.33 for a ground plan, and, by way of contrast, a ground plan of one of the latest types of flats for workers (Fig. 1.34).

A final type of working class housing development which exemplifies the densification brought about by the speculative process, aided by the transport infrastructures provided by the Lliga project, is afforded by the case of La Torrassa studied by Roca Cladera and Diaz Perera.⁽¹³⁷⁾

At the beginning of the century La Torrassa was a small nucleus of rural houses along the Madrid road, beyond Sants and Collblanc. Collblanc was affected by the development of Sants and the typical process of construction of the Barcelona suburbs; the development of factories and around them, working class residences. The development of La Torrassa was qualitatively different; the land was virgin territory and was not divided into small parcels. Rather the developers held areas of sixteen hectares as against the two hectares which was normal, and they provided basic services, then resold each parcel without undertaking further development, using the profits to accumulate more large parcels. In this way they revalued the land and opened up new investment opportunities. With the demand for housing towards the 1920's and the availability of urban transports - La Torrassa was convenient for the site of the Great

Exhibition where many workers were employed, and the first stage of the Transversal metro was planned to run between the two areas - the owners of parcels were able to realize their investments, by densifying the areas built up. This process took place in stages. Any development before 1905 had been by subdividing the large holdings and creating the typical one-family summerhouses of the suburbs (Fig. 1.35); the next step was to build along all four sides of the area (Fig. 1.36). A later model drove a passageway through the middle of the block and thereby added two further sides which could be developed as in Fig. 1.37. Finally the last model typically ran two alleyways through each block, enabling the whole surface area to be built up, creating minimum size houses with restricted access to air and light (Fig. 1.38).

Conclusion: the grounds for working class discontent

The conditions of working class life described in this section - the long hours, the insufficiency of wages in the face of the price rise, particularly after 1917, and the corollary of the exploitation of women, coupled with the housing crisis - lay behind the growth of the working class movement in the period under study. The form that this movement took - revolutionary syndicalism - depended on two factors; the ability of the existing political system to accommodate the working class and the alternatives available to it. The success of a neighbourhood-based syndicalism indicates a last feature of working class life which must be studied here - neighbourhood solidarity.

NEIGHBOURHOOD SOLIDARITY IN BARCELONA

The word 'solidarity' has already been used here in two very different senses; Solidaritat Catalana and Solidaridad Obrera. In a class based and hierarchical society like that of Barcelona, the word had important connotations. Solidaritat Catalana emphasized a feature - that of being Catalan - which was above all divisions of class and served to group people together. Solidaridad Obrera implied something else, a consciousness of belonging to the working class and of loyalty to the other members of that class.

The appeal to Solidarity reflected the ease with which people in Barcelona, Catalans and non-Catalans, joined together in common endeavours, and this feature of social life was remarked upon by the French professor, Escarra, in his 1908 survey of Catalan industrialization. He observed that in this respect Catalonia had nothing to envy France for, quite the contrary. The cooperatives, the mutual aid societies, the working class educational institutions, the leisure organizations were numerous and well supported.⁽¹³⁸⁾ The AE, 1917, confirms this:

La vida corporativa ha gozado en Barcelona, en todo tiempo, de señalado predicamento. Las asociaciones civiles, instructivas, políticas, administrativas, militares, eclesiásticas, cooperativas, mutuales, de seguro o previsión, artísticas, científicas, recreativas, literarias, etc.; las entidades en fin, que han perseguido un objetivo utilitario, han abundado siempre en nuestra ciudad...El espíritu de especulación ha ganado todas las clases sociales, que han buscado en la formación de sociedades el procedimiento para transformar el régimen capitalista... Las entidades obreras y cooperativas han iniciado de unos años a este parte una transformación de la economía mundial.⁽¹³⁹⁾

In 1917, according to statistics of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales the following working class organizations existed in Barcelona province: 493 syndicates, 63 cooperatives, 90 mutual aid societies, 17 instructional and recreative societies, 3 political organizations, and 11 Federations of societies.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Not all of these, as Escarra pointed out, were exclusively working class; often they were aided by members of the

middle class of the neighbourhood.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Thus the Previsió Obrera of Sant Andreu had middle-class supporters. It existed to pay a pension to retired workers (a very fitting objective in view of the fact that the most famous Spanish playwright of the time, Ignasi Iglésias, lived in Sant Andreu, and had written a play - Els vells - on the subject of poverty in old age).⁽¹⁴²⁾ Clapés described its development:

Son fundador fou Jeroni Puig, a finals del passat segle. Tingué amb sos amics reunions; un obrer autèntic que crida a son entorn a totes les persones de bona voluntat. Hi acudiren J. Cararach, D. Pere Gali, i d'altres que treballaren amb zèl i intel·ligència. Per això arrela a la barriada i feu grans progressos la previsió Obrera. ...Aquesta associació esta formada per obrers, si bé es patrocinada i dirigida més aviat per persones de tots els estaments.⁽¹⁴³⁾

Solidarity, then, was capable, in the face-to-face world of the neighbourhood, of making people from the different classes work together. This was symbolized in a Catalan district like Sant Andreu, by the Sardana, the stately circular dance of rural Catalonia; the first time it was seen there was at the Festes de la Mercé in 1897, and each year thereafter the dance became more popular and by 1922 the Foment Sardínic Andreuenc was founded; by 1930 it had 630 members.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

In other areas with a population of less Catalan origin, the Sardana was not so popular. But the social solidarity of these areas was shown equally in the popular festivals. These were mainly derived from the Catholic calendar, though several had little to do with religion (Carnestoltes, Corpus Cristi, the revetlles of Sant Joan and Sant Pere), and one (May Day) was outside it altogether.

The first main festival of the year was Reis on 6 January, which, apart from the arrival of the three kings in the port, and their procession through the city was essentially a family festival. On 17 January was the Tres Tombs, when the domestic animals were blessed in the morning and the afternoon and evening given over to street balls. February and

March brought Carnestoltes, or carnival. Revived by the middle classes in the mid-nineteenth century, it had percolated down to the popular classes by the early twentieth. On the Saturday before it began, Carnestoltes himself would arrive at the Estació de França (it was popularly supposed that he had come from Paris) and was met by civic dignitaries, and invited to preside over the festivities. The most important of these was the Ruà on the Sunday, with the procession of decorated floats, the disguises and masks of the spectators, and the mock battles with paper snowballs, confetti, serpentines and sweets. The festival of Carnestoltes came to its climax of masked balls and attacks on neighbours' houses by disguised groups of friends, as Carnestoltes himself wasted away and died. On the afternoon of Ash Wednesday the Barcelonins went to Montjuïc in the ceremony of enterrar la sardina, burying the symbol of the wasted Carnestoltes, a sardine. In certain neighbourhoods effigies were also burnt.

Sant Medir on 3 March was celebrated in Gràcia, with processing of decorated carts, whose occupants flung sweets to the crowds. Easter was a main holiday, though the religious procession was on its way out, and the mones, the decorated Easter cakes, were beginning to become popular. 23 April was Sant Jordi, patron saint of Catalonia, and the day of the rose fair. 1 May usually saw a demonstration for the eight-hour day by the working class, and the first Sunday in May was dedicated by the middle class to the Jocs Florals. Corpus Cristi in early June had religious professions and palms, but the main event was the appearance of the gegants, the giant figures of kings, queens and moors, an old and extraordinarily popular tradition in Catalonia. 23 June was the revetlla of Sant Joan, and the 26th that of Sant Pere, both with fireworks, coca and champagne, and open-air balls.

