

PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION OF MACRO AND  
MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS TO THE STUDY OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR  
IN CATALONIA.

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PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION OF MACRO AND MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS TO THE STUDY OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN CATALONIA.

After ten years of the first democratic elections in 1977 we can make a balance of the studies made in Catalonia concerning both, theoretical and methodical questions and some technological problems which turned up when the investigation was being carried out.

In the first phase of our research we used mainly the ecological analysis, which allowed us to detect, within Catalonia, different politico-electoral areas with peculiar party structures which reveal diverse sociodemographic backgrounds and different territorial subcultures, both caused by different trajectories of economic and political development. We could also determine the political factors which explain, to a greater extent, the mobility of the behaviour of the Catalan electorate and its relationship with the sociodemographic structure of different contexts and with the processes of expansion and enclosure of the political parties (reduction or concentration in some areas).

Detecting the areas which are "fidel" or "fluctuant" to different parties -according to the kind of election- we were able to choose the territorial dispersion of the

samples of the opinion polls, thus making them more reliable and representative, not only of Catalonia, but of different geographical areas.

Only in the second electoral period (1982-1987) we were able to get series of reliable opinion polls, which allow us to analyze, on the individual level, the factors which determine vote. Since it is true that in Catalonia there are diverse "regional" cultures, any analysis must keep in mind the elector placed in a concrete geographical area and in a precise rural or urban environment to avoid mistaken or trivial interpretations. The corresponding "ecological" data should, therefore, be introduced in the models of interpretation of individual behaviour.

Taking the analysis through opinion polls as a basis, we established types of electors bearing in mind their positions within the sociodemographic and political factors which seemed to be more significant, and we have done long-lasting semidirective interviews with the purpose of going deeply into the processes of political socialization which crystallize in different levels of political culture, where the diverse models of electoral decision are predominant.

Using both complementary approaches -of added data and of electors- and making use of quantitative and qualitative techniques has resulted in a satisfactory understanding of the electoral behaviour in Catalonia in the new democratic period.

## I.- SHORT ELECTORAL HISTORY IN CATALONIA 1977-1987

In perspective from 1987, it seems that the recent democratic history in Catalonia can be divided into two periods, starting, respectively, with the legislative elections in 1977 and with the elections in 1982. The first period is characterized by the important presence of UCD and a four-party system: PSC (PSC-PSOE), PSUC, CiU and UCD. The second period is marked by the disappearance of UCD, the emergence of "Coalicion Popular" as the third party, the concentration of the centre and moderate-right votes in CiU, and the concentration of the left wing vote in PSC. We can, therefore, say that there is a reduction of the initial multi-partisanship, thus the Catalan system approaching the rest of Spain, though in Catalonia the right is headed by the nationalistic coalition (diagram 1). How can we explain this bipolarization? Some acceptable hypothesis have been made pointing out that the institutional support to the "presidential vote" has a strong force reducing the individual preferences and that the dynamic of the state (which is relevant mainly in the legislative elections) leads to the "useful vote" supporting the political parties with more possibilities.

As regards the evolution of the tendencies of the electorate, the predominance of the left in the first period 1977-1980 leads to a balance of the two ideologies, due to a

progressive strengthening of the centre-right . CiU is the coalition which embodies this retrieval from the autonomy elections in 1980 on. It gains the local elites in the municipal elections the year before and becomes the central axis of the conservative vote. As opposed to this enlargement of CiU, the left wing parties undergo important oscillations, due in part to the mobilization -more or less- which the kind of election produces. All this suggests not only a poor level of party identification in the electorate -which is normal after forty years of a nondemocratic regime- but, also a scarce ideological clarification caused by a precarious political culture where the affective- -adscriptive dimensions prevail over those of cognition, and criticism. In this sense it is surprisingly enough the fact that in a developed society as Catalonia, a great part of the population has a very limited knowledge of history and politics, even those educated before Franco .

