

believe that there interests were opposed to each other. "Given the close collaboration of autochthonous and foreign capital, and given the fact that foreign capital was mainly directed by the Greek banking and investment institutions into areas where Greek commercial capital was unwilling or unable to go, it seems obvious that such interests were more complementary than antagonistic" (Mouzellis, 1976: 79).

As to the second point, any analysis that presents the Greek state as a mere puppet of the bourgeoisie, as Poulantzas did in assuming that a struggle for power between certain fractions more or less automatically can lead to a change in political regime, doesn't take into account the structural dependence of the Greek national bourgeoisie on the state, inter alia by way of the public financial institutions. The historically strong power of the state apparatus has made the Greek indigenous bourgeoisie highly dependent on the state for its consolidation and growth. This also applies to foreign capital in Greece (Mouzellis, 1976: 80).

Concluding the above, it can be stated that in Spain, Greece and Portugal (from 1960 onwards):

- an autonomous, autochthonous bourgeoisie existed, characterized by strong ties with the state apparatus and strong complementary interests with foreign capital;
- the financial institutions possessed a very strong intermediary function in the process of industrialization, combining the specific interests of the state, the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital;
- the state played an important role in the process of economic development (state interventionism);
- and finally, foreign capital played an important role in the economic development, but couldn't (and perhaps didn't want or need to) achieve either a dominant position in the bourgeoisie or a direct political influence within the state apparatus.

Remains the question if one could speak of a 'dependent type of state' in Spain, Greece and Portugal. It is certainly true that the internationalization of the Spanish, Greek and

Portuguese economies in the sixties and seventies (the influence of direct foreign investment, the dependence on foreign technology, the increasing share of foreign trade in GNP, etc.) has been a decisive factor in the process of industrialization. It could even be stated that the process of industrialization wouldn't have taken place without this internationalization. However, in the first place, it has to be emphasized that the opening of the national economy for foreign capital after 1960 was generated from an internal dynamic, in reaction to the specific needs and interests of the autochthonous bourgeoisie and not as the result of the pressure of 'international capital'. Secondly, it is of importance that the specific character of the regimes in Spain, Greece and Portugal has particularly favoured this path of economic dependence on foreign capital, without loosing their political independence (Tsoukalis, 1981). This raised the question why these regimes came into crisis and eventually to fall in the seventies. At first sight, the most plausible answer would be, that if the specific character of the regimes formed a precondition for economic expansion in the sixties, subsequently the international economic crisis of the seventies would take away a good deal of their political legitimacy. However, this doesn't seem to be the more structural reason for the fall of the dictatorships.

A second point of critique on Poulantzas' analysis of the crisis of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal should be focused on his implicit assumption that the struggle for power within the bourgeoisie has directly effected the regime-stability. Or to put it in another way: that the class-struggle can be directly translated on the political level. In the case Spain, Greece and Portugal, however, it seems that we rather have to speak of indirect connections.

To make this point clear, we have to go into the specific, historical determined character of the form of government in these countries during the sixties and early seventies. As point of departure can serve the thesis that whether or not a party-system exists, depends on the historical development of the position of a society in the international division of

Labour. It can be stated that in a relative 'closed economy' (i.e. less integrated in the international division of labour) the position of the traditional elite is less challenged and accordingly the need for an horizontal party-system is less actual than in the case of relative 'open economies' (Castles, 1981). This can be illustrated by the Greek example.

Mouzelis has examined "the intricate, shifting relationships between clientelistic and class political organisations during the process of capitalist growth" for the case of Greece (Mouzelis, 1978: 475). Clientelistic elements, he argues, are to a greater or less extent to be found in every political system. The extent in which these elements are manifested, depends on the level of development of a country. The political conflict tends to get a predominant class-character in social formations where the capitalist mode of production is both dominant and widespread in the economy. Clientelistic elements don't disappear completely in the process of development, but are gradually replaced by an increasingly dominant class-structure. "When capital has ceased to operate exclusively in the sphere of distribution and has made a large-scale entry into that of production (agricultural and/or industrial), one finds (a) a widespread process of social and political mobilisation as the rural periphery loses its self-contained character (through the development of national markets, communication networks, education, etc.) and the working masses are inescapably drawn into the political process; and (b) the emergence, within the context of parliamentary regimes, of favourable conditions for the development of formal organisations (political parties, trade unions) which try more or less successfully and autonomously to articulate and promote the collective interests of the dominated classes, i.e. of the urban and rural direct producers" (Mouzelis, 1978: 476/477). Thus, the introduction of wage labour and the separation of the direct producer from his means of production, as associated with the coming to dominance of the capitalist mode of production, are related with the development of class consciousness and organization, which tends to replace vertical mechanisms of political inte-

gration by horizontal ones. When this happens, "conditions are favourable for the decline of personalistic politics and the all-pervasive clientelism always associated with it" (Mouzelis, 1978: 477). This process of gradually replacing vertical mechanisms of political integration by horizontal ones, i.e. clientelistic elements of control by political organization along the lines of class division, actually occurred in Greece in the period after World War II, and more specifically, simultaneous with the process of industrialization in the sixties and seventies. Although traditional patterns of clientelism remained in force, the fall of the Greek dictatorship can be explained by this structural change in dominance between two different forms of political organization, characterized by a growing mass mobilisation of the dominated classes.

In Spain the picture is somewhat different. The vertical build-up of the Spanish society by way of the corporative state had, historically, a much more 'artificial' character than in Greece. While in Greece clientelism was, traditionally, deeply rooted in society, in Spain such a vertical structure of society had to be imposed by repression. One of the most important reasons for this was the fact that in Spain, in a much earlier stage, a strong independent labour movement existed, partially because of the relative early introduction of wage labour as the most dominant form of labour organization. Nevertheless, also in Spain a certain form of clientelism remained into existence: the so-called 'caciquismo'. However, at the end of the autarchic phase this form was only regional of character and for the rest in large replaced by a class-structure. The conflicts which generated from this structure could only be suppressed by way of a repressive corporative system. But also in Spain the economic development of the sixties and seventies involved an increasing mass mobilisation which eventually eroded the artificial maintained, vertical structures from within. The fall of the dictatorship and the establishment of an institutional party-system were the results.

The regime in Portugal can be characterized as an inbetween form with regard to the Spanish and Greek case. In Portugal corporatism as a social system was much more deeply rooted in society than in Spain, but to a lesser extent than the clientelistic system in Greece. That's why in the case of Portugal has to be spoken of an authoritarian, corporative form of government, which could be maintained by a lesser degree of repression than in the case of Spain. But it wasn't also possible "to resurrect a fully corporative system in the classic pattern, since new groups had already grown up organized around principles distinct from those previously considered the only right or legitimate one. Cast in the rigid Catholic-corporatist mold of the 1930's, the Estado Novo could only deal with those elements who rejected the system through repression, because by definition they were subversive, heretical, and pernicious and had to be destroyed to preserve the 'natural' order" (Wiarda, 1974: 27). In the period thereafter, the Portuguese regime was characterized by both the maintenance of the 'natural' order (as in the case of Greece) and the repression of 'subversive' elements (as in the case of Spain). But also in the case of Portugal, this 'natural' corporative order became gradually replaced in the sixties by increasingly dominant horizontal structures.

Resuming the above, in the sixties and seventies in Spain, Greece and Portugal, under the influence of the process of industrialization in these countries, a shift has occurred from a more vertical to a predominantly horizontal form of government, formally enforced by the fall of the dictatorships as a necessary institutional precondition for this continuing change. In other words, we could interpret the eventual fall of the dictatorships as a mere formal act in a structural development from 'state corporatism' to 'societal corporatism'. "Societal corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist state" (Schmitter, 1974: 105). The shift towards

societal corporatism, strongly related to the economic development in Spain, Greece and Portugal, is of great importance in explaining the ultimate erosion of the political legitimacy of the dictatorships, although we have to keep in mind the differences between Spain, and to a lesser extent Portugal, and Greece. In Spain (and Portugal) a shift occurred from a repressive state corporatism to societal corporatism, whereas in Greece a shift occurred from 'state clientelism' (thus, strongly rooted in the Greek society, without the necessity of an overall presence of repression) to 'societal clientelism'.

Finally, it has to be firmly stated that the fall of the regimes didn't concern a crisis of the capitalist system: the form of government was at stake, not the state as such. The Spanish, Greek and Portuguese regimes were evidently not overthrown by an open and frontal movement of the popular masses in insurrection. But it is even wrong to state that the contradictions between the United States and the European Common Market in the seventies, translated into the intra-bourgeois conflict between the comprador and domestic bourgeoisies, has played a direct role in the decline and fall of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal.

3. The stabilization policy in Spain, Greece and Portugal under 'socialist' rule

For the purpose of this paper we now have to make a stride forward in time. The second question we have to answer is why the 'socialist' changes in government in Spain, Greece and Portugal have had a rather moderate impact on socio-economic policy, or to put it in another way, why this new governments weren't able to stimulate the national economies. This section will deal with this question. In section 4, I shall try to explain how this matter can be related to the structural causes of the fall of the dictatorships, which we dealt with in the last section.

In the post-war political economic literature the question of the relationship between the economic policy of the state and the development of the economic cycle has rarely been posed in an explicit theoretical manner. In a famous essay, dated from 1943, Kalecki introduced for this specific relationship the term 'political-business-cycle', but the underlying idea to this has sporadically been subject of discussion.

According to the so-called political-business-cycle theory, in a slump a situation of full employment can, in principle, be established through a Keynesian economic policy, when this economic policy raises the effective demand by 'deficit-spending'. However, such a policy will be contradicted by the interests of businessmen in the subsequent boom, since the disciplinary effect of unemployment gradually falls off and the power of the labour movement accordingly increases. Subsequent wage-increases will put the profits under pressure and the businessmen will react hereupon through price-increases and/or through reducing production. Politically, a powerful bloc is likely to be formed between big business and the rentier interests, and they will put the government under pressure to provoke a 'cleaning-up' crisis by means of a restrictive policy, which must bring the 'disturbed relations' (too high a wage- and price-level) again into equilibrium with produc-

tive capacity. The pressure of all these forces, and in particular of big business would most probably induce the Government to return to the orthodox policy of cutting down the budget deficit. A slump would follow in which Government spending policy would come again into its own" (Kalecki, 1971: 164).

As I have mentioned, this concept of the political business cycle has seldom been worked out after Kalecki. It was not till the end of the seventies that certain important aspects of the political business cycle theory were used as a starting-point for the development of an alternative economic policy (see for example the alternative projects of the 'Memorandum-Gruppe' in West Germany and the 'Alternative Economic Strategy' group in Great-Britain). Like Kalecki, the representatives of such projects, alternative to the present, operative austerity-policy, are all making the same error in leaving out of consideration the conflicting interests between different fractions of the bourgeoisie with regard to the realization and content of economic policy. They rather consider the bourgeoisie as an homogeneous entity, that together with the state apparatus joins issue with the labour movement. In a way these 'alternatives' can be labeled, therefore, as 'elitists', since they start from the concepts of power and influence rather than (in the first instance) from the capitalist mode of production and the consequent general laws of motion.

Closely related to this point, the following has to be put forward: the alternative strategies above-mentioned start from the presupposition that politics are autonomous in relation to the economic cycle, since economic policy is strongly determined by the political pressure of interestgroups and can decisively influence the economic cycle. In a reaction to the political business cycle theory, Jürgen Hoffmann levels his criticism at this presupposition. The political business cycle theory, he argues, doesn't raise the question towards the 'material constraints' behind the articulated interests of the pressure groups. Inasmuch as the economy is considered as

decisively managed and controlled by the state, the constraints resulting from changes in the productive conditions remain out of analysis. What remains is a mere sociological approach (Hoffmann, 1977: 340). However, if one is to investigate on the other hand the contradictions which develop during the economic cycle in the process of capitalist accumulation, then the resulting power constellation between different pressure groups (i.e. between classes) can be analyzed, without necessitating the external introduction of a special strife or special influence.

In this context, I am of the opinion that the restrictive policy in the second half of the seventies and eighties in almost every OECD-country can't be explained on the basis of a particular pressure of (certain) interestgroups, but as the expression of the dilemma every government is placed in during an economic crisis: that a policy of economic stimulation can postpone but not prevent a worsening of the productive conditions and a decrease in the rate of profit. Such an expansionistic policy moves the compromise-line between wage-labour and capital in favour of wage-labour, so far as in certain periods a situation of full employment can be reached. However, in the course of the economic cycle this shift will be turned back by the 'economy', since a deficit-spending policy can not guarantee in the long-term a full occupation of the productive machinery. The capitalist economy itself determines the margins for an alternative economic policy and produces class-specific solutions (in favour of capital) in the time of a slump.

By now we have regarded the economic policy of the state as an continuing adjustment of politics to the capitalist economy. For this purpose we have presupposed the situation in a closed economy. In the last part of this section we shall go further into the matter by viewing the external restraints on a national government to carry out an alternative, expansionistic economic policy.

It could be stated that the international trade flows in the last decades have become less sensitive in relation with

changing parities between exchange rates. Four reasons can be mentioned (Holman, Foot, 1983: 59):

1. an increasing specialization of the economies of several countries, in the course of which many products are no longer (or not yet) produced in these countries. Especially the capital-goods industry plays a prominent part in this process of increasing specialization;
2. a fast developing concern-intern division of labour within Multinational Enterprises, which take over an ever greater share of world trade in the form of concern-intern trade;
3. the central role of the import of raw materials, in the seventies especially oil, which can not be replaced by national products;
4. and the extension of the so-called commodity forward transactions, by which the changes in price-level only with a delay have an influence on the actual payable prices.

As a consequence of this relative, short-term insensibility of trade flows, a renewal of the debate with regard to fixed versus flexible exchange rates has put the emphasis on the influence of, particularly downward, exchange rate adjustments on national rates of inflation. Nominal prices in goods markets are usually inflexible downward, so that initially the increase in the domestic prices of goods tends to be larger in depreciating countries than the decrease in these prices in appreciating countries. Representatives of the so-called cost-push school have pointed out the danger that a government which tries to meet a deficit on the current account by way of external adjustment can push the country into a vicious circle of depreciation and inflation. For if workers are prepared to defend their real living standards from all forms of attack, then they will simply respond to this depreciation-induced rise in the cost of living by lodging compensatory wage claims. In this way a situation can arise in which a spiral of depreciation-increasing inflation-depreciation will explode, hyperinflation being the ultimate outcome. Add to this that an appreciation of a currency with respect to other currencies produces the same effect as a depreciation of this currencies with respect to the appreciating currency.

Therefore, not only depreciations of deficit-countries do generate inflationary spirals, but also appreciations of surplus-countries. Moreover, expansionary monetary policies following incipient domestic costs and price increases can aggravate this situation furthermore.

Indissolubly connected with the influence of changing exchange rates on inflation, the consequences for the international competitiveness of national industry play an important role in the choice of flexible or fixed exchange rate systems by a government. The experiences of the economically weaker countries with the influence of depreciations on the international competitiveness have led to a strong scepticism with respect to this means of improving the competitiveness. The in principle positive effects of a depreciation are in practice totally or almost totally undone by a national inflationary spiral. That is why the governments of these countries are opting for a system of fixed exchange rates. This in turn makes a restrictive economic policy extremely urgent.

We have already mentioned the increasing specialization of the national economies within the international division of labour and the consequent necessity of most countries to import certain products that can not be produced or are no longer produced in these countries. For instance, as to the second enlargement of the Common Market with Greece, Spain and Portugal, it has been argued that these countries will enter into a complementary division of labour with the highly industrialized countries of the Community (Deubner, 1982: 13). The effect this will have on the possibility to pursue an independent economic policy in these countries is already shown dramatically by the moderate policies the new 'socialist' governments are actually pursuing. In order to explain this more in detail we have to give attention to the central role the capital goods industry is playing in the post-war process of international specialization.

The expansion of world trade after the Second World War can be characterized by an increase in trade between industrial nations and a subsequent decrease in trade between these industrial nations and the underdeveloped countries. As a con-


sequence, this trade pattern was coupled with a relative increase in trade of industrial products and particularly with a relative increase in trade of capital goods. This created a new kind of dependence within the highly industrialized part of the world, a dependence between countries with a large share of the capital goods industry in their national economies and countries without such a strong capital goods industry. Along these lines a 'new' inter-capitalist hierarchy has come into existence. Frieder Schlupp has selected four principal elements (through the example of the West German specialization profile) by which the place of a country in this hierarchy can be determined (Schlupp, 1980: 53/54):

1. the national specialization in industrial production (and trade) in general, and in capital-goods in particular;
2. the 'outward' trade orientation toward the world market in general, and the most 'central', more developed foreign markets in particular;
3. the level of concentration and degree of centralization of capital as well as the specific inter-relations between industrial and finance capital;
4. the level of integration of the labour movement into the bourgeois-capitalist economic and political system.

These elements tend to reinforce or weaken each other (see diagram 1).

Comparing this scheme with the situation in Spain, Greece and Portugal, some remarkable differences can be extracted in relation with the countries at the top of the so-called 'inter-capitalist hierarchy'. In the first place, The Spanish, Greek and Portuguese economies are characterized by a relative low share of the capital goods industry (Krieger, 1980; Alonso, et. al., 1982). This means that they depend to a certain extent on other countries for the import of capital goods. Subsequently this means that the lower the absolute and relative national specialization in modern industries and technologies, and especially in capital goods production is, the lower the structural 'coherence' of the national production apparatus, and also the lower the relative homogeneity of economic

Diagram 1: Implications of a large share of the capital goods industry in the national economy



modernization and productivity in all sectors and industries. "Such a national specialization pattern of modern industries and capital goods production tends to favour, by multiple spin-off effects, a relatively 'autocentred' socio-economic national development. A contrasting specialization in traditional industries and production-chains in turn tends to result in a much less autocentred, even structurally dependent national development pattern because of absolutely or relatively incoherent, incomplete and heterogeneous inter- and intra-sectoral linkages within the framework of the national economy" (Schlupp, 1980: 53).

In the case of Spain, Portugal and Greece, the relative low share of the capital goods industry generates, at least partially, a lower degree of productivity, higher inflation rates, a lower general wage level, a relative small percentage of skilled workers and potentially more social conflict (see

diagram 1).

In the second place, as a result of the first point, the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese economies are characterized by a relatively low export orientation in industrial goods. Exports of goods as a percentage of GDP in 1977 amounted for Greece 10%, for Portugal 12,5% and Spain 8,8%, compared with a percentage of 24,01 for the Community as a whole (Tsoukalis, 1981: 26/27).

We now can turn back to the central question in this section: why the 'socialist' governments in Spain, Greece and Portugal aren't able to stimulate their national economies? It is a fact that after 1975 a real internationalization of austerity got through. In almost every OECD-country a relative successful stabilization policy became dominant. This internationalization of austerity was by no means the result of a coincidental synchronization. To my opinion, the austerity-policy was 'exported' from the countries at the top of the inter-capitalist hierarchy to the less developed countries. This can be clearly illustrated by the example of the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese cases. Diagram 2 shows how a relative successful stabilization policy in the highly developed countries (for instance West Germany) can aggravate economic and social problems in closely related countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal. This process eventually generates the necessity in these latter countries to pursue a stabilization policy, or, as is the same, limits the margins to pursue a stimulation policy. The experiences of the French socialist government in 1981 have made clear that an unilateral stimulation policy can not go 'unpunished'. In stead of an impulse for the national industry with positive effects on employment, this expansionistic policy produced an increase in imports and an enlargement of the trade deficit. Anticipating a highly possible devaluation of the French franc, a massive speculation and flight of capital took place, which produced a further downward pressure on the franc. This led eventually to a nominal devaluation in June 1982 and a second one in March 1983. Subsequently, the French government was forced to shift away from this stimulation policy.



#### 4. The process of 'social-democratization' in Spain, Greece and Portugal

In the introduction we have distinguished three approaches in analyzing the problems of development and underdevelopment. These approaches not only imply three different levels of analysis, as we have seen, but are also based on different political presuppositions and lead accordingly to different kinds of proposals and expectations for the future. Moreover, the academic debate has increasingly shifted away, in time, from a strict national approach (as in the case of Rostow) to a more global approach (as in the case of Wallerstein). In this context, it isn't accidentally that Rostow wrote his 'magnum opus' in 1957 and that the world-system approach has become extremely popular in the last decade. One of the most important reasons for this shift in primacy has to be found in the post-war internationalization of productive capital and, more specifically, in the development of the world economy in the late sixties and seventies, usually described as the coming into existence of a 'New International Division of Labour'.

For Wallerstein capitalism has always been a feature of the world system as a whole. National developments within this framework are therefore unimportant, both in terms of explaining the past and in the transformation of the system in the future. The existence of such a unitary system is based on Wallerstein's definition of the capitalist mode of production. For him, capitalism is production for profit in the market that unites the world in a system of exchange relations. These relations in turn determine the division of the world into a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery. As a result of this emphasis on the economic division into distinct national systems becomes less relevant (Wallerstein, 1979).

As opposed to the vision of Wallerstein, according to traditional marxism capitalism originates in a few places or states and then passes through certain stages, a process involving the internationalization first of commodity capital, then of money capital and, in the post-war division of labour, of

productive capital. In this view, the internationalization of capitalist production relations, although increasingly global, is still a process which is not yet complete.

Comparing these two visions, we could state that the world-system approach is putting the emphasis on the sphere of circulation and realization, while the marxist approach starts from the sphere of production. In other words, we deal here with the primacy of production for profit in the market as confronted to the primacy of social relations of production. When we now turn back to the subject of this paper it can be pointed out that the primary subject matter of section 2 consisted of an explanation of the fall of the dictatorships starting from the primacy of the social relations of production, i.e. the gradual introduction of wage labour as the dominant form of labour organization and the subsequent shift from vertical to horizontal (class-) structures. In section 3 we have tried to explain the moderate impact the 'socialist' governments have had on economic policy, starting from the implicit primacy of production for profit in the market. The internationalization of commodity realization (that is, the growing importance of international trade for the national economies), the different national rates of productivity and the different exchange rates, in short, the differences in international competitiveness between national industries, and the different specialization of national economies are all points that have been mentioned in this context.

Yet, the two approaches above-mentioned are not mutually exclusive, as I shall point out in this section. To make this point clear, the emergence of a transnational bourgeoisie in Spain, Greece and Portugal will be analyzed from two angles: as an integral part of the internationalization of capital, and as the result of the specific class configuration in the sixties and seventies in Spain, Greece and Portugal.

The idea of class-division in the Atlantic Area, the economically integrated bloc under the Pax Americana, generally has focused upon the existence of Atlantic and European fractions of the European bourgeoisie. Even if the business

and governmental circles of Western Europe are all in favour of the EEC today, there exists a division between those who are in favour of an Atlantic Europe, viz., integrated with the American economy, and those who recommend an European Europe, i.e., independent from, if not rival to this American economy.

The idea that the division into Atlantic and European tendencies in Europe is somehow the work of forces emanating from the United States, accordingly presupposes the existence of groups functioning as internal relays of the external influence. The fractionation of the indigenous class structure deriving from the foreign impact has been analyzed for Latin America by Andre Gunder Frank, who distinguishes between a 'comprador' bourgeoisie (the fraction serving as the internal relay of external influence) and a generally rudimentary 'national' bourgeoisie. Frank's approach is applied to Atlantic integration by Poulantzas in his book 'Classes in Contemporary Capitalism'. To Frank's categories, Poulantzas added the notion of an 'domestic' bourgeoisie in order to convey the condition in which a would-be national bourgeoisie in Western Europe actually exists. The domestic bourgeoisies in the various Western European countries may succeed temporarily in consolidating a basis for capital accumulation under their control, but they no longer are able to rise to the status of a national bourgeoisie capable of confronting American capital, since the technical superiority of the latter in terms of its advanced labour processes, and the degree to which the reproduction of American capital already takes place in the European countries, prevents such a stand. By implication, in Poulantzas' view, a truly European bourgeoisie in fact is not a real possibility any more, given the effective superiority of labour processes controlled by American capital in the context of the post-war internationalization. That is, in his analysis he didn't build in any indication of developments which would put an end to this American superiority.

However, and contrary to Poulantzas' analysis, an adequate analysis of Atlantic class formation should try to analytically distinguish between the dynamics of trans-Atlantic class alignments and the momentary superiority of American capital.

It should be able to label American and European class fractions most actively engaged in internationalization by a common name derived from the comprehensive context they are both part of, before labelling one of them by the name of the other. In her critique of Poulantzas, Suzanne de Brunhoff marks the direction of such an analysis. Poulantzas, she argues, only spoke of American capital and European bourgeoisies and obviously ignored the complementary existence of the American bourgeoisie and European capital. Accordingly, it is not possible to know what happens in the United States themselves, for American capital is presented as an unalterable force, i.e., in an abstract and static way (De Brunhoff, 1976).

Kees van der Pijl, in his analysis of the Atlantic ruling class, tries to meet this problem by analyzing transnational relations, which exceed the strict national character of class formation. Fractions within the European and American bourgeoisies, he argues, can be translated into two functional forms of capital, viz., money capital and productive capital. These functional forms are related to two ideo-typical 'concepts of control': the money-capital concept, or 'liberal internationalism', and the productive capital concept, or 'state-monopoly tendency'. Within the Pax Americana a synthetic concept, viz., 'corporate liberalism', has crystallized, a synthesis that shows a strong resemblance with the 'accumulation regime' which has been called 'Fordism' (v.d. Pijl, 1985).

The two 'concepts of control' above-mentioned are quite similar to what Polanyi, years ago, has called 'the double movement', personified as the action of two organizing principles in society. "The one (is) the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other (is) the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market - primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes - and

using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods" (Polanyi, 1957: 132). These two organizing principles strongly overlap with the money capital concept and the productive capital concept, as politico-ideological concepts related to economic interests, and are historically reflected in the shift from the economic liberalism inherent to the predominance of capital engaged in circulation, in the 19th century, to the pre-dominance of large-scale production in the inter-war period. From the moment that productive capital becomes internationalized, especially after World War II, a synthetic concept comes into existence, based on some specific characteristics.

In the first place, this process of internationalization of productive capital is based on a specific phase in the development of capitalism, the progressive mode of accumulation, which combines labour intensive and capital intensive production (v.d. Pijl, 1983: 16). Secondly, and of great importance, the post-war expansion was based on the combination of increasing productivity and real income, as originally introduced by Henry Ford (the introduction of the production-line and the '5-dollar-day'), and accordingly increasing mass-consumption. This continuing spiral of rising productivity (and output) and increasing mass consumption was based on two conditions: "unless increased productivity in the producer-goods sector offsets the rising technical composition of capital, the proportion of immobilized assets will become dangerously high; and unless increased productivity in the consumer-goods sector balances the rise in mass purchasing-power, the share of wages in total value-added will climb to the detriment of profit" (Lipietz, 1982: 35). However, when productivity began to slacken at the end of the sixties and early seventies, these two conditions couldn't be fulfilled anymore, resulting in a crisis of 'mass underconsumption'. Thirdly, and for the purpose of this paper highly important, the post-war period was characterized by the rise of the welfare-state, a process which could be strongly identified with the important role social-democratic parties played in

governmental socio-economic planning.

These three characteristics of the post-war expansion form the basis elements of the so-called Fordist mode of accumulation or 'accumulation regime' (Aglietta, 1979), the whole of social structures and institutions which supports and maintains the process of accumulation. This specific accumulation regime has to be seen as a social model of compromise between the two organizing principles in society above-mentioned, as a compromise between economic liberalism and state interventionism. Apart from an economic component, i.e. the combination of increasing productivity and real wages, this 'regime' bears in it a socio-political component in as much as it means the subordination of the working class to a 'corporate-liberal' class compromise. In this sense the fundamental subordination of wage labour to capital isn't overruled; the relation labour/capital is rather socially embedded in order to reproduce this specific relation under changing circumstances, in the context of the progressive mode of accumulation. Furthermore, as a result of this new accumulation regime, a transnational bourgeoisie comes into existence, united along the lines of the compromise between economic liberalism and state interventionism. At the political level, social-democracy is the most natural representative of this intra-bourgeois compromise, serving at the same time as a political relay for the maintenance of the class compromise, according to which the working class is both subordinated to the general interests of the bourgeoisie, and benefiting from increasing socio-economic welfare.

We have to keep in mind that this Fordist accumulation regime originated in the United States in the inter-war years and was eventually transferred, through the post-war internationalization of American productive capital, to Western Europe. In this way, Fordism is essentially connected with the socio-economic formations of the old industrial core-areas, where it was introduced in order to regulate the long established relation between wage labour and capital. We have to bear this in mind when talking of the eventual extension

of this accumulation regime to countries in the periphery of Europe, i.e. Spain, Greece and Portugal. In this context we could state the following: The idea that the division into Atlantic and European tendencies in European class structure is the effect of forces emanating from the United States has to be revised on account of evidence relating to the new wave of Fordist restructuring now affecting the Mediterranean countries. As is particularly transparent in the case of social-democratic Spain, Greece and Portugal, Fordism as an organizing principle of class relations has abandoned its historical Atlantic constraint and is operative as a restructuring force independent of the expansion of American capital.

One of the main theses we want to elaborate in our ongoing research is that the ideo-typical concepts above-mentioned strongly overlap with corresponding, historically determined concepts, established in the 19th and early 20th century in Spain, Greece and Portugal and generated out of specific national conditions (as an example can serve the division in liberal and conservative Hispano-Americanism in Spain; see for example Pike, 1971). This division makes possible a significant fractionation of the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese bourgeoisies, along the lines of the two organizing principles in society. We could state that this fractionation of the national bourgeoisie was the dominant one at the end of the 1950s, although characterized by an historical pre-dominant position of the fraction which relied on state interventionism at the economic and socio-political level. Subsequently, the economic liberalization of the 1960s fortified the 'liberal fraction', organized along the principles of economic self-regulation and free trade. That is, the internal necessity for the 'state monopoly' fraction to open the frontiers for international capital at the end of the 1950s, made it possible for the 'liberal' fraction to strengthen its position in the period thereafter. Gradually, as the economic liberalization became structural and (in the sixties) successful, a synthesis crystallized out of the two concepts of control, on the basis of which these fractions

were organized, a synthesis which emphasized both the need for economic liberalization, with a moderate impact of the state at the economic level, and political liberalization, with a moderate impact of 'self-regulating' mechanisms at the political level (i.e. the need for a party-system). On the basis of this synthesis a transnational bourgeoisie came into existence, in a combined effort of the largest part of the two national fractions and foreign capital, to ensure further economic growth and to continue the control over the dominated classes, although under different conditions. In other words, in this process the complementary economic interests of the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital were extended to the socio-political level, within the framework of the formation of a transnational bourgeoisie. At least in the case of Spain this process was accompanied in the seventies by a gradual shift in the character of direct foreign investments, from production for the domestic market to an increasingly export-orientated production, and the liberalization of the legislation with regard to the acting of foreign banks on the Spanish market.

It is important to note that the formation of a transnational bourgeoisie in Spain, Greece and Portugal occurred at the moment of the collapse of the Pax Americana. When the crisis of Atlantic integration became manifest, this formation took shape. In this context it is worth noting that the massive penetration of foreign capital in Spain, Greece and Portugal, in the course of the sixties, was accompanied by the gradual equalization of accumulation conditions within the Atlantic Area (i.e. between the United States and Western Europe). We have already pointed out the enormous impact of these foreign investments on the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese economies. However, one remained unmentioned: the influence of direct foreign investment on the industrial structure in Spain, Greece and Portugal. The economic expansion in these countries generated a dualistic structure between on the one hand a small amount of large-scale, modernized enterprises and on the other hand numerous small factories

and shops that are backward in technology. It can be stated that the combined increase of productivity and real wages, as an integral part of the Fordist accumulation regime, was introduced in the sixties only in the large-scale enterprises, without having a 'spin-off' effect on the small factories. This aggravated the dualistic industrial structures in these countries further more. Still, it is important to state that the 'economic component' of Fordism was actually, although at the same time partially, introduced in the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese economies, forming the material base on which, eventually, the transnational bourgeoisie came into existence.

This brings us at the central point of this section. When talking about the economic and socio-political formations of Spain, Greece and Portugal in the seventies and early eighties, we have to speak of semi-peripheral Fordism, as to point out the intermediate position these countries occupy in the International Division of Labour. Resuming the above, we can state that the economic and socio-political 'components' of the Fordist accumulation regime weren't introduced at the same time, as an integral social model of compromise, as in the case of the European core in the post-war period. In Spain, Greece and Portugal the economic component was introduced in the sixties, generating both an enormous economic expansion and the need for the gradual replacement of vertical mechanisms of political integration by horizontal ones.

However, at the moment that this socio-political precondition for further capitalist expansion and continuing control of the dominated classes, had to be formally institutionalized in the form of a party-system (that is, the completion of the social model of compromise), the economic component, i.e. the combined increase in productivity and real wages, was already overruled by the international economic crisis. This produced a very specific situation: political liberalization had to be carried out without the 'material assistance' of the 'economic component', on the basis of which the very need for political liberalization had occurred. In this context the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese social-democratic parties got

their political legitimacy. As the natural representative of the synthesis between the two ideo-typical concepts of control, social-democracy formed the obvious relay of the transnational bourgeoisie to effectuate the process of democratization under changed conditions. Social-democracy formed the only reliable force with regard to the establishment of horizontal mechanisms of political integration, without overthrowing the capitalist system or generating severe social conflicts.

Finally, the above-mentioned process of the formation of a transnational bourgeoisie doesn't mean that the class-struggle is de facto subordinated to the struggle between fractions of the bourgeoisie. A primacy of the transnational formation of fractions would underestimate the specific national dynamics. Hence, I should like to make an explicit distinction between objective social classes and the institutional experiments thereof, in other words, according to Poulantzas, between 'class places' and 'class positions' (Poulantzas, 1978). In my vision the class-struggle between capital and labour occurs on the 'objective', structural level, and there the specific national dynamics are produced on the basis of which the bourgeoisie again and again seeks to find new compromises (appealing to the 'general interest'), the so-called 'hegemonic concepts of control' (v.d.Pijl, 1985). Beside this and at the same time, on the institutional level ('class positions') a 'fusion' takes place represented by social-democracy, partially as a result of the displacement of the 'traditional bourgeoisie' by the 'new petty bourgeoisie' and the coming into existence of a labour aristocracy. In Spain, Greece and Portugal, the emergence and development of such a 'new middle class' has to be linked with the economic expansion of the 1960s and 1970s. In this context it would be interesting to know whether it is true that the PSOE, PASOX and PS are relatively recruiting their mass following from these 'new petty bourgeoisies' and labour aristocracies. Perhaps the paper of Mr. Condomines will shine, inter alia, a light on this highly interesting topic.

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LE PREMIER GOUVERNEMENT SOCIALISTE DANS  
L'HISTOIRE DE LA GRECE - LES CONDITIONS  
DE L'ACCES DU PASOK AU POUVOIR

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L'observateur de la vie politique grecque ne peut qu'être frappé par l'irrésistible ascension électorale et la marche vers le pouvoir d'un acteur politique nouveau, le PASOK (Mouvement Socialiste Panhellénique), qui est apparu sur la scène politique avec le rétablissement de la démocratie en 1974. Après ce qui a été considéré comme un échec électoral aux élections du 17 novembre 1974 (13,58% des voix), le PASOK a pratiquement doublé ses suffrages chaque fois : 25,34% aux élections du 20 novembre 1977 où il devient premier parti d'opposition et 48,06% le 18 octobre 1981, résultat qui lui donne une majorité absolue à la Chambre et lui permet de former un gouvernement "monocolor". Ce succès croissant qui fit que l'on parla du "phénomène PASOK" ne paraît pas être uniquement conjoncturel, et nous appuierons cette affirmation sur le fait que l'usure du pouvoir n'a été que relative par la suite. Après presque trois ans au gouvernement, le PASOK obtient aux élections européennes du 17 juin 1984 (qui portaient sur "toute la matière" et très peu sur la question de l'Europe) le score très honorable de 41,6%, restant le premier parti grec. La montée électorale du PASOK apparaît donc bien comme un phénomène d'émergence et d'institutionnalisation d'un acteur politique nouveau, et doit être perçue aussi sous l'angle de la stabilisation et de la simplification de l'expression des clivages politiques en Grèce. C'est ce processus que nous tenterons de cerner, en essayant de comprendre ce qui a porté le PASOK au pouvoir.

Nous mettons d'emblée en garde le lecteur sur le fait que c'est là une entreprise difficile dans le cadre restreint de cette communication. Il s'agira de faire la part entre des phénomènes de causalité qui paraissent complexes et imbriqués; nous tenterons d'être aussi analytique que possible tout en conservant un aspect concis à notre argumentation, d'être bref en évitant toutefois des schématisations abusives.

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## 4. Perspectives

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américaine (mise en oeuvre de la doctrine Truman et du plan Marshall) et à l'abandon des communistes grecs par les pays de l'Est, la guerre aboutira à l'écrasement de ces derniers. Le système politique grec jusqu'en 1967 devra donc être perçu comme le produit de la victoire militaire de la fraction la plus à droite des forces politiques et portera les marques de celle-ci.

La défaite de la gauche dans la guerre civile en 1949 conduira à un long règne de gouvernements de droite (sans interruption de 1952 à 1963) et surtout à la mise en place d'un régime de démocratie limitée, autoritaire et policière. Les institutions démocratiques, par exemple le Parlement, demeurent formellement; mais elles fonctionnent dans un climat de restauration, de culte de l'"attitude nationale" ("ethnikofrossyni"). La droite gouvernera avec l'anti-communisme au centre de son idéologie; les pressions seront dissuasives face à la manifestation des sensibilités progressistes (instauration par exemple avec la loi 516/48 du "certificat d'opinions sociales" témoignant de l'allégeance au système, et nécessaire pour entrer dans le service public et même pour obtenir des prestations de l'Etat). La gauche sera donc exclue non seulement de la vie politique (le PC sera interdit avec la loi 509/48) mais aussi sociale. Au niveau du fonctionnement politico-institutionnel réel du système, celui-ci se caractérise par l'existence d'une "para-Constitution" (un arsenal de lois répressives d'"exception" mais qui sont restées permanentes)<sup>2</sup> et d'un "Etat-parallèle", c'est-à-dire par le fait que les centres du pouvoir sont surtout extra-parlementaires. A savoir le Palais, ce qu'on a appelé le "facteur étranger" (l'interventionnisme des Etats-Unis et l'implantation à l'aide notamment de leur pénétration auprès de l'appareil d'Etat grâce à un puissant réseau d'ingérences) et les forces armées, fortement orientées en

I. Pourquoi n'y a-t-il pas de parti socialiste en Grèce avant 1967 ?

1.1 La restauration de l'hégémonie politique de la droite après la guerre civile (1946-49)

Le socialisme grec est récent en tant que phénomène de masse. Entre les deux guerres mondiales, certaines tentatives de petits groupements d'intellectuels pour créer des partis socialistes se sont avérées inefficaces. En effet, le mouvement ouvrier grec était faible : la classe ouvrière était peu nombreuse et fractionnée dans de petites unités de production, ceci malgré l'appoint de réfugiés paupérisés d'Asie Mineure après la défaite militaire face à la Turquie en 1922. De plus, ce mouvement a été monopolisé par le PC, mieux organisé<sup>1</sup>; le clivage "réformes ou révolution" n'apparaîtra donc pas en Grèce, contrairement aux pays d'Europe occidentale. C'est pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale que la gauche gagnera en prestige et en légitimité populaire : le PCG sera à l'origine d'un puissant et vaste front de résistance à l'occupant (l'EAM : Front de libération nationale), dont il contrôlera la direction, mais qui mobilisera la majorité de la population sur l'objectif de libération nationale, et grâce à la mise en oeuvre de structures démocratiques-participatives qui apparaissent comme une réponse au discrédit de la classe politique d'avant-guerre. Après la libération, la situation se polarisera et la guerre civile éclatera : d'un côté un bloc dirigé par les anciennes élites monarchistes de droite auxquelles se joignent celles du centre en tant qu'"alliées parias" (la base du centre démantelant anti-monarchiste mais aussi en partie anti-communiste) et défendu par l'armée régulière; de l'autre, un mouvement qui se limitera de plus en plus au seul parti communiste. Grâce notamment à l'aide

fonction des objectifs de l'OTAN. 3)

Ce qui est donc fondamental par rapport à notre problématique, c'est que cette phase de l'histoire grecque est marquée par une symbolique contre-révolutionnaire dans laquelle ne sont qu'à peine tolérés les discours politiques de gauche : il est clair qu'un PS peut difficilement se développer en tant que tiers-terme sous ces conditions de polarisation extrême; il serait immédiatement taxé de "compagnonnage".<sup>4)</sup> Certes, il serait incorrect d'ignorer l'EDA ("Gauche démocratique et unitaire") parti de gauche légal largement contrôlé par le PC hors la loi; celui-ci fut toléré mais il demeura continuellement soumis à des persécutions, enfermé dans un "ghetto politique" à la marge de la légalité car assimilé au communisme homophobe. L'EDA a toutefois joui d'un rayonnement largement supérieur à celui de sa représentation parlementaire restée faible, en tant que principal agent pendant longtemps d'expression des revendications progressistes dans une situation politiquement figée.

### 1.2. Les racines du PASOK : l'émergence et la maturation du radicalisme populaire

La situation que nous venons de décrire a bien entendu suscité des réactions. Aux élections de 1956, les partis du centre principalement firent une alliance électorale avec l'EDA (l'Union démocratique). Elle obtint la majorité des suffrages mais, grâce à la loi électorale, la droite obtint la majorité des sièges au Parlement. Aux élections de 1958, l'EDA profite du morcellement du centre et devient le premier parti d'opposition avec 25% des voix et 78 sièges sur 300. Ceci apparaît comme une anomalie pour le système, habitué à l'exclusion de fait de l'EDA des

enjeux de pouvoir. Les partis du centre seront aussi amenés à réagir : le centre se regroupe pour les élections de 1961 sous l'étiquette de l'"Union du Centre", "géant mou"<sup>5)</sup>, magma de notables, sous la direction charismatique de Georges Papandréou, père d'Andréas Papandréou, leader du PASOK actuel. Celle-ci regroupe des "formations issues de l'ancien mouvement libéral, certains éléments séparés de la droite et quelques éléments socialistes qui avaient fait partie de l'EAM".<sup>6)</sup> Le but est de reprendre à l'EDA l'hégémonie de l'opposition à la droite et de fournir une alternative acceptable de gouvernement : il semble que la création de l'UC ait été encouragée par l'administration Kennedy, car elle pouvait jouer un rôle régulateur du mécontentement populaire.<sup>7)</sup> Si nous nous attardons un peu sur l'UC c'est bien parce qu'il faut la concevoir comme la formation d'avant le coup d'état de 1967 où le PASOK a surtout pris ses racines.<sup>8)</sup> Rien qu'en ce qui concerne le personnel politique du PASOK, 55% des députés élus en 1981 avec le PASOK ont fait de la politique avec l'Union du Centre<sup>9)</sup>, et surtout avec sa jeunesse (ONEK puis EDIN) qui a formé le noyau du courant du centre-gauche au sein de l'UC, qui sera dirigé par Andréas Papandréou (quant aux anciens notables du centre qui ont survécu à la dictature, ils ont, eux, dans leur majorité, rejoint les rangs de la droite).

Aux élections, l'UC devient effectivement le premier parti d'opposition avec 33,5% des voix mais dénonce la fraude et la violence électorale qui a permis la victoire de la droite. Georges Papandréou lance alors la "lutte intransigeante", qui sera une vaste campagne de mobilisation populaire, la réaction jusqu'alors la plus importante face au système et le coup d'envoi de ce qu'on a appelé le "radicalisme grec". L'objectif essentiel visé est le fonctionnement régulier des institutions démocratiques, notamment la limitation du roi au rôle d'arbitre prévu par

Aux élections de novembre 1963, l'UC devient le premier parti avec 42% des suffrages mais elle organisera de nouvelles élections en février 1964 pour obtenir la majorité absolue. L'EDA voit le processus d'un bon oeil puisqu'il s'agit d'un déblocage de la situation, et ne présente pas de candidats dans certaines circonscriptions. L'UC obtient 52,72% des voix, la droite (ERE) 35,26% et l'EDA 11,8%. L'UC vient au pouvoir avec une nébuleuse idéologique que l'on peut qualifier de "populaire-démocratique" dans la mesure où elle traduit les aspirations du "peuple" qui s'oppose au "bloc au pouvoir"; il s'agit d'une idéologie participative dont le point central est précisément la revendication de la rentrée politique des masses.<sup>13)</sup> Mais sa politique au gouvernement a été marquée par de la timidité et des contradictions, une hésitation d'aller jusqu'au bout de ses revendications, ceci impliquant une confrontation (qui s'est avérée de toute façon inévitable) avec l'"Etat-parallèle". L'UC a tenté une mise en oeuvre de ses principes : être "allié" et non "satellite" des Etats-Unis (ainsi elle a refusé le plan de l'ancien secrétaire d'Etat Atcheson sur la partition de Chypre), elle a réformé l'enseignement, a conçu un plan de développement et de redistribution des revenus, et surtout elle a créé un climat de libéralisation: abrogation de fait de la "Para-Constitution" et libération des prisonniers politiques. Mais elle a hésité dans l'épuration des forces armées, des services secrets et de la police, se contentant d'empêcher le fonctionnement de l'"Etat-parallèle" mais n'osant pas démanteler ses structures. D'ailleurs quand elle a décidé d'aller plus loin dans le contrôle des "centres étanches" la crise a éclaté : Georges Papandréou voulait remplacer lui-même son ministre de la Défense qui était considéré comme l'homme du Palais (en 1974 il sera le leader d'un éphémère parti d'extrême-droite). Le jeune roi Constantin a refusé et, suite à la persistance de G. Papandréou, il a renvoyé de fait le

la Constitution (à la place d'un rôle de leader officieux de la droite). La neutralisation politique de l'armée et la tenue d'élections régulières. Nous ne pouvons qu'insister sur le fait que le conflit porte encore sur le fonctionnement du régime ainsi que sur le rôle de ses institutions (refus du monopole du pouvoir par la droite, demandes de participation populaire effective et contrôle sur les centres de pouvoirs "étanches"), ainsi que sur le fait qu'il est encore inacceptable que le discours dominant de l'opposition porte sur des thèmes classiques de gauche. Sous ces conditions, ce n'est qu'une formation du centre qui peut être appelée à devenir le pôle principal qui remplit la fonction d'opposition, et pas une formation de gauche. Le courant du centre-gauche dont le leader charismatique sera Andréas Papandréou devra s'autonomiser progressivement à partir de l'UC (le PASOK sera perçu à juste titre comme le "fils prodigue" de l'UC<sup>10)</sup>).

En Grèce, le clivage gauche-droite a été liquidé dans un jeu à somme nulle par la guerre civile avec l'écrasement de l'expression politique de la gauche. Il a donc été remplacé par un clivage droite-centre qui rappelait celui de l'entre-deux guerres<sup>11)</sup> mais qui dissimulait derrière le notabilisme de l'UC la volonté de "rentrée politique" des masses "disponibles" désireuses d'avoir leur "voix" dans la prise de décision.<sup>12)</sup> Andréas Papandréou fera, lui aussi plus tard, son entrée politique avec le parti de son père, l'UC; il sera élu député aux élections de 1964 et siégera au gouvernement centriste. S'il a donc bénéficié de la couverture de son père au sein de l'UC, il entrera progressivement en conflit avec lui, créant le courant de centre-gauche, qui est devenu l'aile la plus radicale du mouvement populaire. Il sera donc à la tête de ce qui sera perçu comme la menace la plus sérieuse de "brèche" dans le système édifié après la guerre civile.

