



EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH

JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS. BARCELONA, 1985

E-122

Incloem una relació de les ponències presentades a les sessions. Les marcadades amb un asterisc poden ser consultades a la Fundació Jaume Bofill. Les restants estan pendents de tramesa per part dels Serveis Centrals de l'ECPR d'Essex. Podrà haver-hi algunes variacions en els títols, normalment no en el seu contingut substancial, ja que els autors introdueixen algunes vegades modificacions en l'inicialment anunciat.

1. Models in the Comparative Study of Political Systems

- Berg-Schlosser, D. *On the Conditions of Democracy in Third World Countries*
University of Augsburg.
- *Eiklit, J. *Stein Rokkan's Comparative Method*
University of Aarhus.
- *Frank, P. *Developing a Model of a Soviet - Type Political System*
University of Essex.
- *Gassner, M. *Can a Model apply to Political Reality? A Simple Proof for a Simple Case*
Université Libre Bruxelles.
- *Horrichter, J. *The Ecology Issue in the Political Process of Western Democracies*
University of Mannheim.
- *Holler, J. M. *Paradox Proof Decision Rules in Weighted Voting*
University of Munich.
- *Lindstrom, U. *In Search of the Social Democratic Heritage. Scandinavia 1815-1918*
University of Umea
- *Meurg, G. de *Political Fairness. at the Limits of Possibility*
Université Libre Bruxelles.
- *Mitchell, J. *Models of Party Systems*
The Open University

- *Norstrom, T. *The Popularity of the Government: Lagged Response or Omitted Predictor*
University of Stockholm.
- *Pammett, J. H. *Election Issues in Comparative Research*
European University Institute. Firenze.
- *Stray, S. *Modelling Party Identification*
University of Essex.
- *Strom, K. *Toward an Institutional Model of Competitive Party Behavior.*
University of Bergen.
- *Upton, G. *Blocks and Voters and the Cube Law*
University of Essex

2. The Stability and Instability of Democracies

- *Bealey, F. W. *Where, When and How Does Democracy Collapse?*
Aberdeen University.
- *Benyon, J. *Legitimacy, Conflict and Order. Urban Disadvantage & Political Stability in Britain*
University of Leicester.
- *Dowding, K. *Pluralism, Economic Growth & Democratic Stability*
Nuffield College. Oxford.
- *Fenton, J. H. *Electoral Turnout and Political Stability in Britain and the USA*
Aberdeen University.
- *Girvin, B. *Change and Stability in Irish Democracy*
University College. Cork.
- *Kimber, R. *Conceptual Problems in Research on Democratic Stability*
University of Keele.

- *Krug, B. *The Relationship of Economic Success/Failure to Political Stability*
 Universitat des Saarlandes.
- *Lawton, A. *The State and Civil Disobedience*
 Teesside Polytechnic.
- *Minogue, K. *Conceptual Incoherence and Democracy*
 University of London.
- *Pasquino, G. *Democracy, Representations and Free Riders*
 Università di Bologna
- *Rootes, C. *Intellectuals, Intelligentsia and Stability of Democracies*
 University of Kent.
- *Rosenthal, U. *The Political Function of Large-Scale Riots: Amsterdam in the Early
 Eighties.*
 Erasmus Universiteit. Rotterdam.
- *Svensson, P. *Stability, Crisis and Breakdown*
 European University Institute, Firenze.
- *Szajkowski, B. *Socialist Orientation: the Concept and its Adoption*
 University College, Cardiff.
- *Wiberg, M. *Wrong Persons are Making Good Decisions without Hearing us*
 University of Turku.
- *Wiseman, J. A. *Democracy and Stability in Post-Colonial Africa*
 University of Newcastle Upon Tyne.

3. Territorial Voting Patterns as a Lasting Phenomenon

- Berntzen, E. --
 University of Bergen

- *Broughton, D. *A Comparison between the Federal Rep. of Germany and Canada in Terms of Territorial Voting Patterns*
University of Essex.
- *Clarke, H. *Short-term Forces and Partisan Inconsistency in Federal States: the Case of Canada*
Virginia Polytech. Inst. & State Univers.
- *Joye, D. *Géographie des Comportements Politiques en Suisse*
Ecole Polytech. Fédérale. Lausanne.
- *Laurent, A. *Logiques territoriales et comportement électoraux: l'action des espaces légaux*
Université de Lille II.
- *Nef, R. *Referend. & Elect. : Cleavag. in Contemp. Switzerland: Variable Complexity vs. Historic. Freezed Simplicity*
University of Zürich.
- *Nicolacopoulos, E. *La géographie des forces politiques en Grèce depuis 1974*
Centre National Recherch. Sociales. Athènes.
- *Pallarés, F. *Stability/Instability of Electoral Behaviour before and after Francoist Dictatorship*
Universitat de Barcelona.
- *Salvador, E. *The Geographical Stability of the Vote: Reflections on the Case of Spain*
Universitat Autònoma. Barcelona.
- *Schmidt, O. *Les Pays-Bas entre 1925 à 1939: une stabilité électorale à toute preuve*
University of Amsterdam
- *Sundberg, J. *The Impact of Party Organizations on Territorial Voting*
University of Helsinki.
- *Wellhofer, E. S. *Two Nations: Class & Periphery in Late Victorian Britain. 1885-1910*
University of Denver.

*Worlund, I. *Party Organization as a Determinant of Regional Voting Patterns*
University of Umea.

4. Metropolitan Government

*Andersen, B. R. (Direktor) *Interact. of Migration Patterns, Condit. of Health, Employ. & Financ. Squeeze: Vicious Circl. for Big Cities*
AKF. Copenhagen.

*Brandsdal, E. *Crossing*
Administrat. Boundaries: Intermunicip. cooperation as strategy for coordin. Norw. Urban Regions
Inst. Publ. Administ. & Organiz. Th. Bergen.

Bruun, F. *The Notion of the Unbalanced Denmark*
Institute Political Science. Aarhus.

Buschor, E. (Director) *Connurbations and Inter Governmental Relations: A European Overlook*
Finanzdirektion des Kantons Zürich.

*Collins, N. *Reorganisation of Metropolitan Government: Dublin*
University of Liverpool.

*Cuchillo, M. *The Role of the Corporació Metropolitana de Barcelona*
Universitat de Barcelona.

*Dente, B. *Metropolitan Policy - Making Processes and Structures in Milano*
Università di Bologna.

Eck, N. van (Director) *Some Remarkable Recent Develop. intergovern. Relations - Rotterdam, Central & the Provin. Government*
Stad Huis. Rotterdam.

*Goldsmith, M. & Wolman, H. *Changing in Grand and their Consequences for a Metropolitan Area-A Comparative Analysis*
University of Salford.

- *Hale, R. (Under Secret. Local Governm.)
Central Government and Urban Finance in the UK
 Chartered Inst. Publ. Finance & Account. London.
- *Hanf, K.
*Developments in the Rotterdam Metropolitan Area as Illustrated
 by the Rijnmond Public Authority*
 Erasmus Universiteit. Rotterdam
- *Larsen, H.
Mayoral Leadership & Problems of Urban Governance
 University of Tromso.
- *Lee, E.
*Comparative Reflections on Local Government & Politics in En-
 gland & the USA*
 University of California. Berkeley.
- *Rallings, C. & Thrasher, M.
Electoral Turnout, Size and Democracy
 Plymouth Polytechnic
- *Sharpe, L. J.
*The Abolition of the Greater London Council: the Onward March
 of Centralization in Britain*
 Nuffield College. Oxford.
- *Vigneron-Zwetkoff, C.
*Local Referendum: Another Right for the Citizen ora New Right
 for Consumer of Public Service?*
 Université de Liège.
- *Wolman, H. & Goldsmith, M.
Intergovernmental Grants & Metropolitan Fiscal Charge
 University of Salford.
- Young, K.
The Concept of Metropolitan Government Reconsidered
 Policy Studies Institute London.

5. Justice and Politics

- Federico, G. di *Courts and Politics in Italy*
Università di Bologna.
- Guarnieri, C. *Courts in Italy*
Università di Bologna.
- Lustgarten *Public Prosecution and Democratic Constitutionalism in England*
University of Warwick.
- Marten, M. *The Role of the Judiciary in the Political Process: a Comparative View*
University of Mannheim.
- Vallespin, F. ---
Universidad Autónoma. Madrid.

6. Inside Communist Parties in Western Europe

- Courtois, S. *P.C.F.*
Fondation Natle. Sciences Politiques. Paris.
- *Fennema, M. *The End of Dutch Bolshevism*
University of Amsterdam.
- Fischer, A. *Swiss C.P.*
Zürich.
- *Hermansson, J. *Swedish C.P.*
University of Uppsala.
- *Heywood, P. *P.C.E. Carrillo's Contradictions: the PCE 1964-1982*
London School of Economics & Polit. Science.
- *Hotterbeex, M. *Belgian C.P.*
Université de Liège.

- *Hyvarinen, M. *Finnish Communist Party: Failed Attempts to modernize ACP*
University of Tampere.
- Jenson, J. *Feminism in the P.C.F.*
Carleton University, Ottawa.
- *Lucardie, P. *C.P. of Germany*
Doc. Zentrum C.P. W. Germany, Groningen.
- *Paastela, J. *Finnish Communist Party: Failed Attempts to Modernize a C.P.*
University of Tampere.
- *Rouston, C. *Socialising the National Question: the Dilemmas of Irish Communism*
University of Ulster at Jordanstown.
- *Waller, M. *Democratic Centralism*
University of Manchester.

7. The Politics of Health

- Altenstetter, C. *Bureaucratic Dominance and Hospital Need-Planning in Germany 1950-1984*
Health Services Management Center.
- *Baakman, N. *Health Care and Paragovernment in the Netherlands*
Katholieke Universiteit, Nijmegen.
- *Bjorkman, J. W. *Physicians Power in the United States*
University of Wisconsin.
- *Christensen, J. G. *The Politics of Industrial Productivity*
University of Aarhus.
- *Dohler, M. *Physicians, professional Autonomy in the Welfare State: Endangered or preserved. A Comparative Analysis*
Konstanz.

- *Fargion, V. *Power Distribution in Ital. National Health Service: Center vs. Periphery Politicians vs. technicians*
Università di Bologna.
- *Ferrera, M. *Politics of Health Reform: Establishment of Ital. National Health Service in a comparative perspective*
Università L. Bocconi. Milano.
- Freddi, G. --
Università di Bologna.
- *Granaglia, E. *Medical Personnel Policies in Italy: Problems and Perspectives*
Università L. Bocconi. Milano.
- *Harrison, S. *Medical Power in Nationalized & Free Market Health Systems: Medical Autonomy in UK and USA*
University of Leeds.
- Hollingsworth, R. *Structure and Performance in the British and the American Medical Delivery Systems*
University of Wisconsin.
- *Johansen, L. N. *The Politics of Hospital Productivity*
Danmarks Forvalt Ningshoysskole. Copenhagen.
- *Kettunen, P. *Legal Guidelines in the Development of the Finnish Hospital System*
University of Turku.
- *Lane, J. E. *Local Government Health Policy and the State*
University of Umea.
- Made, J. van & Mur-Veeman, J. *New Patterns of Decisional Power Concerning Delivery of Rijksuniversiteit. Maastricht.*
- *Mur-Veeman, J. & Made, J. van *New Patterns of Decisional Power Concerning Delivery of Medical Services in the Netherlands*
Rijksuniversiteit. Maastricht.

- *Ronning, R. *The Welfare State as a private-public Mix*
Oppland Regional College. Lillehammer.
- Santos Lucas, J. *Primary Health Care Policies in Portugal*
Escola Nacional Saude Publica. Lisboa.
- *Schulz, R. *Medical Power in Nationalized & Free Market Health Systems:
Medical Autonomy in UK and USA*
University of Wisconsin.
- *Scrivens, E. *The Politics of Information in the British National Health Service*
University of Bath.
- *Steffen, M. *Les politiques alternatives dans le domaine de la santé*
Université Sciences Sociales. Grenoble.
- *Williams, A. *Keep Politics out of Health*
University of York.

8. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

- *Bochel, J. *Candidate Selection: an Analytical Framework*
University of Dundee.
- *Denver, D. *Trade Unions and the Selection of Candidates in the British
Labour Party*
University of Lancaster.
- *Gallagher, M. *The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates in Ireland*
University of Dublin.
- *Katz, R. *Nominations in System with Intraparty Preference Voting: Strategic
Considerations*
John Hopkins University. Baltimore.
- *Koole, R. *Candidate Selection in The Netherlands*
Rijksuniversiteit. Groningen.

- *Leijenaar, M. *Recruitment Patterns of Women Politicians in the Netherlands*
University of Leiden.
- *Marsh, M. *Nominating Unattractive Candidates*
Trinity College. Dublin.
- Matthews, D. R. *Candidate Selection in the USA*
University of Washington. Seattle.
- *Sainsbury, D. *Women's Routes to National Legislatures: A Comparison of Eligibility & Nominat. in the US, UK & Sweden*
University of Stockholm.
- *Shiratori, R. *Candidate Selection in Japan: Localism, Factionalism and Personalism*
University of Essex
- *Thiebault, J. L. *The Selection of French Parliamentary Candidates*
Université de Lille II.
- *Valen, H. *Nominations at National Elections in Norwegian Parties*
Institute Social Research. Oslo.
- *Winter, L. de *Candidate Selection in Belgium*
European University Institute. Firenze.

9. Voluntary Associations in the Democratic System

- Garrigou, A. *Conjonctures sociales et conjonctures associatives*
Inst. Etudes Politiques. Bordeaux.
- *Gaxie, D. & Offerle, M. *Militantisme associatif et carrière politique en France*
Université de Paris.
- *Gerrichhauzer, L. & Gissen, M. *The Political Role of the Dutch Non-profit Housing Association*
University of Rotterdam.

10. Policy Effects Theories, Methods and Applications

- Allison, L. *The Assessment of Land Use Policies and their Implementation*
University of Warwick.
- Gerlich, P. *Theories of Legislation in Austria*
Institut für Politikwissenschaft. Wien.
- Hakovirta, H. *Policy of Neutrality and Its Effects*
University of Tampere.
- Hellstern, G.-M. *Linking Evaluations to the Constitution*
Freie Universität. Berlin.
- Honigh, M. *Comparative Policy Evaluation: Theory and Practice*
Technische Hogeschool Twente. Enschede.
- Hoogerwerf, A. *Policy Theory and Policy Evaluation*
Technische Hogeschool Twente. Enschede.
- Jenkins, B. *Policy Evaluation in British Government: the Search of Efficiency*
University of Kent.
- Massey, A. *The Joint European Forum: Professional Effect on a European Policy*
University of Salford.
- Rose, L.E. *Assessing Policy Effects in a Program of Experimental Community Development*
University of Oslo.
- Sundborn, L. *Does Political Matter? or the Matter of Politics*
University of Stockholm.
- Vedung, E. *The Implementation Chain as a Tool in an Evaluation Research*
Freie Universität. Berlin.
- Wolters, M. *Law Chain Liability: Expected Utility Legislation*
Katholieke Universiteit. Nijmegen.

- *Giessen, M. van & Gerrichhauzer, L.
The Political Role of the Dutch non-profit Housing Associations
 Erasmus Universiteit. Rotterdam.
- *Gray, V.
The Advocacy Explosion: its Origins and Effects
 University of Oslo.
- Lacroix, B.
Conjonctures sociales et conjonctures associatives
 Inst. Etudes Politiques. Bordeaux.
- Lyne, T.
Voluntary Associations and Political Parties in Ireland
 National Inst. Higher Education. Limerick.
- Mouriaux, R.
*Le problème des contractuels dans la fonct. publiq. et l'émergence
 d'un mouvement associat. spécifique*
 Fondation Natle. Sciences Politiques. Paris.
- Offerle, M. & Gaxie, D.
Militantisme associatif et carrière politique en France
 Université de Paris.
- Outshoorn, J.
*Making an Issue: Interest Groupson the Abortion Issue in the Nether-
 lands*
 University of Stockholm.
- Pijnemburg, B.
*Volunt. Associat. in Belg.: Pillarization & Nature & the Role of
 Cathol. "soc. cultural" organiz. in Fland.*
 Erasmus Universiteit. Rotterdam.
- Siisiainen, M.
On Adequacy of the Theory of Sociological Theory of Pluralism
 University of Jyväskylä.
- Subileau, F.
Towards an Institutional Model of Competitive Party Behavior
 Fondation Natle. Sciences Politiques. Paris.
- Svasand, L.
*Problems in Linking Social Structure in Polit. Parties & Voluntary
 Associations: an Ecological Explor.*
 University of Bergen.

11. Styles of Economic Policy and Ways Out of Economic Crisis:

- Andersson, J. O. *Nordic Models Challenged*
Abo Akademi. Turku.
- Armingeon, K. *Is Economic Policy Economic Policy?*
University of Mannheim.
- Braun, D. *Econom. Strateg., Modes of Conflict Regulat. & Labour-Market
Polic. in the Neterlands during Crises 73-82*
University of Amsterdam.
- Czada, R. & Grande, E. *Convergence Lost? Policy Innovations & Interest Politics in Liberal
Democracies*
University of Konstanz.
- Dijk, T. van *Political Economic Profiles and Policy Performance in Capitalism*
University of Amsterdam.
- Esping Gosta, A. *Rise & Fall of Postwar Social Contract. Politics of Policy Regime
Change in Contempor. Economic Crises*
Harvard University. Cambridge.
- Hovi, J. *Political Reasons for Cross-National Variations in Unemployment
Rates*
University of Oslo.
- Keman, H. *Political Economic Profiles and Policy Performance in Capitalism*
European University Institute. Firenze.
- King, D. S. *The New Right and the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis*
University of Edinburgh.
- Kristensen, O. P. *Cross National Analysis of the Politics of Taxation Policies*
University of Aarhus.
- Laniado, R. N. *Economic Policy in the Crisis: the Brazillian Case*
University of Essex.

- Lehner, F. *The Political Economy of Distributive Conflict in the Welfare State*
University of Bochum.
- Othick, J. *Historical Origins of the contemporary World Crisis*
Queen's University. Belfast
- Paloheimo, H. *Causes of the Economic Crisis and the Diverging Policy Models*
University of Turku.
- Whiteley, P. F. *Monetarism in the U.S. and the U.K.*
University of Bristol.

12. The Soviet Union and the Third World: a Study of Strategies and Representations

- *Alibert, C. *Les interventions militaires sociétiques dans le Tiers monde*
Université de Lyon.
- *Clapham, C. *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa*
University of Lancaster.
- Domenach, J.-L. *L'URSS et l'Asie*
Paris.
- *Hout, W. *Soviet Imperialism in the Third World*
Erasmus Universiteit. Rotterdam.
- Laidi, Z. *L'URSS et l'Afrique*
CERI (FNSP). Paris.
- *Rupnik, J. *L'URSS et le Proche Orient*
CERI (FNSP). Paris.
- *Sliwinski, M. *"Hybris": Reflexion sur l'estrategie russe et soviétique en Asie Central*
Genève.

*Vaner, S. *L'URSS vue par l'Iran khomeiniste*
CERI (FNSP). Paris.

13. The 1984 Direct Elections to the European Parliament

- Bacot-Decriaud, M. & Plantin, M.
La 2ème. PE: approche sociologique et organisationnelle
Université de Lyon.
- Bardi, L.
MEPs & the Euro-elections
European University Institute. Firenze.
- Burgess, M.
European Union
Plymouth Polytechnic.
- *Devin, G. & Guyonnet, P. *L'Union des Partis Socialistes de la Communauté Européenne et les Elections Européennes de 1984*
Université de Paris X.
- Eijk, C. van der
Strategies for the Investigation of Nationalization or Europeanization in Voting for the EP
University of Amsterdam.
- Harrison, R.
The Media & Euro-elections
University of Lancaster.
- Loeb-Mayer, N.
European Electives: A Challenge for Incumbent Coalitions
Université Libre. Bruxelles.
- Millar, D. (Dir. General, DGV)
The Impact of the 1984 Euro-election on European Union
European Parliament. Luxembourg.
- Muller-Rommel, F.
Rainbow Groups: a New Fraction in the European Parliament
Hochschule Luneburg.

- Niemoller, K. *The Impact of Left-Right and Materialist-post-materialist Cleavages On Euro-election Voting*
University of Amsterdam.
- Paterson, W. *Euro-Elections and the GFR*
University of Warwick.
- Perry, G. *The British Labour Party: EEC Policy & the 1984 European Elections*
University of Hull.
- Pridham, G. *Routinisation of Euro-elections*
University of Bristol.
- Rabier, J.-R. (Spec. Counsellor)
Public Opinion & the Euro-Election
EC Commission. Bruxelles.
- Worre, T. *The Danish Euro-party System*
Espergaerde.

14. Centre-Periphery Structures and the Revival of Peripheral Nationalism in Western Democracies

- *Arbós, X. *Central vs. Peripheral Nationalism in Building Democracy. The Case of Spain*
Universitat de Barcelona.
- *Coakley, J. *Ethnic Resurgence in Europe*
National Instit. Higher Education.
- *Colomer, J. M. *Ideology of the Catalan Nacionalism*
Universitat Autònoma. Barcelona
- *Deruette, S. *La prise de conscience régionale wallonne à la faveur de la grève de l'hiver 1960-1961.*
Université Libre. Bruxelles.

- *Diaz, C. *Centre and Periphery as analytical Tools Useful in the resolution of Politico-territorial Problems*
Universidad Complutense. Madrid.
- *Guillourel, H. *Analyses des rapports centre-périphérie en France: Le cas du mouvement autonomiste breton*
Université de Paris X.
- Jaillardon, E. --
Université de Lyon II.
- *Keating, M. *Regional Movements and State Policy in France and Britain*
University of Strathclyde.
- *Knuessel, R. *Les réthoromanches*
Institut Sciences Politiques. Lausanne.
- *Lancaster, T. D. *Comparate Nationalism: the Basques of Spain and France*
Emory University. Atlanta.
- *Leresche, J.-P. *Centre-périphérie: Culture politique et conception de la démocratie. La Décentralisation en France*
Institut Sciences politiques. Lausanne.
- Liebert, U. *New Social Movements in Spain: the case of Andalucismo*
Università di Firenze.
- *Luther, R. *The Increasing Saliency of the Centre-Periphery Dimension in the Federal Republic of Austria*
Lancashire Polytechnic.
- *Macartney, A. *Special Characteristics of island Autonomism*
The Open University.
- *Melich, A. *Some Remarks on National Identity: an Example about Catalonia*
Université de Genève.
- Monreal, A. *Centre-periphery Relations in Spain after 1978 till now*
Universitat de Barcelona

- *Moxon-Browne, E. *Peripherality in the UK: The Case of Provisional Sinn Fein*
Queen's University. Belfast.
- Seiler, D. *Introduction, centre Periphery Structures*
Institut Sciences Politiques. Lausanne.
- Virós, R. *Some remarks on National Identity: an Example about Catalonia*
Universitat de Barcelona.

15. The EEC as an International Actor: Policy Process and International Impact

- Antola, E. *EC-EFTA Relations and the International Role of the EC*
University of Turku.
- Bradshaw, G. *The Role of the E.C. in the Falklands Crisis*
University of Hull.
- Brewin, C. *Limitations on the Potential Role of the E.C. as an International Actor*
University of Keele.
- Dieckhoff, A. *Political Cooperation in the E.E.C. towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict*
European University Institute. Firenze.
- Henig, S. *From External Relations to Foreign Policy: the E.C.'s Mediterranean Policy*
Lancashire Polytechnic.
- Holland, M. *The E.C. and the Republic of South Africa*
University of Canterbury.
- Jespersen, L. *Dimensions of the EC's effect on the International Position of Japan*
University of Aarhus.

- Kenis, P. & Schneider, V. *The EEC as an Internat. Corporat. Actor: Case Stud. of Chemicals control policy and multi fibre agreement*
European University Institute. Firenze.
- Keukeleire, S. *European Integration and America Security Commitments*
University of Hull.
- Moon, J. *The E.C. and IT Trade with Japan*
University of Strathclyde.
- *Pijpers, A. *The Development of EPC in the 1980s.*
University of Amsterdam.
- Schneider, V. & Kenis, P. *THE EEC as Internat. Coporat. Actor: Case Study of Chemicals Control Policy & Multo Fibre Agreements*
European University Institute. Firenze.
- Snellen, Th. M. *The Planning Process of the EEC and Its International Impact: the Case of Sugar Policy*
Katholieke Universiteit. Nijmegen.
- Tsakaloyannis, P. *Western Europe's Quest for Security: the Case of Western European Union*
European Inst. Public Administ. Maastricht.

16. Confidentiality, Privacy and Data Protection

- *Burkert, H. *Public Administration of Information Conflicts*
Gesellsch. Mathem. & Datenverarbeit. S. Agustin
- *Day, K. *Towards a Redefinition of Privacy*
University of Edinburgh.
- *Flaherty, D. *Role of Data Protect. Agencies in Limit. Government. Surveillance & Promoting Bureaucratic Accountability*
University of Western Ontario.

- *Holvast, J. *The Continuing Story of Privacy Protection in Holland*
University of Amsterdam.
- *Maisl, H. *Accès aux Docum. Administ., Informatique et Vie Privée: Quelques
Reflex. a partir de l'approch. Française*
Commiss. Natle. Informatique & Libertés. Paris.
- *Mellors, C. *Data Protection in Britan of Freedom of Information*
University of Bradford.
- Michel, J. *Legislating Transparence*
Central London Polytechnic.
- Nielsen, P. *Public & Private Data Protect. in Denmark: Informat. Preservat.
vs. Computer. Exterminat. of the History*
University of Odense.
- *O'Malley, L. *Personal Data Protection and the Right to Information in Ireland*
University College. Galway.
- Olaussen, T. G. *Social Science and the Issue of Privacy*
Norwegian Soc. Sc. Data Archives. Bergen.
- *Oyen, O. *Social Science and the Issue of Privacy in Norway*
University of Bergen.
- *Raab, Ch. *Confidentiality, privacy and Data Protection: Issues for Political
Scientists*
University of Edinburgh
- *Rengger, N. *The Public Interest Privacy and the Modern State*
University of Strathclyde.
- *Robertson, K. *Intelligence, Secrecy and Security in a Democratic Society*
University of Reading.
- *Tanenbaum, E. *The Use of Public Data for Private Purposes*
University of Essex.

17. Exploitation

- *Brewer, J. D. *The Theme of Exploitation in Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society*
Queen's University, Belfast.
- *Carver, T. *Marx's Political Theory of Exploitation*
University of Bristol.
- Cunliffe, J. *Neither Communism nor Capitalism*
Birmingham Polytechnic.
- *Fowler, J. P. *New Directions of J. Roemer*
University of Glasgow.
- *Goodin, R. E. *Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person*
University of Essex.
- *Jonasdottir, A. G. *Beyond Oppression. On exploitation in the Sex-Gender system*
University of Goteborg.
- *Mac Innes, J. *Commodity Status of Labour Theory and Theories of Exploitation*
University of Glasgow.
- *Miller, D. *Exploitation in Market*
Nuffield College, Oxford.
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MODERNIZATION, CHANGING CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, AND THE RISE OF THE
GREEN PARTY IN GERMANY

Stein Rokkan Memorial Lecture, held at the ECPR Joint Sessions of
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Outline

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No await des d'essai
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Foreword

When I was asked to suggest a title for the Stein Rokkan Memorial Lecture I did not yet have a specific lecture in mind. I only knew that I wanted to find out to what extent Rokkan's work would be helpful in the analysis of new social movements and parties of the type of the German Greens. The title I chose, "Some reflections on new social movements in western democracies" seemed sufficiently broad to leave all options open. With the benefit of hindsight the lecture that finally developed could now more aptly be entitled "Modernization, changing cleavage structures, and the rise of the Green party in Germany".

I intend to use Rokkan's work as a springboard for the attempt to develop a conceptual framework which sets some topics for comparative research on new party formations. More specifically, I want to raise four issues. First, I want to briefly discuss whether we have reason to assume that the long freezing of the European party systems will now give way to a melting process. Second, I want to examine if we can detect new social cleavages which may underlie new party formations. In an empirical illustration, I then want to discuss this question with special reference to the German Greens. Finally, and very briefly, I want to make some remarks upon the socio-political settings which promote the transformation of a specific cleavage into party formations.

I am aware that this amounts to the maybe presumptuous attempt of a dwarf to jump on the shoulder of giants. Since a dwarf only manages to get up with the assistance of helping hands, I would like to mention that much of what I shall be saying could not have been developed without the long-standing intellectual exchange with Peter Flora who for me was not only the major transmitter of Rokkan's work, but also an instructor who showed how to build on it.

I Introduction: Freezing or melting of the Western European party systems?

In their famous article on Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments Lipset and Rokkan postulated a "freezing" of the Western European party systems since the 1920s. Their oft-cited freezing hypothesis is not only based on the empirical observation of remarkable continuity, but also rooted in the conceptual consideration that the narrowing of the support market brought about through the growth of mass parties and the high level of organizational mobilization of most sectors of the community "left very few openings for new movements" or new party alternatives (Lipset/Rokkan 1967:51).

On the other hand, Talcott Parsons - the author from whom Lipset and Rokkan derived their conceptual framework - seems to foretell profound changes in the politics of western societies. Departing from his famous A-G-I-L scheme, Parsons postulated three (and only three) revolutions in modern western history: the industrial revolution as the differentiation between the societal community and the economy, the democratic revolution signifying the differentiation between the societal community and the polity, and the educational revolution marking the differentiation between the societal community and the cultural subsystem (Parsons 1971). For Parsons this third rupture is just as deep reaching as the first two. It will give rise to new quests for solidarity, community, participation, and decentralization, and markets and bureaucracies as dominant forms of organization will increasingly be complemented by new forms of collegial associations, rooted in the rise of the professions. At least implicitly, it seems, Parsons foresees a melting rather than a freezing of western party systems.

Now we all know that something close to an educational revolution has taken place during the last decades. Since 1950 enrolment ratios in institutions of higher learning have quadrupled in Western European countries. From various political studies we also know that the Western European party systems are no longer marked by the traditional degree of persistence. Mogens Pedersen (1983) has shown that there is a widespread trend towards increasing electoral volatility. Maria Maguire's replication of the Rose/Urwin studies showed that since the 1960s parties register significant changes in electoral support, with old and leading parties being particularly susceptible to losses (Maguire 1983). Klaus von Beyme (1982) demonstrated that in the 1970s there has also been a trend towards increasing party fragmentation, as the number

of parties polling more than 2 percent of the vote has been growing. From single country studies, we also know that the political salience of the old cleavages seems to be diminishing. Thus, the major longitudinal study of German elections in the post-war period found that the combined explanatory power of the four traditional cleavages declined from almost half of the variance explained in 1953 to roughly one third in 1976 (Baker/Dalton/Hildebrandt 1981).

Does this mean that we have already entered a new stage of political development? The results of the empirical studies are somewhat equivocal. They allow the reader to find the extent of persistence just as remarkable as the amount of change. Neither volatility nor the number of parties increased throughout all Western European countries. Within single countries, social class and religion seem to remain the strongest single predictors of partisanship. Clearly, there is change and persistence. The binding force of the old cleavages has diminished but not disappeared.

In this situation it is somewhat premature, I think, if some scholars - maybe under the impression of the great success of Inglehart's book on the Silent Revolution (1977) - turn to individual life-styles and value preferences rather than structurally rooted interests in the search for social bases of political behaviour. "Values" are certainly important, but as a tool for macroanalysis the concept seems useful only, if values are conceived as stable orientations which may be linked to specific milieus in the social structure. Conceptually it is difficult to understand why a citizen's opinion about the urgency of certain items on the political agenda should be called his "value orientation". As Böltken's and Jagodzinski's (1983) longitudinal analysis of "materialistic" and "post-materialistic" outlooks in the 1970s has shown, these preferences fluctuate so rapidly among Western European publics that we should interpret the Inglehart index as a measure of political issue-attention cycles rather than as a measure of value priorities.

The question remains, how we should interpret the recent political changes. In the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan, and in the light of Parsons' arguments it appears fruitful to inquire whether we can detect new cleavages which might become foci of group formations, how such new cleavages interact with the old cleavages, and how the existing political institutions and party organizations channel the new demands. Then we should examine what new parties have actually been formed in recent years and inquire whether they can meaningfully be related to new cleavage structures. This is the task I now want to tackle. As a first step, I have prepared the conceptual framework shown in figure 1. It presents some speculations about the development of new cleavage lines together with a schematic summary of factors which seem likely to diminish the salience of the old cleavages.

II Modernization and the restructuration of cleavages

My attempt to specify potential new cleavages departs from the Lipset/Rokkan typology, but it interprets their approach in the light of the Weberian sociology of domination. Seen from this perspective, Lipset and Rokkan discuss cleavages in four analytical dimensions: (1) the realm of sector-specific (positively privileged) property classes (primary vs. secondary sector), (2) the dimension of acquisition classes (workers vs. employers), (3) the realm of the power struggle between the state and power contending associations (state vs. church), and (4) the dimension of authority relations between governing elites and the subject population (dominant vs. subject culture). In this adaption, the territorial axis of the Lipset/Rokkan scheme is understood as an institutional centre-periphery axis which captures the growing importance of the state and hence of authority relations focussing on issues of political control and legitimation.

The question then is if we can observe societal trends which create potentials for new cleavages in these dimensions. My conceptual scheme is an attempt to specify hypotheses in this respect, and to suggest topics for research on new group formations that we can actually observe.

Let me first turn to a discussion of property classes. All western nations have witnessed the twin process of an enormous growth of the welfare state and of the service sector. The bulk of the labour force is shifting from the production of goods to the production of services. Within the service sector, public employment in the fields of health and education records particularly heavy increases. In this process new kinds of property rights differentiate. The educational revolution and the increasing dependence of economic growth upon technological innovation make academic degrees a new form of educational capital which is usable for returns. With the growth of the public sector, the right to tenured office becomes another new form of property of some quantitative importance. The growth of the welfare state, finally, has created welfare entitlements as a third new type of property.

This differentiation of new property classes creates novel potentials for cleavage. Since civil servants and welfare beneficiaries are paid from state coffers, conflicts over the tax ratio between groups living from the private and the public sector appear likely. Demographic changes making for a growing number of pensioners probably exacerbate

these tensions. A second potential for tensions may arise from the growing employment in the service sector. Producing services rather than goods, and interacting with people rather than with machines, persons in the service sector may be less inclined towards formal rationality than persons socialized in the industrial sector. As they earn their incomes outside industry, they are afflicted by the negative effects of industrial production without participating in the positive effects of growth. Tensions between the new "educated service class" and the old "business class" therefore appear likely. The issue "economic growth vs. quality of life" will probably become the focus of such tensions.

As the overwhelming part of the labour force in western countries is by now working in dependent employment, the old class conflict between workers and employers will probably be complemented by cleavages between new acquisition classes within the dependent labour force. The growing importance of educational credentials as determinants of mobility chances make such a development likely in a double respect. First, the educational revolution tends to reverse the quantitative relationship between groups with lower and higher schooling. While in preceding decades those having only fulfilled the period of compulsory schooling represented the large majority of an age cohort, they now become a rapidly shrinking minority. This entails a high potential for the emergence of an unskilled underclass with severely limited possibilities in the labour market. In this situation conflicts over the opportunity structure and the degree and direction of public labour market controls appear likely. As the mobilization in third world countries and the extension of the European Communities will increase the inflow of competing unskilled migrant workers, the new underclass appears as a potential base for the revival of ethnic prejudice and right wing movements. The recent developments in France may already be an expression of these tendencies.

A second aspect of the educational revolution entails a potential for the formation of acquisition classes among those who possess degrees of higher learning. If vocational careers become more closely linked to educational credentials, intergenerational mobility replaces career mobility as the dominant channel of advancement. In this situation, changes of the occupational structure will largely be effected through the succession of generations. This implies a growing potential for a differentiation of life-chances between various age-cohorts and hence intergenerational cleavage.

While the growth of this potential seems inherent in the increasing importance of educational credentials and intergenerational mobility, its actualization will largely hinge upon phase-specific constellations of factors which structure mobility chances. In a constellation where the cohorts graduating from the universities meet with structurally blocked mobility chances, they become a negatively privileged acquisition class which is likely to voice an intergenerational cleavage. During the phase of heavy enrolment expansion, the chance to define the situation in these terms is even enhanced, as many students are recruited from strata living in social distance to institutions of higher learning, so that they enter the academic world with diffuse expectations that seem particularly prone to generate frustration. Since the growth of mass universities concentrates the student cohorts in a common setting, the organizational chances for an effective mobilization are high.

In several European countries this constellation seems to have been present in recent years. The enrolment revolution occurred among the large cohorts born during the baby-boom years, so that the absolute number of graduates mushroomed. At the same time the expansion of the service sector in general and the public sector in particular slowed down. The stock of positions in these fields is occupied by relatively young cohorts who will keep their posts for decades. In this situation the potential for a cleavage between established and non-established cohorts is high. Whereas those inside the system will defend the status quo, those not finding qualified openings in the labour market will press for more equality of opportunity, for the expansion of services, and for more participation. Being young, not integrated into a stable system of social control, and barred from the assumption of responsible positions, they may also be prone to cultivate an ethic of commitment rather than an ethic of responsibility in public affairs.

The educational revolution also affects the relationship between the state and associations. The growing output of academics swells the ranks of the professions. These groups are the traditional strongholds of liberal resistance against an increasing state penetration. They are highly cohesive, socially closed groups with high organizational capacity. Organized along collegial rather than hierarchic lines, they are alien to bureaucratic control and tend to resist public encroachments upon their autonomy. On the other hand, the advancements in medicine, biology, and physics confront the public much more immediately with the consequences of professional work than before, because they involve basic questions about human life and death. The array of problems ranges from genetic

manipulation, extra-corporal fertilization, and the selection of patients for life-saving organ transplantations to the utilization of nuclear energy. In this situation demands for a public regulation of professional work are likely to grow, especially since the upgrading of educational standards presumably enhances the attention for scientific issues among the public. A cleavage between the professionals' quest for autonomy and public pressures for control thus appears likely.

A second cleavage between the state and associations may centre around the role of the media. The growth of the mass media has given the journalists and owners of media strong legitimation and control functions which in some ways echo the traditional role of the hierocratic powers in western countries. This poses new problems for the relationship between the state and the press. Here, as in the case of the professions, the balance between associational autonomy and public responsibility will probably be at the heart of conflicts.

A potential for a new centre-periphery cleavage between governing elites and subject citizens builds up, because the past decades have been marked by an upsurge of both, state penetration and social mobilization. The "citizens" are such an inclusive category, however, that it seems much easier to specify issues of conflict than to locate specific social carriers of the antagonisms. Two foci of conflicts seem to be generic. First, the revolution in data processing makes for a cleavage between the planning interests of public bureaucracies and the citizens' interest in privacy. The question which groups articulate this conflict seems structurally underdetermined, however. A second potential for new cleavages arises from the growth of welfare state schemes. As an increasing number of persons live from politically regulated transfer payments, the contacts between state authorities and citizens multiply. Since the outlooks of bureaucracies and clients are inevitably at variance - the former deal with claims in a highly standardized, universalistic form as "cases", the latter see them as particularistic "personal requests" - the cleavage between bureaucracies and clients widens. This creates a certain potential for the formation of client organizations which seek to influence the budgetary process and to defend the claimants' interests against the bureaucracies. If internal differentiations within the group of clients are high, however, an individual settlement of grievances via the judicial process seems more likely than an effective collective mobilization, especially if we consider that there are no pre-structured channels of contact or communication among clients. Finally, a certain potential for territorially based defense movements against central interventions is probably kept alive, as the increasing state penetration

meets with increasing mobilization in the peripheries. The realization of this potential will probably remain sporadic, however, depending on specific issues such as the instalment of nuclear power plants.

Now, I am fully aware that all of this is speculation. The interesting part of the exercise, of course, is to see if and how movements and party organizations that we can actually observe fit into this framework. In this respect the scheme suggests topics for research, as it contains hypotheses about the likely social carriers and the issues of new movements. For illustrative purposes I want to apply the framework to an analysis of the German Greens. The question then is if the Greens can be interpreted as representatives of one of the cleavage structures that the scheme specifies.

Such an analysis is not merely an exercise in classification. It immediately relates to the broader theoretical approaches I have outlined at the beginning. From the perspective of the Parsonian theory on the three basic revolutions we would interpret the Greens as harbingers of a new phase of post-industrial politics which are here to stay. If this interpretation were correct we should expect to find the party supporters predominantly among those groups whose rise is a trend pattern linked to the educational revolution: the new educational class in the service sector, and the professions. The perspective of the freezing hypothesis, on the other hand, would suggest to interpret the Greens merely as a transitory appearance on the political scene. In this case we would expect the Green support to come predominantly from groups whose rise is rooted in a phase-specific constellation rather than long-term trends, such as the non-established age cohorts we specified in the lower left category of our scheme.

III An illustrative application of the conceptual scheme: the German Greens

Much of the German writing on the Greens defines them as a movement of the educated new middle class (cf Fogt/Uttitz 1984). At first sight, the results of empirical studies seem to conform with this picture. I have re-examined seven empirical studies carried out between 1980 and 1984 (Infas 1982, Bürklin 1984, Feist/Fröhlich/Krieger 1984, Fogt/Uttitz 1984, Schmidt 1984, Veen 1984, Infas-Krieger 1985). They all agree that between one third and one half of the Green followers have earned an educational degree qualifying for academic studies. This means that the upper educational strata are roughly three times overrepresented among the Greens. However, this does not yet indicate where to place the Greens in

our scheme. Are they the representatives of the new educated middle class concentrated in the public sector? Are they the sounding board of the professions? Or are they the vanguard of a new negatively privileged acquisition class with blocked mobility chances?

Unfortunately, the available studies do not present their findings in the analytical break-downs that our conceptual framework would suggest. Thus, they usually do not differentiate between private and public employment, or between traditional and professional categories among the self-employed. They also say very little about the propensity for Green voting in various social groups. However, they allow some conclusions about the categories which are most heavily represented among the followers of the Greens.

The central result is that the bulk of Green support comes from students and other groups outside the labour force. Roughly one third of the Green followers are students, almost another third are either unemployed or not economically active. Among these three non-active categories only students and unemployed persons are overrepresented; pensioners who account for a high proportion of voters for the other parties are heavily underrepresented (Fogt/Uttitz 1984, Schmidt 1984, Veen 1984). The proportion of white-collar employees and civil servants is about as high among Green voters as in the population. These groups are clearly overrepresented only among the followers of the liberal party. Self-employed categories are heavily underrepresented among Green voters (Veen 1984). Clearly, then, the Greens cannot be interpreted as the party of the educated new middle class of higher employees and civil servants or the professions.

But how do we account for the fact that Green voters are so frequently found to be in possession of higher educational degrees? The answer is: because they are young. All studies agree that the bulk of Green supporters is below 30 years, and that the propensity for Green voting diminishes with increasing age (Infas 1982, Bürklin 1984, Schmidt 1984, Veen 1984). This suggests to see the association between educational status and Green voting largely as a spurious one, explained by the enrolment revolution among the younger age cohorts. The only German study that examined the effect of education by controlling for age, concurs with this view (Bürklin 1984). While academics in general have a much higher propensity for Green voting than the population at large (35 vs. 16 percent), academics over 40 report Green preferences only marginally more frequently than all respondents (20 vs. 16 percent).

If we compute an index of educational voting following the logic of the Alford index of class voting, the difference between the groups with the lowest and the highest educational status shrinks from 33 percentage points in the age cohorts below 30 years to 20 points in the age group 30 to 39, and to 12 points among respondents over 40 (calculated from Bürklin 1984:88).

In terms of our conceptual scheme, these findings are best compatible with an interpretation that sees the Greens as the representation of highly trained age-cohorts with blocked mobility chances. A closer analysis of the political preferences of the unemployed fully sustains this view (Feist/Fröhlich/Krieger 1984, Infas-Krieger 1985). Among the unemployed the Greens are the second strongest party outrunning the christian democrats and falling short only of the SPD (Infas-Krieger 1985). This implies that in the absence of mass unemployment the Greens would probably not have been able to surpass the 5 percent threshold of German electoral law. Among unemployed academics Green voting is found seven times more frequently than in the population. In this group the Greens almost capture an absolute majority (47 percent), being four times stronger than the CDU and twice as strong as the SPD (Infas-Krieger 1985). The typical supporter of the Greens, we may conclude, is young, highly trained, and unemployed or not economically active. This makes the Greens appear as a party of frustrated academic plebeians rather than as an organization of the educated new leading strata of post-industrial societies.

This result has political and sociological implications. Politically, it makes a difference whether a party is advertised as the vanguard of future trends or as a representation of alienated academics on the dole. Sociologically, it means that we should interpret the Greens not as a harbinger of Parsonian evolutionary trends, but as the outgrowth of a maybe unique historical macro-constellation in which the heavy expansion of educational enrolment coincided with the demographic wave of the baby boom cohorts, and with fiscal problems of the state which curbed the expansion of the tertiary sector.

If this interpretation is correct, we would also expect that the issues the Greens advocate conform to the classification. Movements of ascendant, but socially blocked acquisition classes are traditionally found on the political left rather than on the political right. They usually stress issues of equality, of membership, participation and improved opportunities. If we follow Max Weber's analysis of the ideological orientation of groups

living in distance to the routine of everyday economic life, non-economically active groups in precarious circumstances may also be prone to adhere to a rationality of values rather than a rationality of means and to cultivate an ethic of commitment rather than an ethic of responsibility (Weber 1956).

The empirical findings of the German studies are compatible with these assumptions. Clearly the Greens are a party of the new left rather than the new right. On a ten point left-right scale, the average Green supporter ranks himself one point left to the average SPD supporter (Fogt/Uttitz 1984:222). Nearly one third (29 percent) of the Greens rank themselves as leftist, as compared to merely 17 percent of the SPD followers (Schmidt 1984:5).

The issues that the supporters and candidates of the Greens advocate, centre around two basic themes: equality of opportunity and quality of life. When asked about the most urgent problems on the political agenda, Green followers name economic issues much less frequently than other respondents. For the Greens, only job protection is an economic issue with high priority which falls short, however, of environmental protection and peace politics (Veen 1984:11). A survey among Green candidates found that they give utmost importance to the following six problems: environmental and energy issues, freedom of opinion and political participation, improvement of the educational system and promotion of young people (Bürklin 1984:155). An analysis of the political priorities of voters found related topics to be most characteristic of a "new politics" orientation which Green supporters favour, namely improved educational opportunities, extended political participation, freedom of opinion, and combat against unemployment (Bürklin 1984: 143). In an analysis of value priorities five political values were perceived as insufficiently realized by a great majority of Green supporters: social justice, equality of opportunity, women's rights, equality before the law, and political participation. None of these values was considered neglected by a majority of all respondents in the sample (Veen 1984: 9).

In summary, the empirical findings seem to justify our classification of the Greens as a representation of age cohorts which form a negatively privileged acquisition class. They draw their support overproportionately from non-established groups, and they advocate better opportunities for access to social and political positions. They also stress quality of life issues, however, which according to the logic of our scheme

should also be strong among established groups in the service sector. While the interests of these two (established and non-established) categories thus clash in the labour market, they seem to coincide in the commodity market. As I suggested before, the non-established groups seem prone to pursue quality of life issues because of their general distance to the routine of economic life, the established groups in the service sector may follow this track because of their social distance to industry which produces visible negative effects without being their source of remuneration. Given these partially clashing and partially overlapping interests of established and non-established groups, an aggregation of their interests under the roof of a common political party cannot be precluded.

If I am right in assuming that the potential for a cleavage between age cohorts with discrepant mobility chances hinges upon a phase-specific constellation, the crucial question with respect to the stability of party systems is under what conditions the existing parties cannot aggregate the new demands. As Giovanni Sartori keeps telling us, once a party has achieved a certain organizational consolidation, it becomes a potent agent of mobilization which not only reflects social conditions, but actively shapes them (cf Sartori 1969). The decisive question then is, under what conditions a phase-specific cleavage becomes transformed into viable party formations.

IV Institutional and organizational contexts shaping the formation of new left parties

In the tradition of the Lipset/Rokkan approach, an attempt to answer this question should follow a double strategy. First, we should try to develop a typology of the alternatives of coalition building, second we should examine, how the institutionalization of the old cleavages creates macrosettings which either promote or impede the transformation of new cleavages into parties. The first strategy is certainly tempting, but it may be less fruitful than the second. To a large extent, the formation of coalitions is structurally underdetermined. In Imperial Germany, even the coalition between landed and industrial interests which the Lipset/Rokkan typology seems to foreclose, materialized. Therefore, I only want to hint at this possibility, but not pursue it any further.

The second approach seems particularly helpful for an understanding of national variations in the emergence of new parties. The question, of course, is why the Greens are so strong in Germany. One hypothesis following from Stein Rokkan's work seems obvious, if not trivial: The lower the institutional thresholds of representation, the higher the chances that new parties will be formed. However, we can go a bit further than this. Since we understand the Greens as a variety of new left parties, the salience of the old class cleavage should be one of the crucial factors structuring their chances. The more intense this old conflict is, and the higher the degree of mobilization it generates, the less chances for a new left organizational mobilization will probably exist. The same reasoning may be applied to the political arena. Where the major left parties pursue a strategy of conflict rather than of cooperation, forcefully voicing leftist demands for equality of opportunity, participation, and control of the business sector, the space remaining available for the formation of new left protest parties is probably small. Finally, the chances of the old left parties to channel radical demands appear higher when they are on the opposition bench than when they are forced to compromise as governing parties.

Figure 2

Figure 2 attempts to combine these hypotheses in a typology of settings which condition the chances for the emergence of new left parties. The salience of the old class conflict is measured by the frequency of strikes, the degree of political conflict or compromise between "left" and "right" parties is indicated by the length of joint coalitions, the position in government refers to the second half of the 1970s when the increased output of academics combined with structurally blocked mobility chances. The potential for new left parties representing non-established age cohorts with educational degrees appears highest in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, lowest in Italy and France.

A test of this hypothesis is clearly beyond the scope of this presentation. It would not only imply to present comparative data on the strength of new left protest parties, but also the much more laborious task to develop empirical measures of cohort-specific mobility chances which the typology had to assume as constant throughout all Western European nations.

V Summary

Figure 3

Figure 3, the last figure I want to present, summarizes the argument of the lecture in a schematic form. I have argued that the educational mobilization and state penetration constitute two central processes of modernization which re-structure societal cleavages. I have then suggested a conceptual framework for the empirical study of new cleavages. One of the new cleavage potentials hinges upon phase-specific constellations which structure the mobility chances of age cohorts graduating from institutions of higher learning. In a situation of structurally blocked mobility chances these age cohorts will constitute a negatively privileged acquisition class with a high potential for political mobilization. The organizational transformation of this potential is filtered by socio-political macrosettings which may favour or impede the formation of new parties. If new cleavages are translated into new party organizations they may remain politically relevant, even if the constellation that made for their rise no longer prevails, because parties with a certain organizational consolidation become independent agents of mobilization.

The basic message, however, is that it is useful to build on Stein Rokkan's work. I think that the ECPR would provide an ideal context to pursue some of the suggestions I have made in a more systematic and comparative form.

FIGURE 1: MODERNIZATION AND CHANGING CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES





FIGURE 2: TYPOLOGY OF SETTINGS SHAPING THE FORMATION OF NEW LEFT PARTIES

SALIENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT (Strikes)	Low				High			
	SZ, AU, GE, NE, SW, DA, NO				BE, IR, FI, UK, FR, IT			
DEGREE OF CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS POLITICS BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT (Coalitions)	Consensus		Conflict		Consensus		Conflict	
	SZ, AU, GE, NE		SW, DA, NO		BE, (IR)		IT, FR, UK, FI	
POSITION OF LEFT PARTY IN MOBILIZATION PHASE	Govern.	Oppos.	Govern.	Oppos.	Govern.	Oppos.	Govern.	Oppos.
	GE, AU, SZ	NE	DA, NO	SW	(BE)	(IR)	UK, FI	FR, IT

FIGURE 3: SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT



ECPR

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How Party Government Works: A Working Report on the Distribution of Ministries between Parties in West European Coalitions 1945-80.

Ian Budge

Summary

The paper first summarizes a general theory of Democratic Party Government, which has been presented elsewhere (Budge 1984 a). This turns traditional approaches on their head by postulating that policy maximization rather than office seeking is the major determinant of party behaviour in government. This would render conceptions like the minimum winning coalition and power indices based upon it irrelevant. The paper presents provisional findings which seem to indicate, in line with policy - pursuing assumptions, that certain parties regularly seek certain ministries. This means that strict proportionality assumptions (ministries represent the same value to all parties and share of ministries = share of legislative seats within coalition) may be in need of revision. The impressive observed relationship between share of seats and share of ministries (Browne and Franklin 1972) can be squared with the present findings by postulating a multi-stage rather than one-stage allocation of ministries.

1. Empirical and Normative Democratic Theory

Elections are central to democratic procedures because they are in some sense controlling - they ensure that electoral demands and preferences are made manifest and promises given to convert them into government policy. Parties are crucial to the transmission process - not only do they ensure that electoral preferences have concrete expression in their programmes (for an empirical check see Budge and Farlie, 1977, p. 434-437), but they use the programme as a basis for their actions in government (Rallings, 1986, in Budge, Robertson and Heath 1986).

It has been argued that even selfish leaders with no concern beyond office would ensure the responsiveness and reliability of government (Downs, 1957, p. 120-155). Parties with a strong desire to carry policies through should be even more effective in implementing them. Therefore the present theory provides strong descriptive underpinnings for the normative theory of democracy,

if it fits with the evidence. After describing the theory, the paper presents some provisional findings which seem to uphold it.

2. Office-Seeking versus Policy-pursuit

General theoretical explanations of how parties behave in government, and attempts to check these, have generally concentrated on the formation of coalition governments. Within this restrictive focus they have also used a restrictive assumption: that parties' only concern is the maximization of spoils from office. This has given rise to specific predictions of the formation of Minimum Winning Coalitions in terms of numbers of parties or seats (Riker, 1962) and strict proportionality between share of seats and shares of ministries between parties (Gamon, 1961). The latter has impressive support (Browne and Franklin, 1972) but the former does not fit the available evidence on coalition formation (see e.g. Herman and Pope, 1973).

To save it, a further argument was introduced, that policy-distances between parties in a coalition were important - but only in terms of the existence of tensions between parties, costs of negotiating differences, crises etc.. In other words, policy concerns were viewed in narrowly economic terms and strictly subordinated to the concern for office. Notions such as the Minimum Connected Winning Coalition (Axehrod, 1970) or reduction of policy differences in other ways do better than simple Minimum Winning notions but still fit only about a third of the cases (Taylor and Laver, 1973) although their success varies in different countries (Schofield, 1986). There is also some evidence that governments formed according to these criteria last longer than others which do not conform, though again this may vary with country (Dodd, 1976).

Where there is no basis for estimating trade-off functions between policies and offices, one has to be subordinated to the other in a lexicographic fashion - i.e. it is only after the primary need for one has been satisfied that the other will be taken into consideration as a factor in party decisions. In all the models mentioned above, office is primary: thus policy considerations only come into play within a Minimum Winning Coalition. Policy is not considered to form a basis on which a group of like minded parties could form a surplus majority government for example - one with more members than a minimum winning coalition - or a minority government (with less members) on the basis of ad hoc policy coalitions with outside parties. Yet both occur all the time.

Research is currently going on to establish trade-offs between policy and office (Manifesto Research Group of the ECPR)

on the basis of the relationship between party electoral programmes and government programmes. This research will be long and complex however; and may well not provide a basis for a general theory owing to great divergences between parties and countries.

For purposes of comparative theory, in the meantime, it seems more plausible to assume a primacy of policy over office than of office over policy (and it is at the very least interesting to do so to see how far the revised assumption gets us). It may be in fact that it would be modified only slightly by future empirical results on trade-offs, for two reasons:

a) it is easy to construct counter-examples to office pursuing postulates showing that utility from office declines radically the more one sacrifices policy goals (Budge and Farlie, 1977, p. 158-161).

b) once one accepts that policy has any importance at all, it is clear that it must influence the choice of ministries made by a party in government. If policy-implementation has a relevance (and we know it has) ministries cannot logically be regarded as exactly equivalent offices. Therefore policy considerations will predominate even in the distribution of ministries, certainly important ones.

This last assertion has so far found only dubious support in aggregate comparative research (Browne and Franklin, 1973: Browne and Feste 1975). The country-by-country analysis reported below (Section 5) does on the other hand provide quite strong support. Before coming to this however we ought to consider the theoretical framework within which it was carried out.

3. A Comprehensive Theory of Party Behaviour in Democratic Government

The theory is summarised in the form of verbal propositions in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 gives the general assumptions from which the more specific criteria and predictions in Tables 2 and 3 derive. These Assumptions posit that policy is the main concern of parties: Ass 3 specifies what the policies are, allowing for environmental changes which alter priorities. Ass 1 and 2 reject the Minimal Winning Hypothesis, underlining the obvious fact that government survival depends on ability to attract a sufficient plurality of legislative votes rather than controlling a magic number of seats. Ass 5 extends policy-based reasoning to factions within the party. The others are more specific and operational in nature.

The hierarchical criteria for Government formation in Table 2 are also fairly self-explanatory. They cover all cases of government - formation - single - party as well as coalitions, in line with the general intention of the theory to be as comprehensive as possible. In nature they are lexicographic - thus only if a preceding criteria does not apply will the next be called into play. Thus they are also mutually exclusive. A test on cases of government formation in 21 democracies from 1945 - 1978 showed that the criteria successfully postdicted 78 per cent of the actual governments formed, and successfully excluded, in most cases, alternative governments not formed (Budge and Herman, 1978).

Table 3 presents implications on why parties might choose to support a government from outside and the distribution of Ministries (both topics linked to decisions about formation) - but also on other aspects of the life of governments such as internal reshuffles and policy-making. Finally, they also deal with the death of governments - an aspect which has been emphasised increasingly in recent work (Browne and Dreijmans (eds), 1981).

The reasoning in Section 4 of the Table (turnover of personell, or reshuffles) rests on the central idea that the Prime Minister is himself a member of a party or faction with policy-interests divergant from those of other parties or factions. Where he has the power (s)he will move other ministers when opportunities arise to promote his ends. Constraints arise however where other parties in coalition can end the government if their policies are adversely affected. Therefore we should expect reshuffles to be much more frequent in single-party than coalition-governments. We should also expect more reshuffles where external bodies (e.g. the French or Finnish Presidency) had also considerable executive power, reducing that of the Prime Minister.

These hypotheses were confirmed for 21 post war democracies in a paper presented to the Coalition Workshop at the 1984 (Salzburg) Joint Sessions of the ECPR (Budge 1984 b). Of course, the Prime Ministers' concern to use his power might derive from office-based rather than policy-pursuing ends. However these hypotheses are derived in the present context from explicitly policy-based grounds and their confirmation strengthens the previous validation of the hypothees on government-formation.

This paper is explicitly concerned with implications for the distribution of ministries - Section 2 of the Table. The

essential reasoning is that parties, being concerned with advancing policies, see implementation as almost or equally important to their realization as their general formulation in Cabinets or Government committees. They therefore aim to get Ministries within their particular areas of policy concern 2(iii) - or of course the generally influential Premiership, if they can, on the grounds of making the largest overall contribution to the coalition (2i). On the same reasoning all important parties will get at least one of the central co-ordinating ministries (2ii).

There is however a particular problem in postulating specific party ministry links, deriving from the fact that they vary between different countries. So far as ministries are concerned, this does not matter much - if a particular type does not exist in a country it is not an object of competition; and in any case their representation is fairly stable cross-nationally. Where a given type of party does not exist in a particular country however this creates more problems. Its policy-concerns and potential client-groups are still likely to be present and to have been taken over by some cognate party. Thus the absence of a particular type of party does not imply that its target ministries go into a general pool, but rather that related parties will add them to their shopping list. This is the point of Implication (2iiii). It is in failing to allow for the possibility of some parties substituting for others that the pioneering study by Browne and Feste (1975) found relatively weak links between party ideology and choice of particular ministries. Analysis of variance between types of party and types of ministry, aggregated across a number of countries, not unnaturally undervalues such relationships because, for example, the Agriculture Ministry cannot go to the Agrarian party where the latter does not exist. But it may go to a 'successor' party in a perfectly comprehensible way. We need therefore to conduct the analysis on a country-by-country basis, and to specify in each context exactly what party succeeds another.

To save space the specification of such relationships will be discussed with regard to each specific hypothesis presented in Section 5 below. This does not imply that the linkages of parties to ministries are a posteriori or ad hoc: the hypotheses in fact were formulated before any data-processing was done and formed the indispensable basis for constructing tables in the first place. Their confirmation thus gains from whatever additional weight the subsequent validation of an a priori hypothesis entails.

Two additional Implications which have not yet been tested but which equally follow from our assumptions are presented in the Table. Firstly, given the predominance of system-related concerns whenever they come into play (Table 1 Ass 3) it is logical that parties will be least concerned to get their particular policy goals implemented when the system is threatened and the coalition partners share a common over-riding goal. Such a common intent will also be present in a Bourgeois or Socialist coalition formed at a time of tension between the blocs.

As we have noted (Table 2 Criteria ii b and iv b) small parties may be included as a convenience in governments where their presence is not absolutely necessary to survival. In these particular situations they may be expected to get one Ministry of particular concern but no more. Given that such parties are often single issue parties such a solution seems attractive from their point of view and convenient for the larger partner.

4) Data on the Distribution of Ministeries

These implications are in a sense glosses on the main argument, which is that parties systematically seek certain ministries linked to their main policy-concerns. This is a hypothesis of course about what happens in coalition governments - in single party governments the problem of distribution between parties does not exist. In this paper (which is it must be stressed an interim report presenting work in progress and not yet finished) we concentrate on the 12 West European countries with reasonably frequent experience of coalitions governments, with the notable exception of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics for which data is still being processed.

The names of ministries distributed vary in minor particulars between countries and for the analysis we have lightly standardised descriptions. This is not a major problem as the terminology does not vary very much, but it may explain why a country specialist does not find the exact title of a particular ministry given in the discussion.

A more substantial point about the treatment of ministries is that analysis concentrated on 13 standard and centrally important ministries rather than all Cabinet ministries for each country. This selection is necessitated by the need to have a standardised basis of comparison for the tables, the tendencies in which would be confused by inclusion of varying numbers of minor posts. Of

course later analyses of the proportionality of Cabinet posts and legislative seats will be extended to all Cabinet positions.

There is not the same difficulty with parties, which are more limited in number - certainly as regards those participating in government. Parties also fall into well defined families, pretty well covered by Left Socialist, Communist, Social Democrats, Agrarian, Liberal, Conservative, Religious and Regionalist/Nationalist.

A last operational point concerns the definition of a 'government'. This is defined here in standard terms as an administration formed after a general election and continuing in the absence of:

- a) change in prime minister
- b) change in the party composition of the cabinet
- c) resignation in an inter-election period followed by reformation of the government with the same prime minister and party composition (Hurwitz, 1971: Sanders and Herman, 1977)

Although there are other definitions (leaving out a) and c) for example (Dodd, 1976)) we do in daily practice tend to think of such events as delimiting governments and it brings our theories closer to practice when we use the commonsense definition.

Coming now to the actual data, it extends from 1945 - 1980 as presently constituted and is based on characterizations of ministries assigned to parties, mainly from Keesing's Contemporary Archives, supplemented by other cross national sources like the Times and New York Times Indices. Each assignment has been individually characterized and then aggregated by country before being finally aggregated in the presentation below. The discussion is centered round the aggregate results but refers back to the results of country analyses when this is appropriate.

5) Analysis of the Distribution of Ministries in 12 West European Democracies 1945-81

As noted above, the data analysis is explicitly designed to test the operational hypothesis deriving from the Assumptions and Implications discussed above. A certain attention must therefore be given to clarifying and justifying the hypothesis, as well as

reporting results of the analysis. Discussion is therefore organized under each hypothesis and proceeds from an introduction and presentation of each to an assessment of the relevant data.

a) The largest party takes the Premiership.

This has already been discussed in Section 3. Parties will be anxious to have the Premiership because of its general influence over discussions and implementation of policy, and there are no clear grounds of assignment other than size. This is of course another case where office-seeking and policy-pursuing assumptions support the same expectation. However, later hypotheses are exclusively based on policy grounds and within this context a confirmation of the hypothesis tends to strengthen the general argument.

Over all coalitions in the 12 countries the largest party does take the Premiership in 80% of the cases (133 out of 166) (Supporting previous results of Browne and Feste 1975). The only country where results go strikingly against the hypothesis is Finland, where the largest party takes this office in only 13 out of 27 cases, followed by Norway with two against two. This perhaps results from the partners being fairly equal in these cases and the numerical criterion therefore not being as overwhelmingly obvious as elsewhere. It is striking that where coalitions are formed with predominant parties, these almost inevitably take the Premiership (even in Denmark (7 cases out of 8) where the predominant party is weakest of those considered).

b) Major parties take at least one of the important Ministries (Premiership, Deputy Premiership, Foreign Affairs, Economics or Interior).

This expectation is clearly tied closely to the previous one. If a party is of reasonable size it can certainly expect to get a co-ordinating and generally influential Ministry, and wishes to do so for the wide influence over policy which these exist. However the notion is marginally refuted by the evidence (the postdiction fits only 46% of cases). There are interesting variations between countries, with Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden supporting the hypothesis while in both Germany and Finland the evidence goes strongly against. In the latter cases different reasons may be involved: in Germany because partners tended to be overshadowed by the predominant CDU-CSU, in Finland again because sheer numbers made it difficult to give all parties a central ministry.

Overall the hypothesis is only narrowly refuted - there are obviously some tendencies working in this direction. Therefore we ought to postpone a final evaluation until we see the results of other checks.

c) Agrarian Parties take the Ministry of Agriculture/Fisheries out of all cases of coalition governments where i) Agrarian parties participated in the coalition and ii) there was a Ministry of Agriculture.

This is the first hypothesis linking a Party to a Ministry on the grounds of a substantive policy interest. The connection is so obvious that it needs no justification (and again is a clear finding in the Browne - Feste analyses (1975)). However the hypothesis needs to be worded cautiously to cover only the cases where the Agrarian party had an opportunity to get the Ministry because it formed part of the coalition and such a Ministry existed. In fact post-war agrarian parties exist only in Scandinavia (with the exception of one small party in Ireland which disappeared in the fifties) and there the Ministries also exist. There is overwhelming confirmation - 47 cases out of the sub total of 49. Finland in this case completely conforms to expectations: it is only Norway which splits 2 - 2 on the point.

Perhaps more interesting is the extent to which heirs or pre-emptors of the appeal of Agrarian parties gain Agriculture. Christian parties are likely to be the nearest cognates of Agrarian parties because of their appeal to traditional values which are strongest among the rural population. For the same reason Conservative parties are likely to appeal to this group and consider their interests where there is no Agrarian or Christian party.

d) This reasoning leads to the first related hypothesis: Christian parties take Agriculture in coalitions where a) no Agrarian party exists b) a Christian party participated in the coalition c) there is a Ministry of Agriculture.

This receives almost as overwhelming support as the straight Agrarian - Agriculture linkage - of the order of 94%. There are no countries where the non-existence of Agrarian and Christian parties leaves Conservatives the heirs.

e) The other case where a party particularly interested in one policy area can assert its claims without encountering opposition from other parties with interests in the same area, is that of Religious Parties. A similar formulation can be made to that for agrarian parties. However although there are many religious parties in Western Europe the area lacks that type of Ministry.

It is clear from the Israeli case however (not included here) that this hypothesis is strongly upheld where both exist.

f) An area of conflict involving both Christian and anti-clerical parties is Education, where both want to have supervision of the Schools area (often involving State financing or control of religious schools). In practice, anti-clericalism in this form only exists in Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium of our sample, and the education question was largely settled by the end of the fifties. For these countries and for this period however there is a complete monopoly of the Education Ministry by these (opposing) parties. When they were in government on their own, without the participation of the opponent, this established a unique claim. When they were in government together control of the Education Ministry obviously passed in relatively unpredictable fashion between Christians and Anticlericals, depending on what trade-offs of other ministries of particular interest were involved. We examine links to these other type of ministry, below.

g) Socialist or Christian Parties take the Ministry of Labour or Social Affairs or Welfare or Health for all coalitions where a) Socialist or Christian parties participate in the coalition and b) there is a Ministry of Labour or Social Affairs or Health.

The wording of the hypothesis is very broad because there is a postulated conflict between the two types of party in the coalition which have a strong concern with social affairs. In cases where only one participates that will have a unique claim to Ministries in the area (or in the two areas, if we distinguish Welfare from Social Security). However, with such a number of Ministries involved out of the limited set of cabinet posts available, even in these cases it would be difficult for either Christians or Socialists to defend their claim to all the Ministries - especially given their other interests outside this field.

Additional complications enter when both are in Government together, when we can expect the distribution to vary with strength and local conditions in idiosyncratic ways. So the hypothesis has to be broad and assert essentially that these types of parties will always try to maintain an interest which will show up their success in gaining at least one of the relevant ministries. Analysis of particular ministries are given below and further research will investigate links for specific parties more closely.

Probably in part because of its inclusiveness the general hypothesis receives almost 100% support - 147 out of 148 cases conform. This is also true for the sub-hypotheses that the

Socialists or Christians take Labour (92 cases to 4, with only Norway an individual exception): and that one or other takes Social Welfare (110 to 2) and Health (58 cases to 7). It also emerges that more specific relationships hold in particular countries. In Belgium for example the Christian Socials only take Labour when Socialists do not participate in the coalition - perhaps ceding to the more strongly-held preferences of the Socialists in return for other Ministries of interest to them.

6. Conclusions: Proportionality and Policy based Shareouts

The obvious existence of such relationships in individual countries, supports the general thrust of the argument that parties have strong, policy based interests in particular Ministries. Even if country-specific relationships cannot be incorporated in general, cross-national hypotheses, they contribute to the assertion that as a result Ministries cannot be treated as undifferentiated coin. Having established the point through testing inevitably rather general comparative hypotheses, we will proceed in further research to consolidate it with a posteriori analyses, still working however within the general framework of the theory presented above.