In the first electoral period, the "cleavage" Right/Left is associated with ProFranco/Antifranco, or rather, with Continuity/Democratization and the left wing capitalizes its opposition to the previous regime in the first elections in 1977 but later on they are not able to keep the votes, lacking a clear proposal of concrete and effective policies based on new values. This is due in part to its weak organizing capacity and its acritical imitation of the model of a typical left party, which is already in crisis in consolidated democracies. Probably the proFranco

right wing knew about that precarious situation when it consented to the Law of Political Reform, as it thought itself able to lead or, at least, control the transitional process .

Another factor must be kept in mind when explaining the pouring of the electorate within the left and right spectrums in the first electoral period. This factor is related to the different "logic" reasons of vote which exist in every kind of election -legislative, autonomy and municipal- and it is the one which promotes the infidelity of vote and, accordingly, the scarce crystallization of the party identification.

As a consequence, in the second electoral period, part of the Catalan electorate transgresses the dividing line of the classical ideological areas .

Already in the first autonomy elections in 1980, which are in fact a pivot between the first and second period, the first signs of movement of the socialist electorate towards CiU can be detected. This should not be interpreted as a change in ideology towards the right, but as a displacement of the conservative and democratic sectors towards its "proper" area. This displacement is justified by several interwined "deserters" not as a "rational" act, which adapts their behaviour to their interests, but as a search of an option which protects Catalonia from certain PSOE policies, interpreted by part of the Catalan electorate as anti-

-autonomic and centralizing . The image of the left orientated Catalonia in 1977 gives way to the reality of an increasingly more conservative Catalonia. A serious interpretation of the Republican period would help us to understand this "change" and would reinforce the thesis that the results of the first period and, particularly, those of the first legislative elections, must be interpreted in the terms ProFranco/Democracy.

The achievement of CiU - from 1984 it has absolute majority in the Catalan government- is its ability to show itself as a movement and not as a coalition of "closed" organizations. Its social and economic ideology -slightly conservative- and its liberal attitude in moral and social aspects (abortion, divorce) attracts ample sectors of the middle class. This attraction is increased by protecting a non radical nationalism in practice -in spite of sporadic radical expressions-. Nevertheless the most important attractive is an indisputable and venerated leader, with a strong personality, who agglutinates different parts of the political spectrum of the electorate, and who shows himself as a guarantor of the conservative interests and as an efficient defender of the "essence" of Catalonia.

In spite of all, though the merits of CiU are many, it is also true that its success is also due to the fact that its immediate opponents -UCD and AP- are unable to take roots in the Catalan society, and the same happens to FSQE.

Many of the socialist voters who vote CiU in the autonomy elections affirm that they do not believe that PSC is able to maintain, in the Catalan government, an independent policy, different from that of PSOE .

Nevertheless the Catalan socialist party has had the largest number of votes in the legislative and municipal elections. PSUC -and the IC coalition from 1986- is relegated to the more industrial areas, where it remains firm from 1977 to 1980, but from 1982 on, its internal crisis is materialized in the scission of PCC and the desertion of most of its electorate, which now support socialists. So, being the second political force in 1977, it becomes the fourth in the second electoral period. We think that this party has been negatively influenced by the initial relative failure of the PCE in the rest of the Estate.

What has been said suggests that the electoral power of the left wing is strong and weak at the same time: strong because it rules over almost all town councils with large population -where more than 50% of the electorate concentrates- and it's weak because, from the local elections in 1983, CiU heads the polls in almost all towns with less than 10000 inhabitants, what means almost 90% of the towns in Catalonia.

This concentration of the left vote in some concrete areas may lead to its defensive enclosure in its own areas



and to a demobilization of the voters in the areas of strong CiU force.

The left parties ERC and NE, which claim to be radical nationalists, have a reduced appeal and, in fact, they obtain their votes in areas where CiU is the strongest force. ERC obtained relative good results in the first autonomy elections, but its shifty support to Fajol's government and its participation in the second government of CiU turned it into a vicar option of the governing coalition, unable to create an alternative from the most progressive sectors of the nationalism. NE gets only a testimonial support, while PCC concentrates in some towns, with communist majors who had left PSUC some time before. Both parties -NE and PCC-, together with PSUC, form -from 1987 onwards- a coalition "Iniciativa per Catalunya" -IC-.

