

of the agenda, however, is an extremely subtle and difficult area to investigate.

Obviously, election of government officials whether national, regional or local, is a method of controlling the explicit wielders of political power, and the *desire* for election and re-election is also a form of control. Party processes in both one-party and multi-party systems are also a method of institutionalizing forms of upward control. Whether interest group organizations can be said to be able to produce upward control or not they nevertheless influence the explicit wielders of power to a greater or lesser degree. If the pluralist thesis is even partially correct, the interest group system may even be one of the more important sources of upward control. Of course, all of the institutional methods of actualizing the ideal of upward control are open to ossification and abuse. Elections may be rigged, not only by overt illegal methods but also by well-known methods of agenda control and control of procedures [Riker, 1982b]. Parties may be more or less democratic. Here, institutionalised and procedural downward control is common; and of course, the shadow of Roberto Michels darkens this too. Interest group organizations are often organized in ways far removed from traditional democratic methods, and this is in many cases far from being sinister (we have in mind groups whose membership may be enticed by selective incentives as much as group interests) and even democratically organized trade unions tend to exert far more control over their members than the members do over their agents. But even if the agents of organized interests do wield more control over their members than they do over government, they do (to a greater or lesser extent) aggregate the interests of their members, and via their relationship with government stand as a proxy for upward control. In any consideration of democratic stability, these methods of institutionalizing the first condition of democracy can be examined to see how far they can

withstand threatening contingencies, and just what those contingencies are.

The second condition of democracy is equality, a subject of treatise length in itself. In the western (pluralist / bourgeois / liberal) democracies the ideals of equality are institutionalised in the following two respects. Firstly, an equality of treatment of individuals in respect to the particular and actual processes of upward control. That is, all adults (with a few reasonable exceptions) are treated as citizens having the same voting rights, and the same rights with regard to other forms of participation in the political process. Of course, equality of rights may be far from equality of practice, and under some conditions this disparity of right and practice can be so great that there have been attempts to bridge it institutionally, for example by those methods usually called consociational. Secondly, the condition of equality is taken to imply that individuals have the same rights to perform certain actions thought to be requisite for the particular institutional manifestation of upward control. Such conditions may include the rights to assemble, to speak freely, to have equal access to information etc. Any analysis of democratic stability will need to examine the threatening contingencies to these institutional arrangements, and the form that those contingencies might take.

The third condition of democratic behaviour cannot be institutionalised except through the legal system of the regime; but the legal system is not itself enough. This is so for two, closely related, reasons. Firstly, legal rules may have anti-democratic entailments and implications. That is, they may just be anti-democratic or they may produce anti-democratic results under certain conditions. This may seem to break conditions one and two, and so not come into the ambit of democracy, but as we have seen the institutionalisation of these conditions is necessarily one of degree. Even within a so-called democracy laws may be propagated that discriminate politically, intentionally or unintentionally,

against sections of the society, and under certain conditions individuals may be under a democratically inspired moral imperative to break that law. Those actions, though law-breaking, may be held to be democratic and not anti-democratic. Secondly, for the practice of a democracy, all individuals, or at least an I-subset of them (where I = small but important, or large and unimportant), must not be behaving beyond the limits of that practice, even if they are behaving within the institutionalised and legal rules. Essentially, this second reason implies a general acceptance of the first two conditions, and constitutes a kind of meta-rule. Thus, we may regard these behaviour rules as meta-rules over and above any logically possible (and actual) institutional legal rules. When the meta-rules count against some action, even where the institutional legal rules allow it, that action is anti-democratic. Clearly, this constitutes a further, and threatening, contingency to be examined that is open to even less quantification than the previous sets of contingencies.

The three principles elucidated here suggest that democracy involves not just limited government, but universal limitation. Government is directly limited through the principle of upward control, but individuals are limited too, indirectly through upward control and directly through the principle of equality. The behaviour rules institutionalised in the legal system also limit behaviour directly and the meta-rules similarly limit behaviour, if only counterfactually. In the tradition of the literature on 'rights', individual actions must not derogate from the political rights of others. Any account of democratic political stability at this most abstract level therefore requires consideration of individual behaviour as well as of institutional structure. This will lead directly into a theory of democracy which may be made more concrete under different institutional arrangements. We do not wish to travel further down this path here, but to consider more specifically certain aspects of the set of possible

arrangements, broadly tied to context, and the types of threatening contingencies that may arise.

There is a degree of imprecision surrounding the term 'democratic stability', and as commonly used it seems to have at least two distinct meanings, related to two of the three Eastonian political objects (authorities, regime, and community). On the one hand, in relation to the authorities, it refers to the stability of governments under democratic regimes. On the other hand, in relation to the regime, it refers to the stability of regimes having a particular character (viz. democratic). This is the sense in which we would prefer to see the term used.

Given that governments in democracies are a subset of all governments, some propositions about the stability of democratic governments will not be unique to that subset, but will also apply to governments in other types of regime. That is, some propositions involving stability will be true of any kind of government, and some will only be true of democracies. Similarly for propositions about the stability of democratic regimes: some will relate to the stability of any regime. Insufficient attention has been paid to this distinction. Many factors that have been said to undermine democratic governments and/or regimes are also threats to other kinds of government and/or regime. For example, researchers have often focussed upon the levels of violence in a system [Rummel, 1963; Russett, 1964, pp. 97-100; Feirerabend and Feirerabend, 1966; Gurr and Ruttenburg, 1967, esp. pp. 28-44; Sanders, 1982], but this may be just as much a threat to authoritarian regimes as to democratic ones. Similarly, the Roman Catholic church is sometimes seen as being an alternative and competitive source of authority within a state [Hobbes, 1968; Lipset, 1959; Aron, 1960, 1968], but this threat is not confined to democratic regimes and, indeed, is more likely to be felt most acutely by the less pluralist regime types. However, there is a need to develop those

problems which are unique to democratic regimes and those which are felt most acutely under democracy. Economic growth, for example, is also relevant to the stability of all regime types but, whereas rapid economic growth has been identified as a major cause of instability in both broadly democratic and authoritarian developing countries [Lipset, 1959; Olson, 1963; Eckstein, 1966; Lijphart, 1968], the slowing down of economic growth is seen as a major threat to stability in the democracies of the developed world [cf. Dowding and Kimber, 1985]. Indeed, this final source of threats is instructive in showing that many of the threats to the stability of political objects emanate from the internal demands of a system, and the fact that individuals feel justified in making such demands is itself conceptually tied to the three democratic principles. Perhaps we can develop this point by its converse: there is at least one threat to regimes that democratic regimes, seen in the abstract, cannot encounter - that is, the threat of democracy. Perhaps the greatest threat that an authoritarian regime can face is the demand of its citizens for greater upward control, equality, and democratic rules to govern the behaviour of the government. If such demands cannot be quashed then fully answering them requires a transformation of the regime. The demand for greater democracy cannot threaten democracy itself, but may threaten the particular institutionalisation of democracy that is being threatened by the demand. Such challenges may indirectly threaten democracy if the consequent changes in the institutions produce other problems (e.g. economic problems, perhaps of the kind envisaged by Olson [1982]). Thus, less democratic regimes may be stable in relation to a greater variety of contingencies than more democratic ones.

One threat, again felt most acutely by democratic regimes, is the persistent instability of authorities in the face of threatening contingencies. For democratic regimes we can see that all threats to the

authorities, if they become persistent, and if they are not coped with, become residual threats to the regime. That is, the persistent non-survival of successive authorities through their inability to deal with threats, becomes a threat to the regime. Formally,⁷

$$(\forall_r)(\forall_g)(([S_{g1}]^c \& !c + S_{g1}) \& ([S_{g2}]^c \& !c + S_{g2}) \& \dots \\ ([S_{gn}]^c \& !c + S_{gn}) \& (c \neq \phi_r)) \rightarrow S_r$$

that is, where the threats to the government do not abate they may become threats to the regime, where these threats are not seen as part of the constitution of the regime.

The regime, as such, does not have the capacity to *respond* to a threat of this type, for the regime is merely that system of rules, norms and behaviours that are exhibited. The regime may be open or closed to such threats, however. That is, given the conditions of the polity the regime may be instrumental in encouraging or discouraging government breakdown. Where the threat is encouraged or develops because of the conditions of the the polity, or a combination of both, then the authorities or (a subset of) the community must possess the capacity to respond.

While it is clear that the stability of Easton's first two political objects is of major interest to political scientists, rather less attention seems to have been paid to the concept of the political community, from a theoretical if not from an empirical point of view. In our original paper on the concept of stability [Dowding & Kimber, 1983] we wrote mainly in relation to the system, the authorities, and the regime, though we argued that our approach was intended to be general and would, *mutatis mutandis* apply to any political object. Since the concept of the community is so completely different from that of the other political objects, it is worth considering its nature and how it relates to stability.

As Easton acknowledges,

"Authorities typically come and go, regimes or constitutional orders may change. In both cases the community may remain quite stable." [1965b, p. 179]

This raises the question of the possibility of the instability of the community. What would it mean? What would the consequences be? Under what circumstances does the community in any form fail to persist? Easton tells us that the key to this is whether all members are willing to conceive of themselves continuing as a group that is part of, and subject to, the same set of processes for arriving at political decisions and taking action [1965b, p. 179-80]. While there are numerous examples of groups wanting to split off and form new communities (e.g. the many nationalist movements), actual secessions are relatively rare, partly because they are prevented by the authorities, and partly because the groups do not always constitute cohesive sub-groups that are sufficiently geographically concentrated to make such a move seem viable. One of the problems of Northern Ireland is that the two groups whose allegiance to the two different political processes is at the root of the problem are intermixed geographically. This, as much as anything else, makes the problem intractable. The success of solutions such as federation or partition depends on a coincidence of political community sub-group boundaries with sensible geographical boundaries.

Clearly, there is more to the question of community instability than the gross question of complete breakdown. There seem to be three dimensions involved: (1) Integration (2) Coherence (3) Affiliation.

By integration we are referring to the extent to which the members of the community share a willingness to be subject to the same political processes. Thus in a completely integrated community, all members are willing to be part of and subject to the same set of processes - the opposite of this is presumably a state of nature. By coherence we mean the

extent to which any lack of integration corresponds to societal groupings on a geographical basis. In a completely coherent situation, involving two complete sets of political processes, it would be possible to draw a geographical line that completely separated the original community into two new communities, each of which would be completely integrated. By affiliation, we refer to the strength of feeling with which members identify with a particular set of political processes. Clearly, individuals may only be weakly committed to a particular set of processes, even if there is complete integration.

These three dimensions may be used to summarise the effects on the rest of the system of threats to the political community. The changing levels of integration, coherence, and affiliation will be particularly significant for the stability of the authorities and the regime. What sorts of threats affect the integration, coherence, and affiliation of a community? And what responses are possible? It is worth pointing out first that there is an intimate relationship between the regime and the community. The community represents the political relationships through which individuals are linked, and through which they pursue their objectives. These relationships are ordered and governed by the regime. This suggests that a measure of the proportion of individuals involved in activity not sanctioned by the regime might be a starting position for an indicator of integration. One problem with this is that it is quite common for people who are antipathetic to a regime to "play the system" at least to some extent.

A low level of integration is not *per se* a threat to anything, much depends on the level of affiliation in the respective groupings. However, threats to the level of integration need to be considered. But what are these? Contingencies of some kind that cause, say, a perfectly integrated community to split into two are hard to envisage on their own. At first

glance, one might reasonably hypothesize that the answer lies in a change of regime; this could certainly cause a split. But where could the impetus for such a change come from? It might come from the authorities; but if not, it must come from the community. But if so, this must mean that there is already a division in the community, and so the change of regime cannot cause the loss of integration. Thus, aside from the influence of the authorities, we must look for factors operating within the community itself. Clearly a change of regime can only be secondary to action by the authorities or a change in the community.

The level of coherence within the community subsets has several implications. When there is a high degree of coherence, it is relatively easy for groups to press their claim and for it to be acceded to (if the will exists). On the other hand, when coherence is low, not only does that make it more difficult for the dissident group to present an effective case, but also it is one that is more difficult to accede to, and therefore the problem is likely to be more persistent. Again, threats to the level of coherence are hard to imagine, and it is not clear what levels are conducive to stability.

As far as affiliation is concerned, a high degree of affiliation among an integrated community would seem to be conducive to stability, though it is not clear what the threats would be - other than actions by the authorities. A low degree of affiliation on the part of a dissident section would presumably not be much of a threat to the main regime. On the other hand, with low integration and high affiliation, the prospect would be bleak. The concept of affiliation is presumably what Easton had in mind when he referred to a sense of community [Easton, p. 183]. In Appendix I we list the logically possible combinations of the three dimensions and discuss some of the implications of each, though we should not assume that all the possibilities correspond to realisable situations.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have set our approach to democracy and stability in a broadly systemic context, and have argued that since stability is concerned with the ability of a political object to survive, and since recognising survival is dependent upon the ability to identify the given political object, how we characterise it is crucial to an understanding of the stability of that object. We have argued, however, that an object's identity is not, as it were, chiselled in granite, but may be subject to change - in the same way that Wittgenstein's rope, while remaining the same rope at each end, nevertheless consists in a changing bundle of elements. The British political system remains, in this sense, the same political system in 1850, 1900, and 1950, because of the continuity from one moment to another in elements that are generally regarded as essential; yet, the same elements are not necessarily present at all moments. How much of this kind of allowable evolutionary change there is depends a great deal on the nature of the object under consideration. In particular, it depends on how broadly the object may meaningfully be characterised. The concept of 'system' is a complex one, with many possible elements, and therefore there is considerable possibility of change. Other concepts are much more specific, and so have a narrower range of possibilities for change. Democracy, for example, to any given investigator in comparative politics should, during the course of a given piece of research, have a fixed meaning with certain essential elements - though these need not be (and, indeed, in our suggested conceptualisation are not) seen as entailing a particular, fixed, pattern of institutional arrangements. With democracy, empirical observation is concerned, then, not with change in the identity of democracy itself, but with changes in the manner in which particular regimes embody the essential democratic principles.

Thus, there are two aspects to the study of democratic stability, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on the continuance of the regime, or of democracy. On the one hand, the stability of particular regimes embodying democracy may be studied. These will be identified in terms of particular rules or institutional arrangements. On the other hand, one may study the stability of democracy in the sense of studying the extent to which successive regimes have embodied the essential features of democracy, and therefore one may study the stability of those features over time.

Since the identification of the authorities seems to present neither particularly difficult theoretical nor particularly intractable empirical problems, we have concentrated our attention on the question of how we might characterise the regime and the political community. In each case we have suggested a three-fold scheme for approaching the concepts.

Our approach to democracy differs from conventional modern approaches particularly in the third characteristic, that of norms limiting the behaviour of members in the system. Robert Dahl [1982] lists five ideal criteria for democracy:

- 1) Equality in voting.
- 2) Effective participation.
- 3) Enlightened understanding.
- 4) Final control over the agenda.
- 5) Inclusion.

Roughly speaking, (2) and (4) correspond to our criterion of upward control, while (1), (3), and (5) correspond to our second criterion of political equality. What is absent from Dahl's list is the idea that there should be a prevailing, accepted, norm to the effect that all behaviour should conform to the requirements of these five criteria, which we believe to be an important aspect of democracy.

More tentatively, we have suggested that the important dimensions of the political community are: the degree to which there are sub-groups that regard different decision-making processes as legitimate; the extent to which these sub-groups are geographically coherent; and the strength of attachment, or affiliation, of members to the particular set of processes they support.

An important aspect of studying stability is the need to distinguish clearly the role in the explanation that is played by each factor that is included - which are threats, which are the political object's resources available for countering the threats, and so on - so that the analysis may be clearly seen to be placed in the context of a body of theory, and is not merely the outcome of a set of factored correlations. Of course, producing an adequate theory is not an easy matter. Section III indicated the complexity of the problem, and the difficulty of producing genuine law-like generalisations. However, while MacIntyre may at times have been unduly pessimistic about this, we do accept his argument regarding the role of culture and the problems this raises for comparative analysis. For this reason, we conclude that analysts should strive harder to ensure that the elements involved in their comparative explanations do not mean different things in different cultural contexts. If they do not ensure this, little progress will be made in understanding which factors contribute to the stability or instability of democracies.

APPENDIX I

Dimensions of the Political Community

1) *high integration, high coherence, high affiliation.*

Clearly there is a distinction between a completely integrated community and one of high but not complete integration. If it is completely integrated (presumably a rare quality) then the main sources of threats are likely to be three: the authorities might act in such a way as to cause a rift in the community; there may be some form of immigration bringing in alternative values from outside, or setting up pressures that lead to an erosion of support for the regime; or some issue might arise internally that divides the people such that they are unwilling to remain a part of the political process that produces such a result. Of course with a strong sense of community, issues are less likely to have such an effect. One feature of non-democratic regimes is that the authorities are likely to play a much greater role in preserving the integration of the community. Indeed, a fully integrated community is likely to have been formed by the coercive action of earlier authorities [Easton, 1965b, p. 186] and it is ironic that in a democracy the very coercion which could maintain the community is ruled out, except perhaps *in extremis*. If the integration is high but not complete, the situation is probably rather different. It really depends on the significance of the dissident group(s), in relation to the total. One very large sub-group is clearly more of a problem than several very small ones, even when the latter are highly coherent and have strong senses of community. How one may approach this problem is not clear. In the former case, however, there would seem to be a strong challenge to the status quo and also a practical solution for the authorities if they are willing to grasp it. Presumably an example of this kind of situation was pre-revolutionary America, although the authorities

resisted and the obvious solution had to be forced on them.

high integration, high coherence, low affiliation.

This seems to be inherently less of a threat to the established order when integration is less than perfect, because of the poor sense of community involved. Though because of the latter, it is presumably somewhat vulnerable.

high integration, low coherence, high affiliation.

Leaving aside the unlikely case of perfect integration, this seems to represent the case of Northern Ireland, where there are basically only two significant competing groups, but they are groups fairly widely dispersed through the geographical area, and are of high affiliation. This is a particularly difficult combination of factors.

high integration, low coherence, low affiliation.

This is less of an immediate problem for the authorities, because of the poorly developed sense of community. Though with low affiliation in the competing groups, the situation appears vulnerable. Of course we are ignoring here the obvious other complications, such as having two competing communities one of which has a highly developed sense of community, the other having a poor sense of community. Clearly we cannot describe every possible combination here.

low integration, high coherence, high affiliation.

This seems like an impossible and highly unstable situation, with many small highly coherent groupings with a strong sense of community. In such a situation one would not expect it to survive as an entity, but that it would break up into its component parts. This situation seems like a tribal one, and emphasises the difficulty of uniting tribal groupings. Again, much depends on the size of the sub-groups in relation to the whole; small ones would not constitute a serious problem.

Low integration, high coherence, low affiliation.

Perhaps, given the low affiliation here, the authorities could hold this together. This situation might be analogous to the Tanzanian example, where there are a number of tribes, but with the possibility of combining them into a unified political community.

Low integration, low coherence, high affiliation.

A curious, and perhaps very unlikely state of affairs, corresponding, in the limit, most nearly to Hobbes's state of nature.

Low integration, low coherence, low affiliation.

NOTES

- * We should like to thank F.W. Bealey for reading, and making helpful comments on, an earlier draft.
1. The essentialism we mean will to some extent be discussed below, but we do not mean by the term that which Popper defines [Popper, 1974, p. 1115] and attacks [Popper, 1961, 1966, etc.]. Popper's essentialism is a doctrine about the ontological status of universals, whereas our use of the term is a doctrine about the method of denoting (naming) an object (individual or universal) by a description said to be necessary for that denotation. However, it would be probably true to say that Popper would take exception to our views here as well.
 2. Whilst radical change is proof of instability this does not imply any value judgements about the desirability or otherwise of change through instability.
 3. The following argument is based upon that of Jonathan Dancy [1981], though his use of it is directed against the moral claim of the universalizability of moral judgements and not the scientific generalization of explanations of behaviour.
 4. For one argument about their analyticity, and problems of such a view, see Kyburg [1977].
 5. Also, if existence is not a true predicate, its use would be incorrect as well as otiose. Note: of course we could also use $! [S_p]^c$ since the possible state of instability of p relative to ϕ (i.e. the dispositional property of p) also exists.
 6. See the essays in Holtzman and Leich [1981], especially McDowell, for the notion of rules that are unspecifiable except extensionally; *cf.* also Popper [1961, p. 66] who suggests that this is a "technological law of social science."
 7. Where ϕ_x means ϕ characterizes x . Something may characterize x essentially, or it may just characterize it. Here we will assume ϕ characterizes essentially, but the relation may hold even if ϕ is a non-identifying partial description of x .

REFERENCES

- AKE, C., (1974) "Modernization and Political Instability: A Theoretical Explanation" *World Politics*, 26, pp. 576-591.
- AKE, C., (1975) "A Definition of Political Stability" *Comparative Politics*, 7, pp. 271-283.
- ARON, R., (1960) *France: Steadfast and Changing*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- ARON, R., (1968) *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- BARRY, B., (1980) "Is it Better to be Born Powerful or Lucky?" Part I, *Political Studies*, 28, pp. 183-198.
- BUDGE, I., (1984) "Parties and Democratic Government: A Framework for Comparative Exploration", *West European Politics*, 7, pp. 95-118.
- BUDGE, I., and FARLIE, D., (1981) "Predicting Regime Change: A Cross-National Investigation with Aggregate Data 1950-1980", *Quality and Quantity*, 15, pp. 335-364.
- DAHL, R.A., (1961) "The Behavioural Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest", *American Political Science Review*, 55, pp. 763-772.
- DAHL, R.A., (1982) *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs Control*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- DANCY, J., (1981) "On Moral Properties", *Mind*, XL, pp. 367-385.
- DAVIES, J.C., (1962) "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, 27, pp. 5-13.
- DOWDING, K.M., and KIMBER, R., (1983a) "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability'", *European Journal of Political Research*, 11, pp. 229-243.
- DOWDING, K.M., and KIMBER, R., (1983b) "Stability as a Pattern of Behaviour: a Critique" *Keele Research Papers, No: 15*, Department of Politics, University of Keele.
- DOWDING, K.M., and KIMBER, R., (1985) "Pluralism, Economic Growth, and Democratic Stability", paper for ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Barcelona.
- EASTON, D., (1965a) *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- EASTON, D., (1965b) *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- ECKSTEIN, H., (1966) *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- EVANS, M., (1970) "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System", *Journal of Commonwealth Studies*, 8, pp. 117-132.
- FEIERABEND, R., and FEIERABEND, I., (1966) "Aggressive Behaviour Within Politics, 1948-1963: A Cross-National Study", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16, pp. 249-271.
- FINER, S.E., (1969) "Almond's Concept of 'The Political System': A Textual Critique", *Government and Opposition*, vol. 5 no. 1, pp. 3-21.
- GURR, T.R., and RUTTENBURG, C., (1967) *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- HOBBS, T., (1651) *Leviathan*, (ed. C. B. Macpherson, 1968), Book III and IV., Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- HOLTZMAN, S.H., and LEICH, C.M., eds., (1981) *Wittgenstein; To follow a Rule*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- HURWITZ, L., (1973) "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability", *Comparative Politics*, 5, pp. 449-463.
- LAKATOS, I., (1978) *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers 1*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LEHMBRUCH, G., and SCHMITTER, P., eds., (1982) *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, Beverly Hills: Sage.
- LESLIE, P., (1972) "General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis", *British Journal of Political Science*, 2, pp. 155-172.
- LIJPHART, A., (1968) *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley: California University Press.
- LIJPHART, A., (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- LIPSET, S.M., (1959) *Political Man*, New York: Doubleday.
- KYBURG, H.E., (1977) "All Acceptable Generalizations are Analytic", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 14, pp. 201-210.
- MACINTYRE, A., (1973) "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Ryan, ed., [1973].
- MACINTYRE, A., (1981) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, London: Duckworth.
- OLSON, M., (1963) "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force", *Journal of Economic History*, 23, pp. 529-532.
- ORDESHOOK, P.C., (1982) "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Enquiry", in Ordeshook and Shepsle, eds., [1982] pp. 25-31.

- ORDESHOOK, P.C., and SHEPSLE, K.A., eds., (1982) *Political Equilibrium*, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Pub.
- POPPER, K., (1961) *The Poverty of Historicism*, (2nd edition with corrections), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- POPPER, K., (1966) *The Open Society and its Enemies* (5th edition), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- POPPER, K., (1972a) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Fifth Edition), London: Hutchinson.
- POPPER, K., (1972b) *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- POPPER, K., (1974) "Agassi on Modified Conventionalism", in Schilpp (ed) [1974].
- QUINE, W. V. O., (1960) *Word and Object* Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- RIKER, W., (1982a) "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions", in Ordeshook and Shepsle, eds., [1982] pp. 3-24.
- RIKER, W., (1982b) *Liberalism Against Populism*, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co.
- RIKER, W., and ORDESHOOK, P., (1973) *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- RUMMEL, R.J., (1963) "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations", *General Systems Yearbook*, 8, pp. 1-50.
- RUSSETT, B., et al., (1964) *World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- RYAN, A., ed., (1973) *The Philosophy of Social Explanation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SANDERS, D., (1981) *Patterns of Political Instability*, London: MacMillan.
- SCHILPP, P.A., ed., (1974) *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, volume II, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Pub.
- SCHMITTER, P., and LEHMBRUCH, G., eds., (1979) *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*, Beverly Hills: Sage.
- WARE, A., (1979) *The Logic of Party Democracy*, London: MacMillan.

B85 SD
f 1-00

Draft: Not for Quotation, Comments Welcome

ETHNO-POLITICAL ACTIVITY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY

Lee E. Dutter

Department of Political Science
University of Illinois
Box 4348
Chicago IL 60680
USA

Prepared for Delivery to the
European Consortium for Political Research
Workshop on Democratic Stability
Barcelona Spain
March 1985

INTRODUCTION

At first glance, "stability," "democracy," and "stable democracy," when used to characterize a given set of political and governmental institutions, might appear to be relatively straightforward terms. This, of course, is not the case. A plethora of definitional and operational problems and conundrums attend all three (e.g., Ake, 1975; Barry, 1978; Dowding and Kimber, 1983; Eisson and Lane, 1983; Hurwitz, 1973; Lijphart, 1975, 1977a). These compound efforts to assess the impact on a given "stable democracy" of the myriad internal and external problems or "threatening contingencies" that it might conceivably face.

On the other hand, the identification of individuals or groups who might pose such contingencies for any set of political and governmental institutions or incumbent regime appears, prime facie, to be a more promising endeavor. In other words, can we identify individuals and/or groups whose potential or manifest political behavior may have significant ramifications for the functioning, if not the existence, of an incumbent regime. Identifiable forms of "deviant" political behavior are, surely, the initial steps in the "destabilization" of any system, democratic or not. Thus, the understanding, explanation, and prediction of such behaviors should be necessary preconditions for assessing any long-term systemic consequences.

This paper focuses on the political behavior of ethnic groups, one potential source of threatening contingencies. Its principal goal is to elucidate more clearly, although briefly, the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno-political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning, not necessarily the "stability," of "democratic" political and governmental institutions. A related objective is the identification or delineation of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno-political activity and some assessment of the efficacy of these policies in resolving ethnic "grievances" and, thus, obviating the threatening contingency that a given group might pose.

THE FORMATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The development of a primordial "group" depends upon anthropological, economic, psychological, and sociological variables such as region or territoriality, means of livelihood, kinship, customs or way of life, religion, language and literature, and formal organizations (Hall, 1979; Ra'anan, 1980; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982; Rothschild, 1981). These group "markers," many of which can be objectively identified, typically evolve into a subjective "collective identity system" (Spicer, 1971) or group "consciousness," composed mainly of moral and cultural values and beliefs, common perceptions and interpretations

of historical events, and a set of well-defined rituals which, among other things, reinforce and perpetuate this consciousness.

Contact with other groups stimulates the development of a we-they perception and transforms a group consciousness into the foundation of an "ethnic" identity (McKay, 1982; Nagel and Olzak, 1982; Ross, 1982; Williams, 1982). Ethnicity can then be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics which derive principally from an individual's birth and upbringing. While physical appearance may be relevant, it is, in essence, composed of psychological elements which are not only self-perceptions, but also perceptions of other, contiguous groups.

These characteristics cannot be shed or significantly altered, even if an individual desires to do so, as easily as purely acquired or adopted characteristics such as occupation. Thus, the individual is forever "stigmatized" by his group of origin and, if ethnic and political divisions coincide, the switching of ethno-political affiliations is a very rare occurrence (Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Horowitz, 1982; Lijphart, 1977b; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Rothschild, 1981). In other words, political divisions based on ethnic identities are, it can be argued, qualitatively different from those based on individuals' socio-economic characteristics or adopted ideology. In the latter instances, the individual can, with comparative ease, adapt to a specific group or political party and be accepted and, later on, switch to another.

Hostile contacts with and/or "encroachments" by out groups can not only reinforce, as well as hasten, the development of a we-they perception, but also stimulate the appearance of a perceived need for collective action by the group in order to defend itself and to preserve its collective identity and the socio-economic status quo. Thus, a "political agenda" develops and there emerges a "hierarchy of values" or goals, i.e., individuals perceive that their group loyalty and political actions directed toward group benefit take precedence over all potential or real competing loyalties such as social class, which may temporarily or inadvertently cut across group boundaries.

Prior to political action, ethnicity can form the basis of a perceptual and intracommunal consensus on policy alternatives (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Seliktar, 1984). Here, a question of particular relevance is: Why do some ethnically-diverse societies witness the appearance, development, and persistence of ethno-political activity, especially organized violence or terrorism, while others do not? A major part of the answer can be found in the distinction between a "nation-state" and a "territorial state," a distinction to which we now turn.

THE FORMATION OF TERRITORIAL-STATES

Since the Renaissance, we have seen the gradual development and spread throughout the world of the modern, European "nation-state" with, in the 20th century, three main characteristics: (1) the identification of a specific geographic area and the demarcation of a physical boundary around it; (2) within that boundary, the development of centralized, complex governmental and administrative structures, an incumbent regime, which controls, monitors, or otherwise regulates the economic, military, political, and social affairs of that geographic area; and (3) an attitudinally, culturally,

or ethnically homogenous population within that boundary which is "legitimately" or effectively governed by that incumbent regime. Typically, in the "successful" nation-state, the development of a relatively homogenous population preceded the appearance of (1) and (2), whose leaders then brought these into existence. In other words, the (European) nation-state is a major manifestation of a group's cultural or ethnic identity and the principal manifestation of its ethno-political identity (e.g., represents the psychological boundary of the regime's legitimacy).

On the other hand, a "territorial-state" has (1) and (2), but to some extent lacks (3), i.e., during its formation, the physical boundary of the regime's authority came to exceed the psychological boundary of its legitimacy. The process by which a territorial-state is formed can constitute a principal source of "encroachment" by one or more groups on others and, thus, can be a major factor in the development of ethno-political identity and all forms of ethno-political activity. Hence, a necessary precondition to the appearance of ethno-political identities and the development of ethno-political activity is the formation of an ethnically-heterogenous territorial-state.

How have ethnically-heterogenous territorial-states originated? Among their principal sources are: (1) negotiation and consensus (e.g., the Swiss confederation); (2) "accidents" of history (e.g., the enormous, voluntary immigration into the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries); (3) long past historical events (e.g., French defeat in Canada in the 1760s); (4) the "residue" of European colonial rule which, of course, introduced (1) and (2) into many regions of the world without regard to (3). It is to history, then, that we must first turn when assessing the probabilities of the formation of ethno-political identities and the development of ethno-political activity, our next subjects of concern.

THE FORMATION OF ETHNO-POLITICAL IDENTITIES

As implied, the probabilities of the formation of ethno-political identities and the development of ethno-political activity are fundamentally related to the origin of a given territorial-state. This origin can result in comparatively harmonious, non-politicized ethnic relations or it can create a sense of grievance which, while generations old, is an integral part of a group's collective memory and is perpetuated by the current political status quo.

How does ethnic heterogeneity in a territorial-state get transformed into a conflictual, ethno-political heterogeneity? In general, this transformation depends upon the psychological "milieu" of a group's members and the resultant behavior of its old or new, emergent ethno-political leaders. This milieu is rooted in the collective memories and ethno-historical experiences of the group. First and foremost, it depends upon the answers to five basic questions regarding the origin and composition of the territorial-state.

Did the development of its constituent groups precede the establishment of the territorial-state and how long before the state's appearance did the groups appear? If the first answer is yes, then, the longer the groups have been in existence, the greater the probabilities of ethno-political identity formation and the appearance of ethno-political activity. Very simply, indi-

viduals will find it difficult to transfer quickly, if at all, their allegiance and loyalty from their "natural" group of origin to any new, "artificial," supra-group institutions or organizations.

How did its constituent groups come to be in the territorial-state? Were its boundaries "imposed" on them? Were they "negotiated" and accepted by all? Or were they already defined and then group members "voluntarily" settled within them? If imposition, coercion, and/or forced settlement were involved, then the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased. Such actions, which can be called "primordial encroachments," typically reinforce group identity and loyalty and strengthen individuals' emergent sense of ethno-political grievance.

How many identifiable groups does the territorial-state contain? If groups are few in number, then the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased (Mason,1971; Rabushka and Shepsle,1972). In this case, group members can more easily identify themselves and others, perceive the political issues that divide them from other groups, and organize to pursue ethno-political goals with a higher probability of success. On the other hand, a situation of numerous groups complicates these matters and is likely to facilitate domination by one relatively large group or multiethnic coalition.

What proportion of the territorial-state's population does each group constitute? The distribution of these proportions is, of course, somewhat correlated with the number of groups. However, if group populations are close to equality, then identity formation and political activity are more likely. Again, it is easier for group members to identify themselves and others and relevant political issues. Also, relatively large numbers enhance the probability of achieving ethno-political objectives. By contrast, if one group predominates, then it can more easily acquire sufficient influence to achieve its goals and is more likely to have sufficient numbers to enforce, however tenuously, its political will and social "peace" on the others (Mason,1971; Rabushka and Shepsle,1972).

Are group members regionally concentrated in their traditional "homelands" or widely dispersed throughout the territorial-state? On the one hand, dispersion, whether voluntary or forced, can again facilitate control by a dominant group, a variation on the ancient maxim of "divide and rule." On the other, if group members are concentrated, then some of the "disadvantages" of its small numbers facing numerous other groups are attenuated. Ceteris paribus, large, localized majorities can more easily organize to pursue political goals successfully. Thus, the probabilities of identity formation and political activity are increased.

For instance, Kowalewski(1979) estimated that from 1966 to 1977, the Soviet Baltic republics accounted for approximately 19% of all dissident political demonstrations in the USSR, while constituting only 2% of the Soviet population. In a democratic context, Northern Ireland was created in 1921 and maintained by a localized, unified, intense, Protestant/unionist majority. Its institutions eventually came to grief in the 1970s due to the opposition of a localized, largely united, intense, Catholic/nationalist minority, despite the fact that both groups are only tiny fractions of the population of the British Isles.

A second major consideration is the formal structure of the territorial-

state's governmental and political institutions. In other words, what is its "constitution"? Also, how do these institutions operate? Or, what formal and informal political practices are displayed in the processes of collective decision making and policy implementation?

Regarding the structure of governmental and political institutions, some relevant questions are: If a territorial-state has a federal structure, do its constituent units explicitly reflect ethnic divisions? If it has a unitary structure, is formal or informal recognition given to ethnic groups? Are the boundaries of electoral districts drawn so that groups obtain some local and/or national representation through elected officials, especially if the groups are regionally concentrated? Under what ground rules are elections conducted, i.e., a single-member-district, plurality-winner system or some form of proportional representation? Again, do the procedures result in the consistent election of some group representatives?

Affirmative answers to these questions should, on the whole, decrease the probabilities of identity formation and political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism. Such efforts to involve groups directly in the processes of government and politics can give them a tangible stake in the existing system and reassure group members that their individual and group identities and socio-economic positions will not be threatened by the incumbent regime. Thus, depending in part on the degree of involvement, the perceived need for separate, vigorous, disputatious political action will be diminished.

On the related issue of the extent to which formal and informal political and decision-making and policy-implementation practices take ethnicity into account, some relevant considerations are: (1) proportionality or special consideration in governmental programs or fiscal allocations; (2) acceding to the principal goals of a group; (3) offering positive incentives, especially to selected individuals, in order to defuse potentially divisive issues or organizations; (4) disproportionate economic or welfare benefits and/or positive discrimination targeted on a particular group (Etzioni-Halevy, 1975; Lijphart, 1977a, 1975; Smooha, 1978).

Such constitutional, political, and policy approaches, as well as other "conflict-management" techniques, which regime incumbents might adopt can be problematic. They can, at least in the short run, defuse conflictual or potentially destabilizing ethno-political demands for the reasons outlined. On the other hand, in the long run, they can encourage and perpetuate individuals' perceptions of political issues and activities in ethnic terms. New issues may then arise, stimulate new demands, and, in turn, lead to renewed conflict or instability (Dutter, 1984). For instance, consistent, disproportionate government benefits or positive discrimination are likely, over time, to stimulate resentment and related political action by other groups in the territorial-state (Smooha, 1978).

A final consideration, related to institutional formation and operations, is the general behavior of regime incumbents who occupy the key decision-making positions in those institutions. In the face of latent or manifest ethno-political demands, these incumbents can follow one or a mixture of three basic approaches: (1) do nothing; (2) accommodate; (3) repress. The exact policy mix that they follow, or are able to follow, is another crucial factor in the politicization of ethnicity and progression thru the analytically

separable phases of ethno-political activity, our next foci of attention.

THE PHASES OF ETHNO-POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The primary factors in the formation, cohesion, and maintenance of an ethno-political identity are group members' collective memories and interpretations of ethno-historical events. These memories are a mixture of "old" and "new" elements. Old elements, originating in earlier generations, provide a psychological backdrop against which new elements, those within the living memory and experience of the present generation, are absorbed into the collective memory and then interpreted as guides for current and future political action. Ethno-political leaders are not only carriers, but also the principal articulators and interpreters of these memories and experiences. Indeed, they are chosen or elected primarily because they are best able to perform these functions (e.g., Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Tilly, 1978).

Thus, the first phase of ethno-political activity is the appearance of leadership "cadres" or ethno-political entrepreneurs, who engage in four major, overlapping, but analytically-separable activities: (1) defining ethno-political goals (e.g., economic advancement, political power); (2) articulating these goals for and to group followers; (3) presenting these to regime incumbents; (4) mobilizing and recruiting ethnic followers into organizations for political action in pursuit of these goals, which overlaps with the next phase.

An important variation of this first phase applies to former colonies, namely, a united, inter-ethnic, anti-colonial leadership was often instrumental in winning independence. After independence, these united leaderships typically fractionated as internal political issues replaced the independence question. In addition, new ethno-political entrepreneurs often emerged and outbid established leaders for ethnic followers if the latter failed to move quickly to the above-mentioned activities (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Another variation, which applies primarily to democratic political systems and has implications for the emergence and development of organized violence, is that, regardless of the origins of ethno-political leaders, intra-ethnic divisions may appear over the strategy and tactics required to achieve ethno-political goals, but not over the goals themselves (Dutter, 1985).

The second phase can be labeled "normal" politics. In the democratic context, resulting primarily from the activities of ethno-political entrepreneurs, this phase includes the appearance and development of organizations and political parties, as well as differential patterns of ethno-electoral behavior. Here, important observable factors are: (1) the issues relevant to elections; (2) the behavior of ethno-political entrepreneurs; (3) candidate/party/entrepreneur positions on electoral issues; (4) each citizen's perceptions of candidate/party/entrepreneur issue positions; (5) each citizen's evaluations of candidate/party/entrepreneur positions in light of what s/he would like government to do; (6) the probability that a given candidate/party/entrepreneur can win the current or subsequent elections; (7) the formal and informal rules or procedures under which elections and government formation are conducted; (8) the relationship of (1)-(7) to each citizen's decisions of whether or not and for whom to vote; and (9) the composition of the resultant govern-

ment and the policies which it adopts (Dutter,1978,1981,1982,1985; Rabushka and Shepsle,1972).

The third phase can be labeled "abnormal" politics (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically-based, politically-motivated marches, demonstrations, protests, or strikes by one or more "dissident" groups or organizations). The fourth phase can be labeled "sporadic" violence (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically-based, politically-motivated, but essentially spontaneous riots, murders, or bombings). The fifth phase can be labeled "organized" violence (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically-based, politically-motivated and premeditated riots, assassinations, bombings, terrorism, coups, or civil war). For a given territorial-state, progression thru the phases, especially these latter three, and the observed frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each depends upon five major factors.

First, is there or has there been an external threat to the formation and/or continued existence of the territorial-state and all of its inhabitants? If the answer is yes, then, depending upon the magnitude of the perceived or real threat, the less the expected progression thru the phases and the less the observed frequency and severity of activities under each (Esman,1977; Lijphart, 1975; Nordlinger,1972; Seliktar and Dutter,1983). By contrast, if one or more internal groups has external links, then, if anything, the frequency and severity of ethno-political activity will be increased and exacerbated (e.g., American, British, and Irish involvement in Northern Ireland; Greeks and Turks in Cyprus; Palestinians, Syrians, and Israelis in Lebanon).

Second, what is the nature and substance of ethno-political goals? At least three categories of goals can be identified in increasing order of their implications for the long-run survival of an existing territorial-state: (1) symbolic or substantive goals (e.g., economic advancement or more political power within extant societal structures and governmental institutions); (2) constitutional or procedural goals (e.g., a desire for regionally-based, political autonomy or federation within the boundaries of the territorial-state); (3) fundamental political goals (e.g., separatism and/or irredentism which, of course, imply alteration or dissolution of the existing territorial-state). In general, the greater are the potential consequences of ethno-political goals for the survival of a territorial-state, the farther will be the progression thru the phases and the greater will be the observed frequency and severity of activities under each, but especially the latter three.

Third, to what extent are regime incumbents, especially key decision makers, drawn from one ethnic group? If one group predominates, then non-members will likely expect, whether justifiably or not, that at least some policy decisions will significantly or systematically favor the incumbents' group of origin. This expectation could easily receive psychological foundation or reinforcement if the incumbents are perceived to be slow or unwilling to respond to "reasonable" ethno-political demands (e.g., redress of economic disparities), which an "aggrieved" group has voiced through the normal or "legal" avenues of political action, or if they are violating or manipulating the formal and informal "rules" of the political "game" in order to remain in power (Rabushka and Shepsle,1972). Exacerbating this latter situation are the extent to which and how long regime incumbents have engaged in such practices. If these conditions obtain, then the farther will be the expected progression thru the phases and the greater will be the frequency and severity of activities under each.

Fourth, what are or have been the policy responses of regime incumbents to fully articulated ethno-political goals or demands? Doing nothing literally invites progression thru the third, fourth, and fifth phases, especially in the face of unsatisfied ethno-political demands articulated by ethno-political entrepreneurs who are supported by significant numbers of fully mobilized and organized ethnic followers.

In the abstract, accommodation would appear to be a more promising avenue. Among other things, it can include negotiations (e.g., allow group representatives to prepare their own recommendations and then implement many, if not all, of them) or granting autonomy or independence to the traditional ethnic homeland(s). However, in some situations, depending in part on the comprehensiveness of ethno-political goals, accommodation may not be feasible or desirable. First, as noted, special benefits to one group are likely to provoke reactive, disputatious political action by other groups. Second, conceding may solve one set of problems and create another (e.g., a dissatisfied, militant Protestant minority in a "united" Ireland, independent of Britain). Third, regime incumbents may be psychologically unprepared to trade their present, if tenuous, economic and political dominance for an uncertain future.

While it might be effective in the short-run, the ignoring of ethno-political goals or demands and the active repression of the ethno-political leaders who articulate them do not constitute an efficacious, long-run "solution," particularly if it is the sole response and used against various forms of non-violent political action. First and most obvious, the territorial-state will soon lose much of the substance, if not the appearance, of "democracy." Second, repression is likely to add incidents and martyrs to the dissident group's collective memory which will reinforce past feelings of grievance and again demonstrate the incurable "evil" of the subjugating group. Third and most important, it is likely to stimulate the very actions, which might not appear otherwise, that repression is intended to control or to prevent. In addition, more extreme measures such as the dispersion or expulsion or indiscriminate killing of group members could eventually return, for example, in the form of external attacks on the territorial-state or its external agents by expellees or their descendants (e.g., Armenian attacks on Turkish diplomats).

Such approaches or policies are also likely to have two additional effects with, from regime incumbents' point of view, negative consequences: (1) heightening group members' feelings of insecurity regarding their group and/or individual, physical survival; and (2) hastening the spread of "risk-acceptant" attitudes among group members, i.e., increase their willingness to support and/or to engage in physically risky political actions. These effects will, of course, increase the probability of progression thru the third, fourth, and fifth phases of ethno-political activity, as well as the frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each.

Similarly, quasi-coercive actions (e.g., "homogenizing" educational policies), ostensibly designed to reduce group differences gradually, are more likely to incite short-run resistance, as well as fail in the long-run to destroy or even to weaken a group heritage and collective memory which have been generations, perhaps centuries, in the making. In other words, they are likely to be perceived as additional, sinister attempts to emasculate group culture, if not to harm its members directly.

In this same context, an important question is: Can long-run, non-coercive or "natural" processes (e.g., economic development, emergent "value consensus," inter-marriage, social "integration," "cross-cutting" organizational memberships, demographic changes) eliminate, or at least diminish, ethnic divisions and, thus, obviate the political "problems" that these can present? This is possible, but the available evidence suggests that such processes typically result in, at best, cosmetic changes and a superficial homogenization (e.g., Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977).

For instance, consider economic development. If inter-group contacts follow a superior-inferior pattern, accompanied by perceived discrimination against the latter, then economic "progress" may do more to heighten ethnic awareness and tensions than to alleviate them, even if everyone's standard of living is rising (Smoocha, 1978). Prosperity can also contribute to the appearance and development of ethno-political activity through the education of potential leaders and the accumulation of financial resources which can be devoted to the mobilization and organization of ethnic followers.

The fifth major factor, long-run generational dynamics, concerns repetitions of the phases. More specifically, if regime incumbents adopt and retain coercive or repressive policies, which may successfully contain ethno-political demands and activities in the short-run, then, in addition to the abovementioned effects, risk-acceptant attitudes are likely to spread to group members' descendants thru the socialization process. This will increase not only the probability of progression thru all the phases in the current generation, but also the probability of reprogression thru them in subsequent generations (Dutter, 1984). For instance, throughout the 20th century, the Irish Republican Army has failed to achieve its goal of a united Ireland, independent of Britain, and Ireland has seen four periods of major IRA activity; 1916-23, 1939-40, 1956-7, and 1970 to the present (Buckland, 1981; Darby, 1983; Murray, 1984). Each period has been met with repression by both the British and Irish Governments, followed by approximately fifteen years of "peace," sufficient time for the next generation of children and adolescents to be socialized, to reach adulthood, and to resume the "struggle."

ETHNO-POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

General Discussion

Ethnically-heterogenous territorial-states, which also display ethno-political heterogeneity, are sometimes called "plural" societies. Extant theoretical and empirical writings on these have found not only that democratic governmental and political institutions are likely to face multiple, serious "threatening contingencies," but also that there is a significant probability of their demise (e.g., Lijphart, 1975, 1977a; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Moreover, ostensibly democratic institutions may be considerably more fragile than they might appear to be. For instance, despite fifty years of existence, Northern Ireland's institutions rapidly "failed" when faced with their first major, "normal" political challenge from the dissident, Catholic-Irish ethnic minority. From the first civil-rights demonstrations in 1968 to the suspension by the British Government of its parliament in 1972 was less than four years.