Two points however remain for discussion. One is the relative failure of Hypothesis b) on larger parties taking at least one of the central co-ordinating Ministries. As this hypothesis has office-seeking as well as policy-pursuing antecedents its relative failure does not discredit the latter vis-a-vis the former. As outcomes here vary between countries and types of coalition, these will need more detailed examination before we can clearly specify implications for the leading arguments.

The final point to consider is the compatibility of specific party-ministry links with the thesis, resoundingly supported by general evidence (Browne and Franklin, 1972) that the proposition of ministries going to a party corresponds almost exactly to its contribution in seats to the coalition. The point will be checked with our data but seems very likely to be reconfirmed.

The proportionality thesis has been taken as supporting the following argument:

- i) Parties are office seekers
- ii) they therefore seek to maximize their share of offices in government
- iii) since all are seeking to do this the only rule that can be agreed is to relate the share of payoffs to contributions

- iv) hence we get strict proportionality between offices and seats implying, further:
- v) that all offices (ministries) are equivalent in value to all the parties - as if only concrete spoils of office are being considered.

It is to be noted however that proportionality could also be justified on policy - based grounds. Ministries are not only of interest for specific policy - implementation but also for their relative weight on general policy formation within the government. Maximization of the number of ministries held contributes to this as it adds to numbers of votes in cabinet.

So desires for maximization leading to a strict general rule of proportionality, derives from the attachment of parties to their policies just as much as desires for specific ministries. Combining the two gives to the policy-based theory distinctly different expectations about distribution compared to the office-seeking one. Instead of a simple one-stage shareout of equivalent offices, a multi stage process is postulated in which:

- a) parties assert claims to specific ministries of interest
- b) conflicts involved in claims to the same ministry are provisionally traded
- c) the resulting distribution is checked against the proportionality criterion and accepted when it fits.

Negotiations may go between these different levels several times, leading to adjustments in original claims and failure to gain some specific ministries of interest from the point of view of implementation. Distribution can be smoothed out with the aid of 'make-weight' ministries of no particular policy interest to any party, and perhaps concessions on larger co-ordinating ministries are easier to make (depending on internal decision procedures).

While the details of such bargaining may never be clear except at a specific country level, it does seem from the present results that specific policy based interests must be taken into account, even if they complicate the beautifully simplified world of office-seekers and purely materialist parties. Indeed it is probably better for the health of representative democracy if they do.

FOOTNOTES

1. This report is part of an ongoing project on Parties in Democratic Government, on which I am working with Hans Keman, of the University of Amsterdam. Some of the work reported was done with Valentine Herman. Lea Boralevi of the University of Florence not only collected the data but made many helpful suggestions about the theory. The work has been supported financially by the Nuffield Foundation and the European University Institute, Florence.

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TABLE I

General Assumptions of an Integrated Theory of Democratic Party Government

1. In parliamentary democracies the party or combination of parties which gains a majority on legislative votes of confidence forms the government.
2. Parties seek to form that government with a majority on legislative votes of confidence which will most effectively carry through their declared policy preferences under existing conditions.
3. (a) The chief preference of all democratic parties is to counter threats to the democratic system.
(b) Where no such threats exist, and Socialist-Bourgeois differences separate the parties over salient current issues, the preference of all parties is to carry through policies related to these differences.
(c) Where neither of the preceding conditions hold, parties pursue their own group-related preferences.
4. Normal governmental arrangements are most effective in getting policies carried through. Subject to their declared policies being advanced, therefore, parties seek to form governments with a party composition as close to the normal as possible.
5. Within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and disciplinary and procedural constraints, factions seek to transform their own policy preferences into Government policy most effectively.
6. With the exception of essentially caretaker administrations, Government ministers, including the Prime Minister, are members of parties; and within them, of factions.
7. Ministers are replaced if forced to resign from their particular post.

TABLE 2

Hierarchical Criteria for Government Formation

Implied by Assmptions 1-4 of Table 1

- Criterion i Where the democratic system is immediately
 theatened (externally or internally) all
 significant pro-system parties will join the
 government excluding anti-system parties.
- In the absence of immediate threats to democracy:
- Criterion ii(a) Any party with an absolute majority of
 legislative votes will form a single-party
 government;
- Criterion ii(b) except where such majorities are unusual,
 where it will form the dominant party of a
 government excluding anti-system parties.
- Where no party has a majority of votes and
 Socialist Bourgeois differences over current
 issues are salient:
- Criterion iii the tendance with the majority will form a
 government either including or with support
 from all numerically significant parties in
 the tendance (anti-system parties can only
 provide support and are excluded from
 participating in government).
- If no such Socialist-Bourgeois differences exist the
 party which:
- Criterion iv(a) is largest and has a near-majority of votes
 or
- Criterion iv(b) is manifestly larger than any other pro-system
 party will form the government alone in
 countries where single-party government is
 normal, or will form the dominant part of a
 government (excluding anti-system parties).

TABLE 2
(continued)

	<u>Where Socialist-Bourgeois differences are not salient and no single party has sufficient votes to meet Criteria ii or iv, coalitions with a plurality will be formed:</u>
Criterion v(a)	to group the parties most agreed on the specific issues currently salient;
Criterion v(b)	failing such agreement to minimise the numbers of parties in government to those which will provide a majority on legislative votes of confidence;
Criterion v(c)	in any case, to include the normal parties of government (if any) subject to v(a) and (b), and to exclude anti-system parties.

TABLE 3

or Implications of the General Assumptions of Table 1 for Other
Parties' Support of Government from Outside, for the distribution
of Ministries, for Policy-Making, and for Dissolution of
Governments

Support of Government rather than participation

A party regarded as anti-system cannot because of the
opposition of other parties participate in government, and
can only support and not join Governments which will
pursue some of its preferred policies (Assumptions 1-4).

Where threats to democracy are absent but Socialist-
Bourgeois differences are salient, anti-system parties
will support parties of their own tendance from outside
Government (Assumptions 1-3).

A party which cannot persuade others to form a Government
which will put into effect any of its characteristic
policies, will not join the Government which is formed,
but will vote for/abstain in favour of that Government if
it considers all practicable outcomes (including an
election) would further reduce the possibility of putting
its policies into effect (Assumptions 1-3).

Distribution of Government Ministries between parties in a
coalition

The largest party in a coalition will take the Premiership
(Assumptions 1, 2, 3(c)).

All major parties in a coalition will take at least one of
the centrally important ministries (Assumption 1, 2,
3(c)).

Subject to rough overall proportionality, each party will
seek control of Ministries in their own areas of policy
concern, e.g. Agrarian parties will seek the Ministries of
Agriculture and Fisheries; Labour and Christian parties
will seek Ministries of Social Affairs, Economic Affairs,
Labour Relations; etc. (Assumptions 2, 3(c)).

Where a particular type of party does not exist, the most
similar of the existing parties will seek ministries in
its area of policy concern (Assumptions 2, 3(c)).

These tendencies are least evident when governments are
formed to counter anti-democratic threats and less evident
when tendance governments are formed in a situation of
Socialist-Bourgeois hostility.

A small party in a Government which could be formed by a
large party on its own will not necessarily get a
proportinate share of Ministries.

Policies pursued by Governments

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§ 1-10

**OPEN VOTING IN PRUSSIA AND DENMARK,
OR: THE COMPLEXITY OF COMPARISON.
SOME POST-ROKKANIAN REFLECTIONS**

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Introduction

One of the themes which occupied the late Stein Rokkan in a number of his writings was the impact of institutional changes on political development, especially on the introduction of full-fledged democracy (e.g. Rokkan, 1970: 32).

This meant to Rokkan that both the development in a number of dimensions (in particular: extensions of suffrage, weighting of votes, and privatization of electoral preferences) and the sequencing of decisions crucial to political development were to be studied. It also meant that comparisons could not avoid becoming a central analytical tool - comparisons over time, between systems, within systems, and between subsystems across systems.

In the late fifties Stein Rokkan realized that the functions of various institutions, e.g. the safeguarding of the privacy of the electoral act, for political systems could be studied by way of comparison. His reading of some German authors in this period made him aware of the potential of comparing the Prussian system with the Reich (Rokkan, 1961) for studying some of the effects of open voting as well as the unequal weighting of votes. He and Henry Valen had already then (Rokkan and Valen, 1960: 114; reprinted 1983: 267) suggested that a three-cornered comparison of Denmark, Prussia, and the German Reich should be carried out because that would be of the "greatest interest in the functional analysis of electoral institutions". The idea was that it would be possible to contrast records of turnout and partisan choice before and after the introduction of secrecy in the electoral systems and by doing so one would be able to throw light on the functions of this institution in political life.

The intention of this paper is to discuss this proposal of Rokkan's in order to see what kinds of problems the would-be analyst would confront.

A central point for Rokkan was that the privatization of the voting act was an integral part of a democratic system. Most Western European countries had, however, made provisions for the secrecy of the vote before or - at least - at the same time as suffrage was extended to the lower classes, and therefore the importance and functioning of this institution could only be studied by looking at systems with open voting, i.e. the public declaration of one's electoral preferences. Denmark and Prussia both had open voting as well as a fairly extended suffrage, so it was obvious that they should be included as cases in the study of the passing from open to secret voting as a means to understanding the institution of secret voting (Rokkan, 1970: 32).

Elements in the Prussian Electoral System

Since the Prussian 1849-system for elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus is probably less well known than the two other systems, some of its central features will be described here. Helpful reference works are Vogel et al. (1971) and Ritter & Niehuss (1980). For Denmark, see in particular Elklit (1983) and Elklit & Mitchell (1983).

The Prussian system of 1849 was part of the reaction after 1848 when a progressive electoral law had been carried through (v. Gerlach, 1908; Vogel et al., 1971). The Prussian electoral law of 1848 was even more democratic than the Danish one of 1849, which is normally considered rather progressive - considering the time, of course.

The changes in the Prussian law of 1849 were mainly (1) that secret voting was abandoned and open voting was introduced, and (2) that voting was to take place according to which of three tax groups or classes the voter belonged. The system of indirect elections was not changed.

The election of electors took place in so-called Urwahlbezirke, i.e. small polling districts constructed in such a way that each of them had between 750 and 1,749 inhabitants. Normally this corresponded to 160-340 voters. Tax amounts in each polling district were then added up (the rules for this were not exactly the same throughout the period), and those voters who together paid the upper third of all taxes were then the first tax class, those who paid the second third were the second tax class, and those who paid the last third were the third and last tax class. In most cases, each of the three classes of voters in a polling district elected the same number of electors, one in the smaller districts, and two in the larger districts; thus the larger districts had 6 electors.

The income distribution was so skewed that on the average 3-4 per cent of the voters belonged to the first tax class, 10-12 per cent to the second, and 84-85 per cent to the third and last tax class. Due to an even more skewed income distribution in some parts of Prussia and in some of the polling districts it was not uncommon to find only one voter in the first tax class. He then appointed the elector (or even two electors in the larger districts). It also sometimes occurred that the second tax class comprised only one or two voters, so that he (or they) appointed one or two electors for that class. The third tax class counted all the remaining voters, in some cases n - 2 voters.

In all three classes the electoral decision system that of absolute majority, and if no such majority was found in the first round, a second ballot was held

Table 1. Number of Voters etc. in the Constituency of Flensburg at the Election of Electors 1903

		Administrative County of Urban Flensburg		Administrative County of Rural Flensburg			
Number of polling districts		33		34			
Total number of electors		195 ¹		163 ²			
		Abs.	Pct.	Voters Electors	Abs.	Pct.	Voters Electors
Voters in	1st tax class	251	3	4	378	4	7
	2nd tax class	862	9	13	1,017	11	18
	3rd tax class	8,479	88	130	7,857	85	148
Total number of voters		9,592	100	49	9,252	100	57

Source: Official election statistics.

- 1) This means that 31 or 32 of the 33 polling districts had the maximum of six electors.
- 2) This means that the average number of electors per district was 4.8. That figure implies that the number of districts with five electors (two in tax class 1, one in tax class 2, and two in tax class 3) was almost as high as the number of districts with four electors (two in tax class 2 and one in the other two tax classes). Therefore the distribution of electors in tax classes does not influence the voters:electors ratio.

rural Kreis. The town also had relatively more voters in the third tax classes because its income distribution was more skewed than was the case in the countryside. The percentage of voters in the third tax class of course varied from one polling district to another. Electoral participation in the tax classes is seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Turnout at the Election of Electors 1903 in Flensburg. Per Cent

		Administrative County of Urban Flensburg		Administrative County of Rural Flensburg	
Turnout in	1st tax class	69		45	
	2nd tax class	55		29	
	3rd tax class	32		11	
Total turnout		35		14	

Source: Official election statistics.

1903 also witnessed an election to the Reichstag, the national parliament. The Reichstag elections were direct elections in single member constituencies with an absolute majority system, i.e. maybe two ballots. The districting was not the same as for elections to the Prussian parliament, since the county (Kreis) of Åbenrå was added to the two Flensbourg counties to form Schleswig-Holstein's second Reichstag constituency. Turnout in this election was 71 per cent in the rural districts, 77 per cent in Flensbourg itself, and 80 per cent in the town of Åbenrå, i.e. much higher participation rates than we saw in Table 2 for the open, indirect and unequal election of electors. The Social Democrats now had as many as 5,743 votes (almost four times as many as recorded in Table 3), and 780 Danish votes were also recorded at this election - as compared to none at all in the election to the Abgeordnetenhaus.

These very different turnout rates and very different results for various parties and candidates makes it of paramount importance to ask if it is meaningful to compare the two kinds of elections. One of the points to consider is the many cases of non-congruent constituencies which call for much more complicated recalculations than the above example in order to have comparable units at the two levels.

Horst Nöcker of the Historical Commission of Berlin has, however, established a data bank for the two 1903 elections as far as Prussia is concerned. This data bank allows comparisons among almost identical units, i.e. he has reshaped the constituencies from the elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus to fit the Reichstag constituencies.

The difficulties met during such an undertaking are well-known and need not be repeated here. One has to accept this procedure and the inherent problems if systematical studies of the interplay of social and political structures at the two levels are on the agenda.

The Reichstag elections were - as mentioned above - direct elections in single member constituencies with an absolute majority system, i.e. maybe two ballots; they placed the voters in a situation where all the classical problems about participation, tactical voting, etc. had to be considered.

This, however, was almost nothing compared to the elections to the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus. Here, the voters - in each tax class and each little polling district - had to consider if they could have their preferred elector (or pair of electors) elected, but also - if they succeeded in that - if their chosen

It does not follow from this that national minorities of some strength or a high percentage of industrial workers led automatically to high turnout rates and heavy support for national minority parties or candidates of the Social Democratic Party, respectively. Many other factors were also influential - confessional, traditional, and others as well - creating both at elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus and to the Reichstag a much more complicated picture as far as participation and partisan choice were concerned (see for instance Rohe, 1981). For this reason it is difficult - to say the very least - to give a coherent and satisfactory picture of the central features of the Prussian and German electoral systems and electoral behaviour in this period.

The outline presented above of the Flensburg case in 1903 was mainly intended to show some general features of the system in a fairly typical constituency; this does not mean that it should be considered the representative Prussian constituency.

So far four analytical dimensions have been introduced, and they will be used in Table 4 below where the considerations presented are summarized schematically. The four dimensions are:

- Open versus secret voting;
- Indirect versus direct voting;
- low versus high degree of politicization of elections;
- unequal versus equal voting rights.

Only 6 of the 16 cells in Table 4 can be filled in. One thing that this table does show is that, due to the number of analytical dimensions, it is rather doubtful if these electoral systems can be compared directly. But if it is done, nevertheless, then the conclusion is straightforward: The combined effect on participation of the unequal voting right and the indirect way of election to the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus (and, related to this, also on partisan choice) was indeed considerable, especially when the degree of politicization was low. The combined effect of these two factors is so strong that the question of open versus secret voting loses some of the importance that it otherwise has. So one therefore has to ask if we can compare this Prussian electoral system with other electoral systems in any meaningful way - especially when the focus is mainly to look at open versus secret voting in order to throw light on the importance of electoral secrecy for political development.

This picture does not change if one takes all the three classes together: Going through Prussian electoral statistics makes it possible to conclude that less than 10 per cent of all constituencies had a turnout of more than 50 per cent when all three tax classes are taken together (as a weighted sum). Almost all constituencies with a turnout above the 50 per cent mark were Polish-dominated. Towards the end of the period, however, there is a tendency for this figure to increase.

By concentrating on the most politicized of the Prussian constituencies, the problem of comparability can be reduced. It was still open, unequal, and indirect elections which had high participation rates only if there were strong national minorities (i.e. in the main where such minorities were local majorities) or a strong working class movement, and as a consequence of such social structural factors a considerable social pressure which helped the voters to overcome the pressure against voting "anti-system" (Parkin, 1967; Himmelweit et al., 1981: 13, 113).

In order to get a better understanding of a constituency with high turnout in the election of electors, I have looked at the constituency of Haderslev (Schleswig-Holstein's first constituency for elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus). Normally, this constituency had the highest turnout of the constituencies in Northern Schleswig. Again the relevant data concern the 1903 election.

There probably is no need to go into details as far as polling districts, number of electors, tax classes, etc. are concerned. Table 5 shows the partisan division at the election of electors (EE) in 1903. The table also gives the results of the Reichstag elections (RE) 1902-07 as well as the 1908 election of electors in order to have a base line for comparisons. The German parties are placed together, in one group only; it should also be noted that the 1902 and 1906 elections were by-elections. All votes not explicitly registered as either Danish or Social Democratic are counted as German.

Table 5 shows a high turnout both in the rural and the urban parts of the constituency at all four elections to the Reichstag. It reveals a stable following for the Danish candidates at the same four elections to the Reichstag, and also shows a marked difference between the rural and urban parts of this constituency.

The costs - social as well as other - connected with voting for a Danish candidate at the election of electors were so considerable in Haderslev itself that they obviously kept many potential Danish voters back. This was probably also caused by the fact that everybody in the town knew that the Danish majority in the countryside eventually would ensure the election of the Danish candidate. The same picture is seen at the parallel elections in Åbenrå and Tønder, but not in Sønderborg.

Comparisons within the confines of individual constituencies illustrate that open voting per se probably had an influence of its own on turnout and/or partisan choice, even in constituencies with a high turnout. This makes it all the more important to combine analyses at the system level with analyses at lower levels to see if conclusions reached at higher levels also hold at the lower levels. This is especially important in a German context since regional and local variations make it difficult to reach conclusions which hold across time and space (see, e.g., Schultze, 1980: 83; Rohe, 1981).

If one agrees with Himmelweit and her associates (1981) and sees the voters' decision as dependent on three sets of factors - attitudinal, traditional, and social - then we have found that the social factors (together with politico-strategical considerations) were the most influential at the open election of electors in the three towns mentioned above. They made a considerable proportion of the Danish group abstain, who at Reichstag elections were influenced to vote for the Danish candidate by attitudinal and traditional factors.

In the context of this argument is it not decisive if one can tell how this pressure, this influence, was exerted on some voters. Sometimes the social pressure against voting Danish was exerted in a most subtle way - at other occasions it certainly was less subtle. It is well known from the literature and the press that Prussian civil servants tried to influence the Danish-identifying population in various ways because they themselves had been under pressure to have the following of the anti-system parties minimized as much as possible. And discussions in public - both in Berlin and locally all over Prussia - must have made it understood by even the most slow-witted that to vote otherwise than the way the State wanted involved certain risks. There is some reason to suppose that this pressure by far exceeded what was seen in Danish open elections in the same period.

they should vote was much stronger in Prussia than in Denmark. This means that the openness of elections was utilized much more directly and consciously in Prussia and that, consequently, the introduction of the secret vote would have much more significance in that system than in Denmark.

Even though the argument of this paper has been that a comparison of the three systems along the lines proposed by Rokkan is not advisable, then the initial problem still remains: What impact did the privatization of the electoral act - considered to be a major institutional change - have on political development?

An obvious thing to do would be to reduce the number of analytical dimensions trying in this way to address the problem of more variables than cases. But the number of cases would under all circumstances be too small, and the process would probably involve an oversimplification of matters which would limit the use of the results.

The only way out of this impasse seems to be a shift to another analytical level, i.e. from comparisons between systems to comparisons within systems. It should be possible to find enough comparable cases within each of the systems in question to solve the problems of control reasonably well (for an example, see Elkiit & Mitchell, 1983: 371).


It might then be that the overall pattern from the analysis within one system of change from open to secret voting, controlling for as many factors as considered necessary, would parallel results from the analyses of other systems, where one maybe would not find it necessary to control for exactly the same factors.

This mode of comparison - i.e. comparison across systems of within-system results and patterns - might be the only way to tackle the problem of comparing some rather important aspects of political development in Prussia, the German Reich, and Denmark, as Stein Rokkan urged us to do.

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Workshop on Models in the Comparative Study of Political
Systems (Directors: Frank Aarebrot & Jeremy Mitchell)

DEVELOPING A MODEL OF A SOVIET-TYPE POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

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CONCERNING MODELS OF ANALYSIS

Totalitarian, developing society, state-socialist, modern-
ising, apartheid state, degenerate workers' state, corporat-
ist, limited pluralist - these are some of the models of
analysis that have been, or are still being, applied to the
USSR and other Soviet-type political systems. As someone
who has found a certain utility in most of them, I should
perhaps admit to having always taken an eclectic approach to
the study of the Soviet Union. Yet the fact that no one
model has ever seemed to me (let alone to the Soviet studies
profession as a whole) to be entirely acceptable raises the
question as to whether or not a satisfactory model of analy-
sis of this type of political system is possible.

Part of the problem may consist in the very word 'model'.
It suggests drawing-boards, blueprints, technicians, precise
and unvarying laws of physics, mechanics and mathematical
formulae. A model is something in which there is an exact
relationship between parts. Given A and B, C will follow.
What is more, given A and B, C will follow every time.

Most social scientists would deny that they expect such
precision and predictability. Yet the interest in models of
analysis has increased in proportion to the social scientists'
desire to emulate the pure and applied scientists. Models,
we are told, must be 'explanatory'; the 'methodology' must
be 'rigorous'; 'results' must be 'verifiable' . . . and so
the scientific ('scientific'?) terminology goes on.

Another feature of the scientific approach to the study

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somewhat, were linked with 'progressive' social and political change (Bazarov in Turgenev's Fathers and Children, notwithstanding his generally nihilistic outlook, is a good example of this type). So, then and since, there has been in Russia close identification of a 'correct' model with a scientific outlook - precisely the features which, as I have argued, are to be found both in recent Western political-science debates on models of analysis and in the Weltanschauung of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

It was the logic, the rationality, the 'realness' of Chernyshevsky's didactic novel What is to be Done? (1863) - the title was consciously adopted by Lenin for his treatise on the theory and practice of Bolshevik organisation in 1902 - that provoked Dostoevsky's bitter attack on Utopian socialism in the form of his Notes from Underground (1864). Dostoevsky perceived Chernyshevsky, and others like him, as having a view of human behaviour which was so rational that, acting from enlightened self-interest, the individual is as logical as the arithmetical equation $2 + 2 = 4$.

Dostoevsky was revolted by such a 'model'; for him, the essence of the human condition was that the individual has the right to act as if $2 + 2 = 5$:

'One's own free and unfettered volition, one's own caprice, however wild, one's own fancy, inflamed sometimes to the point of madness - that is the one best and greatest good, which is never taken into consideration because it will not fit into any classification, and the omission of which always sends

all systems and theories to the devil.'⁽²⁾

And again:

'[Man] likes progress towards the goal, but he does not altogether care for the achievement of it, and that, of course, is ridiculous. In short, mankind is comically constructed; all this plainly amounts to a joke. But $2 \times 2 = 4$ is nevertheless an intolerable thing. Twice two is four is, in my opinion, nothing but impudence. "Two and two make four" is like a cocky young devil standing across your path with arms akimbo and a defiant air. I agree that two and two make four is an excellent thing; but to give everything its due, two and two make five is also a very fine thing.'⁽³⁾

At this point, with respect to models, I must confess that I am a Dostoevskyan! That is to say, I am profoundly sceptical about the notion that human behaviour, even in the aggregate, can be allocated to immutable, predictable categories. This is a rejection on my part of economic determinism; and it is also an inchoate belief that certain traits of the human character (notably free will) will conflict with, and ultimately triumph over, 'scientific' rationality. In short, like Dostoevsky, I reject Chernyshevsky's dictum that 'what is real is rational; what is rational is real'.

The point of this digression is that I would argue that if models are to be of practical utility then we should abandon the notion that a 'good' model is all-embracing

ant, the kulek, was the target; but very quickly the term came to be applied to any peasant who did not comply with the demands of 'Soviet power'.

It was in the wake of all this that, following the murder of Kirov in December 1934, Stalin unleashed the seemingly insane, but, given his objectives, perhaps inherently rational campaign of violence which is nowadays commonly referred to as the 'Great Terror'.

Again, historians argue as to whether or not the Terror bore more heavily on this or that sector of society. More men more affected than women, party members rather than non-communists, white-collar personnel more than ordinary workers, some nationalities more than others? Whatever the answers to these questions, and however much estimates may vary of the numbers imprisoned, exiled, tortured and killed, there is no denying that this was the application of mass, physical terror on a huge scale. It was, moreover, terror initiated, sanctioned and applied by the state in the name of the ideology upon which society was founded (even today, insofar as the Terror is discussed at all in the Soviet Union, what happened is referred to as 'excesses'). And all this came at the end of the sequence of violence mentioned already: war, revolution, civil war, forced collectivisation.

Of the many effects the Terror had, two are especially relevant in the present context.

First, the old social fabric was systematically destroyed. Not only did 1917 mark the genesis of new political and economic systems, it was the start, too, of a calculated, delib-

A MINIMALIST MODEL OF A SOVIET-

TYPE POLITICAL SYSTEM

- 1 A society that has passed through a period of sustained, mass, physical terror. (Hereafter in no particular order.)
- 2 A society that has been atomised, reconstituted, vertically ordered and massified.
- 3 Rule by a single, monolithic party.
- 4 An exclusive ideology rooted in, and using the terminology of, scientific socialism.
- 5 Strict separation of the process of government into a superior element (rukovodstvo) and an inferior element (upravlenie), with the party maintaining monopoly control over rukovodstvo.
- 6 A judicial system in which due process is inferior to political expediency.
- 7 A centrally controlled, planned economy.
- 8 Strict censorship and control of information.

RULE:

A model should identify only the constant, salient features of a society, without any one of which the completion of the society would change qualitatively to such a degree as to render the model invalid.

erate attempt to eliminate the old social order and to replace it with new, socialist relationships. How and to what extent those socialist ideals were corrupted and debased are not matters for discussion in the present paper. What is clear, however, is that by the late 1930s, if not earlier, under pressure of the social dislocation brought about by collectivisation and, not long after, by mass terror, the myriad, horizontal relationships which knit together the social fabric, and which normally define 'society', had been, to the extent that this is absolutely possible, destroyed. In short, society had been atomised: as conventionally understood, society had ceased to exist.

A chaotically atomised society would have been incapable of achieving the grandiose goals set for it by the regime. Therefore society had to be reconstituted in such a way as to ensure that horizontal relationships could not re-form. Compliance had to be maintained; public activity made purposeful; but without permitting pluralistic tendencies to form. Society had to be vertically ordered: individuals and groups, atomised and lacking autonomy, were mobilised into mass organisations which were themselves links in a chain of subordination leading to the apex of a strictly centralised system where power and authority were concentrated. Yet, however interpreted, Marxism-Leninism is a collectivist ideology; so this atomised, socially fragmented society had to be 'massified' (I derive the concept from the Russian massovost, 'massness'), which is to say that atomised, subordinated individuals are organised in their work and social activity into mass, collectivist bodies such as the GPU, the labour collect-

ive, and so on.

The second principal effect of sustained mass terror was that when it was eventually halted following the death of Stalin the legacy of fear was such that subtler, less crude (and, incidentally, less dysfunctional) methods of social control proved to be sufficient to keep society compliant. Indeed, according to Valentin Turchin, Soviet society has entered a 'steady state' - the term is borrowed from thermodynamics - where, as he puts it in his book The Inertia of Fear, 'the level of violence drops in proportion as society becomes accustomed to [the totalitarian] way of life'. (4)

The 'massification' and vertical ordering of society could not happen spontaneously. The transformation was effected by the party, the sole political authority, monolithic, and enjoying a monopoly of political power. It is true that at the time of 'high Stalinism', certain state organs had played the dominant coercive role; but always in the name of the party and the ruling ideology. Since 1953, these organs have been made actually subordinate to the party. Moreover, from the outset the justification for the party's arrogated 'right' to be the sole interpreter of the exclusive ideology has been rooted in Lenin's variant of scientific socialism, and despite the many twists and turns that it has undergone over the years, scientific socialism remains the legitimating basis of the Soviet political system.

Although the party rules, it does not, in the fullest

and all-explanatory. It is futile to try to produce a model within which all phenomena, all forms of individual and group behaviour, can be accommodated. A society is not a laboratory; the properties of human behaviour are not the same as those to be found in chemistry, physics or mathematics, and to pretend that they are is to define a task for the social scientist that social 'science' is incapable of accomplishing.

Instead, a model should seek to identify only the salient, constant features of a society without any one of which the complexion of that society would change qualitatively to such a degree as to render the model invalid. I shall refer to this hypothesis as the rule.

Such a model is 'minimalist', in that it purports to identify only the salient and constant features of a society (whereas, as I have argued, most models are 'maximalist', in that they seek to interpret all or most social and political phenomena). Also, this model contains a built-in test or verifier: if the rule is violated (if a 'constant' feature disappears or is radically modified) then the model is either wrong, or there has occurred within that society a fundamental change (revolution) of such magnitude as to render the model invalid.

What follows is an attempt to provide a minimalist model of analysis of the Soviet political system, and, more generally, of Soviet-type political systems; and also an attempt to test that model against the rule formulated above.

A MINIMALIST MODEL OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

The model has eight components, all interdependent, of which only one is a pre-condition for the model's existence (namely, that the society has undergone a period of sustained mass, physical terror (please refer to page 8 for a summary of the model's eight features)).

The Bolshevik revolution was in part precipitated by an exceptionally savage war. After only a brief respite, the new Soviet Russia was plunged into an even cruder conflict, the terrible civil war and the fight against foreign military intervention. From the outset, 'revolutionary terror' was used in the struggle against counter-revolution, and no concession was made to 'due process' as the Bolsheviks fought to extend their precarious hold over the former tsarist empire.

Interpretations of the period 1921 to about 1929 vary. Some see it as a time of, at least, limited democracy in Soviet Russia, while others point to an insidious underlying climate of fear and intimidation by party and state. Be that as it may, at the end of the decade there was unleashed on the Russian countryside (where the bulk of the population still lived) an unprecedented assault on the peasantry in the shape of the collectivisation of agriculture. Social dislocation, enforced geographical and social mobility, famine, often indiscriminate violence, intimidation and terror - these were the lot of the peasant. Initially, the rich peas-

of politics has been the desire to create models that are not only rigorous and verifiable, but ones which are also all-inclusive. A 'good' model must be able to explain everything - perhaps not every tiny detail of human and social behaviour, but certainly most of what happens within a society, within the model itself. Indeed, models are constantly being demolished because they are unable to account for this or that feature. The totalitarian model, we are told in refutation, is static; it does not show why or how the USSR has been so 'dynamic' in its historical development; and, in any case, Stalin could not possibly have taken care of every detail of policy: these are but two of the many charges levelled at what is still the most durable of models.

Not surprisingly, any model assessed from the perspective of what it does not explain is bound to fail. Now often has one attended academic gatherings where the critic has triumphantly 'demonstrated' that a model is unsatisfactory because it cannot cope with some social or political phenomenon or another:

Several consequences follow from this kind of attitude. One is that the model is treated as if it were a laboratory in which, if proper procedures are observed, the results must be correct, otherwise the experiment has been wrongly conducted. Or, more seriously, the model is 'adjusted' to accommodate phenomena as they arise or change, or/and the model becomes so general as to lose the very rigour that models are supposed to provide (Friedrich and Brzezinski's modification of their definition of terror in the second

edition of their Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1) is an example of 'adjustment'; while, in my view, the developing-society model is a case of a model's being so broad and flexible as to render it unhelpful, except in the most general sense).

Students of the Soviet Union have to contend with another problem with respect to models of analysis. It is that the Soviet political leadership itself purports to have a 'correct' model, one which has the capacity not just to analyse and explain the past and present, but one which can also predict future development. That this model is, in the opinion of many students, seriously flawed, and is the subject of semi-covert scholarly debate amongst Soviet theorists, cannot obscure the fact that a distinguishing feature of a Soviet-type society is precisely that it rests upon an exclusive ideology which, inter alia, is a model for the economic, social and political development of that society.

Marxism entered Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century not under that name, but as scientific socialism. This was what it was called, and that was what it was believed to be: scientific. It was a body of ideas and theory which rested upon constant, immutable laws (the proposition that economics determines social and political behaviour, and not vice versa, is an obvious example). Further, the advent of scientific socialism in Russia was particularly opportune in that there existed already a strong climate of opinion amongst the radical intelligentsia that the natural sciences were what mattered, were 'useful', had point and purpose, and,

sense of the term, govern. If government is understood to mean both leadership, policy-making and decision-making, and policy-implementation, then the GICU is concerned exclusively with only the superior element, the leadership function (in Russian, rukovodstvo). Policy-implementation (upravlenie) is the task of the governmental apparatus, the soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol and other public organisations, with the party playing a supervisory role vis-à-vis this important, yet secondary aspect of government. The fact that the economy in a Soviet-type political system is planned and centrally controlled increases dramatically the importance of the party's superior leadership function (and, of course, complicates enormously the task of policy implementation).

Given the party's leading role, the free circulation of information in society cannot be permitted. Knowledge generates questions, questions criticism, and criticism leads to opposition. In a Soviet-type society, there is no such concept as a 'loyal opposition': that would be but a step away from political pluralism. Consequently, censorship is strict and the circulation of information is closely controlled. Only the party - the repository of the collective wisdom - can decide (but democratic centralism ensures that the collective wisdom is the wisdom of the small leadership collective).

In a system of close political, social and economic control judicial principles lack autonomy. It may well be the case that in wide areas of judicial activity something akin to due process is observed. But whenever the interests of the party-state clash with those of the individual or group, then political expediency prevails.

I have presented only the most skeletal argument in support of my minimalist model. This is largely because the work is still at only its early, hypothetical stage; but also for reasons of brevity (one has to have something to say when the workshop meets!). The intention is to go on to argue the case, test the hypothesis, in close detail, drawing examples from countries other than the USSR (China, eastern Europe) and looking, too, at embryonic Soviet-type societies (Ethiopia, Yemen). In the meantime, it cannot be emphasised too strongly that, although this is a minimalist model, it is also an integrated model: all of its eight components are interconnected; if one falls, so does the model (or the system). In short, it is a model to which any number of features may be added, so long as they conform to the rule, but none may be subtracted (unless, that is, the system itself undergoes profound, fundamental change).

FOOTNOTES:

- 1 FRIEDRICH, Carl J. and BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew K. (1966) Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd edn (New York: Praeger)
- 2 DOSYTOYEVSKI, Iyodor (1972) Notes from Underground. The Double (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), pp. 33-4
- 3 Dostoyevsky, pp. 40-1
- 4 TURCHIN, Valentin (1981) The Inertia of Fear (Oxford: Martin Robertson), p. 6

CAN A MATHEMATICAL MODEL APPLY TO POLITICAL REALITY ? A SIMPLE PROOF
FOR A SIMPLE CASE

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1. Introduction

The use (and abuse) of mathematical models is widely spread amongst various scientific fields today and has its promoters and detractors. The question is, of course, whether these theoretical models, often needing restrictive hypotheses, can apply to real-life situations. The polemic is certainly permanent in the economics field, for example, where provisions are made concerning the future of unemployment, general conjuncture, etc. using various mathematical tools. The antagonism comes from an impregnation of economic science by sophisticated mathematical models. It is to this sophistication, which necessitates many hypotheses, that we owe precise results, but also a lot of opposition.

In Political Science, the situation is certainly not as critical, as the use of mathematics is less widely spread. We believe that there is much left to be done in the search for mathematical models, but that a lesson must be learned from what is happening in the economic field and that we must be careful that every extra hypothesis introduced has its motivation other than just mathematical elegance.

2. Representing a population

The model discussed here is one for fair representation of a population ranked by two criteria simultaneously, a very widely met situation, as, for example, electors are often classified according to the region in which they cast their votes and the political party of their choice.

The many problems met when dealing with the much simpler corresponding one-dimensional problem have been most thoroughly discussed and surveyed (Balinski and Young (2)). Yet, to our best knowledge, the only formalised study of a two-dimensional case is one concerning a regional election in the Netherlands (Anthonisse (1)) : delegates are to be elected

amongst the communal councillors of a region in order to form the regional council ; these representatives must be chosen in a way which respects as well as possible the geographical and political distribution (communes, parties) of the communal mandatories.

The method described by Anthonisse, while respecting legal texts, cannot avoid impossible situations and, moreover, does not respect some aspects of fairness which we considered fundamental (De Meur, Gassner, Hubaut (3)). Indeed, in a first approach, we elaborated a definition for "fair" representation dictated to us by real-life situations. We then chose, amongst the different demands of fairness we met, some conditions which we judged minimal in order to meet those demands.

Examining existing two-dimensional systems (see (1), for example), we were convinced that we should not give both dimensions identical properties : we thus imposed "institutional" constraints on one of the criteria and purely logical ones on the other : for example, the size of each commune's global representation (first criterion) was imposed by electoral law, while the size of a party's representation (second criterion) was a consequence of the considered political and geographical setting . Likewise, the ordinal structure derived from the initial population was respected differently by each dimension in the delegation. Unfortunately, the formalisation of our fairness constraints brought us to a discouraging result : Only "binary" divisions (two parties, two communes) could guarantee the existence of a solution (see Appendix A) which brings us today to review the problem in its entirety in particular with regard to the following criticisms :

- a) An "institutional" constraint like predetermining line sums, in an almost arbitrary way, can seem abusive.
- b) An uneven treatment of the two dimensions (two division criteria, partisan and geographic, for example) is not always justified.

This leads us a set of rules of fairness, that we describe formally before commenting them.

Let (p_{ij}) be an n by m matrix of non-negative integers with element p_{ij} representing the number of individuals associated with option i of the first criterion and option j of the second.

A matrix (d_{ij}) of non-negative integers must be derived from (p_{ij}) in the sense that it must have the same dimensions, and that each element d_{ij} must be smaller or equal to corresponding element p_{ij} .

We give ourselves an order of magnitude of the proportion of the population to be delegated in the form of a number π such that $0 < \pi < 1$. π will be the basis for the computation of the total amount of delegates which will in fact be assigned. More precisely :

- each element d_{ij} is equal to $p_{ij} \cdot \pi$ rounded either up or down (σ^*)
- (d_{ij}) must also obey the following four conditions :

Marginal line condition (C1)

$$\forall i, j : p_{i.} < p_{j.} \Rightarrow d_{i.} \leq d_{j.} \text{ and } d_{j.} - d_{i.} \leq p_{j.} - p_{i.}$$

$$p_{i.} = p_{j.} \Rightarrow |d_{i.} - d_{j.}| \leq 1.$$

Line condition (C2)

$$\forall i, j, k : p_{ij} < p_{ik} \Rightarrow d_{ij} \leq d_{ik} \text{ and } d_{ik} - d_{ij} \leq p_{ik} - p_{ij}$$

$$p_{ij} = p_{ik} \Rightarrow |d_{ij} - d_{ik}| \leq 1.$$

Marginal column condition (C3)

$$\forall i, j : p_{.i} < p_{.j} \Rightarrow d_{.i} \leq d_{.j} \text{ and } d_{.j} - d_{.i} \leq p_{.j} - p_{.i}$$

$$p_{.i} = p_{.j} \Rightarrow |d_{.i} - d_{.j}| \leq 1.$$

Column condition (C4)

$$\forall i, j, k : p_{ij} < p_{kj} \Rightarrow d_{ij} \leq d_{kj} \text{ and } d_{kj} - d_{ij} \leq p_{kj} - p_{ij}$$

$$p_{ij} = p_{kj} \Rightarrow |d_{ij} - d_{kj}| \leq 1.$$

Commentary

- 1) C1 and C3 ensure that the order induced by two elements of a same margin of the matrix not be reversed in the delegation and that the increase of the initial difference between these numbers be limited : one will allow no increase of a positive difference while an initial zero difference can reach one.

2) The same type of concern appears in the conditions relative to the elements d_{ij} (C2 and C4) ; nevertheless, the irrelevance of comparing any two elements made us choose to compare elements belonging to the same row (or column).

3) The choice of the two possible values for each d_{ij} is motivated by a desire to stay as near as possible to a perfectly fair representation consisting in giving out seats proportionally to the size of each p_{ij} .

Amongst the $2^{n \cdot m}$ matrices satisfying C^* , we hope that at least one satisfies C1, C2, C3 and C4. In the case $n = m = 2$, we prove that this is so, and we build such a matrix (d_{ij}) . We conjecture that the result will be easily generalised for n by 2 (and thus 2 by n) matrices, and in this direction, we proved so for 3 by 2 (and thus 2 by 3) matrices (see Appendix B).

We propose, as an open problem, to solve the other cases.

3. Proof for a simple case (2 by 2)

In order to solve the 2 by 2 case, two more general lemmas are necessary.

For any non-negative integer matrix (p_{ij}) and any π such that $0 < \pi < 1$, for each i and j ,

$$\text{let } d_{ij} = \lfloor p_{ij} \cdot \pi \rfloor, \text{ let } p = \frac{1}{\pi} ;$$

p_{ij} can be written uniquely as $\overline{p}d_{ij} + q_{ij}$ with $0 \leq q_{ij} < p$

Lemma 1

(d_{ij}) obeys the following condition :

$$p_{ij} < p_{kl} \Rightarrow d_{ij} \leq d_{kl} \text{ and } d_{kl} - d_{ij} \leq p_{kl} - p_{ij}$$

$\forall i, j, k, l$

$$p_{ij} = p_{kl} \Rightarrow |d_{ij} - d_{kl}| \leq 1$$

Proof

- 1) $p_{ij} < p_{kl}$ is equivalent to $\overline{p}d_{ij} + q_{ij} < \overline{p}d_{kl} + q_{kl}$

Since, for any $i, j : 0 \leq q_{ij} < p$

we have $\overline{d}_{ij} \leq \overline{d}_{kl}$

and $\overline{d}_{kl} - \overline{d}_{ij} = \pi ((p_{kl} - p_{ij}) + q_{ij} - q_{kl})$
 $\leq p_{kl} - p_{ij} + 1$

2) $p_{ij} = p_{kl}$ is equivalent to $p \cdot \overline{d}_{ij} + q_{ij} = p \cdot \overline{d}_{kl} + q_{kl}$.

Since, for any $i, j : 0 \leq q_{ij} < p$

we have $\overline{d}_{ij} = \overline{d}_{kl}$.

Corollary

(\overline{d}_{ij}) obeys C2 and C4.

Lemma 2

If $q_j + xp \leq q_i < q_j + (x+1)p$ ($x \in \mathbb{N}$) then $\overline{d}_i + x, \overline{d}_j$ and $\overline{d}_i + x + 1, \overline{d}_j$ obey C1.

Proof

1) If $p_i < p_j$, then $p \cdot \overline{d}_i + q_i < p \cdot \overline{d}_j + q_j$.

by (*) $\overline{d}_i + x < \overline{d}_j$.

Also, $\overline{d}_j - (\overline{d}_i + x) = \pi ((p_j - p_i) + q_i - q_j) - x$
 $< p_j - p_i + 1$

2) If $p_i = p_j$, then $p \cdot \overline{d}_i + q_i = p \cdot \overline{d}_j + q_j$.

by (*) $\overline{d}_i + x \leq \overline{d}_j < \overline{d}_i + x + 1$

and thus $\overline{d}_i + x = \overline{d}_j$.

3) If $p_i > p_j$, then $p \cdot \overline{d}_i + q_i > p \cdot \overline{d}_j + q_j$.

thus $\overline{d}_i - \overline{d}_j > \frac{1}{p} (q_j - q_i) > - (x + 1)$

Also $\overline{d}_i - \overline{d}_j = \frac{1}{p} ((p_i - p_j) + q_j - q_i)$

$< p_i - p_j - x$

Using the same arguments, we have

a) If $q_j + xp \leq q_i < q_j + (x + 1)p$ ($x \in \mathbb{N}$)

Then $\overline{d}_i + x, \overline{d}_j$ and $\overline{d}_i + x + 1, \overline{d}_j$ obey C3

b) If $q_{ij} \leq q_{ik}$ then $\overline{d}_{ij}, \overline{d}_{ik} + 1$ obey C2

c) If $q_{ij} \leq q_{kj}$ then $\overline{d}_{ij}, \overline{d}_{kj} + 1$ obey C4.

Let $(p_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} p_{11} & p_{12} \\ p_{21} & p_{22} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{N}^{2 \times 2}$

without loss of generality, we assume

$q_1 \geq q_2$.

and $q_1 \geq q_2$

By lemma 1, (\overline{d}_{ij}) obeys C2 and C4.

If (\overline{d}_{ij}) obeys C3 and C1, then $(\overline{d}_{ij}) = (\overline{d}_{ij})$

If (\overline{d}_{ij}) obeys C3 and not C1, then, by Lemma 2

$q_1 \geq q_2 + p$
 $(\overline{d}_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d}_{11} + 1 & \overline{d}_{12} + 1 \\ \overline{d}_{21} & \overline{d}_{22} \end{pmatrix}$ obeys all conditions

Due to the symmetry between rows and columns of the situation, matrix

$(\overline{d}_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d}_{11} + 1 & \overline{d}_{12} \\ \overline{d}_{21} + 1 & \overline{d}_{22} \end{pmatrix}$

solves the problem when (\overline{d}_{ij}) obeys C1 and not C3.

Finally, it can be easily shown that conditions C1 and C3 cannot be simultaneously violated in a 2 by 2 setting.

Appendix A : A fair representation with "institutional" constraints.
 From an n by m non-negative integer matrix (c_{ij}) , one must derive a non-negative integer matrix (r_{ij}) of same size, the line sums of which are predetermined. These given values, along with the unknown elements of (r_{ij}) must obey the following fairness constraints :

Condition 1 (C1)

$\forall i \quad 0 < r_{i1} < c_{i1}$, except if $c_{i1} = 1$ in which case $r_{i1} = 0$ or 1

$$c_{i1} < c_{ij} = r_{i1} \leq r_{ij} \text{ and } r_{j1} - r_{ij} \leq c_{j1} - c_{ij}$$

$\forall i, j$

$$c_{i1} = c_{ij} = |r_{i1} - r_{j1}| \leq 1$$

Condition 2 (C2)

$\forall i, j \quad 0 \leq r_{ij} \leq c_{ij}$

$$c_{ij} < c_{ik} = r_{ij} \leq r_{ik} \text{ and } r_{ik} - r_{ij} \leq c_{ik} - c_{ij}$$

$\forall i, j, k$

$$c_{ij} = c_{ik} = |r_{ij} - r_{ik}| \leq 1$$

Condition 3 (C3)

$$c_{i1} < c_{ij} = r_{i1} \leq r_{ij} \text{ and } r_{ij} - r_{i1} \leq c_{ij} - c_{i1}$$

$\forall i, j$

$$c_{i1} = c_{ij} = |r_{i1} - r_{ij}| \leq 1$$

We call fair representation rule, a rule which associates any matrix (c_{ij}) of $N^{m \times m}$ and any n -uple $\vec{r} = (r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n)$ of N^n obeying C1 with a matrix (r_{ij}) of $N^{n \times m}$ such that, for each $i, r_{i1} = \sum_{j=1}^m r_{ij}$ and which obeys C2 and C3.

Theorem 1

If n or m is larger than 2, no such rule exists.

Theorem 2

If $n = m = 2$, at least one such rule exists.

Appendix B : Proof of the 3 by 2 (and thus 2 by 3) case

$$\text{Let } (p_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} p_{11} & p_{12} \\ p_{21} & p_{22} \\ p_{31} & p_{32} \end{pmatrix}$$

without loss of generality, we suppose

$$q_3 \leq q_2 \leq q_1, \\ q_1 \geq q_2$$

A. If (\bar{d}_{ij}) obeys C1 and C3, then (lemma 1), $(\bar{d}_{ij}) = (\bar{d}_{ij})$

B. If (\bar{d}_{ij}) obeys C1 and not C3, then (lemma 2), $q_{11} \geq q_{12} + p$

As, for each i and j , $0 \leq q_{ij} < p$, we distinguish two cases :

$$a) \quad q_{12} + p \leq q_{11} < q_{12} + 2p \quad b) \quad q_{12} + 2p \leq q_{11} < q_{12} + 3p$$

$$\begin{cases} q_{11} \geq q_{12} \\ q_{11} \geq q_{21} \\ q_{11} \geq q_{31} \end{cases} \text{ then } (d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \bar{d}_{11} + 1 & \bar{d}_{12} \\ \bar{d}_{21} & \bar{d}_{22} \\ \bar{d}_{31} & \bar{d}_{32} \end{pmatrix}$$

As a consequence

$$q_{11}, q_{21} \text{ and } q_{31} > q_{12}, q_{22} \text{ and } q_{32}$$

And thus

$$(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \bar{d}_{11} + 1 & \bar{d}_{12} \\ \bar{d}_{21} + 1 & \bar{d}_{22} \\ \bar{d}_{31} + 1 & \bar{d}_{32} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{cases} q_{11} \geq q_{12} \\ q_{11} \geq q_{21} \\ q_{11} < q_{31} \end{cases} \text{ then } (d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \bar{d}_{11} + 1 & \bar{d}_{12} + 1 \\ \bar{d}_{21} + 1 & \bar{d}_{22} + 1 \\ \bar{d}_{31} + 1 & \bar{d}_{32} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{cases} q_{11} \geq q_{12} \\ q_{11} < q_{21} \\ q_{11} < q_{31} \end{cases} \text{ then } (d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \bar{d}_{11} + 1 & \bar{d}_{12} + 1 \\ \bar{d}_{21} + 1 & \bar{d}_{22} \\ \bar{d}_{31} + 1 & \bar{d}_{32} \end{pmatrix}$$

If $q_{11} < q_{12}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}+1} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

C. If $(\overline{d_{ij}})$ obeys C3 and not C1, then (lemma 2)

$q_1 \geq q_3 + p$
 which implies that q_{11} and $q_{12} > q_{31}$ and q_{32}

a) If $q_1 \geq q_2 + p$ (q_{11} and $q_{12} > q_{21}$ and q_{22})
 then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

b) If $q_2 \geq q_3 + p$ (q_{21} and $q_{22} > q_{31}$ and q_{32})
 then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}+1} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

c) If $(q_1 - q_2)$ and $(q_2 - q_3) < p$

If $\begin{cases} q_{11} \geq q_{12} \\ q_{11} \geq q_{21} \end{cases}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}} \\ \overline{d_{21}} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

If $\begin{cases} q_{11} \geq q_{12} \\ q_{11} < q_{21} \end{cases}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

If $\begin{cases} q_{11} < q_{12} \\ q_{21} \geq q_{22} \end{cases}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

If $\begin{cases} q_{11} < q_{12} \\ q_{21} \geq q_{22} \end{cases}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}+1} \\ \overline{d_{31}+1} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

If $\begin{cases} q_{11} < q_{12} \\ q_{21} < q_{22} \end{cases}$ then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}+1} \\ \overline{d_{31}+1} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

D. If (d_{ij}) obeys neither C1 nor C3, then (lemma 2)

and $q_1 \geq q_2 + p$ *

$q_1 \geq q_3 + p$

which imply q_{11} and $q_{12} > q_{31}$ and q_{32}

and thus q_{11} and $q_{21} > q_{22}$ and q_{32}

a) If $q_1 \geq q_2 + p$ (q_{11} and $q_{12} > q_{21}$ and q_{22})

then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}+1} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}+1} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

b) If $q_2 \geq q_3 + p$ (q_{21} and $q_{22} > q_{31}$ and q_{32})

then $(d_{ij}) = \begin{pmatrix} \overline{d_{11}+1} & \overline{d_{12}} \\ \overline{d_{21}+1} & \overline{d_{22}} \\ \overline{d_{31}} & \overline{d_{32}} \end{pmatrix}$

c) If $(q_1 - q_2)$ and $(q_2 - q_3) > p$

then solutions of C.c fit this case (except the last which is irrelevant).

* It should be noted that these conditions imply $q_{11} < q_{12} + 2p$

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21-00

The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
First Steps Towards a Model.

by

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&

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Project and its rationale:

At present there is no genuine cross national analysis of the world economic crisis of the 1930's, of the political turbulence to which it led (in some cases bringing about a collapse of the existing political regime) nor of the economic and political measures that were taken in response to this crisis. In this research we plan therefore to carry out such a study by analysing the political and economic consequences of the inter-war world economic crisis through a comparative, quantitative based examination of the 'crisis experience' in a group of western democratic polities.

Choice of systems

The set of nation states to be studied derives from a reduced version of Stein Rokkan's well known categorisation of European States (see Figure 1). Within each of the four cells generated by the double dichotomy we plan to carry out a detailed paired comparison of two systems.

City structure

	monocephalic	polycephalic
system large size	1. Britain/France	2. Germany/Italy
small	3. Denmark/Austria	4. Belgium/Netherlands

Figure: A simplified classification of European nation states (early 20th century)

Some comment on this scheme is necessary. Obviously in this reduced form it does not capture the full subtlety of Rokkan's analysis as it conflates several of his distinctions: Early as against late state formation; differences in centre-periphery structure both within countries and within Europe as a whole; relation to the two differentiating axes of the European system - the north south divide of the Reformation and the east-west gradient, and so on. However, since we are concerned with a shorter time period and a relatively evolved state system - and one that remains stable over our period of study - we suggest that this set of eight polities will be diverse enough in their response to economic crisis, and representative enough of the differing patterns of state development within Europe, to allow us to reintroduce finer distinctions and further 'precondition' variables at a later stage of the analysis. Two final points on this scheme and the chosen set of countries. In its present state it does neatly capture the distinction between core and periphery during early phases of capitalism. The countries in cells 1 & 4 constituting the capitalist core of Europe. Secondly there is still some internal debate within the group about one of the systems in cell 3. Arguments have been advanced for both Denmark and Finland.

The period of study will be from 1927 (as the base year of comparison) to 1938, or the collapse of the polity. Among the variables that will be incorporated in such a macro-political analysis are various economic indices - unemployment, level of industrial disputes, money wages, industrial production, price indices, as well as measures of political and social variation: Electoral volatility, government instability, political protest and violence, measures of social strain and social structural differentiation and class formation. Data for these variables will be taken from published sources altho in some cases we may well have to develop our own quantitative indicators corresponding to the theoretical variables we identify within a developed overarching theoretical framework.

All the nations under discussion were gravely affected by the economic crisis, but with some remarkable differences, in areas such as electoral volatility and governmental stability, for example. Our aim is to develop and test models relating economic and political factors in crisis response to crisis outcomes. But there are also more qualitative aspects

of comparative analysis which need to be undertaken and we would hope to approach these through both single country and cross-national comparative analysis, eventually bringing these two types of analysis together.

Aims of the project:

Overall the project has both theoretical and empirical aims - the empirical aims have been outlined briefly above. But there is too a need to develop and refine a theoretical framework by drawing together the existing strands of literature in a usable way - work by Rokkan, Linz and others on the structuring of regimes, on historical patterns of development and the relationships between social and political stability; more recent work on the political consequences of macro-economic policy, regime overload and so on. The group is well aware of the parallels that can be drawn between the response of democratic polities to the economic crisis of the late 1970's and the 1920's; we are aware also of the symmetry that links the breakdown and the survival of democratic systems in such situations and the inverse relationship between breakdown and the subsequent re-birth of democracy.

Methods:

The work of the project is conceived as falling onto four overlapping stages:

1. Theory review and the development of an overall framework of analysis.
2. Single country diachronic studies.
3. The development of comparative indicators.
4. Cross national theory testing.

These areas are seen as complementary and also decoupled. That is stages 1, 2 and 3 can initially proceed to some extent independently not only of each other but also of stage 4. Over time dialogue and exchange between individual group members will lead to the use of a common analytical/theoretical framework and to a testing of this framework both against individual system data and to a truly comparative analysis of

democratic system response to economic crisis using data generated by the study of individual systems.

The organisation of the project and its relationship to existing literature

1. Theory review and theory development.

Because of its focus on the political response to economic crisis the project will initially draw on several distinct theoretical traditions: First that derived from historical sociology which has tended to stress social factors in accounting for the decline or collapse of democracy - for example the work by Linz and Bracher amongst others. Secondly, work in the area of political economy which links macro-economic conditions to government action (for a useful recent review of this area see, for example, the book by Alt and Chrystal). Note the first tradition has tended to concentrate on the description and analysis of deeply rooted historical causes, the latter on the analysis of contemporary events. We would hope to apply the latter historically while at the same time incorporating the insights of the socio-historical tradition. So one of the first concerns of the group would be to assess whether any substantial synthesis of these two approaches is theoretically feasible or analytically useful. Even if they cannot be fully integrated the overall aim is to derive a common frame of analysis through which the individual country studies can be compared.

2. Single country studies.

The literature covering the inter-war period is now enormous, much of it in the form of single country studies. There is however a distinctive lack of systematization of findings across nations and no coherent theory which tries to combine the two most important levels of analysis of system response and system breakdown: The socio-structural and the political. (As indicated above we see one possible linkage through the mediating role of macro-economic policy itself.)

Much of the analysis has been concerned with the social and electoral conditions that made the rise of fascism possible - particularly in Germany, or studies of the development of Fascist ideology. Studies of

the social and political structure of several systems which 'succumbed' to autocratic rule are available but they mostly serve to underscore the limits of the strictly sociological approach to the breakdown of democracy in this period as they outline 'preconditions' or 'defining' characteristics but not a set of variables which defines system response and crisis outcomes.

The crux of the matter is this: How can we understand the interplay between subjective factors in history and their socio-structural underpinnings? Obviously mobilization at the polls is just one aspect which can help us to explain the ultimate regime change. But to understand the entire breakdown response/sequence we must include other factors, such as those intellectual traditions which provided the conceptual grid which made political events intelligible for the actors involved, constitutional and institutional factors as well as the impact and extent of the economic crisis itself. The point is that the economic crisis does not only have a direct impact on the political system through critical actors and groups, but it also has a politically mediated impact as well. For example, when we study the effect of the depression in Europe it is easy to see that although severely hit, Germany was not 'objectively' the system that was most affected. But amongst the political consequences in Germany was the growing exclusion of compromise and thus of some possible systemic outcomes. The reasons for this are historically conditioned, that is underlying this type of interpretation are elements of political culture which also need to be incorporated into a comprehensive explanation. Because of the variation in system response, and in the availability of comparable data for the countries under study, the group will need to undertake a series of single country case studies to refine our knowledge of particular systems, to generate comparable quantitative indicators for the variables identified and thus to facilitate later comparative analysis through the application of a common theoretical framework. Initially we have selected the sample of eight countries on the basis outlined above. Underlying this is a partial scheme of paired comparison - Britain as a democracy can be compared to France, a system which oscillated between caesarism and leftist mass participation. Developments in the Netherlands and Belgium can be compared with each other partly on the base of the consociationalist model and - ex negativo - with those in Austria. (Germany and Austria as "close cousins" are well suited for comparison anyway). Denmark and Austria are two "small" systems whilst Germany and Italy are the two canonical cases of the rise of fascism.

3. The Development of Comparative Indicators

As suggested above the single country studies will serve two purposes: (1) To provide a set of qualitative accounts of systemic responses to economic crisis, and (b) generate data over a wide range of indicators for measuring and comparing 'economic crisis' and response to such crisis: rate of unemployment, industrial production, strike activity and so on. It is only after a theoretical review and this qualitative analysis that the research will move onto comparative quantitative analysis (see timetable below). It is not clear, at this planning stage just how extensive the range of social, political and economic variables for analysis will ultimately need to be.

4. Cross national theory testing

The data in stage 3 will then be used to 'test' the theoretical framework developed in stage 1 of this project. Note that this work is not starting without the benefit of either an existing theoretical tradition or empirical base. We will be building on existing bodies of work: a theoretical one represented, for example, by Linz et al. 'The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes', and the historical data archives that already exist for the countries in question.

Final comment

We would summarise the aim of the project as follows:

- to review the existing body of literature on the response to economic crisis in liberal democracies and in particular to try and develop a systematic theoretical framework for the explanation of the variousness of response in the period from 1927 onwards, especially in the case of regime breakdown.
- to develop systematic indicators of economic crisis and political response in order to lay the groundwork for testing theory which makes an attempt to combine 'subjective' and 'objective' factors in the breakdown sequence.

We are aware that this is an ambitious undertaking but we feel that the existence of other studies suggests that such a project can be

attempted. Events in the 1970's have shown that democratic regimes are not immune to extremist politics. The combined impact of economic stagnation, inflation and unemployment poses threats to the stability of liberal democratic regimes. Political leadership, within the constraints posed by the varying conditions in each country, has proved crucial. These parallels in the inter-war period suggest the timelessness of such research. To study the interplay between leadership, precondition variables and conjunctural factors poses a formidable challenge to political scientists. The challenge to produce a 'comprehensive' analytical theory is both intellectual and political. We feel it ought to be that way, but we also feel that given the groundwork done by others the time is ripe to take up this challenge.

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21-90

First Draft

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Theoretical framework and research plan for the analysis
of the environmental issue in the political process
of western democracies

by

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1. Introduction

Since the students' protest movements of the late sixties, manifold discussions and empirical findings referring to changes in the relationship between citizens and political order have appeared. In this paper, the structure of the relationship in the mid-sixties is conceptualized as a heuristic model or framework in which micro-, meso-, and macro-level are treated separately. The micro-level represents the individual, whereby attitudes and behavior are distinguished. The sector of intermediary structures and agents is referred to as meso-level, where parties, interest groups and organizations, leisure-time and ad-hoc groups, social movements, churches, and science are located. The macro-level includes, firstly, the legal-institutional organization of the system (for example the constitution, system of government, etc.) and secondly, the ideology of the system. This ideology, or public philosophy, defines the functions and relations of the elements on and between the different levels by using normative positions and interpretations of reality. Thereby a discrepancy between claim and reality can and will actually occur. Furthermore government, parliament, bureaucracy and judiciary are actors on the macro-level. Connecting mechanisms between the levels are in particular the institution of the vote and party competition. The social and economic structure is seen as the underlying basis which influences the elements and their connections. Thus, the societal cleavages rooted therein have a determining influence upon the relationship

between social structure and political order (Lipset/Rokkan 1967).

This model then, is contrasted with recent discussions and findings from the literature to demonstrate the diagnosed changes. Since the first report of the 'Club of Rome' (1972) via the dramatic conflicts about nuclear energy in the mid-seventies, up to the recent problem of the dying woods, the environmental issue has developed into an important and broadly discussed problem in public opinion and politics. In the scientific debates about the rise of new issues, new parties, new cleavages, new social movements etc., it can be identified as a crystallization point of the actual developments and discussions. It is often problematized as a challenge to the predominant institutionalized modes and mechanisms of political mobilization, political participation, and political decision-making.

An analysis of the significance of the issue has to deal with the aspect of 'institutionalized politics' on the one hand and on the other hand, the aspect of the 'new politics', or unconventional and/or uninstitutionalized modes of political representation of the issue, has to be considered. Therefore, different modes of dealing with the issue in the political process of western democracies can be distinguished: 1. institutionalized modes without structural change in the existing channels and mechanisms; 2. institutionalized modes with differentiation of existing structures and channels; 3. differentiation and institutionalization of new structures and channels; 4. non-institutionalized

modes. They shall serve as a framework to attain a structured and systematic description of the history of the environmental issue since the early seventies in the Federal Republic, France, Great Britain and The Netherlands.

2. Citizens and political order in the mid-sixties

With respect to political attitudes, findings of empirical social research show that, on the micro-level, political interest, knowledge about politics and political competence were relatively low, and only the political elites displayed democratic attitudes (Berelsen/Lazarsfeld/McPhee 1954, ch. 14; Stouffer 1954). Research on political participation shows that the political behavior of the citizens was concentrated on voting and related modes of institutionalized participation. Participation was low and infrequent and "Politics and government (...) a peripheral rather than a central concern in the life of most citizens in modern western societies" (Milbrath 1965: 143). For the explanation of different rates of political participation, the socio-economic standard model of political participation (Verba/Nie 1972: 125-137) states that the higher the socio-economic resources of a citizen (measured by the indicators education, occupational status, income), the higher the probability that he will participate in practically all forms of political action. The model was confirmed in comparative studies (Verba/Nie/Kim 1978; Barnes/Kaese 1979). Another major result of participation research is that, due to the participation of most citizens in

general elections, a higher degree of political equality than ever before had been realized. The reason is that at high turnout rates, the probability of systematic differences between the active and the total citizenry with respect to social characteristics and political preferences is minimized (see Kaese 1982b: 365).

In empirical social research, political behavior is analyzed in three steps: socio-structural variables ==> societal-political orientations ==> actual political behavior (in Verba/Nie's terms (1972:126): socio-economic status ==> civic attitudes ==> participation). The socio-structural/demographic characteristics, which are determined by the societal cleavages, are conceptualized as indicators for different socialization effects. They shape social and political value orientations, which are the yardsticks and standards for evaluating social and political situations. They are culturally interpreted (usually by parties) and become relevant for action as interest conflicts (see Pappi/Laumann 1974: 160-161; Kaese/Klingemann 1979: 534; Kaese 1984a: 8).

The western democracies are based on the free consent of the citizens to the political authority structures. Thus, legitimacy means on the micro-level a social-psychological concept for the convictions of the individuals about the rightfulness of the social and political order. On a system level, legitimacy is an attribute of a system (Zimmermann 1981: 237) and means the ability of a system to insure obedience to its decisions. Therefore legitimacy can be conceptualized as a variable, which is produced

in a permanent process of legitimation of the political order and which can be measured on the micro-level through the investigation of the legitimacy beliefs of the citizens (Kaese 1982a: 3, 1984b: 7). With the acknowledgement of the equality principle "one person - one vote", all citizens entitled to vote are seen as relevant sources of legitimacy and bearers of legitimacy beliefs. Actually, referring to the terms legitimacy/legitimation a lot of theoretical and empirical problems and controversies are discussed. Every systematic connection between theory and operationalization can be fundamentally put into question (Kaese 1979: 329). Concepts like political trust, political efficacy, political support were used to discuss and measure legitimacy beliefs (for a thorough review see Kaese 1982a, 1984b, Abramson 1983).

Especially Eastons (1965, 1975) conceptual distinction between dimensions and objects of support is seen as theoretically fruitful. The dimension of specific support is conceptualized as cognitive, short-term oriented and is directed as an instrumental output orientation towards the political authorities. Diffuse support is conceptualized as an attitude towards the regime and the political community (for example nation state) which is more effective, long-term oriented, and thereby, from the short-term effectiveness and evaluation of the system output, independent. Samson (1968) added the public philosophy of a system as another object of support, so that a hierarchy of support for authorities, regime, public philosophy and political community results.

With respect to the different levels of the presented model, diffuse support refers to the non-partisan institutional structure and the systems' ideology (macro-level). Furthermore, it refers to the institutions of the vote and party competition which, as norms and structures of the political order, guarantee the fundamental openness and flexibility of the system and allow control through the voters. Objects of specific support are the political authorities, persons and single parties, from which support can be withdrawn. The chance of change in political office - especially change in government - ensures that the withdrawal and/or new orientation of legitimacy takes place in the dimension of specific support, so that diffuse support for the total system can be left untouched. The underlying assumptions of a hierarchical order and independence of the support dimensions as well as the differentiation between structure (diffuse support for regime and community) and process (specific support for the authorities) explain why political systems possess a fairly stable structure while having a built-in discontent on the process-level (see also Fuchs 1983: 123).

But the distinction between specific and diffuse support is theoretically and empirically difficult, and the theoretical discussion has hardly an appropriate counterpart on the empirical side. Actually the problems of "combining the dimensions of input and output with the hierarchy of objects of political trust (...) has not even been appropriately mastered by Easton himself, and also not by others" (Kaese 1984b: 7). Kaese (1982a: 22-28;

1980b: 7,23,29) emphasizes the necessity for further conceptual and empirical efforts in the analysis of legitimacy beliefs and sees promising attempts in the work of Muller et al (Muller/Jukam 1977; Muller/Jukam/Seligson 1982); Schmidt (1983) and Fuchs (1981,1984).

At this point, some empirical results concerning the situation in the sixties are in place. In the United States, the internal efficacy grew from 1952 to 1968 to almost 50%, then remained stable; the external efficacy rated in 1960 at about 55%. In 1964 75% of the americans had trust in their political system, and three out of four identified themselves with a political party. After a steady increase, the voting turnout reached almost 60% in the sixties (see Abramson 1983: 5-15).

For the european systems there are few data available. In the civic culture study (Almond/Verba 1965), 85% of the americans were proud of their political system, in Great Britain 46%, the federal Republic 7%. Knowledge about and interest in politics showed similar rates in the three countries. For the federal republic, Almond/Verba found that the feelings of subjective political competence were missing, and political participation was heavily concentrated on the vote. They evaluate the federal republic as a primarily output oriented political culture, where the regime and the political institutions had no great acceptance among the population. Because of the lack of a considerable amount of 'diffuse support', they expressed sceptical expectations concerning the development of a democratic political

culture. However, on the micro-level, interest in politics and knowledge about politics have increased, and turnout has stabilized at a considerably high level. During the attempts to use the concept of party identification in the european context, considerable numbers of the citizens expressed their affiliation to the political parties located on the meso-level.