We cannot finish this section without mentioning that, in spite of the reduction of the communist area, its support to PSC is of vital importance to keep left orientated governments in many town councils.

## II.- THE ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The analysis of added data, or ecological analysis allows us not only to describe the distinction of the different geographical areas according to latent socio-political structures but also to describe the evolutive process of those structures and the displacement in time of

the territorial unities studied regarding the different political options.

### 1.- Sustantial findings

Through the application of different varieties of factor analysis -of principal factor, of main components and of correspondences- we have isolated the three factors which explain, on the whole, between 50% and 75% of the variability of the electoral behaviour in Catalonia. If we put aside the third factor which is usually defined by abstention, the two main dimensions detected, statistically independent between them, could be defined as a Left/Right factor and as a Nationalism/Centralsim one, (Catalanismo/Españolismo, according to the interpretation of some authors).

The first factor sets the geographical areas in a continuum Right-Left, a relatively stable situation since in Catalonia there is a local ideological tradition which is kept in bold strokes, and above all, in the first electoral period (1977-1980): the important cities, the industrial and coastal areas maintain their left orientated tradition while in the rural areas and on the inside the most conservative options prevail.

In the first electoral period, the second factor distinguishes, within the right of the political spectrum,

the areas where the nationalist coalition CiU is predominant from other areas which tend to the party of the government, UCD, and to AP. In the second electoral period UCD is missing and CiU becomes its substitute attracting a great part of its local elites; in this way the second factor is wiped out since AP is unable to take the place occupied before by UCD within the Catalan political spectrum. In diagram 2 we can see the strengthening of the first factor to the detriment of the second one, which in 1984 has a marginal character. The two ideological scissions (cleavages) of the Catalan society seem to be reduced to one which is the result of a superposition of the two ideological dimensions. We know from opinion polls that it would be a mistake to simplify the analysis saying that only the factor Left/Right is detected and that nationalism has reduced its explanatory capacity. In general terms we would say that there is a process of unification of the electoral structures in different geographical areas in Catalonia with a more or less strong predominance of CiU -depending on the areas-, being the left wing relegated to the industrial zones of Barcelona and to the peripheral suburbs of this city. These small areas -in extension- concentrate about 70% of the Catalan electorate.

From 1984 on, the areas of the second belt, which in the first electoral period had a different behaviour depending on the kind of election -legislative or autonomy elections-, show now a more stable conservative orientation.

As far as the relationship between electoral and sociodemographic structures are concerned, the ecological analysis allows us to establish a connection between the Left/Right factor and the Urban/Rural one. In <sup>GRAPHS</sup> 1 and 2 we can see the difference of correlation in two electoral districts: Barcelona -more urbanized- and Lerida.

The number of inhabitants of a town council influences substantially the electoral orientation of it ( diagram 3). The centre and right candidatures usually have the best results in town councils with small population. In big territorial areas the nationalism factor does not indicate a significant correlation with any specific sociodemographic dimension, but it does in Barcelona, where the analysis can be made from electoral sections highly homogeneous (aprx. 1000 electors each section). It is just here where this factor becomes the most important cause of the variability of behaviour -about 50%- and it is substantially defined by the birthplace variable. The social class -related to the Left/Right dimension - is here a second factor, causing about 30% of the total variability.

## 2.- Some considerations about the process of ecological analysis

Through our experience in the use of the ecological approach we have verified that the consideration or non consideration of differentiated territorial areas,

the unit of analysis chosen and the varieties of multivariant analysis really influence the obtained results.

a) Differentiation of contexts

The results vary substantially depending on the settings taken for the analysis: Catalonia -the four electoral districts- or diverse groups of town councils in accordance with their population. In diagram 4 we can see that in some cases the sign of correlation is even inverted, which demonstrates that the electoral options do not have the same relative positions in the different contexts (graphs 3 to 6 ). As a consequence, the order of the factors and their explanatory capacity varies also in the different geographical areas (diagram ).

b) The unit of analysis

As a matter of fact we get different correlations depending on whether we use as a basic territorial unit of analysis the town council or the electoral sections. Electoral sections are usually relatively homogeneous units as regards their sociodemographic structure and their political behaviour. The correlations which disappear when using the town council as a unit of analysis remain if we use the electoral sections as the unit of analysis. In this level of aggregation, so close to the individual, it is sometimes difficult to avoid the "ecological fallacy" trying to substitute the opinion poll data by added data on

a reduced level.

c) The multivariant techniques used

Obviously, not all the multivariant techniques of analysis are equally suitable for the solution of different sorts of problems. Even those techniques that can be used indistinctly, theoretically at least, produce relative different results, and thus we think it is very important not to found the interpretation on a single type of analysis.

