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The model of the rational voter assumes that the choice between voting and abstaining basically depends on expected benefits and costs. This article offers a test of these assumptions, conceiving benefits of voting as deriving from the importance of politics (measured through the relative public expenditure) and from differential democratic system, and costs of voting coming from voluntary vote and voluntary registration of electors. The analysis compares average turnout with other respective data from 21 democratic countries over the period 1974-87. The results of regressions strongly support the rational choice theory.

The model of the rational voter assumes that the choice between voting and abstaining depends on the expected benefits and costs.

Part of the discussion of this model has focused on the paradox that, in large electorates, the probability of one vote altering the outcome is so small that, when there is some cost, a predictable rational action would be to abstain. But this paradox has been reduced in several ways, assuming a high subjective perception of the political benefits from voting or a strategic behaviour of voters such as conjectures on behaviour of others, minimax regret decision, and so on (see, among others, Tullock, 1967; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Owen and Grofman, 1984).

It appears, then, legitimate to take the benefits and costs of voting as basic explanatory factors of the rational decision of the voter and, in a collective aggregate, of the *relative* level of electoral participation (even though it can be considered that the voter's perception of the influence of his vote in the outcome would enter, among other factors, in the *absolute* level of participation).

The calculus of decision based on benefits and costs is also consistent with the theory of abstention in spatial models of electoral competition. In this there are two types of abstention, for indifference and for alienation. The former, based on the idea of 'cross-pressure' coming from the behavioural theory, in rational terms means that the elector obtains no differential benefits from the victory of one party or the other. In the second type of abstention it is assumed there is 'enough' distance between the elector preference and the position of the closest party to provide disincentive to vote. This is an intuitive idea which must also be understood to mean that the distance is 'enough' where benefits are regarded as inferior to the costs of voting.

The design of this article is testing the basic assumptions of the rational voter based on an operationalization in four variables of the benefits and costs of voting

and on an analysis of the data of electoral participation in 21 countries over a period of 14 years. The result, as will be seen, strongly supports the rational choice theory.

Basis in the Theory

In Downs's interpretation of vote as an investment, the benefits from voting come from the differential policies of parties in electoral contest and are conceptualized as differential benefits of party. The costs of voting are measured in time, money and effort to obtain information, deliberate and vote, and other selective incentives for voting are also perceived.

However, Downs himself points out that other political benefits derive from the existence of the democratic system, independently of which party wins the elections and is in the government. These political benefits can also motivate the vote. In the author's words: 'Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by a sense of social responsibility independent of their own short-run gains and losses', and we can 'view such responsibility as one part of the return from voting'. Downs assumes that the elector can estimate that a low turnout would cast the legitimacy of the democratic system in question and could endanger its survival: 'One thing that all citizens in our model have in common is the desire to see democracy work. Yet if voting costs exist, pursuit of short-run rationality can conceivably cause democracy to break down.' Therefore, to summarize Downs, 'the reward a man obtains for voting depends upon: (1) how much he values living in a democracy', besides (2) the benefits derived from the government of one or another party, from the competitiveness between parties (Downs, 1957: 267-8, 270).

Brian Barry has objected to this point stressing that the probability that one vote can be decisive to save democracy is at least too small to be decisive for the electoral triumph of one party (Barry, 1970: 20 ss.). But it is possible to reduce this paradox in a similar way to the former, taking into account each individual's subjective perception of the importance of his vote as well as strategic or ethic considerations. Particularly, the sense of social responsibility is stressed, calling it a sense of civic duty, in Riker and Ordeshook's interpretation of vote as a consumption, valuable in its own right. That sense expresses a subjective satisfaction to vote, from which are enumerated, as examples, the following components: '1. the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting; 2. the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system; 3. the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference; 4. the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.; 5. the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system' (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 28).

We can interpret that satisfactions 1 and 2 are connected to the benefits from preserving the democratic system, which it is assumed could fail if most people fail to vote. The authors themselves seem to admit that a sense of social responsibility or sense of citizen duty can be interpreted, in rational approach, as benefits: 'the scale of citizen duty turned out to be very similar to the scale of the sense of political efficacy', (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 36, note 16). Instead, satisfactions 3, 4, and 5 could be identified as what Downs calls selective incentives, that is, satisfactions derived from the act of voting.

Thus, we obtain two types of benefits and two types of costs for the calculus of the act of voting or abstaining:

Benefits from the party in the government (which Downs conceptualizes as differential party).

Benefits from democracy (called a sense of social responsibility by Downs and a sense of civic duty by Riker and Ordeshook).

Positive costs, basically measurable in time and money (basic to the model).

Selective incentives, that is, satisfactions from the act of voting, which can be considered negative costs (present in Downs as well as in some components of Riker and Ordeshook's subjective satisfaction of voting).

Discussion and Operationalization

Benefits of Voting

As we have said, we can distinguish two types of benefits: the benefits from the party in the government and the benefits from democracy.

Benefits from the party in the government. According to Downs, we conceptualize the differential benefits from the policies of the government as differential party and propose a new way to measure it.

Perhaps it deserves to be said that the number of parties cannot be considered as an index of ideological distance among parties or differential party. On one hand, we could expect that few and ideological close parties is a disincentive to participation (Bingham Powell Jr., 1982, 1986). For example, in the United States, the only country with a pure two-party system, and where there is not a socialist party with parliamentary representation, there is a low turnout. But there are some empirical paradoxes which allow us to doubt that correlation. Switzerland, for example, with twelve or more parties in the Parliament has an even lower turnout than the United States. In this case it can be argued that there is a deliberate demobilization, and not actual competition among parties at the federal level of government in Switzerland, including rotating chairmanship. In fact, in cantons with 22 per cent of the population where only one representative is elected there is not any kind of party competition. However, there are other paradoxical cases in countries with a multi-party system: Japan, for example, with seven or more parties in the Parliament, or France, with six or more parties in the Parliament, also have a low turnout. On the other hand, we should take into account that a multi-party system reduces the role of the electoral result in the government formation, since this usually requires the formation of coalitions. This can also reduce turnout. For this reason, some authors consider the opposite argument rather than the Downsian argument: multi-party system reduces turnout (see, for example, Jackman, 1987).

A similar indetermination can be found in relation to electoral systems. The majoritarian system based on single-member constituencies distorts the vote-seats ratio in the Parliament, and this can depress turnout, but proportional systems favour multi-party systems and the subsequent formation of coalitions also produces a distortion of the vote-seats ratio in the government.

In general, empirical evidence shows indetermination: 'No substantial difference can be found between the average turnouts of the seven countries which have most claim to be considered two-party systems (Austria, Canada, W. Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States) and the seven which have most claim to be considered predominant multi-party systems (France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden)', according to criteria of G. Sartori (Crewe, 1981: 257). Likewise, 'variations in turnout among European nation-states do not react consistently to variations in certain measures of the competitiveness of party systems' (Dittrich and

Nørby Johansen, 1983: 113), and 'the moderately varying degrees of party competition found in most of the democracies are not very powerful shapers of the [average] level of turnout' (Bingham Powell, Jr., 1982: 120).

Thus, we propose another way to approach the benefits from the policies of the party that is in the government: the general influence of policies on the interests of the citizen or, what is the same thing, the level of state intervention in economic and social activity.

That is not properly the differential party, which would be measured as a part of this intervention—that part which is different when one or another party is in the government. But we can suppose that the part of the general intervention of the state that changes with a change of party in the government is more or less proportional to the volume of general public intervention of the state.

So, we propose to measure these benefits from the government by public expenditure; more accurately, by the public expenditure of the central government (according to the selected type of general elections in our framework) as a percentage of the gross domestic product in every country. In a country where there is a high relative level of public expenditure (as, for example, the Scandinavian and central European countries), we can suppose there will also be a high volume of public expenditure the destination of which changes with a change of party in the government, and therefore, a high differential party; in other terms, a high level of differential benefits from policies for the citizen that can push him to vote rather than abstain. In a country with a low level of public expenditure (as the United States), the opposite effect will be observed.

This variable can also contribute to explain the higher level of turnout in national or general elections than in local and regional elections, according to the different level of public expenditure per person at every level of the administration. This difference is not visible in the United States as a result of the multiple votations for the different levels of representation which take place in the same electoral process, but is amply significant in the most decentralized European regimes in which the votations are separated in time, as well as in the low level of turnout in European elections.

We can call this variable 'importance of politics'.

Benefits from democracy: Benefits from living in a democracy, independent of which party wins the elections and is in the government, are benefits from liberties.

We can expect that the perception of these benefits will be greater for people who knew and remember alternative (authoritarian) systems and compare differential utilities of a democratic system to an authoritarian system, and in the aggregate, in the countries with some authoritarian domination or serious threat against democracy (for example, a war of aggression from the nazis) during the life of some current generation. More descriptively, this means that the memory of alternative regimes can be an important source of legitimacy to the current regime or sense of 'civic duty' which promotes participation.

So, we propose to measure the subjective perception of the benefits from democracy by the antiquity of a peaceful and not threatened democracy. According to this criterion, we can distinguish two groups of countries: (1) those with democratic regimes destroyed or threatened during World War II or more recently converted to democracy (Japan and most European countries, except the neutrals Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland), and (2) those with older democratic regimes.

We can call this variable 'differential system'.

Costs of Voting

Measuring the costs of voting in time and money, we can consider that the penalization of abstention, that is the legally compulsory vote, will increase the turnout, and that the requirement of a greater effort in order to vote, such as the registration of electors by the initiative of citizens, will decrease the turnout. It would also be appropriate to consider other selective incentives which produce positive or negative costs from the act of voting.