Aux élections programmées pour mai 1967 la victoire de l'UC et le renforcement de l'aile du centre-gauche dirigée par A. Papandréou semblaient certains. La mobilisation populaire pour une ouverture réelle du système dépassait de nouveau la variété tolérée. Le coup d'état apparaissait dès lors comme la seule solution "sûre" pour la conservation de l'hégémonie politique de la droite et des Etats-Unis, pour empêcher la libéralisation du système et la rentrée politique des masses. 14) Il est significatif qu'un sondage réalisé en mars 1967 à Athènes et au Pirée 15, peu fiable mais pouvant être utilisé à titre d'indicateur de tendances, posait la question de "qui désirez-vous avoir comme premier ministre ?" 21% répondaient Caramanlis (leader charismatique de l'ERE en exil volontaire à Paris depuis 1963), 16% Andréas Papandréou, 13% son père (encore leader de l'UC) et 4% Canellooulos (leader de l'ERE). Andréas Papandréou jouit donc d'une popularité au moins égale à celle de son père et est juste derrière le leader quasi mythique de la droite, chacun des deux se trouvant devant le leader respectif de son parti (en 1985, Caramanlis est Président de la République et A. Papandréou premier ministre.) Selon Meynaud 16), 40 députés soutiennent Andréas Papandréou en 1967. Si donc, avant 1967, la Grèce se caractérise par l'absence d'un parti socialiste, les racines du PASOK sont toutefois là avec le radicalisme centré autour de son futur leader. 17)

## 2. Qu'est-ce qui a rendu possible l'apparition et le développement du PASOK après 1974 ?

C'est, comme on l'a vu, la montée du radicalisme grec, et de son leader charismatique, A. Papandréou. Mais ce mouvement a été enrayé avec le coup d'état. Celui-ci a empêché l'ouverture du système, avec l'institution d'un

gouvernement le 15 juillet 1965. Lui succèdent une série de gouvernements "du palais" formés par des députés dissidents de l'UC et soutenus par l'ERE. Mais ce n'est là que le début d'une longue crise politique qui aboutira au coup d'état des colonels du 21 avril 1967. Les manoeuvres du Palais suscitent une nouvelle vague de réaction populaire, la "deuxième lutte intransigeante" qui sera cette fois-ci menée par Andréas Papandréou avec comme objectifs "le peuple souverain, l'armée à la Nation, la Grèce aux Grecs". C'est la période pendant laquelle l'actuel leader du PASOK renforce son aura charismatique : il favorise par exemple une implantation organisationnelle du courant radical montant qui s'identifie à lui (les "andréistes") en créant dès 1965 les "Ligues démocratiques", associations populaires de soutien à cette lutte. Si avec la première "lutte intransigeante" nous avons assisté à la première expression du mouvement radical, avec la deuxième nous assistons donc d'une part à son identification avec le leader actuel du PASOK et d'autre part à l'apparition de thèmes non seulement "populaires-démocratiques" mais aussi clairement anti-impérialistes. Ceux-ci seront par la suite radicalisés et repris dans l'idéologie du PAK (l'organisation de résistance que crée A. Papandréou sous la dictature) et celle du PASOK.

Mais en même temps avec le renversement du gouvernement centriste, commence le processus de "contre-réforme" qui aboutira à la dictature. Il s'agit de remettre en place les réseaux partiellement démantelés par l'UC nécessaires pour préparer une solution autoritaire; on peut parler d'un réel processus de (re-)fascisation qui se traduit d'une part par la re-stanchéisation de l'appareil d'Etat et d'autre part par la tentative de neutralisation des forces progressistes (à titre d'exemple, Andréas Papandréou sera accusé d'être l'inspirateur d'un complot d'officiers "nasséristes" : c'est l'affaire "Aspida").

régime ouvertement répressif. En outre, comme on le verra par la suite, la peur d'une nouvelle dictature marquera les premières années de retour à la démocratie de 1974; la droite profitera de ce climat pour restaurer son Etat sur de nouvelles bases (plus "ouvertes"). La dictature favorisera malgré son échec une restructuration de la stabilisation bourgeoise. Mais nous nous attacherons à montrer que le processus de contestation du système n'a été qu'enrayé, retardé et que la dictature a eu comme effet à plus long terme une radicalisation encore plus forte du mouvement populaire, qui a permis l'acceptabilité croissante de l'idéologie du PASOK.

#### 2.1. L'activation du sentiment de dépendance

Le coup de force royal de 1965, le coup d'état des colonels de 1967, le maintien de la dictature, le coup d'état contre Makarios à Chypre en 1974 et l'invasion consécutive de l'île par l'armée turque sont apparus de plus en plus, aux yeux de l'opinion publique grecque, comme des expressions d'une stratégie délibérée d'intervention des Etats-Unis. Le sentiment anti-américain s'est progressivement très largement développé comme réaction à ce qui a été perçu comme une ingérence exacerbée des Etats-Unis dans la politique grecque.<sup>18</sup> Il a par exemple obligé même le très modéré Caramanlis (revenu au pouvoir en tant qu'homme fort grâce à un compromis avec l'état-major militaire qui a abandonné le pouvoir "à l'argentine" suite à la défaite de Chypre) à annoncer en août 1974 le retrait de la Grèce de l'organisation militaire de l'OTAN. La dictature, perçue comme une conséquence exacerbée de la dépendance grecque a donc donné au niveau populaire un énorme coup de pouce au sentiment anti-américain. La rationalisation idéologique anti-impérialiste développée par Andréas Papandréou et le PAK sous la dictature se fit donc

le reflet articulé, systématisé d'attitudes populaires diffuses, d'où son efficacité. Savoir ceci, c'est commencer à comprendre dans le cas "comment des discours qui sont à l'origine ceux de quelques individus peuvent-ils devenir, en l'espace de quelques années seulement acceptables pour une grande partie de la population".<sup>19</sup>

En effet, avec la constitution du PAK (en 1968) s'élabore progressivement une radicalisation de la pensée politique d'Andréas Papandréou. Il est difficile de cerner avec précision les motivations à la base de ce processus mais nous pouvons avancer certaines hypothèses. Il semble, à travers les textes de l'époque, que ce leader ait connu progressivement une lassitude face à l'impuissance ou le manque de volonté des pays européens, à gouvernements souvent social-démocrates, de réagir effectivement contre la dictature en Grèce, ce qui impliquerait, selon lui, de s'opposer aux Etats-Unis. Ce point de vue l'a distancé des notables de l'UC qui espéraient toujours une solution de la part des alliés occidentaux au problème grec; il ne pourra donc plus prétendre être le leader de ce parti (après la mort de son père en 1968), ce qui apparaîtra, à l'époque, comme un suicide politique. Son argument de base était qu'il n'y avait plus rien à attendre de la social-démocratie européenne qui est l'autre facette du capitalisme et qui est soumise aux Etats-Unis.<sup>20</sup> A. Papandréou opère donc une rupture à deux niveaux, idéologique et partisan. Il se tournera plein d'espoir vers la lutte des mouvements du Tiers-Monde et vers la pensée de la "nouvelle gauche" (présente notamment dans les milieux universitaires américains dont il est proche): la réponse au problème grec ne pourra venir selon lui que du peuple grec, organisé en "mouvement de libération nationale" contre l'occupant de fait américain (le PAK se réclamera d'en être un et préconisera - sans aucun succès d'ailleurs - la lutte armée contre la dictature).

Papandréou introduira dans un premier temps dans son discours le paradigme néo-marxiste du "centre-périphérie" : il lui permettra de classer la Grèce, en fonction de certains traits de sa structure socio-économique, à la périphérie. En même temps le concept de "dépendance" deviendra central dans son discours pour caractériser la situation politique de la Grèce. Ces innovations discursives permettront un rapprochement non seulement analytique de la Grèce avec les pays du Tiers-Monde mais aussi politique, puisque la Grèce devra avoir une politique extérieure non-alignée.<sup>21)</sup> L'idéologie du PAK sera radicalement innovatrice dans la mesure où, pour atteindre notamment l'objectif d'un développement autonome et équilibré, elle préconisera une large décentralisation, avec l'implantation de Conseils périphériques à compétences étendues.<sup>22)</sup> Il s'agit donc d'une radicalisation de l'idéologie de l'UC axée sur la participation : le concept ne recouvre plus seulement le contrôle populaire sur les centres étanches, mais aussi l'extension des compétences du pouvoir régional et des organisations d'intérêt. Celle-ci est la réponse à une critique du caractère étriqué de la démocratie représentative et du parlementarisme. Par ailleurs, l'idéologie du PAK se caractérise par une autre innovation discursive fondamentale : l'injection du socialisme sous sa forme autogestionnaire cohérente avec l'idéologie participative, et qui est la principale caractéristique de la recherche d'une "troisième voie" marquée par le refus aussi bien de la social-démocratie (puisqu'elle capitaliste et impérialiste), que du socialisme bureaucratique de l'Est (puisqu'anti-participatif). L'idéologie du PAK se cristallise vers 1972 autour de quatre pôles (objectifs) fondamentaux qui seront repris par le PASOK et qui constitueront une partie de son noyau idéologique <sup>23)</sup> : l'indépendance nationale, la souveraineté populaire, la libéralisation sociale et les processus démocratiques. Le

premier de ces objectifs, caractéristique d'un "mouvement de libération nationale", apparaîtra toutefois comme déterminant pour l'effectivité des trois autres. C'est ce qui fera la spécificité du PASOK par rapport aux autres partis socialistes d'Europe : un certain problème d'identité que le parti tentera de façon permanente de résoudre, entre parti et mouvement, et surtout entre socialisme et nationalisme, dont il faudra légitimer la coexistence harmonieuse au niveau sémantique pour le cas grec.

L'idéologie socialiste du PASOK s'intégrera donc dans un discours "nationaliste-émancipateur" qui rejoint les significations imaginaires de groupes sociaux blessés dans leur orgueil national par l'intervention étrangère et par celles qui sont perçues comme ses conséquences néfastes : pendant la dictature le mouvement radical s'est, lui, radicalisé dans une optique anti-américaine; l'intervention du PASOK amènera l'inclusion aussi du socialisme dans son idéologie.

## 2.2. La stabilisation progressive de la démocratie et la modification des clivages

En juillet 1974, quand les militaires ont dû abandonner le pouvoir à Caramanlis, il ne s'est pas agi d'un simple retour à la "démocratie" d'avant le coup d'état de 1967. Par rapport à celle-ci, la démocratie d'après 1974 connaissait certaines transformations fondamentales dans la structure du pouvoir. Certes, l'"Etat de la droite" a de nouveau été restauré avec certaines de ses caractéristiques classiques (clientélisme, quasi-monopole des appareils d'Etat, favoritisme dans le service public). Mais, il a dû être épuré de ses éléments les plus ouvertement fascistes<sup>24)</sup>; bien au-delà, le nouveau

système était beaucoup plus ouvert et démocratique. Il s'agit bien depuis 1974 d'un régime de compétition pluraliste-libéral conforme au modèle "occidental" et débarrassé de l'arsenal répressif et des pouvoirs étanches d'avant 1967 : la monarchie a été supprimée par voie référendaire, la "Para-Constitution" a été abrogée (le PC a été légalisé). Les gouvernements de droite qui se sont succédé jusqu'en 1981 n'ont plus eu l'anti-communisme au centre de leur idéologie, ils ont dû mener une politique plus autonome vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis et d'ouverture sur l'Europe qu'ils percevaient comme contrepois, et s'ils n'ont pas démantelé l'"Etat-parallèle", ils se sont efforcés de le soumettre. Dans cette situation marquée par la rupture avec le passé, où la symbolique politique se modifie, la gauche n'étant plus ni réprimée, ni bannie de la vie sociale et politique, l'acceptabilité d'un parti socialiste augmentait fortement. Andréas Papandréou s'est rendu compte qu'un espace politique devait être occupé d'une façon ou d'une autre, celui du centre-gauche, situé entre l'UC et la gauche traditionnelle auquel il s'agissait de donner une expression institutionnalisée. Il décida donc de créer le PASOK. Celui-ci a eu toutefois au début une rhétorique qualifiée de "gauche de la gauche" (25) : elle consistait par exemple à minimiser le passage à la démocratie en le traitant de "simple changement de garde" orchestré par les Etats-Unis dans le cadre de l'OTAN, à accuser l'UC reconstituée ainsi que les partis communistes de collaboration et d'acquiescement respectifs face à la restauration de l'"Etat de la droite". (26) Mais on verra que le PASOK sera favorisé à plus long terme par la perte de la raison d'être du centre en tant que parti d'opposition (le clivage sur le régime qui était son principal cheval de bataille étant résolu mais aussi parce qu'il apparaissait trop proche de la droite<sup>de</sup> manquant de leader charismatique). Il bénéficiera aussi des divisions de la "tata

originelle", de l'aspect "vieillot", ainsi que de la "bonne conduite" de la gauche traditionnelle. On verra comment, progressivement, le PASOK apparaîtra comme la principale alternative à la "Nouvelle Démocratie" (fondée par Caramanlis et qui est, en fait, l'"enfant", non prodigue celle-ci, de l'ancienne ERE).

La stabilisation progressive de la démocratie nous paraît être une variable fondamentale (condition nécessaire mais bien entendu non suffisante) pour expliquer l'irrésistible marche du PASOK vers le pouvoir : nous tenterons de montrer que, d'élections en élections, le climat politique change, permettant de libérer progressivement des forces sociales qui soutiendront le PASOK. En effet, plus la démocratie se stabilise, plus l'alternance politique face à la droite est perçue comme possible, faisant partie d'une "variété tolérée" croissante du système. Nous examinerons pour chacune des élections législatives qui ont consacré la montée du PASOK (1974, 1977 et 1981) le climat politique dans lequel elles ont eu lieu.

#### 2.2.1. 17 novembre 1974 : des élections (presque) pas comme les autres...

Aux élections de 1974, la "Nouvelle Démocratie", parti de C. Caramanlis, le premier ministre appelé à assurer la transition pacifique de la dictature à la démocratie, obtient 54,37% des voix, ce qui est un score tout-à-fait exceptionnel dans l'histoire du phénomène partisan en Grèce. Pendant la première législature de la Chambre (1974-1977) nous assisterons à un phénomène de parti dominant dont l'hégémonie ne sera pas remise en question par l'opposition du centre et de la gauche divisée. (27) Ce parti apparaît comme le continuateur de la tradition conservatrice en Grèce; mais il imprime une orientation réformiste à son

idéologie et son leader a l'ambition d'en constituer un mouvement unificateur. Caramanlis voudra, dans un élan "gaullien", apparaître comme une personnalité supra-partisane qui incarnera le dépassement des clivages passés (notamment celui de la dictature et de la guerre civile de 1946-49). Cette ambition se traduira par une volonté de transformation idéologique de la droite grecque, un déplacement vers le centre. Bien entendu, ceci n'est qu'une image schématique du nouveau conservatisme grec. Le parti de la "ND", comme tout grand parti, est traversé par des contradictions internes. Il comprend des membres se situant entre l'extrême-droite favorable selon les circonstances à des solutions autoritaires et le centre-droite, partisans, eux, d'une démocratisation réelle ainsi que d'un certain réformisme social.

En revanche, le PASOK ne recueillait que 13,58% des voix, score inférieur à ses attentes, et devait céder la place de premier parti d'opposition à la très modérée NC-FN (20,42% des voix). De nombreux électeurs "démocratiques" (qualificatif qui désigne dans le vocabulaire politique grec ceux qui ne sont pas partisans des formations de droite) avaient fait défection pour voter Caramanlis (le vote en Grèce étant largement personnalisé), qui représentait une garantie de stabilité et de sécurité. Il s'agissait donc d'élections exceptionnelles marquées par la présence de la personnalité charismatique de Caramanlis qui pouvait se présenter en "sauveur" et avait l'avantage d'être déjà au gouvernement. Il a pu mettre à profit le fait d'avoir repris la situation en main (malgré une "épuration" jugée imparfaite) et rétabli la démocratie dans un moment dramatique de crise, marqué par la blessure du sentiment national avec l'intervention de la Turquie à Chypre, la désorganisation et la liquéfaction de l'Etat militaire en Grèce, mais aussi par la crainte d'un retour au pouvoir de

l'armée. Selon une technique connue de la propagande politique, la "Nouvelle Démocratie" activait efficacement le sentiment de peur de l'opinion publique en dramatisant le choix politique qui impliquait, selon son slogan, un choix de régime: "Caramanlis ou les blindés". Face à cela, le discours du PASOK qui mettait l'accent sur la socialisation des secteurs-clés de l'économie et du commerce, apparaissait utopique (ne tenant pas compte du rapport de forces: concentration du pouvoir à droite et dans l'armée), extrémiste, nébuleux, et surtout singulièrement éloigné des préoccupations des électeurs. La solution de droite était la seule acceptable par les militaires (qui avaient transmis le pouvoir à Caramanlis, se sentant incapables de gérer la crise) et peut-être aussi par les alliés américains qui avaient encore à l'époque plus d'influence qu'actuellement sur les orientations politiques de la Grèce. Compte tenu du mode de transition à la démocratie (cessation de pouvoir et non révolution), tout choix politique qui n'allait pas dans le sens d'une stabilisation bourgeoise risquait de provoquer une réaction et d'avoir des conséquences graves; et ceci l'opinion publique l'avait compris.<sup>28</sup> Ces élections eurent donc une fonction de légitimation politique de la stabilisation bourgeoise, de réduction de la variété et de l'imprévisibilité introduite dans le système par la transition de la dictature à la démocratie, bref une fonction régulatrice.

Toutefois, la fluidité de la situation laissait un espace pour des discours politiques radicaux. Il s'agit alors d'une période d'"effervescence", d'"intense émotionnalité des expressions et des conduites"<sup>29</sup> où la recherche d'agents nouveaux de représentation des intérêts est aussi forte. En effet, malgré la prédominance d'un état de peur, la présence de la personnalité paternaliste et

tranquillissante de Caramanlis, et l'hégémonie des forces politiques traditionnelles, une partie du climat politique reste empreinte de désir de changement. N'oublions pas en effet qu'on était en train de tenter de restaurer l'ancien système de partis d'avant 1967 qui avait traversé une grave crise de légitimation avant l'intervention des colonels. Le PASOK fera alors le pari de se présenter comme "le seul porteur de contestation", comme un agent de rupture et d'innovation, ce qui, à plus long terme, s'avèrera payant. Il a vu qu'il y avait là un espace politique à occuper, qui était celui de l'opposition radicale au réaménagement de l'Etat de la droite. Il a donc choisi: le présenter un projet de société incompatible avec les valeurs du système qui se mettait en place, de se faire le porte-parole de la "variété" dans le système. Pour notre part et a posteriori bien entendu nous accorderons une certaine fonctionnalité à ce choix d'un acteur de minimiser les contraintes d'une logique de l'efficacité à court terme et de parier sur l'acceptabilité à plus long terme de son discours. Nous n'épouserons donc que très modérément la thèse de la "maladie infantile" du mouvement.

"La signification fondamentale du discours du PASOK nous échappe si nous lisons celui-ci comme un discours du pouvoir ou avec des perspectives de pouvoir. Il s'agit d'un anti-discours, d'une tentative de démythification et de refus du discours dominant. Et en tant que tel il a joué avec succès un rôle organique". 30)

#### 2.2.2. 30 novembre 1977 : Des élections alibi

Les élections anticipées de novembre 1977 furent un moyen pour renouveler pour quatre ans le mandat populaire du gouvernement Caramanlis. Celui-ci escomptait, et il s'avéra qu'il eut raison, que l'usure du pouvoir serait moins forte qu'au terme de la législature et qu'il pourrait encore obtenir une majorité au Parlement. C'étaient des élections sans enjeu réel de pouvoir, l'opposition restant divisée

(elle n'aurait pu obtenir la majorité au Parlement que si elle s'était coalisée). Mais il s'agit par contre d'élections où la compétition est forte pour l'occupation des espaces politiques de la droite, du centre (et centre-gauche) et de la gauche communiste respectivement. La "ND" est talonnée à sa droite par le "Front National" et surtout l'UC-FN et le PASOK sont en compétition au centre/centre-gauche ainsi que les deux PC (le PC de l'intérieur ayant formé une "Alliance" avec quatre autres petits partis) au sein de la gauche communiste.

Le PASOK, avec 25,34% des voix, devient la principale force d'opposition face à la "ND" qui subit l'usure du pouvoir (41,84% des voix) mais qui, grâce à la loi électorale, conserve effectivement la majorité absolue en sièges. Mais à ces élections, le dilemme qu'a de nouveau posé la "ND", "Caramanlis ou le chaos", variation à partir du thème de 1974, a été moins efficace. Avec la stabilisation démocratique, le sentiment diffus de peur s'estompe et le vote devient plus fidèle aux allégeances partisans.

Les élections marquent donc la reproduction du pouvoir de la droite. Toutefois, elles marquent aussi la clarification interne du conflit dans chacun des espaces susmentionnés:

- la "ND" subit une usure indéniable (quoique assez attendue; compte tenu du caractère exceptionnel de son score de 1974) mais reste hégémonique à droite; le Front National, avec 7% des voix n'aura qu'un effet limité et transitoire,
- le PCG (pro-soviétique) assoit son hégémonie sur le mouvement communiste grec,
- et surtout, fait marquant de ces élections qui est significatif pour notre problématique, le PASOK, avec sa

spectaculaire montée électorale, atteint son objectif en s'imposant comme principale force d'opposition. Il évince l'EDIK (11,95% des voix en 1977, 20,42% en tant qu'UC-FN en 1974), son principal concurrent pour l'héritage centriste, pour l'hégémonie à l'intérieur de l'espace politique situé entre la droite et la gauche communiste, pour l'opposition au gouvernement. Par ailleurs, le PASOK réussit à cantonner le communisme grec à des pourcentages relativement faibles (le PCG obtient 9.36% des voix) : il ne lui permet donc pas d'occuper l'espace de la gauche non communiste, qui n'avait pas d'expression politique importante avant 1967.

Le PASOK a été conscient, dès 1974, qu'il y avait une fonction d'opposition à remplir, que celle-ci était imparfaitement remplie aux yeux de l'opinion publique par l'UC-FN, et que sa chance consistait à la remplir, lui, efficacement. Il a donc mis l'accent pendant cette période jusqu'aux élections de 1977 sur le fait qu'il était la seule véritable force d'opposition; à ces élections ceci s'est aussi traduit numériquement. Pour accomplir cette fonction le PASOK s'est attelé (très schématiquement) à deux tâches :

- critique très dure et sur tous les points du gouvernement Caramanlis, tout en se présentant, lui, comme un acteur responsable, évitant les excès et tout en reprenant à son compte des valeurs communément partagées qu'il accusait le gouvernement de bafouer (défense de la nation, de la démocratie, etc.).

- accusation que l'UC-FN ne fait qu'une opposition ponctuelle et tiède. Elle collabore en fait avec la droite, légitimant ainsi la restauration de "son" Etat (les dirigeants de l'UC-FN ont participé au gouvernement d'"union nationale" de 1974). Sur le plan social l'UC-FN ne se différencierait pas de la ND puisqu'elle représenterait aussi les intérêts de l'oligarchie, d'où la proximité idéologique entre ces deux formations "bourgeoises". Le

résultat des élections de 1977 traduit donc le fait que le discours du PASOK, discours de délégitimation des autorités et d'invalidation des concurrents, a été efficace. Il a confirmé son émetteur comme seul agent crédible d'opposition et c'est là un succès majeur qui ouvrira en 1981 les portes du pouvoir.

### 2.2.3. 18 octobre 1981 : Des élections à enjeu réel

Aux élections du 18 octobre 1981, le PASOK double pratiquement ses voix par rapport à 1977 en obtenant 48,06% des suffrages et constitue le premier gouvernement "monocoloré" d'un parti de gauche dans l'histoire grecque. Il s'agit des premières élections après 1974 où se pose dans des termes réels la question de l'alternance au pouvoir en termes de concurrence et de bipolarisation entre deux partis. L'enjeu renforcera cette bipolarisation, les Grecs ayant voté "utile" (aux élections européennes qui ont eu lieu le même jour le PASOK obtint bien moins de votes et les petits partis plus). L'existence d'un parti dominant a favorisé la stabilité politique, ainsi que l'assimilation de ce parti au système. Or, la "ND" n'a pas pu tirer les avantages d'une telle situation : elle ne s'est pas légitimée comme une composante indispensable du pouvoir (comme le gaullisme autrefois en France ou la DC en Italie), au contraire elle s'est progressivement discréditée.

L'acceptation de l'alternance par la droite au pouvoir est un fait significatif de la stabilisation démocratique. N'oublions pas qu'en 1963-65, quand l'UC, beaucoup plus modérée que le PASOK est arrivée au gouvernement, la droite politique a contribué à sa déstabilisation. Notons aussi que l'accession du PASOK au pouvoir a sans doute été favorisée à double titre par le

fait que le leader charismatique de la droite, Caramanlis, accéda en mai 1980 à la présidence de la République. D'une part, la droite perdait ainsi son leader, et d'autre part des électeurs modérés pouvaient voter pour le PASOK, sentant que Caramanlis freinerait d'éventuels "excès" de celui-ci, qu'il serait une garantie pour la préservation de l'ordre bourgeois. Nous reviendrons plus en détail par la suite sur les facteurs qui ont permis au PASOK de renverser, de 1977 à 1981, le rapport des forces avec la ND.

### 3. Analyse en termes d'acteurs en compétition : les avantages du PASOK et les handicaps de ses concurrents

#### 3.1. Les handicaps des concurrents

- La "Nouvelle Démocratie" a subi une usure progressive et normale du pouvoir. Elle a suscité la lassitude, un "ras le bol" diffus des masses qui a formé un terrain fertile, une matière première pour l'acceptabilité du discours du PASOK. Celui-ci deviendra progressivement le lieu de cristallisation, d'articulation, d'expression et de traduction des mécontentements en une idéologie "anti-statu quo". Il viendra donc canaliser les protestations générées notamment par les effets de la crise économique, les dirigera contre la droite qu'il présentera, bien entendu, comme le principal responsable, et promettra un "changement" qui amènera solution à tous les problèmes. Le discours aura donc un rôle de renforcement de la tendance au déclin de la "ND", aura une fonction de prophétie auto-créatrice ("self-fulfilling prophecy").

Ainsi, l'inflation qui n'est encore que de 11% en 1977, atteint 19% en 1979 et 20% en 1980. 31) Selon des données de sondage 32), 53,4% des électeurs considèrent l'inflation comme leur première source d'inquiétude, loin devant le "mauvais fonctionnement de l'Etat", qui vient en deuxième position (9,1%). On peut en effet expliquer cela par un certain fatalisme face à l'inefficacité et à l'autoritarisme de la bureaucratie. La politique (anti-inflationniste) du gouvernement ne fait pas baisser l'inflation - tout en contribuant à ralentir le taux d'accroissement du PNB : 5,9% en 1977-78, 3,6% en 1978-79, 1,6% en 1979-80, 0% en 1980-81. 33) Ainsi le chômage augmente, couplé à une détérioration de la qualité de la vie dans les grandes agglomérations où vit la majorité de la population grecque, surtout liée à l'insuffisance des services publics (hôpitaux, transports, etc.) et à la pollution. La "ND" accumule progressivement les handicaps : non seulement elle perd le capital que représentait son leader charismatique (qui passe à la présidence) et commence à être la proie de querelles internes de notables pour la succession, mais elle dégage une image désécurisante de parti débordé par les problèmes, incapable d'une politique cohérente. La perception généralisée d'un gouvernement qui ne maîtrise plus la situation, et l'attente d'un nouveau leader charismatique comme A. Papandréou, la perte de crédibilité de la "ND" et la montée du PASOK, vont de pair. Le PASOK devient l'agent canalisateur du mécontentement populaire diffus, la réponse institutionnelle à une crise de confiance et de légitimité généralisée face au gouvernement et au système qu'il a édifié et auquel il a été identifié.

Le PASOK conservera aux élections de 1981 ses électeurs et récupérera des électeurs traditionnels de droite et du centre; ces derniers encore plus facilement que la "ND" fera l'erreur de s'adresser, pendant la campagne, à l'électorat d'extrême-droite qui avait donné 7% de voix au

Front National en 1977. Or, ce qu'elle a récupéré ainsi n'a pas suffi à compenser ses pertes par ailleurs. En septembre 1981, 24,8% des électeurs de 1977 de la "RDV" et 40% de ceux de l'EDIK déclaraient avoir l'intention de voter PASOK; en outre, si la HD absorbait en 1977 84,8% des électeurs qui se déclaraient "conservateurs", ce chiffre n'était que de 71,2% en septembre 1981. Par ailleurs, ce qui restait de l'électorat de l'EDIK se situait, selon l'émbaromètre 15 à la veille des élections de 1981, à 5,45 sur un axe gauche-droite allant de 1 à 10 (moyenne non significative statistiquement mais qui nous semble logique pour définir grosso modo par extrapolation la position de l'électorat centriste à capter). Or, le PASOK situé à 4,6 était beaucoup plus proche de cet électorat que la "NP" avec 8,34).

- Le déclin de l'UC-FN doit être perçu en forte interaction avec la montée du PASOK, les deux organisations étant en concurrence pour l'héritage centriste. Il se fait en deux étapes : de 1974 à 1977 l'UC-FN 35) perd presque la moitié de son électorat et disparaît quasi-complètement en 1981. Objectivement, le centre perd sa raison d'être, la droite ayant pris l'initiative de résoudre elle-même le clivage institutionnel sur lequel était axée l'idéologie centriste (notamment avec l'abolition de la monarchie et l'instauration d'un véritable Etat de droit). En outre, l'UC a souffert du manque de leadership fort, par opposition au charisme d'A. Papandréou. Le discours du PASOK a ici aussi, comme on l'a vu, un rôle de renforcement, puisqu'il sera très dur envers cette formation.


- Il faut enfin considérer l'émergence du PASOK comme une réponse à la crise de la "gauche traditionnelle" grecque, c'est-à-dire du mouvement communiste. 36) En effet, en tant qu'acteur nouveau et présentant des idées séduisantes d'autogestion, auto-organisation etc., il a mobilisé beaucoup d'éléments déçus par la crise de ce

mouvement, ainsi que des éléments proches de l'extrême-gauche ou hors parti 37). De 1974 à 1981, la gauche communiste sera le seul courant à maintenir plus ou moins la même force électorale (autour des 10% des voix). Inférieure aux résultats de l'EDA d'avant 1967. On peut voir là un produit de sa crise, renforcée par l'autre produit qu'est l'"effet PASOK". En effet, depuis 1968, en pleine dictature, le mouvement communiste est divisé, scindé entre un PC pro-soviétique (qui deviendra hégémonique dans cette constellation) et le PC "de l'intérieur" (eurocommuniste). Il n'arrivera pas à surmonter sa marginalité politique, son "ghetto", d'autant plus qu'il sortira affaibli de la répression. Le PASOK aura sur cette gauche l'avantage de ne pas avoir le "péché originel" d'être identifié à la défense du système soviétique, d'être un acteur nouveau qui s'oppose au "passéisme" communiste, qu'il s'attache d'ailleurs à mettre en valeur. Le PASOK exploitera le fait que la gauche communiste, reconnaissante d'être légalisée, adoptera une "bonne conduite" envers le système en place. Celle-ci s'avérera contra-productive car le PASOK aura ainsi un argument de plus pour montrer qu'il est le seul à remplir effectivement la fonction d'opposition. Bien entendu, le discours du PASOK amplifiera les "tares" du mouvement communiste : il suggérera d'une part les liens du PCG avec l'Union Soviétique (par opposition au PASOK qui, lui, propose une "voie grecque au socialisme" 38), et accusera d'autre part le PC de l'intérieur de faire objectivement le jeu de la droite.

Le tableau suivant montre l'évolution de l'électorat du PASOK et des émetteurs-concurrents respectivement de 1974 à 1984 :

grecque est en transition vers la phase de la "Zweckrationalität" wébérienne, et que la domination charismatique apparaît dès lors comme un état intermédiaire appelé à disparaître. 41) Pour notre part, nous nous bornerons à constater empiriquement l'émergence répétitive de leaders charismatiques tout le long du XXème siècle en Grèce. On peut les classer soit en restaurateurs de l'ordre (le maréchal Papagos après la guerre civile, Caramanlis qui lui succéda), soit en réformateurs (Vénizélos, fondateur du libéralisme grec, le général Papatzias, Georges et Andréas Papatziou). Le charisme semble être une condition nécessaire pour l'implantation d'une idéologie politique en Grèce, où la vie politique reste fortement personnalisée. Une piste qui nous semble intéressante pour expliquer ce phénomène en Grèce est le type de développement socio-économique du pays (nous y reviendrons plus loin en étudiant l'idéologie du PASOK), caractérisé par la domination de secteur parcellisés, atomisés, comme les petits entrepreneurs ou les employés du secteur public hypertrophié, dépendants de l'Etat. Il apparaît dès lors logique que la prépondérance chronique de ces couches sociales "intermédiaires", n'ayant pas de pôles identificateurs stables conduise chaque fois à la recherche d'un "père" sécurisant, plutôt que de représentants réels d'intérêts précis. 42)

On a vu que la boucle charismatique d'Andréas Papandréou s'amorce déjà dans les années 60 et notamment au sein du gouvernement de l'UC. Il a été rappelé en Grèce, après un long séjour aux Etats-Unis, en tant que technocrate par le gouvernement Caramanlis de l'époque; il a bénéficié du capital de son père pour faire son entrée politique; mais son propre pouvoir charismatique en tant qu'incarnation du courant radical s'est affirmé rapidement. On peut dire que les ressources propres dont il bénéficie, c'est d'être



### 3.2. Les avantages du PASOK

#### 3.2.1. Charisme et organisation

Le PASOK bénéficie tout d'abord du fait qu'il est, comme la "ND" l'a été aussi d'ailleurs, l'oeuvre d'un leader charismatique, Andréas Papandréou. Nous n'entrons pas en profondeur dans le débat théorique sur les origines et les fonctions du leadership charismatique. On sait notamment que l'appel à un chef paternaliste, que l'on considère comme un être tout-puissant, quasiment surnaturel, relève d'une interprétation psycho-symbolique 39) mais est activé par des raisons d'ordre social, relevant donc aussi d'une interprétation sociologique 40) : il apparaît comme une réaction de sécurisation d'une société en temps de crise. En ce qui concerne le cas du PASOK, en reprenant de façon quelque peu mécaniste les thèses de Weber, Katsoulis adopte une perspective évolutionniste en argumentant que la société

considéré comme le leader réformateur, économiste intégré et compétent. 43) Mais ce qui est surtout important, c'est qu'il se placera déjà à la tête d'un mouvement idéologique qui dispose d'une ébauche organisationnelle. Avec la destitution de fait du gouvernement de l'UC ce courant s'affermira, réclamant d'une part une radicalisation des positions de l'UC et représentant déjà une idéologie participative. Ses principales revendications seront le rééquilibrage de la position de la Grèce par rapport aux Etats-Unis, la démocratisation et le contrôle des centres étanches du pouvoir, une planification et une redistribution du revenu. 44) On peut donc caractériser cette première phase de l'émergence du pouvoir charismatique comme une phase de mobilisation d'abord idéologique, et encore fragmentairement organisationnelle.

On peut relever une deuxième phase, qui est celle de la dictature et de l'exil. Elle a une composante apparemment paradoxale. D'une part, il y a institutionnalisation du charisme avec le développement d'une organisation structurée : le PAK. A. Papandréou a compris la nécessité de mettre en place une organisation qui, couplée au charisme, activerait le réseau de communication avec les masses; toutefois le PAK n'a eu que des contacts très tenus avec les masses pendant la dictature et n'a joué qu'un rôle marginal dans la lutte anti-dictatoriale (malgré, - et probablement à cause de - sa volonté de lutte armée). D'autre part, il y a marginalisation politique due à la radicalisation idéologique que nous avons observée. Andréas Papandréou entre alors dans une phase que l'on peut qualifier de "splendid isolation", de rupture délibérée avec le réseau des notables de l'UC mais aussi d'éloignement par rapport aux masses. Toutefois, on verra que ce qui apparaîtra comme l'expression d'un "romantisme"

45) aux yeux de tout le monde sauf de ses partisans, deviendra progressivement - moyennant des aménagements, certes - un discours de plus en plus acceptable dans la société grecque, notamment car il mettra à l'ordre du jour le problème de la dépendance du pays.

La troisième phase est celle qui débute avec le retour en Grèce en 1974. A. Papandréou décide de renouveler son distancement de l'UC et de ré-institutionnaliser son charisme, en fondant son propre mouvement, le PASOK. Celui-ci reprendra largement les principes idéologiques très radicaux du PAK (rejet de la social-démocratie, socialisation de secteur-cié, autogestion et décentralisation, anti-Etats-Unis, -OTAN, -CEE, non-alignement). Toutefois, le chemin pour modeler une organisation qui ne soit qu'un simple relais approprié pour la communication avec les masses ne sera pas évident, il sera jalonné de crises, suivies chaque fois de purges importantes. 46)

Un appel est d'abord lancé pour une "auto-organisation à la base". Ce principe, cohérent avec l'idéologie participative et anti-clientéliste (et un moyen pour court-circuiter les réseaux clientélistes en voie de rétablissement) est largement suivi malgré l'échec électoral (il s'oppose déjà à la mollesse organisationnelle de l'UC-FN). Mais en même temps ce principe génère de la fluidité, en termes systémiques de la "variété" dans l'organisation) le dynamisme s'accompagnant d'un manque de cohérence interne. S'amorce une longue période de crises internes successives, de luttes de tendance : la première porte d'ailleurs sur le degré de démocratie dans l'organisation. En ce moment-là, A. Papandréou n'est encore que partiellement maître de la situation quoiqu'il dispose comme ressource supplémentaire face aux opposants à ses orientations autoritaires de sa légitimité charismatique

masse, destinées à compléter la triade nécessaire pour l'efficacité de la communication, à savoir leader-parti-masse. Le PASOK sera le premier parti (sauf le PC) en Grèce à disposer d'un réseau organisationnel intermédiaire. Celui-ci est animé par la volonté politique de lutter à la base contre la fermeture excessive d'organisations locales "sectaires" ou au contraire l'ouverture excessive d'organisations contrôlées par des notables clientélistes à des fins seulement électorales. A. Papandréou apparaît désormais comme le seul pôle de référence dans un mouvement à origines diverses et comme le seul porteur de légitimité pour élaborer les règles des messages acceptables. Les délégués à la Conférence seront loyaux : ils étaient du Comité Central de 60 membres dont 50 proposés par A. Papandréou; ce CC se réunit le 1er septembre et élit les 8 membres du Bureau Exécutif, tous proposés aussi par A. Papandréou.

Le PASOK devra produire des textes légitimateurs du pouvoir de son leader au sein de l'organisation. L'argumentation est la suivante 50), où coexistent deux paradigmes de justification.


- Une légitimation mythique, où le leader est présenté comme un héros qui lutte contre les "forces du mal". 51)
- Une dimension utilitariste liée à une nécessité, pour des raisons d'acceptabilité, de minimisation, en tout cas de rationalisation, du charisme : le leader est l'articulateur qui favorise l'acceptabilité du message du PASOK car il dispose d'un contact direct avec les destinataires. En outre, il est le seul pôle d'attachement de tendances diverses qui, malgré les purges, survient "en douce" dans le mouvement. Le leader n'apparaît plus ici que comme un moyen pour que l'organisation arrive à ses fins.

(par exemple le groupe d'intellectuels-résistants de "Défense démocratique" qui a fusionné avec le PASOK en octobre 1974 et qui est le foyer des demandes de démocratisation interne n'a pas d'impact populaire). Il fera constamment appel à la base, au "peuple", contre ces "groupes-parasites", en cultivant l'idéologie anti-intellectualiste du mouvement; c'est ce qu'on peut appeler le procédé de l'inversion. 47) Il est important de comprendre qu'A. Papandréou a dû réduire la variété tolérée dans l'organisation, appauvrir les discours acceptables au sein de celle-ci, pour qu'elle devienne un relais du charisme. Il opérera par purges successives en mobilisant chaque fois l'ensemble de l'organisation contre le groupe incriminé. D'abord il faudra liquider ceux qui réclament des structures démocratiques, puis l'extrême des trotskystes et l'établissement de liens de communication horizontale, puis la gauche "sectaire" qui met l'accent sur les principes. La stratégie a donc été celle de la marginalisation 48) de ceux qui ont articulé un discours concurrent au sein de l'organisation. Mais A. Papandréou a compris qu'une condition d'acceptabilité n'en demeurerait pas moins la reproduction partielle des modes de représentation politique traditionnels : s'il a expulsé la gauche du parti il n'a fait que critiquer et contrôler les notables de tendance centriste qui disposaient de réseaux d'allégeances politiques personnelles. Il a voulu mettre celles-ci au profit de l'organisation; il s'agissait simplement d'empêcher les notables de s'autonomiser, en créant des structures de pouvoir de base, les organisations locales. 49)

C'est la conférence nationale de juillet 1977 qui consacrera la stabilisation réelle du charisme au sein de l'organisation, amorcée déjà en janvier 1976 avec la désignation de Comités départementaux provisoires en tant que structures intermédiaires, relais du charisme avec la

- par rapport aux critiques de gauche de personnalisation et d'autoritarisme, il est enfin nécessaire de présenter cela comme un dispositif transitoire, d'"exception", mis en place à cause de "maladies infantiles" du mouvement.

Ce qui est important, c'est que comme le montre le graphique suivant, au niveau de ses membres, le PASOK remonte bien les effets de ses crises (les données ne sont malheureusement qu'irrégulièrement fiables).



Sources :

- (a) Bulletin d'information mensuel du PASOK (en grec), Miniaio Enimerotiko Deltio, No 1-2, 1977 (17426 membres d'organisations du PASOK en Grèce).
- (b) Rapport du Secrétariat Exécutif à la 1ère Conférence Panhellénique du Mouvement, juillet 1977, (27000 membres).
- (c) Décision de la 6ème session du C.C., mars 1980 (65000 membres).
- (d) PRETENDERIS, Y., "La marche du Mouvement de la Déclaration du 3 septembre à aujourd'hui", Io Vima, 2/9/84, (110000 membres lors des élections de 1981, 220000 au 1er Congrès, en mai 1984).

Nous constatons qu'une fois la période de crises et de purges passée, il n'y a plus d'"effet passoire" (celui-ci marque au mieux une stabilisation des effectifs d'un parti en crise, où la perte d'anciens membres est compensée par l'arrivée de nouveaux). Depuis 1977 (année de la Conférence Panhellénique qui marque la stabilisation interne et de la première montée électorale) la mobilisation dans les rangs du PASOK a été importante. Son rythme s'est accru depuis la décision de la 5ème session du C.C. en 1979 (février) d'"ouvrir" les organisations en vue des élections ("massification"), et encore plus depuis la victoire électorale de 1981. On peut faire l'hypothèse que les gens ont perçu dès avant son arrivée au pouvoir (et qu'ils en ont été convaincus par la suite) que le PASOK instaurerait un système de "clientélisme d'organisation", et que pour avoir droit à ses privilèges il fallait faire valoir des titres de noblesse dans l'engagement au sein du Mouvement.

En conclusion, à cette partie nous aimerions insister sur le fait que le leader charismatique dispose de "plus-values d'autorité", 52) au sein de son organisation car il peut faire directement appel aux masses pour intimider celles-ci. Mais il n'en demeure pas moins que:

- son autonomie n'est que relative par rapport à l'organisation; il doit au sein de celle-ci avoir une politique centrée qui équilibre les tendances, 53) ou bien faire jouer les tendances les unes contre les autres, ou enfin en marginaliser une. Autant de stratégies pour asseoir son pouvoir dans l'organisation, mais qui sont coûteuses, - enfin, même auprès des masses, le charisme ne suffit pas à lui seul, il doit être couplé à une idéologie acceptable en tant que renforcement. Ceci nous ramène au prochain et dernier volet de notre étude qui consiste à souligner l'importance des principes de l'idéologie du PASOK pour comprendre la mobilisation qu'elle suscite. Un leader charismatique ne peut être aphasique, ni ne peut tout dire. En effet, ce leader est soumis, en régime libéral-pluraliste, à des feedbacks où il est noté (notamment lors des élections) et sanctionné. Ansart écrit à ce sujet :

"En même temps le chef charismatique n'est pas le maître arbitraire de ce réseau complexe : à la fois cet amour politique dont il est l'objet lui donne une certaine liberté de décision et facilite les consentements dont il a besoin pour réaliser ses objectifs mais il ne peut en user excessive-ment sans rencontrer le risque d'affaiblir son capital de confiance."54)

3.2.2. Une idéologie mobilisatrice et maniable

3.2.2.1. Rapports entre idéologie du PASOK et imaginaire de ses destinataires

Notre présupposé théorique de base, que nous n'allons pas développer ici, est qu'une idéologie politique, pour qu'elle soit mobilisatrice, doit s'ancrer sur la culture politique de ses destinataires 55), apparaître comme une "élaboration-rationalisée systématisée" de significations imaginaires sociales" des groupes

destinataires. 56) Nous nous attacherons donc à rechercher d'abord les facteurs socio-économiques 57) à l'origine d'un imaginaire que l'on peut qualifier de "petit-bourgeois" et qui est perméable par une idéologie comme celle du PASOK. 58)

Il est donc important de relever la prédominance en Grèce de catégories sociales hybrides, "intermédiaires", d'un manque de netteté dans les structures sociales. Skovoromos écrit à ce sujet :

"... les notions qu'on applique généralement à la société occidentale - grande, moyenne et petite bourgeoise, ne recouvrent pas exactement la réalité grecque ... De plus, en marge de ces groupes et à leur remorque s'est formée une catégorie socio-professionnelle anormalement étendue, tirant des revenus médiocres et aléatoires d'activités marginales plus ou moins parasitaires."59)

Une telle structuration paraît comme la conséquence d'un "mal-développement". 60) Celui-ci se caractérise notamment par son aspect tardif, dépendant et, ce qui est le plus important pour nous, par un transfuge de population du primaire directement vers un tertiaire hypertrophié, gonflé et parasitaire, et non vers le secondaire, trop aménagé pour fournir des emplois en nombre suffisant. Ainsi, l'évolution de la répartition de la population en secteurs d'activités (selon les recensements du Service National des Statistiques) est la suivante :

	1961	1971	1981
Primaire	55,7%	39,9%	30,7%
Secondaire	20 %	27,5%	29 %
Tertiaire	24,3%	32,6%	40,3%

et radicale leurs désirs secrets ... (ils) ont peur de disparaître, pensent donc en catégories simples (ami-ennemi) et recherchent des solutions radicales". 63) C'est sous cet angle que nous traiterons l'idéologie du PASOK qui nous semble répondre à ce besoin.

3.2.2.2. Les effets de la crise

L'acceptabilité de l'idéologie du PASOK sera renforcée par la crise économique qui entraînera la désaffection de ces groupes face à un Etat-protecteur désormais incapable de satisfaire leurs demandes, car surchargé ("overloaded") et disposant de capacités distributives amoindries. Le désir de "changement", qu'articulera le PASOK, sera repris et diffusé :

- la paysannerie, qui traditionnellement votait à droite, rejoint largement le PASOK. En effet, l'idéologie du PASOK peut lui paraître séduisante à plusieurs titres : coopérativisme qui ne porte pas atteinte à la petite propriété paysanne mais seulement aux "intermédiaires" désignés comme boucs émissaires, culte de la paysannerie ("la plus soumise à l'injustice") et dénonciation des pressions sur celle-ci qui ont permis de financer le développement (exode rural, émigration, etc.). Cette idéologie apparaît comme une réponse à la prise de conscience de l'insuffisance des prestations fournies par le réseau de clientèle, et comme un réflexe de protection face à une peur de paupérisation (liée à l'adhésion à la CEE dénoncée par le PASOK, d'où des demandes de protection, de subventionnement de la production, etc.).
- les employés du secteur public et des banques voient avec la crise leurs privilèges diminuer et une baisse des capacités de l'Etat (assimilé à la droite) de couvrir leurs besoins ; le PASOK se fera la "voix" de toutes leurs revendications.