In the discussion about the emergence and importance of the west european parties and party systems, Lipset/Rokkans' (1967) work is the dominating theoretical conceptualization of the relationship between parties and voters (Buerklin 1983: 22). Parties developed along central societal conflict lines (regional, religious, economic etc.) dependent upon and in complex interaction with institutional thresholds of representation. They offer cultural interpretation to limitable segments of the population, guarantee political representation and politically mobilize the citizens along those cleavages. Therefore a cleavage is a "lasting political conflict which is anchored in the social structure and has come to an expression in the party system" (Pappi 1977: 195; my translation, J.H.). Important aspects are the clear cut party political and other organizational assignment of certain population segments to the cleavages, the cleavage's actual importance, the organizational density of the segment and the strength of the ties to the segment (see Kaase 1981: 371). So the relationship between parties and citizens, i.e. between micro- and meso-level, is conceptualized on the basis of socio-structural cleavages with considerable determining power. Parties, together with other intermediary structures, represent

the value orientations and attitudes acquired during the process of political socialization. They articulate and aggregate the interests of the citizens and offer alternatives for decision. Through voting the citizens decide about the composition of the political institutions. Thus parties are central mechanisms of interest aggregation, conflict regulation and political decision making as well as agents of political mobilization. In democratic societies they provide the political order with legitimacy. Through the periodic vote for, the support of, the ties to, and identification with parties, the citizens document their acceptance of parties as core mechanisms in the political process.

Furthermore, the societal interest groups are located on the meso-level. They represent, especially in their linkages to parties and the administration, mechanisms of interest articulation which concentrate the variety of societal interests in a kind of prepolitical space. In sportive, cultural and other leisure time associations, the life of the members of society outside the family takes place. Actually, these kinds of associations crystallize in accordance with existing societal cleavages to a considerable extent, thereby perpetuating them and expressing them as milieus, classes and layers. Thus, such associations constitute the social-organizational environment of parties.

The churches are mighty institutions of world interpretation.

They judge and influence politics with the yardsticks of morality and religion through parties on the one hand and through direct

influence upon individuals in the educational and socialization process on the other hand.

The role and influence of the mass media has, in the tradition of Lazarsfeld, long been seen in the selective reinforcement of attitudes. Wildermann/Kalterfleiter (1965: 15-40) attribute the functions of information, articulation and critique to the media. They see them as technical resources for communication and as essential for a democratic mode of governing. During the period up to the mid-sixties, electronic mass communication expanded enormously, especially television. This probably led among other factors to an increase in political interest and knowledge. Science and technology were broadly accepted as useful and promising means to reach progress. Thus, the jump into the outer space and into the nuclear energy era was widely welcomed.

Bottomore (1981: 37) adds "social movements" to the "organized political formations". In the process of self formation of the society, social movements represent those forces which question an established action system and try to direct development into other directions (Bottomore 1981: 40). In the mid-sixties the overcoming of the results of the activities of the fascist movements and the continuous integration of working class movements lead to a stabilization of the western social and political orders. In the case of the Federal Republic, issues like socialism, neutralism, economic democracy, and problems of citizenship had practically become politically unimportant (see Diffe 1983: 14).

The macro-level is composed of government, parliament, bureaucracy, judiciary, the organizational and institutional structure, and the systems' ideology. Especially the electoral system is an important institutional setting. Liberal democratic systems normally are welfare states and constitutional states with a separation of powers. Government and parliament are the central political decision making institutions. Bureaucracy and administration are responsible for implementation, the jurisdiction for the interpretation and observance of rules. There are different institutional arrangements between the executive and legislative organs in parliamentary and presidential systems, which influence the role and organization of parties (see Steffani 1979). Federal and unitary systems are to be distinguished as well as different plebiscitary elements. This is the field of comparative politics and not further discussed, but if change is diagnosed, the different institutional settings have to be taken into consideration.

The constitutions of liberal democratic systems include three core elements: 1. definition of procedures by which the sovereign people appoint the power holders; 2. guarantees of individual freedom in civil rights catalogues; 3. a non-partisan legal institution of control (see Shell 1981: 21). An organizational principles Shell (1981: 15-27) lists individualism (micro-level) and interest group pluralism (meso-level). Democratic political orders are based on the principle of the people's sovereignty, which is delegated to representatives who are controlled. On the input-side of political participation the

principle "one person - one vote" is claimed to be the redemption of the demand for equality in the bourgeois revolutions. The vote is the core mechanism of legitimation, the majority rule the universal rule of decision taking (see Lenk 1982: 74, Guggenberger/Offe 1984). The control of the representatives' output is expressed through the vote, which underlines the role of party competition, and through independent courts (Shell 1981: 25).

These principles of organization, control and conflict regulation are partially realized and are partially to be seen as normative goals. For instance Steffani (1972: 40) states a discrepancy between pluralist theory and practice in the Federal Republic.

In the debates about democratic theory, the empirical-realistic approach was predominant compared to the classical-normative one. Realistic theory of democracy uses the 'descriptive method' to describe and explain democracy as a specific form of organization and appointment of power for certain time periods through voting acts (see Wiesendahl 1980: 79). The sceptical views of the individual citizens' democratic creed found expression in the elite theory of democracy. Thus, apathy was interpreted as functional and not as dissatisfaction. Only a certain extent of political participation was welcomed in the 'civic culture' and the elites were seen as the keepers of the democratic flame.

Another element of the public philosophy is the pluralist theory. Steffani (1980: 16-17) distinguishes a more sociological pluralist theory from a more political science oriented variant. The

former - primarily empirically oriented - defines as a plural society in the tradition of the American group approach, a more pre- or non-state sphere, where autonomous groups compete for influence upon the state. The latter stresses the normative aspect and is predominantly state- and democratic theory, which deals with structural principles and rules of procedure in the political order. In the American context, parties are predominantly interest organizations and campaigning machines. In the European context, parties have a central catalyst function because they are, as the expression of the structural societal variety, the most adequate institutions to guarantee the democratic political opinion forming and democratic legitimization through the principle of competition and institutionalized conflict regulation. Thus parties and party government are seen as constituting elements of a democratic system.

Particularly the institutions of the vote and party competition are interpreted as connecting mechanisms between the levels. Both have to be present because competitive party systems are considered necessary for democratic systems (Sartori 1976). The institution of the vote fulfills the functions of interest articulation and aggregation, conflict-regulation, presentation and decision of alternatives, recruitment and control of political elites, and provides and secures legitimacy (see Meyer 1981: 520). Through voting the citizens decide about the appointment of structures and institutions on the macro-level by choosing between offers from actors on the meso-level. So the vote can be interpreted as a connecting link between micro- and

meso-level on the one hand (because of the aspect of behavior). On the other hand it is placed together with the institution of party competition between meso- and macro-level. Other connecting mechanisms are the influence channels of interest groups like lobbying; direct contacting of representatives, especially in systems with "winner takes all" constitencies; the using of legal remedies by individuals for or against political decisions; information about and control of politics through the mass media etc. At least with the vote, party competition and interest pluralism, flexibility through alternating governments and the chance to introduce new interests and raise new issues are considered to be institutionally anchored.

Most elements and structures on and connecting mechanisms between the three levels have developed since the national and industrial revolutions in the framework of bourgeois, liberal-capitalist economic and social orders. The resulting political orders are exposed to ongoing processes of modernization, social change and social differentiation. The various processes of change are partially influenced and politically intended. But they tend to escape social and political control to a considerable amount, so that in a heuristic framework they can be included as predominantly independent elements. In many analyses indicators like growth, educational and occupational structures etc. serve as explaining factors. So the social and economic structure is seen as relatively stable underlying structure, which influences the elements and their connections. The social and political orders were formed - institutionally and ideologically - on the

basis of processes of social mobilization (Deutsch 1969). The development of the political orders is among others analyzed with the narrower concept of political mobilization. This refers to the "process by which corporate actors like parties or interest groups or direct action groups are successfully drawing people into political action - be it institutionalized, as the vote, or non-institutionalized, as in joining a protest rally or a citizen initiative" (Kaese 1984b: 3; see also Nettl 1967). Lipset/Rokkan (1967) identified and emphasized the role of the cleavages in the historical dimension of political mobilization. During the processes of nationbuilding and industrialization the cleavages had been, and to a considerable extent still are, fundamental and determining societal influence factors for political mobilization and the development of political parties and institutions. They possess determining power on all levels, influence the institutional and ideological formations, the development and performance of the elements of the intermediary sector, and the attitudes and behavior of the individuals. In the historical process of mobilization and democratization parties fulfilled the tasks of structuring (i.e. cultural, and interpretation of meaning) and freezing of opportunities to choose, whereby the institutionalization produced societal stability.

The conceptualized heuristic model refers to the relationship between social structure and political order, which according to Lapsius (1979: 503) is an old problem of sociology. By means of distinguishing the three levels the predominant scientific

interpretations concerning the situation in the mid-sixties are combined to a structural description of the socio-political reality of that time (see figure I). It was characterized by the hypotheses of the end of ideology and of political conflict and by the thesis of the freezing of the cleavage lines of the nineteen twenties in the west european party systems.

The economic growth had led to a quick mastering of the material consequences of the war and probably was favorable for the integration of working class movements. In Scandinavia the social democratic parties dominated; the consociational systems turned out to be as stable as the anglo-saxon systems which served as paradigms in political science, the french fourth republic was consolidated under de Gaulle. The west integration of the Federal Republic, the consolidation of the blocks and the slow process of european integration shaped the picture. The in modern societies developed and institutionalized structures and procedures were seen as being capable of modeling and controlling social change. The western societies saw themselves as models for the developing third world.

3. Modernization, social change, and social differentiation

3.1. Modernization

In modernization theory and research after the second world war, the terms modernization and development were used to describe the

different social, economic and technological processes of change. The traditional modernization theory's main concerns (Problematellungen) were the search for the most important socio-demographic and structural characteristics and the quality of the modern society (Eisenstadt 1973: 22). It was based on the assumptions of a dichotomy between 'tradition' and 'modernity' and of a continuous and congruent development of different societal sectors in the direction of modernity and rationality.

The

"major structural characteristics of modernization have been identified as the development of a high extent of differentiation, the development of free resources (...), of specialized and diversified types of social organization (...), of wide nontraditional, 'national', or even supra-national group identifications; and the concomitant development, in all major institutional spheres of specialized roles and of special wider regulative and allocative mechanisms and organizations, such as market mechanisms in economic life, voting and party activities in politics ..." (Eisenstadt 1973: 23).

In the investigation of modernizing processes indicators from the fields urbanization, democratization, alphabetization, expansion of educational systems, expansion and use of mass media etc. are analyzed in their development and interactions. Karl W. Deutsch (1969) defined in the perhaps "best over-all summary of the sociodemographic indices of modernization (...)" the term 'social mobilization' (Eisenstadt 1973: 23) as

"the process in which major clusters of social, economic and psychological commitment are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior (...)" and the stage of uprooting or breaking (...), is followed by J.H.) the induction of the mobilized persons into relatively stable new patterns of group membership, organization and commitment" (Deutsch 1969: 494).

Modernization implies also the development "of a social, economic or political system, which not only generates continuous change, but (...)" is also capable of absorbing change beyond its own

initial institutional premises" (Eisenstadt 1973: 25). So Eisenstadt describes the development of the modern political orders as 'political modernization' in four steps:

1. development of a highly differentiated political structure, i.e. specific political roles and institutions;
2. extension of the scope of central, legal and administrative political activities;
3. continuous spread of potential political power to wider groups in society - ultimately to all citizens;
4. weakening of the traditional elites and traditional legitimization of rulers and establishment of ideological and/or institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled.

The vote is the culmination of this process, and the institutionalization of election systems is the formal expression (Eisenstadt 1973: 24).

Thus, the crucial problem of modern political orders is the development of an institutional framework capable of self-sustained growth. The described elements and mechanisms of the political order, like parties and interest groups, were interpreted as qualifying modern societies to cope with this core problem and reach further progress.

Since the mid-sixties the assumption of the exclusivity of tradition and modernity, the inconsistency and vagueness, and ethnocentrism of the terms modernity and development have been increasingly criticized. Underlying assumptions from evolutionary and structural-functional concepts were problematized and the possibility of partial modernization and islands of tradition was stressed (for further discussion see Eisenstadt 1973: 98-115; Wieweeds/Kutsch 1978: 70-153, 1979; Flora 1974; Zapf 1969).

Modernization is no longer seen as a unilinear process, and the multidimensionality and causal interrelationships of different dimensions are emphasized. Flora/Alber distinguish in an "analytical framework of modernization" general growth processes (of population, industry, bureaucracy etc.) from structural changes

(institutional and organizational). The economy is the core of the capacity to grow, the polity of the capacity to change structures. The fundamental process that characterizes modernization is the structural-functional differentiation (Flora/Alber 1981: 38-39). Along this line, Zapf argues that the western political orders are an acceptable solution to the above mentioned crucial problem and that they possess enough "institutional reserves of competitive democracy, market economy and welfare society" (Zapf 1983: 305, my translation, J.H.), to cope with the recent 'developmental dilemmas'. According to Zapf, approaches of modernization in the social sciences are those which hold the modern societies capable of learning and self-regulation (1983: 293). According to Sjoebloom (1981: 6), at least four tendencies have an enduring and reliable character of change with specific political relevance: structural differentiation and specialization; institutionalization; secularization/rationalization; and internationalization. Finally modernization theory can be interpreted as an optimistic theory of social change, according to which modern societies and societies in transition basically have positive future prospects.

3.2. Social change

Moore's definition reads: "social change is the significant alteration of patterns (that is of patterns of social action and interaction), including consequences and manifestations of such structures embodied in norms (rules of conduct), values, and cultural products and symbols" (Moore 1966: 366). Concerning

social change, the old sociological problem of "statics and dynamics in the analysis of social reality" (Schaefer 1976: 8; my translation, J.H.) is theoretically and empirically difficult to deal with. Change has multiple dimensions like size, direction, tempo, regularity/irregularity, consequences etc. There are problems of measurement and questions like: does change occur sequentially or in clusters, what is the political saliency, how can it be influenced, what are the internal and/or external reasons? Sjoebloom (1981: 4) furthermore emphasizes that "societal changes proceed at different rates in different parts of society and have different effects on different units". The chance of resulting independent and different effects on actors, forms and functions of a social system can lead to incongruences and lags between societal conditions and institutions and norms (Sjoebloom 1981: 3-5; see also Schmid 1982: 13-16; Wiswede/Kutsch 1978: 1-52).

Thus, the western political orders are simultaneously results, producers and objects of change. Thereby the "sheer power of conservatism in social life: the power of custom, tradition, habit, and mere inertia" (Nisbet 1972: 6) is emphasized. It is often underestimated when diagnosed changes concerning certain elements are used to draw far-reaching conclusions and consequences.

Since the beginning of the seventies, a growing requirement for information about societal developments and state of affairs have lead to programs and projects of permanent observance of society

and welfare measurement in the Federal Republic. Thereby empirical knowledge concerning processes of change is cumulated in the fields of: a) housing development and structure of population (structure of family and households, urbanization etc.); b) educational system and communication; c) economic and stratification system (sectoral and occupational structural change, mobility etc.); d) role of the state (expansion of the welfare state) (see Flora 1984, 1981; Flora/Heidenheimer 1981; Willms 1982).

In the here discussed context, certain more recent or recently consequential developments are of central concern. Especially the expansion of the interventionist welfare state has to be mentioned, which has a considerable part of the social product at its disposal. "In the mid-1970s the nations of western Europe were allocating on the average almost 25 percent of their national resources to public social expenditures" (Flora/Heidenheimer 1981: 5). Simultaneously with the expansion of the role of the state, the international interdependence increasingly restricts the maneuvering room of the nation states. With respect to families and households, an increase in single-person households and changes in the role orientations between the sexes have taken place. These changes and the fact that younger cohorts remain longer in the enlarged educational system indicate changes in (political) socialization. Furthermore, the educational revolution and the expansion of jobs in the tertiary sector lead to an increase in horizontal and vertical mobility.

The ongoing processes of development and change are consequential for practically all elements of the social order. Many debates and results can be identified which problematize the predominant interpretations of the sixties. These interpretations saw a considerable correspondence between socio-structural ties of the citizens and their political orientation and action. But thereby Lepsius reminds us "that neither the political order in its form and contents is absolutely determined by the social structure and its changes, nor is the political order continuously capable of absorbing socio-structural change (Lepsius 1979; ; my translation, J.H.).

3.3. Social differentiation

In this situation, the theory of social differentiation offers some points of orientation. In the tradition of Durkheim, the development from ancient to modern societies is interpreted as a process in which social units selectively react to endogenous and/or exogenous influences. Thereby they differentiate out of predominantly segmentally differentiated units rather functionally differentiated subsystems (Hondrich 1982b: 34, Arzberger 1982: 79). These are able to cope better with the internal and external environment and fulfill their functions with more effectiveness and efficiency than the less differentiated units (Hondrich 1982b: 14, 19, 38). According to Hondrich (1982b: 25-32), differentiation takes place in the five dimensions: function; size; regulation; space; time. Because of the growing size of systems and the increase of functional differentiation,

the system integration is a permanent problem. The reaction to this problem lies in the development of hierarchical levels or structures especially control- and coordination units. Arzberger so describes the development of the modern state and political system as a differentiation process. The process proceeds in three stages: "from 1. bureaucracy and administration over 2. - estates, parliaments and parties (...) up to what today is called 3. participation..." (Arzberger 1982:79-80, my translation, J.H.). The basic motivation for the development of the state as collective actor is the production of binding collective decisions about collective goods (Arzberger 1982: 74). Therefore, and because of the fact that most hierarchical levels are located in the political subsystem, the differentiation of the political 'producer' roles first resulted. Because of the capability of horizontal and vertical increases, the bureaucracy was able to deal best with the requirements following the expansion and differentiation of the state's functions. The increase of functions and the differentiation of the political system has the result that the exchange medium "power" can no longer easily be concentrated. Luhmann (1981:22-23) even diagnoses the lack and the impossibility of central organizations and steering centers in functionally differentiated societies. This problem, and the heterogeneous and divergent societal interests to which political decisions refer, results in increasing complexity, coordination problems and a higher probability of unintended side effects (see Arzberger 1982: 112). So in the third stage of the differentiation process of the political system, the citizens react with demands for more control, transparency and participation. This

has led to a variety of diagnoses, debates and results, which are to be dealt with in the next chapter.

4. Citizens and political order: debates and findings concerning the change of the relationship

In this part, debates, findings, and diagnoses of crisis are confronted with the heuristic model to locate the diagnosed change. This is done in a very brief and placard-style way. First, rather global diagnoses, which apply to all levels and also to the economic and social structure, are presented.

1. Based on theories of social differentiation and modernization, a lag of differentiation between social and political institutions can be diagnosed. As a result, problems of "post-industrial politics" because of rising demands for participation and hedonistic value orientations are expected (Muntington 1974; Kaese 1982b; Nedolmann 1982). According to this view, problems of democratic politics emerge because of discrepancies between the social and political spheres on the macro- and meso-level. As a consequence certain individuals and groups are politically mobilized by new non-institutionalized actors, through new mobilizing mechanisms on the meso-level.
2. The expansion of the states' functions and the internationalization overtax the state and the political parties. Especially international interdependence reduces the influence of national governments. This can lead to a decrease in the acceptance of a competition model of politics. In this view it is assumed that deficits on the macro- and meso-level can lead to a withdrawal of legitimacy on the micro-level.
3. The continuous development of the welfare state leads - together with a short-term orientation towards politics caused by party competition - to high expectations in the citizenry. Because of the extent and complexities of the tasks, the state with its actors and institutions, is structurally incapable of fulfilling them. Thus, a discrepancy between the steering capacity of the system and the expectations and demands of the citizens develops. Value change, hedonism etc. on the individual

level have thereby amplifying effects (Hennis/Matz/Kielmannsagg 1977, 1979; Offe 1979, 1980).

In the debates about 'ungovernability' the thesis of the 'escaping expectations' assumes that, on the micro-level, the structural restrictions of the actors on the other levels are not realized and accepted.

4. As a cyclical appearance of anti-modernity, Berger/Barger/Kellner (1977) discuss a 'discomfort in modernity' (German title: Unbehagen in der Modernität). The technological and bureaucratic rationality and the "pluralization of every day life" (Pluralisierung der Lebenswelten) led to a segmentation and liberation of the individual, but the price is a permanent threat of anomie. This leads to processes of demodernization and substitution of functional rationality for emotionality, and the creation of a private sphere.

5. Raschke (1980: 39-40) diagnoses a crisis of the industrial civilization. It is characterized by an increasing self-destructiveness, decreasing efficiency and decreasing competence of the industrial system for problem solution. As a result, new problems, new values and new modes of action emerge (1980:23) and actually a new 'paradigm of the way of living' (Paradigma der Lebensweise; 1980: 29-32) develops. According to that paradigm, the needs of the individual citizens shall become the starting point and the destination of politics. With respect to the relationship between nature and economy, measures like limiting of growth, ecological compatibility, and political decentralization are proposed to deal with the problem. The supporters of the paradigm are members of professions in the tertiary sector, especially in human services, and groups of persons who are directly affected by negative results of actions of the state. The fundamental value change and the expanded time of staying in the occupational system have supporting effects.

Both approaches discuss reactions on the micro-level - escaping and compensating ones -, which can manifest themselves on the meso-level (for example protest movements, sects, etc.). The ongoing processes of change are not appropriately mastered by actors on the meso- and macro-level. They also influence these actors, which then produce encroachments on the individuals.

6. Habermas' thesis of a 'colonization of the life-world' (Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt) states that, during the process of functional differentiation, the societal social systems economy and politics have become independent of the 'life-world'. Their economic and administrative rationality increasingly influence the shares of action in the 'life-world', which possesses a communicative rationality as organizing and functioning principle. Economic and political regulations increasingly intervene into the private sphere of social interaction and production of meaning, thereby using legal, educational, medical, and other techniques. So the conflicts in modernity develop on

this frontier between the system and the 'life-world'. These conflicts refer - compared to the older conflicts of distribution - to the "grammar of the forms of living" (Grammatik der Lebensformen; Habermas 1987, Vol. 2:576) and the questions of individual identity (see Habermas 1979, 1981).

According to this approach, actions and reactions of actors on the macro- and meso-level, which actually are answers to processes of socio-structural change and differentiation, cause counter-effects on the micro- and meso-level, which can lead to a fundamental threat to the whole system.

7. Because of socio-structural changes and processes of differentiation, the traditional societal cleavages loose a considerable amount of their determining power. The emergence of socio-structurally amorphous, ideologically highly polarized population segments, with highly differentiated political preferences, increases the probability of the development of new conflict-lines. So the assignment between social structure and party system changes, thus old parties have problems and new parties have chances. The decreasing determining power of the cleavages also affects the socialization of the younger cohorts. It increases the probability of individual dispositions for volatility and issue voting, and of lower rates of party affiliation (see Hildebrandt/Dalton 1977; Kaese/Klingemann 1977; Buerklin 1981, 1983; Kaese 1984a).

Lipsset/Rokkans' thesis of the frozen cleavages of the twenties is increasingly challenged in debates about the emergence of new cleavages, 'new politics', the increase of volatility, and changes in party systems (see Pedersen 1983; McGuire 1983; Daalder/Mair 1983; Buerklin 1981; Bartolini/Mair 1984; Smith 1984; Reif 1984; Dalton/Flanagan/Beck 1984).

macro-level

1. The critique of the capitalist state emphasizes that the liberal-capitalist state has taken the responsibility to guarantee the existence of the whole system. The guarantee of the preconditions for the economic growth of the capitalist industry has absolute priority. But the steering mechanisms of the politics of crisis-management are of an indirect nature and do not intervene into the private disposal over the means of production. Thus the state has an overall responsibility and function, which it can not fulfil, especially in situations of economic crisis. This especially can result in a crisis of legitimation because the interests, which are capable of organization and conflict, predominantly come into play at the expense of the interests which are less or not at all capable of organization and conflict (Offe 1972; Habermas 1973).

A structural insufficiency of the institutional and organizational structures is diagnosed, which is rooted in the capitalist way of connecting social and political order. Thereby the

ideology of the system plays the role of disguising the real power relations.

2. With respect to pluralism, some fundamental assumptions of pluralist theory can be problematized. Missing equal opportunities, selectivity and disparity in the consideration of interests, an intertwinement between administration and specialized interest groups, and a lack of intra-organizational democracy in the big organizations are diagnosed (see Steffani 1980, Lehner 1979). Especially since the end of the sixties, the comparison between reality on the one hand and the ideology of the system and the intentions of the constitution on the other hand, turned out to the disadvantage of reality. This resulted in a re-emergence of concepts of normative and direct democracy (see Wiesendahl 1980) and is documented in the recent discussions about the decreasing acceptance of majority rule (Guggenberger/Offe 1984) and the claimed principles of basic democracy and rotation of their delegates in the German 'Green' party.

3. Schmitter's neocorporatism approach can be added at this point, because his concept of neocorporatism refers to the changing quality of the total system of interest intermediation. He diagnoses a change from corporatist to pluralist interest intermediation. The interest groups don't compete and are distinguished according to functional aspects. They are licensed by the state and guaranteed a monopoly of representation of their specific interests (Schmitter 1979a,b,c).

4. Through horizontal and vertical growth, the bureaucracy reacted on the side of the political 'producers' in the most flexible way upon the expansion of the state's activities. The expansion did not always lead to an improvement of service. Especially because of the habitus of keeping the people in tutelage (Arzberger 1982: 108), the relationship between citizens and bureaucracy is strained. Bureaucratic ignorance and insensibility can lead to collective actions against bureaucratic decisions. Actually this seems to be a major field of local citizen initiatives.

Another aspect is that, because of the expertise in administrations, they have increasing influence upon political decisions. Furthermore, because of their segmentation, the integration and coordination - i.e. the chance to gain a significant political-administrative steering capacity - suffers from structural limitations (see Lehner 1979: 136-155).

meso-level

1. Lehbruch's neocorporatism approach describes developments concerning elements of the meso-level and connections between meso- and macro-level. The big economic interest groups are increasingly included in the processes of formation and implementation of political policies. This inclusion has partially been institutionalized through the establishment of a variety of more or less formal or informal commissions and committees, regu-

lations and consultations. The influence of the big economic interest organizations threatens the role of parties, because parties in parliament often are forced to ratify the results of long-lasting informal and difficult bargaining processes (Lehbruch 1979a,b,c).

2. Since the mid-seventies, the influence of the mass media is no longer seen in selective reinforcement. This is documented in discussions about a personalization of election campaigns, the agenda-setting role of the media, and the creation of pseudo-events (which are only created to be reported in the media) (see Schenk 1978; Schulz 1982, 1984).

In the Federal Republic Noelle-Neumann has initiated a controversial discussion about the decisive role of the television in the Bundestags-election in 1976 (see Noelle-Neumann 1979). This has had political consequences on the one hand, and the scientific interest in mass communication research has increased on the other hand. A discussion about political balance grasped the public radio- and television institutions. In the meantime the parties all have media advisors and assistants. The discussion about the new media, especially cable television, and the question of the constitution (public or private) of the new structures grew out of that background. Thus, politics and media have a strained relationship. Questions about the impact of their special characteristics upon each other must be dealt with. For example, in what way does it affect the linkages between citizens and parties if, for instance, political information is predominantly transported through television?

3. The political parties are nowadays broadly criticized. The "dissolution of socio-cultural milieus", the development of big "catch-all parties" with "over-adaption" the "over-institutionalization", and the "self-indicated overloading" through the expansion of competence, lead to political problems (see Raschke 1982, my translation, J.H.). Mintzel (1984) takes a contrary position to Raschke. Kirchheimer's (1965) thesis of the development of "catch-all parties" (Volksparteien) has led to a broad usage of the term basically because of the permanent mixture of the political and scientific debates. Furthermore, the problems of operationalization (Mintzel (1984: 96-112) identifies 22 characteristics in Kirchheimer's article) did not facilitate the development of an analytically fruitful concept. Mintzel proposes to substitute the term "Volkspartei" for "modern party of mass-legitimation" (moderne Massenlegitimationspartei). According to Mintzel this type of party is a "highly adaptive, flexible, and open form of political organization (...), which possesses a great structural-functional internal and external capacity for problem solution" (Mintzel 1984: 317, my translation, J.H.).

Because of their aggregation and articulation functions, parties have structural problems in transporting heterogeneous and highly differentiated political demands and bundling them to political decisions (Nedelmann 1982; Dealder 1981; Kasse

1984a: 9). Buecklin (1983) emphasizes the lack of ability of the political elites to offer sufficient patterns of representation and interpretation for new political issues. This results in a loss of capacity for institutionalized conflict regulation, and new parties like the "greens" have their chances.

In the research about parties the results and the present state of theory are judged rather sceptically - despite the long tradition. Typologies and catalogues of functions shape the picture (see Wiesendahl 1980; Bayme 1983; Mintzel 1984).

The situation of strain in modern parties is characterized by discrepancies in the representativity between rank and file and leadership, a professionalization and academization of politics, problems of control and coordination with bureaucracies etc. Therefore, definite decisions about theses concerning the loss of functions and the crises of parties and party government are difficult to take. Mintzel/Schmitt (1981) distinguish between governmental and intermediary functions of parties and they don't find clear cut signs of crises.

The data on the development of membership in parties show an enormous increase between 1968 and 1976 in the Federal Republic, whereby the conservative parties CDU and CSU had the highest growth rates. These two parties and the FDP still had minor growth rates in the period from 1976 to 1982, while the SPD showed a slight decrease and the FDP had losses since 1981 (see Oberreuther 1983: 12). Since 1976 about 4.3% of the citizens eligible to vote were party members. In 1968 this rate was 2.7% (see Troitzsch 1980).

Obviously the data show an enormous increase in conventional political participation in the mode of party membership. The multidimensionality of the phenomenon party, especially the manifold organizational structures and the problem of clearly dividing party and environment, makes generalizing statements difficult. Therefore a variety of opportunities is available, to diagnose crises of parties and party systems, especially if parties are measured by the yardstick of the fulfilment of non-party ascribed functions.

4. New intermediary actors like citizen initiatives, protest groups and "new social movements" emerged in the seventies subsequent to the civil rights and students' protest movements of the sixties. They used uninstitutionalized modes of political action and new forms and channels of political mobilization, especially in the local context. In the most recent discussions about the "new social movements" (Brand 1982, 1985; Brand/Buesser/Rucht 1983; Grottel/Welles 1983; Offe 1983) a crisis of modernity is diagnosed. Thus, the development of ecology, peace, women's and alternative movements are interpreted as indicators for the problems of the political system. Thereby the problem of defining social movements, especially the newness of the "new social movements", and the question of operationalize-

tion has hardly led to broadly accepted concepts and results. In fact the empirical knowledge about the phenomenon is at best fragmentary (see Stoess 1984).

The originally more defensive reactions of the 'consumers' of politics seem to have resulted in a kind of new intermediary infrastructure, which increasingly shows offensive character. This is documented in the foundation and success of new parties, especially ecology parties.

Thus, socio-structural developments have led to effects on the individual level (highly educated, mobile segments of the population with jobs in the tertiary sector are the core clientele). Together with the problems of parties, and perhaps a favorable and spectacular media coverage of dramatic events, this led to the establishment of new intermediary actors on the meso-level, which there try to cope with the deficits of the established parties and bureaucracies.

5. During the process of secularization, the churches lost influence. The percentage of persons who have a strong religious affiliation has decreased, but the effects of intensive affiliation have remained (see for instance the process of depillarization in The Netherlands, Andeweg 1982).

6. Science and technology are being criticized, especially nuclear energy and the nuclear and outer space weapons. The role of technology in the process of economic rationalization and the new developments in the information and computer area have been problematized.

micro-level

1. As a result of the expanded production of welfare services, a state produced dynamic of rising expectations and an inflation of expectations is diagnosed. The old ethics and values of duty, service and self-restraint are decreasing. Instead, an instrumental supply-orientation has grown because of the expanded welfare programs. But because of the reduced steering capacity of the state in times of economic crisis, the incapability of the state to properly satisfy these demands, which often have the status of legal rights, can lead to a loss in legitimacy (see Klages 1980; for a critical discussion of the thesis of inflation of expectations see Hondrich 1983: 75-84).

2. Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984) has initiated, structured and dominated the discussion and research about value change. Referring to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, he makes two assumptions: 1. hypothesis of scarcity: satisfied needs become less relevant than needs, which range in the hierarchy above them, therefore less satisfied needs gain more importance; 2. hypothesis of socialization: the need-orientations which are acquired during the formative years, develop to lasting value-orientations with a high stability during the life-cycle. During

their formative years of political socialization, the post-war generations equated, on the basis of the material abundance, increasingly post-materialist value-orientations. A shift from materialist to post-materialist value-orientations like self-realization and self-determination is taking place and consolidates itself as a generational effect. Ingleharts' approach and his instrument of measurement have caused controversial debates (see Lehner 1979, Buerklin 1983, Hondrich 1983, Inglehart 1984). There are, independent of the theoretical assessment of the debate about value change and the problems of distinguishing between the terms needs, attitudes, and values, substantial changes in the citizens' political preferences and attitudes towards political institutions and the political process.

3. For the United States, Abramson (1983: 3-15) emphasizes three developments: the decreases in turnout, party identification, and political trust. Since 1960 the turnout rate has continuously decreased (between 1968 and 1972 from 61% to 55.5%), in the last two presidential elections the rate was about 53%. With respect to party identification, the intensity decreased and the percentage of persons who identified themselves with a political party fell to about 60% in the eighties (Abramson 1983: 69-133). A spectacular decrease concerns political trust: the percentage fell from 75% in 1964 to about 30% in 1980. Thereby the items are objects of controversial discussions, as well as the question of whether this dissatisfaction refers to the political authorities or to the system as a whole (see Abramson 1983: 193-238). The indicator 'external efficacy' also decreased from 55% in 1960 to 35% in 1980 (Abramson 1983: 176).

With respect to the west-european countries, clear cut developments are difficult to identify, because longitudinal data are hardly available. A decrease in political trust can not be identified (Kaase 1984b: 26). The turnout in the european context does not show clear-cut trends (Dittrich/Johansen 1983). An increase in volatility during the last two decades is diagnosed (Pedersen 1983; McGuire 1983; Bartolini/Mair 1984). With respect to party identification Saerlvik/Crewe (1983: 333-336) document a considerable decrease between 1964 and 1979 in Great Britain. For the Federal Republic, Kaase (1979) does not find a decrease in party identification in the seventies.

For the Federal Republic, some longitudinal data on legitimacy beliefs are available (Kaase 1984b: 27-29). In the German case, the lack of diffuse support, which was diagnosed by Almond/Verba (1963), has disappeared. Because of the "economic miracle" and the support for Adenauer, a considerable amount of diffuse support for the political institutions has developed. "All of the evidence suggests, that a viable democratic political culture has developed in the Federal Republic (Baker/Dalton/Hildebrandt 1981: 69; see also Conradt 1980; Fuchs 1984).

The expansion of political participation has been widely ana-

lyzed, whereby Barnes/Kaase et al (1979) included the dimension of uninstitutionalized political participation. They found that the socio-economic standard model also holds for the explanation of the preparedness for unconventional participation and that the citizens' action repertory has widened.

On the micro-level, an increase in political competence, interest, knowledge, and capability of ideological conceptualization led to a higher probability for unconventional political participation, especially for young and better educated segments of the population. With respect to actual political and social participation, this resulted in an increase of new forms of social organization and political protest.

The connecting mechanisms, the vote and party competition, are also criticized. Their ability to transport the divergent societal interests and to provide acceptable alternatives for decision is doubted (see Guggenberger/Offe 1984; Guggenberger/Kempf 1984). The destructive effects of party competition are diagnosed on the one hand and on the other hand the possibility of a true vote between alternatives in a "single-party-state" (Einparteienstaat) is denied from a leftist position.

If these debates and findings are contrasted with the model, an impressive picture of changes in the relationship between citizens and political order results (see figure II). This list is far from being complete, for instance problems of federalism and federal policies, changes in the relationship between parliament and government, and other aspects, have not been mentioned.

Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that in many analyses the seventies and eighties are referred to as a period of permanent crisis. The manifold processes of change and differentiation are treated and evaluated differently in the literature. In approaches which diagnose fundamental and far-reaching crises, the negative effects of modernity are emphasized and the new protest potentials are interpreted as indicators of the crisis. In an affirmative evaluation of modernity, the western societies possess enough institutional reserves to cope with the recent developmental dilemmas.

The actual problems of parties and party systems and the development of new intermediary agents and channels should not be predominantly attributed to the development of the parties themselves. The seventies "witnessed a general decline in trust towards all kinds of socio-political institutions" (Kaase 1984a: 16). This decline can also be partially attributed to the changes in the yardsticks with which people evaluate political institutions, associations and decisions (Kaase 1984a).

From a functionalist perspective, it can be argued that new func-

tions as well as functions which can no longer be fulfilled by established actors can be fulfilled by new actors and through new channels. Fuchs (1983: 123-125) sees protest as a catalyzer which forces the political system to adapt to a changed environment. Thus, different modes of reactions in a political system are possible and actually occur. On one hand, the established parties react to the pressure of new issues, actors and strategies, and deal with the problems. Further development is dependent on this political reaction. On the other hand, the new actors also use established institutions and structures of organization like parties and interest groups, which results in a differentiation of the party system and associational system.

The increase in the self-representation of interests and the use of direct action techniques has certainly something to do with a discomfort with the modern state, which is characterized by parties, interest organizations, bureaucracy and a generally deteriorated social-ecological situation. But taking into consideration that the established parties had a membership boom in the seventies (in the FRG), that many party members also participate for instance in citizen initiatives, that the political preferences, action repertoires and yardsticks of evaluation of certain segments of the population have persistently changed, the scenario gets more complex.

Ongoing processes of change and differentiation effect many elements and mechanisms of the political order. Because of the expansion of social and political roles, power and participation

can not be referred to as zero-sum games. Thus, the emergence of new groups, roles and functions does not automatically indicate a loss of significance of already existing structures.

5. Research plan

The lack of responsiveness and sensitivity of institutional politics is often presented as a major reason for the emergence and growth of the environmental issue, which is frequently represented in a politically unconventional and non-institutionalized form. Thus, the analysis of the significance of the issue has to deal with the reactions of institutional politics on the one hand and with the unconventional political representation and political mobilization on the other hand. Therefore different modes of dealing with the ecology issue in the political process of western democracies are listed here with reference to both sides.

1. One institutionalized form is the treatment of the problem without changes in the existing structures and mechanisms. This can happen, for example, when the government and/or existing parties politically react to the new issue or its treatment is assigned to existing administrative structures, etc.

2a. A further mode of dealing with the problem is the differentiation of existing structures which is characterized by the

development of new sections in departments, the division of parties and interest groups, etc.

2b. Another mode is the differentiation of the political order through the building of new structures according to the conventional and institutionalized forms of organization and mechanisms and channels. This mode includes the foundation of new parties, new interest groups, etc, which act according to the rules of parliamentarism, lobbyism, etc.

3. Furthermore, the differentiation of new structures which employ new and unconventional forms of organization, mechanisms and channels of political mobilization can be distinguished. Examples are citizen initiatives and other structures with a permanent organization and formal criteria like membership, etc.

4. Beyond these modes of dealing with a new problem, which can be characterized as institutionalized, there are non-institutionalized modes like protest demonstrations, ad-hoc groups, social movements. They possess the minimal organizational structure, which is necessary to organize collective action and therefore do not constitute institutionalized social units.

The different modes of dealing with a new problem in the political process are summarized in Figure III.

figure III

Modes of dealing with a new issue in the political process

I. Institutionalized modes

1. Dealing in existing structures
- 2a. Segmentation of existing structures,
- 2b. Differentiation of new structures according to institutionalized procedures,
3. Differentiation of new structures with new organizational forms, new mechanisms and channels of political mobilization,

II. Uninstitutionalized modes

The different modes are not conceptualized as alternatives since they can occur simultaneously. But, given a certain level of actuality and saliency of the problem, the less successful that the less differentiated modes are in the process of dealing with the problem, the higher the probability for the occurrence of advanced forms of differentiation.

The distinction among these different modes is an attempt to develop a theoretical guideline for the description of a method of dealing with the ecology issue in the political process. Thereby the actual reactions and measures of government, parliament and bureaucracy shall be considered. What kinds of and how many laws and decrees have been passed, how many new sections or new departments have been built? In general, how do the established institutions and actors react? How do the parties and interest groups react? What is the organization and strength

of the new actors? What are the attitudes of the citizens towards the problem and towards the political treatment of the issue by the societal actors? The descriptive analysis will be oriented on these questions and will include information from the different levels.

In the literature, various authors refer to different factors from different levels with respect to the explanation of the development of 'new social movements' and new parties.

Mueller-Rommel (1982a: 378ff.) discusses as determinants for the development of "parties of the new type" the factors:

- electoral system,
- party system and stability of government,
- number of nuclear power stations,
- policies of trade unions and established parties,
- tendency towards 'new' value orientations.

According to Schmidt (1983: 24-28) "five characteristics of the system of political opinion forming (Wertenbildungssystem) are relevant for the development of new social movements (especially the Green party as the parliamentary arm of the ecology movement)" (p. 24, my translation. J.H.):

1. liberal-democratic rules of procedure,
2. the structure of an alternating two and a half party system with built-in compulsion for coalition,
3. attrition effect of parties in government, which hold power for a longer period,
4. with certain reservations the proportional electoral system,
5. the decentralized structure of the state.

Haus/Rayside (1978: 36-39) distinguish for an analysis of the development of new parties "two sets of facilitating factors, through which the strains and cleavages are filtered" (p. 37). As institutional factors they name the electoral system; the electoral focus, which differs in parliamentary and presidential systems; and the organization of the system (centralized or decentralized). As political factors they discuss on the one hand the behavior of existing parties and the attitudes of the voters, and on the other hand the role of the new party leadership and the new party organization.

Further factors are discussed, for example a 'decline of the parliamentary opposition', problems with the innovation function of the party system (Abromeit 1982: 185), thresholds to party-political influence like restrictive clauses (see Schiller 1983).

- The various factors refer to different levels and structures, which have been distinguished in the model.
- 1) socio-structural and socio-economic factors,
 - 2a) political-institutional factors on the macro-level,
 - 2b) actual political-behavioral factors referring to actors on the macro-level (performance of government, bureaucracy, parliament),
 - 3a) political-organizational factors on the meso-level (interest group system, party system),
 - 3b) political behavioral factors referring to existing and institutionalized actors on the meso-level,
 - 3c) political behavioral factors referring to the new actors on the meso-level, which more or less show some degree of institutionalization,
 - 4a) individual political behavior,
 - 4b) individual political attitudes, preferences and value-orientations towards 2a-3c,
 - 5) socio-cultural factors (like tradition, phenomena of political culture, collective systems of conviction and interpretation).

This list is an attempt to assign factors, which are referred to in various mixtures, to the respective levels. The aim of the descriptive analysis is to obtain information about the modes of dealing with the ecology issue by the different actors in the analyzed systems. Then, for instance, the predominant mode of dealing with the ecology issue on the macro-level by government,

parliament and bureaucracy can be identified.

The next step is the analysis of factors or factor constellations, which determine the predominant mode of dealing with the issue. These factor constellations consist of factors referring to different levels. For an analysis of the influence of certain factor constellations, an international comparative approach is necessary. With respect to the problem of the choice of the countries, which is only briefly mentioned (see Niedermayer 1983: 312-313; Doggan/Pelassy 1984: 99-140), the study will be oriented on the "most similar systems design" (Przeworksi/Teune 1970: 32-34). The different modes of dealing with the issue in the various systems are dependant on the different character of certain factors on the various levels like system of government, electoral system, breadth of party system etc. The study of the impact of certain factors will be done in a more detailed way when the collection of information, which has not yet systematically started, and the descriptive analysis are on the way.

The countries included from the group of the industrialized democracies are Great Britain, France, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic. A classical democracy (Mutterland der Demokratie), a (past) consociational system and the in Lipset/Rokkans' analysis deviating cases of France and the Federal Republic offer a reasonable spectrum of different system factors, so that an analysis of the determinants for the different modes of dealing with the environmental issue will be possible.

figure 1

Citizen and political order in the mid-sixties







figure II

Citizens and political order: changes in the relationship





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PARADOX PROOF DECISION RULES IN WEIGHTED VOTING

VERSION II

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Abstract

In this paper a concept of an ideal decision rule in weighted voting is introduced. It is thought to be a point of reference to comparing and classifying voting systems with respect to stability and efficiency. The mapping of the distribution of voting weights into voting power indices of the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik type is not monotonic. Corresponding paradoxes imply a potential to increase an agent's a priori voting power by decreasing his (or her) voting weight. Paradox proofness of a voting body is achieved if the distribution of voting power is strictly proportional to the vote distribution. In this paper a randomized decision rule is proposed to bring about paradox proofness. Several implications of this procedure are discussed with respect to its application.

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1. Introduction

It is well known among game theorists and political scientists that the distribution of voting weights in a voting body, e.g., the seat distribution in a parliament, is generally a poor proxy for the distribution of voting power. This view gains support by non-monotonicity effects (so-called paradoxes) which occur if a priori voting power is measured by the power indices of Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik¹ and effects of changes in the seat distribution are analyzed by these measures. These non-monotonicity effects challenge the idea of political representation inasmuch as an increase in votes (and seats in the representational voting body) decreases the voting power of the corresponding agent. In this paper, a family of paradox proof decision rules will be presented which rule out paradoxical effects as described. The randomization of the decision rules is the heart of the proposed solution.

The concept of paradox proof decision rules (the PPDR solution) is suggested as a tool for comparing voting systems with respect to notions of stability and efficiency implied by the PPDR solution. Moreover, it is proposed as a yardstick to the construction of new representational bodies. In the final section of this paper, two interpretations are given with respect to the application of this concept. First, however, we will take a look at the "Paradox of Redistribution" and the

"Paradox of New Members", in order to illustrate the paradoxical effects with respect to the vote-power relation. In Section 3, borrowing from Berg and Holler (1984) and Holler (1982a, 1984b), the concept of strict proportional power (SPP) is defined. In Section 4, a simple model of randomized decision is elaborated which permits satisfaction of various political and institutional restrictions without distorting SPP. In Section 5, a frequency interpretation as well as a probability interpretation is given for the randomized decision rule.

2. Voting Paradoxes

In a series of articles by Dreyer and Schotter (1980), Fischer and Schotter (1978) and Schotter (1979, 1982) a surprising phenomenon was found within the analysis of voting power: the "Paradox of Redistribution". The Paradox exists when, "given a vote distribution $w = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$ and a voting rule q , we can construct a new vote distribution $w' = (w'_1, \dots, w'_n)$ which gives at least one voter a smaller proportion of the votes yet gives him more power, when power is measured by either the Banzhaf or the Shapley-Shubik power index" (Fischer and Schotter, 1978, p.52; for a discussion see Holler, 1982c).

The "Paradox of New Members", which has been introduced by Brams (1975, p.178) and Brams and Affuso (1976), is a specialization of the "Paradox of Redistribution".

Fischer and Schofter (1978, p.66) illustrate the relationship between the two voting power paradoxes by comparing a voting body $v = (d, w)$ to a voting body $v' = (d, w')$, assuming the decision rule $d = .7$, $w = (.6, .4, .0)$ and $w' = (.5, .25, .25)$. A change from w to w' implies an increase of the weight of voter 3 from .0 to .25. Therefore, voter 3 represents the idea of a new member. The Banzhaf index relating to v is $(.5, .5, .0)$, while the Banzhaf index relating to v' is $(.6, .2, .2)$. The corresponding Shapley-Shubik indices are $(.5, .5, .0)$ for v and $(2/3, 1/6, 1/6)$ for v' . Both indices indicate that the power of voter 1 has increased in spite of the fact that his (or her) voting weight decreased. (Formulas for the indices are given in Section 3 of this paper.)

Fischer and Schotter (1978) show that no paradox proof vote distribution exists for any voting body with $n \geq 6$ ($n \geq 7$) members if the voting power is measured by the Banzhaf index (Shapley-Shubik index). Given a vote distribution w , we can always find a vote distribution w' which will increase some member's power while decreasing his (or her) voting weight. If we restrict the choice of the decision rule to majority voting, the "critical size" of the voting body lowers from $n \geq 6$ ($n \geq 7$, respectively) to $n \geq 4$. Therefore, the voting paradoxes are potential for a large number of multiparty systems which we find in the political and the economic sectors of democratic societies.

In a recent publication, Rapoport and Cohen (1984) show that (a) the relative frequency of the occurrence of the "Paradox of New Members" generally decreases for both power indices as the size of the original voting body and the number of new members increases, (b) the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices cannot be distinguished from each other on the basis of the relative frequency of the "Paradox of New Members", (c) for $m \geq 4$ the relative frequency of the paradox generally decreases as the decision rule d increases, and (d) for $m \geq 5$, the mean size of the paradox (i.e., loosely speaking, the average power measure distortion experienced by the voters for whom the paradox occurs) is sufficiently small to render its practical importance questionable. (m is the number of voters in the original voting body, i.e., before a new member enters.) However, for voting bodies of $m < 4$ members the relative frequency of occurrence of the paradox and its mean size seem to be quite substantial and are not to be neglected if the rules of the voting game are to be implemented "rationally".

The described voting power paradoxes imply various possibilities of manipulation. In accordance with the "Paradox of Redistribution" a member of the voting body can increase his voting power by voluntarily reducing his voting weights. Inasmuch as the voting body is determined by the outcome of general elections and the voting weights are positively related to the vote shares gained in these elections, a loss in vote shares (and,

thus, a decrease in voting weight) can increase the a priori voting power of the representing agent in the voting body under consideration.

If applied to a parliamentary party system, this implication of the voting power paradoxes dodges the Schumpeterian idea of democracy as a competition of the politicians via winning elections. The "will of the people" (i.e., of the voters) does not find its expression in the workings of the body in a faithful way, if the described paradoxes occur and the manipulation of the seat-power relation can be used to influence the political outcome contrary to the voters' support.

If we abstract from the distortion between vote shares and seat shares²⁾, caused by electoral formulas (i.e., apportionment methods) such as d'Hondt, Imperial, and St. Laague (see, e.g., Rokkan, 1968; Lipphardt and Gibbard, 1977; Laksó and Taagepera, 1982), the problem of paradox proof decision rules in weighted voting can be solved by designing decision rules that - given the distribution of weights (and support) - lead to a distribution of voting power which is identical with the distribution of voting weights (see Nurmi, 1982). For a large range of voting bodies, however, the substitution of the decision rule d by any alternative decision rule d' does not bring about full concurrence of voting weights and power shares, i.e., strict proportional power as defined in detail in the following section.

Before describing a solution to this problem, we suggest the following theorem.

Theorem 1: A decision rule in weighted voting is paradox proof if, and only if, it guarantees strict proportional power (SPP).

It is easy to show that SPP guarantees paradox proofness. As it seems, the necessity of SPP for paradox proofness can be demonstrated per absurdum. This, however, has as yet not been accomplished.

Lemma 1: A decision rule in weighted voting is strategy proof (i.e., increasing the vote share is the dominating strategy) if, and only if, it guarantees strict proportional representation (SPP).

3. The Concept of Strict Proportional Power

The concept of strict proportional power (SPP) implies equality of the voter's weight and his (or her) voting power. Given "one man, one vote" and a proportional electoral

Formula the voter's weight is represented in the aggregate by the number of seats his representatives occupy in the reduced voting body. Correspondingly, his voting power is represented by the voting power of the candidates that were elected by his votes and the votes of those voters who expressed identical preferences concerning the proposed candidates. This relates the election of candidates and the winning of seats to the voting in the representational voting body.

- (a) a vector of decision rules $d = (d_1, \dots, d_k)$, such that $d_j \in \{0, 1\}$ for all $j = 1, \dots, k$, and
- (b) a weight distribution $w = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$, such that $\sum w_i = 1$ and $w_i > 0$. (w_i represents the relative number of seats which are occupied by the representatives who were elected by the i th group of voters.)

In the following it is assumed that the representatives of each group of voters vote as a bloc. We may therefore label the representatives elected by the i th group of voters the i th representative in $v(d, w)$.

If we denote the set of elected candidates by N , a coalition $S \subseteq N$ is called winning according to a decision rule d_j , if and only if $d_j \leq \sum_{i \in S} w_i$, for all $j \in S$. Given this, S is an element of the set of winning coalitions W with

the properties:

- (a) $\emptyset \notin W$,
- (b) $N \in W$,
- (c) If $S \in W$ and $S' \supseteq S$, then $S' \in W$.

The pair (N, W) describes a simple game as defined by von Neumann/Morgenstern (1947, pp. 423-431), if

- (d) for every $S \subseteq N$, either $S \in W$ or $N - S \in W$.

Because of (d), all coalitions will see a winner.

We assume that the i th representative is prepared to collude with other representatives on unbiased terms so that all (winning) coalitions are of equal probability. The (a priori voting) power of a representative i thus can be expressed by the standardized Banzhaf power index:

$$(1) \quad b_i = \frac{\sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S - \{i\})]}{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S - \{i\})]}$$

where $v(T) = 1$, if $T \in W$, and $v(T) = 0$, if $N - T \in W$, for all $T \subseteq N$.

Equation (1) defines a power index (vector) $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$. Its i th component b_i can be interpreted as representative i 's proportion of critical defections.

The Banzhaf index (as introduced in Banzhaf, 1965) weights all coalitions with an equal number of swings equally. (It causes a swing to S , if $S \in W$ and $S - \{i\} \notin W$.) As

pointed out by Brams and Afuso (1976), the Banzhaf Index is equivalent to the Coleman Index. It therefore does not show the rather curious results which Coleman (1972) attained from the examination of the Shapley-Shubik Index.

The Shapley-Shubik Index refers to the ratio of the number of differently ordered coalitions (i.e., permutations) and thus gives a higher weight to coalitions with a larger number of members. On the other hand, the Deegan-Packel Index seems to favor coalitions with a small number of members since the coalition's value ($v(S) = 1$, if $S \in W$) is decided by its cardinality according to this measure (Packel and Deegan, 1982; Holler, 1982b).

The public good power index as introduced in recent publications by Holler (1982b, 1982a) and Holler and Packel (1983) treats coalition value as a public good. Whether a winning coalition forms depends on whether it is supported by a winning decisive set. Thus, winning coalitions are not treated equally.

There are good reasons to use the Shapley-Shubik Index, the Deegan-Packel Index, or the public good power index for the analysis of the a priori voting power in situations of strategic interdependence and sharing of private or public goods. Since, however, we will not specify the quality of the issue voted on, the Banzhaf Index seems to be a suitable measure of the voting power under discussion.

Given that the a priori voting power within a voting body $v(N, d)$ is measured by the Banzhaf Index $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$ groups of representatives, SPP can be defined as follows:

Definition 1: Strict proportional power (SPP) is given for a voting body $v(d, w)$, if for every $i \in N$,

$$b_i(d) = w_i.$$

We note that for an arbitrarily chosen decision rule d_j there is no reason to expect the power distribution, as measured by the index vector b , to be very close to the seat distribution w . For the sake of the stability of the political system, it might be desirable to have a close agreement. Since generally this is not possible in weighted voting games with a fixed decision rule d_j , we will extend the class of voting games to include mixtures of voting games:

Definition 2: The set of games $\{v(d_j, w), d_j \in d\}$ together with an associated probability vector $q = (q_1, \dots, q_n)$, $\sum q_j = 1$, is a mixture of voting games, if the game $v(d_j, w)$ is played with probability q_j , $j = 1, \dots, k$, $k > 2$.

Definition 2 implies the concept of a randomized decision rule, which is defined as follows:

Definition 3: A randomized decision rule (RD rule) is a function which pairs elements of vector q with elements of vector d with respect to a given set of players N and given weight distribution w . It is described by a vector (d,q) of dimension $2k$.

Given the notion of the RD rule, we can compute for every pair of vectors d and q and weight distribution w an expected power index (or average power index) $b = (d,q)$, such that

$$(2) \quad b_j = \sum_i q_i b_{ij}(d_j), \quad j = 1, \dots, k.$$

Given this, the problem of SPP can be restated as follows: SPP can be achieved if for a given weight distribution w we can find a RD rule (d,q) , such that

$$(3) \quad b(d,q) = w.$$

In the following, a solution to (3) with respect to the variables d and q will be discussed.

3. Solutions to SPP

Dubey and Shapley (1979) prove that SPP is attained, if power is measured by the Banzhaf index as defined in (1). If d is taken to be a random variable, uniformly distributed over the interval $[0,1]$. Because of the symmetry inherent in a simple game, it suffices to let d be distributed over the interval $(.5, 1]$. However, there might be political as

well as practical reasons for restricting the number of decision rules to the elements of a smaller, discrete set without distorting SPP. Moreover, it might be convenient to exclude from this set certain "extreme" decision rules, such as the maximal veto rule $d = 1$. Similarly, it might be desirable to include in the set of available decision rules such familiar ones as, e.g., single majority voting, $d = 2/3$, and $d = 5/6$, as used, e.g., in the Finnish Parliament.

To help us discuss some implications of SPP as outlined here we define three properties for the RD rule:

Property 1: Given that (3) applies for some RD rules (d,q) and (d',q') , then (d,q) is SPP minimal, if its dimension $2k$ is equal to or smaller than the dimension $2k'$ of every (d',q') satisfying (3).

Property 2: A RD rule (d,q) is SPP dictatorial, if (d,q) applies for (3) and, for some $d_j \in d$, assigns power index $b_j(d_j) = 1$ to one of the players, for a given weight distribution w and $q_j > 0$.

Property 3: A RD rule (d,q) is a SPP vetoer, if (d,q) applies for (3) and for some $d_j \in d$, given $w, d_j > \sum_{i \in N} w_i$, $i \in N - \{j\}$, for all $i \in N$.

Let us illustrate these properties in a three-member voting body by means of a numerical example. Assume a weight

distribution $w = (.5, .3, .2)$ and a vector of decision rules $d = (.51, .71, .81)$. The matrix containing the corresponding Banzhaf indices is described by $b(d)$ such that

$$(4) \quad b(d) = \begin{bmatrix} b(d_1) \\ b(d_2) \\ b(d_3) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 3/5 & 1/5 & 1/5 \\ 1/2 & 1/2 & 0 \\ 1/3 & 1/3 & 1/3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Neither of the selected decision rules $d_1, d_2,$ and d_3 will produce a power distribution identical to the weight distribution w . In fact this applies for a much wider set of decision rules. We do not get SPP even if we are free to choose d 's in the intervals

$$(5) \quad .5 < d_1 \leq .7, \quad .7 < d_2 \leq .8, \quad \text{and} \quad .8 < d_3 \leq 1.$$

Since these intervals cover the entire domain of $dc(.5, 1]$, we can conclude that there is no single decision rule which leads to SPP for the given weight distribution w . However, if we allow for RD rules, then SPP can be readily attained in our example. Let $q = (q_1, q_2, q_3)$ be the vector of mixing probabilities. According to (3), SPP requires

$$(6) \quad qb(d) = w = (.5, .3, .2).$$

This equation is readily solved with respect to q . The mixing probabilities are found to be $q = (.5, .2, .3)$.

It follows from the computation that the RD rule (d, q) , with $d = (.51, .71, .81)$ and $q = (.5, .2, .3)$, is SPP minimal


For $w = (.5, .3, .2)$. However, as we see from the intervals in (5), there is an infinite number of SPP minimal RD rules.

In order to discuss the properties 2 and 3 for the voting game of three players, we look at the situation in general. To do so, we introduce an ordered simplex denoted by

$$(7) \quad S(3) = \{x \mid x = (x_1, x_2, x_3), \quad x_1 \geq x_2 \geq x_3, \quad x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1\}$$

Geometrically, the simplex (5) corresponds to the triangle ABC in Figure 1 below. The coordinates $x_1, x_2,$ and x_3 are the distances measured on the vertical to the corresponding legs of the triangle.

Figure 1



Points belonging to ABC which are not boundary points will be called interior points; points in the larger triangle outside ABC will be called exterior points. Obviously, for all interior points x_1, x_2, x_3 holds.

Now we can represent every conceivable weight distribution w and every vector of Banzhaf indices as a point in the triangle ABC. In Figure 1, the four points A, B, C, and D represent the four possible Banzhaf index vectors of the three players voting game, i.e., $b_1 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$, $b_2 = (1/2, 1/2, 0)$, $b_3 = (1, 0, 0)$, and $b_4 = (3/5, 1/5, 1/5)$. From this we can conclude, that point A corresponds to all RD rules of the game which are SPP vectors. Moreover, we see that point C implies RD rules which are dictatorial.

If we keep the weight distribution w fixed and let the decision rule d_j vary in the interval $d_j \in (.5, 1]$, we can distinguish the following two cases:

Case 1: Let us take a point w in the triangle BCD and vary the decision rule d_j from .5 to 1. Then we get as Banzhaf index points A, B, C, and D. If it is desired to have SPP, we can use a mixture of games corresponding to points B, C, and D. The corresponding RD rule is SPP dictatorial because it implies the power vector represented by C. On the other hand, we can take a mixture of the points A, B, and C. The corresponding RD rule is SPP dictatorial as well as a

SPP vector. It follows from Figure 1 that the points A, B, and D will suffice for SPP if w is a point in BCD. Points inside BCD cannot be written as a positive linear combination of vectors A, B, and D. Thus, in this case we cannot avoid applying a SPP-dictatorial RD rule. However, we do have the possibility of avoiding RD rules which are SPP vectors.

Case 2: Let us take a point w in the triangle ABD. In order to have SPP, we can make use of the fact that the point is interior to either of the two triangles ABC and ABD. Therefore, we can attain SPP without having to use a RD rule which is a SPP dictator. However, SPP entails inclusion of some RD rule which is a SPP vector.

We are now in a position to discuss the property of SPP minimality (Property 1) for the voting game of three players in general. Equation (4) implies that the dimension of the vector $b(d)$ has to be equal to the number of voters n . Otherwise SPP cannot be attained. Thus, $k = n$ constitutes a minimum number of dimensions. Of course, any two of the related Banzhaf index vectors of $b(d)$ have to be linearly independent.

If there are m power indices $b(d_j)$ for all alternative decision rules $d_j \in (.5, 1]$, all different in numerical values, we have $m-n$ degrees of freedom in the selection of appropriate decision rules. This often allows for avoiding RD rules which are SPP dictatorial or SPP vectors. On the other hand, the SPP condition as presented in (4) enables us to analyse

(a) whether a given set of decision rules is consistent with SPP for a given set of voters, (b) whether the set of decision rules has to be changed if a new group of voters enters the voting body and SPP is to be attainable, and (c) how the barriers to entry have to be modified in order to ensure SPP for a given set of decision rules.

4. Interpretation

RD rules allow for two rather different interpretations: The frequency interpretation implies that each decision rule $d_j(d_1, \dots, d_k)$ related to a SPP minimal RD rule (d, q) will be realized q_j times out of the set of all voting decisions D taken, where $q_j > 0$.

The probability interpretation implies that each decision rule $d_j(d_1, \dots, d_k)$ related to a SPP minimal RD rule (d, q) has a chance of probability q_j to be put into reality.

The latter interpretation is consistent with the fact that only one single $d_j(d_1, \dots, d_k)$ will occur, whereas the first interpretation implies that we will see all d_j ascribed to the chosen RD rule (d, q) applied "in the course of time", given that D is large enough so that the problem of divisibility inherent in this interpretation can be solved. Of course, the two interpretations lead to quite different problems when it comes to the application of RD rules. Some of them are discussed in Berg and Holler (1974).

Notes

1) The Shapley-Shubik index has been introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954) as an application of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) to weighted majority games. The Shapley value expresses the players' expected values of games. Hereby, a game is considered as a set of rules.

2) Regardless of the chosen electoral rule, it is possible that a party increases its vote share and nevertheless its voting weight decreases. In this paper, however, the apportionment paradox should not be dealt with.

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**IN SEARCH OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE:
SCANDINAVIA 1815-1933**

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Paper prepared to be presented at the workshop 'Models in the Comparative Study of Political Systems,' ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Barcelona, 25-30 March, 1985

Prologue

This is a research outline. It does not present findings, only questions. While the overarching interest—what accounts for the origins of Scandinavian political consensus—is fixed, the approach is negotiable as to scope, design and topics. The author shall appreciate all suggestions about improvement.

IN SEARCH OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE:
Scandinavia 1815-1933

Ulf Lindström

Scandinavia is commonly known as the heartland of Social Democracy.¹ As such it has tickled the curiosity of prominent scholars and traveled intellectuals.

It was a time during the fifties and sixties when these visitors returned home to bring the news of heaven on earth, a middle-way Schlaraffenland.² Recently, however, Scandinavia—and Sweden in particular—has been used as an example of what drawbacks lure behind the welfare state.³

While journalists may be excused (or held in contempt) for their opportunist reporting, academics are expected to pursue the truth irrespective of its political implications: it is not for them to make Social Democracy take the whole credit or blame for Scandinavia's achievements and flaws in the making of the welfare state.

While some identify Bismarck as the founding father of the welfare state and others see it as the legitimate offspring of the labor movement, there is also reason in pleading immaculate conception.⁴ But in rejecting the stork-hypothesis only one avenue remains open in the search of the origins of the welfare showcase.

Assuming that much of the preconditions of Scandinavia becoming a welfare society are to be found in the 19th-century development of this area does not necessarily reduce Social Democracy to a mere trustee of an ever-growing aggregate wealth. But even the most inveterate Social Democrat would have to accept the notion of his party as having been a redistributor of available assets rather than an explorer of unknown social frontiers.

What Is to be Explained?

It should be emphasized at the outset that this study does not aim at explaining the enactment of and appropriations to various welfare programs by way of controlling for party distribution of seats in elected assemblies. Rather, it is the political consensus across party lines as well as among corporate interests in favor of peaceful allotment of the growing wealth that constitute the dependent variable in this case; why was it that in the period between 1919 and 1933 organized interests and parties representing labor, industry, and agriculture reconsidered their policy of confrontation in favor of cooperation within the format of unitary government?

The year 1919 was a turbulent one in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden although the intensity of the political confrontations varied. Certainly, Social Democracy's cabinet-holding positions in Denmark and Sweden are not to be compared with the Norwegian Labor Party's alignment with the Comintern. This postwar radicalization was to be countered by industry with the forming of militant strikebreaking forces modelled on Weimar Germany's Technische Nothilfe, in Scandinavia known as the National Rescues /Samhällshjälpen, etc./. Similar, although less extensive, measures were resorted to by agriculture to crush organized labor. It is hard to imagine any period in modern Scandinavia that in terms of class confrontations compare to the first two or three years of the twenties.⁵

The year 1933 was the antithesis of 1919. Denmark and Sweden experienced the red-green Crisis Agreements between the Social Democratic and Agrarian parties; Norway's Labor Party held its reformist congress, a solid red event which foretold the red-green Crisis Agreement with the Agrarians in 1935. All the re-alignments occurred within the representational-territorial format of government, and served to introduce a new concept of nationalism and political leadership to "numeric democracy."⁶

At one level lower in the body politic, within the functional-corporate branch of government—non-existent to the constitutionalist—organized interests such as the unions, employers' federations, and the agricultural co-ops were busy trying to reach agreements

guiding industrial relations. This process, the Silent Crisis Agreements, was closely monitored and, whenever showing signs of losing momentum, pushed ahead by the governments.⁷ Whether the combined results of these transitions in Scandinavian governance are to be summed up and labeled 'Societal corporatism' or 'Corporate pluralism' is not of immediate relevance here. Of importance is that no substantial alterations of the governmental process has been attempted since then.

Now there is certainly not a lack of treatises claiming to offer explanations to the events condensed above, and which for reason of convenience may be referred to as '1919' and '1933.'⁸ Our endeavor, however, is to develop the framework of an explanatory model which accounts for both confrontation and consensus in Scandinavian politics. Would it be too academic to think of 1919 as more significant than 1933 to Scandinavian politics? And, if not, what would that imply for our pondering over the theoretical status of today's welfare state in terms of its political legitimacy? There is more to these questions than rhetoric. For one thing, it is highly unsatisfactory to find contemporary issues of widely different nature purportedly "explained" by historical determinants easily resorted to at the arbitrary discretion of individual analysts. If it is a topic of confrontation which begs for account there is always 'historical evidence' at hand showing that conflict is the quintessence of the Scandinavian society; and if the topic is consensus the analyst need not be in doubt that Matthew once again will be proven right: 'And he who seeks finds.' Before this turns into philosophical hair-splitting it should be made clear that the present ambition is not that of proposing a final history of nineteenth-century Scandinavia. The "final" history, like the "final" future, make academia expendable.

Scandinavia's Road to 1933

What does the year 1933 signify? In what way should the conception be operationalized?

While the horizontal perspective on nation-building justifies the classification of some states as unitary instead of federalist,

etc.,⁹ we may also speak of the vertical structure of the state and how well it is integrated. Such a dimension permits us to propose that 1933 represents the beginning of a process toward unitary government in Scandinavian politics. After this year it was no longer meaningful to speak of the Civil-Servant Government, Parliamentary Government, or Corporate Government as if one of the forms at different times was the power-center in Scandinavian politics. In fact, it lies at the heart of this study to re-open the case about the fruitfulness in referring to the nineteenth century as the regime of the civil-servant estate, the early 20th century as the height of parliamentary democracy, and the period after 1933 as one which has been ruled by corporate interests.¹⁰ For, as noted by P-E Back in his analysis of the Swedish case:

"Most of the forms of contact and collaboration, usual nowadays, were in lively use even before the First World War. Associations took the initiative in making changes in the existing regulations and laws. They themselves originated proposals for bills and ensured that the deciding authorities were informed of these preparatory works. They interested themselves in cooperation in Royal Commissions and participated in those of importance; they subjected members of national expert committees to pressures of various kinds. They aimed at becoming advisory bodies and sometimes were resorted to as such."¹¹

Rokkan's expression "Votes count, Resources decide"—to which we would add "State rules"—is another reminder of the multi-faceted character of government:

"This 'double-tiered' structure of policy bargaining is a characteristic of all the Nordic mass democracies. In each country the process of democratization brought about a doubling of efforts of mobilization; the development of mass parties was paralleled by the buildup of member-based interest organizations in one sector after the other of the social structure...In a later phase, in most countries from the 1930s onward, at least the largest of the organizations entered into regular bargaining networks and were increasingly coopted into public consultative bodies, boards, commissions, and committees."¹²

While Rokkan's observation has become common wisdom and accordingly been put to use in analyses of contemporary politics, there is nothing that makes it inappropriate in a retrospective sense: why should we

not suspect corporate interests of having been politically active during the nineteenth century, a century which faced the advent of railways, to mention but one of the many technological innovations with profound political implications? True, those who fought for having their town integrated with the national railway network, or other goods and services controlled by government, did not know of how to employ citizen action committees in furthering the cause. However, if these webs of industrial tycoons, bankers, engineers, and military officers of the late 19th century were still around they would hardly be surprised to learn from political scientists that there is no empirical evidence to uphold the idea of a linear relationship between the membership strength of organized interests and their record of successful operations vis-à-vis government.