Compulsory vote. There are several democratic countries in which the vote is legally compulsory and, therefore, there is a positive cost to abstention and a selective incentive or negative cost to vote. According to an accessible exposition:

In Australia, Belgium, and Venezuela a citizen who does not vote is in violation of the law and subject to fines and other penalties unless excused by illness. The potential sanctions in Venezuela are particularly harsh. Such penalties have also existed in Costa Rica since 1960 and were in effect in the Netherlands until the 1971 election. Similar penalties and requirements also existed in Chile before its democracy was overthrown, and apparently in Greece before the 1967 military coup as well as at present. Italy does not have legally designated compulsory voting, but nonvoters are stamped as such on their official work and identification papers, and it is widely believed that they are discriminated against in employment and other benefits. (...) The introduction of penalties in Costa Rica increased turnout by about 15%. Elimination of penalties in the Netherlands led to an initial decrease of 16%, although turnout has leveled off at less than 10% below earlier levels. Uruguay enforced constitutional provisions for compulsory voting for the first time in the 1971 election; turnout increased sharply in that election, from 67% to 84% (Weinstein, 1975: 125-6). Moreover, Tingsten (1963) reports that the introduction of compulsory voting in Australia led to an average increase in turnout of around 18% for men, 30% for women (Bingham Powell, Jr., 1982: 113)¹

At the present there is also compulsory voting in Argentina, where there are administrative penalties for the abstainers who cannot justify to being at least 500 km. away from the polling place on the election-day; abstainers have to justify their absence in embassies and consulates in the country where they are at the moment. The turnout in Argentina in 1983 was appreciably high: 82 per cent. There is also compulsory voting in Turkey, where there is a fine of about \$8 for non-voting, and where the turnout in 1982 was 91 per cent; and in Austria, although only in three of the nine electoral districts.

Logically, we can expect a high percentage of spoiled ballots in compulsory voting countries. For example, in Belgium in 1981 there were 8.5 per cent spoiled ballots.

Registration. In most democratic countries, registration of electors is the responsibility of the state and is automatic for the citizen who legally resides in it. In these countries, the number of electors is about that of the voting-age population. In some countries, however, there is registration by application of citizens: Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Jamaica, New Zealand, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Voluntary registration produces a cost as it is as if the elector had to vote twice. Thus it is to be expected that the electorate will decline in relation to the voting-age population and the turnout will decrease.

Certain distinctions, however, should be noted. In the cases of New Zealand and

Australia, registration is by application of citizens but compulsory. Thus, we will consider them as non-voluntary registrations.

In the list of 21 countries which are the object of our study there are only two countries with registration by application of citizens: France and the United States.

In the case of France, registration is at the same governmental bureau where a citizen has to obtain his obligatory identity card. This could then be considered as an incentive to register.

Instead, in the case of the United States (where there is no official identity card) registration seems an especially arduous chore. Certainly, poll tax and literacy tests were abolished in 1964–70, but, according to some evidence, in most states, potential voters have to register in the county seat and there are other bureaucratic inconveniences as well. Also most states do not allow ordinary citizens (as party activists, for example) to register potential voters. Registration is important because of the high mobility of the population: nearly one-third of the population moves every two years. Thus, some observers have stated that 'contemporary voter registration obstacles thus function as de facto equivalents of the poll tax, literacy test, and other class—and race—oriented restrictions on the suffrage of an earlier era' (Fox and Cloward, 1988: 180).

As a matter of fact, there are significant differences of turnout in the states that do not require pre-registration or allow election-day registration (see Table 1).

TABLE 1.

	1980	1984	1988
States without registration:			
North Dakota	64.8	62.7	61.5
States with election-day registration:			
Maine	64.6	64.8	62.1
Minnesota	70.1	68.1	66.3
Oregon	61.5	61.8	58.6
Wisconsin	67.2	63.5	61.9
United States	55.1	55.0	50.16

If all states had adopted registration laws as permissive as those in the most permissive states (30 days closing date, offices open on Saturdays and in the evenings, allowing absentee registration), turnout would have risen by about nine percentage points (Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978; and Glass, Squire and Wolfinger, 1987). Other variations could be explained by the number of places open for registration; for example, there is only one in Manhattan, but many in Chicago, so there is a higher turnout (also in Chicago there are many polling places), (see also Kim, Petrocik and Enokson, 1975).

Other selective incentives. There are also other less significant costs of voting. Among them we can cite the following:

It may be expected that the turnout will vary according to whether the elections are held on a holiday or a work day, according to how many days the voting lasts and the schedule for voting. In Spain the early democratic elections were on work days but the companies were required to give four paid hours to every employee in order to vote, obviously more than the necessary time to go to the polls and

come back, and the elector was required to present a sealed application certifying that he had turned in his vote. Arrangements for absentee voting, such as advance voting (for example, 24 days in Sweden) and postal voting (10 per cent of votes in Sweden), can also have an effect on turnout.

The effect of other factors is more difficult to evaluate. Thus, for example, the number and spatial distribution of polling places (for example, in New Zealand an elector can vote at any polling place, as is the case in Australia so long as it is within the same state). We can take in account, however, that having many places can avoid queuing to vote but it can also increase the likelihood of being selected to serve on juries, which can promote abstention of registration. Another factor is the good or bad weather on the electoral day; however, maybe good weather is an incentive to vote when elections are on a work day, but the same good weather when the elections are on a holiday can increase the temptation to spend the weekend at the beach or camping; inversely for bad weather. Travel facilities for returning to home constituencies should also be cited (for example, in Italy, southern migrant workers in the North or beyond Italy's frontiers), gifts to voters (for example, in Japan: coca colas and sandwiches, balloons for children), frequency of elections, as too frequent can tire the electors.²

Data and Results

Our selection of 21 countries has been guided by the following criteria: existence of democratic regimes, understanding democracy as a regime of liberties and alternation of parties in the government; countries with more than 1 million people; and available and trustworthy turnout data.³ The list includes 15 countries from Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom; two from North America: the United States, Canada; two from Oceania: Australia, New Zealand; and one from Asia: Japan (see data Table 2).

The selected period is 1974–87, which fulfils the following conditions. Firstly, it allows the use of more recent data than other studies. Secondly, it is relatively homogeneous in the political aspect. It includes only periods not affected by major changes of political system (such as, for example, those begun in France in 1958, Greece in 1974, Portugal in 1974–5, and Spain in 1976–7). It also excludes periods with significant changes in electoral systems. For example, enfranchisement of young people, which in most countries took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s (starting with Austria in 1968); the suppression of the compulsory vote in the Netherlands in 1971, which produced a sudden reduction of turnout (from an average turnout of 94.7 per cent in the period 1945–67 to 78 per cent in 1971); the beginning of female suffrage in Switzerland in 1971, which also produced an apparent reduction of turnout (in 1971 71 per cent of men voted and only 49 per cent of women).

For measuring turnout, we have always chosen legislative or 'general' elections (including some countries where there are direct presidential elections, like Austria, France and Portugal), except in the United States, where we have chosen the presidential elections. The measures are carried out using the average turnout of each country, taking into account that there are different numbers of elections during the same period in the various countries, and in order to explain the relative level of turnout in one country compared with other countries.⁴

TABLE 2.

Country	Elections included	Average turnout (registered)	Average turnout (voting-age)	Public expenditure (% GDP)	Recent threat to democracy	Compulsory vote	Automatic registration
Italy	'76, '79, 83, 87	91.5	95.3	41.0	1	1	1
Austria	'75, '79, 83, 86	92.0	90.1	37.0	1	1	1
Belgium	'74, '77, '78, 81, 85, 87	93.6	87.7	49.2	1	1	1
Greece	'74, '77, 81, 85	80.8	87.1	39.3	1	1	1
Sweden	'76, '79, 82, 85	90.5	86.6	40.9	0	0	1
Denmark	'75, '77, '79, 81, 84, 87	86.8	85.7	38.1	1	0	1
Portugal	'75, '76, '79, 80, 83, 85, 87	81.7	83.4	37.3	1	0	1
Netherlands	'77, 81, 82, 86	85.5	83.2	52.2	1	0	1
Australia	'74, '75, '77, 80, 83, 87	94.4	83.0	26.7	0	1	1
W. Germany	'76, 80, 83, 84, 87	89.4	81.9	29.6	1	0	1
Spain	'77, '79, 82, 86	73.8	78.7	26.9	1	0	1
New Zealand	'75, '78, 81, 84, 87	87.5	77.0	36.6	0	0	1
U. Kingdom	'74, '74, '79, 83, 87	75.3	75.0	38.5	1	0	1
Ireland	'77, 81, 82, 82, 87	74.5	74.6	45.0	0	0	1
Norway	'77, 81, 85	83.0	82.8	37.6	1	0	1
Finland	'75, '79, 83, 87	74.2	72.9	28.8	1	0	1
France	'78, 81, 86	79.1	71.2	40.1	1	0	0
Japan	'76, '79, 80, 83, 86	71.1	71.0	17.2	1	0	1
Canada	'74, '79, 80, 84	72.7	70.8	21.1	0	0	1
United States	'76, 80, 84	-	54.8	22.5	0	0	0
Switzerland	'75, '79, 83, 87	49.0	40.1	19.5	0	0	1

Sources: For turnout, Mackie and Rose (1982) for 1974-81, and *European Journal of Political Research* for 1982-87. For public expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product, International Monetary Fund: *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* (1986, 1987).

Note: In the third column data of turnout are corrected corresponding to the population voting-age, like the only available data for the United States, using differential coefficients elaborated from Glass, Squire and Wolfinger (1984: Table 1). However, this correction has a problem: to account for resident foreigners (aliens) in voting-age without legal right to vote. This especially affects Switzerland, where rules require a twelve-year residency to become a citizen; using corrected data, level of turnout in Switzerland would be close to the United States.

The first thing apparent on observing the statistics on average turnout in the various countries are the great differences between them. There is more than 50 per cent difference between Italy, the first country on the list, and the United States and Switzerland, at the bottom. But there are also significant differences in turnout between countries of similar sociological characteristics and political cultures like France and Italy, with nearly 25 per cent variation between them.

Secondly, it is important to point out the high stability of level of turnout within countries across the period, without a clear general tendency to increase or decline over time. Half of the countries have less than 5 per cent change in levels of turnout; only three: Portugal, Spain and New Zealand, have more than 10 per cent change in levels of turnout (the two former countries, obviously for reasons of instability corresponding to the early times of the new democratic regimes).