On peut donc largement décrire la société grecque actuelle comme une société d'agriculteurs, de personnel surnuméraire qui dépend du service public, de petits entrepreneurs, artisans, commerçants, et d'employés. La classe ouvrière reste faible (comme sont peu nombreuses les grandes unités de production), et les salariés constituent un pourcentage anormalement faible de la population active. En 1981, les salariés ne formaient que 48% de la population active selon une enquête du Service National Statistique (à titre comparatif, le Portugal qui a le chiffre le plus proche de la Grèce parmi les autres pays de l'OCDE, a 67,1% de salariés). Parmi les salariés, 52% sont employés dans des unités comprenant moins de 20 personnes. La décennie des années soixante-dix apparaît être celle d'un développement axé sur les PME, souvent trop fragiles et endettées, donc dépendantes de l'Etat : de 1971 à 1979 la population active augmente de 9%, les salariés de 23% et les employeurs de 77%. Si en 1961 et en 1971 on comptait 10,4 salariés par employeur, en 1981 on n'en compte plus que 7,3 seulement. 61)

La société grecque apparaît donc comme un magma peu différencié, d'où une certaine ambiguïté et confusion idéologiques. Mavrogordatos synthétise en partie notre argument : "The overwhelming majority of the Greek Society continues to bask in a distinctly petty bourgeois mentality, supported and constantly reproduced by the enduring preponderance of small property and small business, a key peculiarity of modern Greek development; 62) il faut ajouter aux porteurs de cette mentalité les employés d'un secteur public hypertrophié, habitués à des prestations et des privilèges (sécurité d'emploi, etc.) liés à la dépendance face à l'Etat. Tous ces groupes sociaux "sont sensibles à toute forme de propagande qui réussit à comprendre, à identifier et à articuler de manière simple, compréhensive

- les petits entrepreneurs, artisans et commerçants voient aussi désormais l'Etat de moins en moins capable de les protéger, se sentent menacés par le développement économique et l'adhésion à la CEE. Ils sont des destinataires privilégiés d'une idéologie qui, comme on le verra, active la peur des "petits" face aux "gros" <sup>64</sup> (généralement identifiés au grand capital qui, en plus, est lié à l'étranger),

- enfin l'inflation et la crise dans certains secteurs (le bâtiment) renforceront les protestations des employés et des ouvriers; le PASOK dénoncera systématiquement les mesures "anti-populaires" du gouvernement et se fera aussi le défenseur de ces groupes. <sup>65</sup>

Nous verrons que le PASOK dispose des ressources idéologiques nécessaires pour canaliser et articuler les protestations contre le système renforcées par la crise. Le parti laisse entendre déjà dans ses principes initiaux une volonté d'être "catch-all"; <sup>66</sup> celle-ci se traduira progressivement en réalité sociale. Nous aimerions toutefois préciser que les partis "catch-all" classiques sont liés à des phénomènes de politique consensuelle dans les pays hautement développés, et dans des périodes de forte conjoncture. Une de leurs caractéristiques sera donc la baisse de leur agressivité politique et la minimisation de l'idéologie. Le PASOK s'y prendra autrement, dans une conjoncture différente : au contraire, il encouragera toutes les oppositions ponctuelles au gouvernement et, plutôt que de baisser uniquement l'intensité de son discours, il en fera un discours "mosaïque", caractérisé par une forte dose de syncrétisme.

"Ainsi le PASOK peut être une version de gauche de la "Nouvelle Démocratie", mais aussi une version de gauche-extrémiste du PCG, il peut être acceptable au niveau national en projetant des visions qui jusqu'alors appartenaient au ghetto de la gauche, il veut être un parti bourgeois "sérieux" et en même temps organiser le "trottoir" et récupérer les mobilisations et les grèves les plus hétéroclites". <sup>67</sup>


Il n'existe malheureusement pas à notre connaissance de données sociologiques sur l'électorat qui nous permettraient de confirmer ou d'infirmer l'hypothèse d'une évolution du PASOK de 1974 à 1981 en un parti "catch-all". Nous disposons toutefois de données agrégées de géographie électorale, sur les pourcentages de vote obtenus par le PASOK dans toutes les circonscriptions, en 1974, 1977, 1981. Nous pouvons donc considérer une nationalisation éventuelle <sup>68</sup> du vote du PASOK comme un indicateur de l'évolution du PASOK en un parti "catch-all", dans le sens d'un parti disposant de soutiens électoraux sensiblement équivalents dans l'ensemble du pays. Nous avons pour chaque élection examiné le nombre de circonscriptions où le PASOK recueillait +/- 20% de voix par rapport à sa moyenne nationale. Nous obtenons les résultats suivants :

:	:	1974	:	1977	:	1981
:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	Circonscriptions où - 20%	:	15	:	9
:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	Circonscriptions où + 20%	:	11	:	10
:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	Total circonscriptions	:	:	:	:
:	:	où +/- 20%	:	26	:	19
:	:	:	:	:	:	:

L'implantation électorale du PASOK devient donc de plus en plus homogène sur le territoire national, ce qui, nous semble-t-il, peut être considéré comme une évolution vers le statut "catch-all". Il est important de noter qu'à ce titre le PASOK apparaît là aussi comme l'héritier de l'UC, "parti populiste dont l'influence est à peu près égale dans tout le pays" <sup>69</sup>, et qui a créé un phénomène se produisant alors pour la première fois dans la vie politique

grecque. Nous pensons dès lors qu'il n'est pas osé de conclure qu'un tel parti, quand il est victorieux, "balaie tout" : ainsi comme la droite populiste (le Rassemblement hellénique, l'ERE) a conquis les bastions du libéralisme d'avant-guerre, de même l'UC et le PASOK par la suite ont conquis progressivement les bastions de la droite, notamment les campagnes.

A partir d'octobre 1980, il existe toutefois des données de sondage régulières, les "Eurobaromètres" de la CEE portant dès lors aussi sur la Grèce. Or, selon l'Eurobaromètre 15 réalisé à la veille des élections de 1981, le PASOK apparaît comme le plus "catch-all" des trois grands partis, dans le sens que son électorat est le plus dispersé sur l'axe gauche-droite. Ceci peut être considéré comme un facteur de son succès électoral. Non seulement le PASOK est, de loin, le parti le mieux implanté au centre (5 + 6), mais il domine amplement la gauche (3 + 4), et reste implanté à droite (près de 10% de ses partisans).<sup>70</sup> Nous obtenons la configuration suivante pour la distribution des électorats respectifs du PASOK, de la ND et du PCG sur l'axe gauche-droite (où N = 203 pour le PASOK, 160 pour la ND et 38 pour le PCG, les moyennes respectives étant de 4,62; 8,06; 2,10).



Le sondage réalisé par le KPEE <sup>70</sup>) va dans le même sens : 57,7% des électeurs qui se déclaraient "libéraux" au sondage avaient voté "ND" en 1977 et seulement 15,3% avaient voté PASOK; en 1981, le rapport est inversé : 43,5% avaient l'intention de voter PASOK et seulement 31,8% "ND".

Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne l'implantation dans les régions urbaines, rurales et semi-rurales, le PASOK apparaît, en fonction de ses résultats de 1981, comme le parti implanté de la façon la plus homogène <sup>72</sup>) : la "ND" conservatrice est plus mal implantée dans les villes tandis qu'il est normal que le PCG y soit beaucoup mieux implanté qu'ailleurs.

	Régions urbaines	Régions rurales	Régions semi-urbaines
PASOK	48,2 %	48,4 %	46,7 %
ND	30,9 %	39,6 %	39,3 %
PCG	14,6 %	8 %	9,1 %

Des données de sondage d'octobre 1983 (Eurobaromètre 20) confirment encore ces différences d'implantation (sauf que la "ND" remonte son handicap urbain).

Nous disposons enfin de données de sondage (Eurobaromètre 20 d'octobre 1983) sur les préférences partisans en fonction du type d'occupation socio-professionnelle (nous sommes ici dans l'interprétation stricte du concept de parti "catch-all" dans le sens d'

à des changements dus à l'évolution fonctionnelle du parti dans le système politique. 74)

Nous avons appelé la part du discours qui reste constante le "noyau" dur de l'idéologie 75), ou en d'autres termes ses principes. Nous mettrons l'accent sur ce qui nous paraît être des structures fondamentales mobilisatrices du discours du PASOK.

Un discours mobilisateur doit nécessairement réduire la complexité du réel, être pauvre en nuances afin de pouvoir définir des pôles clairs d'identification et de rejet. C'est pour cela qu'il se basera sur quelques mécanismes psycho-symboliques fondamentaux, notamment :

- une vision du monde simpliste et dichotomique, caractérisée par sa partition binaire à forte connotation affective (entre "bons" et "méchants" par exemple); il en découle

- la réduction de la conflictualité existant parmi les destinataires à séduire (par exemple groupes sociaux antagonistes dans le cas d'un parti "catch-all") de sorte à persuader qu'ils forment un groupe homogène,

- apparaît alors comme conséquence nécessaire le transfert de la violence interne du groupe vers des ennemis extérieurs, désignés comme boucs émissaires. 76) Les schémas de causalité impliqués seront donc nécessairement réducteurs. Il s'agira d'activer une vision persécutoire du monde en suggérant l'idée de complot.

Par là même, par son apparente rigidité mais dont le corollaire est le manque d'analyse fine, même si en tant que "noyau" il est "sacré", y reste néanmoins susceptible d'aménagements, de réinterprétations en fonction de la situation. Il répond alors par là même parfaitement à la nécessité d'adaptabilité qui caractérise les discours idéologiques :

"interclassiste").

Nous ferons l'hypothèse que la répartition de l'électorat du PASOK correspond sensiblement à la répartition de la population grecque en secteur d'activité. Nous avons les résultats suivants :

-----	
:Agriculteurs:Propriétaires:Ouvriers: Cols : N	
: Pêcheurs :d'entreprise :manuels :blancs:	
-----	
% électorat :	: : : : :
PASOK :	10.6 : 5.9 : 15.3 : 10.6 : 340
:	: : : : :
% électorat :	: : : : :
"ND" :	17.2 : 8.2 : 9.8 : 8.2 : 122
:	: : : : :
% population:	8.8 : 7 : 12.6 : 9.6 :1000
-----	

Effectivement, compte tenu des marges d'erreur, notre hypothèse est vérifiée. Mais, compte tenu de ces mêmes marges, les différences avec la "ND" ne paraissent pas très significatives, en d'autres termes, elle est aussi "catch-all" en 1983 (elle est par ailleurs surreprésentée chez les paysans).

### 3.2.2.3 Les constantes dans l'idéologie : esquisse d'une interprétation systématique

Il nous semble que pour une analyse même sommaire 73) mais dynamique d'une idéologie comme ce sera le cas ici, il est utile d'opérer une distinction entre deux choses. D'une part ce qui reste relativement constant dans le discours à travers le temps et d'autre part ce qui est soumis

économique de la Grèce ("centre vs périphérie") que sociale ("oligarchie vs non-privilegiés") et politique ("droite vs PASOK"). Il est important de comprendre que la perspective est dynamique et accorde nécessairement un rôle moteur au volontarisme politique des acteurs, et notamment du PASOK. Selon que le moteur est le "grec" ou "l'étranger" (ou plutôt leurs expressions politiques) la situation du pays se transformera nécessairement.

- Il anéantit tout conflit pouvant exister entre les différents groupes sociaux (paysans, artisans, employés, ouvriers, jeunes, etc.) que comprend le magma des "non-privilegiés". L'idéologie a donc une fonction de création d'un sentiment d'appartenance commune, de cohésion sociale chez ses destinataires.

- Le corollaire de cette création de cohésion est la création de boucs émissaires extérieurs au groupe : l'oligarchie locale liée à l'étranger, qui est par ailleurs incarné par les Etats-Unis, l'OTAN, la CEE, les "centres de décision" étrangers, etc. L'idéologie active ici les "significations imaginaires" liées à la situation de dépendance et au nationalisme en tant que réponse à celle-ci.

On comprend dès lors, qu'avec l'utilisation de l'opposition "grec vs étranger" comme paradigme, la dimension des relations internationales devient fondamentale dans la grammaire des thèmes de l'idéologie du PASOK (nous avons montré que parmi les objectifs, celui d'"indépendance nationale" était une condition pour l'effectivité des autres). Le PASOK introduira donc le socialisme dans le vocabulaire politique non communiste grec par "la porte de derrière". La stratégie de mise en acceptabilité de cet objectif reposera sur la création d'un agencement sémantique original "nationalisme-socialisme", cohérent avec l'auto-définition du PASOK comme mouvement de libération nationale.

"L'apparent dogmatisme de l'idéologie rend parfaitement possibles des adaptations et des compréhensions indéfiniment renouvelées. L'extrême distance entre l'abstraction des principes et la particularité des applications rendra possible et nécessaire la diversité des relectures." 77)

Or, le discours du PASOK reprend de façon pratiquement idéal-typique ces principes du discours mobilisateur.

- Il repose effectivement sur une partition binaire du monde dont la forme principale est "grec vs étranger". Celle-ci retrouve de multiples traductions, par exemple "oligarchie (qui se définit par sa subordination à l'étranger) vs non-privilegiés ou peuple" (tous les autres groupes sociaux, dont le PASOK recherche le soutien). "droite (soumise à l'oligarchie et à l'étranger) vs forces progressistes ou démocratiques ou mouvement populaire ou PASOK", etc. Ce qui est important c'est, d'une part la réduction de la complexité opérée avec la division du monde en structures bipolaires à pôles antagonistes, et, d'autre part la cohérence de ces structures entre elles de sorte que l'on peut parler d'une véritable grammaire idéologique. On peut donc formaliser la vision du monde du PASOK en posant des équations sémantiques analogiques :

$$\text{grec} = \text{non-privilegiés} = \text{PASOK etc...}$$

$$\text{étranger} = \text{oligarchie} = \text{droite}$$

que l'on peut lire "le grec est à l'étranger ce que les non-privilegiés sont à l'oligarchie" etc. Les rationalisations de ce discours reprennent d'ailleurs la même grammaire :

$$\text{grec} = \text{périphérie} = \text{développement autocentré}$$

$$\text{étranger} = \text{centre} = \text{développement hétérocentré}$$

Ce qui est intéressant dans notre optique ce n'est pas leur pertinence analytique mais leur effet mobilisateur. 78) Car en effet l'opposition "grec vs étranger" devient un véritable paradigme 79) qui sous-tend l'analyse aussi bien

Le PASOK opère donc une réinterprétation symbolique du nationalisme le légitimant comme progressiste et favorisant par là-même l'acceptabilité de ce qui apparaît dès lors comme son corollaire nécessaire, le socialisme. Les conséquences politiques de cette opération seront importantes : le PASOK réactive la signification imaginaire de la "Nation" et arrive ainsi, débarrassé, lui, de la tare originelle des PC perçus comme affiliés à l'URSS, à opérer un renversement acceptable, à accuser la droite d'être, elle, soumise à l'étranger.

Outre cette dimension déterminante nous pouvons regrouper les différentes facettes de l'idéologie du PASOK en trois autres dimensions : la définition du parti par rapport au système politique (et à la droite qui lui est assimilée), l'évaluation des émetteurs-concurrents et le projet de société. Mais il est important de relever que la dimension des relations internationales constitue un discours fondateur, dont on retrouve les traces sur les autres. Nous utiliserons de nouveau un exemple d'application des équations analogiques en partant de l'opposition Tiers-Monde/Europe (qui est devenue fondamentale déjà sous le PAK).

Tiers Monde=Socialisme Tiers-Mondiste=Non-alignement=	Mouvement
Europe	Alignement Parti
(1ère (3e et 4e dimensions)	(1ère (2e dimension) dim.)

Notons par ailleurs deux autres types de structure, outre les structures binaires réductrices de la complexité du réel, caractéristiques de l'idéologie du PASOK.

- Des structures ternaires où le PASOK s'identifie à un tiers-terme nouveau qui apparaît comme la négation de deux extrêmes connus. Celles-ci ont pour fonction l'acceptabilité

de l'innovation discursive (le PASOK comme émetteur de propositions nouvelles), à des fins de démarcation par rapport aux émetteurs-concurrents. L'exemple le plus classique est celui de la "troisième voie au socialisme", opposée d'une part à la social-démocratie et d'autre part au "socialisme bureaucratique".<sup>80)</sup>

- Des structures tripolaires dont la fonction est de démontrer une prise en compte plus large de la variété des possibles en politique par rapport aux discours des émetteurs concurrents. Il s'agit donc de montrer (si l'on conçoit le discours comme système) une plus grande ouverture du discours et de dénoncer la fermeture du discours chez l'adversaire. Ainsi sur la première dimension on trouve la structure EUROPE/BALKANS/MEDITERRANEE opposée à l'attachement uniquement occidental de la "ND". Sur la quatrième dimension, la structure PARLEMENT/SYNDICATS/COLLECTIVITES LOCALES comme acteurs nécessaires au bon fonctionnement du système démocratique sera opposée à une conception étriquée de celui-ci, comportant uniquement le parlementarisme (cette structure est par ailleurs cohérente avec l'idéologie participative et la critique de la représentation). Notons enfin que même si elles font partie du noyau "dur", ces structures apparaissent comme relativement souples, permettant une certaine mobilité discursive de l'émetteur : on verra que celui-ci pourra, selon les circonstances, actualiser ou potentialiser l'un ou l'autre de leurs pôles.

L'importance du paradigme "grec vs étranger" ainsi que l'agencement sémantique "socialisme-nationalisme" nous amènent par ailleurs nécessairement à discuter de la caractérisation de l'idéologie du PASOK en termes de populisme.<sup>81)</sup> Un certain nombre de points militent en faveur d'une telle approche. Cette idéologie apparaît clairement, avec sa composante participative, comme la réponse aux demandes de rentrée politique de nouvelles



graves problèmes internes. C'est uniquement dans le domaine de la politique agricole que l'on peut réellement parler de populisme dans le sens d'une tentative, non de réfutation, mais de synthèse entre capitalisme et socialisme 91) à travers l'accent mis sur le mouvement coopératif.

En conclusion, nous devons rappeler que les éléments de l'idéologie du PASOK caractérisés comme "populistes" constituent par ailleurs des principes plus généraux des langages politiques réducteurs à des fins de mobilisation (l'analyse du "capitalisme monopoliste d'Etat" des PC fonctionne sur le même principe). Ne risque-t-on pas dès lors de procéder à des généralisations trop hâtives et de traiter de populistes ces langages en bloc ? Un problème analogue apparaît d'ailleurs quand l'on considère comme variable fondamentale du populisme le "césarisme". 92) Ne risque-t-on pas ainsi d'assimiler tout phénomène d'exercice de domination charismatique au populisme ? Il nous semble qu'il vaut mieux dès lors parler du populisme ainsi :

"... populism is better regarded as an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organization". 93)

Il s'agit donc de définir le populisme en termes de culture et non d'idéologie politique. Par extension, on pourrait qualifier de populistes les idéologies ou fragments d'idéologie particulièrement pénétrés par ces "logiques populaires" diffuses, les discours qui correspondent parfaitement au modèle d'interlocution. Il s'agirait donc des idéologies dont le fondement premier serait le principe "ce que le peuple veut, le parti le veut", a priori indépendamment des contenus de la formule. Ce principe (de communication et non interne au discours) serait d'ailleurs la clé de l'efficacité de ces idéologies. Or, l'idéologie du PASOK ne reprend que partiellement ce modèle : on a d'ailleurs vu qu'une "overdose" de l'innovation discursive que le PASOK a voulu injecter a été inacceptable (l'emphase

sur les socialisations en 1974). On peut donc parler d'une évolution du PASOK vers le populisme avec une minimisation de la composante socialiste à mesure que le parti vise le pouvoir. Mais celle-ci ne peut être totale, comme le "socialisme" fait aussi partie du noyau "dur" de l'idéologie.

Il semble que Laclau tienne aussi compte, outre des traits internes aux discours populistes, de cette définition communicationnelle quand il écrit, afin de résoudre la contradiction "socialisme vs populisme" : "There is no socialism without populism and the highest forms of populism can only be socialist". 94) La deuxième proposition est un jugement de valeur, mais la première dénote la compréhension du fait que le socialisme est inacceptable socialement s'il ne rencontre pas les significations imaginaires fondamentales d'une culture politique donnée.

#### 3.2.2.4. La mobilité discursive du PASOK : analyse fonctionnelle

Le discours politique du PASOK s'adaptera toutefois nécessairement au glissement dans l'accomplissement des fonctions qu'accomplit le parti dans le système politique. L'idéologie donc, si elle se définit par l'existence d'un noyau "dur", doit aussi être un système ouvert, souple, maniable, un moyen approprié pour maximiser le pouvoir de son émetteur. Bien entendu, il faut nuancer cette approche quelque peu instrumentale : l'idéologie n'est pas maniable à souhait par la direction de l'organisation. En effet, les membres de celle-ci les plus attachés au dogme peuvent empêcher le leadership de transformer l'idéologie soit en protestant, soit en menaçant de quitter le parti. 95) Mais le leadership du PASOK (notamment Andréas Papandréou qui

est le seul émetteur légitimé pour l'innovation discursive car il dispose de "plus-values" d'autorité grâce à son charisme) est doté d'une large autonomie pour remanier à sa guise le discours. En effet, les mécanismes de contrôle et de feedback démocratique sont atrophiques dans le PASOK.

La mobilité discursive est facilitée par un fait qui à notre sens n'a pas été assez relevé : le fait que l'idéologie du PASOK, est, malgré les apparences, constituée par une grammaire de la prudence. Certes le PASOK a enrichi la symbolique politique grecque en diffusant au niveau du débat public des concepts nouveaux "à la manière" comme la décentralisation, l'autogestion qui auparavant se retrouvaient surtout dans des discussions d'intellectuels. Mais la prudence de l'idéologie apparaîtra surtout après la première phase, où le parti a besoin de s'affirmer, de se créer une identité propre en marquant la rupture avec les émetteurs-concurrents. Ainsi le PASOK contestera la Constitution et critiquera durement le gouvernement mais il insistera en même temps sur son sens de la responsabilité, notamment en période de tension avec la Turquie; par ailleurs, il se pose en "défenseur de la démocratie", en reprenant ainsi à son compte un stock de valeur largement consensuelles. On a vu par ailleurs que l'introduction du socialisme a été "homéopathique", accompagnant le nationalisme. Le PASOK s'attachera enfin toujours à se démarquer des PC, par exemple en restant très discret sur l'appropriation du marxisme.

Même si l'on s'attache uniquement à la forme et au style des trois textes sur lesquels le PASOK a respectivement fait campagne en 1974, 1977, 1981, on peut les considérer comme des signes d'accomplissement de fonctions différentes.

- En 1974, la plateforme électorale fut la Déclaration du 3 septembre, constitutive du parti, énoncé des principes généraux de son idéologie. Il ne s'agit donc pas à proprement parler d'un programme d'action gouvernementale, mais comme tout texte "fondateur" d'un document assez vague et susceptible de réinterprétations diverses. 96)

- Pour les élections de 1977, le PASOK a élaboré les Lignes directrices de politique gouvernementale, un petit livre dont le titre déjà apparaît comme un signe d'ambivalence fonctionnelle : d'une part une volonté d'être perçu comme une alternative gouvernementale (le programme met l'accent sur les différentes politiques publiques), mais d'autre part une incapacité d'assumer parfaitement cette fonction, le parti se contentant d'esquisser son action au gouvernement.

- Le Programme de politique gouvernementale (ou "Contrat avec le peuple" comme dit A. Papandréou) de 1981 apparaît par contre comme le signe d'une volonté affichée et d'une capacité d'apparaître comme l'alternative gouvernementale à la "ND"; d'ailleurs la campagne eut lieu sous l'impulsion des propositions du PASOK, auxquelles la "ND" était amenée à répondre, se trouvant sur la défensive. C'est surtout dans ce programme que le PASOK opère clairement sur différentes "issues", dans la perspective d'accéder au gouvernement, une coupure entre objectifs à court et long terme, stratégie et tactique, fins et moyens, etc.

Le PASOK saura progressivement baisser la dose des thèmes choquants, notamment le socialisme et ses corollaires (par ailleurs, en 1981 il ne conteste plus le régime en se taisant sur la réforme de la Constitution). Ainsi l'emphase sur les socialisations lors de la campagne électorale de 1974 cède progressivement la place (déjà à la campagne de 1977) à l'accent sur le terme beaucoup plus vague, diffus et moins radical de "changement". D'ailleurs le parti avait belisé le terrain en évoquant ce terme dès 1975 97), et

celui-ci fait partie d'une ancienne symbolique du centre-gauche grec. 98) Il s'agit donc d'un retour progressif vers des messages connus, redondants, stéréotypés, vers les "formes normales" de la communication. Ainsi le "Changement" devient le centre de la symbolique de la campagne de 1981, chaque parti (y compris la "ND") tentant de se l'approprier; mais il restera la "marque déposée" du PASOK. Selon des données de sondage (septembre 1981), 50,4% des électeurs de "ND" de 1977 désiraient un certain changement et seulement 44,7% n'en voulaient pas. 99) Le discours du PASOK rencontre donc les aspirations populaires diffusées : si les gens réinterprétaient de façon quasi-personnalisée le "Changement", ils ne le désiraient pas moins. Il nous semble que Veltsos 100) a raison quand il présente la demande de "Changement" de l'opinion publique comme l'expression d'un désir, plutôt que comme un choix politique conscient, fusion fantasmatique plutôt que synthèse conceptuelle.

*déjà dans le programme de 1981 on écartait*  
En ce qui concerne d'autres points, sur les "issues", il n'y a pas de référence au marxisme. Par ailleurs l'autogestion, qui est toujours restée un concept vague dans le discours du PASOK, a ainsi pu subir une série de glissements sémantiques et être réduite à une participation des représentants des travailleurs dans la gestion (co-gestion) des entreprises socialisées. C'est dans une interview au quotidien To Vima le 26/4/81 qu'A. Papandréou se charge de sécuriser les électeurs modérés en officialisant l'édulcoration de son programme radical (les réponses qu'il y apporte seront développées en juillet sous forme de programme gouvernemental). Notons qu'A. Papandréou fait néanmoins preuve de subtilité : ainsi les secteurs touchés par la "socialisation" ne sont pas moins importants qu'en 1974 mais entretemps celle-ci a changé de sens. Marginalisée dans le discours, elle est vidée de son contenu radical : elle ne désigne plus que la direction des

entreprises socialisées selon l'"intérêt général", son contenu variera de cas en cas sans qu'il soit précisé. Par ailleurs, de nouveaux boucs émissaires sont créés en la personne des "intermédiaires", A. Papandréou cherchant à se concilier aussi les traditionnels "privilegiés". Le discours devient de plus en plus celui de la nécessité de rationalisation, et la critique de la droite se déplace de plus en plus sur le plan de son incompétence pour gérer les affaires du pays, par opposition au PASOK.

En matière de politique extérieure, le PASOK affine déjà aux élections de 1977 son opposition de principe à l'adhésion à la CEE en proposant une "relation spéciale" de type norvégien; aux élections de 1981, il proposera un référendum sur l'adhésion ou cette relation, que l'on savait impossible puisqu'il était du ressort du président Caramanlis, artisan de l'adhésion. D'ailleurs, il n'a jamais été demandé par la suite. Ainsi, le pôle EUROPE sera actualisé, aux dépens des deux autres; A. Papandréou abandonne d'ailleurs progressivement ses velléités tiers-mondistes et de non-alignement et commence déjà en 1979 une offensive de charme auprès des leaders des PS européens. Le PASOK n'adhérera toutefois pas à l'Internationale Socialiste; toutefois les raisons du refus deviennent de moins en moins radicales. Il ne s'agit plus d'agents de l'impérialisme, simplement on a peur de l'ingérence d'un "centre de décision étranger" dans les affaires internes. En 1980, le PASOK vote contre les accords Rogers sur la réintégration de la Grèce dans l'OTAN militaire. Toutefois à l'interview d'avril A. Papandréou subordonnera l'"Exit" et la fermeture des bases américaines aux besoins de la souveraineté nationale du pays, (déjà en 1977, était introduite une coupure entre court et long terme avec l'évocation d'un calendrier pour le retrait des bases comportant notamment une première période d'"étanchéisation"). Le principe

initial est donc désormais soumis à des conditions restrictives. D'ailleurs, une fois au gouvernement, le PASOK ne fera rien pour quitter l'OTAN et renouvellera l'accord sur les bases en le présentant comme un accord de retrait futur. Ainsi, on peut dire qu'un saut encore plus grand vers la "modération" a lieu une fois que le parti est au pouvoir. Toutefois, le PASOK conserve une politique extérieure fondamentalement différente de celle de la "ND" : on ne considère plus comme une donnée le fait d'appartenir à l'Occident. La Grèce ne s'entend plus comme "satellite" depuis 1974; mais depuis 1981 elle est en plus un allié qui sait faire du chantage à partir de sa "loyalty" qu'il remet en cause si ses demandes ne sont pas prises en compte. On peut donc dire que le PASOK a remplacé la stratégie initiale de l'"Exit" du système occidental par une stratégie de "Voice" prononcée, visant au réaménagement, au raffermissement de la position de la Grèce dans l'espace international. Toutefois l'"Exit" subsistera toujours sous forme de menace.

Ce que nous venons de dire risque d'inciter le lecteur à comprendre que le PASOK est arrivé au pouvoir essentiellement parce qu'il a évolué vers la modération, c'est par ailleurs une thèse assez souvent avancée, un peu trop rapidement à notre sens.<sup>101</sup> Néanmoins la thèse contraire existe aussi, que le PASOK est arrivé au pouvoir parce qu'il s'est acharné à une entreprise de délégitimation continue du système.<sup>102</sup> La première interprétation se baserait en fait sur le postulat que le PASOK aurait compris l'importance de l'électorat modéré, la deuxième sur le postulat que le PASOK aurait compris l'importance de la récupération des mécontents. Or, il nous semble que nous devons nuancer ces deux thèses opposées. On a vu que la prudence n'est pas absente du discours du PASOK déjà assez tôt; par ailleurs, l'évolution vers la modération n'est pas

synchronisée, elle dépend des domaines; enfin le double discours a toujours été un outil important utilisé par le PASOK et son leader.<sup>103</sup>

On peut se servir d'une grille d'analyse fonctionnelle qui permet une évaluation nuancée de l'évolution du PASOK, à condition de considérer les différentes fonctions qu'accomplit un parti dans le système politique comme idéal-typiques.

- Le PASOK mettrait d'abord l'accent sur la fonction tribunitienne, de "défense de la plèbe" : il s'agit d'

"organiser et défendre des catégories sociales plébiennes (c'est-à-dire exclues ou se sentant exclues des processus de participation au système politique, comme d'ailleurs des bénéficiaires du système économique et du système culturel) et de leur donner un sentiment de force et de confiance ... Le programme politique proposé et l'action politique menée/ signifient pour ces plébiens que leur colère est officiellement représentée par des mandataires qui leur ressemblent et parlent leur langage mais sous une forme politique articulée".<sup>104</sup>

Il proposera donc un programme de réorientations si bouleversantes que le système ne pourra les supporter, ainsi que des choix trop vagues pour qu'ils puissent être traduits en décisions concrètes et réalisables avec les ressources du système.<sup>105</sup> Le PASOK apparaît donc comme l'agent d'expression, mais aussi de canalisation des protestations; son rôle en tant que parti tribunitien témoignant ainsi d'une certaine ambivalence. Malgré la virulence des critiques, il met aussi en avant son légalisme et son sens des responsabilités, contribuant ainsi à intégrer dans le système des catégories sociales qui, autrement, risqueraient d'être amenées à des formes plus radicales de révolte. Il est intéressant donc que l'aspect "catch-all" du parti ne

s'accompagne pas d'un discours modéré, le parti devant se faire le "fédérateur" des mécontents. Le PASOK poursuivra tout le temps une critique très dure du système, reprendra à son compte des demandes incompatibles avec ses ressources, visera à le déstabiliser en augmentant son "stress". Notons que, selon Lavau, une telle fonction est accomplie par un parti s'il est impossible pour lui de renverser les rapports de force. Or le PASOK réussit à inverser le rapport de forces précisément aussi parce qu'il accomplit cette fonction qui, pour lui, n'a pas un caractère seulement défensif mais aussi offensif. On trouve donc ici un cas intéressant de phénomène politique que l'on peut qualifier de populiste, de "catch-all" et de tribunitien. C'est parce que le PASOK accomplit la fonction tribunitienne qu'il devient "catch-all" et réussit à fédérer le "peuple" contre le "bloc au pouvoir".

Toutefois, il est un fait que le PASOK se modère aussi progressivement. On peut dire qu'il augmente ainsi la dose de la fonction de relève politique qu'il remplit. Celle-ci consiste à se présenter comme alternative crédible de gouvernement et implique donc modération et pragmatisme. Le PASOK, s'il continue à critiquer très durement les "autorités", se joint au consensus sur le "régime" incarné par l'acceptation d'abord tacite de la Constitution J06. Par ailleurs, il modère les solutions alternatives qu'il propose. Mais il n'accomplit la fonction de relève politique qu'imparfaitement, trop pris dans l'exercice de sa fonction tribunitienne : il est contraint, afin de mobiliser, de prendre à son compte toutes les exigences, de faire trop de promesses, celles-ci "surchargeant" le système, en lui demandant trop de ressources. Il en pâtira, une fois au gouvernement.

#### 4. Perspectives

La première législature avec le PASOK au gouvernement s'est presque écoulée; les élections doivent avoir lieu cet automne. Nous aimerions conclure en nous posant certaines questions sur l'issue de ces élections, à partir d'une brève analyse du rapport des forces politiques actuel.

L'enjeu des élections demeure toujours au centre, dans le système grec de "2 partis et demi" (dans le sens que le PCG, troisième force en présence au Parlement, ne semble pas pouvoir empêcher la formation de gouvernements "monocolorés", sans que toutefois cela soit strictement prévisible a priori). Nous assistons en fait actuellement à la cristallisation de trois courants idéologiques profonds qui ont marqué la vie politique grecque récente à travers les "partis de personnes", à savoir la droite, le centre (centre-gauche) et la gauche (communiste).

L'électorat centriste semble imprévisible : il est en principe par tradition "anti-droite" et ne devrait pas éprouver de sympathie particulière pour le leader actuel de la "ND", Mitsotakis. <sup>107</sup> Celui-ci a d'ailleurs été élu surtout grâce à l'appoint des députés de la droite du parti. Le programme gouvernemental de la "ND" ne peut par ailleurs paraître très séduisant : il est vague, met surtout l'accent sur des allègements fiscaux et agite la menace du collectivisme du PASOK. Mais l'électorat centriste peut être attaché aux valeurs bourgeoises et peut se sentir excédé par une indéniable arrogance du pouvoir que manifeste le PASOK et par certains de ses élans populistes. Par ailleurs, il nous semble peu probable que les mécontents de gauche du PASOK votent PCG; ils ne l'ont même pas fait aux élections européennes de juin 1984 où ils pouvaient agiter un vote qui

Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'une faible dose d'"Exit" suffit pour que le rapport des forces soit inversé (la différence entre le PASOK et la KND n'était plus que de 3% aux élections européennes de 1984, contre 13% aux législatives d'octobre 1981). Dans l'euphorie de la victoire de 1981, A. Papandréou pouvait déclarer que la droite, qui avait gouverné le pays pratiquement sans interruption pendant 50 ans, était désormais placée dans l'"armoire de l'histoire". Or, après quatre ans de gouvernement socialiste, même si le PASOK gagne les prochaines élections, la droite est en train d'émerger à nouveau : en juin 1984 elle a remonté son handicap électoral dans les grandes villes et elle est en train, pour la première fois, de s'organiser à la base. Le PASOK a intérêt à tirer les enseignements de la gestion du pouvoir. Cela implique certainement une vision plus analytique des clivages sociaux que celle qui l'a porté au pouvoir (tout en sachant qu'elle est difficilement acceptable par ses électeurs), ainsi qu'une conception plus globale et plus précise du "changement". Car s'il y a eu des changements indéniables, ils se sont faits souvent sans concertation, sans synchronisation, allant parfois trop loin, parfois pas assez, sans cette combinaison de "pessimisme de la raison et d'optimisme de la volonté" qui est censée guider la marche vers le socialisme.

serait enregistré comme une protestation sans qu'il ait toutefois d'enjeu réel.

Mais l'on ne peut nier que, globalement, le problème des mécontentements se pose. Le PASOK a été pris à son propre piège : voulant tout promettre à tout le monde il n'est bien entendu pas arrivé à réaliser ses promesses. Le PASOK a été pris dans la logique du pouvoir : il a été amené à traiter des pressions contradictoires qu'il avait occultées à des fins de mobilisation. Il s'agit là d'une situation typique de parti "catch-all" situé au centre d'un axe idéologique, qui n'arrive vraiment à "faire le deuil" d'aucun des nombreux destinataires de son message pré-électoral et qui est ainsi pris dans une situation de "double lien" (soumis en même temps à des demandes contradictoires). Il est donc amené à donner des coups de barre une fois à gauche et une fois à droite, croyant ainsi résoudre l'ambivalence de son rôle, imposée par une clientèle trop hétérogène.

Concrètement : quelles sont les possibilités d'"Exit" du PASOK pour les mécontents ? L'"Exit" paraît difficile, coûteux, compte tenu d'une situation bipolarisée qui arrange en fait les grands partis (elle rend difficile la création d'un parti centriste ou la progression du PCG). En outre, la grande distance idéologique entre les deux grands partis rend difficile le passage de l'un à l'autre ; la psychologie du "vote utile" empêche le PCG de progresser et de remplir, lui, une fonction tribunitienne ; comme elle empêche le vote blanc (le vote est obligatoire en Grèce). Enfin, la situation est différente par rapport à 1981 : il est difficile de placer ses espoirs d'un nouveau "changement" dans la "ND" actuelle, minée par les querelles internes de notables, plus animée d'esprit revanchiste que de volonté d'élaborer des programmes constructifs.

NOTES

1. Sur l'histoire du mouvement ouvrier grec et du PC de cette période, cf. ELFANDIS, A., L'invocation de la révolution impossible - PCG et bourgeoisie dans l'entre-deux guerres, (en grec), Athènes, Oikos, 1976. Ou encore SOLARO, A., Storia dal partito comunista greco, Milan, Teti, 1973.
2. Sur cet arsenal d'"exception", cf. la remarquable thèse d'ALIVIZATOS, N., Les institutions politiques de la Grèce à travers les crises : constances et spécificités d'un parcours constitutionnel agité (1922-1974), Paris, LGDJ, 1979. Cf. aussi CATIPHORIS, G., La législation des barbares (en grec), Athènes, Themelio, 1975, ou enfin KOUNDOUROS, R., Law and the Obstruction of Social Change. A Case Study of Laws for the Security of the Prevailing Social Order" in Greece, M. Phil, Brussel University, 1974.

3. On lira sur l'ensemble de cette période deux brèves histoires de la Grèce en français : SVORONOS, N., Histoire de la Grèce moderne, Paris, PUF, Coll. "Que sais-je?", 1972 et TSOUKALAS, C., La Grèce de l'indépendance aux colonels, Paris, Maspéro, 1970. En anglais : CLOGG, R., A Short History of Modern Greece, Cambridge, The Cambridge University Press, 1979 et LitGG, K. Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford University Press, 1969. Et, "last but not least", l'ouvrage classique de MEYNAUD, J. Les forces politiques en Grèce, Lausanne, Etudes de Science Politique, 1966. Nous aimerions ici relativiser la thèse que, contrairement à l'Espagne et au Portugal, la dictature n'aurait été qu'une parenthèse aberrante et peu significative dans l'histoire grecque : formellement oui, mais nous ne pouvons la percevoir que comme une croissance maligne d'un système qui a balisé le terrain pour sa genèse, voulant ériger des défenses face aux pressions en faveur de changements politiques d'envergure. Sur la dépendance de l'Etat grec face aux Etats-Unis après 1947 (doctrines Truman), cf. des ouvrages susmentionnés ainsi que COULOUMBIS, T.A., PETROPOULOS, I.A., PSOMIADIS, H.G., Foreign Interference in Greek Politics : An Historical Perspective, New York, Pella, 1976, ou, en grec, ROZAKIS, G., "La Grèce dans l'espace international", in Tsoussis, D.G. (Ed.), Η Ελλάδα και η Μεταπολίτευση, Athènes, Estia, 1983, pp. 91-119.

4. Nous pouvons bien entendu citer un certain nombre d'autres variables, plus sociologiques et endémiques, qui peuvent expliquer aussi l'absence de PS : elles sont toutefois renforcées par le climat politique d'après-guerre. Par exemple, la faiblesse chronique du mouvement ouvrier et syndical, renforcée par le développement d'un syndicalisme "paternaliste" contrôlé par les gouvernements de droite. Cf. KATSANEVAS, Th., Trade Unions in Greece : their Present Organizational Structure and Determinants of their Growth, Ph. D., University of London, (LSE), 1980. Ou encore, après le fonctionnement éphémère des structures participatives sous l'EAM, la rediffusion de rapports clientélistes liés à la faiblesse de la capacité distributive du système. Ceux-ci sont à l'origine des partis, constitués par des notables disposant de ressources, qui leur permettent de créer des liens d'allégeance personnels (l'EDA était le seul parti à disposer d'une organisation solide). Cf. MEYNAUD, J.P., cit. ainsi que LE66, K., "Political Change in a Clientelistic Policy : the Failure of Democracy in Greece", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 1, no 2, 1973, pp. 231-246.
5. VOURNAS, T., Histoire de la Grèce contemporaine (en grec), Athènes, Tolidis, 1980.
6. SVORONOS, N., op. cit., p. 117.
7. PLORITIS, M., "La monarchie en Grèce", Les Temps Modernes, vol. 25, no 276 (bis), 1969, pp. 67-95, ainsi que TSOUKALAS, C., op. cit.
8. Pour une excellent exposé extensif sur les racines complexes du PASOK, cf. l'ouvrage malheureusement difficilement accessible de LYRINTZIS, Chr., Between Socialism and Populism : the Rise of the PASOK, Ph. D., University of London, (LSE), 1983.
9. MAVROGORDATOS, G., The Rise of the Green Sun. The Greek Election of 1981, Londres, King's College, 1983, p. 54.
10. ibid.
11. NICOLACOPULOS, I., Les deux guerres civiles et le système des partis politiques en Grèce, ECPR Joint Sessions, Aarhus, 1982, ou encore MAVROGORDATOS, G., "El sistema griego de partidos", Revista de Estudios Políticos, no 27, mai-juin 1982, pp. 87-112.

12. Sur cette problématique, cf. par exemple GERMANI, G., "The Transition to a Mass Democracy in Argentina", in Heath, D., et Adams, R., Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, New York, 1965.
13. Sur les éléments "populaires-démocratiques" des idéologies, cf. l'importante contribution de LACLAU, E., "Towards a Theory of Populism", in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Londres, New Left Books, 1979, pp. 143-198.
14. On lira à ce sujet MEYNAUD, J. Rapport..., ainsi que la remarquable contribution synthétique de N. DIAMANDOUROS (qui, toutefois, nous semble-t-il, minimise l'importance du coup d'état pour la préservation des intérêts des Etats-Unis dans la région), "La transición de 1974 de un regimen autoritario a un regimen democratico en Grecia: datos basicos e interpretacion desde una perspectiva europea", in Santamaría, J. (Ed.), Transición a la democracia en el sur de Europa y America Latina, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1981, pp. 199-241.
15. Cité in Anti, no 87, 3/12/77, pp. 6-11.
16. MEYNAUD, J., Rapport sur l'abolition de la démocratie en Grèce, Montréal, Etudes de Science Politique, 1967.
17. Cf. aussi TSOUCALAS, C., op. cit.
18. Dans l'étude de COULOMBIS et al., op. cit., il apparaît que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas été acteurs de ces bouleversements politiques mais simplement des spectateurs satisfaits (contrairement au rôle conféré par Meynaud et Tsoucalas, op. cit.). Toutefois, ce qui sera significatif pour comprendre l'efficacité de l'idéologie du PASOK, c'est le fait que, au niveau de l'opinion publique, les Etats-Unis soient perçus comme à l'origine de ces événements. Selon ROZAKIS in Tsoussis, op. cit., p. 113 : "Le rôle de protagoniste de l'Occident, et plus particulièrement des Etats-Unis, dans tous les événements importants d'après-guerre qui concernaient le sort de la Grèce dans des questions nationales et internationales, avait fait porter aux Etats-Unis un pourcentage important des malheurs nationaux : gouvernement autoritaire des années 50, coup de force royal de 1965 et ses conséquences, dictature, tragédie chypriote, revendications turques sur la mer Egée." Nous ne disposons pas de données empiriques

- antérieures, mais selon un sondage réalisé en septembre 1982, soit après un an de gouvernement socialiste qui n'avait, contrairement aux déclarations initiales du PASOK, ni retiré la Grèce de l'OTAN et de la CEE, ni fermé les bases américaines (à noter toutefois que le sondage a eu lieu seulement à Athènes sur un échantillon faible qui laisse une marge d'erreur importante) : 53% des personnes interrogées étaient pour un retrait complet de l'OTAN, 28% pour un retrait de l'organisation militaire et 70% pour la fermeture des bases américaines. Seulement 29% étaient favorables à une amélioration des relations avec les Etats-Unis, 80% avaient une mauvaise image de ce pays, et "seulement" 60% avaient une telle image de l'URSS. (Rapport qui doit bien être unique en Europe occidentale). Rapporté par DIMITRAS, P., "La Grèce en quête d'une politique indépendante", RFSP, vol. 33, no 1, février 1983, pp. 109-132.
19. WINDISCH, V., Pensée sociale, langages en usage et logiques autres, Lausanne, L'Age d'Homme, 1982.
20. Cf. par exemple <sup>en grec</sup> sur la progressive opposition d'A. Papandréou à la CEE, l'analyse de TSAKALOVANNIS, P., "La dictature militaire en Grèce et la CEE", O Politis, no 64-65, nov.-déc. 1983, pp. 16-124.
21. Pour un aperçu de la pensée politique d'A. Papandréou de cette époque, cf. ses ouvrages Man's Freedom, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970; Democracy at Gunpoint, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1970; Paternalistic Capitalism, The University of Mimesota Press, 1972; ou bien son article "The Takeover of Greece", Monthly Review, vol. 24, déc. 1972, pp. 13-22.
22. Cf. par exemple la Déclaration du Conseil National du PAK de septembre 1971. Pour un aperçu de la vie organisationnelle du PAK, cf. VASSILIADIS, D., PAK-PASOK Mythe et réalité (en grec), Athènes, Dialogos, 1977.
23. Sur ce concept, qui désigne la partie "dure" d'une idéologie, celle qui est peu susceptible de changements, cf. BON, F., "Structure de l'idéologie communiste", in Le communisme en France, Paris, A. Colin, Cahiers de la FMSF, 1969.

24. La dictature a créé une fissure dans le bloc au pouvoir de droite : la majorité de ses leaders politiques s'y est opposée. Le conflit entre droite pro- et anti-dictatoriale éclatera de façon ouverte aux élections de 1977, où la "Nouvelle Démocratie" aura comme concurrent à sa droite le "Front National" qui obtiendra 7% des voix. Par la suite, notamment face au danger de la montée du PASOK, la "ND" tentera de récupérer ces électeurs d'extrême-droite.
25. Par Karamanlis lui-même dans une séance à la Chambre en 1976.
26. Le premier gouvernement Karamanlis (juillet-octobre 1974), était considéré abusivement d'"union nationale". Il comportait en réalité surtout des anciens notables de l'ERE, quelques notables de l'UC et quelques résistants à la dictature. L'UC s'est reconstituée avec l'appoint de certains résistants et est devenue l'UC-FN (Union du Centre - Forces Nouvelles). Depuis 1968, le mouvement communiste grec s'est scindé en deux : le PCG (pro-soviétique) et le PC de l'intérieur (euro-communiste).
27. Sur la question du parti dominant et sur les problèmes de légitimité démocratique que génère une telle situation, cf. CHARLOT, J., "Du parti dominant", projet 48, sept.-oct. 1970, pp. 942-951. Sur le système de partis grec depuis 1974, cf. MAVROGORDATOS, G., "El sistema griego de partidos", op. cit.
28. Sur le choix électoral de 1974 et la rationalité de celui-ci, cf. l'analyse très lucide de NIKOLIMAKOS, M., "Les perspectives pour une nouvelle théorie révolutionnaire en Grèce" (en grec), in Papasarañdopoulos, P. (Ed.), PASOK et pouvoir, Thessalonique, Paratiritis, 1980, pp. 83-104. Cf. aussi CLOGG, R., "Karamanlis's Cautions Success : the Background", Government and Opposition, vol. 10, no 3, été 1975, pp. 339-353. Du même auteur, sur les changements intervenus après les élections de 1977, "Greece : the End of Consensus Politics ?", World Today, vol. 34, no 5, mai 1978, pp. 184-191; sur les élections de 1981 "The Greek Elections of 1981", Electoral Studies, no 1, 1982, pp. 95-106. Sur les transformations du système politique grec en rapport avec les élections, cf. MACRIDIS, R., "Elections and Political Modernization in Greece", in Pennimann, H. (Ed.), Greece at the Polls, Washington et Londres, AEIPR, 1983, pp. 1-20. L'ouvrage contient aussi des monographies sur les partis en compétition en 1974 et 1977. Sur les élections de 1981, cf. aussi FEATHERSTONB, K., "Elections and Parties in Greece", Government and Opposition, vol. 17, no 2, printemps 1982, pp. 180-194.