The summer brought the festes majors of the neighbourhoods, dedicated to their respective patron saints. The most important was that of Gràcia,

on 15 August, when the residents of each street competed in decorating their streets. In the evening balls were held in the envelat, a canvas construction unique to Catalonia, similar in appearance to a huge tent.

24 September was the fiesta major of Barcelona; though it was the least major of all. It failed to grasp the popular imagination; the integration of the city still had a long way to go.

1 November was Tots Sants, with the obligatory visit to the cemetery, and then the consumption of chestnuts, marzipan panellets and sweet wine, an essentially family affair. Christmas, too, was for the family; the pantagruelic dinner lasted until suppertime.

28 December was the Día dels Innocents. In the monasteries of medieval Catalonia a choirboy was elected Bishop for the day, and ruled over the monks. The custom had passed into lay practice, with the children ruling for the day. But by the twentieth century it had declined, and the only echo of the medieval practice was that children were allowed to play practical tricks on adults for the day.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

The popular festivals, then, marked one aspect of the social solidarity of the Barcelona neighbourhoods. A further aspect, that of associative life was also noted. A final feature would be a description of how that sense of solidarity operated in everyday life; and the evidence is largely lacking. There are few personal memoirs from the period which dwell on this aspect, and it has passed out of the reach of oral history.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

But there is no reason to expect that this solidarity did not exist, nor that in the working class neighbourhoods it was anything but working class in outlook. At the beginning of the period under study there was often middle class support for working class attitudes as in the case of the Setmana Tragica; by the end, as in the case of the transport strike of 1923 there was none. But with or without middle-class support, it was

solidarity among the working class of a neighbourhood which made such actions possible; and the organization of the working class movement will be shown to reflect its neighbourhood basis.

CHAPTER 2

PROTEST IN NINETEENTH CENTURY STYLE: THE SETMANA TRÀGICA OF 1909

INTRODUCTION

Although most observers and historians agree that the week long urban revolt in July 1909 in Barcelona which has become known as the Setmana Tràgica was caused by the call up of military reservists from the City to fight in the unpopular war being waged by Spain in Morocco, they differ widely in their interpretations of the nature of the revolt and its significance.⁽¹⁾

Contemporary observers took sides according to their political allegiance; for the Lliga and its allies the revolt was a profoundly shocking glimpse of their ferocious proletariat, which could only be tamed by severe repression. For the Radicals of Lerroux the revolt was anti-clerical and anti-military, though not anti-nationalist. The Catalan Republicans saw it as an anti-military and anti-centralist movement, incapable of accepting leadership and consequently diverted by the Radicals into church burning. The Anarchists presented it as a revolutionary general strike against the state; the Socialists as a peaceful strike against colonial ventures.

By the 1930's when many of the passions behind the strike had been forgotten, intellectuals such as Andreu Nin could present it as a spontaneous and pointless insurrection, doomed because of its localized nature. Historians writing in the early Francoist period were keen to point to it as an early example of the church burning and desecration which had been so prevalent in the Republican zone in the Civil War. The theme of anti-clericalism was further taken up by Joan Connolly Ullman, and elevated by her into a dominant working class ideology in

early twentieth century Spain. The makers of the recent Catalan film, La Ciutat Cremada, and their historical advisers, chose to present it as a dignified but doomed revolt on nineteenth-century lines, by an internationalist working class movement, strongly influenced by anarchism, and highly anti-centralist, against incompetent authorities.⁽²⁾

Given this multiplicity of interpretations it is not surprising that the true significance of those July days resists easy summarization. It is the contention here that the revolt can only be properly assessed in the light of the material which has formed the basis of the Introduction and Chapter 1. Only in this context can the contradictory aspects of the revolt be evaluated and its crucial importance in shaping working-class politics (both electoral and socio-economic) in Barcelona in the ensuing years assessed.

Causes of the protest

In the first place the events of July 1909 began as an organized general strike within a political campaign against the war in Morocco. This campaign had, however, taken on a particularly strong character in Barcelona and the industrial towns around it, because of the popular memory of the embarkation and return of the soldiers and sailors sent to Cuba only eleven years previously, and because of the ineptness shown by the government in calling up the reservists, many of whom had only recently been licensed from their military service, and were now settling down to married life and parenthood.⁽³⁾ The passage of the troops through the city and their embarkation at the port was the occasion for emotional scenes by wives and relatives. The indignation of the assembled crowds was further fuelled by the fact that the boats used to transport soldiers both to and from Cuba and to Morocco were the same, belonging to the Marqués de Comillas.

A particular incident during the embarkation of 14 July which caused a spontaneous demonstration at the time and much ill-feeling afterwards was the presentation of tobacco and medallions of the Virgin of Guadalupe to the soldiers as they went up the gangplank, by ladies from the high society of Barcelona. Among them were the wife of the Civil Governor, Ossorio, the Marquesa de Comillas, the Marquesa de Castell Florite, the Condesa de Figols, and the Señoras de Singlas, Bosch y Labrús. The Catalan Socialist leader, Fabra i Ribas called these ladies 'impertinentes' and stated that the soldiers could not contain themselves:

'Se expresáron con frases no siempre muy corteses, lo que en mejor forma, pero no con menos energía repetían las esposas y las madras: "Valiera más que se ocuparan ustedes de que no hubiese guerra!" "Procuran ustedes de que nos devuelven pronto a nuestros hombres!" "No les dicen a ustedes nada estas criaturas!" "Aquí no hay que venir a lucirse!"'

La Campanya de Gràcia of 24 July published a front page cartoon alluding to the incident and there was abundant commentary in the press. The large anti-war meeting held in Terrassa on 21 July was especially agitated:

'La actitud del público fue en aquella oportunidad mucho más elocuente de lo que hubieran podido ser los discursos de los mejores oradores, como lo demostraron las repetidas y clamorosas ovaciones de la muchedumbre, interrumpidas más de una vez con desgarradores gritos de mujeres, gritos que tenían mucho mas de angustia que de protesta'.

Nonetheless, the skill of the orators, among them Fabra i Ribas himself, led to the approval of a motion of protest, which included among its points the following:

'Contra los procedimientos de ciertas damas de la aristocr cia, que insultaron el dolor de los reservistas, de sus mujeres y de sus hijos, dand les medallas y escapularios, en vez de proporcionarles los medios de subsistencia que les arrebatan con la marcha del jefe de la familia'.