In many plural societies, all five phases of ethno-political activity have appeared, often following the temporal progression implicit in the preceding discussion. Needless to say, the most serious threatening contingency to democratic institutions is the appearance of organized violence of which terrorism is one major manifestation. In this context, it can be tentatively defined as organized violence initiated by a conspiratorial, surreptitious organization and directed at the domestic symbols, personnel, and supportive population of the incumbent regime and/or its international extensions. Its principal cause can be found in a regime's perceived failure to satisfy the major policy demands of the organization's "host" ethnic group (Allemann, 1980; Fetscher, 1980; Laqueur, 1977; Murray, 1984; Wilkinson, 1977).

There are a number of noteworthy differences between ethno-political terrorism and other forms such as that based on quasi-ideological movements (e.g., Baader-Meinhoff, Red Brigades). First, while its proportion of the territorial-state's population may be minuscule, the absolute size of the group in which the terrorists originate is likely to be considerably larger. Second, as a consequence, the amount of verbal and material support upon which the terrorists can rely is also likely to be greater. Third, these two differences will also make it easier for an embryonic organization to gain initial recruits and, later on, to obtain replacements for those captured, injured, disabled, or killed.

Fourth, these first three differences typically lead to a greater frequency and/or severity of terrorist attacks, at least in the initial stages of the organization's activities. Fifth, inter-generational dynamics give ethnically-based terrorism a greater potential for long-run persistence. More specifically, ideologically-motivated terrorists, who are usually attracted to a cause or movement as young adults, may single out the ideas and actions of an intellectual "ancestor" as their stimuli for joining and participating. On the other hand, due mainly to their socialization as children and their ability to point to "real," blood or group ancestors as role models and emotive antecedents, ethno-political terrorists invariably have significantly more psychological engagement in and attachment to their cause, which they, in turn, can pass along to the next generation.

Finally, underlying everything is the hierarchy of values or goals alluded to earlier. Individuals in the plural society typically display a "lexicographic" ordering of the dimensions or attributes on which these values or goals are based. In other words, ethno-political objectives must be satisfied before socio-economic divisions and issues can become politically salient and "trade-offs" on these are not acceptable or even considered without satisfaction of the ethno-political goals. This is one important reason why it can be argued that ethno-political cleavages are qualitatively different (Dutter, 1981, 1982).

The lexicographic structure of the psychological foundation of ethno-political objectives has two major consequences. First, socio-economic divisions within ethnic groups in the plural society are largely irrelevant politically. What relevance they have lies in the observed patterns of leader-follower recruitment and relations. Typically, the ethnic "middle" class constitutes the bulk of the entrepreneurship/leadership group which then mobilizes and organizes ethnic "working" or "lower" class followers. Second and more important, unless economic grievances are the catalysts for ethno-political activity, tangible incentives or rewards cannot "buy off" the ultimate pursuit of ethno-political goals, although these may attenuate the urgency or perceived need

for accomplishment of the goals and thus reduce somewhat the probability of organized violence.

These considerations further complicate the policy process for incumbent regimes, especially if ethno-terrorist incidents have already occurred. Also, democratic regimes face some difficulties not generally shared by their authoritarian or totalitarian counterparts (e.g., Wilkinson, 1977). First, their "openness" would present, at least initially, more potential "targets" for organized violence and could facilitate attacks on them due to, for example, greater freedom of movement. Second, this "problem" is likely to be compounded by a greater initial restraint or lethargy by regime incumbents in the formulation, adoption, and implementation of active and passive counter-measures. This may also limit the stringency of the measures initially adopted.

For instance, while mass incarceration might be acceptable in some situations (e.g., Japanese Americans in World War II), democratic "norms" militate against extreme policies such as "preemptive genocide" or even the forced dispersion of the host group. However, in the face of recurring violence, such psychological restraints, in both the regime incumbents and the out-group population, do eventually erode (e.g., the adoption of extraordinary security and judicial procedures in Northern Ireland).

Long-run consequences are also likely. One is the significant degradation or possible destruction of "democratic" governmental and political institutions and/or the prospects for their eventual restoration (e.g., Nigeria). Another is the erosion or stunting of democratic norms in the general population, i.e., the attitudinal support structure generally viewed as necessary for the maintenance and perpetuation of "democracy." This would depend, of course, on the frequency and severity of the ethno-political terrorism, the nature and stringency of the counter-measures, and the length of time that these measures are in force.

For instance, does the routine screening of their persons and luggage, designed, of course, to reduce the frequency of airplane hijackings, undermine over time the widely-accepted norms that citizens have a right to privacy and to be free from "unreasonable" searches and seizures? The additional "ripple" effects of such measures could include the stereotyping of members of the host group as the cause of all political and other trouble, i.e., the development of a perception of collective guilt which may "poison" interpersonal relations and exacerbate inter-group tensions, and a quicker acceptance in the future of measures against that group, as well as others, at the slightest hint of trouble (e.g., activities subsumed under phases three or four).

Israel illustrates some of these possibilities. As noted by Seliktar (1984), some observers characterize it as an emergent "Herrenvolk" democracy, which is reflected in the attitudes and behavior of regime incumbents and many Israeli Jews toward pre-1967 Israeli Arabs; inhabitants of the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan, and Lebanon; and the Palestinian refugee population. Conflictual attitudes and behavior are also apparent between ethnically and ideologically diverse groups of Israeli Jews (Dutter, 1977, 1983; Etzioni-Halevy with Shapira, 1977; Seliktar and Dutter, 1983; Smooha, 1978). As a consequence, there are grounds on which to question both the present quality and future viability of Israeli "democracy." For instance, Dutter (1977), examining survey data from the late 1960s, found that majorities of Israeli Jews agreed with the statements

that "elections do not actually affect policy" and that "a few strong leaders could be more useful for the State than all the debates and laws."

Reviewing briefly, when faced with the potential or real prospect of ethno-political terrorism, an incumbent regime encounters four principal problems: (1) preventing or resolving immediate (e.g., hostage) situations; (2) apprehending and dealing with perpetrators; (3) formulating, adopting, and implementing preventive counter-measures; (4) formulating, adopting, and implementing policies (e.g., economic) designed to reduce incentives in the host group for future organized violence.

These problems, as well as our earlier discussion, can be thrown into sharper relief thru a more detailed examination of one group whose members would have ostensibly appeared unlikely to engage in organized violence, but nevertheless did. This group is not, of course, truly representative of the entire ethno-political world. However, by focusing on a few salient aspects of its history and behavior, we can illustrate the potential applicability of our analytical approach to the understanding, explanation, and prediction of ethno-political behavior, especially in assessing the probability that organized violence will be initiated by groups which, at first glance, have no apparent reasons to do so.

The major questions that we address are: How did the group come to be in the territorial-state? Who controls the incumbent regime? What were the regime's initial policies in dealing with the group? What were group goals? What were the composition and activities of ethno-political organizations? What were the incumbent regime's main policy responses to the incidents of organized violence? What were the responses, if any, of the population at large? What aspects of generational dynamics can be identified?

South Moluccans in the Netherlands

Our discussion draws heavily from that of Herman and van der Laan Bouma(1980), which is necessary as almost nothing on the South Moluccans has been published in English. More to the point, their origin in Holland is, in essence, a residue of Dutch colonial rule over the Indonesian archipelago. They come from a group of islands there and were one of those colonial peoples that cooperated with their colonial rulers, in this case for many decades, including conspicuous service in the Royal Dutch Indonesian Army.

In the late 1940s, as the Dutch imperial position in the region collapsed, the South Moluccans wanted their home islands to become an independent republic (Republic Maluku Selatan, RMS) rather than be governed as part of the emerging Republic of Indonesia. In the event, this did not occur and in 1951, the Dutch government arranged the transport of 21,300 Moluccan soldiers and their families to the Netherlands, where they were summarily demobilized and discharged from the Dutch army. Both the Moluccans and the Dutch government expected their stay to be brief: the Moluccans anticipating a quick return to their cherished republic; the Dutch that they would soon tire of the Netherlands and gradually repatriate of their own free will. Neither occurred.

These events clearly illustrate some major points of our earlier discussion. First, while the Moluccans were not forcibly settled in the Dutch territorial-state, they were not voluntary immigrants either and retained strong "irred-

entist" feelings vis-a-vis the Indonesian territorial-state. Second, their primary goal, establishment of the RMS, was unequivocal from the start, as was the strategy by which it would be achieved and they immediately engaged in ethno-political activity. Herman and van der Laan Bouma(1980:230) observed

...the Moluccans staged a series of mass demonstrations to draw attention to their cause and to persuade the Dutch government to do what they considered to be its duty: to put pressure on Indonesia, and to bring the South Moluccans' case before the United Nations. In 1954, 50 percent of the Dutch population supported the latter demand. However, the Netherlands had never recognized the RMS, nor supported its goals.

Third, aside from caring for their immediate physical needs, the (native Dutch) regime incumbents not only did nothing to help achievement of Moluccan political goals, but also did not adopt special policies to facilitate their integration into Dutch society, policies typically instituted for other groups of colonial immigrants. In addition, their attitudes and occasionally inept policies, if anything, reinforced and perpetuated Moluccan group identity and members' support for the original ethno-political goal, particularly among second and third generation Moluccans who had never seen their "homeland."

As noted by Herman and van der Laan Bouma(1980:230-1),

...the Dutch authorities initially housed the new arrivals in...special "settlement areas"...by Dutch standards, these were primitive, but to the Moluccans they were satisfactory. In 1960...the government began to move...(them)...to specially built "open" residential areas. Frequently these moves were accompanied by violent protests from the South Moluccans, who feared that their cultural identity, solidarity, and social control over their own people would be dissipated. (emphasis added)

The Moluccans have frequently urged the government to provide bicultural educational programs, but these have been rejected on the grounds that such programs would only increase the problems that young South Moluccans have in adapting to Dutch society. Additionally, the Moluccans have claimed that the government has used the educational system to "Hollandize" them, so that they will give up their allegiance to the RMS. (emphasis added)

In this environment, a generational split eventually developed between the original settlers, who came to realize that their ethno-political goal was unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future, and their offspring, who felt a greater sense of urgency and were prepared to act militantly and violently. The principal political manifestation of this split was between adherents of the "respectable road" to the RMS, i.e., engaging in phase one, two, and three ethno-political activities, and those favoring a "hard approach," i.e., phase four and five activities.

Following the execution in Djakarta of a South Moluccan leader, phase four and five activities began in 1966 with the setting on fire of the Indonesian embassy in The Hague. The first of several premeditated terrorist incidents occurred in 1975. This and subsequent ones included the hijacking of trains, the occupation of (Dutch) government buildings and schools, and the taking and killing of hostages. They also included an abortive plot to kidnap Queen Juliana. Consistently, the terrorists' principal demands were that the Dutch government recognize the legitimacy of their aspiration for the RMS and inter-

cede on its behalf at the United Nations and with the Indonesian government.

The immediate responses of the Dutch government were, of course, to break the hostage situations and to apprehend the perpetrators. Interestingly, as each set of perpetrators was brought to trial, they received progressively less verbal sympathy from the courts and harsher penalties. These were complemented by preemptive or "repressive" measures effectively directed at the entire Moluccan community. Herman and van der Laan Bouma(1980:242) describe what happened.

While the trial of the...(1977 perpetrators)...was being held, the police decided to "clean up" the South Moluccan housing developments in Bovensmilde and Assen. The areas were sealed off, and armed police—backed up by armored cars and personnel carriers—went through the developments seeking weapons and plans for other attacks, as the whole South Moluccan community was under suspicion of plotting further incidents. In a massive display of force, the police fired shots into Moluccan homes, harassed women and children, and police vehicles flattened the Moluccans' gardens. The Moluccans met this force with hostility but not violence. The operation's main outcome was a hardening of Moluccan attitudes against the Dutch authorities...(emphasis added)

While some special police measures were retained, the long-run policy responses were more accommodationist. After the 1975 events, a joint, permanent Dutch-South Moluccan Commission, which eventually was expanded to include representatives of the younger, more militant South Moluccan community, was formed to hear grievances and discuss possible solutions. In 1978, a new package of socio-cultural measures, aimed at meeting some of the South Moluccans' grievances, was announced. However, the Dutch government made it clear that it had no intention of bringing up the RMS either in the international arena or with the Indonesian government. Following the analysis of the preceding sections, we must conclude that the issue of whether or not young South Moluccans will eventually give up their ethno-political goal and the possible use of violence in its pursuit is, as yet, unresolved.

Finally, there were noteworthy effects on the Dutch population. Beyond some immediate threats and individual incidents of reprisal, Herman and van der Laan Bouma(1980:244) noted some significant changes in public opinion and inter-group relations.

Immediately after the ending of the 1977 hijackings...Two out of three members of the (Dutch) public agreed with the statement that the South Moluccans "should be placed under intensive control, even if this gives our country the appearance of a police state."

In the past, the Dutch held a widespread belief that all South Moluccans were loyal to the Netherlands; now there is an equally prevalent belief that all South Moluccans are potential terrorists. (emphasis added)

CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis and discussion may lead the reader to believe that every ethnically-diverse territorial-state in the world constantly teeters on

the brink of disintegration. This is, of course, not the case. Any perceived exaggeration in this regard should simply be interpreted to mean that no ethnically-diverse territorial-state can be automatically assumed immune to the appearance of ethno-political activity and the potentially serious consequences that can result. Our analysis outlines a comprehensive approach to assessing the probabilities that such activity and its most serious consequences will appear. It is considerably less clear and sanguine regarding solutions. In fact, one of the problems is that there are no general solutions, at least none have yet been discovered.

Depending, of course, upon ethno-political goals, it may be that democratic regimes have a greater potential for accommodation and eventual solution than others (e.g., Swedes in Finland, French in Canada, non-European Americans in the United States). However, given generational dynamics, past or present "success" is not an ironclad guarantee of future peace, but given that, a priori, ethnic groups would have considerable latitude to engage in non-violent political activity, future ethno-political objectives would probably be more immediately visible and readily identifiable to regime incumbents, although the thorny problem of appropriate policy response(s) would remain. Concomitantly, this latitude may make ethno-political movements more likely to develop, i.e., increase the probability of a progression thru all of the phases of ethno-political activity.

In this context, a predictive problem of some consequence is timing. Except for numerous references to the short and long runs, little has been said about the exact timeframe for ethnic "upheavals" or even the development of significant ethno-political activity. This problem is endemic to the field. Predicting such upheavals or activities is, at present, a bit like predicting earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. We know what the main pre-conditions are and where they exist. We can monitor events and developments, identify "tremors," and issue warnings, but we cannot, as yet, confidently predict major occurrences. We can only say that, ceteris paribus, occurrences which may be very unlikely to occur in any given year may be almost certain to happen within a generation.

REFERENCES

- Ake, C.(1975) "A definition of political stability." *Comparative Politics*, 7, 271-283.
- Allemann, F.R.(1980) "Terrorism: definitional aspects." *Terrorism, An International Journal*, 3, 185-90.
- Barry, B.(1978) *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Buckland, P.(1981) *A History of Northern Ireland*. London: Macmillan.
- Clark, R.P.(1983) "Patterns in the lives of ETA members." *Terrorism, An International Journal*, 6, 423-54.
- Connor, W.(1977) "Ethnonationalism in the first world: the present in historical perspective," pp. 19-45 in M.J. Esman (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Darby, J.(1983) *Northern Ireland, the Background to the Conflict*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Dowding, K., and R. Kimber(1983) "The meaning and use of political stability." *European Journal of Political Research*, 11, 3.
- Dutter, L.E.(1985) "Perceptions of group identity and recent political behavior in Northern Ireland." *Political Psychology*, forthcoming.
- (1984) "A theoretical approach to the explanation and prediction of the political behavior of Soviet ethnic minorities." Mimeo. American Political Science Association.
- (1983) "The political relevance of ethnicity among Israeli Jews." *Plural Societies*, 14, 17-31.
- (1982) "The structure of voter preferences: the 1921, 1925, 1973, and 1975 Northern Irish parliamentary elections." *Comparative Political Studies*, 14, 517-42.
- (1981) "Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests." *Public Choice*, 37, 403-23.
- (1980) "Northern Ireland and theories of ethnic politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24, 613-40.
- (1978) "The Netherlands as a plural society." *Comparative Political Studies*, 10, 555-88.
- (1977) "Eastern and western Jews: ethnic divisions in Israeli society." *Middle East Journal*, 31, 451-68.
- Eisson, S., and J.E. Lane(1983) "Political stability in European democracies." *European Journal of Political Research*, 11, 3.

- Esman, M.J.(1977) "Perspectives on ethnic conflict in industrialized societies," pp. 371-90 in M.J. Esman (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Etzioni-Halevy, E.(1975) "Patterns of conflict generation and conflict "absorption," the cases of Israeli labor and ethnic conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 19, 286-309.
- with R. Shapira(1977) *Political Culture in Israel, Cleavage and Integration Among Israeli Jews*. New York: Praeger.
- Fetscher, I.(1980) "Theses on terrorism today." *Terrorism, An International Journal*, 3, 215-7.
- Frohlich, N., J.A. Oppenheimer, and O.R. Young(1971) *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, R.L.(1979) *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Herman, V., and R. van der Laan Bouma(1980) "Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands." *Terrorism, An International Journal*, 4, 223-57.
- Hofman, J.E., and N. Rouhana(1976) "Young Arabs in Israel: some aspects of a conflicted social identity." *Journal of Social Psychology*, 59, 75-86.
- Horowitz, D.(1982) "Dual authority politics." *Comparative Politics*, 14, 329-49.
- Hurwitz, L.(1973) "Contemporary approaches to political stability." *Comparative Politics*, 5, 449-63.
- Kowalewski, D.(1979) "Dissent in the Baltic republics: characteristics and consequences." *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 10, 307-18.
- Laqueur, W.(1977) *Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Lijphart, A.(1977a) *Democracy in Plural Societies, A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1977b) "Political theories and the explanation of ethnic conflict in the western world: falsified predictions and plausible postdictions," pp. 46-64 in M.J. Esman (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- (1975) *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mason, P.(1971) *Patterns of Dominance*. London: Oxford University Press.
- McKay, J.(1982) "An exploratory synthesis of primordial and mobilizationist approaches to ethnic phenomena." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5, 395-420.
- Murray, R.(1984) "Killings of local security forces in Northern Ireland, 1969-1981." *Terrorism, An International Journal*, 7, 11-52.

- Nagel, J., and S. Olzak(1982) "Ethnic mobilization in new and old states: an extension of the competition model." *Social Problems*, 30, 127-43.
- Nordlinger, E.A.(1972) *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- Peres, J.(1970) "Modernization and nationalism in the identity of the Israeli Arabs." *Middle East Journal*, 24, 479-92.
- Ra'anana, U.(1980) *Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States, a Multidisciplinary Approach to Human Resources and Conflict*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Rabushka, A., and K.A. Shepsle(1972) *Politics in Plural Societies, A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill.
- Rokkan, S., and D.W. Urwin(1982) *The Politics of Territorial Identity, Studies in European Regionalism*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Ross, J.A.(1982) "Urban development and the politics of ethnicity: a conceptual approach." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5, 440-56.
- Rothschild, J.(1981) *Ethnopolitics, a Conceptual Framework*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Seliktar, O.(1984) "The Arabs in Israel." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28, 247-69.
- and L.E. Dutter(1983) "Israel as a latent plural society," pp. 301-326 in W.C. McCready (ed.) *Culture, Ethnicity, and Identity, Current Issues in Research*. New York: Academic Press.
- Smooha, S.(1980) *The Orientation and Politization of the Arab Minority in Israel*. Haifa: Institute of Middle East Studies, University of Haifa.
- (1978) *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Spicer, E.H.(1971) "Persistent cultural systems." *Science*, 174, 795-800.
- Tessler, M.A.(1977) "Israel's Arabs and the Palestinian problem." *Middle East Journal*, 31, 313-29.
- Tilly, C.(1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Wilkinson, P.(1977) *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. New York: Wiley.
- Williams, C.(1982) "Social mobilization and nationalities in multicultural societies." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5, 349-65.

COMPARING COMMUNIST POLITICS

Bogdan Szajkowski

**University College,
Cardiff
United Kingdom**

**Paper presented at the workshop 'Comparative Study of Political Systems'.
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Barcelona, 25-30 March 1985**

Caja 3

The study of communist political systems on a comparative basis is of relatively recent origins. As such, and primarily for historical reasons, it is the outgrowth of the study of Soviet politics in particular and of comparative politics in general, it attempts to blend the particular with the general. This blending has proved more often than not both a difficult and elusive task. The problem of how to strike the right balance without making excessive generalizations on the one hand and being absorbed by details of a particular communist system on the other, has occupied scholars for many years now. (1)

THE PROCESS

The fortunes and misfortunes of the study of communist political systems closely resemble the main trends in the study of comparative politics. The study of a communist system as a distinctive sub-field in political science enquiry began in the period between the wars with the study of Soviet politics. During that period it involved to a large extent the application of concepts and approaches developed for the purposes of analysing Western political systems with stress on political history, formal constitutional arrangements and institutions. These to a large extent partisan studies explained facts without developing theories. (2) The crude sort of empiricism involved in these analyses suggested implicitly at least that facts are self-explanatory.

Over a period of time, however, it became clear to scholars that the formal-legal approach could not provide a sufficiently stimulating intellectual analysis of a system in which the political process was somewhat divorced from the formal constitutional structure. A new approach to the study of the Soviet political system emerged in the immediate post-war period. It was focused as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, more on the uniqueness and particularities of the Soviet experience; it concentrated its attention on the varieties of informal, indirect and even covert systems of party controls; it

stressed the importance of political coercion both in the maintenance of the political system and especially in the effort to effect a far-reaching and ideologically influenced reconstruction of society; and it emphasized the ideological rather than historical dimension in its broader generalizations about the Soviet political system. (3) It was based on a somewhat crude juxtaposition of the Soviet Union and the United States. By emphasising some of the more horrendous features of Stalinism it attempted to compare it, on the one hand with Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, on the other it contrasted the Soviet political system with that of the liberal democracies in the West.

In the wider study of comparative politics, there was, in the immediate post-war period an increasing interest in non-Western systems and the broader setting of politics. It began with a recognition of the sterility of trying to analyse these polities in terms of their constitutions, laws, and executive, legislative, and judicial systems. Robert E Wardy associates this with a recognition that political institutions that bore familiar Western names simply did not perform functions analogous to those of their Euro-American namesakes. The obvious question was "Why?" The equally obvious answer was "cultural differences." From this rather elementary perception stemmed a much more detailed and sophisticated search for the cultural determinants of particular non-Western political institutions, events, attitudes, and behaviour. (4) However, Harry Eckstein links this period in the evolution of comparative politics with another trend among political scientists, namely their recognition of the declining faith in the inevitability of democracy, which kindered scholarly interest in the process of political change and the forces governing it and the social forces rather than the legal rules governing politics. (5)

The majority of scholars were now faced with a least three closely related problems. The first was their linguistic competence - very few of them spoke or read the languages of the people whose systems they wanted to study. The barrier to further enquiry was thus quite considerable. The second problem

was in terms of traditional categories of comparative analysis, categories which were developed with Western European and American experience in mind, and which were proving increasingly inadequate. The third problem lay in terms of devising alternative categories of analysis sufficiently broad and precise to incorporate both the traditional Western political systems and a variety of quite different non-Western polities. (6) It is interesting to note that at this junction political scientists in order to gain insights and try to explain the causes of the unexpected political experience, began to rediscover the works of earlier political sociologists, and through the writings of for example Pareto, Mosca, and Weber they acquired at least a cursory acquaintance with a wider range of political systems than political scientists had normally possessed. (7) Needless to say the post-war interest in non-Western areas was to large extent a reaction to new political conditions and a consequence of certain modes of thought engendered by pre-war political experience.

As far as the comparative study of communist political systems is concerned the expansion of communism to the West as well as South-East of the Soviet borders and the Cold War that followed meant that for many scholars for many years it was not difficult to distinguish the eight regimes in Eastern Europe and four in Asia which resoundingly claimed adherence to the tenets of Marxism and more particularly to their Soviet interpretation - Marxism-Leninism. These regimes, variously called 'People's Republic', 'People's Democratic Republic', or 'Democratic Republic', claimed to have derived their inspiration from the Soviet Union to which, indeed, in the overwhelming number of cases they owed their establishment.

To many scholars and analysts these regimes represented a multiplication of and geographical extension of the 'Soviet model' and consequently of the Soviet sphere of influence. Although there were clearly substantial similarities between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, especially in the initial phase of their development, these were often overstressed at the expense of noticing the differences between these political systems.

It took a few years for scholars to realize that generalizing the

particular, i.e. applying the Soviet experience to other states ruled by elites which claimed to be guided by 'scientific theory' about human society, human history and human destiny, was not good enough. The relative assumption of a cohesive communist bloc was questioned after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau in 1948. It is worth remembering that the importance of the Yugoslav case lies precisely in the fact that in that country a communist party lead by Comintern trained leadership was in power at the time of the expulsion and remained in power afterwards despite Stalin's attempts to dislodge it. The Yugoslav communists rather than plunging their country and their party into chaos, as their adversaries in the the East and the West expected, reorganized their regime, strengthened their position and produced their own complex version of a communist political system. There was further serious questioning of the cohesiveness of the communist bloc after the workers' riots in Poznan in 1956 and the Hungarian revolution of the same year which saw the first post-war example of a rapid and almost complete collapse of a Soviet installed communist regime. The abolishing of forced collectivization, concessions towards the churches and a certain degree of plurality in intellectual and artistic life in both Poland and Hungary, to mention just a few aspects contributed further to the questioning of the extent of the uniformity among the communist political systems. Also by 1958 there were also clear signs that the ideological divergencies and the political differences deeply rooted in history, between the Soviet Union and China, were developing into yet another open split between two ruling communist parties. China, as Yugoslavia earlier, proceeded to develop its own version of a communist political system and for a while for followed by Albania.

The direct consequence of this proliferation and diversification for the comparative study of the communist political systems was the introduction of the area approach. (8) This involved studying and interpreting the language, literature, history, economy or politics of the area concerned. There was, however, in this approach little of common and shared theory or methodology

nearly a common interest.

By the mid-1960s, the totalitarian model of communist politics, which until then had been very much in force, began to crumble. As some of these regimes articulated demands for a distinctive path of socialist development, many specialists studying these systems began to notice that the cohesiveness of the communist bloc was less apparent than had been claimed before. The stage in the study of a monolithic communism, and now it is doubtful if there ever was one, was clearly over. Many scholars were becoming increasingly aware that all communist political systems, despite a common ideological source, interpret that source in a variety of ways and that their policy process and social and political institutions and organisations reflect that interpretation. Further, that all communist states have individual state interests and foreign policy no less than 'capitalist' states. (9)

The new awareness was also connected with what is often called the 'behavioural revolution' in political science and closely linked with it growing sophistication of statistical and research techniques which allowed for the testing of some of the behaviouralists propositions. Although behaviouralism first began to make rapid progress soon after the Second World War, there was a considerable delay in its rigorous application to the study of communist political systems, which was mainly due to the scarcity of sources and difficulties in obtaining reliable data. (10)

The relaxation of some aspects of political control over intellectual deliberations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought about academic exchanges, scholarships and wider access to primary source material. This coupled with the internationalisation of social sciences in the West resulted in a synthesis of behavioural and area studies and consequently the broadening of comparative studies of communist systems.

For the purpose of re-capitulation let us remind ourselves that the communist systems at that time had clearly defined features. In principle at least they all claimed to derive their inspiration from the 'Soviet model', to which in some cases, they owed their establishment. In all these states, power

was concentrated in the hands of a highly centralized communist or workers' party; and the state, economy and virtually all areas of social life were directed by the party through its 'leading role'. This leading role was legitimated by an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, to which all the regimes claimed to adhere; and the states' foreign policy was based on proletarian internationalism. (11)

So far, this necessarily brief analysis of the process of the proliferation of communist systems and how this was reflected in the studies of comparative politics, has concentrated on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam. However, let us not forget the similar proliferation of 'scientific socialism' that was taking place elsewhere.

The acceleration of the decolonization process since the late 1950s and the resurgence of nationalist struggles for political and economic independence have also produced a panoply of socialist regimes and designs in the Third World. In comparison with socialism elsewhere, its Third World version, with an emphasis on brotherhood rather than class struggle, was something of an anathema to Soviet and Eastern European Marxists as well as to radical African intellectuals. While the Russians, for ideological and pragmatic reasons never considered regional versions of socialism acceptable, the Third World radicals began to associate the early progressive ideologies with governments now in power, and therefore with the *status quo*, consequently unable to be the motivating force for those desiring change.

By the mid-1960s when the prestige of a geographically defined version of socialism such as 'African socialism' was beginning to wane, 'scientific socialism' tied to the tradition of Marxist thought was adopted for the first time by a political elite of a newly independent country. In 1963 the military regime of Marien Ngouabi in Congo-Brazzaville went beyond the general socialist commitment claimed by several African leaders and announced the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as its official doctrine.

Similar self-ascription was followed subsequently by the political elites

of South Yemen, Guyana, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Benin, Kampuchea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Angola, Sao Tome e Principe, Laos, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Grenada, Surinam and Zimbabwe.

It was primarily the Cuban precedent which made a significant contribution to

the emergence of some of eighteen self-professed Marxist regimes in the Third World since the 1960s. As I have pointed out elsewhere (12) the Cuban revolution was to so many political elites in the Third World not only an inspiration but a clear military, political and ideological example to follow. Apart from its romantic appeal to many nationalist movements, the Cuban revolution also demonstrated a novel way of conducting and winning a nationalist, anti-imperialist war and accepting Marxism as the state ideology, without the vanguard party, until now obligatory in communist practice. Or as Regis Debray puts it, Cuba showed that the vanguard of revolution

is not necessarily the Marxist-Leninist party; and that those who want to make the revolution have the right and the duty to constitute themselves a vanguard, independently of these parties.

It takes courage to state the facts out loud when these facts contradict a tradition. There is then, no metaphysical equation in which vanguard = Marxist-Leninist party; there are merely dialectical conjunctions between a given function - that of the vanguard in history - and a given form of organization - that of the Marxist-Leninist party. These conjunctions arise out of prior history and depend on it. (13)

Thus the experience of Cuba demonstrated clearly that it is the function and success of a particular group of people in a revolutionary process that makes them a vanguard and not the other way round. In other words the political praxis in Cuba have substantially undermined the necessity of the experience of practically all previous socialist revolutions which were the result of however small vanguard - communist or worker's parties.

The Cuban example of bypassing an over-rigid conception of 'party', like Castro's unprecedented 16 April 1961 declaration on the 'socialist' nature of his revolution, was echoed subsequently in diverse parts of the Third World, and was taken as the typical path to socialism. Furthermore it is important to note that it is with the Cuban revolution that the link between communism and

movements of national liberation becomes clearly apparent. What we have seen since 1959 is the creation - and the constant and extended creation - of viable and autonomous nationalist movements which derive their ideology and claim to derive their policies from the tenets of Marxism. At the same time, in contrast to earlier periods in the extension of the Soviet bloc their close relationship with the Soviet Union is based upon something other than force majeure.

On another level Cuba has shown the way of pragmatic adaptations of high nationalist aspirations within the limited options available to political elites in the Third World. In a number of cases self ascription as a Marxist regime appears to have been a purely instrumental act. In the cases of Somalia and Ethiopia it would seem to be a result of efforts by their leaders to secure military and/or economic aid from the communist countries. Similar factors undoubtedly played an important role in the encompassing of Marxist ideology by the liberation fronts in South Yemen, Angola and Mozambique. On the other hand, countries such as the Congo, Benin and Guyana, Surinam and Madagascar where the acceptance of Marxism was instrumental for the purpose of legitimization, were not favoured recipients of military and economic aid from communist countries in their pre-acceptance periods

It would also appear that for most if not all of these regimes formal identification with Marxism may have been an attempt to upgrade their status by simultaneously associating themselves with prestigious symbols and powerful high-status regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Cuba, separating themselves from exclusive identification as former colonies. Similarly, on an international level, acceptance of scientific socialism provided these regimes with an opportunity of closer relationships with 'positive references' in the international arena such as the communist countries of Europe and Asia and at the same time separation from the 'negative references', the capitalist countries of Western Europe and the United States.

PRELIMO in Mozambique, the NLF in South Yemen, ZANU-Patriotic Front in

Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent the MPLA in Angola, the PAIGC in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde and the MLSTP in Sao Tome e Principe developed their socialist ideology independently but through similar processes of protracted internal political struggle while waging a military and political battle for liberation. The acceptance of Marxism as a guiding ideology by them was decided before their assumption of power. Their subsequent transformation into vanguard parties appears therefore to have been the next step in their ideological and political development.

It is important in my view to emphasize that the emergence of these self-professed Marxist regimes has effectively resulted in the substantial decay of the once authoritative and virtually compulsory Soviet model as well as the substantive undermining of the once formidable machinery for enforcing ideological uniformity within the Marxist-Leninist world. Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, whatever their importance and impact on Eastern Europe, became somewhat pale reflections of their predecessors, the Comintern and Cominform. The diversity of patterns of the Marxist-Leninist state brought into sharp focus two important aspects of the communist movement. The first of these is the splitting of the communist monolith and the second is the harnessing of Marxism to the movements of national liberation. This has made it extremely difficult, and possibly otiose, to establish where the boundaries of the communist movement lie. (14) In other words 'the more important a phenomenon in twentieth-century history has communism become, the greater is the complexity of dealing with it at the most inclusive level'. (15)

The polymorphic nature of contemporary communism has resulted in considerable disagreements among scholars working in the area of comparative communist systems. There appears to be no agreement even on what constitutes such a system. (16) The present stage in the comparative enquiry into communist systems is best characterised by variety, eclecticism and disagreement and thus it essentially mirrors the general trends and tendencies in comparative politics as a whole.

APPROACHES and MODELS

As the discussion in the preceding paragraphs may suggest, the complexity of the subject under enquiry has resulted in different approaches and models developed for the purpose of analysis of communist regimes. By approach I mean a general strategy for the purpose of organising data and research and the construction of various models as aids to interpretation.

There are now some thirteen major approaches and models for the study of communist systems employed in the literature on the subject. These include: 1) Kremlinology, 2) the Marxist-Leninist model, 3) the historical-cultural approach, 4) the totalitarian model, 5) the bureaucratic model, 6) the group-conflict approach, 7) the elite-conflict model, 8) the national development model, 9) the modernization and political development model, 10) the convergence model, 11) the industrial society model, 12) the socialist orientation approach, 13) the complex organizations approach.

It is worth noting that although many of the approaches and models listed above overlap, they nevertheless represent a distinctive strategy for analysis. Lack of space does not allow for detailed consideration of these strategies. I have listed them here not for the purpose of discussing them or indeed resolving disputes between them, but for the purpose of suggesting something about the complexity of the subject matter.

The bewildering variety of approaches and model now available clearly reflects the rapid development of both the theoretical basis and the range of empirical data for the analysis of communist systems. At the same time it raises a fundamental question: which of the approaches and models is more useful than other for any given purpose. Moreover, what is the use of any of them at all, since as it was suggested earlier the subject matter is characterised by heaps of conceptual formulations and mountains of data, extremely difficult if not impossible to cope with.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

This brief survey of the main aspects of the comparative study of communist systems is by its very nature inconclusive. It must be remembered that the study of communism involves a movement which as such assumes different forms at different times in different places. It is polymorphic. And it is ultimately more important to register this fact than to assume that any single form of it is a model par excellence. (17)

The politics of communism ought therefore to be studied at three levels. First, the component organisations (states and parties) ought to be analysed as part of the general discourse on comparative politics in the broad, using the very generalised language which that discourse requires (patterns of participation and elite recruitment, present interests versus future goals and so on). Secondly, the movement as a whole ought to be analysed in terms of its goal and its cosmology (which means analysing it in its own language, its own semantic system). And, third, each component organisation requires separate investigation of a kind which will reveal its particularities, either as an individual organisation or as a member of a coherent group.

These are clearly separate tasks, and yet the comparative studies of communist systems have so far, and on whole, attempted to conflate them. The result is that, with rare exceptions, the first two of these tasks have not yet been satisfactorily tackled. The third, on the other hand, has produced an abundant literature, while being the least comparative of the three exercises. (18)

NOTES

1. Lenard J Cohen and Jane P Shapiro (ed), The Communist System in Comparative Perspective. Garden City, New York. Anchor Books, 1974. p IX.
2. See for example Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? Printed by the authors for the subscribing members of the Transport and General Workers' Union. 1935.
3. Lenard J Cohen and Jane P Shapiro, op.cit. p IX-X.
4. Robert E Ward, 'Culture and Comparative Study of Politics, or the Constipated Dialectics'. The American Political Science Review. no.1, 1974. p 193.

5. Hary Eckstein and David E Apter (ed), Comparative Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1963. p 24
6. Robert E Ward, op. cit. p 193
7. Hary Eckstein and David E Apter (ed), op. cit. p 24.
8. The oldest organised area studies programmes relating to the USSR and China began in the USA around 1947. Their counterparts on Eastern Europe date from about 1959. In Britain and elsewhere in Europe most of the area programmes have been established since the mid-1960s.
9. Hugh Seton-Watson, 'Contemporary Communism in Perspective', in J D B Miller and T H Rigby, The Disintegrating Monolith. Canberra, The Australian National University, 1965. p 10.
10. Archie Brown, Soviet Politics and Political Science. London: Macmillan, 1974. p 9.
11. Stephen White, 'What is a Communist System?'. Studies in Comparative Communism. vol. XVI, no. 4, (Winter 1983). p 247.
12. See B. Szajkowski. The Establishment of Marxist Regimes. London: Butterworths, 1982, especially pp. 139-156.
13. R. Debray. Revolution in the Revolution?. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. pp.96-97
14. For important contribution to the discussion on this topic see: Stephen White, op. cit. pp 247-263.
15. M. Waller. 'A Movement is a Movement is a Movement'. Communist Affairs. vol.1, no.1, p.40.
16. For the most recent contribution see: Stephen White, op. cit.
17. For further discussion see: Michael Waller and Bogdan Szajkowski, 'The Communist Movement: from Monolith to Polymorph', in B. Szajkowski (ed), Marxist Governments: A World Survey. London: Macmillan, 1981. pp 1-19.
18. Ibid p 16.

B85 MCSPS 14
#1-10

BLOCKS OF VOTERS AND THE CUBE "LAW"⁷

GRAHAM UPTON*

The so-called cube "law" has become "part of the political folklore of Great Britain"¹ - indeed it seems also to have passed into the general folklore of political science, having been applied to electoral systems having single-member constituencies contested by two major parties in the United States², New Zealand³, Canada⁴, Australia and South Africa⁵.

A continuing mystery concerning the cube law is its provenance, and no entirely satisfactory explanation has been provided⁶. A recent suggestion as to its origin, provided by Stanton⁷, will be examined in more detail later, following a discussion of various generalisations and difficulties with the law that have been the subject of earlier papers.

The main result that is developed in this paper is that a power "law" may be regarded as a natural consequence of the geographical arrangement of voters into homogeneous "blocks", with all the voters in a block voting for the same party. Changes in the block size or in the constituency size would result in different power "laws" being appropriate. As it happens, the average constituency size resulted, for many years, in the number of blocks corresponding to a power of three, and hence to the cube "law".

However, the English results for the 1983 election are not consistent with any choice of block size, so that no power "law" would be appropriate. It appears that, at present, Alliance voters

*Department of Mathematics, University of Essex, Colchester, U.K.

do not exist in England as tight geographic communities, but are dispersed within blocks of Labour and Conservative voters.

THE GENERALISED CUBE "LAW"

A number of alternative methods have been proposed⁸ for extending the "law" to the multi-party situation. Suppose that there are n parties and that party i gains V_i votes and wins S_i seats. A natural generalisation is provided by the relation

$$S_k = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n S_j^m}{\sum_{j=1}^n S_j} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n V_j^m}{\sum_{j=1}^n V_j} \quad (1)$$

or, equivalently, for two parties k and l, we can write

$$\frac{S_k}{S_l} = \left(\frac{V_k}{V_l} \right)^m \quad (2)$$

Several authors have investigated alternatives to the power of 3, considering the more general relationship

$$\frac{S_k}{S_l} = \left(\frac{V_k}{V_l} \right)^m \quad (3)$$

for various values of m⁹. Further generalisations are possible. The study by Schrodt concludes that "on both statistical and empirical grounds" the most desirable general model is

$$\frac{S_k}{S_l} = \left(\frac{V_k}{V_l} \right)^m e \quad (4)$$

where e has a lognormal distribution, and represents the random variation (about the "law" of equation (3)) that is experienced for a particular election within a particular party system. If we write e as ln(e), then e is an observation from the more familiar normal distribution and we can use ordinary least squares to estimate m from the linear relation

$$\ln(S_k/S_l) = m \ln(V_k/V_l) + e \quad (5)$$

THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBE "LAW"

The first reference to the cube "law" appears to have been given by the Right Honourable James Parker Smith as evidence for consideration by the Royal Commission of 1909 on Systems of Elections; relevant sections of this evidence are reproduced in the famous paper by Kendall and Stuart¹⁰.

Smith presented to the Royal Commission the analogy of a great box of marbles of two colours, red and blue, with the ratio of red to blue being 11 to 9. Clearly if one takes out of the box one marble, chosen at random, then the odds are 11 to 9 that the marble is red. But suppose one takes out a whole shovelful of marbles - Smith argued that it was clear that, if the marbles were "effectively mixed all through the box" then the chance was much greater than 11 to 9 that there would be a majority of red marbles in the box. Here a "shovelful" is, of course, Smith's model of a constituency. Smith concluded by quoting "my friend Major Mackdon, who is one of the leading mathematicians of the day" as stating that in the shovelful the odds will be at least in the ratio 11³ to 9³. The cube "law" is derived directly from this statement.

Kendall and Stuart were rightly puzzled by Smith's presentation, because of the presumed size of a real-life "shovelful". Suppose that p = P(red) = 0.55, as before, and that N, the shovelful size, is equal to 40000. The number of red balls in such a shovelful may be regarded as an observation from a normal distribution with mean 22000 and variance 9900¹¹. For red to be in the minority we need to have observed a value some 20 standard deviations below the mean - an infinitesimal chance.

Kendall and Stuart implicitly allow for socio-geographic variation by allowing p to have a distribution and to vary from constituency - a fundamental change from the presentation made by Smith ¹⁵.

PENROSE'S BLOCK MODEL

As an alternative to the mystic cube "law", we turn to the proposition of Penrose ¹⁶, who was concerned with the general study of crowd behaviour and devoted a chapter to the particular study of voting behaviour. Penrose noted that political commentators are prone to refer to groups of people as all voting in the same way. Thus, in the context of American elections one hears reference to "the black vote", "the Jewish vote", and so forth. Penrose studied both American Presidential elections and British elections. In each case he concluded that the results could be modelled very simply by introducing the concept of (equi-sized) blocks of voters.

Expressed in terms of Smith's box full of marbles, we must now regard the 'marbles' as being 'differentially sticky', so that we no longer have singleton marbles, but have clumps of marbles (blocks of voters), each clump being of size x and of a single colour. When we dip our shovel into the box of marbles and draw it out, it will be found to contain a total of $N(kn)$ marbles comprising n clumps. If there are more red clumps than there are blue clumps then there are evidently more red marbles than there are blue marbles in that shovelful.

Because each clump is of the same size, we do not need to count individuals to determine which colour is in a majority - the relevant feature is how the value of n is subdivided between the colours.

Thus the original presentation of the "law" does not make sense and this has prompted Tufté ¹² to question whether "there actually is a theory behind the cube law". Kendall and Stuart concluded that "the Royal Commission was very probably out of its depth and did not pursue the matter in further questions". Kendall and Stuart themselves conducted an investigation, based on allowing p , the proportion of red balls in a shovelful, to vary from shovelful to shovelful according to a normal distribution. They showed that, if the variance of that normal distribution happened to have a particular value, then a cubic relationship would be forthcoming. They then examined data from recent elections and verified that the conditions of normality with the required variance did indeed hold true ¹³.

Of course, the empirical normal distribution for p itself needs an explanation. Kendall and Stuart noted that "the distribution of ... votes over Great Britain cannot be accounted for by any simple scheme. It depends on powerful geographical and historical as well as on political and demographic factors and no probabilistic scheme could hope to predict on prior grounds what the combined effect of these multitudinous interlocking influences might be" ¹⁴.

The failure of Smith's presentation of the model of the voting population lies in his phrase that describes the marbles as being "mixed all through the box". The voters in a constituency are not a random sample from the population: they are more similar to each other in their political characteristics than they are to the voters of another constituency - we could easily distinguish between the voters of Ebbw Vale and those of Guildford.

This model presents various interesting features, of which potentially the most useful, from the modelling point of view, is the small size of the value that is required for n. For post-1900 Presidential elections Penrose suggested n = 26 voting blocks, with n = 14 blocks for the British elections.

Under Penrose's scheme, when n is even (=2u, say) and the shovelful results in u red clumps and u blue clumps, the choice of red or blue is decided on the toss of a fair coin. In Appendix I we prove that, whatever is the proportion of red clumps in the box, the probability that a shovelful results in the choice of red in the case n = 2u is exactly equal to that for the case n = 2u-1. In other words the cases n = 27 (for U.S. Presidential elections) and n = 13 (for British elections) are equivalent in effect to the cases laid down by Penrose.

According to Penrose's model, therefore, a British constituency containing N=39000 voters might be regarded as comprising h=13 separate blocks of size k=3000. Of course, the scheme is not really as restrictive as this would seem to imply, since we can allow some variation in block size without affecting the probabilities of selection of the two competing parties. Furthermore, a more realistic effect could doubtless be achieved by allowing the number of blocks to vary from constituency to constituency so that 13 (or 14) represented solely the average number of groups present.

A further restriction implicit in Penrose's findings is that his results refer to a Great Britain dominated by a two-party system. With the recent resurgence of third (and fourth) parties we can expect that an optimal model would expect a rather larger value for n, the number of blocks. We can reasonably equate Penrose's basic idea of block votes with Guggin and Taylor's ¹⁸ idea that constituencies consist of aggregations of

internally socially homogeneous housing areas - council estates, commuter areas, shetloes, and so forth. Within any one of these areas we can expect a very considerable uniformity of political opinion and Penrose's value of 13 (or 14) gives us an indication of the number of distinct regions that might be anticipated within a single constituency ¹⁹.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE BLOCK MODEL AND POWER LAWS

We now propose to relate Penrose's block model to the generalised power relationship between seats and votes that was given by equation (3).

Suppose that the overall proportion of red balls in the box is P_r and the probability that red balls are in the majority in any given shovelful is $P_r^*(n)$, where n=2u-1 is the number of blocks specified by the model.

Thus

$$P_r^*(n) = \sum_{j=0}^u \binom{n}{j} P_r^j (1 - P_r)^{n-j} \quad n-1$$

$$= P(\text{red in majority} | P(\text{red}) = P_r; n \text{ blocks}). \quad (6)$$

suppose also that, in the real-life situation, P_r is the proportion of total votes cast for the "red" party, with P_r^* being the proportion of total seats gained by that party. Denoting the equivalent quantities for the "blue" party by P_b and P_b^* , equation (3) may be rewritten as

$$\frac{P_r^*}{P_b^*} = \left(\frac{P_r}{P_b} \right)^m \quad (7)$$

To link equations (6) and (7), and hence the two equations, we enquire as to what values of n, for given m, would best satisfy the relation

$$\frac{P_r^*(n)}{P_b^*(n)} = \left(\frac{P_r}{P_b} \right)^m \quad (8)$$

We cannot expect to obtain exact correspondence between the two sides of relation (8) for all values of P_r and P_b , but, for values in the range $0.3 \leq P_r, P_b \leq 0.7$ it has proved possible to find a quite striking correspondence, as the results reported in Table 1 demonstrate.

Table 1 near here.

Table 1 relates to the 45 Scottish constituencies contested by Conservative, Labour, Alliance and Scottish Nationalist Party candidates in the 1983 election²⁰. The final column of the table shows the value of the standard (Pearson) goodness-of-fit statistic, $\chi^2 = \sum \{(\text{Observed} - \text{Expected})^2 / \text{Expected}\}$. For this 4-party situation χ^2 has an approximate chi-squared distribution with 3 degrees of freedom. Since the upper 5% point of this distribution is 7.82, while none of the observed χ^2 values is anything like this large, we can conclude that all six of the models listed provide an excellent fit to the data! We could regard the data as being singularly unhelpful as a guide to which models are good predictors.

