

THE ENERGY SECTOR.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY-JAPAN COOPERATION POSSIBILITIES

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Both, the European Community and Japan present some common problems and similitudes in regard to the energy field and which basically derive from their dependence on external supply of energy sources and from the similar process shown in the last years in their economy and their efficient level in energy skill. This common situation opens up several important possibilities of cooperation between Japan and the European Community.

It is very important to stand out that in the European Community, during nine years, from 1980 to 1989, the gross energy consumption, monthly, in millions of metric tons, of equivalent (mtep) has increased by ten per cent totally (970 mtep to 1098); this increasing is very reduced if we compare it to the growth of the Community economy, specially important in the latest years of the considered period.

This improvement in the energy efficacy levels is quite comparable with the one experienced in Japan, as may be shown by the following figures:

<u>Concept</u>	<u>Years</u>	<u>EC 12</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>USA</u>
Final Consumption per capita tpe	1973	2,48	2,31	6,29
	1986	2,39	2,08	5,29
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Energy Intensity (tep/1000 ecus)	1973	0,40	0,43	0,80
	1986	0,31	0,27	0,55
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In this context, engagement is possible by means of the proposed European Chart of Energy which has been essentially thought for an efficient rationalisation and cooperation in the development of the energy sources available after the new situation of Center and East Europe countries and the Soviet Union. Possible cooperation might also be carry out in the field of thermonuclear fusion research.

Bearing in mind these possibilities, it is reasonable that relations between the European Community and Japan concerning cooperation in different aspects of the sector may enter a new phase. Once again, the Gulf war has clearly shown Japan's and European's Community dependence on external energy sources, mainly petrol. Therefore, we can affirm that a better cooperation in the area of research and technological development of energy and in the structure of energy supplies would certainly be of reciprocal interest.

In this context, both the framework program of research and of technological development (1990-1994) and the European Chart of energy call our attention.

Until now cooperation in the research area has been mainly executed in the nuclear fusion domain. The EC and the United States are still examining the Japanese proposal for the "Intelligent Manufacturing Systems" Initiative. In the Parliamentary Committee of the European Parliament responsible for energy, research and technological development, being myself member, we have established a report on cooperation, both scientific and technical with third countries (including Japan) which has provoked interesting discussions among members.

Like the author, we could really question ourselves whether the division between technological and scientific partners of high European, and non-european level, is realistic and wise. It is not only a matter of competitors but of partners. And it also depends on the will of our non-european partners. There are still several problems to be solved mainly to be able to access to Japan's level of research and development and its applications, and also to the sector of cultural property protections (just to assure that protagonists of this cooperation will be able to benefit of the cooperation applications).

The same question is asked for the framework program of research and technology. After long discussions, the European Parliament has decided that participants in the main projects of the specific programs must spend at least 50 % of their spendings in research and development inside the European Community. The Council and the executive Committee are ready to consider the participation in R&D specific programs of third countries having concluded the agreements of cooperation both scientific and technological, bearing in mind mutual advantage criterium.

Since 1980,spendings in real terms in the area of energy research and technological development, throughout the world, have decreased, mainly due to the low petrol prices. Notably, in the areas of alternative energy supplies and consequently of energy efficacy.

Several times, we have asked for an increasing in Community financing for technological research and development. Clearly, a better cooperation with Japan in the area of research should mean a Japanese co-financing.

Evidently ,the main objectives of the framework program should be the essential criterion when determining whether cooperation is to be continued if mutual advantages can be obtained.

In this context, the first Community programs which deserve cooperation with Japan, regarding mutual advantages, would be, firstly, the R&D program in the non-nuclear branch, where I am "Rapporteur"; secondly, the THERMIE program, which considers the promotion of technologies for energy control; and lastly, the project of the SAVE program which takes into consideration energy efficacy: on the one hand, in the area of technical measures for the definition of patterns and technical specifications, and on the other hand, in the area of the development of technologies for rational use of energy in industry, construction and transports, renewable energy, solid combustibles (including coal applications) and hydrocarbures.

The Gulf war, while attracting all the attention to supply guarantee, gave a supplementary stimulus to the idea of the European Chart for Energy. According to this statement, the Soviet Union could obtain European assistance for restauration and enlargement of petrol and gaz industry, for transport systems, for coal extraction, for improving security in nuclear power stations and for energy economies and environment. In exchange of all the efforts that Western enterprises would accomplish with the aid of bank credits, occidental customers would achieve long terms delivery contracts. This way, the supply of East and Central Europe that due to the recent political changes have been cut out from their advantageous Soviet Union importations, could be assured. Essentially, the success of the Chart (and its execution agreements), which should be opened to all OECD countries and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe too, depends on banks acquiring a certain security in order to be able to furnish long scale loans to enterprises. This means on the one side, protection against nationalisations and any other political risks, and on the other side, certain guarantees for gaz, petrol and coal free circulation, in

front of market prices and the right of enterprises to export to the Soviet Union products and capital. The Chart should serve as political umbrella to the uncertain present-day situation in Mr. Gorbachev's country. Here it may be seen, too, a common interest for both Japan and the E.C.: the creation of a West-East Energy Community, based on a free energy market among country-members. Technology and financing of energy sources development in the Soviet Union, as well as supply guarantee can only be obtained if we all work together.

At present, the escapes from the petrol netting in the Soviet Union origine swamps; and the number of gaz escapes per year are even larger than the year production of the Netherlands, which is of 75 milliards of cubic meters.

Therefore, in order to combine competence, supply guarantee and environment in the energy area, an active participation of the EC and Japan is necessary during the international conference that will be held at the end of this year and where the creation of the Chart will be questioned.



EC NEWS

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24 MAY 1991 - PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT DELORS

OPENING STATEMENT

The visit Vice President Andriessen and myself paid to the Government of Japan came at a crucial moment: the EC is changing fast, Japan is reassessing its role in a world order seriously shaken by the end of the cold war and by the Gulf crisis, a new surge of the commercial surplus of Japan on the EC market just occurred.

In these circumstances, how could we improve the relationship between Japan and the EC in order to strengthen the third side of the triangle?

That was the main point of the conversations we had during these three days.

In order to assess the ground we covered, I think we realistically have to start from a lucid examination of the obstacles, on both sides, to a better relationship.

On the EC side I will mention:

- insufficient knowledge of Japan's society, culture and tradition. This unfortunately is also true for the whole South East Asia region;
- problems of competitiveness in some sectors;
- diversity of approaches towards Japan among our Member States.

On the Japanese side, I will note:

- some difficulty in sharing responsibilities at a world level commensurate to its economic weight;
- problems of market access;
- disparity of approach to business practices.

Leaving things in this shape would present risks of development resulting in serious social, psychological and political tensions in some European public opinions. Hence the necessity to frame our relationship in a dimension and at a level where global issues appear for what they are: problems of mutual concern on which Japan and the EC should work together, the EC trying to learn more about Japan, Japan trying to measure the consequences of its growing importance in today's world.

As Prime Minister Kaifu put it, and I agreed with him, we have to rely on sane competition as well as on constructive cooperation.

We discussed all the main international topics of the day. Prime Minister Kaifu briefed me on his recent visit to South East Asia. I was able to reassure him that the concerns which had been expressed to him about a closed Europe were unfounded. We discussed the situation in the Middle East following the Gulf crisis, and agreed on the need to enhance the role of the United Nations. Mr Andriessen gave the state of play on the Community's assistance to the Soviet Union. We also discussed assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe coordinated by the European Commission in the G-24 framework, and agreed that the existing close consultation with Japan would be further reinforced.

During this visit, and building on our mutual wish to embark together in this direction, my assessment is that we made appreciable progress.

With Prime Minister Kaifu we had a wide exchange of views on international questions, including the need for a successful early conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and on the relations between the European Community and Japan. We agreed that there was a pressing need to strengthen these especially in view of the international situation and the role that both sides were increasingly called on to play.

The Declaration on EC-Japan relations at present under discussion will, by enlarging the relationship, be of particular importance in this context.

We agreed that the Declaration should be conducive to substantial issues and concrete cooperation between Japan and EC. It is my view that, for example, political and economic relation, long-term technological cooperation and cooperation on the environment, development and culture and promising areas which could usefully be explored.

We agreed on the importance of ensuring the effective implementation of the Declaration. With this in mind, we will pursue the idea of setting up a small senior level task-force which will be entrusted with the identification of promising areas of cooperation in the context of the Declaration.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EC - JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMY

STOA BRIEF NOTE

This document has been prepared by STOA* as part of documentation for
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OVERVIEW OF EC-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S.

In recent years, the Japanese economy has proved to be much more adaptable than that of the EC or the US. Its pattern of production has been shifted towards high technology areas and this has helped to maintain a high rate of growth, despite the unfavourable world economic environment in the 1980's. Between 1965 and 1984, Japan's GNP per head increased annually (in real terms) at 4.7%, the highest among the industrialised countries.

In the mid 1980's, under the Nakasone government, Japan intensified its international activities. In July 1985 a marketing opening plan - the 'Action Programme' - based on the idea of 'freedom in principle, restrictions as exceptions', was announced in Tokyo. Its aim was to lessen overall trade tensions and promote cooperation in cultural, scientific and technological spheres.

In May 1988, Japan announced a new five year economic policy. The plan focuses on improving individuals' quality of life, contributing more to the world's well-being and increasing the transparency and access to Japan's business structure. Under the new policy national growth will become increasingly dependent on domestic demand, (estimated to rise by 4.25% a year until 1992), and far less so on exports. Therefore, the Japanese trade surplus should decrease.

For the EC, these efforts were a start at improving what has been a limited and at times unsatisfactory relationship. The trade deficit with Japan had been steadily growing reaching approximately 22 billion ECU in 1986. Access to the Japanese market had been severely restricted, hampered by numerous technical, legal, and standards barriers.

In October 1986, the Commission began to pursue market opening talks with Japan to improve the conditions of access for European companies. Three or four sectors were to be targeted each year for negotiations. Areas that have so far been discussed in this context include motor vehicles, medical equipment, cosmetic products, pharmaceuticals, intellectual property and dairy products.

The general relationship between the EC and Japan has strengthened and improved in the past few years and much closer cooperation now exists. Japan's trade surplus continues to fall, and the EC deficit improved by over 1.0% in 1988. High-level consultations took place on a regular basis in 1987 and 1988 and the EC has recognised Japan's contributions to the world economy and international adjustment process. The Japanese authorities are anxious to keep an open dialogue as fears of the internal market and concepts of reciprocity grow. Still, many bilateral problems remain.

TRADE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY ISSUES

Investment

Japanese investment in the EC has been growing at an incredibly rapid pace. While most of this has been in financial assets, direct investment has also been rising, a trend that is likely to continue. In fiscal year 1987, (April 1987 to March 1988) Japanese direct investment in the community reached US dollars 6.201 billion - 90% increase from fiscal year 1986 (US dollars 3.321 billion). This direct

investment is increasingly having an impact on the Community's economy and negative sentiments towards it are growing.

Due to the numerous barriers and different business approaches, European investment in Japan is still minimal.

Culture/Social/Management Differences

The difficulties encountered between the EC and Japan in the trade environment are caused by numerous complex factors, as they have extremely varied economic policies, business customs and government regulations. Differences in financial practices, marketing procedure and legal aspects all hamper open, competitive trade.

Technical Problems

Some of the more technical barriers between the EC and Japan include incompatible standards, testing procedures, certification and licensing methods, as well as different means of distribution. The Japanese distribution system in particular is extremely inhibiting to foreigners. It contains numerous levels with complicated and often bureaucratic procedures, and is based on long-standing relationships between the buyer and seller.

Protective Measures

Protective measures whether openly or indirectly applied, also restrict trade and have contributed heavily to bilateral friction. These include the issue of reciprocity, local content requirements, the determining of the origin of goods, the granting of subsidies on national aid, and the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.

For the EC and Japan, the issue of anti-dumping has been a particularly difficult one. Japan views the use of anti-dumping as a tool of industrial policy to protect certain sectors and industries. The EC views Japan's aggressive dumping practises as an unfair method to try and obtain larger market shares.

In 1987, the EC approved an amendment to its anti-dumping legislation which was a direct response to the Japanese European screwdriver operations. The Japanese government requested that a GATT dispute panel be established claiming this new legislation, which requires a minimum local content of at least 40%, violates GATT rules on national treatment of a foreign company. The Dispute Panel is currently conducting an investigation.

Bilateral Negotiations and Agreements

Besides the six previously mentioned areas targeted by the EC for negotiations, the following issues have recently been discussed bilaterally.

- semiconductors
- public procurement
- ship building
- wine and spirits
- financial services

In addition, recent years have seen cooperation in a wide range of issues increase substantially. High-level meetings and consultations have taken place regularly which have discussed not only trade and economic issues, but matters such as environment, telecommunications,

research and development, science and technology, exchange programmes, energy, industrial cooperation and legal policies. All of these issues, as well as the sectoral disputes are discussed in full in the main report.

THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES

Based on the promotion of manufacturing industries for the export market, Japan has achieved and maintained a very high rate of economic growth since 1945. GNP grew at an average annual rate of 10.3% between 1962 and 1972, and in 1971 it became the second largest in the world, behind the US (Soviet bloc countries excluded).

In recent years, the Japanese economy has proved to be much more adaptable than that of the EC or the US. The pattern of production has shifted towards technologically-advanced growth industries and this has helped to maintain a high rate of productivity despite the unfavourable world economic environment of the early 1980's. In trade, labour-intensive products like textiles, which used to be the mainstay of Japanese exports, have been replaced by goods such as advanced consumer electronics and numerically-controlled machine tools which rely on intensive research and development. These factors, combined with Japan's highly educated labour force, growing abundance of capital, and competitive and entrepreneurial private sector, all contributed to Japan's economic success. Between 1965 and 1984, Japan's GNP per head increased annually, in real terms, at 4.7% - the highest national growth rate among industrial countries.

In the mid 1980's, under the Nakasone government, Japan intensified its international activities. In July 1985 a marketing opening plan - the 'Action Programme' - based on the idea of 'freedom in principle, restrictions as exceptions', was announced in Tokyo. To promote this programme, the Prime Minister made extensive tours of North America and Europe in 1986 and 1987 aimed at lessening the overall tensions caused by many trade conflicts. Broader cooperation in cultural, scientific and technological areas was also planned to promote a more positive relationship.

This policy was continued by Prime Minister Takeshita who emphasised balanced and sound economic and trade relations in his European visits of 1988. He also promised to enlarge Japan's market opening programmes and policies, to further extend cooperation with Europe in those areas where it already existed, and to begin in new fields as well. In addition, Prime Minister Takeshita stressed Japan's new five-year economic policy, approved in May 1988. The plan focuses on improving individuals' quality of life, contributing more to the world's well-being and increasing the transparency and access to Japan's business structure. To achieve this, Japan must correct its trade imbalances (see the section below), participate more in global issues and forums, restructure its domestic economy, and better distribute its national wealth. In addition, the discrepancy between domestic and world market prices must be narrowed.

Under the new plan, in the coming years national growth will become increasingly dependent on domestic demand, (estimated to rise by 4.25% a year until 1992), and far less so on exports. Japan's global trade surplus should therefore steadily decrease.

While the EC strives to gain greater access for European companies on Japanese markets, it is anxious that any success gained by other countries must not be granted on a bilateral basis. It is closely

following the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) between the US and Japan. These talks resulted in an agreement in June 1990 when Japan gave a commitment to introduce a number of market-opening measures. Japan has nevertheless promised that the EC will gain from any benefits arising from the SII. As recently as January 1991, however, both the US and Japan were accusing each other of failing to introduce the measures outlined in the agreement.

The Japanese trade imbalance - tax incentive plan for Japanese to buy foreign goods

On 20 September 1989 a plan was announced by MITI (the powerful Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry) that from now on tax concessions would be offered to Japanese companies buying foreign goods in an attempt to reduce the country's vast trade surplus. Trade tension with the US is thought to lie behind the plan which could allow companies to deduct between one and four percent of the cost of increased foreign purchases over a year. These figures, said Mr. Hatakeyama of MITI, would vary between manufacturers and trading houses and would not apply to purchases of raw materials. While he clearly sees the measure (which will have to be given the go-ahead by the Japanese Parliament) as an effort to reduce trade tension, he simultaneously condemned the American so-called 'Super 301' law (see section 2. of the EC/US report) and its threatened usage against Japan in cases of 'structural impediments to trade'.

EC-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE 1990'S

It was expected by many observers that trade relations between the EC and Japan would become more difficult as a result of the Japanese general election results, in which the ruling Liberal Democratic Party returned to power. The LDP, which had been responsible for a slow but sure improvement in trade relations in recent years, was re-elected in part on the basis of a promise to voters to tighten up concessions to its trading partners. Consequently, it was felt that the new government would be more confident in its relations with the US and Europe and would not take on board all the demands of the trading partners. The most recent initiative in the campaign to redress the Community's trade deficit with Japan was launched by the Commission in July 1990 following joint consultations at the May 1990 Ministerial (see below). The project, which will be in place for three years will operate on two levels. Firstly, it will attempt to increase awareness amongst European manufacturers about the export opportunities in Japan while also promoting European products through a wide-ranging advertisement and information campaign aimed at the Japanese consumers. Based on a study commissioned in 1988, the campaign will concentrate on promoting furniture, jewellery, analytical and measuring equipment and health food exports to the Japanese market. The May 1990 Ministerial between the two sides was one of the first opportunities to see how the new circumstances had affected EC/Japan relations. The meeting was the first of its type for two years because of the internal problems in Japan particularly regarding the Recruit scandal. Little was expected of the meeting which was seen more as an

opportunity to relaunch cooperation and discussion. Specific problems such as the issue of Japanese car exports to Europe were not touched upon. Some progress was made nevertheless which can be summarised as follows:

- An agreement to establish a bilateral working group to look at on-going trade disputes. The dispute over leather and shoes and processed food were singled out for particular attention
- An undertaking by Japan that the benefits of the Japan/US Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) would be extended to all other parties
- Both sides confirmed their commitment to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round
- Japan gave assurances that it would do everything to encourage inward investment from Europe and to eliminate continuing problems of market access faced by European companies. For its part, the EC stated that the Single Market in 1992 would be open to all foreign imports
- An agreement was signed by the Commission and the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) to cooperate on nuclear safety and developing peaceful uses for nuclear power and materials.

The first negotiations of the bilateral working group to discuss barriers to trade also took place in July 1990. Twenty barriers which European exporters face when exporting to Japan were singled out for discussion by the Commission. But, progress was disappointing. The Japanese agreed not to raise fishing quotas for certain fish and gave the go-ahead to the sale of European alcoholic drinks through catalogues. However, both sides were able to give undertakings that henceforth counterfeit products arriving at their external borders would not be turned back but destroyed instead. For their part, the Japanese complained about the continued application of anti-dumping measures for products assembled in the community, especially in the light of the recent GATT dispute panel ruling which found the EC's powers in this area to be illegal.

In October 1990 the Commission announced that 'serious differences remain at this stage over the basis by which solutions can be found'. This followed a further meeting to discuss the lowering of tariffs imposed by the Japanese on fifteen products from the EC. It also shows how the dispute has changed with the emphasis now on the high tariff rates applied to leather goods, fisheries and processed foods. However, the Japanese justify their lack of action in these areas by maintaining that they are awaiting the outcome of the Uruguay Round of trade liberalisation talks which stalled in December 1990.

Despite these never ending disagreements over the speed of market opening measures, the Commission has agreed to go ahead with Japan's request for a joint declaration on relations between the EC and Japan. Ironically, the exact wording of the Declaration is likely to be difficult and the Commission has had to approach the subject rather cautiously. For the time being though, the Declaration is being dealt with in the Council. Essentially, the Member States are divided over whether the text should specifically refer to the current state of EC/Japan trade relations. The Japanese may not welcome such a reference and yet to exclude mentioning the subject would weaken the Declaration considerably. The Declaration, when agreed will be adopted in July 1991. However, the type of formalised arrangement foreseen is unlikely to elevate the EC-Japan dialogue to the same level as that between the EC and the US. For example, ministerial meetings may only take place annually rather than bi-annually. While the final draft is being drawn-up, the Commission President Mr Delors will meet the Japanese

Prime Minister, Mr Kaifu in Tokyo in May 1991.

SOURCE:

EUROSCOPE from Coopers & Lybrand Europe

ANNEX

EC - JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMY
(abstract of selected press articles)

ANS 30 Jul 90 Asahi Shimbun editorial: Japan's new role in Europe

Two events that suggest the future of Japanese-EUROPEAN economic relations are the cooperative agreement reached in March between Daimler-Benz of West Germany and Japan's Mitsubishi group and the recent agreement through which Fujitsu Ltd. will acquire STC International Computers Ltd. (ICL), Britain's largest computer firm.

The Daimler-Mitsubishi agreement resulted in the coupling of a gigantic Japanese-German corporate group involved in everything from automobiles to the aerospace industry. The Fujitsu-ICL agreement represents the first example of a large, high-tech Japanese firm gaining possession of one of Britain's major corporations.

These two examples indicate a new situation in the relationship between private Japanese and European corporations.

Frankly speaking, JAPAN has become more important to Europe in this new situation.

Soon after the agreement was reached with Mitsubishi, Daimler-Benz approached the Japanese group with plans for joint production of automobiles in the Soviet Union and East Germany. In the case of ICL, the British company had to depend on Fujitsu for the huge sums of money required to develop a multipurpose computer.

Needless to say, Japanese corporations have their own intentions and hopes for profit in obtaining footholds for advancing into the expanding European market. However, beyond that, these two examples should be seen as indicating the way in which JAPAN is increasingly being drawn into the new European economy as an indispensable factor. A heretofore unknown interdependent relationship between JAPAN and Europe is in the process of developing.

This is an epoch-making change. Attention must especially be paid to a number of points that lie in the background.

First of all is the fact that competition among European corporations is becoming increasingly fierce. Within the European Community a furious round of mergers and tie-ups has been continuing for quite some time as corporations struggle to survive before the integration of the EC in 1992. With the recent addition of the move toward a market economy on the part of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany, the future of the European economy has come to possess a large degree of

possibility and uncertainty beyond any previous predictions. Undoubtedly, EUROPEAN corporations must have fully realized their lack of strength in order to overcome this 'sturm und drang' (storm and stress). The second point to consider is the recent surfacing of differences in the stances of EC member nations toward EC integration. France and its allies that strive for strong EUROPEAN COOPERATION are eager to independently foster EUROPEAN industry and develop EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY and thus tend to be exclusionary.

In opposition to this stance are britain, which stresses autonomy and national interests, and west germany, which wants to maintain a thorough free-market economy. These nations either welcome or take a hands-off policy to the entry into the EUROPEAN economy of corporations from outside nations such as JAPAN and the united states. As far as industrial and technological policy are concerned, there is a clear break within the EC. The view that the EC will become a stronghold of protectionism after integration of the market appears a bit out-of-date.

The third factor that must be considered is the apparent start of competition between the united states and JAPAN in the ever expanding EUROPEAN market. The united states appears to have taken an optimistic view of its advantage in the EUROPEAN market stemming from its traditionally close relations with the region, but some also saw the agreement between mitsubishi and daimler-benz as a gigantic challenge to the united states. It goes without saying that the coupling of fujitsu and icl is countermeasure to america's ibm, which has maintained dominance in the EUROPEAN computer market.

However, in considering the cautious feelings of those within and outside the EC, fujitsu plans to keep the icl company name and maintain the present management staff for the time being after the acquisition is completed. Nothing is better than sufficient consideration of the feelings of others, factor that had been missing in previous advances into overseas markets by japanese corporations.

The Asahi News Service 1990

AP 25 Dec 90 Poll of EC countries gives favourable view of JAPAN (388)

TOKYO

A majority of people surveyed in major EUROPEAN countries have a favourable view of JAPAN but believe it is not fulfilling its international responsibilities, the Foreign Ministry reported Tuesday.

Among the chief criticisms was that JAPAN needs to correct its trade imbalance. However, many respondents said the EUROPEAN single market scheduled for 1992 will improve relations between JAPAN and the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, the ministry said in a news release.

The poll was the sixth conducted by JAPAN in the EC since 1977. It was carried out by private RESEARCH organizations in each of the countries surveyed: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

In all seven countries, 'the degree of trust in JAPAN is rather high,' ranging from 71 percent to 91 percent, the ministry said.

In every country except Italy, however, a majority of respondents thought JAPAN was not fulfilling its international role. JAPAN, the world's No. 2 economic power, has come under criticism for not doing more to assist US-led forces in the Persian Gulf and to ease its chronic trade surpluses. Many respondents called for a prompt correction of Japan's trade surplus

with the EC, which totalled 1.49 billion US dollars in November. The most commonly cited recommendation was for JAPAN to improve market access and expand domestic demand.

Among other findings, according to a summary released by the ministry:

- Expectations for direct investment from JAPAN were high in every country.
- Business development by Japanese companies in Eastern Europe was 'generally desired.' But most respondents said Japanese companies should invest only in COOPERATION with Western EUROPEAN countries. In Germany, however, 71 percent said the Japanese should get involved on their own. The survey, sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, was conducted by mail in Britain, Germany (the former West Germany region) and Belgium with responses from 1,543 out of 6,550 people to whom questionnaires were mailed. In the other countries, interviews were conducted with a total of 1,936 people.

The poll did not give a margin of error. Japanese pollsters do not calculate such margins, claiming they might mislead readers into thinking a poll is more accurate than it really is.

The Associated Press

AP 17 Jul 90 French Premier to Visit JAPAN (358)

By JANICE FUHRMAN
TOKYO

French Prime Minister Michel Rocard will arrive in Tokyo on Thursday for a three-day visit aimed at strengthening relations with JAPAN, officials said Tuesday.

'Mr. Rocard will come here keen to convey the message that France is now welcoming Japanese investment,' said Fumiaki Takehashi, a senior Foreign Ministry official.