This allows us to think that institutional factors (as stable features of every political situation) are important for the individual behaviour of many people and consequently for the aggregate: relative level of turnout in every country. Even so, maybe some differences across time could be explained for conjunctural reasons: closeness, etc.

Appearing below are several comparisons of average turnout and each one of the other variables in different groups of countries formed according to the levels of these variables, linear regressions between turnout and each of one of the other variables in all countries, and multilinear regression between turnout and the selected four variables in all countries.

Benefits

Importance of politics. We observe the four lowest countries in relative public expenditure (less than 25 per cent of GDP) are four of the five lowest countries in turnout (less than 72 per cent). We find the following correlations: 17 first countries with relative high public expenditure have a turnout average of 82.4 per cent; and 4 latest countries with relative low public expenditure (United States, Canada, Switzerland and Japan) have a turnout average of 59.2 per cent.

The regression is:

$$Y = 50.5 + 0.79 X_1; S_{YX_1} = 9.58\%; R^2 = 0.37$$

(where Y : average turnout; X_1 : average relative public expenditure)

Differential system. We observe these correlations: 14 countries with threatened democracies during World War II or converted later to democracy after dictatorships have an average turnout of 81.7 per cent; and 5 countries with longer political stability (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland) have an average turnout of 69.5 per cent.

The regression is:

$$Y = 69.5 + 12.2 X_2; S_{YX_2} = 10.76\%; R^2 = 0.21$$

(where Y : average turnout; X_2 : recent threat to democracy)

Costs

Compulsory voting. We observe four of the five countries with compulsory voting are the first four countries in level of turnout. There is the following correlation: five countries with compulsory voting (Italy, Austria (1/3), Belgium, Greece, Australia) have an average turnout of 88.6 per cent, and 16 countries without

compulsory voting have an average turnout of 74.2 per cent.

The regression is:

$$Y = 74.7 + 14.6 X_3; S_{YX_3} = 10.6\%; R^2 = 0.23$$

(where Y : average turnout; X_3 : compulsory voting)

Registration. We find the following correlations: 17 countries with automatic registration have an average turnout of 79.1 per cent, and four countries with registration by application of citizens (Australia, France, New Zealand, and United States) have an average turnout of 69.1 per cent.

The regression is:

$$Y = 64.2 + 14.9 X_4; S_{YX_4} = 10.99\%; R^2 = 0.17$$

(where Y : average turnout; X_4 : automatic registration)

Benefits and Costs

Finally, there is this multilinear regression between turnout and the four selected variables:

$$Y = 46.82 + 0.33 X_1 + 17.8 X_2 + 9.23 X_3 + 6.4 X_4$$

$$S_e = 6.26; R^2 = 0.73$$

(where Y : average turnout; X_1 : average relative public expenditure; X_2 :

recent threat to democracy; X_3 : compulsory vote; X_4 : automatic registration)

The coefficient of determination indicates that near to three-quarters of the variations in average turnout between countries are explained by the variables with which we have measured the importance of politics, the differential system, and the incentives (or negative costs) derived from compulsory vote and automatic registration of electors.

Concluding Comments

We can intuitively confirm the explanatory capability of the model by comparing the characteristics of the countries occupying the top and bottom of Table 2.

At one end we have Italy, where the following incentives to vote are present: a high degree of state intervention in the economy (public expenditure is more than 40 per cent of the gross domestic product); a recent democracy with a vivid memory of fascism and, as well, a difference with, for example, West Germany or Japan, antifascism, which provokes a strong sense of civic duty which leads citizens to vote; compulsory vote and automatic registration of electors. Moreover, there are in Italy other factors not included in the model which could help to explain its high level of electoral participation, such as allowing two days for voting: Sunday, 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., and Monday morning; and facilities on train fares to return home to vote.⁵

At the other end of the Table we have the United States and Switzerland.

In the United States we find a relatively low incentive to vote. This is partly due to several basic characteristics of the country. One is the low central public expenditure (less than 23 per cent of gross domestic product, nearly 20 points lower than the average of the countries of the European Economic Community). Another is the fact of being the oldest and a highly stable democracy, which produces neither memory of an authoritarian regime nor the feeling that democracy can be threatened, and consequently a low sense of civic duty in the above-mentioned sense of a lack of appreciation of a differential system. There are also

disincentives derived from other institutional characteristics such as the voluntary vote and registration by application of citizens. There are, finally, other disincentives not included in the model derived from the high costs of the act of voting itself: elections on a work-day; long and very complicated procedures for voting;⁶ low subjective perception of closeness of the results, given the existence of more polls with trustworthy predictions of results than anywhere else; projections of votes with virtual winners on television when polls are still open in the West.

Also in the case of Switzerland some of the disincentives to vote are derived from the special historical characteristics of the country, such as the low level of public expenditure, the minor role of the federal government (which includes the non-existence of electoral competition between parties at the federal level of government and chairmanship by turns), and a long and stable history of neutrality and peace. Along with voluntary vote, there are also other factors in Switzerland which could explain its low turnout figures such as the most recent enfranchisement of women, and even the existence of more aliens than anywhere else included in the calculus of the voting-age population.

Notes

1. It is possible to adduce more interesting details on compulsory voting in some countries. Note, for example, this information on Australia: 'The practice [compulsory voting] was universal [in Australia] by 1942. The measure was introduced by the political parties in their own interests. Compulsory voting obviates the need to get out the vote, reduces the need for a large corps of workers and increases informal voting (...). Compulsory voting has also brought about the phenomenon of the 'donkey voter', the elector who numbers the candidates from top to bottom (or, on the Senate ballot paper, from left to right), thus benefiting the candidate whose alphabetic preeminence placed him at the head of the paper. (...) As each voter accepts a ballot his name is crossed off the electoral roll by a polling clerk; those whose names have not been crossed off are pursued by the divisional returning officer, who sends an inquiring letter (known popularly as a 'please explain'); those who cannot provide satisfactory explanations (in practice any plausible reason apart from sheer forgetfulness or preoccupation with other matters) have the option of accepting a small fine (\$2) at the hands of the commonwealth electoral officer in their state or of contesting the matter in court. The vast majority of those receiving 'please explain' have the luck or the wit to be able to provide 'valid and sufficient reasons'. Court actions are uncommon' (Aitkin and Kahan, 1974: 440, 447).
In Italy, the Constitution stipulates that voting is a duty, and 'Did not vote' is stamped on the identification papers of abstainers. 'No specific penalties are attached to this entry (...) but such a procedure in a country with a long tradition of bureaucratic control helps to spread the conviction that voting is not only a right but a public duty and that failure to exercise the right might have unfortunate consequences' (Galli and Prandi, 1970: 28–32).
2. The great variety of selective incentives which can be considered to have an effect on the decision to vote or abstain has even led to the following thought: perhaps the best [attempt to fit voting into a framework of rational self-interest] is the half-serious claim that people will vote in order not to be pestered any longer by a succession of political canvassers asking them if they have voted yet' (Ian McLean, 1987: 47).
3. These criteria have brought us not to consider, for example, Mexico, Colombia, South Africa, Turkey, which appear as democratic countries in some statistic data; as well as Iceland, Luxembourg and other small countries. Usually, there are several kinds of difficulties in obtaining homogeneous and trustworthy data because different results are

- found in different sources. In some cases, there is deficient basic information, such as deficient census or unofficial results; in others, the use of different criteria, such as registered electors or voting-age population, only valid votes or all votes (including spoiled votes), and so on.
4. Maybe the closeness estimated of the results, which had been emphasized in Downs's initial formula, could explain some temporal changes in the level of turnout within a country. Usually an electoral result is considered close in a two-party system when there is less than 10 per cent difference between parties (about 55–45). It could be also measured, for example, by frequency of change of the chief executive or of the parliamentary majority.
 5. It would also be relevant to consider that there are high benefits to be derived from a high differential party, according to Downs's formula. In the period in question there were as many as 14 parties in the Parliament, as many as five parties in the government, and a high rate of change of the chief executive. Note this simple description of several factors favourable to a high turnout in which the variables of our model are reflected: 'In Italy, further [automatic inscription in the census], the high turnout is favored by the celebration of the elections on a holiday, by the existence of special facilities for certain categories (sick people, military personnel, sailors, emigrants, etc.), by the administrative punishment to register 'Did not vote' in the certificate of good conduct and, in general, by an element of political culture of postwar Italy: the very extended idea that the act of voting is an important political and moral duty, an element which is strongly influenced by the suppression of electoral participation under fascism.' 'In Italy the dominant political culture stresses only or mainly the civic duty to vote and it is a motivation more linked to a more or less justified fear of punishments than to positive elements' (Sani, 1976).
 6. There has been a recent introduction of an easier mechanical procedure for voting in some states, but for example in 1988 in San Francisco the act to vote was so complicated (74 decisions for offices and referendums) that the time to vote had to be limited to the not short period of ten minutes for every elector. Consider also the probably low differential party, in Downs's sense, derived from the existence of only two parties.

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Electoral Competition and Minority Alienation in a Plurality System: Sri Lanka 1947–77

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Till recently, Sri Lanka was distinctive amongst the less developed countries for having a parliamentary democracy based on regular and fair competitive elections. The present article analyses the long-term impact that the plurality system of elections had on the consolidation of political alignments and cleavages in Sri Lanka in its post-independence period. The study finds that the very success of the plurality system in encouraging popular participation, bi-polar competition, political cohesion and stability contributed to engendering their unacceptable extremes in Sri Lanka's resource-scarce context. In the longer run, the increasing radicalization of the electorate, acute party competition for control of the state, ethnic sectarianism, and absolute parliamentary majorities served to undermine the democratic aspects of the system.