Perhaps even more striking than the goodness of the fits of the rival models to the observed data, is the internal consistency between each pair of models. Thus the cube law model ($m = 3$) is very closely reproduced by the block model with $n = 17$ or 18.

Table 2 near here.

The optimal values of n for the balancing of the relation (8) depends upon the number of parties involved, and the relation $p^*(2u) = p^*(2u-1)$ holds only for the two-party situation. From simple numerical matching of the two sides of the relation (8) we can produce the table of approximate

equivalences between the two models that are summarized in Table 2.

Note that, for the special case of two parties and the cube law the optimal value of n is precisely the 13 (or 14) suggested by Penrose²¹ who probably performed a similar calculation (though this was not stated)²¹.

CASE STUDIES

We now consider how well, if at all, these models fit various sets of British data. Since the block model appears more flexible than the power law model (assuming that we restrict attention to cases where $2m$ is an integer)²², we examine the fit of the block model, as we vary n , for various homogeneous data sets.

Table 3 near here.

Table 3 displays the results for a number of coherent groups of electoral contests. All constituencies in which fringe candidates stood have been neglected in order to get as clear a picture as possible. Thus the second row of the table refers to the 23 Welsh seats contested by all four parties, and no other parties, in the 1983 election, while the last row refers to the 15 Welsh seats contested by the Conservatives, Labour and Plaid Cymru parties, and these parties alone, in the 1950 election.

Whilst the exclusion of seats contested by even the "no-hoper" candidates may represent an error on the conservative side, it is vastly preferable to the alternative of reporting statistics based on a jumble of different types of contest²³. In particular, it is important not to base calculations involving numbers of seats on collections of seats that

include some seats that were not contested by the party in question. Thus, it would be ridiculous to assess the cube law by comparing the number of seats obtained by the Scottish Nationalist Party with the number of votes for that party expressed as a proportion of the total United Kingdom vote.²⁴

Included in Table 3 are the party percentages of the vote and the numbers of seats actually won. For each group of data, the predicted values for the numbers of seats won, using the Penrose model with n blocks (see Appendix II) have been calculated and compared with the observed values, using the χ^2 goodness-of-fit statistic, as in Table 1. We saw for the Table 1 data (which forms row 1 of Table 3) that values of n from 7 to 18 all gave reasonable fits to the data in the sense that the corresponding χ^2 values were less than the critical 5% point of the approximating χ^2 distribution. In fact the feasible range of n is much greater than this - Table 3 records that any value of n between 1 and 28 inclusive would lead to a "good fit" of the model! The final two columns of the table record the minimum χ^2 value and the value of n to which that value of χ^2 corresponds.

CONCLUSIONS

The results presented in Table 3 show two opposite faces of what can happen when one fits speculative mathematical models to social science data. On the one hand we can have a data set (Scotland, 1983) for which 28 different explanations are available (more, if we start on the Power Law model), and on the other hand (England, 1983) we have a set of data for which none of those models would be appropriate. The optimal value of n (8) for the latter data set corresponds to a predicted CON/LAB/ALL breakdown of 151/51/45 compared to the observed 165/79/3.

In their discussion of the two 1974 elections and the 1979 election, Curtice and Steed²⁵ trace the evolution of various socio-economic cleavages and characterise the Welsh and Scottish situations as displaying a strong territorial-cultural cleavage. Thus, in Giddin and Taylor's geographical context, it is easy to describe regions of housing as being blocks of SNP (or whichever) voters. With well-defined blocks, the block model (and hence a Power Law) provides an adequate description of the results.

For England in 1983 the situation is clearly different from that in Scotland and Wales. The work of Curtice and Steed makes clear that this is not a recent phenomenon; they note that, in the 1970s, the English liberal vote reflects "very little of either a social class or a territorial-cultural cleavage"²⁶. In other words there do not as yet - exist compact regions of housing in England that can be labelled as Alliance regions. The diffuseness of Alliance supporters will be partly due to the genesis of the Alliance as an amalgam of two parties, but the Liberal party of the 1970s clearly showed similar characteristics.

For the block model (and, perhaps, the cube law) to be relevant once again in English politics, we must, presumably, await the development of a clear Alliance persona such as, apparently, already exists in Wales and in Scotland.

A possible modification of the block model to allow for the diffuse locations of the Alliance voters, is to allow for "hybrid" blocks. Thus each "conservative" block would contain a proportion ϕ of Alliance voters, while each "Labour" block would contain a proportion ϕ of Alliance voters and there would also be a (much reduced) chance of "pure" Alliance blocks.

Perhaps the only sensible conclusion that we can draw from Table 3 is that it seems probable, in view of the results given in the final column, that it will be possible to find a fairly simple and intelligent explanation of the link between votes cast and seats won (under the present first-past-the-post system), in terms of the possible arrangements of small numbers of groups of people²⁷. As it happened, for a period in the past, one manifestation of the link between votes and seats was that they satisfied the cube "law", but this was not a law in the sense of the natural sciences, and, as it stood it provided no insight (just a rule of thumb) concerning the seat-vote link.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most grateful to the referees of an earlier version for causing me to think more carefully about these results and for various pertinent suggestions.

NOTES

1. E.R. Tuftes, 'The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party System', American Political Science Review, 67, (1973), 540-54.
2. J.G. March, 'Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election Results', Public Opinion Quarterly, 21, (1957) several other authors have included United States elections in a comparison of the behaviour of electoral systems in various countries. See, for example, Tuftes, Ibid; W.J. Linehan and P.A. Schrodt, 'A New Test of the Cube Law', Political Methodology, 4, (1977), 353-67; P.A. Schrodt, 'A Statistical Study of the Cube Law in Five Electoral Systems', Political Methodology, 7, (1981), 31-53.
3. R.H. Brookes, 'Legislative Representation and Party Vote in New Zealand', Public Opinion Quarterly, 23, (1959), 288-91. See also Linehan and Schrodt, Ibid; Schrodt, Ibid; Tuftes, Ibid.
4. T.H. Qualter, 'Seats and Votes: An Application of the Cube Law to the Canadian Electoral System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1, (1968), 336-44. See also T.W. Cassstevens and W.D. Morris, 'The Cube Law and the Decomposed System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5, (1972), 521-31; Linehan and Schrodt, Ibid.
5. Schrodt, Ibid.
6. H. Thell, 'The Desired Political Entropy', American Political Science Review, 63, (1969), 521-5 and D. Sankoff and K. Mellor, 'The Swing Ratio and Game Theory', American Political Science Review, 66, (1972), 551-4, provide theoretical justifications for a relation of this type, though their arguments were dismissed by Tuftes, Ibid, as being unconvincing.

7. R.G. Stanton, 'A Result of Mackham on Electoral Predictions', Annals of Discrete Mathematics, 8, (1980), 163-7.
8. Examples are to be found in Qualter, Ibid; Thell, Ibid; Cassstevens and Morris, Ibid; R. Jaeger, 'Seats and Votes: A Generalisation of the Cube Law of Elections', Social Science Research, 2, (1973), 257-75.
9. Thus M. Laakso, 'Should a Two-and-a-half Law Replace the Cube Law in British Elections?', British Journal of Political Science, 9, (1979), 355-62, compares the cases $n = 2, 2.5$ and 3 and finds 2.5 to be the preferable value for British elections.
10. M.G. Kendall and A. Stuart, 'The Law of Cubic Proportions in Electoral Results', British Journal of Sociology, 1, (1950), 163-97.
11. Using the normal approximation to the binomial, with mean np and variance $np(1-p)$.
12. loc. cit.
13. That these conditions appear to no longer hold true is demonstrated in Table 2 of J. Curtice and M. Speed, 'Electoral Choice and the Production of Government: The Changing Operation of the Electoral System in the United Kingdom since 1955', British Journal of Political Science, 12, (1982), 249-98. However, the position for recent years has been clouded by the intervention of third parties and G. Giddin and Taylor, 'Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections, (London: Pion, 1979) have shown that the required value is a result of the arbitrary placing of constituency boundaries upon a class-based voting map. See also G. Giddin and P.J. Taylor, 'The Decomposition of Electoral Bias in a Plurality Election', British Journal of Political Science, 10, (1980), 515-521.

14. The effect of social milieu on geographical variations in p has recently been taken up by geographers. See, for example, R.J. Johnston, A.M.

Hay and D. Rumley, 'On testing for structural effects in electoral geography, using entropy-maximising methods to estimate voting patterns', Environment and Planning A, (1984), 16, 233-40.

15. A fascinating series of examples of the results of variations in p in an artificial situation are provided by J.K. Wildgen and R.L. Engstrom, 'Spatial Distribution of Partisan Support and the Seats/Votes Relationship', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 5, (1980), 423-35.

16. L.S. Penrose, On the Objective Study of Crowd Behaviour, (London: Lewis, 1952).

17. Thus we could have 11 blocks of size 3000, one block of size 4000 and one of size 2000 without altering any of the resulting probabilities. In this case, ⁴7 to 6 block majority might appear as a narrow 20000 to 19000 vote majority or as a thumping 24000 to 15000 vote majority.

18. Guggin and Taylor, Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections (14.

19. The correspondence will not be exact because real-life housing-blocks will not be equi-sized. Nevertheless, the value of n does give us an order of magnitude to work with.

20. The results were taken from The Times newspaper, which gave the aggregate numbers of votes as Con 550463 (31%); Lab, 573207 (32%); Alliance, 445645 (25%); SNP, 228584 (13%).

21. My attention was brought, ^{to} Penrose's model by the work of Stanton, *ibid*, who points out the equivalence of the cube law and Penrose's choice of 14 blocks.

22. This Table 2 refers to 7 values of n, but considers up to 28 values of n. ^{yyo}

23. Thus Qualter, *ibid*, reports that "the results were at first far from encouraging" until he analysed each type of constituency separately. Note that Kendall and Stuart were comparatively lax, considering all seats in which one or other of the major parties was successful, without regard to the possible intervention of other parties.

24. Why stop with the U.K.? How about the Common Market or the World,...

25. Curtice and Steed, sections 3 and 4.

26. Curtice and Steed, section 5.

27. Note that this does not mean that there are only 12, say, identifiable groups of people in the country! What it does say is that within any given area the people can probably be subdivided into about 12 different groups - all of which might be different from all groups in other areas.

APPENDIX I

We show the equivalence of the results for block models having $2n$ blocks and $2n-1$ blocks, denote the difference between the number of red blocks and the number of blue blocks by d , and write $P(d \geq 2|2n)$ to mean the probability that there are at least 2 more red blocks than blue blocks in the case of $2n$ blocks. Let the probability that a randomly chosen block is red be p .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } P(d \geq 2|2n) &= P(d \geq 2|2n-1) + P(d = 1|2n-1) \cdot p \\ &= P(d \geq 1|2n-1) - P(d = 1|2n-1) \cdot (1-p). \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Also } P(d = 0|2n) &= P(d = 1|2n-1) \cdot (1-p) + P(d = -1|2n-1) \cdot p \\ &= \binom{2n-1}{n} p^n (1-p)^{n-1} \cdot (1-p) + \binom{2n-1}{n-1} p^{n-1} (1-p)^n \cdot p \\ &= 2 \binom{2n-1}{n} p^n (1-p)^n. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Thus } P(\text{red selected}|2n) &= P(d \geq 2|2n) + \frac{1}{2} P(d = 0|2n) \\ &= \{P(\text{red selected}|2n-1) - \binom{2n-1}{n} p^n (1-p)^n\} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2} \{2 \binom{2n-1}{n} p^n (1-p)^n\} \end{aligned}$$

Hence $P(\text{red selected}|2n) = P(\text{red selected}|2n-1)$.

APPENDIX II

Calculation of expected frequencies for the block model in the multi-party case

Suppose that there are I parties and n blocks per constituency, with the probability of a block supporting party i being P_i ($\sum P_i = 1$). Let n_i be the number of blocks supporting party i ($\sum n_i = n$). The probability of the configuration (n_1, n_2, \dots, n_I) is

$$P_{\mathbf{r}}(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_I) = \binom{n}{n_1} \binom{n-n_1}{n_2} \binom{n-n_1-n_2}{n_3} \dots \binom{n_1}{n_I} P_1^{n_1} P_2^{n_2} \dots P_I^{n_I}.$$

The probability that party i is the outright winner is the probability that n_i is greater than n_j , for all $j \neq i$:

$$P_{i1} = \sum_{\substack{\text{All combinations} \\ \text{for which} \\ n_i > n_j, j \neq i}} P_{\mathbf{r}}(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_I).$$

Because n is small there will be many combinations in which there is no outright winner. Let P_{s1} be the combined probability of those combinations for which party i shares the lead with $(s-1)$ other parties. In these cases it is presumed that each of these parties is equally likely to win the constituency (by, for example, having a very slightly larger block size than the other parties). The total probability of party i winning the constituency is then

$$P_{i1}^{(n)} = \sum_{s=1}^I \frac{1}{s} P_{s1}.$$

Expected frequencies are then obtained by multiplying the $\{p_i^*(n)\}$ by the total number of constituencies being considered.

| Observed Results (Total 45) | Number of seats won by | | | | Goodness-of-fit value of χ^2 |
|---|------------------------|--------|----------|-----|---|
| | Conservative | Labour | Alliance | SNP | |
| Power model m=2 Block model n=7 or 8 | 15.4 | 16.8 | 10.1 | 2.7 | 2.22 |
| Power model m=2.5 Block model n=11 or 12 | 16.0 | 17.7 | 9.5 | 1.8 | 1.33 |
| Power model m=3 Block model n=17 or 18 | 16.5 | 18.6 | 8.7 | 1.2 | 1.36 |
| | 16.6 | 18.6 | 8.9 | 1.0 | 1.95 |

TABLE 1. The fit of various models to data for the 45 Scottish constituencies which were contested by the three main parties and the Scottish Nationalist Party in the 1983 election.

TABLE 2. The optimal number of blocks, n , for equivalence between Penrose's block model and various power law models.

| Number of parties | n : | Power of power law (m) | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|----------------------------|--------|--------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| | | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| 2 | n : | 1 or 2 | 3 or 4 | 5 or 6 | 9 or 10 | 13 or 14 | 19 or 20 | 25 or 26 |
| 3 | | 1 | 4 | 7 | 11 | 17 | 22 | 28 |
| 4 | | 1 | 4 | 7 | 11 | 17 | 22 | 28 |

TABLE 3. Party percentages and numbers of seats in various multi-party electoral contests, together with the best fitting numbers of blocks for Penrose's block model.

| Year | Country | Party percentages | | | | Number of seats | | | | Usable range of n based on 5% point of X^2 | Value of X^2 for best n | Best n |
|-------------------------|----------|-------------------|-----|---------|---------|-----------------|-----|---------|---------|---|--------------------------------|-------------|
| | | CON | LAB | LIB/SDP | PLC/SNP | CON | LAB | LIB/SDP | PLC/SNP | | | |
| <u>4-party contests</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1983 | Scotland | 31 | 32 | 25 | 13 | 15 | 21 | 7 | 2 | 1 to 28 | 1.4 | 12 |
| 1983 | Wales | 33 | 35 | 24 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 1 to 4 | 6.9 | 3 |
| <u>3-party contests</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1983 | England | 46 | 28 | 26 | - | 165 | 79 | 3 | - | none | 56.5 | 8 |
| 1964 | Scotland | 42 | 35 | - | 22 | 12 | 5 | - | 3 | 1 to 27 | 1.0 | 8 |
| 1951 | England | 47 | 41 | 12 | - | 64 | 31 | 1 | - | 7 to 22 | 2.3 | 15 |
| 1950 | Wales | 33 | 46 | - | 20 | 3 | 9 | - | 3 | 1 to 14 | 1.0 | 3 |

B85 SID
1-30

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL STABILITY
AND ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

BY

JOHN H FENTON
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH,

BARCELONA,

25 MARCH 1985

I am grateful to the Massachusetts Development Research Institute for a grant to do the U.S. portion of the study; to Professor Steve Coelen, Director, MDRI, and Dr. Michael Dyer, Department of Politics, University of Aberdeen for their valuable suggestions, and criticisms of the manuscript, and to Sam MacLeod, MDRI, for help with the data analysis.

Democracy is founded on the belief that over the long haul the will of the majority is a better guide to public policy than the will of any elite. And the majority will cannot be determined unless most of the electorate participate in the political process. And, according to James Bryce, "To sum up, government by the whole people best secures the two main objects of all governments--Justice and Happiness. Justice because no man or class or group will be strong enough to wrong others. Happiness, because each man, judging best what is for his own good, will have every chance of pursuing it. The principles of liberty and equality are justified by the results they yield."¹

The enemies of rule by the "great unwashed" from both the right and the left and in both the United Kingdom and the United States, claim that there is evidence of alienation from the democratic political systems of both countries. The principal evidence adduced for this claim is the decline in election turnout since World War II. One such critic is quoted in The Times of 17th September 1984 (Stephen Govier, a Conservative Westminster City Councillor) as saying, "If in the final analysis, less than 50 percent turnout to vote in Greater London Council by-elections, then change will have been endorsed, and there will remain little justification for the retention of the Greater London Council (disliked by Mr. Govier for being dominated by the political left). Similarly, Gore Vidal, an American novelist and a left-wing critic of the American democratic system, was widely quoted as "hoping" that fewer than 50 percent of the electorate would cast ballots in the American Presidential election, revealing by their withdrawal from participation in the election their withdrawal of support for the political system and thus its essential bankruptcy.

The intent of this paper will be to determine, first, whether and to what degree a decline in election turnout has occurred in the

two nations. And, secondly, to ascertain the degree to which changes in electoral turnout are associated with or caused by political instability. For example, to what extent, if any, is the decline in election turnout in the United States in the 1970's associated with or caused by the resignations of, first, Vice President Spiro Agnew for certain financial irregularities, and, secondly, the resignation of the President, Richard M. Nixon, due to the Watergate affair?

Figure 1 shows the history of election turnout in United States Presidential elections over the period, 1920 through 1980. The base date, 1920, was selected because it marks the beginning of universal adult suffrage in the United States.² Figure 2 shows the history of election turnout in general elections in the United Kingdom, 1918 through 1983. The base date, 1918, marks the beginning of universal adult suffrage in the United Kingdom.³

The history of turnout in both countries reveals little in the way of consistent patterns. It begins at a rather low level in both countries (presumably due to women suffrage and the distortions associated with World War I), but increases thereafter. However, in the Post-World War II era, initially high turnouts are followed by declining voter turnout in elections in both the United Kingdom and the United States.

About 20 years ago, V.O. Key wrote in the Responsible Electorate, "...the perceptions that leadership elements of democracies hold of the modes of response of the electorate must always be a matter of fundamental significance."⁴ In the 1960's V.O. Key was concerned with the new analyses of voting behaviour which pictured the people as manageable fools. Key wrote, "The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools.... In American Presidential campaigns of recent decades the portrait of the American electorate that develops from the data is not one of an electorate strait jacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful propagandists."⁵

As with V.O. Key in the 1960's, we are concerned in the 1980's with the perceptions by critics of British and American




FIGURE 1
 PERCENT TURNOUT OF POTENTIAL VOTERS IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
 ELECTIONS, 1920-1980

ELECTION YEARS

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984
 (104th ED.) WASHINGTON, DC, 1983, P. 262

% TURNOUT

% TURNOUT




Figure 2

Percent turnout of estimated register in General Elections, United Kingdom 1918-1983

UNITED KINGDOM TURNOUT

ELECTION YEARS

Sources: F.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1885-1975 (London: MacMillan Press, 1976), pp.75-77
 Britain Votes 2 (Parliamentary Research Service, 1980), p.70
 Britain Votes 3 (Parliamentary Research Service, 1983), p.98

democracy, emphasizing as they do declining political participation induced by alienation and anomie and producing political instability. We are concerned out of fear that these perceptions will lead politicians and other leaders to behaviour consonant with the perceptions. According to V.O. Key, "The voice of the people is but an echo. the output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input."⁶ Thus, if the leadership of the nation concludes that the people are no longer interested in selecting their rulers through the ballot, this perception will "affect the nature of the input into the echo chamber...and thereby control its output."

The echo chamber analogy, then, leads friends of democracy to fear that the widely advertised alienation of the voters will encourage the belief among certain politicians and political activists that the "road to change is not through the ballot box."⁷

The intent of the study, then, is to determine the reasons for the decline in turnout, if any, in the post World War II period in the United Kingdom and the United States and the degree to which decline is linked with political instability. The hypothesis to be tested is the null hypothesis, i.e., that decline in turnout has little to do with political instability, but is primarily due to other variables, such as the changing composition of the voter population. The approach will be to, first, examine election turnout in the United States, secondly, examine turnout in the United Kingdom, and, finally, speculate on the relation between turnout and political stability in the two countries.

ELECTION TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES

There is a widespread conviction in the United States, held especially by the better educated classes, that election turnout is down from the halcyon days of yore. In this connection, political science instructors are fond of quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, e.g., "It is difficult to say what place is taken up

in the life of an inhabitant of the United States by his concern for politics. To take a hand in the regulation of society and to discuss it is his biggest concern and, so to speak, the only pleasure an American knows. ...in some countries the inhabitants seem unwilling to avail themselves of the political privileges which the law gives them;... But if an American were condemned to confine his activity to his own affairs he would be robbed of one-half of his existence..."⁸

However true this may have been, it is worth noting that in the 1830's when Tocqueville penned these lines, only about 10 to 12 percent of the total population cast ballots. In 1900, after property qualifications were eliminated and blacks were given the franchise, some 18 percent of the total population voted. In 1920, when women received the vote and universal adult suffrage was the norm in the United States, approximately 25 percent of the total population voted. In 1980, after adding the 18, 19 and 20 year olds to the electorate the ratio of the total vote to the total population was 38 percent of a total population of 227 million.

Turning again to Figure 1 showing the history of election turnout in the United States over the period, 1920 through 1980, examination of the Figure leads to skepticism concerning many of the more widely held stereotypes concerning trends in turnout over time. First, it is evident that election turnout in the United States has grown over the period covered by the Figure. In 1920 and 1924, election turnout was less than 45 percent of the potential vote, consisting of all age 21 and over in the United States. In the 1930's and 1940's turnout hovered at the 50 percent range. In the 1950's and 1960's turnout moved up yet another step to the 60 percent range. Then in 1972, turnout fell precipitously back to the 50 percent range and has continued to fall in 1976 and in 1980 until in 1980 turnout was barely more than half the "potential" vote consisting of every single solitary soul counted in the 1980 census at age 18 or above.

In an effort to identify the causes of or the reasons for the apparent decline in turnout in the 1970s, Table 1 was constructed containing the raw turnout data for the Presidential elections,

1968 through 1980. Table 2 contains like data for Congressional elections, 1966 through 1982. Reference to the Tables reveals that the total vote for President has increased from 73.2 million in 1968 to 86.5 million in 1980. Similarly, the total vote cast for members of Congress has increased from 52.9 million in 1966 to 64.5 million in 1982. However, the potential vote has increased at a more rapid rate than the increase in the number of votes cast, resulting in a decline in the turnout ratio in both the Presidential and Congressional elections.

One of the reasons for the sizeable increase in the potential vote is apparent. In 1971, the 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified, containing yet another extension of the suffrage, i.e., that "The right of citizens of the United States who are 18 years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by any state on account of age." Therefore, in the 1972 Presidential election and in the 1974 Congressional elections much or most of the increase in the number of potential voters over the preceding election was due to the enfranchisement of 18, 19, and 20 year olds. In fact, in 1972, the combination of the coming of age of the progeny of the "baby boom" in the late 1940's and early 1950's, plus the ratification of the 26th Amendment to the Constitution, meant that fully 19 percent of the potential electorate was eligible to vote for the very first time. The tiny proportion of the newly eligible voters who actually cast ballots in 1972, is reflected in the fact that the 18 to 24 age voters in 1972 constituted only 12 percent of the total vote, according to U.S. Census estimates. One of the topics to be examined in the following pages is the impact of the 18, 19, and 20 year old vote on turnout levels since 1972. There is little question that the turnout levels of 18 to 20 year olds is quite low relative to other age groups. For example, in 1982 the census estimates that only 18 percent of this age group cast ballots compared to 48 percent of all persons of voting age. It is our hypothesis that the effects of the failure of 18 to 20 year olds to vote extends far beyond this single age group. Each year there is an entirely new crop of 18 year olds and not only does the voting rate of this age group remain small, but their failure to vote results in habits and attitudes of non-participation that seem to persist in later years.

TABLE 1
 PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT
 INCLUDING NON-CITIZENS

1968 TO 1980

| | RESIDENT POPULATION INCLUDING NON-CITIZENS OF VOTING AGE (1,000) | TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT (1,000) | % VOTES CAST OF VOTING POPULATION |
|------|--|--|---|
| 1968 | 120,285 | 73,212 | 60.9 |
| 1972 | 140,777 | 77,719 | 55.2 |
| 1976 | 152,308 | 81,556 | 53.5 |
| 1980 | 164,381 | 86,515 | 52.6 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (104th ed) WASHINGTON, D.C. 1983, p.262.

TABLE 2
 PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS FOR CONGRESS
 1966 TO 1982

| | RESIDENT POPULATION INCLUDING NON-CITIZENS OF VOTING AGE (1,000) | TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR CONGRESS (1,000) | % VOTES CAST OF VOTING POPULATION |
|------|--|---|---|
| 1966 | 116,638 | 52,908 | 45.4 |
| 1970 | 124,498 | 54,173 | 43.5 |
| 1974 | 146,338 | 52,495 | 35.9 |
| 1978 | 158,369 | 55,332 | 34.9 |
| 1982 | 169,342 | 64,514 | 38.1 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (104th ed) WASHINGTON, D.C. 1983, p. 262.

A second reason for the decline in turnout in elections in the United States is revealed by Tables 3 and 4. In Tables 1 and 2 the column headings note that the potential vote includes non-citizens. In point of fact, non-citizens are barred from voting in the United States and consequently it would seem logical to subtract them from the potential vote. This is done in Tables 3 and 4. It provokes the furled brow and raised eyebrows that the turnout figure conventionally peddled by the media and accepted in the United States and abroad are the data in Tables 1 and 2 which include non-citizens in the denominator of the turnout ratio. The turnout percentages in Tables 3 and 4 reveal that after 1972 in the Presidential elections and after 1974 in the Congressional elections that turnout has declined very little among U.S. citizens--and they are the only people eligible to vote in American elections. In fact, in the 1982 Congressional elections there is evidence of increasing turnout among U.S. citizens. The data circulated by the media giving an impression of continued declines in election turnout after 1972 were due to the increasing proportions of aliens residing in the United States, none of whom were permitted to vote, but all of whom were included in the denominator of the turnout ratio.

Up to this point, then, we have accounted for some but not all the decline in turnout after 1966 and 1968. It was our belief that most if not all of the decline in turnout could be accounted for by, 1) the increasing proportion of non-citizens (already taken into account); 2) the enfranchisement of 18, 19, and 20 year olds; 3) the large numbers of people in institutions and the armed forces, few of whom vote; 4) the changed age distribution of the voting population since 1966, i.e., larger proportions of the voting population at the younger and older ends of the age spectrum; and 5) the tendency of 18, 19, and 20 year olds to become fixed in a non-registered and non-voting posture, so that when they turn 21 there is no longer the same motivation to register and vote that existed when age 21 was synonymous with "coming of age." Consequently, as the enfranchised population ages, the non-voting propensities of the 18 year olds are thrust forward into the older age groups.

Tables 5 and 6 contain the outcome of efforts to test the first

TABLE 3
 PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT
 OF CITIZEN POPULATION ONLY

1968 TO 1980

| | RESIDENT POPULATION OF CITIZENS ONLY OF VOTING AGE (1,000) | TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT (1,000) | % VOTES CAST OF VOTING POPULATION |
|------|--|--|---|
| 1968 | 117,606 | 73,212 | 62.3 |
| 1972 | 137,236 | 77,719 | 56.6 |
| 1976 | 148,198 | 81,556 | 55.0 |
| 1980 | 158,089 | 86,515 | 54.7 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (104th ed) WASHINGTON, D.C. 1983, p.262.

TABLE 4
 PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS FOR CONGRESS
 OF CITIZEN POPULATION ONLY
 1966 TO 1982

| | RESIDENT POPULATION OF CITIZENS ONLY OF VOTING AGE (1,000) | TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR CONGRESS (1,000) | % VOTES CAST OF VOTING POPULATION |
|------|--|---|---|
| 1966 | 114,353 | 52,908 | 46.3 |
| 1970 | 121,248 | 54,173 | 44.6 |
| 1974 | 142,664 | 52,495 | 36.8 |
| 1978 | 152,991 | 55,332 | 36.2 |
| 1982 | 162,283 | 64,514 | 40.0 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (104th ed) WASHINGTON, D.C. 1983, p. 262.

four of these five hypotheses. The data in the Tables were obtained from special reports published by the U.S. Census dealing with registration and voting, i.e., "Current Population Reports" for the 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980 Presidential elections and the 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, and 1982 Congressional elections, Series P-20, Nos. 174, 192, 228, 253, 293, 323, 344, 370, 383 respectively. In these reports interviewers asked a household respondent to report on the registration and voting of all eligible household members. The data in Tables 5 and 6 are drawn from these reports. The first column of Table 5 provides the percent of the eligible civilian non-institutional population that reported voting in each of the Presidential elections, 1968 to 1980. Translated, this means that the denominator of the turnout ratio does not include members of the armed forces or people in institutions, few of whom vote. In 1968, 68 percent of this population reported that they voted. In 1972, there was a sharp drop in reported turnout to 63 percent, and in 1976 there was yet another drop to 59 percent. In 1980, reported turnout remained at the 59 percent level.

The second column of Table 5 controls for non-citizens. In other words, non-citizens are subtracted from the denominator containing the civilian non-institutional population age 18 and above. The result (as in Tables 3 and 4) is a reduction in the turnout loss after 1968, due to the increasing proportion of non-citizens in the population.

In column 3 of Table 5 we control for age. The purpose is to compare turnout of like populations in terms of age for the period examined. In 1968, very few people age 18, 19, and 20 were eligible to vote and consequently removing them from the denominator had little effect on the turnout ratio in 1968. It was not until 1972, that the 26th Amendment lowering the voting age to 18 was ratified. Therefore, column 3 of Table 5 compares the reported turnout of the age 21 and over population, excluding members of the armed forces, institutional inmates, and non-citizens. The finding is that between 1968 and 1980 there was a small drop in turnout for this population, from 69 percent in 1968 to 64 percent in 1980.

TABLE 5
 REPORTED PARTICIPATION IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
 OF CIVILIAN NON-INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION

1968 TO 1980

| | % REPORTED VOTE | % REPORTED VOTE LESS NON-CITIZENS | % REPORTED VOTE LESS NON-CITIZENS AND AGE 18 TO 20 | % REPORTED VOTE ACCORDING TO 1968 AGE DISTRIBUTION LESS N-C AND AGE 18 TO 20 |
|------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1968 | 67.8 | 69.4 | 69.5 | 69.5 |
| 1972 | 63.0 | 64.7 | 66.0 | 66.4 |
| 1976 | 59.2 | 61.0 | 63.0 | 63.6 |
| 1980 | 59.2 | 61.7 | 63.8 | 64.7 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENCUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS - VOTING AND
 REGISTRATION NO. 383 AND EARLIER REPORTS AND PRESS RELEASES.

TABLE 6
 REPORTED PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
 OF CIVILIAN NON-INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION

1966 TO 1982

| | % REPORTED VOTE | % REPORTED VOTE LESS NON-CITIZENS | % REPORTED VOTE LESS NON-CITIZENS AND AGE 18 TO 20 | % REPORTED VOTE ACCORDING TO 1966 AGE DISTRIBUTION LESS N-C AND AGE 18 TO 20 |
|------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1966 | 55.4 | 56.6 | 56.7 | 56.7 |
| 1970 | 54.6 | 56.0 | 56.1 | 56.7 |
| 1974 | 44.7 | 45.9 | 48.2 | 49.1 |
| 1978 | 45.9 | 47.6 | 49.9 | 51.2 |
| 1982 | 48.5 | 50.7 | 53.0 | 54.6 |

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS. SERIES p-20,
 NO. 383 AND EARLIER REPORTS AND PRESS RELEASES.

In column 4 of Table 5 we control for the changing age distribution of the voting population after 1968. In 1968, there was a smaller proportion of the population at the younger and older age levels than in later elections, and both younger and older people are less likely to vote than middle aged people. Therefore, in an effort to compare like populations the civilian non-institutional population who were citizens and age 21 and over were distributed according to the percentage age distribution in 1968. The actual turnout of each age group was determined and then applied to the numbers according to the changed age distribution. Then a new turnout ratio was calculated and reported in Column 4 of Table 5. The finding is that controlling for citizens, age, and age distribution that the reported election turnout in United States Presidential elections has dropped very little. There was a modest drop from 69 percent turnout in 1968 to 66 percent in 1972; in 1976 turnout declined to 64 percent; and then in 1980 rose to 65 percent of the potential vote.

Table 6 contains identical information for the Congressional elections, 1966 to 1982, as Table 5 contains for the Presidential elections. The first column of Table 6 shows the reported turnout of the civilian non-institutional population. The second column eliminates non-citizens from the potential vote, the third column also eliminates those aged 18, 19, or 20; and the fourth column distributes the potential citizen voters for each year according to the 1966 age distribution. The outcome is that each column reduces the reported drop in turnout, until in the fourth column, after a rather sharp drop in 1974, turnout recovers until in 1982, it is 55 percent of the potential vote, only 2 percentage-points below the turnout level of 1966.

Table 7 contains the data for 1982 from which the 1982 turnout information in Table 6 was calculated. The purpose of Table 7 is to provide the reader with an improved understanding of Tables 5 and 6. Column 1 of Table 7 contains the number of civilian non-institutionalized people in 1982 by age categories. The sum of column 1 is the total age 18 and over. Column 2 omits non-citizens from each of the age categories and the sum of column 2 is the potential vote less non-citizens, members of the

TABLE 7
 REPORTED PARTICIPATION OF CIVILIAN NON-INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION
 IN 1982 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

| AGE | 1 TOTAL (1,000) | 2 CITIZENS (1,000) | 3 REPORTED VOTE (1,000) | 4 % VOTE CITIZENS | 5 CITIZENS 1966 AGE DISTRIBUTION (1,000) | 6 VOTE BY 1966 AGE DISTRIBUTION (1,000) |
|-------|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--|---|
| 18-20 | 12,076 | 11,450 | 2,390 | 20.9 | ----- | ----- |
| 21-24 | 16,748 | 15,966 | 4,749 | 29.7 | 13,375 | 3,972 |
| 25-34 | 38,751 | 36,577 | 15,667 | 42.8 | 27,925 | 11,952 |
| 35-44 | 28,130 | 26,626 | 14,676 | 55.1 | 30,717 | 16,925 |
| 45-54 | 22,226 | 21,373 | 13,350 | 62.5 | 29,101 | 18,188 |
| 55-64 | 21,954 | 21,434 | 14,141 | 66.0 | 22,487 | 14,841 |
| 65+ | 25,598 | 24,998 | 15,336 | 61.3 | 23,369 | 14,325 |

REPORTED % VOTE OF CIVILIAN NON-INSTITUTIONAL POP.: (80.3 M/165.5 M) *100=48.5
 REPORTED % VOTE OF CITIZENS: (80.3 M/158.4 M) *100=50.7
 REPORTED % VOTE OF CITIZENS 21 AND OVER: (77.9 M/147.0 M) *100=53.0
 BY 1966 AGE DISTRIBUTION: (80.2 M/147.0 M) *100=54.6

SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: NO. 383,
 VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1982.

armed forces, and the institutionalized population. Column 4 has the percentage turnout of citizens for each of the age categories. Column 5 shows the potential vote in 1982 divided by age categories according to the percentage age distribution in 1966. Column 6 contains the total 1982 vote for each of the age categories assuming a 1966 age distribution and the 1982 turnout ratio for each age category.

At the bottom of Table 7 are four lines. The first line contains the percentage of the civilian non-institutionalized population age 18 and above that voted in 1982, and is obtained by dividing the sum of column 3 (the total 1982 vote) by the sum of column 1 (the potential vote in 1982 less members of the armed forces and institutionalized persons) and multiplying by 100. The succeeding three lines wherein 1) non-citizens; and 2) ages 18 to 20 are removed from the denominator of the turnout ratio; and 3) citizens age 21 and above in 1982 are distributed according to the 1966 age distribution, demonstrate that turnout in 1982 is almost as high as in 1966, when like quantities are compared.

ELECTION TURNOUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, it is maintained by the media and believed by those who rely on the media for their information that turnout in elections has declined in Great Britain. And, according to the paper pundits, the cause is alienation, anomie, and social atomization.

Figure 2 provides some modest support for this view of election history. In 1918, turnout was unusually low because people in the armed services were unable to vote and because women over age 30 were enfranchised for the very first time and many failed to cast ballots. After 1918, voting turnout reached a plateau at the mid-70% level and remained there through 1945. Turnout was inhibited in 1945 due to the dislocations associated with World War II.

In the 1950 general election turnout soared to 84 percent of the register, the very highest turnout recorded since the advent of universal suffrage in the United Kingdom. After 1950, there was

a gentle secular decline in election turnout until in 1983 it was 72.7 percent of the register.

After 1918, there were two important additions to the electorate, potentially affecting turnout. The Representation of the People Act of July 1928 enfranchised women age 21 and over. In combination with The Representation of the People act of 1918, which abolished property-related qualifications for voting in addition to enfranchising women age 30 and over, full adult suffrage was achieved in the United Kingdom in 1928. Finally, the Representation of the People Act of April 1969 extended the franchise to persons age 18 and over.

Unlike the United States, the electoral register in the United Kingdom is prepared by the local authorities and includes virtually all citizens residing in the United Kingdom. Non-citizens are not included in the register, and, therefore, when turnout is reported the denominator of the turnout ratio does not include non-citizens. Another difference with the United States is that registration does not require a voluntary act on the part of the citizen. The register is prepared by means of a door-to-door census where people are asked their names and placed on the register if not already included. Thus registration to vote is not an individual responsibility, but is regarded as a responsibility of the authorities. Therefore, on election day when interest in the election is at its height virtually everyone age 18 and above who is a citizen is able to vote.

Once again, in an effort to isolate the causes of the apparent decline in election turnout in the U.K., Table 8 was constructed containing the raw turnout data, "adjusted" turnout percentages, and the age distribution of the electorate, 1964 to 1983. The Table shows almost a 7 million increase in the size of the electorate over the two decades after 1964. About one-half the increase in the size of the electorate took place in 1970, when those age 18 to 20 were added to the register. The total vote cast has only increased by about 3 million votes over the same period. Therefore, the denominator of the turnout ratio has increased at a more rapid pace than the numerator, resulting in a

TABLE 8
 PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
 1964-1983

| <u>ELECTIONS</u> | <u>REGISTER</u> ¹ (1,000) | <u>TOTAL VOTES</u> ¹ (1,000) | <u>% TURNOUT</u> ¹ | <u>ADJUSTED</u> ² <u>% TURNOUT</u> | <u>% UNDER</u> ³ <u>AGE 30</u> | <u>% AGE</u> ³ <u>65+</u> |
|------------------|---|--|-------------------------------|--|--|---|
| 1964 | 35,894 | 27,657 | 77.1 | 83.3 | 17.2 | 18.6 |
| 1966 | 35,957 | 27,265 | 75.8 | 77.4 | 17.7 | 18.9 |
| 1970 | 39,342 | 28,345 | 72.0 | 75.1 | 23.2 | 18.3 |
| 1974(F) | 39,754 | 31,340 | 78.8 | 79.1 | 23.5 | 18.8 |
| 1974(O) | 40,073 | 29,189 | 72.8 | 78.7 | 23.5 | 18.8 |
| 1979 | 41,096 | 31,221 | 76.0 | 78.6 | 23.5 | 19.7 |
| 1983 | 42,198 | 30,671 | 72.7 | 75.9 | 23.5 | 20.0 |

SOURCE:

1. F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1885 - 1975 (London: MacMillan, 1976).
 F.W.S. Craig, Britain Votes 2 (Parliamentary Research Services, 1980).
 F.W.S. Craig, Britain Votes 3 (Parliamentary Research Services, 1983).
2. Ivor Crewe, Tony Fox, & Jim Alt, "Non-Voting in British General Elections 1966 - October 1974", in Colin Caduch (ed), Participation in Politics (London, Croom Helm, 1977).
3. Census 1981, Sex, Age & Marital Status, Great Britain (London: H.M.S.O.).
 Census 1971, Sex, Age & Marital Status, Great Britain (London: H.M.S.O.).
 Census 1961, Sex, Age & Marital Status, Great Britain (London: H.M.S.O.).
 The Northern Ireland Census 1981, Summary Report. (Belfast: H.M.S.O.).
 The Northern Ireland Census 1971, Summary Report. (Belfast: H.M.S.O.).
 The Northern Ireland Census 1961, Summary Report. (Belfast: H.M.S.O.).

declining turnout ratio.

Table 8 includes data on the proportions of the electorate under age 30 and age 65 and above. In 1964, only 35.8 percent of the electorate were in these age groups, whereas in 1983 fully 43.5 percent were in one or the other age category. Election studies confirm that the turnout of these two age groups is substantially below that of middle-aged people. For example, according to Butler and Stokes, in a 1964 British Election Study, the percent reporting that they voted in that election was 88.4 percent (considerably above the reported turnout of 77.1 percent). However, in 1964, only 81 percent of those under age 30 reported voting. In October 1974, 85.6 percent reported voting, according to Butler and Stokes (far above the 72.8 percent officially reported), but only 75 percent of those under age 30 said they voted. The implication, then, is that much of the modest decline in election turnout may be attributed to the changed age structure of the voting population.

Table 8 also isolates another reason for the decline in turnout. Column 5 of Table 8 contains an "Adjusted" turnout figure for each of the election years. The "Adjusted" figures were taken from an article by Crewe, Fox, and Alt entitled, "Non-Voting in British Elections 1964-October 1974." The authors use a formula first applied to election data by Richard Rose in Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook.⁹ The formula may be found in the footnotes to this paper, but it purports to adjust the register by taking into account those not registered, those registered twice, effects of deaths, effects of removals, and the number of months between the preparation of the register and the general election. The "Adjusted" turnout percent would indicate that even though there is some small decline in election turnout, the propensity of citizens of the United Kingdom to vote remains as high as at any other period in the history of election turnout since 1918, save for elections in the 1950's.

In conclusion, election turnout in the U.K. is much higher than in the United States. One reason is the preparation of a register in the U.K. that includes virtually everyone residing in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland with the exception

of non-citizens. Turnout remains quite high and the illusion of a substantial decline is a product of the changed age distribution of the voting population and certain defects in the register that affect elections according to the time lag between the preparation of the register and the election.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND TURNOUT IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S.

There are two contradictory theses concerning the relation between election turnout and political stability. One thesis maintains that exceptionally high levels of turnout are symptomatic of and may in fact exacerbate political instability. The case in point in the United States is the Civil War, when election turnout of the enfranchised population (white males) exceeded 80 percent of the potential vote. Allegedly, this high level of turnout overheated an already steamy political situation, resulting in an election where Southerners were so committed to their candidate (Breckinridge) that they could not accept the victory by Abraham Lincoln. The outcome was withdrawal from union by means of Secession.

It may seem curious that an 80 percent turnout in the United States would be regarded as excessively high, when Austria regularly has election turnouts in excess of 90 percent and other nations regularly have turnouts in excess of 80 percent of the potential vote. However the 80 percent turnout in the United States must be evaluated within the political context of the Civil War period. This high level of turnout represented a significant departure from accustomed patterns of political behaviour. And the choices in the election were perceived as quite distinct in terms of their probable impact on individuals and whole regions of the nation. Thus the election strained to the breaking point the brittle bonds holding together the citizens of the nation.

In a sense, the South felt akin to the fabled victim set upon by Robin Hood and his merry men in Sherwood Forest. Upon intercepting the traveler, Robin Hood called a meeting and proposed a vote on "A People's Act to Relieve This Traveler of This Wallet." The vote taken, the traveler was democratically

relieved of his wealth. The South felt that Wall Street and the power brokers of the northeastern United States were similarly relieving them of their goods by means of a noble cause and democratic procedures. The outcome was division and war. The large turnout in the elections of the period were because of the recognition that the stakes of the election were very high indeed--much too high for the South to accept defeat.

One might have expected a similar outcome from the elections in the United Kingdom after World War II, and particularly the elections of 1950 and 1951, when turnout was extraordinarily high and the stakes of the election outcome were perceived as very high indeed. In 1945, a Labour government was elected which proceeded to implement a thoroughgoing transformation of British society and the economy. A "Welfare State" was created implementing Lord Beveridge's "Cradle to the Grave" security programme. In addition, many industries were nationalized. The elections of 1950 and 1951 represented a challenge to these programmes. However, there was little evidence of political instability. The reasons were many. First, there remained a strong sense of community in the United Kingdom produced by the shared suffering of World War II. Secondly, the challenge to the programmes was not reactionary, but rather was accompanied by a promise to improve the administration of the welfare state. Third, the challenge was led by Winston Churchill, who embodied the sense of community which emerged out of World War II. It is also true in other Western European states, such as Sweden, that similar divisions between economic classes and similarly high turnouts in elections have not produced political instability--to the dismay of many Marxists.

According to Walter Korpi in The Democratic Class Struggle, "Nevertheless, increasing electoral participation primarily represents the gradual incorporation and mobilization of the Swedish people in the democratic class struggle. This mobilization of the people has not been a steady, smooth process. Instead, it has been characterized by abrupt spurts in turnout during elections where important political issues have stirred the feelings of the electorate and where control of the government was at stake. During the intervening elections, the

voting turnout subsequently has often fallen but has remained at a higher level than before the mobilizing election."¹⁰

The United Kingdom and the United States do not conform in all particulars to Walter Korpi's scenario. It is true that following enfranchisement of the adult population that turnout gradually increased in both countries and that to some degree at least the increases in turnout were related to the intensity of the political battles. Turnout in the United Kingdom reached a peak in the 1950's when the ruling Labour party's administration of the welfare state was challenged. In the United States, turnout was highest during the political turmoil of the 1960's. However, a strong sense of community was maintained in both countries throughout the political battles and the outcome was that the Conservative party in the United Kingdom and the Republican party in the United States both embraced the main features of the welfare state, only rejecting nationalization of industry. It is possible that during these periods of high turnout that the political system suffered from overheating and that there was a danger of political instability. However, in fact after these periods of heated political battles voter turnout has fallen, as in Sweden.

The falling turnout could be interpreted as a sign of political health after the disturbances of the 1950's and 1960's. However, the Cassandras in the media purport to see evidence of alienation and despair in the declining turnout. And, in the United Kingdom there is objective evidence to support this interpretation of the turnout decline, e.g., the fall of the British Conservative government in 1974, after the chaos caused by the three-day work week, and the evidence in 1985 of strains on the brittle bonds holding the British people together, caused by the coal strike and the accompanying confrontations between the strikers and the government. On the other hand, after the Watergate scandals and Richard Nixon's resignation, the declining turnout in the United States has been accompanied by economic growth and political stability.

The data reported in this study indicate, first, that the decline in turnout in the U.K. and the U.S. is largely an artifact of the

changed composition of the electorate. The residual decline in turnout may well be the lull between storms of class battles, as described by Walter Korpi. However, the amount of the decline is so slight and the duration so short that it would seem unrelated to either instability in the United Kingdom or stability in the United States.

NOTES

1. James Bryce, Modern Democracies, 2 Vols. (New York: MacMillan, 1921) Vol I, pp44-45.

2. The 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1920, provided full voting rights for women.

3. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 provided the franchise for women age 30 and over and abolished property qualifications for voting.