'France has in the past wanted to protect its own industries more than other EUROPEAN countries have, but they eased some restrictions on foreign investment this year,' said Takehashi.

Japanese investment in France was 1.1 billion dollars in 1989, while French investment in JAPAN was 25 million dollars, he added.

Earlier this year, Edith Cresson, the French minister for EUROPEAN Affairs, was quoted as saying the United States had meekly succumbed to a Japanese takeover of its economy.

She said Europeans were worried Japanese would buy assets in Europe as they have in the United States and that Washington and Europe should agree on a joint strategy to confront a Japanese economic challenge.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe said at the time that Cresson's remarks were the product of 'stereotyped images and lack of knowledge.' While in Tokyo, Rocard will meet with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and hold talks with Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and Kabun Muto, the head of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

France's minister of industry and the minister of SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY will accompany Rocard, Kutsura said.

Talks will focus on bilateral issues, problems the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY is facing with the integration of the EUROPEAN Market in 1992 as well as China, Cambodia, the Korean peninsula, and the global environment.

Rocard will also travel to Hakone, outside Tokyo, for a luncheon given by Keidanren, Japan's largest group of business leaders.

The French prime minister will also attend a formal signing ceremony for an

updated nuclear COOPERATION agreement between the two nations. Former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita extended an invitation to Rocard to visit JAPAN two years ago during an official visit to France.

The Associated Press

AP 22 Jun 88 The document issued by the seven major industrialized countries at end of their summit in Toronto
(Abstract)

TORONTO

Here is the text of the Economic Declaration issued Tuesday by the seven major industrialized countries at the end of their three-day summit.

1. We, the heads of state or government of seven major industrial nations and the president of the commission of the EUROPEAN Communities, have met in Toronto for the 14th annual Economic Summit. We have drawn lessons from the past and looked ahead to the future.

....

OTHER ISSUES

HUMAN FRONTIER SCIENCE PROGRAM

We note the successful conclusion of Japan's feasibility study on the Human Frontier SCIENCE Program and are grateful for the opportunities our scientists were given to contribute to the study. We look forward to the Japanese government's proposal for the implementation of the program in the near future.

....

ANNEX ON STRUCTURAL REFORMS

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-JAPAN will pursue further structural reforms to support and sustain the greater reliance on domestic demand-led growth which has quickened remarkably. JAPAN will promote reform of government regulations in key sectors including land use policies and the distribution system and reform of the tax system.

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The Associated Press

FT 26 Jan 90 World Trade News: EC acts to fend off Far East chip wolves
- Strategic considerations prompted the price agreement

By MICHAEL SKAPINKER

THE EUROPEAN Commission's minimum price agreement with 11 Japanese memory chip manufacturers, published yesterday, is an attempt to save Europe's high TECHNOLOGY industries from the ravages of Far Eastern competition. Europe's computer manufacturers warn that it could have the opposite effect. They are all for the survival of the EUROPEAN semiconductor industry, they say. But not if it means that EUROPEAN users of memory chips are driven out of business.

'We view this agreement with dismay,' says a senior executive with one

EUROPEAN computer manufacturer. 'You can't expect companies like ours to foot the bill for semiconductor companies that have not invested to supply products at the level, quality and price that the Japanese guarantee. We say this more in sorrow than in anger.'

The Commission says it has gone to some lengths to meet the computer manufacturers' objections. It has attempted to devise a pricing formula which ensures that users of dynamic random access memories (D-Rams) are not placed at a competitive disadvantage.

At the same time, the Commission says, the EUROPEAN D-Ram industry has to be protected. An anti-dumping investigation carried out by the Commission found that the import of low-priced Japanese D-Rams resulted in Japan's unit share of the EC market rising from 24.6 per cent in 1983 to 70.5 per cent in 1987, peaking at 81.1 per cent in 1986.

The Commission says it is essential that Europe's ability to manufacture D-Rams is preserved. EUROPEAN companies will find it difficult to manufacture more complex semiconductor devices if they don't make D-Rams as well. It says it sees the semiconductor industry as a strategic sector because it provides key components for the data processing, telecommunications and motor industries.

The Commission has agreed minimum prices with Japanese manufacturers of D-Rams, which, it says, will interfere with the market as little as possible. The minimum prices are based on the weighted average cost of the manufacturers' production, with the weighing done on the basis of each Japanese producer's sales volume to the COMMUNITY.

The Commission argues that as the producers with the lowest costs tend to have the highest level of EUROPEAN sales, minimum prices are likely to be low. The minimum price allows the producers a 9.5 per cent profit margin on the cost of goods sold.

Mr Bruno Lamborghini, vice president for corporate planning at Olivetti, the Italian computer manufacturer, says he recognises that this formula is a concession to EUROPEAN D-Ram users. The Commission had been considering allowing the Japanese companies a profit margin of 20 per cent.

The Commission has made other concessions too. New generation products can be imported into the COMMUNITY at prices below the cost of production for a certain, unspecified, period. There will also be no minimum prices for sample products. Each producer can provide each customer with 1,000 samples below the minimum price.

The Commission also says it will review the effectiveness of the agreement in September 1991, when the semiconductor agreement between JAPAN and the US ends.

Mr Lamborghini, who is also chairman of the EUROPEAN integrated circuit user group, welcomes the last concession. The others cut little ice with computer manufacturers. The minimum prices may be below the current market price, as the Commission argues, but they will only be revised quarterly. D-Ram prices can drop rapidly, says Mr Georges Grunberg, the head of long range planning and EUROPEAN COOPERATION at Groupe Bull, the French computer maker.

'We are very concerned that even if the EUROPEAN Commission is very sensitive to the speed that prices change, they will not be able to react quickly enough,' Mr Grunberg says.

Mr Lamborghini is dismissive of the concessions on new and sample products. It is not clear for how long new products will be exempt from the minimum price stipulations. The price of new products falls dramatically as production increases, he says.

He also argues that the number of samples that can be provided at below the minimum price is far too small. 'A thousand is not enough. When you introduce a new product you need 50,000 to 70,000 samples in the

introductory phase. A thousand might be all right for a small user, but not for users who use hundreds of thousands,' he says.

If the Commission wants to protect the EUROPEAN semiconductor industry, he says, it should intervene when evidence of dumping appears, rather than imposing minimum prices on everyone.

Another computer company executive says the Commission should think about subsidising the semiconductor industry directly rather than penalising D-Ram users.

But Mr Enrico Villa, vice-president for government affairs at SGS-Thomson, the Franco-Italian semiconductor company, argues that 'you don't solve the problem with subsidies. What we want are fair market conditions. We are all for free trade, but you have to have prices that relate to costs.'

The Financial Times

FT 30 Mar 91 Apricot to start selling in JAPAN (180)

By ALAN CANE

APRICOT, the Birmingham-based computer manufacturer acquired last year by Mitsubishi Electric, is to sell workstations and other information TECHNOLOGY equipment designed and manufactured in the UK in JAPAN, writes Alan Cane.

The intention is to capture more than 10 per cent of the Japanese market for small, powerful computers operating in networks by 1993, representing sales of about 40,000 units a year. Such sales would be worth between Pounds 40m and Pounds 43m a year to Apricot. Its last recorded turnover figure before the Mitsubishi takeover was Pounds 83m.

The computers will be sold through Mitsubishi's established distribution channels comprising the Japanese direct sales force of 400 and a network of dealers and software houses.

Dr Peter Horne, Apricot's group managing director, said it was the right time to move into the Japanese market. Apricot is a leader in industry standard or 'open' systems - which can be used with another manufacturers equipment. In the west these are replacing traditional systems based on manufacturer's proprietary designs.

The Financial Times
London Page 4

12th Japan-EC Parliamentary Conference
27-29 May, 1991
Tokyo

Résumé of the lecture by the Guest Speaker,
Professor Tamotsu AOKI,
Faculty of Human Sciences of Osaka University

Japan: The In-Between Society

1. The In-Between Society:

It is now impossible to ignore that Japan's position in the international world is growing increasingly important. Thus, there is an expectation that both Japanese society and the Japanese people will fulfill an international role but within Japan just exactly what is the situation in relationship to this expectation?

Before posing this question, however, we must first consider the character of contemporary Japanese society.

I have labelled Japanese society an "in-between" society and in order to discuss Japan's internationalization I would like to begin first by considering the special characteristics of an "in-between" society.

First the term itself. It speaks for itself in the sense that Japan's position in the world today is as "in-between" one. In other words, Japan occupies an intermediary position. The reason I say intermediary is that when one compares Japan with other societies in the sense of geographical position, political systems, social structures, laws, industrialization etc, Japan's special characteristic all boils down to an "in-between" position.

For example, Japan geographically is positioned between Asia and U.S.A. Although Japan is on the far eastern edge of Asia, within Asia it has been

conspicuous as a modern industrial nation and thus often grouped with Western nations. However, rather than group it with the modern Western nations it would be better to classify it as "in-between" Western and Asian nations. Likewise, in the north versus south debate, Japan cannot necessarily be grouped with the U.S.A. and Western Europe. In her social welfare policies and methods of aiding underdeveloped countries, Japan should be placed more towards the "south" or be seen as an intermediary between the two. In her relationship with South Africa, the argument concerned with whether or not to give up the position of a "second class white" is also representative of this position.

In looking at social structures, this intermediate position becomes clear. In Japanese society, the classes have been neutralized. As the middle class has increasingly expanded, pressure from the upper and lower classes has subsided leaving only a minimum of inter-class conflict. Fixed social levels such as that of an aristocratic upper class no longer exists. This has occurred along with economic growth but the point in question here is not one of gaps in the distribution of wealth. It is more a matter of cultural homogeneity.

Unlike the countries of Western Europe, South-East Asia, America or even Russia, although a difference in wealth may be perceived, no hierarchy based on culture exists. In Western Europe, America and Korea, styles and lifestyles tend to be associated with social class but such a cultural elite associated with different foods, clothing, housing, language or manners, does not exist in Japan. For example, elite schools and education in Japan are more a matter of higher marks and higher ratios of students going on to higher institutions. Within these schools, elite cultural education is not included in the

curriculum. Thus, Japan can be said to be an "in-between" society in both the structural and cultural sense. Moreover, the fact that Japan, from the

run by a powerful bureaucracy classifies the methods of it's system within the realms of socialism.

Yet the conduct of politics and economics belong to the category of capitalism and liberalism. However, although the political system is one based on parliamentarism, Japan is in fact a kingdom with an emperor and thus a constitutional monarchy. On this point both England and Thailand are the same but within Japan the special privileges associated with imperial court status are not employed. Yet the awareness of elite status that existed in the old Imperial court has been transferred to the "successful" in the political, economic and public service worlds, which clearly display nepotistic relationships. However, within the ranks of the successful there is no cultural deviation to be seen. The "elite" are all subject, without prejudice, to the rigours of the open examination system.

Japan knows capitalism, yet does not operate, as does America, on the principle of free competition. It is firmly controlled and managed by the government. Take for example freedom. Within Asia, Japan has comparatively unlimited freedom of speech but pornography is still strongly censored. Yet, at the same time, the degree of nudity allowed on television is much greater than that allowed on U.S. television. Also movies are not rated thus allowing children through to adults almost free rights to admission to any movie - without any notable questioning on the part of society. So Japan is neither a capitalist

society in the sense of American capitalism nor can it be said to be a socialist society like the U.S.S.R. It is one that is partly socialist, partly liberal, placed right in the middle between freedom and control.

In the area of social organisations and manners and customs both Asian and Western types co-exist. The densely built-up areas, the bustle and rush of the cities - these are of Asia. But behind this is the high technology of the West and the advanced nations. The technology and GNP of Japan are on a par with the West yet her people tend to live according to an Asian sense of life. A combination of rationalism, that could be said to surpass that of the West, and religions and belief systems that include Shinto, superstitions and Buddhism which command a total population that somehow amounts to double that of the actual population of the nation.

We can thus see that contemporary Japanese society is in many aspects one that commands an "in-between" position. Just such a position is unique in the world today. However, it is not one that is original. From technology to lifestyle, foods, clothing and technological know-how. All these have come from elsewhere to be digested in a unique way. Innovations occur but the transformed does not necessarily appear elsewhere. Hence, the characteristic of an "in-between" society is not originality and invention but synthesis. And yet the precision of this synthesis can be said to be close to invention.

Another characteristic of this society is the fact that it cannot become an elite society. An elite model derives from a rising through the social ranks in order to become elite and an identification with that model through the efforts to achieve the culture dictated by the elite. In an "in-between" society, such a

socially defined model and such efforts do not exist. For example, one may have academic qualifications but be without pedigree, or have pedigree but no qualifications. Or perhaps have wealth but be lacking in pedigree. Those who have power need to attain wealth and often pedigree is obtained through marriage. So saying, no doubt all of you are now picturing within your minds the "elite" of Japan. They are nearly all endowed with but one particular element associated with elitism and as such necessarily must play supplementary roles. It is just this situation that demands a degree of reciprocity that saves society from leaning too far in one direction and also what gives society it's shade of egalitarianism.

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Moreover, the need for supplemental elite roles tends to remove any resentment that the public may feel towards an elite class because they too have possible access to participation in such an exchange of roles. Thus revolutions and anti-system movements tend not to occur because there is no particular set of elites at which to hit out at - only the faceless entity of society or at best an enterprise in it's whole. Thus one could describe this non-elitist characteristic as a circulation of the whole social structure. This society, from top to bottom, is continually rotating.

2. The "In-Between Society" and the Outside World:

In an "in-between" society the distinction between the two dimensions of town and country, city and village, disintegrates. Urbanization in Japan has now reached 90%, yet within the city we see the introduction of village values, resulting in the clouding over of the personality of the urban man. He becomes an "urban rustic". Not only that, but the border between private and public also

becomes vague. The urban society supposedly promotes individualism but in the "in-between" society rural human relations are maintained thus continually exposing the private self to the public realms. Rapid urban growth has therefore disabled a smooth intergration of rural characteristics into the conventional form of urban life.

This can be explained as the inability of the "in-between" society to clearly distinguish between the inner and outside worlds. Urban lifestyles, rights to privacy etc, are not differentiated from rural village lifestyles, thus making it difficult to realize the personality of the outside world. In a "homogenous society" ubanization mixes with the rural. An "in-between" society is based on the assumption that "everyone is the same" and thus rejects those who fail to conform. Consequently, the enemy of an "in-between" society is the outside that envelopes these non-conformists.

To illustrate this relationship to the outside, two points need to be elucidated. This involves institutions and organisations, both of which are particular to any country and therefore can be considered to be closed entities. However, in relation to Japanese institutions and organisations there are some misunderstandings that I should like to deal with, of course in the context of their relation to the outside world.

First, it is true to a certain extent that Japanese institutions, from the bureaucracy to social security systems, are very closed to the outside world. These are based on the idea of "everyone being the same" and consequently a type of hierarchy that is formed on the basis of a standard deviation scale. This tends to result in centripetal efficiency on the inside and closed doors to the

outside. Therefore, things that differ from the "homogenous inside" are rejected, making communication with the outside very difficult. This, in the context of Japan's efforts to become more international, is illustrated in her inability to co-exist with contrasting elements and her urgent need to show more flexibility in her attitude towards the "non-conforming".

Secondly, despite the fact that organisations must remain sensitive to movements in the outside world, the principles upon which Japanese organisation operate are a vertical hierarchy supplemented by a traditional demand for harmonious human relationships that show very little tendency towards change. These two principles also tend to shut out the outside world, limiting exchanges with others. Yet, on the other hand, Japanese society also operates on a form of open egalitarianism.

The Japanese sociologist KIDA Minoru illustrated this particular form just after the war in his research on Japanese village life. He describes egalitarianism that takes into account the individuality and egoism of each member of that society and the reciprocity that results. This sense of "particular" equality can still today be seen to exist in small religious groups and, in fact, is a fundamental principle of Japanese organisation (along with the more conspicuous vertical organisation principle) that allows for the co-existence of different people in an equal atmosphere. Thus, without meaning to totally reject the vertical principle, I feel that this principle of open egalitarianism, which allows openly for co-existence, needs to be recognised and realised in order to promote Japan's efforts to be more open in her relations with the rest of the world.

3. The Cultural System and Assimilation:

One realises when considering ^{Japanese} methods of dealing with different cultures that there are two contradicting properties to be dealt with. ① Open acceptance and ② Isolationism through assimilation.

On the first account KATO Shuichi pointed out, just after the war, that Japan was a hybrid culture that had practised the assimilation of foreign cultures from ancient times. One sees no other example in the world to equal the receptiveness of Japan to the influence of other cultures. Her religions, language, clothing and cuisine have all come from abroad. In the case of her language not only are the Chinese characters, of course, from abroad but contemporary Japanese is now spattered with words introduced from other languages. An example of this is the national railroads use of J.R. to label itself and the smattering of foreign words to be encountered in almost all commercials in Japan.

In the case of language or Buddhism the Japanese have accepted these fully into their own systems resulting in an overall digestion of foreign culture. Ralph Linton in his essay "100% American" described how the American lifestyle was one made up of totally imported cultural elements. One could perhaps say the same of the Japanese. Even "Japanese cultural characteristics" are mainly derived from Asia. Thus, Japanese culture could hardly be called original. Rather it would be more precise to say that the originality of Japanese culture lies in its ability to accept and blend foreign cultural elements, in an original form, into the Japanese culture.

Including the bed from which the Japanese arise in the morning and the lifestyle they lead throughout the rest of the day, there is an abundance of foreign influences to be found. This is an illustration of nothing more than Japan's ability to accept openly. Despite this, as with religion, she has failed to digest the strongly principled religions Judeo-Christianity, Islam or Theravada Buddhism. The Japanese, who care not for principles and fundamentalism, instead prefer to greet foreign cultures in a more flexible and aesthetic manner. This method of introducing the outside to the inner realms is surely one that may suffice as a way of dealing with internationalization.

Yet, in so saying, I must now turn to what appears to be a contradictory point and that is the point that isolationism can stem from assimilation. Japan, like any culture, is extremely ethnocentric in her dealings with foreign cultures but the point here is that there is a striking difference between her, on the one hand, open acceptance and, on the other, ethnocentrism. Since Meiji times when efforts were made to build a modern nation, the Japanese employed the slogan "Japanese spirit, Western technology" and proceeded to treat foreigners as outsiders. From the point of view of foreigners, the opinion about Japan seems to be the same. That is, Japan does not accept cultural systems as a whole but accepts and digests cultures in a purely fragmentary manner.

For example, the pronunciation of the "R" in Japan's railroad company JR should prove most difficult for the Japanese, yet they quite nonchalantly pronounce it without any thought for its original sound. Buddhism has also been completely Japanised. One of the buddhas central to SE Asian Buddhism when introduced to Japan became the god "Miroku" and was subsequently worshipped in

the Kashima Shrine. In other words, a buddha was changed to a god and has been worshipped until this day in a shrine without any doubt to it's validity.

The point to be made here is that once a foreign element is accepted into the cultural system, it is utilized without any thought for it's original form; assimilated and then it's foreign origins are totally forgotten. By so doing, Japan's hybrid culture is effectively closing the doors tightly on that which has been "accepted". And here we see the resulting complete rejection of the "foreign" within the inner system.

This awareness, or lack of it, is a product of Japan's traditions and peculiarities and forms a Japanese cultural wall that is not easily scaled. The "in-between" society of Japan therefore must now ponder on how it is to deal and co-exist with diversity.

In this light she must also reconsider her position within Asia. Japan for the past 100 years has modelled her modernisation process on the West with both fateful and successful results. However, Japan has always subscribed to the "Japanese spirit and Western technology" mentality and as such her modernisation is not to be equated with Westernisation.

The "in-between" society of Japan is a contemporary society and nation that carefully balances 20th century science and democracy with Asian social and cultural traits and, as such, is a nation that knows no equal in the present world. One could compare this delicately maintained balance with the movements of a mollusc which demonstrates an amazing strength for living by adapting to and living off the outer world. But at the same time a mollusc makes no contribution to the outer world. Japan, similarly, is only substantiated within

her own individual inner realms.

Whilst basing her progress on the Western model, Japan was able to advance without any thought or worry towards a single goal but now that she has outgrown such a model she is now faced with having to go it alone and is thus exposed to the continual ordeal of how to deal with the outside world.

This dilemma is exemplified by the post-modern "leaving the West and entering Asia" trend. Japan's Asianisation must occur but this will prove to be an extremely difficult task. Unlike the modern period when she "left Asia and entered the West" Japan this time has no clear model which she only has to simply pursue.

Moreover, Japan's attitude towards Asia has dominantly been one removed from reality and submerged in self glorified dreams that resulted in such projects as "Asia as one" with the Japanese reigning - mainly through violence that resulted in a grotesque turn of events.

Japan has been unable to look on the diversity of Asian culture and view it as a different culture. Japan has, of course, digested and assimilated parts of Asia's culture but has failed to either make attempts to distinguish Asian culture or to co-exist with it. The diversity and disparity of Asian culture must be focussed on and then accepted for what it is. However, a nation built upon the myth of homogeneity tends to have a great deal of trouble in recognising an alter-ego. Thus Japan is unable to position herself alongside another culture, not to mention her inability to recognise differences and then proceed to conduct exchanges on an equal basis with different cultures and "others".

The world today demands of Japan not that she digest and assimilate but that she learn to co-exist on an equal plane with heterogeneous elements. This I believe to be the true meaning of "Internationalization". No longer are overarching empires such as those demonstrated by Pax Britannica or Pax Americana etc., sought after in today's world. The world seeks an era that promotes the smooth management of plurality and the cognizance of the relativity upon which the world must be based in order to achieve mutual reciprocation.

Japan throughout her history, has been subjected to lengthy periods of isolation partly because of politics partly because of geographical circumstances. Consequently, as a homogeneous nation her conception of a nation state has been based upon a principle of nationalism and the integration and exclusion of foreign cultures and different peoples. However, in this age of ever increasing advanced communications and travel she can no longer apply this principle. But just what now is this "in-between" society of Japan compelled to do?

As I mentioned, there are a number of problems involved in the Japanese "in-between" form of society, but should efforts be made from the inside to overcome the prejudices towards the outside world, and should her conception of the nation state be transformed to one that dictates co-existence with other divergent nation states on the same plane, then (and only then) the "in-between" form of social structure could well be considered the standard model for the Japanese.


Japan must now revolutionise her attitudes towards outer worlds and be prepared to co-exist within a culturally pluralistic domain. Only when she achieves this can she truly claim to have achieved internationalisation.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL

FOR RESEARCH

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EC - JAPAN COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

STOA BRIEF NOTE

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1. FUNDING AND ORIENTATION OF R&D.

Traditionally, research and development expenditures in Japan and the EC vary substantially in format and substance. In the early 1980's Japan spent almost 3% of its GDP on research and development while the EC spent about 1.5%. However, it should be noted that the Japanese government provides only about 25% of total research and development expenditure the rest coming from industry. (In almost all other industrialised countries the ratio is 50:50.) This contributes to the fact that in Japan, an overwhelming proportion of research funds are spent on company internal research and development. Japanese research and development is also more application-oriented, whereas in Europe it is more often devoted to basic research. The main areas of emphasis in Japan are electronics and electrotechnology - receiving over 30% of total expenditures; motor vehicle industry - about 15% and the chemical and pharmaceutical industry - almost 20%. Japan's research and development expenditure also differs from Europe's in that military research is extremely limited. In 1984, defence research accounted for only 2.8% of Japan's state spending whereas it was 31.3% in France and 49.4% in the United Kingdom. In recent years there has been a shift in Japanese policy towards more basic research and an increased desire for closer cooperation with other nations and particularly with the EC. This issue was specifically emphasised in an official exchange of letters between the two in 1984. Numerous programmes have since been created as explained below.

2. AREAS OF COOPERATION

2.1 Thermonuclear fusion

An agreement between the European Community and Japan for cooperation on research into thermonuclear fusion, was signed on 20 February 1989 (see COM(88)603). Scientists hope that fusion reactors, by the nature of the technology involved, will be able to offer very significant safety and environmental advantages over conventional fuels and nuclear fusion power, and would run on an almost inexhaustible supply of fuel. This is the first formal agreement between the community and japan in the scientific field, reflecting the important role of the community in science and technology, and the growing Japanese emphasis on research with long term goals.

Previous informal agreements include the decision in 1987, by the EC, Japan, the US, and USSR to cooperate through the ITER project which brought together all four countries' fusion programmes under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was hoped that access to experiments and the sharing of results and research and developments tasks would be of mutual benefit and could accelerate the progress towards useful fusion power for all.

2.2. The Human Frontiers Science Programme

Japan is continuing its efforts to achieve its three broad goals in the science and technology field: an increased level of creative basic research, a greater contribution to international development and the pursuit of science and technology in harmony with society and nature. After the completion of a feasibility study (in which scientists from Summit countries and the community have been involved in their personal capacities); Japan proposed in 1987 an international programme of cooperation in basic research focused on advanced biological functions. This initiative, the 'Human Frontiers Science Programme', would support all three goals of Japanese science and technology policy. In September therefore the European Commission agreed that the EC would take part in the experimental phase of the programme which runs until 31 March 1992. This will mainly involve organising international workshops and contributing funds. A further decision will have to be taken at a later stage on whether the EC will participate in the operational phase. The main bulk of the costs will be shouldered by JAPAN and the other members of the group are the US, Canada and four of the Member States namely Germany, France, the UK and Italy. The main aim of the HFS programme is to promote research on the higher cerebral and biological functions. It is expected that the results of the research will have a significant impact on the environment, health and industry.

2.3. Exchange Programme for Scientists

The Community's approach has essentially been the exploration both of the research fields in which Japanese work is likely to be of interest and of the conditions under which cooperation is likely to be mutually satisfying. The EC has launched a Young Scientists Exchange Programme whereby individuals are placed in research facilities of the host country for 2 years to be able to better understand and interact in each other's research efforts.