Sri Lanka was, until recently, distinctive amongst the less developed countries as a showcase of parliamentary democracy based on regular and fair competitive elections. However, the electoral irregularities and ethnic hostilities that divided Sri Lankan society in the 1980s and continue to do so today call for a re-examination of the political system that prevailed in the preceding decades. The present article analyses the long-term impact that the single-member plurality system of elections can be discerned to have had on the consolidation of political alignments and cleavages in Sri Lanka in its post-independence period between 1947 and 1977.

Theoretical Perspectives

In the well-known discussion on electoral systems, scholars have pointed out that the advantage of the single-member simple plurality (SMSP) system over the proportional system of representation (PR) lies in the fact that the former is the more likely to result in a stable government and a democratic two-party system

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TRANSITIONS BY AGREEMENT:
MODELING THE SPANISH WAY

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Several nonrevolutionary cases of transition to democracy are modeled. Different preferences and strategic choices between the alternatives of continuity, reform, and rupture of the authoritarian regime are used to define conventional distinctions between hard-liners, soft-liners, and opposition more precisely. Six groups of actors emerge. Using game theory, the interactions among these actors are formally analyzed. The possibility of political pact in the first phase of change is identified with the possibility of cooperation between players in games in which the equilibrium is a deficient outcome. Three models of transition by agreement are established: agreed reform within the ruling bloc, controlled opening to the opposition, and sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime. Each of these models entails differences in the pace of change and in the limits of the pact and can be associated with different cases of transition in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

Around one-third of the democratic regimes existing today are the result of transitions from authoritarian regimes that have taken place since 1973. Three large waves can be distinguished: in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe since the end of the 1980s. In many of these processes, frequent and praiseworthy references to the *Spanish model* of transition to democracy have been made, generally identifying it with negotiations and pacts among political elites and consensus among the citizenry that avoid acts of revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war. Spanish politicians have often presented themselves abroad as protagonists of this process; and numerous politicians from other countries in transition have sought inspiration in the Spanish experience.¹ At the same time, scholars on comparative transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America have paid particular attention to the "Spanish model." One of them, Juan J.

Linz, who has studied the breakdown of democracies extensively, returned to this subject after the first wave of transitions to democracy (Linz 1978, 1981). The references to the Spanish model are also abundant in the important collective work directed by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) in which Adam Przeworski goes so far to say that "Spain seems the country to be studied" (1986, 3, 61).

To model the Spanish transition, it is important to observe the first phases of the process. It should be especially noted that real negotiations and pacts between the former Francoists, converted to reformists of the authoritarian regime, and the democratic opposition—which tend to be presented as characteristic of this case—did not take place until after the first free elections, held on 15 June 1977, a year-and-a-half after the death of the dictator on 20 November 1975. In fact, these postelectoral pacts (especially the elaboration of a new democratic constitution, the

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decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy) were largely conditioned by the composition of the elected Cortes, in which the reformists of the government, the Unión del Centro Democrático, failed to obtain the majority to which they aspired. Instead, in the preelectoral period, which tends to be decisive in many aspects of processes of transition, the reformists did not agree with the democratic opposition but, rather, with the continuists of the authoritarian regime.

Based on this case, some of the characteristic features of the first phase of the transition to democracy are modeled below in a manner I believe valid for interpreting processes of change of regime in multiple real cases. The conceptual categories and the analyses presented, based on game theory, are especially appropriate for a phase characterized by much uncertainty among the actors about the future and by the predominance of strategic behaviors—namely the phase between the liberalization (which permits the definition of positions and the identification of actors) and the first free elections (which establish a more precise relationship of forces and tend to move the interaction of groups within parliamentary and state institutions).

Game theory furnishes useful tools to study situations of interaction between several groups with contradictory and at the same time interdependent interests, such as transitions to democracy. The theoretical framework focuses on choices and strategies; but some findings of our formal analysis also indicate the importance of social and cultural factors in identifying the relevant actors and their orders of preferences, aspects to be further developed in the future. For the moment, I present a definition of the alternatives and actors of the process and a formal analysis of the interactions, especially in some games permitting a

beneficial cooperation between players, in order to interpret and stress certain features of real processes of transition.

Alternatives and Actors

In light of numerous cases, it may be said that in the face of an authoritarian regime, three basic alternatives can be defined. First, there is the continuity (C) of the regime, which sometimes may be based on a successful institutionalization process of the authoritarian government. Second, there is a moderate reform (r) of the authoritarian institutions, which generally leads to a limited democracy. Those who favor this alternative accept that a postauthoritarian regime has to be based on a plurality of parties and on free elections by universal suffrage but usually attempt to impose some restrictions on the activity of certain parties, an electoral system that deviates representation in their favor, the continuity of certain institutions, and the absence of the settling of accounts and reprisals against authoritarians. When the transition necessarily entails change in the economic system, as in the socialist countries, they also attempt to maintain control of some parts of the productive apparatus. Third, there is the rupture (R) with the legal and institutional framework of the authoritarian regime and the initiation of a constituent process without restrictions for the establishment of a democratic regime (as well as a market economy in the transition from the socialist regimes).

It is easy to line up the three alternatives according to a greater or lesser degree of change or discontinuity with the past: R, r, C. There are six different orders of preference of the three alternatives, which define six different actors or strategic groups in the political process of transition, as seen in Table 1. Understand that column 3, for example, means that for the persons of this group the first preference is r, the second preference is R, and

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Table 1. Transition Preference Orders of Strategic Groups

Strategic Groups	Opposition		Ruling Bloc			
	1 Revolutionaries (Maximalists)	2 Rupturists	Soft-liners		Hard-liners	
			3 Reformists (Gradualists)	4 Openists	5 Continuists	6 Involutionists (Maximalists)
Most Preferred	R	R	r	r	C	C
Least Preferred	C	r	R	C	r	R
	r	C	C	R	R	r

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

the third preference is C; that is, reformists prefer reform to rupture and rupture to continuity. The rest of the columns indicate the other possible orders of preferences.

These different orderings exist among citizens as well as among political elites and allow us to identify the actors of the political process of transition more precisely than the usual simple distinctions between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners." Broadly, they can be defined as follows:

1. *Revolutionaries.* Of the existing alternatives, they prefer rupture; but rather than reform, which would only half-way satisfy popular demands and would mortgage possibilities for more radical change for many years, they prefer to preserve revolutionary militancy and continue the struggle against continuity.
2. *Rupturists, or democratic opposition.* They prefer rupture but would rather accept reform (which can provoke internal contradictions among continuists and allow a more gradual and somewhat slower advance toward the achievement of some democratic objectives) than continuity. Some former members of the revolutionary opposition may join this group following experiences with negative results, such as a previous civil war. However, the

failure of a transition by agreement can also push some members of this opposition toward the first group's position of intransigent radicalism.

3. *Reformists.* They desire a change of regime, controlling it better from above, preserving some elements of continuity, and benefiting from the advantages that their positions of power give them. Some members of the democratic opposition may adapt their preferences, identifying them with those of the reformists, after having reached the conclusion that rupture is impossible or too costly and because, above all, they wish to rid themselves of the dictatorship.
4. *Openists* or promoters of a political thaw (*aperturistas* in Spain or *aberturistas* in Brazil). They desire moderate reform, but faced with the danger of rupture, they prefer to resist by joining the continuists. Some authoritarians may adopt this position after reaching the conclusion that continuity is impossible and that rupture is to be feared more than anything else.
5. *Continuists.* They prefer continuity but would rather accept reform (which would allow them to conserve some privileges from the past) than the feared rupture.
6. *Involutionists* (known as "*el bunker*" during the Spanish transition). They

aspire to continuity, but in the face of a democratizing reform that would dilute the foundations of the authoritarian regime, they would prefer a direct confrontation with the rupturist opposition as a way to establish a new dictatorship. Some continuists may feel compelled to radicalize their position toward those in this column if their initial concessions to reform end up leading to the success of rupture.

Observe that groups 2-5 maintain orders of preference consistent with the above gradation R, r, C; for this reason I will call these groups *gradualists*. On the other hand, groups 1 and 6 prefer the two extreme options to the intermediate one; for this reason I will call these groups *maximalists*.

Maximalists may adopt more or less bombastic expressions, such as "Better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees," as some Spanish communist leaders said during the civil war of 1936-39, or "Better to die with honor than live in contempt," a common expression in some publications of Spanish fascists of the 1960s. Often, the political culture of these groups includes elements such as the interest in "unmasking the true nature" of the enemy, the opinion that their possibilities for success increase in a situation of open confrontation, the rejection of "lukewarm attitudes," the shared hatred of liberalism more than even communism or fascism, and dialectical pirouettes such as "The worse, the better." Obviously, in both cases, to *live* on one's feet or with honor is preferred above all; but in contrast to the magnificence attributed to that main objective, the alternative implying humiliation or mediocrity is relegated to last place. Understandably, characteristic slogans of the gradualist groups, such as the "lesser evil" or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," are judged by maximalists to be expressions of moral

misery. The actors in columns 2-5 tend to be characterized by risk neutrality or risk aversion, that is, caution and fear, and those in columns 1 and 6, by a propensity for risk and a taste for *vivere pericolosamente* ("living dangerously," the slogan of Italian fascism).

This distinction between gradualists and maximalists may be compared with that outlined by Duncan Black in his study of the conditions of equilibrium in voting. While the preferences of gradualists may be represented by single-peaked curves, those of maximalists would take the form of multi-peaked curves. According to this theory, maximalist opinions would always be defeated in any voting in which gradualists converge around an alternative preferred by the majority; but if the maximalists had sufficient support, they would generate cyclical majorities (Black 1987, esp. chaps. 4-7). This suggests that if maximalists are sufficiently influential, they can generate a situation of prolonged political instability, with an absence of equilibrium. Otherwise, they tend to be excluded from the consensus among gradualists. I will return to this suggestion later.

