counter-insurgency theory - posits three levels of conflict: high intensity is war between the superpowers; medium intensity is regional war such as between Iran and Iraq; low intensity is anything else - bombing Libya in 1986, invading Grenada in 1983, sending naval forces to the Arabian Gulf in 1987, involving the US military in efforts to end the drug trade, supporting the *contras*.[89]

The first problem for LIC advocates is that, in the current economic and budgetary context, it would only be possible to increase funding for LIC-type capabilities by cutting other elements of the US force posture.

The second problem is the continuing, deep reluctance to commit US forces to combat in the Third World; the Vietnam syndrome has not yet been conquered. This reluctance is shared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[90] For all the rhetoric of the Reagan period, it was evident in a demanding list of conditions, expressed by Weinberger, which had to be met before troops were committed in combat. They were that vital interests had to be at stake; force should be used in the strength required to win; objectives must be clear and attainable; fighting must continue only while there is a will to win, the use of force should only be a last resort; and there must be clear and sustainable public support at home.[91]

However, the Bush administration's three actions involving use of armed forces are all LIC-related, all in Third World situations: US forces in the Panama Canal zone have been strengthened as a way to put pressure on General Noriega in Panama; a military alert was declared during the Lebanon hostage crisis; military assistance including advisers is being sent to Bolivia, Colombia and Peru for use in the drug war there. Already there are signs that this assistance will be active; Bush has authorised US advisers to move outside base camps in order to train Colombian forces and to participate in patrols. White House officials acknowledged that, though training is to be in 'secure areas', this decision would make US advisers more vulnerable to attack by drug cartels and anti-government guerrillas.[92] The potential for US troops being involved in escalating violence is evident. Yet it is unclear whether such action could be

89 Michael Klare, 'The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare', in *idem* and Kornbluh, eds, *Low-Intensity Warfare* pp 53-5.

90 Bernard Trainor, 'Vietnam Experience has made the Joint Chiefs cautious about using military force', *New York Times*, 17 August 1989.

91 Caspar Weinberger, *Annual report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* [Washington DC, Department of defense, 1986] pp 77-9.

92 'Bush to Let U.S. Anti-Drug Troops Move Outside Latin Base Camps', *New York Times*, and 'US army may go to cocaine valley', *The Guardian*, both 11 September 1989.

sustainable on anything more than the relatively small scale now planned. Sporadic action against Latin American drug barons does not meet the criteria laid down by Weinberger, and the problem of reluctance about involvement in combat has not yet been solved.

Although the LIC debate has had a low profile during 1989, it would be a mistake to assume this element of military preparations has vanished or diminished. For the present, however, it does not appear likely to assume a more central place in US strategic funding. Were it to do so, it would necessarily be at the expense of other commitments, including - perhaps especially - those in Europe.

Burden-sharing

In 1987 and 1988 an old theme in US discussions about NATO resurfaced - the suspicion in Congress, expressed from the very foundation of NATO, fluctuating over the years since, that what the alliance means is the USA paying for the defence of western European countries whose people and governments are too lazy, irresponsible or clever to pay for it themselves.

The variation on this theme in the 1980s took the form of comparing how much the USA and its European allies spend on the military, finding a discrepancy, and insisting the allies take a fairer share of the economic burden. In Congress, the pressure came primarily from liberal Democrats and is especially associated with Representative Pat Schroeder. One of the attractions of the burden-sharing argument in Congress is that it makes the case for cutting US military spending respectable. It was successful enough that in the 1988 presidential primaries, the need for the USA's allies to spend more on their own defence was agreed by virtually all candidates. In April 1988, William Taft, then Deputy Defense Secretary, was sent on a tour of European NATO capitals to put the case for burden-sharing.[93] Taft is now the US Ambassador to NATO. The European NATO governments tactfully agreed to consider the problem, but there was a widespread sense that this was an old and boring tune they had often heard before and were not very interested in. They have often agreed to increase military spending in the past, but deed has not always - or even usually - matched the word.

The burden-sharing argument has also been directed against Japan, a prosperous ally which runs a massive trade surplus with the USA and spends only about 1 per cent of GNP on the military. That, of course, is a consequence of the Japanese constitution imposed by the USA after World War II.

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93 'Congress is up in arms over NATO spending', *Sunday Times*, 24 April 1988.

The burden-sharing issue is well enough established that each side now has a number of familiar, routine arguments. The basic American case is that the USA spends more than its allies - in gross terms, as a percentage of GNP and *per capita*. The basic counter-argument is that, even so, western Europe provides the majority of forces in the central European theatre and already shares the burden properly.[94] Within the European case, there are two strands to the argument: first that the USA spends more because it is a world power, while western European states are regional ones; second that the USA also spends more because of gross inefficiency. The second strand is not normally made explicit but discussions with European officials at NATO Headquarters reveal its salience to them.

In that European perspective, what burden-sharing is about is not the allies taking a fairer share of the costs of providing for their own security. Rather, it is about them contributing to the USA's costs of being a world power by relieving it of some of the burden in Europe. The response to this among Congressional burden-sharers is, more or less, that US world power benefits western European governments - since it enhances stability and resists the worldwide Soviet threat - and that, therefore, they morally ought to agree to supporting its costs.

One implication of burden-sharing has not often featured in the American debate, and it is hard to know how to read it. Will sharing the burden mean sharing the power? Reaction among knowledgeable observers and Congressional officials is decidedly mixed, ranging from 'no way' to 'why not?' Most observers of US political culture agree it is ill attuned to the idea of the USA not being the number one power. Graceful decline is not a vote-winning foreign policy. While 'a stronger European pillar in NATO' is one thing, transforming the basic architecture of the alliance would be quite another. Were western European states to insist, for example, that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe should no longer be an American general whose appointment is effectively in the hands of the US President, they could hardly expect a unanimously cordial reception in Washington.[95] Yet precisely such a proposal is a logical extension of the burden-sharing case, and may be the logical destination of proposals on both sides of the Atlantic to 'strengthen the European pillar'.

So far, a potential Congressional coalition between the burden-sharers and supporters of a shift in focus to the Pacific and/or LIC has not emerged. Whatever their differences, the two groups could unite on the need to cut the US military presence in Europe. The non-emergence of this possible coalition may be due in part to the state of Congressional politics,

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94 *Western Defense: The European Role in NATO* [Brussels, NATO Eurogroup, May 1988].

95 Though the suggestion has been made in 'The Myths NATO Lives By', *Time*, 29 May 1989.

and in part to the risks that burden-sharing will come to mean power-sharing But it is also partly because burden-sharing in 1989 has been less central than in the previous two years.

Much of the immediacy was removed from it by the conventional arms talks at Vienna. Had Bush not made the proposals he did at the Brussels summit, it is likely that the heat would have come back into burden-sharing during the last quarter of 1989. In view of those proposals, it will probably remain relatively low-profile for as long as the talks proceed with good prospects of success. Should they take much longer than Bush's one-year timetable, the pressure would come back on.

It is likely that, to satisfy Congress, or at least the burden-sharers, a conventional arms control treaty would have to involve what it can see as benefit-sharing - i.e., disproportionate reductions by the USA within NATO's overall arms cuts. Thus, it might be at the moment when a treaty has been signed and is being considered for ratification by the Senate that the burden-sharing issue would re-emerge.

NATO, however, seeks disproportionate cuts in a different sense - small on its side, large on the Warsaw Pact's. Even with benefit-sharing which favours the USA, US reductions will not be very large.

As a result, conventional arms talks now may defer the burden-sharing issue, but a treaty is quite likely to bring it back to the surface. This may happen if Congress believes the USA should get a bigger share of NATO's cuts. Or it may happen because calculations of US and western European military spending will produce the same apparently unfair results. Equally, if there is no treaty the issue will re-surface.

Out-of-area operations

Reducing US military spending in the name of burden-sharing would only have radical consequences for the structure of relations and the balance of power between the USA and Japan on the one hand, western Europe on the other, if the allies sought those consequences. If burden-sharing were not transformed into power-sharing, it would lead not to changing the architecture of the alliance, but to a minor readjustment. The USA would retain its strategic leadership of NATO and strategic predominance in northeast Asia at less cost. Therein lies the basic attraction of burden-sharing from the viewpoint of both the Reagan and Bush administrations.

Therein also lies the attraction of 'out-of-area' operations by NATO -

i.e., military activities outside the region defined by the North Atlantic Treaty.[96] The out-of-area theme unites in one the two themes of burden-sharing and a shift of US strategic emphasis to Third World contingencies.

The out-of-area coat was trailed in front of the rest of NATO for some years during the 1970s. But the key moment came at the turn of the decade with the coincidence of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In his final report as US Defense Secretary, Harold Brown called for both indirect and direct European assistance for US activities in southwest Asia.[97] This demand made slow but steady progress through NATO during the Reagan administration. Facilities were made available to assist US forces in transit and the western European allies agreed to replace US forces withdrawn from Europe for Third World contingencies.[98] In Lebanon in 1982 and in the Arabian Gulf in 1987, western European states sent forces to support US forces. Neither of these operations, however, was conducted under the aegis of NATO. The western European members have resisted a formal redefinition of the NATO area, rejecting Weinberger's view that it is 'an outworn geographical tag'[99]

The out-of-area issue has a very similar face to that of burden-sharing The risk for the USA in the long-term is that it might give some western European states a renewed taste for intervening in the Third World. They might even develop an inclination to do it on their own account, independently of the USA and conceivably in contradiction to its policies.

But in the short-term [and in the longer term if such a renewed taste for a world military role does not emerge], the involvement of NATO states in US operations outside the NATO area, under whatever formal aegis they are conducted, allows the USA to conduct its policy at less cost. Far from challenging US power, it strengthens the USA's leadership in NATO as well as its hand in the Third World.

In another similarity with the burden-sharing issue, the heat has gone out of the out-of-area theme for the moment. That is not, however, because the Bush administration is uninterested in it. Rather, it is because appropriate opportunities have not presented themselves. Should they do so, the issue will immediately take on much greater urgency.

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96 North America, the Atlantic as far south as the Tropic, Europe and Turkey, and the Mediterranean.

97 Harold Brown, *Department of defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982* [Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, 1981] p63.

98 Mariano Aguirre, 'Looking South', in Dan Smith, ed, *European Security in the 1990s* [London, Pluto, 1989].

99 'NATO row over boundary shift', *The Observer*, 15 June 1986.

Strategic leadership and the Cold War

The burden-sharing and out-of-area debates encompass a single issue: the feasibility of the USA retaining strategic leadership over its allies despite relatively declining economic resources. Whatever other elements also play a part in the two debates, this one has to be kept at the forefront of consideration.

Economic problems are not the only source of the challenge to US strategic pre-eminence over its allies. Reforms in the USSR and the détente diplomacy of Gorbachev have convinced many people that the USSR is no longer the threat they once thought. This raises serious questions about the future of NATO. As Michael Howard asks, 'With a Soviet Union genuinely friendly and cooperative, would there be any further need for it?'[100]

NATO, however, cannot be seen merely as an instrument of collective western security against the perceived threat from the USSR. It is also a major channel of US influence in western Europe, simply because it is a US-led alliance premised on the need for cohesion under US leadership for the sake of collective security.

As western Europe's economy has grown relative to the USA's, the basis of a greater independence from the USA has been laid. But the situation in NATO has changed little. The Reagan administration proved particularly successful in getting its European allies to accept its leadership over a series of key issues ranging from strategic defence to naval operations in the Arabian Gulf. US strategic leadership was sustained, and the western European side had to temper [though not abandon] disputes over other issues in order not to put the whole western alliance at risk.

If NATO becomes less important, putting it at risk will become less of a fear, less of an inhibition on western European political positions at variance with the USA's, less of a constraint upon economic and commercial rivalries. The same is true of US relations with Japan and several other countries. As Luttwak says,

> 'If a new era does materialize in which Soviet and Soviet-sponsored security threats are much less central than they have been for more than four decades, then the relative position of the United States in the world will decline as its own military power and alliance diplomacy become devalued.'[101]

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100 Michael Howard, 'The Gorbachev challenge and the defence of the West,' *Survival*, Vol. XXX, No 6, November/december 1988.

101 Luttwak, 'Do We Need A New Grand Strategy?', p10.

The early emphasis by Bush administration officials that the Cold War is not over must partly be understood in this ideological light. To accept that the Cold War is over is to encourage allied governments to feel more independent of the USA and then, perhaps, to act more independently. It is in US interests to persuade them and their electorates that the Cold War is not over. That this has to be accomplished while at the same time finding a way to respond to Gorbachev's diplomacy is a difficult task. For a while in 1989 it seemed to be beyond the Bush administration; at the Brussels summit, it became clear that it was not - or not entirely.

Former Defense Secretary Carlucci, arguing against any hasty reductions in US forces, has made a distinction between a transformation of world politics and a transition in them: transition might lead to transformation but has not got there yet.[102] In the Bush administration, this view was buttressed by an analysis that the reform process in the USSR is fragile.[103] When, in April 1989, Cheney expressed his 'guess that [Gorbachev] would ultimately fail', the White House sought to distance itself from his pessimism and affirmed the hope that Gorbachev would succeed, while approving the Defense Secretary's caution.[104] Later in the year, Cheney attacked the House of Representatives for failing to see that the Soviet threat had not only failed to disappear, but had actually grown.[105]

I have argued that Bush's Brussels proposals were not based on new thinking about NATO strategy and the US role in the alliance. Nor did they draw on a new conception of US-Soviet relations. The reason for being bolder on arms control was actually the same as the reason earlier used for being so cautious - the fragility of reform in the USSR and the possibility of Gorbachev either adopting the old hard line or being replaced by an old hard liner.[106] The point was to take a possibly short-lived opportunity to get Soviet concessions in arms control. Just before going to Brussels, while the new arms control initiative was being developed, Bush warned against complacency about the Soviet threat and enthusiasm about Gorbachev's diplomacy.[107] After the summit, he spoke about a future end to the Cold War

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102 Frank Carlucci, 'A Policy Warning: The "New Era" Isn't All That New', *International Herald Tribune*, 28-29 January 1989.

103 Martin Walker, 'Gorbachev reforms threatened' and 'Bush unwilling to bet on perestroika', *The Guardian*, 15 February 1989.

104 'Cheney Remarks on Soviet Future Ruffle White House's Feathers', *New York Times*, 2 May 1989. A top White House official described as 'ridiculous' 'the notion that Dick Cheney is off the reservation' [i.e., out of line with administration policy and thinking].

105 'Cheney Criticizes Cuts in Military', *New York Times*, 5 August 1989.

106 'Mr. Consensus', *Time*, 21 August 1989.

107 'Bush Warns Allies On "Complacency"', *International Herald Tribune*, 22 May 1989.

- i.e., he affirmed it is not over yet.[108]

What is at stake here is a battle of perceptions. If the *New York Times* is right that the Cold War is already over[109] then the Bush administration appears out of touch with reality, its policies anachronistic. They must then be analysed in psychological terms combined with reference to the power of entrenched interests. The end of the Cold War, in this view, is resisted because it 'fills the United States with uneasiness', because

> This country has lived with the cold war for a long time. Interests have grown up around it. The prospect of change is unsettling.'[110]

A different perspective is voiced by *The Economist*:

> The cold war is a non-lethal struggle for advantage. After long years of immobility, it has moved into a period of rapid manoeuvre, a time for Rommels, not Haigs; but a struggle for advantage it still is.'[111]

If one takes that perspective, the judgement on the Bush administration must be very different.

Examined through a Cold War prism, changes in East-West relations have to be seen as benefiting the USA. Détente in the second half of the 1980s has involved little concrete action on the US side - only the withdrawal of Cruise and Pershing II missiles from Europe under the INF Treaty in return for numerically much larger withdrawals on the Soviet side. Otherwise it has been a matter of a different rhetoric and atmosphere, negotiations at Geneva and Vienna, Bush's May 1989 initiative at the NATO summit and his declared willingness to relax controls on trade in high technology.[112] On the Soviet side there has been a greater number of more far-reaching diplomatic initiatves, a more dramatic change in rhetoric and atmosphere, two sets of unilateral force reductions [the conventional cuts of 500,000 military personnel announced in Gorbachev's UN speech in December 1988, and the withdrawal of 500 short-range nuclear warheads announced in May 1989], larger cuts in intermediate-range missiles under the INF Treaty, combined with important modifications in Third World

108 'The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole', quoted in *The Guardian, 1 June 1989*.

109 *New York Times*, 2 April 1989.

110 Anthony Lewis, 'Cold War Comfort', *New York Times*, 24 April 1989.

111 'Here we go', *The Economist*, 3 June 1989.

112 'Bush boosts US hi-tech trade with Russians', *The Guardian*, 30 May 1989.

policies, arguably including the withdrawal from Afghanistan [though that must also be seen as a *sui generis* action] as well as a new approach in Southeast Asia, southern Africa and central America. Most recently, the USSR seems prepared to drop the linkage between agreements on strategic nuclear arms reductions and restraints on the Strategic Defense Initiative.[113] Hitherto, these linkage has seemed not only logical but axiomatic; dropping it seemed to mean the USSR, by reducing its strategic nuclear strike capacity, making the job of US strategic defence easier.

In short, if the Bush administration's view is correct, then what is happening in East-West relations is not the end of the Cold War, but a US victory in it. In this view, if the strategy is winning, why change it?

The point of Bush's arms control proposals at Brussels, then, was not to respond to a fundamentally changed East-West political axis, but to exploit Soviet weakness. The administration has been careful not to make this too explicit. To do so might strengthen the prospects of a hard-line reaction in Moscow; while the administration has its difficulties dealing with the fast-moving Gorbachev's diplomatic footwork, it has decided it prefers him to conceivable alternatives. Being too explicit might also be politically costly in the USA. Thus the administration has to conduct a skilful balancing act: acting on old premises in a new situation, while appearing to act on new premises.

Balancing resources and strategy

In fact, that is but one of several balancing acts it has to conduct. And perhaps it is the easiest one. For the problem in all of this comes back to economic resources.

Except in the context of bilateral and preferably disproportionate arms control, a policy based on the view that the USA is winning the Cold War cannot yet include cuts in military spending. On the contrary, it requires not a change in US grand strategy, but a reaffirmation of it, in budgetary action as much as political word. And reaffirming grand strategy means spending not less but more since the increasing costs of weapons raise the strategy's price tag constantly.

The Bush administration therefore has to balance between an unchanged strategy and resources which are no longer adequate to it. Any suggestion of a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific and/or the Third

113 'US-Soviet delight as mountain talks smooth path to arms treaty,' *The Observer*, 24 September 1989.

World, if it means increased strategic funding for the appropriate elements of US force posture, simply underlines the resource problem. So long as the rest of grand strategy remains unchanged - with large US forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear 'triad' - the USA does not have the capability to allocate more resources to its strategic presence in the Pacific or to Third World contingencies. Here again we see the connection between maintaining strategic leadership in straitened economic circumstances and the issues of burden-sharing and out-of-area operations. The latter could be the means of doing the former.

A different side to this same act came when Bush visited Poland and Hungary in the summer. It had been the expectation that the USA would use economic aid to strengthen the reform process in both countries. Some commentators advocate it as a way of continuing to win the Cold War by encouraging the break-up of Soviet power in eastern Europe.[114] It would be like Marshall Aid, forty years on. Before Bush's visit Lech Walesa said Poland urgently needed $10 billion; the more modest President Jaruzelski sought $3 billion.[115] They must have been thinking of a different USA in a different time. Bush offered $115 million for Poland and $31.5 million for Hungary *Time* magazine commented that the sums were 'rather paltry, less than Lyndon Johnson might have dropped on some backwater congressional district during a quickie campaign stop.'[116]

The most important easement for Poland's position was the agreement, at the Group of Seven economic summit in Paris in July, to defer repayment of $5 billion of Polish debt. The major role in that will be taken by the EC states, which are Poland's major creditors. Similarly, the lead role in coordinating food aid and economic assistance to Poland and Hungary will be European, at European insistence, despite the Bush administration's desire to run the operation.[117] And underlining how small the US aid offer to Poland and Hungary was, at the economic summit the Japanese government offered to make $43 billion available in Third World aid.

The irony of this situation was reflected in the argument that broke out about the same time back in Washington about the $70 billion Stealth bomber programme. The USA remains a military superpower, and Bush administration policy shows not the slightest inclination to change that. On that basis it is the strategic leader of its alliances with western Europe and Japan. But there is a price to be paid, and paying it makes the USA

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114 Among them, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'A Proposition the Soviets Shouldn't Refuse', *New York Times*, 13 March 1989.

115 'Poland's Leader Asks West For Aid', *New York Times*, 14 July 1989.

116 'From Patrons to Partners', *Time*, 24 July 1989.

117 'A Change Ideas Not Made in U.S.A.', *New York Times*, 17 July 1989.

become in other ways 'just another' major power. Of course, it could only have been more ironic if the Bush administration had tried to meet the requirements of either Jaruzelski or Walesa - the world's largest debtor nation bailing out the fourth largest.

The capacity to lead

Press coverage of Bush's two visits to Europe in 1989 showed marked differences. The Brussels summit was reported as a triumph of leadership. When Bush went to the Group of Seven economic summit in Paris about six weeks later, the coverage stressed that Bush did not lead, did not want to lead, was not able to lead and was not wanted to lead.[118] One could not ask for a more cogent expression of the contrast between continuing strategic leadership and effectively evaporated economic leadership.

If the Bush administration continues to emphasise strategic leadership, and continues to meet the bill for it, such dischords between the strategic and economic realms will persist and probably grow sharper.

There is also another possibility: that the USA's allies will not continue to accept its strategic leadership, or not to the same extent. In that case, the real dischord will between the appearance and the substance of power. It is far from impossible for the USA to remain a military superpower even as that fact becomes much less impressive.

For that to happen, the USA's allies would have to revise their interpretations of Soviet policies and East-West relations. There are plenty of reasons for doing so. An accommodation in Europe at much lower force levels seems eminently possible; Gorbachev has provided all the openings which are required, and western European states could simply decide to accept them. The result could be a new concept of European security, closer to 'common' than 'collective security', acknowledging the inescapable interdependence of each country's security. A consequence of that would be to reduce western European reliance on US capabilities; trans-Atlantic strategic relations would then mesh better with economic and political relations. That would signify a definitive break with the terms of European Atlanticism, for as the era of the Cold War passes, so too does the era of Atlanticism.

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118 E.g., 'The President Tours a New Europe That Calls Its Own Shots', *New York Times*, 16 July 1989; 'A Change Ideas Not Made in U.S.A.', *New York Times*, 17 July 1989; 'For Europe, A New Look: Bush Fixes U.S. Role As More Modest One', *New York Times*, 20 July 1989; 'From Patrons to Partners', *Time*, 24 July 1989.

There is little the USA could do to prevent such decisions being taken in western Europe. Military action is unthinkable and economic pressure is not a concern. All that would be left would be political pressure, on the theme of not putting the cohesion of the western alliance at risk because of the Soviet threat. But in the new conceptual framework, that theme would no longer be tuneful.

This is the problem the USA faces: military strength is harder to mount than in the past and may be politically less useful than in the past.

Japan's economic strength means the USA may face similar prospects there too.[119] There is a growing tendency to view this possibility with real resentment and with an urge towards some sort of confrontation, not necessarily military. A diatribe against Japan's unfair trading practices in *The Atlantic Monthly* was tellingly entitled 'Containing Japan', a presumably conscious reference to Cold War containment. Its theme was summarised above the headline:

> 'Japan's one-sided trading will make the US-Japanese partnership impossible to sustain - unless we impose limits on its economy.'[120]

Naming Japan an unfair trading nation, and the dispute with it over sharing US technology in the FSX fighter deal, reveal the extent to which this thinking has permeated US policy under Bush.

The Bush administration is also experiencing difficulty making its point prevail in its 'backyard'. When the five Central American presidents met in August, they ignored pressure from the Bush administration and produced an accord acceptable to the *Sandinista* government in Nicaragua. One Central American diplomat was quoted as saying the Americans 'still have their army [the *contras*] but they have lost their policy.'[121] Later that month, the administration faced criticisms inside the Organisation of American State that the attempt to put pressure on Noriega in Panama by deploying extra US troops to the Canal zone had been counter-productive.[122]

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119 'Japan Ready to Share Burden, But Also the Power, With U.S.', *New York Times*, 7 March 1989;

120 James Fallows, 'Containing Japan', *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1989. The article draws on and is similar in theme to Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* [London, Macmillan, 1989].

121 'The Contras: Lost Cause?', *New York Times*, 10 August 1989.

122 'U.S. Is Faulted on Military Manevers in Panama,' *New York Times*, 24 August 1989.

For all the Bush administration's deft diplomacy and tactics, then, it faces serious problems in asserting leadership on key issues. As British governments this century also found, there is a point when all the deftness in the world cannot compensate for a decline in the real substance of power.

The reassertion of US strategic leadership at the Brussels summit was not immune to this problem. Bush's achievement is not to be minimised, yet it was gained in part by tacking to the new winds blowing in NATO. A month before, the US administration was insisting on two cardinal policy points: it wanted an early decision to deploy new short-range nuclear missiles and it did not want arms control negotiations about them.[123] The West German coalition government spoke for majority European NATO opinion by seeking no early deployment and arms control. On both these issues, the FRG won. There is to be no decision on deployment before 1991, and talks will be entered on partial reductions of short-range nuclear weapons once conventional arms talks have been concluded. The latter agreement was clearly a compromise on the FRG's position, but the US concession was larger. And the Kohl government also made it clear that it did not regard the insistence on the word 'partial' as an ever-lasting bar to seeking the complete removal of short-range nuclear weapons.

Thus while Bush's innovativeness at Brussels overlaid his continuing pragmatic conservatism, his victory masked the concessions he had been forced to make in order to win it. If the episode indicated the Bush administration's continued capacity to exert strategic leadership, in contrast to what unfolded in Paris six weeks later, it also revealed the constraints surrounding that capacity. That is the reality of the changing world. The Bush administration has shown a capacity to make tactical adjustments in the face of that reality and to come out with distinct gains; the larger question is whether it can make the appropriate strategic adjustment.

123 'U.S. Rejects Appeal by Bonn For Battlefield-Arms Talks', *New York Times*, 25 April 1989.

PART V
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS

An assessment of the Bush administration's capacity to effect a major change in US grand strategy, or even to make further tactical adjustments, entails reflecting on and understanding the US system of decision-making. That does not mean focusing on the specifics and complexities of the US budget-making process, but on the overall shape of the political system, for it is there that several constraints are to be found on any administration's ability to get its way. Even if an approach could be devised within the administration which would solve the problem of the Federal deficit and remodel US grand strategy while sacrificing nothing of its world power, the policy would have to be implemented. That is to say, to begin with, that it would have to be accepted by the president's political opponents.

The power of division

The division of party control over the executive and legislative branches of government seems to be approaching near permanency in the USA. The Republicans have held the White House since 1969 with the exception of the Carter years, winning five of the last six presidential elections. For all of that period, the Democrats have had a majority in the House of Representatives and for most of it in the Senate as well. The reasons for this electoral bifurcation need not be explored here. What needs to be understood is that it creates a complex policy-making machinery.

Part of the complexity lies in the powers of Congress, which are much greater than those of most western European parliaments, and which are vigourously defended. Major political scandals of the recent past - including Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair - and some which were not so major - Congressional outrage about the 1984 mining of the Nicaraguan harbours, for example - have often swung more on the issue of Congressional rights than on the substance of wrong-doing.

With divided powers in the Constitution, and divided party control in Washington, the US administration does not have as free a hand as western European governments. Congress is able to control elements of US policy to a much greater extent than can be achieved by western European parliaments against the government's will. It can alter budgets, removing and inserting items, making spending conditional on implementing specific policies. It can restrict, alter and reject policies to which the administration is committed. Congress can do these things, and does, which means today that the Democrat majority can do them. A Republican president, therefore, must

have the support of the Democrats for major items on his domestic and international political agenda.

The situation, however, is not quite that simple. These two divisions - powers and party control - are complemented by a third: divisions within the parties. Party loyalties have broken down to a considerable extent over the past 15 to 20 years.[124] Democratic Congressional leaders cannot always lead their followers where they will. The powers of the leading Committee Chairmen are much less than they used to be. Two consequences follow from this. First, a deal between the president and the Democratic leaders in Congress will not necessarily carry the day when it comes to voting on the floor of House or Senate. Second, however, a president can, with skill, construct coalitions on specific policies which cross party lines, even against the will of party leaders in Congress. Reagan was particularly adept at this, especially in the early part of his presidency.

And finally, there is a fourth division to consider: within the administration Here the Reagan administration was much less successful. It was notorious for internal bickering, with both sides using selective leaks to the press to make their case. In foreign and security policy, such divisions are institutionalised. The Secretary of State heads the State Department and is in charge of foreign policy, but the National Security Adviser has the President's ear. In the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski fought with Cyrus Vance. Under Reagan, the White House staff became increasinlgy frustrated with Alexander Haig and sought to exclude him on major issues. Under Nixon the problem was solved for a while when Henry Kissinger held both posts.

These features of the American system are instituionally, constitutionally and politcally embedded. They cannot simply be wished away They are key facets of the context within which the Bush administration must operate, whether it wishes to sustain or change grand strategy or any notable element of it. The effects of these elements of the Washington system are evident if, in their light, we examine how major issues are addressed within it. The key term which comes out of such an examination is not just division, but indecision.

A Washington resolution

For several years there has been disagreement about the next generation of US inter-continental ballistic missiles. The multi-warhead MX with a mobile system was initiated in the 1970s but has always been subjected to

124 See Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game* .

criticisms both on strategic grounds and because of its expense, even before it was evident that it has technical problems too. A smaller, single warhead missile - the Midgetman - has been favoured by many instead.

To resolve this difference, the Bush administration decided to proceed with both MX and Midgetman. It gained the support of Congressional leaders for the plan. Senator Carl Levin, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said of it,

> 'The proposal is that we buy two new mobile land-based missiles. And I think the clear sentiment of 90 per cent of the people in the military and probably on this committee is that we need to buy one, not two ... One group wants the Midgetman, the other group wants the MX. The resolution of this problem, I'm afraid, is a rather typical Washington resolution ... an inside-the-Beltway resolution: I'll support your missile if you'll support my missile.'[125]

Disputes over important issues, not confined to either security or budget questions, regularly involve this sort of horse-trading in Congress. It is a process, of course, which is far from unknown in other countries, but it does seem fair to see it as a particularly central and defining characteristic of Congressional politics.

Once the bargains have been struck, they can come undone. The MX/Midgetman compromise itself is an example of that. In August, the House of Representatives cut Midgetman from its version of the FY 1990 military spending programme. That, of course, was but a prelude to a fight in the House/Senate Conference, since the Senate kept Midgetman in its spending programme. And whatever the outcome, either the supporters or the opponents of Midgetman will be back in action when the FY 1991 budget comes up for consideration.

In other words, a Washington resolution need not resolve the problem at all. In the absence of strong party loyalities, and in the context of the budgetary powers of Congress, issues can be returned to time and again and votes can change.

This volatility within Congress is viewed by Hedrick Smith as reflecting a much deeper problem:

> 'Our national political irresolution derives from the ambivalence of voters on many central issues and from the lack of an over-

125 "It's a Washington Resolution on Missiles", *New York Times*, 9 May 1989.

> arching political force to organize and manage government. It takes an effective, durable governing coalition to make our government work. But over the past three decades, governing coalitions have been exceptional interludes, not the norm of American politics. Our recent history is a story of episodic spurts of cohesive action followed by long periods of stalemate and disarray.'[126]

Political ambivalence among electorates elsewhere, like horse-trading between politicians, is not unknown. But the difference in party and political systems lead to far fewer decisive outcomes in US politics.

The difficulty of coming to firm and durable decisions augurs ill for any expectation that major action will be taken on such issues as the Federal deficit and grand strategy. In many ways US politics presents a picture of a seething surface over still depths. A great deal of activity can produce a very small result. Grand strategy can be as durable as it has been in part precisely because the American system of power makes decisive action difficult.

Taxes

An example of how this works is the political box erected around the issue of taxation. The deficit is now widely seen to be a major problem and, in theory, action to reduce it would be popular. But reflecting the traditional American suspicion of 'big government', Bush's pledge during the 1988 election campaign that there would be no new taxes is also popular and so far he is sticking to it, repeating it in his first address to Congress.[127]

Out of this comes a classic double bind. No Democratic politician wants to be seen as fiscally irresponsible; therefore all say the deficit must be reduced. But, equally, none wants to be tagged by the President as a tax-mad legislator, so they cannot go for new taxes.

Being fiscally responsible without increasing taxes means cutting programmes. Bush seeks a roughly steady-state military budget, with small increases to come. He will probably not get the increases; Congress refused to grant them to Reagan for four years and there is no reason to expect it to grant them to Bush. But he probably will stave off any pressure for large cuts at least this year and probably next year too. At the same time, the

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126 Smith, *The Power Game*, p652.

127 'Text of Address by the President to a Joint Session of the House and Senate', *New York Times*, 10 February 1989.

Democratic majority in Congress is well able to protect social programmes, which are popular with its electorate, and prevent significant cuts in spending on them.

Thus, the pressures against raising taxes and those against cutting major spending programmes exert roughly equal opposite forces. Out of that stalemate comes the inability to make sharp reductions in the deficit. And out of that comes the creative by-passing of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law which initially seemed to be a decision to take firm action on the deficit but has since turned out not to be.

Some commentators argue that this reflects a peculiarly American view of government spending. Anthony Lewis characterises it as

> 'the philosophy of entitlement: the belief, held by millions without regard to income or class, that we are entitled to the benefits provided by civilized government without paying for them.'[128]

Robert Tucker argues that, under Reagan, this same approach became a defining characteristic of US foreign policy:

> '[T]he principal Reagan legacy in foreign policy may well be just this: that the nation's 40th president transformed what had been a disposition not to pay for the American position in the world into something close to a fixed resolve not to do so.'[129]

A more acid view was expressed by a journalist describing a neon display in New York's 42nd Street which gave a second-by-second flashing display of the national debt: 'I'm afraid that the only way to get Americans worried about the debt is to ask them to pay it back.'[130]

There is a lot in this analysis. It reflects the preference for short against long-term perspectives. It reflects the combination of - in domestic policy - American individualism and - in foreign policy - the American desire to be 'number one' - with the suspicion of big government, exacerbated by frequent reports on Pentagon inefficiency, the Pentagon corruption scandal which broke in June 1988[131] and, most recently, the scandal in the Reagan administration's public housing programmes.