To detect the politico-electoral structure we have used, satisfactorily, the factor analysis of the principal factor, of the main components and of correspondences. For an exploratory and descriptive analysis the main components analysis -without using any rotation- seems to be the best (F. Bon warned the "jouer naturel"). If we want to see the evolution of the parties and of the territorial units in the political spectrum, the correspondence analysis seems to be the most appropriate, though the less common variables -parts with minimum values concentrated territorially or units of analysis with very extreme behaviour- should be eliminated to avoid deforming the projection of the variables and of the territorial unities on the factorial plan, allowing us an adequate interpretation of their situation and distances (graph } ).

To correlate electoral and sociodemographic structures the canonical correlation has been very useful since it is

inadequate to mix political and sociological variables in a factor analysis (and even more when the units are scarcely homogeneous). The analysis of multiple regression has confirmed that in Catalonia it is very difficult to get a significant adjustment of the results of the parties from a combination of sociodemographic variables; the only exception would be the vote to the Communist Party PSUC because it is concentrated in very homogeneous contexts with very peculiar characteristics (high percentage of immigrations and industrial workmen). The regression coefficients are highly improved by introducing strict political variables such as the number of militants -in spite of the fact that the informations are not very reliable- and the electoral results of the Second Republic.

The attempts to create causal models starting from added data have been frustrated as their explanatory capacity has been very moderate.

### III.- INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Micro-level analysis deals with explaining the individual behaviour from the most usual sociological and attitudinal characteristics of the individuals.

#### III.1 Analysis through polls

The relationship between electoral and socioeconomic

variables -studied through techniques such as correlation, regression, canonical correlation- that we have observed in the ecological analysis has been completed with the results of the individual level analysis, through polls.

In Catalonia, the usual "cleavage" between left/right doesn't adopt the same forms as in Spain as a whole, and the same happens in the Basque territory.

The double variation in time and kind of election brings up some questions:

Was CiU not only the party of centre and right voters, as clearly deduced from the ecological analysis, but also an "interattitude" party, from the nationalistic point of view, as it received votes from non-nationalistic sectors?

What was the meaning and the cause of the electoral "swinging" depending on the kind of election?

In Catalonia, where at the end of the 70s, 40% of the population had been born outside, what was the reaction of those immigrant people to a system in which the nationalistic coalition was one of the two main pillars?

#### a) Sociodemographic profile

- Sex as a variable of behaviour is rather irrelevant and if it's true that women tend to be a bit more conservative than men, this is even clearer when sex and age variables are crossed. Differences are observed at both extreme points in the age scale: young people from 18 to 25



and, above all, those over 60.

Obviously, it's in the older social strata where the process of equality between men and women has been weaker and thus we can observe the topical image of women tending towards more conservative options than men.

On the other hand, among young people we can observe a greater tendency towards PSC in women than in men, the latter showing a tendency towards the two options very similar to the average.

- If we only take into consideration the Age variable, the teens and youths of the late 60s and 70s -now between 25 and 40- show a balance between CiU-PSC (on the whole there's a slight tendency towards the left). Among younger people the tendency towards CiU is slightly stronger, but on the whole, there's a balance left/right.

- As far as Education is concerned, also both extreme groups show the most significant differences in behaviour. Thus there's a greater tendency to vote socialist among those with lower level of education while the attraction of socialism is really small among those with a higher level.

The also scarce receptivity of the socialist offer among students not only proves the above mentioned tendency but it also seems to suggest their future consolidation (and even their progressive enlargement according to percentages obtained). It's among unemployed people where CiU has the

smallest audience, almost balancing the PSC percentage.