4. V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) p.7.

5. Ibid., p.7.

6. Ibid., p.2.

7. The Times, 17 September, 1984, p.12.

8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Knopf, 1945) Vol I, p.250, Phillips Bradley Edition.

9. Ivor Crewe, Tony Fox, and Jim Alt, "non-Voting in British Elections 1966-October 1974" in Colin Crouch (ed), Participation in Politics (London, Croom Helm, 1977) p.87.

Adjusted turnout is based on the formula given in Richard Rose, Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (New York and London: The Free Press, 1974) p.494.

Adjusted Turnout=Unadjusted turnout divided by the sum of 100:
+3.4% (not registered) (-) 1.0% (registered twice (-) 0.15m
(effect of deaths) (-) 0.67m (removals).

m=months since the date of the compilation of the register.

10. Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) p.58.

B85 SID
07-170

Change and Stability in Irish Democracy:

The Impact of Nationalism

European Consortium for Political Research,
Institut Catalic D'Estudis Socials Barcelona

25-30 March 1985

Brian Girvin,
Department of Modern History,
University College, Cork.

Section I

A recurring theme in political theory has been the need to reconcile, within an institutional framework, the often conflicting values of authority and freedom and power and justice. The growth of democratic forms of government in the nineteenth century sharpened concern on these points. Alexis de Tocqueville is certainly the best known of those who warned of the possible effects of democracy on the functioning of the polity. De Tocqueville maintained that the principle of majority rule was to be welcomed; but unless the majority was restricted by constitutional and legal checks and balances the expression of its power could lead to the tyranny of the majority.¹ This theme was taken up by John Stuart Mill later in the century. In *On Liberty* he sought to establish the conditions where individual freedom and democracy would prove compatible. He had two main concerns. The first was to establish the limits of state action and the second, more pressing, was to restrict the possibility, on the part of the majority, of an abuse of power. Mill warned that there was a danger that in a formal democracy the majority, or perhaps those who most actively pursue a cause, may use its consequent electoral influence to oppress others.² The force of these arguments were accepted in many European states during the nineteenth century, the outcome of which was the evolution of a liberal-democratic variant of democracy. Notwithstanding this development simple majorities retained their attraction in representative institutions. Once all citizens acquired the franchise it is extremely difficult to object to a decision of the majority. What was being sought by liberal democratic theorists was a set of norms against which democratic actions could be evaluated. There is strong resistance to the idea that a

government may, because it has a majority in parliament, coerce a minority to act in a fashion repugnant to its beliefs, (compulsory sterilisation for example). The objection is then to unlimited government not to democratic government as such. The attractions of the democratic method are many; it permits peaceful change, it maintains liberty, it expands the possibilities of political education and participation. However, it has to be seen as a method, a procedure for determining the way a government will be formed and legislation decided. Liberalism lays stress on what the legislation ought to be and invokes certain values in order that this can be secured. What the liberal insists on is that a law made by a majority is not necessarily a good law. There is an essential tension on the latter point between the 'pure' democrat and the 'pure' liberal. Liberal democracy is then an attempt to resolve this tension.³

Nonetheless, the tension remains. A majority may be frustrated by constitutional checks while a minority may be so disaffected by its status that the polity may become wholly unstable. The objection might be met in a number of ways. At best liberal democracy is a compromise between contending philosophies. But it might be urged that coercion may be a greater possibility in a formal democracy than in a liberal democracy. In addition, the latter emphasises the opportunities for active participation of the individual citizens in the political process. There is also more stress on individual autonomy and a greater concern for the rights of minorities and the responsibilities of majorities.⁴ To achieve these ends two conditions have to be met. The first is negative, there must be an absence of real or possible coercion of the citizen. The second is a positive right to a set of freedoms. Furthermore, in an ideal situation these safeguards would be reinforced

by the legislative process; the individual representative being influenced by the 'principles of justice' rather than the opinions of a majority or a minority, however well organised they might be.⁵ However, more is required of the liberal democratic polity if it is to function, rights and responsibilities are frequently too abstract to acquire legitimacy for the system. Implicit to the model is consensus, general agreement on the rules of government and legislation. This presupposes not only that there is no intransigent or excluded minority, but that there is always the possibility that the minority can become a majority or at the very least that the policies of the minority can be accommodated. This tends to presuppose distinct political parties and alternation in government. In addition a sense of cohesion among the citizens of the polity reinforces the possibility of consensus and stability.⁶

Unless consent is forthcoming from the citizens of a particular state, its continued legitimacy is in doubt. How this consent becomes available in a particular case is a matter for historical investigation, but for a state to be considered liberal democratic it must fulfil most if not all of the conditions discussed above.⁷ In most of the world today this consent is rarely present, however in the liberal democracies that exist this consent is not necessarily based on an affirmation of the principles involved. It is far more frequently based on a nationalist collective consciousness which facilitates consensual politics. Political nationalism has since the eighteenth century been the focus for national integration, the creation of closely knit loyalties, and for political mobilisation.⁸ The circumstances under which this occurred in Europe were fairly unique, most states were homogeneous in composition. In some parts of Europe, but more particularly in other areas of the world, this homogeneity is not forthcoming. However, because nationalism is

such an important focus of loyalty, conflicting national identities within a state can lead to serious disruption. In particular, a nationality in a state where it is in a minority numerically may, and frequently does, refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state because its primary loyalty is to the nation and not the state. Thus a process that might well reinforce consensus in one set of circumstances may, in others, lead to the disruption of the state. In fact, less than ten per cent of the one hundred and sixty states in the world are highly homogeneous, in another ten per cent the level of homogeneity is such as not to present a serious threat to the framework of the state. In probably a further sixty to seven per cent of these states not only are there ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities, but the political cleavages within the state are based primarily on them. When it is also recognised that there are 8,000 separate languages in the world, and possibly 800 'nationalities' the scope of the problem is clear.⁹ If the primary allegiance of a minority is not to the state then there is a danger that the conditions necessary for a functioning liberal democracy will not arise. Unless the nation and the state are coterminous the tendency will be for that group which is numerically the largest to invoke the majoritarian principle to integrate both majority and minority into a specific state. In most circumstances this will be resisted by the minority who will stress the separateness of their nationality and claim certain rights on this basis. There is no theoretical reason why a liberal democratic state cannot accommodate these rival claims, one reason why this rarely occurs is because nationalism as an ideology tends to invoke a loyalty which is incompatible with liberal values. Moreover, in homogeneous states where nationalism is an important aspect of mobilisation this may weaken liberal democracy or indeed destroy it.

Nationalism and liberal democracy concentrate on different values. Whereas the latter is concerned with individuality and autonomy, nationalism is a primarily collectivist movement, emphasising uniformity, group loyalties, and separatism from others. In addition, the nation has been very successful in mobilising political support, the nation becomes the 'natural' focus of loyalty in contrast to the 'artificial' attractions of the state. This has been so for two reasons, the nation usually identified with a territorial unit and this gives it a sense of permanence. In addition, nationalism is able to draw on various cultural elements which existed over time and integrate them into the nationalist ideology. In this way the supposed primordial element of the nation is reaffirmed for the members of the nation and consequently take on a reality of its own.¹⁰ This is further reinforced by the claims of a nationalist movement. In contrast to liberal democracy its demands are for collective autonomy, national sovereignty, and a recognition of its unique status in the order of things. Although the two are not incompatible the self for status may be decidedly anti-liberal. Moreover, such determination does not imply any set of constitutional norms, it may involve corruption or inefficient government but once the conditions for sovereignty have been met the self-determining political structure may prove acceptable to the members of the nation. The main emphasis is not on the specific rules of government but on who shall constitute the government of the nation.¹¹ The main democratic element in nationalism is popular sovereignty. The emergence of political nationalism involves the mobilisation of all sectors of the nation as citizens. Citizenship involves equality of participation, in the belief that all the members of the nation are of equal value. Democracy has also been important in the way that nationalists have created nations. When nationalist elites

claim nationhood they must be in a position to demonstrate that the mass of the nation do in fact subscribe to that sense of nationhood. If electoral support is then forthcoming, the elites are in a strong position to press for sovereignty. This democratisation of the political process does not in any way presuppose a constitutional structure.¹² In consequence, it is frequently the case that national unity will become the main value with the subsequent intolerance of minorities or dissidents that this involves.

There may be cultural or historical reasons why most post-colonial states do not remain or become liberal democratic. After all the European states arrived at liberal democracy after several hundred years of experiment. However, the main reason for this is the contending claims within the states by national groupings. The tensions between these groups increase when one group, usually in the majority, denies the national claims of the other(s). Thus in Ireland and in India the demand for a unitary state based on the concept of an 'historic nation' led to the partitioning of the territorial unit, and in the case of Pakistan to its subsequent repartition. The invocation of majoritarian democracy to resolve nationalist conflict neutralises the opportunity to create a liberal democratic political entity. This problem becomes acute when national identity is asserted in terms of sovereignty over a particular territorial unit by more than one nation. Insofar as nations define sovereignty in terms of independence, any overlap will lead to conflict. Where there are a number of competing loyalties in a particular territorial unit, nation-building can easily become nation-destroying and this process cuts across any form of democracy except the most formal.¹³

As a consequence liberal democracy has not been a durable feature of most political systems during the twentieth century. Yet democracy has retained its popular attraction, for totalitarian and one-party systems attempt to utilise democracy in any description of their political framework. Whatever attractions such approaches may have the traditional model of democracy, including parliamentary institutions, political parties, an opposition and a legal framework, remains restricted to a reasonably narrow constellation of states. This is not to claim that only these states have been stable, indeed even within the narrow range of examples in Figure 1 the impact of change has not been the same.

Figure 1

The Continuity of Democracy in Europe since 1920

| A | B | C |
|-------------|------------|----------|
| Britain | Norway | Italy |
| Ireland | Denmark | Germany |
| Sweden | Belgium | Austria |
| Finland | France | Spain |
| Switzerland | Holland | Portugal |
| | Luxembourg | Greece |

A = Unbroken democracy since 1920

B = Unbroken except for military occupation

C = Breakdown of democratic regimes.

Since World War I only five European states have had a continuous period of parliamentary democracy. However, category B overlaps with A in that whatever strains existed internally democracy was undermined by war

and invasion. Category C is more clearcut, democracy was effectively challenged internally and a dictatorship established. In the case of Spain, Portugal and Greece the conditions for the restoration of democracy did not exist until the 1970s, while in the case of Germany, Italy and Austria democracy was restored as a consequence of defeat in war. Within Europe the experiment in democracy has a long tradition, but actual experience of democracy over time is relatively slight. In Eastern Europe after World War I the grounds for democracy were weak and parliamentary institutions were replaced in nearly every case, Czechoslovakia being the notable exception. Since 1945 great power rivalry has precluded the development of democratic institutions there. Stable democratic systems emerge over time and consolidate the democratic process. At any one point in time a system may be democratic, but this may be partial or insubstantial if assessed over the longer term. Thus Germany or Italy may have appeared to be institutionalising democracy in the 1890s or the 1920s, yet it is clear retrospectively that the basis for a stable democracy was weak and eventually overwhelmed. From a contemporary vantage point there is considerable confidence in believing that Italy and Germany have established stable democratic foundations; can this be said of Spain or Portugal (probably), or Turkey (most unlikely). The emphasis on time is important because there appears to be a correlation between the length of time that a system has been democratic and the stability of its democratic institutions. However this is not the crucial variable because as has been demonstrated in the case of India, democracy may have institutional foundations but still be unable to resist internal pressures.

Durability and stability are intertwined, the states included in Categories A and B have been characterised by both throughout the twentieth century. Military occupation simply postponed democracy, it did not undermine it. In the case of Category C durability and stability were bound up with authoritarian regimes, the foundations of stability were located in authoritarianism rather than in democracy. There is a danger in ascribing the reasons for stability to a system on a post hoc basis. Such an explanation can end in circularity along the lines 'it is stable because it is stable'. This is surely unsatisfactory. It does appear however that some societies are more stable than others and that some democratic systems are more stable than others. It is easier to detect why Weimar did not survive than to explain satisfactorily why democracy in the United States or Sweden has continued virtually unchallenged for over a century. In addition, democratic stability has permitted societies to overcome the challenge of change at other levels, particularly the economic and the social. Paradoxically, the impact of change in authoritarian stable societies is often destabilising to the political system, whereas in the case of stable democratic entities change has been a factor in reinforcing stability. As Kimber and Dowding have noted 'Continuity of some elements is needed between moments in time in order that the system may be said to survive - but as long as continuity of some elements is maintained, over a long period there is no reason why all the elements could not be replaced.'¹⁴ If the changes which take place are not forced there is nothing in principle to prevent continued evolution of the society within a stable democratic system while accounting for change.¹⁵ Therefore governments may change, the economy might be transformed, or the social structure can be altered without instability.

The same changes can have very different outcomes in different systems. During the 1970s when the post-war economic expansion collapsed concern was voiced that democracy was under threat from the consequences of inflation, unemployment, and recession.¹⁶ It is assumed that difficult times lead to the growth of anti-democratic sentiment and consequently increase the threat from anti-democratic forces. To date this has not proved to be the case. The political systems in Western Europe have proved to be less stable than once thought, but this is a reflection of adaptation rather than disintegration. The political parties have slowly accommodated change among the electorate, which in some cases has led to a realignment of specific political systems. This can be taken to be a sign of resilience rather than instability. All the evidence to date indicates that when democratic variables are strong then even in the face of uncertainty and unpredictability the democratic framework will not only be maintained but will be taken by the electorate as the focus for handling change.¹⁷ Stability requires as much explanation as instability or indeed revolution. It is a mistake, as Charles Maier, has noted to 'treat stability as a passive coming to rest or a societal inertia that requires no explanation'.¹⁸ The achievement and maintenance of stability is a complex and dynamic process, the outcome of which results in the creation of a set of circumstances which meet the challenge of change effectively within a stable framework. This stability can only be achieved if human motivation allows it to occur. This stability may be acquired through fear or indoctrination, but in a democratic society it is closely associated with legitimacy. Legitimacy underpins stability because the system is accepted willingly by the members of the polity; not only are they designated citizens, they have internalised a sense of personal citizenship. Moreover, a

strong sense of legitimacy will, as Raymond Grewe has noted, contribute to the resolution of crisis.¹⁹ Legitimacy may be a strong feature of stability but it is not enough. It is also necessary; 'that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belonged to'.²⁰ If this condition can be fulfilled then another difficulty can be resolved; 'to single out national unity as the sole background condition implies that no minimal level of economic development or social differentiation is necessary as a pre-requisite to democracy'.²¹ It is possible to outline a process of democratisation which presupposes national unity, this in turn allows the institutions of the state, even when they are not democratic, to acquire legitimacy, and therefore permit the emergence of representative institutions. This process when it occurs is self-reinforcing in that each of the variables contributes to the future successful adaptability of the system and therefore its stability.

It would be mistaken to see this process as a series of steps which inevitably follow one another. National unity may exist but a sense of legitimacy may not. National unity presupposes not only a common national identity, it also requires a common political culture which is accepted by all the participating groups in the society. This sense of cohesion can be missing in societies which have a strong sense of national identity. To the extent that a society has internalised these variables its response to crisis can lead to a democratic or undemocratic resolution. The economic crisis of the 1930s has been frequently blamed for the demise of democracy in many states, yet little notice is taken of those states that remained democratic throughout. The contrast between the experience of the United States and that of Germany is most illuminating. Both countries

were devastated by the slump, at its worst unemployment accounted for over thirty percent of the work force, welfare benefits were low or non-existent. Under pressure both countries introduced counter cyclical policies to offset the crisis. In one case these policies were a consequence of dictatorship while in the other democratic norms were maintained. In the United States democracy was enhanced by the New Deal, at no time were the traditional democratic institutions threatened. The reason for this is that democratic institutions were considered by most Americans to be the most suitable method of resolving the difficulties, whereas under Weimar the slump further alienated those who had never accepted the legitimacy of the democratic state.²² This point is reinforced by the experiences of both Sweden and Britain during the same decade where democratic institutions defined the response to the slump. Even in Finland, where there was an extra parliamentary movement for the abolition of democracy, parliamentary institutions were preserved by a coalition of the democratic forces of the left and the right. In this case some liberal democratic rights were infringed, but the essential factor is that the overall structure of democracy was maintained.^{22A}

From a comparative point of view there are many variables which might be used to examine the stability of a system. The island of Ireland offers a useful case study of the factors which reinforce democracy and those which imperil it. Ireland actively participated in the democratisation process in Britain after 1832 and shared in the extension of democratic rights. The constitutional issue tended to camouflage nationalist Ireland's participation in this process. One of the anomalies of the process is that when the constitutional issue was resolved in 1922 it led to increasing stability in the new Irish state.

and in British politics generally, but increased the sources of instability in that area of Ireland which became known as Northern Ireland in 1921. Whatever context one takes since then, the British Isles, the island of Ireland, the British state, or Northern Ireland itself, this latter area is the most unstable part of the framework. However, there appears to be some confusion in recent work on stability when it refers to Ireland; 'It is not true that multipartism combined with a homogeneous culture results always in political stability, as the cases of Ireland, Norway, and Denmark testify.'²³ The reason for instability in Ireland is attributed to 'civil disorder'. There is considerable analytical confusion here. If the Irish Republic is the focus of analysis then the claim is patently untrue, the Republic has remained politically stable throughout the 1970s and 1980s. If the Island is the basis then it is conceptually flawed as the island is not a single political unit. If Northern Ireland, then to claim that there is a homogeneous culture there is misleading. Furthermore, if Northern Ireland is placed within the British state for reasons of analysis the latter proves to be more unstable in comparison with the Irish Republic. What then are the considerations which have given rise to a stable democratic framework in the Irish Republic but an unstable one in Northern Ireland which though part of the British state does not share in its stable democratic patterns.

Section II

The interaction of democratic politics with nationalism in Ireland since the nineteenth century is a useful example of the process discussed above. Although both parts of Ireland participated in the process of democratisation, neither area can be said to have internalised the values of liberal democracy to the degree that mainland Britain has done. Developments in Ireland provide an early example of the break up of the multi-national state due to contending national loyalties. Both nationalists and unionists challenged the sovereignty of the liberal state and its parliament to adjudicate on their respective claims. Moreover, each community sought its political legitimacy from its own religious grouping rather than from the state. This placed in jeopardy the traditional liberal approach to political conflict which presupposed compromise within the parliamentary structure. Democratic forms were being used to mobilise support for what was often anti-liberal ends. The difficulty was one of sovereignty, nationalists denied the right of Westminster to determine its future without taking account of its national identity, but once this was conceded a similar counterclaim was promoted by unionists. Depending on the area defined, what was one community's minority was another's majority. Therefore in the one part of the British Isles where there was conflict over national identity liberal democracy did not take hold. This was because majorities were taken by each community to be the measure of democracy, as such democracy was partial in that each community denied certain rights to the other. This restricted version of democracy continued into the establishment of the two quasi-confessional states. Moreover, neither side could absorb liberalism because to do so would reduce the effectiveness of their claim.

The effectiveness of this claim was based partly on the internal mobilisation of its own members, but also externally in seeking to persuade opinion outside Ireland of the justice of their respective cases.²⁴

Following the partition of Ireland the new states were formally democratic. The parliamentary structure, the legal system, and the role of political parties appeared to fulfil some of the conditions deemed necessary for a liberal democratic system. These appearances were somewhat illusory in both states, but for different reasons. It is generally accepted that the Northern Ireland state was a partial democracy with intense polarisation along political lines. As the constitutional status of Northern Ireland remained in doubt and its legitimacy was challenged by a substantial minority the possibility of accommodation remained remote.²⁵ Despite the homogeneous nature of the Free State the basic political culture remained anti-liberal, indeed as the state matured it became less liberal. Insofar as a liberal democratic tradition existed in the Free State this was closely associated with the concept of political sovereignty and the democratic sources of authority rather than with the individualistic elements of autonomy and toleration which are emphasised by liberal theorists.²⁶ The importance of the collectivist elements of Irish democracy is due to the influence of nationalism. In the face of the British state in the nineteenth century, Irish nationalists had to ensure unity in a single mass political party. To divide the united front could be characterised as treachery, a charge very effectively made by the Home Rule Party against the AIL for Ireland League in Cork in 1914.²⁷ The Roman Catholic Church supplemented this at the social level. Not only did religion become a focus for national identity, but the church itself pursued an anti-liberal policy which was supported by the nationalist political

institutions. The national elites and the church authorities confronted the same state, considering it alien and oppressive.²⁸ This was compounded by the justification for the use of violence by the nationalist community prior to independence. Whereas in liberal theory violence can rarely be justified, Irish nationalists sought their justification within the nationalist community. Furthermore, the nationalist claim questioned the primacy of parliament as a source of legitimacy which further weakened the influence of liberal democracy on the nationalist polity. The crucial source of conflict then becomes the question of the state which the nation should inhabit. In liberal theory there is no natural territorial unit for the state, whereas for the nationalist this is imperative. A further source of instability was that nationalist territorial claims extended beyond the unit where it had successfully mobilised its adherents, giving rise to irredentist claims after independence. Consequently, the ideological emphasis within Irish nationalism focused on majoritarianism, Catholicism, and separatism, these became the component parts of Irish democracy.²⁹

These traditions which contributed to the instability of the British state paradoxically underwrote the stability of the Free State. The use of violence between 1916 and 1921, though not always welcome was condoned by nationalists. When the republicans appealed to the same sources of legitimacy in 1922 their claims were rejected by a majority of the nation. Notwithstanding de Valera's claim that '... majority rule ran counter to the fundamental rights of the nation and so clashed with a matter of natural right and justice. There are rights even of an individual, not to speak of a large majority in a nation, which no majority is justified in destroying', majority rule was successfully invoked against this minority.³⁰ A fine distinction was made after 1922 between the rights

of a nation as a minority within a multi-national state and the democratic procedure within the nation which was based on the majority principle. During the Civil War the republicans appear to have been quite unable to generate a legitimate claim for their actions within the context of the nation. However, the presence of an intransigent minority within the state during the 1920s meant that Irish democracy remained potentially threatened. The new state, however, was able to draw on the traditional sources of legitimacy and utilised them to stabilise its institutions. It was the success of this process that led to the divisions in Sinn Fein and the establishment of Fianna Fail in 1926. Because a form of sovereignty had been achieved in 1922 the majoritarianism of Irish democracy worked against the republicans. The appeal to nationalist traditions in these circumstances failed to win support. Fianna Fail's entry to the Dail in 1927 effectively recognised this, by doing so the party ceased to be an anti-system party. It subsequently accepted the constitutional apparatus of the state and the logic of its position as a minority, but a minority that sought to become a majority within this structure. Furthermore, the party not only accepted the majority principle, it accepted the democratic process with alacrity, rejecting minority claims for the use of violence.³¹ The political stability which followed this should not be equated with the growth of a liberal democratic system. There was in the state an absence of pluralism and toleration which is reflected institutionally in the 1937 Constitution. This in turn is closely linked to the continued powerful presence of the Roman Catholic Church in the society. De Valera was acutely aware of the relationship of majoritarianism and Catholicism when he remarked at the time: 'There are 93% of the people in this part of Ireland and 75% as a whole who belong to the Catholic Church, who believe in its teachings

and whose whole philosophy of life is the philosophy that comes from its teachings ... If we are going to have a democratic state, if we are going to be ruled by the representatives of the people, it is clear their whole philosophy of life is going to effect that, and that has to be borne in mind and the recognition of it is important'.³² Within this context there was an uneasy tension between the dominant nationalist values and those of liberalism. The latter were mainly concerned with property or with the continued influence of English law, in practice liberalism was residual and defensive.³³ The 1937 Constitution reflected, in the main, a growing intolerance and a certain authoritarianism. The articles concerned with social issues and the nation were products of the church's influence and the majoritarian nature of the society. The Irish political system by 1937 might be described as constitutional populist which in many areas was also anti-liberal. Populism as a form of democracy tends to be anti-individualistic, implying mass participation and equality of the citizenry with unrestrained majority rule. Majority rule in populism is considered a value in itself and, in theory at least, there should be no limitation on the will of the majority. This extreme case was modified in Ireland by a constitutional structure, but the general political framework embodied many populist elements.³⁴ It is also important to recall that this growing authoritarianism in the 1930s was not opposed by any significant political or social force. The achievement of status for the nation-state was considered of more importance than pluralism or individuality.

That this was the case was due to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the society and on the state. The stable nature of Irish society reinforced the ability of the church to influence decision-making. Interest groups are far more capable of mobilising power in stable societies than in those undergoing change.³⁵ In addition, the

church was not a mere interest group, it successfully asserted its independence of and primacy over the state. Although the Irish state was never theocratic, in the sense that Iran is, it was extremely weak in the face of a society that was theocratic due to the church's successful permeation of its culture and ideology. Pluralism, on the liberal model, implies countervailing force, in Ireland there was no countervailing force to the church. The church was in a predominant position within the society imbuing the state with many of its values. This predominance of a single interest group is not uncommon in other democratic polities, what is unique in the Irish case is the absence of any constraining forces. For this reason the predominance of the church cannot be equated to the predominance of the trade unions in Sweden or the business community in the United States. The pervasiveness of the church's influence was such that it achieved a hegemonic authority which was not challenged by internal social forces. While it would be mistaken to argue that the church was the only obstacle to liberalisation its hegemony was such that in general liberal alternatives did not arise as practical politics.³⁶

The role of nationalism in this anti-liberal environment is in fact ambiguous. It was probably not the determining factor, although it is difficult to specify where the religious influence ends and that of nationalism begins because they were so intertwined. Nationalism is more important in defining ideology when the nation is challenged externally, its mobilising power after independence may be less than once thought. Certainly in the case of Finland nationalism was unable to prevent social cleavages from emerging after 1917 nor was its use as an ideology successful in weakening the democratic structures in 1931. Alternatively, in the case of Weimar Germany nationalist ideology proved

decisive in facilitating Hitler's rise to power. In Ireland there were certain limits to the use of nationalist ideology to create consensus and stability. This limit was reached by the mid-1940s when the Fianna Fail government sought, unsuccessfully, to undermine the independence of the trade union movement. Furthermore, its continued legitimacy was challenged during the economic crisis of the 1950s. Nonetheless, the ideology of Irish nationalism did have many anti-liberal features, but the major sources of anti-liberalism were generated by the society. Consequently, it is possible that after 1937 nationalism as a force in internal politics played a more passive role than heretofore. Furthermore, national independence and sovereignty reinforced a long term commitment to democratic norms. Despite the anti-liberal elements in Irish nationalism and the violence associated with nation building the Irish political system had successfully absorbed most of the institutional features of British liberal democracy. The Irish parliament was modelled on that of Westminster, while the legal system continue to reflect British standards and practice. A further source of instability had been removed prior to independence by an equitable distribution of land which permitted the emergence of an independent class of farmers who throughout the early decades of the new state maintained a commitment to the democratic system.³⁷ Until the 1960s at the very least Ireland proved not only to be stable but extremely resistant to change. Through its religion it maintained an independent, if narrow, understanding of the world. Nationalism sustained this in political and economic terms. While the political system, and particularly the political elite, had internalised democratic values which overcame any residual attraction of anti-democratic politics.³⁸

Since 1960 the Irish Republic has experienced considerable change. The main feature has been the rather rapid industrialisation which has been accompanied by urbanisation and secularisation. Over the past twenty five years Ireland has been transformed from an agrarian economy to a predominantly industrial one, a process reflected in the social structure.³⁹ Despite these changes there is little evidence that democracy has become more unstable. Ireland has accomplished the transition from an under-developed agrarian economy to a mature industrial economy without the instabilities which often accompany that process in other parts of the world. Moreover, the political system has remained largely impervious to the economic and social changes at least in terms of electoral support. At the last general election in November 1982 the three traditional parties attracted 94 percent of the vote, a figure which does not differ substantially from previous elections. The two major parties (which account for 84 percent of the vote) have proved adaptable to the changing political environment in which they function. This has been due mainly to the catch all nature of Irish politics and the unstructured nature of the electorate. It also suggests an ability on the part of the political parties to take the lead in defining issues and therefore mobilising electoral support.⁴⁰ Since 1960 each of the variables which have traditionally reinforced stability have come under pressure without stability itself being in doubt. Religion, land, and nationalism are no longer the defining features of the political culture and on each issue there has emerged political cleavages which to some extent cuts across traditional political mobilisation. The most serious of these are the urban-rural division and a church-state division. The latter in particular has generated intense political divisions over the past five years.

Section III

The main obstacles to liberalism in Ireland have been internal. Up to the 1960s the society could be characterised as authoritarian, agricultural, and nationalistic. Once the internal basis for this anti-liberal consensus broke down the subsequent changes began to react on the political culture.⁴¹ This has proved to be the case most spectacularly in the area of religious participation and authority. By the end of the 1960s a cleavage had emerged based on tensions between clerical and secular tendencies.⁴² In political terms this new liberal constituency now accounts for at least 25 percent of the electorate.⁴³

The politics of pluralism as a consequence have taken on an urgency for the first time in Ireland. Although the most public, attitudes to moral questions illustrate only one aspect of a growing pluralism. The growth of an industrial society has led to a significant increase in pressure and interest groups. In addition, the expansion of the public sector and the growth in welfare services leads to pressures on the state either from those involved in these sectors or from strategic sectors of the electorate to provide for the services of this type. It is suggested that excessive expectations on the part of the electorate and the pursuit of narrow group interests can have a detrimental effect on liberal democracy.⁴⁴ In particular, it may prove impossible for the state to accommodate the different pressures without one sector paying the cost of another's 'pork barrel'. No consensus may be forthcoming on a wide range of issues associated with the cost of challenging entrenched interests. Recent examples of this are the resistance of farmers to taxation and the strike by some ESB power workers. The pattern is not restricted to producer groups, the electorate has sought throughout the

1970s to escape the impact of recession. This was successful in that the cost of adjustment was transferred to the state which, through foreign borrowing, neutralised the unpleasant aspects of the recession. When in 1981 Fianna Fail and Fine Gael agreed that such policies could not continue, there was substantial resistance to the implications of the new policies. The electorate has been unwilling to accept that foreign borrowing or inflation should be the priority in policymaking; not only do they consider unemployment the main concern, but it is generally believed that it is the function of the state to provide employment.

Very few consider that job creation should be the concern of the business community.⁴⁵ To compound these difficulties recent data demonstrate that

there is little confidence in most public institutions, among the young these tendencies are most pronounced.⁴⁶ This type of organised politics is new to Ireland, but it may now be replacing traditional brokerage as a channel for influencing politicians. The existence of many groups does not mean that Ireland is ungovernable, only that it has to be governed in a new way.

Economists may bemoan the impact of interest groups on the market system, yet unless governments decide to outlaw them they will find it necessary to negotiate with them. It is not sectionalism per se that is objectionable in a liberal democratic society but the way power is used. Where corporate pluralism is institutionalised, as in Sweden or Austria, the interest groups play an important role in stabilising the economy while at the same time representing their members.⁴⁷ The National Wage Agreement structure during the 1970s in Ireland is a further example of how interest groups can be accommodated institutionally. In other words if interest groups are given access to power and simultaneously made responsible for their actions they will be less inclined to abuse that power.⁴⁸ To achieve

this what is required is probably both a strong state and strong interest groups. This could prevent the situation where a single interest group could dominate the policy process for its own ends. At a more general level Irish politics is now close to the classic model of group politics within liberal democracy. Interest and pressure groups abound, the latter tend to be issue specific while the former have a more permanent and institutional form. Issues, however, are central to both types and there is some evidence that issues are becoming more important for the electorate.⁴⁹ Rule by minorities is frequently taken as undemocratic and appears to be at variance with the majoritarian traditions. Yet the process is far more complex, the interest or pressure group is the mechanism through which the activists hope to generate a majority on a particular issue. It is the state of course that finally has to close the circle and accept the responsibility on a specific issue. Caution may at times be the better part of valour but the evidence to date appears to justify the view that pluralistic politics are of increasing importance. As Irish politics are fairly unstructured, the impact of these developments may be more significant in terms of increasing the accountability of the politician to the electorate. Furthermore, it may in fact equalise power more efficiently, particularly for those previously excluded from influence.

Section IV

It would be premature to conclude from this that liberal democratic values have become central to Irish political culture. Although the sources for change in a liberal direction are internal, the social weight of the traditional norms remain strong. Liam Ryan has identified two

types of democracy in Ireland, a democracy of emotion and a democracy of rationality. ⁵⁰ In some ways these could be compared to the populist and liberal forms of democracy. The democracy of emotion is closely identified with the traditional and authoritarian features of Irish society, probably reflected in the political structure by Fianna Fail. That the sources of authoritarianism remained strong can be seen from political responses to such issues as individual liberties, social questions, and criticism of the Gardaí. In addition, Irish institutions, although they are changing, retain authoritarian features. It is perhaps ironic that the European Community has proved as influential in generating social reform as internal pressure. Pressure from the European Community removes the responsibility from a government to take the initiative. In many areas of what are considered personal morality the Irish take a more conservative stand than their European counterparts, in addition Irish respondents appear to give less attention to sexual equality and individual freedom and more to their religious faith than the Europeans. ⁵¹ The continuing search for consensus among politicians on contentious issues such as Northern Ireland or divorce may also reflect these trends.

These pressure are all part of the political process, they express tensions that are internal to a changing society. A more serious threat to the expansion of liberal democracy is the possible existence in a state of groups which either do not acknowledge the legitimacy of the state or who possess a separate source of legitimacy within society. The various fascist and communist parties in inter-war Europe are examples of movements which include both these aspects in their make-up, as do some nationalist groups in the contemporary world. Examples of the latter type are rare and more complex. Although the authority of the state is

explicitly accepted there is a tension in that an organisation may qualify its acceptance due to considerations which it is believed are of prior value to those of the state. This, in fact, is a feature of virtually every citizen's initiative group, but in the case of Ireland the Catholic Church is probably the best example. The function of the state is to resolve social conflict, it is unable to do so if accommodation and compromise is not forthcoming from the contending forces in society. Virtually every interest and pressure group acknowledges that a government will define its legislation and accept its right to enforce it, not to do so can place a group in a quasi revolutionary relationship with government. The continued legitimacy of any regime, but more particularly the liberal democratic, depends almost entirely on the general acceptance of the rules of the game. The difficulty for any government in Ireland is that the church has an independent source of legitimacy in its teaching and structures, and an independent source of power in the society and through its membership of the world wide church. Consequently, as the traditional source of anti-liberal ideas in Ireland there will be a greater resistance on its part to the trends discussed above.

Nonetheless, the first impression is that the hierarchy has become more similar to other interest groups since the late 1960s. Its political profile has become more public as its relative influence has waned. Whereas previously the hierarchy did not find it necessary to intervene directly because its influence was so great, it now has to frequently mobilise power resources to achieve its specific ends. Insofar as this occurs these changes reflect the progress of pluralistic politics and the recognition that the church faces eclipse if it does not function within that process. It would be mistaken to conclude that this new public profile is an acceptance of pluralism as distinct from

utilising its mechanism to slow down or retard development which it considers a threat. There is, however, a considerable tension in the church's response to the changing demands of the polity on it, between its new role as an interest group and its traditional position as a hegemonic authority. The recent referendum brought these tensions into the open. Although church statements were unequivocal in their support for a yes vote, the hierarchy found it necessary to recognise that a Catholic could, in conscience, vote no. 52 The New Ireland Forum posed a further dilemma for the church because, if only by implication, its concerns challenged some of the certainties of church teaching. Indeed the first approach of the hierarchy to the Forum reflected tensions within the church on how to handle it, and it was only following public pressure that the hierarchy agreed to attend in person. 53 The written submission and the later oral evidence are in places ambiguous, but in the main while expressing general agreement with the spirit of accommodation, simply reiterated the hierarchy's commitment to the status quo. On specific areas of reform, such as divorce, the church objected to any change in the existing arrangements. Two objections to change are made, one on principle and the other on political grounds. The latter involves the empirical evaluation of a suggested reform and its consequences. This approach accepts a pluralistic system, albeit one which is limited and requires justification, and concludes from this that the majority has certain rights which must be accommodated: 'A Catholic country or its government, where there is a very substantial Catholic ethos and consensus, should not feel it necessary to apologise that its legal system, constitutional or statute, reflect Catholic values'. Furthermore, '... it is not unreasonable to require sacrifice of minorities in the interests of the common good'. Although this invokes

the majoritarian principle it is not entirely incompatible with pluralism, for it is the case that if there is a sizeable majority on a particular issue then the government, all else being equal, should legislate to that effect. But it also implies that if there is a majority in favour of a particular issue that the minority will accept this. However, the argument on political grounds is a supplementary one, the main force of the objection is based on principle. Pluralism cannot, the hierarchy maintained, be justified on its own terms. It is not an ultimate value because '... divorced from its relation to the common good it tends towards division and disintegration'. This argument in principle cuts across the values of liberal democracy and, indeed, accommodation due to its inclusive nature. 'It must, however, be kept in mind that 'the moral law', 'the common good of all' and 'the objective moral order' are not derived simply from the teaching of the Catholic Church. They are largely accessible to human reason whose conclusions may well coincide on a particular issue. They oblige all, including non-Catholics, because they proceed from right reason, and not because they are taught by the Catholic Church'. 54 The implications of these views for political action are also underlined. 'They are also an invitation to those who exercise political power to reflect on the nature of man and of human society and in the enactment of laws to eschew the often brilliant attractions of pragmatism, of relativism or of short term solutions in favour of lasting concern for the common good of all.' The views of the hierarchy are also explicit on specific matters of policy. Their defence of the existing constitutional arrangements concerning the family is due, in part, to a concern with the social consequences of possible changes, but more emphatically on the issue of principle. The family, it is argued, is a

creation of God and therefore, '... it exists prior to the state, and it possesses inherent rights which are inalienable. It is, therefore, the obligation of the state to promote and protect these rights'.⁵⁵

At the public session of the Forum Bishop Cathal Daly drew out further some of these implications when he stressed that an electorate could not be expected to leave its conscience outside the polling booth. Despite this, Bishop Dermot O'Mahony insisted that in a new Ireland Northern Protestants would not be deprived of their civil or political rights. Yet, there was a basic contradiction here between general commitments to pluralism and objections to specific items of legislation. Bishop Cathal Daly claimed the church's right to alert Catholics on the implication of such legislation. Furthermore, Professor Mary McAleese appeared to take this a step further when she declared that: 'The church wants no hand in making decisions. They only want the freedom any group would have. They are saying: at the end of the day it is up to you.' This was illustrated when John Kelly sought a guarantee of neutrality on the part of the church in the event that legislation on divorce was introduced. That the guarantee was not forthcoming was to be expected, given the nature of what was expected.⁵⁶ Kelly's question drew attention to a further tension in the area of legislation where the church was concerned. Politics, particularly liberal democratic politics, is an essentially secular phenomenon. Political sovereignty and government legitimacy is sought in the support of the citizens. Policymaking is usually an attempt to accommodate the various interest groups concerned with an issue. There can, clearly, be no objection to the church acting as an interest group, the difficulty exists when the church invokes absolute principles based on a divine order. Because the values which the church holds are external to the liberal

democratic process rather than a part of it, conflict on specific issues can become zero-sum, with little possibility of a resolution through accommodation.⁵⁷ As the pluralistic nature of Irish society increases there will be a tendency, if the church's view prevails, for various minority rights to remain restricted by the use of simple majorities. If successful such an approach weakens the impact of liberal democracy and prevents its values from operating at the political level. The recognition and acceptance of minorities and dissidents is the hallmark of liberal democracy, the stated position of the church denies the legitimacy of these values. The current period is a transitional one and it is difficult to predict the outcome. However, whatever reservations might be offered concerning the church's role, it is clear that at the political level it is being drawn, unwillingly, into a pluralistic framework. It may be that the very homogeneity of the society which once reinforced its authority will now contribute to a weakening of its influence. Because the sources of liberal democracy are internal to the society the evolution of a pluralistic system can occur without substantial instability. Political tensions will be unavoidable, but the conflicts will be political. The continued existence of the state will not depend on the outcome.

Under these circumstances it is difficult to predict what, if anything, would undermine democracy in the Irish Republic. The changes which have occurred over the past twenty five years have been successfully mediated by the political elites and the political culture has absorbed the new tensions and cleavages within the traditional democratic framework. Tension has increased between various social forces and groups, cleavages are far more pronounced than hitherto, yet the values usually associated with democracy remain strong. If

authoritarianism, based as it was on the strength of religion, nationalism, and land, helped to sustain democracy for most of the twentieth century, the emergence of pluralism and individualism out of this tradition appears to have reinforced rather than weakened democracy. A more critical society is not necessarily a less stable or democratic one. While threats to democracy are not absent, they are decidedly weak. The main threat from anti-system groups is presented by the IRA. However, the direction of their activities is towards Northern Ireland rather than the South, in addition the Southern political establishment has been remarkably successful in isolating any perceived threat to the stability of the South from this source. Moreover, because of the origins of the state in the 1920s all governments are acutely aware of the nature of the IRA challenge and therefore promptly meet it. Their recent decision to extradite Republicans to Northern Ireland is a further demonstration of the weakness of Republican forces in the South. The real threat to democracy in the Irish Republic, as in other long-standing democracies, comes not from non-consenting groups, but from the threat of the breakdown of the political system. The increasing complexity of modern government has given rise to a degree of apathy and perhaps alienation on the part of sections of the electorate, particularly among the young. 58 Notwithstanding this there has been no real decline in voting turnout or participation, even when there were three general elections between 1981 and 1982. On the contrary, there was some evidence that the electorate welcomed the opportunity to pass judgment on the incumbent government. As discussed above, public contestation has contributed to the further stabilisation of democracy and there is no evidence that group politics is set to move beyond the limits established by constitutional

activity. There is no clear link in Ireland, or elsewhere, between economic failure (however that is measured) and democratic breakdown. Indeed Ireland offers an example of a low level of economic wealth and a high level of democratisation up to the 1960s; while the industrialisation of the economy and the impact of the recession has not impaired democratic participation. The Irish Republic therefore offers an interesting example of a society where democracy has established deep roots under conditions not usual for Europe and demonstrates that even following substantial change in the society the democratic apparatus remains strong.

Section V

The contrast between two contiguous regions in the European polity could not be more striking than that between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. Whereas the homogeneous culture in the Republic has facilitated change without instability, any change in Northern Ireland appears likely to question the continued existence of this region as an entity. The main reason for this is that Northern Ireland does not contain a homogeneous population, nor, given the national differentiation, has it been possible to reach agreement along the lines of consociationalism. 59 Ironically, it may be the case that partition led to the stabilisation of politics in the South, whereas a united Ireland in 1921 would have led to instability throughout the island. However, instability has been restricted to that areas of Ireland where the sources of political loyalty are derived from mutually exclusive responses to the constitutional structure. The devolution of power from Westminster to Stormont in 1921 ensured that the constitutional question would be the primary source of political

loyalty and that simple majoritarian democracy would be utilised by the Unionists to offset threats from the minority. Unlike the South, majoritarianism reinforced the divisions between the communities.

Given that the source of the conflict was about status and identity, it is debatable whether the Nationalist minority would, even if Unionist government had been even-handed, have accepted the legitimacy of the state. In the event the opposing loyalties rendered liberal democracy inoperative, while democratic structures were attenuated. The function of political participation in Northern Ireland since 1921 has been either to assert or reject the constitutional link with Britain. In effect, each election has been a plebiscite on this question.

Robert Osborne's study of electoral behaviour concluded that: 'The accumulated evidence from the first two general elections of 1921 and 1925 and from the 1929 to 1965 period reveals a dominant cleavage fundamentally shaping and dividing electoral behaviour. Focusing on the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a political entity, each election was conducted as a reaffirmation of the continuation of Partition on the one hand and an equally ritualistic statement of the anti-Partition case on the other. Each solution evidenced a tacitly stable distribution in this ideological space. Electoral behaviour in this period reveals two stable groups in a divided society with a characteristic territorial pattern of voting behaviour displaying 'where men are for the Union on the one hand and against it and want to go into a Dublin parliament on the other'.⁶⁰

Nor has this context changed since the beginning of the recent round of violence since 1969. Indeed, for a period in the early 1960s, it appeared as if the traditional hostility and suspicion could be removed by a gradual reform of institutions to include both traditions.

However, the absence of an agreed national identity, the resistance on the part of some Unionist to reform, and the physical confrontation and violence led to an even greater polarisation than previously.⁶¹ Northern Ireland is the one part of Europe that has experienced a genuine 'legitimation crisis' since World War II, in a sense crisis has been central to its existence since 1921. This crisis is based on the absence of national unity or an agreed consensus about institutions. Moreover, national differences are closely related to religious affiliation, while national identity has sharpened since the present phase of violence began. Table I shows the dimensions of nationality in Northern Ireland since 1968.⁶²

Table I

| | Protestants | | Catholics | |
|---------|-------------|------|-----------|------|
| | 1968 | 1978 | 1968 | 1978 |
| British | 39 | 66.8 | 15 | 15.2 |
| Irish | 20 | 7.8 | 76 | 69.1 |
| Ulster | 32 | 19.8 | 5 | 5.7 |

Source: 1968. R. Rose, Governing without consensus (1971). 1978.

E. Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (1983).

Furthermore, on specific constitutional options there are fundamental differences based on national and religious affiliation, which does not allow space for compromise. This difficulty is reinforced when it is noted that all political events in Northern Ireland are assessed not in

objective terms, but in the context of a nationalist ideological framework. Clearly, under these circumstances it is impossible to establish a stable democratic entity acceptable to both communities. This should not lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to establish the foundations for a stable democracy when there is national conflict. It is clearly difficult to do so, but there are examples where national-ethnic or religious conflict has been resolved within a stable democratic structure. However, it does require a shift in perspective on the part of the communities involved. Both communities in Northern Ireland appear to be characterised by relatively high levels of authoritarianism. Furthermore, any decision to accept a liberal democratic framework on the part of either community would entail giving pluralistic values a greater authority than national identity, this is an unlikely outcome as evidence from all parts of the world demonstrates. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed this problem recently: 'A certain abstract form of democracy may operate in Northern Ireland but the real substance of democracy does not. Democracy requires equilibrium, it demands assent and legitimacy, it requires institutions that have the confidence of the entire community. When the institutions of the state do not have that assent, then democracy is lifeless and inanimate. Real democracy in Northern Ireland will require structures which fully acknowledge and accommodate the fundamental divisions of the community. The absence of real democratic structures has created and nurtured today's dangerous alienation'. Real democracy on these terms is not numerical, it appears to coincide with the consensual basis of liberal democracy. For consensus to be achieved on this basis two sets of accommodations are required; between the British and Irish governments, and between the two communities in

Northern Ireland. Other solutions are entirely conceivable, military victory by the IRA or the mass expulsion of Nationalists. Such a solution however would neither be liberal nor would it overcome the fundamental divisions.⁶³

A solution that satisfies liberal democratic criteria is not readily apparent. Indeed, most inter-ethnic or national conflicts tend to be resolved in an authoritarian fashion.⁶⁴ To fulfil liberal democratic norms certain pre-conditions would have to be met. A solution would have to obtain the support of at least a majority of both communities in Northern Ireland and ensure, at the absolute minimum, the active neutrality of the two governments. This would ensure that a settlement would not be enforced on one of the communities, the presence of internal majorities is therefore fundamental. This is based on the assumption that both communities have clearly defined and separate identities and therefore political leaders must ensure their internal majorities before a consensus can emerge. Such an approach would weaken the recourse to a simple 51 percent majority for change. In such an event there is a danger that the 49 percent majority might remain hostile to the democratic outcome. The principle of reciprocity is essential to this. The recent suggestions of Boyle and Hadden are the most interesting to date. The constitutional position of the Unionists would be safeguarded by the deletion of Articles 2 and 3 from the Irish Constitution, and the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would not be changed without the consent of a majority. Not only would the national tradition be given expressed recognition, but legal reforms and the suggested bilateral international agreement between the two states could give them confidence to work within the Northern Ireland context.⁶⁵ Clearly

the details of such an arrangement would have to be negotiated, but the general approach might fulfil the conditions necessary for a consensual outcome while fulfilling liberal democratic norms. Indeed there is some evidence that power-sharing or direct rule, under certain circumstances, are solutions which receive a consistent level of support. Neither are considered the ideal solution, but do attract significant support from both communities. This is all the more important when the preferred solution of each community is the one which proves most objectionable to the other. If liberal democracy is above consensus, and if consensus is above accommodation and legitimacy, then it might prove necessary for each community to reject its traditional certainties and accept that mutual vetoes are ineffective in promoting stability.⁶⁶

Section VI

As the Northern Ireland case demonstrates, nationalist conflict is particularly difficult to resolve. Yet the evidence globally indicates that similar inter-communal hostilities are on the increase. In addition, authoritarian regimes seem to be able to contain such conflicts only because they are free of the pressures which constrain governments in liberal democratic societies. Since 1945 this type of conflict has become more general, as nations assert their identity and sought sovereignty. Moreover, the link between state and nation has become more tenuous as the assertions of nationality have accelerated. The experience of the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland draw attention to two essential approaches to democratic stability. In the first national unity facilitates the growth of political legitimacy and

allows for the peaceful inclusion of all social forces within the political culture of the state. Where this national unity is not forthcoming legitimacy cannot easily be based on a common identity. Democratic consensus can only be established on the basis of recognising the different loyalties and creating institutions which can be a source of legitimacy for the different identities without encroaching on the essential loyalties of the different traditions. This basis for a stable democratic polity has only rarely been successful, but once successfully implanted it gains an internal momentum and justification. The first model presupposes the existence of a nation-state, the second emerges when experience clearly demonstrates that a nation-state is an exceptional phenomenon. In a world of diverse nationalities without nation-states the second model offers the possibility of accommodation within a democratic framework and with that the promise of stable political development.