29. ANSART, Pierre, La gestion des passions politiques, Lausanne, L'Age d'Homme, 1983, p. 156.
30. KAFITANZOGLU, I., Discours politique et idéologie (en grec), Athènes, Ekaspas, 1979, pp. 54-55.
31. MEGREPONTI-DELIVANI, M., "La Grèce comme 10ème membre de la CEE" (en grec), Praxis, No 2, janvier 1981, p. 11.
32. LOULIS, J.C., "Comment et pour quelles raisons les grecs ont-ils voté en 1981 ? - Une analyse des tendances électorales" (en grec), Epikendra, No 22, sept.-oct. 1981, pp. 4-21.
33. MEGREPONTI-DELIVANI, op. cit.
34. Pour le premier sondage, cf. LOULIS, J.C., op. cit., pp. 5-7 et 19. Pour l'analyse de l'Eurobaromètre, cf. CONDOMINES, J. et BARROSO, J.D., "La dimension gauche-droite et la compétition entre les partis politiques en Europe du Sud : Portugal, Espagne, Grèce", Il politico, 1984, XLIX, No 3, pp. 405-438.
35. Sur ce parti, cf. VEREMIS, Th., "The Union of Democratic Center", in Pennimann, H. (Ed.), op. cit.
36. Cf. PAPAYANNAKIS, M., "The Crisis of the Greek Left", ibid.
37. Sur la mobilisation initiale suscitée par la genèse du PASOK, cf. bien entendu LYRINTZIS, Chr., op. cit., ainsi que ELEFTHERIOU, R., "9 ans de PASOK ou comment le Mouvement risqué de se situer lui-même hors-parti" (en grec), Anti, No 240-241-242, 2-16-30/9/83.
38. Nous verrons en étudiant l'idéologie du PASOK que celle-ci fonctionne en général sur le principe "grec vs étranger", structure fondamentale qui traverse les thèmes du discours.
39. Cf. l'apport de la psychanalyse, par exemple BARANDE, R., "psychanalyse et idéologie", Pouvoirs, No 11, 1979, pp. 105-114 ou CHASSEGUIE-SMIRGEL, J., "quelques réflexions d'un psychanalyste sur les idéologies", Pouvoirs, No 11, 1979, pp. 33-40.
40. Cf. l'oeuvre classique de Weber, Economie et société (traduction française), Paris, Plon, 1976.
41. KATSIOULIS, I., "Le rôle et l'importance du leadership charismatique dans la société transitionnelle grecque" (en grec), in Papasarañdopoulos, P. (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 445-463.

42. A ce sujet on peut donc observer des analogies avec le comportement politique des paysans français attachés à Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, qu'analyse Marx dans son 18 Brumaire. Pour une remarquable et originale restitution de cette approche, cf. ANSART, P., op. cit..

43. Sur la composante charismatique du mouvement "andréiste" et par extension du PASOK, cf. la contribution assez polémique d'ELEFANDIS, A., "PASOK and the Elections of 1977 : the Rise of the Populist Movement", in Pennimann, H. (Ed.), op. cit..

44. Cf. MEYNAUD, J., Rapport ..., op. cit..

45. Pour une telle interprétation cf. par exemple ELEFTHERIOU, R., op. cit..

46. Pour un historique détaillé de l'organisation interne du PASOK, cf. bien entendu LYRINTZIS, Chr., op. cit., ainsi qu'ELEFTHERIOU, R., op. cit., ou encore, ZOTIROS, D., Les structures du PASOK, Mémoire de DEA, Université de Paris IX - Nanterre, 1979.

47. Utilisé entre autres par Lénine.. Cf. ROIG, C., La grammaire politique de Lénine, Lausanne, L'Age d'Homme, 1980.

48. Ibid., pp 96 et s.

49. On peut par ailleurs faire l'hypothèse que le parti, une fois au pouvoir, assurera un rôle de "mass-patronage party"; sa protection sera nécessaire compte tenu de la faiblesse de la capacité distributive du système qui réduit le nombre de ses bénéficiaires. Le critère sera alors l'allégeance à l'organisation pour bénéficier de prestations publiques importantes (notamment l'entrée dans le service public). Cf. pour le concept, GRAZIANO, L., "A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelism Behavior", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 4, No 2, juin 1976, pp. 149-174.

50. Cf. texte in Ta Nea, 10/3/79.

51. Pour une analyse structurale, cf. le classique GREIMAS, A.-J., Sémantique structurale, Paris, Larousse, 1976.

52. Sur le concept et celui, lié, d'"émetteur-privilegé", cf. OSSIPOW, W., La transformation du discours politique dans l'Eglise, Lausanne, L'Age d'Homme, 1979.

53. Cf. la remarquable postface de BON, F. et BURMIER, M.A., "Qu'elle ose paraître ce qu'elle est", in Bernstein, E., Les présupposés du socialisme (traduction française), Paris, Seuil, Coll. "Points", 1974. Il semble qu'une telle position soit, théoriquement du moins, la plus susceptible de mobilisation au sein de tout continuum d'options idéologiques car, géométriquement, elle est celle qui permet le plus facilement de créer du consensus autour d'elle (par exemple, de séduire un électeur de droite, plus que si l'on se situe délibérément à gauche). Cf. à ce sujet sur la compétition partisane en général, DOWNS, A., An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper and Row, 1957, ainsi qu'OSSIPOW, W., "Oligopolisation de l'idéologie et localisation optimale", in Centre d'Etude de la Pensée Politique, Analyse de l'idéologie, t. 1, Paris, Galilée, 1980, pp. 131-147. Pour un exemple au sein du PASOK, la position d'A. Papandréou lors de son Discours au Pré-Congrès de mars 1975, que l'on peut formuler ainsi :

Emetteurs Notables	AP	Gauche du parti
b) clientélistes		
<u>Ideologie</u>	Organisation ouverte, cour-roi de diffusion du message idéologique	Organisations fermées "sectaires", "Élitistes", "Clubs de discussions"

54. ANSART, P., op. cit., p. 14.

55. On peut à la limite parler de modèle d'interlocution où l'émetteur ne dispose d'aucune autonomie par rapport au destinataire du message, qui lui suggère alors à voix basse (sondage par exemple) ce qu'il aimerait entendre de lui, chose que l'émetteur répète à haute voix dans son message. Cf. OSSIPOW, W., La transformation ..., op. cit., pp 51 et s.

56. Sur cette problématique très importante, cf. CASTORJADIS, C., L'institution imaginaire de la société, Paris, Seuil, 1975. Sur la culture politique grecque, cf. DIAMANDOUROS, N., "Greek Political Culture in Transition : Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends", in Clogg, R., Greece in the 1980's, Londres, The Macmillan Press, 1983. Nous ne voulons pas surestimer le rôle de l'idéologie dans l'accèsion du PASOK au gouvernement; on a vu que le besoin de "changement" était diffus. Mais pas n'importe quel acteur pouvait l'articuler; or le PASOK disposait, entre autres ressources, d'une idéologie appropriée pour répondre à ce besoin.

57. Une excellente synthèse critique des différentes analyses du capitalisme grec se trouve dans PETMEZIDOU-TSOULOUVI, M., "Approches de la question du sous-développement de la formation sociale grecque : une vision critique" (en grec), Synchrone Themata, No. 22, juillet-septembre 1984, pp. 13-29.
58. Sur les raisons de l'efficacité idéologique du PASOK, cf. MAYROGORDATOS, G., The rise ..., op. cit., (en grec), cf. in Papasarandopoulos, P. (Ed), op. cit., la contribution d'ANDONAKOPOULOS, L., "Les causes sociales de la création et du développement du PASOK", ainsi que celle d'ANDRIANOPOULOS, A., "Le profil politique du PASOK". Ou encore KALOMALOS, Th., "PASOK - Modernisation, idéologie petite-bourgeoise", Anti-thesis, No 8, janvier-février 1982, pp. 51-60 ou ISOUICALAS, C., "La structure de l'emploi et le miracle 'petit-moyen'", Anti, No 260, 11/5/84, pp. 21-23.
59. SVORONNOS, N., "Esquisse de l'évolution sociale et politique en Grèce", Les temps modernes, vol. XXV, No 276 bis, 1969, p. 28.
60. Pour un exemple d'analyse de ce développement, cf. MOUZELIS, N., Modern Greece. Facets of Underdevelopment, Londres, The Macmillan Press, 1975.
61. Pour ces données, cf. LINARDOS-RULMON, P., "1971-1981: la décennie des petits-moyens", Economicos Tachydromos, No 36, (1981), 8/9/83, pp. 3-4.
62. The Rise ..., op. cit., p. 51.
63. KATSOUKLIS, I., in Papasarandopoulos, P. (Ed.), op. cit., p. 449. L'auteur adopte, toutefois, ici aussi une perspective évolutionniste, considérant cette structure sociale comme transitoire, les classes sociales étant en voie de stabilisation et en voie d'acquisition de consciences de classe déterminées.
64. Sur le fonctionnement de ce type de discours, cf. BIRNBAUM, P., Le peuple et les 'gros', Paris, Grasset, 1979.
65. Cf. en français LINARDOS, P., "Vers une relève politique en Grèce ?", Le Monde Diplomatique, septembre 1981.
66. Sur le concept, cf. KIRSCHHEIMER, O., "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", in Le Palombara, J. et Weiner, M. (Eds), Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.

67. KYPRIANIDIS, T. et TSEKOURAS, Th., "Le PASOK et la nouvelle conjoncture idéologique" (en grec), Thesis, No 3, avril-juin 1983, p. 58.
68. Cf. NICOLACOPOULOS, I., Géographie électorale de la Grèce depuis 1945 Vers la nationalisation du vote, ECPR Joint Session, 1984.
69. Ibid., p. 16.
70. CONDOMINES, J. et BARROSO, J.D., op. cit., pp. 425-426.
71. Cf. LOULIS, J.C., op. cit., pp. 17-18.
72. Cf. FEATHERSTONE, K., op. cit., p. 189.
73. Cette esquisse est la première interprétation à partir de quelques données parmi celles d'une analyse intégrale, tant sémantique que structurale, de la totalité des documents du PASOK destinés à la diffusion externe entre sa fondation en 1974 et les élections de 1981.
74. Pour une analyse fonctionnelle des partis politiques, cf. l'oeuvre de LAVAU. Par exemple : "Partis et systèmes politiques: interactions et fonctions", Revue canadienne de Science politique, II, 1, mars 1969, pp. 36-44 et particulièrement sur le PCF, A quoi sert le PCF ?, Paris, Fayard, 1981.
75. Cf. note 23.
76. C'est ce que Roig, op. cit., appelle dans le discours de Lénine le principe de "victimage". Cet ouvrage est une analyse empirique approfondie de la "grammaire" d'un discours mobilisateur. Cf. aussi une subtile analyse théorique, ANSART, P., Idéologies, conflits et pouvoirs, Paris, PUF, 1977.
77. ANSART, P., Les idéologies politiques, Paris, PUF, 1974, p. 20.
78. dont EEFANDIS par exemple (in Pennimann, H. (Ed), op. cit.) saisit la portée mais avec un certain mépris pour une telle forme "primaire" de la pensée politique, qui, qu'on le veuille ou non, est la plus mobilisatrice.
79. On pourrait parler aussi d'"anecdote représentative", dans le sens d'un modèle verbal qui comporte potentiellement tout ce que va expliciter le système terminologique développé à partir d'elle". ROIG, C., Symboles et société, Berne, Lang, 1977, p. 42.

80. On a vu (note 53) que l'on retrouve les mêmes types de structures dans le discours de la direction concernant l'organisation. Là, il se posera en discours "centriste", par négation des deux "extrêmes" de droite (le clientélisme) et de gauche (le sectarisme). Toutefois l'objectif principal dans ce cas sera la création, à travers une position centriste sur un axe idéologique donné, de soutiens à l'émetteur.

81. Il existe en effet un remarquable consensus parmi les auteurs des meilleures analyses sur le PASOK pour traiter celui-ci en tant que phénomène populiste. Cf. l'ouvrage de LYRINTZIS, Chr.: op.cit., ainsi que les études plus brèves d'ELFANDIS, A.: in Pennimann, H. (Ed), op. cit., KAPETANYANNIS, B.: "La signification théorique et politique du débat sur le PASOK" (en grec), in Papasarandopoulos, P. (Ed.), op. cit., MOUZELIS, N.: "The Greek Elections and the Rise of PASOK", New Left Review, No 108, mars-avril 1978, pp. 59-74, PAPASARANDOPOULOS, Sp.: "Les forces politiques aux prochaines élections - et au-delà" (en grec), in Papasarandopoulos, P., op. cit. Bien entendu, l'acceptation du PASOK comme populiste dépend de la définition que l'on donne de ce phénomène; elle cadre bien par exemple avec la définition de DI TELLA qui prend en compte quatre facteurs importants: au niveau de l'idéologie le réformisme social couplé au nationalisme; et par ailleurs, une base populaire couplée à un rôle important du leader. Cf. "Populism and Reform in Latin America", in Veliz, C. (Ed), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Londres, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 47-74. Pour traiter un mouvement de populiste il ne suffit donc pas de se référer à l'idéologie, mais aussi à sa clientèle sociale, au rapport direct qu'elle entretient avec le leader, etc. Mais on verra qu'il n'existe pas de consensus sur ce qu'est le populisme, sur les réalités sociales qu'il recouvre, ni sur les modes de son appréhension. A titre d'exemple, STEWART relève trois possibilités de le traiter: comme une nomenclature de faits historiquement distincts, comme système d'idées ou comme produit de situations sociales spécifiques. Cf. "The Social Roots", in Ionescu, G. Gellner, E., Populism: its Meanings and National Characteristics, Londres, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, pp. 180-196. Pour notre part nous nous limiterons uniquement à l'étude de la caractérisation populiste de l'idéologie du PASOK.

82. Cf. note 12.

83. STEWART, A., in Ionescu et Gellner (Eds), op.cit., p. 180.

84. NEIRA, H., "Populismes ou césarismes populistes ?", RFSP, vol. XIX, No 3, juin 1969, pp. 536-573.

85. WILES, P., "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine: some Elementary Theses on Populism", in Ionescu et Gellner (Eds), op. cit., p. 166.

86. Ibid., p. 167. Il est significatif à cet égard que lors des crises internes les "adversaires" ont été marginalisés par appel à la base et par la qualification classique soit d'"intellectuels", soit de "petits-bourgeois", soit des deux, ou de courants "élitistes". L'opposition sémantique "mouvement vs club de philosophes" a été centrale dans ce discours d'exclusion.

87. Cf. LACLAU, E., op. cit.

88. Notons que la thèse du complot n'est que sous-jacente dans le discours. Le degré de son affirmation dépend d'ailleurs du type de discours: elle disparaît par exemple dans les discours d'exégèse où l'accent est mis sur la scénarisation de la situation, c'est-à-dire du passage du paradigme de l'acteur à celui des structures (discours du type: "il n'y a pas de bons ou mauvais américains, le rôle des Etats-Unis est déterminé par la dynamique de l'impérialisme"). Sur la scénarisation dans le discours, cf. ROIG, C., Symboles et société, op. cit.

89. "L'unité des forces du changement peut se réaliser", in Papasarandopoulos, P. (Ed), p. 417.

90. Cf. NEIRA, H., op. cit.

91. Cf. WILES, P. in Ionescu et Gellner (Eds), op. cit., p. 167.

92. Ibidem, ainsi que NEIRA, H., op. cit.

93. WORSLEY, "The Concept of Populism", in Ionescu et Gellner (Eds), op. cit., p. 245.

94. Op. cit., p. 196.

95. Cf. HIRSCHMANN, A., Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, Harvard, University Press, 1970. Pour cet auteur, les membres mécontents d'une institution disposent de ces deux alternatives. Notons que dans le cas du PASOK la critique ouverte ("voice") est pratiquement impossible, entraînant généralement l'exclusion. Par ailleurs, il devient de plus en plus coûteux de quitter le parti ("Exit") avec, d'une part, la cristallisation des forces politiques qui limite les possibilités de créer un nouveau parti, et d'autre part avec la bipolarisation de la vie politique et la grande distance idéologique entre les partis qui rend difficile le passage d'un à l'autre.
96. Il s'agit d'un texte "sacré" puisqu'il ne pût même pas être révisé par le Congrès. Mais cela est largement rituel : A. Papandréou déclarera au C.C. provisoire, déjà le 19/1/75 : "peut-être que chacun lit dans la Déclaration du 3 septembre ce qui se trouve le plus proche de sa mentalité propre, de sa façon de penser et de sa disponibilité psychique".
97. Le terme apparaît pour la première fois à une allocution d'A. Papandréou au Comité Central en mars 1975.
98. Notamment de l'EPEK du général Plastiras après la guerre civile. Cf. MANESSIS, A., "Le processus pré-électoral : programmes, tactiques, forme" (en grec), in Diamandouros, M.P., Kitromilidis, P.M., Mavrogordatos, G.T., (Eds), Les élections de 1981, Athènes, Estia, 1984.
99. LOULIS, J.C., op. cit., p. 13
100. VELTSOS, G., "La psychographie du "Changement" ou le "Changement" en tant que représentation", Politiki, (Revue grecque de Science Politique), No 2, janvier-mars 1983, pp. 93-96.
101. Cf. par exemple CIOGG, R., "The Greek Elections of 1981", op. cit., p. 95 ou MAVROGORDATOS, G., The Rise..., op. cit., p. 10. Ce sur quoi l'on a par contre des données empiriques, c'est sur le fait que le PASOK est perçu comme un parti relativement modéré; en mars 1981, la majorité des interviewés (37,6%) le perçoit comme un parti socialiste non-marxiste, malgré son affirmation d'être marxiste. Cf. LOULIS, J.C., op. cit., p. 19.
102. Cf. PAPADIMITROPOULOS, D., "Répétitions nécessaires pour conserver le "souvenir du futur"", O Politis, No 45, août 1981, pp. 14-25.

103. Cf. une interview d'A. Papandréou déjà à Communautés Européennes de nov.-déc. 1974 sur la CEE où il est beaucoup plus nuancé que dans ses prises de position habituelles.
104. Cf. LAVAU, G., "Le parti communiste dans le système politique français", in Le communisme en France, op. cit., 1969, p. 18.
105. Cf. LAVAU, G., "Partis et systèmes...", op. cit.
106. Lavanu reprend la distinction d'Easton entre trois niveaux de soutien au système : les autorités (le gouvernement), le régime (les règles du jeu), la communauté (l'entité nationale). On a vu que le PASOK, avec la reprise du nationalisme, a fait dès le début de l'attachement à la communauté une dimension fondamentale de son idéologie.
107. Il est considéré comme le chef de file des "apostats", députés dissidents de l'UC qui ont entériné le coup de force royal de 1965. Il est significatif à double titre, pour la nature de magma de l'UC et pour la continuité de la politique grecque, que les leaders respectifs actuels des deux grands partis avaient fait partie de l'UC.

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PASOK IN POWER: SOCIALIST RHETORIC AND POPULIST IDEOLOGY

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## PASOK IN POWER : SOCIALIST RHETORIC AND POPULIST IDEOLOGY

### " PASOK IN OFFICE, THE PEOPLE IN POWER"

In May 1984, a few months before its tenth birthday, PASOK held its much discussed, long awaited and repeatedly postponed first national congress. During the congress PASOK reaffirmed its commitment to the socialist transformation of Greek society and the basic policies of the party's programme. In his address to the congress the party's founder and president A. Papandreu, stated : " PASOK seeks and creates a new road to socialism...The third road to socialism... The third road means the rejection of the world power blocs logic, the safeguarding of party pluralism and of freedom of thought and action. It is tantamount to the socialization and social control of both the means of production and of political domination. It means the dominance of national characteristics and singularities that characterize the Greek road to socialism". Papandreu together with other leading party members claimed that PASOK's performance in power was successful and that "the government of change"(the word change was PASOK's central electoral slogan in 1981 and the PASOK government calls itself "the government of change") had introduced structural changes in Greek society "aimed at realizing PASOK's strategic objectives". The socialist transformation, according to PASOK, cannot be achieved in four years; the implementation of the party's electoral promises require at least two full four year terms. It is not surprising, therefore, that the party's leadership tried to present the image of PASOK as a party poised to win another term in office. Hence the attempt to convey the image of a party proud of its performance in office and sure of its forthcoming electoral victory. The ideas behind this effort are that socialism is in good hands in Greece and that another four year term is necessary in order to consolidate and deepen the socialist transformation of Greek society.

In this paper it is argued that PASOK is not only far from introducing and consolidating socialist change in Greece, but is also in the process of constructing a social reality characterized by populist ideas and practices, in which the state has an ever increasing and all-embracing role, and where there is a profound confusion about what is being done and in whose interests. Moreover, the purpose of this paper is to show that populism is (analytically) a useful and relevant concept in order to examine and explain the "PASOK phenomenon" in Greece.

#### A. POPULISM

Populism is a vague and controversial concept; the variety of definitions and the conflicting views to which it is subject underline its bewildering scope, and also illustrate its importance. Ideology (programme), policies and organization are three variables which are helpful in understanding the nature of populism. In this paper populism is defined in terms of ideology, with organization, programme and policies as the main areas in which the implications of populist ideology are most clearly seen.

According to Laclau, populism consists of " the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology" and " populism starts at the point where popular-democratic elements are presented as an antagonistic option against the ideology of the dominant bloc".\*

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\* E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London, 1977; see, also, N. Mouzelis, Ideology and Class Politics, New Left Review, Nov. 1978.

It is not possible within the limits of this paper to elaborate on Laclau's terminology and his theory of populism; we can, however, use his approach as a basis for understanding its nature and for arriving at an analytically useful conceptualization of populism. Thus, populism is defined as the exploitation of popular-democratic elements arising out of the antagonism between the people and the power bloc, which characterizes a social formation. At the same time, populism can also exploit the class contradictions related to the capitalist mode of production. However, the articulation of popular-democratic elements with class elements in a populist ideology is characterized by the dominance of the former over the latter. From this perspective, populism is viewed as an ideology emerging out of antagonisms between the people on the one hand, and the power bloc on the other. This antagonism exist and operate parallel to the class struggle, but whereas the antagonism between the people and the power bloc is characterized by popular-democratic elements that arise at the level of a determinate social formation, class contradictions are marked by class elements arising from contradictions in the mode of production. Within this context, popular elements appeal to individuals by stressing their participation and the fact that they belong to the people or the "non-privileged"; in contrast, class elements address individuals as class agents. Populism, therefore, is conceived as an ideology that mobilizes not a specific class, but the people or the masses in general, against whatever is identified as the enemy, be it the state, the ruling class, the "officialdom", the economic and political oligarchy or a foreign power. In this sense, populism may appeal to a variety of social groups and may be used in defence of the interests of either a dominated or a dominant class. In other words, populism is able to mobilize large sections of a society relatively rapidly, without making concrete references to class or other divisions that might hinder their collective

action.

Within this context, populism markedly differs from what can be described as class-based politics. Class elements are peripheral to a populist ideological discourse. The abolition of the capitalist relations of production, the transformation and dismantling of the capitalist state, the planning and programming of the economy and other areas of social life, or the establishment of participatory structures and the advancement of direct democracy are themes that are either not found, or are peripheral to populism.

The fact that populism appeals to the social forces as an amorphous and undifferentiated whole, sharing as their only unifying feature their identification as the "people" and their opposition to and dissatisfaction with the dominant classes or ruling elites, leads to a difficulty in elaborating a concrete set of policies and in determining which social forces are going to benefit from it and how. Hence, <sup>the fact that</sup> populist programmes for change are vague, if not contradictory. A populist programme does not aim at changing the capitalist relations of production, or at restructuring class relations in society; instead, its policies are presented as beneficial to all the social forces constituting the populist social alliance. For populism, in other words, there is no difference between a prosperous farmer and an agricultural worker, between a private employee and a liberal professional, between a small scale businessman and his employees. Moreover, the state is not seen as a structure to be transformed or dismantled, but rather as a mechanism to be used for the consolidation of the power position of the populist movement. As it is practically impossible to satisfy all the competing interests of the social forces which constitute the populist alliance, populism turns to the state as a means of controlling and supervising socioeconomic developments and maintaining mass support.

It is perfectly possible, of course, that some ideas and concepts arising out of class contradictions will be incorporated into a populist discourse and programme. However, the manner in which these ideas are used and the specific measures taken for their implementation will follow a different logic and serve different purposes from those encountered in class-based politics.

The ideological "fluidity" of populism is directly related to its weak and precarious organization. Even if populism manages to create a strong grass-roots organizational base, the latter is characterized by a direct relationship between leader and led, which tends to weaken the structuring of intermediary administrative levels between the top and the rank and file. Any intermediaries are distrusted and they are seen as preventing the direct and immediate support between the populist leader and his people. The plebiscitary element in populist organizations differentiates their structure from western European socialist or communist organizations. The latter, irrespective of the degree to which they have incorporated popular elements into their discourse, have much more autonomous and institutionalized organizational structures. Populism, by contrast, tends to have a plebiscitarian-charismatic leadership, which acts as a substitute for a strong and effective organization and which serves as the basic means for achieving the necessary party cohesion and common identity. Within this context, the populist ideology and programme are not elaborated and formulated within the organization, and the mass membership has little - if any - participation in its shaping and presentation.

Thus, the populist ideology serves as a point of reference for the mobilized forces, and its vagueness and obscurity are related both to its role and to the way in which it was formed. Since the organization and through it the rank and file, have little to do with ideology and programme, these areas constitute the leader's reserved domain. He thus becomes the major agent for the formulation and communication of the party's ideas and objectives.

This schematic and necessarily elliptic presentation of the main characteristics of populism may serve as a framework for the examination of PASOK in power which follows. The discussion of PASOK's performance in office, seeks to show what characteristics predominate within the party and to explain how the populist nature of the party is reflected in its programme and policies. Furthermore, it seeks to show how a populist ideology can be combined with socialist ideas and concepts and, at the same time, with an attempt to rationalize and modernize the political system.

## B. PASOK IN POWER : THE ECONOMIC POLICY

In order to outline PASOK's policies it must be remembered that the party's economic programme was based on three central ideas, namely, the socialization of the means of production, the decentralized planning of the economy and self-management. These basic policies were complemented by a set of measures designed to improve the living standards of the "non-privileged" and to stabilize the economy. The seriousness of the deterioration of the Greek economic situation is not in doubt. It is characterized by continuing high rates of inflation (over 20% in 1982 and 1983); by a persistent unemployment rate approaching 10 per cent; by a rampant increase in the balance of payments deficit as well as of the foreign debt; low productivity; a marked decline in receipts from two traditional props of the balance of payments, shipping and tourism, and low investment, both in industry and agriculture. The slump in investments is not a new phenomenon. Total investment in the Greek economy began to decrease in 1973 and continued decreasing until 1983 when it reached the 1970 level. Thus, the index of investments is now at the same level as it was 14 years ago and low investment has become a structural feature of the Greek economy. Against this background, PASOK showed no imagination, boldness or decisiveness. Furthermore, it did not take a consistent and systematic approach to these problems. Given that the above problems of the Greek economy were well known long before PASOK's rise to power, a coherent and organized economic strategy might have been expected. The party's programme proposed to cope with these problems through socialization, self-management, the decentralized planning of the economy, the curbing of tax evasion and the active role of the state as a key investor in the economy.

To begin with socialization, PASOK's approach was not clear both as to the definition of the concept and to the extent that it was to be implemented. According to PASOK, socialization was characterized by the control and/or management of a company by the regional or local authorities - depending on the size and importance of the firm - and by the workers' and employees' participation in its administration and management. Self-management, however, was not the dominant characteristic of a socialized unit. It was the participation of the "social agent", i.e. the state, the regional council or the municipality that determined the socialization of a productive unit. It is clear that as a result of this conceptualization, it was uncertain how socialization was to be implemented, or to what degree the "social agent" or the employees would participate in the management of the socialized unit.

The PASOK government proved to be very cautious and undecided on this issue. Only a very small number of private companies came under state control (mainly in the mining and energy sectors), and in these few cases one can hardly speak of effective workers' and employees' participation in the management, let alone in the profits. In June 1983, however, the PASOK government passed a law providing for the socialization of companies already belonging to the public sector (communication, electricity, transport and the banking sector). The new law introduced employees' participation on the management council of the state companies, without specifying the responsibilities of this council, nor those of the newly created managers' council. More important, however, was the controversial Article 4 of the law, according to which a strike in these companies was legal only after obtaining the support of absolute majority of the registered members of a union, through a secret ballot.

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As expected, this article caused an uproar within the unions, but also within PASOK, and it was criticized as a law which effectively curtailed, if not abolished, the right to strike. Thus, PASOK on the one hand offered minimal participation in management to the employees, and on the other sought to secure their passivity and the safeguarding of social peace by creating legal hurdles to the right to strike.

In October 1984, the government began drafting the decrees implementing the new law. The decrees again caused serious reservations about the content and purpose of these socializations. Representative Councils of Social Control were set up consisting, in equal numbers, of representatives of the state, the employees and independent associations. These new structures are described as the main administrative and controlling bodies of the companies; in fact, however, they have only supervisory and advisory functions. Real power and effective control and management of the company are entrusted to the general manager and to the managers' committee.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the rationale behind these policies, one has to bear in mind first, that the public sector companies undergoing socialization employ a total of more than 100,000 employees, organized in highly active and effective unions, and second, that all these companies have huge budget deficits. Their rationalization and modernization and the balancing of their budgets, would require the introduction of new technology, a freeze of wages and salaries and other harsh measures whose implementation and success would depend on the employees' consent. The so-called socialization of these units, could neutralize the employees' unions and secure the necessary social peace by offering a minimum of participation to the employees, and by making them co-responsible for their policies. In other words, "socialization" is a way of linking the fortunes of the employees to those of the company, by institutionalizing the representation of corporate interests in the company's administration.

Since one can hardly speak of effective self-management and employees' participation, it is more a matter of a policy characterized by corporatist structures and mentality, which, while paying lip service to the idea of socialization and self-management, in fact weakens the trade unions, and encourages a corporatist approach to the interests and problems of the employees.

PASOK's vague programme and half-hearted approach to the question of socialization was coupled by an indecisiveness and ambivalence towards businessmen and industrialists. At one time PASOK appeared to be holding an olive branch to private capital and at another cited big-business as the major cause of the government's mounting economic difficulties. PASOK appeared to rely on private initiative to reactivate the Greek economy, and leading members of the cabinet tried to appease industrial capital and attract new investments. Given the unwillingness of Greek industrialists and businessmen to invest in Greece, however, - a reluctance that had been evident since the early seventies - PASOK's hopes were frustrated. Furthermore, the continuing talk about socialization and self-management did not help to create a climate of mutual confidence. On the other hand, socialization and self-management were not used as a means of systematically restructuring the Greek economy. The recurrent references to these concepts was primarily part of PASOK's rhetoric, and as such it neither helped to achieve an understanding with capital, nor did it help to mobilize the workers and employees and attract their support. Finally, PASOK's promise that in the event of continuing unwillingness to invest on the part of industrialists, the state would intervene and make the necessary productive investments was only partly fulfilled. Despite the remarkable increase of investment to construction and work on the infrastructure, the state did not manage to fill the gap left by private capital.

In conclusion one may comment that PASOK's economic performance showed that the party lacked a coherent and well planned programme for action. In its economic programme PASOK included a number of socialist ideas, that is ideas emerging from and based on class contradictions. These ideas, however, were incorporated into PASOK's ideological discourse in such a manner as to become part of a populist rhetoric designed to impress and attract the masses. The final outcome of the incorporation of such ideas into a populist logic is first, that these very ideas become discredited because of the manner in which they are applied, and second, that they are eventually opposed by both capital and labour. The introduction of such policies in the name of the people cannot win organized mass support and in the end will create more problems than it was intended to solve. PASOK's economic policy oscillated between contradictory alternatives:

Reliance on private initiative and socialization; effective self-management and limited participation under state tutelage. Thus, PASOK was caught in a series of compromises and spent much energy in an attempt to satisfy and balance competing interests. In the end it seems that PASOK has opted for state control and by this means hopes to attract mass support and to supervise social and economic developments.

### C. PASOK IN POWER : SOCIAL . POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

By social and institutional changes or reforms we mean not only policies dealing with various areas of social and political life (e.g. the family, criminal law, education, health), but also more general practices that concern and affect the "public sphere", and which often have both symbolic and practical significance. It is in this particular area that one can detect another aspect of PASOK's policies which is the rationalization and modernization of the social and political system.

As many of such changes are low-cost, the PASOK government has been quick to implement them, thus fulfilling some of its major electoral promises. These reforms have included the introduction of civil marriage (against the strong opposition of the Church) and of divorce by consent, coupled with a significant reform of the family law; the ending of the dowry system; the decriminalization of adultery; official recognition of the war time resistance against the Axis and of the communist-led resistance organizations; measures providing for the return to Greece of the Communists who fled to Eastern bloc countries in the aftermath of the 1946-49 civil war.

Apart from these changes, however, which in many cases were long overdue, PASOK had promised major changes in education, health and labour legislation. Here its performance was not an unqualified success. A new law concerning higher education was introduced which aimed at breaking the traditional authority of university professors and vesting decision-making powers in the academic departments, where students' participation was effectively introduced. This legislation was a major step forward; however, the problems of the Greek educational

system remain unresolved. Despite the announcement of ambitious plans such as the creation of two new universities (at a time when the existing ones face acute problems), PASOK has demonstrated its lack of a systematic programme which could cope with the mounting problems of the Greek educational system. Specifically, the large number of students registered at universities, the lack of research facilities and post-graduate courses, the shortage of teaching staff and the idiosyncracies of the examination system have combined to render the universities mere examination centres for the awarding of degrees. In a society where higher education has always been seen as a means of securing upward social mobility (and higher social status), PASOK has not confronted the problems caused by the large number of students and by the lack of a satisfactory infrastructure. Instead it has adopted a populist policy by declaring its determination to provide education for the masses without concerning itself with the quality of that education. It is true that higher education should be available to all citizens and that a socialist government should take measures to make education an easily accessible good. Yet, a socialist government might be expected to safeguard the quality of education, to secure employment for university graduates and to plan higher education according to general social and economic needs. The alternative leads to a situation, as in Greece today, where university degrees are undervalued and there is high unemployment among several categories of university graduates. A long-term well planned programme, providing for the necessary number of students and infrastructural reforms is a basic necessity of a socialist education policy. By contrast PASOK succumbed to the popular demand for more higher education, and has proceeded to create new universities, which can only add to the existing problems. Given the problems facing the relatively new universities

in Crete and Thrace, the obvious priority would seem to be to invest in the existing institutions, in order to consolidate, reorganize and modernize them. PASOK, however, has based its educational policy on political criteria rather than on social and economic ones.

PASOK's legislation concerning elementary and secondary education also illustrates the government's populist approach to education. Although the new law was hailed as reforming and democratizing secondary education in Greece, in fact it concentrates all power in the hands of the minister of education. The latter together with his "school advisers" are responsible for the programming and supervision of secondary education, and they are also in a position to intervene in the teachers' activities and performance. Above all, the new law maintains the principle that "the school should advance and reinforce faith in the country and the pure elements of the orthodox Christian tradition".

Legislation has also been introduced to create the basis of a National Health System, but the initial plan has been repeatedly changed - obviously due to financial constraints - and at the beginning of 1985 the results are poor. This has led to continuing uncertainty and confusion over the prospects for the new system and the frustration and adverse reaction of left-wing medical associations.

With regard to trade unions, PASOK introduced new legislation aimed at freeing the trade unions from state tutelage and interference and at safeguarding free and proportional representation of the labour force. The political practice of the government, however, has not been in accordance with its stated intentions. The old conservative

leadership of the General Confederation of Labour was replaced by a new one, but despite new elections and the holding of a trade unions congress, there is significant evidence of continuing party and state intervention in the trade union movement. The imposition of P.R. as the main system for interest group elections facilitated the reproduction within the unions of the parliamentary party scene and thus the parties' control over the unions. Initially, the active presence within PASOK's organizational structure of branch or professional organizations (Kladikes Organoseis) was seen as a development that could lead to an effective representation of each sector's interests. In spite of the fact that in several cases these organizations tried to promote their corporate interests, eventually party allegiances prevailed over the union ones and often unions controlled by PASOK were abruptly silenced or forced to conform with the official party line. As a result, most sectors of Greek society lack an autonomous and credible spokesman in their dealings with the PASOK government as most unions or other associations are either controlled by PASOK itself or, by the opposition parties.\*

Moreover, the often arrogant and interventionist attitude of the government in its relations with the labour movement, its handling of strikes, and opposition to those unions which are not controlled by PASOK are indicative of PASOK's political orientation. The ministry of labour has not hesitated to bluntly intervene in the unions' affairs and to use all available means to break the strikes that have engendered social dissatisfaction and opposition to the government.

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\* G.Mavrogordatos, " Legitimacy and Autonomy of interest groups in Greece", Unpublished paper presented at the conference, Democracy and Interest in Southern Europe, Florence, November 1984.

A last but highly important area that is worthy of examination is the role of the state, the reorganization of the civil service and the state apparatus. PASOK had promised to eliminate "polythesia" or institutionalized moonlighting, to reorganize and modernize public administration, to make it more effective and responsible to the public and to decentralize decision making. Decentralization was a central concept in PASOK's programme and it was presented as the basic means of achieving the above ends. PASOK's policies, however, did not live up to existing expectations. The government introduced legislation reforming the role and responsibilities of the prefects and creating a new representative council attached to the prefect with significant responsibilities. This council consists of elected representatives of local government, professional associations and trade unions. Its main task is to allocate public investment in the department. According to PASOK, this was a step towards establishing popular representation at the departmental level.

More significant, however, were the local government reforms, by which neighbourhood (or quarter) councils were established in each municipality and the mayor was vested with more power than he had held in the past. Moreover, this new law provided for the division of each municipality into municipal departments, which, together with the neighbourhood councils constituted the new participatory local government structures. Although these were important innovations, they were far from establishing a decentralized system with effective participatory structures as PASOK's programme had envisaged. The latter had provided for a three tier decentralized system, with the community or municipality, the eparchy and the region constituting its three main levels. Each level held full responsibility for social and economic planning and implementation in its area.

PASOK, of course, made it clear from the outset, that this reform was transitional until the full revision of local government legislation. This may account for PASOK's hesitant approach to the matter, its failure to adopt a radical stance or to create <sup>new</sup> means for citizens to participate in the exercise of power. Nevertheless, despite PASOK's rhetoric on the local government issue, it must be pointed out that these reforms illustrate the government's intention to rationalize and modernize several key areas of social, economic and political life. This aspect of PASOK's policies is clearly evident if one considers not only the government's policy on decentralization, but also its policies vis-a-vis the state apparatus, the civil service and the social services.

Thus, the local government reform, despite its shortcomings, was, on the one hand, part of a strategy of rendering local and departmental structures more effective and more responsive to <sup>the</sup> citizens demands, and on the other, of decentralizing the traditionally centralized Greek state. Similarly, PASOK tried, albeit not always successfully, to restrict institutionalized moonlighting in the public sector and to simplify some of the complex and time-consuming processes of the civil service. The socialization of public sector companies can also be seen as part of this strategy to modernize key areas of the economy. Above all, however, this modernizing effort is manifested in the legislation reforming civil servants' recruitment. The new law abolished the old system based on competitive examinations and introduced a new one, under which appointment to the civil service was to depend on the social and economic position of the applicants, measured through a complex points system. In this way, PASOK attempted to introduce a fair system, immune from

political interference, and at the same time to break the impermeability of the state. Hence the dominance of the social and economic criteria over the meritocratic. The above reforms illustrate both PASOK's policy towards a highly centralized state apparatus which has always had an active role in social and political developments, and also how the rationalization and modernization of the system could easily be combined with populist ideology and practices. The presentation of the new legislation as facilitating the entrance of the people into the state bureaucracy underlines the populist nuances of PASOK's policies: according to PASOK these reforms safeguarded popular sovereignty.

The modernizing zeal of PASOK can also be detected in the political sphere, where the government abolished the preference vote, considered by many as a basic means of encouraging clientelistic practices. Furthermore, new legislation was introduced concerning the financing of political parties. The government, however, did not fulfill its promise to introduce proportional representation; nevertheless, PASOK tried to convey the image of a party improving and modernizing the political system and advancing new political practices in day-to-day politics.

Last but not least, the modernizing aspects of PASOK's policies are evident in the government's efforts to establish a welfare state. Whatever the degree of success of PASOK's reforms of education, health and other social services, the fact that PASOK gave special attention to these areas and presented these reforms as a key part of its programme is significant. Considering the deplorable state of the country's social services and institutions, PASOK's attempt at establishing a welfare state was without doubt timely and popular.

At the risk of ever-generalization, it can be argued that the role played in northern and central Europe by social-democratic parties, was undertaken in Greece by a populist party. The different historical, social and economic processes which brought social democracy to power in western Europe and PASOK to power in Greece account for the differences between the western European and the Greek experience. Social-democracy was the outcome of an historical process marked by industrialization, economic expansion, the establishment of well organized trade unions and the development of political organizations that gradually acquired a mass character. In Greece, by contrast, industrialization took place under different conditions and was limited in scope; the weak socialist movement never split into communist and socialist parties; nor did social democracy ever establish itself as a viable presence in Greek politics. Given the failure of the Greek left (which was identified with and monopolized by the Communist party) to establish itself as a major political force, the demand for social and political change was taken up by a populist party. The populist ideology, the leader's charisma, the "fluidity" of its programme, and the development of a mass base, enabled PASOK to mobilize an heterogeneous social alliance relatively rapidly and to claim the representation of the radicalized social forces. A number of ideas and policies that characterized social democracy in western Europe were incorporated into PASOK's programme, some of them becoming the most popular and attractive part of it. Of course, the implementation of these policies was realized through a populist logic and practice, which accounts for the opposing views and the conflicting practices in PASOK's performance. The most striking example of the confusions, oppositions and conflicts arising out of a populist implementation of modernization and welfare policies is PASOK's behaviour vis-a-vis the state apparatus. Namely, on the one hand PASOK tried to modernize

and reshape the cumbersome and antiquated state mechanisms and the related social services, and on the other tried to penetrate and control the state apparatus and use it ~~for~~ its own benefit. In a country where the state has always played a central role in social and political developments, and where its functioning and performance were the outcome of long-term right-wing rule, the need for reforms was evident. The traditional interdependence between the state and the ~~political~~ <sup>political</sup> forces, and the all-embracing nature of the Greek state pleaded in favour of drastic changes. PASOK did introduce several reforms, yet, at the same time there is adequate evidence to suggest that it followed a similar <sup>strategy to</sup> its predecessors in using the state apparatus for the reciprocal dispensation of favours which has traditionally oiled the wheels of government in Greece. In order to understand how and why this happened one has to look at the ~~nature~~ <sup>past</sup> nature of the party and at the development of its organization.

Despite the development of an impressive grass-roots organization, PASOK failed to institutionalize democratic procedures within its ranks ~~or~~ to use the party ~~apparatus~~ <sup>apparatus</sup> as an autonomous force, which could serve as the main forum for the articulation and communication of the party's ideas and programme and as the major mechanism for attracting mass support.

The organization was dominated by the personality and charisma of A. Papandreou, who powerfully influenced its development.

Papandreou's charismatic authority and appeal to the masses sustained the party during its initial period of internal crises, and later it was his influence that brought about the reconstruction of the party organization and the <sup>party's</sup> subsequent steady growth.

It was he who devised and presented the party's ideology and programme and served as its dominant spokesman.

The mass membership was never effectively involved in the decision-making process because the president and the eight-member executive bureau controlled all party activity. Furthermore, Papandreou's firm control of the party meant that dissent was either non-existent, or not tolerated.

PASOK's rise to power aggravated its organizational problems. Despite a remarkable growth of the mass membership, the organization did not function as a channel linking the party with the government. Almost all leading party members occupied government positions and the few members who disagreed with the government's options were either neutralized, or expelled from the party. During 1982-83, many departmental

and local organizations suffered from serious internal problems, and the party leadership had often to intervene to solve intra-party conflicts, to appoint new local or departmental leaderships and to keep the party apparatus active. Thus, the 1984 national congress was realized after a

period of serious internal problems, but at a juncture when all effective opposition to the dominant party line had been silenced. It is not surprising, therefore, that PASOK's first national congress did not serve

as a forum for criticizing the party's strategy and tactics and for debating and reformulating its ideology and programme. It was simply used as a rubber-stamp, necessary for the legitimation of the leadership and useful for paying lip service to the principle of democratic procedure, which often dominates PASOK's rhetoric.

Given these organizational problems, it is natural that the party organization cannot act as the main channel for attracting mass support. This function is performed partly by the leader's charisma and partly by the clientelization of the state apparatus and of state controlled agencies. The allocation of favours to groups or individuals through state mechanisms was a familiar practice of the right-wing governments of the period 1952-67, as well as of the New Democracy government of 1974-81. What is, however, different is that whereas in the past the distribution of favours was mediated through MPs and other party officials, patronage is now exercised through a well-established party apparatus, which systematically infiltrates and tries to control the state. In this sense, the organization plays a vital role in PASOK's performance. Its action, however, is characterized not by the independent mobilization of the social forces, but <sup>by</sup> the direction and control of clientelistic practices. The latter appeared as the only solution to a situation, which, as PASOK realized, could not continue forever. It was not possible to persist with the strategy that <sup>had</sup> enabled PASOK to emerge as the champion of all those sections of society that were dissatisfied with the policies of the New Democracy party, nor could the party organization maintain the fragile <sup>social</sup> alliance that had brought the party to power. Thus, the party is becoming a collective patron and the mass membership is <sup>being</sup> drawn into a competition for jobs and benefits, further reducing its autonomy and independence.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The above discussion of PASOK's ideology, programme and policies aimed at showing the relevance and usefulness of the concept of populism in analysing and explaining PASOK's performance in office. The clientelization of the state, the dependence on the leader's charisma, the passivity of the party organization and the presentation of an ideology appealing to the "people" or the "non-privileged", constitute the basic characteristics of populist politics.

The implications of and the problems inherent to this sort of politics are obvious. The participation of the citizen in the political system is achieved through a combination of vague and ill-defined programme communicated by a charismatic leader, and through clientelistic practices. The party and its functionaries act as brokers who connect the masses to the national power structure. Person-to-person contacts and the related exchange of benefits continue to determine the dominant political "ethos". Cooptation becomes the rule and what counts is personal loyalty to the party and the leader who becomes the embodiment of the party's principles and ideas. This is how paternalism becomes a mass movement.

To conclude, it can be argued that PASOK incorporated socialist themes in an ideological discourse that addressed the social forces as the "people" or the "non-privileged"; exploited the antagonism between the people and the power-bloc, capitalized on nationalistic overtones (the recent campaign of the government to persuade the public to buy Greek products illustrates this point) and deliberately avoided any references to class divisions and to the

specific interests of a class or fraction of class. This ideological discourse borrowed concepts and ideas from a socialist ideology only to use them in a manner alien to a true socialist perspective. PASOK adopted and followed a populist ideology and practice, in which the people always play an apparently dominant role; it is the state, however, or the state controlled agents, that keep the decisive responsibilities and have the last word. Unable to clarify who was to benefit and who was to lose from its policies, PASOK's performance was characterized by vagueness, conflicting practices and repeated changes. The lack of clarity in PASOK's programme, and the elliptical manner in which the party had formulated most of its policies resulted sometimes in the overall inability to implement a policy (e.g. the wealth tax or the nationalization of the Church's property) and sometimes in the partial or compromised implementation of a policy (e.g. socialization, self-management and the introduction of civil marriage). The party's leadership tried to overcome these contradictions through recurrent references to the interests of the "non-privileged" and to the "deepening of change in Greece" or "PASOK in office, the people in power" slogans.