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128 Anthony Lewis, 'Fly Now, Pay Never', *New York Times*, 4 September 1989.

129 RW Tucker, 'Reagan's Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs* Winter 1988/89, p27.

130 Hal Lux, 'I'll Meet You Beneath the National Debt', *New York Times*, 13 March 1989.

131 'The Pentagon Up for Sale', *Time*, 27 June 1988

But what is also striking is the apparent impossibility of breaking out of this box. That is not just the result of politicians watching out for their re-election chances. It is also the effect of the 'national political irresolution' identified by Hedrick Smith. In a system of unified party control of executive and legislature, combined with strong internal party loyalties, an administration in its early months could get to grips with the taxation problem. Whatever its pledges, it could implement a policy, ride out its unpopularity, work to gain credit for taking the long view, and hope the fuss would have died away by the time re-election came round. But that is not the American system. The result is that both Bush and Democratic leaders in Congress are waiting for the other to lead on the taxation issue. It seems likely that a similar syndrome will affect change in grand strategy, if that does at some point get onto the mainstream political agenda.

The Bush administration

Within these multiple constraints, the Bush administration emerges as competent and often deft.

There are some complaints. Officials at the State Department, for example, reportedly find a deep confusion in administration policy towards Japan.[132] In part this reflects particularly intense strains at State between career official and political appointees and resentment by the former at the way are denied access to Secretary Baker.[133] There were also disputes within the administration over the handling of the FSX fighter deal with Japan. But these internal stresses do not appear to have reached the levels they did under the Reagan administration when, for example, there was virtually open warfare between Richard Perle at the Pentagon and Richard Burt at State [now the US START negotiator].[134]

In any case, disputes within any government are a necessary part of the process of defining policy. The problem arises when they hamper the definition and sabotage its implemention. That almost happened when the White House counsel, Boyden Gray, challenged the constitutionality of the *contra* deal between administration and Congress in March.[135] But the

132 'Confusion Is Operative Word In U.S. Policy Toward Japan', *New York Times*, 20 March 1989.

133 'Baker Brings an Inner Circle of Outsiders to State Dept.', *New York Times*, 27 March 1989 and 'At State, the Acid Of Distrust Corrodes', *New York Times*, 12 April 1989.

134 See Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* [New York, Random House/Vintage, 1985].

135 'Gray-Baker Vendetta: A Long-Running Tale Of Potomac Intrigue', *New York Times*, 29 March 1989.

dispute was quickly suppressed, the deal done and the policy implemented.

Bush's management style is reportedly, as expected, very different from Reagan's. Where Reagan wanted issues brought to him after his officials had argued them out, Bush wants to know about the arguments as they happen.[136] Differences having been aired, he then wants them done with. So far he has largely succeeded in that. Cheney, for example, was known to oppose including Midgetman in the military budget; he lost and apparently accepted with a good grace.[137] These points, apparently small, can have an important effect. The more cohesive the administration is, the more confident it will be, and the more confidence it will generate in all quarters - Congress, domestic opinion and allies. It will also make it more possible for Bush than it apparently was for Reagan to stay abreast of his administration's policy and actions, though that it is also a result of different temperaments and work habits.

Relations with Congress

The Bush administration made what can most charitably be described as a slow start with Congress. Unlike Reagan in 1981, Bush could claim no real mandate from the presidential election. He won it, but the Democrats increased their strength in both chambers of Congress. He won it too in a campaign marked by its pettiness, and with tactics which infuriated many Democrats who returned to Washington in a mood to make him pay.

The first hurdle was the appointment process. The administration suffered a major setback when Tower was rejected as Defense Secretary. It has met further defeats since, in the rejection of William Lucas to head the civil rights section of the Justice Department, and again when Richard Armitage withdrew from being nominated as Army Secretary rather than face questions about his role in the Iran-Contra affair and his relationship with a woman convicted of illegal gambling.[138]

Since then, however, perhaps especially since the Brussels summit in May, Bush has done better in relation to Congress. The *contra* deal was the first sign of a change, though through it he accepted Congressional veto of an important policy item. Despite many complaints, Bush also got the plan to deal with the collapse of the Savings and Loans institutions through in

136 'Mr. Consensus', *Time*, 21 August 1989.

137 'Officials Say Bush Will Back A Force Of Mobile Missiles', *New York Times*, 26 April 1989.

138 'Armitage Withdraws as Army Secretary Nominee', *International Herald Tribune*, 27-28 May 1989

more or less the shape he wanted. The reception given by Democrats to his national drug strategy launched in September, however, has been highly sceptical. They have criticised both its priorities and the level of funding.[139] It is possible the strategy will be remodelled by Congress - i.e., by the Democrats - before it is implemented.

The Bush administration did not enjoy even the briefest of 'honeymoon' periods with Congress. This can be attributed to several reasons. Two already mentioned are that Bush won the election but the Republicans did not, that he won it in a way which infuriated Democrats. In addition, Bush is the inheritor of a series of difficult legacies from the Reagan era. The most notable, perhaps, are the Federal deficit, the lingering after-effects of the Iran-Contra issue and the HUD scandal. Another Reagan legacy, however, hard to provide evidence for but easy to define and even easier to feel in the air in early 1989, is a pent up frustration among Congressional Democrats who never found it easy to deal with 'the great communicator', the 'teflon president' to whom no dirt stuck. What was notable about Reagan's dip in public opinion polls during the height of the Iran-Contra revelations was not only how sharp it was, but how transient. Democrats, unintimidated by Bush, expected to find him easier to deal with and were unprepared to let him set the terms of debate the way Reagan had in 1981. Further reasons for the lack of honeymoon are to be found in the administration's own actions: its apparent inactivity on a series of major issues in the early months of 1989; its evident lack of imagination; and the choice of Defense Secretary.

Bush's found a way out of those early difficulties partly because, after a time and most decisively at the Brussels summit, action began. His way was eased because the Democrats did not function as an effective opposition. In the House of Representatives they became embroiled in their own ethics scandal which cost them two of their three leaders - Speaker Jim Wright and Majority Whip Tony Coelho. They also failed, just as much as Bush, to carve out their own ground - their own agenda, vision, ideas.[140] It is in part because of their lack-lustre performance for most of 1989 that they are likely to try to change Bush's national drug strategy; no less than Bush by mid-May, they need achievements.

If the Democrats function more effectively in 1989-90, the results as far as this analysis is concerned - the conditions for changing grand strategy in major or minor ways - will probably be no different. Congress is, at the best of times, a bad place from which to initiate major change in long-established US policies. Change in grand strategy must be initiated

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139 'More of the Same', *New York Times*, 6 September 1989.

140 'So Far, Congress Comes Up Short On Ideas', *New York Times*, 6 August 1989.

from within the administration and then gain acceptance in Congress; the other way round is unworkable.

The key question, then, is whether Bush can forge a 'governing coalition'. The 1989 evidence of the Bush administration's ability to do this is mixed. In its first few months one would have judged it quite impossible. The lack-lustre performance of Democrats in Congress, however, together with elements of Bush's policy - the *contra* deal, Savings and Loans, the Brussels summit - make it necessary to revise that judgement. Though several observers and Congresional officials said in interviews that Bush's record revealed no special ability as a coalition builder, his actions in 1989 suggest he can at least do it on occasion. The question is whether it can be done with durability. To that, there is currently no certain answer, though one can say with confidence that everything in the US political system makes it an extremely difficult task.

PART VI
PROSPECTS

The USA is a power of great reach and weight, but it is undergoing relative decline. It has lost the full dimensions of its former pre-eminence, yet it remains a superpower, the unrivalled strategic leader of its global alliances.

Relative decline necessarily imposes strains on the grand strategy which the USA has followed for the past forty years, most notably and directly because its economic capacity is no longer adequate to sustain it, unless a remarkably different consensus were to emerge permitting significant increases in military spending. As the world changes, so the grand strategy is less affordable and potentially less effective.

The scene seems perfectly set for major change in grand strategy. Change seems not only necessary but appropriate. The problem, however, is that it is not quite feasible.

The almost-missing debate

The issues explored in this paper have been frequently discussed in the US media, touching time and again on the central concerns - relative US decline, the changing world, the nature of US relations with its allies and with the USSR, changing economic circumstances. Yet there is an oddity about that discussion: the central concerns are touched but not explored; issues are discussed but not connected. The debate on US grand strategy is almost missing.

There are exceptions, some of which have been cited in this paper and will be in what follows. But the general judgement must be that, so far, American debate is marked by its lack of attention to the overall problem. The issue of grand strategy lurks behind articles rather than surfacing within them.

There are several, inter-related reasons for this. One is Cold War triumphalism. There is a dual irony here. At a time when the US administration could reasonably claim to be winning the Cold War - although that view ultimately fails to explain what is happening either in the USSR or in East-West relations - its capacity to continue to fight the Cold War is coming into greater question and the costs are coming home. It faces decline on a series of other fronts; victory will not be as sweet as was always assumed. But the irony is not visible through the Cold War

prism which remains a highly fallible viewing aid, clouding rather than illuminating the central issues.

The second reason is that, even during the period of greatest impatience at Bush's policy towards the USSR, imaginative alternatives were not on offer. Bush was challenged, but not by ideas which were both commanding and fundamentally different. In a sense, there was no debate, only criticisms. Democrats in Congress expressed plenty of them, but put forward nothing which could act as the opposite pole of attraction to the administration's policy of continuing in the theme of US policy for the past 40 years. It is possible that this absence of political alternative occurred because Democrats became embroiled, first, in the battle to reject Tower's nomination as Defense Secretary and, then, in the resignations of Jim Wright as House Speaker and Tony Coelho as House Majority Whip. But that is probably too charitable an explanation. More likely is that no new ideas were put forward because none were available.[141]

This lack of ideas itself reflects the third reason for the lack of explicit debate about the over-arching themes of US foreign and security policy. Here it is necessary to refer again to two themes visited earlier: 'the vision thing' and the preference for the short-term view. Grappling with grand strategy means taking a long view. And it requires vision. The only major aspect in which such a perspective has been opened concerns the re-unification of Germany - apparently endorsed implicitly by Bush just after the Brussels summit, and explicitly by Vernon Walters, US Ambassador to the FRG, in September.[142]

The fourth reason is that it is genuinely difficult to conceive of alternatives to current grand strategy. For example, Luttwak conceives of the possibility that, eventually, the Soviet threat might no longer be a central focus. He suggests that were that to happen the USA should shift from a policy of collective security - the extended deterrence, alliance diplomacy and large military infrastructure of today - to one of 'collective prosperity'.[143] Yet market integration in the EC and the continuing dynamism of Japanese technology and industry indicate the drawback to this nostrum: it focuses policy into an arena of growing comparitive disadvantage for the USA.

Luttwak's article also shows the inter-relationship of these reasons. To begin with, if it is so difficult to have new ideas, why make the effort?

141 'So Far, Congress Comes Up Short On Ideas', *New York Times*, 6 August 1989.

142 *The Guardian*, 1 June 1989, and Flora Lewis, 'Go Slow on Germany', *New York Times* 12 September 1989.

143 Luttwak, 'Do We Need A New Grand Strategy?', p11.

Equally, while he is prepared to speculate about a future in which the Soviet threat matters much less, he is not prepared to concede that it matters less today, or is likely to in the near future. Thus the prime task is to continue fighting and winning the Cold War. It can be acknowledged that, well into the future, new policies may be necessary, but politics is focused into a shorter time period than that.

The result of this almost missing debate is that there is no strategic or political context to proposals for lower level adjustments in policy Pentagon inefficiencies and Reagan extravagancies aside, US force posture is relatively well-fitted to the broad shape of grand strategy. Trimming here and there could be done without affecting the overall strategy, but at a certain point any proposal on those lines runs into one of two obstacles: either it would necessitate a change in grand strategy, for which that absent debate would have to be present; or, precisely because it does not challenge the basic concept, it will be resisted out of habit, inertia and self-interest by well-entrenched power groups.

For example, John Lehman, the former Secretary of the US Navy, has argued for a major change in force structure, reducing active forces and increasing reserves.[144] This would entail a major change in how the reserves are operated. The key to his proposal is that,

> 'We would not have to withdraw forces from Europe or South Korea, and the Navy could still keep its battle groups forward.'

In short, it is essentially a technical fix to meet the problem of tighter resources. As such, it might be thought cannily designed to make the path of change easier. But, without changing the broad shape of grand strategy, it would entail radical change in force structure and, consequently, if any political muscle were put behind, a powerful institutional resistance would come into effect. It is too modest a proposal to require change in grand strategy, but too ambitious to be implemented without change in grand strategy

Similar thoughts occur in other contexts. Major budgetary savings would be available, for example, if spending on the Strategic Defense Initiative were not just cut but eliminated. They would also be available if the strategic nuclear triad - land- and sea-based missiles plus bombers - were reconsidered and one of its 'legs' were 'amputated'. Yet this would require rethinking long-held orthdoxies about nuclear strategy going back to the 1950s and the study of the USA's vulnerability to nuclear attack.[145]

144 John Lehman, 'A New Blueprint for U.S. Forces', *New York Times*, 26 March 1989.

145 Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* [New York, Simon & Schuster, 1983] ch6.

Even eliminating SDI - except on grounds of its continuing technological impossibility - would involve that sort of rethinking, because strategic defence is a logical goal in the context of US strategic thinking about what happens if deterrence fails.[146]

The same is true in a NATO context. It is now by no means daring to criticise the premises of flexible response - willingness to use nuclear weapons first, reliance on trans-Atlantic reinforcements, NATO's capacity to sustain conventional war, the Warsaw Pact's alleged military superiority, the need for the USA to carry the major burden.[147] But to seek to rewrite the premises opens much larger issues. Flexible response is essentially a political compromise in the form of a strategy; it was knowingly designed as such. Changing the strategy means changing the compromise, which means addressing the basic architecture of the alliance which, from US perspective, is only possible in the context of new thinking about grand strategy.

There are two major reasons why there has been debate on aspects of the issue of grand strategy: one is détente, the other is the budget deficit. In the short term, the latter is of more impact. Budgetary pressures provide half a context for rethinking and reformulating US grand strategy. It may be clear from them that grand strategy cannot or should not be sustained in its current form for very long, but without a debate on the strategy itself and, crucially, on alternative over-arching concepts, they provide only half a context. The other half has yet to be created. It seems inevitable that this debate will begin in the USA, but it is impossible to predict when and with what effects. In the meantime, sectional interests and lobbies are likely to prevent major change even if it falls short of a radical transformation.

The question of agency

Were such a debate to emerge, it would be necessary to consider how any consensus - or adequate near-consensus - it produced in mainstream politics could be implemented as policy. Perhaps the most striking feature of US politics in relation to the issue of grand strategy is that it is currently impossible to identify an agency for change.

The political culture and system in the USA militates against it. The system requires a governing coalition which has to be constructed across party lines. It also makes it hard to produce such a coalition of any

146 Dan Smith, 'Strategic Defence: Forward to the Past?', *Arms Control*, Vol. 8, No. 2, September 1987.

147 'The Myths NATO Lives By', *Time*, 29 May 1989.

stability. The political culture makes it hard to take the long view. The major issues discussed in this paper can only be dealt with by taking a long view. To work on such issues, the system requires decisive leadership, against whose emergence it throws up innumerable barriers.

The grand strategy the USA has had for four decades was put in place by a group of men who knowingly took a long-term view. In th extraordinary circumstances of world war and its aftermath, they rose to positions of power and influence which they used to extraordinary effect.

Godfrey Hodgson has pointed out that these men were linked in part by sociology, but more importantly by a shared history, policy, aspiration, instinct, technique and dogma.[148] Their history began with the Versailles talks after World War I, but the most decisive event for them all was World War II. Their policy was to oppose American 'isolationism' - by which they essentially meant standing off from Europe - and their aspiration was to assume leadership of the capitalist world. Their instinct was for the political centreground; out of this they forged bipartisan consensus on US foreign policy and many worked for Republican as well as Democrat administrations. Their technique was to work largely out of the public gaze, to influence opinion by selective leaks to a small coterie of chosen journalists. Their achievements were mostly in the Executive branch of government. They were often contemptuous of Congress, which they by-passed as often as they could, but whose endorsement they nonetheless intermittently required, when again they turned to a small group of reliable Senators and Representatives. Their dogma, finally, was containment.

This was the American foreign policy establishment. The Vietnam war both split and, to some considerable extent, demoralised it. Though Nixon, Carter and Reagan all drew to some degree on it for both positions in the administration and advice, it has never again had the decisive, unified and unifying role it did between 1945 and 1964. Nor has it been replaced. It is an absent agency of change.

In the wake of Bush's performance at the Brussels summit in May 1989, there may be some temptation to argue that his administration itself will constitute the agency of change. That cannot be ruled out. It is most likely to happen - if at all - as a response to the logic of world events and the tide of American public opinion. The most important engine of change here is the continuing pressure of the budget deficit. It could be that new directions taken by US allies could also enforce change.

But there is nothing in the background of Bush or the most senior

148 Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time* [New York, Random/Vintage, 1978] pp 114-22.

officials with influence in grand strategy which suggests any taste for deeply innovative policies. All the evidence suggests an attraction to managerial pragmatism. This makes them reasonably well suited to conducting the balancing acts required to resist and retard the decline in American power. It does not suggest they are likely to want to head off in an altogether new direction.

Nor can the Democrats in Congress be thought of as the agency of change. They lack the necessary degrees of unity and ability to transcend the limits of their political culture and system. They can, in any case, go little further than stymying the administration; they could not force through a new grand strategy against the opposition of the executive branch. They may reshape the national drug strategy. The chances of them reshaping national grand strategy are exceedingly slim.

The view from Washington

The thrust of the argument so far is that change in grand strategy is necessary and appropriate but not quite feasible. However, a different view on its necessity and appropriateness is possible. The Bush administration could comfort itself with the thought that such grandiose change is not required. There is, after all, no serious current rival to the USA for the position of number one superpower. Consider the other four world powers of the 21st century identified by Paul Kennedy in a book which took a central place in discussions of US decline in the first half of 1988.[149]

Against the USSR, the administration can believe the USA is winning the Cold War. Soviet diplomacy is active and popular in the West, but it also consists of a series of concessions to US policies. Domestically, the USSR is in turmoil. US intelligence has begun to consider the implications of national unrest and even secessions from the USSR. The economy remains sluggish for consumers, and it increasingly appears to official American eyes that perestroika will fail.[150] Meanwhile the Soviet grip on eastern Europe is weakening and the USSR is withdrawing from various positions in the Third World.

China is only a potential world power, not just because its economic and industrial base remains insufficient, but also because of political instability. The Tiananmen Square uprising was brutally suppressed, but a generational change of leadership is on the way. The potential for prolonged cycles in which pressure for reform alternates with countervailing reaction

149 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* [New York, Random House, 1987].

150 'U.S. Unease on Gorbachev: How Exposed Is He?', *New York Times*, 10 September 1989.

is very real. The result may be China continuing to focus for a considerable period on domestic rather than rather than international issues.

Japan is an economic giant which has done much to reduce US dominance. But it is unlikely in the near term to seek to dislodge the USA from its strategic positions in northeast Asia and the Pacific. The political influence created by Japan's economic power will probably not be used to go far beyond narrowly economic and commercial issues. There is evident potential for great frictions between the USA and Japan on trade, but that is hardly likely to threaten the USA's strategic position in the region.

In western Europe, EC market integration in 1992 will take unity to a new level, but a qualitatively new degree of political cooperation is not an automatic nor necessarily a quick consequence. So western Europe may not even become a rival for world power. Western European governments remain committed to essentially Atlanticist conceptions of security For as long as they do, strategic dependence on the USA will persist.

In short, looking ahead even as far as the end of a potential second Bush administration in 1996, the view from Washington may suggest the pertinence of a common American saying: If it ain't broke, don't fix it. Or, perhaps more appropriately and precisely: Don't fix the bits which ain't broke.

That some modifications of policy must be made to keep military spending down to amounts Congress will provide seems inevitable. That East-West relations will provide the occasion for such adjustments seems a sound bet. The Bush administration's characteristic competence and pragmatism suit it well for such tasks; they are essentially managerial - tinkering with the system, not changing it entirely. Beyond that, it is very likely that the Bush administration currently sees no great need for change in grand strategy and no great threat to it.

Power: substance and appearance

That may be the administration's perspective. It is, however, quite fragile. In relation to western Europe and Japan it rests on acceptance within those countries of American influence and power. Yet it does so at a time when on most non-strategic and some strategic issues, US power and influence is at a lower ebb than at any time since 1945.

The western European states have the capacity to take a different view of East-West relations and to act upon it. To do this would not be an

easy task. Obstacles include the divisions which persist within growing unity But nor would it be impossible. Growing public disenchantment with US leadership during the Reagan era has laid a political basis for being less dependent upon it. Working together, western European governments could come to a new accommodation with the USSR. The Bush administration would quite probably be willing to accept such developments and, if not actually encourage them, nonetheless talk positively about them, if only because it would not be able to prevent them. Indeed, ready to gain victories through concessions, the administration might even be inclined to claim the credit for making them possible.

The real stumbling block for a perspective is Atlanticism, an institutionally embdded and powerful philosophy. Yet that is to say that US strategic leadership of western Europe rests fundamentally on what people think. If they change their minds, the process of the USA's relative decline as a superpower will move forward another notch. The ultimate goal of US policy within NATO, therefore, will be to persuade people not to change their minds, to assure them that the world has not been transformed though it may be in transition, to reassert the fundamental orthodoxies of the Atlantic alliance and thus to retan its strategic leadership.

While our eyes focus on the USA's military capacity, it appears powerful. But if we consider other indices of power, such as those displayed at the Paris Group of Seven summit, it appears a great deal less powerful though by no means insignificant. And if we imagine a future where western European states leave behind them strategic dependence on the USA,there is nothing in the actual substance of US power to prevent it from coming about.

In the short-term, this creates numerous opportunities for western European governments to take the lead over major issues within NATO. The Brussels summit showed this, despite the headlines acclaiming Bush's achievement there. In the end, if western European governments do not want early [or any] deployment of short-range nuclear weapons, there is nothing the US administration can do to force its case. Indeed, if it uses what has hitherto been the ultimate American threat - to run down its military commitment in Europe - it would simply be abandoning a position of advantage from which it still gets political influence.

There is no sign of any western European government wanting to push things to such a watershed - no sign that, faced by the threat of a US withdrawal, they would do anything other than knuckle under as, with the exception of France in the 1960s, they always have done. But what prevents them from testing the alliance to the limit is themselves, not the USA

CONCLUSION

The trajectory of US power and influence in the post-1945 era began from the heights of economic, strategic and political pre-eminence. What has happened since then, in a complex process full of twists and turns, can be summed up as a more or less continuous decline.

Primarily, the USA's economic predominance has fallen. There have also been blows to its strategic position, most notably the defeat in Vietnam and the accumulation of military strength by the USSR. But in relation to its allies, it is relative economic decline which is most prominent. In many ways this was not only inevitable but also the product of US policy, not simply in providing aid for economic reconstruction to countries which became its major competitors, but in meeting the costs of global military reach. For this is in part responsible for the slower growth in productivity and GNP which it has experienced compared to its major economic rivals - that is, compared to its allies.

To a large degree, what remains outstanding about the USA as a world power resides in its grand strategy. The focus here should not be on the tedious and misleading recitals of numerical comparisons much favoured by American hawks as a way of showing the USSR is militarily stronger. Rather, it should be on the global reach of the strategy, the network of alliances, the foreign bases, the worldwide infrastructure. It is from these - from extended deterrence - that political influence flows.

The contrast between the economic and strategic realms is amply demonstrated by the contrast between the two summits in 1989 - NATO's at Brussels and the Group of Seven's in Paris. At the former Bush was the key figure. If he had failed to provide an initiative, the short-term impact for NATO would have been next to catastrophic. All eyes were upon him; leadership was expected. Within the constraints discussed above, he provided it. At Paris, however, while not a 'bit player', Bush was not the star. That was not simply because the summit coincided with the French revolution's bicentennial. It was because the USA does not have the decisive role in setting the agenda and defining the outcome on the issues discussed there, which it does have on the issues discussed in Brussels.

Thus for the USA to remain a superpower, retaining its strategic pre-eminence is vital. Yet its capacity to do that is under threat. The resources to fund Pentagon plans to the full are not available under current political and economic circumstances. The looming presence of the Federal deficit, even if no decisive action is taken to cut it, exerts a sharp downward pressure on military spending. For four years Reagan could not increase

military spending: it is unlikely Bush will succeed where his predecessor failed. Willingness to keep increasing military spending has gone not only because of the deficit but also because of détente. The enemy is no longer threatening enough to let the hawks have their day.

There is, however, strong counter-vailing pressure. If military spending cannot be increased, the course of cutting it is strewn with obstacles. This pressure is to be found within the budget itself, in the legacy from the Reagan years. A large backlog of appropriated but unexpended funds means the room for manoeuvre is limited. An approaching tide of new production projects will all have their usual institutional, corporate and Congressional backers who will resist cuts.

Getting over the hurdles within the budget is made a great deal more complicated by the nature of the US political system and culture. Divided powers in the constitution mean divided party control of executive and legislature is of particular weight. To succeed on any given policy, Bush must either win the support of the Democrats' leaders in Congress, or woo away enough votes to win despite them. The fragmented system of power and, by western European standards, low level of party loyalties makes decisive government action difficult. Deals between president and Democratic leaders can and do come unstuck. The task of creating a stable governing coalition has been beyond most presidents.

In any case, the importance of retaining strategic leadership is itself a barrier to major cuts in military spending. Despite appearances, there are few opportunities for painless cuts. Arms control will not provide them on a large enough scale to reduce the Federal deficit seriously, and eliminating waste has been a permanent priority and a permanent impossibility for years. Yet the Bush administration so far opposes reducing the deficit by increasing taxes, and while it can probably protect military spending from major cuts, so can the Democrats protect social programmes.

All these considerations suggest that one should not expect decisive change in American grand strategy. Rather, the prospect is for relatively minor adjustments which will in all probability be presented as bold innovations. The Bush administration can be relied upon not to return to the seeming stasis of the early months of 1989 in relation to détente. The development of its policy towards the USSR and on arms control will in all likelihood continue within a pragmatic, orthodox framework, based at its core on the view that the USA is winning the Cold War.

The administration's characteristic pragmatism and caution is reasonably well-suited to this complex task, involving as it does a series of

balancing acts - between its preferences and public opinion; between retaining the current strategy and a resource base which is longer adequate to it; between steadily losing that political influence which is based on economic predominance while trying to retain that which is based on strategic leadership.

Part of what makes these balancing acts possible is continued allied acceptance of US strategic leadership. Were that to erode, the performance would be far less convincing What gives the USA power in trans-Atlantic relations has largely come down to a matter of philosophy and perception. If western European governments were to decide - which they show little or no sign of doing in the short-term - that they need not be strategically dependent on the USA, they would not have to be. Were they to decide that the USA's military apparatus is politically unimpressive, it would be. The basis for such decisions lies essentially in taking a new approach to relations with the USSR and to security in Europe. Détente makes that possible, while by no means making it inevitable.

On more specific issues in the trans-Atlantic context, the burden-sharing theme is likely to return to its high place on the agenda at some point in the not-too-distant future. If the Conference on Forces in Europe goes slowly, it will get a higher profile. Likewise, it will re-emerge if the eventual treaty from these talks does not provide disproportionate benefits for the USA. And even if the treaty does allow the USA to cut more and save more money than the rest of NATO, burden-sharing will probably still return to the limelight in a few years since, by all measures, the USA's military spending will still be considerably more than its allies'. Likewise the issue of out-of area operations by NATO states - which is a variation on the burden-sharing theme - will become more important if occasions arise which, in US eyes, call for joint allied operations in the Third World.

Burden-sharing and out-of-area operations both present a dual face. They are both attempts to retain strategic leadership at less cost. If they work, the effect will be to strengthen the USA's influence. However, they both also contain the risk that, sharing the costs, the USA's allies will want to share the power too and begin to seek change in the basic architecture of alliance. That is perhaps, an inevitable risk for a great power in straitened circumstances.

Western European states thus have consirable room for manoeuvre. This has been created by a number of factors combined - the effects of perestroika and Gorbachev's diplomacy, the economic and political stresses on US grand strategy, the potential for greater political unity implicit in EC market integration. These create conditions quite unlike those of the past 40 years. Whether and how this room for manoeuvre will be utilised is an

open question. It could be the beginning of decisive change in trans-Atlantic relations, based on superseding Atlanticism as the dominant security concept in western Europe. Or it could make possible lesser changes, manoeuvring within an essentially unchanged framework. The range of possibilities is great; the odds on one or another are quite unclear. If the American debate on US grand strategy has hardly begun, the western European debate on these issues is little more developed. If we can see institutional and political obstacles to change in US grand strategy, a survey of the western European scene must identify at least as many.

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THE NEWLY EMERGING SITUATION IN EUROPE THROUGH SOVIET EYES

Stephen Shenfield *

November 1989

An "Agenor" Report

THE NEWLY EMERGING SITUATION IN EUROPE THROUGH SOVIET EYES

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November 1989

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It is intended that a revised version should be published following discussion in the Sounding Board.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to explore how, from the Soviet point of view, the general situation in Europe -- strategic, political and economic -- appears now to be changing. The main focus is upon the perceived implications for the medium and longer term of two key developments occurring at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s:

-- the shift in the European military balance, resulting in the first place from the unilateral Warsaw Pact force reductions of 1989-90 and the accompanying force restructuring and revision of military doctrine; and

-- the expected acceleration of the process of West European integration, in the economic sphere (marked by the creation of the EC Single Market in 1992), in the sphere of politics (including foreign policy) and possibly also in the military sphere.

I attempt to formulate the strategy by means of which the Gorbachev leadership hopes to cope with these developments as it pursues the internal development of the USSR. I consider various issues of Soviet foreign policy in Europe within this context.

Two questions are worth clarifying at this point. First, out of all the current developments in European affairs why focus upon these two in particular? And second, given that different citizens of the USSR naturally view things in different ways, whose "Soviet view" exactly do I aim to analyze?

I focus upon the changing strategic situation and West European integration above all because these are the developments most stressed by Soviet observers themselves. The latter tend to be somewhat insensitive to certain factors emphasized by Western analysts, such as the strivings for autonomy of the peoples of Eastern Europe[1]. It should always be kept in mind that I am presenting an interpretation of *Soviet* views of the situation, not my own views. To this I would add that these two developments are already in progress and very unlikely to be reversed. Thus it is, I feel, more urgent to analyze the direct effects of the unilateral Warsaw Pact force reductions currently being implemented than it is to consider the possible results of future arms control agreements. Finally, this report deals with Soviet views of the European situation in broad outline: I do not, for example, examine Soviet views of the prospects for individual countries. In a more detailed report it would undoubtedly be desirable to make a more comprehensive survey of the subject.

I am ultimately concerned with the views of those foreign policy makers most closely associated with the reform effort of Gorbachev and his closest supporters in the top leadership (e.g. Yakovlev, Shevardnadze). I am not primarily concerned with the views of traditionalists within the power elite, even though they may retain significant influence. My working assumption here (which it is not appropriate to defend against its critics in this report) is that Gorbachev and his group will retain sufficient power to pursue a fairly coherent strategy in both internal and foreign affairs. Nor am I concerned, except in Chapter 7, with the views of the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens who do not belong to the power elite at all.

I do, however, pay a great deal of attention to the expressed views of Soviet international-relations analysts, only the most prominent of whom -- institute directors, a few senior consultants -- might reasonably be counted members of the power elite. This is because I am of the opinion -- one shared by many Western analysts of Soviet politics though not entirely uncontroversial -- that these Soviet analysts are on the whole quite sensitively attuned to the policy needs of the political leaders who patronize them, and can therefore be regarded (to some degree of approximation) as intellectual proxies of those leaders[2]. In the absence of such

materials as the minutes of closed discussions among Soviet policy makers, the writings of Soviet academic analysts are, I believe, the most valuable of the sources of insight available to us. I would argue, for instance, that they reflect top-level Soviet thinking more accurately than the public speeches that Soviet leaders make before international or even internal audiences.

In certain areas, little if any really useful writing by Soviet analysts is available. These areas are gradually diminishing, but they remain important. They include assessment of the military balance, which I consider in Chapter 2. Here there is no alternative to inferring likely Soviet views in a more speculative fashion -- that is, by analyzing the situation oneself using Western methods but at the same time trying to see how things might look from a Soviet vantage point.

The first four chapters of the report are devoted to an assessment of changes in the strategic situation in Europe in the wake of the unilateral Warsaw Pact force reductions. Chapter 2 is an attempt to view through Soviet eyes the newly emerging East-West balance of conventional forces in Europe. Chapter 3 takes into account the "defensive" restructuring of the Warsaw Pact forces remaining in Europe after the unilateral reductions, and Chapter 4 examines the ongoing revision of Soviet military doctrine and discusses its significance. Chapter 5 sums up the new strategic situation in Europe by reassessing the military threats now faced by both sides on the basis of the analysis in Chapters 2-4.

The next two chapters consider the probable impact of the force reductions upon the internal situation of the Soviet Union. Chapter 6 assesses their impact upon the Soviet economy, Chapter 7 the role they are playing in Soviet internal political life.

The following three chapters focus upon the process of integration in Western Europe and its implications from the Soviet viewpoint. Chapter 8 reviews Soviet analyses of West European economic, political and military integration in general and the way it directly impinges upon Soviet-West European relations. Chapter 9 supplements this review by considering Soviet analyses of the implications of West European integration for developments in Eastern Europe and for the triangular relationship among Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the USSR. Chapter 10 briefly examines Soviet views on the question of the future unification of Germany.

Chapter 11, finally, draws the various threads of argument together to present the outlines of an overall Soviet view of the new situation emerging in Europe in the 1990s, and of the corresponding foreign policy strategy of the USSR.

Notes

1 A reflection and partial explanation of this insensitivity is the shortage of Soviet experts on Eastern Europe (except in the economic field), in contrast to the abundance of experts on the Western world.

2 This opinion is effectively defended by Neil Malcolm in the introduction to his Chatham House Paper, **Soviet Policy Perspectives on Western Europe** (London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989). The relationship between analysts and policy makers is not wholly one-way: analysts are to an increasing extent able to influence the perceptions of policy makers. However, this is not a necessary condition of the relevance of analysts' products. Even in a case where the real influence of an analyst is negligible, his or her work may still be a valuable indicator of high-level thinking simply because it has been written with a view to serving policy needs.