Japan has also taken some unilateral actions to facilitate foreign access to its research system. One such initiative has been a programme under which one hundred foreign scientists will spend a year in a Japanese national laboratory, the cost being met entirely by the Japanese.

2.4. Telecommunications

There has been a wide range of cooperation and discussion in the field of telecommunications between the EC and Japan.

The aim of the Community is to encourage Japan both to adopt international standards for telecommunications and information technology, and to apply these standards in such a way that Community and Japanese systems are compatible. This would help to limit the scope for non-tariff barriers in the Japanese market and to make it more accessible to foreign suppliers of both equipment and services. It would also assist in the integration of European and Japanese communications and information systems.

2.4.1. Interconnection of data processing equipment

International standards are being developed that allow the interconnection of data processing equipment of different types and makes. The Commission and the Japanese authorities have annual high-level consultations and a joint technical working group on the development and implementation of Open System Interconnection (OSI) standards. They have also agreed to cooperate on conformance testing developments and to investigate the possibility of joint demonstrations.

2.4.2. Digital telecommunications

The Japanese authorities have agreed to implement international standards for digital telecommunications. At the end of 1987 they began holding annual high-level consultations with the EC and created a technical working group. This group has concentrated on standards for Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and on the architecture of future international communications networks.

2.4.3. High Definition television

Both Japan and the EC have developed individual systems and standards for High Definition Television. The Japanese system (1125 lines/60Hz), known as Muse or 'Hi-Vision', was the first to actually be produced and to begin limited broadcasting. However, it has one major drawback - it is incompatible with existing broadcasting and receiving systems, so that completely new equipment is needed. In 1986, the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), a branch of the International Telecommunications Union, did not approve the Japanese system as the proposed world standard.

In the Commission's view, it is essential for the acceptability of high definition television, that it be compatible with existing equipment. It also believes that there should be one production standard throughout the world. This would facilitate the exchange of programmes, and aid in the development of the European broadcasting industry in general, particularly as regards export opportunities. One standard is also important, as in the future it will apply not only to television, but also to cinema, video, colour printing and advertising.

The European system, developed through the EUREKA project, was demonstrated in September 1988 at the second EC-Japan working group on HDTV. This method of production (1250lines/50Hz), is compatible with existing equipment and the EC has proposed it as the world standard. Japan, the US and the EC agree on the importance of establishing common standards, but recognised the difficulty involved. This issue will be addressed in the scheduled meetings of the CCIR in 1990. The discussions also recognised the importance of uniform world production standards for the exchange of programmes, joint productions and the many potential industrial applications. Given the importance of the issue and the international concern, it was agreed that further talks should take place on a frequent basis. (see Media report for further details).

SOURCE:

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ANNEX

~~RESEARCH~~ AND TECHNOLOGY IN JAPAN. COOPERATION WITH THE EC.
(abstract of selected press articles)

ANS 03 Sep 82 Ministry of International Trade and Industry issues report refuting EEC claims that Japan's technological advances result of heavy government funding

TOKYO

The EC claims that Japan's advances in technological developments are a result of the patronage of heavy government funding. To refute such allegations and quench the fires of growing cries of protectionism against JAPAN, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) announced a report to refute such claims.

Japan's allocation for technical RESEARCH rank second only to the United States among Western nations. Government funded RESEARCH however accounts for only 27.4 percent and makes JAPAN the low-man on the totem pole after France (58.4 percent), USA(49.3 percent), UK(49.2 percent) and West Germany (46.7 percent). This confirms Japan's assertions that technical RESEARCH is financed for the most part by the private sector.

To reinforce its report, the MITI will call its industrial TECHNOLOGY advisory council on International RESEARCH and Development COOPERATION Committee together after 8-year interim to discuss international frictions concerning technical development.

MITI with JETRO (JAPAN External Trade Organization) collected data for compilation of this report. The report is composed of four parts - Japan's technical development RESEARCH and its international comparisons, basic plan for industrial TECHNOLOGY policies, MITI's present industrial technological policies and COOPERATION between EUROPEAN and Japanese international RESEARCH.

Although JAPAN is number two in its technical RESEARCH outlays among industrialized democracies, its percentage share of the GNP is only two percent. In addition, government funds make up only about 30 percent compared to 50 to 60 percent for other western nations. The report also clarifies that defense-related RESEARCH is very low. The report continues stating, "Japan's RESEARCH is mainly sponsored by private institutions", claiming that 57 percent of RESEARCH comes from the private sector.

The second section stresses that Japan's technical development RESEARCH policy "place more priority on creating an environment to encourage private RESEARCH activities." It also stated that the government will devote its RESEARCH to areas which require an extended time span before it can be applied for commercial usage; to RESEARCH requiring large investments of funding and in fields requiring intensified development to meet social and economic needs.

The third and fourth sections explain that government assistance to private technical development will be limited to "RESEARCH which is too risky for private institutions to sponsor on their own" and "promoting commercialization of new TECHNOLOGY."

The report aims to refute the West's misunderstanding that "the government is promoting RESEARCH on products which already have a commercial potential." Moreover, the report emphasizes Japan's positive stance to

promote international COOPERATION via exchanges of researchers and information on developments on new energy and marine TECHNOLOGY based on scientific and technical COOPERATION agreements.

The content of the report has already been conveyed to Western nations through the joint working group on US-JAPAN high TECHNOLOGY and the GATT meeting with EC. This view will be emphasized as Japan's basic stance on the issue espoused by the working group on high TECHNOLOGY and development called the Committee of Eight. This committee is made up of the seven major countries that participated in the Summit Meeting together with the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

The Asahi News Service

AP 15 Dec 86 Japanese and EEC legislators open three-day meeting in Tokyo (153)

TOKYO

Japanese and EUROPEAN COMMUNITY legislators opened a three-day meeting Monday to discuss international and bilateral problems including trade issues.

Japanese official Osamu Hirano said Tsutomu Hata of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's ruling Liberal Democratic Party led the 43-member Japanese delegation and the 21-member EUROPEAN delegation was led by Carlo Garluzzi of Italy.

....

On Tuesday, the legislators will discuss international COOPERATION, exchanges in SCIENCE and JAPAN-EC trade issues, Hirano said.

On the final day Wednesday, Hirano said, they will discuss cultural exchange, education and drugs.

The Associated Press

AP 14 Oct 86 EEC and Japanese officials meet to discuss standards for computer links to enable different types of machines to communicate (570)

By LESLIE BRODY

TOKYO

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY and Japanese officials met Tuesday to hammer out standards for computer links that would let different kinds of machines and telecommunications systems talk to each other.

Success in setting up codes for compatibility would permit such services as immediate message transfers and electronic mail, regardless of the machines' makers or origins.

Christopher Wilkinson, EC head of strategy of information TECHNOLOGY and telecommunication, said Open Systems Interconnection standards would pave the way for better, cheaper data services of all kinds.

'But if we fail to get international standards for telecommunications,' he warned, 'there will be several blocks on the road toward the information society our governments and our public are so keen to participate in.' Wilkinson was speaking to reporters after the second round of talks aimed at keeping the 12-nation EC and JAPAN in touch on OSI issues. The first was held in March, and the next is expected in early 1987.

While the EC and JAPAN seek world standards for making computers

compatible, the United States has pushed for corporate standards. An EC source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, charged that major US firms have tried to corner markets by putting secret codes in computer systems, which force users to keep buying the same firm's components.

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry released a statement saying 'both sides were very satisfied' with Tuesday's talks. They agreed to push for the global acceptance of OSI standards, and to share information in testing for compatibility, among other points.

While applauding MITI's efforts to develop OSI standards, Wilkinson cautioned that success also depends on the COOPERATION of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, as well as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Inc., which recently was turned into a private corporation.

Wilkinson reiterated the EC's dismay over the US-JAPAN semi-conductor accord.

In July, Washington and Tokyo settled a long dispute over US claims that JAPAN was 'dumping' computer chips, or selling at unfairly low prices. The accord requires Japanese makers to supply details on production costs, so the government can control prices of most exported chips.

Wilkinson charged that the accord jacks up chip prices for EUROPEAN buyers, and gives US computer makers special access in the Japanese market. The EC, a net importer of chips, uses them to make larger computer equipment.

'Bilateral resolution of hi-tech issues between the US and JAPAN will not do, particularly when the results are unfavourable to us,' Wilkinson stressed. 'You cannot conduct multilateral non-discriminatory trade policy on your own. You need partners.'

Last Wednesday, the EC called on GATT, the international watchdog for fair trade, to investigate the accord's fairness.

'If major governments throw GATT out of the window on the threshold of the new round (of international trade talks), then I am pessimistic for world trade and growth,' he said.

Last year, the EC suffered an 11-billion-US-dollar trade deficit with JAPAN. It expects that figure might swell to 18 billion dollars this year. Since the Japanese yen has risen faster against the American dollar than against the EUROPEAN Currency Unit, the EC charges that JAPAN has diverted some of its exports from the United States to Europe.

The Associated Press

AP 01 Oct 86 EEC and JAPAN agree to further efforts in bid to standardize consumer electronic industry (423)

TOKYO

The EUROPEAN COMMUNITY and JAPAN agreed Wednesday to further efforts to make international standards for the consumer electronics industry, a Japanese official said.

The agreement came after 20 leading EC and Japanese representatives of the electronics industry held a one-day session of the fourth meeting on consumer electronics, the official of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) said.

The EC side was represented by Van Der Klugt, president of NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken of the Netherlands, and attended by EC Deputy Director General for External Relations Jos Loeff, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

He said the representatives discussed future prospects of consumer electronics TECHNOLOGY and possibilities of industrial COOPERATION between

JAPAN and Europe to achieve 'harmonious development of standards and to avoid unnecessary friction in the field of consumer electronics products. The official said both sides agreed to hold the next meeting in Europe in 1987.

Loeff, who arrived in Tokyo last Saturday, met Monday with Japanese Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry officials and asked JAPAN to open its liquor market more to EUROPEAN wines and alcoholic beverages.

Koji Watanabe, director general of the Foreign Ministry's economic affairs bureau, told Loeff that at this moment JAPAN cannot give the EC 'concrete indication' of measure it may take to open the market further.

Meanwhile, Dieter Ziegler, minister for agriculture, grape cultivation and forestry of the West German state of Rheinland-Pfalz, told a news conference Wednesday, that Japan's duty and tax structure for imported wines and spirits makes German wine unduly expensive by taxing quality rather than volume or alcoholic content.

Ziegler said 90 percent of all German wine exports originate in his state. After the toxic sweet solvent diethylene glycol was discovered in some imported wine in JAPAN in July 1985, he said, Germany's wine exports to JAPAN dropped by 24 percent from 7,300 kiloliters (1.9 million gallons) in 1984 to 5,500 kiloliters (1.43 million gallons) in 1985.

During the first six months of this year, Germany's wine exports to JAPAN were 1,330 kiloliters (345,800 gallons), he said.

Ziegler said his state government will soon put a new Japanese-language label on bottled German wines to assure Japanese consumers about the quality of these wines.

Some Austrian wine makers have been accused of putting diethylene glycol in cheap wines to produce tastes similar to those of expensive wines.

The Associated Press

FTE 19 Jul 90 Power Europe: Conference Report: Twenty-four ministers in search of an idea (516)

Energy and environment ministers from the Twelve say they must work together on a common policy to combat global warming. Italy, which chairs the EC's rotating six-month presidency and so sets the agenda for all energy matters until the end of this year, says it will opt for a greener Europe with stricter rules on environmental issues. Moreover, Rome wants close coordination among member states in order to cooperate with the US and JAPAN to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions.

...

The Financial Times

FT 12 Apr 91 Nippon Seiko plans R&D centre (297)

By ANDREW BAXTER

NIPPON SEIKO, Japan's largest producer of bearings, is to spend about Pounds 10m on a European RESEARCH centre at Ruddington, near Nottingham. The move comes a year after the Pounds 145m takeover by Nippon Seiko (NSK) of United Precision Industries, the biggest British-owned manufacturer of bearings. The deal was the biggest Japanese acquisition in the UK and marked further consolidation in the European bearings industry.

The RESEARCH centre is the first significant UK investment by NSK since the takeover, and should allay initial criticism by some UK industrialists that the sale would further weaken Britain's manufacturing base.

The new facility will be the RESEARCH centre for NSK and UPI in Europe. Mr Toshio Arata, NSK president, said it would reinforce his company's 'long-term commitment to Europe and is designed to ensure that we stay in the forefront of precision TECHNOLOGY'.

Mr Arata expects a strong exchange of technical information between Europe and JAPAN. The new centre will be one leg of a 'tripolar' RESEARCH and development system for JAPAN, North America and Europe.

The new centre will be built on a seven-acre site. When it opens next March, initial staffing will be 30, some of whom will have moved from other group facilities. Staffing is expected to rise to 50 as business needs increase.

The centre will concentrate on R&D work for the aerospace, industrial, automotive, machine tool and general engineering sectors.

A regular exchange of engineers is expected between the UK and JAPAN. UPI, which makes RHP brand bearings, was established in 1987 with the acquisition of the bearings division of RHP by a management group led by Mr Alan Bowkett, UPI's chief executive. The company was bought by NSK in March 1990.

The Financial Times
London Page 7

FTE 08 Apr 91 International Coal Report: Kyushu builds 350MW PFBC (166)

Another large Japanese coal-fired unit is moving off the starting blocks, with Kyushu Electric Power announcing it intends installing a 350MW coal-fired power station, using pressurised fluidised bed combustion TECHNOLOGY.

Japan's power utilities are increasingly moving further down this track of boosting efficiencies of coal-fired units, in order to overcome any opposition on environmental grounds to planned units.

Construction of the new unit at Kaitacho is to commence in 1994, with operation from 1997. Initial approaches have been made to the local authorities seeking their support for the project.

By using PFBC TECHNOLOGY, the utility is hoping to cut CO₂ emissions by 10% compared with a conventional plant. The unit is budgeted at about Y100bn (USdollars 709m).

International Coal Report 91/04/08 P. 11

Some Statistics on Present Situation of the Japanese Economy


K E I D A N R E N

Financial Affairs Department

April 1991


1. Economic Growth Trends-Deviation of Actual Results from Official projections
2. Contribution to Real Growth Rates
3. Current Balance
4. Exports
5. Imports
6. Ratio of Manufactures to Total Imports
7. Exports/Imports and Trade Balance
8. Direct Overseas Investment
9. Business Outlook -Judgement by Enterprises-
10. Industrial Production
11. Current Profits
12. Plant & Equip. Investment
13. Employment
14. Domestic Consumption
15. New Housing Construction Starts
16. Price
17. Foreign Exchange Rates

Ch. 1 Economic Growth Trends-Deviation of Actual Results from Official projections (Real Terms)




Source : Economic Planning Agency
"Annual Report on National Accounts"

Ch. 2 Contribution to Real Growth Rates (percent changes from previous year)



Sources : Economic Planning Agency
"Annual Report on National Accounts"


Ch. 3 Current Balance



Note : Seasonally adjusted at annual rates


Sources: The Bank of Japan "Balance of Payments Monthly"
Economic Planning Agency "Annual Report on National Accounts"

Ch. 4 Exports (percent changes from previous year)




Source : Ministry of Finance "The Summary Report on Trade of Japan"

Ch. 5 Imports (percent changes from previous year)




Source : Ministry of Finance "The Summary Report on Trade of Japan"


Ch. 6 Ratio of Manufactures to Total Imports



Source : Ministry of Finance "The Summary Report on Trade of Japan"

Ch. 7 Exports/Imports and Trade Balance (Customs Clearance Basis)






Source : Ministry of Finance


Ch. 9 Business Outlook — Judgement by Enterprises —

(「Favorable」 — 「Unfavorable」, percentage of Replies to Total, %)



Source : The Bank of Japan "Short-term Economic Survey of Principal Enterprises"


Ch. 10 Industrial Production (Percent changes from previous year)



Source : Ministry of International Trade and Industry "Industrial Statistics Monthly"

Ch. 11 Current Profits


(percent changes from previous year)



Source : Ministry of Finance "Financial Statements of Incorporated Businesses"


Ch. 12 Plant & Equip. Investment

(percent changes from previous year)




Source : Ministry of Finance "financial Statements of Incorporated Businesses"

Ch.13 Employment




Sources : Management and Coordination Agency "Monthly Report on the Labour Force Survey"
Ministry of Labor "Report on Employment Service"

Ch. 14 Domestic Consumption (percent changes from previous year)



Source : Management and Coordination Agency "Monthly Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey"
Ministry of International Trade and Industry "Industrial Statistics Monthly"


Ch. 15 Housing Construction Starts




Note : Seasonally adjusted at annual rates

Source : Ministry of Construction

Ch. 16 Price (percent changes from previous year)



Source : Management and Coordination Agency "Monthly Report of Retail Prices"
The Bank of Japan "Price Indexes Monthly"



Bruselas, 27 de marzo de 1991

PROYECTO DE DICTAMEN

de la Sección de Relaciones Exteriores, Política Comercial y Desarrollo
sobre
**"Relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Japón
y entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón"**

Ponente: Sr. Aldo ROMOLI

Remisión: 27 de marzo de 1991

Miembros de la Sección de Relaciones Exteriores,
Política Comercial y Desarrollo

N.B.: El presente documento será examinado el 9 de abril de 1991.

CES 777/90 I-JUL/JAS/JIB/va/ac/cf/sh

El 27 de marzo de 1990 de conformidad con el apartado 4 del artículo 20 de su Reglamento Interno, el Comité Económico y Social decidió elaborar un dictamen de iniciativa sobre

"Relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Japón y entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón"

La Sección de Relaciones Exteriores, Política Comercial y Desarrollo, encargada de preparar los trabajos en la materia, adoptó su Dictamen el ... (Ponente: Sr. ROMOLI)

En su ... Pleno (sesión del ...), el Comité Económico y Social ha aprobado por ... el siguiente Dictamen:

*

* * *

Observaciones preliminares

Desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta mediados de los años 80, Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética han dominado la escena mundial, en una bipolarización casi absoluta.

Estados Unidos ha mantenido un claro predominio en el ámbito político, militar, industrial, financiero y científico. La Unión Soviética ha contrapuesto su influencia sobre una parte muy importante del mundo menos desarrollado, con una hegemonía imperiosa en el campo ideológico, militar y económico, emplazándose como punto de referencia en la lucha del socialismo comunista contra el capitalismo "imperialista".

En cinco años, desde 1985 a 1990, todo ha cambiado. La Unión Soviética ha perdido rápidamente poder político a escala mundial y está atravesando una profunda crisis económica y estructural, a pesar de lo cual mantiene un inmenso poder militar que continúa siendo un factor a tener en cuenta.

La escena mundial está hoy dominada por tres polos, ampliados a las respectivas zonas de influencia: Estados Unidos, Japón y la Europa Comunitaria.

Estados Unidos sigue siendo la única superpotencia capaz de ejercer un poder militar, político y económico a escala global. Su liderazgo está, no obstante, condicionado y limitado por sus dificultades internas en materia económica y financiera y por su necesidad de coordinar con sus aliados las acciones políticas a nivel mundial.

La Europa Comunitaria, ha cobrado un nuevo impulso por la realidad del Mercado Único y, reforzada por la reunificación de Alemania, se halla ante unas extraordinarias perspectivas ofrecidas por la apertura de los países de Europa Central y posiblemente por la propia Unión Soviética. Este último país, sin embargo, sigue siendo muy débil en materia política.

Japón se halla en una situación análoga a la de la Comunidad Europea, a pesar de haber alcanzado una potencia global, económica y financiera, de dimensión mundial.

Estos tres polos de poder económico -Estados Unidos, Europa y Japón- pertenecen al mundo del capitalismo de mercado y están ligados entre sí por relaciones muy estrechas: el 60% de los intercambios comerciales internacionales, el 90% de las inversiones mundiales, un porcentaje muy alto de la capacidad mundial en materia de investigación y desarrollo, el control casi exclusivo de las nuevas tecnologías y, por último, un predominio total en el ámbito financiero y monetario.

Estas tres realidades son, sin embargo, distintas entre sí, tienen estructuras económicas y sociales diferentes, basadas, en el caso de Japón, en rasgos culturales específicos, lejanos de las tradiciones culturales europeas. En el aspecto económico, sin embargo, existe una adhesión común a los principios de la economía libre de mercado.

Por muchas razones, sus relaciones han conocido vicisitudes diversas, con fases en las que ha prevalecido una fructífera colaboración y armonía de objetivos, pero también con fases de tensión y de ásperos enfrentamientos de intereses.

Se hallan, no obstante, unidos por una creciente interdependencia y por una manifiesta responsabilidad en la organización de un proyecto de orden internacional capaz de afrontar la inestabilidad y las tensiones que se manifiestan a nivel mundial.

Dichos países tienen también la responsabilidad común de ayudar al conjunto de países del tercer mundo.

El presente dictamen de iniciativa se propone ilustrar el estado de las relaciones y de los nexos económicos existentes entre Estados Unidos y Japón, y entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón, y apuntar algunas perspectivas para una más eficaz colaboración entre sí.

1. Relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Japón: tensiones entre asociados

1.1. Las inquietudes de los Estados Unidos

1.1.1. En los últimos años, en ambos países aliados, Estados Unidos y Japón, han surgido sentimientos de frustración, desconfianza y hostilidad recíprocas muy preocupantes.

En un reciente sondeo de opinión llevado a cabo en los Estados Unidos, el 68% de los ciudadanos consultados ha indicado que el Japón constituye para los Estados Unidos un peligro incluso mucho mayor del que ha supuesto en los pasados años la Unión Soviética.

Por reacción, también en la opinión pública japonesa, blanco de críticas y acusaciones, han surgido sentimientos de resentimiento marcados por un encendido nacionalismo. Se han podido oír tesis inquietantes sobre una presunta voluntad de revancha por parte de Japón tras la derrota militar, acusaciones de racismo y de voluntad de discriminación.

1.1.2. El estado de malestar existente en los Estados Unidos tiene su origen en la frustración y la ansiedad de la opinión pública, informada de una manera incompleta por la prensa y las intervenciones de algunos políticos que consideran fácil acusar a Japón de ser la causa principal de los problemas de la economía norteamericana, del persistente déficit comercial¹ y de las dificultades que encuentran sus exportaciones.

Los **mass media** norteamericanos tienden también a hacer hincapié en la adquisición, por parte de los capitalistas japoneses, de sectores importantes de la estructura productiva e inmobiliaria del país.

Destaca también el hecho de que la economía japonesa tiene la ventaja de no estar gravada por los gastos militares².

1.1.3. En opinión de los expertos económicos y de los políticos norteamericanos resulta, pues, particularmente preocupante el fenómeno de la creciente dependencia del Tesoro de los flujos de financiación provenientes de Tokio, indispensables ya para cubrir el déficit incontrolable del presupuesto federal.

¹ El déficit comercial de Estados Unidos respecto a Japón ascendió a 52.000 millones de dólares en 1987, descendiendo a 45.000 millones en 1989 y a 38.000 millones en 1990.

² Por parte japonesa destaca que ese país ha aumentado su volumen de ayudas a los países en vías de desarrollo, y se encuentra hoy en la primera posición de la lista de países donantes, con más de 10.000 millones de dólares por año. Japón contribuye también sustancialmente a la ayuda a los países de Europa del Este.

El efecto acumulado de dichas financiaciones ha transformado en pocos años a los Estados Unidos en un país fuertemente endeudado con los mercados financieros internacionales y en particular con Japón.

Sobre este telón de fondo, existe la percepción por parte de la opinión pública y del mundo político y económico de que los Estados Unidos están perdiendo rápidamente su tradicional liderazgo tecnológico y, con ello, su status de superpotencia económica mundial. Según ciertas opiniones, están ya en peligro, no sólo los intereses nacionales, sino la misma seguridad del país.

1.1.4. Este conjunto de preocupaciones ha originado, en Estados Unidos, desde hace tiempo, una tendencia a hacer frente al problema de las relaciones económicas con Japón recurriendo a todo tipo de instrumentos comerciales bilaterales y de "managed trade", aun cuando no sean coherentes con los compromisos asumidos en el marco de los acuerdos multilaterales GATT.

Así, se han estipulado, en los dos decenios de los años 70 y 80, numerosos acuerdos comerciales generales y particulares, con exigencias cada vez mayores de Estados Unidos a Japón para que liberalice algunas categorías de productos o tipo de operaciones a fin de obtener un acceso preferencial para las mercancías norteamericanas al mercado japonés. Se ha pedido repetidamente al Gobierno de Tokio que asumiese compromisos de limitación voluntaria de las exportaciones de productos concretos (desde los automóviles al acero, pasando por los semiconductores, etc).

Los resultados concretos de dichas operaciones han sido decepcionantes y han alimentado nuevas recriminaciones recíprocas y fuertes polémicas.

1.1.5. En algunos ambientes del Congreso y del mundo intelectual de Washington se ha consolidado el convencimiento de que no caben las ilusiones: los japoneses no habrían cambiado en ningún momento su filosofía, sus políticas industriales y su voluntad de hegemonía en los mercados mundiales. El único modo de reaccionar y poner freno a dicha tendencia expansionista debería buscarse en las represalias directas y unilaterales que hacen posibles los oportunos instrumentos legislativos.

Sobre esta base, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos ha elaborado y aprobado la legislación protecciónista del "Trade Act of 1979", reforzada, diez años después, por el "Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" que el presidente Reagan firmó en julio de ese mismo año.

La Sección de Relaciones Exteriores del CES ha tenido la posibilidad de exponer sus opiniones sobre dicha ley, divergente de los compromisos multilaterales asumidos por los Estados Unidos en los organismos internacionales y que ha perjudicado notablemente las negociaciones de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT³.