Our analysis, of course, has by necessity omitted several areas of the PASOK government performance where the populist elements are evident (i.e. foreign policy). The main aim of the above discussion, however, was to show that populism can better explain the nature and characteristics of PASOK's performance and to suggest, first, that socialism is only part of the party's rhetoric, and second, that populism can be easily combined with modernization policies. Finally, it is important to show how socialist concepts may become discredited and lose their appeal when they are incorporated in a populist discourse and how the socialist transformation of society can easily become mere "change".-

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SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

BETWEEN REFORMISM AND ADAPTATION

TO STATE STRUCTURES

E.C.P.R. Joint Sessions.  
Barcelona, March 1985

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(Preliminary Draft)

"There's no sort of use in knocking" said the Footman, "and that for two reasons. First, because I'm on the same side of the door as you are. Secondly, because they're making such a noise inside, no one could possibly hear you".

Lewis CARROLL, Alice in Wonderland.

## I. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize some general elements of the Socialist governments experiences in Southern Europe. The approach will be obviously comparative, as other contributors to the workshop will discuss the specific points of these experiencies.

But the aim of the paper is not only to summarize comparative items. I put the alternative "reform" or "adaptation" as a theoretical point because I want to underline the problem which, in my opinion, is the common core of these political experiencies, so different in their backgrounds and so coincident en time.

Generally speaking, this theoretical point can be summed up as follows: which is the link between the theoretical and political tradition of socialist movements in this Southern European countries ( that's to say: models of new social organization, models of access to power and new State-building, models of party organization, national specific traditions as regards to religion, antimilitarism, etc. ) and the practice and the political theory of a number of governments which acceded to power and are governing as "socialist"?

Of course, a preliminary point is if it is possible to discuss on socialist governments in Southern Europe as a single concept. The main danger of a general treatment of the subject is to neglect the national differences and to explain, for instance, the experience of the French socialist government in the same terms as the Greek experience.

Anyway -- and being fully aware of this danger -- I think that the concept "Southern Europe countries" is a useful one, from three points of view;

- 1) Because it refers not only to a geographical area but also to a historical, political and economic one.

- 2) Because all the Socialist governments of this area have acceded to power in very similar conditions and in the same period of time.

3) Because all these parties and governments contrast with the long established tradition of social-democratic governments in Central and Northern Europe.

It is a common point to define this Southern Europe are in terms of backwardness from the economic and social points of view. There is, of course, a historical background of backwardness as compared with the developed countries of Central and Northern Europe. But this is, only, a part of the problem and even as that it is hardly useful to analyze the French case, for instance.

Without rejecting the concept of backwardness I think that other political and social elements must be taken into account.

As the most significant, I suggest the following ones:

All these countries have developed strongly centralized States, with powerful and largely inefficient bureaucracies (France is an exception in this last sense) and very weak self-government structures at the local or regional level.

One of the most outstanding and contradictory aspects of this political centralization is that the building of the centralized State has been the work of liberalism against "regional" forces linked to ancien régime. The model of centralized State was, then, an advanced and progressive model against the regionalist model of absolutism. In all these countries, socialist tradition was linked to this centralizing line as the only modernizing model of State building and social transformation. To put in in other words: socialism assumed deeply the jacobin State model, as opposed to ancien régime regionalist model and to latter peripheral nationalist models (in Spain, for example).

But, at the same time, the jacobin State was in all the countries concerned the work of very restrictive élites, as with the exception of France, capitalism developed late and in a very unequal way and the social and political hegemony remained largely into the hands of very restricted agrarian, financial and bureaucratic groups.

As a result, the State structures developed with a nearly total lack of permeability to popular demands and to social

and political reforms. Only in France the State structure opened to popular participation through <sup>the</sup> Socialists and latter the Communists, but in a limited way and with strong reminiscences of revolutionary sindacalism, which was the political expression of the long impermeability of the French political system to working class demands. In Italy, Giolitti essayed to open the Albertin system to some kind of integration of Socialists in it, but this politic line was abruptly interrupted by the emergence and latter success of Fascism, which created a fully new situation. In Spain, Portugal and Greece no significant reforms broke the strong impermeability of the State and the large majority of people was mantained away from any possibility of participation in the State structures till very recently.

Both as a cause and as a consequence of this impermeability is the continuous and decisive role of the Army in government and in the general political life. In Spain, Portugal and Greece, even in the form of "civil" dictatorships, the Army has been actually the strongest core of the political system. In Spain, for instance, during fifty years of the XX century the Army has ruled directly. But the role of the Army in government has been permanent throughout the XIX and the XX Centuries (BALLBÉ, 1983; LOPEZ GARRIDO, 1982; SECO SERRANO, 1984). In Portugal, the long Salazar dictatorship found its main support in a very strong Army that combined its home role as a political instrument and its external role as the only garant of the Portuguese colonial power. In Greece, the general Metaxas dictatorship in 1935 and the military coup d'état of april 1967 show the very important role of the Army as a government institution, in a context of civil wars, of external wars against Turkey and of extreme regime changes. In Italy, the long Fascist period developed in a military way and it was in reality a military rule albeit its "party" form. In France, the role of the Army increased during the XX Century, till the Pétain regime and latter, through the colonial crisis, till the general De Gaulle emergence as a military President.

Another common element of the Southern Europe countries is the lack of religious pluralism and the absence of a strong protestant tradition. A very important consequence is the recurrent identity between the predominant religion and the State in Spain, Portugal and Greece. In France the predominant feature has been the State lay tradition, but the "catholic problem" has been extremely important till nowadays, specially as regards to the educational system. And this "lay tradition" has been the result of a very hard dispute in which catholicism as a mentality and as an organization has showed a considerable strength. On the other side, the laity tradition in the Italian case is the result of a very complicated process of political unification of the modern Italian State, but ~~the~~ the weight and the significance of catholicism and, specially, of the Church in the Italian political life and in <sup>the</sup> working of the State structures is, perhaps, the most outstanding case of mutual interpenetration between State and non-pluralistic religion.

Backwardness as an explicative concept is, of course, a strong reality in the area. But it is a relative concept, which cannot be used in the same terms to explain every national situation. It doesn't apply, obviously, to French capitalism, even if the French society has shown in the last period of the accumulation process very important weaknesses in the productive structure and in the territorial equilibrium of the development.

In the other countries concerned, backwardness means that capitalist system has developed mainly on the basis of financial capital and with very important distances and clashes in territorial equilibrium, that's to say, with great underdeveloped zones in every country and with strong North-South conflicts. From the political and social point of view, that means very sharp social differences and conflicts in the respective class structures, with a historical predominance of agrarian interests.

But most important of all, the process of modernization

in the last two decades has not been implemented through the building of consistent Welfare State structures. In fact, in all these countries the Welfare State has not been developed. The process of social modernization and of economic development has not been a planned process, but has proceeded in a very tumultuous way under military dictatorships (Spain, Portugal, Greece and even Italy in some aspects) or under civil governments hardly stabilized or, as in the case of France, with a combination of centralized bureaucracy (in a jacobin mode) and new technocracy.

Another very important feature has been the strong difficulties to organize a stable system of political parties rooted in the civil society. The traditional party system in France was largely upset at the beginning of the sixties and in fact a new system developed under the gaullist regime. In Italy the party system emerged largely as a new system after the II World War and the overcoming of fascism. Of course, the party system in Italy has, till then, developed very strong roots in civil society and it can be seen even as an exceptional case. But in Spain, Portugal and Greece, crushed by a succession of civil wars and military dictatorships, the party system began to develop very late, actually in the seventies decade, and their roots are even now extremely weak.

From the ideological point of view, all these aspects have had a very important consequence, namely: a sharp and fundamental contrast between right and left on all the substantial problems of national life. That means a radical contrast on problems like the political legitimacy of the system, the concept of national unity, the values and organization of the educational system, the forms of the State structure and so on. Each one of these problems has taken the form of a political polarity in which the ~~the~~ subject was not the "technical side" but the ideological one. In Spain, Greece and Italy, for example, the problem of Monarchy-Republic has been till very recently a very traumatic one. In Spain, one of the main political subjects in discussion is, even now, the problem of national symbols and the concept of Spain

as a Nation. The problem of the State structural organization ( for example, centralism or regionalized organization) has been ( actually, it is) not only nor mainly a problem of policy but a great subject of ideological polarization.

The weight of tradition is in this sense very significant. The combined effects of the impermeability of the State structures, the military predominance and the strong presence of religion in the organization of the State have produced very strong consequences in the political ideology of working class movements -- both in political parties and in trade unions. A common feature of working class politics in all these countries is, for example, the strong influence of antimilitarism, anticlericalism and antimonarchism as political and ideological references of all the left political organizations, including of course Socialism and Communism.

The development of strong  $\alpha$ , in any case, significant Communist parties in all these countries is related to all these features, in contrast with the situation in Central and specially in Northern European countries. In fact, the majority of these Communist parties reflect in their development, in their ideology and in their structure, these sharp contradictions of society and they are largely the heirs of the strong anarchist tradition in all these countries. Even now, in the political practice of some of the so-called "pro-soviet" Communist parties can be seen some elements of continuity with the old anarchist tradition. On the other side, it is well known the strength and the political weight of "leftism" in the political practice and, specially, in the ideology of the Socialist parties in all the countries concerned.

And last but not least, Socialism and Communism in all the Southern European countries have shown a strong tendency to isolationism in face of European general problems. Their internationalism has been generally speaking an ideological internationalism. In fact, their political practice has taken the form of some kind of nationalism, even if not stated explicitly as a such.

## II. THE ACCESS TO POWER.

Socialist parties acceded to power in Southern European countries conditioned by this historical background but also by very similar 'general' circumstances.

The most important of this circumstances was the crisis of the accumulation model of the two previous decades. It is well known that the so-called "petrol crisis" was not the core of the crisis in itself but the expression of a deep change in the general conditions of the accumulation process.

Socialist governments in power in Central and Northern Europe reached the crisis after a long period of economic development headed by these governments through the Welfare State structures. They suffered, of course, the blow of the crisis but their political line was clear: to resist and counteract its negative effects fighting for the continuity of national Welfare States.

In the Southern Europe countries the political shift went in another way, actually the opposite way. Military dictatorships fell and conservative governments went into deep difficulties. Public opinion, beyond the traditional working class basis of left parties, strongly demanded significant changes.

The Socialist governments in Southern Europe countries were all formed as a result of this high wave and as an answer to this deep popular feeling on the need of a change.

The crisis of the previous model of accumulation was at the same time the cause and the effect of a deep change in the productive structure and in the internal reality of social classes, that's to say, in the internal reality of class relationships.

All these countries underwent important modifications in the social structures, ceasing to be, although in different degrees, agrarian centered societies to become industrial a services centered societies. As previously said, this social change developed even under military dictatorships, and the incapability of these ones to cope with the reality of the changes can be

considered as one of the main causes of their decay.

The Socialists access to power in the Southern Europe countries can be seen, in this context, as a consequence of popular demands of more public welfare against the effects of the crisis, that's to say, against unemployment, inflation, insecurity, etc. Generally speaking, I dare to say that it was a popular demand of some kind of Welfare State in countries in which it didn't exist. Evenmore, it exploded as a demand in a historical moment in which Welfare State was in crisis, at least in its classical form.

These demands were largely due, also, to the specific weakness of corporate institutions and of civic organizations in the Southern Europe countries. In my feeling, it is very important to realize that the demand of change was different in Italy, where civil society was very strongly organized by political parties and the Church and where the State was not so strong. In the other countries, the demands exploded in face of very strongly centralized States, which occupied all the political space and didn't permit the development of other political organized forms between the State itself and the isolated citizens. This was specially true under the military dictatorships of Spain, Portugal and Greece and their aftermath.

But the demands of change coincided in time with another crisis: the worsening of international relationships between the great powers and the raising of another wave of cold war and arms race. The deepening of international conflict resulted in the loss of Europe's protagonism both in the economic and the political fields.

Some form of popular consciousness of this fact developed and also of the growing dependence of each European country and of Europe as a whole from the two great powers -- U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. This general feeling acted as an internal dividing factor, as public opinion divided

pro and against the dominance of the great powers. In this context, right wing opinion accepted the situation and warmly claimed on the support of USA politics as a guarantee of the established situation. Left wing opinion, generally speaking, opposed the situation demanding some form of national independence, which politically took the form of a new popular nationalism. I speak obviously in very general terms, but I want to underline that "right-wing" or "left-wing" are not in this context concepts referring to straight class divisions. These dividing lines of public opinion ran through established social class lines, cutting some of them to pieces and creating opinion social blocks rather heterogeneous along the most crucial items.

In this context, the party systems underwent strong changes. The notorious exception was Italy, where the political parties were deeply rooted and were able to face the new situation in a creative way. In France the party system changed both in the right and in the left sides and a new Socialist party emerged after the breakdown of the old S.F.I.O. In Spain, Portugal and Greece the political parties emerged actually as new organizations, in national conditions quite different, but all of them with significant breaks with previous tradition.

I think that the international situation had another deep and lasting effect on the left wing opinion and the left organizations. I mean the crisis of the East Europe socialist countries as a model, mainly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and later the invasion of Afghanistan. The Communist parties divided themselves along this line. Some of them abandoned all kind of allegiance to the Soviet model and developed as Eurocommunist parties, looking for a new model and a new way both of organization and of political prospects in a deeply modified European horizon. Others, like the Portuguese C.P. and to some extent the French C.P., remained faithful to the ancient model, looking for a difficult equilibrium between this allegiance and the claim for a national independent line. Others, like the Greek C.P. and later the Spanish C.P. splitted along this main dividing line, so losing abruptly the political

benefits of their fighting against the respective military dictatorships.

These difficulties of the Communist parties created something like a new free space in the social and political left. But for the classical Socialist parties it was not easy to occupy this space. The deep change in social and political conditions destroyed the coherence of their ancient ideological corpus. They also felt the crisis of their ideological references, mainly because of the weakness of these references in their own ideological tradition.

Spanish socialism, for instance, emerged after the Franco dictatorship with all its political bias nearly untouched. This meant -- as said before -- anticlericalism, antimilitarism, antimonarchism, etc. And at the same time emerged with a lack of a social and political theory able to cope with the new national and international realities.

This was the general scheme in which exploded and developed the popular demand of change. In a wave of international new cold war, Communists were not able to respond to this demand. Nor were the Socialists anchored in their traditional forms of organization and political thought.

The answer came and developed from a new Socialist movement in which melted old and new elements. The old claim of transformation of the social and economic basis became a proposal of change in a generic way, with no precise implementations and goals.

At the same time, the party organization changed in a movement-like organization along very broad and non definite lines.

Both things resulted in a political proposal formed by heterogeneous elements of nationalism and populism, coupled by references to old elements of socialism as a "weltanschauung" more than as a political and an economic program.

The party itself developed as a catch-all political movement in which the decisive link became the personality of a charismatic leader. The relationship of the party with the people became a relationship between the leader and the

citizens in a plebiscite-like way.

Socialists were able to develop along this line not only because of their lesser rigidity in both the organization and the ideological fields but also -- and mainly -- because they were less limited by the conditions imposed by cold war or, to put it in another way, because they were better accepted by the ruling power in the Western block. The paradigmatic demonstration of it is the Italian case, where a very strong and very liberal Communist Party cannot become a governing party in spite of its relative majority and instead a very small Socialist Party, with a little more than 10 % of the votes holds the Presidency of the Republic and the Presidency of the Government.

Coupled with this process, in all these countries -- again with the specific scheme, not the exception, of Italy -- the political scene changed in the sense of a very sharp polarization. Socialists have become the main -- and in a certain sense the unique -- political alternative of the left, in a large sense. The Communists have been reduced to something like radical minorities, without any possibility to accede to power, except in a subordinate position. In the Italian case the polarization is the consequence of a political life whose main objective is to bar the access of the Communist Party to power.

On the other side, right wing opinion has gathered around another pole, with a unique leadership in some countries (Spain, Greece) or with something like a dual leadership in others (France, Portugal).

The political center has been absorbed by both poles (Spain, Greece, France) or has been reduced to a minority unable to accede to power, except in the very specific case of Italy, where the political center is a very composite one, with a leading role of the Socialist Party.

Of course, this is a very general description. In each country exist specific conditions that modify -- but not change -- this general outline.

To the purpose of this paper, the most important thing to underline is that as a result the Socialist parties of the Southern Europe countries have become large and loosely structured movement-like organizations, with non definite ideological references, politically centered in sociological general concepts like "modernization" and strongly gathered around a populist leader who establishes emotional and carismatic relationships with citizens as voters. And I underline "as voters" because I think that in all the cases the party tends to vanish as an instrument of social organization and of popular participation, thus breaking thoroughly the tradition of Socialist parties as organizers of working-class "countersociety", in face and against the bourgeois State.

Generally speaking, these new Socialist parties have become electoral structures whose political task is, following SCHUMPETER's analysis, to ensure support to the political activity of the leader and whose main output is to select a political élite.

Relationship between the party and the leader has changed thoroughly as compared with Socialist tradition. It is not the leader who becomes political leader as a result of the political activity of the party as an organization, but it is the leader who wins (or loses) the battle in a plebiscite-like way and consequently the party structure channels to power an élite largely unknown by the people and whose main task is to give support to the rule of the leader. This is specially true in the case of a proportional mode of scrutiny, with blocked lists, as the candidates included are not voted as individuals.

In this sense, it can be said that parliamentary elections and parliamentary majorities are epiphenomenal con-

sequences of the leaders electoral competition. The plebiscite character of this competition tends to equalize the effects of majority and proportional modes of scrutiny and to transform parliamentary elections in presidential direct elections.

This fact has also a durable consequence on the institutional system. I mean the trend to erase the differences between classical parliamentary, presidential and semipresidential systems.

Of course, this general description is not exclusive of the Socialist governed countries of Southern Europe. It is rather a general trend which applies to all institutional systems of Western Europe and North America. In this sense, it can be said that the Socialist governments in Southern Europe are not exceptions in the general trends.

But this is, perhaps, their main specificity: the weakness of the party system, the lack of a Welfare State tradition, the decay of radical ideologies and the persistence of Catholic or Orthodox roots in the collective consciousness of a large majority of people and in each national culture react in the same sense towards a prevailing of individualistic and charismatic elements in political life largely more strong than in the long established social-democratic systems of Central and Northern Europe, in which society is largely more organized about and around great public issues.

Lastly, I want to point out a main problem, largely untouched by analysts, namely the problem of transition and of continuity and discontinuity in the State apparatus. This is not, obviously, a mere theoretical point but a very important practical one.

Socialist parties acceded to power in Spain, Portugal and Greece after long periods of military dictatorship

that created very specific structures of the State apparatus. In France it was not the case, but the problem was clearly similar as the French State apparatus was formed throughout <sup>the</sup> last decades mainly under the leadership of right wing governments.

In the Spanish case, for example, the problem of transition from dictatorship to democracy was a very crucial one, whose effects are due to be lasting and whose process is not finished. Contrary to similar models of dictatorship, the Franco dictatorship was not crushed by a military external defeat or by a popular armed uprising. Anti-franchist movements developed with great difficulties and they succeeded to develop important political and trade union vanguards but not to develop a large mass movement against the dictatorship. To put it other words: antifranchism was able to stop the continuity of franchism as a regime after Franco but it didn't win the battle against the Franco State.

Certainly, the more specific features of general Franco's regime disappeared, like single party, corporate trade-union, censorship, extreme concentration of power, military rule, non elected Parliament and suppression of civil and political rights. But the more important institutions of the State remained untouched as democracy began to develop. I mean the Army, the Police, the Public Bureacracy, the Judicial System and, of course, the economic system of power. In face of this powerful State apparatus, which was the core of the dictatorship system, political parties and trade unions were emerging from clandestinity or they were simply created at the very eve of general elections.

Taking into account the national differences, I think that this problem arises in all the cases considered, even if at different degrees. In my opinion, it is impossible to analyze the general conditions of the access to power in the countries of "Sunbelt Socialism", as

The Economist put it (August, 13, 1983) without considering deeply all the consequences<sup>of</sup> each national process of transition and the weight of continuity in each State apparatus.

And this is specially meaningful because the general leit-motiv of all political proposals of Socialist parties in the way to power was that of change. After some years in power, the crucial issue is to know what has happened with this change. Has change become a deep implementation of reforms ? Or it has rather become the ideological word to hide a mere adaptation to existing social conditions and to continuing State structures ?

The purpose of the workshop is to give some kind of answer to this questions. So in this paper I don't pretend to analyze all the problems but only to open some ways to the general discussion. This is the purpose of the following pages.

### III. REFORM OR ADAPTATION

All the analysts coincide in one crucial point: there is a cleavage between the theory and the practice of Socialist parties before and after their access to power. The first problem is if the cleavage exists as a result of the government practice or it is previous to it, something like a pre-condition of the electoral success. As Daniel VERNET says( Le Monde, Oct. 13, 1984): the point is :

".. si la rupture avec les grands mythes de la gauche européenne a eu lieu avant ou après l'arrivée au pouvoir, si elle a été une condition préalable à la victoire électorale, ou si elle s'est produite sous l'empire de la nécessité, parce que

le dogme socialiste s'est heurté aux "faits têtus".

The answer to this question cannot be a uniform one. The "new" Socialist parties emerged in Spain, Portugal and Greece after long dictatorships were in this sense more "free" as all was to be created nearly from nothing. Their model was the theory and the practice of German S.P.D. and their ideological reference was the Bad Godesberg programm. The only problem was to get rid of some "national specificities" which blocked the way (I mean items like antimilitarism, antimonarchism, anticlericalism and so on) but it was not a very difficult task as the large majority of the members of these parties were also new.

The situation was not the same in the French case, as the Socialist Party developed certainly from an outworn S.F.I.O. but in a political field occupied by a number of Socialist groups, with strong ideological programs and a number of prestigious leaders.

In Spain, Portugal and Greece the cleavage was previous to access to power. In France, the Socialist party went to the election battle with a more orthodox ideological program and the cleavage appeared after more than two years of power exercise.

Which are the main issues through which the cleavage can be seen and examined ?

One of these issues is Welfare politics. Socialist parties and governments in Northern and Central Europe develop their political practice in a general setting of Welfare State tradition. The Socialist parties and governments in Southern Europe are acting in national settings without this tradition. But the deepness of the crisis creates a general demand of new Welfare politics in all the political levels, from local governments to central governments. The issue is if it is possible or even necessary to create or to develop Welfare institu-

tions in countries without a Welfare tradition and in a historical moment in which these institutions decay or they are disrupted by new social and political pressures.

The French Socialist program was a Welfare State program. They began to put it into practice in a rather orthodox way. But after two years of difficulties they changed abruptly the path and turned to a program of economic stabilization and of industrial restructuration. Socialist governments in Spain and Portugal renounced even to the idea of implementing some kind of Welfare institutions and the Socialist government in Greece took in practice the same way even if in a more populist mode. The Spanish Socialist leader Felipe GONZALEZ summarized sharply this political line when in the 1982 electoral campaign synthesized the Socialist concept of "change" in the formula : " We want it (the State) simply to function".

The second main issue is the handling of the economic system -- and, of course, the economic situation. From this point of view national situations are indeed quite different.

The French capitalist system is a highly developed one, even if growing difficulties have appeared to cope with the effects of the international crisis and with the inner breaks of equilibrium between territorial zones and industrial sectors. Public sector, for instance, was not before the Socialist access to power, very developed but its working reached a high standard. The French problem was, then, to hold the main financial institutions and the main private corporations to control the essential mechanisms of accumulation.

In Spain, on the contrary, the Franco regime created a very large public sector but in a non competitive way. It was a very bureaucratic public sector, unable to develop in a competitive market. The problem was not to enlarge

the public sector but to change it into a competitive one in a context of crisis and unemployment.

In Portugal the 1974 April Revolution opened the way to important changes both in the political and the economic fields as Portugal, under the Salazar dictatorship remained an underdeveloped agrarian country with a powerful finance capital linked to colonial rule in Africa. The nationalization of banks and great colonial corporations and an agrarian reform were adopted under the initial hegemony of military radicals and of the Communist Party, which <sup>looked</sup> at these nationalizing measures as the way to a Socialist society in a very orthodox sense. Socialists acceded to power after the political defeat of this left wing and in a political climate of strong polarization, both inside and outside the country.

I put these three examples to show that all these national situations, despite their disparities were conditioned by the weight of a crisis of all the system and by implementations and interests that go beyond the national frontiers and invest the system as a whole, so erasing the national differences and making very difficult to implement national isolated politics to face each specific situation.

The overall result has been that economic policies have followed a very similar pattern in all the Western countries, with Conservative or Socialist governments. The dividing line between right and left in this field has been wiped out and it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the "rightist" and the "leftist" bias of the economic implementations of the British Conservative government and of the French, the Spanish or the Portuguese Socialist governments.

A point to discuss is here again the problem of Welfare State. It is my feeling that this dividing line is

more sharply distinguishable in those countries where a Welfare State existed and the main political issue is to maintain its logic or to destroy it. In this sense the Socialist governments in Sweden and Austria show a greater liability to implement specific policies of participation and concertation ( S.EHRLICH,1982; B.MARIN,1982). In countries like France, Spain, Portugal and Greece the lack of a Welfare State tradition that can become a reference point makes more difficult to distinguish the dividing line.

The third main issue is the politics of defence. In a growing cold war atmosphere, Europe becomes more and more a mere field of military tension and manoeuvring between the great powers. Efforts to achieve some degree of independence in this field have hitherto failed. The acceptance by the Spanish Socialist government of the Spain's entry into N.A.T.O., dramatically opposing the previous programatic Socialist proposals shows clearly the weight of the pressure of the higher imperatives of the logic of the great blocks, as interpreted by the ruling power in each block. In the same way, the PASOK government in Greece has failed to withdraw Greece from NATO .

The defence policy of all these Socialist governments -- even in the case of France, whose Socialist government remains attached to its own national nuclear policy -- consists mainly in adapting their Army institutions to NATO structures and to accept the logic of the two military blocks.

The fourth main issue is the cultural one. Socialist parties in Southern Europe acceded to power with ambitious proposals of cultural renewal, as a response to popular claims of national cultural freedom and renewal, both against the dark legacy of military dictatorships and

also against the growing and overwhelming pressure of great international mass media.

In my feeling, achievements in this field are better than in other fields and more connected to previous programmatic proposals and hopes.

But in some very important issues things have scarcely changed. I mean especially the school problem in which the Socialist governments in France, Spain and Portugal have accepted important setbacks in face of the established private institutions (mainly the Church). No significant progress can neither be seen in other decisive field like the great mass media and especially TV.

Broadly speaking, there are too many failures and setbacks in the battle for a new national and progressive culture with an important degree of independence and a link with the traditional left feelings of cultural progress. Great international mass media and great corporative interests tend to impose more and more their logic and their values.

Fifthly and as a result of all the previous discussion, the international policy of these Socialist governments doesn't seem able to overcome the limits imposed by the new cold war and the logic of the great blocks. The French Socialist government, for example, followed the gaullist line of independence and opened even new ways in Latin America (for example giving support to Sandinist Nicaragua). But latter it changed abruptly the line and even accepted the role of a secondary colonial power in Tchad and Lebanon. The Socialist governments of Spain and Portugal don't have any significant initiative that goes beyond the limits of a bipolar ruled world. The only but limited exception is the PASOK government in Greece, which looks for a very difficult position of equilibrium between its condition of NATO partner and a policy of non-alignment.

The discussion of these crucial items and other important questions must give us the main elements to implement an answer to the theoretical issues.

I want to come back to the formula of the Spanish Socialist leader Felipe González. Of course, to get a State and a country "to function", to work efficiently and smoothly is not a minor nor an easy goal. But the problem is, in the general conditions evoked and in face of the great issues previously discussed, which is the exact meaning of the concept "to make it function". Is it something more than to maintain the existing State structures and to free them of traditional obstacles to good and smooth functioning? The problem is if there is a neutral functioning of State institutions and apparatus. Or, to put it in another words, if it is possible to handle the existing State apparatus and to make it "function" without introducing in it deep and substantial reforms, that's to say, without changing the logic and the aims of its previous "functioning".

This is in my opinion the most crucial issue because the answer to it implies the answer to the very question of "Socialism" as a political proposal and as a political movement.

A policy of reform at the end of the XX Century cannot be obviously implemented with the same tools and with the same ideological references as fifty or a hundred years ago. But the present governing parties continue to call themselves "Socialist parties" and their proposals are called "Socialist proposals". Which is the link that makes possible and credible this continuity? Which is the meaning of the concept "Socialism" when the alternative has ceased to be "reform or revolution" but the problems of the new alternative "reform or adaptation" are not solved?

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SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

AND THE POLITICAL DEMAND FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

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## I. Introduction

The phenomenon of socialist governments in Southern Europe at the present time indicates some common roots and causes in the political system of several countries (Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal), which appear as an unspecific class-overlapping demand for "social change" in the public opinion. From a theoretical point of view one can analyze the basic political, social, and economic tendencies and developments leading to this phenomenon under three aspects: (1) the transformation of the party system, (2) the pluralization of the civil society, and (3) the modernization of the state with respect to the historical background and the special geographic situation of the particular country. In these dimensions the present socialist governments are able to demonstrate more effectiveness and competence for solving the actual social and economic problems than any other political group, so that one finally can try to find out some identical significant characteristics of a "governmental" Socialism in Southern Europe.

## II. The Transformation of the Party System

After the World War II the former types of the old bourgeois party with individual representation at the right and of the mass integration party with harder class lines and more sharply protruding ideological structures at the left in the

Western European democracies were transforming itself into a new kind of uniform catch-all "peoples" party (Volkspartei). Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral mobilisation of the masses, the political efforts of the modern parties are turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former antagonistic strategies of the denomination parties (Weltanschauungsparteien). Today the class-mass orientation of the political parties is more and more counterproductive since they claim segments of a potential nation-wide clientele.

This change in the European party system involves: (1) Drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage; (2) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organisation; (3) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a historical relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image; (4) Deemphasis of the "classe gardée", specific social classe or denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among the population at large; (5) Securing access to a variety of interest groups and the mass media with pretence to promote the public welfare. The financial reasons are obvious, but they are not the most important where official financing is available or where access to the mass media is

fairly open. The main reason is to secure and to enlarge the electoral support via voters satisfaction and interest-group intercession. And on this fields the ruling parties normally are much more successful than the opposition.

This unevitable and unreversible process of "de-ideologization" in the post-war European party spectrum reached the Southern countries with a time lag of three decades. In Spain the Franco dictatorship hindered the national reconciliation and a pragmatic renewal of the party system after the Civil War. Portugal too was dominated by an authoritarian regime with only one licensed state party (UN/ANP). The situation in Greece was determined by a long period of "guided democracy" (1952-1963) with a right wing government, a pre-modern left oppositon party, and the strong ideological oriented communist groups (KEE etc.); just the breakdown of the Colonels regime in 1974 gave the first chance for a fundamental transformation of the party system with the emergence of two big catch-all parties coming from the right and the left side. Only the case of Italy is different: There the traditional class-mass structure is still alive with a conservative confessional state party (DC), which are dominating the central administration, and the moderate communist reform party (PCI) ruling in many industrial areas on the regional or local level. But also here patterns are changing: The governmental role obliges the socialist groups to a pragmatic unideological behavior and promotes the development of a middle-left catch-all party in Italy.

Except the PSI, which often has participated in a christian democrat's government, all the modern socialist parties of Southern Europe are founded or reorganized in the middle of the seventies with a background of civil or colonial wars in the past followed or accompanied by totalitarian regimes. These two important facts, the civil war reminiscence and the dictatorship experience, accelerated the transformation process in the party systems of Southern Europe. Therefore the emergence of new or modernized socialist parties (PASOK, PS, PSOE) was determined from the beginning by prevailing political tendencies to open minded, unideological and voters orientied organisations. So the main conditions for the socialist groups becoming a ruling party have to be seen in specific political events of the national history.

Today the PSOE for example is a prototype of such a modern left wing catch-all party. Since the return from the exile in 1976 moving towards the middle, PSOE is arguing now for positions favoring economic growth, a strong defense, a tough stance against crime, for civil liberty and security, the reform of the administration, and, generally spoken, for the modernization of state and society. Contrary to that, traditional marxist positions disappeared or changed in such broad and open formulas as it is the "fight against economic crisis", "education under equal conditions", "reduction of the unemployment", "reconstruction of the industries" or "economic planification" in a framework of a "social contract". With these aims PSOE seems to be much more similar to a civil reform party than a antagonistic class-struggle organisation.

In Greece PASOK was founded only in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou as the successor of the former "Centrum". Now it is also a well organized populist party with a personal leadership structure and a broad basis of middle-left and liberal voters. Winning the elections of 1981 with 48 p.c., PASOK came into power in virtue of a very new political constellation in the history of the parliamentary system of Greece: The traditional liberal-conservative intra-bourgeois split (dichasmos) with its vertical organisations of the working classes in politics has been replaced by a political split more directly linked with the antagonistic structure of the civil society. The most important effect of this development towards a bipolar party system is the integration of the Greek urban and rural working classes in the state. This factor could be sufficient to maintain the balance between the parliamentary government and the army, to prevent a new military revolte and, in the long run, to push back the influence of the army on the political process.

In this context two further aspects have to be considered, if you want to understand the phenomenon of socialist governments in Southern Europe. At first the growth of socialist parties is due to the personal charismatic capacity of the top leaders to inspire the voters and to enlarge political support by a populist policy. Secondly the socialist parties were able to break up the old corporatist structures of the society and to build an environment of associated interest groups, trade unions or labour organisations, which influence the public opinion and dominate the "glacis" (Vorfeld) of the political

decision making process. This successful affiliation of many pressure groups to the socialist parties is last not least a result of the general pluralisation of civil societies in Southern Europe, in which the socialist parties themselves are participating.

### III. The Pluralization of the Civil Society

A common basic feature of the present political systems in Southern Europe consists in the transition from a corporatist or clientelist state structure to an open "plural" society. Briefly, in the broadest sense, by "pluralization" I refer to a society whose members are divided into categories or groups on the basis of such factors as language, race, ethnicity, community of provenience or descent, religion, distinctive social institutions, or culture. Therefore the term "pluralism" applies wherever societies are culturally or socially divided by variables of any kind, number, and institutional significance; and these are normally manifest in the society's public domain. In this general sense, of course, you can find some kind of pluralistic competition in corporatist or clientelist state formations too; but in order to analyze the recent changes in the Southern European societies I propose (with M. G. Smith) to distinguish two major structural categories, as hierarchic and segmental, while recognizing a third, more variable category, in which hierarchic and segmental organisations are variously mixed and combined.

In hierarchic pluralities, one section of the population, which is culturally, racially and/or economically distinct, dominates the rest and ranks above them. The dominated population may consist of one or more cultural sections, ranked serially as superior and inferior, or placed equally as coordinates, despite their reciprocal closure. Alternatively, the various major divisions of an inclusive plural society may claim or hold coordinate political or legal status. In such a case, the plural society has a segmental structure, since its major cultural divisions are segments that hold coordinate status and autonomy within it. While not always regionally centred, such segments are normally autonomous self-administrating units. Then, to avoid domination by others, the constituent organisations of segmentally structured pluralities assert and pursue internal autonomy to regulate their own segmental affairs, so that the societal public domain in which they all participate has the structure of a so called "consociation" (consociational democracy).

If this process of consociation is basically antagonistic and in politics competitive, you have a "polysegmental" plurality. Either it will be explicitly federal or confederal in form, or implicitly and informally so, given some conventional or negotiated bases of coalition, bargaining or power-sharing. Individual incorporation within such consociational polities is therefore indirect, through segments of equivalent status. Thus, just as status parities or complementarities are essential for consociational pluralities based on the equivalent or segmental mode of incorporation, so inequalities

of status at collective and individual levels are basic to the structure of hierarchic pluralities grounded on differential incorporation.

In Southern Europe one of the deepest social alterations we could watch was the transition from hierarchic to polysegmental pluralities within consociational democracies during the last two decades. And, without any doubt, the most advanced country on this way is Italy. The segmentation of the Italian society meanwhile has reached such a dangerous level, that it seems to carry the germ of its own desintegration. Within the state dominated by a conservative party this dissolution process of the civil society has favoured the development of attitudes geared to compromise and mediation. Whereas the pluralistic, "archipelago" configuration of the social system is reinforced in the sense that each institutional area tends to follow its own power logic, the institutions of national representation are obliged to specialize in this work of mediation, so that they are completely unable to take decisions on vital questions. The executive in the state apparatus joins the game both as a partner to particular interests and as an universal mediator between these and other power groups and interests, only with the intend to hold together incompatible elements. In this situation a little party with an undogmatic touch like the PSI is a sheer ideal mediator between the different power centers from a neutral position, and obviously owes to this arbitrator status its leading role in the government ("Zünglein an der Waage"). Therefore the ability of the PSI to stay in office depends on its moderation capacity.

Whereas in Italy the arbitrary function of a little socialist party indicates a weakness of the government, the Spanish case shows the contrary: A traditional socialist party with pragmatic purposes and an efficient organisation came into power in 1982 by a majority of votes, because it has promoted (and is still promoting) the segmental pluralism in a variety of social relations and institutions. At first PSOE demands a regional and local autonomy in the areas of culture and language. Secondly it encourages the process of decentralisation and autonomisation in the constitutional framework. Finally it supports the pluralisation in economic matters, that means the syndical organisations and the associations of profession. So in Spain of today the transition from the corporatist centralized state to a polysegmental pluralist unit with social multiplicity in culture, religion, economy, and administration is used by PSOE to fill the space with its own semi-political "front"-organisations. On this way the old corporatist state is going to be overwhelmed by the modern pluralist party state, in which political problems are solved no longer with authoritarian methods, but by the means of negociation, compromise, federation, and solidarity. (Therefore I doubt about the thesis of the so called "neo-corporatist" tendencies in Spain; but that is the subject of the other workshop).

In comparison with the Spanish level of pluralization the Portuguese transition into a modern society seems to be rather backward, because the old feudal corporatist structure of the state with its social distinctions is so strong, that it was

able to stop the revolutionary process. So there are still dominating hierarchical forms of pluralism with very slowly creeping tendencies to a segmental pluralist society. Therefore the socialist party in Portugal (PS) prefers to enlarge its voters basis by adopting the position of a "party of equilibrium" with a broad class support. By these means the PS won three parliamentary elections and the local elections, mobilizing the masses for political issues and integrating the working class into the democratic state.

In Greece the situation is partially different, but also similar to Portugal. Instead of corporatist methods the Greek pressure groups articulate their political and social interests within the state apparatus much more in a clientelistic and personalistic manner. These patronage politics are still surviving, although the traditional oligarchic clientelism with the entrance of the masses into politics today has taken a new party oriented and influenced form. By that reason Papandreou with his PASOK had to fulfil a triple task: (1) to surmount the organisational weakness of the working class and to create a modern legal catch-all party at the left; (2) to substitute the clientelistic structures by serving them with shrewed strategies in recruiting the ruling personal and with popular political purposes; (3) to overtake the function of an equilibrium between the parliamentary institutions and the army. And inspite of the persistence of a modern clientelism he was successful in approaching these aims by fighting against political corruption and persuing a populist policy. This last point leads to another main question: to the

possibilities and limits in establishing modern industrial states in Southern Europe.

#### IV. The Modernization of the State

The theories of modernization, development and convergence of modern or modernizing societies assume, as well known, that it is the organisational dynamic of political, economic or social institutions - especially those shaped by segments of industrial technology - which enforce the active changing structure of a complex society. And further it is supposed, that, as the world becomes more and more developed and industrialized, societies will become relatively more similar, because the internal dynamics of modernization or industrialisation create certain organisational or institutional problems which tend to obliterate any other differences between the major institutional patterns of these societies. Thus, it was portrayed the image of a world that - because of the strong drive of basic technology or industrialization and, to some degree, because of tendencies to growth and of political participation, becomes more and more homogeneous.

From a marxist position this modernization approach was denied with the argument that the class structure of a society is still predominant, so that the industrialization in capitalist societies has totally different effects as the same process under socialist conditions. Now I would not like to meddle with this controversy. From my point of view "modernization" of the state is equivalent to "rationalization" of the whole

political process in terms of Max Weber. Political rationalization in this sense has to be seen as an integral part of the global process of cultural, economic and technical modernization, which means the transition from social disorganisation to social order, from traditional "pre-modern" societies to a modern industrial state. Therefore the purposes of modernization of political structures and procedures are (1) to develop the individual and collective forces of a society in cultural and economic affairs, (2) to open up new technical and industrial resources, (3) to improve the methods of bureaucracy, the political institutions as well as the legal system, and (4) to set up a government that is really capable of ruling a complex pluralistic society. So modernization and rationalization of the state belong together and are, in substance, the result of social evolution and innovation.

Watching the actual political scene in Southern Europe, nobody can deny that in all these matters the socialist parties are considered to be superior to the other political groups. At the first place of the cultural and economic development of the Southern European societies ranks the system of public education. All the socialist parties in these countries have announced the fight against general ignorance and illiteracy. A system of public schools shall be established in order to guarantee a fair and equal chance in access to profession and to push back the influence of private (mainly clerical) organisations. In a general sense learning is taken as a life-long process of continuing education. At the same time the socialist parties propagate the classical civil liberties

among them the freedom of trade and free exercise of profession. By creating or consolidating a general system of social security the principle of solidarity in the societies shall be stimulated and realized. Thus, just the socialist parties in Southern Europe promise the transition from an antagonistic class structure to a cooperative society.

In the scientific and technical sector too people have more confidence in the ability and competence of the left forces, to open up new resources on the fields of economy and technology. Therefore the socialist parties try to push forward a country wide policy of energy supply and investment promotion, namely in structural weak areas. All this requires the willingness for state intervention in economic affairs, which is necessarily linked with an expansion of the public sector towards a state governed economy. In the contradiction of free enterprise and political regulation the socialist parties have the duty to maintain the balance between the development of private economy by political means and the preservation of the capitalist system as a whole.

Last not least the socialist parties in Southern Europe have begun to introduce new methods of a rational bureaucratic administration. They create a modern planning and budgeting system, which allows the elaboration of integrated programs for improving the social infra-structure all over the country. At the same time this government by planning and programming must be combined with the needs of a modern administration in a decentralized form with autonomous jurisdiction and

participatory procedures. Above all the socialist parties in Southern Europe initiate and promote the overdue reform of the legal and constitutional system. They are engaged in women's emancipation and equalization on the fields of family and inheritance law. They struggle for the legalization of abortion and divorce. Finally, they took an outstanding part in establishing new constitutional systems after the several dictatorships and reached a high degree of identification in their own political purposes with the intentions and aims of the constitutions. The most important results of these efforts consist in a functional invigoration of the state apparatus influencing the process of social change and - absolutely a historical novum - in a close and intimate affiliation of the socialist parties of Southern Europe with the state and its political institutions.

In the stadium of transition from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to democratic constitutional states these achievements of the socialist parties were only possible through a limited cooperation with the traditional conservative forces in the administration and in the army. This ambivalent cooperation was easier to perform by the left parties, because they were not involved in the mistakes of the past, so that they could pursue a politic of appeasement in a convincing and legitime manner. On account of these strategies the socialist parties functioned as a "catalysator" and a mediator between the reactionary forces of the past and the state integrated working class, whose political pacification they were able to guarantee. This difficult and dangerous way could only be

ventured by political parties with charismatic leaders, who have established a personal regime and are pursuing, more or less, populist politics. This constellation leads to the final question, whether one can find some significant common characteristics of a specific "governmental" socialism in Southern Europe.

#### V. The Significance of a "Governmental" Socialism

All the Southern European countries Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece are moving today - in terms of Wallerstein - from peripheral or semi-peripheral states to the core of the world capitalist system. This development originates a specific kind of socialism, which is different from the traditional orthodox marxist positions as well as from the modern scepticism about economic growth and social progress. Then the overriding political fact in these nations is just the desire to attain rapid economic growth in the future. Without such economic progress, the poorer nations feel, there can be no genuine political interdependence or international leadership. Domestically, rapid economic growth is the only means of satisfying the yearning of the people for better living standards, health, and education.

Therefore, at first, socialism in the Southern European countries stands - generally spoken - for the ideal of social justice. Because the differences between the rich and the poor are proportionately greater than in the wealthier countries, socialist governments always have to satisfy the demand for

social change. Socialism, then, stands for the commitment to raise the poor masses to a higher level and to narrow the gap between the thin upper class of the privileged and the vast mass of the dispossessed. Socialism means more welfare services for the poor, more schools for the uneducated, and more human dignity for the traditional underprivileged. Where a clientelist structure of the political process is still alive, socialism is but a new term for more openness, responsibility, and solidarity given universal application. Often socialism also stands for the ideal of human brotherhood and social peace through law.

The second meaning of socialism in the developing Southern countries is the commitment to planning. Because people look upon economic growth with a sense of urgency, they feel that the functioning of the free market may not ensure the kind of rapid economic expansion and growth that are called for. Some basic elements of a modern economy, as they are highways, means of transportation, hospitals, housings, schools, and so on, cannot, in the very nature of things, attract private enterprise, since they are the framework within which private enterprise and profits can be generated but which in themselves usually do not create such profits. Also, there is a kind of basic enterprise, such as manufacture of steel, production of energy, or provision of public services and a sufficient infra-structure, for which there is either not enough private capital available or which cannot hope to compete with foreign established enterprises. Therefore the socialist concept of political domination in economic matters,

of public planning and controlling private enterprise and of state intervention in social affairs is just an adequate model to govern these countries. Then, only the state can build the foundations of a modern economy, and only the state can assume the risks of profitless enterprise over a number of years, if such enterprise is necessary for the economy as a whole. Of course, the need for planning, to which all developing countries are committed, does not imply overall or even large-scale nationalization of the means of production. Thus, socialist governments in Southern Europe seek to increase the proportion of public enterprise mainly by creating new productive facilities rather than by nationalizing existing ones, and to acquire control over the whole financial sector of the economy.

So, in a third sense, socialism in Southern European countries means a mixed economic structure, in which some industries are completely private (such as farming, handicrafts and small business), others have both a private and a public sector (as in heavy industry and banking), and, finally, still others are dominated by the public sector (for example transportation and public utilities). While this is the general meaning of socialism in the economic sphere of developing areas, the practical application by the government varies in several countries. But, in spite of different political or social conditions and circumstances, the term socialism hits exactly the real situation in these countries, describes the true basic needs of the population and, therefore, is also fitting to legitimate a modern government.

Thus, we see that the meaning of socialism in the Southern European countries differs from that in the completely developed and industrialized "core" countries, because the historical and economic situation is different. In the North, Middle and West, socialism has ment, not how to industrialize an developing country, but how to distribute the fruits of a wealthy society in a more equitable way. As a result the concept of the welfare state has partially absorbed the idea of socialism. By contrast, socialism in peripheral or semi-peripheral countries is confronted with the task, not so much of distributing the fruits of an industrial economy which hardly exists, but to build an industrial economy so as to raise the economic and educational level of the masses of the people. For the same reason, while socialism in Western countries has generally developed best within a framework of established constitutional government, socialism in the Southern European states has to fight against a burdensome tradition of authoritarian solutions of the social question. But, just for this experience, there also seems to grow the common conviction of the necessary link between socialism and a modern liberal democracy.

## VI. Conclusion

To sum up the main results of this study, some important roots of the existence of socialist Governments in Southern Europe today one can find in the political structure, more precisely in the transformation of the party system, in the process of

"pluralization" of traditional corporatist or clientelist societies, and, last not least, in the "modernization" of the state as a real (objective) necessity of the economic development in these countries, but also as a central aim of the socialist parties. From a synoptical point of view, these three factors or causes indicate some common significant characteristics of a special "governmental" Socialism in Southern Europe which is different from the traditional marxist understanding as well as from the meaning in a full- or overdeveloped post-industrial society. Therefore finally I hold back the delicate question, whether the socialist governments in Southern Europa do not overrate their possibilities to change the society by administrative means.

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LES ELECTORATS SOCIALISTES EN EUROPE:  
UNE COMPARAISON NORD-SUD

Jonas Condomines

Papier présenté au Workshop  
"Socialist Governments in Southern Europe"  
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## Introduction

Il n'y a encore que quelques années, il était fréquent d'opposer les partis socialistes de l'Europe du nord à leurs homologues de l'Europe du sud. Dans un article très récent Ignacio Sotelo résumait succinctement la vision prépondérante sur la situation des partis socialistes européens vers le début des années 70 en écrivant que "au sud de l'Europe, en raison de ses structures sociales et du type de socialisation de la classe ouvrière, la droite continuerait à gouverner pendant longtemps; bien que de plus en plus attaquée par des partis communistes plus ou moins forts, mais incapables d'offrir une alternative valable" (Sotelo, 1984, 14).