CHAPTER 2

THE NEW BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

2.1. Introduction

In order to assess how the emerging situation in Europe may be perceived from Moscow, I first consider the new balance of conventional forces being brought about by the unilateral Warsaw-Pact (WP) force reductions in 1989-90. I make the plausible assumption that the strength of NATO forces in Europe will not change appreciably in the course of the WP reductions. I approach the task of assessing the balance in three ways:

a. by focusing upon the tank balance;

b. by comparing forces in terms of the American measure of Armored Division Equivalents; and

c. by comparing forces in terms of a Soviet measure of combat capability.

Analysts have used a wide range of approaches in assessing the conventional balance in Europe and have accordingly arrived at highly divergent conclusions, ranging from massive WP superiority to approximate parity. Similar variation is to be expected in assessments of the balance following the WP reductions, with a shift in the center of gravity in favor of NATO -- i.e. a range from reduced but still very great WP superiority to moderate NATO superiority.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) identifies four general approaches to assessing the European conventional balance:

1. simple static comparisons of numbers of different types of weapon ("bean-counts");

2. enhanced static comp[redacted]h weapon numbers are weighted to take account of their estimated effectiv[redacted]bat;

3. dynamic comparisons, in which force capabilities are assessed by modeling the combat process; and

4. use of complex combat simulation models[1].

The apparent WP advantage tends to diminish as one proceeds from less to more complex approaches. Use of simple bean-count ratios for tanks or artillery pieces leads to the view that WP preponderance will be enormous even after the reductions. It is then natural to draw, as does the NATO SACEUR General John Galvin, the conclusion that the reductions may have political value but are of minimal military significance[2]. None of the more sophisticated approaches support this judgement. Enhanced static comparisons make

allowance for the technical superiority of NATO armaments, casting WP numerical advantages in a less intimidating light. Some dynamic comparisons yield even more evenly balanced assessments by factoring in NATO strengths in such areas as command and control, training and logistics. When, finally, the effect on combat outcome of airpower as well as ground forces is taken into account, this too works in favor of NATO.

In Section 2 I analyze the impact of WP tank reductions on the tank balance in Europe, building upon the careful study of this subject by Chalmers and Unterseher[3]. It is worth devoting special attention to tanks because in the West they are widely considered the single most decisive offensive conventional weapon; their reduction also constitutes the centerpiece of the unilateral Soviet initiative. This analysis can be classified as an enhanced bean-count, inasmuch as attention is paid to combat effectiveness as well as numbers.

In Section 3 I estimate the effect of the WP reductions upon the balance of ground forces as measured in terms of Armored Division Equivalents (ADEs). This type of enhanced static comparison of ground forces, which U.S. government agencies have used since 1971, takes into account three components of weapon effectiveness -- firepower, mobility and survivability -- and scales forces against the standard of an American armored division[4]. I note how the calculations in terms of ADEs might be adjusted, as Barry Posen has advocated, to allow for NATO advantages in command and logistics[5]. Finally, I consider the way assessment of the balance is affected by incorporating the factor of airpower.

In Section 4 I attempt to assess the balance of forces before and after the WP reductions from the point of view of the USSR and other WP states. For this purpose I use statements made by WP military men, and in particular a scale for comparing the capacity of various armaments given by Gen.-Maj. V. M. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna conventional arms talks[6].

Conclusions are summarized in Section 5.

If the meaning of assessments of the balance of forces is to be understood, the military significance of different force ratios must be indicated. According to Lanchester's theory, the offense and the defense are (other things being equal) matched at 1.4 : 1[7]. It is also generally held that an attacker with offensively configured forces and enjoying an overall superiority of at least 2 : 1 should be able to achieve those local force concentrations along selected axes of advance required to break through the defensive line of the adversary. It therefore seems useful to divide the continuum of force superiority ratios into the following three intervals:

a. less than 1.4 : 1, or rough parity, allowing for a fairly reliable defense;

b. at least 1.4 : 1 but less than 2 : 1, or moderate superiority, making for a highly indeterminate outcome; and

c. at least 2 : 1, or decisive superiority, putting the defense in a very vulnerable position.

It must be admitted that the assessment of the balance of conventional forces in Europe presented in this chapter is rather crude. Many important factors are left out of account, such as morale, the cohesion of NATO and the WP in the event of war, and the geographical setting of combat. The effect on the balance of the "defensive restructuring" of the remaining WP forces is set aside for discussion in Chapter 3. The assessment should nevertheless serve its purpose in helping to clarify Soviet perspectives on the emerging situation in Europe.

2.2. The Tank Balance

As Table 1 shows, estimates of the numbers of tanks in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, vary widely, especially in respect of the tanks belonging to NATO. Discrepancies arise mainly from the following three sources:

a. the difference between the WP practice of counting all tanks irrespective of weight -- i.e. including light tanks -- and the NATO practice of counting only main battle tanks;

b. the issue of whether or not to include reinforcements which would be brought over to Europe from North America in the course of mobilization and, if these are to be excluded, whether or not similarly to exclude tanks held in low-readiness WP divisions on the grounds that these fulfil an equivalent reserve function; and

c. the issue of whether or not to include tanks held in reserve stocks outside combat formations (which constitute a larger proportion of the NATO than of the WP tank fleet).

According to the majority (six out of eleven) of the estimates cited in Table 1, including those made by the IISS and other independent organizations, the WP reductions shift the WP tank superiority in Europe from the "decisive" into the "moderate" band. NATO and U.K. government figures define the NATO tank force so restrictively that the WP appears to retain a "decisive" superiority even after the reductions. At the other extreme, the exclusion by Chalmers and Unterseher of tanks in low-readiness (Category 3) WP divisions, on the grounds that these fulfil a reserve function equivalent to that fulfilled by NATO tanks held in North America, creates the appearance of rough parity even before the WP reductions and of a small NATO advantage after them. If, as seems reasonable, one excludes only a part of the WP tanks in low-readiness divisions -- say, those deep in the Russian rear, which are unlikely to be brought forward in time to take part in the initial engagements -- then one finds that the post-reductions pan-European tank balance is one of rough parity[8].

Turning from the pan-European tank balance to that on the Central Front itself, broad variation among the estimates is again observed (Table 2). Here, however, even those Western analysts who take the grimmest view of the balance are obliged to admit that the WP cuts are militarily significant, reducing WP superiority from the "decisive" to the "moderate" level. If one relies upon middle-of-the-road estimates of the pre-reductions balance, one must conclude that the WP cuts transform "moderate" superiority into rough parity. In either case, the defensive capability of NATO is crucially enhanced.

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TABLE 1. DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF TANK FORCES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AND THE IMPACT UPON THEM OF THE UNILATERAL WP FORCE REDUCTIONS

	Numbers of tanks			Ratios[3]	
	WP		NATO[1]		
	before red'ns[1]	after red'ns[2]		before red'ns	after red'ns
A. Including reinforcements from North America					
1. FRG government (1987)	54 300	42 300	22 200	2.4	1.9
2. U.S. government (1987)	52 000	40 000	24 250	2.1	1.6
3. Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)	50 730	38 730	31 175	1.6	1.2
4. USSR government (1989)	59 470	47 470	30 690	1.9	1.5
B. Excluding reinforcements from North America					
5. The Economist (1986)	50 000	38 000	22 400	2.2	1.7
6. U.K. government (1987)	50 900	38 900	16 800	3.0	2.3
7. IISS (1987)	52 200	40 200	22 200	2.4	1.8
8. Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)	50 730	38 730	22 120	2.3	1.8
9. NATO (1989)	51 500	39 500	16 424	3.1	2.4
10. BDM Corporation (1989)	56 250	44 250	23 346	2.4	1.9
C. Excluding reinforcements from North America and Category 3 WP divisions					
11. Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)	25 500	20 200[4]	22 100	1.2	1.1

Notes to Table 1

[1] The pre-reductions figures for sources 1-3, 5, 6, 8 and 11 are taken from Table 12 in Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)(see chapter-note 3), who cite as their sources: **Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987** (HMSO, London U.K.); **The Economist**, 20 December 1986; and **Jane's Defence Weekly**, 15 August 1987. Source 7 is **The Military Balance 1987-1988** (IISS, London, 1987), p. 231 (numbers of Main Battle Tanks). The figures for sources 4, 9 and 10 are taken from Phillip A. Karber, **Soviet Compliance with the Gorbachev Reduction Plan** (The BDM Corporation, February 1989).

[2] Except in the case of source 11 (see note 4 below), it is assumed that WP tanks are to be reduced by 12 000 -- i.e. by 10 000 Soviet and 2 000 non-Soviet WP. The GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria are to reduce their tanks by 600, 850, 251 and 200 respectively, totaling 1901. Poland has not specified the number of tanks it is to reduce, but one would expect at least 100 or so.

[3] All force ratios in this and the following Tables represent the superiority of WP over NATO forces (WP : NATO), except for ratios in bold print, which represent the superiority of NATO over WP forces (NATO : WP).

[4] In setting the reduction in this case at 5 300, it is assumed that all the Soviet tanks reduced in non-Soviet Eastern Europe are taken from higher-readiness Category 1 and 2 divisions, but that all other WP tanks reduced (i.e. Soviet tanks in the USSR and tanks belonging to East European states) are taken from low-readiness Category 3 divisions. The estimated reduction is therefore a lower limit.

TABLE 2. DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF TANK FORCES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT AND THE IMPACT ON THEM OF THE UNILATERAL WP FORCE REDUCTIONS

	Numbers of tanks			Ratios	
	WP		NATO		
	before red'ns[1]	after red'ns		before red'ns	after red'ns
1. U.K. government (1987)[2]	16 700	10 783	7 800	2.1	1.4
2. IISS (1987)[2]	18 000	12 083	12 700	1.4	1.1
3. BDM Corporation (1989)[3]	19 650	12 600	7 090	2.8	1.8
4. Urban (1985)[4]	12 500	7 480	8 800	1.4	1.2
5. Meacham (1986)[4]	13 800	8 780	10 000	1.4	1.1
6. Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)[4]					
Day M + 3	10 020	5 000	6 760	1.5	1.4
Day M + 10	14 570	9 550	10 320	1.4	1.1
Day M + 40	20 020	15 000	15 414	1.3	1.0
Day M + 120	28 640	22 620	21 914	1.3	1.0

Notes to Table 2

[1] The pre-reductions figures for sources 1 and 4-6 are taken from Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)(see chapter-note 3). For source 1 they cite (in their Table 5) **Statement on the Defence Estimates** (1987). For sources 4 and 5 they cite (in their Table 10) Mark Urban, 'Red Flag over Germany,' **Armed Forces** 1985 and James Meacham, 'The Sentry at the Gate: A Survey of NATO's Central Front,' **The Economist**, 30 August 1986. Source 2 is **The Military Balance 1987-1988** (IISS, 1987), p. 231. Source 3 is Karber (1989)(see note 1 to Table 1).

[2] These sources give data for the NATO Guidelines Area -- i.e. the FRG, Benelux, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. WP tank reductions in this area are approximately 5917 -- i.e. about 5/6 of the 5 300 Soviet tanks reduced in non-Soviet Eastern Europe (five of the six tank divisions reduced, and a notional five-sixths of tanks reduced in other divisions and units) plus about 1 500 East German, Polish and Czechoslovak tanks.

[3] This source gives data for Central Europe, including Denmark and Hungary in addition to the NATO Guidelines Area (see note 2 above). WP tank reductions in this larger area are approximately 7 050 -- i.e. all the 5 300 Soviet tanks reduced in non-Soviet Eastern Europe plus about 1 750 East German, Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian tanks.

[4] These sources estimate the tank forces actually available for use to the two sides at various times after mobilization begins (M-day). Urban includes first and second echelon forces available within five days. Meacham includes forces available after two days' warning time and four days of fighting. Chalmers and Unterseher consider forces available after 3, 10, 40 and 120 days of mobilization.

Chalmers and Unterseher assume that on Day M + 3 the WP has available only high-readiness Soviet forces in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia and high-readiness East German forces. I assume that the reductions in Soviet tanks in these three countries (i.e. 5/6 x 5 300) and in East German tanks (600) occur within these high-readiness forces -- a total reduction of 5 020. However, I also assume that the reductions occurring in the USSR and in the other East European countries are concentrated in low-readiness divisions and consequently do not affect the flow of tanks from the rear as mobilization proceeds beyond day M + 3. Thus the reduction estimate of 5 020 is applied to the figures of Chalmers and Unterseher for days M + 10, M + 40 and M + 120 as well as to the figures of Urban and of Meacham. In all these cases it can be regarded as a lower limit.

Moreover, if the superiority of NATO over WP tanks in reliability and combat effectiveness -- as demonstrated by Chalmers and Unterseher -- is taken into account, we are led to the view that rough parity in tanks exists on the Central Front even before the WP reductions and that these reductions place NATO in a position of "moderate" superiority (Tables 3 and 4).

Table 4 also shows the effect of different conceivable patterns of mobilization. Most Western analysts are concerned with the worst case for NATO -- a long WP time lead in mobilizing forces. Chalmers and Unterseher assume that NATO and the WP mobilize simultaneously. In fact, concern that political leaders may unwisely delay mobilization in order to avoid provocative action is felt by Soviet as well as Western military analysts[9]. As strategic stability requires that both sides feel confident of their own security, I consider that all conceivable variants deserve to be analyzed -- the WP mobilizing first, simultaneous mobilization, NATO mobilizing first -- even if the last-named of these variants is highly implausible from the political point of view.

We see that, for various scenarios in which the WP mobilizes first, the effect of the WP force reductions is that the WP can no longer acquire more than a "moderate" superiority on the Central Front. If an adjustment is made for weapon effectiveness, it is even possible to maintain rough parity under these unfavorable conditions[10]. By contrast, after the WP reductions NATO can build up a significant degree of superiority by mobilizing first. If weapon effectiveness is taken into account, NATO could even build up a decisive tank superiority.

It may be concluded that the WP reductions bring about a radical shift in the tank balance. Without claiming to have made a precise evaluation of the strategic implications of this shift, I would argue that at the very least there is good reason to reconsider the Western conventional wisdom to the effect that NATO, and only NATO, faces the problem of the potential vulnerability of its defensive line in Central Europe.

TABLE 3. TANK FORCES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT AFTER VARIOUS PERIODS OF MOBILIZATION, BEFORE AND AFTER THE WP REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT AND WITH ADJUSTMENT FOR WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS

(a) NUMBERS OF TANKS

	WP		NATO[1]
	before red'ns[1]	after red'ns[2]	
Day M + 3	10 020	5 000	6 760
Day M + 10	14 570	9 550	10 320
Day M + 40	20 020	15 000	15 414
Day M + 120	28 640	23 620	21 914

(b) NUMBERS OF TANKS ADJUSTED FOR WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS

	WP		NATO[5]
	before red'ns[3]	after red'ns[4]	
Day M + 3	5 344	3 036	6 084
Day M + 10	7 771	5 798	9 288
Day M + 40	10 010	8 500	13 873
Day M + 120	13 478	12 548	19 723

Notes to Table 3

[1] Pre-reductions data taken from Chalmers and Unterseher (1987)(see chapter-note 3), Tables 6-9.

[2] For explanation of the reduction estimate of 5 020 tanks, see note 4 to Table 2.

[3] I assume, as do Chalmers and Unterseher (p. 50), that 20% of WP tanks before reductions break down before reaching the front. To take account of the lower effectiveness of WP than of NATO tanks, the remaining number (corresponding to 80%) of WP tanks is divided by 1.5 for Days M + 3 and M + 10, by 1.6 for Day M + 40 and by 1.7 for Day M + 120: as mobilization proceeds further, tanks of declining quality are moved up to the front.

[4] On the supposition that tank reductions will be accompanied by a modestly successful effort to improve weapon quality, I assume that after reductions only 15% of WP tanks break down before reaching the front. The remaining number (corresponding to 85%) of WP tanks is divided by 1.4 for Days M + 3 and M + 10, by 1.5 for Day M + 40 and by 1.6 for Day M + 120.

[5] The adjustment to the NATO figures is based on the assessment by Chalmers and Unterseher that 10% of NATO tanks break down before reaching the front.

TABLE 4. TANK FORCE RATIOS ON THE CENTRAL FRONT FOR VARIOUS PATTERNS OF MOBILIZATION, BEFORE AND AFTER THE WP REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT AND WITH ADJUSTMENT FOR WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS

	Without adjustment for weapon effectiveness		With adjustment for weapon effectiveness	
	before red'ns	after red'ns	before red'ns	after red'ns
The WP and NATO mobilize simultaneously				
Day M + 3	1.5	**1.4**	**1.1**	**2.0**
Day M + 10	1.4	**1.1**	**1.2**	**1.6**
Day M + 40	1.3	1.0	**1.4**	**1.6**
Day M + 120	1.3	**1.1**	**1.5**	**1.6**
The WP mobilizes first				
10 / 3	2.2	1.4	1.3	1.0
40 / 10	1.9	1.5	1.1	1.1
120 / 40	1.9	1.5	1.0	1.1
NATO mobilizes first				
3 / 10	1.0	**2.1**	**1.7**	**3.1**
10 / 40	**1.1**	**1.6**	**1.8**	**2.4**
40 / 120	**1.1**	**1.5**	**2.0**	**2.3**

Notes: 1. Table based on data shown in Table 3.

2. Force ratios in **bold** print indicate NATO superiority; other force ratios indicate WP superiority.

3. Mobilization pattern *a* / *b* means that the WP has been mobilizing for *a* days and NATO for *b* days. Some extreme mobilization lags (e.g. 3 / 40, 120 / 10) are not shown.

3. The Balance in Terms of ADEs

I estimate the value of the WP ground force reductions as about 22-23 ADEs (Tables 5 and 6). In resolving uncertainties arising from deficiencies in the information available, I have striven to err on the conservative side, so that this estimate can with reasonable confidence be regarded as a lower limit. It is of interest to recall that in 1988 the RAND analyst James Thomson argued that WP forces would have to be cut by 20-30 ADEs in order to secure an adequate defensive posture for NATO, probably too ambitious a result, he thought, for arms control to achieve[11]. His criterion is satisfied by the unilateral WP reductions, quite irrespective of whatever further reductions might follow an arms control agreement.

At least one-fifth of the total WP reductions is to come from the forces of the non-Soviet WP states. One of the reasons why some Western analysts at first underestimated the significance of the WP reductions is that they left this substantial non-Soviet component out of account. Inclusion of the non-Soviet component also raises the proportion of the reductions occurring west of the Soviet border from about one-half to about three-fifths (Table 6).

TABLE 5. COMPONENTS OF THE ADE VALUE OF WP FORCE REDUCTIONS[1]

			ADEs
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe:			
	six tank divisions	6 x 0.66	= 3.96
	ten independent tank battalions	10 x 0.05	= 0.50
	tanks removed from other divisions and units[2]		4.06
		total	**8.52**
Non-Soviet WP forces in Eastern Europe:			
	GDR:	600 tanks	0.72
	Czechoslovakia:	850 tanks	1.02
		165 AFVs	0.03
	Poland:	two divisions plus 85% of another two divisions[3]	2.18
	Hungary:	251 tanks	0.30
		30 APCs	0.01
		180 anti-tank weapons	0.02
		250 other artillery pieces[4]	0.15
	Bulgaria:	200 tanks	0.24
		200 artillery pieces[4]	0.08
		total	**4.75**
Soviet forces in the European USSR:			
	4 700 tanks[5]		6.46
	7 006 artillery pieces[6]		2.84
		total	**9.30**

Notes to Table 5

1 Data concerning WP force reductions are taken from the memorandum presented by Phillip A. Karber of the BDM Corporation on 14 March 1989 to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, **Soviet Implementation of the Gorbachev Unilateral Military Reductions: Implications for Conventional Arms Control in Europe.**

Data concerning the ADE values of WP units and their armaments are taken from Mako (1983)(see chapter-note 4). These data, based on the publication **Weapon Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Values** (WEI/WUV (U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1974), are incomplete as well as out-of-date. More recent data are classified. Many of the sub-divisional units affected by the WP force reductions -- training regiments, combat engineers regiments, anti-aircraft missile regiments, chemical defense battalions, landing-assault battalions, air assault brigades, as well as air (aircraft and helicopter) and naval units -- had to be left out of the calculation because Mako does not provide ADE values for them. This lends the estimates a significant conservative bias. Partly compensating for this is the fact that the additional anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons which are to be inserted into the "defensively restructured" WP divisions have also been left out of account.

Some of the ADE values shown in the Table are probably understated because where Mako gives several weapon effectiveness indices for different types of a weapon (e.g. artillery) I have used the lowest index.

The estimates shown in Table 6 can therefore with a high degree of confidence be regarded as lower limits.

2 Mako gives 325 tanks for a Soviet tank division (328 according to Karber) and 40 tanks for an independent tank battalion. These two types of formation therefore account for (325 x 6) + (40 x 10) = 2 350 tanks. As Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe are to be reduced by 5 300 overall, 2 950 have to be removed from other divisions and units.

3 I assume that these 3.7 division equivalents are to be taken from tank divisions. As Mako assigns East European tank divisions lower ADE values than motor-rifle (mechanized) divisions, this is again a conservative assumption.

4 The WP uses the term "artillery" in a broad sense to include weapons categorized by NATO as anti-tank weapons and mortars. I assume that the 200 artillery pieces to be reduced by Bulgaria include 84 anti-tank weapons -- i.e. in the same proportion as for Hungary.

5 This is the difference between the 10 000 tanks to be reduced in the whole of the European area and the 5 300 tanks reduced in non-Soviet Eastern Europe.

6 This is the difference between the 8 500 artillery pieces to be reduced in the whole of the European area and the 1 494 artillery pieces (in the WP sense) organic to the six Soviet tank divisions to be disbanded in Eastern Europe. I make here the simplifying assumption that no additional artillery pieces are to be removed from other formations in Eastern Europe.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED ADE VALUE OF THE UNILATERAL WP FORCE REDUCTIONS

	Soviet forces	Non-Soviet WP forces	Total WP forces
Forces in non-Soviet Eastern Europe	8.5	4.8	13.3
Forces in the European part of the USSR	9.3	-	9.3
Forces in the whole of Europe	17.8	4.8	22.6

Note: Data derived from Table 5.

The impact of the WP reductions on the balance of forces in Central Europe measured in terms of ADEs is set out in Tables 7 and 8. According to Thomson, the WP enjoyed in 1988 an advantage on the Central Front prior to mobilization of about 1.5 : 1. A serious lag in NATO's mobilization might increase WP superiority to the "decisive" level of 2.5 : 1. Applying to Thomson's figures my estimate of the WP reductions, we see that by January 1991 there will be approximate pre-mobilization parity on the Central Front, eliminating any credible threat of a standing-start surprise attack. In the worst case of delayed NATO mobilization, WP superiority will be reduced to the more manageable "moderate" level of 1.8 : 1.

The uncorrected use of ADEs, however, leaves out of account such factors as training, command and control, logistics and other support services. NATO has a lower "teeth-to-tail ratio" than the WP: whether, as Posen argues, this indicates that NATO has superior support services is a matter of controversy. There can, on the other hand, be little doubt that the average level of training is higher in the professional armies of NATO than in the conscript armies of the WP. Posen multiplies NATO's ADE strength by 1.5 to allow for its advantages in these areas.

If one accepts the correctness of this adjustment, one comes to the following conclusions:

a. Before the WP reductions there was already rough pre-mobilization parity on the Central Front, and delayed NATO mobilization would have entailed only "moderate" WP superiority.

b. The WP reductions give NATO a "moderate" pre-mobilization superiority. Delayed NATO mobilization will probably entail rough parity.

c. From the point of view of a worst-case WP analyst who assumes that NATO mobilizes first and who shares Posen's appreciation of WP deficiencies in training, logistics and support, the WP reductions transform the previous rough parity into a NATO superiority of 1.8 : 1 (Table 8) -- not "decisive" but still cause for some concern[12].

One's judgements concerning whether the threat to NATO is eliminated by the WP reductions or just substantially reduced and whether a threat to the WP may arise therefore depend crucially upon the view one takes of Posen's adjustment factor. There is unavoidably an element of arbitrariness in assigning it any particular value, but the factor of training alone surely makes omitting it (i.e. implicitly giving it a value of 1) misleading. Some may prefer to give it an intermediate value (say, 1.3), entailing somewhat less radical conclusions. In any case, the strategic situation is becoming sufficiently ambiguous to cast doubt upon customary Western perceptions of the scale and direction of the threat.

It was in fact possible to argue even before the WP reductions were announced that the threat was potentially ambiguous in character. Stephen Biddle showed in 1988 that given the wide range of conditions under which conflict in Europe might break out -- different military developments outside Europe, different reactions to the crisis by various member states of NATO and the WP etc. -- the balance on the Central Front could be anywhere between 4 : 1 in favor of the WP and 2 : 1 in favor of NATO[13]. The effect of the WP reductions is to make this range less asymmetrical, thereby putting the two sides more equally at risk.

The impact of airpower. No aggregate measure for airpower that would correspond to ADEs for ground forces has been devised. However, the view generally taken by experts on the subject is that -- taking due account of such factors as levels of technology and training and maintenance capability as well as numbers of aircraft -- NATO has the overall advantage over the WP. "NATO," writes one specialist, "would probably gain the edge in the air in the Central Region during the early air battle and then hold it thereafter." This would largely protect NATO's rear areas from attack, allowing further mobilization to proceed with minimal hindrance; NATO could repair its airfields and use its remaining aircraft to disrupt the WP's rear[14].

The WP reductions in combat aircraft, modest as they are -- 800 Soviet aircraft in Europe, of which perhaps 160 in Central Europe, plus 130 non-Soviet WP aircraft -- will in some degree enhance this NATO air superiority.

Incorporating airpower into assessment of the balance therefore reduces WP superiority in the case where the WP mobilizes first, and at the same time increases NATO's potential threat to the WP in the case where NATO mobilizes first. A complicating circumstance is that the side which strikes first from the air, which may be the side weaker on the ground, gains a margin of advantage.

TABLE 7. THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BEFORE AND AFTER THE WP REDUCTIONS[1] FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A WORST-CASE NATO ANALYST

(a) IN TERMS OF ADEs[2]

	Before WP red'ns	After WP red'ns
In Central Europe before mobilization		
WP	40	27
NATO	27	27
WP : NATO	1.5 : 1	1 : 1
In Central Europe after mobilization with NATO lagging behind the WP[3]		
WP	80	57
NATO	32	32
WP : NATO	2.5 : 1	1.8 : 1

(b) IN TERMS OF "ADJUSTED ADEs"[4]

	Before WP red'ns	After WP red'ns
In Central Europe before mobilization		
WP	40	27
NATO	40	40
WP : NATO	1 : 1	1 : 1.5
In Central Europe after mobilization with NATO lagging behind the WP[3]		
WP	80	57
NATO	48	48
WP : NATO	1.7 : 1	1.2 : 1

Notes to Table 7

[1] On the assumption that the strength in ADEs of NATO forces in Europe remains constant.

[2] ADE values before the WP reductions are taken from Thomson (1989)(see chapter-note 11), p. 72. Thomson, who is Vice President of the RAND Corporation, appears to have access to classified data for calculating ADEs (see note 1 to Table 5). ADE values after the WP reductions were derived using the estimates shown in Table 6.

[3] Of the three post-mobilization scenarios examined by Thomson, this is the one most unfavorable to NATO. It represents the situation one week after an attack by the WP. The attack was preceded by ten days of mobilization on the part of the WP but by only five days of mobilization on the part of NATO. The WP, but not NATO, had made pre-mobilization preparations. The losses of the two sides in combat are left out of account. The scenario may be taken as exemplifying NATO worst-case thinking, though not of the most extreme kind.

[4] "Adjusted ADEs" are the units advocated by Posen (1984-85)(see chapter-note 5), who multiplies NATO's strength in ADEs by a factor of 1.5 to allow for the superiority of NATO in the areas of command and control, training, logistics and support services (see text). I assume for the purpose of this calculation that NATO will retain the same margin of superiority over the WP in these areas after the WP force reductions. This is a reasonable simplifying assumption for the short term, but over the longer term -- given increased emphasis by the WP on quality and professionalism -- the margin of NATO superiority may be expected to decline.

TABLE 8. THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BEFORE AND AFTER THE WP REDUCTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A WORST-CASE WP ANALYST

(a) IN TERMS OF ADEs

	Before WP red'ns	After WP red'ns
In Central Europe after mobilization with the WP lagging behind NATO[1]		
WP	40	27
NATO	32	32
WP : NATO	1.25 : 1	1 : 1.2

(b) IN TERMS OF "ADJUSTED ADEs"[2]

	Before WP red'ns	After WP red'ns
In Central Europe after mobilization with the WP lagging behind NATO[1]		
WP	40	27
NATO	48	48
WP : NATO	1 : 1.2	1 : 1.8

Notes to Table 8

[1] In this worst-case (from the WP perspective) scenario, NATO has been mobilizing its forces for two weeks while an indecisive Soviet leadership striving to avoid provocation has not yet started mobilization.

[2] See note 4 to Table 7.

4. The Balance from the Point of View of the WP

In discussing the strategic situation in Europe in Sections 2 and 3 I have tried to take the likely perspective of the WP into account, but I have done so mainly on the basis of Western data and the force measure used -- the ADE -- has been an American one. In this Section, the conventional balance in Europe is considered, insofar as this is possible, on the basis of WP data and using a reconstructed WP force measure.

Spokesmen for the WP regularly depict the conventional balance in Europe as the approximate parity of structurally asymmetrical forces. These assertions are widely regarded in the West as insincere, not only because they contradict NATO's perception of its own inferiority but also because they are apparently inconsistent with one another: whatever changes occur over time in the forces deployed on the two sides, the result is always proclaimed to be "approximate parity". To take the latest example: before the current WP force reductions there was said to be approximate parity, and it is now said that after the reductions there will still be approximate parity.

A recent interview with the Bulgarian Minister of Defense, Dobri Dzhurov, may clarify this conundrum. Here he defines the "approximate parity" of the balance as a situation that "gives neither side the opportunity to count upon a decisive military advantage." Asked whether NATO might acquire superiority as a result of the WP reductions, he replies that "the range over which the balance of forces may vary without undermining stability ... is, as practice shows, quite wide"[15]. The term "approximate parity" therefore has a meaning broader than the one it has in most Western usage: it covers the ranges both of "rough parity" and of "moderate superiority" on either side (to use the terminology introduced in Section 1), excluding only the case where one side or the other enjoys "decisive superiority." In this light it seems more plausible to attribute sincerity to claims of approximate parity. Of course, they provide very little insight into Soviet and WP perceptions of the balance and its evolution.

In the past serious technical discussions of the conventional balance in Europe, and even of methods of assessing it, have been absent from the open Soviet literature. A recent article by General V. Larionov, formerly a professor at the General Staff Academy and now an analyst at ISKAN, does however tackle the problem of method, though without drawing any conclusions about the balance itself[16]. Larionov recognises the extreme complexity of comparing conventional forces, especially in view of the fact that each side possesses many types of equipment not used by the other side. He advocates measuring the combat power of different armaments and formations in terms of averages of standardized technical parameters, weighted in accordance with their relative importance. The few examples he gives of this method are hypothetical ones, so that one cannot attempt to reconstruct from them a Soviet version of the ADE, though it might be inferred that some such measure of aggregate combat power probably exists[17].

Given our ignorance of Soviet methods of force calculation, it is necessary to resort to a makeshift approach to reconstructing the Soviet view of the pan-European balance. I use here the statement made in March 1989 by General V. M. Tatarnikov to the effect that if the capacity of one artillery piece is taken as the unit of measurement, then a tank equals 4-5 units, a helicopter equals 6-9 units and a strike aircraft equals 10-12 times a tank -- i.e. 40-60 units. Let us take the mid-points of these ranges -- that is, 4.5, 7.5 and 50 units for a tank, a helicopter and a strike aircraft respectively -- and apply them to the most recent WP figures for the numbers of these four types of armaments on the two sides before the WP reductions[18].

We obtain the result that the WP is superior to NATO by a ratio just over 1.1 : 1. However, the WP figures show that the WP is superior in other important armaments not included in this calculation -- in particular, by a ratio of 11.8 : 1 in tactical missile launchers and by a ratio of 1.5:1 in Armored Personnel Carriers and Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Among the excluded armaments NATO is shown as superior only in anti-tank missile systems (by 1.6 : 1). It therefore seems likely that, taking all important weapons systems into account, the WP would assess its own pre-reductions superiority -- within the broad range of "approximate parity" -- as rather greater than 1.1 : 1.

In reconstructing the WP view of the balance after the WP force reductions, we face the additional problem that information has not been made public concerning either the number of helicopters to be included in the reductions or the exact proportion of the 930 aircraft to be included which are "strike aircraft." It has been stated that "most" of these aircraft are strike aircraft; I assume that this means 85%. Helicopters have to be omitted from the calculation. Calculating the balance for artillery, tanks and strike aircraft alone, we obtain a WP superiority of about 1.2 : 1 before the reductions and a NATO superiority of about 1.1 : 1 after the reductions.

It seems reasonable to conclude from this exercise that a WP analyst probably views the WP force reductions as transforming a modest WP superiority into something very close to parity. One might speculate that the reductions were designed with this end in view.

5. Summary of Conclusions

Both of my approaches to assessing the balance of conventional forces in Europe -- that focusing on the tank balance and that using ADEs -- suggest that the unilateral WP force reductions in 1989-90 will establish a rough parity of pre-mobilization forces in Central Europe. The post-reductions pan-European tank balance is also one of rough parity. The exact results are sensitive to assumptions made about the relative strength of the sides in the areas of weapon effectiveness, command and control, training, logistics and support. One can, however, conclude with some confidence that the threat of surprise standing-start attack is no longer a credible one.

A similar assurance cannot be made with respect to conceivable post-mobilization scenarios. The Western worst-case analyst may still have cause to worry about the capability of the WP to build up at least a moderate superiority of forces on the Central Front in the event of a serious delay in NATO's own mobilization. However, the Eastern worst-case analyst will also henceforth have cause to worry about NATO's capability to achieve superiority of a similar magnitude in the event of an analogous delay in the mobilization of the WP.

Incorporation into the assessment of the factor of airpower gives a further measure of advantage to NATO, though much here depends on which side strikes from the air first.

My attempt to reconstruct an assessment of the balance from the point of view of the WP suggests that WP analysts similarly view the post-reductions pan-European balance of forces as one of rough parity.