En julio de 1989, la administración Bush tomó la iniciativa de proponer al nuevo Gobierno japonés del Primer Ministro Toshiki Kaifu la realización de un nuevo esfuerzo en el plano bilateral para reactivar las relaciones comerciales entre los dos países y para mejorar el clima de las relaciones recíprocas. Examinamos dicha propuesta, conocida con el nombre de "Structural Impediments Initiative (S.I.I)", en el párrafo 1.3. infra.

1.2. Reacciones por parte de Japón

1.2.1. Las críticas y polémicas actuales en Estados Unidos, que no parecen haber remitido tras el final de la guerra del Golfo, han afectado directamente a los ambientes políticos y económicos japoneses, siempre sensibles a las argumentaciones norteamericanas, provocando reacciones vehementes y contrapuestas.

³ Véase el Dictamen del CES nº 1062/90 del 20 de septiembre de 1990: "Dictamen del Comité Económico y Social relativo a la última fase de las negociaciones GATT - Ronda Uruguay".

La orientación de la opinión pública japonesa es sin embargo ampliamente favorable a Estados Unidos, país del que se recuerda vivamente la asistencia ofrecida en los años difíciles de la ocupación en la primera posguerra y por las ayudas recibidas en el periodo de la reconstrucción.

Sin embargo, dichos sentimientos se han visto empañados en los últimos tiempos por amarguras, desilusiones y pesimismo en lo relativo al futuro, con indicios de creciente nacionalismo.

1.2.2. En primer lugar existe el rechazo a aceptar la tesis de que Japón sea la causa principal de las dificultades económicas de Estados Unidos.

Los japoneses invitan explícitamente a los norteamericanos a reconocer que las causas primeras de la difícil situación en que se encuentra su economía residen en los errores en materia de política económica cometidos en los años 80. Dichos años no fueron sólo de orgullosa expansión, como la propaganda oficial de la era Reagan ha repetido a menudo, sino que en ellos también se establecieron las premisas de los desequilibrios estructurales que emergen en la actualidad. Estos indican que el país ha vivido durante demasiado tiempo por encima de las posibilidades de su aparato productivo.

La señal más evidente de dicha situación la constituye la pérdida de competitividad de los productos norteamericanos en los mercados internacionales, que se han visto perjudicados también por una política de sobrevaloración del dólar.

1.2.3. Según los observadores japoneses, una de las causas más profundas de dicho fenómeno debe buscarse en el cambio psicológico que ha tenido lugar en el mundo empresarial norteamericano, que en los últimos tiempos parece haber perdido su impulso creativo tradicional para perseguir exclusivamente el espejismo de las ventajas financieras a corto plazo y el beneficio inmediato⁴; de esta actitud se derivaría el hecho de haber puesto una confianza excesiva en el concepto de "sociedad postindustrial" basada casi exclusivamente en los servicios, descuidando la industria manufacturera y de bienes de consumo que ese país debe hoy importar en gran escala.

⁴ El presidente de la SONY Akio Morita, en su ya célebre libro The Japan that can say NO, escrito en colaboración con el político Shintaro Ishihara, afirma que un elemento equivocado se ha insertado en las empresas norteamericanas: se piensa solamente en los balances cuatrimestrales y en las cotizaciones de bolsa antes que en las inversiones a largo plazo. Parece como si se hubiera perdido de vista el hecho de que la creación de riqueza real solamente se puede alcanzar con la creación de nuevos valores añadidos, sobre todo, con industrias manufactureras competitivas a nivel internacional.

Los críticos japoneses continúan diciendo que no se puede acusar a Japón de que Estados Unidos haya invertido en los pasados años, en materia de equipamientos e investigación, mucho menos de lo invertido por Japón y por la misma Europa.

1.2.4. Además, Estados Unidos ha debido financiar sus necesidades con capitales tomados en empréstito (en gran parte del propio Japón) toda vez que la formación de ahorro en el interior de su país era insuficiente. Por esta razón han debido mantener tipos de interés elevados que han causado una sobrevaloración del dólar.

Asimismo, el bajo nivel del sistema educativo norteamericano, sobre todo los estudios primarios y secundarios, puede, según algunos observadores japoneses (y también algunos norteamericanos), haber contribuido a las dificultades en que se halla la economía del país.

1.2.5. El diagnóstico por parte japonesa no se ha limitado, sin embargo, a defenderse de las acusaciones norteamericanas sino que ha intentado también analizar los aspectos internos de la política económica de su propio país, lo que constituye un elemento nuevo de cierta importancia.

Por ejemplo, se reconoce que el mercado interior japonés ha estado efectivamente aislado y cerrado durante demasiado tiempo, y que las quejas de los restantes países están, al menos en parte, bien fundadas. Japón no puede en efecto continuar con una política comercial orientada en la única dirección de estimular las exportaciones sin dejar espacio para las importaciones de bienes y servicios de terceros países.

Por ello se hacen necesarias intervenciones urgentes y las negociaciones de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT son vistas por los representantes políticos japoneses como una ocasión para alcanzar una reducción general de las barreras no arancelarias por parte de todos.

1.2.6. Algunos análisis más recientes por parte japonesa mantienen que debería considerarse ya superada la fase de política comercial en la que el país establecía prioridades en materia de exportaciones y procedía a una eficaz planificación de los objetivos a alcanzar mediante la intervención del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior e Industria - MITI.

No obstante, en los últimos años, la intervención del MITI se habría limitado a indicar los objetivos estratégicos a largo plazo, hacia los que debería dirigirse el país.

Dichas consideraciones son valoradas con mucha prudencia en Estados Unidos y en Europa.

De hecho, si por una parte parece fundada la afirmación de que el MITI ha disminuido la intensidad de sus intervenciones directas de guía y orientación de los distintos sectores de la economía nacional, se sigue dando el hecho de que el país mantiene su unión y cohesión en la persecución, metódica y constante, de sus objetivos a largo plazo, que invariablemente se alcanzan.

Básicamente, el concepto de "Japan Inc." no parece aún superado. En este marco, las empresas japonesas pueden, hoy como ayer, poner en práctica programas de expansión a largo plazo, incluso cuando éstos comporten pérdidas continuadas durante muchos años, destinados a penetrar en determinados mercados y a conseguir posiciones de fuerza en los sectores escogidos. Para ello, dichas empresas se benefician de la asistencia de un fuerte sistema financiero que pone a su disposición capitales a largo plazo, a unos tipos de interés muy bajos en relación con los tipos corrientes en los mercados americanos y europeos.

No obstante, parecen operarse importantes mutaciones estructurales en la economía japonesa.

Entre otros, es significativo y característico el clima de competencia exasperada entre las propias empresas japonesas en el ámbito de cada sector industrial.

Dicha competencia se extiende también al exterior del país, en los mercados del Sureste asiático, América del Norte y Europa.

Por su parte, los principales grupos industriales japoneses han tomado ya una dimensión, una autonomía financiera y una mentalidad de enfoque "global" respecto al mercado mundial que los convierte de hecho en "multinacionales", disvinculados de una estrecha dependencia de la economía del país de origen.

1.2.7. Otros observadores y estudiosos han dirigido su atención también hacia los importantes cambios que están teniendo lugar en la misma estructura de la sociedad japonesa. Entre otros, se pone de manifiesto que los índices demográficos prevén un sensible envejecimiento de la población, con las consiguientes modificaciones en el comportamiento de los individuos solteros y de las familias, con un gradual alejamiento de los valores de sobriedad, frugalidad y aceptación de unas condiciones de vida incómodas, aspirando a niveles más elevados de calidad de vida.

Se afirma también que se están modificando los valores de absoluta dedicación al trabajo, de lealtad hacia el grupo y hacia la empresa y de represión de todo tipo de individualismo, factores que han caracterizado el mundo del trabajo japonés en los decenios de la posguerra hasta hoy⁵. Por contra, ciertos observadores occidentales ponen de manifiesto que la duración del trabajo anual y semanal en la industria japonesa es todavía mucho mayor que la de los países europeos y norteamericana. Destacan ciertos casos que van en dirección opuesta, con un aumento de la duración efectiva del trabajo, teniendo en cuenta las horas extraordinarias.

⁵ El déficit comercial de los Estados Unidos respecto a Japón alcanzó los 52.000 millones de dólares en 1987, descendiendo a 45.000 millones en 1989 y a 38.000 en 1990.

Se trata por supuesto de fenómenos muy lentos, pero que, de llegar a consolidarse, abrirían perspectivas menos preocupantes sobre la continuación del imparable crecimiento de la potencia económica japonesa con la acumulación de desequilibrios y tensiones no sólo con Estados Unidos sino con todos los países del mundo.

Debemos pues interrogarnos sobre el futuro de Japón, entendiendo a éste ya no como un "país dominante" sino más bien de un país con unos ciudadanos más próximos a los comportamientos de las sociedades desarrolladas del mundo occidental que exigen disfrutar más directamente, en el plano económico y social, de los excepcionales resultados económicos de su país, ciudadanos más dispuestos a participar y contribuir al orden económico y político mundial sin por ello renunciar a sus peculiares características culturales.

En esta perspectiva, también el gigantesco activo comercial japonés podría evolucionar con el tiempo hacia una reabsorción espontánea, tras los citados fenómenos de envejecimiento de la población y de aumento del nivel de vida y del consumo interno⁶.

Como queda dicho, será un proceso lento y plagado de resistencias, pero parece razonable esperar que los países occidentales, en primer lugar Estados Unidos y la Comunidad Europea, que tienen importantes relaciones políticas, económicas y culturales con Japón, hagan todo lo posible por agilizar y potenciar la evolución de la sociedad japonesa que parece hoy esbozarse.

⁶ Véase el libro de uno de los directores de "The Economist" de Londres, Bill Emmott, titulado "The Sun Also Sets - The Limits to Japan Economic Power", que tuvo en 1989 una amplísima difusión en Japón.

1.3. **La "Structural Impediments Initiative", un acuerdo *sui generis* entre Estados Unidos y Japón**

1.3.1. Las conversaciones S.I.I., lanzadas en junio del año pasado por el Presidente Bush, revisten un carácter particular. Al plantearse como objetivo remediar los desequilibrios comerciales entre Estados Unidos y Japón, este acuerdo investiga las causas fundamentales existentes en las políticas económicas y sociales de ambos países, y abordan de un modo nuevo temas que se consideraban de exclusiva competencia de los gobiernos de cada uno de los Estados. El acuerdo no tiene las características de un acuerdo comercial tradicional, sino más bien las de un compromiso recíproco adoptado independientemente por cada una de las partes sobre temas sugeridos por la parte contraria.

El acuerdo no tiene las características de un acuerdo comercial tradicional, sino que es más bien un compromiso recíproco adoptado de forma autónoma por cada una de las Partes respecto de los temas sugeridos por la otra Parte.

El acuerdo *sui generis* constituye por consiguiente un intento que, de tener éxito, podría influir en las relaciones entre Japón y toda la colectividad de países occidentales. Tal cmo ha ido concebido, constituye un modelo nuevo que Estados Unidos podrían proponer (o imponer) también a otros países.

1.3.2. En abril de 1990 se firmaron en Washington dos informes provisionales que, por separado, contienen las medidas que el Gobierno de Japón y el de Estados Unidos se comprometen a adoptar a petición de la parte contraria. En junio del mismo año, los dos informes provisionales confluyeron en un único documento final que contenía los objetivos detallados que las dos Partes se comprometen a perseguir.

Durante las negociaciones, Estados Unidos presentó una larguísima serie de propuestas y sugerencias, que la parte japonesa ha aceptado en gran parte.

Los compromisos del gobierno japonés se pueden resumir como sigue:

- reconocimiento de la necesidad de reducir el superávit comercial corriente del país, con la adopción de políticas económicas dirigidas a promocionar un crecimiento no inflacionista basado en la demanda interna;
- aumento importante de la inversión pública por un total de 4 billones de yen en diez años (aproximadamente el 10% del PNB de Japón), favoreciendo las infraestructuras urbanas, la construcción de viviendas, aeropuertos y puertos, la protección del medio ambiente y la defensa del patrimonio natural. El objetivo declarado consiste en mejorar la calidad de vida de la población y absorver buena parte de los capitales formados en el país. Todo ello producirá un importante aumento de la demanda interna y las importaciones, con el consiguiente beneficio para toda la economía del país;
- modificación de la distorsionada situación actual en el ámbito de los precios en las zonas urbanas -que constituye un importante obstáculo al establecimiento de oficinas y de centros productivos de empresas extranjeras- mediante la promoción de la oferta de zonas públicas destinadas a la construcción;
- liberalización del sector de la distribución, que hoy impide, de hecho, que las mercancías de otros países lleguen al consumidor fijan japonés;
- agilización de los procedimientos de importación de bienes;
- aplicación más puntual de la legislación japonesa en materia de protección de la competencia contra los acuerdos ilícitos entre empresas, prácticas restrictivas, carteles, monopolios, barreras a la importación e intervenciones relativas a las relaciones preferenciales que los grandes grupos persiguen con objeto de impedir la presencia de operadores extranjeros (Keiretsu relationships);

- equiparación gradual de la duración de la semana de trabajo en las fábricas japonesas a los modelos de los restantes países occidentales;
- control más activo y sistemático de los diferenciales de precios de los bienes producidos en Japón tomados del mercado interior y los precios, mucho más bajos, de los mismos productos en los mercados exteriores.

Por último, los negociadores norteamericanos no han olvidado solicitar un acceso preferencial para las exportaciones de productos específicos de la industria y de la agricultura de su país (productos forestales, satélites, aeronaves y superordenadores).

1.3.3. Como puede verse se trata de una mezcla de instrumentos tradicionales de política comercial y de intervenciones relativas a la política económica y social interna del país, sin precedentes en la historia de los acuerdos económicos bilaterales. En ciertos ambientes japoneses, ha sido denunciado como una injerencia inaceptable, lesiva para la soberanía del país.

Es interesante, sin embargo, observar que gran parte de las peticiones norteamericanas se han basado en propuestas que habían sido ya presentadas y discutidas en ciertos ambientes políticos y de expertos económicos japoneses favorables a una mayor apertura del país al exterior (recordemos el informe Mekawa de 1986). Esto explica en parte el hecho de que la opinión pública japonesa haya reaccionado favorablemente a la iniciativa.

1.3.4. Ahora bien, también en lo relativo a las propuestas japonesas dirigidas a la Administración norteamericana, recogidas por ésta, el acuerdo presenta nuevos sorprendentes y, en parte, sorprendentes.

Se invita a que Washington haga frente con decisión y ponga remedio a los problemas estructurales del déficit presupuestario federal, de la baja tendencia al ahorro familiar norteamericano, a la escasa competitividad internacional de los productos norteamericanos, a la predominante orientación a corto plazo de la gestión de las empresas norteamericanas, al escaso compromiso en materia de investigación y desarrollo, y, por último, al insuficiente nivel de educación de los jóvenes y de formación de los trabajadores.

No se olvidan temas relativos en gran parte a la política interior de Estados Unidos que la administración Bush había ya considerado objetivos prioritarios para un próximo futuro. Sin embargo, dichos objetivos han sido asumidos como compromisos bilaterales ante el interlocutor japonés como si fuesen asuntos que afectan de manera exclusiva a los dos países interesados y no temas que seguramente pudieran influir en los desequilibrios de las relaciones de la mayor potencia económica del mundo con todos los demás países. En este aspecto, el acuerdo S.I.I. ha suscitado críticas por parte de los comentaristas europeos.

1.3.5. La colaboración en el marco del acuerdo SII no ha hecho más que comenzar y ya parecen haber aparecido alguna dificultades y retrasos.

En todo caso, e independientemente de este compromiso, las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Japón están destinadas a incrementarse en el próximo futuro, sobre todo si se confirmasen las previsiones de expansiones del "Área del Pacífico", que presenta un dinamismo muy importante, superior al del área del Atlántico Norte.

2. Relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón

2.1. De la Indiferencia Inicial a la oleada de exportaciones japonesas de los años 70 y 80

2.1.1. En el primer período de posguerra, hasta fines de los años 60, las relaciones entre Japón y cada uno de los Estados europeos, unidos desde 1959 en la Comunidad Europea, fueron prácticamente inexistentes.

No existía ningún interés concreto por parte de los europeos, quienes consideraban a Japón como una realidad lejana, poco conocida y, además, con graves dificultades económicas.

Por su parte, los japoneses miraban igualmente a Europa como a una zona de grandes tradiciones culturales, susceptible de importantes desarrollos económicos, pero que no ofrecía ningún interés de modo inmediato. La atención predominante se concentraba de hecho en las relaciones bilaterales con Estados Unidos, relaciones muy estrechas a partir de 1950 como consecuencia de la guerra de Corea.

2.1.2. Habría que esperar hasta 1970 para que se registrase entre ambas zonas una evolución muy rápida de las relaciones comerciales, impulsadas por un impresionante crecimiento de la capacidad industrial y comercial del Japón.

En diez años, de 1970 a 1980, el intercambio pasó de 30.000 millones de dólares a 250.000 millones de dólares, aunque con un fuerte desequilibrio favorable a las exportaciones japonesas que acumularon rápidamente un estimable superávit. Las exportaciones europeas llegaban a cubrir solamente el 34% de las importaciones provenientes de Japón, encontrándose bloqueadas por el carácter cerrado de aquel mercado.

El "milagro económico" japonés se convirtió así en una realidad, no sólo para los Estados Unidos, sino también para los europeos.

2.1.3. Las preocupaciones europeas se convirtieron rápidamente en presiones para que se adoptasen medidas de contención de signo proteccionista contra la ola de productos japoneses. Algunos gobiernos de los países miembros adoptaron la iniciativa de activar las numerosas medidas de contingentación cuantitativa que existían desde el primer período de la posguerra, mientras otros adoptan nuevas medidas.

Dichas intervenciones eran exigidas por los medios industriales y sindicales, que denunciaban el carácter agresivo de las exportaciones japonesas. A base de unos precios muy bajos, sólo en parte justificados por el menor coste de la mano de obra, dichas exportaciones se concentraron peligrosamente en sectores concretos y en segmentos limitados de mercado, con el resultado de dificultar el funcionamiento de las industrias nacionales hasta el punto de obligarlas al cierre.

La Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, que sólo a partir de 1970 había recibido el pleno mandato de realización de una política comercial común, asistió en un primer momento pasivamente al fenómeno de autodefensa de los países miembros que se manifestó en un período de grave crisis económica, inflación y creciente desempleo, como consecuencia de las crisis del petróleo de 1973 y 1979.

Por su parte, los japoneses no parecían preocupados por la falta de una política comercial uniforme en el área comunitaria y siguieron desarrollando sus contactos y discusiones con los gobiernos de cada uno de los países miembros, ofreciendo soluciones pragmáticas de acuerdos parciales de limitación voluntaria de sus exportaciones. Las autoridades comunitarias de Bruselas se vieron ignoradas durante mucho tiempo aunque se dotaron del poder de discutir de modo global los problemas de los intercambios del área comunitaria entendida como un conjunto único.

2.1.4. Debido a dichas iniciativas contradictorias, las relaciones comerciales entre Europa y Japón intentaban asumir una fisonomía coherente, pero continuaron estando durante mucho tiempo fraccionadas, con respuestas diferentes en cada país. No resulta sorprendente que en dichas circunstancias se multiplicasen las tensiones y los conflictos comerciales.

Los sectores más afectados por la primera oleada de exportaciones japonesas fueron los de la construcción naval, productos electrónicos, aparatos audiovisuales, aparatos fotográficos, automóviles y motocicletas. En Suiza, país de la AELC, llegó a estar en peligro la supervivencia de la industria relojera tradicional.

2.2. Fase activa de la política comercial comunitaria

2.2.1. En los años 80, la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas comenzó a esbozar su propia política comercial ante terceros países.

El punto de partida lo constituyó el uso activo de las medidas previstas por los acuerdos multilaterales GATT en materia de antidumping. Cada vez con mayor frecuencia, se abrirían expedientes contra las exportaciones a terceros países a precios más bajos que en el mercado de origen. Dicha política no estaba pensada específicamente contra las exportaciones japonesas, si bien terminó por afectar repetidamente a los productos provenientes de ese país.

2.2.2. En 1982, tuvo lugar la espectacular iniciativa del gobierno francés de concentrar las operaciones de despacho de aduanas para los magnetoscopios japoneses en una única aduana periférica, en Poitiers (decisión posteriormente anulada tras la intervención de la Comunidad).⁷

En 1984, se abrió, por parte de la Comunidad, un procedimiento antidumping sobre las importaciones de máquinas de escribir electrónicas; en 1985 le tocó a las máquinas fotocopiadoras, y en 1986 a los hornos de microondas, a las impresoras y a los microconductores.

2.2.3. Se trataba de acciones muy "visibles" destinadas sobre todo a hacer comprender a la otra parte que la Europa comunitaria no asistiría pasivamente a la destrucción de sus industrias tradicionales o de nueva tecnología, como consecuencia de prácticas comerciales consideradas desleales. Al mismo tiempo, en Bruselas se estudiaba la posibilidad de adoptar, en el marco del GATT, medidas de salvaguarda selectivas aplicables a países concretos.

⁷ El incidente de Poitiers produjo una gran commoción en Japón, y se interpretó durante mucho tiempo como símbolo de la voluntad proteccionista de los países europeos.

La Comisión de la CE siguió también con interés el intento de los Estados Unidos de dar un contenido jurídico a la teoría del "balance de beneficios" en las relaciones entre los países contratantes del GATT, que justificaría acciones legales y medidas de defensa en caso de persistir el superávit comercial estructural acumulado por Japón (como es sabido, dicho intento no ha tenido continuidad).

2.2.4. En 1984, tras un largo debate, el Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas, estableció un Reglamento, conocido como "Nuevo Instrumento", destinado a reforzar la política comercial comunitaria contra las prácticas comerciales ilícitas de terceros países no cubiertas por la legislación antidumping (Reglamento 2641/84). Se adoptó esta disposición en respuesta a las iniciativas del Congreso de Estados Unidos que habían reforzado los poderes de defensa comercial unilateral de ese país (artículo 301 del Trade Act de 1979). El "Nuevo Instrumento" tiene, sin embargo, una aplicación limitada y no ha sido utilizado nunca contra Japón.

Por último, en 1987 la Comunidad inició un procedimiento ante el GATT, que ha tenido una consecuencia positiva, contra las discriminaciones del sistema impositivo fiscal de Japón en relación con los vinos y bebidas alcohólicas de importación. La Comunidad comenzaba así a prestar atención también al tema de la apertura del mercado interior de Japón sobre el que se habían concentrado de modo exclusivo las acciones de los Estados Unidos.

2.2.5. Las autoridades japonesas no han dejado de reaccionar vivamente contra las iniciativas de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, que está siendo acusada de hacer una interpretación arbitraria de las normas antidumping del GATT y de introducir nuevos instrumentos proteccionistas en su legislación comercial.

El gobierno de Tokio recuerda, además, a la Comunidad y a los gobiernos de los países europeos los cambios que a partir de mediados de los años 80 tuvieron lugar en la política comercial japonesa, con reducciones sustanciales e incluso eliminación de numerosos aranceles aduaneros, con la supresión de muchas restricciones cuantitativas a la importación y con la mejora y agilización de los sistemas de certificación y de los procedimientos de importación.

Japón parece seriamente empeñado en presentar una nueva fisonomía, ya no destinada a forzar a cualquier precio sus propias exportaciones, sino, antes al contrario, dispuesta a atender las peticiones de Estados Unidos y de Europa de abrir más su propio mercado a las importaciones. Pero, simultáneamente, Tokio insiste sobre la tesis de que la escasa presencia de las exportaciones europeas en Japón no se debe tanto a la dificultad de acceso al mercado sino -sobre todo- a la indiferencia y a la falta de interés de los agentes europeos que no actúan con suficiente energía.

Invita también a los socios europeos a considerar que el país se encuentra en una fase de rápida evolución de sus estrategias, lo que proporciona un amplio espacio también a las inversiones directas en nuevas instalaciones de producción, tal como está sucediendo en Estados Unidos. Japón pide que la Comunidad tenga en cuenta esta nueva voluntad de colaboración.

2.3. Japón ante la perspectiva del mercado único de 1992 de la Comunidad Europea

2.3.1. El anuncio de la Comunidad Europea, en junio de 1985, de su voluntad de realizar la completa unificación de los mercados de los doce países miembros para 1992 indujo a Japón a replantear sus propias estrategias frente al Viejo Continente, considerado hasta entonces como una suma de economías nacionales dispares entre sí.

La nueva perspectiva de una gran zona económica y jurídicamente homogénea de 320 millones de consumidores, con la desaparición de las últimas barreras a la circulación interna de bienes y servicios, interesa sumamente a Japón. De hecho se perfila la posibilidad favorable de una unificación de las normas comunitarias aplicables a las importaciones procedentes de terceros países, con una eliminación gradual de las barreras cuantitativas que en algunos Estados miembros limitan, hasta casi excluir, algunos de los flujos de exportación de Japón.

Pero aún se da mayor importancia al hecho de que la realización del gran mercado único europeo y los progresos graduales hacia una integración política más avanzada crean condiciones de sinergia capaces de dar a toda la zona europea un impulso de crecimiento de gran potencialidad. Los informes de la Comisión sobre los efectos generales y sectoriales de la unificación económica son atentamente analizados por los servicios económicos del Gobierno japonés y de las grandes empresas multinacionales del país, que consideran ya a la zona europea como parte integrante de sus estrategias de globalización.

2.3.2. En realidad, lo que está ocurriendo en Europa desde 1985 asume cada vez más claramente la fisonomía de un cambio de importancia histórica. Tras un largo período de crisis, la Europa comunitaria vuelve al centro de la atención internacional y asume un papel de polo de atracción para muchos países vecinos y más lejanos. Este proceso influye seguramente, entre otras cosas, en el proceso de cambio que están experimentando los países del Este de Europa y la propia Unión Soviética.