It may be significant of maximalism that the same expression, *ultras*, was used in Spain during the 1970s to describe the nostalgics of the early Francoism, which would correspond to Group 6 of our table, and in the Soviet Union of the 1980s to refer to certain members of the radical opposition who would fall into group 1. Although perhaps in both cases these would be persons of similar right-wing ideology, in conventional terms, transition politics is characteristically not ideology- or class-based; rather, actors are distinguished fundamentally by their strategic orientations in the face of change. In fact, the orders of preference here presented can be adopted by various ideologies and, of course, by civilians as well as members of the military. The same

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ordering can be shared by different organizations; and several of them may coexist within a party, a platform of several parties, a government, or a military body, so that in each case an applied analysis will have to carefully delimit those collectives to which one can attribute the same will and a single criterion of choice.

The proportions of political strength and social support of one or another strategic group probably depend on factors like the social structure and the duration and forms of domination of the authoritarian regime. They are also, however, the expression of attitudes of initiative, self-confidence, daring, imitation, and opportunity of their leaders, as well as of the opinion formed in different sectors of society through reflection on past experience. As I have already suggested in presenting the various groups, some persons may change their affiliation to one group or another in the course of the transition process, given the characteristic uncertainty in which the actors perform and the abundance of unexpected or undesired consequences of their choices in such a fluid situation. In any case, the identification of the six groups of actors is, as we shall see, sufficiently pertinent and allows us more precisely to define the "various currents and factions" that O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) perceived among hard-liners and soft-liners (see also, for some ideas of this sort, although centered on alternatives of economic change, Hirschman 1963, 277-97).

It is also convenient for our analysis to retain affinities by blocs: the opposition bloc, made up of groups 1 and 2, revolutionaries and rupturists, coincide in their first preference R; the bloc of soft-liners, made up of groups 3 and 4, reformists and openists, coincide in their first preference r; and the bloc of hard-liners, made up of groups 5 and 6, continuists and involu-tionists, coincide in their first preference C. The last two blocs make up what can be called a broader-ruling bloc.

Formal Analysis of the Interactions

The interesting situations—because their result is not obvious—are those in which none of the mentioned groups or blocs is sufficiently predominant to impose its first preference by itself on the others. In these situations, in which the "nonrevolutionary transitions" are included, each of the groups may use different forms of legal or illegal pressure, from the use of repressive mechanisms to the mobilization of the masses or threats of boycott. Each group, however, must necessarily enter into relations of concessions and compromises with one of the other groups in order to obtain their objectives. In the Spanish transition of 1976-77, for example, the expression *ruptura pactada* (agreed rupture) expressed the desire of the democratic opposition to negotiate the rupture with soft-liners, while the expression *reforma pactada* (agreed reform) expressed the desire of the reformist government to attract other groups to its reform project.

Though each group interacts with the others, I limit myself to interactions by twos. Thus, each actor has to choose not between the three alternatives defined above, R, r, and C but between pairs of alternatives, that is, situations defined by the actor's choice and the choice of the interlocutor. We need to establish, then, orders of preferences for each actor with respect to each pair of alternatives. To do this, in accordance with the three alternatives, I construct the ordering of pairs of alternatives presented in Table 2, graduated from greater to lesser degree of pressure for change.

To avoid unnecessary complications and in order to maintain an appropriate degree of realism, I will consider only the situations created by the choices made between each actor's first two preferences. The choice of an actor's last preference should be considered, rather than an

Table 2. Pairs of Transition Alternatives By Level of Pressure for Change

Pressure Level	Pairs of Alternatives
Very high	RR
High	Rr, rR
Medium	rr, RC, CR
Low	Cr, rC
Very low	CC

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

interaction, a complete defeat or surrender to the predominance of the other actor; hence, its inclusion would not add any interesting development. I adopt the logical hypothesis that each actor's first preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the first preferred alternative (high and very high for those who prefer R, medium for those who prefer r, and low and very low for those who prefer C); each actor's second preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the second preferred alternative, and so on. I assume that each actor follows the complementary criterion that when there are several pairs of alternatives, with the same degree of pressure for change (as at the medium level), the achievement of the objective that satisfies that level by coinciding with the interlocutor is preferred to the con-

stant conflict and confrontation between incompatible alternatives, since in the latter situation no alternative can win. Consequently, the order of preferences derived from this criterion can be considered an expression of an attitude relatively inclined to pacts. I will return to this later.

These assumptions are enough to construct a complete order of preferences for the six actors defined with respect to the pairs of alternatives, as seen in Table 3 (where the initial sign of each pair indicates the choice of the actor and the second sign the choice of the interlocutor). Thus, for example, group 2 (rupturists) prefers the pair of alternatives following the same order from top to bottom as presented in Table 2 (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C); group 5 (continuists) prefers the pairs of alternatives in an exactly inverse order (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, R); group 3 (reformists) first prefers the pairs of alternatives with a medium degree of pressure for change, then the pairs with a high and very high degree of pressure, and finally the pairs with a low degree of pressure (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C) and, in case of pairs with the same degree of pressure for change, giving priority to the pair in which there is a coincidence with the interlocutor and in which the actor's most

Table 3. Preference Orders of Pairs of Transition Alternatives of Strategic Groups

Strategic Groups	1 Revolutionaries	2 Rupturists	3 Reformists	4 Openists	5 Continuists	6 Involutionists
Most Preferred	RR	RR	rr	rr	CC	CC
	Rr	Rr	RC	CR	Cr	Cr
	CC	rR	rR	rC	rC	RR
	Cr	rr	Rr	Cr	rr	Rr
	RC	RC	RR	CC	CR	CR
Least Preferred	CR	rC	rC	rR	rR	RC

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

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preferred alternative is adopted, and so on.

Games

We can now proceed with the formal analysis of the interactions among the actors using game theory. The combinations of six elements by twos give us a total of 15 different pairings of actors. In each situation defined by the choices of two paired actors, an ordinal value from four to one is given for each actor, according to the orderings in Table 3. The corresponding games, whose matrices can be found in the Appendix, can be classified according to the complete taxonomy of 78 nonequivalent two-by-two games elaborated by Rapoport and Guyer (1966). We find the following categories:

No-conflict games. Those with interactions between two groups of the same bloc: 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 (Figure A-1).

Games with a single strongly stable equilibrium. Those with interactions between contiguous groups of different blocs: 2-3 and 4-5 (Figure A-2).

Games with a single, strongly stable deficient equilibrium. That with interaction between gradualist groups of distant blocs: 2-5 (Figure A-3).

Games with a single, threat-vulnerable equilibrium. Those with interactions between other groups of distant blocs, with presence of maximalists: 1-5 and 2-6 (Figure A-4).

Games with a single, force-vulnerable equilibrium. Those with interactions between gradualist distant groups of neighboring blocs: 2-4 and 3-5 (Figure A-5).

Games with a single, unstable equilibrium. Those with interactions between other distant groups of neighboring blocs, with presence of maximalists: 1-3 and 4-6 (Figure A-6).

Preemption games, or two-equilibria games with nonequilibrium outcome. That with the remaining interaction between groups of distant blocs, the two maximalist actors: 1-6. It is interesting to observe that in an interpretation of this game as a confrontation, known as Let-George-Do-It, or Apology, each party wants to settle with a conciliatory apology, but each prefers the other to take the initiative to avoid "losing face"—a very appropriate image for a confrontation between political extremes (Figure A-7).

Cycle games, or games without equilibria. Those with interactions between the most distant groups of neighboring blocs, also with maximalists: 1-4 and 3-6 (Figure A-8).

Rapoport and Guyer (1966) employ the notion of *natural outcome* (defined by the dominant strategies of the actors, the Pareto equilibrium, and the maximin strategy), represented always in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. Observing these outcomes in the matrices of the Appendix, we can establish three different types of interactions with three different types of outcomes.

Alternative Acceptable to Both Actors. This alternative is rupture, R, in game 2-6 and continuity, C, in game 1-5. In descriptive terms, this means that the democratic opposition can obtain its objective of rupture if the relevant adversary in confrontation is a hard-liner group with maximalist strategic attitudes. This model might possibly explain some aspects of the establishment of democracy in certain countries in Europe in historical periods previous to those I consider here, including some processes that took place at the end of World War II, at least in those countries where there was an organized antifascist resistance by the main democratic parties. In a similar manner, the continuists can obtain their objective,

continuity of the authoritarian regime, if the adversary with which they are in confrontation is a group with maximalist strategic attitudes, as shown by the survival capacity of certain nontotalitarian dictatorships when they confront a revolutionary opposition. In other words, maximalists on each side are defeated by the gradualists of the opposite bloc.

Confrontation between Two Alternatives or a Cycle. In games 1-3 and 2-3 an outcome Rr is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two opposition groups and the reformists produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and reform. In games 4-5 and 4-6 an outcome rC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the openists and the two hard-liner groups produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of reform and continuity. In game 1-6 an outcome RC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two maximalist groups, revolutionaries and involutionists, produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and continuity. In games 1-4 and 3-6 cycles are obtained; that is, in the remaining interactions of the maximalists not included in the cases already mentioned, confrontations without agreement also take place between different alternatives, in these cases with changing outcomes that may indicate a situation of general political instability.

Deficient Equilibrium Improvable by

Cooperation between the Two Actors. They are those represented by games 2-4, 2-5, and 3-5. According to the orders of preferences I have hypothesized, the cooperation leading to an agreed and efficient outcome is only one possibility. There is no guarantee that this outcome will occur, especially if the actor or actors motivated, in each case, to choose the alternative leading to a better outcome do not have the necessary capability for promise and threat to make the other comply with the commitment. This means that cooperation would not be possible if the structure of preferences of the actors did not follow the complementary criterion adopted before on the preferability of coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail the same degree of pressure for change. But even following this criterion, the possibility appears only in very few interactions, as we have seen. The real meaning of these games, the matrices of which I reproduce in Figure 1, is the possibility of political change by means of a pact. As can be easily observed, success depends in large part on the subjective conditions of the actors to take advantage of the opportunity.