Cette opposition Nord-Sud, expliquée par la différence de degré de développement économique et le type de culture politique, se manifestait essentiellement par la présence de partis communistes importants, d'un point de vue électoral et syndical, au sud de l'Europe. On simplifiait ainsi la situation au nord de l'Europe, en l'homogénéisant, le sud étant limité aux cas de la France et de l'Italie. Ce que l'on savait des trois autres pays du sud renforçait d'ailleurs le schéma d'ensemble. On connaissait le dynamisme militant des communistes dans l'Espagne franquiste, ce qui les faisait apparaître comme la principale force de l'opposition et en tout cas la mieux

structurée. Au Portugal, la très longue durée de la dictature avait empêché le développement d'un mouvement socialiste dont les racines étaient plus tributaires d'orientations anarchistes que marxistes. Finalement, en Grèce, non seulement le parlementarisme antérieur au régime des colonels n'avait pas suscité un parti d'orientation socialiste mais l'organisation communiste apparaissait nettement plus présente et importante, en particulier dans son rôle de résistance à la dictature.

La surprise des observateurs au moment de la démocratisation des trois dictatures de l'Europe du sud a été à la hauteur des idées reçues. Dès les premières élections libres (Grèce 1974, Portugal 1975, Espagne 1977), il est apparu que la principale force de gauche n'était pas le parti communiste. En Grèce, le PASOK devançait d'une courte tête la coalition des partis communistes (13,6 % et 9,5 % des suffrages, respectivement). Au Portugal, le PS obtenait trois fois plus de suffrages que le PCP, devançant nettement celui-ci même si on ajoute aux électeurs communistes ceux du MDP/CDE (4,1 %). En Espagne, le rapport était encore plus favorable au PSOE qui obtenait trois fois plus de suffrages que le PCE (34,5 % et 9,3 % des suffrages respectivement). Lors des deuxièmes élections, les partis socialistes portugais et espagnol confirmaient leur prépondérance à gauche, alors que le PASOK se distançait considérablement du KKEex en devenant le premier parti de l'opposition.

Dans les deux démocraties "établies" de l'Europe du sud la situation était différente. En France, le PS, dont F. Mitterand avait pris le contrôle en 1971, obtenait au premier tour des élections législatives de 1973 un résultat légèrement inférieur à celui du PCF (19,1 % et 21,4 % des suffrages respectivement). Ce résultat indiquait une forte progression par rapport à celui enregistré en 1968 par la FGDS. Lors des élections législatives de 1978, le PS devenait prépondérant à gauche en devançant le PCF (22,8 % et 20,6 % des suffrages, respectivement). Par contre, en Italie, les résultats des élections des années 70 reflétaient la stagnation du PSI, alors que le PCI enregistrait son meilleur score en 1976, pour reculer et se stabiliser par la suite (1976: 34,4 %; 1979: 30,4 %; 1983: 29,9 %).

L'impression d'unité que donnent les socialismes de l'Europe du sud est sans doute due, entre autres raisons, à la coïncidence chronologique de l'accès aux responsabilités gouvernementales de leurs dirigeants dans un laps de temps relativement bref: entre juin 1981 et avril 1983. Pourtant, cet accès a eu lieu dans des conditions bien différentes. Au Portugal, le PS avait déjà formé plusieurs gouvernements au lendemain des élections constituintes et son succès électoral de 1983 ne lui permettait d'obtenir qu'une majorité relative à l'Assemblée de la République. De ce fait, et à fin d'éviter les inconvénients rencontrés auparavant, des gouvernements minoritaires, M. Soares devait conclure un accord avec le PSD. En Grèce et en Espagne, la victoire des

partis socialistes était beaucoup plus claire. Tant le PASOK que le PSOE obtenaient la majorité absolue des sièges, respectivement au Vouli et aux deux Chambres des Cortes, ce qui leur permettait de constituer des gouvernements "monocolori". En France, si le PS obtenait à l'issue des deux tours, une majorité absolue des sièges à l'Assemblée Nationale, on ne peut oublier que cette victoire est tributaire du report presque parfait des suffrages communistes entre les deux tours. De plus, ce résultat était acquis dans la foulée de l'élection présidentielle, où le succès de F. Mitterand était dû, entre autres facteurs, à l'appui du PCF au second tour. En Italie, le PSI participait depuis longtemps déjà au différents gouvernements de coalition. L'arrivée de B. Craxi à la présidence du Conseil ne saurait être attribuée à la progression électorale de son parti, qui fut réelle mais toutefois limitée, lors des législatives de 1983. L'échec électoral de la DC ainsi que ses problèmes internes constituent sans doute de meilleures explications à "l'abandon" de la présidence du Conseil aux laïcs, les gouvernements restants, de toutes façon, à majorité DC.

Tout en reconnaissant à chacun des pays de l'Europe du sud sa spécificité et en acceptant explicitement que l'Italie est un cas particulier, le succès des socialistes dans cette aire géographique au cours des dix dernières années constitue un phénomène d'ensemble remarquable. Il est remarquable essentiellement parce qu'il ne correspond pas du tout

au "modèle sud européen" auquel avait conduit une extrapolation de la réalité italienne.

Alors, que s'est-il passé ? A quoi est dû le développement et le succès de ce socialisme sud européen et, surtout, quelle est sa nature ? Nous ne prétendons pas en quelques pages fournir de réponses complètes à ces questions, mais simplement avancer quelques hypothèses s'appuyant sur des données empiriques. Le succès des socialismes du sud de l'Europe est celui de partis neufs (PASOK, PS portugais) ou du moins très profondément renouvelés (PSOE, PS français) qui ont su, en un laps de temps très bref mobiliser un électorat important. A notre avis, c'est notamment en étudiant les appuis électoraux de ces partis que l'on pourra mieux saisir les mécanismes de leurs succès, leur nature et comprendre certains aspects de leur pratique gouvernementale.

Avant d'aborder l'étude des électorats des socialistes de l'Europe du sud il nous semble important d'évoquer, même rapidement, les transformations économiques et sociales qu'a connu cette région au cours des vingt dernières années. Ces transformations ont profondément modifié la structure des électorats potentiels dans les cinq pays qui nous intéressent directement. Il nous est aussi apparu nécessaire de fournir quelques renseignements quant à la conjoncture politique dans laquelle se sont produites les victoires socialistes. Si celles-ci sont tributaires d'une évolution socio-économique, elles sont également dues à des facteurs ayant un impact à plus court terme.

Tableau 1

Résultats électoraux des partis socialistes  
de l'Europe du sud (1974-1983)

	<u>FR</u> <u>PS</u>	<u>IT</u> <u>PSI</u>	<u>IT</u> <u>PSDI</u>	<u>GR</u> <u>PASOK</u>	<u>ES</u> <u>PSOE</u>	<u>PO</u> <u>PS</u>
<u>1974</u>						
% suff.	-	-	-	13,6	-	-
% sièges				4,0		
<u>1975</u>						
% suff.	-	-	-	-	-	37,8
% sièges						46,5
<u>1976</u>						
% suff.	-	9,6	3,4	-	-	35,0
% sièges		9,0	2,4			40,7
<u>1977</u>						
% suff.	-	-	-	25,3	29,3	-
% sièges				31,0	33,7	
<u>1978</u>						
% suff.	22,8(1)	-	-	-	-	-
% sièges	21,2					
<u>1979</u>						
% suff.	-	9,8	3,8	-	30,5	27,3
% sièges		9,8	3,2		34,6	29,6
<u>1980</u>						
% suff.	-	-	-	-	-	27,8(2)
% sièges						29,6
<u>1981</u>						
% suff.	36,1(3)	-	-	48,0	-	-
% sièges	54,8			57,3		
<u>1982</u>						
% suff.	-	-	-	-	48,4	-
% sièges					57,7	
<u>1983</u>						
% suff.	-	11,4	4,1	-	-	36,3
% sièges		11,6	3,7			40,4

Source principale: Union Interparlementaire.

(1) suff. premier tour, sièges total

(2) FRS, PS seul respectivement 26,7 et 28,4 %

(3) suff. premier tour, sièges total, MRG inclus

## 1. Causes des victoires socialistes

### 1.1. L'évolution du contexte

Nous avons signalé que l'une des causes invoquées traditionnellement pour expliquer l'évolution différente des socialismes du nord et du sud de l'Europe était le degré de développement économique et social de ces pays. Hors le "visage" économique et social de l'Europe du sud a substantiellement changé au cours des vingt dernières années et ce à un rythme beaucoup plus rapide qu'en Europe du nord. Si nous comparons les cinq pays du sud à cinq pays du nord où des partis socialistes importants se sont développés (Suède, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne, Pays-Bas, Danemark), cette évolution est frappante.

Ainsi, la croissance annuelle moyenne du PNB par habitant pendant la période 1960-1982 fût, en moyenne, de 4,22 % au sud et de 2,58 % au nord (voir tableau 2). Ces chiffres masquent bien sûr des disparités, mais il est clair que la croissance fût plus forte au sud, en particulier dans les trois démocraties les plus récentes. Un des corollaires de cette croissance économique est la modification substantielle de la structure de la population active. Comme le montre le tableau 3, les données de la Banque mondiale et celle de l'OCDE (Eurostat) ne coïncident pas toujours. Si nous nous basons sur les premières, on constatera que la population active dans l'agriculture diminue, entre 1960 et 1980, des deux tiers en France, en Italie et en Espagne et d'un tiers au Portugal et en Grèce.

Tableau 2

## Produit national brut

	Croissance annuelle moyenne (%) 1960-1980	PNB par habitant US\$ 1980
Suede (SU)	2,4	14.040
Royaume-Uni (UK)	2,0	9.660
Allemagne (DE)	3,1	12.460
Pays-Bas (NL)	2,9	10.930
Danemark (DK)	2,5	12.470
France (FR)	3,7	11.680
Italie (IT)	3,4	6.840
Grèce (GR)	5,2	4.290
Espagne (ES)	4,0	5.430
Portugal (PO)	4,8	2.450

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 1984, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 219

Tableau 3

Distribution de la population active par secteurs  
(% de la population active)

	Agriculture 1960	1980	Industrie 1960	1980	Services 1960	1980
SU.	14	5	45	34	41	61
UK.	4	2	48	42	48	56
DE.	14	4	48	46	38	50
NL.	11	6	43	45	46	49
DK.	18	7	37	35	45	58
FR.	22	8	39	39	39	53
IT.	31	11	40	45	29	44
GR.	50	37	20	28	24	35
ES.	42	14	31	40	27	46
PO.	44	28	29	35	27	37

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 1984, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984 p. 259

Distribution de la population active par secteurs  
(1982)

	Agriculture	Industrie	Services
SU.	5,6	50,3	64,1
UK.	2,7	34,7	62,6
DE.	5,5	42,7	51,8
NL.	5,0	28,7	66,3
DK.	8,5	26,3	65,2
FR.	8,4	34,6	57,0
IT.	12,4	37,0	50,6
GR.	30,7	29,0	40,3
ES.	18,3	33,9	47,8
PO.	26,8	36,5	36,7

Source: Eurostat, Statistiques de base de la Communauté, Luxembourg, Office statistique des Communautés européennes, vingt et unième édition, 1983

Malgré une certaine augmentation du poids relatif du secteur de l'industrie, il apparaît très nettement que le principal bénéficiaire de la redistribution de la population active est le secteur des services. L'augmentation du poids de ce secteur est particulièrement brutale en Grèce (+ 46 %), en Italie (+ 52 %) et surtout en Espagne (+ 70 %). A titre comparatif, on peut remarquer que, au nord, la croissance de ce secteur est nettement plus faible (maximum 31 % en Allemagne) sauf en Suède où elle atteint 49 %.

Parallèlement, on assiste à un processus d'urbanisation accélérée en Europe du sud (voir tableau 4). En l'espace de vingt ans, la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne atteignent des taux de population urbaine comparables à ceux de l'Europe du nord en 1960. Mais ce qui est peut-être plus illustratif est le taux de variation. Celui-ci est particulièrement élevé pour les trois nouvelles démocraties. La proportion de la population urbanisée augmente de près de la moitié en Grèce et de plus d'un tiers au Portugal et en Espagne.

Un dernier indicateur reflète bien la modification des styles de vie: la croissance de la consommation privée (voir tableau 4). Pendant la période 1960-1970, l'augmentation annuelle moyenne fût de 6,2 % au sud et de 4,1 % au nord. Le début de la crise économique affecta ce rythme de croissance puisque, pendant les dix années suivantes celui-ci ne fût plus que de 3,6 % au sud et 2 % au nord.

Tableau 4

## Urbanisation et développement de la consommation privée

	Urbanisation		Croissance de la consommation privée	
	% population sur la population totale	% de variation	1960-70	1970-80
SU.	73	+ 20,5	3,5	1,7
UK.	86	+ 5,8	2,4	1,4
DE.	77	+ 10,4	4,6	2,5
NL.	80	+ 5,0	5,9	2,9
DK.	74	+ 14,9	4,1	1,7
FR.	62	+ 27,4	5,3	3,8
IT.	59	+ 18,6	6,1	2,7
GR.	43	+ 48,8	7,1	4,2
ES.	57	+ 33,3	7,0	3,3
PO.	29	+ 39,1	5,5	3,8 *

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 1984, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 261 et 225 \* 1970-81

Tableau 5

## Croissance de la scolarisation

	Ecole secondaire		Enseignement supérieur	
	% de la tranche d'âge 12-17 ans fréquentant une école secondaire	% de croissance	% de la tranche d'âge 20-24 ans fréquentant une institution d'enseignement supérieur	% de croissance
SU.	55	85	9	37
UK.	66	83 *	9	20
DE.	53	94 *	6	28
NL.	58	95	13	31
DK.	65	105(1)	10	29
FR.	46	86	10	26
IT.	34	73	7	27
GR.	37	81	4	17 *
ES.	23	88	4	23
PO.	..	56 *	4	11 *

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 1984, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 267

\* autres années (proches)  
(1) certains élèves sont plus ou moins âgés par rapport à l'âge normal d'étude

Finalement, cette évolution économique se manifeste également dans un domaine aussi important socialement que celui de l'éducation (voir tableau 5). Dans l'ensemble de l'Europe occidentale l'enseignement supérieur s'est ouvert largement. Tant au nord qu'au sud on trouve des pays où cette progression est spectaculaire (Allemagne, Suède, Grèce, Espagne). Mais c'est surtout dans le secteur de l'enseignement secondaire que les effets sociaux se font sentir et là les différences nord-sud sont considérables. En 1960, les taux de scolarisation étaient substantiellement différents dans les deux régions considérées, puisqu'il était de 59,4 % au nord et de 35 % au sud. En l'espace de vingt ans ces taux se sont considérablement rapprochés, si l'on excepte le cas du Portugal. La proportion d'enfants d'âge scolaire fréquentant une école secondaire s'est multiplié par deux en France, en Italie et en Grèce et par presque quatre en Espagne.

Les quelques données que nous venons de présenter rapidement permettent toutes d'illustrer un fait simple: à la veille des victoires des partis socialistes les pays d'Europe du sud ont rejoint dans de nombreux domaines les pays de l'Europe du nord. Ces changements ne sont évidemment pas neutres d'un point de vue politique. Comme le soulignaient G. Grunberg et E. Schweiguth (1981, 142) "C'est (...) l'ensemble des changements constitués par l'urbanisation, la salarisation et l'élévation du niveau culturel qui ont provoqué dans la société française le profond changement culturel, idéologique et politique qui a permis à la gauche française de frôler la victoire en 1978".

## 1.2. La conjoncture

La victoire des partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud n'est pas due à une lente pénétration de la société, à un lent développement de l'organisation partisane. Au contraire, il s'agit de victoires remportées peu après la renaissance d'organisations anciennes (PS français, PSOE) ou de l'émergence des socialistes comme des forces nouvelles (PS portugais, PASOK). Deux indicateurs classiques peuvent illustrer cette affirmation.

Un premier indicateur est le ratio nombre de membres des partis par rapport au nombre de suffrages obtenus (voir tableau 6). Même en sachant que la plupart des partis "gonflent" leur nombre d'adhérents, la comparaison nord-sud est fort intéressante. On constate en effet que, à l'exception des partis italiens, tous les partis socialistes du sud ont des ratios inférieurs aux partis du nord. Ce ratio est particulièrement faible pour le PS français et le PSOE. Il est aussi assez probable que les chiffres fournis par ces deux partis se rapprochent plus de la réalité que ceux avancés par le PS portugais et le PASOK, dont les ratios s'apparentent assez à celui du PvdA, le plus faible de ceux des partis du nord. Il est remarquable que les quatre partis dont le succès est le plus lié à des victoires électorales ont les ratios les moins élevés. Même si l'on prend en compte la situation à la veille de leurs victoires (cf. colonne "avant-dernière élection"), cette remarque est toujours vraie: le ratio n'est significativement plus élevé que

Tableau 6

Membres des partis  
(aprox. 1979)

	Nombre (en milliers)	Ratio membres / suff. obtenus avant-dernière élection	Ratio membres / suff. obtenus dernière élection
SU. SAP	1.000	42,4 (1979)	39,5 (1982)
UK. Lab.	669(1)	5,8 (1979)	7,9 (1983)
DE. SPD	1.000	6,1 (1980)	6,7 (1982)
NL. PvdA	120	4,9 (1980)	4,8 (1982)
DK. SD	125	12,2 (1981)	11,8 (1984)
FR. PS	200	3,1 (1978)	2,1 (1981)(2)
IT. PSI	450	12,5 (1979)	10,7 (1983)
IT. PSDI	150	10,7 (1979)	10,0 (1983)
GR. PASOK	110	8,5 (1977)	4,0 (1982)
ES. PSOE	101	1,8 (1979)	1,0 (1982)
PO. PS	75	4,5 (1980)(3)	3,7 (1983)

Sources: - Pour le nombre de membres et le premier ratio, voir MONTERO GIBERT, J.R., "Partidos y participación política: algunas notas sobre la afiliación política en la etapa inicial de la transición española", *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, (Nueva Época), n. 23, sep.-oct. 1981, pp. 33-72, cuadro n. 4, p. 46.

- Les données sur le PASOK sont tirées de PREPENDERIS, Y., "La marche du Mouvement de la Déclaration du 3 septembre à aujourd'hui" *Id. vima*, 2/9/84, cité par PAPADOPOULOS, Y.

- Les résultats électoraux utilisés pour calculer le deuxième ratio sont, pour l'essentiel, de l'Union Interparlementaire

(1) Membres individuels. Les membres collectifs (syndicats) étaient 5.750.000 en 1975, ce qui porte les ratios à 55,8 et 75,9 respectivement

(2) PS-MRG

(3) FRS

Tableau 7

Syndicats à forte présence socialiste

Nom	N de membres	% de la pop. active	position relative
SU. LO	1.617.000	37,2	1/1
UK. TUC	12.000.000	46,1	1/1
DE. DGB	7.365.000	28,2	1/1
NL. NVV	722.000	13,9	1/3
DK. LO-D	1.037.000	41,4	1/1
FR. FO	800.000	3,5	3/4
IT. UIL	1.500.000	6,7	3/3
GR. GSEE	623.000	18,0	1/1
ES. UGT	1.400.000	10,9	2/3
PO. UGT-P	981.000	23,1	2/2

Sources: - CES, Secrétariat Général, Les groupements d'intérêts européens et leurs relations avec le Comité économique et social, Bruxelles, Delta, 1980, pp. 128-129

- CES, Secrétariat Général, Les organisations socio-professionnelles de Grèce, Bruxelles, Delta, 1981, p. 89

- CES, Secrétariat Général, Les organisations socio-professionnelles d'Espagne, Bruxelles, Delta, 1982, p. 175

- CES, Secrétariat Général, Les organisations socio-professionnelles du Portugal, Bruxelles, Delta, 1984, p. 75

- Eurostat, Statistiques de base de la Communauté, Luxembourg, Office Statistique des Communautés Européennes, 1981, p. 16 (population active en 1980)

dans le cas du PASOK.

Notre deuxième indicateur renforce les remarques faites à partir du premier. Il s'agit du degré d'implantation des syndicats d'orientation socialiste, exprimé par le rapport entre leur nombre de membres et la population active (tableau 7). Là encore, le taux d'implantation des syndicats d'orientation socialiste du nord de l'Europe est nettement plus élevé que celui de l'Europe du sud. Une exception toutefois, puisque le NVV hollandais est comparable aux plus forts syndicats socialistes de l'Europe du sud. Notre tableau appelle aussi quelques précisions en ce qui concerne l'implantation des syndicats du sud de l'Europe au mouvement socialiste dans deux pays: la France et la Grèce. En France, nous avons inclus dans le tableau le syndicat "Force Ouvrière", scission de la CGT suscitée par la SFIO. Depuis lors, les liens entre FO et le PS se sont considérablement relâchés et n'ont rien de commun avec ceux qu'entretiennent la LO suédoise avec le SAP ou le TUC avec le Labour. En Grèce, le GSEE est en situation de monopole et placé sous une certaine tutelle de l'administration. Des membres du PASOK ont investi sa direction, ce qui explique son inclusion dans notre tableau.

Si nous comparons la situation relative des différents syndicats au niveau national, c'est-à-dire leur rang par rapport aux autres organisations syndicales, on constatera également une certaine faiblesse des socialistes de l'Europe du sud dans ce domaine. Alors que les syndicats de l'Europe

du nord sont pratiquement en situation de monopole, sauf le NVV concurrencé par les syndicats d'inspiration démocrate-chrétienne, au sud le pluralisme syndical est important. Sauf en Grèce, les syndicats d'inspiration communiste arrivent en première position, très nettement comme en France (CGT), en Italie (CGIL) et au Portugal (CGT-Intersindical), mais avec moins d'avance en Espagne (CC.OO.).

Ainsi, par rapport aux partis socialistes de l'Europe nord, les partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud ont une moindre implantation. Contrairement aux premiers, il ne s'agit pas de partis ayant eu un développement lent et fortement lié au mouvement syndical. Même en Espagne, où les racines du PSOE sont anciennes dans le monde ouvrier et de l'UGT, la dictature a introduit une rupture au sein de ces organisations. Si l'on ne peut pas recourir à une explication des victoires socialistes à partir de la croissance de leurs organisations partisanses, il faut se tourner vers des explications plus liées à la logique électorale, et en particulier aux faiblesses et à la désunion de leurs adversaires.

En France, la victoire de F. Mitterand au second tour des élections présidentielles est due notamment aux mauvais reports des suffrages entre les candidats du centre-droit. Les sondages post-électorales nous indiquent que 16 % des électeurs de J. Chirac (RPR) au premier tour votèrent pour le candidat socialiste au second tour, alors que 11 % s'abstenaient (Jaffré, 1982, 15).

En Grèce, le succès du PASOK est aussi dû en partie à l'incapacité de la droite de renouveler ses cadres dirigeants. Privé de son "leader" historique, C. Caramanlis élu à la présidence de la République, la ND se révélera incapable de lui trouver un successeur. L'effondrement de l'EDIK comme option électorale crédible libéra un électorat plus proche du PASOK que de la ND.

En Espagne, le succès du PSOE est notamment dû à l'incapacité de l'UCD à s'affirmer comme parti politique et à ses problèmes de "leadership" après la démission de son fondateur et président du gouvernement A. Suarez. Environ 27 % des électeurs de l'UCD en 1979 votèrent pour le PSOE en 1982. Les principales raisons invoquées pour expliquer leur changement de vote étaient la détérioration de la situation économique (25 %), mais aussi le manque d'autorité du gouvernement (18 %) de même que les querelles internes de l'UCD (14 %). Pour l'ensemble de la population, la première raison de la victoire du PSOE était la mauvaise gestion du gouvernement de l'UCD - "UCD ha gobernado mal" - (31 %) (LOPEZ PINTOR & JUSTEL, 1982, 164-168).

Au Portugal, la mort de F. Sa Carneiro, président du gouvernement et du PSD, principal dirigeant de l'Alliance Démocratique, favorisa sans doute la victoire du PS. En effet, l'AD connu de nombreux problèmes internes, qui se reflétaient au niveau gouvernemental, la présidence de F. Pinto-Balsemão (PSD) n'ayant pas l'autorité de celle de son prédécesseur.

L'échec aux élections municipales, la démission du premier ministre et la dissolution de l'AD annonçaient la victoire du PS.

Enfin, en Italie, le problème se pose moins en termes strictement électoraux, mais plutôt en termes de capacité à négocier la formation d'une coalition gouvernementale. Au sein du PSI, le "leadership" de B. Craxi était fort et sans contestation importante. Face à lui, la DC apparaît divisée en tendances multiples. Cet affrontement donnera lieu à la première présidence du Conseil laïc depuis la guerre (G. Spadolini, mai 1981), puis à une personnalisation de la direction dans les principaux partis politiques, la DC réintroduisant, lors de son congrès de mai 1982, l'élection directe du secrétaire national (LOMBARDO, 1984, 113-115). Le précédent d'une présidence laïque, la force du leadership socialiste, ainsi que les résultats des élections, expliquent la formation du gouvernement de B. Craxi.

## 2. Les électorats socialistes

### 2.1. Les données

Les données sur lesquelles s'appuient les pages qui suivent proviennent de l'Euro-Baromètre 20, sondages réalisés dans les dix pays de la Communauté européenne en octobre-novembre 1983 (voir annexe). L'électorat des partis socialistes inclus dans notre étude a été simplement défini comme l'ensemble des personnes interrogées exprimant une intention de vote, lors d'élection législatives nationales, pour le parti socialiste en question. Le fait que nous ayons retenu une date de référence commune pour l'ensemble des sondages pose le problème de leur contexte de réalisation. En effet, si les sondages ont tous été réalisés après l'entrée en fonction de gouvernements socialistes, ceux-ci étaient en place depuis des laps de temps très différents: 28 mois en France, 24 mois en Grèce, 11 mois en Espagne et 2 mois en Italie. Il faut donc tenir compte de ces différences si l'on veut établir une relation entre le type d'électorat socialiste et la politique gouvernementale.

Comme toujours, l'utilisation secondaire de données de sondages implique certaines limites. Dans notre cas, celles-ci tiennent surtout au fait que, le Portugal et l'Espagne ne faisant pas encore partie de la Communauté européenne, le questionnaire est moins riche dans ces deux pays. Nous avons dû exclure le Portugal de notre analyse car nous ne disposions pas de l'intention de vote des personnes interrogées. Dans le

cas de l'Espagne, ce qui nous manque ce sont les réponses à certaines questions portant sur les attitudes politiques. Enfin, les échantillons des Euro-Baromètres ont une dimension suffisante pour permettre des analyses fines lorsque l'on travaille sur l'ensemble de l'échantillon national, mais les marges d'erreurs augmentent lorsque l'analyse ne porte que sur une fraction de celui-ci, en l'occurrence les électeurs socialistes. Par contre, les Euro-Baromètres présentent un avantage incontestable: ce sont des sondages explicitement conçus pour permettre des comparaisons internationales. De ce fait, non seulement les questions d'attitudes sont aussi identiques que possible, mais les données provenant des questions démographiques permettent des comparaisons aisées, en adoptant souvent la forme préconisée par Converse (1974).

Nous allons insister en particulier sur ces variables démographiques, les plus fréquemment utilisées et celles qui permettent donc de réaliser facilement des comparaisons diachroniques par pays auxquelles nous ne pouvons procéder dans le cadre de ce papier. Pour la présentation et l'interprétation des données nous nous heurtons à une double exigence: la nécessité de présenter les profils des différents électorats socialistes tels qu'ils sont, mais aussi la nécessité de contrôler leur cadre national afin de pouvoir procéder à des comparaisons ayant un sens. Chaque tableau inclu donc des données brutes (% de l'électorat du parti dans la catégorie considérée), mais aussi la différence entre la distribution de l'électorat socialiste d'un pays et la distribution de

l'ensemble des personnes interrogées exprimant une préférence Partisane dans ce même pays, moyen utilisé avec succès Par Sani (1981, 243).

## 2.2. Trois caractéristiques de base

Les électorats de gauche, et par conséquent les électorats des partis socialistes, sont sensés être plus masculins, plus jeunes et plus urbains que l'ensemble du corps électoral.

Nous n'avons pas inclus de tableau rendant compte de la distribution <sup>par sexe</sup> des électorats des partis socialistes, mais nos données reflètent une diversité de situations qui va à l'encontre de l'affirmation générale fait ci-dessus. En effet, seul l'électorat du Labour apparaît nettement masculin (+ 5 % par rapport à la moyenne nationale), par contre, l'électorat SD danois semble être plus féminin que masculin (+ 5 % de femmes par rapport à la moyenne). Les six autres partis pris en compte, et par conséquent les quatre de l'Europe du sud, ont des différences minimales par rapport à la moyenne, en particulier le PASOK et le PSOE pour lesquels cette différence est inférieure à 1 %.

La distribution des électorats par tranches d'âge (voir tableau 8) va également à l'encontre des idées reçues. Les quatre partis du nord ont des électorats distribués de façon très proche à la moyenne, à l'exception du PvdA sous-

Tableau 8

Distribution des électorats par tranches d'âge  
(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	Electeurs socialistes				N
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55 & +	
UK. Lab.	20	29	16	35	301
DE. SPD	14	32	25	29	368
NL. PvdA	12	40	22	26	313
DK. SD	9	39	21	31	252
FR. PS	20	40	19	21	220
IT. PSI	15	23	30	32	143
GR. PASOK	15	25	29	31	340
ES. PSOE	24	27	19	30	379
Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale					
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55 & +	N
UK.	+ 2	- 1	- 2	+ 1	1013
DE.	- 1	+ 2	=	- 1	826
NL.	- 4	+ 1	+ 1	+ 2	890
DK.	- 3	+ 3	=	=	779
FR.	+ 2	+ 3	- 1	- 4	788
IT.	- 3	- 5	+ 6	+ 2	716
GR.	- 1	- 1	=	+ 2	580
ES.	+ 1	- 1	- 1	+ 1	773

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Tableau 9

Distribution des électorats par taille d'agglomération  
(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	Electeurs socialistes		N	
	zone rurale	ville		
UK. Lab.	20	48	301	
DE. SPD	32	40	363	
NL. PvdA	48	38	310	
DK. SD	26	38	254	
FR. PS	33	46	220	
IT. PSI	33	31	143	
GR. PASOK	33	32	340	
ES. PSOE	25	36	378	
Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale				
	zone rurale	petite-moyenne	ville	N
UK.	- 4	=	+ 4	1006
DE.	=	- 2	+ 2	817
NL.	- 4	+ 3	+ 1	882
DK.	- 4	- 1	+ 5	785
FR.	- 2	+ 6	- 4	777
IT.	- 2	- 5	+ 7	716
GR.	+ 2	+ 1	- 3	580
ES.	- 3	- 2	+ 5	769

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Réponse à la question: "Diriez-vous que vous vivez dans: 1. une zone rurale, un village, 2. une ville petite ou moyenne, 3. une grande ville?"

représenté parmi les très jeunes. Egalement très proches de la moyenne ont retrouvé le PASOK et le PSOE. Par contre, le PS français est sur-représenté parmi les moins de 40 ans (+ 5 %), le PSI se trouvant dans la situation inverse (+ 8 % parmi les 40 ans et plus).

La distribution par taille d'agglomérations, appréciée de façon subjective par la personne interrogée, donne aussi une image assez variée de l'électorat socialiste européen (voir tableau 9). Quatre partis, deux du nord (SD et Labour) et deux du sud (PSI et PSOE) ont un électorat clairement plus urbain que la moyenne. La SPD est lui aussi urbain, mais beaucoup moins nettement, tandis que le PvdA et surtout le PS français semblent disposer d'un électorat vivant dans des villes moyennes. Le PASOK par contre semble être le seul parti socialiste dont l'assise est meilleure en milieu rural qu'en milieu urbain, bien que les différences soient faibles.

Dans l'ensemble, sur ces trois variables, il est difficile de faire apparaître un clivage nord-sud entre les électeurs socialistes. Les différences semblent plutôt exister entre un électorat socialiste de type "classique" (masculin, urbain), tel que celui du Labour, et des électeurs moins marqués, plus proches de la moyenne nationale, tel que celui du SPD. Il est difficile aussi d'affirmer que les électeurs socialistes de l'Europe du sud sont homogènes. En effet, les électeurs du PS français et du PSI se distinguent quant à leur structure par tranches d'âge et les

électorats du PASOK et PSOE se distinguent quant à leur distribution par catégories d'agglomérations.

### 2.3. Un électorat de classe ?

Un débat largement actuel porte sur l'importance du clivage de classe pour structurer la compétition partisane et, de façon corollaire, sur la nature de l'appui électoral des partis socialistes. Ce débat est particulièrement important en Grande-Bretagne dans la mesure où la classe sociale constitue l'un des facteurs principaux d'explication du vote, pour ne pas dire le seul facteur (Butler & Stokes, 1969). Le débat concerne donc essentiellement la Grande-Bretagne, (cf. Franklin, 1984) mais aussi d'autres pays comme le Danemark (cf. Andersen, 1984).

La plupart du temps, le débat s'appuie sur des données de sondages, avec les avantages, mais aussi les inconvénients qui en découlent, en particulier l'imprécision des catégories socio-professionnelles codées ou les simples erreurs de codages (cf. p.e. Zuckerman & Liechbach, 1977, revu par Rogowski, 1981). Notre but n'étant pas méthodologique, nous tenterons de saisir le problème à partir de trois variables classiques permettant de déterminer le caractère de classe de l'électorat d'un parti: la catégorie professionnelle, le niveau d'éducation et le revenu.

La distribution des électorats socialistes selon la catégorie professionnelle met en relief quelques faits simples

(voir tableau 10)

Tableau 10

Distribution des électeurs par catégories professionnelles  
(% de ceux qui se pronoucent)

Électeurs socialisés	agriculteur		ouvrier	employé	autres actifs (1)		non actifs (2)		étudiants militaires		chômage	N
	pêcheur	agriculteur			actifs (1)	non actifs (2)	militaires	étudiants				
UK. Lab.	0		27	10	6		41		5		10	301
DE. SPD	0		21	24	4		34		5		12	364
NL. PVDA	0		13	15	11		45		6		10	309
DK. SD	0		27	29	2		33		2		6	253
FR. PS	1		25	6	6		30		9		7	220
IT. PSI	0		12	19	15		44		6		4	143
GR. PASOK	11		15	11	10		44		6		3	340
ES. PSOE	0		12	11	9		48		11		9	378

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

agriculteur	ouvrier		employé	autres actifs (1)		non actifs (2)		étudiants militaires		chômage	N
	pêcheur	agriculteur		actifs (1)	non actifs (2)	militaires	étudiants				
UK.	-	+ 3	- 4		- 3		+ 2	+ 1		+ 2	1011
DE.	- 1	+ 5	=		- 5		+ 2	- 2		+ 1	811
NL.	- 1	+ 2	- 1		- 2		+ 3	- 3		+ 2	864
DK.	- 4	+ 7	+ 1		- 6		+ 5	- 5		+ 1	783
FR.	- 3	+ 7	+ 2		- 5		- 4	+ 3		=	788
IT.	- 1	- 1	=		- 1		+ 7	- 3		- 1	716
GR.	=	+ 1	+ 1		- 2		=	=		=	580
ES.	- 1	- 1	+ 1		- 2		+ 1	=		=	772

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

(1) Professions libérales, patrons, commerçants et cadres supérieurs

(2) Retraités, ménagères et "inactifs" en Espagne

Par catégories, on remarquera tout d'abord que les électorats socialistes sont sous-représentés chez les agriculteurs-pêcheurs, sauf en Grèce. Par rapport à l'électorat ouvrier, il est possible de distinguer deux groupes de partis socialistes: ceux qui sont clairement sur-représentés (Labour, SPD, SD et PS français) et ceux dont la proportion est voisine de la moyenne (PvdA, PSI, PASOK, PSOE). Si l'on prend en compte la catégorie des chômeurs constituée en partie d'ouvriers des industries traditionnelles, en l'ajoutant à celle des ouvriers, on voit apparaître un clivage nord-sud, le PS français s'apparentant au groupe nordique. La proportion d'employés dans les différents électorats est proche de la moyenne, sauf en Grande-Bretagne où elle est nettement inférieure. La colonne "autres actifs" qui regroupe les catégories professionnelles à statut le plus élevé constituent une sorte de "négatif" de la colonne "ouvriers". Tous les électorats y sont sous-représentés, mais ceux du PSI, du PvdA, du PASOK et du PSOE sont plus proches de la moyenne. La catégorie composite des non actifs reflète, comme celle des étudiants et militaires, la répartition par tranches d'âge de l'électorat pour ce qui est des pays de l'Europe du sud. Ces deux colonnes sont des reflets l'une de l'autre dans les électorats des partis du nord; mis à part la proximité à la moyenne du Labour, les autres partis varient dans le même sens.

Dans l'ensemble, il faut souligner la proximité aux moyennes nationales des électorats du PASOK et du PSOE, ce qui n'est

guère étonnant étant donnée l'importance du soutien électoral dont ils bénéficient. Le caractère ouvrier du PS français (25 %) doit également être souligné, puisqu'il apparente ce parti plutôt au Labour, au SPD et à la SD, qu'aux partis de l'Europe du sud.

Le niveau d'instruction, réflété par l'âge auquel les personnes interrogées ont cessé leurs études semble fournir aux électors des partis socialistes européens un de leur facteurs d'homogénéité. En effet, tous les partis sont sur représentés dans la catégorie "15 ans et moins". Toutefois, ce clivage est d'importance inégale selon les pays. Ainsi, il semble fondamental au Danemark, mais plus faible en France, surtout si l'on tient compte de la proportion d'électeurs socialistes qui déclarent étudier encore (les jeunes). Dans l'ensemble, si l'on additionne les valeurs absolues des écarts à la moyenne, il apparaît que ce clivage est particulièrement fort au Danemark et en Grande-Bretagne, puis viennent les pays du sud (dans l'ordre Italie, Espagne et Grèce à égalité, France), et finalement l'Allemagne et les Pays-Bas où les différences sont moins sensibles.

Le recueil de données concernant le revenu des personnes interrogées dans le cadre d'un sondage est toujours difficile, le taux de non réponses étant habituellement supérieur à celui d'autres questions. Toutefois, il nous a semblé intéressant de tenter une comparaison à partir des données dont nous disposons (voir tableau 12).

Tableau 11

Distribution des électeurs par niveau d'éducation  
(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	15 & 16-19				20 &+ encore				N
	15 &	16-19	20 &+	encore	20 &+	encore	20 &+	encore	
UK. Lab.	53	32	11	4	4	4	301		
DE. SPD	50	38	8	4	4	368			
NL. PvdA	32	35	27	6	6	314			
DK. SD	62	30	7	1	1	254			
FR. PS	33	39	20	8	8	220			
IT. PSI	63	24	6	7	7	143			
GR. PASOK	62	18	14	6	6	340			
ES. PSOE	66	14	8	12	12	379			

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

	15 & 16-19				20 &+ encore				N
	15 &	16-19	20 &+	encore	20 &+	encore	20 &+	encore	
UK.	+7	-8	=	+1	+1	1015			
DE.	+4	=	-3	+1	+1	826			
NL.	+4	-1	=	-3	-3	892			
DK.	+11	=	-7	-4	-4	785			
FR.	+3	-3	-2	+2	+2	798			
IT.	+5	+2	-5	-2	-2	716			
GR.	+6	-4	-1	-1	-1	580			
ES.	+5	-3	-3	+1	+1	773			

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Réponse à la question: "How old were you when you finished your full-time education?"

Tableau 12

Distribution des électeurs par niveau de revenus  
(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	-				+				N
	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	
UK. Lab.	40	25	20	15	20	15	294		
DE. SPD	27	31	22	20	22	20	336		
NL. PvdA	20	30	30	20	30	20	288		
DK. SD	30	29	31	10	31	10	218		
FR. PS	18	36	24	22	24	22	220		
IT. PSI	27	22	30	21	30	21	131		
GR. PASOK	26	34	19	21	19	21	302		
ES. PSOE	39	26	25	10	25	10	296		

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

	-				+				N
	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	
UK.	+11	+1	-6	-6	-6	-6	822		
DE.	+2	+5	-1	-6	-1	-6	742		
NL.	+4	+3	+1	-8	+1	-8	817		
DK.	+2	+2	+3	-7	+3	-7	641		
FR.	-1	+2	-3	+2	-3	+2	714		
IT.	+8	-7	+2	-9	+2	-9	659		
GR.	+1	=	=	-1	=	-1	522		
ES.	+13	-1	+3	-15	+3	-15	685		

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Revenu exprimé en quartiles

Pour ce qui est des partis socialistes de l'Europe du nord l'importance du clivage est indubitable, l'électorat des quatre partis étant sur représenté dans les catégories ayant le revenu le plus faible. Toutefois, il est clair que le clivage est plus intense en Grande-Bretagne que dans les autres pays. En Europe du sud, l'électorat du PS français et du PASOK ne semblent guère concernés par ce clivage, les différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale étant limitées. Par contre, l'électorat du PSI et surtout celui du PSOE semblent marqués par ce clivage.

Dans l'ensemble, il nous faut constater le manque d'homogénéité des électorats tant dans le groupe des partis du nord que dans celui des partis du sud. Au nord, des partis socialistes "classiques" (ouvriers, faible instruction et bas revenus) tels que le Labour se trouvent dans le même groupe que le PvdA, beaucoup plus proche d'une moyenne nationale et où les clivages sociaux issus de l'instruction et du revenu sont beaucoup moins aigus. On trouve également une grande variété parmi les partis de l'Europe du sud. Le PS français a un électorat ouvrier, mais ni l'instruction, ni le revenu ne semblent déterminant pour structurer sa clientèle électorale. La situation du PSOE est presque l'inverse.

#### 2.4. Attitudes fondamentales

Si les clivages socio-économiques ne nous permettent guère de trouver une spécificité exclusive aux partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud, il nous faut nous tourner vers leurs attitudes politiques, en particulier celles qui sont susceptibles de mettre en relief des éléments d'une éventuelle culture politique sud-européenne, "latine" ou "méditerranéenne". Trois dimensions nous semblent devoir être retenues. La première est l'attitude à l'égard de la religion, pour de nombreuses raisons historiques et à cause du rôle important de l'Eglise catholique, <sup>en Europe du sud</sup> la Grèce exceptée. La seconde dimension est l'attitude à l'égard du changement politique afin de savoir si les européens du sud sont aussi "radicaux" que certains le prétendent. Finalement, la troisième dimension est, très classiquement, la position de ces électors sur l'échelle gauche-droite.

On se heurte souvent à l'opérationnalisation du clivage religieux lors d'études comparées. En effet, dans les pays où les confessions importantes sont plusieurs, tel les Pays-Bas, la question pertinente est l'affiliation religieuse. Par contre, lorsqu'une confession est absolument dominante, comme en Espagne, il convient de mesurer le degré de pratique, en général en demandant la fréquence d'assistance aux offices. Dans le cas des Pays-Bas Lijphart (1974, 247) signale que, bien que la pratique religieuse soit un prédicteur plus sensible, une appréciation subjective de la personne interrogée donne des résultats qui, dans l'ensemble sont similaires.

C'est ce type de données que nous avons utilisé (voir tableau 13).

On remarquera tout d'abord que deux des sept électorats figurant sur le tableau sont très proches de la moyenne. Pour les électeurs de la SD et du PASOK la question religieuse ne semble pas structurer le champ politique, en termes absolus se sont d'ailleurs les deux électorats qui se déclarent le plus "religieux" (66 % et 84 % respectivement). Pour les autres partis, le clivage religieux a une importance, mais celle-ci est inégale. Ainsi, elle reste relativement faible pour le SPD et le Labour mais est nettement plus importante pour le PS français et le PvdA et surtout pour le PSI, dont le trait définitoire principal est celui d'être un parti laïc. Comme nous ne disposons pas des mêmes données pour l'Espagne, nous avons eu recours, pour pouvoir compléter la comparaison, à des indications portant sur la pratique religieuse (cf. Linz, 1980, 139). Si l'on divise l'électorat du PSOE de 1979 en trois groupes en fonction de leur niveau de pratique religieuse, on obtient les résultats suivants:

1. 22 % se déclarent très bons catholiques ou catholiques pratiquants,
2. 61 % se déclarent pas très pratiquants ou non pratiquants, et
3. 17 % se déclarent indifférents ou athées.

Le clivage religieux joue donc un rôle en Espagne, les différences à la moyenne pour les trois catégories citées ci-dessus étant, respectivement, - 17 %, + 13 % et + 4 %. Ainsi, le clivage religieux ne joue pas un rôle uniforme en Europe du sud. En effet, il est absent pour l'électorat du PASOK, important pour ceux du PS français et du PSOE et déterminant pour celui du PSI.

Tableau 13

Distribution des électorats selon l'autoperception en matière religieuse

(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	Religieux		Non religieux		athée		N
	Religieux	Non religieux	Religieux	Non religieux	athée	athée	
UK. Lab.	54	38	8	8	295		
DE. SPD	56	40	4	4	346		
NL. PvdA	52	41	7	7	301		
DK. SD	66	28	6	6	232		
FR. PS	45	36	19	19	210		
IT. PSI	58	26	16	16	141		
GR. PASOK	84	13	3	3	336		
ES. PSOE	(voir texte)						

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

	religieux	non religieux	athée	N
UK.	- 9	+ 6	+ 3	999
DE.	- 7	+ 7	=	777
NL.	-14	+12	+ 2	866
DK.	=	=	=	729
FR.	-13	+10	+ 3	765
IT.	-24	+13	+11	708
GR.	+ 2	- 1	- 1	572
ES.	(voir texte)			

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Réponse à la question: "Indépendamment du fait que vous êtes pratiquant ou non, diriez-vous que vous êtes: 1. Quelqu'un de religieux, 2. Quelqu'un de non religieux, 3. Un athée convaincu?"

Tableau 14

Distribution des électorats selon l'attitude face au changement politique

(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes	action révolutionnaire		réformes		défendre société		N
	action révolutionnaire	réformes	réformes	réformes	société	société	
UK. Lab.	10	70	20	20	283		
DE. SPD	2	59	39	39	358		
NL. PvdA	10	66	24	24	298		
DK. SD	1	63	36	36	240		
FR. PS	5	78	17	17	215		
IT. PSI	5	82	13	13	139		
GR. PASOK	7	64	29	29	310		

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

	action révolutionnaire	réformes	réformes	défendre société	N
UK.	+ 5	+ 6	-11	964	
DE.	- 1	+ 6	- 5	768	
NL.	+ 3	+ 3	- 6	846	
DK.	- 1	+ 2	- 1	752	
FR.	- 4	+ 9	- 5	763	
IT.	- 2	-10	- 8	689	
GR.	- 5	+ 4	+ 1	540	

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

Réponse à la question: "Sur cette liste se trouvent trois attitudes fondamentales vis-à-vis de la société dans laquelle nous vivons. Voulez-vous choisir l'attitude qui correspond le mieux à vos idées personnelles? 1. Il faut changer radicalement toute l'organisation de notre société par une action révolutionnaire, 2. Il faut améliorer petit à petit notre société par des réformes, 3. Il faut défendre courageusement notre société contre toutes les forces subversives"

Les attitudes à l'égard du changement politique font apparaître une division assez nette entre les partis socialistes de l'Europe du nord (voir tableau 14). La distribution des électorats du Labour et du PvdA, tant en pourcentages qu'en différences à la moyenne, confère à ces deux partis un caractère marqué à gauche, tandis que le SPD est réformiste et la SD très proche de sa moyenne nationale. Tant le PS français que le PSI s'apparentent plus au SPD que aux autres partis du nord. Il sont pourtant plus "radicalement" réformistes et leur électoral plus homogène sur cette position ( $\pm 80 \%$ ). Le cas du PASOK est intéressant, car si on ne considère que les pourcentages bruts, il apparaît proche du PvdA, donc marqué à gauche. En revanche, si l'on prend en compte les différences à la moyenne, c'est-à-dire sa position au niveau national, il apparaît comme relativement conservateur par rapport aux autres électorats. Dans l'ensemble, nous sommes tentés de dire qu'il existe plus de différences, sur la base de cet indicateur, entre les partis socialistes de l'Europe du nord que parmi les partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud.