The inclusion of this particular point shows how much the incident was popularly resented. (4)

These protest meetings were more than a reaction to the call-up of the reservists; they were part of a campaign being waged by the Socialists in all Spain against the Moroccan war. In Barcelona other elements besides the Socialists were at work, however. While the Socialists in Madrid were calling for a national general strike against the war to begin on Monday, 2 August, elements among the various working class organizations in Barcelona, especially the Solidaridad Obrera decided to begin the strike on Monday, 26 July, in order to capitalise on the existing discontent in the city and to forestall the likely government move of suspending the constitutional guarantees in Spain and imprisoning the union and political leaders in the days leading up to 2 August.⁽⁵⁾ The Barcelona Socialists, faced with a fait accompli, fell in with the organization of the strike and formed part of the small strike committee appointed on the night of Saturday, 24 July which contained one representative of the Solidaridad Obrera, one representative of the anarchists outside of the Solidaridad and the socialist representative, Fabra i Ribas. Committees and sub-committees were rapidly formed and took possession of their responsibilities on the morning of Sunday, 25 July. During that day the organization of the strike was elaborated. Final instructions were issued between midnight and one o'clock on the Sunday night and, early on the Monday morning, representatives went out to meet the workers on their way to the factories to tell them that the strike had begun.⁽⁶⁾

Significance of the protest

The first day of the strike was very successful, but the organized protest was soon to break down for a variety of reasons. Among these were the refusal of local political leaders, both Radicals and Catalan Republicans, to involve themselves in leading the strike, the divisions between civil and military authorities and the lack of forces at the disposal of the latter. In some areas the revolt degenerated into

the burning of religious buildings, in others it took on a more revolutionary nature, though the tactics employed such as barricade building were as much from the nineteenth century as were the church burnings. A much more modern tactic was also employed, however, that of stopping the trams; as was seen in the Introduction, a vital part of the Lliga project for Barcelona, the new tram network under Foronda was taking shape by 1909, and it would seem reasonable to assume that disruption of the system was not just a tactic but also conveyed a deeper meaning. Certainly the removal from service of the trams emphasized the abnormality of the situation created by the strike, but it also restored the neighbourhood dimension to everyday life and communications. As such it reinforced traditional working class social solidarity and it therefore rejected the Lliga model of the city in both the immediate economic sense, and the social and ideological sense.

The course of Setmana Tràgica has been described in detail by Ullman, and a detailed account will not, therefore be given here. Instead, key elements of the protest will be picked out and analyzed, and this will be followed by a discussion of the consequences of the protest.

THE COURSE OF THE PROTEST

The first day: stopping the trams

The general strike was not wholly seconded on the Monday morning. However groups of strikers visited those workshops and enterprises which were still working and through persuasion or threats brought the workers out. At the end of the morning the only workers still at their posts were the personnel of the trams. For the authorities the maintenance of the tram service was a publicly proclaimed symbol of their ability to assure the normal life of the city.⁽⁷⁾ The strike committee therefore dedicated its efforts to halting the circulation of the trams.

The fight against the trams began at just after 9.00 a.m. on the Monday morning, in the industrial barri of Poble Nou. The drivers at first attempted to pacify the crowds by saying that they would return the trams to the centre and stop there. Once they had been there they did not stop but came back and were attacked by the crowds. The Chief of Trams in Poble Nou phoned the Civil Governor, Ossorio, who sent the Comandante de Caballeria de la Guardia Civil in person to restore order. But once the Guardia Civil had completed their task and gone, the crowd attacked once more. The Guardia Civil were therefore once more brought in and had to remain until midday.

The Strike Committee, impressed by the action of the strikers in Poble Nou called these to come down to the city centre and to repeat their actions in order to bring the trams to a complete halt. The Civil Governor in turn sent out Guardias de Seguridad with Mausers on the trams; whether this was simply in reaction to the morning's events in Poble Nou or whether Ossorio was trying to provoke a disturbance which would serve as a justification for a large scale repression, as Connolly Ullman points out, the end result was the same; a violent collision between the workers and the armed police with two dead and eleven seriously injured.⁽⁸⁾

Meanwhile the Ministro de Gobernación, La Cierva, had telegraphed to Ossorio at 11.40 a.m., telling him to call a meeting of the local authorities and to proclaim martial law. Ossorio and La Cierva had been in personal enmity since the appointment of the former as Civil Governor of the province of Barcelona in 1907, for personal and political reasons.⁽⁹⁾ Ossorio, wishing to avoid any diminution of his power as Civil Governor by his rival, wished to avoid the declaration of martial law since this would have involved submitting himself and his post to the authority of the Captain General, the military governor. The decision however lay between him, the Captain

General, Luis de Santiago Manescau and the President of the Audiencia, Elpidio Abril.

The meeting took place at midday and Ossorio was outvoted on the issue. He immediately telegraphed La Cierva announcing his resignation and cut off the communication when ordered to remain in his post, leaving his office shortly afterwards. He thereby ruined his political career.

The refusal of Ossorio to give any aid considerably complicated matters for the Captain General since he had only been in the post a month and hardly knew the layout of the city. To make matters worse the Barcelona middle classes, whom he had offended by his pomposity in the ceremony of taking power, refused to help him. This tacit middle-class anti-militarism had already manifested itself earlier in the morning in the willingness to close shops and an unwillingness to use the streets. As Ullman, echoing Amadeu Hurtado, points out, this neutrality of the middle classes was extremely important in allowing the general strike to extend.⁽¹⁰⁾

The Captain General therefore found himself alone, without helpers or advisers in dealing with the strike. As regards men, he had a reduced number of forces, of doubtful efficiency and loyalty.⁽¹¹⁾ Under these conditions he refused to maintain the tram service which had been the scene of repeated battles since the arrival of the strikers from Poble Nou at midday. The trams no longer carried any passengers: they served merely as the symbol of the ability of the authorities to maintain normality. The strikers blocked the lines, deliberately placing women in the forefront and withdrawing before the Guardias de Seguridad, before letting fly a hail of stones and smashing all the windows. Considerable damage had been done to the trams and some had been overturned and set on fire. There had been a certain amount of

shooting with two drivers killed and eleven seriously injured.

At three o'clock the Captain General phoned Foronda with instructions that the trams should be returned to the sheds. He published a ban declaring the Estado de Guerra and detailing the acts which would be considered seditious and giving instructions to all citizens not to form groups on the streets.⁽¹²⁾ His policy after that was to avoid any alteration in the public order while he waited for the reinforcements for which he had telegraphed Madrid (and which would take two days to arrive). He refused to apply the categorical order of the War Minister that he use cannons to bring the revolt to a quick end.⁽¹³⁾

The general strike was therefore a fact by mid-afternoon on the Monday. The divisions within the authorities, the inability of the Captain General to carry out a sudden repressive action, the tacit, initial support of the Barcelona middle-classes, and the determination shown by the strikers had all played a part in bringing it about. At this point the strategy of the Captain General of avoiding disorder might have been successful if the strikers had not begun to attack the police stations in the neighbourhoods around the city in order to free prisoners inside. In El Clot the fight was particularly hard, resulting in three deaths among the strikers and nine serious injuries among the Guardia Civil and Guardias de Seguridad. At the same time there was a demonstration from the centre of the Rambles down to the Capitanía-General on the Passeig de Colon. The tactic, used extensively in earlier demonstrations, of cheering the troops while insulting the police was repeated to good effect. While the sources are contradictory and it is not clear whether the soldiers present under the command of General Brandeis were or were not ordered to fire, it is certain that they took no part in repressing the disturbance, whereas the Guardia de Seguridad fired into the crowd, wounding demonstrators. To the strikers it seemed evident that the conflict was between them and the police and that the soldiers were of

doubtful loyalty.

By Monday evening, therefore, the strike committee could feel that the strike was completely successful in Barcelona and the news was that it had also found a notable echo in the textile towns to the north and north-east of the city. However no strike had been attempted in any other part of Spain, and this lack of support was crucial in determining the attitude of Catalan politicians towards the protest, as well as allowing the authorities to send in reinforcements to the hard-pressed troops in Barcelona.