Japón percibe la necesidad de estar presente de manera más activa en la zona europea, también con instalaciones productivas, por el temor de que nuevas posibles orientaciones proteccionistas (que en algunos círculos de Estados Unidos han llamado "Fortaleza Europea") puedan crear nuevas dificultades para las exportaciones japonesas.⁸

⁸ Varias encuestas realizadas por entes gubernamentales japoneses y por asociaciones industriales señalan la persistencia de la preocupación por que el objetivo comunitario de 1992 esconda la voluntad de hacer futuras discriminaciones en perjuicio de las exportaciones japonesas.

2.3.3. En estos mismos años, a consecuencia también del inicio de las negociaciones de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT, la Comunidad Europea se ha comprometido a definir con mayor precisión su propia política comercial frente a los países terceros.

La orientación oficial del Consejo y de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas (establecida en la Declaración de Rodas de diciembre de 1988) es resueltamente favorable a las reglas generales del libre intercambio multilateral basado en un decidido refuerzo del sistema del GATT.

En lo que se refiere al mercado único del 92, las autoridades comunitarias afirman claramente que los beneficios de la liberalización comunitaria no podrán ampliarse automáticamente a los terceros países sin la negociación de concesiones recíprocas, para que las empresas europeas puedan tener oportunidades similares en los mercados de dichos países, preferiblemente en el contexto multilateral del GATT que precisamente prevé la búsqueda de un equilibrio mutuo de beneficios⁹.

2.3.4. La Comunidad expresó su posición frente a Japón en una Comunicación del 15 de marzo de 1988¹⁰ en la que se declara la intención de "establecer una relación equilibrada" que pueda salvaguardar los intereses recíprocos en el marco de una estrecha colaboración en los intercambios comerciales, a nivel industrial, en los servicios y en la ciencia y la tecnología.

Sin embargo, la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas afirma que para obtener algún resultado de las discusiones con los interlocutores japoneses será necesario adoptar una actitud "firme y coherente", sobre todo para convencer a dicho país de que debe reducir su preferencia por las exportaciones¹¹ y encaminarse seriamente por la vía de la apertura y de las reformas estructurales de la economía, mejorando el acceso a su mercado para los operadores europeos.

⁹ "Europe 1992: Europe World Partner" - Nota informativa de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas sobre las declaraciones de los Comisarios Lord Lockfield y Sr. De Clerk en un debate sobre las dimensiones exteriores del mercado único -19 de octubre de 1988.

¹⁰ "Relaciones entre la Comunidad y Japón" - Comunicación de la Comisión - 15 de marzo de 1988.

¹¹ A este respecto la parte japonesa señala que desde hace ya varios años el aumento de la renta nacional bruta se basa en el crecimiento de la demanda interna y no en la marcha de las exportaciones.

2.4. El problema de las inversiones directas de las empresas japonesas en la Comunidad. El caso de la industria automovilística.

2.4.1. La razón del lenguaje prudente y mesurado que utiliza la Comisión para hablar de las relaciones comerciales con Japón hay que buscarla en el fuerte desequilibrio comercial y en la existencia de divergencias entre ambas partes con respecto a los límites de aplicación de las normativas antidumping del GATT.

La Comisión tiende a hacer una interpretación extensiva de dichas normas, y en Reglamentos ad hoc ha afrontado el nuevo aspecto de las prácticas diversivas de los operadores japoneses, que tienden a soslayar la imposición de derechos antidumping sobre productos acabados recurriendo a la importación de piezas sueltas y componentes para ensamblar en talleres de montaje¹².

En la Comunidad se entabló un encendido debate sobre el concepto de "contenido local mínimo" para que un producto pueda considerarse de procedencia comunitaria, y por tanto verse excluido de las restricciones cuantitativas que algunos países miembros mantienen en vigor frente a las importaciones de productos japoneses.

Pero los puntos de vista difieren apreciablemente en los diversos sectores industriales. En algunos sectores de alta tecnología, como el químico, se rechaza totalmente la aceptación del propio principio de "contenido local" considerándolo contrario a las disposiciones del GATT.

En el extremo opuesto se encuentran los sectores industriales más directamente afectados por la conquista a cualquier precio de cuotas de mercado por parte de las industrias japonesas. En el sector automovilístico, especialmente, tuvo lugar una discusión muy viva sobre el caso de los automóviles montados en talleres de Gran Bretaña que en realidad son de origen japonés y por tanto están sujetos a las restricciones cuantitativas que limitan su venta en algunos países miembros.

¹² El Reglamento básico en el que se establece la política de la Comunidad Europea en la materia se remonta a 1984, Reglamento nº 2176/84. Dicho Reglamento fue posteriormente integrado en el Reglamento nº 1761/87, en el que se afronta la cuestión de los "talleres destornillador". En 1988 el Consejo emitió un Reglamento consolidado sobre el tema del antidumping que ha absorbido a los anteriores, el Reglamento nº 2423/88.

El examen se centró gradualmente en los porcentajes de componentes o partes fabricados en Europa que podrían permitir a dichos productos ser considerados comunitarios (del 60 al 80%).

Por otra parte, la Comisión señaló con preocupación el surgimiento en los Estados miembros de una peligrosa tendencia resultado de un ambiente de competencia para atraer las inversiones japonesas en determinados sectores industriales. Esta tendencia consiste en recurrir a ayudas y subvenciones públicas para estas inversiones, lo que provoca cierto exceso de producción y un riesgo de desempleo.

2.4.2. Ante la incertidumbre y las divisiones del frente comunitario, la parte japonesa reaccionó en dos terrenos distintos.

Por una parte, el Gobierno de Tokio recurrió formalmente al GATT para poner en cuestión la legitimidad de los reglamentos comunitarios sobre el soslayo de los derechos antidumping mediante los "talleres destornillador" de montaje.

Un grupo de árbitros, tras una instrucción que duró varios meses, emitió una sentencia en la que se acogía favorablemente la demanda japonesa y se declaraba a las disposiciones comunitarias incompatibles con los artículos III y XXd del Acuerdo General GATT. La Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas impugnó el procedimiento y el valor de las conclusiones de dicho grupo. Por consiguiente, la entera cuestión se remitió al ámbito de la Ronda Uruguay, donde se está negociando un nuevo código antidumping que debería cubrir también el problema del soslayo de los derechos antidumping.

En otro terreno se hallan las empresas automovilísticas japonesas que operan en Europa, que decidieron afrontar el problema desde la raíz: en un intento por mejorar su imagen, aceptaron substancialmente las tesis de la industria comunitaria y aplicaron rápidamente programas para modificar la naturaleza de sus instalaciones industriales en Europa, ampliando la proporción de componente y partes suministrados por empresas europeas.

Con estas decisiones, las empresas japonesas han mostrado su voluntad de revalorizar su papel y de ser "good corporate citizens of Europe".

2.5. Los encuentros a alto nivel entre la Comunidad y Japón, en enero de 1990, señalan el inicio de una nueva fase de cooperación

2.5.1. En enero de 1990 una delegación oficial del Gobierno japonés, encabezada por el primer ministro Toshiki Kaifu, se entrevistó con los responsables de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas.

El clima amistoso y constructivo de los coloquios hizo surgir la voluntad de dar un salto cualitativo en las relaciones entre las dos zonas, superando la limitada contraposición de intereses comerciales contingentes en pro de una visión estratégica más amplia y previsora.

Esto supuso el inicio de una nueva fase de cooperación institucional entre la Comunidad y Japón. En las declaraciones oficiales se afirma que se deberán establecer relaciones sólidas y permanentes similares a las que desde hace tiempo tienen lugar entre Japón y Estados Unidos y entre la Comunidad y Estados Unidos.

2.5.2. De hecho, en el orden del día de las reuniones no figuraban solamente los temas, a menudo controvertidos, de las relaciones comerciales, sino también cuestiones más generales como los cambios en el Este de Europa, la integración económica y política de la Comunidad, las relaciones Norte-Sur y las relaciones con Estados Unidos.

El Primer Ministro Toshiki Kaifu declaró que su Gobierno acoge de modo muy favorable la realización del proyecto de unificación económica y política de la Comunidad Europea, que constituirá sin duda un factor de progreso, desarrollo y estabilidad de las relaciones comerciales internacionales.

Japón reconoció el papel central de la Europa comunitaria en el "Grupo de los 24", encargado de prestar ayuda concreta y asistencia a las democracias nacientes del Este de Europa. Japón contribuye ya activamente a los programas de dicho Grupo y ha manifestado su intención de coordinar sus iniciativas eventuales en los países del Este con las de la Comunidad.

También con respecto al tema de las relaciones con los países en vías de desarrollo, la Comunidad y Japón se proponen cooperar más estrechamente en las respectivas políticas de ayuda y asistencia¹³.

2.5.3. En cuanto al futuro de las relaciones bilaterales entre la Comunidad y Japón, en el encuentro de enero se llegó a la decisión de conferir una estructura permanente a los contactos entre ambas partes, que deberán desarrollarse a tres niveles: con encuentros a nivel personal entre el Presidente de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas y el Primer Ministro del Gobierno japonés; a nivel ministerial con reuniones anuales regulares; y a nivel técnico con el refuerzo de los contactos y las consultas en los ámbitos de la economía, la ciencia y la tecnología, el medio ambiente, la cultura y los asuntos sociales.

Un encuentro a nivel ministerial tuvo lugar en Bruselas, en mayo de 1990, y en él se estudiaron importantes cuestiones relativas a las relaciones bilaterales entre la Comunidad y Japón. Se creó un "Grupo de trabajo permanente para asuntos comerciales" con el cometido de definir los obstáculos que impiden un desarrollo adecuado de los intercambios comerciales en ambos sentidos y discutir las posibles acciones y soluciones en cada uno de los sectores afectados.

La delegación japonesa confirmó que las medidas previstas en el acuerdo "Structural Impediments Initiative", al que llegaron Japón y Estados Unidos, no tendrán un carácter exclusivo y bilateral, sino que se aplicarán "erga omnes" y podrán así ampliarse a la Comunidad Europea.

¹³ Cabe recordar que Japón ha alcanzado el primer puesto en la clasificación del volumen de ayudas concedidas a los países en vías de desarrollo (véase nota 2, pág. 4).

En respuesta a las inquietudes de la otra parte, los representantes de la Comisión aseguraron que el futuro mercado único de la Comunidad estará abierto a los interlocutores exteriores, y por tanto también a Japón.

2.5.4. En lo que se refiere a la supresión de las barreras que todavía obstaculizan el acceso al mercado japonés, la Comisión hizo público un programa propio de promoción de las exportaciones europeas combinado con un programa del Gobierno japonés de promoción de las importaciones europeas.

Las delegaciones de ambas partes prestaron también especial atención al tema de la expansión de las inversiones directas de las empresas europeas en Japón, actualmente muy reducidas y formularon propuestas y sugerencias para acciones a corto plazo.

Se firmó un acuerdo para desarrollar entre ambas partes una cooperación en materia de seguridad nuclear y salvaguardias, mientras que se previeron otras iniciativas futuras para la intensificación de la cooperación en los ámbitos de la ciencia y la tecnología, el medio ambiente, los asuntos sociales y los intercambios culturales.

2.5.5. La controvertida cuestión de las inversiones japonesas en el sector automovilístico en Europa no se discutió directamente en la reunión ministerial de Bruselas, pero se trató por separado en coloquios anteriores y posteriores a dicho encuentro.

Se observó una aproximación de las posiciones respectivas y se entrevió la posibilidad de un entendimiento basado en los siguientes puntos:

- 1) definición de un "periodo de transición", al menos hasta 1999, para permitir a la industria automovilística europea reestructurarse y mejorar su competitividad de cara a la completa apertura del mercado europeo del automóvil;

- 2) durante dicho período la industria japonesa limitará y controlará el número de vehículos exportados a la Comunidad; también se tendrán en cuenta los vehículos producidos en el interior de la Comunidad;
- 3) las restricciones cuantitativas que siguen vigentes en varios Estados miembros con respecto a los automóviles de marcas japonesas se eliminarán gradualmente.
- 4) a cambio, se pedirá a Japón una reciprocidad global en materia de intercambios, es decir, tanto en el sector automovilístico como en los demás: bancario, de mercados públicos, petrolífero, etc.

En suma, el objetivo es permitir a la industria automovilística europea ser de los primeros beneficiarios de la creación del mercado único europeo.

2.5.6. Los encuentros a alto nivel entre la Comunidad y Japón proseguirán durante el año 1991.

A finales del mes de mayo el Presidente de la Comisión, Jacques DELORS, viajará a Tokio para hacer una visita oficial al Gobierno de Japón.

Para octubre de 1991 está prevista una nueva reunión a nivel ministerial entre los representantes de la Comunidad y los del Gobierno japonés, que permitirá replantear los problemas pendientes e intensificar la cooperación económica y la colaboración política.

También están previstos otros encuentros bilaterales para contribuir a desbloquear las negociaciones de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT, que tienen un interés prioritario tanto para la Comunidad como para Japón.

3. Conclusiones y recomendaciones de la Sección sobre las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón

3.1. Al término de las investigaciones y las discusiones desarrolladas por la Sección de Relaciones Exteriores sobre las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón en el pasado parece útil formular algunas conclusiones.

Tales conclusiones se presentan también como recomendaciones dirigidas a las autoridades comunitarias con el fin de conseguir en un futuro próximo una mejora substancial de la calidad de dichas relaciones, dando contenido real a las aspiraciones de una mayor colaboración entre ambas partes.

3.2. En primer lugar cabe señalar que las decisiones ya adoptadas o anunciadas por el Gobierno de Tokio para un cambio de la estrategia económica y comercial del país exigirán por su propia naturaleza un firme compromiso y unos plazos de realización nada breves.

Sin embargo, es alentador comprobar cómo en los últimos tiempos han aparecido señales significativas que indican que ya está teniendo lugar un cambio de tendencia con respecto al pasado. No obstante, habrá que esperar a que dicha tendencia se confirme y tome consistencia.

El aumento de la demanda interna japonesa, debido a unas mayores inversiones públicas y a un incremento del consumo de las familias, se ha convertido en el factor principal de crecimiento de la economía del país y está provocando un aumento de las importaciones en general y de las de productos manufacturados en particular.

Por primera vez desde hace muchos años las importaciones de Japón aumentan en valor y en volumen con incrementos superiores a los de las exportaciones, hecho que ha provocado una disminución del superávit de la balanza comercial global japones.

Esta tendencia positiva se refleja también en la evolución del superávit comercial japonés frente a Estados Unidos y la Comunidad Europea. Desgraciadamente, los datos estadísticos procedentes de fuentes comunitarias y los procedentes de fuentes japonesas son difícilmente comparables entre sí, pero la dirección del fenómeno parece confirmada¹⁴.

Los observadores japoneses dan por hecho que la estructura del comercio exterior de su país se está haciendo más "madura", porque actualmente puede ya dejar márgenes cada vez mayores a las importaciones de productos manufacturados acabados y de bienes de consumo procedentes de los países occidentales, y a las importaciones de productos semiacabados y de componentes destinados a la industria japonesa procedentes de países de la zona del Sudeste asiático, al tiempo que se mantienen, como es evidente, las importaciones de materias primas y de recursos energéticos¹⁵.

En caso de que esta tendencia se consolide efectivamente en el próximo futuro, como se espera, las relaciones comerciales entre Japón y sus interlocutores occidentales podrían mejorar rápidamente. Estados Unidos, Japón y la Comunidad Europea podrían así dedicar su atención y concentrar sus esfuerzos en los aspectos de una fuerte expansión de la colaboración recíproca en todos los ámbitos.

3.3. La Sección valora de forma muy positiva los resultados de los últimos encuentros entre los representantes del Gobierno japonés y los de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, que han llevado a la decisión común de dar un salto cualitativo en las relaciones recíprocas en un marco estratégico amplio y previsor.

La cooperación institucional del Gobierno japonés y la Comisión al máximo nivel y a niveles técnicos deberá ser el fundamento de esta nueva fase de colaboración. Sin embargo, dicha cooperación deberá integrarse y completarse mediante contactos y consultas regulares en los ámbitos de la economía, la ciencia, la cultura y los problemas sociales.

¹⁴

Según las estadísticas oficiales japonesas, el superávit con respecto a la Comunidad se redujo en 1989 a 19.700 millones de dólares americanos, frente a 22.800 en 1988. Los datos de EUROSTAT señalan un déficit comunitario de 21.200 millones de ecus en los primeros diez meses de 1989, frente a 24.500 millones de ecus en 1988. Sin embargo, es lamentable que ambas partes no lleguen a convenir un método uniforme para calcular datos tan importantes.

¹⁵

Ver "A l'Ecoute du Japon", 10 de diciembre de 1990.

La Sección manifiesta su preocupación por la posibilidad de que en este segundo aspecto se avance con demasiada lentitud o surjan obstáculos no previstos en la realización de las iniciativas necesarias, con el riesgo de que las declaraciones oficiales terminen sin dar fruto alguno. Esto resultaría muy negativo, pues no cabe pensar que la deseada mejora de la cooperación entre la Comunidad y Japón termine por limitarse a un calendario de plazos burocráticos formales.

La Sección insiste en que los contactos previstos se lleven a cabo a todos los niveles lo antes posible, y hace especial hincapié en la importancia de establecer modalidades para poner en comunicación entre sí a los medios socioprofesionales, con el fin de examinar sus problemas e intercambiar sus experiencias.

3.4. Durante los análisis sobre el estado de las relaciones entre Japón y la Comunidad se ha comprobado varias veces que uno de los mayores obstáculos lo constituye el escaso conocimiento recíproco de las respectivas realidades culturales y sociales.

En realidad son sobre todo los europeos quienes muestran tener un conocimiento insuficiente del mundo japonés, que tiene raíces de civilización espiritual y material completamente diferentes de las de la tradición europea.

Por parte japonesa, como es sabido, se está realizando desde hace tiempo un esfuerzo muy serio de estudio y comprensión de la realidad histórica y actual del mundo europeo (y del de Estados Unidos), esfuerzo que se centra principalmente en los aspectos económicos y culturales, y quizás en menor medida en los sociales y políticos¹⁶.

¹⁶

Se ha señalado que una de las razones del éxito de la penetración de productos japoneses en los mercados europeos y americanos estriba en los profundos análisis de los empresarios japoneses sobre las exigencias y preferencias de los consumidores occidentales. Los operadores europeos están bien lejos de tener un conocimiento semejante del mercado de consumo japonés.

Por lo tanto, el problema que se debe afrontar en Europa es el de mejorar el grado de conocimiento de la realidad y de las características del conjunto del pueblo japonés, de los valores de su cultura, de su historia y de sus ordenamientos, hasta descender a los pormenores de las características de su sistema económico, productivo, financiero y de servicios.

La Sección insta a que se definan sin tardanza las iniciativas más adecuadas para desarrollar en todos los ámbitos, empezando por el mundo de la escuela y de la universidad, y basándose principalmente en el contacto directo entre los operadores y los ciudadanos de ambas partes. Será necesario insistir en la utilidad de los encuentros, las visitas y los seminarios de estudio, que permiten un amplio intercambio de experiencias a todos los niveles.

Entre otras cosas sería útil estudiar el modo en que se podría valorizar la presencia de decenas de miles de familias de operadores y funcionarios japoneses que trabajan en varios países europeos. También se debería encontrar el modo de sensibilizar y activar, de cara a un mejor conocimiento recíproco, el abundantísimo flujo de turistas japoneses que cada año visitan nuestro continente.

3.5. Las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón en el ámbito económico y de los intercambios siguen estando presididas por la necesidad de aumentar el volumen de las exportaciones europeas al mercado interior japonés.

A este respecto es necesario recordar que el marco reglamentario existente en dicho país está cambiando rápidamente: ya se han desmantelado numerosos obstáculos y sujetaciones formales, mientras que las barreras no arancelarias más duras se van suavizando poco a poco.

La Sección considera que la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas debe trabajar muy activamente en la indicación de los obstáculos explícitos e implícitos que todavía existen, y ponerse de acuerdo con la otra parte sobre las acciones necesarias.

Pero esto no debe hacer creer que el mercado japonés podrá abrirse fácilmente a la industria europea. Al contrario, en el próximo futuro resultará todavía más evidente que las mayores dificultades por superar estriban en el carácter fuertemente competitivo del mercado interno japonés, en la competencia encarnizada que las empresas locales ejercitan entre sí y frente a los recién llegados, en las severas normas y prácticas locales y en las resistencias psicológicas que todavía retienen a los consumidores japoneses a la hora de aceptar los productos procedentes del extranjero.

Todos los operadores europeos que quieran tener éxito en Japón deberán hacer un esfuerzo especial por adaptar sus productos y sus políticas de venta a las exigencias de un medio económico y social diferente en muchos aspectos al que existe en los países de la Comunidad, como hicieron en el pasado las empresas europeas que ya se han afianzado en este mercado.

La Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas no deberá escatimar su apoyo y asistencia a dichos esfuerzos, que a medio plazo deberán contribuir a un mayor equilibrio en los intercambios entre la Comunidad y Japón.

3.6. La escasísima presencia de instalaciones productivas de empresas europeas en Japón es ciertamente un motivo de preocupación.

Las causas que en el pasado determinaron esta situación son ya bien conocidas. Sin embargo como ya se ha señalado con respecto a las exportaciones comunitarias a Japón, la situación está mejorando rápidamente, entre otras cosas por obra de las disposiciones liberalizadoras que el Gobierno japonés está adoptando por su propia iniciativa en el marco de la "Structural Impediments Initiative".

La Sección confía en que la Comisión sepa convenir con sus interlocutores japoneses un marco de normas e incentivos específicos que fomenten las futuras instalaciones de empresas europeas en Japón¹⁷.

Al mismo tiempo la Comisión debería hacer un esfuerzo para concienciar a los empresarios comunitarios de la conveniencia de intensificar su presencia en Japón, un país que actualmente tiene ya un mercado interior de gran entidad y que se encuentra en fase de fuerte desarrollo.

3.7. La Sección señala con preocupación la ausencia casi total de iniciativas conjuntas de colaboración entre empresas europeas y empresas japonesas situadas en terceros países, sobre todo en países en vías de desarrollo.

En dichos países, entre otras cosas, sigue intensificándose la competencia de los productos japoneses, que van ganando el terreno adquirido desde hace mucho tiempo por las exportaciones europeas, hecho que pone de relieve otro punto vulnerable de las economías de los países de la Comunidad.

Sería conveniente que las autoridades comunitarias tuvieran muy presente este problema de la colaboración industrial en terceros países en los futuros encuentros con los interlocutores japoneses, y que impulsasen estudios, seminarios y propuestas concretas.

3.8. Los problemas planteados por las inversiones directas en instalaciones productivas de las empresas fabriles japonesas en Europa exigen una atención especial, entre otras cosas porque están aumentando rápidamente en número e importancia.

¹⁷ La Comisión ha emprendido ya el estudio del problema: véase la reciente publicación "Guía para las inversiones europeas en Japón".

La Sección afirma como principio que las inversiones directas japonesas en la Comunidad deben mirarse con buenos ojos, sobre todo cuando produzcan un aumento del "valor añadido tecnológico de procedencia comunitaria"¹⁸ y la creación de nuevos empleos.

También deben fomentarse los acuerdos de cooperación y las joint ventures formadas por empresas de ambas partes, que muy a menudo aportan tecnologías innovadoras y prácticas avanzadas de dirección y gestión empresarial.

Las instalaciones productivas que las empresas japonesas han puesto en marcha en los últimos tiempos en la Comunidad han provocado en muchos casos importantes transferencias de know-how y de métodos de organización de la producción hacia las pequeñas y medianas empresas comunitarias llamadas a suministrar partes y componentes con el debido respeto de las estrictas normas de control de calidad exigidas por quienes se los encargan¹⁹.

No obstante, la Comisión deberá ejercer una vigilancia especial para evitar formas de competencia injustificadas en la concesión de incentivos por parte de los países miembros.

3.9. En lo que se refiere a los problemas de la agricultura, la Comunidad Europea y Japón se hallan en situaciones muy similares. Ambos sufren las presiones de Estados Unidos y de otros países productores de productos agrícolas encaminados a la apertura de las fronteras y a la reducción de las subvenciones agrícolas.

¹⁸ El criterio del "valor añadido tecnológico producido en la Comunidad" parece más adecuado y menos impreciso que el criterio del "contenido local mínimo".

¹⁹ La agencia gubernamental "JETRO - International Economic and Trade Information Center" realiza periódicamente un análisis detallado de las inversiones directas de las empresas fabriles japonesas en la Comunidad, de las motivaciones que las han determinado y de los problemas surgidos. El sexto informe se publicó en marzo de 1990 con el título: "Current situation of business operations of Japanese manufacturing enterprises in Europe".

Las respuestas que la Comunidad y Japón dan a dichas presiones son paralelas y se pueden resumir en pocos puntos:

- aceptación de una reducción general de las subvenciones, con tal de que se lleve a cabo de forma gradual y razonada;
- acuerdo sobre el principio de establecer normas multilaterales que cubran el sector de los intercambios agrícolas internacionales;
- rechazo pleno de las exigencias que planteen directa o indirectamente un desmantelamiento total o substancial de las políticas agrícolas seguidas por la Comunidad y Japón desde hace mucho tiempo. Estas políticas protegen de hecho valores que no incumben a las negociaciones comerciales, como los de la preservación de valores tradicionales de las respectivas colectividades rurales, la protección del territorio y del medio ambiente o las exigencias de seguridad de los bienes de consumo frente a una excesiva dependencia externa (muy acusadas en Japón, donde se guarda un vivo recuerdo de las experiencias de los primeros años de la posguerra).

La Comunidad Europea y Japón están convencidos de que la vía que se debe seguir es la de reforzar los instrumentos multilaterales del GATT, y no ven con buenos ojos la multiplicación de propuestas para llegar a acuerdos bilaterales parciales sobre los intercambios de productos agrícolas específicos.