- The most discriminating sociodemographic variable of behaviour is that of origin, autochthonous or immigrant, of those interviewed.

First of all we must say that from some years ago Catalonia is no longer -at least meaningfully- a receptive community of streams of population, especially if compared with the elevated rates of immigration from the 50s to the 70s.

The Macro analysis related the contexts where immigrants and workmen are predominant to the highest percentages of PSC (and left) votes and also to the highest levels of demobilization in local elections compared to general ones.

The figures in the diagram are significant enough: Only 1 person out of 10, born in Catalonia -in second generation at least- votes PSC in local polls, while 4.5 out of 10, born outside, are inclined to PSC. On the other hand, only 2 persons out of 10, born outside Catalonia, tend to CiU while 6 out of 10, born in Catalonia, vote CiU. (We can't forget that each origin group stands for about 40% of the Catalan electorate).

Between these two origin groups there is a perfect gradation of intermediate situations, concerning both objective condition and behaviour. So, if we go from the

"pure" autochthonous to that who was born in Catalonia but only one of his parents was born in this community, the CiU vote descends in benefit of PSC, though CiU still heads the poll in this sector, with almost double votes than PSC. The Socialist support gradually increases and it balances CiU when the voters are born in Catalonia but both parents are immigrants. The impact of primary socialization is evident in this gradation but also that of secondary.

Thus, it's not at all meaningless to pose a question which has not been fully answered yet.

Having both conditions, that of immigrant and that of paid worker, a high correlation concerning individual attributes, which factor outweighs the decision, that of class or the cultural/linguistic one? Even though both factors stimulate the same results they do not affect all the electors in the same way. (We'll be back to this later).

It's in this context, since the "immigrant" category is slowly getting weaker as an increasing percentage of electors are being born in Catalonia -and because of the socialization process-, where the arrangements about the future of the electoral alignments in Catalonia and about the future evolution of its party system must be placed.

b) Attitude profile

- As far as the religious attitude and behaviour is

concerned, the "Micro" analysis allows us to transfer to the individual level the relationship observed in the "Macro" level between contexts of more religious practice and those with more conservative positions. Thus, if CiU takes votes from all sort of electors, it is the favourite option of practising catholics. The greater part of the sample is formed by "non-practising" catholics and among them there is a balanced orientation towards PSC and CiU, the latter with a slight advantage. Non believers and indifferent people, small groups in the sample, are the only ones with a greater tendency towards PSC and left wing. (Table 5)

- The "Macro" analysis revealed the existence of a double axis which arranged the territorial electoral competence, as has been said before, indicating the clear definition of contexts of implantation on the Left/Right and Nationalism axis. (Where does this conclusion lead us?)

The individual attitudes -location in the axis- in relation to these factors show their strong discriminatory capacity.

Generally speaking, the Catalan electorate seems to tend slightly towards nationalistic positions and towards the left. (In which portions of the electorate are these tendencies complementary and in which are they incompatible?)

- CiU attracts persons from all positions of the scale but it is among persons with a nationalistic identification

-strong or moderate- where it is deeply rooted, far above the socialist.

In the central position of the scale CiU and PSC are balanced, whereas it is among those with less Catalan nationalistic identification and more Spanish identification -the least significant group in quantity- where PSC is strongly rooted. On the other hand, those sectors without Catalan identification -mainly, but not exclusively, born out of Catalonia- are the more likely to non participation in the local polls.

- As regards the Left/Right axis, centre and centre-right voters are mainly the ones who are inclined to vote CiU. The electors in the central positions of the scale are almost 2/3 parts of the CiU electorate, at the same time we must take into account that about 10% of CiU electorate is placed either in the left or in the centre-left. The Socialist Party is the favourite option of the centre-left voters and also of the left, though sharing left voters with the Communist Party, PSUC. As opposed to CiU, which receives votes from all groups of the scale, PSC is only supported by the centre-left and, on a smaller scale, by the left.