Isolation of the protest and lack of political leadership

The same Monday evening, at a meeting of the Barcelona newspaper editors, Iglesias, leader of the Radicals and editor of the party newspaper, backed up by the directors of the Catalan Republican papers, stated that he would not publish the following morning. Despite his lead no agreement was reached. However the strike committee was resolved that no newspaper would be allowed to publish and no further editions appeared until 2 August.⁽¹⁵⁾ Thus the workers of Barcelona were prevented from learning their true position. In any case the strike committee had sent out orders that Barcelona was to be isolated through the cutting of phone and telegraph lines and the ripping up of the railway tracks. News could not, therefore come from outside and serious difficulties were created for the Captain General, both in communicating with the central government and in obtaining reinforcements. For the strike committee the scene was set for an insurrection in Barcelona demanding the Republic and inspiring a similar movement in the rest of Spain.

Various factors, both external and internal to the situation were, however, to prevent any such scenario being realised, In the first

place La Cierva carried out an adroit and unprincipled move to deny the movement in Barcelona and Catalonia any support in the rest of Spain. At a press conference on the Tuesday morning he insinuated that the events in Catalonia represented an attempt by Catalan separatists to take advantage of the situation caused by the war in Morocco, an unfounded lie which had all the more effect because news had just arrived of the military disaster of the Barrance del Lobo, with the highest numbers of casualties of the campaign.⁽¹⁶⁾ By this action La Cierva effectively diverted attention away from the extreme weakness of the monarchy at that moment, and, by portraying the Barcelona working class as unpatriotic, he made it impossible for the working class movement outside Catalonia to support the protest. Similarly he made it difficult for the Radicals or the Catalan republicans to assume leadership of the movement in Barcelona.

The attitude of the Radicals and Republicans was further affected by the burnings of religious buildings which began on Monday night, and the erection of barricades which began on the Tuesday morning. These two internal factors completely changed the insurrectionary possibilities which had seemed so evident on the Monday evening, by destroying the inter-class solidarity which had been shown at the beginning of the strike, and by alienating any possible political leaders.

Burnings and barricades

That typically nineteenth century form of protest, the burning of religious buildings, had been recalled in the Radical newspaper El Progreso on the Sunday prior to the strike and it is not surprising that the protesters, isolated in their neighbourhoods in Barcelona, with no overall direction or purpose, should turn to this form of protest.⁽¹⁷⁾ The first burnings took place on the Monday night in

Poble Nou where the crowds returning from the centre had been fired on by the Guardia Civil, resulting in two deaths. This caused a great deal of excitement which found an outlet later in the evening towards midnight when the Patronato Obrero, and later, the school and church belonging to the Marists was set alight. The Marists, intimately connected with the Circulos Obreros were generally regarded as being against the workers interests and their circles were seen as mere devices for the recruitment of blacklegs. The Patronato Obrero and the school were very generously financed and offered considerable competition to the sindicalists and to the rationalist school in the area. Furthermore it was generally believed that the finance for the Marists came from the Marqués de Comillas, owner of the boats which were being used to take the reservists to Morocco, whose wife had been one of the protagonists of the incident at the port.⁽¹⁸⁾

There were therefore several reasons why the Marists in Poble Nou should be attacked by the considerably excited crowd. The first building to be burned was the Patronato. Cavalry troops were sent by Santiago in an attempt to control the situation and were met by applause from the crowd. They restricted their action to escorting the Marists from the buildings to their nearby residence and then retired, leaving the crowd free to enter and set fire to the buildings containing the school, library and church.

The next morning the residence of the Marists was burned down. It was said that the priests there had fired against the crowd.⁽¹⁹⁾ The priests were lured out of the building and fired on, killing one of them instantly. The others escaped in the confusion, and one took refuge in the police station. The crowd insisted that he be brought out but were shown instead the body of a worker killed the previous day and told that it was him. In this way the police were able to disperse the multitude.

In the rest of the city Monday evening and night had been relatively calm. On Tuesday morning, however, there had been activity in all parts. In El Clot firing against the police had begun from early in the morning. In Gràcia the electricity station had been attacked. In District V there had been continual scuffles against the police all morning, culminating with an attack on the police station of Dressanes. The low key response of Santiago who seemed to have decided to keep clear only the central area of the Rambles, encouraged the strikers to take an increasingly radical line, culminating in the erection of barricades in the working class districts of the city from midday on Tuesday, accompanied by the widespread burning of church buildings.

The burnings began between 1.30 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. in both the centre and the suburbs; the apparent synchronization of the efforts of the fire-raisers did not obey any co-ordinated pattern and was probably due to the easy visibility of the columns of smoke, acting upon an already suggestible public and inciting them to copy the protest. By 5.00 p.m. the protesters had dealt with the churches, convents and monasteries in the working class areas and moved out into the middle class areas, where they largely completed their destructive task that evening. In all, 14 churches, 33 teaching centres and 64 buildings belonging to the religious orders were burned.

The scale of the attack on religious buildings suggests that the Catholic Church was seen by the protesters as a chief enemy; the reasons for this are various, and include the role of the Church in the Moroccan question, the support given it by rich capitalists such as Comillas, the attitude displayed by the clergy towards the poor, and in particular the selection which they operated when dispensing charity, and most importantly, the hold of the church over education. As will

be seen in Chapter 9, the anarchists were already opponents of church education; the Republicans and Socialists, while they believed in political solutions in the short term, felt that in the long term educational effort was necessary to end social misery. What was a nineteenth-century protest in style therefore contained a twentieth century ideal in content. (21)

As for the barricades, these, too, were spontaneously erected in a very short time as Comaposada, describing two visits to the central district, observed.

'El que escribe estas líneas atravesó la ciudad, desde la Rambla del Centro hasta la entrada de Gràcia, a la una y media, sin observar en las calles otra anormalidad que la expresada. [In the section previous to this extract, Comaposada had spoken of hearing shooting at intervals.] No obstante, al penetrar nuevamente en la casco de la población, dos horas mas tarde, el aspecto habia cambiado por completo. La ciudad estaba en plena revolución. Habianse construido como por encanto centenares de barricadas. Calculasé en más de 300 metros cuadrados los trozos de calle desempedrados para levantarlas'. (22)

District V was a perfect area for the erection of barricades, with its limited number of streets giving access from the Rambles and the Rondes, the complicated network of communicating streets between these points, narrow, twisting and full of shadows. This area was one of the last to be occupied by the army and was a considerable embarrassment to the authorities because of the impunity with which the strikers acted inside it. (23)

However it would be a mistake to regard it as the only barricaded area worthy of comment simply because of its central position. Considerable numbers of barricades were also erected in other neighbourhoods of the city - Poble Sec, Sants, Gràcia, Sant Andreu and Poble Nou. Borja de

Ricquer has produced a map showing the basic lines of the barricades (see Map 2.1). It would seem that these followed the same pattern as the barricades erected in popular revolts in the nineteenth century. And as such they were to prove to be no match for an army which had, however inadequately, evolved out of the nineteenth century into the twentieth and was therefore disposed to use cannon against the armed men behind the barricades. (24)

It would also be mistaken to assume that like the church-burning, the barricades were erected simply for the sake of it. Clearly a common purpose was expressed through their construction. As with the church burning individual motives could occur in some districts. Thus, in the case of District V, Ossorio had no doubt that there was considerable ill-feeling towards the authorities because of his recent campaign against vice. In the ex-independent township of Gracia it seems that there was considerable strength of feeling against the war in Morocco. Gracia, with its long republican and federalist tradition had been one of the leading areas of the city in the fight against the quintes in 1870 and also, according to Ullman, the number of reservists called up from Gràcia (some 200) was perhaps the greatest from any single district of the city. At any rate the protest in Gràcia was not diverted away from the primary objective of protesting against the war and no religious buildings were burned there. (26)