In general, I would conclude that there is emerging in Europe a more symmetrical pattern of forces, threats, risks and capabilities. Depending upon the relative timetables of mobilization and upon which side struck first from the air, either side might face a substantial disadvantage in the event of conflict. Only in the most extreme and implausible of conceivable scenarios, however, could such a disadvantage assume decisive proportions.

Notes and References

[1] **The Military Balance 1987-88** (London: IISS, 1987), p. 226. For another useful discussion of methods of assessing conventional forces, see Charles A. Kupchan, 'Setting Conventional Force Requirements: Roughly Right or Precisely Wrong?' **World Politics** Vol. XLI No. 4 (July 1989), p. 536.

[2] General J. R. Galvin, 'Some thoughts on conventional arms control,' **Survival**, March/April 1989, p. 99.

[3] Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, **Is There A Tank Gap? A Comparative Assessment of the Tank Fleets of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Peace Research Report No. 19** (School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, October 1987). The authors also present their work in the article 'Is There A Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets,' **International Security** Vol. 13 No. 1 (Summer 1988), p. 5. Steven J. Zaloga has disputed some of the judgements made by Chalmers and Unterseher, but their replies to his points seem on the whole convincing; in any case, the basic thrust of their argument has not been undermined ('The Tank Gap Data Flap,' **International Security** Vol. 13 No. 4 (Spring 1989), p. 180. Some technical points cannot be definitively resolved without access to classified information.

[4] For accounts of the method of calculating ADEs, see William P. Mako, **U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe** (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), Appendix A, pp. 105-25, and Kupchan (note 1).

[5] B. R. Posen, 'Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment,' **International Security** Vol. 9 No. 3 (Winter 1984-85).

[6] Statement at the Press Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 29 March 1989 (**Vestnik MID SSSR** No. 8(42), 1 May 1989, p. 16).

[7] **The Military Balance** (see note 1).

[8] The choice of assumption depends on one's judgement of the relative difficulty of transporting tanks to the Central Front from North America and from the deep Soviet rear. It is usually thought in the West that geographical contiguity gives the USSR an inherent advantage in this respect. Soviet strategists apparently do not share this view. Speaking at a seminar at Harvard on 13 June 1989, deputy director of ISKAN Andrei Kokoshin pointed out that the reliance of the USSR mainly upon rail transport, imposed by the limited capacity of its roads, entails vulnerability to air strikes against Brest and a few other key choke-points of the rail network. Movement is also impeded by the change in rail gauge at the Soviet frontier. On the other hand, NATO has now acquired the amphibious capability to land reinforcements at any point on the North Atlantic shoreline even after the disabling of its ports. It is easier, Kokoshin concluded, to get forces to Central Europe from across the Atlantic than from the Volga Military District.

[9] See, for example, the discussion on p. 242 of Gen.-Col. M. A. Gareyev, **M. V. Frunze -- voennyi teoretik** (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985). Gareyev argues here, with special reference to Stalin's unwillingness to mobilize in 1941 out of fear of provoking Germany, that the decision to mobilize is unavoidably taken with a view to political and not just military-technical considerations, and that military planners must not therefore assume that mobilization will have been completed at the outbreak of a future war.

[10] Quite such optimistic conclusions would not be warranted for scenarios more extreme than those shown in Table 4. I have assumed that the likelihood of extremely long mobilization lags may be regarded as negligible. The reader who does not share this assumption will need to adjust the analysis accordingly.

[11] At the conference of the IISS: J. A. Thomson, 'An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance,' Adelphi Papers 236. The Changing Strategic Landscape. Part II (London: Brassey's, Spring 1989).

[12] At the seminar mentioned in note 8, Kokoshin commented that some of his colleagues think that as a result of its force reductions the WP will lose its "margin of safety" against the "technological threat" from NATO.

[13] S. D. Biddle, 'The European Conventional Balance: A Reinterpretation of the Debate,' Survival, March/April 1988, p. 99.

[14] Professor Ted Greenwood (Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University), 'The operational dimension: the role of air power in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict,' p. 45 in P. Sabin (ed.), The Future of United Kingdom Air Power (London: Brassey's, 1988); Joshua M. Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[15] See the interview with the Bulgarian Minister of Defense Dobri Dzhurov, 'Voennyi balans v Yevrope,' Problemy mira i sotsializma No. 4(368), April 1989, p. 20.

[16] Gen.-Maj. V. Larionov, 'Problemy predotvrashcheniya obychnoi voiny v Yevrope,' Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 1989, No. 7, p. 31.

[17] Larionov's examples may nevertheless be suggestive of Soviet approaches to the measurement of combat power. For comparing the power of different types of tank he assigns weights of 30%, 25%, 20%, 15% and 10% to armor thickness, gun caliber, speed of fire, presence or absence of gun stabilization, and number of items of combat equipment respectively. Some parameters which one would expect to be used, such as maximum speed and range of movement of the tank, are ignored.

[18] As given in Annex 2 of the Statement by the Ministers of Defense of the WTO Member States (International Affairs, April 1989, p. 137).

CHAPTER 3

THE RESTRUCTURING OF WP FORCES

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I assess the significance of the reorganization of WP forces[1] remaining in Europe which is to accompany the quantitative force reductions analyzed in Chapter 2. To what degree is the claim of the WP that this reorganization imparts to their forces a defensively orientated structure justified?

In Section 3-2 I review the known aspects of the WP force restructuring. In Section 3-3 I make a quantitative assesssment of the single most important aspect of the restructuring -- the reduction in the "tank-heaviness" of Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 3-4.

3.2 Aspects of WP force restructuring

The restructuring of Soviet forces remaining in Eastern Europe has two main aspects.

First, certain special "air-assault" (paratroop) and "landing-assault" (river-bridging) units -- in particular, an air-assault brigade in the GDR, an air-assault battalion in Hungary and an army landing-assault brigade in Poland -- are to be withdrawn. As these units will be not disbanded but redeployed in the USSR[2], the offensive capability which they represent will be reduced rather than eliminated.

Second, the weight of "offensive" armaments held by divisions and other formations remaining in Eastern Europe is to be reduced, and the weight of their "defensive" armaments increased. Thus, according to the Chief of the General Staff, the tanks, artillery, air-assault and bridging equipment in tank and motorized-rifle divisions will undergo reductions of 30-35%, while anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons in these divisions will be increased by a factor of between 1.5 and 2[3]. More specifically:

-- One tank regiment will be removed from each tank division. The number of tanks in a tank division will fall from 328 to 260, by just over 20%. Tank divisions will be provided with additional anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, engineering equipment (for creating obstacles and laying minefields) and means of camouflage.

-- The tank regiments of motorized-rifle divisions in the GDR and Czechoslovakia will be removed, leaving only motorized-infantry regiments. The number of tanks in a motorized-rifle division will fall from 270 to 160, by 40%.

-- Separate tank regiments (i.e. tank regiments subordinated not to a division but directly to a Group of Forces) will be transformed into motorized-infantry regiments.

Less is known about the restructuring of Soviet forces deployed in the European part of the USSR. It has been stated that machine-gun/artillery divisions will be set up in the three western border Military Districts -- the Baltic, Carpathian and Belorussian MDs. This will be the restoration of a traditional type of formation designed for the defense of fortified areas or bastions. Possessing only forty tanks, a machine-gun/artillery division will have very low mobility. What is not yet clear is the extent to which such unambiguously defensive formations will replace rather than just supplement existing offensive formations. In one respect -- the availability of paratroops and bridging forces -- the offensive capability of forces on Soviet territory will actually be enhanced by the redeployment of such forces from Eastern Europe.

3.3 Reduction in the "tank-heaviness" of Soviet formations in Eastern Europe

The "tank-heaviness" of a military formation is widely regarded as an important indicator of the extent to which its orientation is an offensive one. The restructuring of Soviet formations remaining in Eastern Europe, described in Section 3.2, considerably reduces the overall "tank-heaviness" of Soviet forces there, as does the reduction in the proportion of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe which are tank divisions, resulting from the fact that all of the six divisions to be disbanded are tank divisions.

How one assesses the significance of this reduction in "tank-heaviness" depends, of course, on one's standard of comparison. By the demanding standards of some advocates of "non-offensive defense," for example, even the restructured Soviet forces must be considered highly offensive in orientation. A more pertinent standard of comparison, perhaps, is that represented by corresponding NATO formations. A rough comparison of the "tank-heaviness" of Soviet tank and motorized-rifle divisions in Central Europe, before and after the restructuring, with that of French, West German, British and American armored and mechanized divisions in Central Europe is shown in Table 3-1. For this purpose I define "tank-heaviness" of a formation as the proportion of its total combat power, measured in terms of ADEs, which is embodied in tanks.

We see from the Table that even after restructuring Soviet tank divisions will remain substantially more tank-heavy than the armored divisions of any of the four NATO countries considered, though the gap will be much narrower than in the past. On the other hand, Soviet motorized-rifle divisions, previously about as tank-heavy as West German mechanized divisions (the most tank-heavy in NATO), will henceforth be much less tank-heavy than their West German counterparts and only somewhat more tank-heavy than their American counterparts. When account is taken of the reduced proportion of tank divisions in the set of Soviet divisions in Central Europe, Soviet and NATO divisions in Central Europe are roughly comparable in respect of tank-heaviness. I suggested in Chapter 2 that parity with NATO may have been the goal of the quantitative WP force reductions. Similarly, rough comparability with NATO force structure may have been the goal of the WP restructuring.

TABLE 3-1. COMPARISON OF THE TANK-HEAVINESS[1] OF SOVIET DIVISIONS, BEFORE AND AFTER WP FORCE REDUCTIONS AND RESTRUCTURING, WITH THAT OF NATO DIVISIONS[2]

	Tank (armored) divisions	Motorized-rifle (mechanized) divisions	All divisions[3]
USSR			
before restructuring	68	44	55
after restructuring	59	32	41
France	54	NA[4]	54
FRG	51	43	47
Britain	40	NA	40
U.S.	38	27	33

Notes

[1] Defined as the proportion (in %) of divisional combat power, measured in terms of ADEs (see Section 2.3), which is embodied in tanks.

[2] In Central Europe -- i.e. the FRG, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

[3] These are weighted averages of the figures for tank (armored) and motorized-rifle (mechanized) divisions, with the weights proportional to the numbers of divisions of the two types in Central Europe -- i.e. 13 Soviet tank and 15 MR divisions before restructuring, 7 tank and 15 MR divisions after restructuring; 3 French armored divisions, 4 British armored divisions, 6 West German armored and 5 mechanized divisions, 2 American armored and 2 mechanized divisions.

[4] NA -- Not Applicable, as no divisions of this type in Central Europe.

3.4 Conclusions

In assessing the significance of the restructuring of WP forces, a clear distinction must be made between forces deployed in non-Soviet Eastern Europe and forces in the European part of the USSR.

The extent to which WP forces in Eastern Europe are offensively orientated is significantly reduced by the force restructuring taken in conjunction with the force reductions. Henceforth WP forces in Central Europe will be about as defensively (or offensively) structured as NATO forces there. This supports the inference drawn in Chapter 2 from the rough quantitative parity brought about in Central Europe by the WP force reductions that the threat of a surprise standing-start attack will not in the future be a credible one to either side.

The significance of the restructuring of forces on Soviet territory is a matter of greater uncertainty. The developments making for a more defensive orientation of these forces are difficult to gauge, while some developments may even work in the opposite direction. It is probably true to say that one should not expect in the USSR itself defensive restructuring of the scope of that carried out in Eastern Europe. This again supports an inference drawn in Chapter 2 -- that is, that the WP will remain capable of generating a substantial offensive capability in Central Europe in the course of mobilization.

I note finally that there exist some components of WP forces which are very little, if at all, affected by defensive restructuring. This applies above all to WP aviation, the offensive strike capability of which is not greatly reduced by the modest reduction in the number of combat aircraft.

Notes and references

[1] Most of the information so far available pertains specifically to the restructuring of Soviet forces: I assume that non-Soviet WP forces are to be restructured along similar lines. I have drawn upon the account of the reorganization of Soviet military formations given by Phillip A. Karber in **Soviet Implementation of the Gorbachev Unilateral Military Reductions: Implications for Conventional Arms Control in Europe** (The BDM Corporation, 14 March 1989), pp. 6-7.

[2] The Commander of the Air-Assault Troops, Gen.-Lieut. V. Achalov, states in a recent interview that Soviet air-assault forces will be maintained and improved to carry out missions of "active defense" ('Golubye berety,' **Pravda**, 3 August 1989, p. 3.

[3] General M. A. Moiseyev, 'Yeshchyo raz o prestizhe armii,' **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 13 (July), p. 3.

CHAPTER 4

THE REVISION OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

4.1 Introduction

The reduction and restructuring of Soviet and WP forces in Europe are accompanied by, and explained as products of, changes in Soviet and WP military doctrine[1]. It seems logical that there should be a close connection here: smaller and more defensively orientated forces are called upon to prepare to carry out tasks of a more defensive character. In reality, the relationship between force reductions and restructuring on the one hand and revision of doctrine on the other is not so simple and direct. While doctrinal revision has served to legitimize changes in forces, the doctrinal controversy remains unresolved. The force changes have not been precisely tailored to meet the requirements of a clearly defined new doctrine but, like the state of doctrine at any given moment, bear the hallmarks of compromise among different groups of military and civilian policy advisers. Just as re-examination of doctrine was, together with economic and foreign policy considerations, a factor in the decision to reduce and restructure forces, so has this decision acted as a further stimulus to doctrinal debate[2].

Whatever the exact role of doctrinal debate in the process of change, military doctrine provides at any one time an officially authorized definition of the tasks faced by the armed forces. Change in doctrine accordingly constitutes a vital part of the evidence upon which an assessment of the strategic significance of the current shift in the Soviet military posture should be based.

The new "defensive military doctrine" deals with the "defensive" strategy to be pursued by WP forces in the opening phase, assumed to be conventional, of a possible future armed conflict in Europe. It can therefore be merely one component -- if a very important one -- of military doctrine taken as a whole (what I shall call "general military doctrine"), which is primarily concerned with the general character of a possible future war throughout its course and at the global level. The problematic relationship between the "defensive military doctrine" and pre-existing general military doctrine will be at the center of my analysis.

Sections 4.2-4.4 are devoted to clarification of the "defensive military doctrine" as such. The variant of this doctrine expounded by senior Soviet military figures is described in Section 4.2. The motives underlying introduction of the new doctrine are considered in Section 4.3. The views of those (mainly civilian) Soviet analysts who advocate more radical variants of the doctrine are discussed in Section 4.4.

In Section 4.5 I proceed to discuss the "defensive military doctrine" in the broader context of its relationship with general Soviet military doctrine. In Section 4.6 I assess the strategic significance of recent doctrinal change in the context of the reduction and restructuring of military forces.

4.2 The new defensive doctrine as expounded by senior military figures[3]

The "main" or "basic" mode of repelling aggression in a future war was formerly held to be offensive combat actions. Since the end of 1988 defensive combat actions have been thus described. What this means in strategic terms is that Soviet forces in Europe no longer aim to take the offensive at the earliest possible moment after the outbreak of hostilities, but instead plan to fight the aggressor in defensive operations during an initial phase of substantial duration. In a second phase Soviet forces are to go over to the counter-offensive, the final goal of which is "the complete defeat of the enemy troops" -- the war aim traditionally set by Soviet doctrine.

The tasks of the defensive phase are, according to General Vladimir Lobov, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the WP, "to check the enemy offensive, to enfeeble the enemy forces, to prevent the loss of a considerable area of territory and to create conditions for launching a decisive counter-offensive"[4]. Forces not brought into active use during this phase serve the purpose of deterring the aggressor from escalating the conflict either to the nuclear level or in geographical terms.

Some further inferences may be drawn about the course of the defensive phase. The aggressor is to be reliably prevented from decisively breaking through the defensive zone. Any local penetrations are to be rapidly thwarted by mobile reserves held behind this zone. Retreat deep into the Russian rear, such as occurred in 1941 or 1942, is deemed unacceptable. On the other hand, there is none of the insistence on "forward defense" that one finds in NATO doctrine. It is assumed that the side taking the initial offensive enjoys a considerable advantage, so that some retreat on the part of the defending side is inevitable if it is to conserve its forces and to weaken the aggressor sufficiently to turn the tide. The creation of defensively orientated divisions for holding fortified areas in the western border Military Districts (see Section 3.2) suggests that the possibility is envisaged of the retreat even continuing a certain distance past the Soviet frontier. In any case, Eastern Europe serves the USSR in this scenario as a defensive buffer[5].

The duration of the defensive phase is usually left unspecified. The Minister of Defense, General Yazov, and other senior military men have, however, indicated to Western interlocutors that it is expected to last "twenty" or "twenty to thirty" days. The counter-offensive phase might be of comparable duration. Its goal in practical terms would apparently be a drive to the Atlantic to defeat NATO on the European continent.

This two-phase strategy requires very great offensive capabilities, but the delay in bringing them into play in a war allows for their deployment in the rear, well behind the line of confrontation, in peacetime and even during crises. The capability to mount an immediate offensive from forward positions is no longer needed. This is consistent with the differential extent of the defensive restructuring of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and on Soviet territory (Section 3.4).

An important area of ambiguity in the "defensive doctrine" concerns the precise definition of "defensive" combat action. Senior military figures have stated that defense must be "active" in character[6], and "active defense" is interpreted as permitting such apparently "offensive" actions as paratroop assaults[7]. In Soviet military science, the "defensive operation" has been defined as including elements which are, from the point of view of their impact upon strategic and crisis stability, more or less offensive. In particular, the defensive operation is supposed to open -- before the adversary's offensive is fully prepared and launched -- with the "counter-preparation" (*kontrpodgotovka*), a disruption of his preparations for attack by means of air, artillery and missile strikes against his force concentrations and C^{3}I. Unless and until the theory of the defensive operation has been appropriately revised, the "defensive doctrine" fails clearly to rule out pre-emption from the air, even if it does exclude pre-emption on the ground[8]. Concern about this limitation of the new doctrine is further aroused by the fact, noted in Section 3.4, that the offensive threat embodied in WP strike aviation is largely left in place by the force reductions and restructuring.

Pertinent to this problem is another question that is not always discussed very clearly in Soviet expositions of the new doctrine -- that of the extent to which change towards a more defensive doctrine and force structure on the part of the WP is to be unconditional, and the extent to which such change is to be conditional upon corresponding change on the part of NATO. No Soviet writer any longer argues that no significant steps can be taken unilaterally, nor does anyone defend the view that unilateral restructuring can proceed as far as the elimination of all offensive capability above the tactical level. Between these two extreme positions, however, there is ample scope for dispute. Military writers tend to insist that major change requires mutuality, while many civilian analysts emphasize how much can be done on a unilateral basis if necessary. Thus it should be borne in mind that some desirable doctrinal changes which the Soviet military are reluctant to make unilaterally under existing circumstances, such as the unequivocal exclusion of pre-emptive air strikes, may still be attainable through the arms control process.

4.3 Motives underlying introduction of the new defensive doctrine

A variety of benefits are said in Soviet sources to flow from adoption of the new doctrine and from the corresponding restructuring of forces. Let us review first those benefits which accrue directly in peacetime or in the event of a crisis entailing the threat of war, and then those which accrue should armed hostilities actually break out, whether as a result of misunderstanding in a crisis, escalation from a local incident or deliberate aggression on the part of the adversary.

1. **Peacetime foreign policy gains.** It is expected that a more defensive military doctrine and posture will facilitate improved relations between Western Europe (and the FRG in particular) and the USSR, with all their potential for advantage in the security, economic and other spheres, by reassuring West European opinion concerning the peaceful orientation and stability of Soviet policy towards Europe. Soviet foreign policy analysts now commonly recognize that the offensive military posture of the USSR has had the counter-productive effect of consolidating the opposing alliance and stimulating its arms buildup[9].

2. **Crisis stability.** It is understood that an offensive military doctrine and posture create powerful pressure to pre-empt in the event of a serious crisis, undermining the chances of a peaceful resolution. This is because offensively postured forces are poorly equipped to conduct the defensive should the adversary strike first[10].

3. Insurance against worst-case scenarios. The reverse side of the coin is that this defensive weakness of an offensive posture may put Soviet and WP forces in a critical position if NATO does strike first. A defensive doctrine and posture provide better insurance against worst-case scenarios. As examples of such scenarios contemplated by Soviet strategists, Andrei Kokoshin mentions:

-- an unexpected NATO attack on the GDR alone developing without interruption out of large-scale NATO field manoeuvers; or

-- a NATO first "surgical" strike in depth against WP command and control in a situation of rising tension or minor conflict, especially if the WP had not yet gone on alert. At present, such a strike would still have to rely upon tactical nuclear weapons, but a future large-scale deployment of "smart" weaponry might make a purely conventional (and therefore more plausible) decapitating attack feasible. Heightened awareness of the implications of the relative weakness of the USSR in advanced technology raises the priority assigned to insurance against such a scenario[11].

4. Facilitation of war limitation and termination. According to recent speeches of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the tasks of Soviet diplomacy include not only war prevention but also the limitation and early negotiated termination of any conflict that does break out[12]. In making provision for an initial defensive phase, during which the geographical scope of military operations is constrained and the ability of the leadership to control their course maximized, the new defensive doctrine facilitates the limitation and termination of a war.

War limitation and termination are familiar concepts in Western strategic thinking. Their firm incorporation into Soviet military doctrine would, however, represent a radical departure from tradition. According to long-established positions, escalation to global war becomes inevitable once the armed forces of the U.S. and the USSR enter into direct engagement anywhere in the world, and such a global war would be "the decisive historical clash between the two socio-political systems," by its very nature brooking no compromise[13]. Since about 1980 it has been admitted that fear of nuclear catastrophe on both sides might limit a future war to the conventional level, but both the idea of geographical war limitation and that of war termination short of victory are innovations of the "new thinking."

The new interest in early war termination reflects increased awareness of the potentially catastrophic consequences of a future war -- even of a war in which nuclear weapons are not used, should it take place in a densely industrialized region like Europe where enormous environmental devastation would result from deliberate or inadvertent missile and air strikes on such objects as nuclear power stations, chemical plants, stores of fuel, weapons and toxic chemicals[14]. Equally important, it reflects recognition of the point that war is now more likely to be the product of a crisis or local incident that escapes from political control than the result of deliberate aggression. The outbreak of war would not therefore in itself constitute proof that the political differences between the two sides had become irreconcilable.

There remains a tension between the diplomatic goal of negotiated war termination and the military goal of complete defeat of the adversary. Both goals have been affirmed at an authoritative level -- the former by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the latter by Defense Minister Yazov. The extent to which the goal of bringing about early war termination can now be regarded as part of Soviet military doctrine is not yet completely clear. Some, though not many, military writers have mentioned the possibility of a war ending as the result of political intervention[15].

5. Operational advantages. A defensive strategy, provided that it is well prepared and does not have to be implemented under conditions of surprise, is also said to possess advantages from the operational point of view. It gives rise to a less fluid and more predictable situation than that generated by an offensive strategy, and consequently makes less demanding requirements on the command and control system for centralized coordination[16].

On the other hand, of course, the abandonment of the previous more offensive doctrine does entail certain disadvantages. Above all, the chance is given up of expelling the U.S. military presence from the European continent in the early phase of a future war. This chance may now be considered an unacceptably slim one. Many Soviet strategists had, it is said, always been skeptical concerning the feasibility of successfully carrying out the deep offensive operations required by this goal without setting off a nuclear war[17].

4.4 The new defensive doctrine as expounded by civilian analysts[18]

All Soviet commentators approve of the first defensive phase of war envisaged in the new doctrine, but the second counter-offensive phase -- its timing, goals and force requirements -- remains a matter of controversy. While, as noted in Section 4.2, military men state that the final goal is still the "complete defeat" of the enemy, civilian analysts such as Alexei Arbatov (IMEMO) and Andrei Kokoshin (ISKAN) propose to limit the goal of any counter-offensive to restoration of the territorial *status-quo-ante*. In effect, they wish to see a return from the total concept of "victory" dominant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the more limited concept of the pre-Napoleonic era, according to which victory is won once the aggressive plans of the adversary have been thwarted[19]. In the nuclear era the quest for total victory has become too dangerous, because an adversary facing total defeat may escalate to the nuclear level, with catastrophic consequences for both sides.

The advocates of complete victory argue in turn that a premature halt to the counter-offensive permits the aggressor to recover his strength to launch a second, and possibly more successful, attack. General Serebryannikov (a doctrinal theorist in the armed forces' Main Political Administration) advances a compromise position: the Soviet counter-offensive should pause temporarily on reaching the original line of contact while an attempt is made to negotiate an end to the war on satisfactory terms; if this attempt fails and the adversary is rebuilding his offensive capability, then the counter-offensive is resumed[20].

Alexei Arbatov points out that the strategy of defensive and decisive counter-offensive phases generates enormous force requirements -- in fact, requirements exceeding those of the old offensive strategy, for the latter is subsumed in the final phase of the new strategy. Were these force requirements to be met, neither the economic savings nor many of the foreign-policy gains sought in adopting a more defensive strategy would be realized. Western Europe would still perceive a substantial, if less immediate, offensive threat from the USSR.

Arbatov also questions the apparently arbitrary figures cited by Soviet military men for the duration of the defensive phase. Could the USSR build up within twenty or thirty days of an attack the force superiority needed to go over to a general offensive? If mobilization at the outbreak of war were still at a relatively early stage, just completing mobilization under war conditions might take considerably longer than this. Planning for a longer defensive phase would be militarily more realistic, and would give the diplomats more time to negotiate an early end to the war. I draw out the full implication of this argument in the next Section.

4.5 The defensive doctrine in its broader doctrinal context

As I argued in Section 4.1, greater insight into the problems associated with the new "defensive doctrine" is obtained when it is viewed in the broader context of general Soviet military doctrine concerning the likely character of a possible future war.

Since the end of the 1970s Soviet doctrine has no longer considered it inevitable that a future war would escalate to the nuclear level. In the 1980s Soviet military thinking has become increasingly orientated towards the prospect of a war conducted wholly or predominantly with conventional weapons. This change of approach can be attributed to two main factors: on the one hand, a growing conviction that not only Soviet but also Western leaders have come to understand the mutually catastrophic consequences of any large-scale use of nuclear weapons and would be restrained even in war by that understanding; and, on the other hand, a recognition of the potential effectiveness of advanced conventional armaments, destined in coming years to become increasingly capable of fulfilling missions currently still assigned to nuclear weapons[21].

There is not, however, a consensus concerning the likely course, duration and outcome of a future conventional war. I would distinguish three schools of thought among Soviet writers on the subject:

(a) "Neo-traditionalists" look upon a future conventional war as a prolonged global struggle. Technological and other changes notwithstanding, such a war would in fundamental ways resemble World War Two. The basic concepts of strategy and operational art elaborated by Frunze and other Soviet theorists in the inter-war period and applied with success in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, but prematurely dismissed in the 1960s and 1970s as outdated in the wake of the nuclear "revolution in military affairs," would in a new war again prove of value. Victory would be attainable through a cumulation over time of partial advances[22].

(b) "Military modernists" hold, by contrast, that a future conventional war would differ fundamentally from all past wars. The large-scale use of new generations of long-range high-precision ("smart") weaponry would efface the traditional distinction between "offense" and "defense." The old pattern of gradually shifting continuous fronts would be replaced by a "fluid battlefield" upon which the forces of the two sides deeply and inextricably penetrate one another. Military operations would be much more intensive and destructive than they were in the past. The war would accordingly be rather less prolonged than the two last world wars -- perhaps several months[23].

(c) "Anti-military modernists" -- as we might label the analysts at ISKAN and IMEMO -- also expect that the advance of military technology, if not sufficiently constrained by arms control, will give rise to the "fluid battlefield." However, they argue that it will probably not prove feasible to sustain military operations on this fluid battlefield for longer than quite a short period: Alexei Arbatov suggests no longer than several weeks[24]. In support of this prediction they cite such factors as extremely high rates of loss of troops and equipment, exhaustion of troops subjected to uninterrupted combat, disruption of communications, transportation and logistics systems, environmental devastation and the strong likelihood that one side or the other will in desperation escalate to the nuclear level[25]. The view is sometimes expressed that the point has already been reached at which prolonged conventional operations become infeasible.

How compatible is the new "defensive doctrine" in its various versions with each of these three schools of thought?

The defensive doctrine presents the fewest problems to the "neo-traditionalists." For them a relatively short initial phase fought on the strategic defensive need not prejudice the prospect of eventually reaching complete victory in a prolonged struggle through an ultimately decisive counter-offensive. The "modernists" of either type, on the other hand, must confront the basic incompatibility between the "fluid battlefield" and a specifically "defensive" strategy. Unless the possible strategic future represented by the concept of the "fluid battlefield" can be averted by mutual agreement, any defensive doctrine formulated in the current period is doomed to become progressively more meaningless.

The views of "anti-military modernists" like Alexei Arbatov, who hold that even now a prolonged conventional war in Europe is infeasible, appear in a special light once careful consideration is given to the time factor. Arbatov, we recall, doubts whether it is realistic to plan on going over to the counter-offensive within three or four weeks of the outbreak of hostilities. But he also holds that a conventional war cannot last longer than several weeks in all. It is therefore legitimate to wonder whether (even if Arbatov himself does not explicitly spell the point out) he regards it as likely that the counter-offensive phase would be reached before the conventional conflict ended in one of two ways -- either through an early diplomatic settlement, or in an environmental catastrophe (with or even without escalation to nuclear war) that engulfed both sides. Fighting on the defensive can then no longer be considered part of a strategy for eventually "winning" a war, as "winning" (even in the limited pre-Napoleonic sense of the word) has become impossible. It is just one aspect of a last-ditch attempt to avert an intensive large-scale conflict and the accompanying slide into catastrophe.

4.6 The strategic significance of the new defensive doctrine

As Alexei Arbatov implies, the fit between the reductions and restructuring of Soviet forces and the revision of Soviet military doctrine is by no means a close one. When account is taken of the difficulty of rapidly expanding forces in the course of hostilities, the offensive capabilities which the USSR will retain after force reductions and restructuring are almost certainly inadequate for executing the demanding version of "defensive" strategy currently expounded by senior military figures. The practical need to achieve a closer fit between doctrine and capabilities may therefore act as an impetus to further doctrinal change in the direction indicated by the civilian analysts, even if such change is for a time impeded by institutional and psychological obstacles.

While post-reductions capabilities may not suffice to meet the requirements of the most demanding variant of "defensive doctrine," they may be excessive from the point of view of the most radical and least demanding variants. This supposition is supported by the rumored existence of a secret report prepared by an expert commission headed by Academician Yevgeni Velikhov, Vice-Chairman of the Academy of Sciences and Gorbachev's science adviser, which recommended force reductions even larger than those now being implemented. It is known, moreover, that in the months leading up to Gorbachev's speech at the U.N. in December 1988 he sought the reactions of leaders of other WP states to a proposal to withdraw 70 000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, 40% more than the 50 000 eventually decided upon[26]. It is conceivable that the conventional force proposal submitted by the "Velikhov Commission" or that underlying Gorbachev's soundings (if the two proposals were not indeed one and the same) was designed to be consistent with one of the more far-reaching variants of "defensive doctrine" elaborated in the Academy of Sciences institutes.

In short, it seems reasonable to look upon the current "official" version of the new doctrine (to the extent that such a version can be identified) as a provisional construct. It would perhaps be premature to attempt to assess in detail the strategic significance of the doctrine. However, some general observations are in order.

It seems to me that in assessing the strategic significance of the changes underway in Soviet military doctrine the central question -- setting aside problems of exact interpretation, important as they are -- is whether the overall defensive thrust of these changes should be taken at face value as a genuine expression of Soviet strategic intentions. The threat perceptions of a Western observer will crucially depend upon his or her judgement of this matter. Thus if one explicitly or implicitly discounts the new doctrine, one will see the offensive capability of forces on Soviet territory in the same light as before -- that is, as a time-lagged threat to Western Europe. One will expect this threat to turn into an immediate one in the course of any crisis mobilization as additional offensively orientated Soviet forces are moved forward into Eastern Europe. If, on the other hand, one broadly accepts the new doctrine as a genuine expression of Soviet intentions, one will see the same offensive capability in a much less threatening light -- that is, as a counter-offensive capability -- and one will not expect its forward deployment into Eastern Europe in the event of a crisis. If at a time of crisis forces were being mobilized on Soviet territory, crisis stability might be unnecessarily weakened were Western decision-makers automatically but mistakenly to perceive this as the prelude to a massive buildup of offensive potential on the Central Front.

Force structures in themselves cannot provide watertight proof that offensive capabilities are intended to serve an initially defensive strategy. Large-scale forward deployment in a crisis of offensive forces from the USSR into Eastern Europe would constitute evidence that the defensive doctrine had not been a reliable indicator of Soviet intentions. The converse, however, is not true. The absence of such deployment would not constitute equally convincing evidence for the authenticity of the defensive doctrine: it could always be argued that the crisis had been resolved before Soviet mobilization had reached its final pre-war stage.

A useful basis for judging the authenticity of Soviet defensive doctrine is the state of the infrastructure in Eastern Europe which would permit the rapid introduction of additional forces from the USSR. A weak infrastructure could not be taken as a conclusive indicator, as it could be strengthened again during a period of rising tension. In the nature of things, there are no absolute guarantees. Arms-control and confidence-building measures designed to constrain forward-deployment capabilities should nevertheless be able to do much to alleviate Western (as well as Soviet) anxieties.

The inclination of a Western observer to take seriously the hypothesis that Soviet military doctrine is and will continue moving in a defensive direction depends not only on technical indicators but also on more general assumptions concerning the USSR. Firstly, in order to accept that Soviet military power might really pursue primarily defensive purposes one must disabuse oneself of the assumption, quite widely held in the West, that it is self-evident to everyone -- including Soviet leaders -- that the Western states are inherently non-aggressive. Secondly, in order to accept that the USSR might rationally choose to pursue these defensive purposes in accordance with a defensive military doctrine one must find it plausible that at least some of the proclaimed motives for introducing such a doctrine, which I reviewed in Section 4.3, are sincerely held. I focus here upon an apparent Soviet perception which underlies a number of these motives: the view of the USSR as a declining power, the fundamental strategic position of which has been growing progressively weaker.