The message behind this is that we should be expecting different kinds of milestones to appear along Scandinavia's road to 1933; it is certainly more to this chronicle than the extension of the vote and introduction of parliamentarism. Chart 1 serves as a check-list of various thresholds in the development of unitary government. The chart uses well-known Rokkanian concepts,¹³ but aims at extending them also to include the sphere of the functional-corporate channel of democracy.

First, however, it must not be forgotten that ultimate political legitimacy rests with the State. It rules. But, unless qualified as to the context and content of State decision-making, this is not a very informative observation. At this tentative stage, the double-pointed arrows in Chart 1 linking the State to the two types of governance merely indicate how the initiative in the governmental process was gradually removed from the State in favor of both corporate and parliamentary interests.

Since Scandinavia's transition from oligarchy to democracy in the representational aspect is amply discussed elsewhere,¹⁴ it is sufficient to comment on the upper box in Chart 1, which deals with the economy and its political organization. Questions to be asked are, e.g., to what extent and intensity did the State in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden try to maintain control over the spread of free enterprise and the liberation of labor in the wake of the Industrial Revolution? As for incorporation, it must be determined whether the

abolishment of the guild system meant any substantial change in the organization of the economy or if new associations—and trade unions—were simply erected on the basis of the old guilds. This is also where the problem of mass recruitment should be analyzed. Under the heading of 'representation' we ask if new agricultural and industrial societies and trade unions must join the already existing ones in order to gain a position of influence among the national federations. Finally, the perfection of the functional-corporate government is referred to as that point at which the various interests come together to establish independent fora for resolving their conflicts, collective bargaining being the foremost example. Whenever united, the employers' federations, trade unions, and farming co-ops are in a position to put the State under heavy pressure.

Thus unitary government becomes an appropriate term in describing the ideal-type situation prevalent in Scandinavia after 1933.

Preliminaries: Model


What, then, explains the variation in the process toward, and perfection of, unitary government among the three Scandinavian countries?

Standard textbooks in methodology tell us that the variance in the dependent variable cannot be accounted for by invariable independent factors. Nevertheless, these similar features of the Scandinavian societies are not to be overlooked: none of the three countries have been occupied by foreign troops; all concluded a successful Reformation whereupon the State-Church and Monarchy helped legitimize each other; all escaped feudalism and were located outside the European city-belt; Denmark and Sweden represented two old nation-concepts, and none of the countries had exceptional difficulties in making territory and culture overlap so as to form homogeneous entities.¹⁵ These characteristics, matters of paramount importance in analyses of Continental macro-history, do indeed exert impact on Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish state- and nation-building, but only when qualified to fit the Scandinavian scale of the crisis junctures. So, when reduced to a lesser format, Norway has fought a struggle for independence from Denmark and Sweden; all three countries have ex-

perienced religious sectarianism of relevance for politics; to varying degree all three had a large portion of people living under near-feudal conditions; both Denmark and Norway had cities heavily exposed to the international market; and all three had been engaged in conflicts over national supremacy outside today's territorial borders.

It is obvious, however, that the political conflicts caused by the cleavages and issues identified above were of a too transient nature to serve as permanent units of analysis. While interesting as part of the documentation of Scandinavia's political trajectory, the way in which the problem of religious sectarianism was addressed and pacified in the institutionalized process only lend piecemeal knowledge of the origins of unitary government.

Instead, the relative simplicity of the Scandinavian societies in terms of religious, cultural, and national homogeneity encourages us to arrange the analysis according to confrontations along the economic dimension, i.e., class is the single best analytical level for this purpose. After all, it was on the basis of consensus among classes, both within the representational-territorial and functional-corporate channels of democracy, that unitary government was said to have been established. The way in which the class interests were mobilized and brought to bear on Scandinavian politics may be summarized in a figure, which should be duplicated for as many classes as seems reasonable:



This side of what is meant to be seen as a pyramid, and which is equally applicable to corporate interests and political parties, contains six common topics in the study of organized mass democracy. The diagram helps structure the analysis and conserve space. A few comments are in order. Point 2 raises the problem of which class definition is the most distinct and discriminatory. Parsimony requires a limited number of classes at the expense of possible overlap with other social groups. For instance, Norway and Sweden have had a large number of smallholders seasonally employed as workers within the forestry and construction industry. Point 4 concerns the incidences of organized factionalization within organizations and parties. Point 5 takes on the question whether some organizations or parties have been excluded by other members of the same category, whereas point 6 raises the problem of which organizations and parties control power enough to make and unmake coalitions and agreements. Finally, the ideal-type picture of the civil-servant government is symbolized by placing it above rather than within society at large, i.e., where unitary government is to be found.

Preliminaries: Design

Scandinavian historiography has left a rich collection of monographs on where, when, how, and why various classes organized themselves to become partaker in public life. The documentation is especially voluminous for points 3,4, and 5 in the figure above. Our concern, however, is with those who lost (point 1 above), while at the same time ignoring political runaways and pathetic eccentrics. Emphasis will be placed on movements, irrespective of size, deliberately hesitant to let themselves be adopted as a more or less well-mannered member of the family behind the unitary government. Why those who lost? In an oblique sort of way this design throws light on what was to become mainstream Scandinavian politics and ultimately provide the cornerstones of unitary government. Second, a perspective like this should contribute to the understanding of contemporary politics, e.g., the likelihood of alternative movements being accommodated or aborted in confrontations with the unitary government of today. While

this is an issue which goes well beyond the empirical ambitions of this project, it may serve as a healthful check of whether the concept 'unitary government' ever was a correct approximation in the first place. If a case can be made of Scandinavian government's openness to all new group and issue formations pushing for a position as an insider, there is always reason in revisiting our models and rephrasing our topics about, e.g., the future legitimacy of the welfare experiment.¹⁶

Five concrete phenomena of the period 1815-1933 will be singled out for empirical analyses: Scandinavianism, the emigration, anarchism, and the explorers as examples of political exit; and changes in central government before 1919 as part of the conditions for the thorough restructuring of government from 1933 onwards (see Chart 2). The arguments in favor of choosing these topics read as follows:


(1) Yes, the Scandinavian urban middle-class never managed to carve out a political niche of its own and was therefore later assimilated by both the Conservative and Social Democratic parties,¹⁷ but what if the Pan-Scandinavianist movement and the ideas of 1848 had registered success instead of fading away? Or, why was it that organized liberalism in Scandinavia did not survive World War I?

(2) Yes, the Scandinavian peasantry was spared from feudalism and therefore managed to organize itself into strong co-ops as well as parties, but what if, first, liberalism had become a viable force in society, and the mass emigration to North America had not relieved Scandinavia of its hordes of landless poor? Or, why was it that agrarianism in Scandinavia has survived until this day?

(3) Yes, the Scandinavian working-class lost its revolutionary zeal at an early stage and was therefore to become the source of the world's strongest Social Democracy, but what if, first, liberalism had become a viable force in society, second, there had been no overseas emigration, and anarchism (syndicalism) had secured lasting influence among the working-class? Or, why was it that Social Democracy in Scandinavia managed to avoid serious factionalization?

(4) Yes, the Scandinavian bourgeoisie was soon controlled by its moneyed sections and was therefore to prove openminded to negotiations and compromises with its main adversary, but what if, first, liberalism

Chart 2: Summary of the Empirical Foci as Part of the Analysis of the Origins of Scandinavian Political Consensus.



5. Changes in the structure of central government before 1919

had become a viable force in society, second, there had been no overseas emigration, third, anarchism had secured lasting influence among the working-class, and the bourgeoisie had engaged itself in the race for colonies instead of employing explorers as a substitute for imperial grandeur? Or, why is it that Conservatism in Scandinavia lost its dogmatism so early?

(5) Yes, the Scandinavian civil-servant estate resigned its position as the impartial and predictive custodian of central government and therefore lowered the barrier against, first, parliamentary government and, second, corporate government. But, was the civil-servant estate ever in full control of central government, i.e., impartial and predictive, and did it ever lose its influence and vulnerability vis-à-vis the other two centers of power?

How do these questions bear upon the italicized question on page two above, i.e., why, between 1919 and 1933, Scandinavian politics changed from that of confrontation to consensus subsequently paving the way for unitary government?

First, the analyses will show how, by alienating elements—people and/or ideas—likely to cause dissension in the years ahead, various class interests were helped in their mobilization, organization, and representation of their subjects (cf., points 2 through 6 in the figure on page eight above).

Second, in its main contours, this organizational structure was largely laid by the end of the First World War. And since this was a time of severe political turbulence in the European theater, the first encounters among the different interests ended in a clash, most evidently in the functional-corporate channel of democracy. In the course of the twenties, a decade which meant substantial losses of members among many organized interests,¹⁸ the leaderships of the trade unions, employers' federation, and the agricultural co-ops gradually began to reconcile themselves with the thought of a dialogue across corporate barriers.

Finally, when Scandinavia faced the Great Depression and the extremist political ideas which followed in the backwater of the crisis the three countries already possessed an organizational framework suitable enough to be employed as instruments in implementing the Silent Crisis Agreements. For instance, the primary economy was legislated out of the market and into a system in

which the farmers themselves took care of marketing, distribution, and financing of their products. Similar arrangements were designed for handicraft. This neo-mercantilism in the miniature-scale format, i.e., government handing over legislative power to organizations, was inappropriate in dealing with the plight of the working-class. So, in order to provide organized labor with a jobs program the parliaments in Scandinavia arrived at the Red-Green Crisis Agreements, which in the process provided the farmers with additional subsidies on top of their recently acquired neo-mercantilist shelter. A very straightforward test of what the events of 1933 meant for organized interests in Scandinavia is to look into their membership records; before war broke out some organizations had doubled, trebled, even quadrupled their membership, and that in the course of six years.¹⁹

From 1933 onwards, if not earlier, it was apparent that the governmental system of Scandinavia had come a long way from the constitutionalist's textbook perspective on how the State was ruled. A very blatant example of how the civil-servants, and Parliament itself, were deprived of power was the laws which placed a mandate in the hands of agricultural interests to make membership in co-ops mandatory for the farmers and fishermen. No wonder then, that these programs were accused of being unconstitutional by those who were opposed to the crisis policies of the Depression years.

Conclusions

This research outline aims at suggesting avenues along which to travel in order to fulfill these objectives:

First and foremost, a contribution to the documentation of the origins of Scandinavian political consensus. For this purpose the outline employs a few points of departure, of which the first is that the year 1933 signifies the definite turn to the perfection of unitary government, which is defined as the amalgamation of civil-servant, parliamentary, and corporate government. Unitary government is not an absolute novelty after 1933, however, as its origins goes back to previous overlapping of the three types of government. In other words, any notion of a sequential progress of the governmental format in Scandinavia must be ruled out and subjected to empirical

inquiry.

For this purpose, the most fruitful way of arranging the analysis is to use classes as units, onto which we address questions about the background of their successful organization both within the representational-territorial and functional-corporate channels of democracy. One of the answers to this story is the way in which Scandinavian classes were purified through the alienation and exit of aspirations and people likely to obstruct the drive toward mass mobilization and hierarchical perfection of the classes. Chart 2 contains a proposal of which kinds of exit were important for the future status of the four major classes in society.

Notes:

1. Cf., Francis G. Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: RKP, 1978), and my review of the book in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 2 (NS), 1979.
2. The most well-known of them all, Marquis Childs, visited Scandinavia already before WW II, see his Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).
3. However, Roland Huntford was a pioneer in this field, see his The New Totalitarians (London: Allen Lane, 1971). For the most recent vogue of critical monographs, see, e.g., Mogens Berendt, Tilfældet Sverige (København: Chr Erichsens, 1983), Marianne Alopæus, Drablad av Sverige (Uppsala: Brombergs, 1983), and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Svensk höst (Stockholm: Dagens Nyheter, 1982) and the same author's diagnosis of Norway, Norsk utakt (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1984).
4. Cf., Stein Kuhnle, Velferdsstatens utvikling. Norge i komparativt perspektiv (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983).
5. Cf., Ulf Lindström, Fascism in Scandinavia 1920-40 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell Int'l, 1985), Chs 3-4.
6. Ibid., Ch 7.
7. Ibid., Ch 4.
8. For 1919, see, e.g., William M. Lafferty, Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), and for 1933, e.g., Lindström, op. cit.
9. Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin, "Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe," in Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin (eds.), The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982).
10. For this topic see, e.g., Francis Sejersted, Demokrati og rettsstat (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1984) and Ulf Torgersen, "Inntresseorganisasjonene—partifundament eller partikonkurrent?" Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Nr. 4, 1984.
11. Pär-Erik Back, Sammanslutningarnas roll i politiken 1870-1910 (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1967), p. 222.
12. Stein Rokkan, "The Growth and Structuring of Mass Politics," in Erik Allardt, et al. (eds.), Nordic Democracy (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab, 1981), pp. 76-7. The emphasis, which is added, serves to highlight the hazards of placing too much weight on membership as a determinant of corporate interests' position vis-à-vis government, cf., Back's arguments (note 11 above).
13. Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).
14. Cf., Lafferty, op. cit., pp. 166-174 with emphasis on organized labor, and Øyvind Østerud, Agrarian Structure and Peasant Politics in Scandinavia (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978), pp. 213-15 with emphasis on peasantry.

15. Rokkan, "The Growth..," op. cit.
16. About the accuracy of models, see the disciplinary self-critique discussed in Johan P. Olsen, Organized Democracy (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983).
17. Each of these five theses contains two introductory statements, of which the latter is to be seen as a consequence of the former. For reason of conserving space, these theses are not elaborated upon here. Generally speaking, they belong to the repertoire of common wisdom in the Scandinavian community of historians and political scientists. This, of course, is no conclusive evidence of the accuracy of the observations. For the moment, however, we will take them at face value and accordingly not support them with references to scholarly accounts. As for the statements following the introductions and the layout of Chart 2, the present author assume full responsibility.
18. Lindström, op. cit., Ch 4 (the tables in particular).
19. Ibid.

POLITICAL FAIRNESS, AT THE LIMITS OF POSSIBILITY

Paper presented at the workshop "Models in Comparative Study of Political Systems", ECPR Joint Session of Workshop, Barcelona, 25-30 March, 1985 .

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1. Introduction

Within the fuzzy frame of social choice and aggregation of preferences, voting theory, taking its roots in our history [6], [7], had the great advantage of being confronted with numerous concrete situations, conflicts, or real hopes. From these collisions between theory and practice, appeared firm concepts, clear questions and collective intuition of the goals to pursue : equity, sovereignty, rationality, etc... We set ourselves, in this context, in the classical situation of an election involving n candidates (n political parties, ...) on which an arbitrary finite number N of judges (electors ...) are to give some individual advice. From their intimate and personal preferences, they will be asked to derive one answer to the vote according to a particular given rule (to choose their favorite candidate, to establish a ranking, ...) and from the set of votes must emerge the outcome of the vote, the social choice, the establishment of a Parliament, the nomination of a President ... The comparative study of different approaches of this subject (for example see references [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [8] [12] [13] [14] [15] [17]) leads us to some reflexions about the initial directions taken by the different works in this field, and about the choice of hypotheses, even the implicit ones. The following raises some of these questions, and far from ultimately proposing a "new best rule of aggregation", has the modest ambition of inspiring to the reader the slightly conflicting desire to make out the pros and cons of each instrument, for each music !


Some technical, historical, critical or anecdotic commentaries were banished from the text to ease its reading; they are grouped at the end of the paper in the form of notes.

The reader needing more thorough references should refer himself to a bibliography by Monjardet [19] and a survey by Vincke [22] .

2. Opinions, votes, outcomes

In proportional representation systems, each voter gives his vote to one party, the percentages obtained by each party are then computed and the apportionment of seats in whole numbers is performed in a way which is as proportional as possible to the scores earned. Balinski and Young [3] published an excellent work on the subject, where a great number of methods can be found, along with the properties that characterise them.

In the case of three parties A, B, C the outcome of the vote can be represented geometrically with the help of Viviani's theorem :



As (A, B, C) is an equilateral triangle, the sum $a+b+c$ is constant, independently of the choice of P inside the triangle.



The generalization of this theorem to n -dimensional simplexes (with $n+1$ vertices) allows to extend this representation to the general case (for an arbitrary number $n+1$ of parties). As each vertex of the simplex corresponds to a party, any point inside the simplex represents an electoral outcome : the ratio defined by the (euclidian) distance from the point to the face opposite to a party, divided by the height of the simplex, is the percentage of votes earned by that party.

For a given number of seats to be apportioned to the parties, we can analyse the different fair apportionment rules, i.e. the different ways of proposing a division of the simplex into regions "centered" at the points corresponding to integer distributions (1).


Two classical examples :

Hamilton's rule (greatest remainders) (1)

Jefferson's or d'Hondt's rule (a divisor method) (1)



This allows us to notice an unavoidable paradox (Steinhaus [21]), whatever the rounding technique, and thus the apportionment method chosen : when the number of parties is larger than 2, it is possible for a party to increase its percentage of votes (① → ②) and nevertheless lose a seat. This leads to think over the scope of the axiom introduced by Arrow [1] under the name "positive association of values" (2). Indeed, each personal opinion of the electors can be seen as a ranking of the parties, the electoral rules (and the aggregation of these opinions) necessitating that only the party ranked first by each voter will be taken into account in order to establish a collective ranking ; this ranking is obviously derived from the percentage earned by each party. So it might happen that the rank of a party increases in the individual rankings and yet decreases in the collective one. For the usual apportionment methods above, this necessarily implies that the individual rankings of at least one other party moves in the same direction, and thus the axiom holds. Yet, we show a non classical example (figure) where the axiom is clearly insulted (from 1 to 2 we have $A'B'C_V$).



Remarks and preliminary conclusions

a) Starting with information poorer than a ranking, we reach an information richer than a ranking : with only the "number one's" of all the voters, the aggregation leads to a collective cardinal ranking, which adds to the ordinal ranking an information concerning the intensity of the preferences. This dissymmetry between the source of the message and its synthesis can be criticised.

b) The point inside the simplex which represents the outcome of the vote can be seen as the barycentre of the simplex weighted in each vertex by the number of votes earned by the corresponding party (3).

This shows the illusive euclidian metric nature of our aggregation. The imbedding of the simplex in an affine space R^n and the affine notion of centre of gravity are sufficient to define the outcome of the election. This point of view calls for comparison with aggregation concepts proposed by different authors like Condorcet [7] , Guilbaud [11] , Kemeny [15] , etc...

3. Voters' cardinal rankings

Let us imagine that each voter is invited to give an individual cardinal ranking of the parties in the following way : each one will divide 100 BF (the "price" of his vote !) as he likes between the competitors. Each of these votes is represented by a point inside the simplex of the parties, and their aggregation is obtained as before, by taking the barycentre of the individual votes. Besides the fact that this system allows to shade the choices, it presents a pleasant symmetry between the initial data and the outcome of their aggregation.

What are the properties of this electoral system ? (in particular, where does it stand with regard to the now classical axioms introduced by Arrow and his followers ? It obviously verifies :

- rationality (of the voters and the global choice) : the preferences are translated into complete and transitive relations.
- neutrality (with regard to the parties) : the system awards to each party an identical role.
- equality (of voters, or anonymity) : the system awards to each voter an identical role (this eliminates dictatorship).

This property can even be reinforced : the system contains effectivity of the role of each voter : if one vote is altered, the outcome of the ballot is necessarily modified (4).

Let us prove that the system also verifies unanimity (in the Pareto sense) : if all the voters give more weight to x than to y , it will be the same in the outcome. Indeed, each vote preferring x to y will be represented by a point of the simplex situated in the half-space including x determined by the hyperplane joining the middle of interval $[x, y]$ to all the other vertices of the simplex. By linearity of the aggregation (barycentre), the outcome must also place itself in the same half-space.

On the other hand, independence (in the Arrow-sense (5)) is not satisfied. It is sufficient to consider 3 parties and 2 electors giving respectively votes (90, 8, 2) and (0, 20, 80) : if we do not take party A into account, the relative proportions for B and C are 80 % - 20 % and 20 % - 80 %, which would result in giving the same to B and C. But aggregation on all 3 parties gives a different outcome (45, 14, 41), far away from equality between B and C - and rightly so ! Indeed, aggregation based on pairwise comparisons totally neglects the absolute importance really granted to B and C together : only 10 % of the total for the first voter, as opposed to 100 % for the second. At this stage, imposing this axiom can rightly seem abusive, as it would lead to give as much importance to a ranking the voter considers principal as to what is, in his eyes, only a ranking of leftover crumbs ... One can also wonder what fundamental reasons prevent this axiom from being verified for this particular electoral rule. The latter example helps in understanding that the essential reason is the relative aspect of the preferences, given in percentages.

This leads us to propose a second electoral rule.

Each voter will give a cardinal ranking of the parties as follows : he will divide a sum he chooses between 0 and 100 BF, amongst the competitors (the amount really dealt being a sort of measure of his interest for the vote). Each vote can be represented by a point of an affine space \mathbb{R}^n , of dimension

n for n parties, inside the bounds described by inequalities


6.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} X_i \geq 0 \quad \forall_i = 1, 2, \dots, n \\ \sum_{i=1}^n X_i \leq 1 \end{array} \right\}, \text{ which}$$


corresponds to the space limited by a simplex with $n + 1$ vertices. Again, the barycentre of all the votes cast defines the outcome of their aggregation. This second electoral system satisfies the 4 properties of rationality, neutrality, equality, unanimity as before, and also the independence property. Indeed, to cut off the performances of 2 parties from the rest needs the following projection : in the plane determined by the 2 parties and the origin, the set of votes cast is projected parallel to the subspace of the other parties : $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \rightarrow (x_1, x_2, 0 \dots 0)$ for example. As the barycentre is an affine notion, it is preserved by parallel projection. One may be surprised that such a simple system can lead to a cardinal collective ranking verifying simultaneously these fairness requirements (and others ?!), while a well-known theorem proved the impossibility of obtaining this with ordinal rankings, even though these are "contained" in the cardinal rankings. We show that it is precisely erasing information on the intensity of individual preferences that gives birth to incompatibility between requirements.

The hyperplanes of ties between two parties (through the middle of the edge joining the 2 corresponding vertices and the $n-2$ other vertices) divide the simplex into $n!$ regions (the complete orders). For 3 parties :

3 parties (system 1)




3 parties (system 2)



If the information retained limits itself to each voter's ordinal ranking, this means that one knows the region in which the vote lands, but without being able to point out its exact position inside the region. It can then be proven, not only that the exact position of the centre of gravity can no more be found, but also that even the region where it can be situated may vary, for identical sets of voters ordinal rankings.

Example : a first elector votes (A B C), a second votes (B C A).




The result of the aggregation of their two votes can, according to the case, correspond to a ranking (A B C), (B A C) or (B C A) with eventual ties.

In other words, our aggregation no longer ends in the establishment of a ranking.

An idea in order to avoid the deadlock, is to predetermine a supposed "point of landing" within each region, while respecting the symmetry of the parties (neutrality) :


choice of the first point ; the others follow.



Joining these points together, we obtain a $n - 1$ dimensional polyhedron, called semi-regular permutohedron (Guilbaud [12]), the vertices of which are weighted by the number of electors having cast the corresponding ranking. The ranking in correspondance with the region in which the barycentre falls can be chosen as the collective ranking. Nevertheless, it is indispensable to note that

this outcome depends upon the choice of each region's representative point, and, as a consequence, that this choice must be motivated by the circumstances of the election and not by considerations of simplicity or of mathematical elegance.

E.g. we can give all the importance to the "number ones" (the simplex vertices are the representative points), which brings us back to proportional representation. In another direction, we can choose to predetermine each region's representative so as to obtain a regular permutohedron ; this means, in the case of 3 parties that we award to the "second" place in the ranking the same importance than the average of that awarded to the "first" and the "last". Or, in metric terms, that the distance between (A B C) and (A C B), is equal to that between (A B C) and (B A C), which is not an harmless hypothesis : the reversal of the two ranked first or the two ranked last does not always have the same impact.



Though some scoring systems (6a), awarding decreasing points according to the place in the ranking, may have this property, it is far from always being so, and one could suspect that such a choice might be motivated more by mathematical habit and taste for regularity !

Accordingly, as soon as we point out the hypothesis which underlies the regularity of the permutohedron, we must keep it in memory when we consider derived or equivalent models (6b).

In short, without any intention to put to trial a choice amongst others, we find important to emphasize our habits of mathematician aesthetic fans : a mathematical choice is a real choice, and must be conscious, owned, motivated - and free from dictatorship or imposed taboos !

4. Physician, heal thyself !

As you wouldn't trust a healer who wouldn't use his own medicine, we have to ask ourselves : what about our models ? Shouldn't our proceeding also be contested ? Our aggregation is based upon the notion of barycentre ; is this choice natural or imposed ? Arbitrary or motivated ? The question asked is the following : N points (P_i) are given in a n -dimensional real affine coordinate space R^n (the individual opinions, cardinal rankings) and we seek a function (F) which maps them onto a point of the same space (the collective opinion, collective cardinal ranking).

It seems natural to require for F some properties :

- A. $F(P_1, P_2 \dots P_N)$ is symmetrical with respect to the P_i 's : we want equality amongst the electors.
- B. F is invariant under translations and homotheties of R^n : the choice of the origin and units of space R^n is irrelevant for the outcome.
- C. If $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} F(P_1, P_2 \dots P_N) = P \\ \text{and} \\ F(P_1', P_2 \dots P_N) = P' \end{array} \right\}$ then $F\left(\frac{P_1+P_1'}{2}, P_2 \dots P_N\right) = \frac{P+P'}{2}$:

F is proportionally linked to the opinion of each voter.

It can be proven (7) that the only function F that satisfies these 3 criteria simultaneously is the barycenter of $P_1, P_2 \dots P_N$.


This is the motivation of our choice, but won't prevent you, we hope, from discussing it !

5. Notes

(1) Apportionment rules

For given percentages of votes for each party, the apportionment of seats is not uniquely determined, except for exceptional cases where the quota for each party is integer. In the other cases, the corresponding points belong to regions, usually "centered" around these integer distributions. It is natural to ask that regions which only differ by the transfer of one seat be contiguous. As soon as more than 2 parties are involved, whatever the chosen partition, one can't avoid the paradox of a party increasing its percentage of votes and yet losing a seat.

Already in the particular case of 3 parties :



from P to P' (to P''), party A increases its percentage of votes (by a quantity ϵ however little it may be) ; to avoid the loss of one seat, the border of the region centered in $(a+1, b, c)$ should not be crossed by any of the two segments PP' and PP'' , and thus should form an angle $\geq 180^\circ$, at each meeting point of 3 regions. For this to be true for those 3 regions simultaneously is clearly impossible as $3 \times 180^\circ > 360^\circ$. Another proof is given in Balinski and Young [3]).

Amongst the most often used methods, the oldest one is the greatest remainders rule due to Hamilton, which corresponds for 3 parties to a paving of the triangle with regular hexagons. Unfortunately, this method leads to the following paradox : the relative percentage of two parties can vary in one direction while the distribution of seats between them moves in the opposite direction. In order to avoid this paradox, the apportionment rule must be a divisor method, which leads to cover the triangle by hexagons, the edges of which pass through the vertices of the triangle.


One may give the following definition for a divisor method : for a given rounding rule $[\]_a$, the apportionment of k seats is performed by seeking a real divisor d such that the summation of the quotients

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left[\frac{V_i}{d} \right]_a = k, \text{ where } V_i \text{ is the number of votes obtained by party } i.$$

(2) Principle of positive association between individual and social values

A ranking on a set E is a binary relation on E which is reflexive, complete and transitive ; it allows thus a possibility for ties, while an order on E does not, since it must also respect the antisymmetry condition. The axiom of "positive association of values" is defined by Arrow [1] in a way equivalent to the following : if, through 2 electoral ballots (by rankings), each of the voters maintains his ranking, with that eventual exception that one given party may improve its position, then the collective ranking is not allowed to retrograde this party


behind any of those who were precedingly strictly after him.



The point P is the barycenter of the vertices A, B, C ... of the simplex, weighted by masses a, b, c ... Indeed, P is the barycenter of the barycenter (P_{AB}) of A and B (with masses a and b) and the other vertices ; for 3 parties, we have

$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{PA_0}{PB_0} = \frac{PB'}{PA'} = \frac{P_{AB}A}{P_{AB}B}$$

Therefore, our representation does not necessitate a metric. Each point P inside a simplex A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n is the barycenter of points A_i weighted by masses $k \cdot m_i$, where the m_i are non-negative real numbers adding up to one. In practice, the percentage (m_i) of votes earned by a party i can be affinely measured by the value of the quotient $\frac{PP_i}{A_i P_i}$, where P_i is the point of intersection of line $A_i P$ and the face opposite to A_i .



(4) Elimination of indifferent individuals

This axiom, defined by Arrow [2] deals with the role of voters conceding a same utility to all the alternatives in play ; it asks for the outcome of the vote to be independant of the values taken by these utilities.

As far as the elector has the liberty to abstain from voting, it is not obvious that the electors under debate are "indifferent" and that the amount of utility that they award without discrimination to all the competitors is meaningless. Our "effectivity" property attenuates the

strength of the latter axiom, allowing the concerned voters to "center" the outcome of the vote if they wish. In this way we avoid a paradoxical situation which could proceed from the "elimination of indifferents", i.e. that an elector of extreme opinions could force his point of view to be victorious against all the other voters whose moderate opinions would have taken the shape of a tie between all the competitors.

(5) Binary independance (or binary relevance)

The axiom to which we refer here comes from the idea of pairwise comparisons, already carried out by the precursors Borda and Condorcet. It is actually commonly formulated as follows : the collective decision to rank x before y depends only on the restrictions of the individual rankings to the two alternatives x and y .

Though it was the target of many criticisms, this axiom with Keeney [14] holds as the "weakest" of Arrow's axiomatique, has nevertheless stayed in style in contemporary literature and the principle of pairwise comparisons still has defensors such as Young [23], Michaud [17], Fishburn [10], ...

(6) Around the permutohedron

(6a) The scoring system proposed by Borda [6] gives out points to each of the n parties according to their position in the voter's individual ranking : the party ranked first received $n-1$ points, the second $n-2$, etc... the last receiving no points. For each party, the sum of the points assigned to it by each voter is computed and the parties are ranked according to their totals, in decreasing order.

This scoring system can of course be generalised as, in particular, it is commonly performed in sports (points ranking in the Tour de France, Decathlon, ...), assigning regressive bonuses according to the position obtained but with variable intervals (for example, the first receives 10 points, the second 5, the third 2, the fourth 1, and 0 for the others). As long as the set of values to assign by each voter is given (and represents the ranks), the sum is constant and we are thus within the frame of our model 1, where each region of the simplex is represented by one of its points (the localisation of which is determined by the choice

of the values assigned to each rank). As an illustration of the various uses of scoring systems, we cannot resist to the pleasure of telling the following "Belgian story" : an important representative of our national press proposed to its readers a contest where they had to rank 10 press-photographies according to their preferences, and assign to them 9, 8, 7, ..., 0 points. Each reader's opinion was thus "summarised" by a number of 10 different digits. An (independant !) jury of journalists had sovereignly determined (how ?!) the "good" ranking i.e. the "good" 10 digit number. The winner(s) would be the one(s) whose number was arithmetically as close as possible to the number chosen by the jury ... How do you like this ?

- (6b) The rule proposed by Condorcet to avoid the famous cyclic majorities problem (A preferred to B preferred to C preferred to A) can be exposed as follows. Choose, as a collective order \mathcal{C} , the one(s ?) which is supported by the largest number of votes - this "support" being equal to the number of agreements (in pairwise comparisons) between the order chosen by each elector and the order \mathcal{C} , added over all the pairs and all the individual orders. For further details, see Michaud [17].

The method that we'll call Kemeny [15]-Kendall[16]'s, equivalent to the latter, is exposed in metric terms : the distance d_k between two complete orders is defined as the sum of disagreements in their pairwise comparisons, which is the same as the number of elements in symmetric difference (Δ) between the two orders (considered as subsets of the cartesian product of the set of candidats by itself) ; let us recall that Kendall's coefficient is obtained by an affine transformation of d_k , mapping 0 (total agreement or identical orders) onto + 1 and $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$ (total disagreement or opposite orders) onto - 1.

The distance d_k between two orders may be seen, on the regular permutohedron, as the minimal number of edges connecting the two corresponding vertices. On the other hand, on a semi regular permutohedron associated with a scoring method, the euclidian distance between two vertices is equivalent to Spearman's [20] distance on the corresponding complete orders.

(7) Theorem of the Centre of gravity

Let F be a symmetrical function of N points in the n -dimensional real affine space which maps any set of N points onto a point such that F is invariant for the dilatations (translations and homotheties).

Moreover assume that if \bar{P}_1 is the midpoint of P_1 and P'_1 , then the midpoint of $P = F(P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N)$ and $P' = F(P'_1, P_2, \dots, P_N)$ is $F(\bar{P}_1, P_2, \dots, P_N)$. Now we prove that such a function F is uniquely determined ; it is the function which maps any n -tuples of points on its barycentre.

For the proof we shall use coordinates and thus the function F reduces to a set of n numerical functions f_i , $i=1, \dots, n$, each of them satisfying :

1) $f(x_1, \dots, x_N)$ is symmetrical

2a) $f(x_1 + a, \dots, x_N + a) = f(x_1, \dots, x_N) + a$

2b) $f(ax_1, \dots, ax_N) = af(x_1, \dots, x_N)$

3) $\frac{1}{2}[f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N) + f(x'_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)] = f(\frac{x_1+x'_1}{2}, x_2, \dots, x_N)$

Using 2b, 3 may be rewritten as :

3') $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N) + f(x'_1, x_2, \dots, x_N) = f(x_1 + x'_1, 2x_2, \dots, 2x_N)$

We shall use induction on j for functions with j non zero arguments.

First $f(x_1, 0, \dots, 0) = x_1 f(1, 0, \dots, 0)$; let $k = f(1, 0, \dots, 0)$, $k \neq 0$ by 2a, and we get $f(x_1, 0, \dots, 0) = kx_1$.

Using 1, we then know the value of any function with j non zero arguments.

Assume $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_j, 0, \dots, 0) = k(x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_j)$.

Using repeatedly 3', we compute the following expression :

$f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) + f(0, x_2, \dots, x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) + f(x_1, 0, 2x_3, \dots, 2x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) + \dots + f(2^{i-2}x_1, \dots, 2^{i-2}x_{i-1}, 0, 2^{i-1}x_{i+1}, \dots, 2^{i-1}x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) + f(2^{j-1}x_1, \dots, 2^{j-1}x_j, 0, \dots, 0)$ and

we get as result :

$f(2^j x_1, 2^j x_2, \dots, 2^j x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) = 2^j f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0)$.

It follows that $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{j+1}, 0, \dots, 0) = k(x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_{j+1})$.

Finally using 2a we determine k :

$f(x_1 + a, x_2 + a, \dots, x_N + a) = k(x_1 + a + \dots + x_N + a) = k(x_1 + x_2, \dots, x_N) + Nka$

So $Nk = 1$ and $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N) = \frac{1}{N}(x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_N)$.

Q.E.D.

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The Popularity of the Government: Lagged Response or
Omitted Predictor?

Paper presented at the ECPR-session March 1985 in Barcelona

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THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL

In several countries there are fairly long time series from monthly polls concerning the electorate's support to the government in office. Under the assumption of the rational voter we should expect that the individual evaluates the government on the basis of how successful its policy is. The economy is an area of great concern, and two key indicators of the nation's economic performance are the level of unemployment and the rate of inflation. The hypothesis that suggests itself is thus that the popularity of the government is affected by changes in these two economic indicators. This idea has been tested in a large number of studies.¹⁾ The model specifications vary somewhat, but the basic form is:

$$(1) P_t = a + b U_{t-1} + c I_{t-1} + e_t$$

P_t is the percentage of people supporting the government at time t as measured by the polls, for example by the question: "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. X as Prime Minister?" Another indicator that is sometimes utilized refers to voting intention: "If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support?" U_{t-1} is the level of unemployment at time $t-1$ and I_{t-1} the rate of inflation. (The rationale of the distinct one month lag is that when the economic indicators are published, they refer to the preceding month.) The error term, e_t , comprises other factors affecting the government support, and sampling- and measurement errors. The parameters to be estimated are thus a , b and c . In most studies the estimates of b and c are significantly negative, as expected. Additional economic indicators are sometimes included as well, for instance disposable income.

The assumption of independent error terms is much less evident when time series are being analyzed than in the context of cross-sectional data. In the former case there are several reasons for assuming the presence of autocorrelated disturbances: measurement errors may well operate in the same direction at a number of successive points in time, an omitted predictor is likely to be serially correlated, and so forth. The presence of autocorrelated errors may severely distort the estimates (see Ostrom, 1978: 25-31). The standard errors will be underestimated, which can lead us to accept estimates which actually are insignificant. If the autocorrelation is due to an omitted predictor which happens to be correlated with an predictor that is included in the model -- a case that is far from unlikely -- the estimate of the latter predictor will be biased.

Usually some test (e.g., the Durbin-Watson d-test) accompanies the findings, but not always is the outcome of the test heeded: that is, in spite of the test indicating autocorrelated errors, the estimates are accepted at face value instead of inducing some repecification of the model (see e.g., Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970: 43-106).

One possible cause of autocorrelation, in additon to those mentioned above, is that a lag structure has been omitted. It is conceivable that an increase in the unemployment level, for example, induces not only an instantaneous decrease in the popularity of the government, but that this effect endures for a longer period of time as well. If such a lag structure is omitted in the model, it will result in the residuals being autocorrelated.

In a study by Jonung and Wadensjö (1979), using Swedish data, it appeared that the residuals of a static model

(i.e., with no lagged effects) were strongly autocorrelated. When instead a dynamic model was estimated, the fit was much improved: R^2 increased and the autocorrelation almost disappeared.

The dynamic model which was estimated accords to a lag-scheme where the impact of a change in the predictor declines geometrically with the passage of time. If we for simplicity assume a model with one predictor only and no intercept, it can be written:

$$(2) P_t = b I_{t-1} + \lambda b I_{t-2} + \lambda^2 b I_{t-3} + \dots + \lambda^{j-1} b I_{t-j} + e_t$$

$0 < \lambda < 1$

In words, it is assumed that the individual has a memory, so that the popularity of the government is affected not only by the last month's rate of inflation, but by the inflation that has been prevailing in the past, too. The single month that counts most in this evaluation is the most recent one; the further back in time the month, the less weight will be attached to it. The rate with which the impact decreases depends on the value of λ -- the higher the value, the slower the decrease.

A model of this kind is usually referred to as a Koyck-model. In many situations it seems to be a plausible description of a dynamic process. It has one further advantage: it is easily shown that eq. (2) can be written in the following way, which facilitates the estimation:

$$(3) P_t = \lambda P_{t-1} + b I_{t-1} + u_t$$

That is, introducing the dependent variable, lagged one step, on the right-hand side reduces the large number of terms which makes eq.(2) impossible to estimate. The total effect of I_{t-1} , summed over time, will equal $b / (1 - \lambda)$. The only material difference

between eq.(2) and eq.(3) is the disturbance term. This will have consequences for the estimates, as will become evident presently, but we will not go into the statistical details here (see Jonhston, 1972).

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL - SIMULATION AND ESTIMATION

Although it may seem plausible that people's support to the government is affected by how the economy performs, and that changes in the support are gradual rather than immediate, there is room for objections which will lead us to ^{/outlining} an alternative model. The reasoning, and the subsequent empirical part, will refer to the time period 1967-1976 in Sweden, but the argumentation and results have much wider implications; indeed they pertain to the modelling of aggregate change in general.

To summarize what will follow, the issue to be pursued is: assume that the true model embraces a slowly changing determinant of government support, and that the impact of the economic factors is fairly weak and instantaneous only. How will this affect the estimates of a dynamic model where the slowly changing predictor has been omitted? By means of a simulation experiment, it will be demonstrated that the findings may well indicate marked lag effects, even though there are none, and that the impact of the economic indicators may be grossly overestimated. The treacherous point here is that the dynamic model appears to be an improvement of the static one (with the economic predictors included only) in two senses: theoretically, as it seems at least, but statistically, too, when assessed by the common tests: the autocorrelation may decrease to insignificance, while R^2 increases. However, when the model is submitted to some additional tests, the misspecification is clearly indicated. When these tests are applied to an empirical dynamic model, we get the same signs of misspecification.

But before detailing the simulation and the results from it, the model that will be taken as the alternative to the dynamic one will be outlined. The ambition here is not to elaborate a detailed model of the process at issue, for that too little is known anyhow. Rather, an if - what strategy will be applied: if the process has such and such properties, what will its statistical symptoms be as they appear from an estimated model? Can two processes with widely different properties yield similar statistical symptoms; in that case, how can we tell them apart?

Basic properties of the alternative model

But now to the substantive arguments underlying the model that will be proposed as an alternative to the dynamic one. The latter, to repeat, implies that the support to the government is significantly affected by the monthly changes in the level of unemployment and the rate of inflation. The impact of these economic indicators fades away with the passing of time but may well be felt during quite a long period. According to the estimates of Jonung and Wadensjö, it takes six months before the initial impact is halved.

There are at least three necessary conditions here, the fulfillment of which can be discussed: (i) changes in the economic indicators must somehow be perceived by a sufficient number of people, (ii) these changes must induce the response predicted from the rational voter conception, namely that an increase in the level of unemployment, e.g., leads to a decreased governmental support, and (iii) that the political (and economical) memory is long. In the discussion of these points, I will refer to the period March 1967 through September 1976 in Sweden, and to the time series used by Jonung and Wadensjö.

The level of unemployment, which refers to insured

industrial workers, was at a very low level during this period (mean = 1.81 per cent). Considering the fairly restricted range (0.80 - 3.30 per cent) and the modest changes from month to month, it may be asked to what degree this variation is noticed by the public. There are two sources of information: the news media and direct experience from one's work place and acquaintances. The unemployment figure that is published usually refers to the entire economy; this series is far from perfectly correlated with the series utilized, which pertains to industrial workers ($r = 0.66$). (The series concerning total unemployment was less efficient as predictor in Jonung and Wadensjö's study). Further, when figures on the unemployment situation are presented in the media, the comparison is often made with the same month last year, while the predictor refers to monthly changes. In addition, during a large part of the period the published figures are usually based on data from the labour force surveys, while the time series at issue is based on insurance statistics; the two series are not completely consistent.

There is the possibility that people experience changes in unemployment more directly. But if this is the operating mechanism the preferable indicator should pertain to total unemployment. It should also be noted that unemployment figures are affected not only by changes in the number of unemployed persons, but also by changes in the denominator, that is the number of people in the labour force or insured.²⁾

Changes in the rate of inflation is something most of us notice as consumers. However, the price indicator that is utilized does not refer to changes from month to month, but instead to the yearly percentage changes on a monthly basis

$$\text{i.e., } I_t = 100 \frac{(P_t - P_{t-12})}{P_{t-12}}, \text{ where } I_t \text{ is the rate of}$$

inflation, and P_t is the consumer price index. It may be doubted whether this kind of price changes is very salient. (Its correlation with the inflation rate from month to month -- $100(P_t - P_{t-1}) / (P_{t-1})$ -- is 0.53).

Now we will assume that at least some people notice the variation in the economic indicators at issue. What is their likely reaction with regard to government support? Considering that the Social Democratic Party was in office during the entire time period, it is not evident that an increase in unemployment elicits a uniform, negative response among the electorate. Some may think of the rising unemployment as a consequence of external factors outside governmental control (e.g., the world economy); further, people have more faith in a Social Democratic government than in a bourgeois one, when it comes to the maintenance of employment.³⁾ Hence, a rise in the level of unemployment may give rise to a split response, and it cannot be taken for granted that the net effect strongly disfavours a Social Democratic government. Increases in the rate of inflation are more likely to reduce the support, but here, too, external factor considerations may dampen the impact.

As to the existence of a lag period, and its length, it is difficult to advance any well founded hypothesis. If the changes in the economic indicators are barely noticeable, as has been suggested here, it seems somewhat farfetched to believe that they would have an impact that lasts for about a year. On the other hand, the stimulus underlying a change in political preferences may be quite weak, but once the change is made there is an inertia in changing back, even though the initial cause of the alteration has faded away.

Jonung and Wadensjö (1979: 349-50) note two exceptionally

large residuals which they can locate to specific political events. If economic changes would have prolonged effects, it is arguable that extraordinary political events should have that as well. From an ocular inspection of the time series on popularity it is difficult to determine whether there are distributed impacts of these random shocks. However, when modelling one of them (by means of a dummy variable) the authors do not assume any delayed response.

To summarize the above arguments, it does not seem evident that the economic variables should exert substantial and prolonged effects on the popularity of the government. An equally plausible hypothesis is that the impact is fairly weak and instantaneous only.

Nobody would contend that economic factors are the sole determinants of changes in government popularity. However, since there is little monthly data on other possible predictors, we cannot specify any alternative empirical model. Another strategy will be applied instead, where we simulate a model according to:

$$(4) SP_t = 40.0 - 2.5 U_{t-1} - 0.01 I_{t-1} - 0.5 N_t + e_t$$

The unemployment and inflation series are the authentic ones (which were used by Jonung and Wadensjö). The disturbance term e_t is white noise, while N_t is a simulated construct representing the neglected predictor. It is dominated by an upward trend, upon which random fluctuations are superimposed. Thus, N_t represents a determinant of the government support that changes gradually over time. Its feature resembles closely an index of political distrust, for which, however, there are only some few data points over time (Holmberg, 1981:167). The index is based on items in electoral polls which measure people's confidence in politicians

in general. As it seems, people's distrust in politicians has increased during the study period, and it is not unlikely that this general lack of faith has hit the politicians with most power (i.e., the government) in particular. The empirical basis for this hypothesis is quite fragile, however, and we can as well think of N_t as any slowly changing determinant (or the total of them), occupational structure, political currents, or the like. The point here is not to suggest the exact content of N_t , but instead: if a determinant of this feature does exist -- which is far from inconceivable -- what will happen to the estimates if it is omitted in our model? This is the issue to which we turn now.

Estimation of the simulated time series

As can be seen from eq.(4) the simulated model specifies immediate effects only (there is a distinct one-month lag for the economic factors, but no distributed effects). We could have specified a lag structure for N_t , but this is insignificant with regard to the point that will be demonstrated. As appears, an increase in the level of unemployment with one percentage point leads to a decrease in popularity with 2.5 percentage points. If the level of inflation last month is one per cent higher than it was twelve months earlier, is decided to pass without any marked consequences, whereas an increase in N with one unit is associated with a drop by 0.5 percentage points in support to the government.

We will now take our familiar role as the partly ignorant researcher. We then, in the vein of the rational voter tradition, specify the model:

$$(5) \quad S P_t = a + b U_{t-1} + c I_{t-1} + e_t$$

(SP signifies simulated popularity series.) The estimates are

significant and with the expected signs (see Table 1. The estimate of the intercept is not shown in the tables, since it is of less interest here). However, the significant autocorrelation of the residuals calls for some respecification. An omitted lag structure is thought to be the problem, and under the assumption of geometrically declining lag weights, we specify:

$$(6) \quad S P_t = a + \lambda S P_{t-1} + b U_{t-1} + c I_{t-1} + u_t$$

The fit now improves markedly; R^2 increases, but above all the crucial test for autocorrelated residuals leaves a satisfactory impression. Hence we report our findings: the long-term impact -- summed over the entire lag period -- of a one percentage increase in unemployment is a 9.62 percentage decrease in popularity ($\hat{b}/1 - \hat{\lambda}$). The corresponding estimate for inflation equals 1.24.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Testing the model

From the hindsight of having generated the series, we can see that the true values are grossly overestimated: the effect of unemployment 3.84 times and inflation 124 times. The researcher, of course, is unhappily unaware of this. Considering that the model performs excellently and yields highly significant estimates which accord with the predictions, he or she may well feel quite content. Assume, however, that some worry does arise; after all, the estimation of dynamic models is known to be a precarious venture. Hence, some further testing is decided.

Estimation of the model in differenced form

The first test will be to estimate the model in differenced form; that is, instead of analysing the level-variables we estimate

them after having taken the first difference: $\Delta SP_t = SP_t - SP_{t-1}$, and analogously for the predictors. The meaning of the coefficients is not effected if all variables are transformed in the same way, that is, their expected values remain unaltered. If eq.(6) is correct we should hence get compatible estimates after differencing. This is not the case, however; the magnitude of the estimates change, the impact of inflation becomes insignificant, and the lag-parameter estimate gets the sign reversed (Table 1). Particularly our earlier estimate of the lag-structure is seriously questioned, and we now turn to a device where it is specifically tested.

Regression on the weighted predictors

One reason for specifying a Koyck-lag is that the lagged endogenous variable will alone represent all those lagged values of the predictors: it is convenient and no observations need to be lost. But in this particular case we have data on past observations. We can thus construct predictors that are weighted sums of current and past observations:

$$(7) W U_{t-1} = w_0 U_{t-1} + w_1 U_{t-2} + w_2 U_{t-3} + \dots + w_n U_{t-n-1}$$

If we set w_0 equal to one, w_1 equal to λ , w_2 to λ^2 , w_3 to λ^3 , etc., ($0 < \lambda < 1$) the equivalent to a Koyck-lag is imposed. Here we of course choose w_1 equal to $\hat{\lambda}$, the lag parameter estimate from eq. (6). We then regress P_t on the weighted predictors:

$$(8) S P_t = a + b W U_{t-1} + c W I_{t-1} + u_t$$

If eq.(6) is correctly specified, eq.(8) should give about the same result. Since we are not quite sure that $\hat{\lambda}$ from eq.(6) is unbiased, we search over a wide range and estimate eq.(8) for w_1 varying between 0.10 and 0.92 to see where the best fit is. As a

point of reference, we estimate a simulated model which accords to the estimates from eq.(6). that is:

$$(9) S P_t = 47 - 9.62 W U_{t-1} - 1.24 W I_{t-1} + e_t$$

where w_1 equals 0.92 (the lag weights are then multiplied by a constant to sum to one).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Table 2 shows the results; first we will inspect the findings for eq.(8), that is the reestimation of the dynamic equation (6). The estimates of b and c now refer to the total impact, summed over time, thus corresponding to $\hat{b} / 1 - \hat{\lambda}$ and $\hat{c} / 1 - \hat{\lambda}$, respectively from eq. (6). It is seen that the estimates differ somewhat, but they are still biased. The fit can be assessed from the joint impression of the diagnostics (t-values, $\hat{\rho}$ or DW, MSE and R²). It is worthy to note that the fit is little affected by the value of w_p in spite of its wide range. In contrast, the fit of eq.(9), where the true model implies a lag structure with w_1 equal to 0.92, is strongly affected by deviations from the actual value of w_1 . We can conclude that the lag parameter estimate from the dynamic model, eq.(6), is not very reliable.

Inspection of cross-correlations

Another clue about the relationship between the economic indicators and the dependent variable as well as the form of a possible lag structure, is the estimated cross-correlation function between the series at different lags.⁴⁾

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

As can be verified from Figure 1 (a and b) the cross-correlations are quite large, not only at lag 1, but at higher lags, too. Since no distributed effects were specified, we know that the correlations at lags > 2 have no causal meaning. Their existence is due to common trends and contamination with the series' autocorrelation (see Mc Cleary and Hay, 1980: 246-50). Figure 1 (c and d) shows the cross-correlations between the filtered series. The same filter (first-differencing) has been applied to the input - and output series. Among the cross-correlations between unemployment and popularity, only a spike at lag 1 now remains, and for higher lags the estimates are insignificant. As to the relationship between inflation and popularity, all cross-correlations have vanished. Having generated the model, the outcome does not surprise, the immaterial impact that was specified for inflation does not leave any trace, whereas the impact decided for unemployment does. Perhaps our imaginary researcher is not very surprised either at this stage, but regards the result as yet another indication that there is something fundamentally wrong with his dynamic model.

ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHENTIC SERIES

We now proceed to the analysis of the authentic time series which pertain to the period March 1967 through September 1976, the data being monthly observations. The economic indicators are the same as the ones used in the simulated experiment. The popularity of the government was measured by the following question: "Which party do you think is the best one today?" In general election months, the question was: "Which party are you going to vote for in the election?" The Social Democrats were in office throughout the study period; in a subsequent section we shall consider a shorter period when they were in opposition.

First we shall take a look at the autocorrelation structure of the popularity series, which might have an interest in its own right.⁵⁾

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

It appears that the series can be approximated to a first-order autoregressive process:

$$(10) P_t = \vartheta P_{t-1} + e_t$$

with ϑ equal to 0.95.

The differenced series is white noise. The implications of this is a source of hope as well as despair for the party; on the basis of the change this month, nothing can be said about the change next month or the following ones.⁶⁾

In the following analysis of the relationship between the economic indicators and government popularity, we will follow basically the same procedure as that applied precedingly. Hence we begin with the static model:

$$(11) P_t = a + b U_{t-1} + c I_{t-1} + e_t$$

The parameter estimates are statistically significant with the expected sign, but the residuals are strongly autocorrelated. As in the preceding analysis, we assume this to be caused by an omitted lag structure. Hence a dynamic Koyck-model is estimated:

$$(12) P_t = a + \lambda P_{t-1} + b U_{t-1} + c I_{t-1} + u_t$$

The parameter estimates and the diagnostic tests make it tempting to accept this model (as did Jonung and Wadensjö in their analysis of the same series). However, the outcome is

disturbingly similar to the level-estimates from the simulated model, eq.(6), which we know is misspecified with regard to dynamics. The estimated variance of the residuals from eq.(12) raises some doubt as well. The minimum value of the variance in the true error term (the latter is estimated by the fitted residuals) is that which arises from sampling fluctuations in the poll data. This can be approximated to: $100^2 (pq / N)$, where p is the mean proportion supporting the Social Democrats, q is $1-p$, and N is the sample size. (Since the dependent variable is expressed in percentage rather than proportion, we multiply by 100^2 .) The expected minimum variance calculated in this manner is: $100^2 \times 0.445 \times 0.555 / 1300 = 1.89$. The actual variance of the true error term will of course be much larger, as it will include the variances of other causal factors as well. However, the variance of the fitted residuals is 32 per cent less than the calculated minimum value, instead of larger as should be expected. Apparently the residuals underestimate the error terms, which strongly suggest that the dynamic model, eq.(12), gives an overfit to the data. There is thus more than one reason to submit the model to further tests, beyond that for the presence of autocorrelated residuals.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Estimation of the model in differenced form

We start the testing, like before, with the analysis of changes rather than level-data, which is expected to result in at least similar estimates. As can be seen, however, the differencing results in all estimates are becoming insignificant. We may think that the differencing has washed out relationships that do exist, although the drop in R^2 from 0.91 to 0.02 seems too large for

that being the sole explanation. Be as it may, we proceed to estimate the model by regressing popularity on the weighted predictors.

Regression on the weighted predictors

We thus have:

$$(13) P_t = a + b W U_{t-1} + c W I_{t-1} + e_t$$

Where $W U_{t-1}$ and $W I_{t-1}$ are the weighted unemployment and inflation variables which were used before. We search over the same range of the lag weight w_1 , 0.10 -- 0.92, which will include $\hat{\lambda} = 0.88$.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

As appears from Table 4, the outcome of the test is by and large the same as was found for the simulated model. The residual autocorrelation is strongly significant for all values of w_1 , and the fit is little affected by large changes in the fixed lag parameter. Virtually nothing can be said what lag structure, if any, that is most appropriate.

Inspection of the cross correlations

Next, we inspect the cross-correlations between the dependent variable and the predictors. As pointed out (and visually demonstrated) before, the cross-correlations between the level series (i.e., the raw series) are contaminated by common trends and autocorrelations. When these have been substantially reduced by means of first-differencing, the coefficients decrease markedly. Between popularity and inflation, there is a positive but insignificant value at lag 1, two negative spikes (lag 3 and 8) and one positive (lag 4). These spikes might be attributed to

the structure which still remains in the inflation series in spite of the differencing. Ideally the series should be prewhitened which would require an additional filter. However, it does not seem to be worthwhile to probe the relationship further, since the coefficient expected to be the most significantly negative one has the reverse sign. The values of the cross-correlations between unemployment and popularity are close to zero at all lags.

To conclude, there is nothing in the cross-correlation structure to support the hypothesis of a negative -- and at increasing lags geometrically declining -- impact of the economic variables on the support to the government. It can correctly be objected that even though the filtering removes spurious correlations, it may wash out actual relationships as well. This will particularly be the case if the dependent variable is much influenced by other causal factors not included in the model and stochastic disturbances. However, it cannot at the same time be contended that the estimates from dynamic model in level form, eq.(12), are unbiased; its R^2 of 0.91 leaves little room for such external influences.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

The Social Democrats in opposition

A corollary to the hypothesis that a party is disfavoured by increases in unemployment and inflation when it is in office, is that it should be favoured by such changes when in opposition. To test the prediction we will analyse the period October 1976 through August 1978 (when the Social Democrats were in opposition) in the same manner as did Jonung and Wadensjö (no lag structure was assumed here).

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

As Table 5 shows, the estimates (a) accord with the prediction as to unemployment (Jonung and Wadensjö got a significant estimate for inflation as well). The autocorrelation of the residuals results in inflated t-values, however, which makes the significance ambiguous. The autocorrelation has been removed in two alternative ways: first-differencing (b), and a first-order autoregressive estimation procedure (c) resampling the Cochrane-Orcutt algorithm. In both cases the estimates turn out to be insignificant, thus leaving no support to the hypothesis.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, it has been shown that the estimates from a dynamic Koyck-model can be seriously biased upward although the model performs adequately according to the customary diagnostics. If the generating scheme in fact is static and incorporates a strongly autocorrelated determinant, the omission of this predictor may well produce such an outcome if a dynamic model is estimated: Substantial impacts of the included predictors -- distributed over a long lag period -- might be registered even though the actual process at work involves weak effects, which are instantaneous only. The outcome is not restricted to the present simulation experiment, it has been demonstrated in another simulation based on a large sample of artificially generated models under varying conditions (see Norström,). By means of various tests, the misspecification could be detected, however.

It has further been argued that the process underlying the temporal variation in the support to the government may well comprise a slowly changing predictor that -- due to lack of data -- has been omitted in empirical studies. Substantial, and long-term impacts of the economic factors was questioned as well.

When analysing the empirical series, imposing a Koyck-model, the outcome was by and large the same as when the simulated series were estimated: a seemingly satisfactory dynamic model which failed further testing in a like manner. This, of course, does not prove the alternative model which was outlined, but it casts doubt on the dynamic model.

It is apparent that dynamic models must be tested carefully. To replace the DW-test with the Durbin h -test, as often recommended, is little progress. Its power does not seem to be higher (Kenkel, 1974), and it has the weakness in common with the DW-test that it is based on the fitted residuals. The problem here is that the residuals from an OLS-estimated dynamic model are not likely to give a true representation of the error terms. The latter may be strongly autocorrelated even though the residual autocorrelation is insignificant.

More sophisticated lag-schemes (e.g., the Almon-lag) does not seem to be the solution either, as I understand it. The fundamental problem is that the series proper do not contain all the information we try to squeeze out. The ideal strategy is to estimate the lag structure from external information, and constrain the lag scheme accordingly in the analysis of the time series. Various forms of external information can be pursued; for instance, theoretical consideration or findings from individual-level data (for examples, see Carlsson, 1970; Skog, 1984).

The methodological problems which have appeared in this paper are not an argument against time series analysis as a device to investigate the processes that generate aggregate change, they only highlight the specification problem and the need for careful testing. Aggregate data is in no way a substitute, or inferior,

to microscopic data, it all depends upon what issue is being addressed. Kramer (1983) shows, that when studying processes like the one at issue in this paper, parameter estimates based on individual-level data are likely to be strongly biased, whereas estimates from aggregate data are probably closer to the target.

NOTES

1. See e.g.
2. We may of course regard the unemployment series as a more general indicator of the economic situation. However, the measure becomes somewhat blurred by the circumstance just pointed out, and by changes in labour market measures such as relief works.
3. For an overview of poll figures, see Korpi, 1981:219.
4. The cross-correlation is approximately the product-moment correlation between two time series. It can be calculated for different lags of the input series (the independent variable), and is ususally denoted $CCF(k)$, where k indicates the lag. $CCF(0)$ is thus the concomitant correlation between two series; $CCF(1)$ means that the input series is lagged one observation, which of course can be extended to higher lags.
5. The autocorrelation is a series' correlation with some lagged version of itself. $ACF(1)$ is thus the correlation between X_t and X_{t-1} ; $ACF(2)$ is the correlation between X_t and X_{t-2} , which can be extended to higher lags.
6. It might intuitively have been expected that an increase in popularity one month would tend to be followed by an increase the following month as well, and analogously for the case of decrease. However, there is no such pattern in the popularity series.







Figure 1. Cross-correlations.
 Simulated popularity and unemployment, raw series (a)
 " " " inflation, " " (b)
 " " " unemployment, differenced series (c)
 " " " inflation, " " (d)




Figure 2. Autocorrelations for the authentic popularity series, raw series (a) and differenced series (b).







Figure 3. Cross-correlations.

Authentic popularity series and unemployment, raw series (a)
 " " " " inflation, " " (b)
 " " " " unemployment, differenced series (c)
 " " " " inflation, " " (d)

Table 1. OLS-estimates based on simulated series. |T-values| in brackets.

ρ = autocorrelation of residuals. DW = Durbin - Watson's test

Eq.	Form	b	c	λ	ρ	DW	MSE	R^2
5	level	-5.62 (8.30)	- 1.46 (16.43)		0.81	0.28	7.86	0.76
6	level	-0.75 (5.17)	- 0.10 (3.47)	0.92 (58.38)	- 0.13	1.75	0.25	0.99
6	Change	-2.53 (27.66)	- 0.04 (1.97)	-0.11 (3.34)	- 0.26	1.50	0.04	0.89

Table 2. OLS-estimates based on simulated series. |T-values| in brackets.

w_1 = fixed lag weight. ρ = autocorrelation of residuals.

DW = Durbin - Watson's test

w_1	Eq.	b		c		ρ	DW	MSE	R^2
0.92	8	-5.30	(11.08)	-1.60	(30.42)	0.84	0.19	1.57	0.92
	9	-9.60	(268.23)	-1.24	(314.83)	-0.10	1.84	0.01	0.99
0.88	8	-5.24	(11.21)	-1.56	(30.31)	0.86	0.18	1.69	0.93
	9	-9.70	(55.44)	-1.91	(61.86)	0.93	0.12	0.24	0.99
0.70	8	-4.95	(10.04)	-1.43	(24.90)	0.89	0.14	2.68	0.88
	9	-8.51	(17.75)	-1.08	(19.43)	0.93	0.09	2.53	0.88
0.50	8	-4.77	(9.31)	-1.37	(22.23)	0.87	0.17	3.32	0.86
	9	-7.62	(13.25)	-1.03	(14.92)	0.89	0.14	4.19	0.81
0.20	8	-4.53	(8.61)	-1.32	(20.15)	0.83	0.26	3.96	0.83
	9	-6.75	(10.69)	-0.99	(12.58)	0.84	0.24	5.71	0.73
0.10	8	-4.44	(8.42)	-1.31	(19.66)	0.81	0.30	4.13	0.82
	9	-6.52	(10.16)	-0.98	(12.13)	0.82	0.27	6.09	0.72

Table 3. OLS- estimates based on authentic series. |T-values| in brackets.

ρ = autocorrelation of residuals. DW = Durbin Watson's test

Eq. Form	b	c	λ	ρ	DW	MSE	R^2
11 Level	-4.60 (6.62)	-0.56 (6.16)		0.83	0.31	8.28	0.44
12 Level	-0.67 (2.08)	-0.10 (2.42)	0.88 (24.02)	-0.16	1.70	1.33	0.91
12 Change	-0.25 (0.46)	0.13 (1.11)	0.03 (1.12)	-0.17	1.67	1.44	0.02

Table 4. OLS-estimates based on authentic series. |T-values| in brackets.
 w_1 = fixed lag weight. ρ = autocorrelation of residuals.
 DW = Durbin-Watson's test

w_1	b	c	ρ	DW	MSE	R^2
0.92	-6.13 (7.45)	-0.97 (10.77)	0.80	0.32	4.68	0.70
0.88	-6.98 (9.68)	-0.91 (11.49)	0.78	0.38	4.04	0.75
0.70	-7.52 (13.66)	-0.81 (12.62)	0.72	0.50	3.34	0.79
0.50	-7.12 (12.80)	-0.76 (11.34)	0.71	0.53	3.93	0.75
0.20	-6.42 (10.88)	-0.72 (9.79)	0.69	0.57	4.99	0.69
0.10	-6.21 (10.37)	-0.72 (9.42)	0.67	0.59	5.31	0.67

Table 5. Estimates based on authentic series, the Social Democrats in opposition. |T-values| in brackets. ρ = autocorrelation of residuals
 DW = Durbin Watson's test

Eq.	Form	Estimation	b	c	ρ	DW	MSE	R^2
11	Level	OLS (a)	2.09 (2.11)	0.01 (0.06)	0.68	0.45	2.39	0.22
11	Change	OLS (b)	-1.04 (0.62)	-0.29 (1.27)	-0.03	1.95	0.85	0.08
11	Level	AR(1)(C)	1.77 (1.40)	-0.06 (0.24)	0.01	1.98	1.22	0.09

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ELECTION ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

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If the view that elections are a prime subject for comparative research goes relatively uncontested, there is certainly no consensus on the conceptual apparatus with which we should approach that research. While models based on party identification seemed to dominate the field of research on individual voting behaviour during the 1960s, and still have their advocates (Miller, 1976), a number of other approaches have been advanced, among them spatial theories (Downs, 1957; Ordeshook, 1976; Enelow and Hinch, 1984) and retrospective voting. (Fiorina, 1982; Alt and Crystal, 1983). Efforts have been made to study voting and/or government popularity on a macro level by analysing the connections between economic conditions and political support (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Kernell and Hibbs, 1981) and party strategy in stressing certain political issues during election campaigns. (Budge and Farlie, 1983)

Current research findings of increasing electoral volatility and/or dealignment in many democracies, and hesitant judgements about the possibilities of new realignments emerging (Crewe, Alt and Sarlvik, 1977; Pedersen, 1979; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1985) have led to a feeling that models based on the stability of public links to political parties or on the stability of the ideologies, policies and behaviour of the parties themselves are built on shifting sand. In such an atmosphere a number of national studies of voting behaviour on the micro level have seen a more productive strategy in emphasizing the importance of political issues as elements of electoral choice (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976; Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett, 1979, 1984; Kiewiet, 1981 and 1983). Comparative electoral analysis based on models giving a central place to political issues is, however, in its infancy. (Budge and Farlie, 1977)

While issues are of course only one factor motivating individual behaviour, there are certain advantages attending their use as the centerpiece of election analysis. First, they are equally useful in conditions of declining partisanship as when such links are strong and pervasive. In the latter instance they provide a means whereby parties appeal to and mobilize their supporters; in the former they take on a role as more independent determinants of voter decision-making. In addition, the nature of political issues in recent decades can provide at least a partial explanation for the mounting evidence of partisan dealignment. In contrast to a third major variable motivating voting behaviour, political leaders, issues provide a more substantive focus for electoral studies. Much of the appeal of leaders is bound up with their personalities and style, idiosyncratic factors providing little basis for comparative analysis. To the extent that leaders appeal to the public as representatives of parties, ideologies or policies, an issue-based approach can readily pick up this aspect.

A second advantage of basing the study of elections on issues is that it focusses attention on the function of elections as the major representative institution of modern democracy. Elections

public. Party campaign strategy has been the focus of many "traditional" studies of elections, such as the British Nuffield series (eg Butler and Kavanagh, 1984) and the extensive At the Polls series sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute (eg Penniman, 1981). Much more sophisticated techniques appear to be employed in recent years by candidates and political parties to tailor their campaigns to the public agenda, as a glance through the periodical Campaigns and Elections testifies. Rarely, however, has work on party strategy been integrated with analyses of voting behaviour, at least at the micro level.

Parties are by no means entirely free to define the political agenda as they see fit. At times all actors are simply reacting to events, when they identify national or international problems as political issues. The series of oil price rises which magnified the inflation problem in the 1970s, the plant closures which brought unemployment to center stage in the 1980s, and the threats to petroleum supplies caused by world tensions, are all examples of how a problem "forced" its way onto the political agenda. In Britain, the occurrence of strikes made this subject into an election issue in 1974 and 1979, and in the United States the Vietnam war was central to the campaign of 1972 and the hostage-taking incident at the American Embassy in Teheran was injected into the 1980 Presidential campaign.

Problems and Policies as Issues

Election issues fall naturally into two types. Problems are broad subjects of widespread concern. The economic difficulties of recent decades have led to such things as inflation, unemployment, strikes, the need for energy, the need to "get the country moving again", or to "overcome the recession", being defined as the important problems facing the country and the important issues in election campaigns. Outside the economic area one can point to such problems as the need to "make the country respected abroad" or the need for "leadership" as important subjects for discussion during recent election campaigns. From the social area, there is the problem of poverty, or threats to law and order caused by "crime in the streets".

Broad problems like these are discussed in the abstract at great length during election campaigns, and strenuous efforts are made to define some subset of them as "the issues in this campaign." The fact that these phenomena are widely recognized as problems does not consign them to the rhetoric of politicians fighting the election from the position of opposition; rather they form the subjects of everybody's speeches. Governments seeking reelection cannot afford to abandon these fields to the opposition; they typically blame the situation on forces outside their control (preferably outside the country altogether) and then argue that only they have the requisite experience in government to attack the problems properly.