There is less information available on the motives of those involved in the building of barricades in other areas of the city. Only in one area was a definite leader to be found in the person of Josep Miquel Baró in Sant Andreu. There the local protest was initiated by a number of 'agitadores de otros suburbios'. Baró, sent by the Tinent d'Alcalde, (Ignasi Iglèsies the playwright, in the unhappy position of being the highest representative of the local authority to be found in the area),

to investigate the activities of these agitators lost no time in becoming their leader. He was a member of the Partit Republicà Nacionalista Català, but in this matter worked without the knowledge of his party. He was evidently a skilful leader; from Ullman's account he was able to get the agitadores to parade through the streets 'animando a las gentes con sus vivas'.⁽²⁷⁾ Later they erected barricades and then proceeded to the burning of the parish church although they only succeeded in destroying the rectory. They also attacked the buildings of the Marists and two other buildings belonging to educational orders on the following day, the Thursday. On the Friday when cavalry were sent in they met no resistance as Baro and his followers had retired to Horta where they carried out the last church burning of the Setmana Tràgica.⁽²⁸⁾

In the case of Poble Nou it seems that the strikers were generally Radical inspired.⁽²⁹⁾ Some minor Radicals were possibly involved in the burning of the building belonging to the Marists and Radical participation in the erection and manning of barricades was much more open. Ullman believes that the local leaders were either ignorant of or chose to ignore the decision taken by Emili Iglesias on Tuesday 27 not to get involved and not to prejudice the party in any way. This she ascribes to the fact that they were situated in what she calls the suburbs, and they were the group furthest away from the headquarters of the Radicals.⁽³⁰⁾

In El Clot the strikers attempted to force the involvement of the local Radical politicians. Thus they visited the house of their Radical regidor, Luis Zurdo Olivares and demanded that he should be at the front of what was going on since he was one of those who had brought it about. Zurdo made a trip round the area carrying a gun, flanked by two men and followed by two more with guns. A neighbour overheard them commenting that their worry was that Zurdo would escape from them and

find his way home. Once he had finished his visit Zurdo did go home and did not come out again for the rest of the week.⁽³¹⁾

In all these areas then the erection of barricades took place as an uncoordinated spontaneous local action, independent of leaders except in the case of Poble Nou and Sant Andreu. In the centre and in Gràcia there were important local reasons for taking such an initiative. None of the areas was well armed - Modesto de Lara emphasized this as proof that the erection of barricades obeyed no master plan and stated that if they had been well armed the consequences would have been unthinkable.⁽³²⁾ The reduction of the barricaded areas was accomplished by using cannon and reinforcements. Gràcia was taken militarily only after some six hours of conflict on the Tuesday afternoon; the other areas were pacified using fresh troops over the following three days.

The erection of barricades and the short, destructive period of the burning of the religious institutions completely changed the insurrectionary possibilities of Monday evening. The Catalan parliamentarians, meeting on the Tuesday afternoon, refused to have anything to do with the strike once they became aware of the church burnings.⁽³³⁾ Iglesias, who had learned on the Tuesday afternoon that no city outside Catalonia had seconded the strike, decided to do what he could to bring the strike to an end or at least dissociate the Radicals from it. Accordingly he manipulated the Municipal session on the Tuesday evening, finally managing to make it inquorate. Thus the possibility of using the Town Hall to proclaim the Republic was denied the strikers.⁽³⁴⁾

Fabra i Ribas tried to get Jaume Carner, leader of the Catalan Republican Nationalists to assume the leadership later that evening in order to try and calm the mood of the strikers, but Carner prudently insisted on having news from other parts of Spain before taking action.

In view of this Fabra i Ribas persuaded the Radicals not to withdraw from the strike that very night.

On Wednesday the Socialists in Madrid issued their strike call for 2 August. The government's reaction was to detain the national leaders in Madrid and to arrest socialist militants all over Spain. The second meeting between Garner and Fabra i Ribas took place on the Wednesday, after Garner had found out that the strike had not been supported outside Catalonia. They both agreed that all was lost and that what was needed was an ordered retirement. However the strike committee was by now totally overcome by events and did not issue a communication calling off the strike as had been previously agreed with Iglesias. Fabra i Ribas had to lie low for a time and then leave for France.⁽³⁵⁾ Meanwhile the workers of Barcelona, deprived of news from outside carried on their futile revolt for a few more days, and only began to find out their true situation when army reinforcements arrived from outside Catalonia giving out the news while they occupied the barricaded areas. Some areas still offered resistance - the worst case was on the Thursday morning in Poble Nou - but the movement was effectively over. A mysterious feature of the last days of the revolt were the Pacos or snipers, who continually harassed the troops from the rooftops. The futility of the gesture and the fact that they disappeared without trace led to accusations that they were really rightists, trying to infuriate the soldiers into undertaking greater repression. On Friday afternoon as a symbolic gesture a tram was taken out on the Balmes - Sarrià route, although there were too many rails torn up to allow any further routes to be brought into operation.⁽³⁶⁾ On Sunday the trams began to work fully and the papers were published, each giving the same agreed version of the events of the previous week. On the Monday the workers reported to their workplaces in an atmosphere of complete tranquillity, and most of them were paid for the previous week, thereby removing a possible cause of disorder. As for the general strike ordered by the Socialists, the arrest of their leaders had been sufficient to completely quash it.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SETMANA TRÀGICA

Despite the calm on Monday, the first of the numerous arrests began to be carried out, and the Lliga instigated people to inform on their friends and neighbours.⁽³⁷⁾ In time five persons, including the educationalist, Ferrer, would be executed for the part they were alleged to have played in the revolt.

The consequences for the Barcelona working class were serious. The repression closed the working class organizations and removed a significant number of intellectuals and leaders from the city and from the leadership of the workers' societies. The Socialists in particular, were forced to practically abandon their activities. This in itself was difficult enough for them; but the formation in November 1909 of the Conjunción Republicano-Socialista was to present even greater difficulties.

The Conjunción was formed because the Socialists in Madrid, after the failure of their strike campaign, decided to seek a parliamentary alliance to further their aims. This was a major tactical change for the party, and met with considerable criticism in Catalonia, where the Socialists were seen as making political action superior to strictly economic action. In Chapter 4 the importance of this for the development of the Catalan working class movement will be discussed; in brief it brought about a change towards complete apoliticism within the Catalan and Barcelona working class, and secondly it encouraged Solidaridad Obrera to go national, in order to defeat the Socialist U.G.T.

A further consequence arising out of the growing apoliticism was the decline of support for the Radicals. This will be measured electorally in Chapter 3, but it should be pointed out here that the decline was not seen in the elections immediately following the Setmana Tràgica, but rather in those of 1911-13. This was because the Radicals had managed

to retain a revolutionary image in the minds of their followers, but did not suffer great repression by the authorities. It was not until Solidaridad Obrera gained strength after the repression had weakened that the Barcelona workers would be persuaded to abstain from parliamentary politics and to follow syndicalist practices instead. Chapter 3 will measure and discuss the decline in interest in 'official' politics in Barcelona and Chapter 4 and following chapters will examine the 'unofficial' politics of syndicalism which were adopted instead.