Soviet ideology treats the question of the "aggressive character of Western imperialism" within a broad historical framework. Notwithstanding the impression that may be created by the strident tone of much Soviet propaganda, Soviet theorists do not claim that existing Western governments pose a direct threat of aggression to the USSR or its allies. But they argue that it does not follow from the absence of a direct and immediate threat that there is no potential longer-term threat[27]. For specific Western governments are regarded as more or less ephemeral products of an unreliable and unpredictable socio-economic system. Experience (according to Soviet historical interpretation) has shown that under certain circumstances this system is quite capable of giving rise to such dangerous regimes as German Nazism. The potential threat of aggression would probably be realized as the culmination of a process stretching over one or more decades. During this period Western political life would veer sharply to the right (with, for example, the revival of militant "revanchism" in the FRG and the advent to power of right-wing extremists in the U.S.), the full economic potential of the West would be more effectively brought to bear upon its military capability, and international tension would rise as regional conflicts multiplied and merged together throughout the Third World[28]. Contingency planning for such a development of events might be regarded as a manifestation of excessive pessimism, but it is not such an evidently absurd activity that it should merit dismissal as a mere cover for ulterior motives. Soviet strategists really do see something to defend against.

The idea that the military power of the USSR is undergoing a fairly rapid enforced decline may seem counter-intuitive, so long has Western Europe felt under threat from large offensively orientated Soviet forces. Nevertheless, my analysis of the unilateral WP force reductions suggests that such a decline is indeed in progress. If it is granted that the reductions are being pushed through as a matter of economic necessity (which is not to deny the importance of foreign-policy and other motives) and that they establish rough strategic parity between NATO and the WP with the prospect of further shifts in the balance in favor of NATO (as argued in Chapter 2), then it no longer seems so far-fetched to hold that the USSR is entering a period of potential weakness and vulnerability in Europe. This will surely at least appear to be true to a Soviet worst-case analyst concerned about the vastly superior military-industrial potential of the West -- a potential most of which has never been realized -- and the West's advantage in the key military technologies of the future[29].

If the position of the USSR in the world is really so weak, then the defensive reorientation of its military posture, strategy and doctrine is simply unavoidable, even from the narrow viewpoint of a prudent long-term military planner. It will be accepted by Soviet military men -- many of whom may be insensitive to more subtle political considerations -- on precisely this basis[30].

Notes and references

1 As the USSR plays the leading role in the formulation of WP military doctrine, and as the military doctrines of the USSR and of the WP are to all intents and purposes identical, this chapter focuses upon Soviet military doctrine.

2 Alexei Arbatov, head of the arms control department at IMEMO, observes that "the large unilateral reductions in the Soviet armed forces have catalyzed discussions on questions of military doctrine among Soviet politicians, military men and scholars" ('Dilemmy oboronitel'noi doktriny,' **Novoe vremya** 1989, No. 6, p. 19).

3 For a general English-language account of the new defensive doctrine by a senior Soviet military figure, see Makhmut Gareyev, 'The revised Soviet military doctrine,' **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, Vol. 5 No. 10, December 1988, p. 32.

4 'Towards more security' (interview with Gen. V. Lobov), **New Times** 1989, No. 29 (July 18-24), p. 8.

5 This buffer function of Eastern Europe is suggested, for example, in the following comment by ISKAN authors: "In the event of war in Europe, the Soviet Union and its allies will meet it not on the Bug, as in 1941, but almost in the middle of Germany, which has significantly increased the depth of deployment of Soviet and allied troops, and increased the distance between our western defensive lines and the main centers of the country" (**West European Development and Soviet Foreign Policy Options**, draft chapter for forthcoming CFPD/ISKAN book on mutual security, August 1989).

6 See, for example, Chief of Staff General Moiseyev, 'Sovetskaya voennaya doktrina: realizatsiya yeyo oboronitel'noi napravlyonnosti,' **Pravda** 13 March 1989.

7 See the interview with Gen.-Lieut. V. Achalov, Commander of Air Assault Troops, 'Golubye berety,' **Pravda** 3 August 1989.

8 This point has been stressed by a number of other observers. See, for example, Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, 'A "new" Soviet military doctrine: origins and implications,' **Strategic Review**, Summer 1988, p. 9, and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Soviet crisis decision-making and the Gorbachev reforms,' **Survival**, July/August 1989, p. 339.

9 See, for example, S. Blagovolin, 'Voennaya moshch' -- skol'ko, kakaya, zachem?' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 8, p. 5.

10 This point was made by Andrei Kokoshin, head of the military-political department at ISKAN, at a seminar at Harvard on 13 June 1989. He noted that on the eve of war in 1941 two large Soviet formations were preparing for the offensive, but with open flanks themselves proved very vulnerable to German attack.

11 At the Harvard seminar (see note 10). Blagovolin (note 9) sees the "technological threat" from NATO taking critical form ten to fifteen years hence.

12 See, for example, his speech to the conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1988 (**Vestnik MID SSSR** No. 15, 15 August 1988, p. 32).

13 This view was argued even as recently as early 1988 by Gen.-Lieut. (Ret'd) V. Petrenko (**Novoe vremya**, 22 January 1988, p. 14).

[14] See V. Larionov, 'Problemy predotvrashcheniya obychnoi voiny v Yevrope,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 7, p. 31, and Col. V. Milovanov, 'Voennaya opasnost' i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost',' **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 15 (August), p. 24.

[15] (XXX) argues that political intervention could terminate not only a purely conventional conflict but also one in which tactical nuclear weapons had been used.

[16] Kokoshin (see note 10).

[17] Kokoshin (see note 10).

[18] For useful expositions by civilian analysts (though Larionov is a General and formerly lectured at the General Staff Academy), see V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, 'O razumnoi dostatochnosti,' **SShA** 1987, No. 12, p. 18, and A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, 'Protivostoyanie sil obshchego naznachēniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoi stabil'nosti,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1988, No. 6, p. 23. Also useful are the first two chapters of Andrei Kokoshin, Alexander Konovalov, Valentin Larionov and Valeri Mazing, **Problems of Ensuring Stability with Radical Cuts in Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments in Europe** (Moscow, 1989).

[19] See the interview with Andrei Kokoshin in **Detente** No. XXX

[20] For this and other points, see the debate on doctrine between Alexei Arbatov and Gen.-Lieut. V. Serebryannikov in **Novoe vremya** 1989, Nos. 6, 12 and 17.

[21] For an authoritative statement of this position by a deputy chief of staff, formerly head of the Military Science Directorate of the General Staff, see Gen.-Col. M. A. Gareyev, **M. V. Frunze -- voennyi teoretik** (Moscow, 1985), pp. XXX.

[22] See Gareyev (note 21), pp. XXX.

[23] See the account of these views given by Petersen and Trulock (note 8).

[24] Consistent with this expectation of a short war is the fact that the computer model used by IMEMO analysts to test the stability of various force configurations in Europe simulates only the first two weeks of hostilities (Report of IDDS-IMEMO seminar on conventional arms reduction in Europe, **Defense and Disarmament Alternatives**, Vol. 2 No. 1, January 1989, p. 7).

[25] Oleg Amirov, Nikolai Kishilov, Vadim Makarevsky (a reserve admiral) and Yuri Usachev, '"Conventional War": Strategic Concepts,' Chapter 18 in Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, **Disarmament and Security: 1987 Yearbook** (Moscow, 1988), p. 347.

[26] The contemplated withdrawal was scaled down at least in part in order to conciliate the GDR and Czechoslovak leaders, who had expressed themselves opposed to troop withdrawals -- probably out of concern for internal political stability rather than for strategic reasons.

[27] Col. Milovidov (note 14) distinguishes between a direct threat and a potential threat as follows. A potential threat is posed by the existence of social forces which pursue an aggressive policy towards the USSR that could at some point take on a military form. A direct threat arises when such social forces adopt specific plans of military aggression.

[28] For an account of this kind of process that, in the view of Soviet military theorists, might lead up to a new world war, see Yu. Ya. Kirshin, V. M. Popov and R. A. Savushkin, **Politicheskoe soderzhanie sovremennykh voin** (Moscow, 1987), Chapter 5.

[29] "Although we talk about parity," says Marshal of Aviation Nikolai Skomorokhov, head of the Gagarin Military-Aviation Academy, "we lag behind the U.S. and its NATO allies in some fields... We are slow in introducing electronics and automation equipment" (**Literaturnaya gazeta** 11 May 1988, p. 10). S. Blagovolin (note 9) makes a particularly grim prognosis: "Without a sharp acceleration of the scientific-technological development of the country as a whole, without serious positive shifts in the economy, the armed forces are at risk of simply being unable effectively to fulfil their functions" (within 10-15 years).

[30] It is reported that a Soviet army general remarked *a propos* of current changes: "We don't like what we're doing, but we have to do it."

CHAPTER 5

THREAT REASSESSMENT

In this chapter I summarize the strategic impact of the changes, now in progress, which I have discussed in the last three chapters -- the changes in the balance of conventional forces in Europe, in the structure of WP forces and in Soviet military doctrine. I review the main threats facing the two sides before these changes occurred, as they appeared to worst-case analysts, and I then reassess the threats in the light of the changes.

Prior to the reduction and restructuring of WP forces, the main threats perceived by one or both sides in Europe's Central Region were the following:

a. the threat of a surprise standing-start attack by the WP against NATO, taking advantage of the WP's preponderance in pre-mobilization conventional forces;

b. the threat of a prepared attack by the WP against NATO, taking advantage of the WP's preponderance in post-mobilization conventional forces and of a possible lag in the mobilization of NATO behind that of the WP;

c. the threat in a crisis situation of a pre-emptive conventional strike from the air, using combat aircraft and possibly missiles and long-range artillery, which might be made by either side against the other;

d. the prospective threat of a pre-emptive conventional deep strike, using advanced long-range high-precision weapons systems, which might at some point in the future be made by either side against the other; and

e. the threat of a strike in which tactical nuclear weapons are used on a substantial scale for the first time in a conflict. Such a strike could be *either* (i) an initial pre-emptive strike complementing a conventional attack at the very outset of hostilities *or* (ii) a compensatory strike resorted to at a later stage in the event of setbacks in the conventional battle (as in NATO's flexible-response strategy). A non-initial tactical nuclear strike might also have the aim of pre-empting a compensatory strike imminently expected from the other side.

A strike of type (i) on the part of NATO has been seen as a threat by some WP strategists, who have argued that in the event that NATO decided to attack the WP it would not consider its conventional forces adequate to this purpose and would therefore make initial use of tactical nuclear weapons as well. A strike of type (ii) has objectively constituted in some degree a threat to both sides, although in the West it has been widely assumed that the WP, unlike NATO, would not need to make use of this threat in view of its conventional superiority.

The impact upon these five threats of the reduction and restructuring of WP forces is likely to be as follows:

a. Pre-mobilization forces in Central Europe will be brought by the reductions into rough quantitative parity, while the WP forces remaining in the region will assume a structure about as defensive (or offensive) as that of the NATO forces there. Even if political and doctrinal considerations are set aside and technical capabilities alone are taken into account, it follows that a surprise standing-start attack should no longer be regarded as a plausible threat by either side.

b. However, either side (and not only, as formerly, the WP) will have the capability to build up a substantial force superiority on the Central Front in the event that its own mobilization is able to proceed sufficiently far while the mobilization of the other side lags behind by a sufficient margin, whether for political, practical or other reasons. Both sides will accordingly face a potential conventional threat, though probably one of moderate proportions. How likely one thinks it is that such a threat would materialize in a crisis depends, among other things, upon one's assessment of the significance of the "defensive" doctrines of each side.

c. The threat of a pre-emptive strike from the air posed to each side by the other will be very little affected by the reduction and restructuring of WP forces or even, in all likelihood, by the revision of Soviet military doctrine. It is arguable that this threat can be mitigated and eventually eliminated only through mutually agreed measures.

d. Nor is the prospective threat posed to each side by the other of a pre-emptive conventional deep strike likely to be affected by the current changes, except insofar as these changes help move forward the arms control process through which destabilizing developments in conventional military technology may be averted.

e. Some important changes may be expected in the character of the tactical nuclear threats faced by the two sides:

(i) As I have noted, some Soviet strategists have seen in NATO's relatively small conventional offensive capability reason to fear that a conventional attack by NATO would be supplemented by an initial pre-emptive tactical nuclear strike. Using similar logic, NATO strategists would now, following the reduction in conventional WP offensive capability, have like reason to fear such a strike in the context of a WP attack.

(ii) The new rough parity of the conventional forces of the two sides in Central Europe, and the fact that conceivable mobilization patterns may henceforth make possible the emergence of a conventional threat to either side, mean that both sides will have to plan for the contingency of facing defeat in the conventional battle, if not everywhere then at least on some important sector of the front. This in turn means that both sides (and not only, as formerly, the WP) face the threat that the adversary may resort to a compensatory tactical nuclear strike in the event of conventional reverses. Both sides may to some degree be deterred by this threat. It could indeed be argued that, in view of the large Soviet superiority in tactical nuclear weapons (which TNW modernization on the part of NATO might in coming years reduce but would not eliminate), the threat of first compensatory nuclear use by the USSR -- even if officially disavowed -- will become more credible than the corresponding threat by NATO.

In both cases, the heightened salience of the tactical nuclear threat to NATO is a natural consequence of the reduction in the conventional threat, given the continued presence of nuclear weapons. The customary Western view that the denuclearization of Europe would "play into Soviet hands" and weaken the security of the West clearly requires fundamental reconsideration.

In general, the pattern of capabilities and threats will take on a relatively symmetrical form as the result of the WP force reductions and restructuring. Some former threats will be alleviated or even eliminated, but other significant threats will continue to be perceived by both sides. This is likely to remain the case so long as the WP and NATO retain large post-mobilization offensive ground-force potentials and substantial tactical nuclear forces and strike airpower.

CHAPTER 6

ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS

6.1 Introduction

A comprehensive assessment of the impact upon the Soviet economy of the reductions in military forces planned for 1989-90 is probably not feasible. The information available is partial and fragmented, many pertinent planning decisions have yet to be made, and not all the effects of resource shifts are predictable. Quantitative assessments face particularly severe difficulties: even were Soviet statistical data fully accessible, savings calculated in rubles might be seriously misleading in view of the fact that goods, and especially military goods, are still not on the whole meaningfully priced, and also taking into account the barriers to the flow of freed resources into the most effective alternative uses in an economy that continues to function in a predominantly administrative mode.

In Section 6.2 I undertake a mainly qualitative review of the nature and importance of the likely economic yield of the force reductions under four heads:

a. equipment and materials released from military use;

b. production capacity converted from military to civilian use;

c. labor power made newly available to the civilian economy; and

d. savings of general military expenses.

In this review I draw attention to special factors which either enhance the significance of a given resource gain (for example, relief of a bottleneck in a socially crucial sector) or detract from the significance of such a gain (for example, barriers to the reallocation of displaced specialist labor power).

In Section 6.3 I make, subject to the provisos noted, a rough estimate of the net value to the civilian sector of the economy of the force reductions, drawing upon the estimates published by a Soviet military economist, Professor Yudin of the Lenin Military-Political Academy[1]. Finally, in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 I ask two questions. In what comparative light should the economic effect of the current force reductions be viewed? And what are the implications of the economics of demilitarization in the USSR for the prospects of further force reductions?

6.2 Qualitative review of the economic yield of force reductions

a. Equipment and materials

Much of the military equipment to be disposed of can be put directly to non-military use. Examples include bulldozers, mobile electricity stations, bridging equipment, vehicles and everyday appliances. Many of these dual-use items, such as cars, small boats and radios, are being auctioned off to the public by the rear services[2].

Other military equipment is being converted to civilian use, such as the missile lifts being transformed into cranes by a joint Soviet-West German enterprise in Odessa. About 5000 tanks are to be converted into tractors and other haulage machines. Such "swords into ploughshares" operations received much publicity in the press, but at least one Soviet economist has questioned whether their real value is all that great[3].

A great deal of weaponry and equipment is simply being scrapped. According to Professor Yudin's estimate, this will yield inter alia 1.8 million tons of steel and 0.5 million tons of aluminum. A wide range of other materials will be saved on a continuing basis. Savings of coal, electricity and other forms of energy are of some importance in view of the drive to economize on energy consumption. Yudin estimates an annual saving of 1.8 million tons of fuel of various kinds.

b. Production capacity

Yudin calculates that production capital to the value of about 17 billion rubles will be released from military use as a result of the force reductions[4]. This corresponds to approximately 2% of GNP.

'Defense industry' in Soviet parlance (referred to by some authors as the military-industrial complex) comprises the nine ministries subordinate to the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers and responsible for the production of armaments and military equipment. These ministries, however, also produce a wide range of civilian consumer and producer goods. Conversion is planned to take the form not of any contraction of the military-industrial complex (MIC) as an institution -- on the contrary, ailing enterprises under civilian ministries are even being transferred to the MIC[5] -- but of an increase in the proportion of its capacity devoted to the output of civilian products. According to Prime Minister Ryzhkov's report to the Congress of People's Deputies, this proportion will rise from about 40% at present to 46% by the end of 1990 and over 60% by the end of 1995[6]. Given that civilian output by the MIC in 1989 amounts to 27 billion rubles and assuming that the total output of the MIC remains constant, conversion should therefore yield an increment in the output of civilian goods of 13.5 billion rubles per annum by 1995, or about 1.5% of GNP[7].

A complete account of the distribution of this increment of civilian output by types of product has not been published to date, and the distribution may indeed not yet have been fully decided upon. Its likely shape may, however, be roughly discerned by taking as a base-line the established structure of the civilian output of the MIC and then increasing the relative weights assigned to those branches enjoying priority treatment in the conversion process, as identified by Ryzhkov in his report.

My initial working assumption in estimating the increment in the output of various civilian goods arising from conversion is that Soviet defense industry produces civilian goods in proportions which remain constant over time. The estimates can then be derived from the data on the current civilian output of the MIC compiled by Julian Cooper[8] and from the changes in overall proportions of MIC civilian output cited by Ryzhkov.

This method gives the result that conversion should yield by the end of 1995 a direct increase of a little over 10% in total Soviet output of consumer goods, by comparison with the output that would have obtained without conversion and leaving out of account the indirect impact of increased output of capital goods for use in producing consumer goods. One expects this gain to be heavily concentrated in those groups of consumer goods in which defense industry specializes: technical entertainment goods (TVs, radios, cameras, video-recorders, tape-recorders, personal computers etc.), means of personal transportation (cars, motorcycles, bicycles etc.) and consumer durables (refridgerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners etc.).

According to Cooper's data, the defense industry makes a significant contribution to the output of three types of civilian public and producer goods: means of transportation (tram-cars, railroad freight wagons); agricultural machinery (e.g. tractors, irrigators); and certain relatively high-technology products. Among the latter, we might mention the contribution of the MIC of 49% of total national output of electric-arc steel (but of only 8% of the output of crude steel) and of 26% of total output of numerically controlled machine tools (13% of the output of all machine tools). These examples reflect, of course, the higher technological level of defense industry enterprises, the conversion of which should therefore assist in the technical modernization of Soviet industry[9].

Prime Minister Ryzhkov gives pride of place in his report to the contribution of conversion to the output of two particular types of equipment: 'equipment for the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade and public catering,' to increase by 50-100% by 1995, and medical equipment, to increase almost fourfold in the same period. Both of these priorities are responses to urgent socio-political as well as economic requirements:

-- **Improving the food supply:** Of special importance here is the focusing of conversion efforts on relieving the bottleneck in the sphere of food processing that arises from shortage of the appropriate equipment for storage, freezing, canning, packaging, pasteurization and cooling of milk etc. Such is the current scale of wastage in this sphere that an improved supply of equipment is expected to increase the amount of food reaching the consumer by 25%. The most publicized instance to date of this kind of conversion is the project to make the Ministry of Medium Machine Building responsible for equipping facilities to process milk and dairy products throughout the country as well as for producing nuclear weapons[10].

On the other hand, expansion of the output of tractors and other agricultural machinery of a traditional kind by the MIC lacks the potential significantly to improve the food supply situation, because the economy is already saturated with such equipment (though its quality leaves much to be desired). The use of a considerable proportion of converted capacity for this purpose, economically ineffective as it may be, is quite likely because the conversion involved is technically simple to implement[11].

-- **Improving the health service:** By increasing the output of medical equipment, conversion can contribute to the tackling of the many acute problems in the field of health care (for example, the high infant mortality rate). It is of interest to note that the production of prosthetics -- the "Stone Age" quality of which in the USSR has been a source of vociferous complaint from veterans of the war in Afghanistan -- is to be entrusted to leading military space enterprises.

The real economic yield of the conversion of military-industrial capacity will depend to a large extent on the efficiency with which the converted capacity is put to use. Military as well as civilian specialists express concern as to whether defense industry, with its highly centralized management structure, can adequately cope with this task[12]. Inefficient practices familiar to every student of the Soviet command economy are already evident in the conversion process. For example, the tendency towards ministerial autarky arising from the unreliability of inter-ministerial supply is manifest in the decision of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, unable to secure an adequate supply of small electric motors for producing milk-processing equipment from the Ministry of the Electrotechnical Industry, to produce such motors at its own enterprises[13]. The danger that choices of output for converted capacity will often be made with a view to technical convenience rather than economic optimality has already been mentioned.

In the field of consumer goods production, a Soviet economist has pointed out, defense industry may for a time find it easy to help satisfy demand for such products as consumer durables, but before very long the market will have become saturated in purely quantitative terms and military enterprises may be less well placed to meet demand as it becomes more differentiated and qualitatively oriented[14]. Defense industry products may tend to be too expensive for the consumer market, for military enterprises are accustomed to meet set requirements without regard to cost. The MIC, finally, is both bound to be less deeply affected by a marketizing economic reform than the rest of the economy and, to the extent that it is affected, less ready to cope with a market environment. Some Soviet economists have accordingly urged that the MIC be deprived of its effective monopoly on the process of conversion through the selling-off of production capacity due for conversion to civilian enterprises or its leasing to work collectives or local authorities[15].

c. Labor power

Yudin estimates that the reduction in the size of the Soviet armed forces by half a million men will yield an increment to the national income of about 1.8 billion rubles, on the assumption that at least 80% of the released troops enter the civilian labor force. That is, he values the civilian labor gained at 4500 rubles per man. Unfortunately the method of calculation is not explained.

The question of the transfer of labor power to the civilian sector must be considered under two distinct heads: the adaptation of the conscription system to the reduced manpower requirements of the armed forces, and the release from the armed forces of almost 100 000 officers and 50 000 NCOs[16]:

The conscription system. As the size of the armed forces is reduced, the established system of universal and compulsory two-year conscription (three years in the navy) would generate annual contingents larger than those needed. The number of conscripts required in the armed forces at the end of 1990 will be 350 000 fewer than the number required at the end of 1988 (total manpower cut of 500 000 minus 150 000 released officers and NCOs). The number of young men conscripted annually can accordingly be reduced by 175 000, allowing some scope for easing the demands made by conscription upon the country's youth.

Three ways of doing this have been considered in Soviet discussion of the issue: reducing the length of conscript service, exempting large groups from service, and supplementing military service with an alternative form of civilian service. There is also much discussion of the longer-term option of abolishing conscription altogether in favor of a fully professional army, which would entail much deeper reductions than those now being implemented (see Section 6.5 below).

Reducing the length of service would be a broadly popular measure, and would provide a general boost to the supply of labor to the civil economy. It is, however, strongly opposed by the military as harmful to training standards and combat readiness; it would run counter to the recognized need for greater professionalism. Even as things are, a common saying goes, conscripts serve just long enough to learn to break the equipment. One can be fairly sure that this will not be the way chosen.

Gorbachev has already taken advantage of the scope for exemptions by restoring the right of higher education students to deferred and very much reduced forms of military service, in practice often amounting to complete freedom from service. In doing so he conceded the main demand of a widespread movement of protest against military obligations which had been sweeping Soviet institutions of higher education[17]. As prominent Soviet scholars and educationalists have argued, this change should yield an economic payoff in terms of the supply of qualified labor and the average standard of its professional skill, as neither training nor the transition to employment will henceforth be interrupted by periods of military service.

Proposals for the introduction of alternative non-military forms of service are of two rather different kinds. Radical civilian reformers are attracted by the alternative forms of civic service available on a voluntary basis to youth in countries like West Germany. Some military reformers, on the other hand, advocate a non-voluntary variant of selective military conscription: the military commissariats would select whatever proportion of the conscription-age cohort was required by the armed forces in a given year according to the criteria of physical, mental and psychological fitness. The remaining part of the cohort would be drafted into a special labor corps, to be employed mainly in work for the civilian economy though perhaps under the control of the top military authorities. The army itself would shed its auxiliary civilian functions and devote itself wholly to military tasks[18].

Such a scheme would provide cheap and largely unskilled labor for economically useful projects which would otherwise be hampered by labor shortages (or lack of the money needed to attract the labor required). One likely use of a labor corps would be in the building of more and better roads in rural areas -- an important precondition for improving Soviet agriculture and rural life. Here the corps would be taking over from the existing road-building detachments of the army[19].

Career officers and NCOs. As I have already noted, almost 100 000 officers and 50 000 NCOs are to be released from the service. In accordance with the principle of enhancing quality to compensate for reduction in quantity, it has been decided first to release not those who happen to occupy the posts being eliminated but those who, having completed or exceeded the legally established periods of service, are eligible for a full pension from the Ministry of Defense[20]. Taking this decision in conjunction with Yudin's expectation that up to 20%-of the 500 000 troops to be cut -- i.e. up to 100 000 men -- will not enter the civilian labor force, none of these presumably being conscripts, it may be inferred that up to two-thirds of the released officers and NCOs will be retired.

The net benefit to the civilian economy of the 50 000 or so officers and NCOs released below retirement age is hard to estimate. Many will possess skills readily applicable outside the military sphere. Many, however, will need expensive retraining for civilian occupations[21], and even those with valuable skills may face difficulties in finding civilian positions in their field of specialization: a naval nuclear engineer, for example, may find his path to a suitable position in the nuclear power industry obstructed by departmental barriers. The average level of skill of the ex-officers and ex-NCOs is particularly difficult to predict. On the one hand,

military personnel departments will be considering on an individual basis requests by young officers to leave the armed forces[22]. Such men would in general expect to do well in civilian life. On the other hand, personnel departments are likely -- especially in view of the policy line that "quality" must substitute for "quantity" -- to take the opportunity offered by the force reductions to rid the officer and NCO corps of their technically least qualified and competent members, whose ability to contribute to the civilian economy even after retraining would be limited.

d. General military expenses

We have yet to take account of the residual category of savings from the general recurrent expenses of maintaining military forces. Although these expenses are on the whole much lower in the USSR than in the West, in particular because the Soviet Union relies on conscripts paid only minimal "pocket money" and subjected to spartan living conditions, savings from this source will still be significant. If the overall reduction of 14% in the declared defense budget is applied to the item "maintenance of the army and fleet" (20.2 billion rubles in 1989)[23], these savings come to nearly three billion rubles per annum.

However, it seems to have been decided that some proportion of the savings from the force reductions will be foregone in order to "solve the most urgent social tasks of the armed forces," such as reducing the shortage of accommodation for servicemen and their families, and also in order to improve the material incentives for undertaking a military career[24]. The exact proportion has not been determined in advance, but "will depend on the general economic situation of the state"[25]. The net annual saving under the heading of "general military expenses" is therefore unpredictable, and might even turn out to be negative.

6.3 Quantitative assessment of the net value of force reductions

Yudin states that in reducing defense expenditure (i.e. that part of defense expenditure reflected in the official defense budget) by 14%, the USSR makes a direct saving of about 10 billion rubles per year. Prime Minister Ryzhkov argues that the full saving is almost 30 billion rubles for 1989-90 -- that is, almost 15 billion rubles per year. This difference arises because Yudin takes as his baseline the pre-existing level of expenditure, while Ryzhkov's baseline is the planned level for the period in question: the five-year plan for 1986-90 had stipulated that the defense budget would grow more rapidly than national income. Adopting Yudin's definition of 'savings,' I conclude that the reduction in recurrent budgetary expenditure on defense is somewhat in excess of 1% of the Soviet GNP for 1988.

In respect specifically of production, I have estimated above the increment in civilian output as a result of conversion by 1995 as 13.5 billion rubles, or about 1.5% of GNP. There is a large overlap between this sum and the saving of budgetary defense expenditure. The total recurrent saving is probably in the region of 2% of GNP.

I recall that Yudin estimates the value of one-off savings as about 2 billion rubles for labor power released from the armed forces and about 17 billion rubles for productive capacity in defense industry available for conversion to non-military use. The total of 19 billion rubles corresponds to rather more than 2% of the Soviet GNP for 1988.

As we are concerned with the net value of the force reductions, we must at least notionally subtract from their estimated gross value the various 'associated expenses' listed by General Moiseyev: the cost of retraining released officers and NCOs and placing them in civilian employment; the cost of eliminating or converting superfluous armaments and equipment; the cost of converting military enterprises to produce civilian products; and the cost of solving urgent social problems in the armed forces and improving the material incentives for military service (see above)[26].

On the other hand, we should perhaps bear in mind the additional saving of military expenditure consequent upon the withdrawal from Afghanistan where, according to Ryzhkov, the war was costing the USSR about five billion rubles per year.

These estimates cannot be regarded as at all reliable. We know very little about the data upon which they are based and the methods by which they were derived; both are probably highly deficient. However, different deficiencies may well operate in opposite directions and thereby partly cancel one another out: for instance, the estimate of productive capacity gained may leave out of consideration the fact that this gain is being used in an economically inefficient way, but on the other hand significant indirect positive spin-off effects of the direct gains may also be left out of account. At the very least, the estimates may give us a rough idea of the order of magnitude of the economic yield of the force reductions.

6.4 Economic yield of force reductions in a comparative light

In what comparative light, then, should this order of magnitude be viewed? We are certainly dealing with very substantial sums, representing resources which can make a very real contribution to the Soviet civilian economy. Recurrent annual savings constitute something in the region of 2% of GNP, which could substantially enhance the rate of growth of the Soviet economy. One-off savings are similarly in the region of 2% of GNP.

However, in the light of the full range and magnitude of the problems -- ecological, medical and social as well as narrowly economic -- facing the USSR, these savings look much less impressive. Petrakov, deputy director of the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, has cited the estimate that the total cost of fulfilling all the promises made by delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies in the course of their election campaigns would be 500 billion rubles. Moreover, this leaves projects of environmental restoration, which are difficult to cost, out of account: rescue of the Aral Sea on its own would probably take another 500 billion rubles[27].

It is easy therefore to agree with the ISKAN analyst Alexei Izyumov when he concludes that conversion is no panacea and offers no long-term solution to the economic crisis of the Soviet Union. The 'defense millions' could be 'eaten up,' as the 'oil millions' were under Brezhnev, leaving the underlying situation as critical as ever[28].

6.5 Implications for further force reductions

The vast scale of Soviet socio-economic and ecological problems generates pressure for force reductions even deeper than those now underway -- pressure which might affect the preparedness of the leadership to make concessions in arms control negotiations, to compress the time-scale of negotiated reductions and to contemplate further unilateral action. At the same time, no conceivable force reductions will yield an economic effect commensurate with the demands of Soviet problems.

There is, however, an important factor which tends to reduce the pressure of internal problems upon disarmament policy. Some Soviet commentators argue that conversion cannot proceed at any arbitrarily determined rate: there exists some upper limit of this rate beyond which the socio-economic system is simply incapable of productively absorbing the resources freed by the contraction of its military sector. Moreover, it is argued, the conversion program already adopted for the period up to 1995 comes close to this upper limit, so that calls for additional force reductions within that period (~~such as that made by Academician Andrei Sakharov~~) reflect incompetence in practical economics as well as an irresponsible attitude towards national security[29]. Lieut.-Gen. Viktor Starodubov, head of the arms control section in the International Department of the Party Central Committee, put the point vividly when he explained recently why the USSR could not accept the accelerated timetable for conventional force reductions proposed by President Bush: "We would get stomach ache"[30].

Representatives of the Soviet MIC might reasonably be suspected of ulterior motives in taking this stance[31]. Moreover, there are Soviet economists who take the view that the planned cut of almost 20% in military production, while "an important step in the right direction," is insufficient to bring about the "deep structural changes in the national economy" required for an effective economic reform[32]. Nevertheless, the difficulties of the process of conversion (partly discussed above) do lend the more cautious approach a considerable degree of plausibility. The military sector is so deeply embedded in the Soviet system that any far-reaching demilitarization of the system amounts to its transformation, and this can hardly be effected overnight. To take an example raised by a Soviet economist in the course of one Round Table discussion, there are whole "secret" towns in the USSR exclusively working for defense industry, and sooner or later it will be necessary to face up to the task of their total social as well as economic reorientation[33]. The process is inevitably one of decades rather than of years.

The place that the military ultimately comes to occupy within the Soviet system will depend upon the outcome of the debate concerning professionalization of the armed forces, which has now reached the pages of the open press. The reformers who advocate full professionalization appear to be quite influential within the military and (perhaps especially) the MIC[34], and their eventual victory cannot be excluded. A professional army, recruited on a completely voluntary basis, would have to be very much smaller than the army existing today, but its personnel would need to be paid sufficiently attractive salaries, so that military expenditure might be not much lower -- indeed, conceivably even higher -- than at present[35]. Moreover, professionalization could consolidate the position of the career military in society, raising barriers to disarmament proceeding beyond a certain point[36]. Thus a relatively gradual build-down of the conscript armed forces as currently constituted might more justifiably be characterized as genuine demilitarization than a dramatic reduction in size of the armed forces associated with their reconstitution on a professionalized basis.

Notes and References

[1] I. Yudin, 'Ekonomicheskie aspekty sokrashcheniya vooruzhennykh sil i konversii voennogo proizvodstva,' **Voprosy ekonomiki** 1989, No. 6, p. 48.

[2] A. Izyumov, 'Konversiya? Konversiya! Konversiya...,' **Literaturnaya gazeta**, 12 July 1989, p. 11.

[3] A. Kireyev, 'Konversiyu -- na khozraschet,' **Ogonyok** 1989, No. 27 (July).

[4] He states that in making this calculation he uses the method of estimating the total volume of military production worked out about twenty years ago by F. Avramchuk.

[5] Thus when the Ministry of Machinery for the Light and Food Industries was abolished recently, ten of its enterprises for producing milk processing equipment that were in a very poor condition were transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building for reconstruction (see interview by Major A. Vorobyev of the Minister of Medium Machine-Building L. Ryabev in **Krasnaya zvezda**, 14 June 1989).

[6] See **Pravda**, 8 June 1989.

[7] General M. A. Moiseyev, 'Yeshchyo raz o prestizhe armii,' **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 13 (July), p. 3.