Policies are of course plans of action that the parties

Let us look more closely at the difficulties involved at each linkage point in Figure 1. The first involves the extent to which "existing situations" of economic distress, social inequality or the like are recognized as problems needing political solutions. Two circumstances may prevent this link being made, at least for substantial enough groups of people to enable the problem to be thought "politically salient." The existing situation may simply not be thought of as a problem, or the problem may be perceived to lie in a different area. For example, the situation of native peoples in many countries is thought of by some as a social problem needing government action. For others, the "plight" of native peoples is a problem only for these groups themselves, and to the extent that there is a social problem it is one of maintaining law and order in case of disturbances.

More common than denial of the existence of problems, however, is a ranking in terms of seriousness or immediacy of threat, such that problems are seen as being outweighed by other problems. This is most noticeable in times of war, natural disaster or threat to the existence of the state. During the Second World War, the nascent British Gallup Poll asked the population to define the most urgent "home front" problem facing the country, assuming that without this qualifier the answers would be dominated by the need to win the war. A similar phenomenon of public ranking of problems is seen, however, in responses to polling on "most important problems facing the country" during recent years. Despite a multiplicity of distressing economic conditions, the tendency was to single out one of them, usually inflation during the 1970s and unemployment during the 1980s, as the major problem, and for this problem, having established link 1 to then go on during elections to establish link 4, and sometimes links 2 and 3. Many other depressed economic indicators, however, never even made the initial link to a perceived problem.

Link 2 (see Figure 1) represents a move from the general to the particular in level of discourse, a move which is not easily made, for it necessitates establishing a plausible claim to have discovered a solution to the major concerns of the day, a claim open to instant attack. Proposed policies are often forthcoming from various groups in society, but the political, particularly electoral, debate does not automatically focus around them, either because these policies are seen as coming from self-interested sources, or because they would involve difficult choices, like sacrifices in personal lifestyle, which might cost a political party support if espoused during a campaign.

The mass media often perceives its role during an election campaign as representative of public opinion in attempting to forge link 2 (and following that, link 3.) It is at times successful. More often than not, however, public opinion at large simply lacks the interest or information to focus on the specific aspects of a large problem. Therefore, by expressing their awareness of a problem, and their willingness to tackle it, party

Linkage 3 may be just as difficult to establish as linkage 2, and in fact the lack of both links often characterizes the treatment of election issues. Even if specific policy proposals are brought forward, however, there is no guarantee that the political parties will adopt differing positions on them. Strategic considerations come sharply into play at this point, for if a policy announced by another party is perceived to be popular there are three ways to attempt to diffuse its impact on voter conversion. The first is to avoid taking any stand on the issue and instead to argue that it is not important; this attacks the saliency of the issue. The second method is to adopt a differing position on the issue and argue the merits of that view; by persuading enough people that the policy is not a good idea, a countervailing flow of behaviour may be generated which could neutralize its impact. A third method is however possible, and that is to adopt a similar position to that of the originating party, thus seeking to neutralize the link that issue has to party. Using this strategy a party can say that the idea itself has merit, but needs improvement--if they are elected, the voters will not only would see this desired policy implemented but a new improved version of it at that. A variation on this strategy is for a party to argue that a policy proposed by another has merit, but that if they want implementation they should choose the second party because the first has no chance to form a government. There is of course no reason why these two arguments cannot be combined.

An illustration of the operation of these two linkage-3 strategies can be drawn from the Canadian federal election campaign of 1979. At this time, the Progressive Conservative party produced a policy proposal to allow homeowners to deduct interest payments on their mortgages from their federal income tax. Considering this to be a potentially popular suggestion, the other two parties had to decide what to do about it. The Liberal strategy was to take a position against the policy, arguing that it was a cynical attempt to buy votes from middle class homeowners; they thus established linkage 3 themselves and worked to neutralize the issue by arguing against the policy. The strategy of the New Democratic Party was different; they tried to weaken linkage 3 by agreeing that the policy had merit but that they had a better version of it which would be fairer to all (thus attempting to counter both the Liberal objections to the policy and the Conservative authorship of it.) A glance ahead to Table 5 will show what happened to "mortgage deductability" as an issue in the 1979 election. The figures show that all three parties could argue that their strategy paid off--the Conservatives had a slight overall edge on the issue, the Liberals came fairly close to neutralizing it, and the NDP were closer to the other two parties in level of support on this issue than on most others. Most obviously, however, the issue did not motivate very much behaviour at all; it failed to make a final link, that of salience in the election context.

Link 4 of Figure 1 essentially involves the extent to which various problems and policies are considered to be election issues. This is basically a question of degree of salience, since

Alt chooses to emphasize the position aspects of economic issues, particularly policy choices involving tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment. His decision to do so, however, does not refute the Butler/Stokes contention that, by and large, economic issues are seen by the public in valence terms. Although very few "tradeoff" questions have been asked in survey research, the Butler and Stokes surveys in 1969 and 1970 asked, with slightly different wordings, whether people thought they could or could not have full employment and steady prices at the same time. Majorities (Alt, 1979: 172) believed that it was possible to have both, and even a softened version of the question asked of new respondents in 1970 showed that only 28 per cent thought that "having everyone employed makes it more difficult to hold prices steady" whereas 43 per cent did not think it made it more difficult. Alt then goes on to label "realists" those who chose the tradeoff option, but the important point is surely that most people did not. Another tradeoff question was asked in the American National Election Study of 1980; at this time 40 per cent saw a connection between inflation and unemployment, 40 per cent did not, and the rest were unsure (ICPSR, 1982: 121). Such public attitudes make it easier for political parties to avoid making linkages 2 and 3 (Figure 1) when major economic problems are being discussed as election issues.

A Comparative Issue Framework

A way of grouping election issues is necessary which will encompass both problems and policies, and the most logical step is to classify them in terms of their subject-matter. For comparative analysis it is useful to make the overall issue-types as broad as possible, and allow for considerable variation in the specific issues within each type from one country to the next, as well as over time within any one country. There are a number of ways of distinguishing between different types of issues, but they seem naturally to fall into four main categories--economic, integration, social, and resource. A fifth category, which we designate for the moment as 'other issues', could be subdivided, as indeed could the other four; a more detailed version of this typology contains 36 categories.

The distinction between types of issues is easier to make with some than with others. There is a sense in which all issues have economic implications (and hence could be considered economic issues) or implications for the society (and hence could be considered social issues.) It will be necessary to look for the most appropriate referent of the issue in order to make an appropriate classification. We will be concerned with the applicable content in Canada, Britain and the United States for purposes of illustration in this paper; when this framework is applied to other countries some of the subcategories differ totally or partially in terms of content.

Economic issues have, for the most part, been common to our three countries in conception, though they differ in degree of importance. A listing of the most important consists of the

of other classes as being responsible for economic exploitation, or poor business conditions. There is as well in Britain some scapegoating of racial minorities and the European Economic Community in this regard. In Canada, some people in Quebec have given an economic dimension to the integration issues of Quebec-Canada relations by identifying anglophone groups as economic exploiters of the francophone population of the province. Similarly, in Western Canada there is a longstanding tradition of analysing the region's economic role as that of a colony of central Canada, and arguing that because of this subordinate economic status the region has never felt itself to be genuinely integrated into an overall Canadian community. In general, however, integration issues in Canada are not interpreted in economic terms and serve as alternatives to economic issues rather than as components of them.

Social issues provide another kind of context for the electoral discourse in any country. These issues represent the traditional debate over two important subjects. The first is the role of the state in providing social services. The degree of government involvement in health care, education, welfare, the pension system, and the amount of expenditure on these services is a perennial subject of debate in all countries. The extent to which this is seen as a "problem" or a subject on which parties need to state policies usually varies according to whether the state is seen to be facing a financial crisis, or whether some group makes a concerted demand for the expansion or contraction of services. The second is the security the state is expected to provide for its law-abiding citizens. When a crime-wave or other threatening developments place security into question, this type of social issue can rapidly assume a position of dominant public concern.

Issues of an integration, social, resource and foreign policy nature have the capacity to dominate election discourse under certain circumstances. There is no doubt, however, that the main issues of concern in elections of the 1970s and 1980s have been economic. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the most important issues in several recent elections in Canada, Britain and the United States.

TABLES 2, 3, 4 ABOUT HERE

Two trends are visible here: first, the tendency for economic issues to dominate the field, and second, the tendency for general problems to outweigh specific policies as issues.

Political issues, in the Canada of the 1974-1980 period, had very little "staying power". Table 2 reveals relatively little continuity either in which issues were considered the important ones in each campaign, or in how similar problems were defined as issues. The 1974 election was almost exclusively focussed on the problem of inflation, as well as the Conservatives' proposal for a wage and price freeze. Despite the fact, however, that wage and price controls had subsequently been applied from 1975 to 1978 (by the party, the Liberals, which had

center of the national political stage was quickly seized by issues related to the emerging "stagflation" economy, energy shortfalls and natural resource shortages. With the economic upturn in the 1980s, and the reduced levels of inflation, discussion shifted to the high numbers of unemployed, the level of interest rates, and threats to export markets.

Table 3 shows the public response when asked during the post-election surveys of 1972, 1976 and 1980 what the most important problems were which faced the United States. In 1972, a majority of those interviewed mentioned foreign affairs and defence issues in answer to this question, whereas with the settling of the Vietnam situation in the interim, only 16 per cent felt these were important problems two years later. References to social problems showed a similar, if less precipitous, decline over the period, particularly with regard to the law and order or crime in the streets issue. With the events in Teheran during the 1980 campaign, foreign policy rose again to public attention at that time.

The pattern for economic issues stands in sharp contrast. Although such issues were matters of concern for a sizeable plurality of Americans in 1972, they occupied the minds of over 80 percent of those interviewed in 1976 and 1980. A steady rise in concern for inflation may be noted in Table 3, while unemployment, though always of major concern, was more prominent in 1976 than in the other two years; the Democrats, more linked with in the public mind with attempts to alleviate unemployment benefitted from this. (Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Kiewiet, 1981) Inflation, unemployment, and foreign policy issues in the United States were predominantly discussed in general "problem" terms, and not with regard to specific policies. Indeed, foreign policy issues like the Vietnam and Iran cases often "cannot" be discussed in specific terms for reasons of national security or international negotiating strategy.

Similar to the American and Canadian situations, British politics has involved many different issues. Only the key economic issues, particularly those related to inflation, jobs, and the general performance of the economy, and to some extent the integration issue of common market membership, appeared consistently in the rhetoric of three British election campaigns. Other issues--strikes, devolution, North Sea oil, law and order, immigration, arose and receded quite quickly.

successive elections. This volatility in issue choice renders more understandable the lack of, or tenuousness of, linkages 2 and 3 (Figure 1). In a situation where the public is ready to move on to a new issue, the lack of specific policies or party positions becomes more a matter of cynical comment than a cause for sustained demand for establishment of those linkages.

Issue Impact on Election Outcomes

The consequences of the frequent absence of the definition of election issues in terms of specific policies, and of the linkage of issues to parties, become apparent when we look directly at examples of recent voting behaviour of people concerned with different issues in the three countries. Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide illustrative examples only, and are not intended to give a complete accounting of all election issues in each case, or to explain the actual results of the elections.

TABLES 5, 6, 7 ABOUT HERE

In the Canadian case (Table 5), there is a remarkably even tendency of voters concerned with a particular economic issue to choose the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the NDP. The Liberals had a small edge on the inflation issue in 1974, as did the PCs in 1979, but these distributions of support were not decisive enough to have played major roles in producing the election outcomes in these cases. Unemployment as an issue similarly failed to distinguish between the parties in terms of voting choice. In 1980, despite the popular tendency to attribute the Conservative defeat to negative public reaction to its abortive budget, and the gasoline tax it contained, Table 5 shows that no party gained a clear advantage as a result of these issues. Most of the issues associated with the 1980 election had only the most limited impact by themselves on the result, either because (as in the case of integration issues such as national unity) they were not salient to large numbers of voters or (as in the case of the economic and resource issues) opinion regarding them was not clearly valenced in favour of any of the parties.

An examination of the American case (Table 6) for the 1972 and 1976 elections presents a picture not unlike the Canadian on many issues. In particular, the inflation issue and most other economic issues fail to differentiate significantly between the Democrats and Republicans. The exception is the unemployment issue in 1976, which worked substantially to the advantage of the Democrats. In addition, an advantage to the Nixon candidacy of the foreign policy issues, mainly concerning the Vietnam war, is apparent in 1972, and certainly affected that result, but there is no consistent preference of the Republicans on foreign policy issues over time.

In Britain (Table 7) there is a somewhat clearer link to party on some issues over time than can be found in either the

election issues in many countries during the 1970s and 1980s, but rarely is any one party decisively linked by the electorate with any preferred solutions. And when specific policies are proposed to deal with the problems, the electorate often divides down the middle as to whether the idea is sound, again frustrating attempts to assign a policy mandate to the party which wins the election. Often, the most that can be said is that the winner of an election has a general performance mandate, to "get on with the job". Such mandates dissolve quickly in the absence of quick results.

There are a number of difficulties with an approach based on public conceptions of election issues, however. It requires, for ideal comparative analysis, appropriate measures of issue salience and party linkage in periodic national surveys. Such data are not readily available, or if available are collected in different formats, as is the case with data used in this paper. While not a barrier to analysis, it is a drawback to absolute comparability of results. In addition, there are difficulties in sorting out the relative impact of issues vis a vis other factors influencing individual voting behaviour, or vote switching. This is especially true since the issues themselves have impacts through parties, leaders and local candidates, even when the linkages to these forces are less than exact. However, the gains in placing voting behaviour squarely in the context of the importance of election outcomes, and hence in the performance of elections as representative institutions, would seem to outweigh the difficulties, and argue for refinement of this approach.

TABLE 2
 MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES IN CANADIAN ELECTIONS, 1974-1979-1980
 (multiple mentions, percentages of cases)

	1974	1979	1980
<u>Economic Issues</u>			
State of the Economy	5	11	9
Inflation	38	13	14
Wage and Price controls	8	1	-
Taxes	3	8	3
Government spending, hiring	1	2	-
Budgets, the currency	2	2	17
Unemployment, jobs	3	10	4
Other economic issues	3	1	1
<u>Confederation Issues</u>			
National Unity	2	8	4
Intergovernmental Relations	-	2	3
Bilingualism	3	3	-
Quebec, separatism, referendum	1	15	6
<u>Resource Issues</u>			
Natural Resources	-	5	1
Energy, oil development	2	4	18
Energy pricing	-	-	13
<u>Social Issues</u>			
Housing, health, pensions, UIC, etc	12	5	2
<u>Other Issues</u>			
Foreign relations, defence	2	2	3
Leadership	6	14	15
Parties, electoral change	1	8	8
The election itself, majority government	7	1	4
Other	3	2	2
<u>No issues</u>			
	30	28	22
	N= 2445	2668	1786

TABLE 4
 "MOST IMPORTANT" (a) ISSUES IN BRITISH ELECTIONS, 1974-9

	Feb 1974	Oct 1974	1979
<u>Economic Issues</u>			
Prices	31	31	40
Unemployment	-	12	32
Strikes	17	13	38
Wage controls	14	15	-
Taxes (b)	8	-	34
Nationalization	8	12	18
<u>Integration Issues</u>			
European Common Market	7	9	16
Devolution (c)	13	-	-
Race Relations	-	-	14
Immigration (d)	-	-	12
<u>Resource Issues</u>			
North Sea Oil	-	5	-
<u>Social Issues</u>			
Law and Order	-	-	41
Pensions	14	12	-
Social Services	7	7	22
Housing	-	9	-

(a) In 1979 question wording was "Extremely Important"

(b) In 1979 question wording was "Taxes and Services"

(c) Asked in Scotland only.

(d) Percent identifying immigration as "a problem".

TABLE 6
ELECTORAL EFFECT OF SELECTED ISSUES IN TWO AMERICAN ELECTIONS
 (as percent of all voters in election)

National problem perceived as single most important, and vote for....	1972		1976	
	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem
State of the economy	-	-	6	5
Inflation	10	5	15	13
Unemployment	2	2	9	20
Oil, energy development	-	-	2	2
Social welfare	2	2	2	1
Law and Order	9	4	3	3
Foreign Affairs	19	9	2	2
Human rights, womens' issues	6	3	1	1
Honesty, trust in government	1	1	1	1

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TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF COMPETITIVE
PARTY BEHAVIOR

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TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF COMPETITIVE PARTY BEHAVIOR

The objective of this paper is to take a few steps toward a better understanding of the rationality of party behavior in parliamentary democracies. In this endeavor, I shall in a systematic manner attempt to account for some of the institutional features that characterize such regimes. This institutional focus will be integrated with propositions concerning party behavior derived from "pure" rational choice theories. My principal aim in this process is to move toward greater richness in our theories of the most important political organizations in the most common form of democratic regimes. Thus, my ambitions will be firmly middle range. Formalization of the argument will be kept at a minimum, although theoretical rigor will be a principal ambition (see Budge et al., 1983).

Efforts to develop "pure" theories of political parties have been of tremendous benefit to political science. Such theories have been built upon simple and strict assumptions of party and voter motivations, and have attempted to derive behavioral conclusions from this basis. The theories of Downs (1957) and Riker (1962) are, of course, the foremost pure theories of political parties. Neither Downs nor Riker was concerned exclusively with political parties, but both have produced works of lasting importance for the study of such organizations. Downs has largely shaped the study of parties in their interactions with the voters; Riker has been the most influential theorist in the study of interparty relations in the process of government formation.

Neither Downs nor Riker was much concerned about political institutions. Certainly, neither made an effort to model the environments of political parties in anything remotely

Equilibrium of a social process depends on the configuration of preferences but can only rarely be guaranteed by that configuration. We must search elsewhere to understand how collective choices are arrived at (Shepsle, 1979: 28) (emphases in the original).

"Elsewhere," of course, is within political institutions, and Shepsle has demonstrated that institutional arrangements contribute crucially to stability in various decision processes (Shepsle, 1979; also Shepsle and Weingast, 1981).

The literature on political parties has also recently been subjected to a variety of the institutionalist critique. Joseph Schlesinger (1984) notes that although the Downsian analysis is by far the most promising approach to political parties, it has yielded little insight into the nature of party organization. Schlesinger's illuminating analysis, from which I shall borrow extensively, sets out to remedy this situation through a focus on the organizational aspects of parties and their institutional environments. Schlesinger, again, sees no contradiction between institutionalism and the rational choice approach. On the contrary, he applauds rational choice theory as a "revival of the institutional approach in politics" (Schlesinger, 1984: 375. See also Rohde and Shepsle, 1978). This insight will be the point of departure for the analysis that follows.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Although much of the focus in this paper will be on macro-political institutions, it behooves us to begin by considering the actors of the game. It would be a joke to say that the literature on political parties is sparse. Yet, or perhaps precisely therefore, we lack a commonly accepted definition of what a party is. In what may be the most influential work ever on the subject, Maurice Duverger (1951) simply skirted the definitional issue (see also Sartori, 1975: 58). Nonetheless, we have no shortage of alternatives in the

These characteristics set parties systematically apart from other types of political organizations. Parties differ from bureaus and interest groups in their reliance on the electoral market, they differ from business firms in their principal output, and they are set apart from bureaus again in their dominant mode of compensation. Naturally, these organizational features also have behavioral ramifications. In attempting to come to grips with these, I shall consider the organizational characteristics above in the reverse order. The significance of the electoral market will be discussed in a later section of this paper. Initially, I shall consider the mode of compensation and the principal outputs.

Successful political parties depend on the support and patronage of large numbers of people. At the most fundamental level, large numbers of individuals have to be persuaded to give their support in the voting booth. More modest, but still sizeable numbers of citizens must be recruited for the more arduous tasks of campaign and routine organizational activities. Finally, the party must attract officers and candidates for office in sufficient numbers and quality, and the latter categories naturally face the largest costs from their partisan activities. Political parties of any consequence need very considerable resources in order to compensate all these various types of participants. Unlike business firms and bureaus, parties rarely control such resources on their own. The necessary compensation can only be had through control of central political institutions. This, of course, is why political parties can only be adequately understood in the context of political institutions, and why a new institutionalism is a necessary prescription for the party literature.

Different types of participants in party activities desire different kinds of compensation. It is a common and plausible assumption that the ordinary voter is concerned primarily with the packages of public goods that the various parties offer (Downs, 1957, and countless others). In the competition for votes, parties present to the electorate a bundle of collective

If we use the symbols P for policy influence benefits, F for office benefits, and B for total benefits available to the parties, then we have:

$$B = P + F \quad (1)$$

Total benefits are equal to the sum of policy influence benefits and office benefits. In the long run, party leaders will strive to make their total benefits exceed the compensation they provide to their voters, members, and activists. Predominantly, party leaders will seek a surplus of office benefits.

ELECTORAL COMPETITION

We have noted that parties maintain themselves through engagement in electoral competition, but we have so far failed to specify in what the competitive process consists. In fact, the definition of electoral competition is no straightforward task. It is not particularly problematic to describe the essence of electoral competition as the process by which political parties exchange promises of political benefits for votes. That much has already been stated in the analysis above. It is substantially more difficult to pinpoint precisely what makes this exchange process competitive, or how different electoral markets compare in terms of their competitiveness. The literature on democratic regimes is replete with references to political competition and its critical role (see e.g. Dahl, 1971; Lindblom, 1977; Powell, 1982), but the concept of competition itself has rarely been defined with the rigor and universality that would be desirable.

Efforts to provide operational definitions of party competition more narrowly conceived have produced results with greater technical sophistication and with clear empirical applicability

Downsian model, each citizen votes for the party he believes will provide him with a higher utility income than any other party during the coming election period (Downs, 1957: 38-39). In the spatial version of this model, citizens, if they vote, will support the party closest to their own most preferred position (Downs, 1957: 118-119; Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 3). A party's policy position or location will be influenced by its use of the policy influence benefits it derives from political institutions, as well as by its commitments regarding the provision of potential future benefits of this sort.

The policy location of any party will tend to be relatively stable over time. This is in part because parties commonly have to make long-term commitment about future policies. Such commitments become subsequent constraints, since they can often be violated only at great costs in terms of credibility. More generally, parties will also seek to maintain consistency in their policy positions over time for the same reason. Voters wish to reduce their uncertainty about future policies and therefore prefer parties that are reliable and responsible, everything else being equal (Downs, 1957: 103-109). Policy location, then, will be determined partly by present and expected future provisions of policy influence benefits and partly by policy location in previous periods. I shall use the symbol L for a party's policy location. If we let the subscripts 0 and 1 denote two successive election periods, then we have:

$$L_1 = a(L_0, P) \quad (2)$$

A party's policy location is a function of present policy benefit provision and past policy location. I shall assume that all constraints from the past can be summarized in the policy position from the previous electoral period.

The empirical literature on voting behavior obviously suggests that real-life voters base their electoral decisions on various factors other than the policy positions of the various parties. Voting decisions may be based on party identification, candidate images, patronage considerations, or prevailing economic or other conditions for which the governing parties may have little

Aggregate electoral results in votes are a function of policy locations, office benefit provisions, and the effect of government incumbency. Political parties are likely to take an incrementalist view of electoral competition. Partly this is due to the fact that competitive party systems need not be perfectly competitive, i.e. many votes may not be winnable. Furthermore, this conception seems most compatible with the Fiorinian view of rational party identification. If this type of orientation is prevalent, then large-scale electoral volatility in response to policy positions is unlikely. In sum, parties are concerned with electoral gains or losses at the margins; they do not contest each election from scratch. For most parties in most polities, the majority of voters are beyond competition most of the time.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Theories of electoral competition cannot profitably stop here. Certainly, it would be most inappropriate in an essay on institutional constraints. Political parties are not interested in votes *per se*. One cannot eat them, and they satisfy few other primary needs for individuals or organizations. Party leaders, as we have noted, are primarily interested in securing office benefits for themselves. That means they must provide the party with a surplus of such. Votes are simply a means toward this end, and in democratic regimes they are an important instrument.

However, votes can only be translated into office (or other) benefits by way of a circuitous process. More specifically, the conversion of votes into benefits takes place through three successive institutional processes. These processes are our most central concerns here.

The first of these institutional processes is defined by the electoral system. The electoral system, of course, specifies the way in which votes are translated into parliamentary seats. There is no shortage of descriptive accounts of different

The conversion of legislative seats into governmental positions is not a determinate process in most cases. Unless a party has an absolute majority in the legislature, it can only gain cabinet office through negotiations with other parties. And it is the aggregate characteristics of the party system that will determine which parties and resources are pivotal. The process by which government coalitions are formed can, however, relatively successfully be modelled through applications of coalition (game) theory.

Coalition theory applied to government formation by now constitutes a well established scholarly tradition. No thorough survey of the literature will be attempted here. Suffice it to say that the most of the literature can be divided into two competing schools, namely size theories and policy distance theories. Size theories simply assume that only the size of each party's parliamentary delegation counts as a resource in the process of government formation. Only such coalitions will be formed as contain no unnecessary members, i.e. parties that could be eliminated without rendering the coalition less than majority size (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976). Policy distance theories add the constraint that parties also seek to build coalitions that are connected or adjacent in the policy space (Leiserson, 1968; Axelrod, 1970). Both schools tend to agree that rational parties will seek to build coalitions that are "winning," commonly defined as majority size.

Comparative tests of size and policy distance theories abound (see e.g. Browne, 1973; De Swaan, 1973; Taylor and Laver, 1973; Lijphart, 1984. Also Browne and Dreijmanis, 1982; Bogdanor, 1983), but the evidence is not conclusive. I shall therefore refrain from making any comparative judgment on these theories, except that no simple theory seems to be overwhelmingly powerful. For present purposes I shall simply assume that inclusion in the government is a function of both size (in

access to office and policy influence than the opposition. But this relationship is rarely absolute. That is to say, government parties do not typically control all office benefits or all policy influence benefits. Parties in the opposition may well have a share and sometimes a large one.

The distribution of office and policy influence benefits between government and opposition is determined partly by characteristics of the government and partly by properties of the political system at large. A minority government is likely to have to share the spoils with the opposition to a greater extent than a majority government in the same system. There are also systematic cross-national differences. In some countries, the opposition parties are much more favored by the institutional rules than in other polities.

We can conceive of each political system as having a typical distribution of office and policy influence benefits between governing and non-governing parties. Let us also allow for these two types of benefit distributions to vary independently of each other. Let us further assume that both types of benefits are constant-sum in the short run. The latter assumption seems eminently plausible with respect to office benefits, perhaps somewhat less so for policy influence benefits. It is clear that the sum of both office and policy influence benefits may change (most often increase) in the long run. Indeed, in situations of low competitiveness it may be quite rational for political parties to unite in efforts to increase the total amount of benefits. The post-war political history of Italy appears singularly interpretable in these terms.

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 2 shows a hypothetical distribution of office and policy influence benefits in four types of regimes. For simplicity, the sums of office and policy influence benefits have each been

the institutional benefits we have explored to varying degrees. In general, we can use the subscripts g and op to denote government and opposition, respectively, and get:

$$B_g = P_g + F_g \quad (6)$$

and

$$B_{op} = P_{op} + F_{op} \quad (7)$$

The total benefits of government and opposition, respectively, are equal to the sums of office and policy influence benefits for each category of parties.

IMPLICATIONS: GOVERNMENT FORMATION

Now that the institutional model has been presented in outline, let us look at some implications for party behavior in a couple of institutional arenas. First, consider the problem of government formation. As previously noted, it is conventionally assumed that parties maximize power and/or policy consistency in this process. I believe power can be understood as equivalent to office benefits in the terminology I have employed. Policy consistency may be understood as a facilitator of policy location consistency over time, i.e. party responsibility. Let us consider these propositions of power and policy consistency maximization successively.

Our first question, then, may be: To what extent, or under what conditions, do rational party leaders maximize office benefits? Party leaders (assumed to be dictatorial teams within their organizations) in competitive regimes never pursue office benefits to the exclusion of policy influence benefits. Presumably, the leaders themselves care about policies, and at any rate they have to provide certain public goods to maintain their support among the voters. Otherwise, their electoral

(2) that parties are concerned only with immediate benefits and not with those may be gained in the longer run (e.g. in the next electoral period). Though the former of these assumptions should generally hold (albeit to varying degrees), the latter is patently implausible.

Recall from equation (3) that government participation in one electoral period is likely to lead to some loss of votes in the next. Party leaders will recognize this tendency and include it in their calculations concerning cabinet participation. The significance of this expected loss of votes will depend on the expected marginal utility of votes for that party at that time. Although governing parties will generally anticipate some loss of votes, there is a great deal of uncertainty connected with such calculations. Even more uncertainty is attached to expectations concerning the further institutional ramifications of electoral fortunes into the next and subsequent electoral periods. Because of this uncertainty, party leaders attach steep discount rates to their calculations of expected benefits in the next electoral period, and I shall assume that they make no calculations concerning events more than one election ahead.

Lawrence Dodd has attempted to explain the a priori willingness of political parties to bargain for government participation. I believe this willingness should not be regarded as a priori, but rather as a consequence of a calculation of the costs and benefits of governing. Competitive parties will wish to enter government only when the net benefits of doing so exceed those of remaining in opposition (see Wittman, 1983). The net benefits of governing are equal to the benefit differential (B_d) between government and opposition, minus the expected utility loss resulting from the decrease in votes in the next election, discounted at some rate. If we call the discount parameter e and let $U_e(E_0 - E_1)$ represent the expected loss of utility, then a party will only be willing to bargain for government participation when

$$B_d - e (U_e(E_0 - E_1)) > 0 \quad (8)$$

seats. But a party's share of seats is only one of the determinants of its potential for government participation. And the benefits of governing are not always worthwhile.

Instead of assuming the principle of vote maximization, I have repeatedly argued that votes have a certain utility for political parties. Votes have this utility because they are more or less efficient means toward the benefits that parties ultimately seek. I have also argued that in electoral markets that are less than perfectly competitive, parties take an incrementalist view of the competition for votes. They are concerned about gains or losses at the margins of their current support. It therefore makes sense to think that parties base their competitive strategies on the marginal utility of votes in any given situation. The higher the marginal utility of votes, the more likely the parties are to behave as if they were indeed vote maximizers, and the better the Downsian predictions should hold.

The analysis above has outlined the institutional features that in part determine the marginal utility of votes for particular parties. But these utilities will also depend on internal party characteristics, which we cannot discuss at length here. Nonetheless, our analysis allows several propositions concerning the marginal utility of votes. The marginal utility of votes for a given competitive party will be enhanced by:

- (1) A high marginal value for the proportionality coefficient c , i.e. a favorable translation of votes into seats at the margins.
- (2) A situation where the party's number of seats are more decisive for its opportunities to govern than its policy location (see equation (5)). The extreme case here is majority parties, for which policy location has no impact on governing potential.
- (3) A large benefit differential between government and opposition. (Because I assume that parties look ahead only one election, incumbency losses need not be deducted.)

enterprises as I have attempted constitute an important avenue for comparative research on political parties.

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


Figure 2

Distribution of Benefits between Government and Opposition in Four Types of Political Regimes

Note: G = Government
OP = Opposition

Subscripts represent regime types:

W = Westminster
C = Consensual
I = Inclusionary
P = Proportional

MODELLING PARTY IDENTIFICATION

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SUMMARY

It is generally assumed that underlying a person's voting decision is that person's identification with one or other of the competing political parties. Respondents interviewed in the course of of the British Election Study surveys of 1974 and 1979 indicated both their party identification and the strength of that affiliation. It is demonstrated that an individual's response concerning the strength of their party identification is related to the local political environment. A consequence of the models is that the "swing" between two parties will be approximately constant nationwide.

Keywords: MINIMAL DISTRIBUTION; MODELS; NORMAL APPROXIMATION; PARTISANSHIP; PARTY IDENTIFICATION; RELATIVE PARTISANSHIP; SWING.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The three British Election Study surveys of the 1970's gathered information from a representative sample of constituencies. Following each of the general elections of February 1974, October 1974 and May 1979, around 2000 respondents were asked (inter alia):-

Q1a: "Generally speaking do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal (Scotland: Scottish Nationalist; Wales: Plaid Cymru) or what?"

Respondents not naming a party were then asked:-

Q1b: "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others? Which party?"

All interviewees naming a party (An response to either Q1a or Q1b) were then asked:-

Q2: "Would you call yourself a very strong ... (appropriate party), fairly strong, or not very strong?"

In May 1979, 92% of those interviewed had some sense of attachment to a party and will be referred to as partisans and as displaying party identification (Sarjivk and Grove, 1983, p294). It is reasonable to assume that these partisans may be regarded as occupying positions along a single "left-right" continuum ranging from "very strong" Labour partisans at the extreme left to their Conservative counterparts at the extreme right, particularly since this appears to be the cognitive political map of the respondents (Sarjivk and Grove, 1983, p 310).

In addition to the constants A and B, the number of issues, N, is also unknown and requires estimation, as do the p-values for the separate constituency groups. With I groups of constituencies there are therefore 6I counts, I fitted row totals and I + 3 unknown parameters, leaving 4I - 3 degrees of freedom available to test the fit of the model.

In order to fit, this model the following procedure was adopted. The parameter B was put equal to 1 and arbitrary values, A₀ and N₀ say, were chosen for A and for N. With these values a standard function maximisation routine from the NAG (Nottingham Algorithms Group) library was used to determine the optimal value of p₁ for each row in turn, and the joint likelihood for the I rows was evaluated. This process was then repeated for a new value A₁, retaining the values of N and B. With a few repeats of this procedure the optimal combination of values for A and for the {p_i} was swiftly determined. Retaining the value of unity for B, the next stage of the iterative procedure involved changing the value of N. Subsequent cycles then lead to the global maximum likelihood estimates for N, A and the {p_i} given B = 1.

The restriction that B should take the value 1 was partly pragmatic: a larger value of B would have necessitated larger values for A and for N and a very much larger consequent computing time. The argument that follows makes it clear that the restriction to a unit value will have only a marginal effect on the goodness of fit.

Consider a variable having a binomial distribution with parameters N and π, where N is large and π is near to 0.5, so that the distribution is well approximated by a normal distribution having mean Nπ and variance Nπ(1-π). It is desired to estimate the end-points [a, b] of an interval containing a known proportion of the data. Using the normal approximation, the relevant end-points become

$$a = 0.5 - N\pi \quad \text{and} \quad b = 0.5 - N\pi' \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{a - 0.5 - N\pi}{\sqrt{N\pi(1-\pi)}} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{b - 0.5 - N\pi'}{\sqrt{N\pi'(1-\pi')}}.$$

Suppose that there is an alternative set of values (a', b', π' and N'), for which the end points have the same functional form. If the two sets of values are approximately equally effective, then

$$a' = 0.5 + N'\pi' + \lambda \{ \pi'(1-\pi') / \pi(1-\pi) \}^{1/2} (a - 0.5 - N\pi), \quad (2)$$

$$b' = 0.5 + N'\pi' + \lambda \{ \pi'(1-\pi') / \pi(1-\pi) \}^{1/2} (b - 0.5 - N\pi), \quad (3)$$

where

$$\lambda^2 = N'/N. \quad (4)$$

Now, since π and π' are close to 0.5, π'(1-π')/π(1-π) ≈ 1 and hence, on subtracting,

$$a' - b' \approx \lambda(a - b). \quad (5)$$

The consequence of this result is that, for 'central' binomials with large N, the sets of values (A, B, N), (2A, 2B, 4N), (3A, 3B, 9N), etc, will give very similar fitted values and similar values for the likelihood. In essence the problem is a scale problem and, if A, B and N were not confined to be integers, it would be preferable to work with the essentially scale-free parameters A/√N and B/√N (or, alternatively, with A/B and N).

2.3 An asymmetric normal model

An explicit assumption of the first two models is that, aside from environmental influences, the definitions of the three strength categories are the same for both parties. This assumption is easily tested in the case of the normal approximation by comparing the fit of the normal model with that of an asymmetric normal model having demarcation points:

$$-a, -\beta, 0, \beta', a' \quad (8)$$

with $a \neq a'$ and $\beta \neq \beta'$. This model has 41 - 4 degrees of freedom.

2.4 A relative partisanship normal model

An alternative extension of the normal model which also introduces two extra parameters is to allow the inner and outer demarcation points to vary in a continuous fashion as a response to some measure, θ , of the local political milieu. The extent of the variation is unlikely to be the same for the inner and outer demarcation points and so two new "slope" parameters, β and β' , are required. Once again there are 41 - 4 degrees of freedom. For the i th group of constituencies the demarcation points are

$$-a + \beta\theta_i, -\beta + \beta'\theta_i, 0, \beta + \beta'\theta_i, a + \beta\theta_i. \quad (9)$$

Two alternative definitions of θ_i proved equally effective. That used hereafter is $\hat{q}_i - p_i$, where \hat{q}_i reflects the "average" partisanship in the constituency group. An interesting alternative is $\theta_i = \log(p_i/(1 - p_i))$, where p_i is the fitted proportion of Labour voters.

3. RESULTS

Results are reported for four sets of data of the type illustrated in Table 1. The first two sets of data refer to the February 1974 and October 1974 elections, while the final two refer to the May 1979 election. The British Election Study had twin purposes: to interview a representative cross-section of the electorate and to explore the changes over time in an individual's political outlook. Thus the majority of the February 1974 respondents were re-interviewed in October 1974 and, where possible, in May 1979, though these panel members were augmented in the latter two surveys so as to maintain a respectable electorate cross-section. Because of the 5-year gap between 1974 and 1979, the augmentation of the panel in 1979 was considerable and use can therefore be made of two complementary data sets, that are labelled "old May" and "new May". The "old May" data refer to respondents who had been successfully contacted in 1974, whilst the "new May" data refer to those interviewed for the first time in 1979.

Whilst the "new May" data may be regarded as being an independent (though complementary) sample, the remaining three data sets are clearly interrelated, since they contain many of the same individuals. Nevertheless, such interrelations as exist would be difficult to identify because of shifts in voting results, since constituencies (and hence respondents) may be grouped in a different fashion for each data set.

3.1 The fit of the binomial model

Table 2 displays the estimated values for N and for A (taking $\hat{h} = 1$ for the reasons discussed earlier). The fit of the model is measured using χ^2 , the likelihood-ratio goodness-of-fit statistic, with the degrees of freedom being reported in the table.

Table 2 near here

Table 4 shows the signs of the standardized residuals $((Obs - Exp)/\sqrt{Exp})$ for the October 1974 data, the worst of the four cases. The grouping of the positive residuals suggests that some further improvement might be gained by choosing either quadratic dependence upon β_1 or differing slope parameters for the two parties, though neither seem worthwhile from the point of view of the interpretability of the model.

As an indication of the actual "lack of fit" of the model to the October 1974 data set, the greatest absolute residual concerns the 57 "very strong" Labour partisans in row 5 which compares with the fitted value of 53 for this category. In terms of the standardized residuals, the two major discrepancies relate to observed frequencies of 8 and 9 ("fairly strong" Conservative partisans in row 9 and "very strong" Conservatives in row 3, respectively), for which the model predicts values of 3 and 20, respectively. We conclude that, even for this comparatively poorly fitted data set, the lack of fit is not a serious problem.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1 The parameter estimates

Table 5 near here

Table 5 shows the point estimates of the two demarcation points (k, β) and the two slope parameters (γ, δ), for the four sets of data. We do not present the array of $\{M_i\}$ values since they do not form part of the distinctive features of the relative partisanship variant of the normal model, however we can report that, as expected, they closely mirror the raw estimates that were used as starting values. Comparison of Tables 2 and 5 also reveals that the estimates of k and β lie within 0.03 of the starting values given by equation (6).

In addition to the point estimates upper and lower bounds are given for each parameter. These bounds define the range of parameter values for which the consequent value of Y^2 lies within 3.84 (the upper 5% point of χ^2_3) of the optimal Y^2 . It can be seen that the demarcation points are estimated with considerably more precision than are the slope parameters, and of course the estimates are much more precise for the comparatively large 1974 data sets.

For the "old May" data, the confidence bounds for both β and δ include zero, as would be expected from the non significant improvement of the fit, for this set of data, compared to that of the normal model. The extent of the improvement of the relative partisanship model over the normal model for the other data sets is also clearly reflected in the confidence bounds for β and δ .

With a single exception (β for the "old May" data) the estimates for β and δ are remarkably consistent with one another, and the bounds are sufficiently wide that it can reasonably be assumed that β and δ have remained unchanged throughout the study period. Since any marked change in slope would presumably reflect a change in the effect of the environment on a partisan, the consistency of these estimates is only to be expected.

There are, however, marked changes in the values of the demarcation points, k and β . Considering the results for the first three data sets (which all refer to a single group of respondents), it can be seen that, while β stays reasonably constant, k steadily increases. This implies that, over this time period, after controlling for overall changes in the level of support for the two parties, there is a steady reduction in the proportion of "very strong" partisans. In fact the joint effect of the change in k and the shifts between elections is that the proportion of partisans who describe themselves as "very strong" decreases steadily from 35% in February 1974, through 31% in October

$$N_1 = 2\phi_1 \sqrt{N} \quad (11)$$

The change from p_1 to p_1' then amounts to a change to the value $0.5 + \delta\phi_1 + \phi_1 + 0.5\delta = 0.5 + (\phi_1 + 0.5\delta)$, since the product $\delta\phi_1$ will be negligible. Thus

$$N_1' = 2(\phi_1 + 0.5\delta)\sqrt{N} = N_1 + \delta\sqrt{N} \quad (12)$$

and it can be seen that the effect of a constant scaling of the $\{p_i\}$ values is approximately equivalent to a simple increment of the $\{N_i\}$ values.

Table 6 near here.

The consequences of a shift of the partisanship distribution which has the same magnitude for each group of constituencies are easily calculated using tables of the unit normal distribution function. The bulk of the constituencies had Conservative to Labour ratios in the range 1/3 to 2/3 which correspond roughly to values of ϕ_1 in the range -0.8 to 0.8. The effects of increases of 0.1 and 0.2 in the mean of the partisanship distribution are shown in Table 6. The entries in this table show the consequent increases in the proportion of Conservative partisans within each group. The predicted swings in partisanship can be seen to be all very similar, but with the greatest effects occurring where the parties were originally evenly balanced.

Of course, Table 6 reflects shifts in partisanship rather than in voting. The latter picture will be somewhat muddled by the effects of cross-voting and, particularly, by differential abstention rates according to the strength of party identification. Nevertheless, Table 6 serves to demonstrate the need to take account of the strength of party affiliation in modelling party behaviour, and makes clear that something close to constant swing is not a surprising outcome.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Simply stated these are as follows:

- (i) Studies of voting behaviour should take account of the strength of partisanship.
- (ii) The strength of partisanship varies according to an individual's local political environment.
- (iii) The form of the partisanship distribution within a constituency suggests that nationwide changes of political climate would result in approximately constant "swings" of the vote.

Although this paper has dealt, for reasons of space, exclusively with two parties, we are confident that these conclusions are equally valid for the multi-party case.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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TABLE 2

The fit of the binomial model to four data sets

	Data set			
	Feb 1974	Oct 1974	Old May 1979	New May 1979
Y^1	81.2	85.4	55.8 or 60.4	49.0 or 52.6
d.f.	33	33	37	37
N	67	57	49 or 75	22 or 37
$\lambda = N/B$	4	4	4 or 5	3 or 4
λ/\bar{N}	0.49	0.53	0.57 or 0.58	0.54 or 0.66

TABLE 3

The fit of alternative normal models to four data sets

Model	Data set			
	Feb 1974	Oct 1974	Old May 1979	New May 1979
I. Normal:	Y 72.2 (d.f.) (34)	Y 86.8 (34)	Y 57.2 (38)	Y 47.2 (38)
II. Asymmetric Normal:	Y 69.2 (d.f.) (32)	Y 82.6 (32)	Y 55.8 (36)	Y 45.0 (36)
III. Relative Partnership Normal:	Y 35.4 (d.f.) (32)	Y 54.6 (32)	Y 32.8 (36)	Y 38.6 (36)
Improvement in fit of model III over model I	Y 36.8 (2)	Y 32.2 (2)	Y 4.4 (2)	Y 8.6 (2)

TABLE 5

Increase in percentage of electorate identifying with the Conservative party due to a constant shift in the mean of the partisanship distribution

	Original location of partisanship mean									
	Strong Labour Area		Marginal Area		Strong Conservative Area					
Increase in	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.2	2.8	
mean	0.2	6.2	7.0	7.6	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.0	6.2	5.3
	μ_1	-0.8	-0.6	-0.4	-0.2	0	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8

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HOW, WHEN AND WHY DOES DEMOCRACY COLLAPSE?

THOUGHTS ON THREATS TO ITS STABILITY

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How, When and Why does Democracy Collapse? Thoughts on Threats to its Stability

It is understandable that the stability of democracy has been a pressing concern of the post-war world. The inter-war years saw the collapse of many democratic systems. Totalitarianism was not eradicated by the Second World War and it remained in all thinking people's gloomier prognostications about the future. The experiences of Italy and Germany, two countries where a form of representative government had been in operation for half a century before it was destroyed, deeply influenced the moods of intellectuals and creative artists. "Can it happen here?" was a question posed by many.

Thus there was a natural tendency towards political hypochondria. The body politic was carefully surveyed by those on the look-out for anti-democratic symptoms. Amid persistent unease about anything that appeared to disturb the equilibrium of the democratic state, the concept of "stable democracy" was born, a product of the early years of the "Cold War" and the fear that Communism was a "clear and ever-present danger".

Stability

The Oxford English Dictionary defines stability as "immunity from destruction or essential change". This would imply that an unstable entity does not always escape being destroyed or changed in its essence. Stability carries with it the notion of survival, not necessarily without change, but with alterations that do not affect fundamental identity. Hence some changes may reinforce chances of survival; others weaken them; and yet others have no effect either way. Some components of an entity are necessary to the survival of it as an identifiable object: others are not. The relationship of these two types of component to each other, and to the whole, is therefore necessary to any prognosis about survival. Dowding and Kimber in a survey of the literature emphasise:

The elements necessary for continuity are just those elements by which we recognise the entity whose stability we are considering and the continuity of those elements constitutes survival. . . .the survival of any given political object assists in the continuity of those elements by which the object is identified.¹

"Political stability", therefore, is the capacity of a political entity to survive threatening contingencies, that is, to prevent those changes which will alter its identity and so "destabilise" it. Therefore, in order to say whether a democratic system is stable or not, in any given context, one needs to define what are the criteria to be used for identifying democracy. When these criteria are under threat democracy is threatened. When they are eliminated democracy does not exist.

It might appear, therefore, that all that is needed is to define the essential features of democracy and to observe and examine those contingencies which threaten them. This is what I hope to do in this paper; but the enterprise is far from simple. The sources of threatening contingencies are very unclear. In the last resort the maintenance of democracy often depends upon a democratic people's attitudes, perception and values. If these change, and they may as a result of other changes or "instabilities"; democracy may be destabilised. Instability of values, conversely, may produce social and economic changes. A democracy may be threatened by circumstances over which its people have little control; or it may be threatened by impersonal forces set in motion by its own citizens.

Democracy

Democracy I shall define as an ideal type characterised by two distinctive features, both of which must be present before a country can be described as democratic. They are: public contestation and inclusiveness, readily recognised as Robert Dahl's two necessary conditions of "polyarchy" which he admits to being a synonym for democracy.² A third feature is often added to "democracy" as an afterthought, resulting in the rather clumsy phrase, "democracy and the rule of law".

"Public contestation" links the traditional civil liberties with the rights of political organisation and opposition to the government. The former can be grouped together as "freedom of expression". Thus freedom of speech and freedom of the press provide intellectual, cultural and artistic freedom as well as freedom to criticise authority. Freedom of assembly and freedom of association allow free expression to be communicated and, if necessary, mobilised and directed. Thus organised opposition derives from all these freedoms.

It is not difficult to understand how public contestation can be regarded as a cause of instability. It assumes a society in which nothing escapes criticism, including political authority. Nothing can be regarded as sacrosanct; moreover, organised opposition to those in authority is regarded as normal. People can advocate changes in traditional procedures and values and proceed with organising their effective introduction. Briefly, public contestation encourages open social conflict.

"Inclusiveness" accentuates this trend. It denotes the right of all adults to participate in the political process. This is assured by universal suffrage and the right of all to compete for representative position and, ultimately, political leadership. It thus guarantees a basic equality of political rights; and it assumes that quite a large proportion of people will be prepared to participate. "Public contestation" can exist without "inclusiveness"; but when the latter principle is attained the former is greatly augmented.

With this goes an increase in the conflict-rousing effects of public contestation. It results in a society in which everyone may be a critic and everyone may be involved in decision making. The general result is likely to be one of heat, noise and lengthy discussion. People used to more autocratic forms of policy-making will tend to see the "inclusiveness" of democracy as untidy and inefficient. It could therefore be regarded as making for social disorder.

Moreover, the operation of public contestation and inclusiveness in concert may produce huge disappointments for large groups of people. Especially when democracy is initiated, expansive new freedoms may wrongly persuade large minorities that their arguments are unassailable and their aspiration within grasp. But what is guaranteed is the ability to have one's "say", not the ability to get one's "way". This may be very frustrating, and disappointed expectations can be very unsettling, not to say radicalising. Public contestation and inclusiveness, therefore, should be seen as promoting a conflictual, rather than a consensual, society.

For these reasons one often finds that in democratic countries emphasis is placed upon maintenance of the rule of law. This must follow logically, I think, from the need to implement decisions made by the democratic process. Were such decisions to be made abortive by a refusal of minorities to accept them, then democracy itself would sooner or later, (probably sooner), come to be regarded as a meaningless exercise. Indeed, no type of regime can be either efficient or intelligible when the implementation of its decisions cannot be guaranteed. In such cases the rule of law has broken down.

The rule of law is not unique to democracy. As Joseph Raz has said:

...the rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess and by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or the dignity of man.³

Some totalitarian governments may observe in some respects the rule of law, which has no moral significance. A state which decreed that the first-born should be slaughtered would be observing the rule of law if it ensured that no exceptions were permitted. The rule of law implies that the law should be exercised without discretion or arbitrary action through an independent, incorruptible judiciary and law enforcement agencies, by processes accessible to all citizens. People should be ruled by the law and agree to be guided by it: laws should be clear so that citizens know what to expect from them.

Consequently they cannot be retroactive; nor can they be open to tinkering from the executive power. In fact, the government should obey the law as everyone else. If these conditions are maintained and the forces of order ensure that the law is observed, then the rule of law appertains.

While the rule of law is not a distinctive criterion of identity for democracy, as I have explained above, it is by no means an unnecessary feature of it. As a concept the rule of law is independent of democracy and can be discovered where there is no democracy; but democracy cannot operate without the rule of law being maintained. Indeed, it might be argued that the maintenance of the rule of law is more important for democracy than for any other type of regime; because, through public contestation and inclusiveness, democratic society is more prone to social conflict, which must not be allowed to degenerate into physical conflict.

In fact, the undiminished rule of law can never be anything but a legal ideal. In one everyday sense it is never complete because a high proportion of crime is never solved and individual criminals punished. Yet as long as the vast majority of individuals go on behaving as if public order is unimpaired, democracy can hardly be considered under threat. This cannot be asserted so confidently with collective breaches of the law, which present more of a problem than individual breaches. Where a fairly large group of people set out deliberately to defy the law they are "cocking a snook" at the government and, in a democracy, they are demonstrating that they do not accept majority decisions. This type of law-breaking is always more difficult to police, and if it became a regular method of reacting by minorities to laws undesired by them, law and order might well break down. It would then be difficult to maintain democracy.

Even greater threats to democracy are posed by breaches of what might be called the "constitutional rule of law", or what are more commonly called the "democratic rules of the game". These may be either constitutional

laws or constitutional conventions. The maintenance of the "rules of the game" will very much depend on the leading democratic politicians and the way they compete with one another. If their competition becomes so intense that one is tempted to break the rules, a competitor may do so. Then the rules will quickly be subverted. An especially important "rule" may apply to the power succession. For example, in Britain it is a constitutional convention that when clearly defeated at a General Election an incumbent Prime Minister resigns. If one refused to resign in such circumstances and held on to power, a constitutional crisis would result and British democracy would be imperilled. The maintenance of the "rules of the game", therefore, is very much dependent on the political leaders who are the game's chief players. They have a great responsibility for the survival of democracy which depends on their possessing a certain minimum amount of trust in each other. While a good deal of dishonesty and corruption on their part may be expected, tampering with the "rules" can only lead to lack of respect for them. Hence the seriousness of President Nixon's transgression at Watergate. It threatened damage to those foundations of trust on which the democratic "game" is based.

The distinctive criteria of identity for democracy, therefore, are public contestation and inclusiveness. The rule of law, including the "constitutional rule of law", is also a criteria of identity thought not a distinctive one. Where there are contingencies threatening any of these three criteria, democracy may be in danger.

Legitimacy

A possible gauge of whether democracy in a particular country is stable or not might be the degree of legitimacy it enjoys. If its legitimacy is low it is unstable: if high it is stable. Unfortunately, the matter cannot be resolved so easily.

In the first place the concept of legitimacy is complicated by the relationship between rulers and ruled. Max Weber, himself, never seemed to clarify absolutely this dichotomy. For the most part he perceived legitimacy as something springing from the ruled. If they saw a political order as "right and proper", "morally valid", or "binding", then they viewed it as "legitimate", and accorded legitimacy to it. Hence legitimacy was located in a set of values. On the other hand, the government, aware of this situation, would attempt "to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy".⁴ Thus any analysis must probe the subtle relationships between a system of authority attempting to "legitimate" itself and the subject citizens who may be evaluating the actions of their rulers in terms of what they see as right and proper. It is much more difficult to understand and explain the stability of relationships than it is the stability of structures.

Secondly the concept is bound to be relative. Few citizens approve of all their governments do. They accord legitimacy to some aspects of governing and not to others. It is as though they are keeping an account and the rulers must attempt to ensure that the account is in credit. If the balance of all citizen accounts in aggregate is in debt the government will be "illegitimate". If successive governments fail to get the account out of debt, the regime will have lost its legitimacy. In practice, there may be some groups in every country who accord little legitimacy to the regime and other groups who never perceive it in an illegitimate light. And there may be challenging counter-elites offering different sets of values and hoping to legitimate them at some future time. In democratic systems competing claims for legitimacy will have freedom to be heard.

Thirdly, although the relationship between rulers and ruled, as I have argued above, may be difficult to analyse, it has been further complicated by numerous commentators bringing another relationship into the model. Most commonly a "political stratum", or "political class", is

held to be important in according legitimacy or otherwise. Thus Nordlinger writes:

Where the overwhelming majority of the politicised stratum believes that the government does not have a moral right to govern it is thoroughly "illegitimate".⁵

The author is especially concerned with the behaviour of the armed forces; but it may well be the case that any highly educated elite who form a "political class", will have a much more developed sense of what is legitimate than ordinary citizens. (It is as though they have the capacity to put more in or take more out of the bank account mentioned earlier.) The nature and effectiveness of support of the few more politically involved will be more important than that of the many unpolitical. This form of inequality may well run counter to democratic values, but it may be a reality in democratic countries. Moreover, where the law enforcers (the police and military) decide that the regime is illegitimate, and consequently neglect their duties, the rule of law will break down.

Fourthly legitimacy may relate to different components of a political entity, and it is necessary to be clear about to which particular aspect legitimacy is accorded. William Gamson perceives four objects of "political trust" - the incumbents, people at that moment in power; the political institutions or constitutional framework; the "public philosophy", or beliefs and values of a regime; and the "political community", an inclusive term comprising all political actors.⁶ Ted Gurr ranks three of these components, arguing:

The intensity of regime legitimacy is the extent to which the political unit, its governing institutions and the incumbents are thought worthy of support.⁷

And he goes on to say that citizens are more likely to regard the legitimacy of the unit (or "political community") as more important than the institutions and the legitimacy of the institutions as more important than the incumbents. Thus, like Gamson, he introduces a ranking system into the political objects to which legitimacy is accorded.

Fifthly a democratic regime may be accorded legitimacy for affective reasons, not related to democratic criteria. British citizens may accord legitimacy to the British state as a reflection of their loyalty to the nation and their love for the Royal family. Hence legitimacy might cease to be granted to a democratic regime because of failings in non-democratic processes and institutions. Illegitimacy accorded to a regime, similarly, may reflect lack of allegiance to the nation, but not to democratic procedures. The Scottish National Party and the Parti Quebecois do not regard Britain and Canada, respectively, as proper objects of legitimate sentiments. But most of the adherents of both parties anticipate that an independent Scotland or Quebec will be a democratic state. What the particular "demos" should be, is clearly something that cannot be banned from the democratic agenda for debate. According legitimacy to the "demos", in consequence, is not a necessary indication of support for public contestation and inclusiveness; and lack of attachment to the "demos" may be accompanied by support in principle for the criteria used for identifying democracy.

Sixthly a democratic regime may be accorded legitimacy for material reasons not associated with the criteria which identify democracy. The citizens of a democratic state may perceive authority as legitimate because they think it "effective". As it is often put, "it works well". Dahrendorf says, "it is clear that effectiveness and legitimacy are related";⁸ though the precise relationship between the two is not easy to define. How effective citizens believe their government to be may depend on their expectations about its performance; but their expectations will probably have been shaped by the promises of the politicians. Hence outputs of government, such as cuts in taxation and increases in social benefits, will be measured against what the citizens have been led to expect. Where outputs disappoint, legitimacy may be withdrawn even when public contestation, inclusiveness and the rule of law are not otherwise impaired. The degree

to which expectation^{of} high outputs is weighed against the criteria of identity of democracy will vary greatly from one democracy to another. Periods of depression, therefore, may well be a testing-time for democracy. A democratic state founded on an "economic miracle", where democracy is associated with affluence, may prove to be much less stable than one where democracy has some basis in an understanding of its intrinsic values, such as beliefs in political participation and freedom of expression.

For all these reasons it may be difficult, both empirically and conceptually, to use legitimacy in order to assess the stability of democracy. There are great problems, as studies by Prothro and Grigg,⁹ and by McClosky¹⁰, have demonstrated, in drafting a questionnaire indicating the magnitude of ordinary citizens' adherence to democracy. The results do not show a great understanding of its implications or a strong and conscious attachment to it. The vast unpolitical majority of people in any democracy may find it impossible to define their fundamental orientations to the regime and only the political stratum may have clear and explicit comprehension. Consequently it is almost impossible to predict how citizens of a well-established democracy would behave when confronted unexpectedly with a crisis of survival.

Finally the stability of democracy may be contingent upon factors which are not part of the "identikit" of democracy, as I have defined it. The existence of democracy may be threatened by assaults upon the rule of law. If the rule of law collapses, democracy, (or for that matter any other regime), will collapse. Democracy is dependent upon the framework of the state in which it operates. If the state disintegrates, democracy can hardly survive. Conceptually the democratic state is a different entity from democracy; yet the two are clearly connected. The stability of the structure of the state in any democracy is thus as important for the maintenance of the democratic regime as the retention of public contestation and inclusiveness.

Threats to Democracy from Anti-Democratic Forces

"Anti-democratic" means consciously opposed to public contestation and inclusiveness. Figure 1 summarises the instances of democratic collapse in the twentieth century and it is significant that nearly every one of them appears to have been brought about by physical force overthrowing civil authority in a more or less direct way. Four sources of physical force are evident.

In the first place out of 60 instances nine are the result of foreign aggression and occupation. These are seven countries invaded by the Third Reich in 1939 and 1940 and two Baltic republics incorporated in the USSR in the latter year;¹¹ clearly examples, (with the possible exception of France,) of what Brian Barry calls "bad luck"¹². Whether there is significance or not in democracy having often been overthrown by anti-democratic foreign invasion; there must surely be in the absence from Figure 1 of any instance of one democratic state destroying democracy in another. Obviously democracies provide little threat to other democracies.

Secondly, right-wing extremist groups such as Fascist parties proclaim their threats to democracy. They see it as effete and unpatriotic, perceiving the nation endangered by democracy which has left it ill-prepared, soft and a prey to both external and internal enemies. Free self-expression produces compromises after long discussion when what is needed is forceful action by an inspired leader. Public contestation must therefore be replaced by a single well-disciplined national movement organised through a party on the lines of an army. Mobilised consensus then replaces conflict. For this reason Fascism is not inimical to inclusiveness; indeed, it supports a certain sort of citizen participation, but it is guided participation towards declared national objectives. Fascism thus does not allow freedom of association which is divisive. National goals are superior to the rights of either collectivities or individuals. Fascist parties have not

Figure 1 Instances of Breakdown of Democracy* Since 1900

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Cause of Collapse</u>
Spain	1923	Military coup
Chile	1924	Military coup
Italy	1925	Fascist coup followed by suppression
Greece	1925	Military coup
Lithuania	1926	Military coup
Portugal	1926	Military coup
Poland	1926	Military coup
Chile	1927	Military coup
Argentina	1930	Military coup
Germany	1933	Fascist rise to power by elections followed by suppression
Latvia	1934	Military coup and civil government by decree
Austria	1934	Fascist coup followed by suppression
Spain	1936	Attempted military coup, civil war, followed by dictatorship
Greece	1936	Military coup
Rumania	1938	Royal coup
Czechoslovakia	1939	Foreign occupation
Norway	1940	Foreign occupation
Belgium	1940	Foreign occupation
Holland	1940	Foreign occupation
Luxembourg	1940	Foreign occupation
France	1940	Foreign occupation
Estonia	1940	Foreign occupation
Lithuania	1940	Foreign occupation
Denmark	1943	Foreign occupation followed by suppression
Argentina	1943	Military coup
Peru	1948	Military coup
Venezuela	1948	Military coup
Czechoslovakia	1948	Communist coup
Colombia	1953	Military coup
Guatamala	1954	Military coup
Argentina	1955	Military coup
Pakistan	1958	Military coup
Turkey	1960	Military coup
Argentina	1962	Military coup
Peru	1962	Military coup
Ecuador	1963	Military coup
Brazil	1964	Military coup
Argentina	1966	Military coup
Nigeria	1966	Military coup
Greece	1967	Military coup
Peru	1968	Military coup
Lesotho	1970	Coup by President backed by para-military police
Turkey	1971	Military coup
Ecuador	1972	Military coup
Ghana	1972	Military coup
Philippines	1972	Presidential coup backed by military
Chile	1973	Military coup
Swaziland	1973	Suppressed by personal dictate of king
Zambia	1973	Replaced by single-party state
Uruguay	1973	Military coup
Lebanon	1975	Civil War
Argentina	1976	Military coup
Pakistan	1977	Military coup
Sierra Leone	1978	Replaced by single-party state
Grenada	1979	Marxist coup
Turkey	1980	Military coup
Ghana	1981	Military coup
Central African Republic	1981	Military coup
Djibouti	1981	Replaced by single-party state
Nigeria	1983	Military coup

* In some cases before 1945 only universal manhood suffrage existed.

I should like to thank Mr A. Angell, Mr A.G.N. Short and Mr J.A. Wiseman, for help in compilation

been sensitive to the niceties of law, and organised hooliganism has been one familiar characteristic of their activities. Mussolini's successful march on Rome in 1922 took place amid nationwide Fascist thuggery. Although Hitler's eventual accession to power in 1933 was by constitutional means; he retained office by physical intimidation of his opponents and by arresting opposition M.P.s.¹³

Nearly all contemporary democracies have extremist right-wing parties, often with a Fascist tinge. Both Britain and France have National Fronts; Italy has a neo-Fascist party; the German Federal Republic had the NDP in the 1960s; and in Spain the Falange has survived from Franco days. All these parties have the support of only a small section of the electorate, but their presence does produce an element of social conflict. For example, both the National Fronts' main thrusts are against black immigrants who are scapegoated as an alien source of national decline. Tactics reminiscent of the early Nazis include marches with national flags, often through immigrant areas. Reaction to this provocation is welcomed and the appeal to young "skinheads" is only too clear. Whether or not such small minority groups are capable of expanding their support and eventually taking power depends on numerous factors with which I deal below. Clearly, however, a very important generator of inter-war Fascism was a strong sense of national failure and humiliation; while the social and economic climate in which Fascism thrived was one of incivisme, fragile authority and the breakdown of law and order.

Thirdly left-wing extremist groups may threaten democracy. Unlike Fascist parties they may proclaim their fidelity to democratic tenets, though Marxist parties espouse "proletarian" or "people's" democracy and characterise my definition of democracy as "bourgeois democracy". The institutions of the democratic state are expressions of bourgeois domination. A classless society can only be brought about through a proletarian revolution

followed by a proletarian dictatorship, which is necessary in the early stages of Communist rule. Consequently public contestation is not a feature of Communist states where freedom of opposition to the government is practically non-existent

All contemporary democracies have left-wing parties of some Marxist persuasion. A feature of the last three decades has been the decline of the Moscow-oriented Communist Parties whose activities often frightened democrats in post-war Europe. Perhaps two main factors have been responsible for this trend. Undoubtedly the vast increase in working-class prosperity in the quarter of a century after 1950 did not make any revolutionary theories easy to disseminate. Furthermore, during these years the experience of the working-class under Soviet-type Communism became apparent to the working class of democratic Europe. Hence Communist Parties in the democracies have found it increasingly difficult to recruit. The two important ones - the French and the Italian - have had, however, rather different experiences. The French C.P.'s vote has declined from 26% to 16% of the total vote of the general elections between 1956 and 1981.¹⁴ Perhaps its reputation as a fairly Stalinist organisation has not helped, though in accepting ministries in a Socialist government in 1981 it genuflected to democracy. The Italian Communist Party has been much more successful at retaining its electoral support; but at the price of distancing itself from Moscow and declaring its attachment to parliamentary democracy.

Today, Communist Parties in most democracies proclaim their intentions of respecting democratic processes. It is difficult to write scenarios about how they could gain power. According to their tenets, the world economic crisis since the mid-1970s should portend the collapse of capitalism. Large armies of unemployed, for example, should provide a fertile soil for the seeds of revolutionary consciousness. Yet, if the inter-war economic

crisis when the industrial workers had much lower living standards, did not produce this outcome, how much less likely is it to do so today. The one post-war example of left-wing overthrow of an industrialised democracy - Czechoslovakia in 1948¹⁵ - is scarcely illustrative of an economically deprived proletariat rising in revolt against the bourgeoisie. Rather was it an instance of a well-organised Communist Party supported by the Red Army, using an armed militia to carry out a coup d'état in order to forestall impending defeat at the forthcoming elections. It was aided by a feeling of gratitude for recent liberation by the Russians. It is difficult to envisage how any industrialised democracy today could find itself in a comparable situation.

Fourthly democracy has been overthrown by soldiers though, as Figure 1 shows, except for Chile no well-established democracy, (one persisting for at least 30 years) has been suppressed in this way. Military officers tend to be different from Fascist or Communist leaders in that they have no "new order" they wish to establish. Sometimes army officers have been influenced by Fascism, as Peron in Argentina¹⁶, but for the most part they have overthrown democratic regimes when they felt national integrity threatened. (Of course, national integrity may often be associated with the wellbeing of the armed forces in generals' minds.) Many see themselves as the ultimate repository of patriotism, perceiving civilian politicians as deficient in this respect. The latter's bargaining and compromising may be particularly distasteful, combined as it is with a form of decision-making that to soldiers seems inefficient. A system in which authority can be criticised by everyone and in which orders are given after prolonged discussion is likely to be accepted only by those military leaders who have been socialised for a generation or more in the ethos of civil rule. There is bound to be a permanent incongruence between the way the armed forces operate and the way a democracy does.

Samuel Finer asks why the soldiers, "lethally and heavily armed", do not intervene everywhere¹⁷. Do they have to worry about the rule of law when they are the ultimate law enforcers? To answer the question one can begin with Figure 1, revealing that a military overthrow of democracy has not taken place in any highly industrialised state. Where democracy is recently introduced, however, as Samuel Huntington argues, and institutionalisation is slight, political participation will be very destabilising. What he calls a "praetorian" society will emerge in which, in the last resort, only the military will govern¹⁸. Modern industrial societies, complex, highly institutionalised and marked by great differentiation of function, are not subject to the same threat. The leaders of their armed forces are likely to perceive running the country as a highly specialised occupation, far removed from their own skills. Consequently, though they may often feel the country is "going to the dogs", only in times of national catastrophe, or when they feel the integrity of the State is threatened, may the military be tempted to overthrow a well-established democracy.

Finer also argues that military intervention will take place only where there is both the disposition and the opportunity.¹⁹ Where the method of transferring power is legitimate; where the sovereign authority is legitimate; and where people are mobilised into large organisations - in short, where there is a high level of political culture - the military will not be disposed to intervene and opportunities will be rare.²⁰ Even such a weak and unstable regime as the Weimar Republic only provoked intervention by soldiers once, the farcical Kapp putsch in 1920, led by a civilian because the army needed a symbol of legality. After its failure, the Wehrmacht never attempted another coup, recognising that their purposes needed mass support, something they later obtained from the Nazis.²¹ The installation of the French Fifth Republic in 1958, Finer writes, was initiated by civilians and the army was "sucked into it".²² When the generals and

paratroopers mutinied in N. Africa in 1961 they received no support from the soldiers, largely conscripts. President De Gaulle forbade them to obey. A one-hour general strike in France demonstrated support for civilian rule.²³ Both the Weimar Republic and the early Fifth Republic were democratic regimes of singular precariousness. The fact that they were both able to withstand attempted coups illustrates the likelihood of the failure of military action where civil institutions are strongly established.

Opportunities for military intervention have occurred in Britain, but neither disorders associated with the 1926 General Strike nor riots in some inner cities in 1981 provoked any action. Would increased violence in a 1985 General Strike, however, combined with more urban rioting, lead to such an outcome? We can only speculate; but it is possible that communal conflict, terroristic outrage and breakdown of political dialogue in Northern Ireland, leading to the army being given a security role, has resulted in the politicisation of senior soldiers (as well as senior policemen). It is surely significant that the occasion when the British generals in some numbers seemed disposed to disobey civilian rule, the "Curragh Mutiny" in 1911, was in reaction to the possibilities of Ulster being part of an autonomous Ireland.²⁴ Robert Dahl has written of a large, centralised and politicised military as detrimental to polyarchy²⁵. Rumours of an army coup d'état in 1973²⁶, with an armoured column seizing Heath Row, were probably inspired by such speculations, and were compounded by economic crisis, inflation and public disorder in the coalfields. In terms of Huntington's model there would have to be a "de-institutionalisation" of a large industrialised democracy before a praetorian society could emerge. With Finer there would have to be a decline in the level of political culture. Only the aftermath of a nuclear war seems likely to produce such eventualities.