Le placement des électeurs socialistes sur l'échelle gauche-droite est un bon indicateur synthétique de leurs attitudes politiques (voir tableau 15). Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, les électorats socialistes sont tous sur représentés dans les cases de gauche (3+4) et sous représentés dans les cases situées le plus à droite (6 à 10). Il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que, au-delà de ces correspondances générales, la

Tableau 15

Distribution des électorats sur l'échelle gauche-droite  
(% de ceux qui se prononcent)

Electeurs socialistes

	<u>1+2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6à10</u>	<u>N</u>
UK. Lab.	16	15	16	32	21	273
DE. SPD	7	20	28	23	22	338
NL. PvdA	21	31	20	16	12	305
DK. SD	1	5	19	56	19	241
-						
FR. PS	19	38	20	20	5	210
IT. PSI	10	42	19	21	8	141
GR. PASOK	2	18	27	42	11	338
ES. PSOE	19	34	19	19	9	379

Différences par rapport à la moyenne nationale

	<u>1+2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6à10</u>	<u>N</u>
UK.	+ 10	+ 9	+ 7	+ 3	- 29	949
DE.	+ 2	+ 7	+13	+ 5	- 27	759
NL.	+ 10	+15	+ 8	+ 1	- 32	856
DK.	- 4	+ 1	+ 8	+30	- 33	746
-						
FR.	+ 5	+22	+ 8	- 2	- 33	747
IT.	- 12	+26	+ 9	- 4	- 19	690
GR.	- 9	+ 3	+10	+15	- 19	576
ES.	+ 5	+13	+ 5	- 2	- 21	697

Source: Euro-Baromètre 20 (octobre-novembre 1983)

structure des distributions est varié et souvent substantiellement différente. Ceci est facilement appréciable si l'on observe les cases extrêmes, tant à gauche (1+2) qu'au centre (5). Ainsi, le Labour et le PvdA sont sur représentés à l'extrême gauche et le PSI y est très sous représentés. D'autre part, le PASOK et surtout la SD sont nettement sur représentés au centre. Si l'on prend en compte l'ensemble des distributions sur l'échelle exprimées en différences par rapport à la moyenne de l'échantillon, on peut distinguer trois groupes de partis. Le premier est composée de partis dont l'électorat se situe nettement à gauche dans le contexte national: le PvdA, le Labour et le PS français. Ces trois partis sont sur-représentés à l'extrême-gauche, et/ou très sur représentés à gauche (ce qui disingue le PS français du PSOE), ainsi que nettement sous représentés à droite. Le deuxième groupe est également composé de trois partis: le PSOE, le SPD et le PSI. Ce groupe est moins homogène que le premier, les partis étant cités d'après le degré l'orientation à gauche de leurs électeurs, telle que la reflète leur position sur l'échelle. Le PSOE est sur représenté à l'extrême gauche, mais moins sous-représenté à droite. Le SPD à une distribution de son électorat axée sur la case 4, mais penchant à gauche. Finalement, le PSI malgré sa nette sous-représentation à l'extrême-gauche, est très sur représenté à gauche (cases 3+4). Enfin, deux parties constituent un dernier groupe caractérisé par la modération relative de ses électeurs: le PASOK et la SD. Les deux partis sont sous représentés à l'extrême-gauche et leur sur-représentation s'accroît au fur et à mesure que l'on

s'approche des positions centristes, en particulier dans le cas de la SD. En revanche, ce dernier parti est beaucoup plus clairement sous-représenté à droite que le PASOK. A nouveau, l'utilisation de cet indicateur met en relief un certain nombre de différences parmi les électeurs des partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud, puisqu'ils se répartissent dans les trois groupes que nous venons de définir.

### Conclusion

L'analyse des électeurs des partis socialistes à laquelle nous venons de procéder a mis en relief le manque d'homogénéité de ceux-ci, tant au nord qu'au sud de l'Europe. Il nous semble important de tenter maintenant une caractérisation globale de l'électorat de chacun de ces partis sur la base des neuf variables que nous avons employées.

Malgré leur diversité, il est relativement facile de caractériser les électeurs des partis socialistes de l'Europe du nord, car ils sont assez typés. Ainsi, pour les électeurs du Labour toutes les variables sont significativement discriminantes, à l'exception de l'âge et de l'attitude face à la religion. Il s'agit sans aucun doute d'un parti ouvrier classique, marqué par les indicateurs de clivages de classe et dont les électeurs ont des attitudes nettement orientées à gauche. Si des modifications importantes interviennent au

niveau de la structure de la population active, il est probable que la Labour perdra beaucoup de son influence au niveau électoral. En effet, son électorat apparaît trop distant de la composition sociale générale de la Grande Bretagne et des attitudes moyennes de ses habitants. Le succès électoral de l'Alliance SDP-Parti Libéral tient, sans doute, à sa capacité de mobilisation d'un électorat pour lequel le Labour a une image de parti vieillissant, peu "moderne", trop exclusivement ouvrier.

L'électorat du SPD a un profil très différent. Les seules variables nettement discriminante sont deux indicateurs de classe: la catégorie professionnelle et le revenu.

Les autres variables sociologiques mettent en relief un profil assez proche de la moyenne (sexe, âge, habitat, instruction). Du point de vue des attitudes, cet électorat est modéré, peu marqué par le clivage religieux, se situant à gauche, mais pas trop. Somme toute, il correspond assez bien à l'image traditionnelle de la social-démocratie.

Les électeurs du PvdA sont, d'un point de vue sociologique, assez surprenants. Sauf le revenu, aucune des variables retenues ne les distingue clairement de la moyenne nationale (sexe, profession, éducation) ou, lorsque cela est le cas, elle le fait dans un sens contraire aux clivages gauche-droite classiques (moins de très jeunes et plus d'habitants de villes moyennes). Cet électorat est surtout de gauche par ses attitudes extrêmement tranchées: laïc, fortement réformiste voir

"révolutionnaire", se plaçant à gauche. Un électorat assez peu classique donc pour un parti socialiste de l'Europe du nord. Il est probable que l'activité de la tendance "nouvelle gauche" se reflète dans le type d'électorat du parti et que nous ayons à faire à un parti social-démocrate "en transition" (cf. Wolinetz, 1977).

Finalement, les électeurs de la SD se caractérisent par tous les indicateurs de clivages de classe (profession, instruction, revenu) et par leur caractère urbain. Sous cet angle, il s'apparenteraient plutôt au Labour. Par contre, leurs attitudes sont très modérées: le clivage religieux est absent, leur niveau de "réformisme" est identique à celui de la moyenne nationale et ils se situent surtout au centre-gauche. Dans ce domaine, celui de attitudes, les électeurs de la SD sont donc plus proches du SPD que des autres partis du nord.

Les électorats de partis socialistes de l'Europe du sud sont beaucoup moins faciles à caractériser, car ils sont beaucoup moins typés. D'un point de vue sociologique, le PS français a un électorat plus jeune et plus ouvrier que la moyenne nationale. Toutefois, les deux autres indicateurs de clivages de classe, l'éducation et le revenu, ne jouent qu'un rôle modéré. C'est surtout au niveau des attitudes que l'on peut distinguer les électeurs du PS: laïcs, réformistes et se plaçant clairement à gauche sur l'échelle gauche-droite.

L'électorat du PSI est plus âgé et plus urbain que la moyenne. Il n'apparaît pas marqué par les indicateurs de clivages de classe, à l'exception du revenu. Ce n'est pas un électorat de gauche classique, comme celui du Labour, ni un électorat social-démocrate comme ceux du SPD et de la SD. On dirait plutôt que le PSI obtient son appui dans les "classes passives" urbanisée et à faibles revenus (retraités,...). Ses électeurs se situent à gauche, mais sont réformistes. Ce qui les distingue surtout c'est leur degré de laïcité, très élevé. Le PSI est loin d'avoir un électorat "moderne", c'est-à-dire jeune, actif, intégrant de nouvelles couches de la société.

L'électorat du PASOK est surprenant dans le contexte des partis socialiste. Il se distingue très peu de la moyenne nationale, et lorsque c'est le cas, ces différences n'en font pas particulièrement un électorat de gauche au sens classique (sur représentation en milieu rural, faiblesse des clivages de classe). Du point de vue des attitudes, on doit souligner non seulement l'absence du clivage religieux, mais le fait que les électeurs du PASOK semblent légèrement plus croyants que la moyenne des électeurs. De plus, ils se situent au centre-gauche sur l'échelle et sont assez peu réformistes. Les données que nous avons utilisées ne nous permettent pas de l'affirmer sans nuances, mais il nous semble que l'électorat du PASOK serait plus "populiste" que de gauche.

Le profil des électeurs du PSOE est lui aussi très proche de la moyenne nationale. Sociologiquement, il se

distingue surtout par son caractère urbain. Il apparaît moins ouvrier que l'électorat du PS français et peu marqué par les indicateurs de clivage de classe en général. Du point de vue des attitudes, il est laïc, mais moins que celui du PSI et orienté à gauche, bien que les différences par rapport à la distribution nationale restent relativement modestes.

L'absence de force des indicateurs de clivages de classe ne permettent pas d'assimiler le PSOE à un parti ouvrier "classique" (Labour), ni même social-démocrate (SPD, SD). Il ne peut pas non plus être inclus dans la catégorie des partis "en transition" (PvdA), étant donné l'absence de force des clivages attitudeux.

A notre avis, il existe une relation entre les électorats des partis socialistes tels que nous venons de les décrire et la pratique gouvernementale de ces mêmes partis. Cette relation entre la politique électorale ("politics") et la politique gouvernementale ("policy") se pose en termes de "rémunération" de leur électorat par les partis au pouvoir. Lorsque l'électorat se caractérise par la prépondérance des clivages de classe, la "rémunération" et donc la politique gouvernementale est importante dans le domaine socio-économique (p.e. welfare), ce qui est le cas des partis sociaux-démocrates (SPD, SD) et du Labour. En revanche, lorsque l'électorat socialiste est marqué par des clivages attitudeux, la "rémunération" doit se faire dans des domaines chargés de contenu symbolique (p.e. relations avec l'Eglise, nationalisation d'entreprises, ...).

ANNEXE

Euro-Baromètre 20: travail sur le terrain

Pays	Institut	Terrain	Echantillon
UK	Social Surveys Gallup Poll	oct. 5-23	1.277
DE	EMNID	oct. 7-25	1.057
NL	NIPO	oct. 12-21	1.050
DK	Gallup	sept. 27-oct. 5	1.000
-			
FR	Institut de sondages Lavalley	oct. 7-nov. 4	1.000
IT	DOXA	oct. 10-30	1.033
GR	ICAP	oct. 1-21	1.000
ES	Emopublica	oct. 10-17	996

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Workshop: Socialist Governments in Southern Europe

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SOCIALISM IN TRANSITION

Contents:

- I. Introduction
- II. Origins and traditions: the socialism of backward Europe
- III. The socialists in the transition to democracy
- IV. The adventures of ideology
- V. Socialism in the world of corporate liberalism
- VI. Some concluding remarks

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## I. INTRODUCTION

More than any other political animals, socialists live by hope. Hope, however, mixed with a great deal of apprehension when socialist governments took office in Southern Europe not so long after the fall of dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Electoral outcomes later in France and Italy meant that, by 1983, the entire European Mediterranean region had come under either socialist-majority rule or under coalition governments headed by a socialist premier.

Through many successive failures and setbacks - ever since the great debacle of the First World War and the rise of Stalinism - socialists everywhere have grown wise to the complexities of history. As a result, especially in Western Europe, many have accepted the slow reformism of social democracy as the viable way of proceeding. Yet, for many radical, albeit essentially 'liberal' socialists, the social democratic path does not necessarily have to be the only possible alternative to the totalitarian brand of socialism advocated by the Marxist-Leninists. They have accordingly been in permanent search for a principled and democratic solution which should avoid, on the one hand, the barbarism of the police state and, on the other, the social democratic management of the capitalist order. It is for this reason that, within the sphere of democratic and pluralist socialism, two largely differing conceptions can be found, one cautiously meliorist and another far more radical, with revolutionary or quasi revolutionary implications. For a long time, only the first current has had any chance to gain lasting access to power, while the second has either remained the preserve of left-wing minorities within parties and movements or has been confined to parties permanently in opposition. This has led some observers to distinguish between 'government' socialism and 'opposition' socialism. They equate the former with slow

reformism and the latter with radicalism. The implication in this distinction is that, given the current constraints of the Western political and economic order, radicalism must be permanently condemned to play a merely oppositional role.<sup>(1)</sup> Mediterranean radical socialist parties, often banned in the past, and hardly ever in power, have thus been seen as endemically of the oppositional sort. Hence the mixture of hope and apprehension with which their peaceful and 'normal' advent to power was greeted by many principled socialists everywhere.

Reasons for scepticism at the hour of triumph were abundant: the entire Mediterranean region has a recent dictatorial past, often militaristic; all the countries concerned had suffered fascist or fascistisant regimes at one time or another; all of them possess powerful conservative social classes or groups apparently capable of stiff and efficient resistance to the implementation of structural changes; there is now an awareness among many of a possible close relationship between any form of institutionalized power (including socialist power) and conservatism; there are direct international pressures against radical 'experiments' that may smack of 'communism'; and last, but not least in that part of Europe, the failure of democratic, socialist radicalism (such as the overthrow of Salvador Allende's government in Chile in 1973) constitutes an important warning against extremism for socialist militants and voters.

In contrast with all this, the region has not been tainted with what are seen as the equivocations of the more Northern kind of socialism. The semi-peripheral position of Southern Europe in the context of the international division of labour, the sharpness of its class cleavages, and its long tradition of radicalism have seemed to give it a number of advantages and opportunities towards the end of the twentieth century which had been missed by socialists elsewhere. Likewise, the

much more fundamentalist electoral programmes of the Southern European socialists<sup>(2)</sup> showed that they were fully aware of the scope of their historical chances. Moreover, although international hostility to radicalism by the major Western powers had not vanished, at least it seemed to have diminished, partly by virtue of changes in the conditions of the Cold War. The abandonment by several Communist parties of a wholly subservient line to the Soviet Union (the rise of Eurocommunism) finally created a new climate, more propitious for a peaceful, and entirely democratic, change towards socialism. Moreover, the new electoral successes of the socialists were greeted with less alarm by the 'bourgeois' forces: the more adventurous among the conservatives in some quarters even spoke of giving the socialists a chance. And, in the eyes of many liberals in Southern Europe the socialists' access to power was not seen as a cataclysm: a change in attitude with hardly any precedents in the history of the region. These conditions, together with the inherited radicalism of the socialist movements of the area, seemed to promise the establishment of an interesting alternative to the North Western European pattern of socialist development.

This essay explores some aspects of the predicament and prospects of socialism in Southern Europe. At the time of writing the various socialist governments have not been in office long enough for anyone to pass a final judgement on the real chances of the socialist project in the Southern region. A discussion of the trends and forces at play may, however, be worthwhile. In order to engage in that discussion I shall begin with a brief consideration of the historical background of socialism in Mediterranean Europe and its vicissitudes and limitations within the political framework of their respective countries. It then examines the position and strategy of the socialist parties (and movements) across the several countries in the 1970s and 1980s in order to look

at the likely direction of their future conduct and to assess the chances of socialism in the region. In doing all this I assume that, despite substantial differences between countries, some significant comparisons are possible, and that so are certain cautious and restricted generalizations about several societies in Mediterranean Europe. (3)

Of all the countries concerned, France is the most highly integrated into the 'Northwestern European' complex and is, at any rate, the 'least Southern' of them all. Italy presents perhaps an intermediate case, closely followed by Spain. At the end of this very irregular spectrum (in terms of proximity and distance to some abstract note of 'advanced society') stand Greece and Portugal. In order to reduce the number of qualifications and to look for regularities I shall pay most attention to the latter three countries, refer to Italy less than it obviously deserves given its size and longer period of constitutional rule, and practically leave France aside, save for some necessary references to its salient role as a powerful influence in the region.

## II. ORIGINS AND TRADITIONS: THE SOCIALISM OF A BACKWARD EUROPE

Historically, the modern world largely originated in Southern Europe. Having fully shared in the first stages of its development, however, the countries of the Mediterranean began to decline. The era of early industrialization and high capitalism found them impoverished, weak and unprepared. Relative to the hub of modernization - Northwest and central Europe and North America - those countries were backward. They had slipped into the immediate periphery of the advanced

societies then in transformation and expansion. More correctly, their new position in the emerging world economic and political 'system' was to be, for a very long time, that of a semiperipheral area, with all the ambiguities and all the ambivalence thus created.

Throughout the Nineteenth century and for a great part of the Twentieth, Southern Europe was the prey of contradictions and frustrations. Largely agricultural and poor, some of its regions (Piedmont and Lombardy in Italy, Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain) witnessed remarkable industrial revolutions of their own. Despite its decline, at least one country, Portugal, continued to be the seat of a large overseas empire while another, Greece, belatedly entered the modern world by gaining its independence from an Oriental one. At one stage, some of these countries even managed to engage in colonial expansion (Italy, and to a lesser extent, Spain) whilst the would-be metropolis remained both economically, culturally and politically backward when compared with the continent and the civilization to which it belonged. The Southern European countries were backward and perhaps also underdeveloped in a sense that did not apply to any non-European society. For their backwardness was that of nations which were seen as having slipped behind in what was considered at the time to be the 'normal' course of development and progress for all civilized peoples. This was so both in the eyes of foreign observers and in those of indigenous progressive critics and ideologists. Backwardness is a neglected notion which should help explain much in the cultural and political orientations taken by reform and radicalism in the European semi-periphery (both South and East) during the early stages of capitalist and industrial expansion.

From its very inception, the history of socialism in Southern Europe was dominated by a lack of congruence between the structural backwardness

of the societies concerned and the advanced tenets of Socialist ideology, benefitting as it did from easy communication and proximity with the advanced European centres of the age. Thus Italian and Spanish socialists participated in the work of the First International and formed their respective 'regional sections'. In Portugal and Greece, however, they remained more marginal: it was a group of Spanish exiles, themselves part of a socialist backwater, who brought with them socialism to Lisbon in 1871. Meanwhile, until the formation of distinct 'socialist' parties, the anarchist, Bakuninist forces of the International were extremely influential in the ranks of the nascent movement. They were to remain powerful for a long time to come, especially in Spain. Southern European socialists, therefore, faced from the start the immensely difficult odds created by this incongruence between their own ideology and the actual state of their countries and cultures. Theirs was a doctrine (and a strategy) best suited for industrial and urban environments of which they were few and far between in their societies. Their own national bourgeoisies, who could have provided intellectual and political leaders amongst their disaffected members or, alternatively, might have accepted the socialists as a legally recognized oppositional force, were weak and relatively small. The exclusion of mass political participation was maintained for a much longer time in the Mediterranean countries than elsewhere in Europe. Such exclusion, in fact, extended to other groups and as a consequence, for a long time, socialists did not have a monopoly on radicalism. Other alternatives, such as anarchism, but also liberal, anticlerical and 'free-thinking' liberalism were as powerful in their opposition to the established order, and often more so than socialism itself.

All this was complicated further by the low organization density, politically speaking, of those countries. Their civil societies were weak, and thus unable

to counterbalance the resources and ambitions of army, church and state bureaucracy. This, together with a 'non-zero sum' conception of power made peaceful negotiations for the solution of national problems very hazardous indeed. Largely for this reason, trade unions and radical political parties and movements were far more mistrusted by the establishment forces in the South than anywhere else in the continent, save in Europe's other periphery, the East. In terms of official recognition and legalization, parties and unions lagged behind all other similar groups elsewhere in Europe. Repression of radicals and socialists became the normal stuff of politics. Revolt and a loss of faith in constitutionalism were the inevitable reactions from the excluded. However, efforts on the part of established political forces to break this mould of oppression and violence were made at a relatively early date. Thus, an explicit programme of legalization for socialists was significantly but unsuccessfully put forward by liberals in Spain as early as 1871, despite bitter opposition from the very militants in the International whom they were trying to help. These saw such legalization as a bourgeois plot, and some predicted that its ultimate price would be domestication. Deradicalization by incorporation was Giovanni Giolitti's explicit aim in his policies towards the Italian socialists. It was with a sense of achievement after a long and strenuous struggle that he announced to the Italian Parliament in 1911 that socialists had finally become acceptably moderate and that their mentor, Karl Marx, had finally been 'relegated to the attic'. (5)

Today, a century after these issues became clear, any general discussion about the realization of socialism still has to grapple with its oldest and most fundamental practical dilemma: whether to accept a measure of rejection from the legitimate political realm and therefore confront it as a revolutionary force or to enter the sphere of legality, and therefore also that of political

integration and social reform. Given the particular circumstances of the Mediterranean countries the dilemma has remained intensely alive in them, especially in the three countries whose periods of dictatorship and repression have lasted longest. But even in Italy, historians of socialism are quick to underline the similarities which exist between today's arguments and debates and those which took place at the onset of the socialist movement, practically a century earlier. (6) This, no doubt, reflects the permanence of old political problems and social conditions in the midst of change, but it must also be attributed to the confrontational nature of the inherited ideologies, for they have their built-in momentum. The political culture of the South still continues to make maximalism and radicalism a plausible proposition for many. Socialist parties, accordingly, are particularly busy in Southern Europe trying to explain to their constituencies how they are, at heart, as radical as anyone. There is not only a struggle for an ideological space no longer securely occupied by the communists, for these have in most parts lost their radicalism as well. It is, also, a new version of the old aim of all true radicals: pas d'ennemis à gauche.

Historically, in Great Britain, Scandinavia and the United States revolution was not so much defeated as ruled out. In Southern Europe it was either defeated through civil war, or smothered violently by dictatorship, or both. Paradoxically, if radicalism in that region still has deep roots it is because it was suppressed time and gain rather than being made unnecessary by a more tolerant polity. The history of that suppression does not need to be retold here. Suffice it to say that what could be termed the 'Giolittian' solution to the incorporation of the left into the legitimate political arena was tried in every country concerned but, in the long run, it met with ultimate defeat. In Portugal, the liberals and republicans themselves who spearheaded political change and on whose ultimate success the small socialist component depended for survival were

routed definitely in 1926; democracy then vanished from the country until 1974. In Greece, the vicissitudes of the also small socialist or left-wing camp were far more tortuous, and the relationship with the liberals more complex: it was the republican and hypothetically progressive element of the Greek bourgeoisie under Venizelos who carried out the task of political exclusion against them. Thus, the 'special law' (idionym) of 1929 made attempts to 'undermine the existing social order' illegal, i.e. it banned socialism, communism and free trade unionism from the realms of legitimate politics. The original Greek development of a 'parallel' constitution or set of general laws set alongside the more democratic constitution, and in direct contradiction with it, permitted conservative politicians to obtain results that, in other countries, required a fully fledged dictatorship. Yet, even this was not enough, and like in Spain, a large scale civil war (1947-1949) was necessary to suppress the enemies of 'the social order'. The difference of course, is that in Spain (1936-1939) the conflict had been led by fascists and reactionaries against a democratic republic, based on an uneasy coalition of socialist, republican and anarchist forces (and to a much lesser extent on communists and other groups). In both cases, however, warfare was the ultimate solution found against socialism. In Italy, a full civil war was not necessary, since the victory of fascism, largely organized as a weapon against the threat of left-wing revolution made that impossible. But it is difficult not to treat the fascist terror that, for instance, reigned through vast parts of the countryside in the early '20s or the fascist elimination of socialist and communist activity in the urban and industrial areas as a case of warfare. The chief difference between Italy and the other Mediterranean countries is that, through fascist defeat in the Second World War, and Allied intervention, the Italian socialists and communists found accommodation and later integration into liberal democracy at a much earlier date.

A shared past of repression, persecution and the corresponding maximalism that must be their consequence is not the only common element in the historical experience of Southern European socialists. More fundamentally, perhaps, is the fact that precisely through such processes the socialist camp everywhere split into a democratic socialist and a Marxist-Leninist, communist sector. The relative strength of each varied not only from country to country but also through time in each country. In all of them communism at one time or another was successful with its uncompromising attitude towards a 'bourgeois' order that had proven its incapacity to cope with fascism and dictatorship and had afforded no protection to socialists and radicals when the crunch had come. Socialist parties were reduced to significant minorities within the left (Italy) or to insignificant ones (Greece, Spain). In some countries (Portugal, Greece) socialists only re-grouped and actually founded their parties on the very eve of democratic change and in the most un auspicious circumstances. In Spain, the old and once powerful Socialist Workers' Party in exile never dissolved, but there were very long periods under the Franco dictatorship when it was non-existent for all practical purposes: it had become as weak and evanescent as that once vast organization of the working classes, the anarcho-syndicalist movement. Communists either drove out socialists from the ranks of the left, or confined them to small enclaves. The reasons for their success included unity of purpose, discipline and ideological commitment as well as effective support from the Soviet Union at crucial moments. Important among them was the earlier 'failure' of the democratic socialists to stem the fascist tide. A result of the communists' rise and near identification with the left was that for a long period they appeared to have taken over the revolutionary tradition of the South and presented themselves as the carriers of the political counterculture. Though communists had never monopolized the resistance and revolt against fascism, foreign occupation and repression (not even in Greece

during the civil war) they reaped the fruits of their combat at the forefront of those movements and exercised hegemony over the entire left. They benefitted from the fascination which emanates from the pure. Their political efficiency also swelled their ranks. They thrived above all because they were or had been best suited for the struggle against the sordid world of reactionary dictatorship.

### III. THE SOCIALISTS IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Fascism, dictatorship and war did not bring about a real solution of continuity in the evolution of the socialists' relationship to parliamentary democracy. Despite - and to a large extent also because - the rise of fascism the trend between the two world wars had been towards the consolidation of the Giolittian formula, that is, towards full participation in the pluralist polity. For the left, the hopes aroused by popular front victories seemed to prove that a peaceful and electoral path towards socialism was possible, even if that was not exactly what the conservative parties in the Giolittian tradition had in mind by inviting socialist integration into the legitimate political order. After 1945, general strikes and popular fronts were ruled out by the left, and active, unreserved participation became an essential part of the renewed socialist faith.

In principle, such will to participate and to accept the rules of the government-opposition system was not supposed to drive out the essential radicalism of socialism. For that reason some important practical problems became immediately apparent. Thus, when early participation of communists in certain post-war governments ceased, the socialists in the only Mediterranean countries enjoying a fully constitutional government, France and Italy, were left to maintain their revolutionary aims and to uphold pluralism. Once

again the radicalism of the South made a successful strategy very difficult. While, for instance, the German socialists - out of power for the first two decades following the war - steadily veered toward the explicit rejection of radicalism and Marxism which finally took place at the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, the Southern European parties could not easily risk such official transformation. When a sector of the Italian party attempted it that party simply split it into two smaller ones: Saragat's moderate Social Democrats and Nenni's Socialists, who refused to isolate the communists, and therefore isolated themselves. The French, for their part, engaged in a curious and ultimately suicidal exercise in political schizophrenia: while their party, the SFIO, regularly participated in government until the Fourth Republic's demise in 1959, they steadfastly stuck to their quasi-marxist ideology and phraseology. It lost ground regularly until it collapsed in the '60s, for in the process the SFIO had become the hostage of a narrow electoral base, largely made up of people suffering from the effects of economic modernization, such as workers in declining industries or small farmers threatened by large, modern agriculture. It was thus that the heirs of Léon Blum, the old enemies of 'participation' into bourgeois government, faithfully continued to proclaim their enmity to a social order they nevertheless actively upheld by behaving as good conservatives would. Whether in government or out of it - as in Italy, where the Christian Democrats were to rule unmolested and indefinitely - the question of radicalism and the support of pluralism for socialists was not wholly resolved under liberal democracy, for neither the political culture nor the class structures of the region permitted substantial advances in ideological deradicalization. Socialists were forced on the 'principled' path from both their flanks; on the one hand, the communists imposed a 'lifter than thou' attitude on any other left-wing groups and, on the other, old fashioned reactionary forces were still strong enough to kindle, as ever, the fires of traditional radicalism.

In the decades after the war, the situation under the dictatorships of Spain and Portugal or under the 'guided democracy' (alternating with dictatorship) of Greece was quite different from that of Italy. In those countries the destruction of socialism had been an essential part of the several regimes' repression of democracy in general and of the left in particular. Their assimilation of socialism to communism was often very successful both in creating confusion and in making many believe that any opposition to tyranny must be communist inspired. Meanwhile, the understandable hopes harboured by socialists that an Allied victory against fascism would also bring with it the restoration of democracy in their countries never materialized. Even worse, with the onset of the Cold War they had to witness how Western democracies, and especially the United States, provided economic, military, political and moral support to the dictatorial governments that persecuted them. Bitterness towards the 'West' and towards the systematic inclusion of their countries into the so-called 'free world' by Western ideologists generated a serious disappointment with liberal democracy. It played at the time a decisive role in the political migration of socialists and potential socialists towards communism. It is all the more surprising therefore, that, from the late 1960s onwards, democratic socialists in all those countries were able to recover from the effects of this extremely unfavourable and adverse situation and began to gather strength again. So much so that in the following decade they were able to become a substantial component in their respective countries' passage to democracy. This, in turn, opened the way for their full passage to participation in government. Besides, socialist parties in Greece, Spain and Portugal were to play a strikingly similar role in the consolidation of democracy after dictatorship as well as in the necessary tasks of political modernization. There were some significant similarities, too, though far less pronounced ones, in their respective roles during the crucial political

transition period in each country. Yet, the political vicissitudes differed considerably in each case. Let us look very briefly at each national development, as seen from the standpoint of the socialists' role during each transition.

### Greece

The fall of Greece's last dictatorship (1967-1974) was due as much to the junta's political blunders as to the rapidly deteriorating internal situation in the country itself. From the time of the students' revolt of 1973 and its brutal suppression the regime had been rapidly heading for a final crisis. After an abortive naval mutiny against the government, the junta, instead of seeking an internal solution to its problems, disastrously attempted to find it outside, by intervening in Cyprus. In the end it was brought down by its own pathetic incompetence, though the influence of the courageous democratic movement in weakening the junta's hold on the country cannot be minimized. (7) It was then that the moderate statesman Constantine Karamanlis was summoned from exile to oversee the peaceful re-establishment of democracy.

Greek socialists began to regroup and find their own bearings only when the years of total polarization were over, when all serious opposition to the ruling reactionary forces ceased to be either identified with communists or really controlled by them. The progressive radicalization of important sectors of the Centre Union Party in the pre-dictatorship years was a clear precedent of the formation of a powerful democratic socialist movement, though of course, the roots of socialism in the country are much older. (Foundation of the Socialist and Labour Party of Greece, SEKE, 1918). The communists had begun to lose much of the charisma they had once possessed. (After the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia they split, in 1968, into an 'Eurocommunist'

branch (KKE, Interior) and the traditional Party, or pro-Moscow KKE. The latter continued to be impervious to the criticisms against Soviet imperialism and Stalinism which had begun to be heard even in countries where reactionary dictatorship had often succeeded in making them almost irrelevant.) By emerging as a very fundamentalist force the several socialist groupings now organized under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, which had been newly founded in 1974 and was charismatically led by Andreas Papandreu, managed to present themselves as the chief left-wing alternative to the conservative constitutionalist party set up by Karamanlis under the name of New Democracy. This they did despite the final legalization of the communists. Their intransigence and purism as leftists - opposition to NATO and the EEC, their view of Greece as a third world country - was possible in the aftermath of the junta's downfall largely because PASOK, as such, had not played a role in the restoration of democracy. Founded hardly one month after the event, PASOK remained 'outside' the restoring groups, though it was firmly 'inside' the new sphere of legitimacy. Insofar as it encompassed a number of groups - chiefly the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, PAK, formed by Andreas Papandreu in 1968 - which had suffered persecution and had most vigorously opposed tyranny, PASOK amalgamated the most serious grudges against the fallen regime as well as against its friends abroad. Hence its simultaneous espousal of socialism and traditional xenophobic feelings, centering this time upon the CIA, Dr. Kissinger, Turkey and other apparent sources of Greece's ills. PASOK's new role then quickly became that of protagonist of the opposition in the newly established 'government-opposition' dichotomy which is essential to the Western form of democracy. It itself endorsed that liberal system despite the presence in its ranks of a number of then still unpurged 'non-pluralist' dissenters.<sup>(8)</sup> The reappearance in this new guise of the old ambivalence between socialist fundamentalism and pluralism forced PASOK to limit its initial demands to the abolition of the monarchy and the

punishment of the leaders of the dictatorship, including the trial of their collaborators and torturers. In this sense the party, despite its extremism, played a key role in the earliest stage of democratic consolidation. Its extremism appeared to threaten stability, but the non-communist, democratic credentials of its members and the keenness of its followers in strengthening the liberal democratic process became a guarantee as to its ultimate political intentions.

### Portugal

The Portuguese Socialist Party was founded in exile by a small group of people one year before the military coup overthrew the dictatorial regime which bears Salazar's name. Just over one year after its foundation its General Secretary, Mário Soares, joined the first provisional government; while the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 itself was largely shaped by the socialists, and so was its revision later.<sup>(9)</sup> Its influence upon the immediate events in the aftermath of the military coup in Portugal was much greater, therefore, than that of PASOK in Greece. Yet, in both countries, the formation of the party coincided with the final crisis of dictatorship, and in both countries small beginnings were followed by spectacular expansion and access to power, though in Portugal this occurred at the earliest possible stage in the process of transition to democracy. Radicalism, likewise, was the hallmark and common denominator of both socialist parties.

Of all transitions to liberal democracy in the South, the Portuguese one was by far the most 'disorderly' and turbulent one. Initiated by an unknown group of officers dissatisfied with the turn taken by Portugal's colonial wars, without any idea or strategy for government<sup>(10)</sup> it unleashed a period of imbalances and a zigzagging search for a stable political formula. Despite

the early appointment of a highly conservative general as head of state - General Spínola - the legitimation of the new political order was bound to be on a left-wing basis, given the fact that it was of the essence to deny anything Salazarism had stood for. It is impossible to produce even the most fleeting account of events in Portugal in the three years following the April 1974 coup.<sup>(11)</sup> Suffice it to remember that, once the communists were defeated in their attempt to create a state along the marxist-leninist lines, the attainment of socialism (enthroned in the Constitution) was postulated through pluralism.

Why did events take that turn? Why was the originally very small and organizationally unprepared PSP thrust into a position of power? Very schematically put, it would appear that Portugal's dependent position within the economic and political order of the West precluded state socialism. Clear statements to that effect were made by leaders of NATO countries at crucial points in the 'revolutionary' process. Internally, even the restricted, though significant, measure of revolutionary change implemented by organizations or by spontaneous movements began to encounter a very stiff resistance - especially during the so-called 'hot summer' of 1975 - in several parts of the country. Localized violence and widespread hostility was not only directed against the P.C.P. but extended also to the Armed Forces Movements (MFA). This warned the government that, should drastic reforms be pressed any further, civil strife could easily degenerate into a much graver form of conflict. Soon the brakes were applied upon the revolutionary process with the de facto victory of the moderate branch of the Armed Forces Movement. (Their plans had already been put forward in the midst of the critical summer of 1975, in the Document of the Nine ). The way was thus opened for the democratic socialist control of the government. The Document of the Nine advocated a form of pluralist socialism. (The fact the pluralist socialism may, in

turn, be open to the penetration of other, non socialist forces was, then, another matter, but one of a crucial importance at a later stage). Once the MFA moderates had won the day, and the PCP lost its chances, power could only revert to a party possessing both the aims that were congruent with those of the Constituion (socialism) and a genuine affinity with pluralism.

When the Socialist government of Mário Soares was sworn in in July 1976 it became clear that political stabilization had begun, though it also became evident that any immediate advances towards the publicly defined national goal of socialism were going to become very problematic indeed. Under liberal democracy the inflationary policies of democratic socialism and its redistribut-ional efforts are often electorally very costly. This could be seen with the rise in popularity of the parties of the centre and centre-right in Portugal (many of whose liberal technocrats had participated in the dictatorship's later administration) not to speak of the constraints put on the economy and the governments' fiscal and other policies by international bodies such as the IMF. After the early nationalization of the banks, a partial (though immensely significant) agrarian reform<sup>(12)</sup> and other similar measures it became apparent that the socialist aspects of Portugal's constitution were simply not being implemented. The defeat of the socialists at the hands of the Conservative Democratic Alliance at the end of 1979 put them out of the misery of having to rule in a manner quite contrary to their stated ideology. However, by then, incipient deradicalization of the party had already set in, and a more pragmatic attitude had developed.

In terms of the creation of a liberal democracy in Portugal the Socialists' achievement was considerable. They consolidated a party in the midst of an almost complete political void, where only the pre-existing Communist clandestine

organizations were minimally organized. They managed to govern despite the permanent confrontational opposition of the communist dominated trade-union Intersindical, and to start a trade-union movement of their own. Their campaign against the official military tutelage of the polity bore results when, in 1983, it was formally abolished. Income redistribution (in the years between the coup and the beginning of austerity measures in 1977) and the pluralistic institutionalization of political conflict were also, very largely, a socialist achievement in Portugal.

### Spain

The collapse of dictatorship in Spain was due, to a very large extent, to the combined onslaught of the democratic forces upon the regime.<sup>(13)</sup> Therefore, when crucial steps were taken by the first transitional government headed by Adolfo Suárez to legalize the opposition forces these did not have to form as hurriedly as they had done in Portugal two years earlier. The dictatorship had lasted in Spain much longer than in Greece, but there was a similarity between the two countries in that experienced politicians were at hand and in that there was much less of a void in the political texture of society. The situation in Spain differed vastly from the other two countries on every other count: the volume of its population, its ethnic and linguistic make-up, its weight as an industrial power, its territory and other characteristics.

As it was pointed out earlier, Spain had gone through a period of political void, especially during the first two decades after 1939, when the democratic forces had been physically exterminated, imprisoned, or driven out of the country. Two of the greatest casualties of the civil war and the repression that followed it were the vast anarcho-syndicalist movement and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) together with its powerful trade

union movement the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores). The anarchists never fully recovered after the restoration of democracy in 1976. The socialists for their part had nearly ceased to exist for a long time as an organized force, save for the PSOE party in exile. However, despite continued repression socialist groups developed under Francoism and fought against it. Some of them became well-defined political parties alongside the PSOE itself, - notably the Socialist Movement of Catalonia and, later, the Popular Socialist Party. A complicated process of convergence led them to merge with the PSOE during the last years of the regime and the early stages of democracy. (14) The old, but now considerably rejuvenated PSOE (its foundation goes back to 1879, its roots are even older) became practically the sole force within democratic socialism. The first years of the constitutional, liberal monarchy established after 1976 (though the Constitution itself was promulgated in 1978) saw the steady rise of the PSOE as a vast, powerful opposition party. There was a corresponding decline of small left-wing, revolutionary parties. Only the minority Andalusian Socialist Party held its own for a while. As for the Communists, their evolution into moderate Eurocommunist Party seemed to transform them into yet another small social-democratic party, though the strength of the traditional Leninist factions within it belied this perception.

In Greece PASOK had provided the role of left-wing opposition once the political transition had got under way. In Portugal, the MFA had turned to the PSP - among other left wing forces - for the formation of a government under its aegis. In Spain, by contrast, the PSOE had been consulted from the start and taken on board the transition operation so that it could be successfully carried out. Its cooperation, as indeed that of the communists (CPE), was vital for the success of the transition; it legitimated it, it made it possible. The

role of left-wing opposition (jointly at first with the PCE and other smaller groups) also befell the PSOE at the beginning, especially as, in stark opposition to Portugal though in a manner not altogether different from that of Greece, the first democratic government had to be moderate and right-of-centre if the armed forces and the most conservative elements of the dismantled regime were to tolerate liberal democracy. The acceptance by socialists of this political system meant their immediate exclusion from power through the possibility of a socialist government in Spain was opened even by a constitutional and electoral system designed to favour, in principle, conservative forces.

From the very beginning of the transition, the Spanish socialists took on a crucial role in a sequence of extra-parliamentary bargains and general compromises with the established powers. The tone had been set by their early cooperation with the King and the transition government of Adolfo Suárez. This was followed by a 'social compact' (Moncloa Agreements of 1978) about wage claims and labour peace and, later, by a deal for the control of regional devolution after the failed coup of February 1981. This sequence proved the socialists' capacity for a 'responsible' conduct of public affairs, sustained by the statesmanlike style of their leaders, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra. Fortunately for them, it did not create major problems for their failure to follow a socialist line. The widespread popular feeling was that socialism was simply not possible in the country at least for as long as the Army and other ultraconservative de facto powers were there to impose their veto. In Spain, the downfall of dictatorship had brought popular joy but in no case did it generate a stage of intense euphoria linked to revolutionary promises. Therefore, the absence of immediate programmes for revolutionary change was not a shock. Very widespread popular awareness of the constraints of the political situation led to a rapid decline of the smaller radical

parties although the realization that those constraints could smother some of the radical hopes of many democrats gave rise to much political desencanto, or disenchantment leading to apathy. This seemed to recede later, when a socialist victory appeared possible in 1982. In fact, such victory, when it came, was hailed by the socialists as the end of desencanto itself. Other observers were not so sure.

#### IV. THE ADVENTURES OF IDEOLOGY

For a long time the left in Europe's South agreed with liberal radicalism on several issues which they both perceived as central concerns: the importance of the clerical-secular divide, the dead weight of the ultra-conservative, landowning classes, the imperialism, obscurantism and inefficiency of public education. Moreover, socialists were increasingly recruited from the ranks of radical liberalism as if by dint of a certain evolutionary logic.<sup>(15)</sup> And, under stress, both facets of radicalism stood side by side on the same camp in that specifically 'Latin' European split between conservatives and progressives, thereby reinforcing a belief in the existence of 'two' Italies, Spains and Frances. The situation was endemic. Far-reaching national crises exposed the depth and the irreconcilable hostility which existed between the two nations dwelling upon each country. The struggle between the state and the Vatican in Italy was intimately related to this phenomenon; so were the Dreyfus Affair in France and the Civil War in Spain.

The conflict was first and foremost one of legitimation. It is still partially unresolved. It has lost virulence, however, through the intervention of external cultural forces. Thus contemporary religious indifference has

proven to be a much greater solvent of churchly power than the widespread clericalism of yesteryear. There has also been a clear shift of the fulcrum of secular radicalism towards the left. At one time the militant secularist counterculture common to all radicals seemed to find a new home in socialism and, even more clearly, in communism. That this was not a permanent and uncomplicated change was soon shown by the rise of Christian Marxism (often pro-communist) after the Second World War, as well as by the continued vigour of lay and liberal parties (such as the Italian Republicans) in the 1970's and 80's. Moreover, recent ecologist, pacifist, feminist and other similar movements have become integrated into the more libertarian wing of the secular counterculture, as a minimal acquaintance with the Italian Radical Party shows. For its part, the slow and not always easy reception and assimilation of these new critical trends by the more established political forces of the traditional left may reveal the existence of a grave case of cultural indigence ('Green' parties, for instance, arise outside socialist ones). Could it be that mainstream socialism has become merely reactive? That it no longer initiates and innovates? (16)

Naturally enough orthodox Marxists in Southern Europe (as do their counterparts in North America) attribute the weaknesses of the political culture of the left to the poverty of the Marxist tradition in the region. Portugal, Spain and Greece have next to nothing in the way of a Marxist theoretical tradition, though the scope and originality of Spanish anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism and contemporary cooperativism can be overlooked only at the risk of perilous bias. By contrast, despite understandable local complaints about the paucity of Italy's Marxist theoretical tradition, its contribution is rather substantial. In practical terms, the question for the entire region is whether Marxism arrived too late to really sink deep roots in the left. It is a question that cannot be reduced to cultural

'backwardness'. It must rather be seen in the context of the early competing ideologies: syndicalism - whether of the anarchist or of the Sorelian kind - and the widespread ouvrierisme of certain countries, such as France). These issues are no doubt somewhat marginal to the main thread of my argument and therefore cannot be explored here, but they must be kept in mind in so far as the rise of new forms of radicalism - coinciding with the incipient development of a so-called 'consumer' economy in the '60s - represented a challenge to the political formulas and strategies put forward by the 'official' left on the basis of its received and often highly derivative Marxist wisdom. (17)

From the early '60s onwards the theoretically more unsophisticated movements and parties (illegal or otherwise) of Spain, Greece and Portugal began to acquaint themselves with Marxism. Simultaneously the democratic opposition to dictatorship underwent considerable marxistization. This ideological current was more superficial than it appeared at first sight but in some quarters - such as the rebellious university student body - Marxism became a nearly universal, albeit thin, subculture. It provided a certain coalescence to the democratic movement and caused a profound unease in the ruling circles of the several regimes as well as among the traditional and professional middle classes. By contrast, in the day-to-day struggles of the workers' movement revolutionary Marxism was not always considered immediately relevant - 'conditions were not rife' - save as a means for collective identification. For some, however, it provided a rallying focus for revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary action. It is perhaps here that one must look for the roots of the more recent contemporary militant radicalism in Mediterranean Europe. The tendency is to see the circumscribed revolutionary efforts of the time as mere adventures - usually preceded by the adjective 'petty bourgeois' in certain literature. In some cases they seem to have been

precisely that. The hi-jack of the Portuguese liner, the Santa Maria, in 1961, was certainly an adventure, though the world-wide publicity it caused against Salazarism was not negligible. But the development of the National Liberation Front (FLP) in Spain cannot be dismissed as cavalierly as it sometimes is. The FLP was romantic. In its fascination for a Cuban and 'Guevarist' solution against Francoism it appeared far-fetched in a country that was on the threshold of full industrialism and economic expansion. Yet though it never formed a successful guerrilla (urban or otherwise), conceptions similar to those of the FLP founders, when in contact with the electrifying force of ethnic nationalism, produced unexpected violent results among Basque independentists. Inevitably, the most extreme conceptions of radicalism were bound to have to come to grips with the question of insurrection. They either recommended it (Red Brigades and Prima Linea in Italy, revolutionary groups in 1975 in Portugal), or provided a wider justification for it through a conception of the advanced capitalist state which entirely rejected its legality and jurisdiction. Professor Toni Negri's work exemplifies this latter position best. And Negri's peculiar relationship with the Radical Party in the 1980's underlines the continued vitality of maximalism in his country.

One of the chief conceptions of socialist radicalism in the South has been, for a period, its tiermondisme, or 'thirdworldism'. Once again, this attitude already appeared far-fetched to many at the time, and yet tiermondisme was destined to play a significant role in the evolution of Southern European socialism. The semiperipheral position of a great part of the region lent much creditability to the notion, especially in the two most dependent economies, Greece and Portugal, and for similar reasons in Andalusia. In the first country the MFA, partly through its confrontation with anticolonialism in Africa presented itself as a 'liberation movement'. An important sector

within the ruling army group led by Melo Antunes convincingly promoted a Third World model interpretation of Portugal, with the implication that a single party system along progressive lines should really be implanted rather than the liberal democratic solution that was to succeed in the end.<sup>(18)</sup> That tiermondisme, however, does not have to be necessarily linked to political monolithism appears quite clearly in the case of PASOK, for whom the conception was essential throughout its early stages; it is still important as part of the Greek party's phraseology and as a means for distancing Greece from joint EEC policies among member governments. The same could be said of the Andalusian Socialist Party, posing for a while a significant threat to the hegemonic PSOE in its region, and even beyond its pale among the many Andalusian immigrant voters of Catalonia.

Alongside or outside the mainstream, bicephalous socialist-communist left, Southern European radicalism therefore continues to produce a permanent challenge. This challenge forces upon that mainstream left a constant redefinition of its situation. It has been said that nearly all political movements and parties in the region define themselves in relation to the communist parties. This is, of course, largely true, even in those countries, such as Spain, where for the moment at least the communists have been routed (save in the trade union field) or others such as Portugal, where it has been contained, partly because its Stalinist stance has forced it into a political cocoon of its own making. But this is simplistic. In the South the constant flow of genuine radicalism, i.e. of a true challenge against the established social order, is also an essential force in the definition of a party (or of a movement's) locus and strategy in the political arena. It is also in its relationship to that force that the mainstream left must be understood.