Footnotes

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Anchor, 1969), pp. 250-3.
2. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 62.
3. Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 403 ff.
4. Michael Margolis, Viable Democracy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 22-7, 78.
5. John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 361.
6. J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 206-32.
7. John Stuart Mill, Representative Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1966 ed.), p. 148.
8. Charles Tilly (ed.), The formation of national states in Western Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975).
9. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 44.
10. John A. Armstrong, Nations before nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the state (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), pp. 44-64.
11. Isaiah Berlin, Four essays on liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 154-60.
12. Gellner, op. cit., p. 55; Rupert Emerson, 'Nationalism and political development', Journal of Politics (22), 1960, pp. 3-28.
13. Walker Connor, 'Nation-building or nation-destroying', World Politics, 24 (1972), pp. 319-55.
14. K.M. Dowding and R. Kimber, 'The Meaning and Use of "Political Stability"', European Journal of Political Research, 11, No. 3 (1983), pp. 229-43, p. 236.
15. Ibid., p. 238.
16. S. Brittan, The Economic Consequences of Democracy (London: Temple Smith, 1977).
17. V. Lauber, 'From Growth Consensus to Fragmentation in Western Europe', Comparative Politics, April 1983, pp. 329-349.
18. C.S. Maier, 'The Two Post-war Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Europe', American Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1981, pp. 327-52, p. 327.
19. R. Grew (ed.), Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 25-6.
20. D.A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy', Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970, pp. 337-63, p. 350.
21. Ibid., p. 352.
22. A.L. Hamby (ed.), The New Deal (New York: Longman, 1969).
- 22A. J.J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978).
23. S. Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane, 'Political Stability in European Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 11, No. 3 (1983), pp. 245-64, p. 260.
24. Breuilly, op. cit., p. 372.
25. David W. Miller, Queen's Rebels (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978).
26. Basil Chubb (ed.), A Source Book of Irish Government (Dublin: The

- Institute of Public Administration, 1983), p. 3; Tom Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981), p. 206.
27. Emmet Larkin, The Roman Catholic Church and the creation of the modern Irish state (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979), p. 396; Brian Girvin, 'Irish nationalism, partition, and the demise of the Home Rule Party 1910-1918', Retrospect, new series, No. 1, 1981, pp. 32-7.
28. Brian Girvin, 'Paul Cullen, liberalism and Irish Catholicism', Church and State, new series, No. 2, Autumn 1981.
29. Garvin, op. cit., pp. 213-4.
30. Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera 1917-1973 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980), pp. 137-8.
31. Brian Farrell, Sean Lemass, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983), p. 23; for a report of statements by de Valera at the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis 1981, cf. Irish Press, 29 October 1981.
32. Cited in John A. Murphy, 'The achievement of Eamon de Valera' in John P. O'Carroll and John A. Murphy (eds), De Valera and his times (Cork: Cork University Press, 1983), p. 9.
33. John F. O'Connor, 'Article 50 of Bunreacht na hEireann and the unwritten English constitution of Ireland' in O'Carroll and Murphy (eds), op. cit., pp. 173-81.
34. Pennock, op. cit., pp. 163-5.
35. Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of nations (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).
36. Charles E. Lindbloom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 172-75. Padraig O'Malley, The uncivil wars (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1983), p. 65.

37. B. Farrell, The founding of Dail Eireann (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971). B.M. Russett, 'Inequality and Instability', World Politics, Vol. 16, 1964, pp. 442-54.
38. R.K. Carty, Electoral Politics in Ireland (Dingle: Brandon, 1983), p. 151.
39. D. Rottman and P. O'Connell, 'The Changing Social Structure in Ireland' in F. Litton (ed.), Unequal Achievement (Dublin: I.P.A., 1982).
40. cf. discussion in Carty, op. cit.
41. B.F. Biever, Religion, Culture, and Values (New York: Arno Press, 1976), pp. 306-7, 369, 419, 432, 481, 496-7.
42. Michael MacGreal, 'Prejudice and tolerance in Ireland (Dublin: College of Industrial Relations, 1977). M. NicChionnla Phadraig, 'Religion in Ireland: preliminary analysis', Social Studies, 5 (1976), pp. 113-64. Michael Fogarty, Liam Ryan, Joseph Lee (eds), Irish Values and Attitudes (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1984).
43. Michael Gallagher, 'Where the votes came from', The Irish Times, 10 September 1983.
44. Samuel Brittan, 'The economic contradictions of democracy', British Journal of Political Science, April 1975, pp. 129-59.
45. Opinion polls as reported in Irish Times, 5 February 1982 and 22 June 1983.
46. Fogarty, et al., op. cit., p. 161.
47. Gunther, Chaloupek, 'The Austrian parties and the economic crisis', unpublished paper presented at ECPR Conference, Salzburg, Austria, April 1984.
48. Joseph Lee, 'Reflections on the study of Irish values' in Fogarty, et al., op. cit., pp. 119-21.

49. Tom Garvin, 'Change and the political system' in Frank Litton (ed.), Unequal Achievement (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1982), p. 33.
50. Liam Ryan, 'The changing face of Irish values' in Fogarty, et al., op. cit., p. 105.
51. Ibid., pp. 138-39. Commission of the European Communities Barometre (June 1982), pp. 18-20, 25, 34, 38.
52. Statement reported in Irish Times, 23 August 1983.
53. Reported in Irish Times, 14 January 1984.
54. Emphasis mine.
55. All quotations, Irish Episcopal Conference, submission to New Ireland Forum, 13 January 1984, as reported in Irish Times, 14 January 1984.
56. Oral evidence to New Ireland Forum as reported in Irish Times, 10 February 1984.
57. See speeches by Bishop Newman as reported in Irish Times, 30 September 1983 and 9 June 1984, and by Bishop McManara, in Irish Times, 10 January 1984 and 3 September 1984.
58. Fogarty, et al., op. cit., pp. 161, 169, 173.
59. D. Rea (ed.), Political Co-operation in Divided Societies (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1982).
60. R.D. Osborne, 'Voting behaviour in Northern Ireland 1921-1977' in F.M. Boal and J.N.H. Douglas (eds), Integration and Division (London: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 137-166, p. 149.
61. D. Harkness, Northern Ireland since 1970 (Dublin: Helicon, 1983), pp. 139-71.
62. R. Rose, Governing Without Consensus (London: Faber and Faber, 1971). E. Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower, 1983).
63. Speech by Peter Barry, 25 August 1984.
64. cf. Walker Connor, op. cit., and J. Hogan, Elections and Representation (Cork: Cork University Press, 1945), pp. 242-45.
65. K. Boyle and T. Hadden, How to Read the New Ireland Forum Report (Mimeo, June 1984). How to Read the New Ireland Report: An Addendum on Security (Mimeo, October 1984). I am grateful to Professor Boyle for letting me have copies of these papers.
66. Moxon-Browne, op. cit., pp. 103-07, 118, 142. Opinion polls as reported in Irish Times, 25 May 1982, 22 May 1984.

B85 SID

21-30

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMY
AND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACIES:

An overview of politico-economic models

Dr. Barbara Krug
University of the Saarland
Saarbruecken
Federal Republic of Germany

I In how far do macroeconomic variables influence voters' preferences and election outcomes?

By which mechanism will those preferences - as revealed in elections - be fulfilled by the political process?

Do voters punish and reward their government for their economic performance?

Does a deterioration in the overall economic environment lead to opposition to all democratic parties and/or less participation in democratic elections?

And finally:

What is the relationship between economic business cycles and political change?

Beginning with the pioneering work of Kramer on U.S. Voting Behaviour in 1971 (Kramer, 1971) these questions have been raised in economic and political science journals. The fact that these aspects of a political business cycle did not attract the attention of economists earlier was largely due to the 'puritanism' found in orthodox economics. Neoclassical theory is exclusively concerned with the working of the price system, regarding politics as institutional givens which lie outside the scope of economics. Only individual responses in the market sphere, like shifts in supply and demand, are analysed, while other forms of adjustments like tax evasion, forms of collective action etc., are neglected.

The following article attempts to give an overview on research done in this field. It is intended to concentrate on conceptual aspects and the findings rather than on econometric problems. Emphasis will be laid on empirical studies and new perspectives provided. Thus, it seems that contributions of individual authors are of secondary importance, instead of burdening the

paper with a host of citations, a short survey of the main trends of literature will be given at the end.

That economic conditions influence voting behaviour is a leading commonplace at least in election years. The question has to be asked though: 'Is the fact a fact?' (Stigler, 1973). The first set of studies regarded here (Chapt. II), consequently, dealt with the task of isolating determinants of voters' behaviour. In particular, the importance of economic variables as opposed to structural variables, played a major role in this debate. A bulk of country studies appeared in the next ten years since the Kramer study, which analysed the influence of macroeconomic variables on election outcomes (or the popularity of French and American presidents). Since all these studies applied multi-variate time-series methods a comprehensive listing of the results allows cross-country comparison. While one part of research in this field concentrated on an improvement of statistical methods, another approach challenged the concepts applied so far. As can be seen in the dispute between Frey/Schneider and Chrystal/Alt, those economists devoted to Public Choice were not satisfied with mere correlations between fluctuations in macroeconomic and highly aggregated political variables, but were searching for explanations for voters' and government's behaviour. This effort ended in the formulation of testable hypothesis of evaluation functions, popularity functions and government policy functions. (Chapt. III)

Finally, the whole two-way interdependence between economy and polity has been newly modelled and econometrically tested. What can be done with this kind of analysis, and what is left open to further research will be summarized at the end. (Chapt. IV)

II. Do Economic Variables Matter?

When Kramer concluded in his study that inflation and growth of real income had a significant impact on election outcomes nobody was surprised. However, the following studies contended his findings for the reason, that certain variables were missing or were too broadly defined. Four areas of dispute became visible:

1) Which kind of economic variables should be included?

Controversies centered around: Should consumer price indices or a general price index, real income, personal disposable income or real compensation per work-hour be used? Furthermore, it was disputed whether the absolute level or changes in these variables should be included and what time-lag should be used or which weights should be put on them.

2) Which structural factors should be included?

The fact that incumbency of presidents or parties would affect voting behaviour was not controversial. However, other variables were only reluctantly isolated, often regarded as part of the intercept or 'packed in' disturbance terms, like party identification, institutional changes in electoral law (women's vote), foreign policy issues or normal participation rates.

3) How should the dependent variables be operationalised?

It was demanded that not only the question should be raised whether or not economic variables do influence electoral outcomes or the popularity of an administration, but who exactly profited from the possible changes in voting behaviour: the opposition party, parties with a specific programmatic profile, extremist parties or no party at all, since voters would abstain from participating in elections.

4) Should economic up- and downswings be treated equally?

It was tested whether there was symmetry between voters' response to economic growth and economic recessions. The deterioration of economic conditions became of special interest. It was asked whether this would favour anti-democratic movements.

ad 1)

Empirical studies done so far proved, as can be seen in Tab. I

(Appendix p. 16), that economic variables do matter in all countries with regard to election outcomes. Since the time periods investigated, the time of specification and the kind of variables included are too different, it cannot be concluded, however, how strong this influence is and which economic factors proved to be the most crucial ones for all countries.

Even if not electoral results but studies based on opinion polls were looked at, this picture becomes not clearer. It turned out that rates of inflation, rates of unemployment and growth rate of income have a significant impact on the popularity of presidents (in France and the United States) or of governing parties (Tab. IIa, Tab. IIb, App. p. 18, 20). Subsequently it becomes of special interest - not the least for the respective administrations - which factor is the dominant one. In other words, the question arises whether voters 'punish' their governments more strongly for an increase of unemployment or for an increase of inflation? As can be seen in Tab. IIa, IIb, in Australia, Denmark, The Federal Republic, Great Britain, New Zealand and in Sweden, the rate of employment does have a bigger effect on the government's popularity than the rate of inflation. This result is partly substantiated by studies on France and the U.S. Only Japan, where the unemployment issue seems to play no role, and inflation and income growth plays an equal role, drops out of this trend.

In summary, the empirical results show a persistent and statistically significant relationship between economic fluctuations and the evaluation of government. The better the economic situation is (measured by inflation, unemployment and growth of real income) the better a government's re-election chances (measured by electoral results and popularity functions).

ad 2)

The question regarding the influence of structural factors was most provocatively put forward by Stigler (Stigler 1973), who claimed that economic variables do not matter, or if, only as far as their distributive effects are concerned. Since modern party programmes in democracies do not differ as far as general economic goals are concerned, voters would not punish or reward incumbent governments or presidents for their failure to meet these goals. Stigler argued that the rational expectations of voters tells them that governments are unable to influence the real economic situation (Lucas 1976, ~~Sargent 1976~~). Even if governments would be devoted to anticyclical economic policy of the Keynes-type, their expenditure would be mainly determined by the overall economic rate of growth and their expenditures in the past. Since laws and regulations restrict economic policy in expenditure and revenues, a government has little discretionary power to influence the business cycle (Chrystal/Alt 1979, 1981). The electorate with rational expectation knows about this inability and will not base its vote on the economic performance of incumbent governments.

This approach leads to further questioning of the role of socio-demographic factors in electoral behaviour, for example the share of farmers, traditional party affiliation, religion, class background etc. Concentrating on these variables did not lead to a significant improvement in the estimations, however. Furthermore, as it was shown in the case for the United Kingdom, social groups do not vote for or against a government solely because they belong to a specific class but rather because classes are differently affected by economic policy. So, for example, do skilled workers worry more about a policy leading to an increase in unemployment, while employees and earners of transfer income feel more affected by inflation (Hibbs 1982, Alt and Chrystal 1983).

In summary, all the latest studies reject the rational expectation assumption of Stigler and the permanent income hypothesis in government expenditure of Chrystal/Alt. Voters do not respond homogeneously to economic variables. Their responses vary because of differences in their objective, concrete interest stake, group loyalties etc. (Hibbs.). They prove a significant effect inflation and unemployment, i.e. cyclical effects, have on government's popularity, though do not deny the influence of other demographic factors (Nordpoth 1984, Whiteley 1984).

ad 3)

Most of the empirical studies took into account the consequences of changing votes on the incumbent government and the opposition within a two-party system only. This has been regarded as a major defect for one conceptual and one practical reason:

(i) The whole range of alternatives for the electorate is not captured. Voters can respond to unfavourable economic and political conditions not only by shifting their votes to the opposition party but also by refraining from voting or voting for minor or extremist parties.

(ii) Limiting the analysis to a two-party system makes the results for most continental countries where multi-party systems prevail less meaningful and hinders cross-country comparison.

Including a larger range and extremist parties was of special importance in the Federal Republic. Here, the question of the interrelationship between economic instability (recessions) and democratic instability (increasing votes for extremist parties) was raised in special reference to the past. It was asked whether the Great Depression was a causal factor for the ending of the Weimar Republic and in how far the rise of the National Socialists was due to the high rate of unemployment in the early 1930s. (Frey/Weck 1983). Since many empirical studies and textbooks in history mainly blamed structural factors (percentage of protestants, farmers, workers) for the success of the two extremist parties (Communist Party and the

NSDAP), the role of cyclical factors was underestimated for a long time. It turned out, however, that unemployment favoured both parties although especially the NSDAP profited. Somewhat surprisingly both parties did not gain from a higher share of electoral participation. It can be assumed that the two parties would not have captured the majority of votes (64,2%) in 1933 if the unemployment level would have remained at its 1930 level of 14,4% instead of jumping to 52,4% in Jan. 1933. These results suggest that economic factors cannot only cause a shift among traditional democratic parties but a total shift away ~~from the~~ whole political system as such.

The other form of voters' response, namely 'not to vote', is still less carefully analysed. Here, again, the question is to what extent do economic (cyclical) variables lead to a change in the participation rate, - or to a stronger party identification. It can be shown that a deterioration of the economic environment (measured in inflation, real income and unemployment) causes a decrease in the participation and a stronger party identification (Bloom/Price 1975).

Which party gains from economic fluctuations does not only depend on being in office or in opposition but also on the image the parties have in regard to their ability to overcome economic conflicts. The empirical studies prove that left-wing parties are regarded as more successful in fighting for full employment, while conservative parties are regarded as better guardians of price stability. Furthermore, it was shown that voters do not base their expectations on party programs alone. They also take into account their experience with the behaviour of a particular party in power. When, for example, voters see that inflation was permanently higher in times of a democratic US-president, they will expect that in the future a democratic administration will care less about price stability as well (Stigler 1973, Bloom/Price et al.). The tests showed that voters put decaying weights on the past, in other words, the

further back periods of economic recession are, the less this plays a decisive role in current voting decisions - and the less a party will be blamed for this (Hibbs 1982, Stigler 1973)

In summary, disaggregated studies show that economic variables can influence the stability of a democratic party system, when this is measured by participation rate and share of votes for extremist parties. Within the traditional party system the extent to which votes are shifted depends, beside on party identification, particularly on the image a party has in regard to its economic performance. ~~and that~~ voters discount the past quite quickly.

ad 4)

A further disaggregation of variables allowed a discrimination between voters' response to economic upswings and recessions. Empirical studies proved that voters tend to punish governments more for failures than they reward them for economic success. This held true for all parties. Economic downturns reduce the share of votes for governments while economic upturns have no corresponding effects. This result led to a reformulation of economic variables used in these models.

In order to avoid to analyse merely the net effect of economic variables on voting behaviour, it is asked now, to separate negative and positive changes in income, unemployment and inflation.

III Do Governments Matter?

In their challenge of the arguments of Alt and Chrystal, Frey and Schneider emphasized their point of view which is opposed to the kind of analysis used by the former - and by many others in this field: A mere correlation between economic and political variables can only explain ex post facto what has happened. For meaningful forecasts, however, explanations on how government actually behave are needed. Or, to start one step earlier, it has to be shown that governments respond to political incentives. (Frey/Schneider 1983).

What they actually asked for was an integration of studies on voting behaviour into the broader scope of Public Choice. This approach means the application of economic methods to the study of politics. It is in particular concerned with the question how voters' preferences (as opposed to consumer preferences) can be met in the political process (as opposed to the market). Since Arrow's paradoxon, that it does not count for any singular voter to vote (Arrow 1963) and Downs' theory of party competition (Downs 1957), the behaviour of participants in the political market, gained increasing attention in economics.

The fact that individuals do vote in order to pursue their self-interest is a commonplace today, while the model of a responsive self-interest maximising government is still not generally accepted. Two basic models for government behaviour can be found. The first is based on Downs' assumption of perfect competition between parties. The behaviour of political parties follows, then, the 'laws' of perfect market competition. This model meets increasing criticism on the following grounds: Voters unlike consumers cannot exert permanent control over the goods supplied by governing parties since elections are held only every 4 or 5 years. The incumbent party enjoys comparative advantages, since it can influence the economy or the political surrounding in order to increase its re-election chances.

Finally, such a model can be applied only in the case of a two-party system.

The second model assumes that there is no perfect competition but that the government has, to a certain degree, the possibility of pursuing its self-interest. The more leeway a government has, the more its behaviour deviates from the one analysed in the theory of perfect competition. The attempt of governments to pursue their own interest can be described by a policy function similar to the popularity function by which voters evaluate the economic and political condition under a specific government. Again, the question is raised, which variables influence a government's behaviour and which is the dominant factor. It can be argued that governments attempt to solely pursue their ideological goals. This is the assumption of neo-classical economics which regards government as maximising an exogenous given social welfare function. The administration, subsequently, acts as a 'benevolent dictator' (Buchanan 1977) who either succeeds or fails (for example Tinbergen 1956). On the other extreme it is assumed that governments are in election times - interested only in vote maximisation.

The model follows the findings of the Phillips curve: A government will allow the unemployment rate increase soon after the election was won in order to push down inflation and expectations on inflation. Thus, the Phillips curve is shifted to its origin. Shortly before the next election the government will execute a policy which reduces unemployment while the cost of this policy - measured in an outward shift of the Phillips curve - will not arise before the election day (Nordhaus 1975).

Other empirical studies, however, rejected this assumption of a political business cycle and prove that this vote maximisation behaviour is only found in situations where competition is so intensive that the 'survival constraint' dominates government behaviour completely (Kirchgaessner 1981, Beck 1982, McCallum 1978).

In general, it can be assumed that governments try to maximise their utility under economic and political constraint. The incumbent party gains utility out of the execution of its ideological goals. To be free to do so, the government depends on

- (i) economic constraints, like budget restriction and the balance of payment situation; and
- (ii) political constraints, like re-election chances and administrative and legal constraints.

For analytical purposes the policy function of a government is expressed by fiscal policy instruments, i.e. expenditure for goods and services, ~~transfer payments~~ and tax revenue. Empirical studies, using this approach, showed that


- left-wing parties tend to increase tax revenues and state consumption in times their re-election chances are high, while
- conservative parties tend to reduce revenues and expenditure in the same situation;
- all governments practise an expansionary fiscal policy in the case of a popularity deficit, in order to increase their re-election chances;
- the expansionary fiscal policy derived from left-wing party programs corresponds to preferences of traditional left-wing voters since it causes a relative low level of unemployment, while
- the contractive fiscal policy of right-wing parties leading to a lower rate of inflation corresponds to traditional conservative voters' preferences since it secures the level of contractual income (Tab. III, Appendix p. 22).

IV On Modelling the Interdependency of Economic and Political Changes

For the purpose of estimating the interaction between the economy and the polity, politico-economic models have been formulated. The authors (Frey et al.) claim that these models can be applied for all representative democracies, i.e. in all countries in which the following two constitutional elements set the 'rule of the game' in the political and economic sector:

- 1) a market economy in which the government is one but not the only decision maker and where consumer preferences are fulfilled by the price mechanism;
- 2) democracy in which government changes and voters preferences are based on common elections.

The politico-economic model reduces the political process to two decision makers (voters and government), to two areas (the economy and polity) and to two interdependencies (the evaluation and the policy function).



Both functions became somewhat refined and read now as follows: Popularity, as the dependent variable, is measured by a so-called LEAD, i.e. the difference between the popularity of the government and the main opposition party. This LEAD is assumed to be influenced by economic and political factors. The economic variables are specified as the rate of inflation, the rate of unemployment and the rate of growth of real dis-

posable income. Political variables are a popularity depreciation of the incumbent party and a pure election cycle which remains unexplained. The last variable is based on the observation that voters turn away from the government in the middle of the election period and return support for the incumbent party shortly before the next election (Frey 1984). The policy function, on the other hand, includes re-election efforts (government expenditure), programmatic efforts and the balance of payments, real wage rates etc. as economic constraints.

In their debate with the competing model by Alt and Chrystal, who used a permanent income hypothesis, a direct comparison was undertaken, using elections in the United Kingdom as a case study. It was proved that the politico-economic model had a superior forecasting quality and the permanent income hypothesis was rejected. That means that macroeconomic variables as GNP, unemployment, inflation, are only of little value in explaining government behaviour. Unlike voters who respond directly to changes in economic aggregates and re-assess the incumbent party's performance accordingly, the government's behaviour is only indirectly determined by those changes. This because it tries to stick to its programmatic goals and will react primarily to changes in its popularity.

Criticism on all models used so far arose mainly on the ground of their over-simplification.


(i) They can only be applied within a specific constitutional setting, namely representative democracies. There is only one model formulated for socialist countries (Lafay 1979). Since election outcomes or opinion polls cannot be used for measuring government popularity in those countries, an indirect indicator was developed. It was assumed that the frequency with which cadres in power are dismissed or purged reflects a higher level of conflict between the ruling party and the population. In order to avoid revolts or increasing expenditure for repression

(which then cannot be used for the implementation of ideological goals) state investment will be cut back. Investment budget cuts allow real income to increase and ease the conflict. As soon as the government thinks the political situation stabilized, it will return to its original plans and raise investment.

The empirical study, so far, is limited to Eastern Europe (with the exception of the USSR and Yugoslavia) as well as to the time period of 1960 - 1976.

(ii) They are limited to two actors, namely government and voters; especially the central bank, bureaucracy and organized interests as trade union should be included. So far only preliminary research is done which suggests:

- that the central bank sees its own interest in implementing a restrictive monetary policy. In case of correspondence with the government's fiscal policy, it can behave as a pure interest maximiser. In case of conflict it will follow only reluctantly, i.e. with a certain time lag.
- that the possibility of organized interests to influence voters' evaluation and government behaviour depends on the kind of interests involved and the number of members. Producer interests can be more powerfully organized than consumers'. The larger the number of members the more influence an interest group has in interfering on the highest government level, while smaller - or consumer interest groups - try to interfere at the bureaucratic level (Schneider and Naumann 1982).
- that the bureaucracy tries to maximise its interest by maximising its budget. Theories on bureaucratic behaviour have been mainly undertaken in the field of political science. Both approaches offered so far - the policy output studies and the concept of incrementalism - show no convincing results. The two concepts cannot give an explanation for the observed differences in the amount of the administratively managed budget, neither for changes over time nor for changes between bureaucratic units (Sharkanski 1970). Public choice theory, on the other hand, offers a theoretical design (Fig. 2) and theoretical explanations which are not yet empirically tested (Tullock 1965, Niskanen 1971).



The last shortcoming which should be mentioned here is that all those models reflect government actions solely through their budget policy. Voters react also to changes in legal and constitutional constraints. However, Public Choice theory in respect to constitutional aspects is only at its beginning (Buchanan 1977).

Table I: The Influence of the Economic Situation on Election Outcomes in Representative Democracies† (Tables reprinted by kind permission of Bruno S. Frey and F. Schneider)

| Country Dependent variable Periods (Yearly data) | Author | Kind of Estima- tion | Rate of Inflation Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Unemploy- ment Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Income or GNP Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of per capita fed. taxes Specifica- tion and Time lag | R df |
|--|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|---------------|
| United States Vote share of Republican Party 1896 - 1964 | KRAMER (1971) | ML | -0.41 ⁺ Actual rate in elect. year | -0.001 Change of 1st diff. in elect. year | 0.27 ⁺ Real, per capita val. in elect. year | ----- | 0.78 (27) |
| Vote share of Pres. Cand. of Democratic Party 1916 - 1972 | FAIR (1978) | GLS | ----- | ----- | 1.16 ⁺⁺ Real, per capita val. in elect. year | ----- | ----- (11) |
| log (vote share of Pres. Cand. in power) 1986 - 1972 | NISKANAN (1979) | OLS | ----- | ----- | Log(real, per cap. val., av. over leg. per) | -0.31 ⁺ Log(real val.) | 0.73 (14) |
| Vote share of Pres. Cand. in power 1896 - 1976 | KIRCH- GAESSNER (1981) | GLS | -0.12 ⁺⁺ Squared value in elect. year | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Denmark Vote share of bigger party in power - dev. from longterm average 1920 - 1973 | MADSEN (1980) | GLS | -0.43 ⁺ Act. value in elect. year | -0.19 Change of 1st diff. in elect. year | ----- | ----- | 0.28 (13) |

Table I: The Influence of the Economic Situation on Election Outcomes in Representative Democracies (Continued)

| Country Dependent variable Periods | Author | Kind of Estima- tion | Rate of Inflation Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Unemploy- ment Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Income or GNP Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of per capita fed. taxes Specifica- tion and Time lag | R df |
|--|------------------|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|--------------|
| <u>Norway</u> Vote share of gov. party 1920 - 1973 | MADSEN (1980) | GLS | -0.36 ⁺ Actual rate in elect. year | -0.10 Actual rate in elect. year | ----- | ----- | 0.09 (13) |
| <u>Sweden</u> Vote share of gov. party - dev. from long- term average 1920 - 1973 | MADSEN (1980) | GLS | -0.22 Actual rate in elect. year | -2.40 ⁺ Change of 1st diff. in elect. year | 0.73 ⁺⁺ Actual rate in elect. year | ----- | 0.47 (13) |
| <u>France</u> Vote share of left opposit. parties 1920 - 1973 | RÔSA (1980) | OLS | 0.20 ⁺ Three years averaged values | 0.02 ⁺⁺ Three years averaged values | -0.08 ⁺⁺ Three years averaged values | ----- | 0.80 (16) |

+ In this table only the results of the economic factors are reported. One + indicates statistical significance at the 95%, two ++ at the 99% confidence level, using a two-tailed test. R is the corrected coefficient of determination, and df are the degrees of freedom. ML indicates Maximum Likelihood estimation; GLS = General Least Squares estimation; OLS = Ordinary Least Squares estimation.

Table II a: The Influence of the Economic Situation on the Popularity of French and American Presidents*

| Country Dependent var. Popularity Periods | Author | Kind of Estima- tion | Rate of Inflation Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Unemploy- ment Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Income Specifi- cation & Time lag | Tax burden (Tot. tax./ GNP) Specifica- tion and Time lag | Change of the exchange rate or bal. of paym. Specifica- tion and time lag | R df |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|---------------|
| France De Gaulle, Pom- pidou, Giscard 1960:1 - 1978:4 monthly data | LEWIS- BECK (1980) | GLS | -1.89 ⁺⁺ Act. rate lagged 2 months | -0.56 ⁺ Act. rate lagged 2 months | --- | --- | --- | 0.73 (217) |
| Pompidou&Gisc. 1969:4 - 1978:4 quarterly data | HIBBS (1981) | WLR | 0.004 ⁺⁺ Act. rate | -0.01 ⁺⁺ Act. rate | 0.017 ⁺⁺ Act. rate real, per cap., disp. | --- | --- | --- (29) |
| Giscard&Mitter. 1974:10-1983:12 monthly data | LAFAY (1984) | WLR | -0.028 ⁺⁺ Act. rate lagged 1 month | -0.103 ⁺⁺ Act. rate lagged 1 month | 0.029 ⁺⁺ Act. rate lagged 1 month | --- | -0.0253 ⁺⁺ Amount Francs per US-\$; one month lag | 0.77 (104) |
| <u>United States</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Kennedy/Johnson 1961:1 - 1968:4 quarterly data | SCHNEI- DER (1978) | --- | -2.61 ⁺ Act. rate 2 quarter lag | -5.43 ⁺⁺ Act. rate 2 quarter lag | --- | --- | --- | 0.85 (25) |
| Nixon/Ford 1969:1 - 1976:4 quarterly data | SCHNEI- DER (1978) | --- | -2.15 ⁺ Act. rate 2 quarter lag | -3.89 ⁺⁺ Act. rate 2 quarter lag | --- | --- | --- | 0.90 (25) |

Table II a: The Influence of the Economic Situation on the Popularity of French and American Presidents (Continued)

| Country Dependent var. Popularity | Author | Kind of Estima- tion | Rate of Inflation Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Unemploy- ment Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Income Specifici- cation & Time lag | Tax burden (Tot. tax./ GNP) Specifica- tion and Time lag | Change of the exchange rate or bal. of paym. Specifica- tion and time lag | R df | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|---------|------|---|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| United States (cont.) | Kennedy/Johnson/ Nixon/Ford/Cart- log (POP/(100- POP)) 1961:1 - 1980:1 quarterly data | WLR | $\log(\text{rate}(t)/\text{rate}(t-1))$ | $-\text{0.017}^{++}$ | $-\text{0.017}^{++}$ | 0.015^{++} | --- | --- | (50) | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Elasticities computed from HIBBS (1982a, p. 456) $^{++}$ | $-\text{0.052}$ | $-\text{0.017}$ | 0.273 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | $-\text{0.113}$ | $-\text{0.143}$ | 0.394 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | $-\text{0.241}$ | $-\text{0.249}$ | 0.392 |
| Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter | | | $-\text{0.573}$ | $-\text{0.382}$ | 0.553 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | $-\text{0.534}$ | $-\text{0.356}$ | 0.452 | | | | | | | | |

Notes +) WLR means Weighted Least Squares Regression; POP= Popularity of the President; further notes see Table I
 $^{++}$) These elasticities are averages over the period each President was in office and should be interpreted as rough indicators of how sensitive voters react to a change in the economic situation under a certain President.

Table II b: The Influence of the Economic Situation on the Popularity of Party(ies) in Government

| Country Dependent Variable Popularity | Author | Kind of Estima- | Rate of Inflation | Rate of Unemploy- | Rate of Income | Tax burden (Tot. taxes/ GNP) | Change of exch. rate or bal. of payments | R |
|--|---------------------------------------|--------------------|--|---|--|---|---|---------------|
| <u>Australia</u> Gov. party(ies) 1960:2 - 1977:2 quarterly data | SCHNEIDER POMMERH- NE (1980) | OLS | -0.47+ Act. rate 1 quart. lag | +1.13++ Act. rate 1 quart. lag | 0.05+ Act. rate real, per c. 1 quart. lag | ----- | 0.04+ Change of 1st diff. i bal. of pay- ments | 0.69 (55) |
| <u>Denmark</u> Gov. party: 1957:2 - 1968:1 quarterly data | PALDAM/ SCHNEIDER (1980) | GLS | -0.41+ Difference between t and t-4 | -0.73++ Difference between t and t-4 | 0.19+ Rate of real wages diff. betw. t and t-4 | 0.51+ Difference between t and t-4 | 0.10 Difference between t and t-4; real bal. of payments | 0.92 (35) |
| <u>Germany (West)</u> Gov. party: Christ. Democ. 1951:1 - 1966:10 monthly data | KIRCH- GAESSNER (1976) | TLS | -0.20++ Act. rate | -0.43++ Act. rate | ----- | ----- | ----- | 0.84 (174) |
| Gov. parties: SPD and FDP 1970:3 - 1976:10 monthly data | KIRCH- GAESSNER (1977) | GLS | -0.09+ Act. rate | -0.31++ Act. rate | ----- | ----- | ----- | 0.76 (85) |

Table II b: The Influence of the Economic Situation on the Popularity of Party(ies) in Government (continued)

| Country Dependent Variable Popularity Periods | Author | Kind of Estima- tion | Rate of Inflation Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of Unemploy- ment Specifica- tion and Time lag | Rate of income Specifica- tion & Time lag | Tax burden (Tot. tax./ GNP) Specifica- tion and Time lag | Change of exch. rate or bal. of payments Specifica- tion and Time lag | R df |
|--|--------------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|---------------|
| <u>Great Britain</u> Lead of the gov. (POP-GOV-POP-OPP) 1955:3 - 1977:4 quarterly data | PISSARRIDES (1980) | GLS | -0.57 ⁺ 1st differ- ence between t and t-1 | 4.55 ⁺ Reciproce value, lag- ged 2 quart. | 0.26 ⁺ Rate of consumpti- on | -0.45 ⁺ Act. rate | 0.26 ⁺⁺ 1st differ- ence between t and t-1; bal. of paym. | 0.66 (80) |
| <u>Japan</u> Govern. party(ies) 1960 - 1976 30 observations | INOBUCHI (1980) | ---- | 0.68 ⁺⁺ Act. rate | ---- | 0.59 ⁺ Act. rate lag:t-2 | ---- | ---- | 0.54 (27) |
| <u>New Zealand</u> Lead of the gov. party(POP-GOV- POP-OPP) 1970:1 - 1981:IV quarterly data | URSBRUNG (1983) | MLS | -0.35 ⁺⁺ Act. rate of change of inflat. | -2.12 ⁺⁺ Act. rate | 0.07 Rate of growth of real, per capita GNP | ---- | 0.36 ⁺⁺ Surplus of bal. as share of GNP | 0.78 (37) |
| <u>Sweden</u> Social Democrats 1967:3 - 1976:9 monthly data | JONUNG/ WADENSJOE (1979) | OLS | -0.10 ⁺ Act. rate 1 month lag | -0.73 ⁺⁺ Act. rate 1 month lag | ---- | ---- | ---- | 0.51 (111) |

Notes +) POP-GOV (POP-OPP) means popularity of the government(opposition) party(ies); for further notes see Tables 1 and 2

Table III: The Use of Fiscal Policy Instruments for Securing Re-election or Reaching Ideological Goals in Representative Democracies¹⁾

| Country Use of Instrument Periods | Author | Fiscal Policy Instruments | | |
|---|----------------------------------|--|---|-----------------------|
| | | Expendit. for goods and services | Transfer pay- ments to pri- vate households | Total tax revenues |
| <u>Australia</u> | | | | |
| Re-election effort | POMMERHNE SCHNEIDER (1980) | + 11 | + 11 | - 1 |
| Ideolog. goals: Country/Liberal | | - 1 | - 1 | - 1 |
| Labour | | + 1 | + 1 | + |
| 1960:2 - 1977:2 quarterly data | | | | |
| <u>Germany</u> | | | | |
| Re-elect. effort | FREY SCHNEIDER (1979) | + 1 | + 1 | - 1 |
| Ideolog. goals: Christ. Democr. | | - 1 | - 1 | - 1 |
| Social Democr. | | + 1 | + 1 | + 1 |
| 1951 - 1976 yearly data | | | | |
| <u>Great Britain</u> | | | | |
| Re-elect. effort | FREY SCHNEIDER (1978a) | + 11 | + 11 | - 11 |
| Ideolog. goals: Conservative | | - 1 | - 1 | - |
| Labour | | + 1 | + 1 | + |
| 1962:1 - 1974:4 quarterly data | | | | |
| <u>United States</u> | | | | |
| Re-elect. effort | FREY SCHNEIDER (1978b) | + 11 | + 11 | - 1 |
| Ideolog. goals: Republ. Pres. | | - 1 | - 1 | ± |
| Democr. Pres. | | + 1 | + | - |
| 1953:1 - 1976:4 quarterly data | | | | |

Notes 1) +(-) means an expansive (contractive) use of fiscal policy instruments on the expenditure side - vice versa for the revenue side; ± = undecided use; 1 indicates statistical significance at the 95%, 11 at the 99% confidence level, using a two-tailed test; all instruments are estimated by including various other constraints (like budget or cost-push factors).

References

- Ahmad, Kabir V. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," Review of Economics and Statistics, 65/1 (1983): 170-177.
- Alt, James E. "Elections and Economic Outcomes in Britain", mimeographed (St. Louis: Washington University: 1984).
- Alt, James E., and Alec K. Chrystal. Political Economics Los Angeles: University of California Press: 1983).
- Alt, James E., and John Wooley. "Reaction Functions, Optimization and Politics: Modelling the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy", American Journal of Political Science 26/4 (1982): 709-740.
- Arcelus, Frank, and Alan H. Meltzer. "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections", American Political Science Review 69/4 (1975): 1232-1265
- Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd ed.) New York: Wiley (1963)
- Atesoglu, H., Sonmer and Roger Congleton. "Economic Conditions and National Elections, Post Sample Forecasts", The American Political Science Review 76/4 (1982): 873-875.
- Beck, Nathaniel. "Does There Exist a Political Business Cycle?" Public Choice 38/2 (1982a): 205-212.
- Bloom, Howard S., and H.D. Price: "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession", American Political Science Review 69/4 (1975): 1266-1276
- Buchanan, James M. Freedom in Constitutional Contract, Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station, Texas and London: Texas A & M University Press (1977)
- Chapell, Jr., Henry W. "Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance: Are Voters Really So Naive?" The Review of Economics and Statistics 65/3 (1983): 385-392.
- Chrystal, Alex K. and James Alt. "Endogenous Government Behavior: Wagner's Law or Goetterdaemmerung?" in Current Issues in Fiscal Policy, ed. S.T. Cook and P.M. Jackson: (London: M. Robertson: 1979): 224-259.
- _____, "Some Problems in Formulating and Testing a Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom", Economic Journal 91 (1981): 730-736.

- _____, "The Criteria for Choosing a Politico-Economic Model: Forecast Results for British Expenditures 1976-79", European Journal of Political Research 11/1 (1983): 113-124.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
- Frey, Bruno S., and Larry J. Lau. "Towards a Mathematical Model of Government Behavior", Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 28/2 (1968): 355-380.
- Frey, Bruno S., and Friedrich Schneider. "On the Modelling of Politico-Economic Interdependence", European Journal of Political Research 3/4 (1975): 339-360.
- Frey, Bruno S. "A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom", Economic Journal 88 (1978a): 243-53.
- _____, "An Empirical Study of Politico-Interaction in the U.S.", Review of Economics and Statistics 60/2 (1978b): 174-183.
- _____, Modern Political Economy, Oxford: Martin Robertson (1978c)
- _____, "An Econometric Model with an Endogenous Government Sector", Public Choice 34/1 (1979): 29-43.
- _____, "A Politico-Economic Model of the U.K.: New Estimates and Predictions", Economic Journal 91 (1981a): 737-740.
- _____, "Central Bank Behavior. A Positive Empirical Analysis", Journal of Monetary Economics 7 (1981b): 291-315.
- _____, "Politico-Economic Models in Competition with Alternative Models: Which Predicts Better?" European Journal of Political Research 10 (1982): 241-254.
- _____, "Do Governments Respond to Political Incentives?" European Journal of Political Research 11/1 (1983): 125-126.
- _____, Modelling Politico-Economic Relationships, in: David K. Whynes (ed.), What is Political Economy? Eight Perspectives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1984): 141-161
- Frey, Bruno S., and Hannelore Weck. "A Statistical Study of the Effect of the Great Depression on Elections: The Weimar Republic, 1930-1933", Political Behavior 5/4 (1983): 403-420
- Golden, David, and John Poterba. "The Price of Popularity: The Political Business Cycle Re-examined", American Journal of Political Science 24/4 (1980): 696-714.

- Goodman, Samuel, and Gerald H. Kramer. "Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer" American Political Science Review 69/4 (1975): 1277-1285.
- Hibbs, Douglas A. Jr. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", The American Political Science Review 71/4 (1977): 1467-1487.
- _____, "Economics and Politics in France: Economic Performance and Mass Political Support for Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing", European Journal of Political Research 9/2 (1981): 133-145.
- _____, "On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain and Germany", The Journal of Politics 44/4 (1982): 428-441.
- _____, "Economic Outcomes and Political Support for British Governments Among Occupational Classes: A Dynamic Analysis", The American Political Science Review 76/2 (1982c): 259-279.
- Inoguchi, Tanaka. "Economic Conditions and Mass Support in Japan", in: Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whitely (London: Sage Publications, 1980): 121-154.
- Kirchgässner, Gebhard. "Rationales Wählerverhalten und optimales Regierungsverhalten", (Konstanz (Germany): Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Konstanz: 1976).
- _____, "Wirtschaftslage und Wählerverhalten", Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18/2-3 (1977): 510-536.
- _____, "Zur Struktur politisch-ökonomischer Konjunkturzyklen", Staat und Wirtschaft, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, N.F. Vol. 102, ed. Carl Christian von Weizsäcker (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot: 1978): 427-450.
- Kramer, Gerald. "Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964", American Political Science Review 65/1 (1971): 131-143.
- Krelle, Wilhelm. Erfahrungen mit einem ökonomischen Prognosemodell fuer die BRD (Meisenheim am Glahn: Hain-Verlag, 1974).
- Lafay, Jean-Dominique. "Important Political Change and the Stability of the Popularity Function: Before and After the French General Election of 1984", mimeographed (University of Poitiers: Poitiers: 1984a).
- Laney, Leroy D., and Thomas D. Willett. "Presidential Politics Budget Deficits, and Monetary Policy in the United States: 1960-1976" Public Choice 40/1 (1983): 53-69.

- Lewis-Beck, Martin S. "Economic Conditions and Executive Popularity: The French Experience", The American Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1980): 306-323.
- Lindbeck, Assar. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economics with Endogenous Politicians", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 66 (1976): 1-19.
- Lucas, R.E. "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique", in: The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, ed. Karl Brunner and Alan H. Meltzer (Amsterdam: North-Holland: 1976): 19-64.
- McCallum, Bennet T. "Rational Expectations and Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy: An Overview", Journal of Money Credit and Banking 12/4 (1980): 714-746.
- MacRae, Duncan. "A Political Model of the Business Cycle", Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977): 239-263.
- _____, "On the Political Business Cycle", in: Contemporary Political Economy, ed. Douglas A. Hibbs, jr., and Heino Fassbender (Amsterdam: North-Holland: 1981): 169-184.
- Madsen, Henrick J. "Electoral Outcomes and Macro-Economic Policies: The Scandinavian Cases", in: Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whitely (London: Sage: 1980): 15-46.
- Minford, David, and Patrick Peel. "The Political Theory of the Business Cycle", European Economic Review 6/2 (1982): 253-270.
- Mosley, Paul. "Images of the 'Floating Voter' on the Political Business Cycle Revisited", Political Studies 12/4 (1978): 375-394.
- Mueller, John. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson", American Political Science Review 64/1 (1970): 18-34.
- Niskanen, William A. "Economic and Fiscal Effects on the Popular Vote for the President", in: Public Policy and Public Choice, ed. D.W. Rae and Thomas J. Eismeler (London: Sage Publications: 1979): 93-120.
- Nordhaus, William. "The Political Business Cycle", Review of Economic Studies 42 (1975): 169-190.
- Norpoth, Helmut, and Yantek, Thom. "Von Adenauer bis Schmidt: Wirtschaftslage und Kanzlerpopularitaet", in: Wahlen und politisches System, Analysen aus Anlaess der Bundestagswahl 1980, ed. Max Kaese und Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag: 1983b): 136-151.

- Paldam, Martin. "A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote and Popularity Functions", European Journal of Political Research 9/1 (1981a): 181-199.
- _____, "An essay on the rationality of economic policy: The test case of the election cycle", Public Choice 37 (1981b): 287-298.
- Paldam, Martin, and Friedrich Schneider. "The Macro-Economic Aspects of Government and Opposition Popularity in Denmark, 1957-1978", Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 118/2 (1980): 149-170.
- Pissarides, Christopher A. "British Government Popularity and Economic Performance", The Economic Journal 90/3 (1980): 569-581.
- Pommerehne, Werner W., and Friedrich Schneider. "Does Government in a Representative Democracy Follow a Majority of Voters' Preferences? - An Empirical Examination", in: Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, ed. Horst Hanusch (Heidelberg (Germany): Springer-Verlag: 1983): 61-88.
- Rosa, Jean J. "Economic Conditions and Elections in France", in: Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whitely (London: Sage, 1980): 101-120.
- Sargent, Thomas, J. "A Classical Macroeconomic Model for the United States", Journal of Political Economy 84/2 (1976): 207-237.
- Schneider, Friedrich. Politisch-Ökonomische Modelle: Theoretische und Empirische Ansätze (Koenigstein: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1978).
- Schneider, Friedrich, and Bruno S. Frey. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States: A Reply", Review of Economics and Statistics 65/1 (1983): 178-182.
- Schneider, Friedrich, and Joerg Naumann. "Interest Group Behavior in Democracies: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland", Public Choice 38/2 (1982): 281-304.
- Schneider, Friedrich, and Werner W. Pommerehne. "Politico-Economic Interactions in Australia: Some Empirical Evidence", Economic Record 56/1 (1980): 113-131.
- Schneider, Friedrich, Werner W. Pommerehne, and Bruno S. Frey. "Politico-Economic Interdependence in a direct democracy: the case of Switzerland", in: Contemporary Political Economy, ed. Douglas A. Hibbs, jr. and Heino Fassbender (Amsterdam: North-Holland: 1981): 231-248.