The above four contingencies cover almost all the failures of democracy

in the twentieth century. Each has a different significance. In the instances of foreign invasion and occupation no real decline of legitimacy (except possibly in the case of France), took place. Indeed, foreign occupation by the forces of a non-democratic regime, helped to emphasise democratic procedures as part of the national political culture. The legitimacy of democracy, and hence its stability, was in most cases greatly strengthened by this experience. Where Fascist parties have overthrown democracy they have claimed that it was not a legitimate part of national political culture and they have sought to establish the legitimacy of their own New Order. The overthrow of democracy by left-wing extremist parties is probable only in a very immature democracy such as Grenada. All Marxists believe democracy to be unstable, however, because the historical process will bring about its eventual demise in a social and economic situation of revolutionary conflict as capitalism declines. Hence left-wing extremist parties do not perceive democracy as legitimate and try to destabilise it. On the whole they have had very little success in this strategy and it is highly likely that the industrial working class in well-established democracies accords less attachment to Communism today than at any time since 1917. (This does not necessarily imply they accord high legitimacy to democracy.) Finally the military may have mixed views about the legitimacy of democracy. Clement Dodd describes how the Turkish military have only intended to intervene "to restore some degree of liberalism and democracy;"²⁷ though this frame of mind may reveal how little soldiers understand democratic principles. Ataturk favoured democracy because it was modern, or modernising, he did not realise all its implications. Elsewhere the armed forces have had little concern for public contestation, inclusiveness, or the rule of law. In many developing countries they have tired of the rule of civilian politicians; but where democracy is well-established, the soldiers have been little disposed to overthrow it, even when it is apparently under threat.

Threats to Democracy from Breakdown of the System: Over-Intensification of Public Contestation

Democracy is not only endangered by those who consciously disapprove of it. Many people who are not anti-democratic are, nevertheless, not aware of the implications of a democratic system. Their behaviour may sometimes result in the weakening of democratic procedures and values, conceivably to the point where they are engulfed. To date there are few examples of such outcomes. Public contestation, however, may become too intensified to be contained within the law, where discussion between two or more groups moves beyond verbal, to physical, conflict. Where the rule of law cannot be maintained democratic procedures, such as protracted debate and electoral campaigns will be disrupted. A large group may refuse to accept the outputs of democratic decision-making. Civil disorder will then follow.

In other words, if the desired outcomes of the decision-making process are more important to certain people or groups than acceptance of the law or the democratic "rules of the game", public contestation cannot proceed peacefully. Deep cleavages that are intensely felt and acted upon may impede the proper functioning of democracy. Two instances of this situation, both capable of producing public disorder, are cultural and communal conflict and social and economic conflict.

(a) Cultural and Communal Conflict

All societies have cleavages. When they are deep, it may be difficult for people on different sides of the divide to understand one another. Dialogue and bargaining between them will be liable to interruption. A. Rabushka and K.A. Shepsle have provided the classic analysis of this in their study of "plural societies" whose tendencies to disintegrate, are often related to their ethnic cleavages, the most difficult to bridge. A language difference often proves insurmountable. Where communication is impossible, understanding may be slight and dialogue rests with bi-lingual

elites. Differences of education, income, life-style and religion, however, may also make for lack of sympathy. Where all these differences run concurrently - there are none of what Dahl called "cross-cutting" cleavages - democratic procedures will operate under a handicap. Rabushka and Shepsle write pessimistically:

Ethnic preferences are intense and are not negotiable. Separate communities with separate institutions and patterns of socialisation are agglomerated with an artificial political community as a result of historical forces and random events... intergroup politics soon become the politics of outbidding.²⁸ brokerage institutions become inefficacious.

The writers, particularly reflecting on the politics of new democracies formed from old colonies, see five stages towards disintegration.²⁹ Before independence the different ethnic groups collaborate against the colonial power. After independence their co-operation has a certain ambiguity. With representative institutions, at the third stage, a new generation of ethnic leaders make demands on the old leaders: the coalition government, if it still exists, will be unable to stand the strain of increased emphasis on race and culture. In the fourth stage they begin to compete over the allocation of power and material resources, trying to exclude one another from public goods. Hence in the final stage communal conflict breaks out, political parties only exist on racial lines and dialogue between ethnic leaders breaks down. Mistrust leads to electoral machinations and there is no longer a wish to observe the "rules of the game" for every one is shouting "foul" and "cheat". In such a context, say the authors, especially if one ethnic group is in a permanent majority, democracy "has little meaning".³⁰

The experience of various states confirms this theory of progressive decline though non-ethnic cleavages may not be so damaging. For example, religion divides a uni-lingual country such as the Netherlands without democracy collapsing³¹. The solution has been the "pillarisation" of

Dutch society, so that much decision making takes place either in the Catholic, or the Protestant, or the secularist/socialist social sectors. Intense contestation has thus been avoided and democracy made viable, by what Lipjhart calls "consociationalism". The Netherlands remains "a nation divided, but not one divided against itself".³² This might not apply to neighbouring Belgium where there is no religious cleavage, Catholicism predominating. Language divides the French-speaking Walloons from the Dutch-speaking Flemings. Political expression of this cleavage, Rabushka and Shepsle argue, only became very important in 1968. Prior to that the three traditional parties - Christians, Socialist and Liberals - appealed to both communities more or less equally³⁵ on national issues such as economic policy. After the 1968 election all the parties were split into Flemish and Walloon wings. Probably with increasing affluence and the decline in working-class solidarity the linguistic cleavage became the salient one. Increasingly it became apparent that democracy could only be maintained in Belgium through a federal solution.

Northern Ireland is only a sub-system; but it represents a breakdown of democracy within the context of the United Kingdom. There is no language divide in Ulster: the cleavage is based on national consciousness and almost completely linked to religion. The dominant Protestant majority controlled Stormont while the Catholic minority participated little in the process. Two trends in the 1960s appeared to portend change. The Ulster Prime Minister, O'Neill, far more liberal than his predecessors, struck up a friendship with the Irish Prime Minister.³⁴ This rapprochement with the Irish Republic caused alarm among Orangemen and led, in 1965, to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, a clandestine army. At the same time the new Catholic middle class with more confidence in democratic processes began to protest about discrimination against Catholics, particularly in the area of housing. People's Democracy, as

the pressure group was called, with demonstrations and marches imitated the familiar tactics of such groups in other democratic countries. They met with some harassment from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, predominantly a Protestant force; but the crucial denouement took place in 1969 when they were prevented from marching through Armagh by a group of Protestant vigilantes led by Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist, anti-Papist preacher. From that time onwards, with the rule of law breaking down, cultural and communal cleavage in Ireland became more pronounced and representative democracy was suspended. Clearly it was only able to function in Northern Ireland for the first 40 years because the grievances of the minority group were never properly expressed. Once they were and public contestation became a reality, the distrust and hatred evoked prevented democracy from functioning.

Switzerland is a country with three major languages and two religions, and one might think its peaceful state nullifies the universal rule of deeply felt cleavages aborting democracy. As Rabushka and Shepsle point out, however, Switzerland did not originate as a nation state³⁵ but as a confederate alliance and it was only slowly transformed into a federation. The language issue has never been salient because the cantonal boundaries have usually followed the language boundaries - 18 of the 22 cantons are uni-lingual. Great power remains in the cantons and the weak central government allocates few collective goods. The most salient issues are local issues. Hence the general theory is not refuted and, indeed, the experience of the Berne canton confirms it.³⁶ In Berne the Francophone Catholics of North Jura demand a new canton separate from the German-speaking Bernese and the French-speaking Protestants of South Jura. Hence the canton of Berne resembles Belgium and Canada where cultural divisions sometimes make public contestation too intense. Probably federalism from the beginning, or partition as between India and Pakistan, or Malaya and

Singapore - are the only solutions for cultural cleavages so deep that great distrust inevitably results. Robert Dahl comments on such situations.

Because conflicts among ethnic and religious sub-cultures are so easily seen as threats to one's most fundamental self, opponents are readily transformed into a malign and inhuman "they", whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery...³⁷

The quotation provokes the question, "What does one's fundamental self" comprise in a collective sense? The acceptance of the principle of self-determination leaves the query, What is the "self" to be determined? What happens in the cases cited above where there were two or more "selves"? In other words, the problem of identity is prior to the problem of legitimacy. Where two or more large cultural sub-groups do not identify with the "demos" then democracy can hardly prove to be legitimate. Conflict between such uncomprehending groups may be seen as, and become, a zero-sum game. Democratic dialogue will be impossible and democratic institutions will break down in physical conflict. One group may control the army and the police and impose its will on other groups. If this does not happen civil war may break out.

Public contestation, however, may be maintained without deteriorating into widespread or damaging physical conflict where the cultural sub-groups are dispersed and small, or relatively integrated. American blacks typify this situation. Ted Gurr argues that by the late 1960s they had reached such a level of relative deprivation that conditions necessary for "internal war" - widespread organised agitation designed to overthrow a regime - existed. Conventional political action, which had seemed to promise much after the Civil Rights Act, 1964, had failed to alleviate the discontent accentuated by inconsistent police reaction to inner-city riots. But the proportion of blacks in the population is only about 12%, and large concentrations of them are present in only a few places, precluding sufficient

institutional support for a black separatist movement.³⁸ Where could their own "demos" be situated? And, anyway, though much of the rhetoric about American democracy may have little meaning for blacks, as James Baldwin points out, the vast majority of them still see themselves as Americans. Hence local breakdowns of the rule of law, though alarming in their frequency in the 1960s, represented local and temporary failures of democratic dialogue. Black expectations of the effects of political enfranchisement were too premature; but not entirely frustrated. The events of the 1984 Presidential election, and the gradual encroachment of black control over many large City Halls, exemplifies a tendency to accept democratic procedures as legitimate. Public contestation has gradually been reinstated. The blacks, to some degree, have been incorporated, (for the first time), into the American political community

(b) Social and Economic Conflict

Could it be possible that other sub-groups - not cultural, but socio-economic - might see themselves as no longer part of the "demos", refuse to accord legitimacy and raise the intensity of confrontation to physical conflict? Socio-economic groups certainly resort to violence at times. French farmers quite often demonstrate, cause public disorder by blocking roads and join in minor physical conflict with lorry-drivers carrying foreign meat, or desecrate prefectures by tipping vegetables and manure in their precincts. When farmers riot they are invariably concerned about their products' prices which regularly include elements of government financial support. With other occupational groups wages are likely to be the main source of grievance and strikes the form of disorder. Usually they are part of the bargaining process. Strikes of this sort may intensify contestation very little. The degree of conflict will depend on the amount of relative deprivation felt, the history of employer-worker relations in the industry and the homogeneity and geographical isolation

of the occupational group.³⁹ Where strikes are not about wages, but more fundamental issues such as closure of plant, they may be more severe, and public disorder may occur. As Ted Gurr writes:

In the twentieth century the closing of unproductive coal mines in Appalachia, Wales, Belgium and the Ruhr led to worker violence.⁴⁰

It is not surprising that threatened pit closures in Britain in 1984 should evoke sharp conflict and violence. The geographical isolation of many mining communities makes the loss of the only visible means of support more painful.

Political and general strikes, (and general strikes are often adjudged political), may be regarded as much more destabilising. Of course, in advanced industrial society where groups are inter-dependent, even peaceful legal action by a strategically placed small group, such as the engineers who run the power stations, could bring industry to a halt. This might result in social chaos and the collapse of law and order. Troops, who might be used for some essential services, such as dockwork and distributing food supplies, could hardly be used to operate power stations and probably not to man sewage pumps. "Bayonets don't cut coal".⁴¹ as Arthur Cook, the South Wales Miners' leader, said. Any strikes can be regarded as political where two conditions are met: they are directed against government policy, (always likely to be the case in the public sector where the government is the employer); and the union leadership parades its political motives (as Arthur Scargill re Mrs. Thatcher). To what degree the incidence of political strikes implies a threat to democracy is difficult to assess. For the most part occupational groups do not resemble ethnic communities. Their concerns are usually with the allocation of benefits, largely through the market, and not with citizen status. British miners identify with the nation: they do not feel excluded from the "demos", even though there may be a certain cultural isolation about the coalfields, giving miners

a sense of collective self-reliance and solidarity which other groups cannot match. Hence the situation is one of a small minority that normally sees the regime as legitimate, using its strategic position in industry in an attempt to frustrate government policy that it sees as illegitimate. The degree to which this is a threat to democracy depends on what one thinks minorities should be allowed to do in order to impede the policy of a democratic government. As striking is legalised in all democracies it is difficult to argue that it is undemocratic, where it is not characterised by violence. Similarly, though general strikes are often thought of as revolutionary, there is no case of one bringing down a democratic government, let alone democracy itself. The 1926 National Strike in Britain, developing significantly from a miners' wage dispute, was largely peaceful - the little violence was spontaneous and sporadic - and especially distressed the trade-union leaders who seemed most worried about the possibilities of anarchy.⁴² Although the issues of general strikes are frequently industrial, their massive impacts are bound, inevitably, to implicate governments. Where economic policy is concerned, as in Britain in 1926, they are likely to be directed against governments and, therefore, in a sense to be political. That does not, however, make them inevitably undemocratic.

Both riots and striking were involved in "les événements" in France in May 1968⁴³. The French Fifth Republic, initiated in 1958, accentuated the traditional French dislike of intermediaries between state and citizens. The President, the charismatic De Gaulle, disliked political parties and pressure groups and favoured referendums as expressions of the national will. Popular election of the President was introduced in 1962. Thus the legitimacy of the regime was embodied in a rather Olympian individual, relatively inaccessible, and not greatly sympathetic to extended democratic debate. He tended to make his referendums, of disputable constitutionality, votes of confidence in himself; and as bargaining between pluralist groups was

somewhat frowned on, he was likely to be the final recipient of every sort of discontent.

The crisis of May 1968 began with a student protest directed, in the first place, at the inadequacies of the government's handling of the great expansion of the university system. Protests became riots, featuring excessive police brutality. The Prime Minister, Pompidou, was away in Afghanistan when the trouble began but, on returning nine days later, he gave in to the demands of the Paris students. By this time, however, the students had called for a token general strike on 13th May and there was a response to this throughout France especially in the depressed areas of the North and West where wages had lagged well behind the rising cost of living.⁴⁴ A chain reaction began and strikes and sit-ins spread like wildfire; but no unions called for a general strike. French unions are weak (the labour force is only 19% unionised) and divided and the union leaderships were never properly in control. This was demonstrated after the leaders negotiated the nationwide Grenelle Agreements with Pompidou and the employers. The rank and file rejected the agreements,

Hence at the end of May 1968 "there was a power vacuum in France".⁴⁵ De Gaulle's broadcast on 24th May, in which he announced a referendum about social and university reforms, was very badly received. On 29th May he left Paris for Germany, the same day on which Mendès-France, the most considerable figure on the left, declared himself ready to lead an interim government. Next day De Gaulle returned, announcing in a broadcast that the Assembly would be dissolved and a general election held. He described himself as "the trustee of national and republican legitimacy".⁴⁶ A massive demonstration of half a million people in favour of him took place in Paris, coinciding with others throughout France. Thus the "silent majority" expressed itself at a vital moment in favour of law and order and the regime. This was reflected in the Gaullist landslide of 23rd and 30th June.

To what extent did these events threaten the legitimacy of the Republic and the legitimacy of democracy in France? Clearly the rioting students would have liked to have enforced the resignation of De Gaulle and probably the collapse of the Fifth Republic. So would the leaders of the CGT and PCF. Whether the striking workers were of this mind is a more difficult question to answer: they had virtually repudiated their leaders in rejecting the Grenelle Agreements. But the whole labour movement throughout remained cool to the students anyway, so a coalition to overthrow the Fifth Republic was never properly forged. In the end the legitimacy of the threatened regime was validated by the election and its result. The vast majority accorded legitimacy to the rule of law and the democratic process.

The greatest danger to the Fifth Republic and to democracy in France probably arose from the behaviour of the security forces. Only they might have been capable of turning a riot into a revolution. Certainly there were revolutionary leftists among the students and their statements and some of their activities, such as tearing up paving stones to build barricades, (though often only to defend themselves against police attacks) were bound to arouse apprehension amongst the forces of law and order. A sense of proportion, however, would have helped to interpret this behaviour as part of the theatre of the streets, a psycho-dramatic self-indulgence expressed largely by the spoilt children of the professional classes. The over reaction of the CRS, a national police force organised specially for dealing with riots, greatly exacerbated the situation. As Gretton says, "trained to deal with insurrections and not with demonstrations", "their massive use remains the surest means of uniting any extra-Parliamentary opposition movement".⁴⁷ In May 1968 their tactics produced a revulsion of feeling which turned into general sympathy with the students. The disorderly behaviour of the forces of order impaired the legitimacy of the regime.

One may deplore police riots, however, and their implications for the rule of law without supporting the overthrow of the prevailing regime or of democracy. When the crisis was some weeks old these more serious considerations became dominant. The swing to De Gaulle in the General Election in June was also a rejection of those who had tried to use the disorder to come to power. The defeat in Grenoble of Mendès - France, the most respected politician of the Fourth Republic, seemed to exemplify this mood. The verdict of the ballot box more firmly established the legitimacy of De Gaulle, the Fifth Republic and democracy in France. In spite of urban riots, strikes by 12 million workers and disorderly repression, the regime and democracy had survived. The simple explanation is surely correct: this was the outcome most French people wanted.

It is not easy, therefore to foresee strikes and riots alone overwhelming a well-established democracy. Perhaps, as the French experience demonstrates, aggressive reaction by the forces of order may provoke and extend disorder.⁴⁸ Television may set in motion an imitative movement. On the other hand, as France again shows, the great majority who deplore violence may rally and declare themselves. The outcome may well be strengthened belief in civic order and a demand for heavier penalties for those who breach it. Rioters may have little respect for the rule of law, but that does not imply a withdrawal of legitimacy from the democratic process even if it does imply a withdrawal of legitimacy from the political institutions and the political incumbents. (This was the position of the French students.) Strikers may often in principle respect the law, though sometimes reacting violently on picket lines. But where both, as in France in 1968, have no wish to overthrow democracy, and where the vast majority of the population in spite of the turmoil have no wish to do so either, it can only be brought down by the intervention of the armed forces or some well-organised consciously anti-democratic group. As we have

noted, this is most unlikely where democracy is deeply embedded. Figure 1 provides no such example: thus writing a scenario for one is very difficult.

To sum up: the intensification of public contestation can only become a threat to democracy when free and vigorous debate and organised opposition deteriorates to the point of physical conflict. If there is a persistence of violence over time, or a pattern of violence in numerous places, the rule of law may be under threat. Yet, this is only likely to result in the downfall of democracy in those situations where large cultural sub-groups feel no identification with one another - the sense of one "demos", does not exist. Where this sense does exist, however, it is likely to bolster support for the legitimacy of a democratic regime, even where there is a good deal of violence.

Threats to Democracy from Breakdown of the System: Attacks on Inclusiveness

Threats to inclusiveness are almost unknown. Robert Dahl writes:

... the suffrage seems to be more easily expanded than contracted: historically, the process has typically been in one direction: once granted, it is rarely taken away. In this respect, the oscillations in France from 1789 to 1845 seem to be unusual.⁴⁹

In the twentieth century, South Africa seems to be the only country with representative institutions which has actually contracted its electorate, though inclusiveness was never a feature, anyway, of its political system. Many twentieth century regimes of a totalitarian kind have, indeed, embraced universal suffrage, using it as a facade for popular sovereignty, though the opportunities allowed for citizen participation in decision making have been slight. Movements in democracies to disfranchise certain groups such as blacks, Jews, women (or men), are virtually unknown. Where such categories are under attack deprivation of more vital things than their voting rights are proposed. Thus there is little evidence of efforts to take away people's participatory rights in contemporary democratic countries.

It might be argued that another threat to inclusiveness might be the

voluntary withdrawal of citizens from electoral participation. This might not seem, hypothetically, very unlikely. As one well-known text avers: "voting differs from other political acts in that it requires relatively little initiative".⁵⁰ There is also some data, largely from Britain and the U.S.A.,⁵¹ to support the conclusion that in the past two or three decades there has been a decline in election turnout. This phenomenon, however, may well be temporary, can partly be explained by factors not related to overall support for democracy and is, anyway, by no means on a scale which threatens the operation of the democratic system.

Exhaustion of Legitimacy

A democratic régime may lose its legitimacy as a result of all the above contingencies. Foreign invasion, right or left-wing coups, cultural and communal conflict, widespread breakdown of law and order, and deprivation of the rights of political participation may all make a regime illegitimate. It is argued, however, that contemporary well-established democratic regimes are losing their legitimacy for less dramatic reasons. Their inability to adjust themselves to changing circumstances, especially their failure to adapt to the altered relationship between the polity and the economy - the political economy - has weakened their legitimacy. There is a growing disrespect for democracy. The general picture is of democracy slowly and inevitably slipping away without people being aware of it.

The most common view of modern democratic governments sees them as ineffective, and so losing their legitimacy. Over a period of time, with successive failures the "reservoir" (Dahl's term)⁵² of confidence will run low. Trust may then be impaired and communication and co-operation between different groups suffer, making public contestation difficult. Bargaining and compromise will falter. The prestige of political leadership and the credibility of political parties may be disputed and voting participation may decline. Of course, lack of success may affect the

legitimacy of all types of regimes. Democracy, however, is particularly dependent on its acceptance by its citizens. If they opt out of operating it, it will not function properly.

There is in the contemporary world a wide spectrum of observers who perceive democratic government becoming increasingly ineffective. They can be divided for convenience into neo-Marxists and non-Marxists.

The neo-Marxists are only concerned with democracy obliquely as an agent of a bourgeois state which has proved remarkably resilient and persistent. Both Poulantzas⁵³ and Miliband⁵⁴, (in some doctrinal disagreement), write in this vein, though the latter has a good deal more use for democracy. Jurgen Habermas sees it legitimised by the theories of Weber and Schumpeter and the values of individual self-advancement or "civil privatism"⁵⁵. "Formal democracy", as he calls it, hides contradictions, the result of the mixed political economy and so of advanced capitalism. The production of collective goods, involving investment in research and development; government delegation of decisions to bargaining between business and unions; and the rise of incompletely co-ordinated planning bureaucracies dependent for information on their clients, all engender a "legitimation crisis".⁵⁶ The present system's legitimating ideology, the theories of competitive pluralism, will be unable to prevent capitalism collapsing, once they are revealed as false. Hence contemporary democracy is unstable because its legitimacy is founded on a lie.

Habermas is clearly more concerned with the instability of capitalism, of which democracy is but an adjunct. So is Claus Offe who perceives, "the late capitalist welfare state" as legitimised by equality of opportunity to use its services and by "the postulate of a universal participation in consensus formation".⁵⁷ But mechanisms supposed to link citizens with their rulers - political parties, pressure groups, trade unions and parliaments - are now very concerned with "symbolic affirmation of prevailing values".⁵⁸ People comply with being by-passed, because the

State has acceded to their demands for welfare benefits. In a famous metaphor Offe describes them as battery-hens, dependent on support systems and expected to produce and remain quiescent.⁵⁹ Class conflict is no longer, according to Offe, the driving force of social change.

A horizontal pattern of inequality, that is, disparities between vital areas, is emerging increasingly into the foreground.⁶⁰

A long period of consensus between competitive interest groups and apathetic conformity to orders maintain the stability of this political and economic system. It faces three destabilising threats; the large allocation of resources to defence policies; the management of a politicised economy in which private capital, though controlled, is still powerful; and the difficulties of ensuring mass loyalty. The State apparatus through crisis avoidance and management, attempts to preserve stability. In spite of this, disequilibrium is incipient in the system because of the interdependence of fiscal, political and economic crises and the undue attention given to the claims of defence, industry and trade and the neglect of other vital areas not adjudged to be functionally indispensable. Thus the form and content of democracy, under contemporary "state-regulated capitalism" have been separated: "the resolution of policy issues takes place within organisational settings which are unknown to democratic theory".⁶¹ Fundamentally the system is quite illegitimate.

Both these neo-Marxists incorporate Weberian ideas of bureaucracy into their theories of late capitalism. It is the instability of the "political economy", rather than the instability of democracy they examine. Democracy they see, in the Marxist tradition, as a camouflage for much that is against the interests of the majority of the electorate who are easily deceived, bought out and lulled into acquiescence. Elites, on the other hand, are skilful at cultivating legitimacy "formulas": indeed, it sometimes seems they pull them from hats like conjurors' rabbits; and they use a coded political discourse within which they force others to argue. Hence a

false consciousness and an unreal consensus prevails. Fundamentally, the "demos" or "political community" (to use Easton's term)⁶² consists of a relationship between deceivers and deceived. The foundations of such a system cannot be stable even if the superstructure for a time appears to be.

The apprehensions of non-Marxist theorists have been expressed in terms of three areas: the economy, the polity and the wider society. Samuel Brittan has argued that the "contradictions" of electoral competition have been one of the main causes of high inflation. Politicians' promises about the material benefits to be obtained from supporting their economic policies have resulted in a sort of political auction which is bound to end in disaster to the economy. Brittan asserted that it would result in democracy passing away "within the lifetime of people now adult".⁶³ Factors involved in such an outcome would be a mixture of individual and collective greed; envy of others leading to a sensitiveness about differential payments; economic illiteracy among the electors who do not realise that a principle they accepted in their private lives - "more of one thing means less of something else"⁶⁴ - is valid at the national level; political passivity resulting in most people being interested in "outputs" from the system at the expense of all other considerations; and the irresponsibility of governments who are too weak to take deflationary steps, desert Keynesian policies and abandon aspirations for economic growth. Peter Jay argued no democratic government could jettison the post-war commitment to full employment.⁶⁵ Hence there was a vicious circle of ever-increasing prices. C.S. Maier said that Britain by 1975 had reached inflation of "Latin" proportions: the creation of new money seemed to be in the hands of interest groups such as the trade unions. They had thus usurped the prerogative of the state, whose sovereignty was threatened.⁶⁶ Essentially failure of performance will lead to the exhaustion of legitimacy.

Closely connected with the theorists of inflation and "rising expectations" are those who draw attention to governmental "overload". Michael Crozier⁶⁷ and Anthony King first used the expression, denoting the too heavy burden upon government from increasing demands for intervention in areas hitherto regarded as unsuitable. The latter argued that Britain had become harder to govern partly because the number of dependent relationships between groups and government had grown, while acts of non-compliance by participants in these relationships had also increased.⁶⁸ (He wrote soon after the miners' 1974 strike.) As expectations became greater, governments' capacity to fulfil them became less. Increasingly complex solutions led to increasingly disappointing failures. He warned:

...we seem likely in the mid- or late 1970s to face the sort of "crisis of the regime" that Britain has not known since 1832, possibly not since the seventeenth century.⁶⁹

Anthony King argued that a decline in confidence in governments might result in a serious questioning of "political arrangements". Perhaps the eventual solution might be the withdrawal of government from many of its functions. Democracy can only remain legitimate if it promises less and does less.

Daniel Bell provides a more universal interpretation. Western society is entering the phase of "post-capitalism" in which work and political activity will be less highly valued. Affluence has produced a mood of hedonism, especially among the young. The Protestant ethic has been destroyed by easy, even instant, credit and capitalism left "with no moral or transcendental ethic".⁷⁰ The modern democratic State is faced by contradictions under post-capitalism. It risks losing legitimacy because its citizens neither wish to relinquish their social benefits nor to increase their productivity. Like Joseph O'Connor⁷¹, and Schumpeter⁷² before him, Bell believes there is a fiscal crisis, evinced in the "overload" of issues and in inflation; but he disagrees with O'Connor in that he sees the risk of losing legitimacy at the expense of accumulating, as not one to the

capitalist state but to democracy. The growing supply of public goods and services from the State, leading to inflation and overload, "are simply prescriptions for increased political instability and discontent".⁷³ Democracy must find a "public philosophy" for the "necessary social responsibilities and social sacrifices"⁷⁴ to be forthcoming. Its legitimacy cannot rest only on prosperity and pleasure.

All these writers, of whatever persuasion, agree that there is a crisis in the modern democratic State, caused by excessive demand for public goods and pluralistic conflict about redistributive policies. The neo-Marxists perceive democracy's troubles as merely to be expected as the bourgeoisie, struggling desperately, uses legitimacy as a device to maintain power. Non-Marxist commentators imply the basis of the legitimacy of democracy, responsibility on the part of both leaders and led, has diminished. Politicians arouse too high expectations and manipulate the economy in order to win elections; and the voters are too greedy to resist the bribes. At the "auction" within the "political economy", implications for democracy are forgotten. Policies inevitably founder, with successive "U-turns" and failures in both "stop" and "go" policies. Legitimacy declines as a result of this governmental ineffectiveness.

There can be little doubt that many of the problems of democracy in the contemporary state, perhaps including a diminished legitimacy, stem from government management of the economy. Where the polity and economy are not separate, and both are "mixed", there are bound to be confusions of roles, values and justifications of actions. Arguments about policy may become involved with collective bargaining about prices and wages: indeed, there may well be governmental decisions about prices and wages. Dan Usher argues that.

Government by majority rule becomes progressively more difficult the greater the share of each man's income depends on the outcome of the vote.⁷⁵

He maintains above all that the attempts of democratic governments to alter incomes "league tables", (what he calls "assigning" incomes) will destroy the "equity", (people's idea of fairness), on which the allocative system is based. Consequently, decision-making about "assignment" will lead to chaos as one unstable coalition follows another. In the process democracy will lose its legitimacy. So it can only be preserved by "a non-political method of assignment".⁷⁶ Hence democratic governments should allow the market to be the main determinant of the price of labour. Governments can redistribute resources and incrementally alter rewards without endangering equity; but otherwise they should leave any significant change to the impersonal forces of the market. Only thus will they escape loss of legitimacy.

It is doubtful, however, whether the difference between assignment and ordinary allocation is as significant in political terms, as it may seem to an economist. Everyone involved in collective bargaining knows that changes in differentials cause more anger than incremental awards. But it does not follow that the latter, where they are unsatisfactory, may not also lead to loss of legitimacy. It is hard to repudiate the notion that the less the governments do, the less there is to blame them for. Unfortunately they may also be blamed for not doing enough, or doing nothing at all. There is some truth in Offe's metaphor: democratic electorates have, to some degree anyway, been conditioned to receiving social benefits without being aware of the economic and political implications. The question is to what degree this is so. Does the legitimacy of democratic regimes depend on democratic governments providing "goodies" for the voters and little else?

In fact to contend that economic effectiveness is the factor which determines whether citizens accord legitimacy to their regime is a very extreme position. It is not in accord with reality, anyway, to brand all voters as crude materialists. A large number of democratic citizens in the twentieth century have given years of their lives, (and sometimes

sacrificed them) in order to defend their democratic countries. Nor - to refer to a more mundane obligation - do the majority of citizens refuse to deliver considerable proportions of their incomes to the state. There is give as well as take; and citizens do not usually withdraw legitimacy from the regime because it taxes them or requires them to undertake military service. Many citizens even recognise that sacrifices cannot always be equal and that a rough justice may have to prevail. Contentions that these values have weakened are, at least, open to dispute.

What may lead to loss of legitimacy, however, is the feeling that sacrifices have been in vain and resources badly handled. "Competence" and "efficiency" are modern values which, to a greater or lesser degree, the rationalisation and professionalisation of society has made salient. Increasingly, governments have come to be seen as "problem-solvers", and this might endanger democracy for, as we noted earlier, it is not, at the ordinary level anyway, a very efficient form of decision making. (No business firm has, for example, ever adopted democracy as a way of making policy.) Much of the dilemma, or "contradiction", springs from the inability of either citizens or politicians to understand the complex problems of the modern mixed economy. The voters are able to support solutions the politicians promise without an understanding of implications for either the economy or the polity. There is evidence, however, that in time electorates and politicians adjust to the realities.

The economic and political atmosphere affects reactions. "Rising expectations" are characteristic of a time of boom the collapse of which may be attributed, (ultimately anyway), to the secular economic situation and not to governments or political regimes. Something like this seems to have occurred in Britain since the late 1970s when both the politicians and the electorate appear to have lowered their sights. The former, beginning with Callaghan, have stressed the limitations of governmental action in a world depression and the majority of voters, at the General

Election of 1983, appear to have accepted that little can be done by governments to restore prosperity at the moment. The assertions of Bell and Brittan that no democratic administration could desert a policy of full employment has been belied by the last three British governments. "Falling expectations" may produce situations in which voters are pleased with very limited material advancement. Perhaps, anyway, people's demands were never so insatiable, and irrational, as some politicians and political scientists believed. James Alt's findings⁷⁷ would appear to support this view. Or, perhaps, democratic electorate's commitments to democracy are stronger and more comprehending than many intellectuals suggest. The fact is that we cannot know how much legitimacy citizens of well-established democracies accord to their regimes and how much disappointed expectations affect their allegiance. We do not have the data for analysis because no such regime has collapsed as a result of the exhaustion of legitimacy - in itself perhaps the most important evidence of all. Thus we have much evidence of performance failure and discontent, even public disorder on a considerable scale, but the overall conclusion must be that long-established democratic regimes can take much more before foundering. They do this by modifying the values on which the accordance of legitimacy depends; and this adaptation occurs largely as a result of the democratic process itself.

The fact is that the decline of legitimacy, (and what that means is difficult to define as we have noted), can hardly in itself lead to the collapse of democracy. Both Brittan and King seem to be aware of this.

The former writes:

There is no need to suppose there will be an overnight coup; there could be a gradual process of disintegration of traditional political authority and the growth of new sources of power.⁷⁸

and Tony King confessed:

... no one has produced a plausible scenario for the collapse of the present British system of government.⁷⁹

though he thought it "significant" that people were talking about it. Perhaps there might be rallying around some leader who had not lost confidence. Thus, in the last resort, both writers admit that for democracy to be overthrown coercive physical force must provide a breach of legality. Exhaustion of legitimacy can never, in itself, produce the downfall of any regime.

Conclusion

It is not unreasonable to assume that the main threats to the stability of democracy are likely in the future to be not very different from those in the past. Based on historical experience, as summarised in Figure 1, it seems that the most common reason for the downfall of democracy is armed force. This is more usually as a result of a coup d'état by soldiers, though with regard to well-established democracies (with the exception of Chile) only military aggression from outside seems to have been capable of toppling them. Other threatening contingencies, such as Fascist or Communist coups, seem very rare indeed. The particular distribution of democratic breakdown seems to bear out Huntington's view that highly institutionalised polities are resilient to threats, whereas those with low institutionalisation find it difficult to withstand them.

Cultural and communal cleavage is a serious built-in threat to democracy. Countries with such characteristics are likely to be subject to social disorder and majority government may be difficult to operate in such circumstances. Where there is a high degree of ethnic and religious cleavage it seems that only with such institutional forms as federalism or consociationalism can even well-established democracy survive. Infant democracy may not do so. Many African countries, of which Nigeria is most notable, bear witness to this. Democracy in Sri Lanka is currently in peril for this reason, and India might anticipate similar problems. Where great communal disorder, and something approaching

civil war, results, the army will be presented with a suitable opportunity for intervention. The fact is that "pluralistic states" are not entities with which their citizens can easily identify and in such situations legitimacy will be very low. In the end for minority groups such a state may have no legitimacy at all.

Public disorder, stemming from the behaviour of social and economic groups, can certainly be regarded as a threat to democracy. Indeed any collective refusal to obey the law and any collective attempt to disrupt society and the economy, however small or temporary, will be detrimental, as I have argued. But that is a far cry from seeing disorderly behaviour, like striking and rioting, as sounding democracy's deathknell. As I hope to have demonstrated, quite a considerable degree of such disorder may fail to destabilise the well-established democratic polity very much. It will probably rally citizens to the side of law and order, (as Italian terrorism appears to have done), and will scarcely affect inclusiveness and public contestation. On the other hand, it may quickly put an end to newly-established democracy, whose "reservoir" of legitimacy and degree of institutionalisation may be low and whose armed forces will have little allegiance to a polity with civilian dominance. We do not know what intensity and persistence of public disorder is required eventually to persuade citizens of a democratic regime, like France, Britain, or the U.S.A., that it is no longer legitimate. But the answer must be: "a very great deal more than we have hitherto experienced."

Factors other than disorder, however, could be expected to affect the accordance of legitimacy. Policy failure, poor governmental performance - ineffectiveness generally in solving national problems - may, as we have noted, be thought to diminish legitimacy. Where these do not incite disorder they may result in apathy and alienation and withdrawal from participation. (Though, conceivably, a long period of prosperity might

produce the same effect.) If political activity diminishes too much, democracy may be difficult to operate. But while there is some evidence of less support for political activity in the well-established democracies, one cannot yet argue that it presents any clear illustration of democracy in peril. Comment which suggests that it might is sheer speculation.

Indeed, though "legitimacy" may be a useful intermediate explanatory concept it offers little towards the comprehension of breakdown of a regime.

Brian Barry, in omitting it from his model, writes of Eckstein:

Are we simply left with the tautology that a regime is legitimate when there is a widely accepted norm to the effect that its nature and geographical extent are acceptable? The answer is, I fear, that this is so.⁸⁰

Again with respect to Lipset, he enquires:

...is "legitimacy" a genuine intervening variable which helps to explain the level of support for a regime, or is it merely a synonym for "support"?⁸¹

In Barry's view a democratic system is maintained mainly by performance which rests on competence and favourable circumstances. Values, based on socialisation and propaganda, play "only a minor part".⁸² As we have noted, however, many well-established democracies may survive gross incompetencies for long periods, and perhaps, unfavourable circumstances, or "bad luck", may most affect performance. Or, again, values may be more important than Barry allows. On the other hand, ineffectiveness over a long period may affect values supportive of democracy by influencing socialising agents such as the family, school and workplace. Whatever the case, neither the statement "Democracy A collapsed because the citizens ceased to accord their support"; nor the statement "Democracy B collapsed because the citizens ceased to accord their legitimacy", have much operational value. No examples of democratic breakdown could be satisfactorily explained by either statement. One would want to know the nature of the support legitimacy and the circumstances in which it was withdrawn, in each case, before pronouncing on the causes of the downfall.

It is surely of the utmost significance that there seems to be no instance in Figure 1 of a well-established democracy suffering from "exhaustion of legitimacy", either through poor performance, or value change, or both. One might explain such a development in terms of social psychology and political culture. Almond and Verba, for example, would perceive such a retrogression in terms of moving from a "participant" to a "parochial" culture and from "allegiance" to "apathy" and "alienation".⁸³ Though there are no cases of democracy breaking down in such a manner, there is indisputable evidence of a decline in the prestige of the regime and of political activity in some countries where democracy is well-established; and it is possible that persistent alienation might be mobilised by the anti-democratic forces mentioned above. Spontaneous revulsion on a large scale against a system which had become strange and "alien", however, is much more likely to be found where a "parochial" culture till recently held sway. Alienated citizens, not surprisingly, are more likely to be found where democracy has recently been introduced and where, therefore, it has not become properly accepted, or "legitimate". Where representative government is operated without the support of democratic values public contestation will intensify to the point where the rule of law disintegrates. The experience of democratic institutions in developing, non-industrialised countries, as we have seen, bears out this contention.

Robert Lane discusses factors in the American political culture, weakening support for the regime. In the first place no alternative system occurs to Americans, because Utopian fantasies are so scarce in the USA. Again, American voters are very realistic and have no great expectations of the democratic system. They tolerate its confusions and delays and, for the most part, do not lose trust in it, believing that their welfare is the prime end of government policy. Stability has largely been maintained

... in the face of war, economic disaster, the expansion of the military, the following out of imperial destiny on a great continent, the industrial revolution, the tensions of race conflict breaking out into race wars in some places, the assimilation of millions of men from a different tradition.⁸⁴

More recently the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, might have led for a time to diminishing respect for the American political system; but it has proved remarkably resilient in the long run. In Britain also, as Tony Birch remarks, the capacity of the democratic system for survival "is truly remarkable".⁸⁵ In a decade it has coped with crisis in Northern Ireland, Welsh and Scottish nationalism, defeat of government policies by industrial action, 25% inflation, urban riots and heavy unemployment.

Hence the "exhaustion of legitimacy" on its own is scarcely valid as an explanation: one needs to know the causes of the exhaustion; but that this is very difficult in the cases with which the commentators are chiefly concerned - Britain - France and the USA - because the legitimacy of their democratic regimes has proved well-nigh inexhaustible. How much this is owed to adherence to democratic principles and how much to other factors such as patriotism is very difficult to judge. Much of the alarm of academics about the maintenance of democracy, however, undoubtedly springs from an exaggerated view of the passivity and malleability of democratic citizens. The likelihood that they do not understand all the implications of democracy does not imply that they will not resist tendencies to totalitarianism. Present threats to democratic legitimacy may be over-estimated, because past attachment to democratic principles is over-estimated. Thus a decline in legitimacy is perceived, though one may not exist at all except in the minds of certain intellectuals. When Offe speaks of the problem of legitimising "unconditional technocratic rationality" with nineteenth century democratic theory he invokes an elitist conception of legitimacy.⁸⁶ Most British voters in the nineteenth century had no more heard of Mill than their twentieth century counterparts have heard of

Habermas. Hence the decline in legitimacy is seen by some academics to be in relation to standards which never existed. While we cannot be dogmatic it seems very unlikely that the legitimacy of any well-established democratic regime rests on theories: it rests on values and beliefs culled from historical experience and encapsulated in the prevailing political culture. The present "crisis" in such countries does not appear to have produced any great threats to either inclusiveness, public contestation or the rule of law.

A good deal of the fear for the maintenance of democracy springs from intellectuals' apprehension about totalitarian tendencies in modern times. Futuristic novels and science fiction abound in horrors of this kind, confirming that creative artists are especially sensitive to political repression (though they often do not understand democracy,) and that their publics relish a certain frisson in contemplating the unthinkable. The threats of Fascism and Communism - one defeated, the other contained - are the source of these fears. Writing in 1984 one can reasonably attempt to achieve a proper perspective about such prognostications.

Much of the "doom-laden" comment arises from the economic crisis which, since 1973, has ended the unprecedented prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s. As Brian Barry argues, it is the contrast with those years which has led to so much exaggerated, almost hysterical foreboding.⁸⁷ Looked at in perspective, democracy in the industrialised world is not in great jeopardy: it is the infant democracies of the non-industrialised world which have collapsed. It is true that the severe economic problems of the English-speaking and Western European democracies have not been effectively solved; but the economic crisis seems to have impinged on political stability only to a limited degree. As Palle Svensson says of Denmark:

... the widespread conception of a crisis of democracy seems without any solid basis. If a crisis of democracy is defined as challenges to the democratic regime of such a kind and such a strength that the persistence of the

the regime is facing a potential breakdown and that a breakdown is likely to occur unless the regime itself or its environment is fundamentally changed, there has been no crisis of democracy in Denmark during the last decade.⁸⁸

A similar verdict would be true of other well-established democracies.

What are sometimes seen as threats to democracy - strong internal disagreement and controversy - are not threats at all. They are examples of the regime responding in the way it is supposed to. Others, such as public disorder, are threats of a minor kind, the impact of which is easily absorbed. Democracy needs eternal vigilance and it draws support from concern with its condition. On the other hand, it needs a sense of proportion, for over-reaction to problems can sometimes engender the very circumstances that one seeks to avoid.

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LEGITIMACY, CONFLICT, ORDER:

URBAN DISADVANTAGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN BRITAIN

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LEGITIMACY, CONFLICT, ORDER: URBAN DISADVANTAGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN BRITAIN

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I URBAN DISADVANTAGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY

1.1 'The fragile basis of the Queen's peace'

After the riots in England in July 1981 Sir Edmund Leach, president of the Royal Anthropological Institute and former provost of King's College, Cambridge was quoted as saying that unless Mrs Thatcher's 'brutal monetarist policies' were reversed

we shall be plunged into an irreversible social disaster in which we will witness the social collapse of our country.¹

Newspapers and television proclaimed similarly dire warnings of impending catastrophe, from politicians, police officers, church leaders, community spokesmen - indeed from anyone and everyone it seemed but the rioters themselves.²

Lord Scarman in his report into the Brixton riots stated that 'racial disadvantage is a fact of current British life' and

Urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease threatening the very survival of our society.³

Is racial disadvantage really threatening the very survival of our society?
Was Britain in July 1981, on the brink of the social collapse of our country?
These are serious statements from serious men and as such are worthy of serious consideration.

Not that the vision of Britain teetering on the brink of social and political disintegration is a recent one. Consider Daniel Defoe's pamphlet of 1730 addressed to the Lord Mayor of London:

The Whole City, My Lord, is alarm'd and uneasy....the Citizens are no longer secure within their own Walls, or safe even in passing their Streets, but are robbed, insulted and abused....and such mischiefs are done within the Bounds of your Government as never were practised here before (at least not to such a degree) and which, if suffered to go on, will call for Armies, not Magistrates, to suppress it.⁴

Two hundred and fifty-two years later, Lord Scarman, too was speaking of the role of the army in curbing disorder; during the Brixton riots, he said there was an occasion when a few police officers

stood between us, the inner city of London, and a total collapse...of law and order....if that thin blue line had been overwhelmed - and it nearly was on the Saturday night - there is no other way of dealing with it except the awful requirement of calling in the Army.

At least the army is there as a last resort to curb disturbances and regain public order, but it is the last resort, and in the past the reliability has not always been taken for granted. Robert Southey voiced this concern in 1812:

At this time nothing but the Army preserves us from the most dreadful of all calamities, an insurrection of the poor against the rich, and how long the Army may be depended upon is a question which I scarcely dare ask myself.

Presumably the armed forces are now dependable, and so the likelihood of a threat to the political order arising from this direction seems remote, but the fear that violent disorder, if not insurrection, may break out remains prevalent. An opinion poll in February 1985 reported that 64 per cent expect further rioting to occur in British cities.⁷ The popular view seems to be that social cohesion and law-abiding behaviour are delicately balanced on a weak foundation. Hence Lord Scarman's references to 'the fragile basis of the Queen's peace'.⁸

Crime and disorder are seen as diseases of the body politic. There are 'outbreaks' of disorder, or an 'epidemic' of crime and a 'crisis' can occur if the contagion spreads too far. Thus Lord Scarman reported the danger that 'disorder will become a disease endemic in our society',⁹ and many of his remarks implied that such an illness can prove fatal.

Lord Scarman identified urban deprivation as a significant factor in the 1981 disorders, and in particular he highlighted racial disadvantage which could threaten 'the very survival of our society'. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether, and ⁱⁿ what ways, urban disadvantage could give rise to problems which might threaten the survival of the government, or the regime or indeed the polity.

1.2 Stability, riots and disadvantage

It is proposed to accept the definition of political stability put forward by Dowding and Kimber:

political stability is the state in which a political object exists when it possesses the capacity to prevent contingencies from forcing its non-survival.

It is not a comparative concept, in that either a political object is able to cope with a threat or it is not, but comparisons can be made between political objects, or between the same object at different periods in time, with respect to the likelihood of a particular threat (or threats) occurring with which they are unable to cope.

Contingencies may arise from within or without a political object, and Dowding and Kimber draw attention to two important questions about them: what is their significance for the survival of the object, and what is the probability of their occurrence? A political object does not require the capacity to cope with threats that do not occur, and it does not need to respond to contingencies which are not threats.

The notion of political stability clearly must include the possibility of change and development but must exclude essential change. This depends upon the political object under consideration, and the characteristics of it which one regards as essential and clearly these may be contested by others.

The political objects which will be considered in this discussion include the British regime, the political system, British government and administration, the British polity and political order, and particular institutions.

Different people seem to use these terms in different ways which raises difficulties and no doubt usage in this paper will be questioned. A government, or an administration, are used to refer to a ministry or body of office-holders who hold sway and conduct policy at a particular time. The regime refers to the prevailing constitutional principles and methods of government, and the political system includes the complex set of institutions and procedures whereby government is conducted and policies made. The polity or political order means the form, processes and condition of organised society and government.

A particular contingency may cause the non-survival of a government, but may not lead to the instability of the system. It is possible, though perhaps not likely, that a particular threat or series of threats could lead to an essential

change in an institution, the fall of a government, and the regime itself might prove susceptible, while the polity is resilient. Most usually in this paper the discussion will consider the effects of possible threats on a government's survival.

The polity in Northern Ireland is distinctive in a number of respects and so the discussion is limited to Britain even though more properly the 'British government' is the government of the United Kingdom. It might be objected that the Scottish political system, too, is distinctive, but for the purposes of discussing urban disadvantage and its effects the differences may be ignored. However, it should be noted that the riots of the 1980s did not occur in Scotland.

The first major disorder of the 1980s occurred in the St Paul's district of Bristol on 2 April 1980. The following year, riots took place in London, in March and April, and in London, Liverpool, Manchester and elsewhere in July 1981.¹¹ Indeed, riots were reported during this period in over twenty-five English cities. Further disorders occurred in 1982 in London and Liverpool, but there were not as serious as those in Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side the previous year and went generally unreported. In 1983 and 1984 further inner city disturbances seem to have taken place,¹² but these two were not the subject of media attention, although of course the violent disorders during the coal dispute received wide coverage.

The explanations for the 1981 disorders included the perennial conspiracy theory, lack of parental control, greed and criminality and even 'the seditious sociological claptrap that is passed on in our schools as education'¹³. Lord Scarman, though, concluded that the Brixton disorders arose as a result of communal deprivation and frustrations although 'the riots were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment'¹⁴ against the police. He reported that urban disadvantage in general, and racial disadvantage and discrimination in particular

provide a set of social conditions which create a predisposition towards violent protest. Where deprivation and frustration exist on the scale to be found among the young black people of Brixton, the probability of disorder must, therefore, be strong.¹⁵

The disadvantage suffered by people living in Britain's inner city areas is indeed considerable. Poverty is widespread and so is deprivation. The areas are characterised by poor housing, lack of basic amenities and overcrowding;

high unemployment and low wages for those in work; poor provision of health and social services; high levels of crime and vandalism; inadequate recreational facilities; frequent family breakdown, intra-family violence and high proportions of children in care; and a generally run down and decaying environment.

A number of these areas are located in London in boroughs such as Brent, Hackney, Islington, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark. Elsewhere, concentrations of urban disadvantage can be found in cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. These boroughs and cities have experienced a period of some thirty years during which their populations have declined, their local economies have eroded and their local rates incomes have decreased.¹⁶

The 1981 census revealed that Hackney was the most disadvantaged area in Britain. Over 20 per cent of its dwellings were officially defined as unfit for human habitation and a further 25 per cent were defined as in need of substantial repairs. A high proportion of its households are overcrowded and 65 per cent of them do not have access to a car. It has high numbers of single parent families, of registered disabled, of elderly, of children in care and of people from the New Commonwealth. Incomes in Hackney are well below the national average despite higher costs. In 1978 the proportion of Hackney residents who said they were dissatisfied with the area was 42 per cent (Manchester: 22 per cent).¹⁷ In short stated Harrison

Deprivation is frequently multiple, cumulative, self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating through generations.¹⁸

It should be noted that there are some nice areas in Hackney, too! The disadvantage is not evenly spread in the borough but is concentrated yet further in particular wards. It is clear that the 'five giant evils' identified by Beveridge in 1942¹⁹ are still to be found in Hackney and elsewhere in Britain, particularly in the inner cities. Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness are prevalent in these locations and now a sixth giant can be added: Crime.

Riots did not occur in all these areas in 1981. Those that did provoked reactions of horror, incredulity, shock and anger. It seems unlikely, though that a few hundred youths rampaging in Brixton, or even a few thousand rioting in a number of cities constitute a serious threat to the stability of the government let alone the political system. Contrary to the views of some,

these were not uprisings or insurrections; they originated spontaneously. There was no premeditation or plan'.²⁰

1.3 Urban disadvantage and five general problems

What threats to the government or the political system might arise from urban disadvantage? Or more fully: what contingencies might arise, how likely are they, would they threaten political stability and how might the political system, or elements of it, contend with them?

Presumably riots may indeed be events which at a certain level cause instability. If, for example, disorder broke out in several cities and persisted for several weeks, the government would probably order the armed forces to intervene. This has not occurred since 1919 in Britain, although it is of course a feature of the enforcement of order in Northern Ireland. What would be the result of the death of a rioter shot by a soldier? Would the outcry, if one occurred, force the government to resign? Much would depend on the particular circumstances, and indeed the personalities of figures such as the Prime Minister. This speculation, though, suggests that it is conceivable that a certain level of rioting could affect the stability of the government.

Riots may be seen as specific problems, with which a government may have to contend, which could arise as a result of urban disadvantage. Other examples might be crime, terrorism, civil disobedience, conflict with local authorities and other groups and the growth of extremist political movements. There may also arise more general threats to the survival of a government, or even perhaps the political system. Specific problems such as riots may be symptoms of more general threats.

In this paper five general problems, which may tend towards instability, are considered. These are diagrammatically outlined below in Figure 1




Figure 1

Action to cope with one specific contingency, such as riots or crime, may fail to tackle the underlying generic problems, and may actually exacerbate them so that they later arise again as a specific threat in a more virulent form.

The five generic problems are similar in some respects to the crises identified by Binder *et al.*, and used by Grew *et al.*, to study political development.²¹ In the latter study three senses of crisis were employed - a serious threat, an irreversible change and a political problem. The five crises used are identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration and distribution. The notion of identity employed in this present paper has similarities with that used by Grew *et al.*, in that it involves the identification of citizens with the policy, the political system and prevailing values. It is suggested that a problem may develop if certain groups of individuals have low identities with the policy and higher identities with particular groups and 'deviant' values.

Legitimacy is a notion which has provoked considerable discussion and argument. Here it is used in the sense that something is legitimate if it is right according to rules and principles. A problem occurs, it is argued, if significant numbers of citizens begin to question the legitimacy of the government and its policies. Participation entails the active involvement in political processes, and may take place in proper ways or may be illegitimate. It is suggested, in line with Huntington's thesis²², that a problem may develop if demands for participation are greater than the institutional opportunities.

Voluntary consent occurs when citizens comply with government directives and laws. A fall in this consent may lead to indifference or defiance, and is likely to necessitate increased coercion. Ineffectiveness may occur in

three senses: a government may be unable to manage its machinery effectively, its policies may not produce the intended results and it may fail to fulfil citizens' expectations. This final form of ineffectiveness, in particular, may cause feelings of relative deprivation.

The five generic problems may be related and so, for example, ineffective policies could lead to a reduction in consent, which may adversely affect the success of future programmes. Some of the relationships which might be found are shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Some possible relationships and reinforcements which may occur between the five problems.

The rest of the paper seeks to explore how urban disadvantage, including that affecting racial minorities, may be related to these five problems, whether these problems are threats to the government or the political system, and whether they may give rise to more specific threats.

2 INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES

2.1 The decline of the cities

The inner city policies of successive governments seem to have been ineffective in the three senses mentioned earlier. Governments have failed to manage effectively the various agencies and institutions which have been involved in the policies, they have not succeeded in arresting the deterioration or in allocating resources efficiently and consequently they have not fulfilled their promises or people's expectations. Lord Scarman confirmed these shortcomings:

The failure of the many attempts over the last three decades to tackle the problem of inner city decline successfully is striking..... it is noticeable that large sums have been spent to little apparent effect....

The lack of an effective co-ordinated approach....conflicting policies and priorities - as between central and local government or between the different layers of local government - appear²³ to have been a frequent source of confusion and reduced drive...

Britain's cities have in general experienced economic decline for thirty years or so. In some respects this was exacerbated by government policies such as the availability of tax concessions and grants for firms relocating outside certain cities such as London, and the refusal to give certificates for the development of offices and factories in these areas. The post-war new towns attracted private and public investment which might otherwise have gone to the old cities, which languished while the new towns grew.

Massive redevelopment schemes were begun in many areas in the 1950s and 1960s. These swept away the terraced housing and also small businesses with the loss of thousands of labour-intensive and low-skilled jobs which had been available for young people. The redevelopment was often only half carried through and as the money ran out derelict sites were left. Surrounding housing was blighted by the threat of demolition, either for further 'redevelopment' or to make way for urban motorways. In some cases the threat lasted for decades and dissuaded people from investing in the decaying properties.

Many people moved out of the inner city areas and these tended to be those with skills, qualifications and in jobs with above average pay. In line with Hirschman's description, those who left the deteriorating area were the

people who were likely to protest about the conditions, had they stayed.²⁴ The people who remained tended to be in low-paid, low-skilled jobs or were unemployed, elderly, or perhaps young parents with children at school. Lord Scarman found that in the Borough of Lambeth the population structure had changed in this way, and in the inner area itself, which includes Brixton

There is a generally higher rate of population decline than in the Borough as a whole; a higher proportion of clerical, semi-skilled and unskilled workers; a larger proportion of low income households; greater proportions of young and elderly; more one-parent families; and higher incidence of mental illness and mental and physical handicap.²⁵

In Brixton, as with a number of inner areas in London and other cities, there existed low paid jobs and cheap housing at the time when immigrants from the New Commonwealth were arriving. The early migrants settled in these areas in response to the availability of accommodation and employment, and subsequent friends and relatives were likewise drawn to the inner cities.

The result in Smethwick in the General Election of 1964, and the way the campaign was conducted, highlighted a growing tension in race relations in some inner city areas. Following Enoch Powell's notorious 'rivers of blood' speech the Government was compelled to try to arrest the decline of the cities. In May 1968 Harold Wilson announced the Urban Programme to provide relief for 'areas of special need'. But according to an authoritative study, the initiative was from the start ad hoc and ill-defined:

Because of its connection with the immigrant issue, the Programme was launched with a haste that militated against the development of any clear objectives or strategy. It was politically imperative to be doing something and to be seen to be doing it....²⁶

The Urban Programme was a Home Office responsibility, but several other other central government departments were involved and there was a general lack of co-ordination and control. Not surprisingly for an initiative without clear aims or firm direction it proved rather ineffective.

A series of further policies followed, all inaugurated with high hopes. The Community Development Project was intended to improve the quality of life in areas of multiple deprivation, and other schemes included Housing Action Areas, Comprehensive Community Programmes, Recreational Priority Areas

and the Six Cities 'Total Approach' Studies. These latter projects found disturbing levels of neglect, deprivation and social breakdown and the Liverpool 8 study found discrimination against the area by local government and other agencies.²⁷

The existing policy for inner cities was laid down in the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978, supplemented by provisions in the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The welter of structures continues to be based on the 'top down' approach and is indeed confusing: Inner City Partnerships, Urban Development Corporations, Enterprise Zones, Task Forces and Free Ports are among them.

Since the disorders of 1981 the Urban Aid Programme has risen to about £350 million, but the local authorities responsible for the inner cities areas have each year lost at least three times that amount in rate support and other grants from central government. The two central features in these attempts by successive governments are a lack of effective co-ordination and the inadequate provision of resources. In recent years the economic recession and the consequent lack of private investment, and the very considerable reductions in local government expenditure have exacerbated the position of inner city inhabitants. In Merseyside, for example, over 70,000 jobs were lost between 1978 and 1982 and by January 1985 the unemployment rate in Liverpool was over 20 per cent. In some inner area wards it was over twice that level.

2.2 'The visible conflict between promises and experience'

Recent research showed that the widespread poverty, squalor, poor housing, and mass unemployment is seriously affecting local people's health, and indeed life expectancy in Liverpool is 7.6 years lower than for people living in more advantaged circumstances.²⁸ It has also been reported by Platt that 'the evidence of an association between unemployment and suicide is overwhelming'²⁹ Separate research carried out for the Office of Population, Censuses, and Surveys demonstrated that death rates among unemployed men were 21 per cent higher than for comparable males in work, and for their wives the figure was 20 per cent; the suicide rate amongst unemployed men was over twice that for others.³⁰

It is generally accepted that poverty per se does not lead people to protest against a government's policies:

There is a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged³¹

It is when expectations are not met - when people feel relatively deprived - that they may blame the government, or the regime, and react accordingly.³²

In his analysis of popular disturbances in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Stevenson concludes

What was often most important was less the absolute level of deprivation than popular perceptions of status, living standards, or accepted practice; the state of 'relative deprivation' rather than absolute deterioration was crucial.³³

The question of the 'generation of excessive expectations'³⁴ has been a central feature in the recent ungovernability debate. King and Crozier both drew attention to this phenomenon³⁵ and its implications and Offe and Habermas also include expectations which cannot be met as a central feature in the notion of a legitimisation crisis:

The increasingly visible conflict between the promise and experience, form and content of state policies can lead....to a growing difficulty for state policies to win acceptance for the legitimating rules....³⁵

From a rather different perspective Brittan argued that unrealistic expectations constituted a major threat to representative democracy in Britain, while across the Atlantic Bell suggested that rising expectations were causing an increase in conflict and a decrease in acceptance of established institutions³⁷.

The arguments echo the views of Millikan and Blackmer that the 'revolution of rising expectations' may culminate in a 'revolution of rising frustrations'.³⁸ Psychologists claim that frustration may result in various forms of behaviour, such as withdrawal and deterioration of performance, but a likely outcome is a feeling of bitterness and anger.³⁹ If this cannot be articulated effectively, the result may be an outburst of aggression, and this interpretation was applied by Davies, Gurr and others⁴⁰ to the riots which occurred in American cities in the 1960s. The Kerner Commission, which investigated the 1967 disorders, pointed out that contrary to what was popularly believed the rioters were not the most deprived members of the black community. What was significant

was their attitudes: they felt strongly that they deserved better and were not achieving it because of discrimination.⁴¹ These findings seem to support the views on the significance of frustrated aspirations, or expectations, in determining people's reactions.

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the expectations of people living in Britain's inner cities are not being met. Runciman has pointed out that relative deprivation may vary according to magnitude, frequency and degree, and he devised a four-fold typology based on a person's feeling of relative deprivation because of his reference group's position, or because of his own position in that group.⁴² According to Hirschman's theory on exit, those who felt dissatisfied with the inner city deterioration and had the means are likely to have left these areas, and so it may be that some of the remaining inhabitants do not have strong feelings of relative deprivation and are more or less resigned to the urban decay.

2.3 A growing disenchantment?

The black and brown migrants into the cities may have arrived with quite high hopes which have not been fulfilled. But it has been suggested that newcomers to a country may often repress feelings of dissatisfaction, or indeed may blame themselves rather than the government or the political system for the unsatisfactory conditions they are experiencing. Hirschman reasons that the high price which an emigrant pays, in severing his ties with his old country, friends, relatives, memories and loyalties, results in a strong compulsion to accept that for which so large a payment has been made.⁴³ This seems to accord with Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance.⁴⁴ Hirschman argues that severe initiation reinforces loyalty to the new country, but if it eventually becomes undeniably evident that it is at fault then voice may 'come into its own with unusual force'.⁴⁵

This view seems to be implicit in Lord Scarman's comments on the need for a concerted effort to combat racial disadvantage:

Unless a clear lead is given by government in this area as in others, there can be no hope of an effective response. The evidence I have received suggests that the black community in Britain are still hoping for such a lead, although they are cynical about what they see as the previous lack of response from all governments of whatever persuasion. If their hopes are again dashed, there is a real danger that cynicism will turn into open hostility and rejection. That must not be allowed to happen.⁴⁶

This was written in 1981, and four years on it is difficult to see anything but a further deterioration in racial disadvantage. The programmes instituted in the 1970s were launched with promises of improvements which were not realised, and the irony is that Lord Scarman's report itself may have again raised hopes which are not being met. Inner city policies have consistently failed to bring the anticipated material improvements, and the effects of the cumulative disappointment may be feelings of frustration, discontent or anger.

This may be particularly so for young people in these areas. Whereas their parents, whether white or black, may be resigned to the deterioration young people may not be so quiescent. It seems that ambitions and expectations may be higher when people are young, and these aspirations are likely to be reinforced at school, where one of the inducements to children to work hard for qualifications is the prospect of a better job.⁴¹ Furthermore the children of immigrant families do not experience the 'severe initiation' costs, which inhibit expressions of dissatisfaction and encourage loyalty, to which their parents were subject. Also, young people may be particularly susceptible to the enticing images of the advertising and entertainment industries, which increase their wish to share in the affluent society. In short, young men and women, black and white, living in disadvantaged circumstances in Britain's cities may perhaps be particularly likely to resent the ineffectiveness of government performance, feelings which may burn even more deeply when they experience police harassment and misbehaviour.⁴⁸

Many of the young people of Brixton are therefore born and raised in insecure social and economic conditions and in an impoverished physical environment. They share the desires and expectations which our materialist society encourages....Many of these difficulties face white as well as black youngsters, but it is clear that they bear particularly heavily on young blacks.... it would be surprising if they did not feel a sense of frustration and deprivation. And living much of their lives on the streets, they are brought into contact with the police who appear to them as the visible symbols of the authority of a society,⁴⁹ which has failed to bring them its benefits or do them justice.

If people feel that a government is failing to produce the desired ends they are unlikely to support it. If their expectations are disappointed, and their hopes dashed, on frequent occasions they may start to question the legitimacy of the polity itself. Government programmes which are not effective and fail to meet expectations may affect perceptions of identity and legitimacy,

may diminish consent and may affect participation. According to a recent Home Office study on public disorder

where any social group perceives government institutions as being indifferent to its needs, the authority and legitimacy of social controls ultimately promulgated by those same institutions will be increasingly questioned.

3 QUESTIONS OF IDENTITY

3.1 Problems of identities in conflict

Perceptions of relative deprivation and evaluations of the effectiveness of a regime are related to the extent to which citizens identify with the political order. Two questions arise: whether people share a common identity in terms of shared norms and values and whether their group identity is more salient than their identification with the polity. The integrity of government and perhaps the system, is threatened if the primary identity of a significant collection of citizens is with values or groupings which conflict with those of the regime. This is a particular problem which besets emergent nations and may lead to insurrection and civil war. In Northern Ireland the effects of the lack of one identity shared by the populus are readily apparent.

Some of the concerns voiced in the ungovernability debate seem to be based on the view that particular identities are becoming more prominent than the national identity. Brittan considered that an endemic threat to democracy is the disruptive effect of the pursuit of group self-interest; two vital conditions specified by Schumpeter for the proper working of the system are tolerance and democratic self-control, wrote Brittan, but

If the electorate is divided into two or more deeply hostile camps, or there are rival ideals on which no compromise is possible, these restraints will cease to function and democracy may wither.⁵¹

St John-Stevas perceived decline in religious allegiance, a weakened sense of community and decline in national confidence as some of the causes for the weakening of a common identity.⁵² Clutterbuck seemed to imply that the loss of people's identity with the system and fundamental tenets such as the rule of law lay behind the willingness to resort to violence, which he considered was becoming more prevalent.⁵³ Questions of identity were clearly raised by the increased prominence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism during the early 1970s. So the notion of political identity involves the integration into the polity of disparate groups and the acceptance of a common set of values and beliefs, about goals and modes of achieving them. This consensus, sometimes referred to as the political culture, relates not only to the perceived legitimacy of the regime and its agents, and the level of consent, but also to institutional participation in the system, and the effectiveness of its outputs.

Since the election of Mrs Thatcher in 1979 commentators have frequently drawn attention to the end of 'consensus politics' and to the 'increasing political polarisation of British society'.⁵⁴ Presumably the Government is prepared to risk certain people's identity being alienated in the hope of achieving more effective system performance, in economic terms. Perhaps an example of polarisation and the clash of identities was the coal dispute of 1984/85 which lasted for almost one whole year. In this instance the Government was determined to achieve economies in coal production costs and was prepared to challenge the National Union of Miners. The struggle seems to have been at least partly a question of identity, as the solid support for the strikes in South Wales, Kent and, to a slightly lesser extent, Yorkshire, demonstrated. The miners' identity with their union, and to some extent their willingness to break laws with which they disagreed, illustrate how a clash of identities of this sort can prove damaging to governments' effectiveness. According to Jenkins

In the moral remoteness of their world they took their stand on values which have small place in the ethics of Thatcherism. In the face of superior forces, like the Polish cavalry charging against the German tanks, they pitted their notion of community against the new cult of the individual, threw social need in the face of economics and mutuality in the face of money, and placed class loyalty above the claims of national interest.

The cost of the dispute has yet to be made public - indeed the full balance sheet may not be revealed for many years - but the lowest estimates put it at £3.5 billion plus a loss in economic growth of 1.0 per cent. The object apparently was to save £250 million per annum.

Urban disadvantage in Britain may diminish the level of identification which people so affected have with the political system and its predominant values. Lowenthal has argued that an 'underlying cultural crisis' is causing a decline of institutional authority and this is visible

in the increasingly defective functioning of the process of socialisation and of the formation of identity.⁵⁶

This may be caused by the failure of governments to overcome deep-seated problems, such as urban decline, perceptions of inequality and unfairness and feelings of relative deprivation.

If the integrity of orthodox rules, institutions and values is not accepted, identity with group norms may become pre-eminent. 'Deviant' behaviour may become accepted behaviour, leading for example to increased levels of crime or a willingness to participate in violent action. Evidence gathered in the aftermath of the American riots in the 1960s showed there was considerable support for the rioters, particularly amongst other black Americans in large cities. McCord and Howard reported that 52 per cent in Oakland and 30 per cent in Houston considered the riots were 'helpful'.⁵⁷ A study of the views of blacks in fifteen cities found over half were in sympathy with the rioters⁵⁸ and Sears and McConahay reported that 28 per cent of the blacks in the Los Angeles riot area approved of the disorder.⁵⁹

Similar figures were reported after the riots in England in 1981. A poll of young people showed that 28 per cent considered the disorders were justified and 44 per cent agreed with the statement 'violence' to bring about political change can be justified' (41% disagreed; 15% did not know).⁶⁰ These findings were in marked contrast to opinion polls of the whole population which showed strong disapproval of the riots. In August 1981 only 8 per cent thought police handling had been too tough and a poll published in November of that year showed 80 per cent supporting the use of water cannon and 46 per cent in favour of the use of CS gas.⁶¹

3.2 Disadvantage, race and identity

In the poll of young people published in September 1981 40 per cent thought that 'Commonwealth immigrants should be sent back to where they came from'. The position of immigrants from the West Indies, Africa and the Indian sub-continent is very much bound up with the problems of urban disadvantage, as discussed earlier. Whereas just 6 per cent of white people are located in inner London, inner Birmingham and inner Manchester, 23 per cent of Asians and 43 per cent of West Indians live there.⁶² The black and brown citizens are the newcomers who settled in the inner city areas from which the better-off, skilled people had 'exited'. They took jobs which were often low paid and they either rented or bought cheap properties which were often in a poor state of repair.