CHAPTER 3

OFFICIAL POLITICS AND THE WORKING CLASS IN BARCELONA, 1910-1923

INTRODUCTION

It is the aim in this chapter to examine the attitude adopted by the Barcelona working class towards the official political system by measuring the extent to which it involved itself in the elections which were held in the city in the years 1910-1923, and by ascertaining what political options it voted for.

The analysis will centre on the districts of the city to see if there are observable differences in working class participation and in working class support for the different parties; but first it is necessary to examine the state of electoral studies in Spain as well as the few existing studies of the electoral process in Barcelona. This will be followed by a discussion of the electoral system, to find out the extent to which it allowed working class participation. Finally the method of electoral analysis used here is explained before the results of the analysis are given and commented upon.

ELECTORAL STUDIES IN SPAIN

Although the first modern elections in Spain were held in 1812 the study of the suffrage, electoral processes and voting patterns had been very fragmentary and incomplete, due, as several contemporary authors have pointed out, to the vicissitudes of the constitutional regime in Spain.⁽¹⁾

Vallés states:

El govern representatiu a Espanya ha sigut objecte, alhora, d'oposició teòrica i de deformació pràctica, de tal manera que la història electoral espanyola es un seguit d'absència d'eleccions i d'eleccions falsejades, en el qual només de forma esporàdica i localitzada s'han intercalat consultes electorals relativament lliures i regulars.⁽²⁾

This has meant that there is a lack of ordered series of comparable data, a factor which in itself poses great practical difficulties. The changes of regime have, however, caused a worse problem in the effects that they have had on the methodological approaches to the subject. Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, analysts of conservative mentality tended to criticise the liberal principle of universal suffrage,⁽³⁾ whereas those on the progressive and democratic side concentrated on denouncing the manipulation and falsification of the vote at the expense of the analysis of the voting itself.⁽⁴⁾ Finally the closed reactionarism of the Franco regime, coupled with the circumstances in which it had come to power produced a virtually complete denial during almost forty years of the suffrage as a popular legitimation of power.⁽⁵⁾ There was therefore a long series of years without any material for electoral analysis and no opportunity to introduce the new methods and ideas which had come into use in Europe and the United States.⁽⁶⁾ It was not until the late sixties and early seventies that electoral analysis was again undertaken, in line with the increased liberalization of the regime, and the growth of interest in the pre-Civil war years among intellectuals and those who were looking for pointers to the development of Spain after Franco.

In these years a number of studies of importance were produced on the pre-war period, and these were followed by analyses of the previous period, that of the constitutional regime of the monarchy.⁽⁷⁾ None of these studies treats Barcelona in any detail with the exception of those of Albertí, Molas, and Riquer which deal with the electoral results and behaviour of the parties, coalitions or groups in which their authors are specially interested, the Catalan republicans in the case of Albertí, the Lliga Catalana in that of Molas and for Riquer, the Solidaritat Catalana.

ELECTORAL STUDIES OF BARCELONA

These studies, with the exception of Riquer which deals with a specific election (that of 1907) which is outside the chronological scope of this thesis, are general surveys: the detailed electoral analysis of Barcelona city in the period 1910-1923 remains to be undertaken and will be the subject of the following pages. It is possible, however, to pick out the general lines of electoral behaviour and the trends in results from these works. Firstly there were clear differences in voting patterns between different districts which had already defined themselves before 1910. In both municipal and parliamentary elections the Radicals could count on being top of the list in Districts I, V and X until almost the end of the period under study; equally the Lliga controlled Districts II, III and VI. Voting patterns in these areas clearly tie in with the social patterns observed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless there were differences between districts controlled by each party, and the working class districts will need to be further analyzed, as will the remaining districts of the city where the correlation of forces was such as to discourage hegemony by any one party or grouping. A second feature commented on in the existing literature is the decline in votes cast throughout the period under study.

The 1907 elections had marked a high point in participation and the global votation was to decline from 1909 onwards until the advent of the II Republic. This process was not uniform over time and in all districts, and certainly not in all working class districts. Further analysis will show that abstention was a generalized phenomenon which affected some working class districts most, resulting in a loss of votes for the Radicals. In response to an old anti-centralist credo, happily adopted by the anarcho-syndicalist movement, these votes were not transferred to alternative parties within the electoral system. Consequently no alternative to the Lliga - Radical system had any possibility of prospering; a more detailed analysis will show that this affirmation needs qualifying. Not only was there a refusal to vote by the working class but the weight of that class itself within the suffrage was small. Moreover the electoral system reduced the possibilities of success for minority parties in municipal elections in the working class districts, denying such parties the chance to create an electoral base for themselves.

The lack of working class participation and the failure of any other group to establish itself allowed the Lliga, once it had defeated the Radical challenge of 1909-1911, to exercise a certain hegemony to the point where its leaders felt sufficiently strong to attempt to play a role at national level both through the Asamblea de Parlamentarios of 1917 and through their attempt to encourage other regional parties in the elections to Cortes of 1918. Thereafter, caught on the one hand between the campaign for autonomy - which would provoke the Government into supporting the Unión Monarquica Nacional in an attempt to break the Lliga hegemony in the elections to Cortes of 1919 and 1920, and on the other hand by the social struggle in Barcelona which was forcing the Lliga into a position of dependence on the Governmental authorities in Barcelona, the Regionalists were to suffer the secession

of their youth movement, the Juventuts. This secession, converted into the party of Acció Catalana, was to strike a sharp blow against the Lliga in the elections to Cortes of 1923. Other new parties founded in the same period - Estat Català, Unió Socialista de Catalunya - showed that a renovatory tendency had arisen within the Catalan political sphere, but this was cut short by the interregnum imposed on official politics by the Dictadura of Primo de Rivera, and these parties were only to show the extent of their support under the Republic, when the voting system had been considerably revised. (8)

The electoral system in vigour at the advent of the Republic was regulated by the electoral law of 1907, and this was in force in all the elections held during the years covered by this study.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN SPAIN: THE ELECTORAL LAW OF 1907 AND THE SUFFRAGE

The electoral law presented to the Cortes by Antonio Maura on 8 August 1907 was not intended to change the basic structures of the previous law of 1890, the Sufragio Universal law of Sagasta, by which single candidates were elected by majority in each electoral district, except in the case of circunscripcions electorals such as Barcelona where a number of majority and minority candidates were elected. Rather the 1907 law represented, as Miguel M. Cuadrado puts it, an attempt to '... corregir y mejorar los mecanismos del sufragio, purificarlo, perfeccionar su técnica estadística y jurídica, robustecer las garantías del ciudadano y de los grupos políticos que concurrían al mismo'. (9)

As such it was the penultimate attempt before the Spanish Civil War to correct the system of direct universal suffrage of 1890, which was the eighth electoral system used in Spain since the beginnings of universal suffrage in 1810.

The 1907 law attempted to tidy up the technical part of the elections by making an independent body, the Instituto Geográfico y Estadístico, responsible for taking and maintaining the electoral register.

During the half century of its existence the Instituto had gained a reputation for its reliability and relative neutrality and the intention of entrusting it with this new statistical task was to depoliticize the census. From 1907 the first reliable censuses of the seventeen year old direct suffrage period were produced.

The new registers included all male Spaniards over the age of twenty-five, who had at least two years residence in their municipality. To fulfil the two year residence requirement a man had to be in possession of the relevant cédulas personales, which, since this involved paying a fee, deterred many from registering even though required to do so by the laws of 1890 and 1907. Thus the same difficulty encountered in compiling the census of population - a refusal to register in order to avoid paying local taxes such as the cédula - was encountered in the compilation of the electoral register.