Sharkansky, Ira. Policy Analysis in Political Science
Chicago: Markham (1970).

Stigler, G.J. "General Economic Conditions and National
Elections", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceed-
ings 63 (1973): 155-1960.

Stigler, G.J., McCracken, and A. Okun. American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 63 (1973): 1961-1967.

Stimson, J.A. "Public Support for American Presidents: A
Cyclical Model", Public Opinion Quarterly 2311 (1976): 1-21.

B85 SID
21-10

THE STATE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

ALAN LAWTON

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL STUDIES

TEESSIDE POLYTECHNIC

EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH

BARCELONA

25-30 MARCH 1985

"All of us have daily seen and heard an ever-increasing number of accounts that show, with unmistakable clarity, the rapid spread of a planned course of lawlessness in our land that threatens seriously to get out of hand and to destroy law and order. Much of this has derived from organised mass defiance of the law and the courts induced by the irresponsible preachments of some self-appointed leaders of minority groups 'to obey the good laws, but to violate the bad ones'; which of course simply advocates violation of the laws they do not like, or in other words, the taking of the law into their own hands."

(C E Whittaker quoted in F R Berger "'Law and Order' and Civil Disobedience", Inquiry vol 13 1970 pp 255)

"If many other bodies did this (civil disobedience), if they succeeded in their efforts, it would be an end, would it not, to the rule of law. It would lead to the end of democracy, to anarchy and possibly to dictatorship...."

(Attorney General in the Official Secrets Trial, February 1962 quoted in C Driver "The Disarmers" pp 168)

Historically the action known as civil disobedience has taken a number of different forms and is used to characterise the actions of Thoreau, who is credited with first using the term, and his radical individualism; the passive resistance of Gandhi; the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King; the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations; more recently, the peace movement and the women at Greenham Common. Yet however diverse the intentions, tactics and justifications of civil disobedience are, there does appear to be a number of general characteristics attributable to most acts that are depicted as civil disobedience.

1. The act is committed with the intention of breaking a law, or laws.
2. It is a political act insofar as it is directed towards some policy or law of a government.
3. It is done publicly and openly, thereby distinguishing it from the act of a criminal.
4. It is not designed to overthrow a government but merely to protest at a particular act of government.
5. The civil disobedient accepts his/her punishment as a fundamental sign of respect for the law in general.

It is not, however, my intention to examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be termed civil disobedience but rather to, given the general characteristics listed above, examine the implications of such an act for the relationship between the individual and the government. In particular the government of a liberal democratic state as understood to exist in the UK and the USA. Characteristically such a state is said to

possess the Rule of Law and to be deemed legitimate through the consent of the governed. These two concepts have implications for the relationship between the individual and the state and in particular the form and limits of that relationship.

Legal Obligation

It seems to me that the concept of the Rule of Law is not an empirical fact about the world but can be used either to justify existing practices or to condemn those practices. From the perspective of civil disobedience its opponents may see any disobedience to law as an attack upon the stability of the legal system and thereby an attack upon the Rule of Law while at the same time the proponents of civil disobedience may see existing laws as unjust and therefore in conflict with the Rule of Law.

One of the claims made by civil disobedients in justifying their acts is that where a law is unjust it can be broken. From this perspective our obligation to obey the law may be overridden by our obligation to some 'higher law'. Thus Martin Luther King was apt to justify his actions in terms of Natural Law theory where there is a necessary relationship between law and morality.

It is important to stress the differing strands within Natural Law theory and the diversity of its proponents' views. But in general it may be assumed that within Natural Law the obligation to comply with a law is dependent upon the content of that law such that there is a necessary, and not just contingent, relationship between law and morality. According to one commentator, Natural Law contains the following assumptions:-

- "(i) All things in the universe, including man, have a particular nature or structure, which makes the thing itself and not something else.
- (ii) This nature, ultimately is to be discovered through the faculty of reason.
- (iii) Man ought to do only those acts which can be shown by the process of reasoning not to be inconsistent with his own nature and the nature of the universe in which he lives.
- (iv) The positive law of a community carries an 'intrinsic' obligation and thus is a 'law' only when it requires or permits actions which conform to the nature of things as they are and, in particular, the nature of man." (1)

Natural Law theory, then, is based on the assumption that it is possible, by logical deduction, from premises concerning the nature of things to conclusions about what we ought to do. Consequently it involves a moral as well as a legal theory and since the moral quality of an act depends upon conformity with Natural Law, it becomes impossible to distinguish between legal and moral obligation. The 'ought' of legal obligation is perceived as a moral 'ought' such that if we are legally obligated to do 'x' then we ought to do it in a moral sense.

Law is seen as a moral proposition and, with Aquinas, the initial prerequisite of Natural Law is to do good and avoid evil. Thus only good laws are laws and for a law to be good in the moral sense it must be

based on Natural Law, such that, at least for some Natural Law theorists, if a law is at variance with Natural Law then it is not, in fact, law at all. A genuine human law will not violate natural law.

This picture of law is appealing, at least in part because it explains why there is an obligation to obey the law. It is considered that there is something about the law which obligates us and this obligation is moral in character. Everything that is law must be in accordance with moral rules and we, therefore, have an obligation to obey the law. From this perspective all law is in accordance with morality because being in accordance with morality is one of the criteria for being law at all.

Yet at the same time if a law is not in accordance with morality, disobedience to this law can be justified, from the perspective of Natural Law, on the grounds that it is no law at all:

"...part of the appeal of the traditional law theory has undoubtedly been that it appears to give a legal basis for disobedience to particular rules which infringe those moral principles which it incorporates by definition into its concept of law." (2)

It may well be that the demand of validity to an 'unjust' law is the most dramatic way of expressing the connection between the concept of law and moral values that obtain for the Natural Law theorist. Yet the claim of obligatory disobedience because of our understanding of the law of nature, universal, divine or human, may be perceived as an 'intolerable menace to the system of positive law'. Brunner continues:

"No state law can tolerate a competition of this kind presented by a second legal system. The laws of the state actually obtaining must possess a monopoly of binding legal force for itself if the legal security of the state is to remain unshaken." (3)

The separation in principle of the law as it is and the law as it ought to be is the most fundamental assumption of Legal Positivism. It thus represents, in its simplest form, a radical departure from the model of Natural Law. As with Natural Law the varieties of Positivism are many and it may be useful to summarise Hart's (4) categorisation:

1. Laws are commands of human beings.
2. The analysis of legal concepts is an important study and is to be distinguished from the study of religion, morality, sociology etc.
3. A legal system is a closed system such that decisions made within the system can be logically deduced from the rules of that system.
4. Moral evaluations cannot be established by rational argument or proof.

Whilst differing theorists may adhere to some or all of the characteristics of Positivism described above, the separation of law as it is from law as it ought to be seems common to all. It is important to note that this separation does not imply any contempt for the importance of values in law as is evident from the work of Bentham, Austin or Kelsen, but the separation does assign both to strictly different fields.

Much of the early Positive Law theory was concerned to offer an alternative to Natural Law theory; Bentham linked his discussion of morals in terms of utility and his rejection of Natural Law thinking with the firm conviction that law could only be properly understood if it was treated as an autonomous field of study distinct from morals or religion. For the Positivist, Natural Law confused legal with moral issues and what the Positivist will deny is that a law cannot be a law even if it violates certain standards of morality. It is in this sense that law is seen as independent of morality. In the same way moral standards held in common do not become law no matter how desirable they may be until they go through the law-making procedure. The Positivist will not deny that bad or immoral laws may exist and that they should not exist, but to deny that such laws are not laws is to deny the distinction between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be. To insist that a law is not really a law unless it meets some given moral requirement is not only to be conceptually unclear but to invite:

"the most indiscriminate type of civil disobedience" (5)

As long as a law is valid then there are no moral grounds for disobeying it. Thus, the perspective that Bentham and Austin share is that law is a command and the individual has a duty, if the law is valid, to obey it. Obligation then becomes obedience. The command theory identifies the legal order with mere compulsion and Hart is correct in insisting that the law is not the 'gunman situation writ large'. (6)

In Hart's 'concept of Law' we find that his 'key to the science of jurisprudence' is to be found by distinguishing between different types of rules. He distinguishes between, what he terms the 'internal' and

'external' aspects of rules such that individuals who take the internal point of view are prepared to comply with the rule and to bring pressure to bear on those who do not. From the external point of view we may acknowledge the existence of rules but we cannot envisage how they govern conduct in the lives of those who take the internal point of view. It is the internal aspect of rules that allows Hart to distinguish between rules to guide conduct and mere habit or between the regulation of conduct in terms of commands and the regulation of conduct in terms of rules.

An individual who takes an internal point of view with respect to a rule would express his/her attitude to the rule by such phrases as "I ought to..." or "You have a duty to...". In contrast, if we take an external point of view we are concerned only with what the consequences of conduct are likely to be and is expressed by "I had better do 'x' or else..." or "They will do 'x' to you if you...". Those who take the internal point of view are prepared to comply with the rule just in virtue of it being a rule and to bring pressure for conformity and to criticise deviation from the rule. Hart wishes to stress the importance of social pressure behind the rules and it is this which determines whether or not they are thought of as giving rise to obligations.

And yet, as Hart's critics have indicated, it is then not clear that those who take the external point of view can have any obligations at all. Hart himself recognises this and suggests that as long as the officials within a legal system take the internal point of view, the individual need only obey:

In an extreme case the internal point of view with its characteristic use of legal language ('This is a valid rule')

might be confined to the official world....Only officials might accept and use the system's criteria of legal validity. The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughterhouse. But there is little reason for thinking that it could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system" (7)

Positivism has nothing to say about the relationship between different and incompatible systems of rules such as moral and legal, except to say that one must be binding. Certain rules are there to be followed, and if someone refuses to follow them, then there is nothing more to be said. This has been the case when civil disobedients have come before the courts and justified their actions in moral terms and the courts have refused to recognise the validity of this appeal. Indeed in certain cases involving the 'Political Question' doctrine the courts have denied their own jurisdiction to pass judgements. (8)

However given the problems associated with the concept of legal obligation we may find it more fruitful to examine the concept of political obligation.

Political Obligation

The concept of the liberal democratic state is bound up with legitimacy and traditional justifications for this form of government have often rested on some form of contract or consent theory. The relationship between the state and the individual is characterised in terms of the

social practice of promising. In making a promise the individual deliberately undertakes some act that voluntarily creates the relationship specified as obligations. It is these features that consent theorists developed in their use of the promise as the paradigm for the introduction of political obligation. The features that promises, contracts and consent all share is that they are all perceived to be deliberate undertakings performed intentionally and knowingly. By suggesting that a promise can be made without any realisation that in so doing an obligation is undertaken is to misunderstand the meaning of what promising entails. By using deliberate undertakings as the grounds for political obligations, consent theorists stress the potential for the individual to choose where his/her political allegiances will lie. Political obligations cannot be inherited or unwittingly acquired and a deliberate undertaking allows consent theorists to stress the voluntary nature of political obligation.

From this perspective the consent of the governed is the source of the obligation to obey laws and it is analogous to the obligation of a person who has agreed voluntarily to perform, or refrain from performing, a certain act.

Thus, for Locke, people agree to live together through explicitly voluntary consent. However, Locke points out that the decision to form a political community is and must be unanimous but it would be totally unrealistic to expect that all decisions subsequently made would be unanimous. Because of the impossibility of continuing unanimity Locke introduces the notion of majority consent:

"It is necessary the Body should move that way whither the greater force carries it" (9)

The doctrine of majority consent offers a way of making governmental legitimacy depend upon consent while avoiding the consequences of requiring unanimous consent.

The problem then arises that some citizens may become bound to a government to which they have not personally consented; the personal consent of those in the majority will be sufficient to bind them.

Of course, one of the standard embarrassments of consent theory is that accepting it leads to the conclusion that very few people have political obligations insofar as very few people personally consent explicitly to government. A theory that aims to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate government and to suggest that obligations are incurred deliberately and voluntarily rather than imposed has the consequence of rendering liberal democratic governments illegitimate. Faced with this problem, Locke introduced the notion of tacit consent which can be inferred quite independently of the individual's awareness that he is in fact consenting:

"And to this I say that everyman that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as any under it; whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever, or a lodging only for a week or whether it

be travelling freely on the highway; and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government." (10)

Here the argument has moved away from the deliberate and voluntary commitment required for an obligation to exist to making this obligation dependent upon some benefit received and to suggest that receiving benefits shows agreement is quite different from an explicit undertaking.

More recently John Rawls has attempted to give an account of obligations based upon the benefits of government.(11) For Rawls the benefits have to be positively accepted and not merely received thus doing away with the Lockean dilemma that tacit consent by residence automatically incurs obligations. The implication of voluntary acceptance seems to imply, for Rawls, that the beneficiary, through the principle of fair play, has obligations to the 'scheme of social cooperation'. The benefits accruing to non-participants of the scheme does not bind them to the principle of fair play.

Intuitively, at least, this seems to make sense: an individual who joins a social club receives benefits such as cheap drinks, enabling the individual to spend more on friends and relatives who thus benefit. However, it seems absurd to suggest that friends and relatives have obligations to the club even though, indirectly they benefit from it. For Rawls, the principle of fair play accounts for the obligations of those whose active role in the scheme consists of accepting the benefits of its workings. An individual who has merely received benefits from the club has exactly the same status as those who remain completely unaffected by it.

However, within the political community there is the problem of distinguishing between participants and 'outsiders' and while it is clear that most citizens in the liberal democratic state may receive benefits from the workings of the legal and political arrangements it is difficult to imagine how those benefits have been voluntarily accepted.

Rawls also wants to argue that only when the scheme is just can any obligations of fair play arise. The justice conditions holds that a person is obliged to do his/her fair share within the scheme only if he/she has been allocated a fair share of the benefits. The corollary to this is that a person ought not to have to share equally in supporting a scheme that treats him/her unjustly.

However, the account of political obligation which utilises the principle of fair play fails because individuals do not seem to have accepted generally, in Rawls sense, the benefits of government.

Rawls took note of these problems and in his later work 'A Theory of Justice', he modifies his account of the principle of fair play and it becomes the principle of fairness. While Rawls continues to accept that the principle may lead to obligations for those who take special advantage of the benefits of government, such as those who run for public office, he suggests that the principle of fairness does not obligate citizens in general:

"Citizens would not be bound to even a just constitution unless they have accepted and intend to continue to accept its benefits. Moreover, this acceptance must be in some appropriate sense voluntary. But what is this sense? It is difficult to find a

plausible account in the case of the political system into which we are born and begin our lives." (12)

Presumably then Rawls' account is no more able to account for political obligation, in general, than the theory of consent. This is not really surprising given that discourse concerning political obligation has often included only certain groups anyway. For Locke, only those individuals who had a stake in the political system, i.e. property owners, qualified as citizens and, indeed, liberal theory has suggested that a government based on universal suffrage could disrupt the social order by giving power to those who had no immediate stake in government.

More recently, the question of under what circumstances do we have obligations to the government is seen as a meaningless question and is unproblematical:

"To refer to something as the government is sometimes a way of saying that it has authority. This is part of what we mean by authority. Now to hold that some person or body has authority is to hold that he or it ought to be obeyed. This again is part of what we mean by authority i.e. authority as opposed to mere power. On this interpretation of government it would be pointless to ask 'ought we obey the government?' for to call something the government is precisely to imply that it ought to be obeyed." (13)

According to the perspective offered by the conceptual argument an individual has no choice in acknowledging that the government ought to be obeyed. If we understand government to mean that which has political authority in the state then it follows that those that are subject to it, i.e.

Its citizens, ought to obey it. It does not make sense to maintain that a government has legitimate authority over us and that we have no obligation to obey it. We may wonder whether government is right to require this or that of us but we cannot logically dispute that membership of political society involves obligations to government because that is part of what being a member means.

Thus it is conceptually incoherent to try to detach the concept of 'political society' from that of 'political obligation'. So to ask the very general question of whether there could be a political society without political obligation is to ask a meaningless question. If this point can be accepted the implications that McPherson draws from it have been heavily criticised.⁽¹⁴⁾ It is argued that the claim advanced by McPherson is not just about the conceptual implications of notions like 'political society', it is also a claim about political obligation to a particular form of government, i.e. the liberal democratic state.

The general terms of the conceptual argument say nothing about the actual form of political institutions and yet the argument is held to be relevant to our political situation today. McPherson writes that his arguments are intended to apply to modern liberal democracies and an illustration of how deep the assumption is that there can be no general questions to be raised about the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state is provided by Pitkin's dismissal of the idea as 'flying in the face of common sense'. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Yet an argument that moves straight from the conceptual connection between 'being a member of political society' and political obligation to conclusions about our obligation to specific political institutions is

stretching the conceptual analysis beyond its proper scope. It is to make the assumption that political society, government and the state all imply each other and that there is a logical connection between them and yet there is no logical objection to government being conceived in terms of institutional arrangements that are very different in form from those of the liberal democratic state.

From a different perspective it has been argued that political obligation is a permanent problem where citizens continually have to create political obligations and a possible expression of active citizenship is political disobedience. (16) The recent advocacy of participatory democracy sees our obligations as horizontal in nature owed to other citizens to whom we make explicit promises rather than to the state as such. From this perspective the concept of liberal democracy is rejected, to be replaced by participatory democracy and civil disobedience may be seen as contributing to this conception of democracy. However, there does not seem to be much evidence to suggest that those who perceive themselves as civil disobedients intend to change the fundamental nature of government. Given the problems associated with explaining obligations to the state in general we can examine the relationship between the individual and the state in other ways, and in particular through the concept of rights.

Rights

One of the features that is accorded to liberal democracy is that although the majority prevails the rights of minority groups are preserved and one of the claims made by the Civil Rights Movement in the USA was that the

legal rights of negroes as enshrined in the American constitution were not being preserved. It was argued that individual state laws were in violation of the constitution and were, in consequence, invalid and without legal effect.

Similarly, anti-Vietnam War demonstrators also argued that the war in Vietnam was unconstitutional and illegal since Congress had not actually declared war.

If minority rights are not preserved the civil disobedient may begin to feel that it is more than a question of inefficiency in what is basically a liberal democratic state but rather a conscious attempt by the government to prevent minority groups enjoying the rights that liberal democracy is supposed to guarantee them.

However, as Dworkin (17) has pointed out, having a right and being right are two different arguments and it is a feature of the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War demonstrators that a moral duty to disobey laws was linked to a legal right to do so.

Of course, legal rights are more clearly specified than moral rights and it may be argued that where rights are prescribed through the legal system then the state has a corresponding duty not to invade those rights. This argument is suggested by Locke:

"The Legislative acts against the Trust reposed in them when they endeavour to invade the Property of the Subject and to make themselves, or any part of the Community Masters or Arbitrary Disposers of the Lives, Liberties or Fortunes of the People" (18)

Given that the reason why individuals enter into society is the preservation of their 'Property' and a government is authorised to fulfill this function on behalf of the individual any breach of the duty of government allows the individual to forfeit the authorisation of that particular government.

Locke's conception of rights was based upon natural rights and natural law and the difficulties of specifying these are well-documented. However, the appeal to natural rights as a justification for actions may be very persuasive. Although commentators on the Civil Rights Movement have suggested that the actions done by civil disobedients were not in fact civil disobedience as they understood it but rather tests of constitutionality it is significant that the language of Martin Luther King was as much moral in character as legal.

Concluding Remarks

As suggested above, attempts to provide explanations for our obligations to the state, in general, seem to have failed. The arguments of consent theorists and their ilk remain unconvincing. However, the myth of consent as justifying legitimacy, may still be one that the civil disobedient has to contend with.

Civil disobedience in using the language of obligations, rights, justice etc is not, I feel, an attack upon democracy but rather an attempt to redefine it. If the liberal democratic state is depicted in terms of a set of institutions and procedures of government then civil disobedience is

concerned with the values that are said to be implicit in democratic theory. The concern with institutions and procedures may develop into a concern for stability, such that the Rule of Law, for example, becomes identified with existing legal practices and a different perception of the Rule of Law such as the promotion of justice may be seen as an attack upon 'law and order'. Yet civil disobedience may not indicate a failure of democracy but rather offer a different definition of democracy that exists in prevailing practices.

NOTES

1. J C Smith - 'Legal Obligation' (Athlone Press, University of London, 1976) pp 5
2. D Emmett - 'Justice and the Law' (Lindsey Press, 1963) pp 22
3. E Brunner - 'Justice and the Social Order' (Hottinger transl 1945), quoted in C Cohen 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', Rutgers Law Review, vol 21, 1966, no 1, pp 11
4. H L A Hart - 'The Concept of Law' (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961)
5. This is the position that W T Blackstone attributes to the Legal Positivist in his 'Civil Disobedience - is it justified', Georgia Law Review, vol 3, 1969, pp 679-703
6. See Hart op cit
7. See Hart op cit pp 114
8. See G Hughes 'Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine', New York University Law Review, vol 43, 1968, no 1, pp 1-19
9. J Locke - 'Two Treatises of Government', II 96
10. *ibid* II 119
11. J Rawls - 'Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play' (New York University Press, New York, 1964)
12. J Rawls - 'A Theory of Justice' (Oxford University Press, London, 1972), pp 336-337
13. T McPherson - 'Political Obligation' (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp 59
14. See C Pateman - 'Political Obligation and Conceptual Analysis' in P Laslett and J Fishkin (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th Series, (Basil Blackwell, 1979)
15. H Pitkin - 'Obligation and Consent', in P Laslett et al (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 4th Series, (Basil Blackwell, 1972)
16. See C Pateman - 'The Problem of Political Obligation' (Wiley, 1979)
17. R Dworkin - 'Taking Rights Seriously' (Duckworth & Co Ltd, London, 1979)
18. J Locke op cit II 221

B85 SID

f1-40

Participation versus Consent :

Conflicting Tendencies within
the Idea of Democracy.

Kenneth Minogue,
London School of Economics.

Paper presented at the
European Consortium for Political Research.

Barcelona,
March, 1985.

1. Democracy and Stability.



"Frankly, it's no better or worse than any other form of government."

(From The New Yorker)

It is one of the few reliable lessons of history that in the long run, all political units collapse and give way to others. Heaven withdraws its mandate, or the Bedouin come thundering in from the desert to inherit a corrupt and crumbling empire. Should

democratic empires be any different ?¹

In the long run, probably not. But if we take a very much shorter timescale, the question of stability admits of a brief and decisive answer. European liberal democracies (including, of course, the United States, Australia etc.) may, as stable political entities, be contrasted with South American republics, much given to caudillismo, or Third World oligarchies whose subjects know well, as a vibrant fact of life, the sudden change of radio programme and the rumbling of tanks through the streets when the latest general (or even sergeant) makes his bid. This is what political instability means ; and its consequences usually are not only bloodshed and oppression, but also a mistrustful civic fabric and poor economic development.

But instability may happen at different levels, which we may briskly categorise as the level of the constitution, the régime, and within the régime. Some democracies, such as the French, change constitutions more frequently than others, such as the British ; but they remain broadly stable in very important respects. Others, such as the Italians and the French under the Fourth Republic, change governments very rapidly indeed, yet the changes, being largely superficial, would seem merely to constitute a stability of a special kind. Still other states may at the highest level remain unchanged, yet suffer from the most violent and disruptive instabilities within a régime. This

1. Modern democracies are empires in the classical sense that they have heterogeneous populations and cover a wide area. In classical terms, they are also monarchies in the sense that they must be governed centrally, and from the top. The important question, as will emerge, is that they are not "republics" in the classical sense.

is especially the case with despotic governments, such as those of communist states. Stalin and Mao may remain at the helm, yet government policy (which in such countries determines most of the details of the life of individuals) may attempt grandiose projects, such as collectivising agriculture or revolutionising the culture ; and all stability goes.

It would take considerable feats of definitional gymnastics to construct an explanatory schema of these complexities. My aim is more modest. It is to explore the contrast to be found in two facts about democratic practice and democratic theory.

Democracies (which are essentially both European and relatively recent) have proved to be very stable indeed, both in the sense that power is regularly transferred from one group to another within them, and in the sense that the citizen body can get on with its life in the reasonable confidence that violent and startling political changes will not commonly upset its calculations. The reason for this is in part recognised by the main argument with which democracies justify themselves : namely, that states are like pressure cookers, and that democracies provide outlets for discontent. Those who would otherwise wish to overthrow the régime, come instead to be part of it.

On the other hand, democracy is the riskiest form of government, since it encourages dissidence, and gives every opportunity for dissident groups to proselytise, conspire and mobilise their supporters. Hence, the distinction between democracies and autocracies would seem to be between those who

can afford to take these risks, and those who cannot.

Looking back over the last century, these two features of contemporary government generate merely an interesting paradox : namely, that a risky form of government is often the safest bet. But what are the risks ? And what is the coherence of the ideas in terms of which those risks are understood ?

2. What is Democracy the Name of ?

It has often been observed² that democracy, now the ideal criterion of modern government, was until about the second half of the 18th century regarded as a dangerous and unstable form of government. It signified rule by the demos, who were unlikely to be the wisest section of the community, and whose greatest times had been when guided by aristocratic statesmen such as Pericles. Aristotle classified democracy as one of the corrupt constitutional forms, because the demos was not so much a majority of the polis, as a particular interest within it, and legitimate rule cannot be the rule of an interest. On the other hand, Aristotle did think that some element of democracy was essential to any sound constitution. Rule must be acceptable to the ruled.

The classical republican ideal survived the Middle Ages by hiding out in the Italian city states, and was popularised by Machiavelli and others. Two centuries later, this tradition was still both bewitching, and out of touch with the times. It was bewitching because it kept alive the dream of a "real" community, by contrast with the tangle of estates, localities and privileges then prevalent in Europe ; and it was impractical because the states of Europe were all too big to become republics. On the other hand, many educated men (whose classical education inclined them towards classical republicanism) were at least convinced that monarchy was an irrational and bellicose form of government.

2. For example, by C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, Oxford University Press, 1966

It was thus an emerging hostility to monarchy which determined the nomenclature, and to some extent the form, of modern democratic thought. If the contrast were thought of in terms of the caprices of monarchy against the constitutionality of a better form of government, then the opponents of monarchy talked of a republic. But if they thought in terms of who it was that ought to have the power - and everything in modern life encouraged this concern with power - then the demos was the obvious contrast with the monos of monarchy. Thus William Paley towards the turn of the nineteenth century uses a derivative Aristotelian tripartism and nominated, as his third type of constitution something called "A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, constitute the legislature."³ Paley is all the more interesting because he is a muddled thinker about politics. A republic and a democracy ought not to be identified because the one is specified in terms of the end of the state (the public interest) while the other is specified in terms of who holds the power. Again, the classical republican tradition had long been committed to the wisdom that a republic must be a balanced mixture of forms of power, and thus include monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements. Hence to identify a republic with a "democracy" was to confuse not only a cause with an end, but simultaneously to identify a genus with one of its species. James Madison and other writers in

3. William Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, London, 1811, Vol. II. p. 170.

The Federalist, were much more clear headed in distinguishing a democracy ("a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person") from a republic (a government in which the scheme of representation takes place)". Democracy, he thought, offered no safeguard against the evils of faction (including the majority acting as a faction) ; a republic might.⁴

During and after the French revolution, the term "republic" tended to lose ground in generalised discussion to the word "democracy" as the name for the set of desirabilities (liberty, community, constitutionality and a kind of basic equality) which had earlier been expounded by the classical republicans. This happened for many reasons. One was that the term 'republic' had been associated with the revolution itself, and was therefore identified with what later revolutionaries thought had been bourgeois aspirations ; it looked to the past rather than the future. The word "democracy" in this usage went one stage further by emphasising the exclusion of any aristocratic or monarchical element in the state ; ranks were to be entirely superseded. A related reason is to be found in the rhetorical advantage of juxtaposing the demos against the monos of monarchy. Most important of all, perhaps, was the fact that the word "democracy" expressed much more precisely than its competitor the ambition of a universal franchise which dominated

4. The Federalist or The New Constitution, Everyman Edition, London 1948. These remarks are from Federalist X (Madison) p. 45.

much of the politics of the states of Europe in the nineteenth century.

It is thus no wonder that the word has become the shibboleth of all parties, for it referred to two quite different traditions. Firstly, it stood for all the desirable characteristics of a free modern government, as they had been established in the course of many centuries of highly specific European development. And where were these forms concretely most fully instantiated? In the two main branches of Anglo-Saxon politics, for the Anglo-Saxons had long been recognised as having a special vocation of liberty by the French, who most influentially handed out vocations to the peoples of Europe during the eighteenth century. Civil liberties and representative parliaments were at the heart of this model, and the United States was an inspiration for the more egalitarian versions of this tradition. Here then was a tradition of government which, while owing a limited allegiance to classical resources, clearly derived from the mediaeval world. Secondly, however, democracy continued to carry within itself a reference to that oppositional tradition of classical republicanism, in which hostility to monarchy (and often to Christianity) involved, to a shifting and indeterminate extent, an ambition to subvert the inherited arrangements of modern Europe.

The co-existence of these two complex ideas fitted deceptively well into the division of European politics into a liberal and a conservative emphasis. Conservatives believed

that with the establishment of constitutional government on a reasonably wide franchise, the issue of constitutionality had been settled ; liberals, by contrast were athirst for further reform. And the concept of democracy was not to disappoint them.

3. The Hellenising Fallacy and its Consequences.

The central idea of the European political tradition is that the state is a framework within which interests may grow and develop ; but the state itself must never become identified with an interest. Yet the most familiar statement of the idea of democracy ("government by the people for the people") did precisely that. The significance of this change, of course, was masked by the fact that "the people" could be identified with everybody, or (according to the dimensions of melodrama incorporated in a political opinion) everybody minus the odd king, priest, capitalist, landlord, kulak, or other undesirable. Nevertheless, the emerging fashion for using "democracy" to refer to everything desirable in politics (rather than just one desirable feature in a complex and balanced constitution) domesticated the idea that what the people wanted, the people ought to get. Politics is not, in other words, an activity concerned to defend the country, service the law and sustain justice, but an activity by which collective wants are clarified and satisfied. Such a change in the conception of a modern state is, in principle of quite monumental proportions, but its consequences were usually mitigated by entrenched constitutional traditions, and by the fact that "the people" in the modern state was so heterogeneous that anything recognisable as its "will" seldom emerged.

To say this is by no means to say that this change in rhetoric had no effect. Indeed, the history of the idea of democracy is a splendid example of the confusions that can result from a mere change of name. It will be clear from my argument that what we now call democracy, which is representative government based on consent, is a mediaeval thing with a Greek name. The result has been an apparently indestructible piece of misleading conjectural history : the idea is that democracy is ideally direct or pure, and hence that its representative element is a regrettable compromise with the unfortunate realities of size. Nor is this misunderstanding limited to youths in debating societies. It plays an important part in the academic understanding of democracy. Thus :

Fundamentally, democracy is rule by the demos, the common people. But how such rule can be realized in a modern mass society, where the people cannot possibly meet face to face to debate and resolve public issues, presents a problem. The common solution of course is to institute representative democracy in lieu of direct democracy.⁵

No "of course" about it. There was never any such problem, and representative institutions were never the solution to it. Representation was an idea that emerged from the practice of mediaeval parliaments and depended upon beliefs about the relation between consent and authority quite different from anything prevailing among the Greeks. But the sheer insidious

5. M. Margolis, "Democracy : American Style" in Graeme Duncan (Ed.) Democratic Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press,

plausibility of this belief already puts modern government off balance, for it presents one of its central institutions - the practice of representation, which allows an element of professional skill to enter many of the tasks of public decision-making - as being a fundamentally unsatisfactory makeshift. Modern constitutional government is thus seriously misunderstood. It is, and ought to be, conducted by experienced professional politicians, most of whom would agree with Paley in deploring "the confusion rage and clamour, which are the inevitable consequences of assembling multitudes, and of propounding questions of state to the discussion of the people."⁶

The significance of this point may be seen if we point out that modern technology on the one hand and this misunderstanding of democracy on the other are on a collision course. The fundamental misunderstanding built into the modern idea of democracy is that government is an agency for giving the people what they want. Modern technology is developing bigger and better ways of ascertaining, in a way, what people think they want. The result is that opinion polls tend to play an increasing part in influencing governments. And beyond that there lie the dazzling possibilities of a computerised future in which every citizen has at his fingertips the possibility of declaring his instant opinion on such matters as the Agriculture and Fisheries Amendment Bill, Clause XVI subsection 2. And yet clearly some version of this nightmare is, for some purposes, appealing

6. Paley, *op. cit.* p. 172.

to some people, for modern democracies are sometimes subjected to a subtle analysis demonstrating that they systematically frustrate the will of the people. Thus Claus Offe⁷ sums up this line of criticism and its exponents as diagnosing that contemporary democratic forms lead to

opportunism (Luxemburg), oligarchy (Michels) and the inescapable plebiscitarian submission of the masses to the irrational impulses of the charismatic leader and his demagogic use of the bureaucratic party "machine" (Weber).

Offe takes these melodramatic abstractions seriously (their historical locus is clearly Europe between the wars) and adds :

According to the common insight underlying this analysis, as soon as the will of the people is expressed through the instrumentality of the competitive party striving for government office, what is expressed ceases to be the will of the people and is instead transformed into an artefact of the form itself and the dynamics put into motion by the imperatives of political competition.

But given that, in a modern society, "the people" contains a great many interests and these interests point in a great many directions, how, one might wonder, do the exponents of this school of thought imagine that the ideal form of government could possibly be a pure reflection of the will of the people ? The answer is, of course, that this is a Marxist view, in which "the will of the people" has, as a preliminary operation, been so pruned, chopped, shaped, selected and castrated as to prevent

7. Claus Offe, "Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State : Factors of Stability and Disorganisation", Policy Science, Vol. 15, April 1983, p. 230

any such problem arising. But it is hardly a serious option in liberal democratic societies.

4. Democracy : An End or a Beginning ?

The question : What is democracy the name of ? is closely connected with the question : Do we currently enjoy democracy, or is it rather an ideal that might be realised in the possibly distant future, and a criterion in terms of which we ought to be changing our society ? A common view taken in the last century, and still perhaps dominant, is that contemporary liberal democracies, with their apparatus of civil rights, competing political parties and free elections, are the more or less ideal culmination of many centuries of political development in which potential tyrants (like absolute kings) and special interests (such as aristocracies) have been subjected to popularly accountable governments. Future changes in the operation of democracies are likely to be merely matters of detail, and democracy as now practised is discovered to be the telos of the evolution of European political institutions over the last thousand years.

On this view, then, democracy is the successful culmination of a process ; but for many others, the idea has become diminished to the position of an early step on the road to something conceived of as total liberation. From this point of view, democracy is a mere beginning. This was, of course, the view Marx took :

Political emancipations (he wrote in "On the Jewish Question") is of course a great progress. Although it is not the final form of human emancipation in general, it is nevertheless the final form of human emancipation inside the present world order.

To follow through this idea would lead us into deep waters, but it is necessary to note that there could be no democracy in the final form of communism because there is no politics, and no politics because there is no state. Unanimity, one might say, rules, except that, being unanimity, it has no need to rule. In these terms, it has been a mistake to regard democracy as the culmination of a movement of liberation, and that very illusion is a measure of how distant that liberation actually is. Marxist writing about democracy thus concentrates upon showing that the acts of government in contemporary civil life can never be passed off as "the will of the people," and Marxist projects for the reform of democracy are caught in the paradox (to be explored later) that the very perfection of a (misunderstood) idea of democracy (as what the people want) also constitutes democracy's dissolution. In this (misunderstood) idea of a perfect democracy, there is no point to government at all because the people "speak with one voice" ; indeed, they only have one voice. More to the point, they have only one utterance.

Most people who practice democracy don't get involved in these rather vertiginous paths of thought. But they are

affected nonetheless. They are likely to pick up the idea that "democracy" is not just the name of a constitution and a set of political practices but also the name of a kind of person and a kind of society. The term comes to be used for all sorts of things imagined to result from the people's choice. In Israel there is a kind of sartorial democracy in the affectation of not wearing a tie. The word "democratic" is sometimes used of easy-going manners in which the forms of politeness are relaxed. Above all, perhaps, the idea of democracy, which has been successively contrasted with the rule of absolute monarchs, and then of dictators, has recently been juxtaposed against something called "authoritarianism", a characteristic some have claimed to detect not merely in rulers but in headmasters, university teachers and in types of personality everywhere. At this point, once more, democracy as a concept has done a complete somersault and become meaningless.⁸ For it cannot be too strongly emphasised that democracy, as a political word, is the name of a theory of authority : namely, the belief that only those officers elected by a free vote have the right to make rules which are binding on us as law.

8. In British political rhetoric, a politician (David Blunkett, leader of the Sheffield council, quoted by Anne Sofer in the Times February 4th 1985) can pejoratively contrast "those who constantly preach about the value of law rather than the value of democracy". The trajectory of the word "democracy" as moves from meaningfulness into a dispersed haze covering the ambitions (and often the muddle) of almost any politician can be plotted in terms of such antonyms : democracy versus law, authority, snootiness, ties, wealth, bosses, pedantry and so on.

Again, it is not difficult to discover the fallacy involved in these mistakes. It is the familiar⁹ confusion between a process and an end-state. Those who believe in democracy often also think they understand the kind of society which the people will bring into existence once they have the democratic power to do so. That society will be largely egalitarian, free from hereditary rank and especially of political chambers of peers, matey in its manners, co-operative in its disposition and secular in its tone. Those who are dogmatic about what it is to be democratic have assumed that they know the end-state which will result from making political processes democratic ; and the Marxist sub-section among them carry this dogmatism one stage further, to affirm that if the demos has not legislated the correct society, then its will must have been frustrated in cunning ways, or its wits confused by mystification.

9. Familiar because it is a staple of modern liberal thought : see, for example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford : Blackwell, 1974, Ch. 7.

5. Participation versus Consent.

My concern has so far been to consider some confusions in the current understanding of democracy, both academic and popular. I now wish to suggest that there is an underlying principle in terms of which these confusions may be understood. This is the distinction between classical democracy, whose master idea is participation ; and modern democracy, whose master idea is consent. Historically speaking, I suspect, most of those who pushed for democracy in the past took a classical view of the matter, but what they got, inevitably, was not classical but modern democracy. This is the reason why democracy has usually been a disappointment to its supporters. One might almost say it began as a disappointment. Even at the beginning, many recognised that democracy was not quite what they wanted, just as Tocqueville, from a quite different point of view, thought it was not what he would really like. Consider Bakunin deploring the lack of real understanding by the voters of Switzerland.

On voit bien dans le système représentatif, même corrigé par le referendum le contrôle populaire n'existe pas ; et, comme il ne peut y avoir de liberté sérieuse pour le peuple sans ce contrôle, nous en concluons que notre liberté populaire, notre gouvernement par nous-mêmes, est un mensonge.¹⁰

10. Mikhaïl Bakounine, "Les Ours de Berne et l'Ours de Saint-Petersburg" in Oeuvres, Tome II, Paris : P.V. Stock, 1907, p. 42.

Un mensonge ? A strong word to use, but far from unusual. Thus consider Sheldon Wolin summing up his discontent with the character of the election which put Reagan in the White House in 1980, in words which reveal the underlying drag of the classical ideal.

Democracy is impossible if citizens cannot practice it by sharing in the deliberations and decisions about the forces and conditions affecting their daily lives.¹¹

It would perhaps be unfair to suggest that Wolin is tempted by the idea of packing the hillbillies of Tennessee and the rednecks of Texas into the White House to decide on the latest defence estimates. But it is not at all unfair to suggest that these words convey the essence of the classical position as it is to be found in contemporary writers. The expression : "decisions about the forces and the conditions affecting their daily lives" is quite remarkably obscure ; and where not obscure, it is often foolish. Wages and prices are evidently important members of the class of things which could be described as "forces and conditions affecting daily life". But it would be absurd to have them determined by an assembly of beneficiaries. One way of formulating the curious twist of thought occurring here would be to say that democracy, which in its modern form is the right, or opportunity to vote and to influence the political process according to one's

11. "Reagan Country", New York Review of Books, Dec. 18th, 1980.

inclinations is here being turned into a duty. The underlying premise of this switch from right to duty is that those who do not participate in political activities (i.e. talk about politics, the deliberations of committees and assemblies) are leading inferior or stunted lives. They are what the Greeks referred to as idiotes. The modern translation of idiotes usually invokes ideas like apathy and alienation.

The reason why democracy is often found disappointing by its supporters is thus that it usually fails to turn a modern state into a replica of a Greek polis, full of citizenly deliberation. There are, of course, very good reasons why a modern democracy cannot be like a polis. The main reason is that modern European populations have learned to be active in a great variety of ways which were not available to most Thebans, Corinthians etc. We have learned to adapt, adjust, change jobs, revise judgments, reformulate our lives, emigrate, get divorced, take up or abandon a religion, change careers in mid-life, start up a new business and so on. This repertoire of active skills available to all adults in the modern world does indeed also include calling protest meetings, going on demonstrations, setting up committees, lobbying politicians and standing for parliament. But for most inhabitants of a liberal democratic state, this particular option is just a small part of their customary repertoire. What distinguishes the neo-classical

democrat is his belief that political participation is the essential human activity ; and from this curious fundamentalism he draws the implication that if others do not share his preference, they must be the victims of some moral malaise, which is then described in terms of alienation, apathy, repressive tolerance and the rest.

Rhetorically speaking, proposals prosper best if they are presented as the solutions to widely recognised problems. One widely recognised problem is the functioning of large-scale modern industry, which is characterised at times both by conflict between employers and employees, and by inefficiencies of operation. This problem may be seen as one of communication between the different parts of the enterprise ; and it may plausibly be assimilated to the fact that modern societies cannot operate at all unless there is a very considerably greater amount of communication between the parts than was ever necessary in human history hitherto. Hence the neo-classical democrat is able to advance participation in industry as the solution to a number of recognised problems ; and in some European countries, new forms of what is significantly called "industrial democracy" are being imposed upon industry by legislation. In examples of this kind we may find the pattern of thought by which the idea of a true community in which people will talk out their differences and come to shared solutions, which will work better precisely because everybody seems to have agreed to the solution.

Now whether such schemes work properly or not no doubt depends significantly upon the people and the circumstances. Sometimes the results will be excellent ; sometimes not. It is important to recognise, however, that such neo-classical ambitions in their fundamentalist form run directly counter to one of the irreducible options of the modern world, which Albert Hirschman has crisply described as "exit".¹² There are few incitements to reform quite so imperative as the fact that the organisation is collapsing ; and the great flexibility of the modern world lies precisely in the fact that industrial enterprises, marriages, churches, even whole states had better be managed efficiently or they will collapse ; and collapse has ceased to be the end of the world. The risk of collapse is part of the dynamism of the modern world, and consent or its withdrawal is the mechanism by which it works. The aspiration towards participatory institutions is thus an attempt - some would regard it as a reactionary and retrogressive attempt - to defeat this freedom of exit and to fossilise the institutions of social life.

One implication of the argument I am making is that the law is a feature of modern democracy just as fundamental as institutions by which the demos can pronounce on the issue of who should carry on the government. For modern politics is a game played with laws, which are abstract in form, indeterminate in consequence and justifiable in dispute. The point about a

12. See Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, 1970.

law, by contrast with a command, is that it allows subjects to be active in the ways I have just described. A minimum wage law, for example, is not a command to an employer to pay higher wages, but a hypothetical condition in the future of employing people. The employer has a variety of options open to him, including going out of business, buying labour-saving machinery or shifting his factory elsewhere. The freedom that characterises a modern democracy (which is consequently often called a liberal democracy) is thus to be found not only in the process of politics which occurs largely before a law has been passed, but also in the options available in responding to a law after it has been passed. Voice is usually appropriate to the first stage, but exit may well be invoked in the second stage. Now the popular understanding of democracy is weak in its grasp of this second vital feature of contemporary life, and has been encouraged in this weakness by the neo-classical emphasis on the idea of democracy as giving the people what the people wants. For the demos is often, in its instincts, a pure despotes which imagines that the massive power of a modern sovereign state can and ought to be used as a machine to bring about what it happens, for the moment, to desire. When the voice of the people does actually speak, as it did, for example, in the Prohibition Amendment in the United States, it not infrequently makes the mistake of identifying a law with a command. The critics of modern democracy are indeed often right in believing that modern democracy, with representatives and competitive

political parties, has the effect of shackling the demos ;
or at least of mitigating the force of its evident impulses.
Whether they are right also in thinking such shackling
undesirable is a different question.

6. The Fallacy of Participation.

A modern democratic state may thus be understood as a dialogue between the two ideals of consent and participation. And I have suggested that it is one superiority of the consent theory of democracy that it implicitly recognises, what the participation theory tends to deny, that the subjects of a modern democracy may be active in a great variety of ways. The participatory theory often gains a spurious plausibility by misdiagnosing as passivity what is really a preference for a different way of being active. The ultimate sanction of the consentor is to withdraw consent, which means failing to turn out on election day, or more drastically, taking up with another party. And this leads us to what is, I would argue, an absolutely fundamental conclusion : That the cash value of modern democracy, as an ideal, lies in the power to change the government. "Get the rascals out" is programme enough. In this sense, exit must be recognised as far more important than voice.

The competing ideal of participation has been, for many years, the yeast in our political life, and it continues to agitate our institutions sometimes in beneficial ways. But the classical ideal of participation, applied inappropriately to modern conditions, becomes logically self destructive. It seeks

to get decisions out of the hands of government and into the hands of the people. Every institutional innovation favoured by the neo-classical school of participation is designed to make it possible for the people themselves, according to some plausible principle of aggregation, to make the decisions that governments normally make. But the more this ideal is achieved, the more completely do the people deprive themselves of any possibility of an alternative. They obviously cannot dismiss themselves. If they make a botch of the task of governing, where else can they go - except, perhaps, hand over their power to a dictator. Bertold Brecht made one of the great jokes of politics when he remarked in 1953 that the East German government (which flatters itself, in its official title, that it is democratic) had better dissolve the people and elect a new one. The participatory model of democracy actually operationalises this joke. It amounts to the most reactionary political system imaginable : a system in which it is logically impossible ever to change the government. ◦

7. Activists and Individualists :

The issues I am considering are many faceted. They may thus be stated in various forms. What I have just argued, for example, may be expressed in the principle that a modern democracy must be a modern democratic state, with all that states include, such as impersonality, a structure of changing officeholders who may be dismissed, and above all, perhaps, a certain necessary distance between rulers and ruled. Modern democracy is evidently the name for a type of state - just as we have earlier noted that it is also a theory of authority. But since certain of the connotations of the term "democracy" are now so popular that they cannot be directly attacked, the neo-classical idea of participation advances its proposals by attacking the general ideas of authority and the state itself, rather than the specific idea of democracy itself. But this neo-classical ideal cannot be democratic in the modern sense for two reasons. The first, as we have seen, is that however responsive a government ought to be, it cannot ever merge with the people, for if it did, it could never be dismissed ; and this would render nugatory all the institutions of the modern democratic process. The second reason is that the participatory ideal, when pushed into every remote corner of a modern society, dissolves the state into a new form of community which could only

be constituted by a universally shared agreement on how people ought to live. Such agreement certainly does not currently exist, and that is precisely why we have states. Further, it would almost certainly be the view of most people in practice that such agreement ought not to exist, for it is the very fact of so many available options, dangled before us in a thousand concrete instantiations, which in part constitutes the modern freedom of action I have earlier described. Such a pure community may perhaps, as many people certainly believe, be much superior to the contemporary world. But it would have in it nothing that could be recognised as democratic.