3.10. La Sección observa que en una perspectiva a más largo plazo los problemas socioeconómicos de la Comunidad y de Japón presentan puntos de afinidad muy interesantes.

El MITI, por ejemplo, al presentar el programa de reforma interna que deberá realizarse durante los años noventa*, señaló entre los asuntos prioritarios los de la mejora de la calidad de la vida, la protección de los consumidores, las nuevas necesidades de una sociedad que está envejeciendo y la protección de la mujer.

* Ministry of International Trade and Industry. "International Trade and Industry Policy in the 1990. creating Human values in the Global Age - July 5, 1990.

Son cuestiones a las que también se presta gran atención en la Comunidad, por lo que sería conveniente mantener vínculos estrechos entre ambas partes para un intercambio continuo de experiencias y para comprobar la eficacia de las soluciones elegidas.

Algo parecido cabe decir de los asuntos relativos al desarrollo a largo plazo de la economía japonesa, la flexibilidad de las estructuras industriales, la promoción de la pequeña y mediana empresa, la política energética y la política medioambiental.

La Sección considera que en estos asuntos, además de un intercambio de opiniones y de experiencias, se puede llegar a preparar estudios conjuntos y experimentaciones dirigidas en común.

3.11. En el ámbito más general de las relaciones económicas y políticas internacionales, la Sección subraya la exigencia de profundizar y ampliar las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón hasta alcanzar una intensidad similar a la de las relaciones que actualmente tienen lugar entre la Comunidad y Estados Unidos y entre Estados Unidos y Japón.

Por otra parte, los tres polos principales de la política y de la economía mundial deberían poner en marcha una estrategia de colaboración y cohesión con miras a realizar un "nuevo orden" internacional que deberá ser fuente de seguridad, armonía y prosperidad para todos los pueblos.

*

* * *

N.B.: Anexos

A N E X O

**CUADRO 1 - COMERCIO JAPONÉS DE MERCANCÍAS POR ZONAS
(1977-1989)**

En millones de dólares americanos, base de despacho de aduanas

	TOTAL		Balanza comercial	CON EEUU		Balanza comercial	CON LA CEE		Balanza comercial
	Exportaciones	Importaciones		Exportaciones	Importaciones		Exportaciones	Importaciones	
1977	80 495	70 809	9 686	19 717	12 396	7 321	8 736	4 195	4 541
1980	129 807	140 528	(10 721)	31 367	24 408	6 959	16 650	7 842	8 802
1983	146 927	126 393	20 534	42 829	24 647	18 182	18 523	8 120	10 403
1986	209 151	126 408	82 743	80 456	29 054	51 402	30 675	13 989	16 685
1989	275 175	210 847	64 561	93 188	48 246	44 942	47 908	28 146	19 762

Fuente: Instituto Japonés de Asuntos Sociales y Económicos, Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1990 - An international comparison Tokio 1990, pág. 36.

A N E X O

CUADRO 2 - INVERSIONES DIRECTAS: EUR 12

(unidad: millón de ecus)

País	Año				
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Flujos de salida					
EEUU	-11 650	-10 063	-17 662	-23 901	-20 074
Japón	-295	-36	-116	-18	-187
AELC	-929	-760	9	-1 826	-2 306
Total mundial*	-17 395	-15 349	-22 164	-30 780	-30 711
Flujos de entrada					
EEUU	2 919	1 766	2 484	2 356	606
Japón	390	646	445	1 502	1 461
AELC	1 661	1 666	3 267	3 543	9 021
Total mundial*	6 177	5 637	6 840	12 578	14 278

* Excluidas las inversiones intracomunitarias

Fuente: EUROSTAT, Unidad C3, Inversiones directas de la Comunidad Europea de 1984 a 1988, Luxemburgo, 1990, págs. 73 y 75 (cálculos de EUROSTAT)

Notas: Flujos de salida: Una cifra positiva indica una desinversión neta.
Una cifra negativa indica una inversión neta.
Excluidos los beneficios reinvertidos.

Flujos de entrada: Una cifra positiva indica una inversión neta.
Una cifra negativa indica una desinversión neta.
Excluidos los beneficios reinvertidos.

A N E X O

CUADRO 3 - INVERSIONES DIRECTAS: EUR 12 - EEUU - JAPÓN

(unidad: millón de ecus)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
hechas por:					
EUR 12	-17 395	-15 349	-22 164	-30 780	-30 711
EEUU	7 128	1 233	-8 796	-8 605	-1 997
Japón*	-7 558	-8 455	-14 713	-16 916	-28 931
recibidas por:					
EUR 12	6 177	5 637	6 840	12 578	14 278
EEUU	28 460	26 733	36 969	39 357	43 870
Japón*	-13	841	230	1 010	-410
inversiones netas de:					
EUR 12	-11 218	-9 712	-15 324	-18 202	-16 433
EEUU	35 588	27 966	28 173	30 752	41 873
Japón*	-7 571	-7 614	-14 483	-15 906	-29 341

(*) Estas cifras se refieren a inversiones registradas en la balanza de pagos por el Banco de Japón, y no a inversiones "notificadas" al Ministerio de Hacienda.

Fuente: EUROSTAT, Inversiones directas de la Comunidad Europea de 1984 a 1988, Luxemburgo, 1990,
pág. 11.

Bruselas, 8 de abril de 1991

**A D D E N D U M
AL
PROYECTO DE DICTAMEN**


de la Sección de Relaciones Exteriores, Política Comercial y Desarrollo
sobre
**"Las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea,
Estados Unidos y Japón"**

Ponente: Sr. ROMOLI

Miembros de la Sección de
Relaciones Exteriores, Política Comercial y Desarrollo

N.B.: El presente documento será examinado el 9 de abril de 1991.

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LAS RELACIONES ENTRE ESTADOS UNIDOS Y JAPÓN Y ENTRE LA COMUNIDAD EUROPEA Y JAPÓN

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S U M A R I O

En el presente Dictamen, la Sección de Relaciones Exteriores, Política Comercial y Desarrollo del Comité Económico y Social de las Comunidades Europeas examina la evolución de las relaciones económicas entre Estados Unidos y Japón y entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón.

El documento comienza recordando que en los últimos años han surgido en Estados Unidos sentimientos de frustración, desconfianza y hostilidad frente a Japón, en concomitancia con el aumento del déficit comercial de la nación, la penetración de productos japoneses y las adquisiciones de industrias y propiedades inmobiliarias norteamericanas por parte de empresas japonesas (véase el apartado 1.1.).

Por parte japonesa se ha reaccionado con parecida amargura, señalándose (apartado 1.2.) que el deterioro de la situación económica de Estados Unidos se debía esencialmente a la escasa competitividad de las exportaciones norteamericanas, a una pérdida aparente del espíritu empresarial y a la insuficiente formación de ahorro del país, a lo que se han sumado las consecuencias de los déficits de la balanza de pagos y de las cuentas públicas y las de los largos períodos de sobrevaloración del dólar.

Con el fin de eliminar las causas principales de las tensiones económicas acumuladas, los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Japón llegaron en 1990 a un acuerdo denominado "Structural Impediments Initiative", que constituye un experimento sin precedentes en las relaciones entre dos países (apartado 1.3.).

Con esta iniciativa, ambas partes se comprometieron a adoptar medidas en el ámbito económico y en el ámbito social en un esfuerzo por mejorar el clima y las condiciones en las que se desenvuelven las relaciones entre ambos países. Si tiene éxito, la SII podrá contribuir también a mejorar las relaciones con terceros países.

En lo que se refiere a las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón, en el documento se examina la situación de desequilibrio que se creó en los años 70 y 80 a causa de la fuerte expansión de las exportaciones japonesas y de la escasa presencia de los operadores europeos en el mercado japonés (apartado 2.1.).

La política comercial de la Comunidad frente a Japón se desarrolló principalmente mediante la aplicación de las normas antidumping establecidas por el GATT (apartado 2.2.).

Para los operadores japoneses, la plena realización del mercado único a finales de 1992 sigue suscitando temores de discriminaciones proteccionistas en perjuicio suyo (apartado 2.3.).

Por otra parte son conscientes del atractivo que representa un gran mercado homogéneo de 320 millones de personas, abierto a la colaboración con los países de Europa central y oriental.

El aumento de las inversiones directas de empresas japonesas en instalaciones productivas en Europa es una respuesta a esta nueva perspectiva (apartado 2.4.), y da una indicación de su voluntad de participar activamente en el desarrollo de la economía europea.

En el sector automovilístico y en otras industrias sensibles han surgido problemas particulares en lo relativo al contenido en los productos finales de componentes y partes suministrados por empresas europeas (apartado 2.5.5.).

En enero de 1990 tuvieron lugar encuentros entre el Primer Ministro del Gobierno japonés y representantes de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, seguidos por reuniones a nivel técnico. Las partes declararon su voluntad de reforzar la cooperación recíproca y de establecer relaciones sólidas y permanentes (apartado 2.5.).

En la parte final del documento se exponen consideraciones y se formulan recomendaciones para la mejora de las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón.

Se subraya la necesidad de mejorar el grado de conocimiento de las respectivas realidades culturales y sociales (apartado 3.4.).

Japón está cambiando en su estructura social y económica: se deben seguir con interés los esfuerzos de las autoridades japonesas para abrir en mayor medida su mercado interior, para aumentar la demanda interior y las inversiones públicas y para mejorar la calidad de vida de los ciudadanos (apartados 2.2.5., 3.2. y 3.10.).

Los empresarios europeos deberían aumentar su esfuerzo de presencia permanente en el mercado japonés (apartados 3.5. y 3.6.). El incremento de las inversiones directas japonesas en Europa debería acogerse favorablemente en la medida en que trae consigo transferencias de know-how tecnológico y de métodos de organización, así como un aumento de nuevos empleos (apartado 3.8.).

Finalmente, en el documento se observa que los tres mayores polos de la política y la economía mundial, Estados Unidos, la Comunidad Europea y Japón, deberían reforzar su cooperación para resolver los problemas que tiene planteados la economía internacional (apartado 3.11.).

PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

DELEGACION PARA LAS RELACIONES CON JAPON

COMISION POLITICA

NOTA

sobre
Las relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea
y Japón

(redactada por la Dirección General de Estudios)

DIRECCION GENERAL DE
COMISIONES Y DELEGACIONES

17 de abril de 1991
SDI/CH/b5

DIRECCION GENERAL DE ESTUDIOS
División de Asuntos Políticos
e Institucionales

Luxemburgo, a 15 de abril de 1991

TG/rg

RELACIONES ENTRE LA COMUNIDAD EUROPEA Y JAPON

I. JAPON COMO ACTOR INTERNACIONAL

A. Japón, un asociado del mundo occidental

Junto con Estados Unidos y Europa Occidental, Japón constituye un triángulo político basado en una comunidad de valores y en el concepto de la asunción de unas responsabilidades comunes, sobre todo respecto del mundo en desarrollo.

No obstante, las relaciones entre Japón y Europa, debidas en parte a razones geográficas, no son tan intensas y profundas como las relaciones entre Europa Occidental y América del Norte, o entre Estados Unidos y Japón. Por lo demás, en los últimos años la idea de que las relaciones políticas entre Europa y Japón deben intensificarse a fin de contribuir al mantenimiento de la paz mundial y a la expansión de la prosperidad económica ha adquirido gran importancia.

En un discurso pronunciado en Londres en mayo de 1988, el ex-Primer Ministro japonés, N. Takeshita, afirmaba que la cooperación con los países de Europa Occidental es un principio importante de la política exterior japonesa y que esas relaciones deberían adquirir más fuerza y profundidad en todos los ámbitos: político, económico, cultural y otros. Este llamamiento a la intensificación de la cooperación euro-japonesa se enmarca, por parte de los japoneses, en "la Iniciativa de Cooperación Internacional", basada en tres pilares:

a) la intensificación de la cooperación para la paz, es decir un mayor compromiso y una mayor contribución japonesa al mantenimiento y reforzamiento de la paz internacional, mediante una intensificación de la actividad diplomática, material y financiera dirigida a resolver los conflictos regionales;

b) la intensificación del intercambio cultural internacional mediante el intercambio de personas, la enseñanza de idiomas, los programas de "vacaciones de trabajo" en los que participen jóvenes japoneses durante unos meses en Europa y viceversa, o la expansión de las organizaciones dirigidas a la intensificación del intercambio y del diálogo euro-japonés. El "programa de intercambio cultural" establecido por el Gobierno japonés hace unos años tiene los mismos objetivos;

c) el tercer pilar de la iniciativa de cooperación internacional es el anuncio de un aumento considerable, tanto en términos cuantitativos como cualitativos, de la ayuda oficial al desarrollo de Japón.

Es evidente que los tres ámbitos mencionados se prestan a una cooperación y a una estrecha coordinación entre Japón y la Europa comunitaria y, en consecuencia, es evidente que Europa debería tratar de hallar una respuesta apropiada para esa iniciativa japonesa.

B. Cooperación para la paz

En materia de seguridad y desarme, Japón ha empezado a reconocer en los últimos años que la seguridad de Occidente es indivisible y que exige un compromiso equivalente de los tres grandes miembros de la Comunidad de valores democráticos occidentales. A tal fin, Japón fue uno de los participantes en las consultas de la Alianza Alántica referentes al desmantelamiento de las armas nucleares de medio alcance. Es indudable que, a pesar de la distancia geográfica, la cooperación y la consulta al respecto (esto afecta también a las negociaciones START) resultan necesarias, ya que la amenaza que suponen unas armas que pueden llegar a todos los lugares del planeta es una amenaza compartida "per se" que exige una respuesta y una solución global.

En la última reunión de la Delegación del Parlamento Europeo con el Parlamento japonés, que tuvo lugar en junio de 1990, también se reconoció el carácter indivisible de la seguridad del Oeste. En dicha reunión, el Presidente de la Delegación japonesa, Sr. KURANARI, formuló tal convicción con las siguientes palabras: "Aun cuando Japón se halla en Asia, geográficamente distante de Europa, estamos muy interesados en que en Europa se adopte un nuevo acuerdo en materia de seguridad. Hoy en día "seguridad" significa seguridad global; por tanto, esperamos con gran interés ese nuevo movimiento en Europa. Realmente, nadie puede predecir con certeza cómo será el futuro resultante de los cambios que están teniendo lugar actualmente en Europa. La profunda interdependencia en el mundo dificulta resolver los problemas regionales de forma aislada. Y, para la coexistencia pacífica de la Humanidad, es de vital importancia que nosotros trabajemos y tratemos los problemas desde un punto de vista global".

Siguiendo con el tema de la seguridad, se observa que Japón ha confirmado en repetidas ocasiones su disposición a asumir mayores responsabilidades en la región occidental del Pacífico. Por otra parte, desde 1986 Japón ha empezado a reaccionar ante las peticiones americanas de que incremente su presupuesto de defensa, que desde 1976 estaba limitado a un 1 % del PNB. La tendencia a intensificar el esfuerzo en materia de defensa se observa asimismo en el último Libro Blanco sobre defensa, que el Gobierno japonés aprobó el 12 de septiembre de 1989.

Este documento pretende claramente centrar la opinión de que, a la vista de la tendencia global a la distensión, Japón podría limitar sus gastos militares. Ahora bien, para un número considerable de políticos japoneses la situación de enfrentamiento Este-Oeste aún no ha terminado, a pesar de las tendencias de democratización observadas en la Unión soviética y de las políticas de desarme y de cooperación de las dos superpotencias. Esos mismos políticos son también bastante escépticos acerca de las posibilidades de éxito de la "perestroika" y de las nuevas orientaciones diplomáticas y filosóficas de Moscú.

Ese escepticismo se basa en la presencia militar de la Unión Soviética en Extremo Oriente; una presencia considerable, ya que casi una

tercera parte del total de las fuerzas armadas soviéticas se encuentran allí. Añádase que la Unión Soviética y Japón son vecinos directos y que existen conflictos territoriales entre los dos. En particular, Japón pide de la Unión Soviética la devolución de cuatro islotes situados cerca de Hokkaido, que ésta se anexionó en 1945.

El Libro Blanco sobre defensa llega a la conclusión "de que, a partir de las declaraciones del Gobierno de Gorbachov, resulta difícil saber si las iniciativas de éste tendrán como consecuencia una reducción sensible de la amenaza militar de la Unión Soviética y si tales iniciativas suponen un cese de la política expansionista de Moscú basada en la fuerza militar." A este respecto, parece que actualmente la mayoría de las fuerzas políticas de Europa occidental pueden tener dificultades para identificarse tanto con el análisis de los objetivos políticos de Moscú ("política expansionista") como con el lenguaje del Libro Blanco, que recuerda en gran medida el de la guerra fría.

La intensificación de la cooperación entre los países miembros de la CEE y Japón, así como entre toda la región del Pacífico, tal como ha propuesto Japón, debería hallar una respuesta positiva en Europa. Sin embargo, lo que parece aún más importante es la intensificación del compromiso japonés en África y en Oriente Medio a fin de controlar conjuntamente las crisis de esa región. Las dos partes reconocen que están directamente afectadas por dichas crisis, como queda demostrado, entre otros elementos, por la dependencia común de la libertad de navegación en el Golfo Pérsico y -de forma más general- por la dependencia de las importaciones de materias primas procedentes de la zona. (Es evidente que Estados Unidos no debería quedar excluido de las iniciativas occidentales dirigidas a la solución de cualesquiera crisis "out of area".)

Para asegurar y ampliar la cooperación entre Japón, Estados Unidos y Europa occidental, se creó en 1973, por iniciativa privada, la Comisión Trilateral. Esta comisión, que agrupa a unas 300 personalidades de la vida económica, financiera, cultural y académica (se excluye a altos representantes de los Gobiernos) tiene por objetivo fomentar la cooperación entre los países democráticos industrializados en ámbitos como las cuestiones monetarias, el comercio, la cooperación política, las relaciones con los países en desarrollo, la crisis de energía, la

"gobernabilidad" de las democracias, la reforma de las instituciones internacionales, la seguridad y el desarme. Las actividades de la Comisión trilateral han hecho posible que la cooperación y la coordinación de las opiniones de los distintos miembros del triángulo vayan más allá del simple marco gubernamental y al mismo tiempo influyan en los Gobiernos respectivos. Por ejemplo, la Comisión tiene como objetivo la participación de los ciudadanos en la política; por tanto, constituye un elemento que materializa la vitalidad del sistema democrático que los socios trilaterales tienen en común.

En muchos casos, la cooperación trilateral entre Europa, Estados Unidos y Japón se centra en el aspecto económico y tiende a descuidar el político y el de seguridad. De hecho, la cooperación económica triangular ha alcanzado un grado de institucionalización que no existe en materia de cooperación política. La cooperación en el marco de la OCDE, del G7, del GATT y de las reuniones en la cumbre de las grandes potencias económicas occidentales lo demuestran. Es evidente que esa cooperación institucionalizada no está libre -esporádicamente- de divergencias de opiniones.

Sin embargo, los tres grupos que constituyen el triángulo están de acuerdo -por lo menos según se desprende de las declaraciones oficiales- sobre los principios: reforzamiento del sistema de librecambio, condena del proteccionismo, responsabilidades frente a los países en desarrollo, establecimiento de un orden económico internacional abierto y justo.

II. RELACIONES ENTRE LA COMUNIDAD EUROPEA Y JAPÓN

A. Políticas y percepciones

Las relaciones entre Europa y Japón se caracterizan por una lucha comercial y una distancia cultural y geográfica considerable. Esa distancia es evidente aun cuando, en las declaraciones oficiales, se aluda constantemente a la solidaridad entre los asociados occidentales, al compromiso común contraído dentro del G-24, del G-7 o de las Naciones Unidas.

Es cierto que, hasta cierto punto, las revoluciones de Europa central y oriental y la crisis del Golfo han suscitado una mayor coordinación de las políticas y de las acciones comunes entre Estados Unidos, Japón y Europa occidental. En todos los partidos existentes en el triángulo, los políticos recuerdan cada vez con más frecuencia la necesidad de intensificar dicha cooperación para resolver, o por lo menos controlar, los problemas mundiales a los que debemos hacer frente al finalizar el siglo XX.

En la última reunión con la Delegación del Parlamento Europeo, el Presidente de la Delegación del Parlamento japonés, Sr. KURANARI, presentó esos puntos de vista como sigue:

"El cambio estructural originado por la rápida democratización causa inevitablemente sacudidas e incertidumbres. Sea cual fuere el dinamismo del cambio provocado, un proceso de democratización como éste no puede invertirse. En tal sentido, la CEE y Japón deben coordinar su acción en materia política y económica para contribuir a la paz y la estabilidad en el mundo."

Sin embargo, a pesar de todas las declaraciones de buena voluntad, aún quedan algunos conflictos por resolver entre Japón y la Comunidad Europea. En un discurso pronunciado en marzo de 1990 en el Royal Institute of International Affairs en Londres, el embajador japonés en la CEE, Sr. NISHIYAMA, llamó la atención sobre los siguientes puntos:

- en primer lugar, manifestó su decepción en lo referente a las declaraciones bastante negativas de la CEE sobre la situación actual de las relaciones;

- posteriormente, el embajador aludió a la imagen negativa que tiene Japón en numerosos países miembros de la Comunidad Europea, imagen que se basa en la presunción de que la expansión económica y comercial de Japón se hace en perjuicio de las economías europeas. A este respecto, señaló incluso que estaba surgiendo una "nipofobia";

- por último, los japoneses se sienten perplejos al comprobar, según ellos, que sus asociados económicos y comerciales tienden siempre a buscar

la causa de los desequilibrios y fricciones comerciales del lado de los japoneses. El Sr. NISHIYAMA lamentó esas sombras que amenazan las relaciones; al mismo tiempo insistió en que, si bien el fondo cultural es diferente, Japón forma parte totalmente, a pesar de las diferencias culturales, de la Comunidad de valores occidentales basados en el respeto de los derechos humanos, en la economía de mercado y en un sistema político basado en la democracia y el pluralismo. Además, el embajador llamó la atención sobre la transformación de la sociedad japonesa; entre otras cosas, esta transformación se caracteriza por una reducción del tiempo de trabajo, por la mayor importancia concedida a las actividades de ocio, por el auge del turismo fuera del país, es decir, por una tendencia a la apertura y a la equiparación de Japón a las sociedades occidentales.

No cabe duda de que la mayoría de los japoneses desean que se luche contra los problemas y contra las percepciones negativas anteriormente señaladas y que se cree una interdependencia aún mayor entre Japón y la Europa comunitaria, basada en la cooperación industrial, en la intensificación de los contactos a todos los niveles y en la profundización y la importancia del diálogo en todos los ámbitos de interés común, como la protección del medio ambiente, la ayuda al desarrollo y la lucha contra la droga y contra el terrorismo internacional.

En opinión de los políticos europeos que conocen Japón, como el antiguo embajador de la CEE en Tokio, Sr. VAN AGT, las relaciones distan mucho de ser satisfactorias. Para el Sr. VAN AGT, la cooperación trilateral no existe. Lo que existe es una relación continuada entre Estados Unidos y Europa, mientras que apenas existen relaciones entre Europa y Japón: "Los funcionarios van y vienen y dicen que es preciso reforzar los vínculos. En la práctica, no ocurre nada. Salvo, quizás, en Europalia, que podría cambiar la mentalidad de los europeos y de los japoneses". En general, el Sr. VAN AGT es bastante escéptico en lo referente al futuro económico de Japón, ya que sus capacidades industriales son limitadas ("Japón ya no es un Sol Naciente, es un sol poniente").

Por lo que respecta al porvenir político de Japón como actor mundial, las evaluaciones son, en cambio, más optimistas. Actualmente se

reconoce que, por ejemplo en lo referente a la ayuda al desarrollo, Tokio ha hecho en los últimos años más que los otros países industrializados. Añádase el compromiso contraído en el contexto de las acciones coordinadas dentro de las Naciones Unidas, del G-24 y en la cuenca del Pacífico. El indudable esfuerzo que han realizado los japoneses para convertirse en actor mundial se explica en parte por su temor de que Estados Unidos y Europa progresen en las discusiones y acuerdos entre ellos, guiados por la ambición de "redimensionar" el poder económico japonés.

Sin embargo, ningún político responsable debería tener interés en aislar a Japón como fuerza económica, ni como fuerza comercial o política. Esa actitud constructiva se observa, entre otros elementos, en las discusiones habituales dirigidas a responsabilizar a Japón como actor mundial. En ese contexto, se discuten actualmente una participación de Japón en la CSCE, la asociación de este país con la Cooperación Política Europea, o su incorporación como uno de los Miembros permanentes al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

De hecho, parece que el potencial económico y financiero de Japón aún no ha sido suficientemente contrarrestado por una responsabilización del país, como se ha observado recientemente durante la crisis del Golfo. Con todo, aumentan los indicios de que Japón está cada vez más dispuesto a asumir responsabilidades y a realizar aportaciones. Por tanto, debería iniciarse una reflexión para definir si el reparto regional de responsabilidades entre Estados Unidos, Japón y Europa podría ser un modelo más apropiado que una corresponsabilidad global de los tres miembros trilaterales. Esto es aplicable tanto en lo referente a la ayuda a la cooperación como en materia de "gestión de crisis", en materia de política internacional o en materia económica, comercial y monetaria.

En conjunto, parece evidente que la intensificación de la cooperación entre las dos grandes potencias económicas (Japón y Comunidad Europea) es adecuada a varios niveles y en varios ámbitos. Tal cooperación debe ser sinérgica y no ha de dirigirse contra los restantes participantes en la vida económica y política a escala global.

En el ámbito comercial, esa cooperación es indispensable para garantizar el éxito de las negociaciones del GATT (Ronda de Uruguay). En

el ámbito financiero, esa cooperación resulta conveniente para evitar los problemas en los mercados financieros internacionales y la inestabilidad monetaria debida a decisiones aisladas. Además, es necesaria para hacer frente a los problemas en materia de deuda que tienen la mayoría de los países en vías de desarrollo.