[8] J. M. Cooper, **CREES Discussion Papers, Soviet Industry and Technology Series SITS No. 3, The Scales of Output of Civilian Products by Enterprises of the Soviet Defence Industry** (Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, U.K., August 1988), Table 1.

[9] For a discussion of the difficulties of realizing the potential of conversion in this respect, see Ye. Kuznetsov and F. Shirokov, 'Naukoyemkie proizvodstva i konversiya oboronnoi promyshlennosti,' **Kommunist** 1989, No. 10 (July), p. 15.

[10] See reference cited in note 5.

[11] Kuznetsov and Shirokov (see note 9). They make the same point with respect to conversion to the production of heavy earth-moving equipment.

[12] See the report of a conference on conversion held at the Lenin Military-Political Academy and attended by military officers, Ministry of Defense specialists and officials of military industry: Col. V. Martynenko and Maj. I. Ivanyuk, 'Oborona. Konversiya. Khozraschet,' **Krasnaya zvezda**, 29 June 1989. For discussions of the problems of efficient conversion by civilian specialists, see the references cited in notes 1, 2, 3 and 9, and also the Round Table comparing the problems of conversion in the USA and the USSR in **SShA** 1989, No. 3, p. 88.

[13] Ryabev (see note 5).

[14] See the Round Table cited in note 12.

[15] Izyumov (see note 2).

[16] In a recent interview, the Minister of Defense, General D. T. Yazov, stated that the officer corps was being reduced by "about 100 000" (**Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik** 1989, Nos. 14-15 (July), p. 11). He subsequently gave the figure as "almost 100 000" (**Krasnaya zvezda**, 28 July 1989). Moiseyev (see note 7) has given the range 97-100 000 for the number of officers to be released and the figure of 50 000 for the number of NCOs.

[17] See J. Cooper, 'The Military and Higher Education in the USSR,' **ANNALS, AAPSS**, Vol. 502, March 1989, p. 108.

[18] The source of my information about this proposal is non-attributable personal contacts.

[19] Moiseyev (see note 7) reports that these detachments built in the first half of 1989 more than 500 km. of asphalt roads connecting the small towns, villages and collective farms of the Non-Black-Earth Zone of the RSFSR -- a rural region in Central Russia notorious for its state of decay.

[20] Moiseyev (see note 7), Yazov (second interview cited in note 16).

[21] Izyumov (see note 2), Moiseyev (see note 7), Yazov (second interview cited in note 16).

[22] Yazov (second interview cited in note 16).

[23] Ryzhkov (see note 6).

[24] The need to do this was stressed by General M. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff: 'Oboronnyi byudzhet SSSR,' **Pravda**, 11 June 1989. In his report to the first session of the Supreme Soviet, Prime Minister Ryzhkov stated that 'the proposals of deputies to spend some of the military savings on solving social problems in the armed forces' would be given special consideration (Izvestiya, 27 June 1989).

[25] Yazov (second interview cited in note 16).

[26] Moiseyev (see note 24).

[27] 'Pozitsiya narodnogo deputata,' Kommunist 1989, No. 10 (July), p. 5.

[28] Izyumov (see note 2).

[29] See interviews with two military men who are members of the Supreme Soviet: Col. Valerii Ochirov (**Krasnaya zvezda**, 1 August 1989) and Capt. V. Lopatin (**Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 14 (July), p. 42). "We have made enough haste already," said Ochirov. Both Ochirov and Lopatin were concerned that an excessive rate of conversion would lead to the use of highly complex technology to produce relatively simple household items ("everyday trifles" was Lopatin's term) such as samovars, irons and children's prams.

[30] **Washington Post**, 12 July 1989.

[31] Ye. Bugrov, head of a sector at IMEMO, complains in his "theses" concerning conversion that "the warnings of a number of Western investigators about the dangers of 'rapid conversion' leave out of account the real prospects of disarmament" (Ye. Bugrov, 'Konversiya: kontseptual'nye i prakticheskie aspekty (tezisy),' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 6, p. 30). It is surely not only, or even perhaps mainly, Western investigators that he has in mind.

[32] See S. Blagovolin (head of department at IMEMO), 'Voennaya moshch' -- skol'ko, kakaya, zachem?' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 8, p. 5.

[33] See the Round Table cited in note 12.

[34] For example, the chairman of the new Committee of the Supreme Soviet on Questions of Defense and State Security, the military technologist Vladimir Lapygin, has expressed himself in favor of professionalization (**Izvestiya**, 26 June 1989). **Krasnaya zvezda** published on the front page of its 18 July 1989 issue three letters devoted to the issue of professionalization -- two for it and one against; the same issue featured an admiring account of the "professionalism" of the British Special Air Services (Ye. Mishin, 'SAS: professionaly iz professionalov'). It might be noted that conscripts have already been excluded from certain high-technology branches of the Soviet armed forces.

[35] This, of course, depends upon the number of men in the professionalized armed forces and their rates of pay. One **Krasnaya zvezda** correspondent (see note 34) proposes reducing the army after the current cuts by a further two million -- i.e. to 1 760 000 men, abolishing conscription and offering soldiers up to 500 and officers up to 1000 rubles per month. He estimates that this scheme would cost 15 billion rubles a year, and argues that this sum could be obtained from the savings yielded by the accompanying force reductions. It is unclear whether this refers to the increase over current wage costs or to the total wage cost. In either case the exercise illustrates the scale on which professionalization of the armed forces could divert savings from force reductions away from the civilian economy.

[36] This is the argument of the **Krasnaya zvezda** correspondent opposed to professionalization (see note 34).

CHAPTER 7

THE IMPACT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ON SOVIET INTERNAL POLITICS

7.1 Introduction

The interests and interaction of different segments of the power elite provide the traditional focus of assessments of the Soviet political scene. The concentration of power in the USSR remains sufficiently great to lend studies of elite politics continued pertinence. However, as the political system undergoes a measure of democratization and opens up wider channels of influence to the broader population, the need arises to combine analysis of elite politics with analysis of public opinion.

In considering the impact of the force reductions on Soviet internal politics, therefore, I examine in Section 7.2 survey evidence of the attitude of the Soviet public towards force reductions. In Section 7.3 I proceed to consider the position of those in the military and in defence industry whose interests are directly threatened by the cuts. Finally, in Section 7.4 I analyse elite perspectives, and discuss the way that Soviet political life as a whole is being affected by the cuts.

7.2 Public opinion

Col. Milovanov, Chief Editor of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, suggests that Soviet society is divided into three opinion groups on the question of force reductions. "Some Soviet people, mainly representatives of the radically inclined intelligentsia, consider [the measures taken] extremely timid and half-hearted." Such people typically see the armed forces as being opposed to perestroika, and believe that there is no longer any danger of war. On the other hand, there is "a significant part of Soviet society which is seriously worried about security" and looks to the army as a stabilizing institution. Finally, there are those in the middle who accept that the force reductions are both justified and adequate[1].

The available results of public opinion polls carried out by various Soviet organizations, set out in Table 7-1, bear out this threefold division. Where the colonel is wrong, however, is in attributing the most radical view mainly to the intelligentsia. In fact, as many as 30% or so of respondents in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev (Ukraine) and Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) are prepared to state that the planned reduction in military expenditure announced by Gorbachev at the Congress of People's Deputies is insufficient. In Tallinn (Estonia) and Tbilisi (Georgia), this proportion rises to 60% and over -- a result which can probably be attributed in large measure to the strength of strivings for national autonomy in the Republics concerned.

Those concerned that even the current reductions may be going too far constitute, by contrast, only about 5-10% of the public. These are the people presumably responsible for the reported flooding of the military press with letters expressing concern that the West is not responding to the Soviet initiative with force reductions of its own and that the defence capability of the USSR is accordingly being undermined[2]. While numerically a small minority, this group is not necessarily an insignificant one in terms of the influence it can bring to bear.

TABLE 7-1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS FORCE REDUCTIONS: RESULTS OF SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS

Survey	For cuts	Against cuts	Don't know	Cuts insufficient
	%	%	%	%
1. Levada	71			
2. MGIMO	80	10	10	
3. ISI: Moscow	75	9	14	33
Leningrad	62	5	33	31
Kiev (Ukraine)	75	5	20	29
Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan)	72	5	23	27
Tallinn (Estonia)	82	2	16	66
Tbilisi (Georgia)	70	1	29	60
4. Kapelyush	87	6	7	

Notes to Table 7-1

Available details concerning each of the public opinion surveys, the questions asked pertaining to force reductions and sources of information are as follows:

1. Levada: The weekly *Literaturnaya gazeta* published in its issue of 1 February 1989 a long questionnaire on political topics. Almost 200,000 readers sent in replies in February and March. Data were analysed by a working group of the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, headed by the prominent sociologist Yuri Levada. The sample, while very large, was self-selected from a readership in which the liberal intelligentsia were heavily represented. Levada himself recognises that this is a survey not of the population as a whole but of "advanced opinion."

Respondents were asked which of various named means of improving the country's economic situation they approved. One of the means listed was cutting the Army and military expenditure. Source: Yu. Levada, 'Vopros -- otvet -- vopros...' **Moscow News** 1989, No. 13 (26 March), pp. 8-9.

2. MGIMO: This survey, devoted to issues of Soviet-West European relations, was carried out in Moscow in April and May 1989 by the Centre for the Study of Soviet Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Problems at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). No information is given concerning the size and composition of the sample.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the planned unilateral WP force reductions in Europe. Source: **Vestnik MID SSSR** No. 14 (48), 1 August 1989, p. 59.

3. ISI: This was a telephone survey, carried out by the Institute of Sociological Investigations of the Academy of Sciences, of a representative random sample of 250-300 electors in each of six major Soviet cities -- Moscow and Leningrad, and four capitals of national Republics: Kiev (Ukraine), Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan), Tallinn (Estonia) and Tbilisi (Georgia).

Respondents were asked: "Do you consider the reduction of military expenditure by 14% proposed by M. S. Gorbachev at the Congress of People's Deputies sufficient?" Answers were categorized as: against the reduction of military expenditure; yes, sufficient; no, insufficient: and don't know. Source: **Izvestiya** 4 June 1989, p. 1.

4. Kapelyush: This survey, concerned with public opinion on the results of the Congress of People's Deputies, was carried out by the department headed by Yakov Kapelyush at the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion on Socio-Economic Questions under the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) and the State Committee on Labour. 2100 people were interviewed at home in 47 towns and villages spread throughout the country (including 18 Republican and provincial centres, 13 other towns and 16 rural counties).

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the proposal to reduce military expenditure by ten milliard rubles in 1990-91. Source: Ya. Kapelyush, 'S"yezd v otsenkakh izbiratelei.' **Ogonyok** No. 34, August 1989, p. 2.

The "radical" view that there is no war danger appears to be shared by a section of the public somewhat broader than those willing to draw the logical conclusion of calling for deeper force reductions. Asked which country poses the greatest threat to the USSR, 54% of a sample of Muscovites chose the answer that they feel no threat from any country[3].

Public support for force reductions is also impressive by comparison with public support for other policies associated with perestroika. Asked which means of improving the country's economic situation they approved, respondents to a questionnaire published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* most frequently approved cutting military expenditure (71%). By contrast, the policy of attracting investment by foreign capital (already being implemented through joint ventures with foreign firms) enjoyed less than half this level of support (31.5%)[4].

7.3 Those who pay the price

While a large majority of the population hopes eventually to derive some benefit from the reallocation of military expenditure to civilian purposes, two important minorities fear that they will lose out in the process:

-- the officers and NCOs displaced from the armed forces and, to a lesser extent, those who remain but whose career prospects are diminished by the force reductions, and also the families of these men[5]; and

-- managers, scientists, technicians and workers in defence industry whose status, income and privileges are adversely affected by the process of conversion.

Discontent in the officer corps at the shabby treatment of colleagues displaced in Khrushchev's force reductions played an important part in undermining his base of support. Contemporary Soviet observers commonly recall this fact and warn that the mistake must not be repeated this time around. It is still difficult to judge just how effective are the efforts being made to cater to the needs of officers released from service and of their families[6]. Their single most urgent material grievance concerns the shortage of living accommodation. The Ministry of Defence has in hand a programme for building new blocks of apartments for officers' families, but it is acknowledged that this programme is not large enough to meet the need. Moreover, serving officers are given priority, so it is doubtful whether many retired men will benefit[7].

The effect of conversion to civilian production on the situation of those working in defence industry is a very complicated question. The retention of converted enterprises under the institutional umbrella of the military-industrial ministries should shield their managers and employees to some extent from loss of privilege, and may indeed reflect a deliberate attempt to conciliate them[8]. Izyumov argues that while defence industry *managers* do stand to lose privileges and status (including the award of special honours), non-managerial employees will not be greatly affected, for pay differentials between workers in comparable military and civilian enterprises have been substantially eroded over the last fifteen years or so[9].

However, many complaints have been voiced to the effect that conversion in practice often entails a lowering in the technological level and profitability of an enterprise as the production of high-technology military equipment gives way to that of lower-technology mass consumer goods. Skilled workers, technicians and designers are alienated as a result and desert converted enterprises, so that "islands of advanced technology are washed away in a boundless sea of mediocrity"[10]. Conversion *as such* is not felt to be disadvantageous, provided that the technological sophistication of the activity in which one is engaged -- and consequently its social status -- are preserved. For example, military aircraft designers are happy to work on the design of modern civilian aircraft or space vehicles, but not all of them derive satisfaction from working on dyeing, jam-making and macaroni-processing machines[11]. Unfortunately for the military technologists affected by conversion, the greater part of unsatisfied consumer demand in the USSR is for "everyday trifles" rather than for prestigious high-technology products.

7.4 Elite politics

The power elite as a whole, so it seems to me, have a strong interest in force reductions. The top political, industrial and military leaders -- unlike those further down the pyramid of power -- do not risk displacement as a consequence of cuts or loss of status in the wake of conversion, and this allows them to focus their minds upon state interests as they understand them. Judging by their published statements, there seems no doubt that members of the Soviet elite, including the generals, grasp (to varying extents) the need for a "deep manoeuvre of resources" in favour of the civilian economy if the USSR is to enter the twenty-first century as a modern industrialized great power. Moreover, the desirability of responding at least partially to public opinion increasingly enters as a factor into their calculation of the state interest. These two imperatives, taken in combination, are now (as they were not yet in Khrushchev's time) sufficiently compelling to override those social forces inclined to oppose force reductions, such as the most conservatively inclined sector of public opinion and those groups in the officer and NCO corps and in military industry who have to pay the price of change.

At the same time, there is a limit. The military leaders have made clear that they are not prepared to tolerate an unconstrained unilateral run-down of Soviet military strength that, in their view, would undermine the country's security (and also the morale and stability of the military as an institution). It is a condition of their willingness to cooperate in implementing the planned round of unilateral cuts that any further force reductions be carried out only on a bilateral basis[12]. And their position in the polity remains sufficiently firm to make it highly improbable that Gorbachev will feel able to renege on the deal.

Notes and references

1 Col. V. Milovanov, 'Voennaya opasnost' i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost',' **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 15 (August), p. 24.

2 For examples of such letters and the editorial response to them see: 'Doktrina novaya -- problemy starye?', **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1989, No. 16 (August), p. 27; and M. Ponomarev, 'Dvizhenie dolzhno byt' dvustoronnim.' **Krasnaya zvezda** 22 September 1989, p. 3.

3 The survey was carried out on 12-14 May 1989 on behalf of **Moscow News** by sociologists who telephoned a sample of 851 adults in Moscow, representative in terms of age and sex ('West Germany and Germans as the Russians see them,' **Moscow News** 1989, No. 25, 25 June-2 July 1989, p. 7). Only 27% of respondents named a specific country or region as posing the greatest threat to the USSR: the U.S. (19%), West Germany (3%), Middle Eastern countries (2%), Asian countries (2%), England or France (0.6%).

4 Yu. Levada, 'Vopros -- otvet -- vopros...' **Moscow News** 1989, No. 13, 26 June 1989, p. 8. This sample cannot be considered representative of the population as a whole (see notes to Table 7-1), but it is unlikely that the relative sizes of these proportions are seriously misleading.

5 The living conditions of families of officers and NCOs usually depend wholly on the position of their male heads because employment for women is rarely available in places where servicemen are stationed.

6 Izyumov (note 2 to Chapter 6) claims that the issue is being handled no better now than in Khrushchev's time. He may be exaggerating somewhat.

7 See 'Retired Officers without Fixed Abode,' **Moscow News** 1989, No. 25 (25 June-2 July), p. 15. See also Section 6.2d.

8 See Section 6.2b.

9 Izyumov (note 2 to Chapter 6).

10 A. Kireyev, 'Yesli razrazitsya mir... Razmyshleniya ob ekonomike razoruzheniya,' **Pravda** 14 September 1989, p. 4.

11 See the record of a meeting of military aircraft designers: 'Oni ostavlyayut avtografy v nebe,' **Pravda** 18 August 1989, p. 4.

12 See, for example, Ponomarev (note 2).

CHAPTER 8

WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter I assess the current evolution of Soviet views concerning political and economic trends in Western Europe and their implications for the USSR. It is necessary first to take account of the historical background: the general orientation of Soviet policy towards Western Europe in the decades since World War Two is considered in Section 8.2. Soviet views of the contemporary process of economic integration in Western Europe are discussed in Section 8.3. Soviet analysis of the prospects and significance of West European political, foreign-policy and military integration is explored in Section 8.4. The final section summarizes the expected consequences of West European integration for the USSR (except for those consequences resulting from the impact of West European integration upon Eastern Europe, which are considered in Chapter 9).

8.2 Historical background[1]

Two conflicting interpretations of the thrust of Soviet policy towards Western Europe since 1945 are prevalent among Western observers. According to one school of thought, it is the long-standing aim of Soviet policy to bring about the break-up of the Western alliance, to expel the American (and Canadian) military presence from Western Europe and thereby to subordinate the region to the USSR, probably by means of some kind of "Finlandization." According to the rival school of thought, by contrast, the USSR appreciates the stabilizing effect of the North American presence, which serves to legitimize the corresponding Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, and fears the possible consequences of an American withdrawal -- above all, the emergence of West Germany as the dominant West European power, perhaps militantly pursuing revanchist goals and perhaps in possession of its own nuclear weapons. The advocates of this view argue that Soviet attempts to exacerbate differences between Western Europe and the U.S. are motivated by purposes less far-reaching than the break-up of NATO, such as using West European governments as a channel for indirectly influencing U.S. policy.

Prima facie, each of these interpretations has some measure of plausibility. If we attempt to reconstruct a calculus of Soviet interests, we find that the choice between trying to break up the Western alliance and working to stabilize the existing structure of alliances hinges on several difficult judgements. To what extent can Soviet interests be furthered at a given time by striving to improve relations with the U.S.? What are the relative likelihoods of a break between Western Europe and the U.S. leading to outcomes favorable and unfavorable to the USSR? What is the chance that such a break can be brought about anyway? (A failed attempt is not cost-free.) How high a price is it worth paying to secure Soviet control over Eastern Europe?

In view of the difficulty of weighing up the many varied factors involved, we would expect the opinions of Soviet analysts and politicians to vary. We would also expect the center of gravity of Soviet official opinion to shift back and forth over time in response to developments affecting the answers to these questions.

These expectations are confirmed by study of Soviet foreign-policy literature and behavior. Different tendencies can be quite readily identified in Soviet thinking, and their relative influence over Soviet policy changes in response to events, at times rapidly.

Admittedly, *direct* debate over Soviet European policy has only recently made its appearance in the open literature. However, different analyses of the "natural" course of events held different implications for policy, for it would evidently be futile and even counter-productive to try to thwart a process (say, West European economic integration) regarded as in accordance with the laws of history. The policy implications of analyses are now for the first time being made explicit.

One can trace through time the following three tendencies:

a. an "Atlanticist" tendency which plays down Western Europe's potential for autonomy and therefore single-mindedly concentrates attention upon bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations;

b. a "Europeanist" tendency which considers that Western Europe is undergoing a gradual process of emergence as an independent power center, and (certain misgivings notwithstanding) takes on the whole an optimistic view of the likely benefits to the USSR of this development; and

c. a "centrist" tendency which recognizes the increasing importance of Western Europe as a semi-autonomous force within the Western bloc but sees no prospect for it becoming a fully independent power center.

By inference, Atlanticists have aimed to stabilize the existing structure of alliances, Europeanists to stimulate the perceived rebellion of Western Europe against American domination, and centrists to pursue a more subtle policy of restrained encouragement of autonomous tendencies within Western Europe without putting the bloc structure in jeopardy.

Until the 1970s the official position of the USSR remained hostile towards the process of West European integration, although some academic analysts were already advocating a more realistic and positive attitude. At that time Soviet "Europeanism" took predominantly the form of encouraging autonomous tendencies in individual West European countries. The most important of these tendencies was Gaullism in France. In recent years, official Soviet opinion has come round to accepting that West European integration, with the possible exception of military integration, does have some positive aspects from the point of view of the USSR, and is in any case inevitable. "Europeanism" accordingly takes the new form of encouraging tendencies towards autonomy from the U.S. within an increasingly integrated Western Europe.

Under Gorbachev a balance seems to have been maintained between "Atlanticists" and "Europeanists" within the foreign-policy elite[2]. This suggests that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze are themselves uncertain regarding European prospects. It is plausible that they are influenced by the "centrist" view, which enjoys broad if diffuse support among officials and is the position of a strong and technically competent academic school based at IMEMO.

The balance between the "Atlanticist" and the "Europeanist" tendencies in Moscow has shifted over time, reflecting to a considerable extent the successes and failures of the West European community apparent in different periods as well as political developments such as the rise and decline of Gaullism in France and the emergence of *Ostpolitik* in West Germany. In the 1980s alone Soviet attitudes towards Western Europe have passed through three phases:

a. In the early 1980s there were expectations within the Soviet elite that Western Europe, still strongly orientated towards detente and increasingly autonomous from the U.S., would help to constrain a confrontationist first Reagan administration. Relatively good Soviet-West European relations would partially compensate for poorer U.S.-Soviet relations.

b. By the mid-1980s, however, the conclusion was being drawn that Western Europe remained too subordinate to the U.S. to justify the hopes earlier placed upon it. On the other hand, the prospects for accommodation with the U.S. seemed to be improving (the Reagan-Gorbachev Summits etc.).

c. In 1987-88 it was again recognized that Western Europe could play an autonomous role, though (in the dominant view) only within the framework of a durable Atlantic alliance. It also came to be recognized that, contrary to customary Soviet assumptions, this autonomous role might be exercized not always in support of Soviet goals but sometimes in opposition to them (as on the issue of nuclear disarmament).

Thus in response to changing perceptions of the trend of events, the predominant Soviet outlook passed from a markedly "Europeanist" cast in the early 1980s through a strongly "Atlanticist" phase at the beginning of Gorbachev's leadership, finally reaching a more balanced "centrist" position at the turn of the 1990s. This trajectory can be interpreted in terms of a process of learning from experience: the second "Atlanticist" phase constituted a powerful reaction to the failure of the "Europeanist" approach of the early 1980s (e.g. the failure to prevent NATO's deployment of Euromissiles), while the third "centrist" phase is seen as correcting the extremes of both preceding phases and establishing a proper coordination between the American and European "directions" of Soviet foreign policy. One might accordingly expect that this latest phase will last well into the 1990s.

There are therefore crucial differences between the "Europeanism" of the beginning of the 1980s and that of the end of the 1980s. The former came at a time of very high tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, and pursued the goal of undermining American influence in Western Europe in order partially to compensate for the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente by preserving a separate detente with a more autonomous Western Europe. Whether even at this time Soviet European policy actually aimed at a goal so ambitious as the break-up of NATO is difficult to judge, but it was at any rate marked by a harshly anti-American tone. The "Europeanism" of the late 1980s, by contrast, comes at a time of gradually improving U.S.-Soviet relations, and after the Western alliance has -- in the eyes of most Soviet analysts -- given convincing proof of its durability and underlying stability. Soviet representatives now take care to emphasize that the European policy of the USSR is no longer directed against NATO or the U.S..

Although the early 1980s saw sustained Soviet efforts to influence the policy of West European states, there was relatively little willingness on the part of the USSR to bolster these efforts with concessions to West European interests, as demonstrated in particular by the course of the Euromissile controversy[3]. One important aspect of the "new political thinking" of the current period is the learning from past failures that European policy needs to be based upon a serious accounting of the interests of Western Europe. This is borne out in practise by the INF Treaty and the unilateral conventional force reductions.

8.3 The West European context: economic integration

Soviet analysts have in the past argued among themselves whether or not the project of West European economic integration centered in the European Economic Community was really of fundamental significance. Some held that Western Europe remained, and would remain, in essence a set of distinct national economies. However, with the approach of the EEC Single Market in 1992, such skeptical assessments seem to have faded away. There has emerged a broad consensus to the effect that the economic integration of Western Europe is a historically "natural" and necessary process that may already be irreversible. The USSR is accordingly making efforts to develop its relations with the institutions of the EEC as such, rather than just with its constituent states: whatever the pros and cons of the new situation, one has to adapt to the inevitable. Meanwhile, Soviet debate concerning Western Europe has come to revolve around the question of the extent to which the economic integration of the region is likely to be accompanied by its political, foreign-policy and military integration (see Section 8.4).

In theory, West European economic integration is now considered historically progressive to the degree that it embodies the larger global trend towards transnational economic interdependence (as well as interdependence in general). Its progressive character is therefore qualified to the degree that the EEC, in integrating at the regional level, raises obstacles to longer-term integration over wider areas -- in particular, to integration at the pan-European level which would extend to the USSR as well as its East European allies.

The assessment made by Soviet economists of the short-term economic impact on the USSR of West European economic integration is very mixed and subject to many uncertainties[4]. The main expectations are as follows:

a. It will become even more difficult than at present for the USSR to export industrial products to Western Europe. Soviet exports of fuel and raw materials to Western Europe may remain at approximately the same level, given a certain growth in West European demand for energy (which will be partly met through enhanced efficiency of fuel use).

b. It is expected that there will still be growing interest within the EEC in exporting goods and services to the USSR and in investing in joint enterprises on Soviet territory. The magnitude of the imports which the USSR will be able to afford will, however, be limited by the magnitude of its exports and by its financial situation. At least some analysts also doubt whether foreign investment will grow sufficiently rapidly to become a weighty factor in the Soviet economy in the next few years.

c. The effect of the Single Market on the access of the USSR to West European credit is uncertain. The scope for manoeuver of the USSR will probably be narrowed by greater coordination of the credit policy of the West European states.

d. The Single Market will act as a pole of attraction for the countries of Eastern Europe as well as for the small European neutral states. Although there are practical constraints on the rate at which economic links between the EEC and East European states can be intensified, one consequence is bound to be the exacerbation of what are already serious disintegrative tendencies within the CMEA (see Chapter 9).

Radically reformist Soviet analysts insist that the USSR must find ways of effectively integrating into the world economy if it is to make substantial progress in overcoming its economic and technological backwardness relative to the most advanced economies. "Organic links," it is argued, are especially needed with the two main zones of capitalist economic integration -- Western Europe and the Asian-Pacific region, which are adjacent to the European and Far-Eastern parts of the USSR respectively[5].

Enormous obstacles, however, face the integration of the Soviet Far East into the Pacific economy. Among the main problems are the underdeveloped infrastructure of the region, its established orientation to economic links along the East-West rather than the North-South axis, and the fact that large parts of the region (including the important Vladivostok area in the south-east) are and may remain closed military zones. It follows that efforts to integrate the USSR into the world economy must be concentrated in Europe, where geographic and economic circumstances are more favorable and there already exists a tradition of economic cooperation. All but one of the six zones of joint enterprise ("free zones") currently planned or under consideration, for example, are in the European part of the USSR[6].

In the short term, the potential for the intensification of links between the Soviet and the West European economies is quite limited. The Soviet leadership, mindful of the Polish precedent, is reluctant either to take advantage of large-scale Western credits (assuming these to be available) which would mean a sharp rise in the national debt or to accelerate the selling-off abroad of the country's natural resources, no longer regarded as inexhaustible. Under these circumstances, the low level of competitiveness of Soviet manufactured exports perpetuates the shortage of foreign currency needed to pay for imports from the West. It has so far proven difficult to attract foreign investment on the scale required significantly to modify this situation.

A number of Soviet economists have convincingly argued that the effective implementation of a really radical market-orientated reform of the Soviet economic system -- such as has not yet occurred and is not likely to occur very soon -- is a precondition for an adequate level of integration with Western economies. It is widely held nevertheless that over the longer term the need for fuller integration cannot be avoided. However great the costs of joining Europe, remark one group of authors, the costs of the only alternative strategy -- "self-reliant" isolation as a backward bureaucratic autarky -- are even greater[7]. Similarly, the economist Alexei Kunitsyn sketches three scenarios of the future:

I. 'Optimistic': Radical economic reform leads to drastic restructuring of the Soviet economy and its intensive integration into the world economy. This inevitably entails exacerbation of social tensions, but there is no other way to catch up with the West.

II. 'Pessimistic': Reform is frozen, leading back to stagnation. The economic gap between the USSR and the West widens, at least some East European countries reorient themselves towards economic, political and cultural ties with Western Europe, and ultimately both the internal and the external security of the USSR are undermined.

III. 'Compromise': Moderate economic reform is combined with protection of the socio-political *status-quo*. The exact outcome then depends on the balance between the reformist and conservative elements in Soviet policy. The USSR cannot, however, overcome its lag behind the West under this scenario.

Kunitsyn argues that neither of the first two scenarios is possible in the near future. Social conditions are not yet ripe for Scenario I, while *perestroika* has now gone too far to permit reversion to Scenario II. Scenario III is therefore the most likely for the time being, but eventually the USSR will have to make the transition to Scenario I[8].

It is therefore important for the USSR that economic integration in Western Europe not take a form that would close the door on this longer-term prospect. The economic requirement for a far-reaching improvement in Soviet-West European relations, entailing *inter alia* the substantial demilitarization of the European continent, is accordingly an urgent one.

8.4 The West European context: political and military integration?

Soviet analysts are naturally well aware that the process of West European integration affects not only the economic field but also those of internal and foreign policy and of military affairs. They pay the most attention to foreign-policy and military integration.

Foreign-policy coordination on the part of the EEC member-states is welcomed. This is partly attributable to the fact that the foreign-policy positions adopted by the EEC (for example, with respect to the Middle East) tend to diverge less from Soviet positions than do those of the U.S.. West European foreign-policy coordination therefore enhances the international weight of positions relatively acceptable to the USSR. The practice of policy coordination within Western Europe is also thought likely to "neutralize" any "extreme" policies that individual countries might otherwise be inclined to adopt. Finally, it should help to simplify the task of finding compromise solutions to problems at the pan-European level.

West European integration in the military field, however, is viewed in a more problematic light. Uncertainties and disagreements here revolve around two questions:

a. Towards what outcome are current attempts at military integration directed? Is it just a matter of "strengthening NATO's European pillar" -- or does military integration complement integration in the economic, political and foreign-policy fields as one aspect of the emergence of Western Europe as an independent superstate, a "United States of Europe" (USE)?

b. What are the likely consequences of West European military integration for the USSR? How serious are the new threats it poses to Soviet security? Does it have any positive aspects?

All participants in this debate recognize the great significance of West European integration in non-military fields. In the terminology proposed in Section 8.2, it is a debate mainly between "Europeanists" and "centrists," with the latter clearly occupying the more influential position. There are in addition authors whom one might term "agnostics" -- i.e. those for whom the continuation of the existing situation in Europe, the consolidation of the Atlantic alliance and the emergence of Western Europe as a new center of military power are all important possibilities.

I shall explore analyses pertaining to West European military integration published in early 1989 by four writers, two of whom may be taken to represent "centrist" opinion (Rassadin and Kunadze) and two "Europeanist" opinion (Burduli and Stupishin)[9].

The "centrists" take at face value the protestations by West European politicians seeking military integration that their sole purpose is to enhance the contribution made by Western Europe to NATO. Western Europe, they argue, furthers its strategic interests indirectly, within the framework of its alliance with the U.S. -- an alliance which derives durability and stability from the intensive and deep-rooted economic, political and cultural ties between the U.S. and the European members of NATO.

The "Europeanists," however, think that behind their public declarations of loyalty to NATO prominent West European politicians conceal "more far-reaching plans" for the creation of a new institutional structure through which the unification of the West European states will be extended from the economic and political into the military sphere (Burduli). This outcome, Stupishin cautiously opines, is a real possibility, but it is not inevitable and can still be averted: the military component is not a *sine qua non* of West European integration in general, which in itself is indeed now inevitable.

A related question of specialist discussion is whether West European armaments firms can yet be considered to constitute the core of a specifically West European "military-industrial complex." The prevailing "centrist" view is that such is not the case. At the same time, the usefulness of the stereotypical concept of the "military-industrial complex" in accounting for the military policy of capitalist states is now contested by some analysts[10].

What strategic goals is West European military integration designed to pursue? Rassadin considers that there are two basic goals. One is the specialization of Western Europe in securing its own defense as part of a division of labor within NATO. This does not, he adds, necessarily mean that there is an aim to shift the balance of forces in Europe against the USSR. The second goal, which he expects to acquire greater salience as the East-West confrontation becomes less intense, is securing the "vital interests" of Western Europe beyond its borders in the adjacent regions to the south and south-east -- i.e. North Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region -- in the possible event of growing instability there. Such an orientation is prefigured in the recent coordination of naval action in the Persian Gulf by the West European states. But, he stresses, even this out-of-area dimension of West European strategy does not elevate Western Europe above the status of a *regional* power center. The West European countries do not aim to constitute themselves, in the foreseeable future, as a force capable of independently undertaking *global* confrontation.

Kunadze puts even less emphasis than does Rassadin on the autonomous components of West European strategic goals. In his opinion, out-of-area military expeditions on the part of West European states, such as Britain's war in the Falklands/Malvinas and the French intervention in Chad, should be regarded as phenomena of secondary significance, mere hang-overs from the colonial past of the countries concerned.

Whatever the assessment made by "centrist" analysts of the North-South dimension of West European military power, they do not regard it as necessarily presenting a direct danger to the USSR[11]. Such a danger, they seem to assume, can only come from a power which strives to confront the USSR on the global level. There is, and for a long time to come will be, only one such power -- the U.S..

West European military integration, argues Rassadin, is not a trend that the USSR should oppose under all circumstances. It is true that -- given an unfavorable evolution of world politics -- it could further catalyze the arms race and increase military-political instability. Should, however, events take a more favorable course, it could (like West European foreign-policy coordination) facilitate the task of reaching East-West agreements. On this point Rassadin is evidently somewhat ahead of mainstream Soviet elite opinion: Gorbachev himself has expressed an unequivocally negative attitude towards West European military integration[12].