Lacking an exhaustive analysis -on the individual level- about the relationship between the two mentioned axis, we must note here that there is an important dispersion in the location of the electorate when we take the two axis together, which indicates their different logic

and discriminatory capacity of them both.

### III. 2 Other methods of analysis on the individual level

The sub-representation of the non-participant electorate, which is systematically detected in the polls, reveals an urgent need to reach the individual level through other means. Owing to this, and with the list of participants, we have done systematic controls of Participation/Abstention in different elections, on a sample of polling tables determined according to the features in the ecological analysis.

All this has allowed us certain accuracy in the data about Participant/Non-participant behaviour according to the sociodemographic variables in the census: Age, Sex, Level of education and Job (which is not specified nowadays).

On the other hand, and above all, it has allowed us to get "sound" data about the mobility of behaviour concerning electoral participation. So, only 56% of the electorate has the same behaviour (45% participates and 11% does not), according to the General Elections in 1982; the Municipal ones in 1983 and the Local ones in 1984. As a contrast, 33% of the electorate has an "intermittent" behaviour, with greater participation in the General Elections than in the others. Finally, the remaining 10% is the result of the "dynamism" of the electoral roll, as a consequence of new

incorporations and deaths. We do not have reliable interviews remembering vote about these three elections (in two years), which allow us to compare their numbers with the above mentioned ones. In addition to this, there exists the problem of those "Don't remember" "Don't answer" "Undecided", etc.

TABLE 1

ELECTIONS IN CATALUNYA: 1977-86

	Leg. 1977		Leg. 1979		Aut. 1980		Leg. 1982		Aut. 1984		Leg. 1986	
	% C	% V	% C	% V	% C	% V	% C	% V	% C	% V	% C	% V
Abstenciones.....	20,7	—	31,5	—	38,6	—	19,2	—	35,6	—	31,0	—
a) AP.....	2,7	3,5	2,4	3,6	1,4	2,3	11,6	14,4	4,9	7,7	7,8	11,3
b) UCD.....	13,3	16,8	13,0	19,0	6,4	10,5	1,6	2,0	—	—	2,2	4,1 (1)
c) UDC.....	4,4	5,6	—	—	—	—	1,5	1,9	—	—	—	—
a + b + c.....	20,4	25,9	15,4	22,6	7,8	12,8	14,7	18,3	4,9	7,7	10,6	14,4
d) CIU.....	13,3	16,8	11,0	16,1	17,0	27,6	17,9	22,1	29,9	46,5	21,9	31,7
a + b + c + d.....	33,7	42,7	26,4	38,7	24,8	40,4	32,6	40,4	34,8	54,2	32,5	47,1
ERC.....	3,6	4,5	2,8	4,1	5,4	8,8	3,2	3,9	2,8	4,4	1,8	2,6
PSA.....	—	—	—	—	1,6	2,6	0,1	0,2	—	—	—	—
x) PSC.....	22,5	28,4	20,0	29,2	13,7	22,3	36,4	45,2	19,3	29,9	28,0	40,7
y) PSUC.....	14,4	18,2	11,7	17,1	11,4	18,6	3,6	4,5	3,6	5,6	2,7	3,9
z) PCC.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,0	1,3	1,5	2,4	1,1	1,6
x + y + z.....	36,9	46,6	31,7	46,3	25,1	40,9	41,0	51,0	24,4	37,9	31,8	46,2
Otras derechas.....	0,6	0,8	1,7	2,3	0,7	1,2	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,5	0,7
Otras izquierdas.....	2,2	3,7	2,4	3,3	0,2	2,0	0,5	0,6	0,4	0,7	1,5	2,2
Otras nacionalistas.....	—	—	1,2	1,8	1,3	2,1	0,7	0,8	0,8	1,3	—	—

(A) CBS



TABLE - 2

## Anàlisi de correspondències

% Tant per cent de la variància explicada pels dos primers factors

	1977 L	1979 L	1980 A	1982 L	1984 A
I FACTOR	50,5	54,9	51,3	64,3	71,5
II FACTOR	23,5	24,8	26,6	20,0	15,5
I + II % variància explicada	74,0	79,7	77,9	84,3	87,0