The register was renewed every ten years and revised annually. The Town Halls were responsible for the leg work under the supervision of the Instituto.⁽¹⁰⁾ Specially designated municipal agents for each electoral section distributed and later collected the individual registration forms at each house. The preliminary results were then collated by the Town Halls and rectified by the Instituto. By the electoral law the Instituto was also required to classify the data collected under some thirty-nine different headings so that the condition of the electors could be identified and their voting behaviour compared. Using this data for Barcelona it is possible to draw some conclusions about the electorate of the city.

The distribution of the electors of the city of Barcelona by districts

An analysis of the distribution of electors within the city is difficult at any but the most superficial level, because of the lack of information about the age structure of the population in the city and districts. A further problem is that already observed of the defectiveness of the available data on population size.

Despite these difficulties it is worth comparing the number of electors with, firstly the total population in each district, secondly the total population in each district minus transients and military, and thirdly, with the total male population in each district to see if any significant variations are observed in the size of the suffrage. The results of the first analysis are contained in Table 3.1; they show that only two districts, II and III classified in Chapter 1 as petty bourgeois and bourgeois respectively had as a matter of course proportionately more electors than was the average for the city as a whole. Three districts, V, VIII and IX were more often over the average than under it and these were mixed districts whose electoral behaviour also reflected their social composition. Finally the remaining districts - I, VII and X - which were clearly working class through and through were generally below the average, as were IV and VI which included significant areas of working class housing as well as the greater part of the Eixampla.

The results of the second part of the analysis, expressing the electorate as a percentage of the total population minus transients and military are shown in Table 3.2. This table shows that in those districts which had more transients and military population the percentage of the electorate goes up slightly, the most marked example being District I,

but that in most cases the difference was insignificant (in some working class districts - VII, IX, X - the phenomenon was hardly noticeable). These two tables are expressed in graphic form in Chart 1.

These tables show that, despite the lack of uniformity in the distribution of the sexes in the city, the percentage of electors in each district was roughly the same since the figures for the districts are roughly similar. It would follow then that districts which had a female population significantly larger than the male, such as Districts III, IV and VI (as was demonstrated in Tables ~~1.4-1.5~~ **1.4-1.6**, enjoyed more electors per 100 males than those districts where the sexes were more in balance. The third part of the analysis then is the expression of the electorate as a percentage of the male population of each district, using the corrected population figures of Tables **1.4-1.6**. The results are given in Table 3.3 and this table has been expressed in graphic form in Chart 2.

This table and the chart show quite pronounced differences between areas, and over time. The most important feature is the drop in the percentage of electors in all districts between 1910 and 1920, and the enormous differences that existed between districts in 1910 and 1915. To some extent these must have been corrected in the ten yearly complete revision of the electoral register since the distribution of the electorate is much more uniform in 1920, though even here there were some quite striking differences between districts. As regards the changes over time in each district some, noticeably Districts I and III were regularly over the average for the city, while District X was regularly well below. All the others varied over time in their relation to the average, Districts II and IV being over it in 1910 and 1915, but slightly lower in 1920. District V passed from well over the city average in 1910 to below it in 1915 and 1920, despite the increase in the male population of this district.

District VII, well below the city average in 1910 and 1915, came closer to it in 1920. District IX fell from slightly above the average in 1910 to slightly below it in 1915 and 1920. District VI, only marginally below the average in 1910 rose above it in 1915 and higher again in 1920, while District VIII, slightly below average in 1910 and 1915 rose above it in 1920.

It is difficult to find any simple explanation for these changes. It would seem reasonable that District III had proportionately more voters than a working class district like District X. But how can the phenomenon of District I which also had proportionately more voters be explained? There are too many imponderables; in District I, men may have been underregistered in the census because of the large floating population in this area, but equally the local tradition of Republicanism which was reflected in the election results throughout the period may have encouraged men to register more than in less politicized areas. It is possible that the emigration into Barcelona, which it must be assumed went to the industrial working class areas, had the effect of depressing the ratio of voters/population for two reasons, firstly that immigrants may have been mainly young men under twenty-five and secondly that immigrants, while figuring in the next annual revision of the census after their arrival in the city, could not be placed on the electoral register until after two years residence. Since immigration was increasing every year from about 1914 onwards this could have had a considerable effect on the census, and may be the explanation of a phenomenon like that of District V, which, as has already been seen, was a reception centre for immigrants.

In conclusion the working class areas of the city were less favoured than the others in the matter of the suffrage, more so still if it is true that there was a larger unregistered population in the industrial

areas which did not figure in the census. Further proof of this can be obtained by analysing the complementary statistics which the Instituto Geográfico y Estadístico was required to draw up, although there is not a great deal to be gained from them.

The social condition of the electors of Barcelona

This data was fundamentally concerned with age, profession, literacy and civil status of the electorate. Unfortunately it is not broken down at district level for Barcelona; as it was solely concerned with electors in parliamentary elections the appropriate electoral unit for Barcelona was the city itself, though the data published in 1912 does at least exclude the two 'associated townships' of the circunscripción (Sarria and Sant Adria).⁽¹¹⁾ This data then covers Barcelona city, and for comparative purposes, Barcelona province and the whole of Spain.

Out of the 123,376 electors of Barcelona virtually 75% were married, while 16.4% were single and 6.4% widowers. A further 2.2% were of unknown status. As regards literacy the figures of the Instituto contain a printing error⁽¹²⁾, however it is possible to correct this and arrive at the conclusion that 84.9% of the electorate could read, a surprisingly high figure given the degree of illiteracy shown to exist in Barcelona in Chapter 1, and certainly much higher than the literacy figure for any of the districts which were classified there as working class. This implies again that the working class did not figure in great numbers in the electoral census. Of the remaining 15.1% of the electorate only 0.5% were listed as unaccounted for, leaving 14.6% of the voters as illiterate.

The age distribution of the population is given; again there is a printing error in the table of the Instituto (which if it had been a

true reflection of reality would have meant that almost three-quarters of the population was aged between 61 and 70!⁽¹³⁾ This information expressed in percentages, is given in Table 3.4 and shows a fairly regular drop with advancing age in the number of voters.

The occupational structure of the electors of Barcelona is given in six main classifications, according to how the persons involved made their living. The classifications were extremely wide ranging, including employers and employees together in the same classifications. Table 3.5 reproduces the main headings and gives the figures involved, quantifying them in percentage terms. Within the classification of 'Agriculture, Property and Unearned Income' some 47,680 persons were classified as agricultural day labourers, shepherds, field workers, which seems a very high figure, representing as it does, 38.65% of the total electorate of the city. By contrast, in the section of 'Mines, Industries and "Artes y Oficios"' only 1,588 men are classed as factory workers, a mere 1.3% of the electorate. Within this same classification were those employed in the clothing trade though this grouping also includes others - 'Oficios que tienen por objeto el vestido, aseo, ornato personal y alimentación del hombre' which represented 6,852 men, 5.5% of the electorate. However the classification of 'Other Professions' also includes waiters, dining room attendants, and those employed in personal and domestic services. Clearly there was some overlapping between categories, and equally the classifications themselves were so vague - as a last example typographers are included with 'Publicistas, literatos', journalists, artists, draftsmen - 'pintores de historia', sculptors and other 'profesiones liberales', as to be virtually useless for our purposes here.⁽¹⁴⁾ It remains evident however that the working classes did not bulk large in the electoral census.