The "Europeanist" analysts conceive of West European military integration as serving the general purpose of "affirming the status of Western Europe as a world power center." This conception does not in itself attribute any specific target to West European military power. Like their "centrist" colleagues, the "Europeanists" apparently see no reason why the USSR should not be able to establish a tolerable *modus vivendi* with the new power center on its western flank.

This optimistic outlook contradicts the widespread Western view that the USSR fears the prospect of an independent and united Western Europe as a potential vehicle of a resurgent militaristic Germany. It is no doubt the case that the undifferentiated fear of Germany as a state still exists in the USSR, especially in the minds of many of the older generation. The Soviet press occasionally carries alarmist reports of the activity of extreme-right parties in West Germany: the publicist Ernst Genri is especially notable for his sensational treatment of the theme of West German revanchism. However, as a recent Soviet public opinion poll on Soviet-West German relations demonstrates[13], the fear of Germany is no longer a very strong element of public consciousness. It should also be borne in mind that most of those leaders who had direct personal experience of the Second World War are now retired or dead.

In particular, serious contemporary Soviet analysts of West European affairs, such as those associated with IMEMO or the new Institute of Europe (Vladimir Baranovskii, Vitalii Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov etc.), give very little credence to the "German threat." They argue that circumstances have so changed since the inter-war period that the probability of a new Hitler coming to power in Germany is negligible. Firstly, the whole social structure of Germany (West as well as East) has been transformed. Secondly, even granting that West Germany has the strongest economy of any West European country, its position is not strong enough to allow it to escape the constraints of the framework of West European integration or single-handedly to take control of that framework against the resistance of its West European partners. Finally, the threat that Germany could ever pose to the USSR is limited by the fact that the international system has ceased to be a Eurocentric one[14].

A common view among Soviet analysts is that if any one country can be said to provide the crucial motive force behind the movement towards West European military integration, that country is not West Germany but France. In fact, some "Europeanist" writers (e.g. Stupishin) portray France as the organizing core of the emergent West European power center. French defense policy, especially with respect to nuclear weapons, is the target of much vituperation in Soviet commentary[15]. It is not, however, claimed that France even potentially poses a threat of military aggression against the USSR[16].

There is admittedly one component of West European military capability that *is* viewed with some concern -- the nuclear forces of Britain and France (which "Europeanist" analysts expect to see merged to form the nuclear force of the West European superstate). These forces, undergoing expansion and modernization against the background of forthcoming deep reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces, may acquire relative dimensions large enough to represent a serious threat to the USSR. Stupishin and his proteges in the MFA have accused their "Atlanticist" colleagues of underestimating the looming threat of this "second nuclear front," and of unrealistically assuming that the U.S.-Soviet duopoly over nuclear weapons can somehow be restored. On the other hand, they believe that arms control can in principle bring about stable nuclear balances between the USSR and each of the two Western power centers. The USSR can maintain adequate nuclear deterrence even in a situation entailing the numerical inferiority of its nuclear arsenal relative to those of its potential adversaries taken together[17].

On the whole, then, even a Western Europe fully integrated in the military as well as other respects, though by no means an ideal prospect, is not perceived as posing an *intolerable* threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Moreover, a high level of military integration is not considered an inevitable concomitant of West European economic and political integration, and -- if it does occur -- it may not take the most threatening of its conceivable forms.

The likely consequences of a fully independent Western Europe do not therefore seem so threatening to the USSR that Soviet policy-makers should feel compelled to try to avert its emergence. Nor, on the other hand, is there sufficient reason that they should feel compelled to take significant risks in order to help bring a fully independent Western Europe to life. Above all, and notwithstanding the Soviet prophets of a United States of Europe, the dominant trend of thought in Moscow today views a sharp break between Western Europe and the U.S. as a highly improbable prospect. It is expected that Western Europe will become an economically, politically and (perhaps) militarily more integrated entity enjoying relative autonomy in relation to the U.S., but that the overarching framework of the Atlantic alliance will prove durable.

This moderate prognosis is regarded as an example of the new Soviet realism in foreign policy which dispels the illusions and wishful thinking held responsible for past failures. It is ironic -- and perhaps fortunate for the West -- that most Soviet analysts should come to the conclusion that NATO will remain basically stable for the foreseeable future just at the time when much Western opinion perceives NATO as entering the period of its most severe crisis ever.

8.5 Summary

The predominant view among Soviet analysts of the likely consequences for the USSR of the process of West European integration is as follows:

In the *economic* sphere, the consequences are bound to be mixed, and the overall effect may well turn out to be a negative one. The foreign-trade situation of the USSR will become in certain respects even more difficult than at present. It becomes all the more essential for the long-term economic and technological development of the USSR that it not be excluded from the process of economic integration centered in Western Europe.

In the *political* sphere, positive consequences are expected. Whether or not Western Europe emerges as a fully independent power center, its political integration as a more united and autonomous actor in world politics should enable the USSR to occupy a less isolated foreign-policy position.

In the *military* sphere, some risk of negative consequences is perceived, although the potential threats to the security of the USSR from a militarily integrated Western Europe may materialize only in part or not at all, and would not be really intolerable even if they do fully materialize. Under the most favorable scenarios, military integration of Western Europe may actually have certain advantages.

Notes and references

[1] In writing this chapter, especially Sections 8.2 and 8.3, I have relied extensively upon the pioneering and invaluable study of Neil Malcolm, **Soviet Policy Perspectives on Western Europe. Chatham House Papers** (London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989). I am grateful to the author, with whose judgement I do not agree on all points, for providing me with an advance draft of the manuscript.

[2] Among influential "Atlanticists" one might mention:

-- the former ambassador in the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, for a time head of the International Department of the Central Committee (ID CC) and now an adviser to Gorbachev;

-- Academician Georgy Arbatov, head of the USA Institute; and

-- senior MFA officials occupied with U.S.-Soviet relations (e.g. Bessmertnykh).

Influential "Europeanists" include:

-- Alexander Yakovlev, currently chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Foreign Policy;

-- Alexander Falin, currently head of the ID CC;

-- Vadim Zagladin, a deputy head of the ID CC with responsibility for West European contacts; and

-- Anatoly Kovalev, the MFA official responsible for Soviet conduct of the Helsinki negotiations and now a first deputy foreign minister.

"Europeanism" is also said to be strong in agencies dealing with foreign trade, a natural consequence of the weakness of U.S.-Soviet as compared to Soviet-West European economic ties.

[3] Soviet policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s with regard to INF has been a topic of critical debate in the Soviet literature recently (see the series of articles in SShA 1988, No. 12, pp. 23-41). Of particular interest is a memoir on the subject by Georgii Kornienko, who was a first deputy foreign minister between 1977 and 1986 (**SShA** 1989, No. 4, pp. 42-52). Kornienko argues that the main mistake of the Soviet Union was its negative reaction to the sounding, made by West German Chancellor Schmidt in Moscow in summer 1979, for a deal by which the USSR would limit its deployment of SS-20s to no more warheads than had been on the old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles the SS-20s were replacing in exchange for non-deployment of Pershing and Cruise by NATO. Kornienko reveals that he and others among his MFA colleagues had at the time pressed for a positive reaction.

[4] For a recent forecast of the consequences for the USSR of the formation of the EEC Single Market, prepared by the Department of West European Research of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, see **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 4, pp. 31-44.

[5] See the dialogue between the *Izvestiya* commentator Alexander Bovin and Professor Vladimir Lukin (at that time of the USA Institute, now a deputy head of department at the MFA) in **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 1, published in English in Steve Hirsch (ed.), **MEMO -- New Soviet Voices on Foreign and Economic Policy** (Washington D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1989).

[6] The zones already planned are:

-- the *Vyborg* area adjacent to the Finnish border, which it is hoped will host electronics and other high-technology firms with links to scientific institutes in nearby Leningrad;

-- the *Novgorod* area north-east of Moscow; and

-- the area around the open port of *Nakhodka* in the Far East, to which it is hoped to attract South Korean capital.

Still under consideration are the following zones:

-- the *Sochi* area on the Black Sea coast near Odessa, in the development of which it is hoped French, Italian and Spanish firms will be interested;

-- the *Zelenograd* area near Moscow; and

-- the *Kaliningrad* area (former Koenigsberg) near the Polish border.

(See the interview with Academician O. Bogomolov and A. Bykov, 'Svobodnye zony,' **Pravda** 22 October 1989).

[7] A. Kortunov *et al.*, **West European Development and Soviet Foreign Policy Options** (August 1989) [draft paper for forthcoming book; cannot yet be publicly quoted].

[8] Alexei Kunitsyn, 'Sotsializm: vybor mirovoi ekonomicheskoi strategii,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 1, published in English in Hirsch (see note 5); see also Alexei G. Kvasov, **Prospects for Economic Reform and Trade of Eastern Europe in International Security Context** (August 1989). [Draft paper for forthcoming book -- cannot yet be publicly quoted.]

[9] Anatolii Rassadin is a senior researcher at IMEMO ('Zapadnoyevropeiskaya voennaya integratsiya -- perspektivy i vozmozhnye posledstviya,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 2, p. 104). Georgii Kunadze heads a sector at IMEMO ('Militarizm v Yaponii: voprosy metodologii analiza,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 2, p. 116). G. P. Burduli is a researcher at the Center for Scientific Information on the Social Sciences of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (see **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 4). Vladimir Stupishin is a Chief Counsellor in the Assessments and Planning Directorate of the MFA. He appears to patronize a group of more junior MFA officials who think along similar lines. For a statement of his views on Western Europe, see his article 'Common European Home and the Slogan for a United States of Europe,' **International Affairs** 1989, No. 3, p. 89. An example of a paper written from an "agnostic" position is that by Kortunov *et al.* (see note 6).

[10] See the article by V. A. Fedorovich (USA Institute) in SShA 1989, No. 4.

[11] That the West European countries do not have as a goal the creation of an aggressive potential of their own against the USSR is also a conclusion of a study of military-economic ties within NATO by a group of IMEMO analysts (**Voenno-ekonomicheskie svyazi stran NATO: tseli, masshtaby, formy realizatsii** (Moscow, 1988)). The book was favorably reviewed by L. Spiridonov, 'Vremya novykh otsenok,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 3, p. 141.

[12] "How do we look upon the integration occurring in Western Europe? As a reality. If it does not mean also military integration, then we can only welcome this process. But you must bear in mind this concern of ours" (Gorbachev's speech at the Koln Chamber of Commerce, 13 June 1989, **Vestnik MID SSSR** No. 12 (46), 1 July 1989, p. 18).

[13] See note 3 to Chapter 7.

[14] See V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, 'Vyzovy bezopasnosti -- starye i novye,' **Kommunist** 1988, No. 1, p. 42. Karaganov unequivocally states: "In Europe there are now no politically significant forces that could deliberately start a war" ('The USA and the Common European Home,' **International Affairs** 1989, No. 8, p. 17).

[15] The dominant Soviet attitude towards French policy may be characterized as one of resentment arising out of the disappointment of the hopes vested in French-Soviet detente in the days of Gaullism. It is now a common view among Soviet analysts that West Germany, not France, is the most promising and valuable potential partner of the USSR in Western Europe. "In the 1990s West Germany will play a role in European politics analogous to that of France in the 1960s" (A. Kortunov *et al*, **West European Development and Soviet Foreign Policy Options** (August 1989) [Draft paper for forthcoming book -- cannot yet be publicly quoted]). Asked in a survey of public opinion on Soviet-West European relations (carried out in Moscow in April-May 1989 by the Center for the Study of Soviet Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Problems at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations) with which West European countries the USSR should first develop its relations, 43% of respondents named West Germany, 30% the U.K. and 24% France (**Vestnik MID SSSR** No. 14 (48), 1 August 1989, p. 59).

[16] It is of interest in this connection that one can find -- and in a military journal at that -- an analysis of French nuclear policy that stresses not the anti-Soviet but the anti-West German orientation of France's nuclear forces: in the eyes of French politicians, we are told, their nuclear arsenal is "political capital, ... securing the supremacy of Paris over its European competitors, bursting ahead economically" (V. Roshchupkin, 'Yadernaya politika Frantsii,' **Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil** 1988, No. 7, p. 82).

[17] See S. Vybornov, A. Gusenkov and V. Leontiev, 'Nothing Is Simple in Europe,' **International Affairs** 1988, No. 3, p. 34; and V. Stupishin, 'Indeed, Nothing in Europe Is Simple,' **International Affairs** 1988, No. 5, p. 69. For a more detailed analysis of this debate, see Stephen Shenfield, **Minimum Nuclear Deterrence: the Debate Among Soviet Civilian Analysts** (Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, November 1989).

CHAPTER 9

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE

9.1 Introduction

One very important aspect of West European integration, as viewed through Soviet eyes, remains to be discussed: its implications for the development of Eastern Europe. Soviet analysts recognise that "Eastern Europe is entering a period of transformation which may last between ten and twenty years"[1], and that West European integration is a crucial factor in this transformation. I consider the implications for the economies of the East European countries in Section 9.2, and for their politics in Section 9.3. The question of the future of the Warsaw Pact is dealt with in Section 9.4. In Section 9.5 I analyze the influence of factors relating to Eastern Europe upon the thinking of Soviet analysts concerning the optimal policy of the USSR in Europe.

9.2 Economic implications

The progress of economic integration in Western Europe further complicates the situation faced by the USSR in Eastern Europe. Ideally, at least from the traditional Soviet point of view, the CMEA would function as the counterpart of the European Community in promoting economic integration in its half of the European continent. However, it is now widely agreed by Soviet specialists and officials that the CMEA has been falling far short of adequately fulfilling this function[2]. Though within its existing framework the CMEA can facilitate some useful exchanges, mainly on a bilateral barter basis, the large-scale development of multilateral economic relations has as its prerequisite the implementation of radical market-orientated economic reforms throughout the region. As for the time being only Hungary, Poland and (in principle) the USSR are willing to undertake such reforms, "organic" integration is not yet on the agenda. Moreover, even under the most favorable of political circumstances the potential of intra-CMEA cooperation would be constrained by various factors, such as the inherited semi-autarkic structures of the East European economies. In particular, collaboration within the CMEA could not on its own prove adequate to the task of technological renewal because even the technologically most advanced member states (East Germany, Czechoslovakia) lag appreciably behind the developed Western countries.

Soviet analysts recognize that under these circumstances -- which are unlikely to change significantly except possibly in the long term -- it is inevitable that West European economic integration will act as an increasingly powerful magnet for the East European countries. These countries will continue to seek closer trading links with the EC, and will prefer to look westwards for partners in technological cooperation. Some countries (in particular Hungary) may actually apply to join the EC. The limit to the pace of intensification of economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe will, on the whole, be set not by the political will of East European governments but rather by objective constraints (financial balances etc.) and by the readiness of West European firms, banks and governments to become deeply involved in East European economies, given all the problems and risks attendant upon such involvement.

Especially unfortunate in Soviet eyes is the growing indebtedness of several East European countries to Western banks, now in excess of 100 billion dollars in hard currency. Some countries, it is admitted, are bound to remain heavy debtors for decades into the future. This plight makes them vulnerable to political as well as economic pressure from their creditors. It is noted that the EC has begun systematically to use its economic leverage as a means of inducing political change in Eastern Europe. The dramatic and unprecedented recent political developments in Poland and Hungary are attributed, at least in significant part, to West European influence arising from the financial position of these countries. In the course of time other

East European countries may be similarly affected. Even though the Gorbachev leadership is by no means wholly hostile to the *substance* of the changes occurring in the reformist-led CMEA states, their concern cannot fail to be aroused by the foreign-policy context of these changes[3].

Many Soviet commentators deplore the steady gravitation of the East European countries westwards. Some writers, it is true, do find it "natural" (given, *inter alia*, the deficiencies of the CMEA) that the relative intensity of economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe should rise while the relative intensity of economic ties between Eastern Europe and the USSR falls. Nevertheless, even these analysts consider it important that the East European countries should not develop their ties with the West more rapidly than the USSR develops its own ties with the West' Ideally the USSR should even keep a little ahead in this respect[4]. In practice, however, the Soviet Union has so far proven less capable than its East European allies of taking part in the process of European integration. This trend, projected into the future to the year 2000 and beyond, leads towards the economic and political isolation of the USSR, to "further weakening of the Soviet position in Europe and the gradual exclusion of the USSR from Europe"[5].

However, Professor Vladimir Baranovskii, head of the West European Department in IMEMO, has recently called upon Soviet policy makers to abandon their misgivings concerning the expanding economic ties between the countries of Eastern and of Western Europe. His argument is that, whatever the disadvantages of these ties for the USSR, they make much less likely the evolution of West European integration in militarily threatening directions[6].

9.3 Political implications

As noted in Section 9.2, Soviet observers attribute the radical changes occurring in the political systems of some East European countries at least in part to the shifting balance between Soviet and Western (primarily West European) influence in the region.

The current political situation in Eastern Europe is marked by the contrast between those countries in which an evolution towards a pluralist system is taking place (Poland, Hungary and now East Germany) and those countries in which political and economic reform is still to varying degrees blocked by conservative leaders (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria). Inasmuch, however, as Soviet analysts view reform as an inevitable outcome of the new geopolitical conditions in which the East European states find themselves and expect these conditions to persist, they must anticipate that within a few years -- at most a decade and perhaps much sooner -- radical change will be under way in all the countries of the region (with the possible exception of Albania). The eventual outcome which they seem to consider most likely for most of the countries of Eastern Europe is a mixed economic system, with state, cooperative and private enterprise all playing important roles, and various political arrangements intermediate in nature between the old partocratic model and Western-type multi-party pluralism.

Soviet analysts and politicians, in contemplating this prospect, appear resigned to the inevitable. They claim that they do not regard internal socio-economic and political change -- provided that the integrity of the WTO is not put at risk -- as a threat to the security of the USSR[7].

Another important consequence of the decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, noted with concern by Soviet analysts, is the re-appearance there of intra-regional disputes, some of them very sharp in tone. These disputes are of several kinds: ethnic (such as the conflict between Hungary and Rumania concerning the position of the Hungarian minority in Rumania), political (such as the argument between Hungary and East Germany concerning treatment of would-be emigrants from East Germany), economic (such as the "customs war" between Hungary and Czechoslovakia) and even territorial (such as the dispute between East Germany and Poland concerning demarcation on the coastal shelf in the Pomeranian Bay)[8]. It is now clear to Soviet observers that the post-war hegemony of the USSR over the region concealed from view

the underlying reality that the political as well as the economic integration of Eastern Europe remained much weaker than that of Western Europe. They fear that the "Balkanization" of Eastern Europe is now re-emerging as a long-term threat to European security[9].

9.4 Military implications

The relaxation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe is, of course, least advanced in the military sphere. So long as a strong American military presence remains in Western Europe, the USSR can be expected to remain committed to the integrity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization[10]. Soviet policy concerning the WTO over the longer term is more difficult to assess. The USSR has long declared that were NATO to be dissolved the WTO would have served its purpose as a counterweight to the Atlantic alliance and would itself be dissolved. Would this undertaking be adhered to in the event that the dissolution of NATO occurred in the context of the formation of a fully independent and militarily integrated West European power center -- a scenario not envisaged by the Soviet policy-makers who first adopted the line of simultaneous dissolution of the two alliances?

So long as the existing structure of alliances in Europe is formally retained, the USSR has indicated that it would be prepared to withdraw all its forces from Eastern Europe in conjunction with a withdrawal of all American forces from Western Europe. According to well-informed sources, there is currently under discussion within Soviet policy-making circles the idea of adopting a more flexible position on the question of mutual withdrawal: recognizing the firm opposition of the West to any total "de-linkage" of West European from American security, the USSR might be prepared to withdraw all *its* forces from Eastern Europe in conjunction with a reduction in the American military presence in Western Europe to a low residual level that would serve as a political symbol of the continuing U.S.-West European security tie. The advocates of this proposal are attempting to get translated into policy terms the ascendant Soviet view that it is unrealistic to aim at the complete severance of the transatlantic connection.

In the meantime, the reliability of the East European allies must be a matter of ever-growing concern to Soviet strategic planners. The issue of whether East European troops would prove willing to fight on the side of the USSR in a future East-West war, while of some significance, is not (to my mind) the central aspect of this problem[11]. Of at least equal import is the question of how East European governments would react in the event of a gathering international crisis that might lead to war. These governments, let us recall, have steadily widening scope for autonomous action in the realm of foreign policy; they fall increasingly under Western (especially West European) influence; and they are more and more prone to come into conflict with one another. In this new political environment, there will be a real risk -- in the eyes of Soviet war planners -- that some or all of the WTO allies may resist measures of mobilization and war preparation considered necessary by the USSR. They may indeed even try to keep out of any approaching war by reaching separate diplomatic agreements with the Western powers. The military value of the East European buffer belt is accordingly in the process of decline.

Considerations of this kind may number among the motives for the USSR adopting a defensive strategy and doctrine in Europe: a defensive military as well as political posture would be more acceptable to East European opinion, thereby reducing the risks of the pre-war period.

9.5 What is to be done?

Some Soviet analysts have gone beyond description of the changing situation in Eastern Europe to suggest countermeasures that might be adopted by the USSR to shore up its position there. These countermeasures are designed to "create a mature political alliance in Eastern Europe capable of withstanding the inevitable destabilizing processes of coming decades." On the economic side, the "tendencies towards the disorganization of the CMEA" must be countered by a reform of that body which will facilitate regional integration[12]. On the military-political side, it is argued, the WTO also needs thoroughgoing reform aimed at strengthening its organization on a new basis of equal relations among the member states (in particular, the creation of a permanent political headquarters) and at increasing the relative weight of its political functions (which should include the resolution of conflicts between member states)[13].

While reform both of the CMEA and of the WTO would no doubt serve useful purposes for Soviet foreign policy under the new conditions now facing it, steps of this kind -- assuming that they can eventually be agreed upon -- would at best slow down the decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and impart a greater degree of stability to the process. They would hardly be sufficient to restore Eastern Europe as an exclusive sphere of Soviet influence, and it does not appear that they are put forward with this end in view. Restoration of full Soviet hegemony would require very drastic action -- military intervention in some countries and the credible threat of it in others, and massive financial backing of existing and newly installed client regimes.

The senior IMEMO analyst Viktor Sheinis concluded a recent reassessment of the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 with the words: "The 'Brezhnev doctrine' is in practice dead. It remains to recognize this"[14]. Even though the previous ambiguity of the Soviet position probably still played a residual deterrent role in East European politics, Gorbachev has now explicitly ruled out military intervention in the region as a future policy option. He is surely well aware both that none of the underlying problems faced by the USSR in Eastern Europe would be solved by military means and that military intervention would set at naught his whole strategy towards Western Europe (and the West in general).

The large-scale use of Soviet economic resources to "buy" back influence in Eastern Europe also seems to be ruled out as a policy option. Deplorable as Soviet analysts and policy-makers may regard the increasing influence of the West European countries in Eastern Europe and the corresponding dilution of Soviet influence there, none of them advocates that the USSR undertake the costly practical commitments to its allies which might reverse or at least halt this trend. In particular, one may infer that the USSR is not willing, given its own financial crisis, to provide financial support to those of its allies which are deeply in debt to West European creditors on the scale that would be necessary to shield them effectively from West European political pressure. "The Soviet Union," observe one group of Soviet analysts, "is gradually losing its capability to offer the East European countries economic advantages sufficient to secure the political stability of the alliance"[15]. Moreover, the USSR seems increasingly willing to weaken its economic ties with Eastern Europe on its own initiative where this is expedient in economic terms[16] -- a course advocated by the most radical of the Soviet reform economists. This unwillingness to pay the price of maintaining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe testifies to the seriousness of the internal economic situation in the USSR, and also indicates that the Soviet leadership no longer assigns the region as high a priority as in the past.

The USSR, then, no longer has available the means to halt the westward drift of its East European allies. It has therefore no acceptable alternative to building a much closer relationship of its own with Western Europe if it is to avert increasing isolation from the outside world. Loss of control over Eastern Europe becomes less threatening a prospect to the extent that a "triangle" of interdependence can be established among the USSR, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. This is arguably the central rationale underlying the Soviet slogan of the "common European home": as a common European home of some kind is bound to be built in any case, Soviet policy must try to ensure that the USSR will find a place under its roof.

To conclude, the East European factor is a third force -- in addition to the requirements of national security and of internal economic and technological development, discussed in earlier chapters -- impelling Soviet foreign policy makers, aware of the critical weakness of the USSR as a polity on the world arena, to a defensive strategy across the board and to a special orientation towards an integrated Western Europe.

Notes and references

[1] Prof. Yuri Davydov (USA Institute), **Eastern Europe and International Stability** (October 1989) [draft for forthcoming book; cannot yet be publicly cited].

[2] For a recent somber assessment of the CMEA by a senior IMEMO economist, see M. Maksimova, 'Razdum'ya o perestroike SEV,' **Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya** 1989, No. 4, p. 65. For the views of some senior officials, see the round-table discussion The Socialist Community: Democratisation and Renewal,' **International Affairs** 1989, No. 1, p. 123.

[3] "Some [East European] countries," observed Gorald Gorinovich, head of the Directorate of the Socialist Countries of Europe at the MFA, "face the prospect of remaining debtors for decades and of being pressured politically and economically by capitalist countries" (**International Affairs** 1989, No. 1, pp. 124-5).

[4] Thus, according to Mikhail Kozhokin, the USSR should take the lead in an effort to preserve "balance" in the pace at which different East European countries develop ties with the West, "so that deepening integration ... does not aggravate differences between East European states... It would be a good thing if the Soviet Union could -- if only by a little -- outstrip the East European countries in developing interstate relations with the West" ('Old words, new line -- U.S. policy in Eastern Europe,' **New Times** 1989, No. 28, July 11-17, p. 14).

[5] A. Kortunov *et al.*, **West European development and Soviet foreign policy options** (August 1989) [draft paper for forthcoming book; cannot yet be publicly cited].

[6] Statement made at conference on mutual security in Providence and Washington, November 1989, organized by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and the USA Institute.

[7] Thus Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated at the 44th Session of the U.N. General Assembly that the USSR did not feel threatened by the election of a non-communist government in Poland (**Pravda** 27 September 1989).

[8] In the course of this dispute coastguard vessels of the two countries have actually exchanged fire. The dispute appears now to have been settled, at least for the time being.

[9] Davydov (see note 1). One Soviet commentator laments that "while the West prepares to open doors to the free movement of goods and services, capital and labor, the socialist countries suddenly begin to introduce artificial customs barriers and to tighten up arrangements for human contacts" (V. Shmyganovskii, 'Pochemu oni doveryayut drug drugu,' **Izvestiya** 29 August 1989).

[10] There can certainly be no doubt that this is true with respect to the crucial northern tier of the WTO (i.e. East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia). There may, however, be some room for doubt with respect to the southern tier. Academician Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, has expressed the opinion that the neutralization of Hungary on the "Austrian" model would be acceptable to the USSR. The USSR has long tolerated the anomalous position of Rumania within the WTO, which *de facto* amounts to little more than purely formal membership: the organization, training and deployment of the Rumanian armed forces as well as their military doctrine are not integrated with those of the WTO as a whole, but are orientated (like those of neutral Yugoslavia) towards the defense of national territory against threats of aggression from any direction. Hungary has also taken a first step in this direction in relocating some of the forces it had on its western border to face Rumania, now perceived as a potential adversary. This leaves Bulgaria as the only really reliable state in the southern tier. On the other hand, the USSR may continue strongly to oppose the loss of even a single strategically less vital member of the WTO, fearing that this would endanger the stability of the whole alliance. Evidence that this is the case is provided by

the response to Bogomolov's remark about the acceptability of Hungary's neutrality from Rafael Fyodorov, first deputy head of the ID CC: such remarks are harmful, he said, for the departure of any country from the WTO would be fraught with serious consequences (**Meetings of Europe Working Group of the Mutual Security Project, Moscow March 28-30 -- Summary Report**, CFPD, 11 April 1989).

11 Given the enormous practical difficulties facing those wishing to mutiny, desert or defect under the conditions of contemporary warfare, this aspect is arguably over-emphasized by some Western analysts.

12 Kortunov *et al.* (see note 5).

13 For a discussion of how to reform the WTO, see Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov, 'What kind of an alliance do we need?' **New Times** 1989, No. 41 (10-16 October), p. 7.

14 'Avgustovskaya zhatva,' **Izvestiya** 13 October 1989, p. 6. It is said that the Rumanian leadership has appealed to the USSR to intervene militarily in Poland to prevent a non-communist government coming to power there.

15 Kortunov *et al.* (see note 5).

16 Thus in April 1989 Gorbachev unilaterally broke off several long-term Soviet trade contracts with Czechoslovakia, apparently in view of the very poor Czechoslovak delivery record, and accordingly stopped the export of Soviet oil and gas to Czechoslovakia (**Eastern Europe Newsletter**, Vol. 3 No. 9, 3 May 1989).

CHAPTER 10

REBIRTH OF THE GERMAN QUESTION

The political upheaval in East Germany obliges me to deal with Soviet attitudes to the "German question." Twice in the post-war period -- in the late 1940s under Stalin and again in the late 1950s under Khrushchev -- the Soviet leadership has made proposals for the unification of the two German states on the basis of neutrality and demilitarization. There is currently speculation in the West that Gorbachev might soon put forward similar proposals. Such speculation has some foundation in internal Soviet debate as well as in the studied ambiguity of the official Soviet position, which rules out German unification in the short term but leaves the more distant future open for "history" to decide. My argument in this chapter is that the adoption by the USSR of a positive attitude towards German unification is indeed possible, even in the fairly near future, but that such a shift in the Soviet stance would be of less practical significance than is often assumed.

Under Gorbachev there has emerged in the international-relations institutes a lobby arguing in favor of German unification. For example, Vyacheslav Dashichev, a historian and Germanist at the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, holds that the division of Europe cannot be overcome without overcoming the division of Germany, which he castigates as "unnatural, inhumane and immoral"[1]. A group of analysts at ISKAN have also recently come out in favor of the USSR putting forward a program of German unification[2].

The advocates of German unification in the institutes have had the opportunity to put forward their views at a number of discussions between scholars and officials on the German question which have been organized by the Scientific-Coordination Center of the MFA. At the first of these discussions, in mid-1988, the "unifiers" met a very hostile reception: one opponent declared that "the German question was solved on the Volga in 1943"[3]. In the most recent discussions the response has been more open-minded, though support for unification is clearly still a minority view and one which has not so far been accepted by the leadership. Of course, this may not continue to be the case.

The "unifiers" do not have in mind any sudden break in the political structure of Europe, the short-term stability of which they (like their opponents) wish to preserve. What they envisage is rather the gradual emergence over a prolonged period -- perhaps twenty years or more -- of a loose demilitarized German confederation within which both parts of Germany would still retain autonomous identities and distinct economic and political systems. At the same time, the two military alliances in Europe would be dissolved. The substantive difference (as distinct from the formal and the psychological differences) between such a "unified" Germany and the "divided" Germany, consisting of two highly interdependent states enjoying a specially close cooperative relationship, which would precede it might not be all that great.

This confederal model of German unification clearly represents an attempt to take into account the interests of the East German regime, which -- even after a process of liberalizing reform -- would hardly consent to its own complete disappearance. While those Soviet policy makers who designed schemes of German unification in the 1940s and even in the 1950s seemed to regard East Germany as a mere puppet state which the USSR might sell off to the West in exchange for the neutralization of West Germany, the currently prevalent conception realistically assumes that East Germany has now acquired (at least to a certain extent) the status of an autonomous actor in international relations[4].

Thus, in terms of the time-scale envisaged and of the internal content of the eventual "unification," the real sense of any future Soviet proposal to unify Germany would in all likelihood be much less drastic than might be assumed. The most important aspect would be the dissolution of the two military alliances, which is a proclaimed Soviet goal in any case.

Why might the USSR express its support for the prospect of a united Germany? It can hardly be convincingly argued that the political unification of Germany is an *essential* component of the long-term Soviet reform strategy of pan-European economic integration discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, though it might be considered an *appropriate* concomitant of pan-European integration. From the arguments of Soviet analysts it appears that the USSR would declare its commitment to the goal of a united Germany not with a view to the expected benefits of the eventual realization of that goal but in order to reap immediate political gains from its new stance.

By playing its "trump card" on the German question, write the ISKAN authors, the USSR "will sharply shift the balance of strategic and political forces in Europe in our favor." The USSR will have activated a mechanism that it will be able to use to augment its influence both in West Germany, where it can exploit the desire for German unification, and in other West European countries, the U.S. and also East European countries apart from East Germany, where it can exploit the fear of German unification. Above all, West Germany will have an additional incentive to intensify its cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic and other spheres.

Dashichev mentions yet one more benefit: such a move on the part of the USSR would help to stabilize the situation in East Germany (and thereby also the situation in Europe as a whole) by recognizing the legitimacy of popular aspirations there for unification. By contrast, Rafael Fyodorov, first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, who defends the traditional view that European stability in general depends upon maintenance of the *status-quo* with regard to the German question, does not believe that there is deep popular support for unification in either German state[5]. No doubt the course of current events will soon make it easier for Soviet observers to decide which of these two assessments is the more accurate.

The degree to which Soviet policy analysts find the prospect of the unification of Germany an acceptable one depends upon their perception of West European and pan-European integration. According to Prof. Baranovskii of IMEMO, two "ideal models" of German unification are in principle conceivable:

(1) unification within the context of a level of European integration so high that the balance-of-power considerations underlying fears of the military-political weight in Europe of a united Germany become totally irrelevant; and

(2) unification within the context of a relatively low level of European integration, for which the balance of power among European states retains its relevance.

German unification, Baranovskii argues, is desirable only if it takes the form of model (1). As it may not prove possible to prevent eventual unification in some form, the need to rule out the possibility of model (2) makes advisable an unequivocally positive attitude towards European integration on the part of the USSR, even if it harms other Soviet interests[6].

It may be hypothesized that "unifiers" lack anxiety about dangers inherent in unification in part because they assume that the process of European integration is already (or will soon be) very deep and irreversible. Their conservative opponents may be less confident that this is so. If we assume that European integration *will* continue, it follows that Soviet opinion will become more favorably inclined towards the unification of Germany as time passes.