Such is one aspect of the situation in the world of theory. But this situation has important echoes in the practical life of democracies. It generates two classes of people whose behaviour is important to the future stability of democracies. We may call them activists and individualists. Individualists are the people I earlier described as implementing to the full the possibilities of active change in response to their shifting desires. Activists are those who live for political change the way those with a spiritual vocation devote themselves to God. They are usually believers in a participatory form of community, and their aim is generally the acquisition of despotic power in order to bring this community of agreed believers into existence. Their current idiom is

usually left-wing, but right-wing versions have flourished in Europe in earlier decades. Their most evident peculiarity, perhaps, is that they are essentially oligarchs, though oligarchs of knowledge rather than of property, pretending to be democrats. And sometimes this character emerges in the form of a theory of participatory democracy, in which only those who turn up to meetings ought to have political rights, since only those people are thought fully to understand the issues. Such a doctrine would clearly tend to constitute two classes of citizenship, and is oligarchic in its general drift. It is a view unlikely to commend itself to the majority of any democratic state, but it is destabilising in the sense that, if it were to be successful, it would transform democracy out of recognition.

Yet it might well be argued that modern democracy is less likely to be threatened by the hidden oligarchism of the activist than by the very stability which it is capable of generating. For modern democracies are great generators of wealth ; and every form of generation of wealth creates articulate and well organised interests. The responsiveness of democracy, as we saw in the first section, is the most likely reason why democracies are stable. Discontent does not fester and become explosive. But modern democracies are, on a longer timescale, still experimental forms of government which are emerging from earlier forms. It is impossible to tell with any certainty how much of their success depends upon inherited

characteristics whose effect we have not noticed. The responsiveness which has in the last two centuries been the secret of democratic stability may generate the kind of stability which is indistinguishable from fixity. Democratic society may turn - indeed is in the process of turning - into a structure of interests all influencing government to continue supplying the conditions necessary for their continuing prosperity. Yet states, like the wings of aeroplanes, must be able to move flexibly under stress. The vogue for democracy took off with the destruction of an ancien régime, which had lost the capacity to change because it had become the victim of its own entrenched interests. It would be ironic if, as we approach the bicentenary of that event, democracy itself were evolving into a new kind of ancien régime.

B&S SID

21-10

Very Preliminary Draft

To be quoted only if
approvingly!

DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS, AND FREE-RIDERS

Gianfranco Pasquino

The Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University

Prepared for presentation to the ECPR Joint Sessions,

Barcelona, March 25-30, 1985

This paper is an exploration in a subject which has been dealt with, more or less tangentially, by several authors. Briefly stated, the paper seeks an answer to the issue of the "free-riders" in a democratic regime. Free-riders are here defined as those who enjoy the collective goods, the benefits of democracy without spending their time, energies, resources. Its starting point is Mancur Olson's famous statement:

It does not follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests. In other words, even if all the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest.

While this statement has often been used to explain the difficulty large groups encounter in recruiting all its potential supporters, its more or less natural constituencies and in effectively mobilizing their members' energies and resources in the pursuit of collective goods, it has not been, to my knowledge, explicitly applied to the workings of democratic regimes. Yet, free riders exist in large organizations as well as in democratic regimes. The difference appears to be that while free-riders in large organizations are considered pathological elements, free-riders in democracies are considered physiological, even positive elements. It is said that free-riders in large organizations represent constraint on the workings of those organizations and in the achievement of their objectives. On the other hand, it is often maintained that free-riders in democratic regimes are those individuals who keep the level of conflict

low enough not to impair the functioning of the regime itself. While apathy and lack of mobilization are a liability for a large organization, the same factors seem to be an asset in the case of democratic regimes.

Indeed, the conclusion is often, and hastily drawn, that while free-riders in large organizations might lead to a suboptimal achievement, free-riders in democratic regimes allow democracies to survive and function to the relative satisfaction of everybody, those involved and those apathetic. After all, it is usually added, large organizations pursue objectives which are, even in the best of the cases, selfish and partial. It is up to them to find and utilize those selective incentives necessary to mobilize their actual and potential members. On the other hand, democracies are entitled to pursue collective goods. In too many cases the excessive mobilization of social constituencies has led to a high level of conflict, to the impossibility of intermediation, to a breakdown of the system.

Even though the evidence is not persuasive that the activists are necessarily more moderate than their rank-and-file and more supportive of democratic norms and procedures, it is almost taken for granted that the mobilization of larger constituencies will exacerbate conflict and produce tensions not conducive to a satisfactory functioning of the democratic regime. However, the same pluralist theory holds that the existence and proliferation of organized groups (provided they be overlapping and cross-cutting) constitute an element of strength of democratic regimes. Yet, the mobilization of new constituencies is looked upon with suspicion. And more recently even the survival and functioning of time-honored associational groups have been decried as factors leading to a decline in the (socio-economic) performance of the system, if not an outright threat to the democratic regime itself.

The point to be made, then, is that with the passing of time a certain streak of traditional pluralist theories has converged with a certain kind of socio-economic analysis in extolling the virtues of the free-riders and the contributions to the very performance of the regime of their unwillingness to be mobilized and their, supposedly free, deci-

sion to remain apathetic. Under different labels and with different approaches, these views have been challenged elsewhere (particularly by the scholars espousing the "participatory theory of democracy"). In this paper I do not want to extol the virtues of a different conception of democracy, but to identify and highlight the distortions in the democratic process following a high level of apathy, the existence of a high number of free-riders.

Representation

To a large extent, the problem of the representation (of socio-economic and political) interests is pre-determined and even pre-solved in large organizations. As a matter of fact, those organizations are normatively supposed to represent the interests of their members as well as of the free-riders. Moreover, were they not to do so, other organizations would supplant them, their members might join other organizations, might "exit", might fragment the previously compact organization. Therefore, the representational gap would be rapidly closed thanks to almost spontaneous market forces. With one, important, exception: some traditional, powerful interests might succeed in remaining on the market of interest representation despite their declining representativeness. But, on the whole, most mechanisms would work towards the creation of a new, though more difficult equilibrium. There are, of course, variations according to the type of organizations and the kind of interests they represent. But it would be fair to conclude that interests will always find a way to be organized and represented and that free-riders will always be capable of profiting from the existence of some large organizations compelled anyway to represent a vast front of interests.

What can be taken for granted in the case of free-riders and large organizations, that is that a representational gap will not emerge or will be small and soon closed, is instead very problematic in the case of political representation in democratic regimes. There is no doubt that in this case the kind of political (and socio-economic) interests that will be represented depends very much on the representational input. To be more precise, let us utilize a model which specifies the "components of responsiveness". The premise is that in the political sphere representation is largely electoral representation.

Therefore, one has to look first for data and analyses of electoral participation and results. It is worth stressing that nothing like electoral representation surfaces in large organizations. Most members do not participate and do not vote. Indeed, organizational leadership is often recruited through cooptation and/or acclaim; only rarely through limited electoral procedures.

The spread in electoral participation rates among democratic regimes is rather large. Often attempts have been made to underinterpret the significance of abstentions in the case of the United States. But on the whole it is quite clear that since the beginning of the sixties for several reasons the US has gone through a precipitous decline in its electoral participation rates. It may be that this decline is somewhat countered by the existence and activities of organized groups. Still the problem remains. Those needs and demands which are not transmitted, albeit in an incomplete and often confused way, at the polls, are really articulated and aggregated and translated in the activities of organized groups? That is, the expansion in the number of free-riders at the polling booths is somewhat compensated by the traditionally extolled inclination of the American people to get organized? And, more specifically, can one take for granted that those who do not vote are also those who do get organized to have their needs and demands taken into consideration by the policy-makers? Or, as it is also often claimed, is it not true that there exists a sort of cumulative effect: those who vote also participate in other ways and those who do not punch their voting cards are more likely to refrain from all other acts of political participation.

If this is indeed the case, then two consequences arise. The first one is that free-riders at the polls cannot expect to be represented in their preferences by those who do vote unless there is an almost perfect, mirror-like reflection between their socio-economic and political preferences and those of the more active ones. The second consequence is that, if no correspondence exists, then, the system as a whole will be less representative than possible because the spectrum of preferences will be more compressed and skewed.

There are two elements to the first consequence. On the one hand, it is possible to state that while those who do not vote might differ socio-economically from those who

vote, this is inconsequential insofar as the political preferences of the two groups do not differ consistently. On the other hand, it might be stated that it is indeed a poor deterministic model the one which maintains that some preferences are taken into consideration only insofar as their bearers themselves carry them into the electoral arena.

Yet, in case after case it has been proven that not only there is difference in the rate of electoral participation between lower and upper socio-economic groups, but that the two groups ~~have~~ ^{show} additional differences in terms of the policy preferences they have. Moreover, individuals belonging to upper socio-economic groups enjoy additional resources through which they articulate their demands and push for their translation into policy decisions. There is a paradox here. That, at least in the American case, admittedly characterized by several exceptional circumstances, "organizations increase the political gap, for the simple reason that those who come from advantaged groups are more likely to be organizationally active" (Verba and Nie, 208). So much so that "in actual fact, voluntary associations lead to greater inequalities in participation" (Verba and Nie, 208).

Obviously, electoral participation is but one instance of political participation. Not a minor one, though, if it is true that it is at the center of a complex web which connects it with socialization and recruitment and with other forms of political participation. Not only then is it likely that by depriving themselves of the weapon of ~~part~~ ^{elect} ~~oral~~ ^{oral} participation the free-riders will reduce their impact on the system of representation. It is also probable that they will not successfully exploit all the other forms of political participation, therefore further limiting the representational capability of the system at large.

Even more so if we conceive representation in Hanna Pitkin's words (1967)²²⁴ as:

primarily a public, institutional arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people.

and therefore we direct our attention to four variables that Heinz Eulau (1969, 303) considers germane to representation: "the degree of social pluralism, the effectiveness of elections as sanctioning mechanisms, the support available to the governing group, and the recruitment processes that select public officials".

Having already said of the problems created by the differentiations in the rate of electoral participation and their consequences on the representation of the interests of the "free-riders", it might even seem correct, even though somewhat paradoxical, to stress that the problem of misrepresentation would seem less serious in those cases in which social pluralism is limited and society is very homogeneous. It is in those cases that the free-riders will really ^{be} capable of enjoying the benefits of the political system, and specifically of a democratic regime, without having to spend some resources in acquiring them (neither time nor energies).

As to ^{the} support available to the governing group, the risk here is to confuse analytically between the free-riders and the apathetic. At least in theory, one ought to make an allowance for those who are aware of their role within the system and consciously play the game of the free-riders (no commitment, many benefits) and those who are on the sidelines of the game because they do not know how to play it. Still, once the distinction is made, it remains that in too many instances support is equated with the lack of open opposition. A regime is "supported" if it is not challenged by anti-regime forces. Authorities enjoy support if the public does not openly reject their policies. And so on. Perhaps, it might be better to put the emphasis on two different variables, following Easton (1975), and on two different levels of analysis.

Support

The two different variables are specific and diffuse support. "The uniqueness of specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities. This kind of support is object-specific in two senses. It assumes that people are or can become aware of the political authorities -those who are responsible for the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system. ... Specific support is object-

specific in another sense. It is directed to the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances of the general style of these authorities. Unless such behavior is apparent to the members, this kind of support cannot be generated. ... Furthermore, the applicability of the concept depends on the validity of the assumption that people can be aware, however vaguely, of a relationship between their needs, wants, and demands on the one hand and the behavior of the political authorities on the other. The relationship needs to be such that the members perceive, whether correctly in some objective sense or not, that the fulfillment of their needs and demands can be associated with the authorities in some way. ... Finally, it is not enough that members perceive this connection. They must interpret it in such a way that they are likely to attribute causative force to the behavior of the authorities. The relationship between felt wants and articulate demands must be such that the members can lay the blame or praise at the door of the authorities..." (Easton, 1975: 437-438).

The rather lengthy quotation has been essential because Easton clearly identifies the two levels of analysis as well: awareness and lack of awareness. If the blame cannot be attributed to the authorities because the citizens, some of them, are unaware of the connecting link between their demands and corresponding satisfaction and the authorities' policies, then the amount of specific support might be or remain somewhat limited. Its negative impact on the authorities and the overall functioning of the regime will be correspondingly contained. However, for the reasons above presented and briefly analyzed, it will be highly unlikely that those free-riders who have not taken part in the process of electoral participation and have not resorted to other forms of political participation have had a voice in the production of inputs. Therefore, their needs and demands will rarely, and only tangentially, be taken care of. Consequently, their amount of specific support will not be great. But their dissatisfaction may.

However, their dissatisfaction will be duly activated only if they are capable and willing to make the crucial connection between their wants and demands and the authorities' political outputs. This is not frequently the case because in too many cases in which the free-riders come from lower socio-economic groups, some politico-cultural

norms seem to militate against this association (Scholzman and Verba). Moreover, one may witness in too many instances the familiar phenomenon of the dissatisfied being unable to coalesce due to their fragmentation and lack of communication. Yet, to repeat the point, the sheer existence of free-riders deprives the authorities and the system of valuable information and automatically affects in a negative way the performance of both.

It would seem that free-riders are much more important as to specific support than to diffuse support. Precisely described, free-riders are those individuals who pursue benefits for themselves without being willing to pay the costs of those benefits. Therefore, they are usually interested in short-term, immediate, personal advantages more than in a long-term, disenchanted view of the overall functioning of the system. Can we infer that they will have less inclination to provide diffuse support to the authorities (and the regime)?

Knowing that "the level of diffuse support will normally be independent of outputs and performance in the short run", we can add that "whereas specific support is extended only to the incumbent authorities, diffuse support is directed towards offices themselves as well as towards their individual occupants". Finally, we may point at the sources of diffuse support: "from childhood and continuing adult socialization, and from direct experience" (Easton, 1975, 444-445). Easton also provides the analysts with precise indications on the expression of diffuse support:

Diffuse support for the political authorities and regime will typically express itself in two forms: first, in trust as against cynicism; and, second, in belief in the legitimacy of political objects.

There ^{are} several intriguing elements in the relationship between free-riders and the forms of diffuse support and in the ways diffuse support is supposed to be created. For all we have said so far, we can expect free-riders to belong both to the category of the trustful and the category of the cynical. However, on the whole, it would be

more probable that the free-riders would tie their trust and even their belief in the legitimacy of the authorities and the regime ^{to specific support} (insofar as they are aware of the connecting links existing between the norms and procedures of the regime and the performance of the authorities ~~xxx~~ ^{and} specific outputs). But whatever they are, aware or unaware of these relationships, the free-riders do not constitute a buffer for the authorities and the regime. Contrary to the widespread belief that unorganized, not mobilized, a pathetic individuals are "functional" to the survival and good working of a democracy, free-riders may represent a constant threat to a democracy. If their support is heavily dependent upon specific outputs, their dissatisfaction is bound to be rather high at any time. And it might explode (the counterargument is, of course, that free-riders, by definition, do not get organized).

Socialization and Recruitment

We have seen that Eulau considers "the recruitment processes that select public officials" as an important variable germane to the problem of representation. As to socialization, this continuing process is deemed by Easton as important in producing attitudes conducive to the creation of diffuse support. How much of an impact do free-riders have on socialization and recruitment?

Political socialization is not just the process through which "political cultures are formed, maintained, and changed" (Almond and Powell, 1978, 79). It is also, probably more precisely, the process through which values are produced, transmitted, and reproduced. Quite obviously, if free-riders in a democratic regime consciously behave in such a way as to exploit the democratic loop-holes with the minimum amount of participation and with selective inputs, it seems likely that their ability (not to talk of willingness) to shape new values will be seriously limited. It is after all not in their intentions.

However, by so doing, that is by refraining from intervening in the process of value-creation, free-riders do more than just confining that process to the more active, involved members of the community. They drastically curtail, for better or worse, the

breadth of the political discourse. Of course, to some extent, this may not matter much insofar as free-riders are, for instance, among those who take advantage of privileged positions which are anyway well-represented. It may be slightly more important if free-riders are bearers of single issues, neglected and suffocated, or not yet organized. It will matter even more when it is the values of entire communities which are not represented. These values will remain stamped down because their impact through the socialization process will be minimal or even nonexistent.

If values are not created and made to circulate, if the breadth of political discourse is curtailed, if free-riders pursue single-issues (or better follow in the coattails of those who pursue specific issues), then the impact of their preferences will not be felt either when it comes to the process of recruitment of public officials. Indeed, this process will remain largely in the hands of activist, well-organized, aggregated groups. And since, after all, ideas and values, demands and preferences, walk on the legs of men, the net result will be that the spectrum of those ideas and preferences which will reach the public forum is not once more representative of the diversity of that specific social system.

The free-riders' miscalculation, from this point of view, is that their sheer belonging to a specific group or that their joining specific associations will be enough to get the intended rewards accruing from the activities of those groups and associations. While that may be the case in some precisely defined instances, all too many variables seem to work against such an outcome. What is more important, if we do not restrict our analysis to the processes of recruitment but extend it to the process of change of public officials, of turnover, it becomes very clear that free-riders have even less of an impact when it comes to throwing the rascals out (and the rascals might be, to add injury to insult, those who have worked in order to represent the interests of a larger community).

We have reached the heart of the free-riders' dilemmas. They do not want to pay for the costs of getting organized. Still, they want to enjoy the benefits of the relatively open system of pluralist democracy. Some of their interests and demands will, one

way or another, filter through the process of decision-making. But it is unlikely that their values or their chosen public officials will fare well unless the free-riders abandon their all too comfortable position. On the other hand, in a large public, the conviction that such a conversion would produce good results in the short run is obviously limited (and, to some extent, justified^{ly}). And the hope still looms large that some policy responsiveness will anyhow characterize the regime.

Responsiveness

Activists participate not simply out of a sense of civic duty, because of values learned during the socialization process, in order to further the commonwealth, but obviously in view of some specific individual ~~and~~^{advantages}, more or less compatible with the collective good. Activists may be representative of the preferences of the public at large, or not. Their ability to translate demands may reflect the interests of the uninvolved population, or not. Their willingness to mobilize the apathetic and the cynical may obtain good results, or not. The issue in all these instances can be formulated as the evaluation of "the extent to which political participation raises the likelihood that those who make governmental decisions will be responsive to the preferences of the citizens" and, more precisely, "to all citizens whether or not they participate? Only to those who participate? And, if the latter, to all who engage in any participation, or only to those whose participation level is fairly high?" (Verba and Nie, 1972, 267).

What is tapped here is not simply the very relevant dimension of the extension of political participation, but also the as much important dimension of the intensity of political participation. Of course, free-riders are ~~not~~^{neither} very intense in their preferences (otherwise they would mobilize themselves) nor very "extensive" (in the sense that their policy preferences might be widespread, but not well aggregated). Several alternative situations are clearly formulated by Verba and Nie (1972, 310): "as participation rates in the community increase, leader responsiveness goes up vis-à-vis all citizens whether or not they participate; or as participation rates increase, leaders become more responsive to the participant citizens, but no more so to the nonparticipants; or as participation rates go up, leaders become more responsive to the participant citiz

ens, and less responsive to those who are not active". An implicit test of the free-riders' efficacy is contained in these alternative situations.

In particular, the free-riders' calculation must be to be able to reap the benefits of policy ^sresponsiveness thanks to their living ⁱⁿ a high-participation community. There, the efforts by other citizens would anyway increase the responsiveness of the leaders and produce advantages for the free-riders as well. Free-riders would then be vindicated: maximum feasible results with minimum involvement.

The evidence is only partially satisfactory for those who do espouse the free-riders' philosophy. Nie and Verba come to the conclusion that "in communities where participation is the highest, leader responsiveness is the highest for all three types of citizens. Very active, moderately active, and inactive citizens in high-participation communities are all better off in terms of the concurrence of leaders with their preferences than citizens in any other type of community. But in the very high participation communities, there is still a great gap between the concurrence rates of leaders with active and inactive citizens" (316).

At this point it becomes awfully important to distinguish among the different components of responsiveness and relate them to the role and expectations of the free-riders. According to Eulau and Karps (1977, 241), there are four such components: 1) policy responsiveness where the target is the great public issues that agitate the political process; 2) service responsiveness which involves the efforts of the representative to secure particularized benefits for individuals or groups in his constituency; 3) allocation responsiveness which refers to the representative's efforts to obtain benefits for his constituency through pork-barrel exchanges in the appropriations process or through administrative interventions; and 4) symbolic responsiveness which involves public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between representative and represented.

Two of these components seem particularly germane to the self-conception of free-riders, namely policy and symbolic ^sresponsiveness. The other two seem to encounter some obstacles in their application to free-riders. No doubt we are dealing here with inclusive

and exclusive benefits. The former cannot be allocated without excluding anyone in a community. Clearly, it is the case of policy and symbolic responsiveness. The latter are definitely based on the premise that it is indeed possible and desirable to confine service and allocation responsiveness to specifically characterized communities. To retain their value they must be exclusive.

The fact of the matter is that service and allocation responsiveness can be managed by the representative according to his desires and intentions up to a point. Demands do come from the constituencies for services and allocations of resources. These demands are, in all likelihood, rather particularistic, sectorial. Their interpretation and evaluation is entrusted upon the representative's ability and willingness to answer them more or less satisfactorily. It is rather unlikely that free-riders will get much out of service and allocation responsiveness unless they reactivate themselves (which is, of course, contrary to their "role"). Paradoxically, though, whether they are successful or not in obtaining resources, the free-riders increase inequality in a community, or produce other undesirable results.

As Verba and Nie have put it (1972, 318): "all citizens --active and inactive-- are absolutely better off in terms of leader responsiveness in communities where there is high activity. On the other hand, equality among citizens in terms of leader concurrence is greatest where participation is the least. If one preferred equal treatment of all citizens, even if this implied equally bad treatment, one might choose a community with very little participation. If one preferred a higher level of treatment for all citizens, even if this meant unequal treatment, one might choose a community with high levels of activity".

Involvement, Innovation, and Conflict

The previous quotation appropriately suggests the existence of a major problem: an ambiguous relationship between (high or low) participation and equality of treatment, the intervening variable being the quality of treatment itself. Once more, the paradox is that free-riders might allow the appearance of equal treatment but at the expense of

the quality of that very treatment. Activists, on the other hand, may succeed in improving the quality of the services, but at the same time they increase inequalities. While the trade-off appears not at all clear, the equilibrium point seems not^t be reached easily.

Other variables come into the picture when the attention is shifted, as it should, towards some other components of political equality and performance. Above, we have remarked that a sizable group of scholars have usually extolled the existence of free-riders on the basis of a need in democratic regimes for a soft buffer to rash mobilizations. Indeed, there is no doubt that as participation increases, so does conflict. At the conclusion of what is, in all likelihood, the best cross-national, comparative research on political participation, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978, 307-308) stress that: "in the absence of explicit contestation on the basis of social class the haves in society have to play an inordinate role in political life ... where there is explicit contestation among social groups and where that contestation is reflected in the institutional structure of politics, the implicit class bias in political activity can be diminished". More importantly, they highlight that "there may be a contradiction between political equality and political harmony ... under some circumstances political equality may increase, but so does conflict".

And while conflict might make the governability of political systems more difficult, it certainly produces positive effects as well. On the other hand, the absence of mobilization and the lack of conflict are not evidence of a well-functioning regime. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978, 306-307) openly challenge this assumption: "The inactives are by no means satisfied; they are more likely to face severe need in their day-to-day lives. If they are not active, it is not because there is nothing to be active about but, we believe, because of their low level of socio-economic resources".

Not all free-riders remain unmobilized for lack of socio-economic resources. Indeed, it might be worthwhile to distinguish among voluntary free-riders in a democratic regime (those who know that they could participate if they wanted to, but consciously refrain

from doing so, after having, supposedly, evaluated costs and benefits) and involuntary ones (those who would like to participate but find too many obstacles). Much of what has been said so far refers to voluntary, conscious free-riders. One ought not to discount the possibility that most involuntary free-riders are kept in that condition deliberately by those activists who take advantage of the existing distribution of power and resources.

All this said, it may well be that some changes have taken place that sharpen conflict and stress the need for involvement. New issues are coming to the fore. Obviously, even when and if affected, the free-riders who do not abandon their postures cannot hope to have a voice in their articulation and solution. Most often, the activists of single-issue movements will come from the ranks of previously organized, established, official groups. To the free-riders the choice to join or not to join, though in a rather subordinate way. On the whole, however, without exerting an impact on the direction of the movements and the nature of the solutions they advocate.

Because, at best, they are subordinate joiners, free-riders miss the opportunity of formulating proposals, advancing ideas, participating in the process of socio-political innovation. The traditional slow rhythm of change of societies before the 1950s allowed the free-riders to enjoy a rather secure place and reap their benefits. The more hectic pace of change, positive and negative, of contemporary societies has challenged vested interests, has attacked or at least exposed privileged positions, has highlighted the need for a more active and conscious involvement. When it comes to the "social limits to growth", it is quite clear that the compatibility of the satisfaction of individual interests with the pursuit of collective goods will be under severe scrutiny. Indeed, some may even question whether it is still possible to satisfy individual interests without pursuing the collective good (as Fred Hirsch has so convincingly intimated). And the question must be raised whether this might not require the reconstruction of a collective ethics.

It is not simply doubtful whether the free-riders might want to participate in this process of ethical reconstruction. More important, there is a sort of structural bar-

rier which separates them from this task and its imperatives. Their role and their interpretation of it are very precise: no open, full, involved, active participation in processes of change. The very characteristic of free-rider would otherwise be impaired.

However, one could stretch the definition of free-riders and apply it to involuntary free-riders in order to be somewhat more fair to them. It might be that some free-riders have indeed tasted the fruits of political participation. Henceforth, they have refrained from it. In societies which have undergone waves of intense mobilization, it might be the case for several groups of individuals (even though, of course, there must have been not a few free-riders even in social movements). Most of them have, apparently, abandoned their active participation in politics. Why has that been so?

An explanation has been offered by Albert Hirschman (1982, 120): "different members and groups of the same society typically go through two opposite, but similarly disappointing experiences when they become more open to involvement in public affairs: those who are capable of participating actively in the shaping of events may then experience the perils of overinvolvement, while those who want to do no more but also no less than forcefully register their aroused feelings on this or that issue may suffer from underinvolvement once they realize that they are essentially limited to the vote. In addition, it is possible for both phenomena to be experienced by the same person at different periods of his or her life; more interestingly, a person could realize ... that participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory too-much-or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or another".

Tentative ⁿConclusions

The topic of this paper has been the role and impact of the free-rider on the functioning of democratic regimes. Some ambiguity has lingered throughout the all too brief and dry presentation of the problematic. In particular, some often analyzed aspects have been somewhat neglected. It is time to deal with some of them and to indicate if not solutions, at least explanations for the remaining ambiguities. The most important of the ambiguities is, of course, that which refers to the "rationality" of the behavior of the free-rider.

The argument is straightforward. The free-rider has no incentive to engage actively in politics. The costs of any additional involvement would by far exceed the projected returns in terms of personal benefits. All the more so if the present benefits are any how satisfactory. Only a major reversal of the status quo might justify a fundamental change in the free-rider's behavior. Otherwise, it remains rational for him to continue in his behavior and expectations of a reasonable, and free, though limited, share of benefits. Mancur Olson (1968, 166) has put it sharply: "The rational individual in the economic system does not curtail his spending to prevent inflation (or increase it to prevent depression) because he knows, first, that his own efforts would not have a noticeable effect, and second, that he would get the benefits of any price stability that others achieved in any case. For the same two reasons, the rational individual in the large group in a socio-political context will not be willing to make any sacrifices to achieve the objectives he shares with others".

As seen from the point of view of the individual, this kind of behavior is endowed with some rationality. As seen from the point of view of the groups, its ^{Zw}recreationalität, as we all know, is highly questionable. It is again Olson (1968, 166-167) to synthesize the open problems: "There is accordingly no presumption that large groups will organize to act in their common interests. Only when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of selective incentives, will they organize or act to achieve their objectives". More important, this kind of behavior is highly detrimental from the point of view of democratic regimes. While Olson does not go so far as analyzing the ^{fun}functioning of regimes (something he will do from the perspective of the generation of innovation and the need for competition, 1982, decrying the existence of "social rigidities"), his words open up a new line of reflections: "The existence of large unorganized groups with common interests is therefore quite consistent with the basic argument of this study. But the large unorganized groups not only provide evidence for the basic argument of this study: they also suffer if it is true" (167, italics mine).

The new line of reflections must be capable of going beyond some traditional evalu-

ations such ^{as} the positive role played by the apathetic population and the free-riders (both for themselves and the regime), the dynamic role of established interest groups, the potential compatibility of lack of mobilization and successful representation of political preferences. It must instead tackle frontally these issues to formulate an appropriate theory of democracy.

The free-rider, if our explorations have penetrated the most important realms, can teach several lessons. He or she has no impact on the process of creation and transmission of values, of socialization of values. This is a serious limitation not only on free-riders' capability to thrive in a favorable environment, but also on the very quality of democracy. As a matter of fact, by so doing, free-riders limit the circulation of ideas and interests and shrink the boundaries of the "political discourse". Theoretically, this might not be a great problem in consensual democracies. It certainly is a serious problem in democracies characterized by conflict. But it might even be that the distinction itself would be blurred if free-riders were to engage actively in the process of value-creation.

As to political recruitment, free-riders in all likelihood are more inclined to opt for a passive position. Therefore, they are not the "producers" of turnover or alternation in power, but the "consumers". It is possible that they might join a front of the dissatisfied, but they will not create one. On the whole, they will probably work as a stabilizing mechanism, briefly in favor of the status quo: "keep the rascals in lest minimum resources are enough to throw them out".

This kind of attitude is reflected in their support of the regime and the authorities. Obviously, the free-riders do give some mild (or should I say fragile) diffuse support to the regime and the authorities. Indeed, their well-being and their ability to gain easy advantages are premised on the persistence of certain norms. But they are not fervent supporters of the regime or the authorities. Their diffuse support can rarely be neatly separated from their specific support, that is from their amount of satisfaction ^{they} derive from the production of cherished outputs. Therefore, were the authorities cease for any reason whatsoever the production of those outputs or the norms of the regime be

strained, as in the cases of recession, inflation, high unemployment, it will be difficult to count on the support of the free-riders to reverse the situation.

It will be difficult also because, in spite of the attempts made by the representatives themselves, free-riders cannot count on special forms and ways of representation. If their ~~own~~ interests are well-represented, it is thanks to the activists of some specific cause or in a larger perspective. But service and allocation responsiveness rarely address the needs of the free-riders. Indeed, services and allocation of resources require to be activated, or at least presuppose a process of exchange in which free-riders rarely, if ever enter.

The results are, as we have stressed with reference to one major research, either equal but not completely satisfactory performance, where there is limited participation (that is, where it is likely that free-riders might exist in large numbers), or better performance but unequally distributed, where there is high participation; In the latter case, though, it can be hypothesized that unless they are totally homogeneous to the dominant groups in the socio-economic system, the free-riders will suffer, remaining on the side of those who are treated in a less than equal way.

Had we attributed a score on each potential measure of the relationship between free riders and the democratic regime, we would now be in the position of evaluating the overall performance of the free-riders. Do they really fare so well as the very term suggests, reaping a high amount of benefits with a limited expenditure of resources? Are they really satisfied? Is their individual rationality working to their best, or is it only the least of the evils which dictates their behavior?

From the very beginning we have tried to avoid being relegated to examine this side of the coin only. To tell the truth, the burning issue is constituted by the possibility of combining in a coherent and satisfactory way the individual rationality of single free-riders and the collective rationality required by democratic regimes (regimes which change because represent ideas and interests, goals and values incessantly created and superseded). In all too many other instances, writers have come to the conclusion that

there are (almost insoluble) dilemmas in the working of democratic regimes. We have definitely touched upon one of them.

In the course of his provocative research agenda, Olson has moved from stressing the need for large unorganized interests to get organized (and, therefore, presumably, to contribute more efficaciously to the working of the democratic regime) to advocating surgical operations to break social rigidities, to destroy the dense networks of collusive, cartelistic, and lobbying organizations (which, because of size, legal regulations, or other advantages, have been able to solve the problem of the free-riders but at the expense of socio-economic innovation and, perhaps, of a lively, dynamic, enterprising democratic regime). In his work in progress, Charles Lindbloom has abandoned his preference for mutual adjustment and is leaning towards central coordination. Finally, in his fundamental contributions to the theory and practice of democratic regimes, Robert Dahl has encountered a similar, previously unanticipated dilemma: between ^{the} autonomy of the diversified groups which make up a democratic, pluralist society and ^{the} control over these very groups lest they impair the fabric of democracy.

Here we are then. Too little organization does not allow society to express itself, its desires, needs, and preferences at their best and with sufficient incisiveness; too much organization runs the risk of solidifying, even freezing society. Free-riders have enjoyed the advantages of a relatively mobile society, unhampered by organizational fetters. These advantages do not accrue any more to those who believe they can freely ride on the train of democracy. It is not simply that the quality of democracy itself is in danger if the range of the political discourse is not expanded to take into account all new needs and preferences. And that the free-riders prevent, more or less consciously, that enlargement. The new trends and the new problems ultimately raise the question whether it is really rational for the free-riders themselves to be or to remain free-riders, or instead it is self-defeating. Whether, in the end, the uppermost limits of individual rationality do not clash with rationality itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALMOND, G.A., and POWELL, G.B., Comparative Politics. System, Process, and Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1978
- BELL, D., The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books 1978
- BURNHAM, W.D., The Crisis in American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press 1982
- DAHL, R.A.; Who Governs?. New Haven: Yale University Press 1961
- DAHL, R.A., Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven-London: Yale University Press 1982
- EASTON, D., A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley 1965
- EASTON, D., A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support, in British Journal of Political Science, 1975, pp. 435-457
- ELLIS, A. and KUMAR, K., eds., Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies. Studies in Fred Hirsch's 'Social Limits to Growth'. London-New York: Tavistock 1983
- EULAU, H., Micro-Macro Political Analysis. Chicago: Aldine 1969
- EULAU, H. and KARPS, P.D., The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness, in Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1977, pp. 233-254
- HART, V., Distrust and Democracy. Political Distrust in Britain and America. London: Cambridge University Press 1978
- HIRSCH, F., Social Limits to Growth. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund 1976
- HIRSCHMANN, A.O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1970
- HIRSCHMAN, A.O., Shifting Involvements. Private Interest and Public Action. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982
- LIPSET, S.M. and SCHNEIDER W., The Confidence Gap. New York: The Free Press 1983

- OLSON, M., The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. New York: Schocken Books 1968
- OLSON, M., The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven-London: Yale University Press 1982
- PARRY, G., ed., Participation in Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1972
- PITKIN, H., The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press 1967
- SCHLOZMAN, K.L. and VERBA, S., Injury to Insult. Unemployment, Class, and Political Response. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press 1979
- VERBA, S. and NIE, N.H., Participation in America. Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row 1972
- VERBA, S., NIE, N.H. and KIM, J., Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-nation Comparison. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press 1978
- LINDBLOM, C., The Intelligence of Democracy. Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment. New York: The Free Press 1965
- LINDBLOM, C., Politics and Markets. The World's Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books 1977

Intellectuals, the intelligentsia and
the stability of liberal democracies

Paper presented to the workshop on
"Stability and Instability of Democracies",
European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Sessions,
Institut Catalic d'Estudis Socials, Barcelona,

25-30 March, 1985

C.A. Rootes,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Eliot College,

The University of Kent at Canterbury

885 SID
ch-17



I.: The paradoxical ambivalence of intellectuals toward liberal democracy.

No political system gives greater scope than does liberal democracy for the enjoyment of the freedoms essential to western intellectual life. It is, therefore, paradoxical that intellectuals should have displayed so little enthusiasm for the regimes which guarantee their freedoms: not only did few intellectuals spring to the public defence of liberal democracy in the crises of the 1920s and 1930s, but western intellectuals have frequently been conspicuous chiefly for the support they have given to extremist or anti-system movements and parties.

Linz (1978:48) suggests that at the root of the intellectuals' ambivalence about democracy is 'the basic moral ambiguity of a political system that legitimizes decisions on the basis of formal, procedural, legal correctness without distinction of content except respect for civil liberties and ... equality before the law ... with no reference to substantive justice and no link to a system of ultimate values'. To this may be added the elitism of intellectuals, their dislike of politics based upon the pursuit of self-interest rather than moral idealism, their dislike of professional politicians, their unwillingness to accept the bureaucratic discipline and cursum honorum of modern mass parties, their resentment at the lack of deference exhibited by mass electorates and mass parties to the claims of high culture and creative ideas, the frustration of experts with the pragmatic distortion of their best proposals and the bitter hostility reserved for those intellectuals ready to serve the holders of power and so to subvert the critical role of the intelligentsia.

The fact that intellectuals have more often been enthusiasts for the principles of liberal democracy than for the actually existing systems which inevitably imperfectly embody liberal democratic principles

undoubtedly reflects the critical stance which many writers have seen as a vocational obligation or, indeed, a definitional characteristic of the intellectual (see, e.g., Metzl, 1970). If it is the sacred duty of the intellectual to 'speak truth to power', then to expect him or her to prevaricate in the interests of making less precarious the regime of the least available evil is to demand that the intellectual commit treason against his or her calling.

The intellectuals' ambivalence toward democracy might, however, be dismissed as a mere sideshow were it not for the central role ascribed to intellectuals in the maintenance of political stability, especially in democratic states.

If, as is widely assumed, legitimacy is a necessary condition of the stability of political systems, then liberal democracies must be presumed to have special need of it, since it is a defining characteristic of such states that their citizens should enjoy virtually unlimited freedoms of speech and political association and that the state's use of repressive violence against its citizens should, correspondingly, be conspicuously restrained. There is no scholarly consensus about what form the legitimization of democratic states should, could or does take, or about which aspects of the regime most need to be regarded as legitimate.¹ There is, however, more agreement that, in the matter of legitimacy, the estimations of some sections of the citizenry are of more consequence than are those of others. Belief in the legitimacy of the regime on the part of those who have, or believe they have, the power to change it - most conspicuously, those in control of armed forces - is obviously critical. So too, it seems, is the support of those who, in the words of Linz (1978: 18), play 'the major role in formulating, elaborating and transmitting the legitimacy formulae': the intellectuals.

All studies of revolutions and of the intelligentsia have pointed out the latter's role as legitimizers and delegitimizers of authority. As Pareto noted, ideological formulations by the clergy, and by intellectuals in the modern world, have been extremely influential in convincing the subject classes of their right to rebel and the ruling classes of their moral right to use force to defend an existing order. Given the role of universities in the training of government officials, judges, and lawyers, and the role of journalists and writers in shaping public opinion in societies that guarantee freedom of thought and expression, the distribution of attitudes toward the legitimacy of the regime and the various sources of attack on it is bound to depend to a large extent on the climate created by these different sectors of the intelligentsia and the academic community.

(Linz, 1978: 47)

Linz observes that intellectuals for the most part stood aloof from the public defense of liberal democracy during the Italian, German and Spanish crises and breakdowns of the 1920s and 1930s. The alleged sins of intellectuals are not, however, only those of omission. They are accused not merely of being lukewarm or unreliable defenders of liberal democracy but of being actively subversive of the very foundations of that system.

Such is the substance of Schumpeter's (1976: 143-155) claim that intellectuals are ultimately the gravediggers of the system upon which their liberties depend. The subversiveness of intellectuals, manifest in their growing hostility to the capitalist foundations of bourgeois democracy, springs not merely from the critical, rationalist culture of western intellectual life, which ironically, is itself symbiotic with capitalism. It is aggravated by the inevitable expansion, in the later stages of capitalist development, of opportunities of higher education beyond the capacities of the labour market appropriately to employ those thus qualified. The effect is thereby to deepen intellectuals' discontent with the system and to make some of their number available for mobilization by movements hostile to the system's continued operation.

If the threat intellectuals actually or potentially pose to the stability of liberal democracies is that they may defect from their role as formulators, transmitters and interpreters of the 'legitimacy formulae' necessary to the stable functioning of that system, then the problem for political analysis is to identify the conditions under which intellectuals are likely so to defect. Linz identifies certain ostensibly invariable characteristics of both the intellectual role and liberal democracy which make the intellectual's attitude toward liberal democracy inherently ambivalent. Schumpeter makes the further and more radical claim that there is in the capitalist economy which underpins the liberal democratic state an inherent developmental tendency to expand the production of intellectuals in a manner ultimately subversive of the system itself.

The critical questions to be answered are:

- 1) are the characteristics of liberal democracy and of intellectuals which make for the intellectuals' ambivalence toward liberal democracy in fact invariable?
- and
- 2) is the developmental tendency toward the expansion of higher education, which Schumpeter describes, in fact subversive of liberal democracy?

II. The socio-economic conditions of stable liberal democracy

Dowding and Kimber (1983: 238-9) assert that 'political stability is the state in which a political object exists when it possesses the capacity to prevent contingencies from forcing its non-survival - that is, from forcing a change in one or more of that object's criteria of identity'.

What, then, are 'the criteria of identity' of the 'political object' - liberal democracy - with which we are here concerned? A liberal democratic political system may be defined, following Therborn (1977: 4; of. Dahl, 1971: 2-3, and Linz, 1978: 5-6), as 'a form of the state with all the following characteristics:

1. a representative government elected by,
2. an electorate consisting of the entire adult population,
3. whose votes carry equal weight, and
4. who are allowed to vote for any opinion without intimidation by the state apparatus.

It further includes, as necessary prerequisites, the important legal freedoms of speech, assembly, organization and the press.'

The question of the conditions and pre-conditions of liberal democracy is too large and complex to be discussed systematically here. I am, in any case, not concerned here with the conditions which, historically, have favoured the development of liberal democracy so much as with those that are necessary to the continued stable survival of existing liberal democratic systems.

Therborn (1977: 7) observes that there is a close correlation between liberal democracy and advanced capitalism: all the seventeen major capital exporting states which are members of the OECD's Trade and Development Committee are stable democracies. Outside that 'rich man's club' liberal democracies are few and those with a continuous independent existence of more than a dozen years are fewer still. In short, stable liberal democracy is the form of the state characteristic of and for the most part peculiar to advanced capitalist societies.

Despite his skepticism of functionalist and evolutionist conceptions of a 'normal' relationship of correspondence between capitalism and liberal democracy, Therborn concludes his review of the historical

processes of the introduction of liberal democracy by identifying a number of tendencies within capitalism which are conducive to democratization, chief among them competition among nation states and the competitively divided ruling classes of those states. Democracy, he argues, develops out of the contradictions of capitalism and has proved viable only because of the elasticity and expansive capacity of capitalism, qualities grossly underestimated by classical liberals and marxists alike. (Therborn, 1977: 35)

This is as close as Therborn comes to deducing the conditions necessary to the continued stability of liberal democracy. A number of marxist writers, most recently Holloway and Piccolotto and Mandel (for a brief review, see Jessop, 1978), have, however, suggested that liberal democracy was an appropriate form of the state only at a particular stage in the process of capital accumulation and that the contradictions associated with the tendency of the rate of profit to fall dictate the development of a form of the state which is increasingly interventionist and authoritarian rather than liberal and democratic.

Habermas's (1976) account of the legitimization crisis of 'late capitalism' springs from a similar diagnosis of economic problems but focuses in particular upon the social and political consequences of the state's attempts to solve them.²

The development of the welfare state may perhaps be considered as an attempt to secure loyalty to the liberal democratic state by investing it with an element of substantive, redistributive justice and so to mitigate the charge that its democracy is only formal. But, says Habermas, the politicization of the economy and the private sphere of social life, which is inherent in the extension of the welfare state and in the state's attempts to ameliorate the economic problems it generates, undermines the traditional free market ideology of capitalism and so carries with it an

increased need of legitimation. This the state attempts to supply by the extension of formal democracy but this, since it is merely formal and is without substance, serves only to exacerbate the problem. The result is a comprehensive crisis of legitimacy.

If, as is claimed, crises of legitimacy are the most dangerous of all the crises a political system might face (Zimmerman, 1983: 203, 415), and the analyses of Habermas and others are correct, liberal democratic states would appear to be in deep trouble. Yet they survive and even as the economic recession leaves in its wake unprecedentedly large numbers of unemployed, talk of 'crises of legitimacy' and the imminent supersession of liberal democracy by a neo-corporatist form of the state begins to sound more and more dated. Once again, theorists appear to have underestimated the elasticity of capitalism and the resilience of liberal democracy.

Nevertheless, if the economic and political turmoil of the past twenty years has not resulted in any fundamental or durable change in any of the 'criteria of identity' of liberal democracy, certain of these have in various countries and at different times been subject to varying degrees of strain. Moreover, what has been distinctive about the political crises that have afflicted liberal democratic states since the mid 1960s is that they were in large measure fueled by social and political movements which drew disproportionately upon the younger and better educated sections of the population. The fact that these movements could plausibly be described as 'the revolt of the young intelligentsia' (Flacks, 1971) suggested to many that Schumpeter's prophecy was about to be fulfilled. If such movements are no longer so clamorous, the shifts in value orientation they reflected are still largely intact (Inglehart, 1977, 1981) and there is ample evidence that such a constituency is a mainstay of such potentially destabilizing movements as the Greens. The

anxieties expressed by Crozier and Huntington in their reports to the Trilateral Commission (Crozier et al, 1975) still find echoes in the words of European policy-makers, especially in Germany.

One way of assessing the future stability of liberal democracy in the face of threats, direct or indirect, from acts of omission or commission on the part of intellectuals is to consider the role they have played in past crises. I propose, therefore, briefly to consider the role of intellectuals in the crisis and breakdown of democracy in West Germany and then, at rather greater length, to consider the crises of the 1960s and 1970s in Italy, West Germany and, particularly, France. However, in order to allay what must by now be a mounting sense of unease, a brief excursus into questions of definition is necessary.

III. Intellectuals and Intelligentsia: the problem of definition

A major obstacle to systematic discussion of the contribution of intellectuals and the intelligentsia to the stability or, alternatively, the instability of liberal democracies, is the large measure of inconsistency in the employment of the terms 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia' in the existing literature. Even writers who make a definitional distinction between the two tend in practice to use them interchangeably. A distinction between them is, however, essential to my argument.

By intellectuals I mean, following Lipset and Dobson (1972: 137), persons who are professionally engaged in the creation, elaboration and dissemination of theoretical knowledge, ideas and symbols. This definition is, then, more restrictive than, for example, that of Shils (1968: 399): it includes academics, scientists, researchers and writers but excludes people who, though often highly educated, primarily disseminate or apply theoretical knowledge (teachers, engineers, medical

professionals) rather than create it. Moreover, it is a functional definition rather than a normative one (see, e.g., Nettl, 1969): I do not presuppose that an intellectual will necessarily adopt a critical stance toward society and politics; whether a person is classed as an intellectual depends, for my purposes, on what he or she does professionally rather than what or how he or she thinks.

The intelligentsia is a much more inclusive category. Birnbaum (1971: 41) and Giddens (1973: 236) define it as those who possess higher educational qualifications and are employed in professional, scientific, managerial or administrative functions. The intelligentsia, so defined, is not presumed to be politically oppositional or politically self-conscious as it was in traditional East European usage (Szelenyi, 1982: 306-8), nor is it a 'cross-class stratum' in the sense that Gella (1976) uses that term. However, since the graduates of higher education are in practice overwhelmingly employed in just such occupations, the functional component of that definition in fact adds very little to the power of discrimination and creates the problem of how to classify those graduates of higher education who are, however temporarily, without professional employment. I shall, therefore, employ the term intelligentsia to mean simply graduates of higher education. Such a definition has the advantage of focussing attention upon the importance of higher education in the cultivation of general intellectual skills, the formation of world-views and the social bonding of diverse specialisms (Mannheim 1936, reiterated by Schumpeter, 1976: 146, Gouldner 1979: 28-31). Employing such a definition, under modern conditions, intellectuals are almost exclusively a subset of the intelligentsia. The remaining boundary problem concerns students. A definition of intellectuals which includes all post-secondary students, as does that of Brym (1980: 12), is surely too broad. A case might be made for including

them among the intelligentsia, but so to do is to overlook those aspects of the student condition which are peculiar to it and which sustain a quite distinctive pattern of political action (see Rootes, 1978). Nevertheless, because students are future members of the intelligentsia and because their politics may offer some clues as to the future political temper of the intelligentsia, I do not altogether exclude them from the discussion.