No other detailed analysis of the electorate was published by the Instituto during the period of this thesis, nor in the years immediately following. The data given in the AE, 1915 only covers the province of Barcelona, covering 294,735 electors, of whom 145,409 were in the city of Barcelona.⁽¹⁵⁾ The electors are classified by occupation and by literacy (76% could write while 23.3% could not read, the remainder being unaccounted for.) A different occupational classification was employed to that of 1912, one which was every bit as difficult to interpret - for example it had a section devoted to industry, but another for 'Jornaleros, obreros etc.'. For comparative purposes this data is reproduced, and the figures quantified as percentages in Table 3.6.

In conclusion the suffrage during this period was restricted; firstly, and obviously, women were excluded.⁽¹⁶⁾ Secondly, and with reference to Barcelona, districts of high working class population seem to have had proportionately fewer voters than other more socially elevated districts. This is an important factor to take into account when considering the voting patterns of the districts; it needs to be complemented however by an analysis of how the electoral system operated in municipal and parliamentary elections.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN SPAIN AND IN BARCELONA: VOTING

Under the laws of 1890 and 1907 all Spanish males over the age of twenty-three who fulfilled the legal requirements of residence were entitled to elect directly and by simple majority the Regidores municipales (Town councillors) and the Diputados (Deputies), to the Cortes (the Parliament) and the Diputacion Provincial (the provincial administration). This apparently simple rule varied in its application according to the status of the electoral district and to the type of election.⁽¹⁷⁾

Thus in elections to the Cortes, Barcelona, like other large centres of population in Spain, was considered as an electoral circumscripción, amalgamating the ten electoral districts of the city with those of Sant Adrià and Sarrià in a sole electoral unit which elected a number of candidates, seven in total, of which five were majority candidates and two were minority candidates. The majority and minority rule will be described shortly after referring to the other types of elections in the city.

In the case of elections to the Diputación Provincial a different electoral unit was used, the Distrito Provincial. There were three such distritos in Barcelona, based on the old judicial divisions of the city. Four deputies were elected in each district, three by majority and one by minority.

In municipal elections the voting division was the municipal district. Each district voted for a certain number of regidores, the number depending on the population of the district. The city as a whole had fifty regidores, of whom three corresponded to District I, five to District II, five to District III, five to District IV, six to District V, six to District VI, seven to District VII, six to District VIII, four to District IX and three to District X. However not all these were elected at the same time; half the council was elected every two years. In practice this meant that the number of candidates to be elected varied at each election, since those districts that had an odd number of regidores, for example District III with five, would vote for two at one election and for three at the following one. Also resignations, deaths etc. could produce vacancies which had to be filled along with the normal number of regidores to be elected. This changing factor is of importance when trying to calculate the number of votes actually cast in municipal elections, since the majority and minority rule also applied to them. (18)

Under this rule the elector could only vote for a lesser number of candidates than the number ascribed to the electoral division, unless only one candidate was to be elected. Thus if the elector had to choose only one regidor or diputado he could vote for only one candidate. If the number was greater he voted for the total minus one up to a maximum of four candidates to be elected. When the number of candidates to be elected was between five and eight he voted for the total minus two. If nine candidates had to be chosen, a situation which did not apply in Barcelona, the voter chose only six, three less than the total.

Thus in elections in Barcelona to the Cortes, the elector was entitled to choose five deputies out of the total of seven. For this reason the candidatures of the parties were made up of five names, aspiring for the first five places in the vote, the so-called majority places. The remaining two deputies were those that had most votes among the lower placed candidates, the minority places. When a party felt very sure of itself in a particular district it could put forward enough names in the candidature to take both majority and minority places, the so-called copo. This was practised mainly in municipal and provincial elections and only in certain districts - Districts I and X by the Radicals and District III by the Lliga in municipal elections, and Provincial District III by the Radicals and Provincial District II by the Lliga.

Since it provided a representation to minorities the majority and minority system could have provided a valuable corrective to the turnante system by which the Spanish Cortes had functioned since 1876 and which prevented the arrival in power of other parties (for example the failure, remarked on in the Introduction, of the Lliga to take an important place in the Cortes). However there were few electoral circumscripciones in Spain. In any case it is doubtful whether the possibility of electing a candidate destined always to be in the opposition

was any incentive to vote. As will be seen the decision of the Radicals to stand only for minorities in the elections to Cortes in Barcelona in 1920 caused a huge drop in the number of votes cast in those districts favourable to the Radicals. In municipal elections the rule discouraged the presentation of minority candidates in districts where only a small number of candidates could be elected, and this caused the somewhat uniform nature of the results in Districts I and X, and may well have been responsible for the high abstention observed in both districts.

However such details need to be elucidated through an analysis of the electoral process in Barcelona 1910-1923, which will be approached chronologically, attempting to place the various elections in their context, and through a series of conclusions. Both parts make reference to Tables 3.7 - 3.58.

No analysis will be made of elections of Provincial deputies, because they were elected on a different territorial basis, one which covered different and very distinct municipal districts, and is not susceptible of social analysis to any useful degree. Sometimes however these elections served as a pointer to the general mood of the city electorate at a particular time and when this happened due mention is made.

THE ANALYSIS: THE METHOD OF CALCULATION OF TABLES OF RESULTS

The analysis of the elections which follows is based on these tables and some explanation of their calculation is necessary. They have been laboriously elaborated in the following way. Firstly the results of the various candidatures in municipal and parliamentary elections were collated in tabular fashion by districts, allowing the calculation of the global total of votes cast in each district (Tables 3.7 - 3.36).

In a second series of tables the number of voters in each electoral district was multiplied by the number of candidates which the elector could vote for in the district concerned, taking into account in the case of municipal elections the particular circumstances of each district. The global vote in each district was then expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible vote for each district thus giving an indication of electoral participation in a uniform fashion, thereby allowing comparisons to be made. Finally the results of the different candidatures in each district were calculated in the same way, as a percentage of the maximum number of votes possible, in order to provide a basis for the comparative assessment of their support and their electoral performance. (Tables 3.37 - 3.58).

ELECTIONS IN BARCELONA BEFORE 1910

Before beginning the analysis of political developments and elections in Barcelona, 1910-1923 it is necessary to give a brief account of the political process in the anterior period⁽¹⁹⁾.

Although the electoral law of 1907 was intended to clean up the suffrage in Spain, this had, in fact, already been carried out earlier in Barcelona through the radical revision of the electoral register in 1899, during the short period when Doctor Robert was mayor. This revision meant that the elections held from 1901 onwards were not manipulated by the centralist monarchist parties and so the results represented the wishes of the electorate (in so far as these could be expressed under the electoral system). For the historian of the period beginning in 1910 in Barcelona, there are therefore reliable precedents for analysis, allowing post 1910 elections to be seen in context.

The first municipal elections of the new century on 10 November 1901 showed an increased participation of about 30% of the electorate, compared with the 10-15% of the last elections under the old register. The three cornered fight resulted in a close victory for the Republican coalition under Alejandro Lerroux, over the newly formed Lliga Regionalista, with the monarchist coalition (made up of the conservative and liberal parties) some way behind. These old dynastic parties were henceforth only to play a minor part in Barcelona elections, and the new monarchist groupings which would arise would have importance only at certain moments. The electoral battles of the next two decades would be basically between republicans and regionalists.

In the elections to Cortes of 26 April 1903 participation arrived at 42%, only to drop to 33% in the municipal elections of 8 November of the same