Game 2-5 is the celebrated prisoner's dilemma, where a deficient outcome is reached, situated in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower right-hand corner of the matrix, that is, to reform by agreement. However, once there, both players are also motivated to depart from this

Figure 1. Games of Transitions by Agreement

		3			
		Reformists			
		R	r		
5	C	2 3	4 1		
	r	1 2	3 4		

		4			
		Openists			
		C	r		
2	R	2 3	4 1		
	r	1 2	3 4		

		5			
		Continuists			
		C	r		
2	R	2 2	4 1		
	r	1 4	3 3		

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outcome—so they need mutual promises and threats to consolidate the agreement. In games 2-4 and 3-5, games with a single, force-vulnerable equilibrium, a deficient outcome is also achieved in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower right-hand corner, that is, to reform by agreement. In these cases, however, once there, only one player (group 2 in the first game and group 5 in the second) is motivated to abandon this outcome—so it is the other player who needs promises and threats to consolidate the agreement.

Transitions by Cooperation

These theoretical findings signify in political terms that there are several possible outcomes to the pressures faced by an authoritarian regime. One possible way to democracy is the change achieved by rupturists confronting an adversary with involutionist strategic attitudes (interaction 2-4). In many other situations a confrontation without solution between different alternatives—that is, a more or less permanent political instability and perhaps a civil war—can occur. Finally, there are three possible pacts, or non-revolutionary transitions. These are

1. between rupturists and openists (interaction 2-4)
2. between reformists and continuists (interaction 3-5)
3. between rupturists and continuists (interaction 2-5)

In other words, there is one possible pact between an opposition group and a soft-liner group, another between a soft-liner group and a hard-liner group, and another between an opposition group and a hard-liner group. The exclusion of maximalists from the consensus among some gradualists appears, then, to be confirmed.

It seems logical to assume that the groups that occupy intermediate positions among the pairs mentioned are also incorporated in the new political framework, although they occupy a subordinate role in the process of change (e.g., the pact 3-5 would entail the inclusion of group 4). But what is most interesting is that there do not seem to be real possibilities for agreement when the two main actors of the interaction are situated in contiguous spaces in the continuum from greater to lesser change (like those represented in Tables 1 and 3) but only between actors relatively distant in their strategic positions. Thus, the pact between soft-liners and hard-liners is not carried out by proximate openists and continuists—as seen in the interaction 4-5, the outcome of which is a confrontation between reform and continuity—but rather by the more distant reformists and continuists (3-5). In the same manner, the pacts of the rupturist opposition are not reached with reformists—the outcome of the interaction 2-3 being a confrontation between rupture and reform—but, rather, with openists (2-4) or continuists (2-5).

This paradox is explained by the capacity of threat and deterrence that can be found between actors who are relatively distant in their strategic positions, leading one or both of them to accept a second-best alternative more readily than the proximity of strategic positions does. Expressed in more formal terms, in interactions 2-3 and 4-5 the two players coincide in their two most preferred alternatives, although they prefer them inversely. In this manner, neither of the two can threaten the other with choosing the second preference, since it would only satisfy the first preference of the interlocutor. Conversely, in interactions 3-5 and 4-2, the player named first in each case can threaten to adopt the second preference, which is the worst for the interlocutor. The latter is then forced to pick the lesser evil of the second preference, which is the

first preference of the first player. In interaction 2-5 the threat is mutual, given that the first preference of each player is the worst for the other, so that both are motivated to coincide in the second.

In the real world, this capability of agreement between actors who are relatively distant can explain surprising and apparently mysterious occurrences, such as great difficulties in reaching agreements in negotiations between groups whose preferences are too proximate, reformist government's capacity for maneuverability in trying to persuade continuists to accept reform of the authoritarian regime, and the outstanding role of certain hardliners with a notorious history of repression in some pacts with the opposition (whom they themselves might have persecuted at one time).

The Spanish Way and Other Ways of Transition

If we follow the analysis of Rapoport and Guyer (1966), the three games mentioned can be the object of some interesting observations that help to enlighten real cases of transition by agreement.

Agreed Reform

We can observe that in game 3-5 only group 5 (continuists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome reached through cooperation, only group 3 (reformists) is satisfied (having obtained the first preference, with ordinal value 4), while the second is motivated to return to continuity. For this reason, the first needs promises and threats to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that cooperation toward the outcome rr can only occur at the initiative of group 3, which is actually the most interested in reform.

An initiative of this type by reformists

toward continuists led to the success of the reform in Spain between July 1976 and June 1977. After the death of the dictator Franco in November 1975, King Juan Carlos named as president of the government the last president of General Franco, Carlos Arias, who can rightly be considered a genuine continuist. However, the new government also included some openists—promoters of a reform of the Francoist legal framework—particularly Manuel Fraga, who was named second vice president and minister of the interior. The openists of the government tried to negotiate the reform in a mixed commission (especially created for that purpose) between representatives of the government and the Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, the single party of the dictatorship where there was a heavy concentration of Francoists. With a logic that my framework may explain with interaction 4-5 (openists and continuists), the openists' capacity to pressure the continuists was insufficient, and the reform negotiations failed. Meanwhile, popular movements in the form of strikes and demonstrations promoted by the rupturist opposition and some revolutionary groups, reached their highest levels.

After this failure, in July 1976, King Juan Carlos named a new president of the government, the reformist Adolfo Suárez, who resolutely faced down the continuists. Suárez soon presented a bill for political reform and submitted it to the consideration of both the commanders of the armed forces and (as the Francoist laws required) the organic Cortes.

Suárez pressured the continuists with a new combination of promises and threats. On the one hand, he promised the Francoists the continuation of the monarchy in the person of Juan Carlos de Borbón, who had been designated by General Franco as his successor; the maintenance of the "unity of Spain"; and ("given its current status and demands") the exclusion of the communists, as well as the revolutionary

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opposition, from the political arena. The Francoists were particularly sensitive to these questions ever since the military uprising against the Spanish Republic and the subsequent civil war of 1936-39, in which the form of government, regional nationalisms, and the influence of the communists were some of the main issues. Suárez also accepted the petitions of continuists and openists in favor of an electoral system that rewarded representation in rural areas (which also benefited him personally) and the establishment of a second chamber elected by a plurality system with a certain number of senators designated by the king.

On the other hand, the army chief of staff and Suárez's direct collaborator, Lieutenant General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, called for political abstention by all military commanders under threat of expulsion from the military. This threat was applied exemplarily to hard-liner Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago, first vice-president since the previous government, who was dismissed and relegated to the reserve for having expressed his disagreement with the government project on labor unions. Suárez also threatened the members of the Cortes named by Franco with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, with making public the recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had made in their homes and offices, and with the transmission on television of the nominal vote of their bill for reform in case they decided to vote *no*.

With these and other measures, Adolfo Suárez obtained the acceptance of the reform of the authoritarian regime by the very Francoists who occupied the institutions; that is, he successfully promoted the cooperation we have seen is possible in interaction 3-5 (reformists and continuists) while avoiding a further cycle and convoked general elections that would open a new phase.

It is important to note that during this

process there was never any real cooperation between the reformist government and the rupturist opposition. The latter's member parties—communists, socialists, Basque and Catalan nationalists, and a few liberals and Christian democrats—joined together in the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos to defend the formation of a provisional government with the participation of the opposition. This government would have convoked elections without any positions of advantage for any group, along with the parallel establishment of regional governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country, freedom of activity for all parties, and the free choice by the constituent Cortes of the forms of state and government. This Plataforma even designated a nine-man commission to open a dialogue and negotiate with the government. However, Suárez received only a few members, not informing them of his projects or allowing them any sort of negotiation, and he made only a few minor concessions. In other words, interaction 2-3 (rupturists and reformists), as my formal framework explains, did not lead to real cooperation. In fact, Suárez used the conversations with the opposition as a latent threat to the continuists that he would join the rupturist project if they did not accept the reform. It can be said, then, that the first phase of the Spanish transition was a *reforma pactada* within the ruling bloc, without interaction with the opposition.

The only important concession made by Suárez to the opposition before the elections was the result of his direct negotiation with the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, for the party's legalization. After the legal approval of the reform by the organic Cortes, the leaders of the PCE followed the rest of the opposition parties and presented the documents that the law required to be legalized. The communists, however, did not present their traditional statutes, but other improvised documents

in which they substituted an affirmation of democratic principles for their traditional revolutionary and republican objectives. At a secret meeting in Madrid, Suárez and Carrillo agreed that the PCE would be legalized if it expressly accepted the monarchy and the two-colored monarchical flag, an agreement fulfilled by both parts two months before the elections convoked by Suárez. In this manner, all the parties of the rupturist opposition accepted the legal framework of reform agreed upon by reformists and continuists, excluding from their electoral platforms any questioning of the monarchical form of government or the unitary form of the state. Meanwhile, Suárez imposed an electoral system that favored him and utilized the advantages of power to organize a candidacy with himself leading the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) ballot.

Negotiations and pacts between reformists and the rupturist opposition as a whole did not take place in Spain, as I have said, until after the elections of June 1977. The reformist candidacies of the UCD received a plurality of votes; but despite the serious deviations created by the electoral system imposed by the government, they failed to obtain a majority of deputies. That is why Suárez's reformists had to abandon the limited constitutional reform they had prepared and accept the elaboration of a new constitution with a wide consensus in the new democratic Cortes in December 1978 (finally approved a year-and-a-half later). The majority of parties also agreed on a new decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy. It was in this later process when the objective of rupture—a democratic regime without restrictions—was obtained, although by a different path than the one originally desired by the rupturists. But these postelectoral pacts no longer correspond to the initial phase of

the transition, which I am modeling by defining the actors according to their strategic orientations. In fact, other actors, better defined by government platforms and ideologies—mainly the centrist, socialist, communist, and Catalan nationalist parties—did this by way of vote trading, logrolling, and parliamentary coalitions, which were based no longer on fears and subjective expectations of the future but, rather, on the specific number of deputies each obtained.

These later concessions and pacts of Suárez with the rupturist opposition led to his confrontation with the continuists. They accused him of "treason" and repeatedly conspired with some involutionist groups to organize a coup d'état, which failed. In fact, the partial agreement of Suárez with the communists and, after the elections, the constitutional and other pacts with the opposition parties, broke the agreements that the reformist president of the government had contracted with the Francoists during the first phase of the transition.