TABLE - 3

Distribució del vot dels diferents partits en els grups de municipis establerts segons la seva població (1982)

Municipis segons població	Cens electoral	Blancs o nuls	Abstencions	AP	CiU	ERC	PSC	PSUC	Altres Dreta	Altres Esquerra
I 1-1.000	228.860	1,5	24,7	10,6	28,9	4,2	20,0	2,1	6,2	1,8
II 1.001-10.000	848.487	1,6	20,1	10,9	23,7	4,1	30,3	2,9	4,0	2,4
III 10.001-50.000	798.420	1,5	18,3	9,9	15,6	2,8	41,4	4,0	3,2	3,3
IV més de 50.000	2.440.971	1,4	18,9	12,5	15,6	2,9	38,6	4,0	3,3	2,8
Total Catalunya	4.316.738	1,4	19,3	11,7	17,9	3,2	36,5	3,7	3,7	2,9





	G. I.	G. II	G. III	G. IV
	< 1.000 habitants N (618)	1.001 - 10.000 N (268)	10.001 - 50.000 N (36)	> 50.000 N (13)
	ABST. .84 CIU - .78	DC/UCD C IU -.93	CIU .95 ERC .85 PSUC -.43 ABST -.68	PSUC .93 PSC .69 PSA .72 ERC -.92 UCD -.76 CIU -.40
FACTOR I	Catalanisme moderat - Abst.	Catalanisme moderat - UCD	Catalanisme moderat- Esquerra	Esquerra-Dreta
	%var exp. 22.3	%var exp. 29.1	%var. exp 49.9	%var. exp. 55.8
	PSC .69 PSUC .49 CIU -.47	PSUC .56 PSA .52 PSC .43 CC/UCD -.49 CIU -.33	CIU .41 CC/UCD -.69	ABST. .94 CIU -.91
FACTOR II	Esquerra-Catalanisme mod	Esquerra-Dreta	Catalanisme - UCD	Catalanisme moderat-UCD
	%var exp. 20.6	%var. exp. 26.1	%var. exp. 20.8	% var. exp. 24.7
	CC/UCD .93 CIU -.34	—	—	—
FACTOR III	UCD- catalanisme moderat			
	%var exp. 17.7			

TABLE 4 FACTOR ANALYSIS. TYPOLOGIE OF HABITATS




CANONICAL ANALYSIS

GRAPHS 3 to 6



Eleccions Autònòmiques de 1980. Anàlisi de Components Principals  
Situació de les principals candidatures respecte dels Factors I i II

GRAPHA 7



*Evolució dels partits a les eleccions legislatives de 1977, 1979 i 1982*  
 CÒRREGS FONDDENCE ANALYSIS

TABLE - 5

VOTE AUTONOMIC ELECTIONS 1984 AND PLACE OF BIRTH							
Party	Catholic, Catholic Practicing, No Pract.	Catholic, Unbeliever, Other	Relig.	Best options (incl. abst.)	Borns in Catalonia		
					One Parent Native	Both Parents Natives	
AP	51	51	51	33	45	100	
PSU	17	22	23	35	10	100	
PCF	15	32	26	35	35	100	
Rest options	17	32	26	35	35	100	
(incl. abst.)	31	45	37	35	35	100	
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(Survey Pre-electoral Catalonia 4/1987, SOFEMASA-La Vanguardia)							
VOTE AUTONOMIC ELECTIONS 1984 AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION							
Party	AP	PSU	PSF	Others	Borns in Catalonia		
					One Parent Native	Both Parents Natives	
Only Spanish	12	12	43	33	100	100	
More Spanish than Catalan	10	16	55	19	100	100	
Spanish and Catalan	4	31	31	34	100	100	
More Catalan than Spanish	-	50	24	26	100	100	
Only Catalan	-	61	12	27	100	100	
VOTE 1984 AND LEFT/RIGHT POSITION							
Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Borns in Catalonia	
						One Parent Native	Both Parents Natives
AP	-	1	1	12	40	100	
PSU	9	13	63	14	22	100	
PCF	19	63	18	4	1	100	
Other	52	33	15	10	37	100	