En el ámbito científico y tecnológico, redonda claramente en interés de todos; si Japón y Europa intensifican su cooperación, redundaría en beneficio de ellos mismos y en beneficio del progreso de la Humanidad en general.

En materia de medio ambiente, la cooperación entre los países industrializados para reducir las consecuencias de la contaminación, de la que son los principales responsables, es un imperativo moral.

Por último, otra lacra de nuestra época, el abuso de la droga, únicamente puede ser combatida mediante una acción coordinada tanto de los países productores como de los países consumidores.

Hasta ahora, la cooperación entre Europa y Japón ha sido escasa; se ha orientado en gran medida hacia finalidades simplemente económicas y comerciales. Lo que ha adquirido cada vez más importancia es la necesidad de que los países y los grupos de países con un gran potencial económico y financiero utilicen ese potencial en acciones conjuntas, a fin de controlar los problemas de nuestra época.

Como conclusión de lo expuesto, parece conveniente que la CEE dé un curso favorable a la reciente propuesta de Tokio dirigida a establecer una carta sobre las relaciones entre Japón y Europa similar a la carta trasatlántica entre la Comunidad y Estados Unidos adoptada en noviembre de 1990.

Por otra parte, en su reunión de 20 de febrero de 1991, los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la CEE ya expresaron una opinión positiva respecto a dicha iniciativa japonesa.

Está previsto que durante su reunión de 15 de abril, el Consejo de Asuntos Generales intercambie puntos de vista sobre el proyecto de

"Declaración de relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea y Japón", sobre la base de un texto elaborado por la Comisión (en lo referente a los aspectos económicos) y por los directores de la Cooperación Política (en lo referente a los aspectos políticos). Según fuentes bien informadas, la Declaración se basará en los siguientes elementos:

- un Preámbulo, que incluirá la confirmación de determinados valores compartidos (democracia, derechos humanos, etc.) y de determinados principios económicos y sociales, como las libertades económicas y comerciales, o la cooperación internacional. El texto hará asimismo referencia al proceso de integración comunitaria, incluso en materia de política exterior y de seguridad;
- una alusión general a determinados objetivos, como la estabilidad del sistema monetario internacional, la lucha contra el desempleo, la mejora del nivel de vida en el Tercer Mundo, la solución de problemas globales en materia de medio ambiente, energía, etc.;
- la definición de los ámbitos de cooperación, que incluirán la cooperación política, económica, científica, cultural y educativa. En este marco, el texto se refiere en particular a las barreras comerciales formales e informales, así como a las limitaciones en materia de inversión y de otras actividades económicas;
- la estructura del diálogo que debe llevarse a cabo, y que debe comprender, entre otras cosas, una reunión anual del Primer Ministro japonés y de los Presidentes del Consejo Europeo y de la Comisión; un diálogo político a nivel ministerial, una reunión anual entre la Comisión y el Gobierno japonés, y asimismo reuniones entre altos funcionarios.

12th Japan-EC Parliamentary Conference

Opening Statement by the Leader of the Japanese Diet Delegation Kuranari at the First Session

Chairman Sälzer, distinguished delegates from the European Parliament, fellow members of the Japanese Diet:

I have been looking forward to this reunion in Japan ever since our last meeting in Strasbourg about a year ago; and I am happy to see all of you again.

I would like at this time to address myself to a series of problems concerning the new international order to be established, with particular reference to salient changes in the international situation that have occurred since our last meeting.

1. The Gulf War and After

The first problem has to do with the structure for peace and security in the world in the wake of the war in the Gulf region.

The Gulf War was the biggest event of the past year for the international community. It constituted a critical test for the principle of international security in the post-Cold -War age. The armed aggression and brazen attempt at annexation of another country--the most blatant challenge to the international community since the end of World War II--was doomed to failure. It was utterly foiled by allied forces mobilized under predominantly U.S. leadership: but leadership which, it is very significant to note, was consistently exercised under the auspices of the United Nations. Multinational forces, rather than UN forces per se, were used to restore peace and order. But the entire process of settlement--beginning with the

economic sanctions approved by the Security Council, continuing with the authorization to use all means possible to bring the situation under control, including the use of force, and concluding with the ceasefire--has demonstrated that, at every stage of the war, the primary purpose of the UN as an organization to promote the "maintenance of international peace and security" has been effectively achieved. Furthermore, the Security Council decided on a detailed package of post-war procedures, including the dismantling of chemical weapons and missiles, the inspection and control of nuclear weapon materials, and the payment of reparations, thus ensuring UN involvement in the entire process.

It is very noteworthy that the UN quickly and efficiently served its function of ensuring collective security and international peace, the sort of function, in fact, that was envisaged at its inception some 45 years ago. This successful performance of the UN, however, was arguably due to the end of the cold war on the one hand and to the wanton lawlessness committed by Iraq on the other. It is also true that there were subtle variations in the ways in which the permanent members of the Security Council responded to the Gulf crisis. For this reason, it would be premature to conclude that the statue of the UN as a collective security organization has now been permanently established.

2. Arms Reduction and Arms Control

What are the lessons, then, that we have learned from the Gulf War?

One thing is certain: to continue to allow arms export to continue unchecked would only add to the otherwise proven difficulty of maintaining peace in the Middle East, or in any other part of the world for that matter. The most urgently needed controls on arms export include measures to prevent the proliferation of atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons, and to restrict the export of the means of delivering such weapons of mass destruction; in particular, missile

launchers and missile-launching technology. These weapons do not simply cause more damage; they threaten to change the very nature of war itself. If the Scud missiles had inflicted substantial damage on Israel, or if chemical weapons had been unleashed on her, and if that nation had renounced its self-control and joined the hostilities, the course of events would probably have been very different.

Despite the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and arms restrictions achieved through the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the number of countries having actual or potential nuclear capability is steadily increasing, and includes nations in Asia. Offensive missiles are also proliferating at an alarming rate. The NPT system and the IAEA inspection function need to be strengthened quickly. It is also necessary for all countries with nuclear energy facilities and missile production capabilities to participate in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, thereby to consolidate international cooperation in this problem area. President Bush recently stated that, given an international agreement, the U.S. will agree not to use chemical weapons even in retaliation, and to dismantle those in its stockpile. It is our sincere hope that his initiative will pave the way for rapid progress in treaty negotiations.

3. Europe and Asia

The adoption of the Paris Declaration at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Summit Meeting last year ushered in a new age of partnership and friendship in Europe.

Since we are all very well aware of the dramatic changes that have unfolded in Eastern Europe, I would like to comment briefly on the Asian scene.

While the strategic environment in Asia has not changed as dramatically as that in Europe, there have occurred several developments that will certainly combine to cause gradual changes in the strategic

environment in the Far East and in Asia as a whole. Perhaps foremost amongst these is the end of the Cold War and the resulting marked reduction in the possibility of an armed conflict between the U.S. and the USSR. Also very significant is the resumption of normalized diplomatic relations between China and the USSR; in this regard, Chinese General Secretary Jiang Zemin's recent visit to Moscow in the wake of the Gulf War is another noteworthy sign of closer China-USSR relations. Other noteworthy developments include the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the USSR, and the opening of negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan.

The Asia-Pacific basin markedly differs from Europe in that there still remain quite a few disputes and confrontations yet to be resolved: in China, between North Korea and South Korea, in Cambodia, and between Japan and the USSR regarding Japan's northern territories. Each and every one of these issues needs to be attended to and resolved if genuine peace is to be ensured on a lasting basis in the Asia-Pacific Basin. Japan is prepared to redouble its efforts to help to settle these disputes and confrontations.

4. Japan's International Contribution

Allow me now to state my view on what should be Japan's international contribution, which has recently emerged as probably the most important challenge that Japan has to face up to.

The Gulf War has galvanized the Japanese people into public controversy over viable ways and means by which Japan can contribute to international peace. There is now an emerging consensus, it is safe to say, that financial and material contributions need to be augmented by contributions of personnel as well. There is at the same time a deep-rooted and widely-shared opposition to Japan's involvement in the use of force outside its own territories. One opinion poll indicates that a majority of the people were in favor of the recent dispatch of a

Self Defense Force (SDF) flotilla of minesweepers to the Gulf, presumably because minesweeping operations after the hostilities are over are interpreted as being distinct from the use of force. While many people believe that Japan should make greater contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping activities, in Japan there still is disagreement whether SDF personnel should be involved in the process; and, moreover, the necessary legislation to permit that is yet to be formulated.

Of course Japan has to further cooperate with not only other Asian nations but also all the nations in the world in maintaining peace, but Japan should meet two important requirements. One is that Japan should firmly follow the policy never to become a military power and stick to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty setup. If by any reason the Japan-U.S. relationship should worsen and the security structure collapse, Japan will likely become a military power, breaking the Asian and world peace.

Another important requirement is that Japan should win the confidence of the international community of nations, of the Asian neighbours in particular, and that Japan should genuinely be a peace-loving nation. Now, half a century after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese people need to look back upon the past. As Premier Kaifu stated in his recent speech in Singapore, the entire nation has to do serious soul-searching regarding its past behavior, and must cultivate an accurate view of history. It will be then, and not until then, that our Asian neighbours will believe in and accept Japan's acts of international cooperation, whatever their specific forms.

5. International Economic Issues

Let me now move on from political to economic affairs, and briefly state what needs to be stated.

Given that some countries are in recession, that others are experiencing inflationary pressures, and that still others in the

developing world are burdened with aggregate debts, the developed countries of the world are called upon more urgently than ever to cooperate in making policy to managing the global economy. It is also urgently necessary to control recalcitrant, protectionist moves that are afoot, and to make a success of the Uruguay Round. I would like to emphasize in this context that bilateral measures and/or unilateral actions in matters of trade will not in any way be in the long-term interest of the international economy. We should all strive for rational agreements on the basis of the spirit of international cooperation.

6. Japan-EC Cooperation

The foregoing reviews do not exhaust the agenda for establishing the new international order. There is a whole spectrum of problems--relating to the global environment, drugs, international terrorism, refugees, and other world-wide issues--that need to be solved by extensive international cooperation in a world of growing mutual dependence.

In closing, I would like to make an appeal to you regarding the future of Japan-EC relations and Japan-EC cooperation. It is satisfying to note that our relations are getting closer than ever, as evidenced by this session of the Japan-EC Parliamentary Conference, by President Delors' visit to Japan, and by the prospective joint statement, on the occasion of the London Summit, concerning the fundamental relations between Japan, the EC, and its member countries.

The end of the cold war spells a shift from a bipolarized world, centered on the U.S. and the USSR, to a multipolar one. Both Europe and Japan have a great role to play in supplementing the U.S. leadership. Japan-Europe relations, which have tended to be looser than Europe-U.S. and Japan-U.S. relations, need now to be consolidated in the economic and political fields, and in cultural and personal exchanges as well. Consolidating the trilateral relations between Japan, Europe and the

U.S. will be of great importance to the rest of the world. We in Japan are prepared to cooperate with our European colleagues in dealing not only with problems between Japan and Europe, but also to move beyond bilateral issues to help solve international problems. It is my hope that the present meeting and discussions we shall hold will add to the track record of productive Japan-Europe cooperation. Thank you very much for your attention.

The Significance of the SII Talks and Directions for the Future

(Provisional Translation)

May 14, 1991
Keidanren

Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf War, the world has been grappling for a new world order. In this context, stable and friendly relations between Japan and the United States have taken on added importance. As a country that shares such ideals and values with the United States as freedom and democracy, Japan must continue to make its security arrangement with the United States the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and should cooperate with the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to make a positive contribution to the development and growth of the world economy. The bilateral SII talks need to be approached in this broad perspective.

In March 1990, Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) published its views on the Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. Subsequently it has voiced opinions on specific items covered in the talks.

Approximately one year has elapsed since the final report of the SII talks was released. The following statement outlines the business community's comprehensive view on the talks and the subsequent follow-up meetings as well as on the future course the two countries should follow.

1. Overview

The SII talks were supposed to promote sustained economic growth and enhance the quality of life in both Japan and the United States by identifying and solving structural problems in both countries that impede trade and balance of payments adjustment. We laud the fact that serious and constructive talks have been held and necessary follow-up activities have been pursued with these aims.

There are some who believe that the talks are supposed to bring about an immediate correction of the trade imbalance between Japan and the U.S.. However, a country's external imbalances are linked to macroeconomic factors. The most fundamental of these include the fiscal balance, growth rate, savings rate, exchange rate etc. Japan's current account surplus has shrunk from 4.5% of gross national product in fiscal 1986 (April 1986 to March 1987) to estimated 1.0% in fiscal 1990. The current account deficit of the United States has also been shrinking. Although both Japan and the United States are moving toward more balanced positions in their overall external accounts, this does not necessarily produce a smaller trade imbalance between the two countries. The success of the SII talks should not be only gauged by whether or not there is a reduction in the Japan-U.S. trade imbalance.

Participants in the talks discussed at length many of the issues that Japan will need to confront in the 1990s. In particular, we positively evaluate the fact that the Japanese government has already taken action for the improvement of Japan's social overhead infrastructure and reform of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law. Improving land utilization, an issue that the United States is still dissatisfied about, will require comprehensive policy including land utilization programs, monetary policy, and taxation.

As for problems concerning the Antimonopoly Law and *keiretsu* (corporate groupings), they will need to be debated in a framework that encompasses all economic legislation along with efforts to achieve harmony between Japan, the United States and Europe.

As for Japan's competition policy, it is true that during the process of postwar development certain industries were supported by policy measures and some others were exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Law, and that this was conducive, to a certain extent, to the growth and strengthening of Japan's industries. Today, however, the most direct path to genuine national prosperity lies in the wider application of the Antimonopoly Law, through the abolition or relaxation of exemptions and certain government regulations.

There are many indications which suggest that the SII talks have been started due to the threat of unilateral U.S. action, such as the application of Article 301 of the Omnibus Trade Act. Indeed, the impression one gains is that the talks focused throughout on structural problems on the Japanese side. From now on, greater attention needs to be paid to structural problems on the U.S. side even if they were not detailed in the final report of the SII talks. The European Community each year issues the *Report on United States Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices*. Many of its well-detailed findings are those that Japan also recognizes as being problem areas. It will become necessary in the future, therefore, to expand the scope of structural talks to a multinational framework so that all the countries of the world may benefit from them.

Both sides are requested to make earnest efforts to tackle their own structural problems that have been pointed out in SII talks, and both should recognize and be enlightened regarding the advantages and merits of the various practices and institutions in the other country.

2. Measures on Japan's side

(1) Saving and investment: In its fiscal 1991 budget, the Japanese government allocated ¥6.6 trillion for public works under the general account (a 6% increase over initial budget on the previous fiscal year). Taken together with increases in expenditures for public works projects undertaken by local governments and under the fiscal investment and loan program, it is clear that the government has made a significant first step toward the fulfillment of its pledge made during the SII talks.

Because Japan's savings rate is expected to decline with the ageing of the population, priority should be given to infrastructure investment that improves living standards. Japan will need to make planned improvements in such areas of its social overhead capital where it lags behind other advanced nations.

The setting aside of budget outlays for investment to upgrade living standards in the 1991 budget is a commendable step. However, there has been virtually no real change in the percentage composition of total public works spending. There is a need for radical change in the rigid allocation of funds to specific ministries and different expenditure items.

The savings-investment balance has been discussed in connection with correcting the current account surplus. It should be noted that Japan's contribution of around \$13 billion to the multilateral forces for the Gulf War related expenditures from the fiscal 1990 and 1991 budgets means a smaller current account surplus. This contribution is paid for through increases in the corporate and petroleum taxes, coupled with reductions in government expenditure.

(2) Land utilization: Resolving Japan's land and housing problem will require a comprehensive approach that takes into account land utilization planning, urban development, financial and monetary policies, and the tax policies.

Priorities for major urban areas include the formulation of a basic long-term plan for land utilization, the establishment of an urban development scheme that encourages the efficient utilization of land, and the relaxation of such building restrictions as those for floor space and height to permit high-intensity land utilization. Also necessary will be drastic measures to reverse the trend toward centralization, such as the relocation of the nation's capital.

Other key areas include the utilization for housing of unused land made available by the relocation of factories and the release of underutilized public land, and the implementation of urban and housing development projects that contribute to increasing the supply of housing and residential land. In addition, the bill to amend the Leased Land and Rented House Laws, which is postponed for consideration to the next Diet session, should be passed as soon as possible.

Although the system of land taxation in Japan has been criticized in the United States, the tax burden of Japanese landowners is by no means small when compared with that in other countries. The Land Value Tax that was just recently passed into law should be considered as a part of the comprehensive land policy to be formulated.

(3) Distribution: The bill to amend the Large-Scale Retail Store Law was passed on May 8. Along with the early enforcement of the amended law, the government should also ensure that the measures introduced May 1990 to improve the implementation of the existing law are thoroughly achieved.

The Large Store Law has become a source of increasingly serious problems. Prior to last year's improvements, procedures not required in the law were being resorted to in order to block the opening of large stores. Even during the amendment process, it became apparent that local governments were acting against the improvements and the intent of the recent amendment, there is the danger, therefore, that the latest revisions may not be enforced as intended.

The government should act responsibly and endeavor to abolish all local regulations that sabotage the amended law and that make opening of large outlets more difficult. It should also increase its efforts to simplify the procedures that must be followed under the amended law and introduce greater fairness and visibility into the process of adjustments in opening new outlets.

Other areas requiring greater simplification and streamlining include the liquor sales licensing system, the rice retail permit system, and the Drugs, Cosmetics, and Medical Instruments Law.

(4) Exclusive business practices: Keidanren has maintained that Japanese business practices, which emphasize stable, long-term relationships based on trust, constitute a rational economic response by individual companies in the marketplace and that such practices do not contravene the Antimonopoly Law. However, we also need to address the criticism from the United States that the importance placed on long-term trading relationships poses some disadvantages for newcomers, in particular foreign companies to get in.

Keidanren has already drawn up Guidelines of Procurement Policies that encourage Japanese companies to avoid purchasing behavior that may be misconstrued as being irrational or exclusive, and we have encouraged our members to make transactions more transparent and treat those wishing to enter markets with greater consideration than in the past. It will also be necessary to provide ample opportunity for foreign firms wishing to enter market to work together for design-in and to explain their products.

With regard to strengthening the Antimonopoly Law, Keidanren has responded to a Fair Trade Commission (FTC) proposal for an increase in surcharge by calling for the limitation of the surcharge to the amount of the undue profit resulting from cartel arrangement in order to ensure consistency with the fine system. We have also made public our views about the draft guidelines proposed by the FTC concerning the sole import agency system as well as distribution and trading practices. Among the points raised by Keidanren are the need for greater clarity in the guidelines and the importance of avoiding new restrictions based on the guidelines.

U.S. government officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the Japanese Antimonopoly Law and the way it is enforced. They have also threatened to call for the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. This constitutes a violation of jurisdiction of the law and is totally unacceptable.

The United States, Europe, and Japan should move as quickly as possible to harmonize their antimonopoly laws and how they are enforced within the framework of a multilateral organization, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We hope that the Japanese government will make further efforts in the area.

(5) *Keiretsu*: The United States has complained that trading within *keiretsu*, or corporate groups, is supported by cross-shareholding. The truth is the business transactions are determined by economic considerations, such as price, quality, and delivery times. Cross-shareholding is a long-established practice and is used to foster stable management. It does not cause unreasonable business transactions.

There are some restrictions in Japan that do not exist in the United States. For example, the establishment of holding companies is prohibited, and firms are in principle not allowed to acquire their own shares. There are also limits on how much stock large corporations may own. It is thus inappropriate to focus exclusively on the question of cross-shareholding. There is also an urgent need to revise these restrictions on corporate stock ownership so that regulations in Japan can be brought in line with international norms.

With regard to the shareholder's right to inspect the books and records, and cumulative voting right, careful consideration should be paid within the overall context of our commercial law.

(6) Price mechanism: Reasons for price differentials between Japan and the United States include government restrictions (price supports, import restrictions, restrictions on new entry), cost of public utilities, land prices, and productivity gaps between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors etc.

The reduction of these differentials will require the relaxation of government restrictions and the promotion of competition in all sectors. Restrictions affecting the cost of raw materials for food processing industry push up domestic food prices, and the government should take bold steps to relax the various controls, including the Staple Food Control Law. These measures should be accompanied by efforts to improve productivity in the agricultural sector.

Distribution practices, such as rebates, quoted prices, and accepting the return of unsold goods, evolved through the market. It is inappropriate to generalize that all of these practices have an adverse effect on prices. These tactics have also been used by new entrants. However, we must also voluntarily strive to eliminate practices that might lead to the abuse of a dominating market position or to concerted boycotting. Finally, it is important to ensure that bureaucrat-made guidelines do not excessively limit marketing strategy options.

3. Structural problems on the U.S. side and the need for greater effort

(1) Saving and Investment: The United States will not be able to correct its external imbalances without reducing its chronic federal budget deficit and increasing personal saving.

It is encouraging to see that at the end of September 1990 President George Bush and Congress reached agreement on five-year deficit reduction plan that will bring about a \$500 billion deficit cut in the period until fiscal 1995 through tax increases and other means. The agreement forecasted a budget surplus by fiscal 1994, but in his budget message for fiscal 1992, President Bush indicated that this will not be achieved until fiscal 1996. Another indication of major problems in his budget proposal is that the deficit for fiscal 1991, at \$318.1 billion, is substantially higher than the initial estimate of \$253.6 billion in the summit agreement. This figure of \$318.1 billion, moreover, is equivalent to 5.7% of gross national product, the highest

ever recorded except for 1983, when the deficit reached 6.3% of GNP. The deadline for the achievement of a balanced budget has been extended twice since the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in 1986. This suggests that the United States has not been working hard enough to reduce its budget deficit. The red ink must be reduced as quickly as possible through all available means, including utmost efforts to streamline spending.

Although the current budget put a cap on expenditures under the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act, there is considerable room for improvement. For example, no commitment has been made to a deficit reduction target for each year, a rosy economic scenario has been adopted for budget calculation, and the Social Security Integrity and Debt Reduction Fund has not been included in the calculations.

Virtually no progress has been made toward an increase of personal savings. The new initiative to establish the Family Savings Accounts and expand the Individual Retirement Accounts has not borne fruit. In view of the growth of world demand for capital and the long-term demographic change in the U.S. to an aged society, bold steps should be taken to correct inveterate excessive consumption and raise the personal savings rate.

(2) Corporate investment and productivity: In order to increase private investment, the United States will need to review the provisions of its antitrust laws concerning joint production. It will also need to reexamine the quarterly reporting system, which eventually encourages businesses to focus on short-term performance, and the recent strengthening of taxation on transfer pricing.

Another problem is that people and companies are inclined to solve any problems through litigation in America. Litigation has some advantages, including transparency and objectivity. However, its excessive use has led to increased social costs and has introduced an unnecessary element of uncertainty into the future outlook for businesses. This tendency could also erode business entrepreneurship and threaten social stability. These problems should be tackled as soon as possible.

The expansion of Japanese direct investment in the United States over the past few years has brought considerable benefits to the U.S., including the revitalization of industrial power and the expansion of exports. Washington is thus urged to maintain open and nondiscriminatory policy for direct investment.

In 1989 and 1990 the U.S. government revised the IRS regulations 6038 A and C in connection with the taxation on the transfer pricing. These measures unilaterally dismiss the nondiscrimination clause contained in the Japan-U.S. tax treaty. Therefore they should be reviewed thoroughly. The revision of the transfer pricing taxation should be discussed in a multilateral forum, such as the OECD.

(3)Corporate behavior and export promotion: A variety of problems have been pointed out in the management of American companies. For example, a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology identified such weaknesses as outdated management strategies, myopic managing styles, failure to recognize the importance of production and capital investment, inadequate emphasis on quality at the design and production stages, lack of cooperation with suppliers, the absence of trust in labor-management relations, and inadequate in-house training.

Although the management practices are the products of a country's history, social conditions, and environment, and it is inappropriate to discuss without due regards to these factors, there can be room for reassessment of managerial practices in light of the long-term decline in the competitiveness of American companies compared to not only Japanese companies but also to European and some Asian firms.

Both the federal and state governments are adopting "buy American" policies, including, among others, the "fly American" requiring government officials to use American flag airlines. This approach would only make American companies more dependent on government procurement and result in damaging their competitiveness.

In the past, American companies have limited the scope of their business activities to the gigantic domestic market and such foreign markets as Europe with similar consumer preferences. They have not channeled enough effort into developing and marketing products for markets with different needs.

Although Germany, France, and Italy surpass Japan in terms of their combined population and GNP, Japanese imports from the United States are substantially higher than the total for these countries. There is thus considerable potential for American companies to grow in the Japanese market, and they could increase their chances of success through sustained and persistent efforts based on a proper understanding of the market's characteristics. It is very encouraging in this context to observe that support from the U.S. government has led to the expansion of exports of industrial goods to Japan and the establishment of the Japan-Corporate Program, under which participating American companies have committed themselves to long-term efforts.

(4)R&D, regulations, and worker training: Maintaining competitiveness over the long term will require the enhancement of research and development activities and the expansion of necessary fiscal and tax measures. At the same time, it is inappropriate to maintain the system of Imperial measures that do not conform to international standards. The United States should adopt the metric system with the target year.

With regard to the export restrictions specified by the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas, immediate steps should be taken to provide concise lists that reflect the changes in the global situation. In addition, the experience of the Gulf War dictates an early start of multilateral consultations to reach agreements on nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons and of missile technology as well as on the limitation of exports of conventional weapons.

It is often pointed out that the recent deterioration of educational environment has lowered the quality of American labor. The U.S. government recognizes this problem and is making valuable and positive efforts to deal with it, including the improvement of primary-school education and the organization of an education summit conference.