Nevertheless, the fact that the transition was initiated by way of an agreement between reformists and continuists (3-5), without the participation of the opposition, has had consequences for the Spanish democracy. For many years, the elements of continuity with the previous authoritarian regime have been very important. Not only was the monarchy consolidated, but no breakdown in the armed forces or any purge of the political police took place. At the same time, there has been a low level of politization of the citizenry, thus conceding a broad margin of autonomy to the political elites.

The process and the result of the Spanish transition of 1976-77 contrast with the process and result in a previous historical situation, the Second Spanish Republic of 1931-36. Its instability and tragic end were influenced in large part by the prominent activity of the maximalists and the weakness of gradualist attitudes in the

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various ideological fields. There is no doubt that the reflection on that disaster and the trauma that the civil war of 1936–39 provoked in broad layers of Spanish society fed the fear of the repetition of a violent confrontation. This fear induced in the principal political actors a predisposition to negotiation and compromise that has been formalized in our analysis and that is usually pointed out as the characteristic feature of the “Spanish model” of transition. (For a more in-depth analysis of the events of the Spanish transition and its implications for consolidated democracy, see my book [Colomer 1990]; for an analysis in English, see Maravall and Santamaría 1986 and, for the postelectoral period, Gunther 1985.)

Controlled Opening and Collapse

Unlike the Spanish model, the other ways of transition by agreement that have been identified coincide in including the opposition among the decisive actors of the first phase. In game 4-2 only the second player (rupturists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome obtained by way of cooperation, only the first player (openists) is satisfied with obtaining the first preference (with an ordinal value of 4), while the second is motivated to return to rupture. For this reason, the first player needs to have enough deterrent capability to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that in this game, the cooperation toward an rr outcome can only occur at the initiative of group 4, the openists, while the rupturist opposition has to adapt to it.

There are several cases where, coinciding with the indication of this framework, the openists have tried to set the conditions of transition and have maintained a certain control over the initial, rather slow, rhythm of the liberalization and democratization process. Although my

purpose here is more conceptual than descriptive, I can illustrate its analytical possibilities by referring briefly to several cases.

The clearest one is probably Brazil between 1982 and 1985, where there was first a period of liberalization (*distencao*) and opening (*abertura*), exercised by the governments of generals Ernesto Geisel and João Figueiredo against the hardliners of General Sylvio Frota. Later, a slow democratization process included an implicit—or explicit but secret—political pact of some government soft-liners, the regime party, and the armed forces with the opposition to name opposer Tancredo Neves, leader of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro as president, in January 1985. Following this, direct presidential elections were convoked for November of that same year. Although some differences between the Spanish, Brazilian, and other cases probably have to do with broad differences in socioeconomic and other structural factors, these would not necessarily explain the attitudes and strategic choices of the relevant actors that I stress here.

A formally similar situation of interaction between openists and rupturists may be seen in the transition that took place in Uruguay between 1983 and 1984. Some soft-liners of the authoritarian regime, headed by the president, General Gregorio Alvarez, and General Rapela of the political affairs commission of the armed forces, maintained conversations over a period of months with representatives of most of the opposition, the Partido Colorado and the Frente Amplio (excluding the Partido Blanco, which they considered to be responsible for most of the political instability in the period previous to the coup d'état). Finally, the Acuerdo del Club Naval was reached, and presidential elections were convoked for November 1984.

A similar process of cooperation might also explain the democratization process

initiated in Chile in 1989, including the agreement that General Augusto Pinochet would continue to be head of the armed forces while presidential elections were held with the participation of the opposition parties led by Christian Democrat Patricio Alwyn. Given the initiative of the openists in all these processes and their imposition of certain initial conditions, such as a calendar, the offices to be elected, the electoral system, and the absence of acts of revenge, I propose to call this model of transition *controlled opening to the opposition*.

The third model is the one formalized in game 2-5 (rupturists and continuists), which, as I have said, is a prisoner's dilemma. Here, both players are motivated to abandon their initial choice and shift to reform, as long as the other cooperates in the same maneuver. But once this new result has been obtained, neither is fully satisfied, and both are motivated to return to their dominant strategy. Thus, the success of the cooperation requires that the two actors employ deterrents and that the two make concessions. This need for symmetrical and conditioned efforts by both parts suggests that the agreement needs to be more synchronized and probably quicker than in the previous games, where one of the actors maintains an initiative to which the other adapts. This leads us to think that this is the most appropriate formal explanation for situations where a power vacuum has been created that must be filled without delay, that is, transitions provoked by a sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime.

A situation of this sort can be perceived in the crises produced, for example, by the military defeat of a dictatorship from abroad. This would be the case of the colonial crisis of Portugal in Africa, which led to the uprising in 1974 of the same armed forces that had carried out the colonial domination, followed by the transitional agreement between the army

and the regime's opposition parties. While General Antonio di Spínola became president of the republic, a provisional government led by the centrist Adelino di Palma Carlos, with the participation of Socialists and Communists, was formed, quickly leading to the holding of constituent elections.

As clear, or more so, would be the case of Greece a few months later. Following a failed liberalization in the period of General Papadopoulos, the Ioannides hardliners organized a disastrous military intervention in Cyprus, after which they convoked a "national council" with the opposition of radicals and centrists. This led to the naming of exiled Constantino Karamanlis as first prime minister, while General Fedon Ghizikis remained as temporary head of state until the celebration of elections in November of that same year, 1974.

Finally, the transition in Argentina in 1983 also offers many elements that can be clarified by way of a game of cooperation between continuists and rupturists. The failed invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands provoked the dismissal of President Galtieri by other members of the military. His substitute, General Reynaldo Bignone, soon established a *concertación* with the traditional parties, the *Justicialistas* and the *Radicales*, that led to presidential elections in October of that same year.

In all of these latter cases there is no such thing as a liberalization process that precedes the democratization, but rather the two take place at the same time. The result obtained, however, is fairly vulnerable, since, unlike the other two models, the two principal actors are motivated to break commitments that had been so urgently and pressingly reached. Hence, the breaking of promises in the postelectoral phase should not surprise us. Reprisals against past authoritarians, as well as destabilizing conspiracies and plans to overthrow the regime, are rela-

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Table 4. Models of Transition by Agreement

Model	Agreed reform within the ruling bloc	Controlled opening to the opposition	Sudden collapse of the authoritarian régime
Actors	3-5 (Reformists-Continuists)	4-2 (Openists-Rupturists)	5-2 (Continuists-Rupturists)
Game	Game with a single force-vulnerable equilibrium	Game with a single force-vulnerable equilibrium	Prisoner's Dilemma (a single strongly stable deficient equilibrium)
Characteristics of the game	3 needs threats to consolidate cooperation 3 is satisfied in the outcome	4 needs threats to consolidate cooperation 4 is satisfied in the outcome	Both players need threats to consolidate cooperation Both are aggrieved in the outcome
Political meaning	Initiative of reformists, adaptation of continuists Liberalization precedes democratization Elements of institutional continuity (no revenges, offices out of elections)	Initiative of "openists," adaptation of rupturists Liberalization precedes democratization Elements of institutional continuity (no revenges, offices out of elections)	Mutual concessions between continuists and rupturists Sudden change of régime
Cases	Spain 1976-77, Soviet Union 1985-1991	Brazil 1982-85, Uruguay 1983-84, Chile 1989-90, Poland, Hungary 1987-90	Greece 1974, Portugal 1974, Argentina 1982-83, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania 1989-90

tively frequent (as in the three countries mentioned).

Unlike the other two models, in this third model of transition, the "sudden collapse" of the dictatorship does not allow the hard-liners a gradual reconversion to openist positions but gives them an unforeseen role in the negotiations and pacts with the opposition. In the controlled-opening-to-the-opposition model the intentions of the openists may have ripened longer, either because from the start the authoritarian regime publicly maintained that its intentions were to return to democracy (as occurred in Brazil) or because their attempts at institutionalizing the regime failed (as occurred with the governmental defeats in the Uruguayan referendum in 1980 and the Chilean in 1988). The Spanish model, or *agreed reform*, maintains an intermediate pace between the other two. It sprang from a situation of moderate social support for

the authoritarian regime, as seen, for example, in the success of the institutionalization of Francoism (including its victory in 1966 in a referendum similar to those already mentioned). However, a sudden event—the death of the dictator—accelerated the process and oriented it toward democratization. In this latter case, the first free elections had a doubtful constituent character when they were convoked. Instead, in the case of the two models with the participation of the opposition, the process led to the reestablishment of the previous democratic constitution or elections to a constituent assembly with the possibility of deciding the form of government (which signified, for example, that in Greece, unlike Spain, the monarchy was abolished by popular referendum). A summary of the achievements presented is seen in Table 4.²

It should also be possible to apply the formal categories presented up to this

point to the transitions from the socialist regimes that have recently taken place in Eastern Europe. At least two categories can be distinguished. For example, we have two processes, those of Poland and Hungary from 1987 to 1990, in which we can perceive a liberalization prior to democratization and where the authoritarian governments developed a certain capacity for initiative. Their dealings seem to correspond in large to the model of cooperation 4-2 (openists and rupturists).

In Poland, the government's defeat in a referendum on economic policy toward the end of 1987, as well as a resurgence of labor strikes in the following months, led to the convocation of a round table in 1989. The president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, began negotiations with the opposition *Solidarność* movement led by Lech Walesa. As a result of these conversations, free elections were called, but with some restrictions: the communists kept the majority of seats in one of the chambers for themselves, and Jaruzelski was named as president without taking part in the elections.