## V. SOCIALISM IN THE WORLD OF CORPORATE LIBERALISM

One thing must be carefully avoided in any serious discussion of the avatars of socialism during the democratic transition and consolidation in Southern Europe: the common analysis of parties and party systems, at least at the present stage of comparative research. We saw that, despite salient differences, some shared features were distinguishable in the role played by the socialists in the diverse political transitions. They were to be found essentially in their contribution to the establishment of a pluralist polity. Yet similarities do not extend to the socialists' concrete performances, ideologies and strategies in each of the newly created democracies. As for the communists, divergencies in their policies and behaviour were acute from the start. In Portugal they opposed the success of pluralism as a matter of course, even joining for a brief but crucial moment with the ultra-leftists in the United Revolutionary Front of 1975. (It was from the military and civilian ranks of ultra-leftism that an attempted coup was prepared soon after). In Spain, by contrast, communists were decisively instrumental in making pluralism possible. Of course, such had already been the case in Italy several decades earlier with Togliatti's 1943 svolta di Salerno. Though marxism-leninism remained the official party line, the CPI had set the scene for the constitutionalist role of most communist parties in the South. The spread of Eurocommunism many years later was in part a logical development of that initial decision. By contrast, the recovery and subsequent rise of the pro-Moscow Communist Party in Greece after the restoration of democracy in 1974 (and the corresponding rapid decline to the Eurocommunist KKE of the Interior) has a greater affinity with Cunhal's policy in Portugal than with anything else in the two larger states of the region. As for socialism, discontinuities and common traits do not seem to follow any distinguishable patterns either: thus both Greece and Spain in

power of traditional corporations (such as the Church, or interventionist armies) and more influenced by the forces of the equally traditional networks of clientelism, as well as fraternity-like criteria for solidarity and resource allocation. However, the trends towards further corporateness and bureaucratization in the Mediterranean are important enough to warrant privileged attention to any consideration of its socialism. Two examples must suffice; by its very nature democratic socialism has a very intimate affinity with the development of the welfare state, and the welfare state itself has become the political framework of 'pluralistic' corporatism; likewise, socialist parties have an equally intimate, though ambivalent relationship with the trade unions: their de facto power as negotiators and compromisers in the struggle for the distribution of income among salaried employees under advanced capitalism is another essential component of Western 'corporatism'. (21)

Other perhaps even more important changes, could be mentioned, though unfortunately not discussed within the limited bounds of this essay. Apart from certain cultural transformations already signalled, the most important, obviously, are the vast transformations which occurred in the demographic, urban, transport and class structures of the South. Since, a 'sociology of socialism' in terms of correlations with these variables cannot be even sketched here (22) we must be content with invoking the overriding importance of these changes for any further considerations of the implications of socialism in power. To sum up, the socialist parties have come to power in the Mediterranean region in a situation which at least includes four different levels of structuration in the realm of interest politics:

- (a) A parliamentary political sphere incorporating a multi-party system, which reflects the prevailing patterns of social inequality and class cleavages, and which is not altogether dissimilar to that found elsewhere in Western Europe.
  
- (b) A neocorporatist structure also reflecting developments elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world, where interest representation of trade unions, employers' organizations and state and para-state institutions play an important role in determining the nature of political reality and the distribution of power and influence throughout society.
  
- (c) Traditional legitimation cleavages such as religion/secularism; traditionalism/radicalism, etc. which are far more specific to the region.
  
- (d) Clientelistic and personalistic power networks; regionalistic and ethnic nationalistic entities, and other forms of political structuration which are, again, quite specific to the Mediterranean region.

It is within this frame of reference that we can consider once again, each of the national cases separately. Having already looked at the role of the socialists in the transition, I shall now review very briefly in the new political environment of the relatively 'corporatist' liberal democracy of today.

### Portugal

Participation in provisional governments during the revolutionary period and two years in office as an elected party (1976-1978) culminated with a grave crisis of confidence on the part of the electorate. (Debacles in trade union (1977) and local government (1978) elections). This might have been related to Soares' willingness, in his extreme pragmatism and refusal to strike any alliance with the communists, to form coalitions with the right when faced with ministerial defections from his own ranks. Nevertheless, a remarkable recovery ensued. By 25 April 1983 the PSP again became the predominant party in the country, with 36% of the votes cast, and 101 deputies in the Assembly. That allowed it to lead a coalition government in conjunction with the social-democrats, (Mota Pinto's party, with 70 deputies). The opposition was made up, basically, of Alvaro Cunhal's 44 communist deputies and another 30 on the right.

In order to form this coalition the Portuguese socialists had to abandon the marxist, collectivist and - to a lesser extent étatist - leanings that characterized an important section of their party. Its left had always been weak (despite momentary appearances) but it now became weaker still. Though Soares can be said to be a monetarist only malgré lui, his government has been forced to apply the most drastic austerity programme to be implemented by any Western socialist leader, practically in the very style which has become the hallmark of the Thatcher government in Britain. The difference with Portugal is that in its case conditions were imposed by the IMF in May and June 1983 so that the government could obtain desperately needed loans. Lisbon thus embarked in a series of brutal public expenditure cuts which soon became felt in a country whose standard of living was the lowest in Western Europe, and which had at least 400.000 unemployed in a population of only 9 million people by 1983. (A figure of 700.000 unemployed in the near future has been given as a real possibility by sympathetic observers, given the austerity measures undertaken).

The options of the "central bloc" (PSP-PSD) which now rules Portugal appear to lie strictly in the area of further modernization, as the prime minister himself has repeatedly stated. According to Soares, socialism can and must be reached through social reform and not through public appropriation of the means of production (23). In his opinion, however, further reforms cannot be wholly initiated until at least 1985, assuming that the financial bankruptcy of the country is overcome by that date. Meanwhile the country is landed with such white elephants as the massive industrial plant complex at Sines in the Alentejo (built before the democratic coup) and for which the government would like to attract foreign investment. Yet this has not been forthcoming in part due to the stringent labour laws introduced in the heat of revolutionary zeal, which restrict the right to hire and fire. The socialist-social-democratic government is now pledged to revise these laws, roughly in the same manner vainly attempted by the last conservative administration during its four years in office up to April, 1983 (24).

Modernization as a program (instead of socialization) cannot entirely be seen as a volte face in Portugal. From the start the first priority of the party was to take radical measures in the direction of the first rather than the second process. Decolonization, basic social reforms, consolidation of pluralist democracy (in tune with the guidelines of the Socialist International) and a firm refusal of a permanent role for the MFA as military overseers of the polity were its first achievements (25). They set the tune for things to come. The further demilitarization of the Portuguese state continues. The formal dissolution of the M.F.A. 'revolutionary council' can be seen in that context. Another step would be General Eanes' removal from his post as President by a future victory of Mário Soares himself at the next presidential elections. Should this event take place, it would go beyond the merely anecdotal significance some attach to the profound hostility which exists between the two men. From the standpoint of the political order the 'civilianization' of the state means that Portugal is converging still further towards the structure of the other Western liberal democracies. Until recently Portugal was the only country where the military

surveillance of the state and the Constitution was institutionalized. Only the 'progressive' nature of that surveillance blurred its long run implications or made it easily forgivable in the eyes of many democratic observers both at home and abroad. Yet the presence of this specific element of Mediterranean corporatism - the military as a relatively autonomous body within the state and therefore freely intervening in the affairs of civil society - has still not been entirely removed in Portugal.

The tasks of internal consolidation of the PSP are as daunting as those of carrying out vast reform policies in a very difficult economic environment. Though electoral success revamped party inscriptions spectacularly in 1983, real party structure and democratic procedures still left much to be desired according to its own supporters. Personalistic struggles, rather than those based upon issues and policies still predominated. The improvisations of sudden and largely unexpected political offices may be more to blame for this than the texture of Portuguese social life. One single example will suffice. The socialist trade union organization, the UGT (General Workers' Union) was founded only at the end of 1978. (Its relationship to the party is not unlike the Spanish UGT's relationship to the PSOE). Until that year the Communist controlled Intersindical was the only major labour union in the country. Its strength remained undiminished after that date, though it must now share its influence with a growing UGT.

#### Greece

Of all parties PASOK is the one that least fits a possible general Mediterranean 'model'. During its first two years in power it was also the party that behaved least in the 'non-socialist' way, perhaps with the exception of the Portuguese socialists during the tumultuous 'revolutionary' phase of the political transition.

Both populism and charismatic leadership are more decisive in the life and fortunes of PASOK than in any other party. So much so that even sympathetic critics think that the leaders' disappearance could bring with it the party's

breakdown (Andreas Papandreou is in fact addressed as the Leader, o Proedros, by his followers). Critics also point out that democracy is scant within PASOK's ranks due to an extraordinary accumulation of power at the summit: democratic procedures apply to the grassroots but not to the hierarchy itself. Neither the current Executive Bureau nor the Central Committee were elected by a Party Congress. They were appointed at a special conference set up to prepare the party organization. (The members of the party's Executive Bureau are now, in fact, the government). PASOK's parliamentary representation includes many moderate or once conservative members of the old Centre Party, whose leader had been Papandreou's father, and in which his son led its important radical faction. For their part, the party's marxists have been confined to activism and local political work. They appear to show an increasing tendency towards aimless verbalization as they see the once official policies of their party being undermined or forgotten and its positions of responsibility filled by 'technocrats' who are recent converts to socialism and whose background often includes long periods in the United States in academic or other professional capacities. Meanwhile, tendencies towards political clientelism have already been detected by the very same observers who once emphasized the modern 'mass' nature of this party, and who announced its arrival on the scene as that of the first non-clientelistic political organization in Greek history. Whether clientelism, if it eventually takes root, should be traced back to the effects of the manifest populism of PASOK or to the stubborn cultural patterns of the country (or to both) is too early to say.

The weaknesses of the Party's base in controlling its executive group (let alone its undisputed leader and chief ideologist) may account for the leadership's greater independence in making decisions and changing course. Lack of democratic control has allowed the leadership to remain aloof from pressures from below which would steer it towards the kind of moderation shown by the other ruling parties on the other two Mediterranean peninsulas. (PASOK's heterogenous electoral base includes several potentially moderate elements). PASOK has thus followed a course only paralleled by the French socialist party in its affinity

with fundamentalism, though obviously not for the same reasons. (And not on all issues, most notoriously on defence matters, where Mitterrand has opted for active Atlantism and nuclear rearmament, whereas Papandreou has put forward the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone). Yet, a scaling down of the original radical aims can already be perceived. Thus the 1983 Law for the Socialization of Public Enterprises made strikes very difficult in that sector. (Strikes must now be voted upon and 51% of the votes cast must be in favour for a strike to be declared official.) This has been interpreted as a measure against communists and other activists but it also puts a brake on the freedom to strike most unambiguously, under the well-rehearsed pretext that by striking against publicly-owned enterprises the employees first and foremost harm themselves. Apart from widespread protests, even sympathisers of PASOK are not sure about this Law's constitutionality. In another field, the government's efforts to create a really 'socialist sector' of the economy has been sluggish: in the absence of the necessary investments (capital is simply not available) the so called self-managed enterprises occupy a small and marginal place in the economy. Such enterprises are not only not expanding, but may be about to close. (26)

PASOK and Andreas Papandreou interpreted their own electoral slogan, allagi (change) as a promise of institutional modernization opening the way to a transition to socialism. Be that as it may the immediate aim has been the reorganization of the state, the administration and the laws: regionalization has been attempted in one of Europe's most centralized states; public health and medical services are to be improved; the educational and university system is to be reformed; divorce procedures have been eased and antiquated dowries abolished. One of the most outstanding and delicate operations has been (and still is) that of the modernization of the army. Efforts have been made to 'nationalize' it entirely, in a country where it had been notoriously prone to external influences and even infiltration by foreign powers, so much so that Greece had practically become a British and, later, an American satellite.

In January 1984, Greek women were finally guaranteed equal pay for equal work by a law intended to bring the country into line with the European Community in this important matter.

Paradoxically, the policy of military 'nationalization', together with the pursuit of a substantial degree of independence in foreign policy has meant that Greece under PASOK spends 7% of its GNP on defence, a higher figure than that of any other European country. This is, in turn, linked to the independent stance taken by Greece vis à vis the joint decisions which EEC and NATO member states are supposed to make. Naturally, supporters of the government tend to see such independence as part of its socialist policies, while socialists in other Mediterranean countries often fail to see the connection between the two.

Greece's drive towards socialism through reform is exceptional in that it is based on an explicit recognition of the backwardness of the country's social structure. Thus the political targets singled out by PASOK's leader smack of the traditional imagery of radical socialism. Well into his third year of office, Papandreou points his accusing finger at the banks, Finanzkapitalismus and the industrial oligarchy as the enemies to tame. Likewise, in an interesting statement for someone advocating vastly interventionist policies, he said that the five-year plan in operation aimed at 'socializing' economic and political life rather than nationalizing it. (The distinction may not be cryptic in so far as it may refer, for instance, to regional devolution, but it is rather obscure when applied to other spheres of political activity). The plan aims at reducing the role and scope of the state, above all in a public sector which in Papandreou's own words accounts for 50% of the GNP. An essential part of PASOK's policies, he added, was to pursue 'moral targets' alongside the more institutional ones. For instance, the government intended to end the interference of corrupt middlemen in the economy (27). Observers of the 'Greek experiment' point at the practical difficulties created by continued inflation (at 20% in 1983), unemployment (at least 10%), widespread and heavy business bankruptcies, a dried-up revenue from migrant workers abroad, falling foreign exchange earnings and declining exports. The PASOK leadership describes these ills only as a situation which is largely shared by most other Western countries. However, and very much in contrast with the PSF in France, at first the

popularity of PASOK did not suffer any substantial erosion by its own bold policies. Riding the populist wave and leaning on direct and often emotional mobilization, PASOK counted in its earlier years of power with a large reservoir of popular confidence. In this it was clearly aided by its identification with patriotic issues over Cyprus, the Aegean disputes with Turkey, and Greece's role as a Balkan nation. Other parties elsewhere in the South could not always count on ideological reinforcements of comparable strength when carrying out the less romantic and costlier tasks of a socialist programme of efficient and rapid modernization, let alone a socialist transformation.

#### Spain

Whereas PASOK's promise of allagi was explicitly presented as preliminary to a swift passage to socialism, for the PSOE - which used an identical slogan - cambio - in its victorious 1982 campaign, the promise was only implicit. Further modernization and democratic consolidation were its twin aims. In many ways the government programmes of the Spanish socialists were much closer to those of the Italian socialists and republicans than to those of the early Portuguese SP or PASOK.

Even under the dictatorship, while the PSOE were reconstructing its clandestine party machinery, its claims were moderate. Agrarian reform, for instance, then still a serious issue in Spain's vast Andalusian lands, was not included in its agenda. (28) This could be attributed, of course, to the all-important, urgent task of first restoring

democracy to the country. Later, the need to tread carefully and not to antagonize the coup-prone section of the army as well as to achieve respectability among many people long indoctrinated about the evils of socialism and communism acted as brakes upon an undue manifestation of extremism. The modest expectations of the electorate itself, fully aware of the dangers from the extreme right, helped the orderly development of the PSOE into the vast, majority party into which it had grown by 1982. Though many derided the extreme moderation and orderliness of the once fiery communists and socialists vis-à-vis the army and the still powerful supporters and collaborators of the Francoist regime, there is no doubt that the latter were largely rendered harmless by this behaviour: only terrorists gave them an opportunity to justify the several right-wing plots and coup attempts against democracy that characterized the early years of constitutional rule.

It would be wrong to see the cautious moderation of the moment as reflecting the true nature of the PSOE. The Spanish party is an old and complex one. Its revolutionary and working class credentials are considerable. Its historical strength among revolutionary workers - such as the Asturian coal miners - run deep. The performance of its powerful revolutionary wing during the years of the II Republic and the Civil War was never outdone by the communists - who were, if anything, even more moderate and careful - though perhaps no one ever matched the near millenarian standards of Spain's anarchist movement. Yet there is another, very important strand within the Spanish PSOE, an equally old and profoundly liberal one, closely related to certain intellectual, educational and secular traditions of academic and republican circles. <sup>(29)</sup> Save during periods of great strain, both strands have coexisted and even blended in the party. The advent of liberal democracy, and the rise of all-round moderation has brought to the fore the more liberal line, especially after the defeat of the party's marxist wing at the hands of the current leadership during a post-Francoist Congress. Despite its

transformation into a de facto social democratic party, this very young political organization (according to the age of most of its members) is acutely conscious of its historical prowess in war or exile, as well as of its past militancy and fundamentalism whether in opposition or in government. This awareness has been put to good use in the party's successful efforts to confine and contain the communists in their attempt to become Spain's genuine left. The Spanish communists' own moderation, however, has no doubt facilitated the PSOE's consolidation of its hegemony, for the radically-inclined sectors of the working class or the middle strata have had nowhere else to turn for their political expression. However, this does not complete the picture; in the first years of democracy all revolutionary and ultra-left parties (and there were several beyond the socialist or communist sphere) suffered serious setbacks and even dissolution. The demise of the ultra-left nearly everywhere (the most conspicuous exception is to be found within the Basque separatist movement) reflects a massive shift in popular mood in the late '70s and early '80s. In turn this relates to changes in lower class economic, political and ideological expectations not without parallel elsewhere throughout Western Europe. In many senses, then, the PSOE's moderation together with its almost unabated popularity<sup>(30)</sup> are expressions of very widespread popular feelings.

The reformism of the PSOE - like that of all other Mediterranean parties, without excluding the French one, though to a lesser extent - is based once more on the all-pervading idea of modernization. In the Spanish case, the leit motiv is that the socialist government's task is to embark on a series of reforms that an enlightened conservative or centreparty ought to have carried out long ago. The function of this line is to defuse antagonism from the opposition and from conservative public opinion, but, given the sorry state of many public institutions in Spain, the argument rings true. Thus,

the PSOE government has accelerated the process of legal reform already initiated by an earlier legislature with the introduction of divorce and civil marriage; it has even (very cautiously) tackled abortion. Educational reform, and especially university reform, had found immense obstacles under previous constitutional administrations: with its parliamentary majority, the socialist government has succeeded in setting this in motion. In some other fields, such as decentralization and regionalization - perhaps reflecting its own centralist traditions and its recent willingness to yield to centralist forces - it has acted in a more devious way, according to its ethnic nationalist critics. More spectacularly, its Minister of Defence, Narcís Serra, has managed to engage in a far reaching reform of the armed forces which, if successful, would not only make them much more efficient for their allotted military task, but also far more obedient to the civilian authorities than they have so far been.

This style of modernization can be clearly seen in the socialists' economic policies. On the one hand they are directed towards the improvement of the taxation system, traditionally scandalously favourable to the rich, the control of inflation and the introduction of a series of measures to combat unemployment. The latter (the party repeatedly promised to create 800,000 jobs if elected) may come into conflict with the 'industrial reconversion' policies firmly initiated under the guidance of Miguel Boyer, the powerful minister in charge of general economic coordination. Unproductive or uneconomic plants (such as certain iron and steel works) are being closed down. On the other hand, the government wishes its economic policies to be inspired by a temper of honesty and efficiency: the dismantling and momentary expropriation by the state of a vast holding company whose financial situation was highly irregular exemplified this approach. Though a section of the conservative

opposition accused the government of doctrinaire hostility towards the holding company (whose connections with the right-wing Catholic secular order, the Opus Dei, were evident) the fact was that its assets were not nationalized. They were put back on the market and offered to private bidders as if to show that the socialists had no intention to nationalize at all costs. The same 'neutrality' could be detected in the agrarian reforms being introduced by the socialist-controlled regional government of Andalusia, directed much more towards criteria of productivity and efficiency and skirting age-old demands for collective land ownership or popular management of the haciendas.<sup>(31)</sup>

There seems to be, therefore, a conscious effort on the part of the PSOE leadership to avoid costly 'experiments' in the manner of the French socialists. Spain's economy they say, could ill-afford them. They have embarked instead on a mildly Keynesian path so as to take into their stride and alleviate the ills of the chronic maldistribution of resources and unemployment. Meanwhile, in the relatively brief period of one (or possibly two) mandates, they expect to have sufficiently modernized Spain's public and political life, so that it has fully caught up not only with the rest of Western Europe but more significantly, with many developments of its own society whose demographic, economic, class and urban transformation largely preceded the advent of liberal democracy.

#### A note on Italy

Similarities and parallels between Italian and the other Mediterranean

socialisms are the more interesting precisely because Italian democracy has enjoyed a much longer period of uninterrupted life. Not only its life has had no solution of continuity since 1948 but the system itself has suffered no internal crises for over three decades. There has been continuity all round: in the constant hegemony of the Christian Democrats, the permanent exclusion or relegation of the nevertheless powerful communists, even in the regular crises of government, and in the formation of coalitions and factions; and in the permanent process of political brokerage at all levels through which the system has had to overcome its own impasses, blockages and deficiencies. In all this Italy differs from the other Southern countries. (32)

The Italian socialists do not only differ from their colleagues elsewhere in the South because they find themselves in an entirely different political environment, but most clearly because they are a minority party. In the long-drawn struggle for the control of the 'space of the left' which socialists and communists have fought everywhere against each other - and not only in Europe - the Italian socialists lost. Given the constraints resulting from that defeat, their comeback in the '80s, for all its limitations, has been remarkable. Confronted with the impossibility of a massive electoral success which could only take place at the expense of the always well-entrenched communists, they have concentrated their tactics on obtaining a strategic position within the complicated system. (33) They have in fact played the system and convinced a growing number of voters - and fellow politicians - that their presence at the helm of the government would guarantee the governability of the country.

Here the similarities begin. Prime Minister Bettino Craxi has broken the mould of Christian Democratic hegemony, but not that (or not yet) that of Italian politics by forming a viable coalition government without the Catholic,

confessional party. By putting forward governability as the chief rationale of his access to power he is, quite openly, referring to the main theme of the process analyzed here: the introduction of modernity in the political life of his own society. Other consequences flow - or are meant to flow - from the possibility of real rule under a socialist: the efficient control of the economy, drastic austerity measures, reform of the unwieldy and gigantic welfare state system of the country, a successful fight against organized crime. (34)

Unfortunately for the Italian socialists, their diagnosis of the political institutions of Italy are useless, or in dire need of reform because they do not permit governability, nor cannot lead to major changes as long as their share of the vote (despite increases) remains limited to the current 11.4%. Parties both large and small have a vested interest in the continuation of the system (the Republicans because their size assures them access to government under coalitions). On the other hand, apart from the temporary disappearance from government of the Christian Democrats, Craxi's socialist party cannot take its radicalism further than expressing a wish for large-scale constitutional reform and further modernization of both the state apparatus and civil society. In order to retain the electoral support of the middle strata, it must in every sense be in favour of a capitalist market economy, and as pro-NATO, anti-soviet, and pro-European, if not more, than the Christian Democrats themselves. (35)

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Under liberal democracy, moderation is nearly always the price of power. The socialist parties and movements of Southern Europe have won their victories and achieved the tolerance of their once intransigent foes by dint of deradicalization. Albeit fleetingly, the story has been told and recorded in the foregoing pages.

One possible inference from the shift to moderation, which in varying measures has been detected practically everywhere is that Southern European socialism has ceased to be 'principled'. At its mildest it has become identified only with the freedoms of liberalism and with a vague sense of social justice. Prime Minister Soares of Portugal seemed to understand it in those very terms when, asked about his definition of socialism late in 1983, he said that it was "before anything else social justice and freedom, the participation of the citizens in the life of the state and society, and in the enterprises. [Socialism] means decentralization and concertation. It is a regime that must deepen democracy and the economic, social and cultural plans [of the government] as well as increase solidarity".<sup>(36)</sup> Save for a reference to government 'plans' (with its implicit étatisme), the statement could be subscribed to by any welfare-state liberals or moderate social democrat anywhere. More optimistically the Southern movement towards reformism could be understood as a preliminary step that socialists have been forced to take within the framework of their societies which will surely open the way, eventually, to the real task of evolving towards socialism. Of these two interpretations the first appears as a correct description of what has happened and the second as a correct description of what many supporters of socialism still would like to be the case.

The recognition that moderation and modernizing reformism are really the chief tasks so far undertaken by the Southern European socialists could easily lead to the conclusion that we are witnessing in that region the fulfillment of a process which democratic socialism achieved long ago in Northern Europe. It is as though, once advanced industrial capitalism and its attendant sociostructural changes had finally arrived in the South, their political orders had to follow suit and join the characteristic all-European brand of welfare state, corporatist, liberal democracy. The political ecology of reformist socialism would then follow the economic ecology of advanced capitalism. One long cycle in the economic, political and ideological development in one area would, in due course, be followed by a parallel change in another. This is perhaps too neat to be true and, certainly too unfair to the aims, intentions and ideals of the Southern European socialists.

A less sceptical interpretation of the marked shift from structural change to genuine modernization may be in order. Anyone who is familiar with the characteristics and problems of Mediterranean societies must also be aware of the formidable task that real modernization poses to any authorities and political movements attempting to implement it over a relatively brief period of time. Likewise, the slightest acquaintance with the fiscal problems of the Southern states and the limits of their economic structures will also explain the constraints of governments in the implementation of socialist measures. Faced with these constraints, radical critics may say, socialists have opted for a mere displacement of structural changes towards moralism, i.e. towards administrative reform, the introduction of a fairer legislation in matters of family law, sexual equality, workers' rights, and a struggle against corruption in public life. But this argument is itself misplaced, because the consolidation of human and civil rights is no mean thing anywhere and has no order of priority in terms of democratic socialism: it is coterminous with it. (37) Furthermore, in explaining the shift from radicalism to

moderation obvious mention should be made of the dictates of the economic recession, for while programmes of structural change invariably require heavy governmental expenditure those entailing civil modernization are often much less costly. And, in societies such as the ones referred to here legal and civic reforms can yield spectacular results without undue burden on the budget.

A more serious argument is the one which hinges on the question of the incorporation of the working classes under the tutelage of liberal democracy - their relative domestication - and which asserts that socialism (in its social-democratic, reformist guise) has achieved just that. Yet, in the analysis of the Southern European situation the starting point for any analysis of this issue is the realization that the class structures of the region have changed almost beyond recognition over the decades following 1945. Initial rises in the industrial proletariat and working classes and spectacular decreases in the rural populations were followed later by a decline in the unskilled workers' population, a growth of the highly skilled working class, and corresponding development of urban middle class strata, paralleled by occupational diversification, and the steady spread of salaried employment throughout the population. The cleavages and antagonisms on which socialism had once based its 'anti-system' legitimation have either disappeared, suffered mitigation, or been considerably blurred. Inequality itself, of course, has not 'diminished', but its forms and implications have changed. The picture that arises is in part similar to that found elsewhere in the West, and poses the question of the incorporation of the subordinate classes also in similar terms. This is not the place to go into the question of the emerging forms of inequality, domination, and social control under the new conditions of corporate liberalism. But it is important to point out that socialism, North and South, is not the sole agent in making such incorporation and control possible. Even so-called 'anti-system' parties,<sup>(38)</sup> such as the Italian Communist Party, vastly share in the 'systemic integration' process that maintains the patterns of inequality as they are in the region. The 'counterrevolution' of lowered expectations generated by recession and unemployment variously affecting all classes, the lessons of a recent history

of violent right-wing repression, and other factors have also come to reinforce political possibilism and reformism in the South.

Once the present phase of left-wing political ascendancy is over observers will no doubt detect further flaws in the socialists' performance. Some are conspicuously clear already. For one thing, these most internationalist of political movements disagree not only on the respective paths to follow - something easy to justify, given the uniqueness of each country - but also on their view of the larger world and of their common interests. The prime ministers of the five countries met in Athens in October 1983 only to disagree on everything that mattered, from Spanish and Portuguese entry into the Common market to policies towards NATO, the deployment of new nuclear weapons and attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, relations between France on the one hand and Spain and Portugal on the other about EEC entry deteriorated. After the Athens meeting the PSOE delegation to the French Socialist Party Congress had to abandon it when confronted with the acute nationalism, as they saw it, of their colleagues on EEC enlargement. Other flaws are bound to appear soon when the first serious setbacks of any durable administration begin to come to the fore, as they already have in the French case and, to a certain extent, in the Greek one as well.

There are achievements, however. Many have already been recorded here. Most probably, the near future will witness further successes in the task of reform and improvement of public life. Yet, it is likely that the least conspicuous achievements will be the more lasting ones in the life of the Southern European peoples. They include, on the one hand, political sophistication and, on the other, the completion of democratic consolidation. Thus by, virtue of the socialist successes Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards have learnt, as the Italians before them, to

distinguish between democratic socialism and its totalitarian aberrations. Then, the transition to democracy, in that region, could not have been wholly completed until the traditionally excluded socialists had reached power peacefully and had been allowed to govern in an orderly and constitutional manner. Once in power the socialists have been carrying out the necessary reforms that other forces were incapable or unwilling to introduce.

From democratic transition to constitutional consolidation: that is at least what socialism has meant. Never before had socialists managed to reach and take over the highest offices of the state in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. This was the final, necessary, stage that Europe's Southern lands had to reach in their long and arduous path towards inner concord.

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NOTES

1. For the distinction between 'government' and 'opposition' socialisms cf. Pelinka, (1983), pp. 77-126. Pelinka's calculations about the 'governing power' of socialists puts the Mediterranean socialists, including the Italians (p.88) in the endemically oppositional position. Is this still tenable?
2. Northern European radicalism is not as exceptional as this paragraph may seem to imply, however. The radicalization of the British Labour Party from the time of Mrs. Thatcher's first electoral victory in 1979 until at least its 1983 Brighton conference is an important exception. The same goes for some aspects of Swedish socialism, both in government and in opposition, especially its attitudes towards world peace and international human rights.
3. For a general comparative study of the social structures, economies and politics of those countries cf. S. Giner (1982).
4. L. Gómez Llorente (1972) pp. 74-78. The first Socialist Party of Portugal was founded by Antero de Quental, Oliveira Martins and their associates in 1875. It disappeared in 1933.
5. A. W. Salomone (1960) p.42, and E. Santarelli (1977) pp. 117-161.
6. G. Galli (1983), passim.
7. For a description of political events cf. R. Clogg (1979) pp. 166-226.

8. The 'non-pluralist' elements in early PASOK were mainly its influential Trotskists. They were ousted from the party in the spring of 1976. Information and analysis of PASOK in English and other non-Greek languages is very scarce indeed. I owe much of my information to the abundant material made available to me by Mr. C. Lyrintzis. Unfortunately it is still in an unpublished form and cannot be quoted here in the standard manner. Suffice it to say that my discussion of PASOK in this and other passages of the present essay heavily relies on the data kindly provided by Mr. Lyrintzis.
9. For my discussion of Portugal's Socialist Party in this essay I have relied considerably on an unpublished paper by Maria José Stock and Bern Rother 'O décimo aniversário do PS (1973-1983): trajetória de um partido'. Though I am unable to quote in the conventional manner, readers may turn to a shorter Italian version of that essay in M. S. Stock and B. Rother (1983). As the authors point out at the beginning of their paper, there is still no available substantial study of the P.S.P. since April 1974.
10. As shown by T. C. Bruneau (1981) pp. 389, and 395-400.
11. For a description of political events, cf. T. Gallagher (1983); for an eye-witness account of the early 'revolutionary' period P. Mailer (1977).
12. A. de Barros (1981)
13. For a substantiation of this statement cf. S. Giner and E. Sevilla (1980) and S. Giner and E. Sevilla (1984).
14. For detailed recent historical and sociological analyses of the PSOE cf. among other sources E. Díaz (1977), E. Díaz (1983), and J. F. Tezanos (1983). For the sociology of the P.S.P. J.M. Stock and B. Rother (1983) pp. 165-168.
15. For a good illustration of this phenomenon cf. the importance of Spain's liberal Institución Libre de Enseñanza for socialism; E. Díaz (1982) pp. 7-40.

16. On the question of the 'cultural-indigence' of contemporary socialism, cf. F. Giner (1981).
17. The '60 saw important theoretical struggles within parties in Spain and Italy. They led to splits in the intellectual sphere. The history of the Manifesto group in Italy or the Claudín and Semprún confrontation with their party, the PCE are only two of the best known (and well documented) episodes. The diverse crises cannot be linked only to international events (such as Soviet repression against Hungary in 1956, and later similar imperialist activities) but most significantly to inter diverging interpretations of the structure and dynamics of the societies concerned.
18. T. C. Bruneau (1981) pp. 395-6.
19. 'Polarized pluralism' is of course Giovanni Sartori's oft-quoted description; for his part Giorgio Galli coined the expression bipartitismo imperfetto; Geoffrey Pridham is the propounder of the more up-to-date and perhaps more precise of the three quoted expressions. G. Pridham (1981).
20. As attempted, for instance, by President Eanes' adviser J. Aguiar (1983).
21. The literature on corporatism (or neocorporatism) is too well known to need references here. For my own use of the notion cf. S. Giner and E. Sevilla (1984). It is used by me always as a dimension or even as a useful metaphor for understanding new, macrosociological development. There is no such thing as a corporate society, only degrees of corporatism.
22. For Spain cf. F. J. Tezanos (1983); for Italy
23. Speech by Mário Soares 'Portugal anos 80-oque?' (10 July 1978) reproduced in Portugal Socialista, August 1978, pp. 23-25.
24. The Times, Special Report on Portugal, July 14, 1983; El Pais April 27, 1983, pp. 2, 3 and 10; La Repubblica October, 2-3, 1983, p.11.
25. M. J. Stock and B. Rother (1983) p.168.

26. These views reflect my own interpretation of an assessment of PASOK's policies presented by Marios Nikolinakos at a Conference on 'Greek Socialism in Comparative Perspective', held at the London School of Economics, on 25th November, 1983.
27. Statements by the Prime Minister in The Times, December 1, 1983, p.12, Frank Giles 'The Greek who bears no gifts'.
28. E. Sevilla and J. Taberner (1983).
29. E. Díaz (1982) pp. 7-40.
30. El Pais (International Edition, 1-27), November 28, 1983, pp. 1, 12 and 13. By late November 1983 the socialists still counted with 37.4% of the voters' allegiance, whilst the conservative opposition parties could only muster 18.7% of support.
31. Financial Times, November 23, 1983, Special Survey on Andalusia pp. 31-34.
32. For the Italian political system cf. A. Spreafico and G. Urbani (1980).
33. Galli's interpretation. G. Galli (1983) pp. 323-324. For a critique of this conception cf. G. Pasquino (1982).
34. On the austerity measures proposed by the government cf. La Repubblica October 1, 1983, pp. 1-5.
35. G. Pasquino (1983) p.40.
36. Mário Soares, Interview in El Pais (International Edition) November 14, 1983 p.7.
37. Throughout this essay reference to the moralization of public life by the socialists must be understood as serious efforts made in that direction by socialists. Scandals in Italy and elsewhere show that neither communists nor socialists are entirely free of corruption. Likewise allegations of 'state violence' and police brutality against some of the Southern European governments have been made by such respectable institutions as Amnesty International. For a significant criticism of the policies and conduct of the Spanish (socialist) Minister of the Interior, cf. the article signed by 159 lawyers in El Pais, 13 December 1983, p.18.
38. A Spreafico and G. Urbani (1980) p. 191. For the cooperation with the 'system' by a hypothetically 'anti-system' party, cf. E. Mujal-Leon (1983).

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**POLITICS AND BUSINESS IN SWEDEN 1975-1985**

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## INTRODUCTION

Since the middle of the 1970s the private sector in Sweden has lost a good deal of ground to the public sector. This shift in emphasis is evident on many fronts. The government's role as money-holder has become increasingly important. Public sector expenditure as a percentage of GNP has thus risen rapidly and now accounts for almost 70 per cent. (See Table 1.) Calculations of the utilization of production reveal a similar picture of expansion in the public sector. (See Table 2.) There has been a substantial shift in favour of public consumption. At the same time the government has also become more important as an employer. About 1.5 million people are employed in the public sector today, which corresponds to about 35 per cent of the total workforce. During the 1970s about 500.000 new job opportunities were created in the public sector. (See Table 3.)

Table 1. Public sector expenditure  
as a % of GNP 1950-1983

<u>Year</u>	<u>%</u>
1950	24,7
1960	31.0
1965	36.2
1970	43.9
1975	49.6
1983	68.1

Sources: SCB and preliminär  
nationalbudget

Table 2. Utilization of production.  
Percentage of total final  
domestic utilization

<u>Year</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1983</u> <sup>1)</sup>
Private consumption	68.9	54.8	53.1
Public consumption	12.8	22.1	29.7
Private investments <sup>2)</sup>	7.3	8.4	6.9
Public investments <sup>2)</sup>	6.0	10.6	7.7
Industrial investments	5.0	4.2	2.6

1) Preliminary figures

2) Exclusive industrial investments

Sources: Nationalräkenskaperna and preliminär  
nationalbudget 1984

In several other areas, too, the state has pulled ahead. The government now plays an important part in the central wage negotiations, and seems to have assumed greater responsibility than before for inflation, for the competitive strength of Swedish companies on the international market, and in particular for employment. Whereas the main responsibility for economic-political goals in these areas used to be divided between the government and the parties on the labour market, it now appears to have shifted during the last 20 years or so in favour of the government. This growing responsibility has shown itself for instance in continual devaluations and in an extremely ambitious labour market policy and industrial and regional policies. 1)

Further, on several occasions - for instance in the wage negotiations in 1975 and 1980 (for a total of four years) - the government has been the wage leader. Thus here too the government appears to have pulled ahead of the private sector. 2)

Table 3. Total no. employed, and distribution between the private and public (state, county, councils and municipal) sectors. The different sectors' relative share of the total in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1983 (thousands)

	1970		1975		1980		1983	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total	3854		4062		4232		4224	
Private sector	2852,8	74.0	2872	70.7	2778	65.6	2711	64.2
Public sector	1001.2	26.0	1190	29.3	1454	34.4	1513	35.8
- state	366.4	9.5	388	9.6	425.1	10.1	429	10.2
- local authorities	621.2	16.1	783.7	19.3	1002.7	23.7	1059	25.1
. municipalities	416.1	10.8	521	12.8	642.8	15.2	665	15.8
. county councils	205.1	5.3	262.6	6.5	360	8.5	394	9.3
- other	13.5	0.4	18.3	0.5	26.1	0.6	24	0.6

Source: Arbetsmarknadsstatistisk årsbok 1981

All this concerns relations between the private and public sectors. But in addition the political system has sought to reinforce its influence over the activities of the private companies more directly. One approach has been by way of legislation aimed at business. It seems to be generally accepted that control has altered and become stricter since 1970. We know that laws and regulations intended to affect corporate behaviour are being continually changed. Laws are repealed or modified and new ones introduced. We also recognize that the latitude enjoyed by the companies is, according to the intentions of the politicians, to be regulated in many aspects. There are laws defining the forms of enterprise, and corporate legislation that provides the basis for all economic activity. Changes are also being made in laws affecting taxation and fund provisions. Wage-earner funds have been introduced, although in a much less radical version than originally proposed by the labour movement. Some controls are aimed at encouraging corporate investment. Some are intended to promote employment in companies, others to persuade companies to employ especially vulnerable categories of labour. Industrial and labour market legislation has emerged, regulating the forms

of intercourse on the labour market. Corporate investment abroad is to be steered. Export-promoting measures have been introduced. Choice of location is also to be controlled. Other measures are aimed at affecting mergers in industry. Technical research, and its development in companies, is to be promoted. Reforms are introduced with a view to influencing the internal corporate environment. Other measures are aimed at limiting the effects of corporate activities on the external environment. Companies are to be made to take active steps to save energy. Thus a great variety of measures have been imposed with a view to steering corporate behaviour, and government controls are legion. According to this picture Swedish companies, like companies in most other Western European countries, have seen their latitude shrink, even if much of the action is also aimed at creating better conditions for business activity, development and revitalization.

Thus, much of the growing ambition of the politicians affects corporate independence, representing an attempt to influence one of the three main corporate functions: product development, production (including investment, employment) and marketing and selling. But in the case of these three main functions, it appears that the attempts at exerting influence have also changed in character, and that the relation between politics and business seems to have altered and grown stronger. When we speak of the "bargaining economy" <sup>3)</sup> today, we are often referring to the growing integration between the political system and business which is connected with these three important functions.

In the following section we shall see how political bodies have drawn ahead of business and increased their influence over corporate research and development, and production and marketing/selling. We shall then attempt to explain why this development has taken place, and suggest some

important factors which appear to have affected the growing politicization of business companies. In the next section, we shall analyse the effects of this politicization on corporate attitudes and behaviour and the response of the companies to the new situation. We shall see that companies today seek actively to influence the design and implementation of the various policies. We shall then examine the political effects of these corporate reactions. Finally we summarize developments to date, and try to envisage how relations between the political system and business may evolve in the future.

#### THE POLITICIZATION OF BUSINESS

Government policy as affecting corporate product development, production and marketing/selling changed during the first few years of the 1980s. We can identify a reorientation along several lines.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s Sweden was famous for a policy of extensive subsidization, particularly to companies in crisis. The government supplied substantial aid in the shape of grants, loans and guarantees. This additional capital was provided in a great variety of forms, and aid came from the government and government agencies, from funds and foundations. Economic controls were frequently used, among other things in industrial and labour market policy and regional policy. However, by far the largest part of the total sum spent on aid took shape of subsidies to particular named companies as decided by the Riksdag. It is difficult to say exactly how much was allocated, but it was certainly a question of several billion Swedish kronor a year during 1976/77 - 1981/82, i.e. during Sweden's first four years of non-socialist government in 44 years.

It was largely a matter of emergency rescue operations, and the steps taken were seldom intended to create new production or lead to new jobs. Essentially this aid was aimed at production; research and development and marketing/selling received relatively little. Action was selective rather than general, and defensive rather than offensive, directed largely towards maintaining uneconomical production. 4) The altered role of the political system in the 1980s visavis the three main corporate functions, can be summarized under three headings.

#### 1. Responsibility for employment is decentralized

There is a desire on the part of the government today to shift responsibility for industry and employment to the regional and local levels. The local governments have been given greater responsibility, for instance for youth employment. A desire to shift responsibility downwards, evident first during the latest non-socialist government, has been reinforced since the Social Democrats regained power in October 1982. Reforms aimed at decentralizing decision-making have been passed as part of the government's labour market policy and its industrial and regional policies. Moreover, several experiments have been or are being made in decentralized decision-making and goal-steering. 5) The state supplies resources, and indicates in outline how they are to be used. But it is left to the regional and local actors to decide how the resources should be allocated.

## 2. Regional and local authorities assume more responsibility for industry and employment

At the same time the decentralizing trend in labour market policy, industrial and regional policy meets with a response from "below". Naturally it is a question of exploiting the responsibility imposed by the central government bodies - a development that can be regarded partly as a response to central government actions and ambitions. But what is much more important than this, there also seems to be a will and an eagerness to experiment at the regional and local levels that was unknown in the 1970s. Today political action is being initiated at the lower levels. We can call it local mobilization. Many local governments are taking offensive action on industrial and employment policy. They employ various types of support: grants, loans and guarantees, as well as the provision of service for companies. Collaborative projects between the local governments and companies have been set up. Municipal service centres are being established. Research willages have been started. Free municipalities are being created on initiatives from "below". At the same time there is also evidence of regional mobilization. The regional government authorities - county administrations, county employment boards, development funds etc - are assuming greater responsibility for industry and employment. Regional venture capital companies and regional investment companies are being established. The coordination of the activities of private and public groups results in the establishment of units to provide industry with service, computer centres, service firms etc. 6)

### 3. Service supplants money in the public aid structure

Government policy has also changed over the last few years, in that the government has openly declared its desire to move away from a defensive aid policy. Its aim has been to discontinue the short-run subsidy policy, and to try to close down Åsling's "casualty department" (Nils G. Åsling was the minister for industry in the non-socialist governments of 1976-78 and 1979-82). There may still be a little crack in the door, at any rate for state-owned companies, but for financial and other reasons the door appears to be virtually closed. In so far as financial aid is paid at all, it is to be directed mainly towards research and development and marketing/selling. The closing of the great Uddevalla shipyard and the bankruptcy of Saléns, Sweden's largest ship owner, show that the government and even the opposition are serious about winding up the policy of industrial aid. 7)

Instead local and regional aid structures are now being created. These appear to be based essentially on infra-structural measures and on different kinds of corporate service, and service centres for a variety of purposes are being established in connection with all the main corporate functions, not least marketing and selling. But another major ingredient is education and training, particularly in the computer field. 8) At the same time the activities of many government agencies are being geared increasingly to the service side, as the whole public administration appears to be sweeping along on a wave of service thinking. We need only cite the Labour Market Administration which is in the course of a major shift towards a business and service approach. 9)

## EXPLAINING THE POLITIZATION OF BUSINESS

Thus the political system has strengthened its position visavis industry in many different ways. The expansion of the public sector and the increase in legislation - both in bulk and in detail - is probably largely related to the emergence of the welfare state. In all essentials this expansion occurred in the post-war period and under broad political agreement. 10)

It would be more interesting to try to explain the new efforts on the part of the politicians to influence corporate technological research and development, production and marketing/selling and to see also how the emphasis in their efforts has shifted. Their policy measures now have rather a different focus, and it is a focus that in important ways has reinforced the integration between politics and business. As we have seen, the late 1970s were noted for a comprehensive policy of industrial aid. When a non-socialist majority in the Riksdag decided time and again to provide specific companies with capital, their motive was the maintenance of full employment. In other words it was a question of employment rather than of industrial policy. As a result of the government subsidies it was hoped that the inevitable changes would proceed at a moderate rate and would assume "socially acceptable forms". 11)

However, the employment goals which were thus being given priority were not simply identical with the tradition economic-political goal of "full employment", in the sense of job security on the labour market. Instead, the four major political parties - the Liberals, the Centre Party, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats - had shifted its focus from the labour market as a whole to the local labour market to "here and now". It was felt that the additional capital helped to maintain local employment (at a certain level), an aspect that weighed heavily in choosing policy

alternatives. One of the reasons for giving priority to this goal was the recognition by the political parties of the depth of feeling among the electorate on the subject. Local job security was becoming a popular demand. Factory and company closures were criticized. People no longer accepted what was often dubbed the "removal policy". They opposed the demands for vocational and geographical mobility. The closures of uneconomical companies led to open conflicts, in which the trade unions with the support of the municipal politicians sometimes succeeded in mobilizing the whole regional coalition, i.e. government and regional authorities, local trade unions, the regional Riksdag members, the regional mass media etc in a grand effort to stop the closures. 12) But despite this broad short-term policy, the problems of the early 1980s largely persisted.

Many factors have contributed to the desire to shift responsibility for industry and employment from the centre to the regional and local levels. The 1970s was the decade of the great industrial-policy projects. And it was the large projects (measured in Swedish kronor) that dominated the scene. Admittedly resources were also invested in small and medium-sized companies, but particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s there was a strongly held belief that companies could be moved to places that had unemployment problems. Here the large corporations played a leading role. But this faith in the policy of relocation received a jolt during the later 1970s. During the 1980s there has been only one fairly large relocation, that of Volvo to Uddevalla. When large projects were such a major tool of industrial unemployment policy, it was natural that decisions should be made at the central level. But now that the trend is towards investment in smaller-scale projects initiated at lower levels, and towards ideas and innovations emerging locally, the central authorities cannot realistically be expected to decide how the resources available for labour market and industrial and regional policy

are to be used in the counties and municipalities. A small-scale approach seems to call for decentralized decision-making. 13)

When the central politicians divest themselves of responsibility for industry and employment, they have sometimes been accused in the political debate of wanting to shirk the problems. Although there is no doubt that events call for the delegation of responsibility to the regions and municipalities the politicians have still felt confused and indecisive when they found that unemployment rose despite increasing subsidies. For this reason the decision to decentralize decision-making and to shift the responsibility was not a difficult one to make.

The idea of decentralization also gains strength from a growing awareness among central politicians of the difficulties involved in controlling social developments, especially when it comes to the growth and revitalization of business life. There are no buttons or levers to push, which will automatically produce the hoped-for revival. Study after study has shown that it is often difficult to combine the traditional tools with the intentions behind the politicians' aid decisions. 14)

Decentralization thus encounters other initiatives stemming from below. The reason seems to be that fewer actors at the regional and local levels now accept Stockholm's paramountcy when it comes to solving regional or local employment problems. They are beginning to want to take the future into their own hands. More of them now seem to recognize that regional or local resources, together with local business, will create the future labour market. All this has resulted in a will and an eagerness to experiment at the local and regional levels which did not exist during the 1970s. Coordination and mobilization have become linked to industrial and employment policy; today political action