Unfortunately these efforts have not yet produced tangible benefits. The Council for Better Corporate Citizenship at Keidanren sent the questionnaire to the Japanese owned companies in the United States and received 192 replies. 46% of those replied feels that there had been a decline in the educational standards. Particularly concerns about the achievement in mathematics, science, and English and about the spread of alcohol and drug abuse are raised.

[Keidanren-member companies are currently being surveyed about their views on measures to resolve further structural problems in the United States. We will present our views on these measures at a future date.]

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DELEGATION FOR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

NOTE

on the economic situation of Japan
and the relations with the European Community

(drawn up by the Directorate-General for Research)

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR
COMMITTEES AND DELEGATIONS

Annex

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I BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS¹

1. General Data

Total population - 122.6 million (1988)
 Area - 378 sq kms
 Income per head - US\$23,411 (1988)
 Merchandise exports US\$ 275.2 bn
 Merchandise imports US\$ 210.8 bn
 Trade balance US\$ 64.4 bn

2. Development in economic indicators

DOMESTIC ECONOMY (% year on year changes)	Average 8 years 1982-89				forecast 1991
		1988	1989	estimate 1990	
Real GDP	4.3	5.8	4.9	5.1	3.2
Total OECD Real GNP	3.1	4.3	3.6	2.2	1.4
Domestic Demand	4.4	7.7	5.8	5.5	3.4
Consumers' Expenditure	3.6	5.2	3.5	3.8	3.4
Private Fixed Investment	8.4	14.7	14.3	10.4	2.0
Industrial Production	4.4	9.3	6.0	4.2	0.5
Consumer Prices	1.6	0.7	2.3	3.0	4.2
Earnings*	3.2	3.8	4.1	7.0	8.5
Unemployment Rate (%)	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.7

*1985-1989

EXTERNAL INDICATORS	1970	1980	1985	1988	1989
Export Volume (% change)	3.9	4.4	4.2	4.5	-2.0
Import Volume (% change)	6.9	16.7	7.9	6.2	3.5
Trade Balance (US\$bns)	64	95	77	55	44
Current Account (US\$bns)	53	80	57	38	26
US\$ Exchange Rate (Yen per US\$)	192	128	138	145	120
STRUCTURAL FEATURES	1970	1980	1985	1988	1989
Manufacturing as % GDP	36	29	30	27.5	n.a.
Productivity - whole economy (% change)	10.3	6.3	4.4	11.5	6.2
Primary Products as					
% total exports	70	77	69	51	50
Export Dependency - US (%)	30	24	37	34	34
- EC (%)	7	13	11	18	17
Public Sector Debt as % GDP	4	13	11	18	17
Personal Saving Ratio (% disposable income)	16.3	17.9	16.0	14.8	15.3

¹. Source: Barclays Country Report, December 1990 and OECD

imbalance between saving and investment in Japan. After peaking in the mid-1970s, household saving has shown a moderate declining trend. Nevertheless, the saving rate is still high by international standards. In conjunction with the scale of government fiscal retrenchment and only a modest rise in the corporate sector deficit, domestic investment has been insufficient to absorb savings, the excess of which have been supplied to the rest of the world.

Although some of the factors underlying the high household saving rate have varied through time, others have remained consistent. Those which explain changes in saving behaviour include macro-economic factors such as rates of economic growth and inflation, but there are important structural factors which explain the high rate of household savings. In particular, the age structure of the population is a key, although cultural and institutional factors, such as the rapid development of a social security system in the 1970s and 1980s, have also played a role.

The ageing of the population is likely to have an important effect on the rate of household saving. The impact of the rapid ageing of the Japanese population in the period up to 2000 is, however, likely to be partly offset by the decline in the ratio of youth dependency, but the Japanese saving rate is expected to show a substantial decline beyond the year 2000. Until that time, the household sector is still likely to produce a substantial, albeit falling, surplus as proportion of GDP.

2. Current situation and medium-term outlook

Although past its cyclical peak, the economy continues to remain robust, with domestic demand centred on private capital spending the driving force behind growth. However, there are signs that the economy may be at a turning point as high interest rates, softening land prices and the collapse in the stockmarket begin to impact on economic activity. Moreover, economic growth at above long-term sustainable rates is generating inflationary pressures. A weakening of the economy is therefore envisaged in 1991/92.

Furtherout, however, progress is likely to be resumed. As a significant proportion of resources are devoted to research and development, technological innovation will remain a major driving force behind Japan's economic development. This will support new consumption and investment demand and, at the same time, should enhance long-run productivity growth. When combined with the opening up of domestic markets to overseas suppliers and reforms significantly improving efficiency and resource allocation in the service sector, inflationary pressures should be relatively contained. Japan should therefore continue to remain one of the leading performers in terms of growth and inflation among the OECD countries.

Japan faces the challenges of adjusting from a producer to a consumer society. External pressure is forcing Japan into a major restructuring involving the reform of the sheltered agricultural, construction and service industries. Moreover, the Japanese themselves recognise the need for change. This is in marked contrast to the previous protectionist policy that characterised most of the post-war period with its mercantilist emphasis and excessive government intervention. While many of the changes have, and will, come about automatically, others will require determined action by the government. In recognition of this, the authorities are placing priority on policies to promote and strengthen private sector efficiency. This includes decontrolling the highly regulated non-manufacturing sector together with the privatisation

II ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. General Situation

In the post war decades, Japan has taken a low profile, concentrating on economic development that has turned the country into one of the richest in the world on a per capita basis and second only to the United States in absolute terms. In addition, Japan is now the world's largest net creditor nation, is a key player in the international financial system and the largest donor of foreign aid.

For much of the period, growth was largely driven by exports, the success of which can be attributed to successful marketing of advanced-technology with a reputation for reliability, and a high level of industrial productivity. This provides a sharp contrast with the remainder of the highly protected and segmented domestic economy. However, the emergence of large external surpluses in the first part of the 1980s and resultant foreign pressure led to a change of direction. As part of international efforts to correct world trade imbalances, the Japanese currency has appreciated sharply, while the policy thrust was directed towards the domestic economy. As a result, domestic demand has become the leading force behind economic activity. Concurrently, progress is being made on the liberalisation of the financial and goods markets that is opening up Japan to a greater extent to the world economy, and this is showing up in the structure of imports. Consumer goods accounted for almost 14% of total imports in 1989 compared with under 5% a decade earlier when industrial materials dominated with a share of over 75% by 1989 this had fallen to 55%.

Even so, considerable structural impediments remain. Japan's highly efficient manufacturing sector is offset, by an inefficient distribution system and cushioned farm sector, both of which are key constituencies of the ruling LDP. While agriculture accounts for under 3% of GNP, services contribute over 60%; the latter has also been the fastest growing sector of the economy over the last part of the 1980s, driven by Japan's restructuring towards domestic demand. Consequently, despite being a major trading nation - by value Japan is the world's third largest trading nation after the United States and Germany - it still remains a relatively closed economy. Total trade (exports plus imports) accounts for just over 16% of GNP, well below the OECD average of around 30%.

Japan is seen as being probably the most vulnerable amongst the main OECD countries to a sharp rise in oil and commodity prices. In particular, oil as a proportion of total energy requirements is around 55% (compared with an OECD average of under 43%). Japan is also reliant on the Middle East for over 70% of its oil requirements. However, this gives a misleading picture as to the extent of energy diversification and substitution that has occurred in Japan. Oil as a proportion of total energy requirement is well below the figures recorded in the early 1970s. Moreover, the country has moved ahead of both West Germany and the United States in terms of oil efficiency in production over the past decade and is now well above the OECD average. In addition, the volume of oil imports - 1.3 billion barrels last year - is considerably less than the 1973 peak of 1.8 billion barrels. In conjunction with a high level of stocks, Japan is better prepared now than at any time in the recent past to withstand such externally induced shocks.

The rise of Japan as a net creditor mirrors the persistence of large current account surpluses, which themselves are a reflection of the structural

the desire to maintain an orderly world trading and financial system; international co-operation will thus remain a major objective of policy.

III RELATIONS WITH THE EC

The Community's general policy approach towards Japan aims at developing a sound and stable relationship while safeguarding the interest of the Community. This involves a mix of trade measures and the development of cooperation in a number of fields and has been pursued in a consistent manner in recent years. The Community's objective in this relationship is to induce Japan to assume the responsibilities of a great economic and increasingly political power for the maintenance and further development of the Western economic system. On the trade side, the aim is to oblige Japan in general to take a more balanced, more responsible, approach towards world trade.

More specifically, the main elements of the Community's trade policy with Japan in the last few years have been the following:

1. Sectoral actions including those on wines and spirits, motor vehicles, medical equipment, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, protection of intellectual property (counterfeits) and Kansai airport, which consisted mainly of demands in the fields of standards, norms and test-data acceptance, specific tariff reductions and other market opening measures in order to improve market access for EC products. These sectoral actions have proven largely successful.
2. Recourse to GATT procedures (Art. XXIII) for specific products such as leather, wine and spirits, semi-conductors (US-Japan agreement).
3. Export Promotion Programme which includes several promotional activities sponsored by the Commission and particularly training of young European executives in Japan.
4. Encouragement of Japanese macro-economic policy changes: expansive fiscal policy, market opening measures and effective appreciation of the yen which have in effect taken place in Japan. Thus there has been a shift in the Japanese economy from export-led to demand-led growth. However, Japan still enjoys a considerable trade surplus with the rest of the world. The recently negative contribution from the external sector to the growth of the Japanese economy is due to the larger percentage increase of imports over exports which has meant that foreign demand has made a negative contribution to GNP growth since 1986.
5. Moderation of certain Japanese imports into the Community: from 1983 to 1985 the Community had an arrangement under which Japan "moderated" her exports of certain sensitive products (passenger cars, light commercial vehicles, video recorders, colour TV-tubes, motorbikes, machine tools and forklift-trucks). Since 1986 the Community has simply monitored imports of these products statistically.

Trade between the Community and Japan has been increasing rapidly in the last few years and thus the EC accounted for 17% of total Japanese trade in 1989 (13% in 1986). The evolution of Community exports towards Japan is remarkable: since 1987 the annual growth rate oscillates around 20%. Nevertheless, the volume of EC exports towards Japan remains low: only 5.1% of total EC exports

of a number of state enterprises and increasing the use of private sector financing for infrastructure projects. Moreover, the 1988-92 five year economic plan builds upon the progress so far made. The thrust to growth is derived from domestic demand, which is projected to rise on average by 4.25% a year. Real GNP is targeted to increase at a slower rate given the negative contribution of the foreign sector, while underlying inflation is anticipated to remain at less than 2%.

Nevertheless, the authorities face a number of constraints. The scope for fiscal expansion is limited by the high debt to GNP ratio. Of greater significance is the radical change in Japan's population structure. A rapidly ageing population raises the problem of funding future pension requirements. Over the next thirty years, overall public debt will soar in relation to GNP unless current payments into state pension funds are raised significantly or the remainder of the budget registers a large surplus. But this would raise Japan's already high saving ratio, exacerbating external surpluses and making adjustment in the short term all the more difficult unless there is a corresponding decline in personal sector saving. Boosting private consumption and investment is the way to lower the latter, but is itself partly dependent on more widespread deregulation and competition to improve resource allocation. Even so, the change in the demographic structure will itself have an impact. Rising wealth and changing life-styles are raising spending as a portion of income; the rapidly ageing population also means more dissavers. The full effects of this will make itself felt as the 1990s progress.

Moreover, the monetary policy background is becoming more restrictive. Over the mid-1980s an expansionary monetary policy was aimed at increasing domestic demand. In particular, from 1985 to 1988 the chief target of monetary policy was United States. In the spirit of international policy co-ordination, interest rates were held down to help the United States finance its external deficit. Japan is now facing the consequences of the policy, with the result that monetary policy over the outlook period is likely to be considerably more cautious. In view of this, and against the background of financial liberalisation shifting the emphasis of monetary policy away from quantitative and qualitative controls, Japan looks to be entering a phase when real interest rates are above those of the last decade.

Japan's shift from a current account deficit in 1980 to massive surpluses from the middle of the decade brought unprecedented financial wealth, but at the expense of generating severe trade imbalances with major trading partners. However, factors already underway are reversing the trend. In particular, Japan's growing network of overseas manufacturing facilities will cut into exports. Although rising rapidly, overseas production by Japanese companies as a ratio of the total is well below that of other major OECD economies - under 5% for Japan according to the latest data compared with almost 20% for Germany and the United States. The aim is to raise the ratio to 10% in the early 1990s. The consequence of this is not only continued heavy outflows of direct foreign investment, but the replacement of exports by local production. At the same time, the rising consumption ratio is boosting manufactured imports while overseas travel and associated expenditure will offset to some extent earnings from overseas assets. The groundwork for a dramatic decline in the current account surplus has therefore been laid.

Internationally, Japan's accumulated assets will leave the country a major player in terms of world capital flows. This will leave the authorities with

to Japan should be larger: Japan imported to a value of 31.6 billion dollars of these products in 1988 of which only 2.5 billion (7.9% of Japanese imports) came from the EC. The US exported 10.7 billion dollars' worth (33.9% of Japanese imports) of the same products to Japan during that year while EC exports of food products to the US were 5.3 billion (19.4% of total US imports of these products).

The discrepancies between Japanese and Community trade statistics also give rise to concern. This question is not a trivial one and a good illustration of its importance is the 1989 deficit: according to Japanese statistics (either in Yen or in Dollars) the EC trade deficit with Japan was reduced by 13.3% in dollar terms (-19.7 billion) and by 7.3% in yen terms (-2.7 trillion) while according to EC trade statistics the deficit had increased by 2% reaching 25 billion ECUs.

Many reasons have been given to explain these discrepancies: currency conversion, accounting method of paintings (the Japanese attribute the import of a painting to the country where it was painted), valuing exports FOB and imports CIF, time-lag effect caused by transport, etc. Some of these discrepancies may be unavoidable but an effort is needed on both sides to try to clarify the situation. These statistical differences are not the core of the problem, which remains the deficit, but they may create misunderstanding and may lead to wrong assessments of the exact situation.

At the Japan-EC Ministerial Meeting of 29 May, 1990, a Working Group was established for the elimination of remaining problems in the field of trade. The Commission has put 18 different issues on the agenda for this group while Japan listed three. For the Commission, leather and leather footwear (liberalization of the restrictive tariff quota system), processed food and fish products are priority areas. The group met for the first time in Tokyo on 17 July 1990. A second meeting took place in Brussels on 11-12 October. An evaluation of the discussions held in the Working Group was made at the High Level Consultation which took place in Tokyo on 25-26 October 1990. At this meeting the Commission side expressed its disappointment at the lack of progress so far in the Working Group. Both Sides agreed to make every effort to solve these problems in the Uruguay Round. But should those efforts fail, they agreed to meet again with a view to finding solutions.

The total amount of Japanese direct investment in Europe is 14.5 times larger than European investments in Japan (accumulated figure for 1988: 27.972 Min. US against 1.917). In 1989 there has been a sharp increase in Japanese direct investment in Europe resulting in an accumulated figure of 41.992 Min US. Japanese investment is welcomed in the Community, in particular if it integrates well in the fabric of the local economic communities and European subcontractors and managers are used as much as possible. However, the present ratio of Japanese direct investment in the Community to the Community's investment in Japan is preoccupying and should be improved by promoting European investment in Japan.

Convinced that a more developed overall relationship with Japan would be beneficial to both sides (strengthening the third side of the triangle EC/Japan/US) the Community has attempted to develop closer cooperative links with Japan, particularly in areas such as science and technology, in the industrial field, and at the political level (Troika meetings at ministerial level and the level of officials). At the last Ministerial meeting it was also agreed that the EC and Japan should enhance and deepen cooperation in the

in 1989 while European imports of Japanese products represented 10.4% of total EC imports for the same year. In absolute terms the figures are 21 billion ECU for the former and 45 billion ECU for the latter.

The trade deficit with Japan is of great concern to the Community. This deficit not only seems to perpetuate itself (the EC has had a deficit with Japan for over 30 years now) but it has reached an intolerable size: for the last five years it has been above 20 billion ECUs and in 1990 it still exceeded 23 billion ECU although this was a slight reduction compared with 1988 and 1989 where it reached 24.6 and 25.2 billion ECU. The problems of duration and size are aggravated by the sectoral concentration of this deficit and thus four sectors are responsible for roughly 50% of the deficit: Cars (4.1 billion ECU), Electronic Data Processing equipment (4.1 billion ECU), Telecommunication equipment (1.3 billion ECU) and Electronic components (2.7 billion ECU).

In absolute terms, Japanese exports to the Community at present double EC exports to Japan which means that European exports must grow at least twice as fast as Japanese exports just to keep the deficit stable.

At the same time, there is an concentration of Community exports to Japan on a few consumer goods which makes them vulnerable to changes in domestic demand for these few products. EC exports to Japan are increasingly vulnerable to shifts in consumer demand since the growth of exports of consumer goods (cars, textiles, alcoholic beverages) is larger than the growth of exports of industrial goods (organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, non-metal minerals).

The faster growth experienced by EC exports to Japan in 1990 and the slower growth of Japanese exports to the Community has not resulted in a reduction of the deficit according to EC figures. Even this "improvement" must be viewed with caution since several factors seem to indicate a potential reversal of the tendency based on the figures of the last part of 1990 and the beginning of 1991:

- Economic growth seems to be slowing down in Japan, although still higher than in most OECD countries. The 5% increase expected for fiscal year 1990 could become a 3% growth for fiscal year 1991 according to most forecasts. Shrinking domestic demand (mainly due to a slowdown in corporate capital investment) would reduce the overall import level although personal consumption would stay firm.
- The relatively high yen value of the last few years has forced Japanese industry into a restructuring process which has resulted in a further increase of its international competitiveness.
- The weak situation of the US economy has resulted in the strengthening of Japanese export growth to the Community and the ASEAN countries.

The Community is concerned with the lack of significant increases of EC exports to Japan in certain sectors where, nevertheless, the EC seems to be competitive internationally. A good illustration of this are the EC exports of Office Machinery and Telecommunications Equipment. Japan imported 7.55 billion dollars of these products in 1988 of which 4.42 billion came from the US and only 0.5 billion from the EC according to GATT statistics. During the same year the Community had an export of 3.87 billion dollars of those same products to the US. Food products are another category where Community exports

ANNEX I

Community trade with Japan by Member States, 1990

	EC-imports (cif)		EC-exports (fob)	
	1000 ECU	- % -	1000 ECU	- % -
Total	46,209,669	100.0	22,714,151	100.0
of which:				
F	5,441,421	11.8	3,401,249	15.0
B/L	3,411,976	7.4	1,240,039	5.5
NL	4,315,692	9.3	895,714	3.9
D	14,471,854	31.3	8,497,785	37.4
I	3,330,566	7.2	3,135,921	13.8
UK	9,478,945	20.5	3,672,080	16.2
IRL	715,122	1.5	343,227	1.5
DK	857,426	1.9	919,854	4.0
GR	922,580	2.0	61,204	0.3
P	516,664	1.1	131,630	0.6
E	2,747,423	5.9	415,448	1.8

Source: SIENA, EUROSTAT

Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service

following fields: G24, science and technology, environment, communication and information, development assistance, labour and social affairs and cultural exchange.

At the same time, on 21 December 1990, the Japanese authorities presented a proposal on new initiatives for strengthening EC/Japan relations (known as the Owada proposals). The main elements of this initiative are:

- An improved mechanism for EC/Japan consultation at Head of government level.
- A joint declaration on EC/Japan relations which would include a statement on basic values shared by both sides, a list of objectives shared by both sides, the principles of consultation and the institutional framework for this consultation.
- A renewed effort to intensify bilateral cooperation.

This initiative is currently under discussion and has already been discussed in the framework of Political Cooperation and at a Full Members' meeting of the 113 Committee.

ANNEX III

Community trade with Japan by commodity classes, 1989				
	EC-imports (cif)		EC-exports (fob)	
	1000 ECU	- % -	1000 ECU	- % -
Total	46,337,072	100.0	21,129,824	100.0
of which:				
SITC 0+1	167,456	0.4	2,183,850	10.3
SITC 2+4	234,641	0.5	499,030	2.4
SITC 3	22,283	0.0	133,429	0.6
SITC 5	2,115,828	4.6	3,352,419	15.9
SITC 7	34,437,616	74.3	6,536,373	30.9
SITC 6+8	8,551,079	18.5	7,464,075	35.3

Source: CRONOS-FRIC, EUROSTAT

Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service

Note: SITC 0+1: Food, beverages and tobacco

SITC 2+4: Raw materials

SITC 3 : Energy

SITC 5 : Chemicals

SITC 7 : Machinery and transport eq.

SITC 6+8: Other manufactured products

ANNEX II

Community trade with Japan, 1980-1990			-1000 ECU-
	EC-imports (cif)	EC-exports (fob)	Balance
1980	13,968,052	4,809,839	-9,158,213
1981	17,287,936	5,925,398	-11,362,538
1982	19,253,328	6,608,883	-12,644,445
1983	21,939,648	7,710,090	-14,229,558
1984	25,668,416	9,364,215	-16,304,201
1985	28,585,824	10,474,895	-18,110,929
1986	33,215,312	11,398,985	-21,816,327
1987	34,756,992	13,617,919	-21,139,073
1988	41,618,064	17,020,336	-24,597,728
1989	46,337,072	21,129,824	-25,207,248
1990	46,209,669	22,714,151	-23,495,518
1990			
Average	274.5	392.9	-----
1980/81/82=100			

Sources: CRONOS-FRIC and SIENA, EUROSTAT

Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service

CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-EC MINISTERIAL MEETING

During a ministerial meeting between Members of the Commission of the European Community and Members of the Japanese Cabinet on 29th May 1990 a broad exchange of views was held on matters of interest to the EC and Japan. On all these matters it was agreed to have closer consultations at every level, including at the level of heads of government and ministers. The aim will be to develop a multi-tier relationship based on dialogue and cooperation in areas of mutual interest in a global context. Both sides share the view that cooperation between Japan and the Community will contribute to the stable development of the international situation.

Both sides confirmed again the importance of giving political impetus for further development of the EC-Japan relationship and re-affirmed that meetings at ministerial level should be held at a frequency of once per year. The next ministerial meeting is therefore expected to be held in 1991 in Tokyo.

Japan and the EC reiterated their commitment to improving the multilateral trading system and strengthening the GATT through agreements reached during the Uruguay Round negotiations, scheduled to conclude in Brussels this December. Trade matters will remain an important aspect of the Japan-EC relationship. Both sides decided to extend cooperation into the field of trade promotion and on a joint exercise on trade matters. The orientations of this have been worked out in the attached papers.

Both sides shared the view that the EC and Japan should enhance and deepen cooperation in the following fields; G24, science and technology, environment, communication and information, development assistance, labour and social affairs and cultural exchange. To this end, a series of visits, seminars and dialogues will be organized in the course of this year.

JOINT EXERCISE IN THE FIELD OF TRADE

Recognising the existence of a large trade imbalance and some remaining issues related to market access conditions between EC and Japan, the Commission and Japan shared the view that they should continue to make efforts to achieve a sound development of their economic relationship.

Both sides decided to establish a working group on trade issues. This group is directed above all to review the present situation on bilateral trade, discuss those problems which are hindering market access and identify bases for possible solutions that could be discussed either bilaterally or multilaterally. (In this context, the Commission mentioned the leather and shoe sector and that of processed foods as requiring further examination as a matter of priority). Both sides will make utmost efforts to solve trade problems within the framework of Uruguay Round negotiations.

The Japanese side explained the general outline of the measures for structural adjustments that Japan will initiate. In this connection, the EC side welcomed the assurance given by the Japanese side that the measures which will be taken by Japan will be beneficial to all trading partners. The Japanese side confirmed its readiness to provide detailed information on the measures to be taken by Japan. The EC side reiterated its commitment that the EC market integration will lead to an even more open European market.

It was agreed to review progress made by the working group during the next high level meeting, to be held between the Commission and the Japanese authorities in Tokyo in 1990.

COOPERATION FOR IMPORT PROMOTION

The Commission of the European Communities and the Japanese Government are actively involved in the promotion of European exports to Japan and have announced their intention to cooperate in their respective efforts.

The Commission welcomes the Japanese Import Promotion Programme of tax incentives, tariff elimination and reduction, import financing and funded import enhancement activities for manufactured products which are being newly introduced this year, and will be utilised by joint efforts in the interest of both sides. The Japanese Government is looking forward to the continuation of the Commission export promotion efforts, including EXPROM. The Commission and the Japanese Government believe that the effectiveness of both the Japanese and the EC measures might be enhanced by cooperation between the Japanese Government and the EC. They recognize that it would be in the best interest of both regions to reinforce cooperation between the Commission and relevant Japanese organizations for increasing the EC's exports to the Japanese market. Japan launches measures such as access and distribution of information from Japanese data banks, market studies by JETRO, trade events, sectoral missions and trade facilitation services in Japan.

The Commission for its part will pursue and develop its programme of executive training, its market studies and other promotion activities. Both sides will attempt to create synergies in the implementation of their respective programmes.

They will make further efforts to inform each other when either side takes an initiative to promote imports into Japan, when it thinks that cooperation by the other side would be beneficial to that initiative. They will also make efforts to ensure that either side is aware of the general outlines of the other's promotional efforts.

The Commission attaches great importance to the strengthening of European investment in Japan and both sides share the view that joint efforts should be made to increase the potential of European companies on the Japanese market. In this respect, the Commission welcomes, as a first encouraging step, inward investment measures in the Japanese Import Promotion Programme. They also underlined the possible role and importance of the EC-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation in this field, as well as in the promotion of business links.

Both sides believe their trade promotion activities can be enhanced significantly by those efforts, and strongly encourage their respective communities to take full advantage of the opportunities they provide.