In Hungary, the liberalization, especially the economic one, had begun in the previous period. But it was also in 1987 when the general secretary of the Communist party, Karoly Grosz, announced the initiation of dialogue between the government party and the opposition. This announcement was followed by the removal of Communist leader Janos Kadar and the isolation of the hard-liners, as well as a series of "national reconciliation meetings" between governmental communists and the opposition round table. Before the celebration of free elections, the openists had time to carry out a series of changes under their own initiative: the opening of frontiers, the proclamation of a nonsocialist republic and the reconversion of the Communist party into a Socialist party to improve its electoral possibilities.

The other processes have followed, instead, a much faster pace. It has been said (with a certain chronological imprecision but a suggestive image) that while Poland needed 10 years to rid itself of authoritarian communism, Hungary did it in 10 months, East Germany needed but 10 weeks and Czechoslovakia just 10 days. (It could be added that a little over 10 hours was enough time for Rumania.) The truth is that something close to a sudden collapse of the regime took place in the fall of 1989 in the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe after Poland and Hungary. The opening of the borders by governments and their crossing by citizens, combined with protests in the streets (i.e., as much or more "exit" as "voice") accelerated "tipping" and the downfall of those republics.

In November, hard-liner Egor Krenz, general secretary of the communists in East Germany, opened the Berlin Wall and called free elections, after which he began a round table of negotiations with the Democratic Forum and the opposition parties. In Czechoslovakia, in December, there were direct conversations between the communist leader Ladislav Adamec and the leader of the Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel, which resulted in Havel's rise to the presidency and the formation of a government of national union as a step toward elections. In the same month, in Bulgaria, the head of state and of the party, Petar Mladenov, promised free elections, following which the Communist party started negotiations with the Union of Democratic Forces. In Rumania, a popular revolt and—as everything seems to indicate—a parallel communist and military conspiracy brought down the dictatorship and led to the creation of the National Salvation Front, in which high-ranking members of the communist regime and the opposition coincided, including the newly named president, Ion Iliescu, and Doina Cornea the Christian democrat. It seems, then, that many of

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the agreements between members of the ruling bloc and the opposition in all these cases can be interpreted with our model of cooperation 2-5 (rupturists and continuists). The difference with respect to the previous cases is that the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe has not been the direct result of a military defeat of the authoritarian rulers by a foreign power but rather of the collapse of its international support structure, that is, the USSR's abandoning of its guardian role.

In this limited overview, cases of transition by agreement best comparable to the "Spanish model" of cooperation between reformists and continuists (3-5) surprisingly do not abound. However, I suggest that some elements of this model can be usefully applied to the analysis of the process in the Soviet Union in 1985-1991. Following a first stage of *glasnost* (liberalization) the process of *perestroika*, which implied democratization but also a federal redefinition of the Russian Empire and a complex change of the economic system, ran into serious difficulties. As a result, change in the USSR gave way to the transition in the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which have gone from being its wards to being its support cushion.

In this particularly slow process, the reformists led by Mikhail Gorbachev were to operate between two main actors. On the one hand, there were the powerful continuists installed in the Communist party apparatus, the secret services and part of the army. On the other, there was a relatively weak opposition, which, unlike other Eastern European countries, maintains practically no connections with previous democratic movements, has practically no relationship with the main democratic tendencies of Western countries, and is led in part by recently converted former communists (like the Russian Boris Yeltsin). At some point, it appeared that Gorbachev's negotiations with the opposition might lead to specific

agreements, such as the economic reform known as the Five Hundred Day Plan discussed during the summer of 1990. But the president of the USSR avoided any commitment and seems to have used his contacts with the opposition as a threat to overcome the resistance of the continuists to the controlled changes he wished to impose. A few months later, Gorbachev named some openists as high-ranking officials. Possibly he thought that these threats and concessions, as well as his victory on a March 1991 referendum to preserve the union, were enough to impose his reform project to hard-liners. However, when he tacked again toward the opposition to sign a new union treaty, openists and continuists, considering that their agreements with Gorbachev were not upheld, turned against him. In this way, and independent of the applied analysis remaining to be done, our model allows us to stress some aspects of the process that in a comparative perspective, may gain importance and improve our understanding of the factors of change in the USSR.

I would reiterate that everything that has been said up to this point refers only to a preelectoral phase of the processes of transition. Electoral results tend to change the delimitation of the actors and formulate new relevant issues, so that the outcome obtained by way of interactions by agreement may then be more or less dramatically altered. As I said, in the agreed-reform and controlled-opening-to-the-opposition models, frequently, the ruling bloc makes efforts to preserve some of its advantages, and recourse is made to "national reconciliation" or the "law of silence" to avoid acts of revenge against the authoritarians. Sometimes there are also attempts at restructuring the future system of parties "from upstairs." However, electoral results, which always carry with them a certain unrelinquishable degree of uncertainty, can defeat some of these expectations; and the process of

reform itself can then lead to a clearer obtainment of the objectives of the rupture (e.g., in Spain, Uruguay, and Hungary). As I have also indicated, in the sudden collapse model, it seems even more logical to expect surprises and a certain instability.

Conclusion

Several nonrevolutionary ways of transition to democracy, with different actors, paces of the process, and contents of the agreements have been identified. One of them, the first phase of which is based on a pact between reformists and continuists of the authoritarian regime, is that that best coincides with the Spanish model, that is, the transition begun in Spain in 1976. A characteristic that distinguishes this model from the others presented is that the opposition does not have the opportunity to intervene directly and conspicuously in the pacts until after the first elections have been held, which concedes to members of the ruling bloc opportunities to introduce some elements of institutional continuity in the future democratic regime.

However, the three models share certain characteristics that can be considered necessary conditions for a transition by agreement. A first condition is the weakness or absence of maximalist actors, because their participation causes disequilibrium and political instability. This formal condition might lead us to explore the social and cultural factors that may explain the greater or lesser relative importance of the gradualist and maximalist actors in a specific society. A second condition is a preference among the gradualist actors for coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail pairs of alternatives with the same degree of pressure for change. This formal condition is linked to the existence of subjective attitudes favorable to cooperation or

compromise, possibly the result of having learned the lessons of historical experiences of civil wars, the failure of authoritarian regimes, and the suffering caused by repression and violence. Finally, it is necessary that given the greater capacity of threat or deterrence between actors relatively distant, the main actors of the agreement be noncontiguous in a gradation of orders of preference. This condition emphasizes the strategic aspects of the processes of transitions, where political structure and the initiative of some of the actors toward others create interactions that entail various possibilities of negotiations.

Some formal aspects of the analysis here presented could be further advanced—for example, by the study of some interactions or games of three or more players. However, the framework seems to already allow a few retrospective explanations. These can be more descriptively developed and extended to transitions in other countries and other more distant historical periods. In a process of change where one can distinguish several actors by their strategic orientations—which tends to require a liberalization process—the present formal models should also contain a certain capacity for prediction.

Appendix

In this section the matrices of two-by-two games of the six actors in transitions to democracy are presented. The natural outcome is always located in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. In games in which cooperation toward a more efficient outcome is possible (Figures A-3 and A-5, representing the interactions for transitions by agreement), this cooperative outcome is located in the lower right-hand corner.

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Figure A-1. No-conflict Games

		2	
		R	r
1	R	4 4	3 3
	C	1 2	2 1

		4	
		r	C
3	r	4 4	1 2
	R	2 1	3 3

		5	
		C	r
6	C	4 4	3 3
	R	1 2	2 1

Figure A-2. Games with a Single, Strongly Stable Equilibrium

		3	
		r	R
2	R	3 3	4 1
	r	1 4	2 2

		5	
		C	r
4	r	3 3	4 1
	C	1 4	2 2

Figure A-3. Games with a Single, Strongly Stable Deficient Equilibrium

		5	
		C	r
2	R	2 2	4 1
	r	1 4	3 3

Figure A-4. Games with a Single, Threat-vulnerable Equilibrium

		5	
		C	r
1	C	3 4	2 3
	R	1 2	4 1

		2	
		R	r
6	R	3 4	2 3
	C	1 2	4 1

Figure A-5. Games with a Single, Force-vulnerable Equilibrium

		3	
		R	r
5	C	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

		4	
		C	r
2	R	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

Figure A-6. Games with a Single, Unstable Equilibrium

		3	
		r	R
1	R	3 3	4 2
	C	2 1	1 4

		4	
		r	C
6	C	3 3	4 2
	R	1 1	2 4

Figure A-7. Two-Equilibria Game with Nonequilibrium Outcome

		6	
		C	R
1	R	2 2	4 3
	C	3 4	1 1

Figure A-8. Cycle Games, or Games without Equilibria

		4	
		r	C
1	C	2 3	3 1
	R	4 2	1 4

		3	
		r	R
6	R	2 3	3 1
	C	4 2	1 4

Notes

I began working on this subject while I was a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago. I am grateful to David Laitin, for his welcome at Wilder House, Center for the Study of Politics, History, and Culture, and for all I learned at the seminar, "Rational Models in the Social Sciences," convened by Gary Becker and James Coleman.

1. Limiting to recent declarations by East European politicians to Spaniards, we can mention, for example, those of Romanian prime minister Petre Roman, those of the president of the Czechoslovakian Parliament and former general secretary of the Communist party Alexander Dubcek, and the Polish president Wojciech Jaruzelski, respectively, in "Roman arranca a González la firma de un documento," *El País* (Madrid), 18 April 1990; "González rinde homenaje a la figura de Dubcek," *El País*, 27 April 1990; and Hermann Tertsch, "Los vecinos no se pueden cambiar," *El País*, 10 June 1990. President George Bush has also presented the Spanish model as "a very special example" for the march to democracy in Eastern Europe (José María Brunet, "Bush propone a España como modelo para la evolución de la Europa del Este," *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 20 October 1989. Outside the Spanish context, see, e.g., the repeated comments of veteran Polish oppositionist Adam Michnik, an "enthusiast" of the Spanish way (e.g., "The Two Faces of Europe," *New York Review of Books*, 19 July 1990).

2. I only know of one conceptualization comparable to that here presented, that of Share and Mainwaring (1986). Three "ideal types" are distinguished and called "transition through regime defeat," "transition through extrication," and "transition through transaction" (although the study is limited to the latter).

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