For Soviet policy makers, the problem of whether to formulate a new stance on the German question may look different depending upon whether or not they feel strong pressure for change from the international environment. In the past such pressure has been absent, but it is now evidently growing.

Before November 1989, proposing the unification of Germany would have seemed an active initiative on the part of the USSR, something of a foreign-policy adventure with largely unpredictable consequences that on balance might -- but might not -- further long-term Soviet strategy in Europe. The decision of the Soviet leaders would have hinged to a large degree upon their assessment of the role played by the "German question" in Western politics and how desperate they were to achieve a breakthrough in the sphere of Soviet-West German economic relations. Although a change of stance would have been consistent with the Gorbachevian spirit of innovative thinking, I judged it more likely that the traditional caution of Soviet diplomacy would continue to prevail.

I now have to revise this prognosis. The dramatic recent events in East Germany force considerations of political stability in Central Europe to the forefront of Soviet calculation. For the Soviet Union, it is no longer a matter of choosing whether or not to take the initiative on the German question, but rather one of deciding how to respond to a rapidly evolving situation. Many of the Soviet traditionalists who would still ideally prefer to preserve the *status quo* in Europe will have to recognize that further change is now inevitable, and that the task of Soviet foreign policy has shifted from blocking change to channelling it in the safest possible direction. Those who have raised the German question again in the internal Soviet debate have prepared the ground for this change of orientation. How it will express itself in policy terms remains to be determined.

Notes and references

[1] **Meetings of Europe Working Group of the Mutual Security Project. Moscow March 28-30: Summary Report** (CFPD, April 11, 1989).

[2] A. Kortunov *et al.*, **West European Development and Soviet Foreign Policy Options** (August 1989) [draft chapter for forthcoming book: cannot yet be publicly cited]

[3] Statement made by Prof. Yuri Davydov, head of the European Center of ISKAN, at the Soviet-American Conference on Mutual Security in Providence and Washington in November 1989. This new department in the MFA was created by Shevardnadze with a view to facilitating the exchange of ideas between the ministry and the academic world.

[4] For a recent Western study of the emergence over recent years of an autonomous East German foreign and security policy, see Hans-Joachim Spanger, **The GDR in East-West Relations. Adelphi Papers 240** (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Summer 1989).

[5] See note 1.

[6] Statement at conference on mutual security (see note 3).

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSIONS

My main conclusions are the following:

(A) UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS

1. The unilateral WP force reductions and the accompanying force restructuring are seen by Soviet strategists as establishing rough parity in combat power and in offensive capability between NATO and the WP in Europe. Strategic stability is enhanced by the defensive restructuring of WP forces, which are no longer capable of standing-start attack. A WP capability for post-mobilization attack remains, but according to the new defensive Soviet military doctrine, this is a *counter*-offensive capability. NATO can also now be seen as having a post-mobilization attack capability. The conventional reductions have (for the time being at least) a negative as well as a positive effect on strategic stability, as they increase the salience in the WP force posture of strike aviation and of tactical nuclear weapons.

2. The scale of the unilateral Soviet force reductions appears to have been determined in such a way as to optimize several variables:

(a) The military leadership regards the reductions as the largest that would be compatible with national security: further reductions are acceptable to them only on a bilateral basis.

(b) The reductions are sufficiently large to make a significant impact upon Western, and especially West European, opinion.

(c) The planned rate of contraction of military production is sufficient to yield a significant economic gain and to loosen some crucial supply bottlenecks. There are doubts as to whether a more rapid shift of resources could be effectively absorbed by the civilian economy.

(d) The reductions in military expenditure are sufficiently large to satisfy a broad central segment of Soviet public opinion while keeping to a minimum the discontent of the large minority who prefer even greater reductions, and of the smaller but still influential minority who are uneasy at any substantial reductions at all.

It is therefore unlikely that further rounds of unilateral force reductions will follow in the near future.

(B) WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

3. Soviet analysts and policy makers now accept West European economic (and to an increasing extent political) integration as a reality; many regard it as irreversible. For the USSR it has potentially both positive and negative consequences. It may take such a form as to provide the main channel through which the Soviet Union can become integrated into the world economy and thereby overcome its technological lag, or it may take a form which blocks off this channel. West European integration is creating a powerful pole of attraction for the countries of Eastern Europe, unavoidably further weakening Soviet influence in the region. The worst scenario from an economic point of view is the one in which Eastern Europe does become integrated with the West European economy but the USSR itself does not, deepening the country's isolation and backwardness (although this scenario does share with the positive scenario of pan-European integration the advantage of reducing the likelihood of West European military integration).

4. Averting the possible negative outcomes of West European economic integration requires:

(i) far-reaching market-oriented economic reform within the USSR, without which economic integration with other countries is not feasible, and

(ii) a cooperative approach on the part of West European governments, banks and firms.

The need follows for a rapid and radical improvement in Soviet-West European (and above all Soviet-West German) relations. This is one of the main motives underlying the unilateral force reductions, which accordingly serve an indirect as well as a direct economic function.

5. The dominant opinion among Soviet analysts is that while Western Europe is acquiring greater autonomy from the U.S., which makes it possible for Soviet-West European relations to improve more rapidly than Soviet-U.S. relations, it is unlikely that the intensive ties between Western Europe and the U.S. will be dissolved and Western Europe emerge as a fully independent power center (a "United States of Europe"). The economic and political integration of Western Europe will not necessarily be accompanied by substantial military integration, especially if Eastern Europe (with or without the USSR) is drawn into the process of integration. If military integration does occur, it may have consequences harmful to Soviet security interests (particularly at the nuclear level) but would not be intolerable.

6. As a result of the loss of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, Soviet strategists must come to see the countries of the region as even less reliable military allies, giving the USSR yet one more reason for adopting a defensive posture in Europe.

7. The eventual prospect of a united Germany is coming to be seen as acceptable to the USSR, provided that it occurs within a context of pan-European integration which alleviates anxieties about the potential military-political weight of Germany in the European balance of power. This prospect makes it even more desirable that integration take a pan-European, non-military form.

The shift of the Soviet Union to a defensive military and foreign-policy posture in Europe is therefore linked in multiple ways to the process of European integration based in Western Europe. This shift is one of the prerequisites for taking advantage of the opportunities, and avoiding the risks, associated with European integration. Assuming that irrational leaders do not come to power in Moscow, it follows that the shift in the Soviet posture will not be reversed in the foreseeable future.

Options for European Security

Report of a consultation in Brussels
November 1989

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Options for European Security

Report of a consultation, Brussels, November 1989

0. INTRODUCTION - THE EMERGING PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

The easiest developments to identify are economic: the economic strains on US grand strategy and on the Soviet economy and the increasing hegemony of western Europe over the whole of Europe - neutrals, EFTA, eastern Europe.

While in the post war era there has been a large overlap between economic and politico-military structures (think of the symmetry between EEC/NATO and Comecon/Warsaw Pact); in the **short term** it seems increasingly possible now to have economic and military structures which do not coincide - so, at least in the short term, there could be a European framework for economic cooperation covering both western and eastern Europe even though NATO and the Warsaw Pact remain in existence.

Within this framework a Vertragsgemeinschaft (Contractual Community) between the two German states is possible even though they remain members of different military alliances.

Western Europe will continue to strengthen the process of economic integration while drawing eastern Europe into its economic sphere of influence; the isolation of the USSR means that it is reduced to supporting and trying to mitigate these developments.

Eastern European states will not develop an autonomy of their own, however: they will remain tied into western Europe economically and into the Warsaw Pact militarily/politically. Gorbachev now seems to be saying that anything can happen in eastern Europe provided that it doesn't threaten the integrity of the Warsaw Pact (defined more liberally than before) but if EC integration opens to eastern Europe, how long will this still be relevant?

However, the asymmetry, already identified, between the USSR and the USA could mean that the United States is the only country with a global military role: what will be the implications for western Europe.

What will happen to the US and Soviet strategic forces? What will happen to British and French nuclear weapons?

In the **medium term** an agreement along the following lines is possible:

- The USSR completely withdraws from eastern Europe; the WTO is dissolved.

- But - although NATO is also dissolved - the US insists on keeping a certain level of military forces on the European continent as a 'symbol' of linkage, and this is accepted both by western Europe and the USSR.

- A new security arrangement for Europe is negotiated, entailing constraints on the armament of a united Germany, some mechanisms for resolving, or at least containing, conflicts among eastern European states. Both superpowers will insist on and get some role in this arrangement (possibly as ultimate guarantors) though the major European states would in practice be the leading actors. Such an arrangement would yield more autonomy than in the Cold War but by no means complete autonomy.

If this general prognosis is accepted, then different variants within it can be formulated, depending whether the direction taken by US foreign policy (radical or only moderate turn away from involvement in Europe) and above all on the fate of perestroika in the USSR and Soviet-European integration (to what degree does the USSR manage to avert the risk of being 'pushed out' of Europe?)

1. CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPERPOWERS

A number of factors combined have created conditions quite unlike those of the past 40 years and mean that western European states, and the European Community, have considerable room for manoeuvre. These include the economic and political stresses on US 'grand strategy' and the effects of perestroika and new thinking in the Soviet Union and the reform process in eastern Europe.

Economic factors are the easiest factors to identify in these changing superpower perspectives:

*Economic weight made US grand strategy possible; economic problems are likewise at the heart of its current difficulties. For the US to remain a superpower retaining its strategic preeminence is vital. Yet its capacity to do that is under threat. The looming presence of the federal deficit exerts a strong downward pressure on military spending.

*Warsaw Pact conventional arms reductions are being pushed through as a matter of necessity. Demilitarisation of the Soviet economy has both a **direct** economic rationale (freeing resources for civilian production) and a no less important **indirect** economic rationale: facilitating the improved relations with western Europe needed for the inclusion of the USSR in a process of all-European economic integration. An apparent Soviet perception which underlies Soviet 'new thinking' and developments in military doctrine is the view of the USSR as a declining power, the fundamental strategic position of which has been growing progressively weaker.

In the short-term, however, there is a basic asymmetry in this process of superpower retraction. Although the United States has long-term difficulties, it can live with them for the time being. Barring a crisis such as the collapse of the financial system, there is little likelihood of any radical change in direction by the USA. On the other side, however, although the USSR has a

leadership that is open to radical change and capable of long-term thinking, it is already in a state of crisis.

1.1 US 'GRAND STRATEGY' UNDER STRESS

The trajectory of US power and influence in the post-1945 era began from the heights of economic, strategic and political pre-eminence. Since then there has been a more or less continuous decline. Western Europe and Japan are now major commercial and economic rival to the USA.

For the US to remain a superpower, retaining its strategic pre-eminence is vital. Yet its capacity to do that is under threat. The looming presence of the federal deficit exerts a strong downward pressure on military spending, yet institutional obstacles - and the importance of retaining strategic leadership - may prevent cutting military spending.

The concept of 'grand strategy' expresses a triangular integration of policies: military strategy, diplomacy and the allocation of resources. This strategy was based, however, on a compound of several different elements, each of which is now coming under challenge:

- US grand strategy was based on the economic capacity to carry it out, including a domestic consensus in favour of high military spending; but the economy is weaker and the willingness to keep raising military spending has evaporated;

- US grand strategy was based on the ability to intervene in the Third World, but US political opinion is now extremely wary of Third World military intervention;

- US grand strategy was based on a fabric of formal alliances, the most important being NATO; but US alliances are coming under stress;

- US grand strategy was based on the existence of a credible threat (the Soviet Union) but the USSR looks a good deal less threatening.

There is an increasing mismatch between continuing US political influence based on strategic leadership and a declining political influence based on economic predominance. This mismatch was manifest in the contrast between the role of the United States at the NATO summit in Brussels (May 1989) and at the Economic Summit in Paris (July 1989). The result is a series of balancing acts between loosing that political influence based on strategic leadership made possible in part by continued allied acceptance of US strategic leadership.

The necessity of these balancing acts suggests that there will be no decisive change in US grand strategy but rather relatively minor adjustments which will be presented as bold innovations. The development of its policy towards the USSR and on arms control will in all likelihood continue within a pragmatic, orthodox framework, based at its core on the view that the USA is winning the cold war.

1.2 CHANGING SOVIET POLICIES IN EUROPE

The unilateral force reductions announced by Gorbachev in December 1988 are motivated above all by the direct benefits accruing to the Soviet economy and socio-political system as well as to

those of the east European countries; and the expected foreign policy benefits, primarily those consequent upon improved relations with Western Europe. Although there are other factors of importance, the economic dimension looms very large under both these heads.[2]

There is evidence, however, of tension between Shevardnadse's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence. The MFA is continually putting pressure on the Defence Ministry to adapt to new thinking and to share decision making power in military policy with the MFA. But the Ministry of Defence is quite resistant.

1.21 The significance of western Europe for changing Soviet policies

By undermining established west European perceptions of the Soviet military threat, the force reductions facilitate the effort to bring about a sharp improvement in relations between the USSR and western Europe vis-a-vis the USA, irrespective at the pace at which Soviet/American relations may improve. It is essential that this opportunity be seized in good time, because otherwise the USSR is in danger of being excluded from the process of economic integration centred on western Europe.

Such exclusion would close the main channel through which the USSR might effectively integrate itself into the world economy and thereby start to overcome its relative economic-technological backwardness. The danger of isolation is exacerbated by the inevitable re-orientation of the economies of eastern Europe towards more intensive links with the western European centre of integration.

The link between Soviet unilateral cuts and the Soviet desire to avoid the unacceptable aspects of western European integration, suggests that EC reactions could play a crucial role. This is one of the reasons West European threat perceptions need to be sharply reduced at this juncture. In theory this gives some scope for EC action, if the EC can agree on a strategy, though within limits: the EC will not be able to get the USSR to abandon what it considers crucial security requirements.

1.22 Soviet Policies towards eastern Europe

Any assessment of changing Soviet security policies in Europe, and the prospect for increased European autonomy needs to take account of Soviet interests in eastern Europe. In the security dimension, these have been reassessed and redefined. According to one Soviet academic, the Soviet Union is coming to realise that it needs simply 'friendly' states on its borders, not socialist or even necessarily allied ones; even neutrality (on the Finnish model) need not be ruled out.

Economic interests are of some importance: eastern Europe should not be too much of a burden to the USSR and the more advanced countries, in particular, the German Democratic Republic, should continue acting as a conduit of technology transfer to the USSR, at least until such time as direct Soviet/Western Europe links are stronger (ie, to avoid eastern/western European economic integration that leaves the USSR isolated).

A further Soviet interest is that eastern European countries should be on reasonably good terms with one another as well as with the USSR; intra-eastern European conflicts could provide a channel for western interference or even affect the internal Soviet situation.

Regulating intra-eastern European conflicts is one of the new functions envisaged for the Warsaw Pact. Given the shift towards a more defensive military strategy, the motivation to keep the Warsaw Pact together could be to provide a foreign policy forum. Comecon, unlike the EC, has never developed a foreign policy function comparable to European Political Cooperation. This is particularly relevant given the context of the CSCE process, which is likely to increase in importance, where the The Twelve work together within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC).

1.3 THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NEW DIPLOMACY

The discourse of US grand strategy has been based on the existence of the Soviet threat. The overall aim has been containment. It has been directed entirely against the USSR, its aggression and its capabilities; other challenges to US interests have consistently been attributed to an underlying, hidden but active Soviet threat. But today there is a much lower perception in the west of the Soviet threat - thus calling into question the ideological basis of US grand strategy.

Examined through a Cold War prism, changes in east-west relations have to be seen as benefitting the USA. Detente in the second half of the 1980s has involved little concrete action on the US side - only the withdrawal of Cruise and Pershing II missiles from Europe under the INF Treaty in return for numerically much larger withdrawals on the Soviet side. On the Soviet side there has been a greater change in rhetoric and atmosphere: two sets of unilateral force reductions, larger cuts in INF missiles under the INF treaty, combined with important modifications in Third World policies.

Bush's arms-control proposals at the NATO summit in Brussels in May 1989 were not based on new thinking about NATO strategy and the US role in the alliance. Nor did they draw on a new conception of US-Soviet relations. The point of Bush's proposals was not to respond to a fundamentally changed east/west political axis but to exploit Soviet weakness.

The administration has been careful not to make this too explicit. The reason for being bolder on arms control was actually the same as the reason used earlier for being so cautious - the fragility of reform in the USSR and the possibility of Gorbachev either adopting the old hard line or being replaced by an old hard liner. The point was to take a short-lived opportunity to get Soviet concessions in arms control.

2. CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Given this background, the process of western European economic integration, and the associated single market strategy, opens the possibility of the European Community playing a more autonomous role in international affairs. Western Europe is now a major economic and commercial rival to the US, and as such, is undermining the US economic predominance upon which the US grand strategy was built. At the same time western Europe could be a means whereby the Soviet union can be reintegrated into the world economy.

At present we seem to be in a five year period, built on a consensus between Mitterrand, Delors,

Rocard and Kohl of using the economic strength of the WE economy to make political decisions. The increasing economic strength of the European Community in inter-European affairs can be seen in the agreement between the EC and EFTA (already a bigger trading partner for the EC than Japan) to create a 'European Economic Space' of eighteen western European countries based on the 'four freedoms' (capital, goods, services, labour) of the Single Market.

But the effects for the EFTA countries will be more than economic: the structure of EFTA will change, including the creation of a supranational decision making body and a common customs policy. The EES offers the EFTA countries access to the EC's Single Market; the price demanded by the EC will be to be able to direct EFTA resources to EC structural funds.

The EES also opens up a framework for possible cooperation between with eastern Europe. For a long time western Europe (especially the EC) was not interested in eastern Europe. However, the widening gap between the stagnating east and the west is forcing countries outside the EC to focus on the EC as there are increasingly few opportunities for economic cooperation between eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The relations between eastern and western Europe are not just those of the Community. There could be an increased role for the EFTA countries in relations between east and west, especially if they can help pay for it. The creation of the EES leads to the possibility of the development of institutional structures of trilateralism based on EC, EFTA and COMECON. Whether there could
relations between WE/EE not just Community - might be increased role for EFTA as an umbrella for non-EC European countries remains open. Yugoslavia, for instance, might want to join EFTA, but what will this mean for EFTA (Yugoslavia is not very attractive).

Taken together, these factors mean that there is a change in the trajectory of the autonomy question facing western Europe. Previously the autonomy that was discussed was the autonomy of western Europe and within western Europe; now it seems increasingly to be the autonomy of others vis-a-vis western Europe.

3.1 INCREASING WESTERN EUROPEAN AUTONOMY

The United States will follow these developments with increased concern. Defence cuts will be forced, therefore the US will not be able to continue to follow its locomotive role in the western Alliance.

If one focusses on the USA's military capacity, it appears powerful. But if one consider other indices of power, such as those displayed at the Paris Group of Seven summit, it appears a great deal less powerful.

If there is a mismatch between continuing US political influence based on strategic leadership and declining political influence based on economic predominance, so there is also a mismatch in western Europe between its increasing political influence based on economic predominance and its lack of political influence based on strategic leadership.

What gives the USA power in transatlantic relations largely comes down to a matter of philosophy and perception. If western European governments were to decide - which they show little or no sign of doing so in the short term - that they need not be strategically dependent on the USA,

they would not have to be.

Western Europe could refuse to continue to accept the strategic leadership of the United States. At the NATO summit in Brussels, May 1989, the FRG coalition Government spoke for majority European opinion by seeking no early deployment of short range missiles and in favour of arms control agreements. On both these issues, the FRG won. If the USA's allies were to revise their interpretations of Soviet policies and East/West relations, an accommodation in Europe at much lower force levels would be possible.

If we imagine a future where western Europe states leave behind them strategic dependence on the USA, there is nothing about the actual substance of US power to prevent it from coming about. At the same time, the USA's allies would have to revise their interpretation of Soviet policies and east/west relations.

The result could be a new concept of European security, closer to 'common' than collective security. A consequence of that would be to reduce western European reliance on US capabilities; trans-Atlantic strategic relations would then mesh better with economic and political relations.

There is little the USA could do to prevent such decisions being taken in western Europe. Military action is unthinkable and economic pressure is not a concern. All that would be left would be political pressure and calling on the western Europeans not to put the alliance at risk because of the Soviet threat. Yet the combined effects of Soviet perestroika in the political sphere and 'new thinking' in the military sphere is to remove the ideological glue of the Soviet threat and mean that such political demands are seen to be less and less convincing.

Whether western European states will, in fact, formally announce their autonomy from the United States, however, is questionable. Is a gradual process of exercising autonomy more likely, where distance from the United States and increased autonomy can be seen only in retrospect?

The style of alliance diplomacy pursued by George Bush, the archetypal manager, is designed to avert an open break within the Atlantic Alliance. The weakening of US power enhances European autonomy only to the extent that interests sharply diverge, which may occur if the pressure from sectional lobbies in the US proves effective enough.

The skill of the US administration lies in the fact that the personnel are adept at alliance management diplomacy[3], in the technical skill of the actors[4] and in the Administration's skill in management in Washington[5]. At the NATO summit in Brussels, May 1989, Bush used the opportunity given by E/W relations primarily as a tool of alliance management even though the only way of doing this was to make concessions to Bonn. The trick worked, and his proposals were hailed as a great success, because western Europe wanted the trick to work.

Bush's policy aims at the US maintaining its leadership in a collegial form: it coordinates the interests of the three centres (USA, western Europe, Japan) as a first among equals. As far as western Europe is concerned this implies allowing the western Europe to take the lead in purely European affairs, including dealing with eastern Europe and, as the process develops further, European arms control provided that it does not call into question the US presence in Europe (although the ultimate level of the presence remains to be fixed).

The key point is the contrast between the military and the economic power of the United States, this will increase and get sharper the more current trends continue. It incorrect to say that only the US has a global presence. Rather, it is only the US that has a global military presence. As far as US power in Europe is concerned, the US has power because western Europe concedes this power.

The problem, however, is the situation in rest of the world; peace, wealth and prosperity are concentrating in the north. Western Europe could adopt different (non-military) priorities with a fair degree of autonomy[6].

The question remains, however, whether western Europe will develop its own 'grand strategy' involving the creation of new formal structures. National politicians may prefer non-formal structures at the European level, with questions of 'grand strategy' discussed informally at meetings at the Elysee, particularly if the creation of formal structures led to a more aggressive US attitude towards western Europe.

3.2 A SECURITY POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

Central to this question of formal structures is the question of the security/military dimension of the European Community. At present the twelve member states of the European Community, meeting in European Political Cooperation, have a mandate, laid down in the Single European Act, to discuss the 'political and economic aspects of security.' The military aspects of security are to be discussed within NATO and the Western European Union. These provisions of the SEA are to be reviewed by the member states by 1992. In the run up to 1992 EPC will become more real and central and will include security cooperation.

In developing a security role for western Europe, therefore, three aspects have to be borne in mind:

a) the need to distinguish between the military and the security dimension

b) the need to redefine what is meant by the 'political' and 'economic' aspects of security

c) the need to diminish the role of the Atlantic Alliance

There was a trend until recently within European institutions for increased EC responsibility for security questions, whether through a formal link with WEU, or by the EC/EPC assuming responsibility for the 'military aspects of security' The changes in eastern Europe, however, and the need to keep the EC at least open to the east, means that there is now a greater consensus to keep military questions outside the EC structures.

Arms procurement is now linked to IEPG rather than the EC, on the basis of a 1987 compromise paper between Britain and France. There was too much resistance within the EC for an arms procurement role.

This does not mean, however, that a security role for the EC is necessarily to be rejected, provided that a 'security' and a 'military' dimension are clearly distinguished from each other. It also entails redefining the 'political' and 'economic' aspects of security. Up until now, the 'political' aspects of security have been defined in terms of 'strengthening the European pillar'

within the Atlantic Alliance; the 'economic' aspects in terms of promoting common western European arms procurement.

However, the 'political' aspects of security could be redefined in terms of a 'Common Security' approach; the 'economic' aspects in terms of east/west economic cooperation.

3.21 Changing military strategy

Ultimately, a redefinition of European security, and a security role for western Europe based on the precepts of common security and east/west cooperation, as outlined above, demand a change in the military strategy of the west, based as it is on a policy of 'flexible response' and the possible first use of nuclear weapons.

Already military strategy is set to change; troop withdrawals from Europe by the superpowers and the pressures on the military budget could lead to a withering away of the military factor in Europe. Given a 'third zero' of short-range missiles, at some point it will become clear that the policy of 'flexible response' can no longer continue.

The policy of 'flexible response', like the post-WW2 arrangement within the western Alliance, was based on a political compromise, between western Europe's desire for US military assistance and US uncertainty as to whether it could give such a guarantee. This political compromise has been the one constant factor in all the crises that have beset NATO in its forty year history. The changing perspectives of the superpowers, the virtual disappearance of the 'Soviet threat' and the changes within Europe itself, however, have altered the terms of this political compromise. What has changed is the idea that the strategic situation is locked into place. Western Europe is now no longer so dependent upon the United States.

In other words, western Europe may not have to formally change NATO's military strategy as such, but instead concentrate on removing the physical manifestations of the strategy. If the Federal Republic decided to change its deployment structure, and this can in no way be ruled out, given the changes in the GDR, the whole strategy of NATO will be obsolete.

3.22 The development of new frameworks for cooperation in Europe

The development of a security role for western Europe as outlined above could form the basis of the development of all-European political structures, possibly based on the Helsinki process, and the existence of regional cooperation groupings (eg, those in the Adriatic and the Baltic).

Economic cooperation between eastern and western Europe entails the danger, however, of reinstating a division of Europe; economic cooperation includes the GDR, Hungary and Poland but the USSR continues to be isolated.

The following elements need to be kept in mind:

a) The role of EFTA: EFTA could play a useful role in keeping contact with eastern European countries and producing proposals for more all-European cooperation frameworks.

b) The Council of Europe should be open to all European countries who wish to join and sign

Conventions.

This suggests that there may be a plurality of structures in Europe in which the functions of nation states are devolved downwards and parcelled out to different trans-European institutions. Central must be, however, the question of democratic control.

4. THE 'GERMAN QUESTION'

The dramatic changes in the GDR have brought the 'German Question' to the forefront of discussion. Ironically, German Reunification - apparently endorsed implicitly by Bush just after the Brussels summit, May 1989, when he called for 'self-determination for all of Germany' and explicitly by Vernon Walters, US Ambassador to the FRG, in September - has been the only example of George Bush's new thinking in practice. There is little sign, however, that even this initiative was little more than an off-the cuff remark: there were no off-the-record briefings, position papers or thought to what reunification might mean in practice.

There were definite signs in July/August 1989, however, that the Soviet Union was studying different options on the 'German Question' and a lot depends on whether and how the Soviet Union is allowed into the world economy. The Soviet Union sees the FRG as playing a key role and is likely to want to maintain good relations. While the USSR may not resist German unification it is unlikely to be an objective of Soviet policy.

There are a number of elements to the debate on (re)unification in the Federal Republic. Firstly, there was the debate in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung in April 1989 in the lead up to the European elections on whether accelerated western European integration hinders reunification. Secondly, there was Kohl's position after the 'Wende' (removal of Honecker) that there can be no economic aid to the GDR without a market economy and political change, and thirdly the Bundestag debate (November) which started lowering the tone and setting the debate into a European context. Ten days after the breach in the wall the CDU has come back to reality saying that West integration is the priority. The SPD's tone has echoed that of the CDU though it has not dared to take the discussion to its logical conclusion. Willy Brandt has taken a very ambiguous line on German unification. At any rate, it is important to remember that the SPD is traditional 'reunification' party in the Federal Republic while the CDU was the party that pressed for the western integration of the FRG.

The new GDR Government under Moderow appears to want a closer formal association with the Federal Republic. In his first Governmental Statement, Moderow spoke of a Vertragsgemeinschaft (Contractual Community) between the two German states going far beyond existing cooperation. He also spoke of the GDR's intention to seek a much closer relationship with the European Community and his advisors have spoken of a formal application for membership in the near future.

This suggests that the debate may not be about German (re)unification versus west German support for western European integration; rather it may be around the desire of the GDR and/or the Federal Republic for the increasingly close relationship between the two German states to be matched by GDR membership of the EC.

Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly be a period of shadow boxing and manoeuvering between the two German states that will not be resolved at least until after the elections in the GDR (May 1990) and in the FRG (December 1990). The question of the future relations between the German states, however, is not just a question for the Germans: the 'four powers' (Britain, France, the USA and the USSR) have the decisive role in questions relating to 'Germany as a whole'.

5. WILL GORBACHEV SURVIVE?

A central role in the redefinition of European security has been played by Michail Gorbachev. Yet the USSR is now moving towards both a political and an economic crisis. A survey in The Economist suggests that savings in the banks will lead to hyperinflation in the next twelve to eighteen months. The Party apparatus is not proving capable of adapting to democratisation or to the economic reform. Party secretaries refuse to run as candidates for the Soviets because they expect to be defeated. Ligachev has commented that officials have stopped ruling by command as they don't want to be regarded as anti-perestroika, but don't know how to rule by consent, so are just passive: hence the chaos.

It is not easy to define Soviet security interests solely in terms of eastern Europe. Conflicts in Central Asia affect the overall global security situation. Soviet relations with Israel and the Vatican are linked to these 'internal' conflicts. The situation that the USSR is in now is comparable to that of western Europe after the Second World War. The colonial possessions of western Europe, however, were mostly geographically distant and western Europe also had the beginnings of a structure of economic integration.

Demands for transition to a multi-party system grow and next year the Inter-Regional group in the Supreme Soviet may declare itself a party. Gorbachev will be forced to choose between the Party and perestroika - a choice he doesn't want to make but may have to. It is possible that he will choose perestroika, in which case he will continue to guide in his presidential role but will leave the General Secretaryship of the Party to someone else. This will be a period of maximum danger for him, as it will be clear that very soon all will be lost for the apparatus.

Some sort of coup cannot be excluded, even civil war, though this would solve nothing in the long term. But this is by no means likely, let alone inevitable. The opposition to Gorbachev is not united, has no charismatic figures and (notwithstanding their attempts at populist demagogy) doesn't have very much popular support (compared with the Inter-regional group; though the differences among **them** provide another imponderable). The big question is: can an effective and broadly based 'perestroika party' take shape in time to push the situation in the right direction?

This is connected to foreign policy. Further withdrawal from foreign policy commitments still provides a substantial reserve for winning time economically to complete the transition to an new economic system. There are growing demands to cut off aid to Cuba. Once it reached the point where giving up superpower status (even if some hope later to gain it) is obviously the price of national survival, they are likely to do this.

But what if Gorbachev fails? New leaders will still face the same situation. They will be unlikely to reverse the inward trend in foreign policy. The main conservative trend now is not ideological Marxism-Leninism (Brezhnev/Suslov/Ponamarev) but Russian nationalism based around the

'Rossiya' faction in the Supreme Soviet. Even if they wanted to reverse the situation in eastern Europe they would be unable to do so. The economist Kunitsyn, in his reactionary variant of the Soviet future, envisages total isolation of the country, including withdrawal from eastern Europe.

6. POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE LEFT IN EUROPE

So far the discussion has concentrated on political options and strategic change in Europe. However, the questions that are posed to the left by the developments in Europe are also those of political practice and political options. The left must speak the language of politics as well as the language of diplomacy. Does the end of ideological confrontation between east and west mean the dominance of western capitalism? What political options are there if there is not the capitalist/socialist confrontation?

There is a new atmosphere of pluralism in eastern Europe: it is becoming clearer that eastern Europe is made up of countries with different historical and cultural backgrounds. Poland and Hungary are making a strong push to move closer to western Europe. However, the left in western Europe should not be so pessimistic that there aren't alternative ideas in the east. The social democrats in Moscow leave Western social democrats behind. The GDR offers the possibility for contacts between the left and the new movements.

What are the implications for Social Democracy? The Milan Socialist International meeting and document spoke out in favour of moderate regulation of economy and east/west cooperation on the environment as a central point. The environment is obviously a central issue for eastern Europe given the scale of the environmental disasters (Leuna, Baltic). Brandt has come up with idea of European Development Bank and the debate about some elements of what has been associated with the Greens has begun to move into the mainstream of social democracy.

The SPD programme for the 1990s focusses on the environment: their problem is how to reconcile this with the Schmidt programme for the 1980s. The SPD wants to focus on the east/west opening while remaining partners with Spain/Portugal. The agreement between Hamburg and Dresden agreements on environmental cooperation sets a precedent but this may simply be a question of employment creation in Hamburg on environmental techniques.

The Finnish Social Democrats are to host a meeting in Autumn 1990 for parliamentary left parties in Europe. A major item on the agenda will be political and economic integration.

Increasingly, however, peace movements have to focus on the issues the Western establishments will not discuss (Islam, Africa, a policing role in southern Africa) and how these are linked to a 'peaceful' role in the European arena.

REFERENCES

1. This paper results from a consultation in Brussels, 23-24 November 1989, based on two studies carried out in the framework of the European Research project on Autonomy: (Dan Smith, 'Bush, US Strategy and western Europe'; Stephen Shenfield, 'The changing situation in Europe through Soviet eyes'). This paper is intended to stimulate debate about options for European security; the opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the authors of the two studies or of the agenor Research Unit Asbl.

2. If the USSR is moving towards a more defensive orientation then this raises the question of victory. Western European discussions on 'defensive defence' are quite explicit that the objective is not to achieve a military victory but to avoid defeat and return to the status quo. This is the logical end point although they may not have got there yet.

In a forthcoming book from the Brookings Institution, Michael MccGwire holds that the Soviet military have been told to plan no longer for the contingency of world war but for the less demanding contingency of conflict in border areas, to hold the line until resolution, ie, assuming that escalation to world war will be avoided.

Not only is a military victory not possible but any military conflict in Central Europe will lead to a collapse of civilization - a GDR study shows that if five central power stations of GDR hit in conflict will lead to complete collapse). While these questions now seem to be discussed in the institutes there may be a time lag before this becomes accepted in contemporary political discourse.

3. Indeed, the pressures of alliance management in the development of arms control policies have been a fairly constant theme during the 1980s. Richard Burt, then at the State Department, commented in 1981 during discussions about the 'zero option' that what was needed was not an arms control proposal but an alliance management proposal.

4. Brent Scowcroft, for example, is more familiar than most National Security Advisors with the technical details of arms control.

5. Compare the lack of leaks from the Bush Administration with the Nixon, Carter or Reagan Administrations.

6. Compare response to the drug problem. The US response is Low Intensity Conflict and dropping support prices for Colombian Coffee; Western Europe could take an economic response and move into Latin America which are at present an enclave of countries in hack to the United States.