Members of the ethnic minorities have suffered particularly from urban deprivation, compounded by racial discrimination. They have experienced high rates of unemployment; Lord Scarman reported unemployment in the Brixton area

was 13 per cent, the figure for members of the ethnic minority was over 25 per cent and for black males under 19 years of age it was an estimated 55 per cent.⁶³ The 1982 Policy Studies Institute survey also found considerably higher rates of unemployment among West Indians and Asians and reported that those who had managed to secure a job were likely to be in low paid employment: 'on average white men earn substantially more than black men'.⁶⁴ Figure 3 shows the unemployment rates by age and ethnic origin using data from the Labour Force Survey. This was a sample survey of some 80,000 households and interviews were conducted between April and June 1981. Unfortunately the position has worsened since then.




Figure 3: British Unemployment rates by age and ethnic origin in May 1981
(in percentages)

Source: Employment Gazette, June 19 84, p261

Black and brown people have also suffered considerable disadvantage in housing, often as a result of discriminatory practice.⁶⁵ The PSI survey reported

the quality of the housing of black people is much worse than the quality of housing in general in this country. Blacks are more often found in flats, and those in flats are more often at higher floor levels, and those with houses are less likely to have detached or semi-detached property; black families have smaller property on average, and....their density of occupation is much higher; black households more often share rooms or amenities with other households; the properties black families own or rent are older.....⁶⁶

Other measures of disadvantage similarly show how members of the ethnic minorities fare consistently badly, a discovery which led Lord Scarman to state

racial disadvantage is a fact of current British life. It was, I am equally sure, a significant factor in the causation of the Brixton disorders. Urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic ineradicable disease threatening the very survival of our society.⁶⁷

3.3 Exit through demonstrative 'Otherness'

One of the factors facing black people living in deprived urban areas is that that the option of exit may not be open to them. Because of the very disadvantage and discrimination from which they suffer, members of the ethnic minorities living there may be trapped in the inner cities unable to muster the resources to leave.

Exit in the sense of physically leaving the area may not be an option but perhaps a special form of exit is available. That is to all intents and purposes to leave the identity of the predominant order - to withdraw visibly from the values of, and participation in, the polity. This form of exit is one that has been adopted by various groups, usually of young people. Kristol has commented on this phenomenon in the United States⁶⁸ and Hirschman highlights the 'cop-out' of groups such as hippies. In Britain each generation seems to throw up its rebellious groups be they punks, skinheads, mods, rockers or teddyboys. The separate group identity, the 'demonstrative "otherness" ', is a form of exit says Hirschman expressing 'dissatisfaction with the surrounding social order'.⁶⁹

The obvious example of this special exit phenomenon among young black people is Rastafarianism, which entails a deliberate rejection of 'white society's' norms and values, and withdrawal from any institutional participation in the polity. The rejection is determined - Rastafarians refuse to accept that they are in any sense British and look forward to a return to Africa. Perhaps some of the reasons for this alienation and the adoption of a specific group identity are to be found in Lord Scarman's comments:

Some young blacks are driven by their despair into feeling that they are rejected by the society of which they rightly believe they are members and in which they would wish to enjoy the same opportunities and to accept the same risks as everyone else. But their experience leads them to believe that their opportunities are less and their risks are greater.

Disappointed expectations may lead to frustration or despair, and so in response to the rejection they feel the young blacks themselves reject the identity of the polity.

Urban disadvantage in general, and racial disadvantage in particular, may lead to a decrease in people's identity with the values and institutions of the political system. This lack of identity with the regime and political community is likely to result in diminished consent and perhaps a repudiation of political authority, it may affect the effectiveness of governments' activities and it has implications for political participation.

4 PARTICIPATION AND OPPORTUNITIES

4.1 Bargaining by riot

The importance of citizen participation in political systems is widely recognised. In democracies elections are a vital means of legitimising the government and the regime, and of ensuring voluntary obedience. Political participation through institutions such as parties and pressure groups is a principal method whereby demands are articulated, and may facilitate the governmental process through the voicing of people's wants and expectations.

However political participation is not limited to formal channels, and indeed need not be legitimate. British history reveals many instances of popular disturbances and violent protest. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries riots occurred with considerable frequency, associated with many different grievances. Bohstedt identified over 740 'full-scale' riots between 1790 and 1810, caused by food prices, impressment and crimp houses, political questions, labour disputes, enclosures, suppression of smuggling and the price of theatre tickets!⁷¹ Of course there were few opportunities for institutional participation for the vast majority of people, especially in the towns and indeed increasingly, from 1790 onwards, reform of the suffrage was a cause of much agitation. Many historians now regard much of the rioting during this period as 'collective bargaining by riot'⁷², whereby workers could negotiate with their employers, or more generally as a means of political participation for those with no other opportunities of political voice.

During the nineteenth century the franchise was extended and opportunities for participation developed through pressure group and trade union activity. Kornhauser stressed the importance for a political system of additional structures through which growing demands for participation can be channelled and ordered,⁷³ and this view was developed by Huntington in his work on political order:

As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.⁷⁴

The most obvious means for enabling, but also constraining, participation are elections, parties, trade unions and pressure groups. These tend to reinforce identification with the rule, procedures and values of the polity, enable the articulation of demands, facilitate consent and strengthen acceptance of the legitimacy of the political system.

Participation is voice in contrast to exit, in Hirschman's terms. Even some forms of exit can be seen in this way, such as the youth movements and the Rastafarian phenomenon.

by making their exit so spectacular, by oddly combining deviance with defiance ... are actually closer to voice ... 75

They are seeking to express their disenchantment with established values and outcomes, to display their alienation and, perhaps too, to bring about some changes. This form of participation, by defiantly not conforming, is perhaps the only means that is open to them short of a return to 'bargaining by riot' or other violent behaviour.

Dahrendorf has pointed out that the majority of citizens do not wish to participate in politics on a day-to-day basis - 'they are not political beings' - what is needed is the opportunity to articulate their views when they wish to: an opportunity for voice.

In the normal course of events, participation is nice but not indispensable. What is important is the possibility of participation in order to veto developments, to express dissent. 76

But, reported Lord Scarman, 'young black people do not feel politically secure' and they find there are few possibilities of participation

The accumulation of these anxieties and frustrations and the limited opportunities of airing their grievances at national level in British society encourage them to protest on the streets ... Moreover, many of them it is obvious, believe with justification, that violence, though wrong, is a very effective means of protest. 77

4.2 Inner cities, voice and loyalty

Inner city areas tend to have few institutions through which participation can be channelled and demands made. If branches of political parties exist at all, they are sometimes virtually moribund and trade unions are not

effective means of voicing protest at urban decay - even if someone has a job and is able to join a union. Elections for the city or metropolitan county may occur annually, but are not effective means for people to voice specific grievances. They do, of course, permit inner city people to take part in choosing between the competing broad approaches to local government, and perhaps it is not surprising that in Liverpool a radical Labour council is in office, including several councillors who subscribe to the much-discussed Militant Tendency. Perhaps the most effective vehicles for enabling people to air grievances, to make proposals and to express dissent are pressure groups but here again, in inner urban areas, there tend to be relatively few.

The absence of opportunities for institutional participation has been commented on in many studies of inner city areas. The Liverpool Inner Area Study reported in 1977

There is not sufficient delegation or public involvement to allow expression of the needs and values of the inner city area in local authority services. 78

And four years later, in the wake of serious disorder in part of the area, Lord Scarman made similar comments:

Local communities should be more fully involved in the decisions which affect them. A 'top down' approach to regeneration does not seem to have worked. 79

He called for full and effective involvement and greater consultation - in short, for more voice.

As outlined earlier, many citizens who were able to do so left the inner urban areas for better quality housing, services and jobs. Between 1961 and 1981, while the population of England grew by about six per cent, that in most major cities fell dramatically: Birmingham down some 14%; Newcastle: a loss of about 24%; Inner London: a decline of nearly 28%; both Liverpool and Manchester down over 30%. These figures of course do not reveal the extent of the exodus for they show only the net loss; many of the emigrants were replaced by newcomers so the actual turnover of the population in British cities was very considerable indeed.

This seems to be a classic illustration of exit as described by Hirshman. When deterioration is occurring, in an open society those who have the means leave the area for better services and yet it is those people who are potentially the most vocal and who would, were they to stay, organise the articulation of grievances and thereby seek to arrest the

decline. As Hirshman puts it :

'When general conditions in a neighbourhood deteriorate, those who value most highly neighbourhood qualities such as safety, cleanliness, good schools, and so forth will be the first to move out; they will search for housing in somewhat more expensive neighbourhoods or in the suburbs and will be lost to the citizens' groups and community action programmes that would attempt to stem and reverse the tide of deterioration' 80

Why should someone raise his or her voice if he is able to remove himself entirely from an unpleasant environment? The result is likely to be an increasingly voiceless inner city population, without the resources to draw attention to the decline and disadvantage they are experiencing, until perhaps such a point is reached that a special case of voice occurs in the form of violent protest.

However loyalty may be an important qualifying condition on the choice between exit and voice: in general 'loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice'⁸¹ In the case of inner city deterioration, those citizens who value quality, and have the means would be expected to move to more advantaged areas and there is considerable evidence to show that many have done so. However, those citizens with these characteristics who also were loyal to the area would, according to Hirshman, be likely to remain, at least until matters became so bad that their loyalty reached breaking point. These people would turn to voice and they would probably be motivated to create new ways of exerting pressure for a recovery. Loyalty, thus stimulates 'quality conscious' citizens to establish innovatory means of voicing discontent.⁸²

It seems reasonable to suppose that some professionally qualified people, such as community and social workers, clergy, teachers and others in health and welfare services may feel an affinity with the local community within which they work, although of course many may find that their wishes for themselves and their family override any such attachment. There does seem to be some evidence, for example, from the membership data, where available, for inner city branches of political parties and pressure groups, to support the view that loyalty can inhibit exit and stimulate voice.

Loyalty may also be significant if it inhibits the exit of upwardly mobile black citizens. The desirability of retaining in the community those members with the most potential to develop voice was put forcefully in the United States by figures, such as Carmichael, in the black power movement.⁸³ In Britain, the identity and loyalty of black and brown people resident in inner urban areas may similarly lead to the development of more voice.

4.3 Participation and the ethnic minorities

So, although pressure group activity is relatively low, one should not assume that inner city areas are devoid of group activity; they 'are not human deserts: they possess a wealth of voluntary activity'.⁸⁴ New modes of representation are developing in some areas, outside the established institutionalised framework. Tenants associations, community groups, squatters organisations, unemployed workers' centres and other bodies have grown up - a number of them having full-time workers funded by local authorities and sometimes through the Urban Programme. Whether these are effective means of institutional participation remains to be seen; at present

much of the action is sporadic, many of the associations ephemeral or schismatic. But the climate of doubt and criticism, the availability of ideologies stressing the need for participation.... ensures easy regeneration of grass-roots political activity. 85

The black and brown communities in many inner city areas have also founded organisations for mutual support and the articulation of grievances. Thomas has described how the Brixton community is 'active and dynamic' and has been 'creating structures and institutions to cope with its members' needs'⁸⁶ But the extent to which these groups are able to influence local and national governments has still to be demonstrated. Perhaps a more fundamental factor is the low level of black political representation, to which attention was drawn by Lord Scarman.⁸⁷ So despite the establishment of pressure groups and self-help organisations, according to the Principal Community Relations Officer in Lambeth the fact remains

Black people are hardly ever in a position to influence decisions made about them - decisions which sometimes alter the course of their lives in fundamental ways. They are hardly ever consulted about matters which affect them, and on the rare occasions when they are consulted they feel their advice goes unheeded. 88

Layton-Henry has outlined four ways in which black political participation may develop.⁸⁹ First, there may be a gradual integration into the class structure and involvement in associated institutions such as the political parties, trade unions, chambers of trade and professional associations. There is evidence that this is occurring and, for example, the PSI survey reported that among male employees 64 per cent of West Indians and 59 per cent of Asians are trade union employees, compared with 57 per cent of whites.⁹⁰ These differences are largely a function of the types of employment, for more whites are employed in professional and managerial occupations where the level of unionisation is lower, and in addition the high rate of black unemployment must be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is clear that blacks have become involved: attendance at meetings is much the same for each ethnic group.

In terms of party support, those members of the ethnic minorities who express a view tend to support the Labour Party. In an opinion poll in 1978, the Labour Party's share of the support for the two parties was 44 per cent among whites, 92 per cent Asians and 95 per cent of West Indians. In the General Election of 1983 the Gallup Poll reported the shares of the ethnic minority support as Conservative: 20.5 per cent; Labour: 64 per cent; Alliance: 14.0 per cent.⁹¹ It should be noted though that the number of non-whites (especially Afro-Caribbeans) who did not vote was significant.

A second possibility is that continuing racial disadvantage and discrimination will encourage black unity, a separate identity and political action on this basis. A third and similar view is that the racism and disadvantage will cause growing disenchantment and withdrawal from participation in the political system: the course adopted by Rastafarians. There is evidence to support these hypotheses to some extent, but in general Afro-Caribbeans and Asians seem to believe that they should participate in multi-racial organisations and the political process. For example 80 per cent of West Indians and 84 per cent of Asians agreed with the statement in the PSI survey: 'People of Asian/West Indian origin should join in political organisations alongside white people' and a slightly higher proportion agreed with the statement

applied to trade unions.

The fourth possibility is based on the influential work of Katznelson, which hypothesised that paternalistic buffer institutions had been established by governments to neutralise black demands and to keep race off the national political agenda.⁹² Katznelson identified the National Council For Commonwealth Immigrants and its local organisations as examples of buffer institutions, and others have seen the Commission for Racial Equality and the community relations councils in this way. The suggestion is that the regime will continue to develop institutions of this kind, which divert the energies of black and brown people from action which would be politically more effective.

However, as Layton-Henry argues, the notion that these institutions prevent black people from exercising political influence is not convincing. Some may choose to participate in these organisations, others may form pressure and defensive groups and yet others may join political parties and seek election to representative positions. But the number who become involved in any of these ways in inner city areas is likely to be small while doubts remain about the likelihood of having a significant impact on government decisions. As Banfield has pointed out

The effort an interested party makes to put its case before the decision maker will be in proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favourable outcome multiplied by the probability of influencing the decision 93.

For black and brown people living in urban disadvantage and experiencing discrimination and unemployment the chances of institutional participation realizing improvements may not look good. Lord Scarman drew attention to the cynicism in the black community and so, despite the PSI findings reported above, significant numbers of black people may not participate, either because of this cynicism or because they live in areas where institutional opportunities are poorly developed.

In general, then, openings for political participation through formal channels, such as parties and pressure groups, tend to be relatively infrequent in inner city areas. Many of those who might have organised groups have left the areas, and the attitudes of many black citizens in these locations may at best be ambivalent. And, as Huntington has suggested, unless the level of institutionalisation keeps pace

with the underlying pressure for the articulation of demands problems for the political order may ensue.

Institutional participation is important not only to legitimise the regime, and to aid the effectiveness of its performance but also to enhance identification with it. The integration of groups with strong identities may not be straightforward; it requires receptivity and flexibility in the system and, similarly, adaptability by the group, 'that is the willingness of the group to relinquish some of its values and claims.'⁹⁴ There is a two-way relationship between identity and participation: the latter facilitates the former, but strong group identity may preclude participation, by its members, in the wider system; the Rastafarian case again seems pertinent. Institutional participation makes integration more likely and also lowers the probability of dramatic non-institutional participation, or voice, in the form of violent protest.

In any institutionalised society the participation of new groups reduces tensions; through participation, new groups are assimilated into the political order. 95

The implications of a lack of political institutions and procedures in inner city areas may be serious; the results may be alienation, withdrawal, resentment or anger.

Apathy and indignation succeed each other: the twin children of the absence of authoritative political symbols and institutions. 96

5 CONSENT ON THE EBB

5.1 Dissatisfaction, identity and consent

Institutionalised participation is related to the level of consent. Citizens are more likely to agree to comply with decisions about which they have formally voiced their opinions, or feel they could have done had they so wished. Of course participation does not necessarily lead to consent for this is also influenced by other considerations such as the legitimacy of the system, and identity with, or attachment to, the polity. But institutional participation is also likely to be important in establishing these factors; according to Almond and Verba their five-nation study revealed that

the opportunity to participate in political decisions is associated with greater satisfaction with that system and with greater general loyalty.....the sense of ability to participate in politics appears to increase the legitimacy of a system....

Participation is a feature of the process of socialisation, or 'politicisation' as Easton terms it,⁹⁸ whereby identification with the prevailing values, rules and procedures is developed. It is a means of generating loyalty and allegiance to the political system, and so is important in determining consent and acquiescence. The lower level of participation in institutionalised processes in Britain's inner cities may thus detrimentally affect the extent to which citizens voluntarily consent to government policies, and rules and procedures of the regime.

The consent of citizens is also likely to be more forthcoming if the government, or political system, is perceived to be performing effectively.⁹⁹ If expectations are being met, or there is a belief that they will be fulfilled, citizens will be more prepared to consent to government directives and agencies than if the regime is adjudged to be ineffective. Recent opinion polls have suggested that the majority of people in Britain have low expectations about the immediate future: it was reported by MORI: 70 per cent expect unemployment to rise during 1985; 59 per cent anticipate a rise in the rate of inflation; 19 per cent expect their standard of living to go up and 39 per cent predict the number of strikes will go up whereas 20 per cent that they will fall. In December 1984 42 per cent thought the general economic condition would worsen in 1985, 32 per cent thought it would stay the same and only 18 per cent expected it to improve. With these relatively low expectations

it might be presumed that in general people would be relatively satisfied, but it seems that many believe they are entitled to expect better, for in December 1984 MORI reported that 57 per cent were dissatisfied with the way the Government is running the country, compared with 33 per cent who were satisfied.¹⁰⁰ Many polls do show that a large majority of people are 'fairly satisfied' (or better) with the life they lead; for example, Eurobarometre reported in April 1980 that 86 per cent in the UK were satisfied, a higher figure than the EEC average (78 per cent).¹⁰¹ The poll found in Autumn of that year that in many countries in Europe opinion was evenly divided on the satisfaction felt with the way democracy was working in particular countries, with the striking exceptions of Germany, Italy and Luxembourg:

Satisfied	34	60	73	36	48	21	77	51	51	46
Dissatisfied	51	35	21	52	46	77	27	45	43	48
Don't know	15	5	6	12	6	2	1	4	6	6
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J

A Belgium; B Denmark; C Germany; D France; E Ireland; F Italy; G Luxembourg; H Netherlands; I UK; J EEC

Responses to the question: 'how do you feel about the way democracy works in your country?' (October 1980; figures in percentages)

If, however, in inner city areas low levels of satisfaction result from perceptions of poor performance the outcome may be diminishing citizen consent. Conversely, if consent is not voluntarily given this may adversely affect government effectiveness. If people do not voluntarily do what government wishes of them, the administration must seek to compel them, which may prove to be expensive or impractical. Rose gives the examples of tax avoidance and evasion¹⁰²; these prove expensive administratively to prevent and cause the government to spend resources on collecting its income, thereby decreasing the amounts available to improve conditions. Indeed it seems reasonable to suppose that it is not cost effective to employ sufficient investigators to try to stop tax evasion entirely.

Another example of the effects on the administrative system of a lack of consent, occurred for many years in London when motorists did not comply with parking tickets issued to them. So many millions were unpaid that it proved impossible to compel more than a small percentage. The rules

were changed in the 1970s, which brought some improvements but recent experiments with wheelclamps demonstrate that voluntary compliance remains a problem.

The ineffectiveness of attempts to combat urban decay and disadvantage may tend to diminish the consent of citizens in these areas. A similar effect may be brought about by a low level of identity with the regime, its goals and prevailing values. At one level it is tautological to explain lack of consent by a lack of consensus, but the notion of identity entails more than a agreement with prevailing opinions and rules. It was suggested earlier, that if the primary identity of individuals in certain groups is with values and rules that conflict with those of the political system difficulties may occur in a number of respects. One of these is the likelihood of a lack of consent to the regime's directives and decisions, although people whose primary identity is with a particular group, may nevertheless consent to many or all of the system's outputs. However,

if the outputs of government are in conflict with values of a significant fraction of a society, consent will diminish.¹⁰³

Northern Ireland is an example, and the results for consent of two deeply-felt and conflicting identities are only too readily apparent. In inner city areas in Britain, government policies which are felt to condone or perpetuate racial discrimination and disadvantage are likely to conflict with values of many citizens in these areas; so perhaps may decisions which appear to prolong inequality and privation. Identity and consent may also be related in the sense of individuals identifying their own interest and well being with those of the polity. A decrease in the extent to which this occurs is associated with what Rose calls 'the decline in the ethos of organic solidarity',¹⁰⁴ leading to a greater chance of clashes of group based identities.

5.2 Crime in the inner city

Evidence to support the view that consent is less forthcoming has been offered by a number of writers. Brittan suggested that the behaviour of various trade unions showed that the pursuit of group self-interest through coercive means is a serious threat to democracy. Birch cites

1973 survey data which revealed 16 per cent thought it acceptable to defy the law 'to further strikes and oppose legal regulation of industrial relations'.¹⁰⁵

Others have claimed that the perceived rise in crime and general lawlessness is evidence of a breakdown in consent. As Figure 4 shows, although the number of police officers increased by 83 per cent between 1955 and 1982, and expenditure by 176 per cent; the reported number of serious offences increased by 568 per cent during the period, to pass three million annually in 1982.




Figure 4: Rising crime and rising costs 1955-1982

Sources: Criminal Statistics 1982
National Income and Expenditure Annual Abstract of Statistics

It should be stressed that there are inherent problems in the interpretation of criminal statistics, as the proportion of crimes which people bother to report to the police varies over time, and from area to area. The British Crime Survey sought to overcome these distortions by undertaking a large scale sample survey; about 11,000 households were selected and interviewing took place in the first quarter of 1982.

The survey confirmed that crime is most prevalent in inner city areas, and is generally under-recorded. Indeed, only two-thirds of burglaries and one-fifth of vandalism offences, and a surprisingly low proportion of personal offences, are reported; theft from the person: 31 per cent; wounding: 39 per cent; sexual offences: 28 per cent; robbery: 47 per cent. Fear of crime was found to be considerably greater among people living in inner cities, and around 50 per cent of women living in these areas said that they sometimes avoided going out on foot after dark for fear of crime.

Robberies were found to be rare (20 per 10,000 per year) with theft from the person more frequent (112 per 10,000) and victims were most likely to be under forty-five and to live in inner cities. Burglaries and attempted burglaries were identified as 410 per 10,000 households per year, and were twice as likely to occur in the inner city as in other parts of conurbations, and five times more likely than elsewhere.¹⁰⁶

It should be stressed that the chances of being a victim of a crime are low: for example, a 'statistically average' person aged 16 or over can expect

- a robbery once every five centuries (not attempts)
- an assault resulting in injury (even if slight) once every century
- the family car to be stolen or taken by joyriders once every 60 years
- a burglary in the home once every 40 years

But the risks are considerably higher in inner city areas: for example, there homes are burgled on average once every 13 years¹⁰⁷ and so crime can be seen as yet another aspect of urban disadvantage.

The figures do provide evidence for the view that compliance with the law, and assent to the predominant values of the polity, are lower in inner city areas. It is here that the commitment to the rule of law seems to be weakest, and of course it was also here that the riots occurred in 1981. It is also in inner city areas that significant numbers of people appear to be reluctant to co-operate with the police, or are positively hostile to them. In Brixton, Lord Scarman commented on 'the crisis of confidence' in which

many of the young...had become indignant and resentful against the police, suspicious of everything they did.¹⁰⁸

And the hostility was not just restricted to the young - it extended across 'significant sections' of the local population. The police had failed to secure sufficient consent; they had

not succeeded in achieving the degree of public approval and respect necessary for the effective fulfilment of their functions and duties.¹⁰⁹

The PSI study of the Metropolitan Police reported that generally Londoners have a reasonably favourable view of the police, but those who came into contact with them tend to be more critical. They find 'overwhelming evidence' that people who are stopped by the police become much more hostile to them. Among young West Indians they report a 'disastrous' lack of confidence in the police - findings which support Lord Scarman's views. Other studies have confirmed lower levels of consent in inner cities, and amongst certain groups living there, such as young people and black people.¹¹⁰ Yet, of course, it is in these very areas, where the level of crime is so much higher that the police particularly need public consent and co-operation.

5.3 Indifference, coercion and 'smouldering apathy'

The level of crime in inner city areas, and the lack of confidence in the police by many people living there, provides support for the view that there is lower consent amongst these communities for the values, institutions and rules of the polity. But of course

these social controls are the bricks and mortar....It is the claim of western democracies that they can accommodate criticism of existing social institutions within a consensual acceptance of basic social rules including respect for the police and for private property.

The author of this Home Office Research Study suggests that the lack of consent he identifies ^{may} be related to lack of opportunities for institutional participation.

It is therefore tempting to speculate that ordinary avenues of political expression may have become blocked, or may appear to be blocked, for those who riot.¹¹¹

He points out that opinion poll evidence shows a 'remarkable degree of apathy and cynicism about conventional parties' amongst the young in general, and among the ethnic minorities there is an absence of an effective ethnic lobby or unified political leadership. Finally, the study quotes Rock who links the lack of consent and rioting to the notion of identity.

Violence has been a frequent resort of those who are denied a substantial identity in the world: it is a vehicle for prowess, assertiveness and a new set of standards for gauging character.¹¹²

Lack of consent may be manifest as 'hostile outbursts', such as rioting, by acceptance of 'deviant' forms of behaviour, such as crime, or by general lack of response to the outputs of the regime. Rose has suggested that:

'Indifference cripples political authority without causing it collapse' and can be seen as a form of exit described by Hirschman. When, for example, people living in inner city areas experience continuing decline they withdraw any positive consent from the regime and retire into political apathy.

Indifferent citizens withdraw from the fray, turning their backs upon authority and shrugging their shoulders in surprise that some people take politics so seriously. They disinvest in their role as citizens...¹¹³

Alt's findings provided support for the view that citizen disaffection was growing as a result of declining expectations and decreasing confidence in the ability of governments to do anything seriously to improve matters. The result was lower consent manifest as indifference, a decrease in party loyalty and identity and a lessening of participation. The outcome

was not a politics of protest, but a politics of quiet disillusion, a politics in which lack of involvement or indifference to organised party politics was the most important feature.¹¹⁴

In a differentiated but interdependent society the withdrawal of significant numbers of citizens and their refusal to co-operate, may adversely affect the effectiveness and the efficiency of government

In a highly structured order, the withdrawal of allegiance....will carry profound implications for the performance of the economy, the tax levels required by the State, the scope of the State's police functions, and the ability of the State to bear the burdens imposed upon it. It may, in short, impair the State's ability to play its legitimate role in the current order of things.¹¹⁵

But in Huntington's words quoted earlier, 'the twin children' of the absence of political authority succeed each other: apathy gives way on occasion to indignation.

The lack of consent in Britain's inner cities, and particularly amongst those who experience racial discrimination and police harassment as well as disadvantage, may appear as withdrawal and indifference, but in fact it may be

a form of smouldering apathy where an apparent quiescent acceptance....conceals pent-up resentments, bitterness and anger which occasionally break out into outbursts of sporadic violence.¹¹⁶

The decline in voluntary consent necessitates the use of coercion, which is expensive. In Britain expenditure on the criminal justice system and particularly on policing, has risen by about 25 per cent since 1979 and is planned to rise still further. In cash figures adjusted for inflation, expenditure on law and order services was £3.1 billion in 1978/79, £3.7 billion in 1981/82 and £4.0 billion in 1983/84. A further real increase, after inflation, of 15 per cent is planned by the end of the decade, second only to the increase in defence (18.1 per cent). Indeed, law and order (4 per cent) and defence (13 per cent) will soon constitute over one-fifth of all public expenditure.

Furthermore coercion may not be particularly successful in preventing lack of compliance. If tax evasion, or fraudulent claims for welfare payments, become sufficiently common in certain areas, they may not prove practical or efficient to prevent. The use of coercion by the police may stop, or minimise, rioting but research suggests that, unless applied in an extreme fashion which would presumably be unacceptable in Britain, it may cause further frustration leading to further outbreaks of violent disorder.¹¹⁷ Coercion may also reinforce particular group identities, thereby leading to further conflict. Moreover, in line with Huntingdon's apathy - indignation - apathy sequence, it has been suggested that riots are cathartic and so after such outbreaks a lull may be expected, perhaps for several years, during which time the pressures underlying the 'smouldering apathy' again build up.

6 PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

6.1 'A very particular form of consensus'

Obedience, consent and the use of coercion are related to the notion of legitimacy. The power to force obedience if necessary is an important resource for a government, but as Weber pointed out it is not the usual method of securing compliance:

"Every state is founded on force", said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right ... Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state ... Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 118

Weber outlines three justifications or 'basic legitimations of domination': traditional, charismatic and legal/rational. As these 'pure types are rarely found in reality', the basis for the legitimacy of regimes may rest on two or more of them.

The concept of legitimacy has provoked considerable discussion.

Lipset stated

Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. 119

Howéver this formulation (and others like it) was taken to task by Schaar, who deplores the dependence on popular opinion.¹²⁰ He argued that this conception reduces legitimacy to acceptance or acquiescence and precludes statements such as 'they consented to the regime although they did not regard it as legitimate'. It is not clear that this criticism is entirely valid, for does Lipset's definition preclude such statements - presumably he would not claim that everyone must believe that the existing system is appropriate.

Barry of course takes issue with Lipset and claims that he uses it essentially as a synonym for 'support'.¹²¹ Although Barry ridicules Lipset's notion of 'ascriptive legitimacy', it is not clear whether he considers the concept is different from support or consent.

Schaar's point is surely valid that legitimacy is distinct from consent; it is, as Friedrich says

A very particular form of consensus, which revolves around the question of the right or title to rule..(122)

Hence, citizens may refuse consent to a regime which they accept as legitimate just as they may consent to one that they view as illegitimate, but more usually consent will be forthcoming if the government, or political system, is seen as legitimate and this in itself will tend to reinforce its legitimacy. So consent and legitimacy are related but distinct.

Essentially, legitimacy is the quality of being lawful or right. A claim that something is legitimate rests upon the assertion that it is proper according to rules or principles, and a government and its behaviour can be evaluated in this way. However, although a constitution or custom or convention provide means for judgement on the legitimacy of an administration's actions, the rules and principles may be interpreted in different ways. In a country such as Britain, with no codified constitution and without an independent arbiter opinions about the legitimacy of government policies and decisions may be subject to particular argument.

Some may take the view that as long as a government can command a majority in a properly constituted Parliament it has the right to be obeyed. Thus the central legitimising notions are parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and regular elections. Others may claim that the legitimacy of its actions depends upon them being in accord with the predominant values - a position perhaps close to Lipset's, and Merelman's:

That government is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for a society. (123)

Dahrendorf seems to accept the importance of a moral basis for legitimacy within his phrase 'fundamental principles':

A government is legitimate if what it does is right both in the sense of complying with certain fundamental principles, and in that of being in line with prevailing cultural values. (124)

'Fundamental principles' include the rule of law and also human rights; which poses questions about the legitimacy of all sorts of governments including that in Britain, while 'prevailing cultural values' includes democracy. These two versions of legitimacy raise many questions which cannot be pursued here, such, as: suppose prevailing cultural values conflict with one or more of the fundamental principles, which is the overriding criterion? What if the majority view of what is 'morally proper' is the persecution of minority opinions or groups? Is it what a government does that gives it legitimacy, or is it the means whereby it achieves power?

6.2 Urban disadvantage and legitimacy

The behaviour of a government does seem, in practice, to be an important source of its legitimacy. This seems to be true in two senses. If it conducts itself properly, that is according to accepted rules and principles, its legitimacy will be reinforced. And so too, if its performance is adjudged to be right, according to prevailing values and expectations, its legitimacy will be strengthened.¹²⁵

Effective performance is a means whereby citizens will ascribe legitimacy to the government and to the system, and so too is identity with the polity and its values. Institutional participation is a means of realising identity, effectiveness and consent but it is also directly a source of legitimacy, through elections, groups and other organisations. These relationships are described by Lowenthal:

The legitimacy of a political order requires, in addition to the clarity, consistency, and effective functioning of the legally established procedures, two things: a value consensus between the governing.....and the governed, and a confidence of the governed, rooted in their experience, that this procedure will normally promote successful action in the direction of those common values¹²⁶

In Britain, 'effective functioning of the procedures' requires opportunities for institutional participation, but these are generally inadequate in inner city areas. A 'value consensus' requires a common identity, but there is evidence that this is lacking amongst some citizens in inner urban areas. The notions of a value consensus, and a 'consensus of the governed', implies reasonably high levels of consent and compliance, but there is a strong suggestion that this is not forthcoming among numbers of people in the inner cities. Furthermore, Lowenthal's criterion of 'normally successful action' is unlikely to be judged favourably by those in Britain's inner cities. This is particularly pertinent because although citizens may consent to the directives and exhortations of a government which they consider to be legitimate but ineffective, it has been suggested that the bases of its legitimacy will be eroded if the poor performance continues. Thomas reported that in England legitimacy crises

have only arisen when the regime fails to deliver other goods expected of it - law and order, religious toleration, political participation, or social justice.¹²⁷

7 URBAN DISADVANTAGE AND THE FIVE PROBLEMS: CHANGE AND SURVIVAL

7.1 Justice, riots and deprivation

A number of social historians have indeed suggested that perceptions of justice are important in determining whether civil disorders occur. If people believe that the behaviour of those in authority, or of others in a position of power over them, is not just they may be prepared to take the law into their own hands. Many violent riots in Britain seem to have been defending established rights, standards of living or working practices. Examples include the anti-Militia Act disturbances, food riots, labour disputes, Luddism, 'Captain Swing' riots, the 'Rebecca' disturbances and the riots against crimp-houses and pressgangs. Thompson has stated that the leaders of the disorders were often regarded as heroes and the direct action was regarded as just.¹²⁸

The notion of justice is important in explaining the behaviour not only of those who rioted but also of those who either tacitly or openly supported them. These disturbances were rarely indiscriminate frenzied eruptions of destruction, they were rather ordered, discerning, and restrained. And these too were the characteristics of the 1981 riots in Britain, contrary to many newspaper reports. It was those people and places which were considered to be 'legitimate targets' which were attacked, demonstrating the curious legitimising notion behind popular disturbances. Thompson explained this further:

By the notion of legitimisation I mean that the men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights and customs; and in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community.¹²⁹

Perceptions of justice seem likely to involve the idea of fairness¹³⁰, which may entail fair treatment in terms of rewards or punishments. Feelings of relative deprivation may give rise to the view that one is not being treated justly, as may experiences of behaviour, by those in authority, which appears to be biased or partial. One of the tenets

of the rule of law is that all citizens are equal before it, but if some people feel, for example, that the police do not act impartially towards them they will probably consider that justice has been violated.

The five problems which have been outlined seem likely to relate to and to reinforce, each other. The direction of the relationships may vary and one possibility is illustrated in Figure 5. The ineffectiveness of government policies in the inner cities and the resultant relative deprivation leads to less legitimacy, participation and identity, each of which cause less consent to be forthcoming and adversely affects the effectiveness of future policies. The dissatisfaction also feeds directly into lower consent, which causes less effectiveness. The dissatisfaction also feeds directly into lower consent, which causes less effectiveness.




Figure 5: Possible relationships between the problems

Each of the problems may be related to perceptions of injustice, but it seems likely that ineffectiveness and a fall in the level of legitimacy will be particularly associated with them. Poverty and deprivation may be seen as unjust, the inequalities of provision of housing and work may be regarded as unfair, and behaviour by the police, and others, against black people may be perceived as improper.

Popular views of injustice may activate illegitimate participation, especially in a context of declining consent and decreasing identity with prevailing values. In circumstances where social controls have

eroded, feelings of injustice may lead to riots. Carlyle stressed the significance of perceptions of injustice:

It is not what a man outwardly has or wants that constitutes the happiness or misery of him. Nakedness, hunger, distress of all kinds, death itself have been cheerfully suffered when the heart was right. It is the feeling of injustice that is insupportable to all men.....No man can bear it or ought to bear it.¹³¹

7.2 Disadvantage, conflict and change

For the reasons outlined in this paper urban disadvantage does constitute a threat to political integration, although the five problems do not seem likely to lead to the non-survival of a government, let alone the political system. Crime and violent disturbances in inner city areas do appear to be becoming more prevalent, and a major outbreak of rioting in some of these locations can be expected within the next few years. Indeed there is evidence that rioting, if not on the scale of 1981, has continued in Liverpool 8 and elsewhere, it is the reporting of them that stopped.¹³² If serious disorders occur again it can confidently be anticipated that they will be contained and suppressed.

The five problems may threaten the regime and indeed the polity itself, in a more insidious way. A growing repudiation of political authority and consensual values within inner cities could lead to a gradual prolonged disintegration. Unless conditions improve for blacks and whites in these areas, identity, legitimacy and participation may decline yet further, with less consent and more defiance in terms of crime, disruption and disobedience. The response from government will presumably be to strengthen legislation and policing, at considerable additional costs, in an attempt to control and subdue the deviant behaviour. But coercion may well only reinforce the problems which are causing the social and political unrest and disintegration. As a last resort the armed forces are available but, in the view of Lord Scarman,

to turn the military inwards on British people is not something which our tolerant and free society can possibly accept.¹³³

In 1975 Brittan described how liberal democracy might disappear

There could be a gradual process of disintegration of traditional political authority and the growth of new sources of power. Indeed, a continuation of present trends might lead to a situation where nothing remained of liberal democracy but its label. Nor need we assume that a new system will be repressive but efficient. It is just as easy to imagine a combination of pockets of anarchy combined with petty despotism, in which many of the amenities of life and the rule of law are absent, but in which there are many things which we will be prevented from doing or saying.¹³⁴

It might be noted in passing that it was Brittan's brother, Leon, who as Home Secretary was responsible for reintroducing, and piloting through Parliament, the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill which the Daily Mail considered was

more likely to threaten traditional liberties than to protect society against the evil doers.....let us not clamp upon ourselves the apparatus of an authoritarian state.¹³⁵

Much of Brittan's gloomy prognosis is echoed by Harrison at the end of his detailed study of urban disadvantage in Hackney. He wrote:

The British system is not self-correcting. Thus the process of polarisation may continue and intensify. Unless its present course is quickly and radically reversed, Britain could become a country as deepy and as destructively divided as many in Latin America. Revolution does not seem likely, rather a chaos of individual and sectional pathologies and disruptions....Crimes of theft and of violence will continue to grow. Riots will recur, and urban terrorism reappear.... Police methods will become the primary response to socio-economic grievances. As the threats to law and order grow, so will the pressure for stricter measures to contain them, reducing the civil liberties of everyone.

This is no mere scenario. It is already happening in our cities. Far-reaching positive reforms will be needed to halt or reverse the trends. In the absence of such action, they will continue and accelerate.¹³⁶

There is of course a tendency to exaggerate the likelihood of problems arising in these ways. However, as this paper has tried to show, urban disadvantage has given rise to five problems, the trends of which are towards declining political and social cohesion. The inner city ghettos may be out of sight, but the effects

of them seem likely to reach much further. Urban deprivation, poverty and the concomitant racial discrimination may turn out to be malignant growths which require treatment to remove them.

Urban disadvantage does not seem likely to give rise to events which cause the sudden non-survival of a government, or the political system. It seems more probable that the five problems, and the perceptions of injustice, if unchecked, will prove more insidious, leading to barely-perceptible but undesirable changes. As Orwell wrote;

England will still be England, an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the past, and, like all living things, having the power to change out of recognition and yet remain the same.¹³⁷

And the 'change out of recognition' may not be pleasant or desirable, as the prognoses of Brittan and Harrison illustrate.

British political development has often been characterised as one of gradual change in response to demands and necessities. In fact history reveals a rather more violent and conflictual development than the step-by-step conception. Recently, 'the British capacity for system maintenance' in the face of various threats has been noted by Birch,¹³⁸ but there is no reason why this should necessarily continue. Thomas points out that the five critical problems which he examined - identity, legitimacy, participation penetration and distributed - were not single crises in British development, but 'endlessly recurring problems'.

In medical terms they should be compared not to childhood illnesses like chickenpox or measles, but to adult ailments like colds or influenza, which frequently recur and which through neglect or growing feebleness may at any point lead to bronchitis, pneumonia or even death,¹³⁹

The poverty, decay, injustice and deprivation in Britain's inner cities are indeed being neglected; the symptoms, such as riots and crime, may be noticed but the underlying condition persists and grows worse. Orwell's 'everlasting animal' will not die, but the five problems arising from urban disadvantage may cause significant changes.

Survival is not in doubt, but the form may alter; the system can cope - but at what price?

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CIVICNESS AND POLITICAL MODERATION

a test of the civic culture theory

by

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Civiness and political moderation: a test of the civic culture theory

1. Introduction

One of the most influential theories of the stability of democracies is the civic culture theory of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba ¹⁾. They applied their theory in a study of five nations (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico and the United States). The most distinguishing characteristic of the Almond-and-Verba-approach is the emphasis on the cultural explanation of the stability of democracies. The civic culture theory states that a certain pattern of political orientations, i.e. "civiness" ²⁾, is conducive to the existence of a moderate political climate. Almond and Verba consider such a moderate political climate to be of utmost importance for the stability of democracies.

In spite of its prestige the empirical status of this theory is uncertain. The study by Almond and Verba themselves cannot be seen as a rigid test of their theory; their work was mostly of an explorative nature. Since then no other researcher has made a serious effort to test the theory. A recently published retrospect on "The Civic Culture" makes clear that its importance is mostly due to the conceptualization of political culture and to the introduction of quantitative methods ³⁾.

This situation is unsatisfactory: a theory that has attracted the attention of so many political scientists deserves testing. This paper is a summary of the results of an attempt to do so ⁴⁾.

Leaving aside the general introduction into the relationship between political culture and stable democracy and the review of the criticism of the civic culture theory ⁵⁾, we will start with the analysis of the structure of the civic culture theory. This analysis shows that the civic culture theory consists of two parts, which must be clearly distinguished: the conceptual model and the explanatory theory.

2.1 The civic culture theory: its conceptual model

The conceptual model indicates in what way Almond and Verba intend to analyse political culture. The political culture is, according to Almond and Verba, the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of a nation. These political objects are (1) the political system as a whole, (2) the input, (3) the output and (4) the individual in his role as a political participant. The orientations toward these four political objects can be of a cognitive, affective or evaluative nature. Depending on the presence or absence of these orientations, Almond and Verba distinguish their well known types of political culture: the participant culture, the subject culture and the parochial culture.

2.2 The civic culture theory: its explanatory element

The explanatory element in the civic culture theory posits that -in order to be stable- every democratic political system must satisfy three pairs of contradictory principles (three tensions). The first tension is the one between, on the one hand, the delegation of power to the governmental elite by the non-elite and on the other hand the control of this elite by the non-elite. Without democratic control, a system cannot be called a democracy. If, on the other hand, the members of the system are not willing to delegate a substantial part of their power to make authoritative decisions to the governmental elite and if they continuously try to put it under pressure, this elite will be hindered in the effective exercise of its governmental powers and authority. A solution for these tensions is reached when the political participation of the members of the system can be called moderate: intense enough to prevent the collapse of democratic control, yet not so intense as to frustrate effective government.

The second tension concerns, as Almond and Verba call it, the mana-

gement of affect. This tension refers to the nature of the political involvement of the members of the system. This involvement must be balanced between political utilitarianism (i.e. involvement only motivated by self-interest), and involvement with the democratic political system as such, irrespective of its output. Democracy implies that the members of the system evaluate the output of the system and the performance of the elite, using their political interests as a yardstick. Nevertheless, a purely utilitarian involvement is an unstable basis for democracy, because it calls for permanent system-effectiveness. If this effectiveness declines, a system that is solely based on utilitarian involvement, will lose its support and its existence will be in danger. Some loyalty to the democratic system itself is required. This argument calls for moderate political utilitarianism.

The third tension is the one between consensus and cleavage. A democratic system cannot live without some cleavage. If democracy is to have some meaning, there must be a certain amount of disagreement about the future course of society. Without this, democratic control of the elite will wither away. Yet, if this political polarization is too deep and if there is no consensus at all, there is -as Almond and Verba put it- little potentiality for the peaceful resolution of political differences that is associated with the democratic process. This tension may be solved if political disagreement in a society is clearly existent, yet not too intense, i.e. if political polarization is moderate.

In order to be stable, a democratic political system must reach a balanced position on all of these three tensions. This position is reached when the political process can be called moderate. On the basis of the civic culture theory, it was decided that this political moderation has three dimensions: moderate participation, moderate utilitarianism, and moderate polarization.

The existence of political moderation is -according to the civic culture theory- enhanced by the presence of a "civic culture". This civic culture is a mixture of directive and acquiescent political orientations. The terms directive and acquiescent are borrowed from Nordlin-

ger.⁶⁾ Almond and Verba speak of activist and passive orientations. These adjectives, however, tend to implicate behavioural aspects in a definition of political culture. Therefore, the adjectives chosen by Nordlinger are preferred. A directive orientation is an orientation that reflects a willingness to engage in politics, and to influence (to "direct") the political elite. An acquiescent orientation on the other hand shows the tendency of the individual to accept the authority of the political elite and shows the individuals' reluctance to engage in politics. The mixture of directive and acquiescent orientations makes the civic culture congruent with and thereby conducive to the maintenance of a political democracy, that also has to reach some kind of a mixture of contradictory principles.

The mixing of directive and acquiescent orientations may take place on the level of society, but also on an individual level. In the first case some members have political orientations that can be called directive, while others take a more acquiescent position. The question whether this does not lead to political polarization, is not dealt with by Almond and Verba. They consider the mixture of directive and acquiescent orientations on the level of the individual to be the most important. In this case, the directive and acquiescent orientations are mixed within the individuals' pattern of orientations, and keep each other in check. This mixture of political orientations on the level of the individual will be called "civicness".⁷⁾

Briefly summarized, the explanatory element of the civic culture theory consists of three statements. (1) The mixture of directive and acquiescent orientations within the individuals' pattern of orientations ("civicness") is conducive to political moderation; (2) the mixture of directive and acquiescent orientations on the level of society is also conducive to political moderation; (3) political moderation is conducive to the stability of a democratic political system.

3. The research design

A complete test of the civic culture theory requires the transformation of the three statements, mentioned above, into testable hypotheses, and an empirical test of these hypotheses. The second and the third statement however, can only be tested in a comparative research design. In view of the high costs of research of this kind, it was considered a sound strategy to postpone this comparative research into the second and the third statement, until the first has been validated. If the first statement proves to be untenable, a very central link in the chain of reasoning is broken, and the civic culture theory will, for the greater part, be falsified. Therefore, this research project concentrated on the first statement: civicism is conducive to political moderation. This statement is transformed into the central hypothesis of this project: "Civicness is relatively often accompanied by political moderation".

3.1 The hypotheses and the dependent variables

The dependent variable in the above mentioned central hypothesis is political moderation. It has^{been} shown above that this variable should be specified into three dimensions: moderate participation, moderate utilitarianism and moderate polarization. In view of this, our central hypothesis was decomposed into three "derived hypotheses": (1) Civicness is relatively often accompanied by moderate political participation; (2) civicness is relatively often accompanied by moderate political utilitarianism and (3) civicness is relatively often accompanied by moderate political polarization. These three derived hypotheses on their turn, were elaborated into ten testable research hypotheses. In formulating these research hypotheses certain limitations had to be taken into account. The researcher did not collect the data himself but used the data of the Dutch National Election Survey 1977.⁸⁾ Thereby he was not quite free in the choice of indicators.

A. Moderate political participation. The research hypotheses concerning moderate political participation are:

1. The degree of political participation is relatively small among people with an acquiescent pattern of political orientations, larger among people with civiciness, and the largest among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.
2. Unconventional forms of political participation are relatively seldom found among people with an acquiescent pattern, more often among people with civiciness, and most often among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.
3. Extreme political demands are relatively seldom found among people with an acquiescent pattern, more often among people with civiciness and most often among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.
4. Negative judgements on the effectiveness of political participation are relatively often found among nonparticipants with a directive pattern and less often among nonparticipants with civiciness. (A prediction about people with an acquiescent pattern is omitted, because the civic culture theory does not enable us to formulate an unambiguous prediction about these persons).

B. Moderate political utilitarianism. The research hypotheses concerning moderate political utilitarianism are:

5. The relation between satisfaction with governmental policy and support for the political regime is relatively weak among people with an acquiescent pattern, stronger among people with civiciness and the strongest among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.
6. Willingness to accept governmental actions against political activities of citizens is relatively often found among people with an acquiescent pattern, less often among people with civiciness and least often among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.
7. Traditional motives for obedience to the law are relatively often found among people with an acquiescent pattern; the democratic legitimacy as a motive for obedience to the law is relatively often found

among people with civicness and utilitarian motives are relatively often found among people with a directive pattern of political orientations.

C. Moderate political polarization. The research hypotheses concerning moderate political polarization are:

8. The relation between evaluations of governmental policies and voting behaviour is relatively strong among people with a directive pattern, and weaker among people with civicness. (A prediction about people with an acquiescent pattern is omitted, because the civic culture theory does not enable us to formulate an unambiguous prediction about these persons).
9. Extreme judgements on governmental policy are relatively often found among people with a directive pattern, less often among people who show civicness, and relatively seldom among people with an acquiescent pattern.
10. Awareness of differences in the political affiliations of one's own friends is relatively seldom found among people with an acquiescent pattern, more often among people who show civicness and most often among people with a directive pattern.

3.2 The independent variable: the pattern of political orientations

So far for the research hypotheses and the dependent variables. The analysis will now concentrate on the independent variable: the pattern of political orientations. In the ten research hypotheses three patterns of orientations were distinguished: civicness, the directive pattern and the acquiescent pattern. The directive and the acquiescent pattern are chosen as theoretically relevant contrasts with civicness.

The observation of these three patterns must satisfy two criteria. The first criterion results from the conceptual model of the civic culture theory. Civicness is, as Almond and Verba would call it, an allegiant participant pattern. This means that it consists of positive orientations toward the four political objects (the political system as a whole, the input, the output and the individual in his role as a politi-

cal participant). The second criterion emanates from the explanatory element of the civic culture theory: civiness is a mixture of directive and acquiescent orientations.

The operationalization of civiness tries to satisfy both criteria. Beyond that, it was attempted to stay as near as possible to the operationalizations of Almond and Verba. Since the researcher had to rely on the data of the Dutch National Election Survey 1977, he was not able to use exactly the same data as Almond and Verba did. Figure S-1 summarizes the operationalization of the three patterns. The observations of the three patterns along these lines produced the following results: 11 percent of the respondents showed civiness; a directive pattern was found with 5 percent, and an acquiescent pattern also with 5 percent of the respondents.

This amounts to a total of 21 percent of the respondents that can be classified in terms of the three patterns of political orientations.

The fact that only 21 percent of the respondents can be classified does not necessarily mean that the civic culture theory is empirically irrelevant. The three patterns of orientations that are central to this research project, must be considered as very specific configurations of political orientations, that derive their meaning from the civic culture theory: the three patterns are expected to have a specific relation with political moderation; they do not pretend to form a comprehensive classificatory system.

Though the small number (N=298) of classifiable respondents has no consequences for the validity of the civic culture theory, it unmistakably had some tedious consequences for the empirical analysis: 79 percent of the respondents had to be excluded from the analysis, and this resulted more often than once in problems of statistical significance. For that reason the analysis was completed with a strategy that allows for the use of all respondents in the analysis: after the examination of the relations between the three patterns and the differing aspects of political moderation, i.e. after the test of the hypotheses, the relations of each individual orientation with the aspects of political moderation were

FIGURE S-1 THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Political object	Indicator	Directive pattern	Civicness	Acquiescent pattern*
Political system as a whole	1. political interest	high	high	high/low
	2. political knowledge	high	high	high/low
	3. respect for political opponents	low	high	**
	4. interest in the political colour of the governmental coalition	yes	yes	no
Output	5. trust in authorities	low	high	high/don't know
	6. sense of political competence	competent	competent	incompetent
	7. judgement on the importance of political influence of electors	important	important	***

* This pattern is the combination of an acquiescent subject pattern and an acquiescent parochial pattern. This accounts for the ambiguity of the indicators 1, 2 and 5.

** The question of the respect is irrelevant. Since the respondent shows no involvement in party politics (indicator 4), his (dis)respect for political opponents probably is of an a-political nature.

*** The judgement on the elector's influence is neglected, since in this acquiescent pattern the meaning of the response to this question is ambiguous.

Note: The indicators 3 and 5 represent acquiescent orientations; the indicators 4, 6 and 7 represent directive orientations. The indicators 1 and 2 are needed to show a certain amount of political involvement.

analyzed. This last step in the analysis was of an explorative nature and tried to uncover whether the directive and acquiescent orientations behaved in a manner predicted by the civic culture theory. In this explorative analysis data on all respondents could be used.

4. The results of the empirical analysis

This completes the operationalization and the formulation of the research hypotheses. Thereupon the ten hypotheses were tested and some further exploratory analyses were carried out. The conclusions of these analyses are as follows.

A. The small number of respondents with one of the three identified patterns of political orientations may be a serious handicap for the further use of the civic culture theory in research. Many may be discouraged from the use of this theory because of its rather wasteful way to classify respondents. For use in further research, a simplification of the system of classifications is suggested: not the conceptual model, but the explanatory element of the civic culture theory, with its distinction between directive and acquiescent political orientations, should be the core of the classification. The conceptual model, with all its refinements, nuances and subclassifications, should only have a heuristic function: it suggests aspects of the political process that should be covered. Thus, it is sufficient to have two measures: one for the directive orientation, and one for the acquiescent orientation. Dichotomised and then combined, they result in four patterns of political orientation, that enable us to classify all respondents. These patterns are (a) civiness -high scores on both measures-, (b) the directive pattern -high on the measure of directive orientation, low on the measure of acquiescent orientation-, (c) the acquiescent pattern -low on the measure of directive orientation, high on the other measure-

and (d) the alienated pattern -low on both measures. These measures must be constructed in such a way that, together, they express how directive and acquiescent orientations keep each other in check. This can be done by making sure that both measures include orientations on the same political objects.

B1. The hypotheses on moderate participation (for the formulation of the hypotheses, see above). Hypothesis 1 (on the degree of political participation) and hypothesis 3 (on the extremity of political demands) were confirmed by the analyses. The support for hypothesis 2 (on the conventionality of political participation), however, was insufficient. The choice for a particular form of political participation seems to be mostly determined by the quantity of energy required and not by its conventionality. There is, however, some evidence that, with another operationalization of unconventional political participation (not just forms of political protest, but rather the more harsh forms such as illegal actions and violent behaviour), hypothesis 2 might prove valid. The effort to expand the civic culture theory to the question of non-participation (hypothesis 4), proved unsuccessful. On the whole, the analysis supports the argument on the moderation of the degree and the content of political participation, as suggested by the civic culture theory.

B2. The hypotheses on moderate political utilitarianism (hypothesis 5, 6 and 7) were not confirmed by our analysis. Nowhere evidence was found of the predicted relation between political orientations (directive, acquiescent or civic) and moderate political utilitarianism. It should be pointed out, however, that there is some reason for doubts on the validity of some aspects of the chosen operationalization of moderate political utilitarianism. A definite rejection of this part of the civic culture theory should wait until further research into this matter has been completed. Nevertheless, the absence of any relationship in the predicted direction suggests that the civic culture theory may prove

invalid in this respect.

B3. The hypotheses on moderate political polarization (hypothesis 8, 9 and 10) were, on the whole, confirmed by the analyses. Moreover, it is essential that political polarization shows a clear and strong relation with the two orientations on the political input (a positive relation with interest in the political colour of the governmental coalition and a negative relation with respect for the political opponents). This neatly corresponds with the civic culture theory that considers precisely these two orientations to be the most important in this respect.

B4. Conclusion on the test of the hypotheses. The results of this research confirm a considerable part of the civic culture theory. Civicness is relatively often accompanied by moderate political participation and moderate political polarization. No support was found for the argument on the moderation of political utilitarianism.

C. The relations, shown by the analyses, were mostly weak. This does, however, not seriously undermine the relevance of the civic culture theory. In the first place, one should bear in mind that the civic culture theory does not pretend to unveil necessary or sufficient conditions for political moderation. The cultural factors, stressed by this theory, are part of a complex of moderating factors, including among others, the nature of the political structure and the level of socio-economic development. Because the cultural factors are just a part of a larger complex, one should not expect them to account for the whole variance of political moderation. A second explanation for the weakness of the discovered relations results from the fact that this research project concerns the political culture of the Netherlands. If it is right to assume that the political process in the Netherlands can generally be called moderate, there is only little room for "moderating" processes. It is only natural then, that the relations predicted by

the civic culture theory were only found in a weak form.

D. Though our research confirms essential parts of the civic culture theory, it raises so many questions that further research is needed. In doing so one should try to satisfy three criteria: (a) The research should be of a comparative nature. The choice of the political systems to be investigated should be based on the nature of their political processes, particularly the degree of democracy and the degree of political stability. (b) Not only the factors of political moderation, stressed by the civic culture theory, should be investigated, but also other factors, like social and political structures and those aspects of political culture that are neglected by the civic culture theory, such as ideologies, value orientations and policy preferences. (c) The research project should enable the investigator to experiment with various measures and indicators. It would probably be wise to look for ways to reduce the complexity of the classificatory system of the civic culture theory (see conclusion 1, above).

5. The relevance of the civic culture theory

Following the discussion on the results of our empirical analysis, some attention was paid to the relevance of the civic culture theory for political science. In doing so, the already well documented contributions to the conceptualization of political culture and to the introduction and diffusion of quantitative methods in comparative research were left aside.⁹⁾ Eventually these contributions are only subsidiary to the final goal of the civic culture theory: a deeper understanding of the relevance of cultural factors for the stability of political democracy.

The influence of cultural factors on the stability of political democracy is an indirect one. As was shown above, cultural factors influence the degree of political moderation. Political moderation, in its turn, is a favorable condition for the stability of political democracy.

The relation between cultural factors and political moderation was discussed above. Therefore we now turn to the relation between political moderation and the stability of a political democracy. Next to the study of the relation between cultural factors and political moderation, this is the most important contribution of the civic culture theory to political science. Since no empirical analysis of the relation between political moderation and the stability of political democracy was done, the discussion of this subject is of a theoretical nature. Two aspects deserve attention. The first is the contribution of the civic culture theory to the conceptualization of political moderation. The second is the question of the relevance of political moderation for the stability of democracy.

Concerning the conceptualization of political moderation, it was concluded that the civic culture theory rightly suggests to treat political moderation as a position between extremes. These extremes are marked by the three tensions, discussed above. If one is willing to follow the self imposed limitation of the theory (no attention for the political elite, no attention for political values and policy preferences), these three tensions are well chosen. Not only do they correspond with the way in which contemporary political science looks at the political process. They also bear an interesting resemblance with themes of the classical theory of democracy.¹⁰⁾ The idea of the three tensions illustrates that Almond and Verba do not consider democracy to be a simple and straightforward concept, but rather a subtle compromise between conflicting principles. This compromise is reflected in their conceptualization of political moderation.

After the discussion of the conceptualization of political moderation, the question of the relevance of political moderation for the stability of political democracy was turned to. In the exposition on this theme it was pointed out that the civic culture theory may be one of the most important examples of the so-called "sociological" approach to political democracy.¹¹⁾ This approach, that can better be called the inductive

approach, concentrates on the problem of stability of existing democracies. Does this mean that the attention for political moderation as a factor of stable democracy is only the result of an interest in existing democracy?

The analysis of some work in the so-called "economic" approach¹³⁾ -or rather the deductive approach- shows that this approach also emphasizes aspects of political moderation. By stressing the normal distribution as the representation of political preferences, the deductive approach tends to exclude extremity and polarization by assumption.¹⁴⁾ When analysing U-shaped distributions of political preferences, Robert Dahl, for example, concludes that these distributions can easily result in the collapse of the democratic system.¹⁵⁾ Other analysts in the deductive tradition come very close to the civic culture theory, when they propose to study the democratic political system as an effort to satisfy conflicting principles, like maximum political participation and governmental effectiveness.¹⁶⁾

All of this shows that political moderation is not just a concept of the inductive approach to political democracy, but is also relevant for the deductive approach. The reason for this is, that the realization of democracy requires the reconciliation of conflicting principles. Such a reconciliation is greatly stimulated by the existence of a moderate political process.

The civic culture theory states that the chances of survival of such a "democratic compromise" are positively influenced by the existence of a civic culture that fosters political moderation. The research summarized in this paper shows that the civic culture theory can contribute to a better understanding of the process of political moderation. Considering this, the concept of political moderation and the civic culture theory deserve a prominent place in the analysis of the subtle compromise we call democracy.

Notes

1. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations, Princeton, 1972 (fourth printing; first printing in 1963).
2. In retrospect I doubt whether the neologism "civicness" is well chosen. Maybe the expression "civic sense" should be preferred.
3. G. Almond and S. Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, Boston/Toronto, 1980.
4. The full report is published as a book (written in Dutch with a summary in English): H.H.F.M. Daemen, Burgerzin en politieke gematigdheid: een toetsing van de theorie van de burgercultuur, Enschede, 1983 (to be ordered from the author).
5. See for example the contributions of Lijphart and Pateman to "The Civic Culture Revisited" (note 3) or: B. Barry, Sociologists, economists and Democracy, London, 1967.
6. E. Nordlinger, The working-class Tories: authority, deference, and stable democracy, London, 1967.
7. See note 2.
8. G.A. Irwin, J. Verhoef and C.J. Wiebrens, Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1977: codeboek, two volumes, Leiden, 1977.
9. Nearly all publications on the political culture mention the research, the theory or the conceptual model of Almond and Verba. In many political science textbooks their work is labeled "influential", "authoritative", "pioneering" etc. For a review see H. Daemen, 1983 (note 4).
10. See for example the discussions on the individual and the state, on the nature of the relationship between individual preferences and majority decisions etc.
11. See B. Barry, 1967.
12. *ibid.*
13. For example A. Downs, An economic theory of democracy, New York, 1957.
14. R. Dahl, A preface to democratic theory, Chicago, 1968, p. 98.
15. J.J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The calculus of consent, Ann Arbor, 1962; W.H. Riker and P.C. Ordeshook, A theory of the calculus of voting, in: The American Political Science Review, 1968, nr. 62, pp 25-42.

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PLURALISM, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

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I

We recognise political objects as the objects they are in terms of descriptions which pick them out from other objects within the same domain [Dowding and Kimber, 1983, 1985]. Democracy is a regime-type which is recognised, despite the variety of its institutional forms, by the relationship of those institutions to three underlying and basic principles: (1) upward control, (2) equality, and (3) behaviour-limiting norms adhered to by both the authorities and the masses [Dowding and Kimber, 1985]. The degree to which these three principles are implemented in any given nation depends upon the history and culture of the nation itself. To that extent we may suggest that some democratic regimes are *more* democratic than others, that is, some methods of institutionalizing them embody the spirit of the principles more fully than other methods. However, no method of institutionalising the principles can *attain* the ideal, since the ideal is not specified in institutional terms. It is the ghost in the machine, so to speak, and cannot be the machine itself.

However, the fact that some methods of institutionalising the three principles are said to be more democratic than others, should not necessarily lead us to suggest that we should always attempt to build those institutions. The claim that one set of institutions is more democratic than another set is a normative claim, because specifying the principles is itself normative, but as a desirable goal it does not stand alone. We also desire other objectives - perhaps a certain minimum of material goods, peace, security and work, and so on. Like democracy, many of these goals (as opposed to the desire for happiness for example) are genuinely political, that is, to make a demand that they be satisfied is often to make a demand that deserves a response from those who act in the name of the polity.

Given the differing circumstances of different nations, individual expectations of democracy will also differ. Because of those differing circumstances individuals will be prepared to make a different trade-off between the desire for democracy and peace, democracy and work, democracy and economic growth, and so on. Given certain circumstances, these other demands may actually constitute threats to the particular institutionalizations of democracy. Thus, different circumstances produce different classes of threat to institutions and require different sorts of response.

Economic demands have been widely recognised as the single most important threat on the political agenda for all democratic governments in the world. The problem for the theorist of democratic stability is the dilemma, if not contradiction, within some of the forms of institutionalising the three principles. That is, some ways of institutionalising democracy may seem inherently at odds with the government satisfying certain economic and political demands generated by the political process itself. In this paper we shall look at pluralist democracy (polyarchy)¹ to see whether it may become threatened by some of the very features which characterise it, when it attempts to respond to genuine demands of the system. The paper focuses on the group process, the heart of polyarchy, to determine whether the criticisms often made of its form suggest that, whilst it may be unstable in relation to some demands, alternatives which may be thought to be more stable suffer equally serious problems. We shall begin by examining some of the arguments suggesting a relationship between economic growth and stability, and shall then suggest how those arguments may need to be modified in the face of reality.

II.

Empirical work on the correlates of political stability has been something of a disappointment. As Sanders [1981] has clearly documented, empirical studies have produced somewhat contradictory findings, particularly with regard to the role of economic factors and of political violence. Twenty years ago, however, the prevailing thesis in both political and academic circles was that economic growth leads to greater political stability in developing nations and thus promotes the probability of the development of peaceful democracy [Olson, 1963, p. 529]. Writing against this orthodoxy, Mancur Olson [1963] argued that rapid growth could in fact produce greater problems not only for democracy but also for government and regime stability in developing nations. Basically his thesis was that, whilst greater growth may lead to greater income for some, it could lead to noticeable losses for others. One of the features of economic growth is capital accumulation, and if a country finances its own capital accumulation then it needs to save more. One way of achieving this is through higher taxation channelled back into the economy in investment projects. Thus, if a country finances its own growth, average earnings may actually fall - especially in the short term. Although this effect on income is likely to be borne primarily by the wealthier classes, it does show that increased growth does not necessarily entail that the people are noticeably better off [Olson, 1963, p. 539-540]. It can also be shown that even where mean average earnings rise, the median average may fall. Further, we may add to Olson's account that if the growth in terms of actual capital accumulation is not home produced but created through borrowing, as indeed much of the growth of the developing world was financed in the late 1960s and 1970s, then serious problems of inflation are likely to result. This inflation will affect the income of lower

classes just as much as the wealthier classes and produce potential threats to government and regime. Higher growth rates, then, do not necessarily lead to an immediate increase in living standards and so to greater contentment and fewer potential threats to government and regime.

Economic growth proceeds not just through greater capital accumulation, however, but also through innovation and technical change. The changing structure of society also leads Olson to suggest that instability may result. In a changing economy some will gain and some lose, but in both cases Olson suggests the rapid economic growth will loosen class and caste ties that help bind people to the social order. Thus individuals may become a destabilising influence from society as their social circumstances become incongruent with their changed economic circumstances. This will affect both the gainers and the losers as the increased number of *nouveaux riches* may use their economic power to change the social and political order in their interest especially if they have rising expectations caused by their new wealth, while the *nouveaux pauvre* also created by growth will resent their poverty more than those who have always been poor. Olson also believes that economic growth can significantly increase the number of losers because the gains of the small percentage of winners may be so large that they may exceed the combined losses of the larger percentage of losers.

Thus, median average income might actually fall, while mean average income rises. He suggests that this is not merely a logical possibility but is the likely outcome, for two reasons. Firstly, as demand increases with economic growth, prices rise while wages remain 'sticky'. Secondly, the changing technology involved in economic growth clearly favours those firms adopting the new methods, while those workers replaced as a result are "apt to be a destabilising force" [Olson, 1963, p. 537]. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that societies undergoing rapid growth

lack suitable institutions for mitigating the problems produced by growth. They are in a kind of no man's land between the traditional societies that have the tribe, the extended family, or the feudal relationship as protective institutions, and the modern industrial societies with their welfare provisions. Thus, a sense of grievance and insecurity results which constitutes a threat, with additional discontent arising from the fact that economic growth stimulates ever rising expectations.

How Olson conceptualises instability is not entirely clear, but he certainly includes challenges to and changes in the authorities and the regime as indications of instability, and he also includes general discontent as a feature of instability. We can reinterpret this as a threat rather than as aspect of stability itself. In the theories of 'overload' and 'ungovernability', to which we shall refer later, general discontent is a major property of society that is seen as an indicator of the instability of government, and which could produce regime instability.

In behavioural terms, general discontent presumably implies both rioting and other forms of political violence, as well as pressure on the authorities through any legitimate channels that may be open. It is easy to quote a few examples of political violence following periods of growth, as Olson does, but more systematic analysis, whilst not conclusive, does not seem to support this aspect of Olson's thesis. As Sanders [1981, pp. 13-21] points out, the study by Flanigan and Fogelman [1970] suggests that a high rate of growth is likely to *reduce* the probability of political violence, except perhaps during the critical 'take-off' period. Further, Olson assumes that people riot purely out of feelings of discontent resulting from their economic position, but studies of rioters suggest that their motivation is not related to any feelings of frustration or deprivation, rather it serves as the "functional equivalent of more conventional grievance mechanisms" which are perceived to be ineffective.

There is certainly nothing in Olson's thesis to explain why feelings of deprivation should manifest themselves in political rather than criminal violence. In a further, more general, study Hibbs [1973] also found that internal war is unrelated to the level of economic development.

Olson further argues that not only does rapid growth tend towards instability, but also that economic stagnation is conducive to political stability [1963, p. 543]. Yet no argument is presented to support this. Presumably he assumes that if the first argument is true then the second follows. If there is no growth, he would presumably argue, there is no social dislocation and thus no discontent, hence there is stability. Of course, if individuals expect their living standards generally to improve then growth will be required in order to satisfy that expectation. Indeed, this is the ungovernability thesis which we shall examine below, and to which Olson's latest work on economic growth and stagnation has a close affinity.

If the consequence of growth is instability, what is the consequence of stability? It might seem mischievous to suggest that it is lack of growth, yet this is precisely the conclusion that Olson has reached in his latest book *The Rise and Decline of Nations* [Olson 1982]. We propose to examine this book in some detail and compare it to the rather different conclusions presented by the literature on corporatism or neo-corporatism. Our question is concerned with whether the Olsonian/ungovernability thesis is correct and whether corporatism is a possible answer to the problems raised by that thesis. Do neo-corporatist methods constitute a possible system response to particular kinds of threat to democracy, or would the advent of corporatism itself constitute a threat to democracy?

III.

In his latest book [Olson, 1982], which has interesting applications to the study of the stability of nations, Olson returns to the theme of economic growth, particularly the capitalist democracies of the west. The book, though entitled *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, is in fact more concerned with explaining differential growth rates, both across advanced capitalist economies and across subsets within those economies. Olson suggests that differential growth rates can be explained by the degree of cartelization or development of distributional coalitions within nations. A distributional coalition is a special-interest organisation which works to promote the economic interest of its members. Since Olson has produced an earlier work concerned with problems encountered in the formation of such organisations [Olson, 1965] it might be thought that this latest work directly follows from the earlier thesis, indeed Olson himself thinks so [Olson, 1982, p. 18]. However, it has been argued that the latest book,

"is rooted not so much in the general thesis of *The Logic*, i.e. the free-rider theorem, as it is in a footnote on page 124 dealing with the efficiency and equity of pressure group activity." [Mitchell, 1983, p. 841].

In fact the relationship between the two books is more complex than this somewhat generous comment allows, in that not only is the later thesis not implied by the earlier but that at times it is inconsistent with it. In *The Logic* Olson suggests that individuals join interest group organisations only where they are (a) privileged (b) able to see that their contributions are pivotal in providing the good, or - the most likely reason - (c) because selective incentives (private goods) are offered to them. So interest group organisations that provide collective or public goods are able to do so for reasons other than the provision of the good itself. Individuals would not voluntarily join in order to help provide the public good since they would attempt to free-ride because of the non-excludable

nature of the public good. For goods already being provided (organisations that have already formed for whatever reasons), the emphasis is on the individual's rational calculation that the good would be continued to be provided because his withdrawal would go unnoticed. But in Olson's resumé in chapter 2 of the new book, the emphasis is on the *share* of the good which the individual could expect to receive. In the new version the individual will not contribute, because the extra part of the good in which he will obtain a share, will be worth less to him than the cost of his contribution upon which that extra part is dependent. But that does not make sense when we are considering collective goods, since they are also defined by the condition of jointness of supply. If something is jointly supplied then it does not make sense to suggest that individual's receive 'parts' of it. Against this, it may be argued that there are no goods which are pure public goods, just mixed goods which fall somewhere in the continuum between purely private and purely public goods. But in many of the examples that we may consider in relation to interest group organisations this is clearly false. If a trades union secures a pay rise of $x\%$ for all workers in a certain section of an industry, then it secures a pay rise of $x\%$ for all, and not $x\%/n$. The pay rise is jointly supplied. Similarly, for Olson's major example in *The Rise* the inflation rate of a nation is both jointly supplied and non-excludable for everyone, it has none of the characteristics of private goods and so is not a mixed good.

In the new book, the focus of the logic of collective action is shifted from the individual calculus to join or not to join interest group organisations to the organisational calculus of whether or not to take part in collective action that will eventually benefit the members of the organisations. The first point to note is that if the major thrust of *The Logic* were correct, the leaders of interest group organisations (often called political entrepreneurs by those swept along by the economic

paradigm, though they do not feature directly in Olson's first argument) would not be in the least interested in furthering their members interests anyway. They would be far more interested in devising schemes to entice more people to join by offering selective incentives, in order to provide a greater surplus to be enjoyed by the entrepreneur himself. But since we believe that the major thrust of *The Logic* is false [Kimber, 1981; Dowding and Kimber, 1984], we shall set that problem aside. Given the new focus, we shall explain why Olson believes that the formation of interest group organisations, or distributional coalitions, differentially affects growth rates depending upon the stability of a nation, and how this fits in with, and supports, the ungovernability thesis of the 1970s. We shall then compare this thesis with the rather different findings of the corporatist or neo-corporatist school.

How might interest group organisations affect the growth rate? Many factors affect growth rate of which some are exogenous to any given political-economic model, such as technical change. Within our models, however, we might believe that the growth rate at any given time is determined by three major factors: (a) the investment opportunities available, (b) the entrepreneurial skill then available which utilizes those opportunities, and (c) the actual rate of investment. The actual rate of investment (c) is in part determined by factors (a) and (b), though it can be encouraged by many other factors such as government intervention through public works or, conversely, government action to increase the potential excess profits available to capitalists thereby encouraging risk-taking, etc. Other, essentially political, factors that encourage growth are ignored by Olson's model; charitably they might be said to be exogenous. Olson would defend this ignorance by saying that his model is not meant to be a monocausal explanation of all growth rates, but one, very important factor, that needs to go into any explanation along with other

factors [Olson, 1982, pp. 14-16; Olson 1983, p. 30].

Distributional coalitions could affect growth (a) if they restrict the investment opportunities available - and this is suggested by parts of his thesis - and by this very fact of affecting (a) they could affect (b), if thereby they frighten away potential entrepreneurs. However, Olson concentrates on (c), and the key to how distributional coalitions affect the rate of investment is time. They slow down the decision procedure because of their size, their bureaucratic structure and the fact that decisions are made by bargaining. We look at this in more detail below.

Olson's thesis is developed through a number of implications, the last four of which carry the weight of his argument concerning growth rates, but we shall begin with the first.

(1) There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organisation of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.

If it were necessary and sufficient that optimal outcomes would be obtained if all groups, or all individuals had the same political bargaining power in the political process, then this implication would follow. Some individuals and some groups will be left out of the bargaining process because they have not organised, though of course organisations are not the only means of representing interests in society. Societal decision-making encompasses a wide variety of institutions (the media, political parties, government, bureaucracy etc.) by which non-organised interests can be represented. Of course, representation in society is asymmetrical, and Olson overlooks the fact that it is part of the job of government to represent some interests that otherwise would be forgotten. However, it is not at all assured that optimal outcomes would be achieved if all interests were represented equally. That it should be thought so must surely be a laissez-faire bias that is inconsistent with his economic analysis of the effects of associational organisations [Dean,

1983, p. 242]. As we shall see, some corporatists suggest that governmental intervention is required in order that a closer-to-optimal outcome will be achieved than would be achieved by thorough-going bargaining.

(2) Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organisations for collective action over time.

Pertinent to this implication is the precise notion of stability that Olson is dealing with. It is largely the same notion that he had in mind in his early [1963] article. So unless the process is interrupted by revolution, war, etc., a society will, over time, accumulate more and more interest group organisations geared to collective action, though this process will occupy a good deal of time. We may wonder, however, if Olson has the correct object on which to predicate stability. Is any environment that is conducive to the formation of distributional coalitions a stable one? Several stable societies in Olson's sense have different levels of development in distributional coalitions and in their influence [De Vries, 1983, p. 12] but as De Vries further points out,

"For a constitutional lawyer, Britain may well be more 'stable' than France. But does this perception also hold for an entrepreneur? I would argue that since World War II the environment for business decision-making has been less stable in Britain, where nationalisation and privatization of enterprise follow each other in irregular cycles and the desirability of EEC membership still remains at issue even after 25 years of debate. Conversely, in France certain technocratic and planning ideals have long inspired public policy, making for a more predictable, and hence more stable, business environment." [De Vries, 1983, p. 12].

Olson seems to overestimate the time scale, and underestimate the legal and cultural factors involved. Writing of Britain he says,

"though there was legal repression of combinations of workers at times during the Industrial Revolution, this cannot explain why unions did not become the norm in Britain until decades just before World War I." [Olson, 1982, p. 39].

In fact, in Britain, combinations of workers were made illegal conspiracies by a series of statutes from the fourteenth century onwards. These statutes were consolidated by the Combination Act 1801. Although several

Acts between 1824 and 1871 decriminalized combinations for bona fide trade purposes, they could still be held to be illegal associations at common law [Hood Phillips, 1967, p. 499]. Not until the Trade Union Act of 1871 were the purposes of trade unions no longer unlawful, and we had to wait until the Trade Disputes Act 1906 for a declaration that peaceful picketing was lawful. It is hardly surprising "that unions did not become the norm in Britain until decades just before World War I." Putting it another way, trade unions very quickly became the norm after the main legal restrictions were abolished in 1871. Where they did not was because of actions of employers in circumventing their formation, and the persistence of residual cultural attitudes that had previously made trade union restriction acceptable. It is clearly absurd, in constructing a hypothesis about the time it takes for collective action to emerge, to include periods where legal penalties could be incurred for that action, and to ignore the very real opposition that such collectivization faced in its early days.

The important factor that follows from this implication in Olson's main thesis is that as the number of group organisations grow with time the relative growth rate will slow. Olson is not concerned with absolute growth rate - which may increase with the increase in the number of group organisations - but the growth rate as it is affected by the organisations. If the organisations slow down economic growth, then growth would, *ceteris paribus*, have been higher without the groups. The only way to measure this counterfactual is to compare growth rates across countries with their relevant associational groups.

(3) Members of "small" groups have disproportionate organisational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time.

If this is so, then in the Labour/Capital bargaining process, Capital will be in the stronger position because of its compactness [Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980]. The fact that Labour in the 1970s did assert its

economic strength and the fact that the bargaining process did tip more towards its favour [Offe, 1984] might be used by Olson to support this implication. However, such a move would be dubious. Employers have always been in a stronger bargaining position and, since the laws of limited liability, have less at stake, whereas workers are strategically weak because they enter negotiation with their livelihoods at stake. Where unions asserted their power in the 1970s they did so not having just found their feet through organisation (if anything union membership was falling) but were able to assert power against a background of growth and rising expectations, and in a particular political context. However, with a new political climate, and as livelihoods have been seen to be at stake with rising unemployment, the bargain has once more swung the natural way towards Capital.

(4) On balance, special-interest organisations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.

One example that Olson gives of this possibility is the doctors' cartel. He suggests that by restricting entry into the profession the country gets fewer medical services and thus, for good laissez-faire reasons, less efficient medical services. Of course, against this it could be argued that if man-for-man we get fewer medical services because of restriction, then man-for-man we will get more other services, though it might be held that these other services will be worth less. However, the importance of this implication lies in the effects upon bargainable benefits that interest organisations have. Rather than seeking to increase the total benefit available to society, group organisations tend to seek a larger share for themselves, at the cost of reduced total benefits. [This was elegantly argued by Hirsch, 1976]. Thus efficiency and aggregate income are reduced, and political life becomes more divisive. Olson does not explore the latter idea fully, and clearly one possible interpretation is

that this could lead to instability. Certainly, he argues that this increased emphasis on distributional issues increases the likelihood of "intransitive or irrational and cyclical political choices" [Olson, 1982, p. 47], and so this divisiveness and instability of political choices contributes to making societies ungovernable, though there is some doubt in the literature as to how prevalent and politically significant cyclicity really is.

Olson's fifth implication is necessary to meet potential objections from the corporatist literature which has reached somewhat different findings [see Schwerin, 1984, pp. 232-234]; it will be discussed later along with corporatism.

The final four implications carry the weight of Olson's argument and we shall consider them together.

- (6) *Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.*
- (7) *Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.*
- (8) *Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of income and values of their membership.*
- (9) *The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution.*

These implications carry the bulk of the Olsonian position. Basically they add up to the argument that as distributional coalitions are defensive, conservative and bureaucratic, they,

"make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities." [Olson, 1982, p. 58].

Thus the rate of investment, *ceteris paribus* is slowed. As we saw above, this counterfactual claim can only be tested by comparison across nations, or across subsets within nations. This leads us to the question of Olson's evidence. The basic thesis is that war, or social unrest destroys existing

coalitions. This brings about a fresh start and allows a considerable period of time free from the restraints of distributional coalitions.

Olson characteristically offers much anecdotal evidence to support his theory, none of which, on its own, offers much confirmation, but which together constitutes a formidable array of evidence. Much of the evidence, however, is not confirmatory as such, it is merely consistent with the theory. The trouble for Olson is that the evidence is also consistent with other, more familiar, hypotheses. Olson cites in support of his theory the fact that the countries invaded or destroyed by war, such as Japan, Germany, and France, have higher growth rates than those which won the war, such as Britain. However, this also supports the view that countries whose capital stock is destroyed in war will have newer capital stock, and hence a more efficient industry, which itself helps to create a higher growth rate through dynamism or 'catch-up'. His evidence [pp. 79-80] that in Britain new industries did relatively better, in relation to old ones, than did industries in Germany, is again consistent with both Olson and the 'catch-up' theory. Nor does his ranking of the major cities in Britain, showing how these have changed over time, support his theory unless every new and expanding area of production is held to be confirmatory. It would be tedious to examine all the evidence cited in *The Rise* - there have been a few, more systematic, studies [Mueller, 1983], none of which produce strong confirmatory evidence. Olson promises us that Kwang Choi is preparing a systematic study which would, but if it utilizes the methods of his earlier paper [Choi, 1983] we remain sceptical. In this, Choi attempts to show that institutional sclerosis is correlated with the age of institutional development. He simply takes the length of polity as a proxy for cartelization, but other, more direct, measures do not produce this conclusion [Schmitter, 1981; Cameron, 1984; Schwerin, 1984]. It is too simplistic to rely on the hypothesis that political instability, measured

by social unrest or destruction by war, is equivalent to a new start for interest group formation. Olson's case remains unconfirmed.

IV.

The ungovernability thesis suggested that, due to inherent contradictions in pluralism, the western democracies would prove to be unstable. The contingencies that threatened these democratic regimes were produced by the particular form of democratic institutionalization in western industrial nations. The thesis has two broad forms which can be placed on the ideological spectrum as a critique from the right, and a critique from the left [see Birch, 1984 for a review].

The first form regained academic respectability in the political-economic analyses of the early 1970s, though had been around for much longer. Goodhart and Bhansali [1970] argued that as governments sought to maximize public support they would push the economy into a position of higher inflation, which would in turn entice workers to push for higher, inflation-proof wages, having the effect of pushing the Phillips curve outwards, that is, of getting higher unemployment for a given level of inflation. In a widely read paper, Brittan [1975] suggested a similar conclusion, though using a different economic analysis. On Friedmanite grounds, Brittan suggested that there is a minimum sustainable level of unemployment and to attempt to push unemployment below that level would create an increasing rate of inflation and currency problems. The result again would be higher inflation and unemployment. Despite their different economic stances on the fundamental economic problems, at the heart of both analyses is a similar economic model of the pluralist democratic political process.

Goodhart and Bhansali used a Downsian model, Brittan a Schumpeterian one, but essentially the analysis is the same. In a competitive battle between the two (or more) parties, the political actors would promise the electorate more than could be achieved. This would result in excessive expectations on the part of the voters who would believe the promises of the politicians since it would be (economically) irrational for them to work out for themselves that they were being promised more than could be achieved. When the expectations were not satisfied, and the economy plunged into ever deepening crisis, this would result in a crisis of legitimacy for successive governments and hence for the regime. The weakening of the legitimacy was given empirical support by data showing that the vote for the major parties was decreasing as a percentage of the total vote. What the model did not take into account is that expectations are not entirely exogenous to the model. As the economic situation became worse, people began to expect less, becoming suspicious of the promises of the politicians. In Britain at least, the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher were able to retain credibility by promising not a brave new world but a hard old one. Indeed, Richard Rose points out that poll research has shown that individuals' attitudes to their life chances (i.e. their expectations) and their attitude towards government barely changed across Europe as a whole between 1973 and 1978 [Rose, 1980, pp. 153-158], and suggests that the reason for this is simple, "the greatest concerns of individuals are insulated from the macro-institutions of society" [Rose, 1980, p. 156]; and he shows that (i) people do not expect their living standards to keep rising continually, (ii) they do not expect them to fall, (iii) across nations attitudes to economic growth vary, (iv) individuals' attitudes to their life chances vary with their perception of economic change. Further, James Alt has shown [Alt, 1979, chs. 8 and 9] that the electorate are more realistic in their assessments of politicians' promises

than political scientists typically assume, and one of the characteristics of the Thatcher government has been the attempt to lower the perception of what government can achieve.

In response to Britain's economic problems, the present Conservative administration has attempted to set the sights of the voters on the long term, and put much of the blame for the crisis on labour and the unions. Simple laissez-faire economics has been promoted, and whilst other fortuitous factors also contributed, the weak, split, and seemingly confused opposition has been exploited. Thus once again this 'realism' paid off when the Tories swept into power with an increased majority in 1983, though the opinion polls prior to the Falklands war suggest that it was not paying off until this particular 'fortuitous' factor occurred.

Brittan's thesis, however, has a further element other than the economic analysis of the party battle. This factor is the effect of producer groups, Capital and Labour, on the economy. Brittan concentrates on Labour to the exclusion of Capital. The argument is essentially that which we saw in Olson [1982], namely that producer groups, or 'distributional coalitions' would all attempt to free-ride upon the possible provision of public goods.

This leads to other theories of ungovernability that more often take the less dramatic title of 'overload' [Douglas, 1976; King, 1975; Rose 1979]. Whilst ungovernability suggests that the very nature of the party democratic process is unsuited to provide the public economy with the goods that the public expect, the overload thesis suggests that the problem arises from the growing complexity of modern industrial society, where so many of the elements are interlinked and interdependent. Rose concentrates upon the expectations involved, King on the growing complexity. The latter's solution is to reduce the load of government. Hand in hand with its success in lowering the (short-term) expectations of the electorate,

the Thatcher administration also seems determined to reduce the load of government, or at least to reduce its responsibility for societal problems in the eyes of the public, though its attempt to apply strict monetary control has led to an increasing centralisation of real economic and political power which seems at odds with its professed philosophy. We can see that the Thatcher strategy is consistent: if the power of the distributional coalitions from the labour side can be weakened, and the government be seen to step back from responsibility for the exigencies of the free-market, the power of profit will allow the possibility of higher growth. Meantime, the public expectations from government are lowered, thus removing the possible threat to government instability. However, their monetary strategy requires lower government spending and this process is resulting in the slimming down of the Welfare State. This is where the left-wing version of the ungovernability thesis has its starting point.

We could take four propositions as basic to the left (or neo-Marxist) position [Birch, 1984, p. 142-144]. Firstly, the western industrial societies are legitimized through the pluralist democratic system. Secondly, the values of the system are ingrained into all who are a part of that system. Thirdly, that legitimization is aided (propped-up) by the welfare services which shelter those who lose out badly under capitalism. Fourthly, this system of legitimation is breaking down. According to the left ungovernability thesis it is breaking down for a variety of reasons. In order to see why, we need to see how the welfare state legitimizes the pluralist system.

Growth, as we saw above, is dependent upon the entrepreneurial function being fulfilled which requires (at least) the three conditions given above. The third requirement was the actual rate of investment. If investment is to come from private rather than public sources, and as economic theory tells us, investment is the other side of saving, then

high investment rates require high rates of saving. Since, private saving occurs after individual needs are satisfied, the greater the disparity in wealth between individuals the greater the national saving rate. Thus high sustainable rates of growth, under unfettered capitalism, requires disparity in wealth. According to Olson's [1963] thesis, however, instability may result where high rates of saving and lack of welfare provision cause discontent and frustration. This has not occurred in the western nations since the welfare provisions have mitigated the effects of some losing out. However that welfare state also provides elaborate labour protection legislation allowing workers to resist otherwise legitimate capitalist practices which improve profitability. Strong unions which have been able to secure wage rises in excess of productivity rises, and the very fact of the cost of welfare provision taking potential saving out the investment market, have also helped to lower the growth rate. Production, the source of profit is also affected;

"the welfare state maintains the control of capital over production, and thus the basic source of industrial and class conflict between labour and capital; by no means does it establish anything resembling 'workers control'. At the same time it strengthens workers' potential for resistance against capital's control - the net effect being that an unchanged conflict is fought out with means that have changed in favour of labour. Exploitative production relations coexist with expanded possibilities to resist, escape and mitigate exploitation. While the *reason* for the struggle remained unchanged, the *means* of the struggle increased for the workers. It is not surprising to see that this condition undermines the 'work ethic', or at least requires more costly and less reliable strategies to enforce such an ethic." [Offe, 1984, pp. 151-152].

Breaking the power of unions through legislation, reducing pay increases by lowering inflation and by creating the reserve army of unemployed, and helping business by reducing consumer protection and company taxation, *ought* to help growth. But will it cause instability for both government and regime? Offe and the left critics think so;

"Given the conditions and requirements of urbanization, large-scale concentration of labour power in industrial production plants, rapid technological, economic and regional change, the reduced

ability of the family to cope with the difficulties of life in industrial society, the secularization of the moral order, the quantitative reduction and growing dependence of the propertied middle classes - all of which are well-known characteristics of capitalist social structures - the sudden disappearance of the welfare state would leave the system in a state of exploding conflict and anarchy. The embarrassing secret of the welfare state is that, while its impact upon capitalist accumulation may well become destructive (as the conservative analysis so emphatically demonstrates), its abolition would be plainly disruptive (a fact that is systematically ignored by the conservative critics). The contradiction is that while capitalism cannot coexist *with*, neither can it exist *without*, the welfare state." [Offe, 1984, p. 153; see also Bowles & Eatwell 1983, p. 219].

This second aspect of the ungovernability thesis is similar to the argument which Olson produced regarding instability in developing nations. It seems that, on Olson's argument, instability may result in two ways. Firstly, it may occur through the social dislocation produced by a high growth rate when, as with developing nations, there is no welfare state to protect the disadvantaged. Secondly, it may occur as a result of the stagnation and divisiveness induced by the activities of powerful distributional coalitions. Is there any evidence for either version in Britain today? Birch [1984 pp. 148-150] suggests that there is evidence that (1) there is a measurable decline in public confidence in the regime, (2) that people are turning away from the normal channels of representative government to press demands through more direct action, and (3) that political conflict is becoming more violent which could lead to a breakdown in public order, but he suggests that this only supports the overload thesis, and not the ungovernability thesis [see also Rose, 1979]. He points to the British system's remarkable capacity to withstand threats. On this version then, the Thatcher government is pursuing policies that will lead to circumstances which will threaten its own existence, but not that of the democratic regime. It would seem, then to possess the property of being unstable in relation to some of its own policies. Any replacement government, however, must also face the first part of the Offe contradiction, the conservative analysis of overload. One possible

solution is that tried in many European nations, particularly the nordic nations, which generally goes under the name of corporatism or neo-corporatism. To this we now turn asking whether it can in fact avoid the contradictions apparently inherent in pluralism, without threatening our characterization of democracy itself.

V.

We began this paper by recalling certain principles which may be said to underlie our conception of democracy. We considered economic growth as a threat to regimes, and examined the thesis of Olson and the various overload theorists that this threat is inherent or endemic to pluralist democratic form - what Dahl calls polyarchy - since its very form generates the threat. We suggested that the theories have not shown that polyarchy is not capable of coping with the endemic threat, though it has no way of removing the threat from the agenda. We have also hinted that some analysts see a possible solution that will allow stable democracy through the form of corporatism or neo-corporatism. We now discuss that possible solution and examine whether (a) it entails the death of polyarchy as understood by the democratic theorists and (b) whether it is inconsistent with the three basic principles that we have suggested underlie democracy.

Pluralism is both a positive doctrine (that is, an attempt at a description of the organisation of modern western industrial societies), and a normative account (that is, a prescription of the way they should function as the most viable form of an essentially democratic or polyarchic society). As a normative account, pluralism claims that it is the best or the only way of institutionalizing democracy in modern society. Its prerequisites thus form "a ready-made standard of evaluation" [Schmitter,

1983, p. 898]. If, as has been suggested, its internal dynamic may under certain conditions lead to overload and consequent instability, another mode of democratic practice will need to replace it, unless pluralist instability leads to a total breakdown of democracy itself (which seems unlikely). One form of that practice is, as we have hinted, what has been introduced under a variety of names and guises but what we will refer to as corporatism. Corporatism is likewise both a positive description of the way that some modern western industrial societies have been or are organised and a possible normative conception or prescription for how others could be organised more efficiently - that is produce a preferred set of ends to that which pluralism has achieved, particularly as an answer to the overload theses.

What precisely are the differences between pluralism and corporatism? The table below indicates the main differences in principle between the theory of pluralism and that of corporatism. The structure of different societies may be correctly characterised as pluralist (say the USA), and others as corporatist (the Nordic countries); but often, even within those societies, group organisations and their relations with government may contingently take on features of the other mode of intermediation. Individual organisations may have some of the features of corporatism and some of pluralism at any one time, and may sometimes behave in a corporatist fashion and sometimes in a pluralist one. Further, even in societies correctly characterised as pluralist, many organisations tend to have some of the features suggested by corporatist theory. In many organisations goals are set by the leadership, and the membership has little choice but to go along with them. That groups are hierarchically organised does not preclude pluralism, and rule out contestation, and indeed groups may also act on behalf of governments [see Kimber and Richardson, 1977].

CORPORATISM

Relations with Government
*Incorporation in
decision structure
(including groups acting
on behalf of governments)
thus: bargaining
thus: co-responsibility
for decisions*

which
→
requires

Organisational Form
*Disciplined membership
Hierarchical organisation
with peak associations*

PLURALISM

Relations with Government
*Opportunistic/Consultative
access to decision structure
thus: contestation
thus: irresponsibility for
decisions*

which
→
allows

Organisational Form
*Unrestricted membership
Group autonomy*

However, our concern here is not with the two models as possible descriptions of any actual nation, but whether those actual and concrete (rather than theoretical) differences in the two modes of mediation between community and authorities lead us to discount corporatist methods as a viable form of democracy. Is it, indeed, the case that corporatism is stable in relation to the kinds of behaviour that threaten pluralism? That is, do they arise under corporatism? Secondly, if corporatism is stable, is it inherently non-democratic?

That corporatist arrangements might overcome some of the problems inherent in the pluralist group system is recognised by Olson in his fifth implication:

(5) *Encompassing organisations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.*

We argued above that Olson has misspecified the problem facing distributional coalitions, since their members do not obtain merely a share of the public good of economic growth or inflation. As they are characterized by both perfect jointness of supply and perfect

non-excludability it does not make sense to suggest they can be cut up like a cake. They are *shared* but not *shared out* [cf. section III, above]. Growth in one sector of the economy may be greater than in another and will thus obviously benefit some groups more than others, despite all benefitting equally through the advantage of the greater growth rate *per se*. This, like greater social mobility or greater societal equality, is a public good under one description since all benefit from it, but these goods may differentially affect groups, depending on the manner in which they are produced. Hence different ways of bringing these into operation will count as private or conflicting interests. Greater social mobility *per se* in society is a pure public good but of course the encouraging of greater social mobility will enhance some individuals more than others. But this is a case of conflicting interests - and not because there are a lot of little groups that only get a minute fraction of the total benefit of the good of economic growth, social mobility etc. Essentially, to return to the cake analogy, they each want a larger cake, but they also want the ingredients that go into making that larger cake to come from their own sector. On top of that they may want the larger slice of the finished product - in terms of excess pay rises as well as the greatest growth in their own sectors leading to the conflict that Olson and Hirsch describe. Thus groups have an overlapping interest in producing the public good but have conflicting interests as well. Under the overload theories this causes overall lower growth, high inflation, greater unemployment, problems of legitimacy and ultimately problems for stability. The corporatist solution requires a reduction in the contestation process, and for the overlapping interest to take precedence over the conflicting interests. In practice, this also requires a hierarchical organisational form in the manner of the 'peak' associations of employer and labour union organisations characteristic of the nordic nations.

However, unless members fully identify with these encompassing organisations, an occurrence that becomes increasingly unlikely, the newer and larger the organisations are, the interests held in common by the constituent subgroup (organisations) will always threaten the discipline of the associations [Schwerin, 1980]. The potential conflict is liable to emerge of course, under just those conditions where the importance of the overlapping interest increases, i.e. in times of economic crisis. However, crises such as these are not inherent in corporatism but are exogenous to it.

That corporatism is not so very different from pluralism is argued for example by Ross Martin [1983]. He suggests that the two are not analytically distinct but just two ends of a continuum. But what is importantly different between the two, as Crouch so forcefully points out [Crouch, 1983] is that the interest organisations constrain and discipline their own members for the sake of the overlapping or general interest (the public goods), as well as attempting to promote particular group interests. That implies a hierarchical organisational control of members rather than the concept of upward control that we have suggested is a condition of democracy. But we may question whether the *organisational form* of corporatist interest group organisations, and the degree of control exercised through them, is in reality different from that of pluralist interest group organisations. Indeed, as Schmitter points out, often the same organisations display both characteristics. For example, the NUM is hierarchically organised, as the past year has shown, and the leadership has had difficulty 'holding' the membership as it has been predicted that corporatist organisations pursuing public goals will find. The difference, then, does not lie in the organisational form of the interest group organisations under the different systems but in the different self-interested ends they pursue. Government of course, may be able to

persuade groups not to pursue their purely private goals to the exclusion of collective ones. This entails strong governmental leadership and strong bargaining in the institutionalized societal policy-making process. Hence, if corporatism does provide an opportunity for greater stability, it is a stability of a form of society just as democratic under our conception of democracy, but requires a relaxation of the contestation aspect of pluralist conceptions in the group sphere. Contestation of course, is not to be wiped out completely, but restricted to areas of peripheral conflicting interest. In the major policy areas of the economic management of society, the general interest - not a vague Rousseauian general will, but concrete and central public goods - will be produced by the interactions of the government and the interest group organisations. Contestation needs to be replaced by discipline emanating from central government. However, this discipline will be mediated by the organisations who will protect their members from overbearing control by central authorities.

The requirement of strong central government is a requirement that the pluralists seem to have forgotten in their characterisation of democracy, where government itself may almost seem to drop out of the analysis as a public body [Truman, 1951, pp. 26-29]. They view an efficiently functioning democracy as a process where the summation of individual interests emerges in public policy. Individual interests are constituted by the preferences revealed through economic and political action [this is most explicitly seen in Bentley, 1908]. The differential problems for this revelation, of course, produces problems for the theory, as does the recognition by individuals of possible preferences they may have. The theory has a two-dimensional linkage with standard laissez-faire economic theory. The first is a common justification. That is, that perfectly competitive markets are more efficient - they produce the goods

that people want at prices they are prepared to pay, since both of these aims are actually revealed through the market process itself. If firms do not produce goods that fulfil these aims, they go out of business. Indeed, Olson's critique of democracy under the group system rests upon this claim, seeing as he does all goods - even public ones - in the mathematical light of private ones. As Hirschman suggests, however,

"the stress on the similarity between spending one's money on goods and services in the market and casting one's vote on public issues makes the electoral process rather than the market economy appear in too favourable a light." [Hirschman, 1982, p. 107]

This is so, according to Hirschman, because when a competitive market establishes a uniform price for a product, a 'consumer surplus' is produced. This 'consumer surplus' has the effect that every consumer can buy some of the product at the unique competitive market price, even though many of them would be prepared to pay a great deal more than that to get it. Hirschman attempts to show that under democracy this consumer surplus becomes voters' frustration. The efficiency of perfect markets is not analogous in the political market, even in the models of Downs and his successors, because voters only get a chance to vote every four or five years, and then only over a bundle of goods (policies) - rather than being constantly able to reveal preference on each of the goods in the bundle, as in economic markets. The group process in pluralist theory might seem a possible way round this problem, but in practice it suffers from similar problems. Essentially, this is because the economic market is able to satisfy a diversity of interests, whereas the political market cannot, especially in respect of the major and central policies of government in which the strongest preferences are held. All that government is able to attempt is to satisfy different interest group claims in different issue areas [Richardson and Jordan, 1979, p. 172]. In the areas we have been examining (those relating to economic growth, which is seen as a potential threat to government and regime stability by the authors we have looked at)

this is not possible on such a contestation model. The contestation model has forgotten the role of government in a democracy because of its attempt to draw the economic analogy, where of course there is no role for government. Where groups lose out, the government should be aware of their claims. Where claims are contradictory, government must not only adjudicate, it must also decide which are in the public interest (i.e. which produce the public goods it feels are most important at the time).

Secondly, and relatedly, the laissez-faire economic market becomes stultified, as we have seen, precisely where some organised groups utilise their economic power within that market. Traditional economic theory ignores the economic power of producer groups (especially from the labour side) in its analysis of the efficiency of capitalism. The economic markets, in practice require political involvement to sort out the resultant mess. Again, this involves the forgotten role of government, which needs to enter the analysis precisely because it is a public body, and not the private one that pluralist theory implies. This then will limit the upward control that we believe is important to democracy, but we suggest that it limits it no more than pluralist practice, even though it limits it more than ideal pluralist theory. We suggest that corporatism is thus not theoretically less democratic than pluralism, and does not generate the economic threats to the regime that pluralism inherently does (according to the conservative or neo-marxist analyses above). However, it is not itself stable against the exogenous economic threats (those originating outside the political system). Typically, in times of economic difficulty organisations do not close ranks, but rather their members press for individual self-interest. It does not follow that it is always possible for corporatism to arise; certainly it has developed in some nations and not others for good historical reasons, and cannot easily be imposed on others [Maier, 1984], but how far it can be recommended to

nations such as Britain and America is beyond the immediate scope of this paper.

NOTE

1. We shall be using the terms 'pluralism' and 'polyarchy' rather loosely and interchangeably. We mean to denote by these terms the general conception of society offered by Dahl, Truman, and others.

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CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN RESEARCH ON
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY*

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses some of the conceptual problems associated with the study of democratic stability. It argues that the identity of a political object, crucial in any empirical study, is not necessarily fixed, and may be allowed to evolve, provided there is continuity in essential elements between consecutive moments. We examine the problems of generalisation in this area, problems which in fact apply to comparative politics in general, and an attempt is made to express our approach to stability in formal terms. Following Easton's discussion of regimes, we characterise democracy in terms of the three criteria of upward control, political equality, and behaviour-limiting norms. The last of these elements represents an important aspect not included in some prominent characterisations of democracy. More tentatively, we examine the political community and suggest a three-fold classification in terms of the degree of integration, coherence, and affiliation.

I INTRODUCTION

In an earlier paper on the meaning of the term 'political stability' [Dowding and Kimber, 1983], we proposed a conceptualisation which implied a broadly systemic approach. That is, we argued that the concept needs to take into account not only the threats to which political objects are subjected, but also their capacity to respond to those threats. In this paper, we elaborate that perspective further, and set the concept more firmly in a systemic context. Despite severe criticism [e.g. Leslie, 1972; Evans, 1970; Finer, 1969], much of the systemic approach of Easton, Almond, and others, has - like behaviouralism before it [Dahl, 1961] - been assimilated into the discipline largely unnoticed. Our defence of a broadly systemic approach is based upon that assimilation, and is neither an endorsement of any particular grand theory, nor a rejection of particular philosophical objections to specific aspects of these over-arching theories. Unlike the grand theorists, our ideas are given empirical relevance by the theoretical essentialism that is vital to the understanding of our approach.¹

The thesis of this paper is neither radical nor particularly controversial, though it does directly confront the growing positivism of political science methodology. We argue that due to the influence of the positivist claim to be theoretically neutral and objective, a great deal of political science, especially in the area of political stability, has attempted to make comparisons and produce law-like generalizations without regard to theory. However, science and its laws are not theoretically neutral and objective, but theoretically laden and objective: the so-called generalizations of many studies are merely the grounds for tests of generalizations. Focussing upon the democratic regime type, we discuss the sorts of analytic propositions that can constitute theoretically based or

theoretically laden generalizations about the characteristics of democratic regimes, and discuss how research can expand or disconfirm their foundations.

II POLITICAL STABILITY

A political object is in a state of stability when it possesses the capacity to prevent contingencies from forcing its own non-survival [Dowding and Kimber, 1983a]. The non-survival of a political object consists in a change in one or more of the object's criteria of, or necessary conditions of, identity. Here 'political stability' is a dichotomous concept; a political object is either politically stable or it is not. As we pointed out, the intensity of threats to a given political object only become interesting in relation to its stability where, singly or together, they constitute a threat with which that object can no longer cope. It follows from this that stability is not itself a concept that can be used comparatively [Dowding and Kimber, 1983a, pp. 239-240]. What can be compared, however, are the circumstances in which political objects exist, and these circumstances include features or properties of the political objects themselves.

The properties of a political object which are said to be stable or unstable, feature in a second way in the approach to political stability we have outlined. The stability of an object has often been confused with the survival of that object. Survival, or persistence, is the key element in two or even three of the five approaches identified by Hurwitz [1973] - (2) stability as governmental longevity/endurance; (4) stability as absence of structural change; and in some cases in (5) stability as a multifaceted societal attribute. It is also an element in the additional approach we

have identified - stability as a pattern of behaviour [Dowding and Kimber, 1983a, 1983b]. The persistence or survival of an object is related to that object's stability but should not be identified with it. It is contained within our conceptualization of stability in the rather clumsy form of "forced non-survival". We require the notion of "force" since political objects may legitimately take it upon themselves to go out of existence, without thereby implying that they were unstable; and we concentrate on non-survival rather than survival since that constitutes an easier test of stability. Survival does not entail stability, nor does non-survival entail instability: forced non-survival, however, entails instability.

Consideration of the question of the survival of an object immediately leads to the question of its identity. There is an enormous amount of literature on the question of the criteria of identity, and in many of the examples discussed in that literature it might be held that there is no right answer. As we require a definite answer, however, we might say that it is necessary that there be continuity of some elements between moments in time. What those elements are that are required to produce continuity are just those elements by which we recognize an object to *be* the object we recognize it to be. Thus, it is the elements by which an object is recognized to be the object as named that become important, ie. our descriptions of that object. Hence the formula: "the survival of any given political object consists in the continuity of those elements by which the object is identified." [Dowding and Kimber 1983a, p. 237]. This essentialist approach to identity might suggest a static or a conservative approach to political objects, but this is not the case. One concern of Claude Ake [1974; 1975] in his analysis of stability, and some critics of the systems approaches, was that concentration upon the concept of stability produced theories with an innate conservative bias, one toward

lack of (natural) change. But change can be allowed for as long as it is not forced. Over a period of time a particular (nameable) political system may change radically, yet still be recognized to be continuous. When we refer to "radical change" of a system we mean that an individual, if fantastically transported from his time to a future time, may not recognize the system he finds himself in as the *same* system he fantastically left. But he may be convinced that it ~~is~~ the same system when he traces through its history those elements that have continued from one moment in time to another and which bind the system together, providing the required continuity. Thus, no single element - except perhaps the name - has survived from beginning to end. Wittgenstein's rope analogy is the best way of expressing this. A two hundred foot rope will be made out of thousands of strands bound together, but no single strand is two hundred feet long. No strand need be more than a few feet long, but one end of the rope, with no physical elements the same as the other end, is still the same rope as the other end. Hence a system can change completely in the way it is identified (i.e. those elements which are considered important to identify it from one point in time to another) yet it is the same, each end of its history bound together only by a continuity. Radical change of those elements by which a system is identified at a particular moment must be considered a change in the system *as identified by those elements.*² The key to this conundrum is the importance attached to any given elements in a system at a given time. This is also important in considering democracy. It, too, has certain characteristics that may be deemed to be essential. We provide a partial examination of these characteristics below.

One objection to the sort of approach outlined here is that it turns research into a question of definitions. This is not so; or rather it is so, but not in a trivial sense. Identification of the political object upon which we are engaging our research cannot be helped - that

identification is what makes objects the objects they are and are taken to be. This apparently simple and obvious point is not always followed, however, and analysts have sometimes shifted from the examination of one political object to that of another, without apparently realizing it [Dowding and Kimber, 1983a, 1983b]. Sometimes, objects go through conceptual change through their reinterpretation within a new theory. Corporatists or neo-corporatists see interest group organizations in society constraining and disciplining their members as well as representing them. But the interest group organizations that they are referring to are exactly the same organizations as those that the group pluralists referred to in their theory criticized by corporatists [see for example the essays in Schmitter and Lehbruch (eds) 1979, and Lehbruch and Schmitter (eds) 1982]. The simpler group pluralist theory is held to be false by the corporatists, who add another dimension to the role of interest group organizations, a dimension that is believed to be open to empirical confirmation and disconfirmation. Understanding the political object "interest group organization" requires an understanding of the role it plays in the theory being tested. This cannot be grasped within a series of statistics matching say, the proliferation of interest groups to political stability. Where such statistics are interesting is where one theory suggests one sort of correlation and another theory another sort; that would then go some way to confirming or disconfirming the theories. However, statistics cannot, on their own, constitute a theory of stability. What is required is an explanatory linkage between the empirical results and the hypotheses of a theory. Of course, there are difficulties in testing theories and problems with the types of generalization that can be tested. Here we must have a short digression into this particular problem, but one that is important to understand our approach to the sorts of acceptable generalisations that we begin to develop in sections IV and V.

III. GENERALIZATIONS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The problem for comparative politics has long been the problem of generalizations. If we are describing and explaining a set of (political) events, we may feel the need - as scientists - to produce generalisations. However, as we study given events more closely, the reaction is to suggest that each event is unique, with its own unique explanation; and any generalization under which the event might be held to fall would miss out important features of the explanation and so be false. This is the beginning of the argument against the 'science of politics' school. But let us consider the nature of generalizations and see if we can find a role for them in political science despite objections like these.

What is a generalization? Is it the same as a law? A law-like generalization is one which supports counterfactual conditionals. We may explain this in a Popperian manner. According to Popper, natural laws are not strictly necessary - that would be to embrace the type of essentialism he so forcefully attacks - but neither are they entirely contingent. Popper takes up the notion of natural or physical necessity to explain this middle nature. A statement is said to be logically necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. A statement which is a natural law might, Popper suggests, express a structural property of our world, and he adopts the following definition of natural necessity:

"A statement may be said to be naturally or physically necessary if, and only if, it is deducible from a statement function which is satisfied in all worlds that differ from our own world, if at all, only with respect to initial conditions." [Popper, 1972a, p. 433].

Natural laws expressed by the use of generalizations are thus weaker than the laws of logic, but stronger than mere universal statements, or generalizations which may in fact be true but not actually be laws. Popper gives an example to elucidate this.

The moa is a universal name of a certain animal with a certain

biological structure that nas, *in fact* (say), only lived in New Zealand thousands of years ago. Under certain favourable conditions such animals may live for 60 years or more. However, let us assume that at the time they lived in New Zealand such favourable conditions never *in fact* existed, and that all the actual moa that have ever lived or will live never reached the age of 50. Thus the strictly universal statement 'All moas die before reaching the age of 50' will be true, because no moa ever has or will become 50. But it is not a law of nature, since it would be possible for a moa to live till 60 if - contrary to fact - such favourable conditions existed. This is what we mean when we say that law-like generalizations sustain the assertion of counterfactual conditionals.

We may never be sure that a particular generalization is a law of nature but we can be sure that some of them are not, by their being falsified during the process of empirical investigation. Generalizations that are held up as laws or hypotheses or theories, are so held because of prior empirical investigation and experience, but will also be so held because of *a priori* reasoning. In the moa example above, it is *a priori* reasoning that may lead us to believe that moa could live to 60 years of age, even if we happened to know that no moa had in fact lived beyond 49 years of age. The *a priori* reasoning will be based upon our prior knowledge (including sets of laws) and such a generalization would fit into, and be derived from, our matrix of laws, both logical and natural.

This, then, is what a law-like generalization is. Alasdair MacIntyre has attacked the so-called generalizations of those who consider themselves to be political or social scientists. It will be argued here that whilst MacIntyre's arguments, directed at his own specific targets, are essentially good, he has not produced reasons for suggesting that we cannot, indeed have not, produced interesting generalizations in political science.

At the beginning of his article "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?", Alasdair MacIntyre [1973] suggests that the man who aspired to produce a general theory of holes misconstrued the nature of explanation concerning the existence of such holes. Holes are caused by a variety of events and there is no general feature or property that can (help to) explain that variety. This story is supposed to be analogous to political scientists' discovery of different sets of correlations in different societies, which have different sets of causes but which can go under the same general description: for example, 'violence directed at the state' or 'violent acts', correlated with different events that could go under the same general description, say, 'state repression.'

In *After Virtue*, MacIntyre [1981] offers several examples of the sort of generalization in the social sciences that he disputes. We shall consider two of them. First is James C. Davies's thesis [1962], that a period of rising, and to some extent gratified, expectations, followed by a period of continued rising expectations which are not gratified, leads to the conditions of instability and revolution. The second is the thesis of Rosalind and Ivo Feierabend [1966], that the most and the least modernized societies are the most stable and the least violent, but those halfway to modernization are those most liable to become unstable and violent.

MacIntyre says about these two examples (along with others) that they are notable because:

- (a) whilst both have confirming examples, they both have disconfirming examples
- (b) they lack universal quantifiers and scope modifiers, that is they do not have the form: $(\forall x)(\exists y)(F_x \rightarrow G_y)$, so that if it is shown that they do not hold under certain conditions, the scope of the laws cannot be restricted, and
- (c) they do not entail a well-defined set of counterfactual conditionals as

do real law-like generalizations, so that we do not know how to apply them systematically beyond observed cases, or what the full set of falsifying observations would be prior to actually observing them.

Generalizations about human behaviour do seem to have a different form from generalizations about inanimate nature. Again MacIntyre produces four (or perhaps five) reasons for the lack of predictability about actual human behaviour. Underlying those reasons seems to be the following account of the form of the decision-making process, the form by which we take account of certain reasons for action. The problem does derive from the complexity of social life, not just its complexity directly, but how that complexity affects our decision-making.³ The problem for producing a generalization that covers all cases is the picking-out of the properties of the situation that are (causally) relevant for the same result to occur in relevantly similar situations. Take three situations, S_1 , S_2 , and S_3 which individuals I_i and I_j may face. S_1 , S_2 and S_3 have the following relevant features (this may be all the features that give a complete identifying description of them).

S_1 A,B,C, E,F

S_2 A,B,C,D,E,F

S_3 A,B,C, E,F,G,H,J,K

Let us say that in each situation we have the choice of two actions and two actions only; a_N (do nothing) and a_Y (do something - e.g. vote, riot etc.) Let us say that I_i chooses to do action a_Y in situation S_1 because of features A,B,C. They seem to be sufficient to get I_i to act (but see below). In S_2 , however, I_i chooses action a_N - despite A,B,C being present - because of feature D. That on its own constitutes a defeater for action a_Y for individual I_i in situation S_2 . (Note that the true characterization of the sufficient condition for I_i 's action a_Y in S_1 , thus now seems to be A,B,C,D, but see below). In situation S_3 , again defeater D is not present,

and no single property from the list E-K is a defeater for action a_Y . But let us say properties E and F together constitute a defeater when any two of the properties G-K are present. So in S_3 I_i does a_N . Now let us say that I_j , like I_i , also does a_Y in S_1 and a_N in S_2 , and for the same reasons. Likewise I_j does a_N in situation S_3 , but this time not for the same reasons as I_i , but because for him E and F together constitute a defeater only when all the properties G-K are present, so there is a situation S_4 :

S_4 A,B,C, E,F,G,H, K

where I_i does a_N and I_j does a_Y . Note that this example has yet to consider strategic reasoning, where one individual's actions affect those of others who may respond and in turn be responded to. All of which itself can be taken into consideration in the original reasons for the first action. What this example is designed to show is the complexity of individual reasoning, even in the simplest of situations, and the difficulties facing those wanting to produce genuine law-like generalizations about human action and thus politics. Riker and Ordeshook say,

"for a political science and a political theory, we need general sentences - that is, sentences describing the properties of classes of events as distinct from particular sentences describing unique events. General sentences, especially those about classes that will have new members in the future, are the form in which we utter descriptive laws of nature and scientific predictions ... [it is a mistake to think that] ... since all events are unique, they cannot be classified and described in general sentences ... the implications that all members of a class must be identical in every respect is an elementary mistake in logic. A class includes those things that have at least one common feature, and this fact in no way implies that its members are alike in all respects." [Riker and Ordeshook, 1973, p. 8-9].

In one sense the logic of Riker and Ordeshook is faultless. Of course, we can classify by the use of one property that happens to be common to a set of events or objects (which is what would make it that set). The problem for the human sciences is picking out the set of properties that cannot be

overridden or defeated by some property that is not on our list. Note, that of course we can model our decision-processes - in a sense that is just what we were doing above - but that does not make the production of law-like generalizations any easier. The examples that MacIntyre [1981, pp. 84-101] gives, and the three problems with the generalizations that he has identified, derive from the fact that the descriptions given are not wide enough to cover all possible defeaters. In order to cover all possibilities, one might think that one would require a generalization that described all (naturally) possible (unique) events relevantly similar to the ones under consideration - and that does not seem to be much of a generalization or general-statement.

Thus, where MacIntyre suggests that all the generalizations he considers have disconfirming instances, those instances provide, under the most favourable analysis of these generalizations, some sort of defeater. His second point (b) suggests that they are not universal in form and cannot provide scope restrictions, precisely because we cannot give the full class of defeaters, and hence his third point (c) that we cannot deduce the outcome for anything more than a very limited set of counterfactual conditions. Thus, generalizing from problems of testing a theory of party behaviour, in cultures where the term denotes different sorts of objects, MacIntyre says:

"the provision of an environment sufficiently different to make the search for counterexamples interesting will normally be the provision of an environment where we cannot hope or expect to find examples of the original phenomena and therefore cannot hope to find counterexamples." [MacIntyre, 1973, p. 14].

In order to overcome this problem, we require law-like generalizations which do not already presuppose the interpretation of the objects under some cultural or physical context. Generalizations about political stability will be possible if they take both context and institutions under the context into account. So, different institutions and different

cultural contexts can be compared by taking something which is independent of context as a fulcrum on which to turn comparison. This is what we attempted to provide with our definition of stability. However, this has a theoretical similarity with a functional approach against which MacIntyre also directs a critique. He admits that functions could supply a type of non-biased generalization but only where we,

"have some criterion for identifying the functions served by political institutions which is other than, and independent of, the aims and purposes of political agents and the effects of political institutions. The provision of such criteria would require the identification of a system, using the word 'system' precisely, so that the concepts of feedback and equilibrium are applicable on the basis of quantitative data which will provide values for variables in differential equations." [MacIntyre, 1973, p. 16-17].

What we do not admit is that we require a notion of a system so precisely specified. We could not expect precise criteria to give us a notion of a verifiable state of equilibrium in a social situation, nor even know what one looks like. Whilst some of the predictive science of politics school still believe that equations which correspond to reality will enable us to search for equilibria on which to base predictions [see for example Ordeshook *in* Ordeshook and Shepsle, 1982, pp. 25-31] others believe that politics is the truly dismal science of disequilibrium conditions [Riker *in* Ordeshook and Shepsle, 1982, pp. 3-24; see also Riker, 1982b ch. 7 and 8]. Economists have, for a long time, been less optimistic about the chances of a real correspondence relation between the equilibria in models and some sort of equilibrium in the actual world [see for example Machlup, 1958]. However, what the models can give us is just what needs to go into our general explanation of specific concrete cases: the contingencies that arise to threaten given political objects and the capacities of those objects to respond. Our general social scientific laws, however completely universal and with the widest scope possible, will be deduced *a priori* given our understanding based upon empirical knowledge, and they structure our understanding of the multitude of possible empirical cases that fall

under them.

Consider, for example, MacIntyre's objection to the deduction of analytic generalizations such as the generalization that in two-party electoral systems the two parties will tend to move together in their policies towards the centre of the ideological spectrum. His objection takes, we think, two forms, though it is not certain that MacIntyre quite realizes this. The first is a scope argument. It takes the form of the first quotation from MacIntyre [1973] above: a complaint that in different contexts, the assumptions of the generalization do not hold. He contrasts political parties in African cases with West European or American; but the logic of the generalization is the same as a generalization about the behaviour of gases under certain conditions. What is affected is the scope.

So, MacIntyre's point cannot be the inapplicability of law-like generalizations in politics, but just that they tend to have restricted scope. This restriction, however, does not make generalizations of this nature entirely uninteresting. Whilst the sentence "Political Parties in a two-party system will tend to converge to the centre of the ideological spectrum" may be false where the term "Political Party" is used to designate very different sorts of entities, *why* the statement does not cover certain cases may be interesting. This leads to MacIntyre's second objection. The statement is itself a product of logic. Essentially it is an analytic law. Given premisses concerning the aims of parties, desires of the public at large, ideological tastes, etc., as exogenous variables, the law follows logically. Does, then, the law apply at all in the actual world, or just in logically possible worlds where the assumptions do in fact hold? Where the statement is found not to hold empirically the law is not simply falsified, since the law is more than the simple statement given above; it is also the conditions under which the statement is held to follow and the theory that leads us to it. Where the law does not hold we

may conduct follow-up research to find out why, since if it is essentially analytic then it must follow given those conditions. It is those conditions, and a logic that constitutes the body of theory, which support the generalization and make it genuinely law-like. It does not seem relevant that certain contingent features of the environment make social scientific generalizations more difficult to confirm than natural scientific ones (which is only the case in the 'hard' natural sciences anyway, and not in evolutionary theory for example), or that they generally have smaller scope. That the conditions are not satisfied in Sierra Leone at a certain time is in the nature of 'Political Party' itself. Here, it is held that parties take an interest in the moral, cultural, social and political well-being of the members and not just in electoral success. In western examples a similar phenomenon might occur. That is, electoral success diminishes in importance where ideology takes over. Alan Ware has given a good general specification of the different strategies that may be perceived by politicians and activists in a political party dependent upon the sorts of considerations that enter into their scale of preferences [Ware, 1979]. Less obviously, but just as importantly, the ideological position of the electorate is not an exogenous variable but is endogenous, dependent (to some perhaps inherently unspecifiable degree) on the position and leadership of the parties themselves. Political parties, under capitalism as well as more obviously in the communist bloc countries, discipline and constrain their members to a greater or lesser extent, and whilst it cannot be so obvious that they constrain their potential supporters, completely to deny such a thesis would be to deny the potential for education, propaganda and emotional appeal.

The search for generalizations in the social sciences is not fruitless then, but it must, as MacIntyre points out, be supported by a body of theory, and essentially that is a logical or analytic process. For

example, Brian Barry [1980] in "Is It Better to be Born Powerful or Lucky?" attacks the Shapley-Shubik index of political power arguing that its scope is limited if not nil, for the simple conceptual reason that it does not measure political *power*. Our attack upon the measures of stability identified by Hurwitz and ourselves was analogous. The indexes just do not measure political stability, but something else, and something else that on its own (i.e. not used to support some body of theory) is just not interesting to political scientists. If we are to generate useful generalizations about democratic stability, we similarly require a body of theory to support them, rather than a mere set of more or less, usually less, interesting correlations. It is here that we turn once again to Popper's specification of the logical form of natural laws. Popper says:

"if we conjecture that [some universal statement] *a* is a natural law, we conjecture that *a* expresses a *structural property of our world*; a property which prevents the occurrence of certain logically possible singular events, or states of affairs of a certain kind." [Popper, 1972a, p. 432, original emphasis].

Given that the structure of human decision-making is of the form we gave above, what forms will natural laws about human behaviour take? The natural laws prevent certain kinds of individual action in certain contexts; but the generalizations only support what the theory that produces them is able to support, and no more. That is, situations, alike in all respects bar one, may produce different sorts of action, despite the generalizations, because that one respect may be a defeater. In macro-analysis, however, we can still specify such generalizations to cover the cases where the defeater does not apply, and we have still specified a natural law, though in our descriptions it will always be under-determined.

The correlations that are produced between possible cases of instability, and the features that stand as proxy for it, do not constitute such a law. We might ask, however, whether we are not just describing tendencies. Tendencies or trends have a logical form different from that

of laws. A statement expressing a tendency is an existential statement and is not universal; it tells us the way the world happens to be, contingently; whereas a universal statement tells us not how the world happens to be, but tells us how it could not be. [Popper, 1961, p. 115] Further, trends do not explain why something is as it is, they just assert that it is that way. Ian Budge has recently suggested that the best way to approach comparative political research is through the examination of well confirmed tendencies, though he does produce a set of general statements [Budge, 1984].

In the development of his theory, Budge uses two types of generalization:

(1) The General Assumptions of the theory - "the kernel of the theory in the sense that they constitute its most abstract and succinct statement, from which all the more specific consequences can be derived. Precisely because of their high level of abstraction and wide generality they are not easily applied." [Budge, 1984, p. 117].

(2) Criteria and Implications of the theory - the development of the general assumptions for the specific circumstances of (West European) post-war democracies. The implications are expectations of how parties will behave if the general assumptions are correct. "They are therefore the generalizations from the theory that can be used as explanations in specific contexts" [Budge, 1984, p. 117], and should therefore be objects of confirmation and disconfirmation.

The General Assumptions should apply and account for all the possible events that could take place and that fall under them. The Implications develop the General Assumptions for particular examples and specific circumstance. So, if the general theory is true, the implications, *where they hold*, can stand as explanations in specific contexts. Where they do not hold, we must look for defeaters that do hold (and thus explain) in

these specific cases.

The most striking aspect of Budge's General Assumptions is their almost definitional nature, for example:

1. In parliamentary democracies the party or combination of parties which gains a majority in legislative votes of confidence forms the government.
3. (a) The chief preference of all democratic parties is to counter threats to the existing system. (b) Where no such threats exist, and socialist-bourgeois differences separate the parties over salient current issues, the preferences of all the parties is to carry through policies related to these differences. (c) Where neither of the prevailing conditions hold, parties pursue their own group-oriented preferences.
5. Within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and disciplinary and procedural constraints, factions seek to transform their own policy preferences into government policy most effectively.

Etc. [Budge, 1984, p. 101].

However, once we realize that if our language is to describe reality, and if it is (ideally) to form a coherent whole [e.g. Quine, 1960], then it is not surprising that correct general statements, whether logically necessary general statements or naturally necessary ones, will be analytic. That is to say all *correct* law-like generalizations are analytic.⁴ Despite their being analytic they cannot be discovered by mere semantic analysis, because we do not know which the correct ones are, though *a priori* methods will help (see above, p. 7ff), since we need to discover the reality, and the language to describe it, by empirical analysis. It is our understanding of the political process that allows us to develop such general statements.

It is the criteria and the implications of the General Statements that are directly put to the test by our statistical techniques and measurement of data, but note, the data does not by itself, constitute the whole of the testing. It is just the beginning of the test, for the implications and the criteria are not by themselves the theory, but are underlain by it, and the theory includes specific natural assumptions that themselves must be taken into the context of the test. We require the

contextual conditions and history of the objects of our statistical tables to see whether, and to what extent, those conditions conform to the assumptions of the theory. The theory may then need to be modified or abandoned in favour of another, which will provide a deeper range of implications; for as Lakatos points out [Lakatos, 1978, p. 31] and Popper affirms [1972a, p. 87 fn. 1], theories are put to the test only in comparison with other theories, and not just tested against raw data, since all data is theory laden.

IV. TOWARDS A FORMALIZATION OF POLITICAL STABILITY

In our earlier work we distanced our conception of political stability from that of Easton by pointing out that it operates on a different level of analysis. [See Easton, 1965a, p. 86, for discussion of levels of analysis]. In Easton the stability of a political system is essentially a first order problem. This relates to the functions that need to be performed if there is to be a political system at all. Second order problems relate to the way in which particular political objects function and change. Although for Easton, political stability is a first order problem, our conception relates to the second order because the political objects of which it is predicated have already been identified under certain descriptions.

Political objects are in a state of stability given certain conditions. These conditions include the non-existence of threats with which the object is unable to cope, and the existence of threats with which it is. One way of looking at this is to suggest that instability is a property of a political object. Thus, while an object may be in a *state* of stability, it may nevertheless possess the *property* of being unstable in

relation to a particular contingency that has not yet occurred, and might not occur. This property, therefore, is not a straightforward property, but a property which the object has in relation to certain features, or potential features, of the environment. We can say that an object p displays the property S (S -ness) where contingency e is present. In fact property S is a dispositional property of p . We can represent this as:

(1) $[S_p]^c$

Where p is a political object, e a contingency, and S is the *state* of instability in which p exists in relation to e . We put S_p in square brackets to show that the state is only a possible state relative to e , and is not actual. Possible objects and events in w^* (a possible world that may be co-extensive with the actual world) we put in superscript, and actual objects we put in subscript. So p has the property S (instability) relative to e (nameable contingency). Thus, $[S_p]^c$ shows that p has the property-relating disposition S (relating to e). Hence our statement that a political object is in the state of political stability when it possesses the capacity (has the properties) to prevent contingencies that will actually arise from forcing its non-survival.

Political stability is the property-relating disposition of the political object. It is dispositional since it is something the object has relative to a contingency, and continues to have even where the contingency by which that property is identified is non-existent. It is property-relating since it is a relationship between the capacity of an object and the contingencies which it may face, if only counterfactually. However, this essentially conditional analysis of stability produces obvious empirical problems for the political scientist. Analysis of conditionals, whilst the business of science, is difficult and awkward both formally and empirically. The problem for us is that our conditional analysis gives no hint of the capacities of any given political object.

Indeed, it cannot, and only empirical analysis ever can. Formally or analytically we can only examine what classes of objects are stable in regard to what classes of contingencies. Of course, no empirical investigation could ever supply all the answers for a given object, since we are in the realm of unactualised possibility. All our empirical analysis can tell us what contingencies have arisen in what circumstances, and our historical study can tell us what responses were available with what result. This may help to confirm or disconfirm various hypotheses that result from our essentially analytic theory, but predicting such results in advance is tricky if not impossible.

The possible state of political instability becomes a reality when the contingencies actually arise. We represent this as:

$$(2) [S_p]^c \& !c \rightarrow S_p$$

We use the '!' sign to mean existence (x exists if and only if $x \in w^*$). We could use the existence sign where we use the predicate-letters (the property-expressions) 's' etc. thus:

$$(3) [S_p]^c \& !c \rightarrow !S_p$$

but we omit the existence sign ! when other predicate letters are used outside square brackets, assuming that they do exist in w^* , since the meaning should be clear.⁵

Any political object is unstable relative to a whole set of contingencies:

$$(4) [S_p]^{c1} \& [S_p]^{c2} \& \dots [S_p]^{cn}$$

Any one of which could make the object exist in the state of instability:

$$(5) [S_p]^{c1} \& [S_p]^{c2} \& \dots [S_p]^{cm} \& [S_p]^{cn} \& !cm \rightarrow S_p$$

The political stability of an object may also be over-determined, that is it may be unstable relative to several actualised contingencies:

$$(6) [S_p]^{c1} \& [S_p]^{c2} \& \dots [S_p]^{cm} \& [S_p]^{cn} \& !c^2 \& !c^3 \rightarrow {}^{2,3}S_p$$

We can represent the contingencies that are (over-)determining instability where necessary by naming them before the predicate-letter 's'.

And of course:

$$(7) [S_p]^{c_1} \& [S_p]^{c_2} \& \dots [S_p]^{c_n} + \sim S_p$$

where $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n \in c$, and $! [S_p]^c$ in w^*

which means that p is in the *state* of stability, even though it is unstable relative to the set of contingencies c .

What we have not represented in our analysis of stability in this section are the characteristics or features of the political object p which enable it to deal with threats e . So far we have simply denoted the political object by the letter 'p', but we are committed to the view that objects are picked out as the objects they are by certain identifying descriptions. These descriptions are partial descriptions, some of which may be descriptions of essential features of the object and some of which may be contingent. We could represent this by: ϕ_p which means ϕ characterises p , though it should not be taken to mean that ϕ characterizes p essentially, but is just one of the features by which p can be correctly described.

A political object that can be described as p may not be unstable in relation to a contingency e_m , whereas a political object that cannot be correctly described by p will be. Thus, the importance of the features in relation to e become paramount to the extent that p itself may almost drop out altogether. Thus, what we are interested in, are what classes of contingency e can be matched by what classes of ϕ remembering that ϕ may be inessential to the identity of some p , or may be essential. For democracies, and the class of threats to which they are inherently unstable, ϕ will be given by those descriptions of features which are either (a) essentially not a description of a democracy, or (b) essentially are a description of democracy, which opens up a class of threats.

We thus relate the threats to a regime in terms that may help to identify that regime as the regime it is. To produce correlations between

some set of variables related to economic, geographic, or political factors, and regime change does not tell us anything about the stability of named regimes at all. The table below lists the factors studied by Budge and Farlie [1981] and shows that some should be seen as contingencies that threaten a regime (ϵ), and some as the properties of the system (ϕ_s). Their quantitative approach overlooks this difference between some of the listed factors.

Table 1: Budge and Farlie [1981].

<u>Contingency (c)</u>	<u>Properties of System (ϕ_s)</u>
	<i>Correlates of stability</i>
	Area - Proxy for 1st 2nd 3rd World
GDP	
Religion - Direct threat	Newspaper circulation - proxy
(a) clash of religions	for education and literacy
- not considered by B & F	
(b) religion whatever	proxy for checks on government
Working population - proxy for	Population - proxy for whether
demands on government	democratic or authoritarian
	<i>Political Variables (not correlated much with stability)</i>
federalism	federalism
no. of regional units	no. of federal units
} threat to central government	} power away from centre
concentration of govt. roles	concentration of power at centre
- proxy for power of govt.	judicial review - constrains govt.
(threat to r)	

As we can see, the table shows the confused nature of the Budge-Farlie attempt to measure the stability of a regime directly. In fact, they are attempting to measure the likelihood of regime change, and not stability as such, though they imply that this is the same thing. They recognise that the index can only be instrumental and not explanatory when, commenting on the 0.000000126 probability that Britain will experience regime change, they say that it is "improbable on all sorts of ground, so these odds obtained through our index are plausible [1981, p. 359]. This plausibility is unrelated to the grounds on which their analysis is based. Even if their conclusions are largely correct, they are correct for the wrong

reasons.

In any attempt to study the stability of democracies in general, we need to have some idea of the properties of democracy that are open to threat before studying particular, named, regimes. In our final section, we shall suggest the nature of some of these properties, in order to highlight the absurdity of the index approach.

V. DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

There is no agreed definition of democracy, and it has even been suggested that democracy might be undefinable [Lijphart, 1977 p. 4]. This need not be a serious problem, unless the lack of precise definition causes serious problems of indeterminacy of reference; but of course it does not. We need not begin with definitions before building theories, rather the two processes go together [Popper, 1972b]. However, we do require constraints over our use of the term democracy which may count as (the beginning of) a definition. Specifying these represents the beginnings of a theory about democratic stability.

Lack of agreement over the term democracy has been largely brought about by an over-concentration on the precise institutional manifestations of democracy and the assumption that 'democracy' means some specific set of arrangements. Democracy however, is a regime-*type*, as is monarchy or totalitarianism. These regime-type terms do not imply that the systems falling under them have exactly the same institutional patterns; rather, they entail that the same *principles* underlie the political process. Thus we are concerned only with regimes that embody certain principles. We take a regime to be that set of rules, conventions and norms that govern the operation of the political process. It is the set of constraints upon the

actions of the individuals, groups and institutions in a political community. Easton [1965b, p. 193] suggests that this set of constraints may be broken down into three components; (i) authority structure, (ii) values, and (iii) norms. For Easton, (i) specifies the formal and informal patterns in which political power is distributed and organized within the community, (ii) provides the boundaries within which day-to-day policy can be formulated without violating community beliefs, and (iii) the kinds of procedures and behaviour that are expected and acceptable to the community.

Thus, we can say that for a democratic regime, the authority structure underlying the institutional pattern is that of upward control. That is, ultimate sovereignty resides at the lowest level of the authority structure. However this desire may be instituted in practice, this characteristic underlies all conceptions of democracy whether pluralist, liberal, bourgeois or socialist. Secondly, underlying the democratic ideal is political equality. Where the different conceptions disagree, is over both the constitution of true equality and how best to promote and defend this value, given the first constraint. The third aspect of democracy is that of norms. These are difficult to specify. The norms of democracy are little more than those values that lead members to *behave democratically*.⁶ We might try to tie this down a little more by suggesting that this norm-governed behaviour must include acceptance of individual and institutional behaviour limited by upward control and equality (however these are understood), but it probably also requires something more.

Upward control may take a variety of forms. The key question is: control by whom, and of what? There seems to be a need for control of two aspects, (1) the actions of the authorities, and (2) the political agenda. A given individual cannot expect that *his* preferences will be the ones that control the authorities. All he can expect is that he is free to input (or

not) his preference into the process that determines the final view on the question of authority control.

Now, if this process is an open one, of a relatively mechanical nature (i.e. like a direct election, where there is nothing intervening between the assertion of individual preference and the collective outcome, other than the electoral system), then empirical measures of voting will tell you something about the propensity to participate. This cannot, however, be used as a measure of democracy, since what is significant for democracy is (a) the *freedom* to express the preference, (b) the *translation* of whatever set of individual preferences happens to be expressed in a collective policy, (c) the *application* of this collective policy to, or by, the authorities. Thus, involved in democracy are the processes of free expression, translation, and application, and these are what need to be investigated empirically. Hence, the emphasis on measures of participation in many empirical studies of democracy can be misleading - though this is not to say that participation is not an interesting question in its own right.

Some things cannot be controlled in this way. Dahl [1982] includes control of the agenda on the part of the demos in his criteria of democracy. In a free society, however, surely the political agenda cannot be *controlled* as such. All one can expect is that there is no bar to the placing of issues on the agenda - an absence of veto. Thus, it is not so much the presence of a degree of competition in society that should be looked for, but rather an absence of impediments. It rather depends here on what we mean by 'agenda' (there is a distinction between those issues raised for debate and action, and those issues upon which the authorities actually take action). Competition may be vigorous within prescribed limits, and measures of competition may overlook the differences between societies in the extent to which there is freedom of the agenda. Control