IV. Intellectuals and the crisis and breakdown of liberal democracy

IV.1. Weimar Germany

The crises of the Weimar Republic and the causes of its breakdown were multiple and it is difficult in the extreme to isolate a single factor and to assess its portion of blame for the collapse. Yet it is widely alleged that the intellectuals were in some measure responsible.

The charges are of four kinds:

Firstly, that intellectuals were responsible for elaborating and transmitting an ultra-nationalist and anti-democratic culture rooted in the German Romantic Tradition;

secondly, that those intellectuals who did support the Republic did so without conviction, that they were Vernunftrepublikaner who had, like Meinecke, 'turned from being monarchists at heart to being Republicans by reason' (Gerth & Mills, 1958: 23);

thirdly, that left-wing intellectuals undermined the Republic by intemperately criticising its shortcomings and contributing to the creative cacophony of Weimar culture which alarmed so many conservative Germans; and

fourthly, that unemployed intellectuals, or, at least, unemployed graduates, students and university dropouts, flocked to the Nazi banner and were heavily overrepresented in the Nazi apparatus.

There is at least some substance to each of these propositions but neither separately nor together would they sustain the contention that it was the intellectuals who were primarily, much less directly, responsible for the crisis and collapse of the Weimar Republic. Carl Schorske (1970), in his review of the literature, argues persuasively that the responsibility of intellectuals for the calamity has been overstated, no doubt in part because the commentators upon their role were themselves intellectuals occupationally prone to exaggerate intellectuals' influence in politics and to wish to settle accounts with intellectuals of political persuasions other than their own. In the event, the Weimar Republic, from the outset rendered precarious by the social, economic, political and psychological dislocations of the humiliating Versailles peace settlement, was overwhelmed by economic crisis and subverted by the political cunning of the Nazis. Neither of these could be blamed on intellectuals whose own political divisions reflected rather than created the lack of political consensus in the country: if intellectuals did less than they might have done to defend liberal democracy, their failure derived from the weakness of the democratic tradition and the fact that, in consequence, their own culture was not fully democratic.

Nevertheless, this lack of democracy in intellectual culture was most conspicuous in the very institutions where it might be most consequential: the universities. The universities of the Weimar Republic continued unreformed the Imperial traditions, their ultraconservative, nationalist culture being reflected in the social backgrounds of the students (fewer than 2% were from working class backgrounds whereas the sons of state

servants were heavily overrepresented), the activities of student societies and the attitudes and behaviour of the professoriate, particularly in the prestigious and influential law faculties.

The absence of numerous clausus and the lack of employment opportunities for school-leavers resulted, in the worst years of the economic crisis, in surges in student enrolments in the universities which, combined with the declining value of student stipends, can only have exacerbated the drop-out rate and the labour market difficulties of those who did graduate. But it is one thing to observe that there was substantial graduate unemployment contemporaneous with substantial support for the Nazis in student elections and prominence of the university-educated in the Nazi Party, and quite another to conclude that students and former students were driven to Nazism because of the absence of suitable opportunities for employment. If students and former students were disproportionately pro-Nazi, the best recent research suggests that declining employment prospects were much less responsible than were the nationalist political cultures of the universities and the social backgrounds from which students were overwhelmingly drawn (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1982; Bracher, 1973; Steinberg, 1977).

A major part of the contribution of nationalist intellectuals to the collapse of the Weimar Republic seems to have resided in the reinforcement of the nationalist socialization of their students. The more direct actors in the drama were members of a swollen though still tiny Intelligentsia.³ Even so, Bracher (1973) notes that a high proportion of those Nazi propagandists who had attended universities had not completed their courses. Moreover, although university graduates were overrepresented in the Nazi apparatus by comparison with the proportion they comprised of the general population, the proportion of graduates in the Nazi elite was in fact much lower than was the case for traditional

elites, a fact which is all the more remarkable in view of the different age structures of the two elites. However the German Intelligentsia was disposed toward the Republic, it cannot therefore be judged to have been disproportionately represented in the Nazi Party itself.

The breakdown of liberal democracy in the 1920s and 1930s took place in states where representative liberal democratic institutions were only relatively weakly entrenched: they did not themselves yet have the force of tradition and they were contested by aristocratic or clerical traditions. They were, moreover, states whose national unity was recent (Italy and Germany) or insecure (Spain) and only Germany could claim to be an advanced capitalist state.

Social and political conditions have so changed since the 1930s that it is difficult to see how those instances of crisis and breakdown, whatever insight they afford into micropolitical processes, can much illuminate the larger political sociological aspects of future crises. The French crisis of 1958 which, though leaving intact the criteria of identity of liberal democracy, nevertheless resulted in consequential changes in the form of that system, but it was clearly the product of destabilizing colonial legacies of a kind which no longer trouble liberal democracies. It may, therefore, be more illuminating to turn to the crises of the 1960s and 1970s.

IV.ii. The crises of the 1960s: France

The French crisis of May - June, 1968 began in the universities and, once the conflict reached the streets of the Latin Quarter, it sparked an immediate response among intellectuals and the intelligentsia. Only gradually did it spread to the working class and while the wave of strikes was spectacular it was not durable: the CGT translated its members demands

into pay rises and a shorter working week while the PCF steered its supporters away from confrontation of the regime and into the electoral arena.

In the June, 1968 elections which finally resolved the crisis, whereas younger university-educated voters voted three to two for the left, a majority of their less well-educated age-mates voted for the Gaullists; indeed, the only section of the population amongst which the Gaullists lost support between 1967 and 1968 was members of the 'new' middle-class aged under forty (Inglehart, 1977: 275). The student movement, even as it triggered a wave of sympathy among intellectuals and the intelligentsia, signally failed to mobilize durable working class support. For many theorists that signified the moment when the baton of revolution passed from the industrial working class to a new mass intelligentsia.

But if the passing of the revolutionary proletariat is the message most often read into the events of May, the eclipse of the traditional intellectual is no less remarkable. It was, after all, not intellectuals who initiated the challenge to the regime, but students. The intellectuals, the traditional conscience of France, had been left on the sidelines. The most plausible explanation is that the social and economic modernization of France had, as Nettl suggests, eroded the social base and function of the traditional 'intellectual as critic' (Nettl, 1969: 129-132).

Stanley Hoffman (1974) provides perhaps the best account of the development of the political role of French intellectuals. Hoffman distinguishes the traditional French 'moral' intellectual from the more practically involved 'action intellectual' more familiar in the United States. The traditional intellectual in France was characterized by a disposition to totalism and moralism, both derived from the legacies of

Catholicism and the Revolution, and a disposition to pose as the 'conscience of society'. All three characteristics derived from the enforced separation of intellectuals from politics which obtained in the pre-revolutionary epoch, but they were reinforced by a society in which culture generale was valued above technical specialization. In post-revolutionary France, the humanist intellectual was heir to the social prestige of the defeated aristocracy and to the responsibility of spiritual guidance formerly reserved to the Church. The intellectual pretended to the status of conscience of society, was taken seriously, and was by turns rewarded and punished for his presumption.

If the slow economic development of France offered limited opportunity or inducement to the more practical application of intellectual skills, it was sufficient to excite the intellectuals to protest the intrusion of the market principle. The tradition of protest received further encouragement from the extreme bureaucratic centralization of the political system.

Gradually, and particularly with the advent of France's post-war economic development, the social base of the traditional French intellectual was eroded. New specialisms developed and new opportunities arose for their employment in the labour market. Metzl (1970: 99) almost certainly exaggerates when he claims that the integration of the French intellectual was complete by the mid-1950s, but the Algerian crisis of 1958-1961 was probably the last occasion on which French intellectuals were nearly unanimous in their claim to be the conscience of society.

May 1968, at the time proclaimed as a *fantasme* for the 'new working class' looks, in retrospect, to have been a requiem for the traditional intellectual. Economic and, belatedly, social and political modernization have since proceeded apace and France appears increasingly to conform to the normal pattern of the advanced capitalist societies in having replaced

the humanistic intellectual with a mass intelligentsia. Even the rearguard action in the universities themselves, as students resist the reorganization of courses away from traditional intellectual culture and toward a better consonance with the labour market of a highly technological society, after fifteen years of increasingly forlorn mobilizations, seems at last to have burned itself out.

In retrospect the most remarkable thing about the crisis of May-June 1968 was the clarity of the manner in which it was ended. De Gaulle's masterstroke was not the stage management of his disappearance or his preference of radio over television when making his appeal to the French but the playing of the electoral card: by risking the government, he guaranteed the survival of the regime. A Sartre might rail against the sham of a democracy in which people do not stand physically and publicly to be counted, but the use of a snap general election to resolve the political crisis issued a challenge which all shades of the political spectrum except the student-based groupuscules felt obliged to accept. No more definitive test of the legitimacy of French liberal democracy could have been devised.

IV.iii. The crises of the 1960s and 1970s: West Germany and Italy

The French crisis of 1968 resembles those of West Germany and Italy in that it had its beginnings in students and young intelligentsia, but it differs sharply from them in that it was over so quickly and did not leave a legacy of political violence or contribute much to a more or less durable political counterculture. If there was a crisis of legitimacy in France it was resolved by the June 1968 election whereas in Germany and Italy the question lingered on. Where Italy conspicuously differed from Germany was in the extent to which protest spread from the intelligentsia to the working class: whereas in Germany the Extra Parliamentary

opposition quite failed to find response in the working class (Smith, 1982: 79) in Italy the reverberations of the student revolt ran wide through the northern industrial working class.

If the Red Army fraction and its circle of 'sympathisers' was one legacy of the German extra-parliamentary opposition, the Green Movement was another. There can be no doubt that the RAF's political murders and the public and state reactions to them threatened the stability of the Bundesrepublik and that they did so by compromising the civil libertarian components of liberal democracy. The unease at the relatively authoritarian actions taken by the state in its own defence was especially acute amongst the intelligentsia (Sonthheimer, 1978) from which the RAF's 'sympathisers' tended to be drawn.⁴ Yet, contrary to left-wing predictions, the more authoritarian practices of the police proved to be reversible once the emergency had passed. The state survived and, since it had defended itself without recourse to extraconstitutional measures, its legitimacy can only have been enhanced.

The threat posed by the Green Movement was more complex. At one level, it reinforced the legitimacy of liberal democracy the moment it decided to enter electoral politics, but its anti-system policies and parliamentary practices seemed for a time to threaten the system from within, in particular by denying the possibility of stable and effective parliamentary government except at the expense of forcing a CDU-SPD coalition of the sort which had in the 1960s stimulated anti-system politics. The recent prevalence of pragmatists over fundamentalists within the Green Party offers the more hopeful prospect that, by demonstrating its flexibility and responsiveness in accommodating even so troublesome a movement as the Greens, the institutions of German liberal democracy will emerge with their legitimacy yet further enhanced.

The threat terrorism posed to the Italian state was more severe because it came from both left and right. Both recruited from the universities and the intelligentsia (Furlong, 1981: 75), but it would be a mistake to overestimate the strength of the sympathy so derived: the fact that two Red Brigades leaders (Curcio and Cagol) had been students at Trento hardly substantiates Acquaviva's contention (cited in Levy, 1985: 24) that the Red Brigades were mainly populated by radical Catholic graduates. At the height of the Red Brigades' activity the slogan most popular in the autonomia, the dominant tendency in student left politics, was 'Ne con lo stato ne con le BR' (Furlong, 1981: 77). The general political proclivities of the intelligentsia are perhaps best revealed by the shifts in their electoral behaviour, drifting steadily to the PCI until the compromesso storico and thereafter ebbing towards the Radicals and Socialists. The disaffection with the PCI after 1973 reflects not so much sympathy for the Red Brigades as disappointment at the PCI's willingness to compromise with a Christian Democratic Party which the PCI had itself long condemned as corrupt and ineffective. As in the German case, the outcome of this testing time has been the strengthening of the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state: at last the myth of the Resistance (and the ambivalence it dictated toward political violence) has been laid and depolarisation of the electorate creates the possibility of an alternation of power hitherto absent from the Italian political system (Pasquino, 1983).

In neither the West German nor the Italian crises did more than a handful of intellectuals play a prominent role. The anti-system actors and their sympathisers were largely drawn from the ranks of students and the intelligentsia (particularly so in Germany) and their action, by testing the procedural groundrules of liberal democracy has, paradoxically, contributed to its legitimisation.

Things might, however, have worked out less happily. It is, therefore, worth considering briefly the reasons for the radicalization of students and the *Intelligentsia* which sparked off these crises.

IV. iv. The determinants of student and *Intelligentsia* radicalism

Worries about the politically radicalizing consequences of graduate unemployment or underemployment are of long standing. The plausibility of attempts to explain the rise of Fascism in such terms can be undermined by the identification of more direct influences upon the political dispositions of students and *Intelligentsia*, but more direct refutation is possible of such hypotheses as they are advanced to explain the radicalism of the 1960s.

If the massive increase in student enrolments during the 1960s was the foundation of a mass *Intelligentsia*, it should not be supposed that it was simply or primarily the actual or anticipated difficulties of graduates in finding suitable employment which dictated their radicalization: the tone of the protests was utopian, their objects were cultural and political rather than economic, and the relative mismatch between the production of universities and the requirements of the labour market was still some way beyond the horizon.

Even in Italy, the European country most notorious for the overproduction of graduates, the student movements developed at a time when graduate unemployment was at a historically low level (see Rootes, 1983a; Barbagli, 1982: 240) and well before the oil-crisis induced recession of the 1970s. Such explanations may be more plausible for the Italian case in the mid to late 1970s (Statera, 1979) but even here there are grounds for scepticism (Levy, 1985).

Much more important, in each of these cases, was the sense of a political vacuum on the left - in France, with the stalemating of the left after the 1967 election, in West Germany with the CDU-SPD Grand Coalition from 1966 to 1969, and in Italy, with the crushing, without dialogue, of the student revolt (Bell, 1978: 241), the stagnation of the Christian Democratic hegemony and, after 1973, the compromesso storico in which the Italian Communist Party, in the interests of aborting the fascist threat to Italian democracy, chose to support the Christian Democrats even at the expense of losing support from the left. Similarly, Melkin and Pollak (1982: 105-7) in their study of anti-nuclear protest in France and Germany conclude that it was the lack of responsiveness of political structures in the face of an increasingly highly educated citizenry that stimulated the development of protest movements. Brym (1980) has proposed that it is the blockage of opportunities for employment and career mobility and/or the constriction of political opportunities which leads to radicalism among *Intelligentsia* and the *Intelligentsia*. For the radicalism of the recent past, the second part of this proposition seems much better supported than does the first.

Crozier (1975: 6-7, 30-32) reiterates much of Schumpeter's argument but gives it a subtle twist by proposing that it is not unemployment which leads to the radicalization of the *Intelligentsia* but the changes in the social status of the intellectual consequent upon the development of mass higher education. The supplanting of traditional, 'value-oriented' intellectuals by a more policy-oriented, technical *Intelligentsia* leads to a drift in the artistic and literary worlds toward a protest and even revolutionary posture which has shaped the cultural milieu of younger generations. This is entirely consistent with Huntington's proposition (Crozier: 62) that the radicalism of the 1960s was a product not of the lasting results of change but rather of a transitory process of change: it

was the rapid expansion of enrolments in higher education in the 1960s (and the consequent upsetting or disappointment of elitist expectations) rather than the resulting high level of student enrolments which produced the 'democratic surge'.

V. The decline of intellectuals, the rise of the intelligentsia and the future of liberal democracy.

I have argued elsewhere (Rootes, 1983) that theorists of the 'crisis of legitimacy' such as Habermas have overestimated the extent to which the liberal democratic state is dependent upon rational-legal legitimation and that they have failed to distinguish among the social constituencies of the various modes of legitimation. Writers on the subject of legitimacy have, in focussing attention upon the importance of intellectuals in producing the legitimacy formulae supposedly necessary to the stability of the system, tended to overlook the importance of the intelligentsia as that larger section of society most likely to be sensitive to questions of legitimacy.

The expansion of higher education and the professional, scientific, technical and administrative occupations in which the members of the intelligentsia are typically employed is perhaps the most striking aspect of the social changes of the present epoch. We might, therefore, expect that the expansion of higher education will substantially increase the proportion of the population able and disposed to adopt the kinds of intellectual orientations to politics which Habermas's argument presupposes. Furthermore, we may interpret the recent rise in the politics of moral protest and issue-awareness⁶ among western publics as evidence that this process is already well-advanced.

Barnes, Kaase et al (1979), for example, see the increased disposition of the younger and better-educated to look favorably upon protest politics as principally the product of the expansion of higher education and the mass media. They argue that the more participatory political culture which the development heralds is nevertheless benign in its implications for liberal democracy because the protest-prone do not, for the most part, evince any marked hostility toward democratic principles but reject violence and are generally instrumental in their politics. The solution to the problems of legitimacy and representation that direct action raises is, they suggest, institutionalization.

It is just an extension of political participation which leads Huntington to be less than sanguine about the prospects for the future stability of democratic states. A more highly educated citizenry, disposed toward higher levels of political participation, may well make demands on government of a kind which it is ill-equipped to meet. Such an overload of the machinery of government would, Huntington suggests, endanger the stability of liberal democracy by making it less able to respond to threatening contingencies.

It is probably this which is the most realistic assessment of the kind of threat which the rise of the intelligentsia presents to the stability of liberal democratic states. Yet it is probably too gloomy, for it places too little value on the positive aspects of the higher education of the citizenry. A more highly educated public may contribute to more rational democratic politics and may be no less prepared than have its predecessors to accept some differentiation between areas of political decision in which maximum public participation is desirable and areas in which political elites must preserve a larger measure of discretion. The difference may be that they are likely to demand more explicit rational

justification for the reservation of such elite discretion than has been customary, but if that increases the accountability of political elites it seems likely only to enhance the legitimacy of liberal democracy.

The complex of changes which has created a mass intelligentsia has, in eroding the social base and function of the traditional intellectual, diminished whatever threat the intellectual posed to the stability of liberal democracies.

The political influence of intellectuals has probably always been overestimated by intellectual commentators, but it was almost certainly greater before the age of mass media and public opinion polls. Then the pronouncements of intellectuals could affect to represent popular opinion and, the politically powerful, having fewer alternative means of judging public opinion or of appealing to the population, were accordingly more likely to be influenced by the views of intellectuals. Now, in an age of electronic mass media and information technology, politicians have means of communicating more directly to the population and are more likely to monitor public opinion than to attend to the opinions of intellectuals. The power of intellectuals rested upon their power to interpret, to translate and, ultimately, to persuade. It was power entirely disproportionate to their numbers and did not in the least depend upon their being an important part of the constituency of a particular government or regime.

The power of the new intelligentsia is rather different. It does, albeit at a less exalted level, preserve some of the sources of power of traditional intellectuals by its ability to set cultural patterns and its privileged place in the chain of personal influence, but it has two sources of power not available to intellectuals. Firstly, because of the enormously increased scope of governmental activity, the intelligentsia has such power as derives from its members' indispensability as the

executors of political decisions. Secondly, because of its own increased numbers, it has become an important electoral constituency in its own right. It is, in short, integrated into the social and political system in a way traditional intellectuals were not.

If, as Nettl (1969: 25) asserts, 'as bureaucratic modernity advances, the intellectual retreats', so too do those characteristics of the intellectual which most powerfully contribute to the intellectual's ambivalence toward liberal democracy. The democratisation of intellectual culture consequent upon the expansion of higher education and the development of the mass media reduces the social distance between the creative intellectual, the technical and professional intelligentsia and the increasingly de-industrialised working class. Such intellectual elitism as persists is, accordingly, largely unconscious and seems most likely to manifest itself in the sometimes arrogant, sometimes patronizing pretensions of members of the intelligentsia to lead or represent contending interests within the democratic system. An intelligentsia which increasingly furnishes the political leadership of democratic mass parties can have little of the elitism which characterized the traditional intellectual. If elitism is manifest in the accent of university-educated oligarchies to the leadership of left and social democratic parties, it seems likely to be quickly self-limiting as the erosion of the traditional electoral bases of those parties compels their activists to seek to regain working-class support.

Such power as traditional intellectuals retain is largely influence mediated by the mass intelligentsia which is the principal market for their cultural products. Some sections of the intelligentsia, chiefly those whose work is in the non-market sector of the economy, are likely to be more sensitive to intellectual dissent than are those employed in more narrowly technical occupations in the market sector for the intelligentsia is

not a homogeneous stratum and it does not normally have a homogeneous political consciousness. But whatever the discontents of some sections of it, there are few who seriously question the fundamental principles of liberal democracy or appear likely to take or support action designed deliberately to subvert them.

To attempt to predict the future stability of liberal democracies is to take a wager on the flexibility of liberal democratic institutions and the adaptability and expansive capacity of the capitalism which underpins it. On balance, the social and political changes reflected in and consequent upon the decline of intellectuals and the expansion of the intelligentsia appear to pose no unmanageable threat to liberal democracy.



Acknowledgements

This paper derives in part from research supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant number: E00232091 - 'The Politics of the Higher Educated in Britain and Italy') and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR Research Group on the Politics of the Higher Educated). I am indebted to Carl Levy, Research Fellow on the above-mentioned project, for his assistance with the Italian material.

Notes

- 1) I have discussed the problem of legitimacy and the social constituencies of the various modes of legitimization elsewhere. See *Notes*, 1983: 1-12.
- 2) For a more extensive discussion and critique of Habermas on the legitimization problems of late capitalism, see *Notes*, 1983: 5-8.
- 3) Even at their peak (in 1920-21) student enrolments represented only 1.3% of 18-25 year olds in Germany (Steinberg, 1977: 34).
- 4) Indeed, Sontheimer (1978) suggests that such concern was virtually confined to the intellectuals and intelligentsia. Just how limited any 'crisis of legitimacy' was in West Germany is demonstrated by the surveys summarized by Conradz (1981).
- 5) Enrolments in higher education grew at an average annual compound rate of 11% in France, 9.6% in Italy, 7.0% in West Germany, 7.6% in Britain, but whereas purely demographic factors account for 38% of the French expansion, they account for only 2% of that in Italy, i.e. the Italian expansion represents almost entirely an increase in the participation rate (de Francesco, 1978: 193-4).
- 6) Huntington, However, argues (in Crozier, 1975: 110-112) that empirical evidence casts doubt on the assumption that it is higher levels of education which have contributed to a more 'ideological political outlook on the part of the American electorate and proposes instead an explanation in terms of the dynamics of the political process itself.

References

- BARBAGLI, Mario (1982) Educating for Unemployment: Politics, Labor Markets, and the School System - Italy, 1859-1973. (New York: Columbia University Press)
- BARNES, Samuel H., KAASE, Max. et al (1979) Political Action (London: Sage)
- BELL, J. Bowyer (1978) A time of terror: how democratic societies respond to revolutionary violence. (New York: Basic)
- BIRNBAUM, Norman (1971) 'The Problem of a Knowledge Elite' in Toward a Critical Sociology. (New York: Oxford University Press).
- BRACHER, Karl Dietrich (1973) The German Dictatorship (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin)
- BRYN, Robert (1980) Intellectuals and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin)
- CONRADT, David P. (1981) 'Political culture, legitimacy and participation' West European Politics, 4 (2): 18-34
- CROZIER, Michel et al (1975) The Crisis of Democracy: report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral Commission. (New York: New York University Press).
- DAHL, Robert A. (1971) Polyarchy. (New Haven & London: Yale University Press).
- DE FRANCESCO, Corrado (1978) 'The growth and crisis of Italian higher education during the 1960s and 1970s', Higher Education, 7:193-212
- DOWDING, Keith & KIMBER, Richard (1983) 'The meaning and use of "political stability"', European Journal of Political Research, 11:229-243
- FLACKS, Richard (1971) 'Revolt of the Young Intelligentsia', in R. Aya & N. Miller (ed) The New American Revolution (New York: Free Press)
- FURLONG, Paul (1981) 'Political Terrorism in Italy' in Juliet Lodge (ed). Terrorism: a challenge to the state. (Oxford: Martin Robertson)
- GERTH, Hans & MILLS, C. Wright, eds (1958) From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press)
- GIDDENS, Anthony (1973) The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchinson)

- GOULDNER, Alvin W. (1979) The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. (London: Macmillan)
- HABERMAS, Jürgen (1976) Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann)
- HAMILTON, Richard F. (1982) Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
- HOFFMAN, Stanley (1974) 'The Ruled: protest as a national way of life', in Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s. (New York: Viking)
- INGELHART, Ronald (1977) The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- INGELHART, Ronald (1981) 'Post-materialism in an age of insecurity', American Political Science Review, 75 (4) : 880-900.
- JESSOP, Bob (1978) 'Capitalism and Democracy: the best possible political shell?' pages 10-51 in Gary Littlejohn et al (eds) Power and the State. (London: Croom Helm).
- LEVY, Carl (1985) 'The Politics of the Higher Educated: Italy', Discussion paper PHE 2/85, University of Kent at Canterbury.
- LINZ, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration, Vol. 1 of Linz & Stepan (eds) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press)
- LIPSET, S.M. & DOBSON, R. (1972) 'The intellectual as critic and rebel', Daedalus, 101 (3) : 137-198
- MANHEIM, Karl (1936) Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge).
- MEIKIN, Dorothy & POLLAY, Michael (1982) The Atom Resisted: Antinuclear movements in France and Germany. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press)
- NETTL, J.P. (1969) 'Power and the intellectuals', 15-32 in C.C. O'Brien & W.D. Vaneech (eds) Power and Consciousness (London: University of London Press).
- NETTL, J.P. (1970) 'Ideas, intellectuals, and structures of dissent', pages 57-134 in Philip Rieff (ed) On Intellectuals (New York: Anchor)
- PASQUINO, Gianfranco (1983) 'Sources of stability and instability in the Italian party system', West European Politics: 93-110
- ROOTES, C.A. (1978) 'The rationality of student radicalism', Australian & New Zealand Journal of Sociology. 14 (3A): 251-258.
- ROOTES, C.A. (1983) 'Intellectuals, the intelligentsia and the problem of legitimacy', paper presented at ECFR Joint Sessions, Freiburg-im-Breisgau. Revised version: working paper PHE 7/83 University of Kent at Canterbury.

- ROOTES, C.A. (1983 a) Review of Barbagli Educating for Unemployment, Sociology, 17 (4), November: 602-5.
- SCHORSKE, Carl (1970) 'Weimar and the intellectuals', New York Review of Books, May 7 and May 21.
- SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Fifth Edition (London: Allen & Unwin)
- SHILS, E. (1968) 'Intellectuals' in David Shils (ed) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 (New York: Free Press/Macmillan)
- SMITH, Gordon (1982) Democracy in Western Germany, 2nd edition. (London: Heinemann)
- SORTHEIMER, Kurt (1978) 'Intellectuals and politics in Western Germany' West European Politics, 1 (1) : 30-41.
- STATERA, Gianni (1979) 'Student Politics in Italy: from Utopia to Terrorism', Higher Education, 8: 657-667.
- STEINBERG, Michael Stephen (1977) Sabres and Brown Shirts: the German Students' Path to National Socialism, 1918-1935 (Chicago: Chicago University Press).
- SZELENYI, Ivan (1982) 'The intelligentsia in the class structure of state-socialist societies' in Michael Burawoy and Theda Skocpol (eds) Marxist Inquiries. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- THERBORN, Goran (1977) 'The rule of capital and the rise of democracy' New Left Review, 103: 3-41.
- ZIMMERMAN, Ekkeart (1983) Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman).

ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM

Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen

EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH

Barcelona Workshop on the Stability and Instability of Democracies

26-30 March 1985


Governmental force in a democratic local polity:
Amsterdam in the early eighties

by

Uriel Rosenthal

(Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Erasmus University)
with the assistance of Paul 't Hart (Research assistant at Erasmus University
Rotterdam)

№ 3 2 4



INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the relation between political stability and political violence in a democratic context. In contradistinction to the usual kinds of theoretical and empirical analyses, the paper focusses on the local level of democracy. Eleven confrontations during the early eighties between the authorities and the police, on the one hand, and squatters and rioters, on the other hand, in Amsterdam are examined.

A well-known thesis in political science is that specific features of governmental force will help to limit the level of political violence and, consequently, to preserve or restore political order. Such characteristics include the legitimacy, consistency and severity of governmental force. Our empirical analysis which is based upon a diachronic comparison of eleven events, examines these three characteristics and affords an opportunity to explore the above-mentioned thesis.

I. Political stability versus political violence

A common theme in the growing literature on political stability is the tension between stability and the occurrence of violence. It may be true that "one of the most remarkable aspects of the literature on political stability is how few writers have attempted a thorough analysis of the concept".¹ And it may be equally true that "the concept may simply be regarded as multidimensional due to the unfortunate employment of an ambiguous term".² Yet I do not know of any conceptual or empirical approach to political stability which does not touch upon its relation to the absence of violence in society. Indeed "the most common and immediate view of political stability is to equate the concept with the absence of domestic civil conflict and violent behavior".³ Whether referring to the absence of structural change, to rule-bound politics, to the legitimation of structures and processes, or to the institutionalization of politics, unidimensional conceptualizations somehow tend to boil down to this quite simple notion. Although there is a wide variety of multidimensional approaches to political stability, the absence or at least the limitation of violence stands firm as a pivotal dimension.⁴ This point is supported by empirical tests as well.⁵

Among the latent factors contributing to the popularity of this kind of perspective is its democratic bias. If political stability could be reduced to the relative absence of violence and if democracy were to imply the use of peaceful methods in the pursuit of political goals, we would arrive at a happy equation of stability and democracy.

Another contributory factor appears to be the unspoken belief in an antithesis between legitimacy and violence. Legitimacy is often conceived of as a crucial factor in playing down the role of violence; in turn, the reduction of violence is regarded as a necessary condition of legitimacy.⁶ Again, one may discern a democratic bias in this line of argument. If one accepts the equation of stability and democracy mentioned above, one may extend it to an even happier triangular equation of stability, legitimacy and democracy. Any allusion to violence would cause trouble in such a good match. It would then be a minor step to the ruthless elimination of any and all signs of violence-prone activities. Eventually, there might even be no room for the kind of opposition which in some countries goes by the name of loyal opposition.⁷

II. Political stability and the regulation of violence

It is somewhat surprising that many political scientists embrace the idea of a perfect order with a complete absence of violence. At the cradle of contemporary political science stands the Weberian concept of the state; no neologism such as the polity or the political system can really challenge it. At the center of this Weberian state concept stands a notion of political stability in which the regulation and management of violence rather than its sheer absence provides for a satisfactory level of political order. Political stability is supposed to involve the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence within a given territory - with the sober observation that legitimacy may relate to a short-lived liberal bias in an oeuvre on violence, power and confrontation. The Weberian perspective is based on the supposition that people will not desist from using violence, unless they are, or perceive themselves to be relatively short of instruments of violence. The state authorities exercise the effective monopoly of the use of physical violence, thus deterring people from using violence. The happy marriage of stability and the absence of violence turns into

a strenuous relation in which stability becomes largely dependent on the effectiveness of legitimate governmental violence.

Terminological solutions

It can be expected that some analysts as well as the public authorities try to downplay the role of governmental violence in producing political order. A favorite solution is to give separate names to violence committed by and against the authorities. For instance, Gurr defines political violence as "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors or its policies", while reserving the term force for the use of violence on the part of the authorities.⁸

This terminological solution is also pursued by Feierabend.⁹ Political violence is said to refer to aggression and violence within nations and is directed against officeholders; what we would call governmental violence gets the label of regime coerciveness. An implicit assumption is that regime coerciveness would relate to the legitimate use of violence, which political violence would stand for illegitimate actions. But as Macfarlane says, "the coercive actions of the state are violence for those who hold them to be illegitimate, and force for those who do not so hold them".¹⁰

Empirical propositions

These kinds of terminological solutions are linked with a series of empirical propositions regarding the relation between political (in)stability and political violence. A well-known idea is that specific dimensions of governmental force or coerciveness will help limit the level of political violence in society. Such dimensions may pertain to:

- (1) legitimacy. Legitimate governmental force will be integrated into "politics as usual" more easily than illegitimate activities. Consequently, and to say the least, the legitimate use of physical force by government agencies will not by definition be a threat to political stability;
- (2) consistency. Feierabend suggests that "inconsistent use of force may give rise to uncertainty of expectations and this uncertainty may be interpreted as yet another source of frustration".¹¹ Consistency in the use of governmental force will increase the predictability of governmental

activity. Consistent repression is accepted more easily than the inconsistent use of force; "frustrations which are perceived to be nonarbitrary are accepted with much less overt aggression than those which are perceived to be arbitrary".¹² This may carry us back to the proposition on the legitimate use of force. But another explanation could be that consistent governmental policies and actions may provide the people with a better "chance" to assess the consequences of resorting to violent opposition;

- (3) severity. Here we find the pièce de résistance of the curvilinearity theory of political violence: the positive correlation between extremely high levels of governmental coerciveness and a low degree of political violence.¹³ Tough repressive policies will deter people from opposing and disobeying the public authorities up until the (violent) end. Some analyses suggest that "the most immediately compelling of negative sanctions is force itself".¹⁴ For that reason, actual repressive behavior rather than latent instruments of force would be the relevant factor to be examined: "demonstration and threat cannot be separated".¹⁵

Comparative urban strife

Discussions on the relation between political stability and political violence usually refer to process on the national level.¹⁶ In addition, a number of studies have been done with regard to samples of urban communities within particular countries.¹⁷ We know less about the relation between political stability and series of disorders within specific cities. Most reports on the consequences of urban disorder for a local polity tend to be impressionistic, lacking the rigor of systematic empirical analysis.¹⁸

Another blind spot involves the investigation of the above-mentioned empirical propositions in democratic settings. For instance, it might seem an insult to democracy itself to examine propositions about the functions of legitimate, consistent and severe governmental force for a democratic local polity. Firstly, governmental force as such would seem an uncomfortable phenomenon which one should play down as much as possible. Secondly, in a democratic context, the legitimacy and consistency of governmental force must be constants rather than variables to be subjected to an empirical test.

As regards urban strife in a democratic local polity, one cannot do very much with the standard indicators which have thus far been used in comparative empirical studies of political violence. In an empirical analysis of disorders in a Dutch city, for example, one should take into account such general features of Dutch political culture as a very high tolerance to political and social opposition and the open access of civic groups to the political elites. To those used to the scene of violence in autocracies like Chile or Iran, the indicators of illegitimate, inconsistent or (less-than-)severe governmental force in a local polity in The Netherlands will seem nearly otherworldly - a preoccupation with phenomena which are only interesting because there are no problems of a more serious kind. On the other hand, one can argue that in such a polity even minor deviations from "politics as usual" may have a rather strong impact on the political climate.

Let us take, then, the case of a series of urban disorders in Amsterdam in the early eighties. For centuries, Amsterdam has been known as a troublesome city - the bastion of burghers and privateers in an otherwise orderly and partly royalist country. The history of Amsterdam is a history of resistance to the government residence of The Hague, disorders, and, in the last twenty years, Provo-cations (1966), student revolts (1969), violent opposition against the construction of a subway line (1974-1975), and an increasing number of squatter riots. Nevertheless, confirming our perspective to the postwar period, we may observe that: municipal elections have never been suspended; there has never been censorship of the press; and nobody has been killed due to governmental force or other forms of political violence.

In such a setting, indicators of specific characteristics of governmental force - and of other kinds of political violence as well - will necessarily be quite subtle:

- (1) legitimacy. The legitimacy dimension of governmental force may be traced from the contents of the public debate on the substantive issues (the rightness of the decision to intervene) and on the modes of intervention on the part of the public authorities (the rightness of the decision to use force). In addition to the political obligation of the public authorities, legitimacy may also derive from a legal obligation (for instance as a result of a court finding). Furthermore, one should take into consideration the procedural aspects of the decision-making process leading to a violent

confrontation (for instance the participative quality of decision-making). Contrasting indicators, which point to a loss or lack of legitimacy, include the use of excessive force and, in the political arena, symptoms of half-heartedness and hesitation;

- (2) consistency. A fundamental question accompanying a series of violent confrontations between authorities and contestants will inevitably pertain to equal treatment in equal cases. This question, which is closely related to the notion of legitimacy, may be divided into various sub-questions. Firstly, one may ask why the authorities do not invariably take action in similar cases. Secondly, the question can be asked why similar cases may induce differing degrees of governmental force. Thirdly, a very sensitive problem is posited by fluctuations in criminal policies with regard to offenses against public versus legal order;
- (3) severity. In the context of a democratic local policy one should try to find out if and to what extent public authorities enter into a confrontation with a deliberate overdose of personnel and equipment. In a similar vein, one may also look at the number and quality of the reserves kept in hand. Another aspect is the militarization of police actions, including the use of military police units and of military material. Of course, one should weigh the pros against the cons (for instance disproportional use of force and political hesitations to bring the military onto the streets). A second indicator of a relatively severe response to (expected) riots or violent resistance may involve the application of specific articles of the law or even of emergency powers. Here too there may be counter-effective consequences. For instance, the application of emergency powers may affect the legitimacy of governmental force. A summary of the indicators is presented in table 1.

Here table 1

III. Amsterdam in the early eighties: a very troublesome city

In the early eighties Amsterdam changed from a traditionally troublesome into a very troublesome city. In this connection emphasis should be put on a set of socio-economic and political factors: a heavy demand by young people for payable

Table 1 - Indicators of effective governmental force in a democratic local polity

1. Legitimacy

1.1.1. Rightness of decision to intervene.

1.1.2. Rightness of decision to use force.

1.2.1. Legal obligation to intervene.

1.2.2. Appropriate procedures.

1.3.1. No excessive force.

1.3.2. Political resoluteness.

2. Consistency

2.1. Consistent decisions (not) to intervene.

2.2. Consistent degrees of governmental force.

2.3. Consistent criminal policies.

3. Severity

3.1. Deliberate overdosis of governmental force.

3.2. Application of emergency powers.

housing; a highly speculative market; political and legal acceptance of widespread squatting throughout the city; political mobilization of both squatters and non-squatters in a semi-organized movement; overt support for this movement in progressive circles; a dramatic incapacity on the part of the housing authorities to provide for reasonably effective (re)distributive housing policies, and -more importantly- individual decisions which would at last shorten the waiting-list of citizens longing for more or less decent housing facilities (see table 2).

Here table 2

This unique constellation of problematic factors has been at the basis of a series of quite violent confrontations between the public authorities and various groups of contestants in the early eighties. Before examining these in terms of the indicators mentioned above, we will give a brief description of these disorders. In table 3 we present a few basic data.

Here table 3

1. Vondelstreet, March 3, 1980. In October 1979, the Amsterdam Court of Justice rendered judgment against the occupation by squatters of an empty building on the Keizersgracht (De Grootte Keyser). The squatters were ordered to vacate the building before November 26; the owner was given the authorization to enforce the legal order, if necessary with the help of the police. Despite several efforts on the part of the authorities and the police to negotiate a peaceful removal, the squatters refused to leave and indeed made the building look like a fortified strong point. In December 1979 and in January 1980 the social-democratic mayor, William Polak, in his capacity of local police authority, showed himself unwilling to provide police assistance asked by the process-server. On February 13, after a very long discussion, the city council defeated a motion of the small leftist parties that would have legitimized the protracted occupation of De Grootte Keyser; but the legal and political predicament remained.

On February 23, 1980 a group of squatters occupied a building in the Vondel Street. The building was owned by a religious association which used it for various purposes. After consultations between the public prosecutor and the police chief a mobile unit of the police evicted them from the premises; the mayor was informed only afterwards. On Friday February 29 a few hundred activists again occupied the building. In the evening, three mobile unit platoons were sent to the site. They encountered unexpectedly fierce opposition from the squatters and sympathizing young people. After some twenty minutes they were forced to withdraw. The demonstrators constructed a number of barricades, gradually extending their control to a rather large "no-go" area.

After a series of consultations, the authorities (in particular the mayor, the attorney-general and the chief of th Amsterdam police) decided on a twofold scenario. Attempts to talk the squatters out of the building and to persuade them to remove the barricades were to be accompanied by preparations for a forceful intervention. Despite several mediation efforts on the part of

TABLE 2 . SOME DATA CONCERNING POPULATION AND HOUSING POLICIES, 1980-1983

| YEAR | | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
|--|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| CHARACTERISTICS | | | | | |
| Amsterdam population (SEX, TOTAL) | M. | 344.663 | 338.993 | 332.355 | 326.799 |
| | F. | 367.702 | 361.868 | 355.144 | 349.725 |
| | TOT. | 712.365 | 700.861 | 687.499 | 676.524 |
| Amsterdam population (AGE) | 0-14 | 108.661 | 106.298 | 102.138 | 94.731 |
| | 15-29 | 194.327 | 193.265 | 190.166 | 182.822 |
| | 30+ | 409.377 | 401.298 | 395.195 | 398.971 |
| total housing stock | | 301.800 | 302.888 | 303.125 | 305.843 |
| AVERAGE OCCUPATION RATIO | | 2.37 | 2.31 | 2.29 | 2.25 |
| HOUSES BUILT AND RECONSTRUCTED (NUMBER OF ROOMS) | ≤ 2 | 328 | 431 | 1540 | 2453 |
| | > 2 | 1525 | 2552 | 2721 | 3922 |
| | TOT. | 1853 | 2983 | 4261 | 6375 |
| EMPTY HOUSING (time, months) | ≤ 3 | 2922 | 3605 | 3993 | 5396 |
| | 4-6 | 996 | 753 | 1514 | 2109 |
| | > 7 | 4570 | 2592 | 3798 | 2814 |
| | TOT. | 8488 | 6950 | 9305 | 10319 |
| URGENT house SEEKERS (ROOMS WANTED) | 1+2 | 35.891 | 40.944 | 39.291 | 33.689 |
| | > 2 | 20.127 | 17.549 | 19.529 | 19.356 |
| | TOT. | 56.018 | 58.493 | 58.820 | 53.045 |

source : municipal statistical
information center

TABLE 3 . Some data concerning rioting in Amsterdam, 1980-1984

| CASE, DATE INDICATORS | VS | ID | PH | DV | DGW | HS | DKW | DB | DLL | WY | SI |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|----------|
| | 3/3/80 | 30/4/80 | 19/8/80 | 8/9/80 | 2/2/80 | 3/4/81 | 8/10/81 | 13/1/82 | 11/10/82 | 14/2/84 | 23/10/84 |
| CONTESTANTS ^A | 400-600 | 4000 | 1500-3000 | 400-700 | 2000 | 200 | 350; 200 | 200 | 1500 | 2000 | 1500 |
| DEMONSTRATIONS ^B | 15.000 | 1500 | 300 | - | 4000 | 400-500 | 2000 | (200) | 1000-2000 | 1000 | 400 |
| AMSTERDAM POLICE | 350 | 805 | 450 | 300 | 600 | 225 | 175 | 14 | 275 | 270 | 420 |
| ASSISTANCE | 1200 | 3500 | 1550 | - | 1400 | - | 250 | - | 500 | 560 | 300 |
| PLAINCLOTHES TEAMS | + | ++ | ++ | + | + | ++ | + | - | ++ | ++ | + |
| MILITARY ^C INVOLVED | + | + | + | - | + | - | + | - | + | - | - |
| GAS USED | - | + | - | + | + | + | + | - | + | - | - |
| HEAVY EQUIPMENT USED | + | - | + | - | + | - | + | - | - | - | + |
| INJURIES CITIZENS | 30 | 95 | 9 | 10 | 10 | - | 3 | - | 35 | 14 | 2 |
| INJURIES POLICE | 40 | 106 | 16 | 8 | 10 | 1 | 1 | - | 24 | - | - |
| ARRESTS | - | 40 | 51 | 9 | 33 | 2 | 21 | - | 129 | 23 | 33 |
| COMPLAINTS | 15 | 45 | 12 | 8 | 44 | - | unknown | - | 95 | 20 | - |

a) Some cases pertain to events at various places.

b) Demonstrations taking place in the aftermath of evictions.

c) Including military police

SOURCES:

NEWSPAPERS
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
CITY COUNCIL REPORTS

prominent local politicians, including a proposal to put the case to court, the first scenario resulted in a complete failure. On Sunday night, March 2, the mayor delivered an ultimatum that the barricades be removed by Monday morning; the squatters would be allowed to stay in the occupied house. This proposal was turned down.

On Monday morning, March 3, at 6.55 a.m., the second scenario went into operation. With the help of military personnel and equipment, the barricades were torn down; the occupied house, however, was left undisturbed. Although the squatters in the house called upon their supporters to renounce violence, later that morning heavy fighting broke out in other parts of the city.

After these events, the mass media and the political debate focused primarily on four issues: the lack of support given to the mayor at decisive moments on Sunday night, March 2, by various party bodies; the lack of coordination between the public prosecutor's office and the local authorities; the supposed pressure from the Home Office (led by the leader of the Conservative Party) for a forceful solution; and the conspicuous presence of the military at a few hundred meters from the National Museum.

2. Inauguration Day: April 30, 1980. On January 21, 1980, Queen Juliana announced that she would abdicate on April 30. The inauguration of her daughter, Beatrix, would take place at the same day in Amsterdam - as the Dutch Constitution prescribes. In the two months following the Queen's announcement it became increasingly clear that April 30 would not pass without major challenges to public order. A well-known slogan spread by some squatter groups simply promised "Geen woning, geen kroning" (No housing, no crowning). Other slogans appealed to leftist activists and, possibly, to whoever would be eager for a turbulent scene in Amsterdam: "Come to Amsterdam, steel caps of capital importance". Later, a memorandum of the mayor and aldermen would criticize the mass media for having contributed to what was called, with sociological expertise, "a self-fulfilling prophecy".¹⁹

The central, provincial and local authorities came to agree upon the following objectives in relation to possible clashes on Inauguration Day:

- (1) the inauguration ceremonies must take place unhindered;
- (2) the safety of foreign dignitaries must be guaranteed;
- (3) spectators must be able, as much as possible, to watch and take part in the festivities;
- (4) the expression of anti-monarchist sentiments should be allowed, but not in the vicinity of the Royal Palace (the area around the Royal Palace was to be closed off).

The mobile units of the police were to stay away from the streets as much as possible; demonstrations would be unimpeded up to a second circle around the restricted area; only the general command was authorized to give permission to use fire-arms (except in case of individual self-defense). Due to complications with regard to ceremonial arrangements, the definite scenario for police operations was drawn up only ten days prior to the event. as a result, briefings and the coordination between various police as well as other units, some of which arrived in Amsterdam on the very day of the inauguration, was far from perfect.

On April 30, 1980, Amsterdam indeed became the scene of the largest and, in particular, the most fierce confrontations between the police and a variety of rioters. Except for a smoke-bomb exploding on the Dam Square, the ceremonies in and around the Royal Chapel and the Royal Palace proceeded without incidents. But at about 11.00 a.m. there were already some skirmishes at various other places in the city; and at 11.36 a.m. there was a first confrontation between a mobile unit platoon and a group of squatters and activists in West Amsterdam

During the early afternoon, the disturbance rapidly escalated to a critical point. When a group of more than three thousand persons - according to the Daily Telegraph "punks, freaks, anarchists, reds of every shade and hangers on, spoilt and vicious children" - moved off from the Waterlooplein towards the Blue Bridge and consequently threatened to break through to the restrictive zone at the southern side of the Dam Square, they were met with a large police force.²⁰ From 2.00 till 2.45 p.m. the "Blue Bridge battle" was fought, ending with the withdrawal of the police to the Rokin. At that moment, the situation was critical. Rioters tried to fight their way to the Dam from the Blue Bridge as well as directly from the Waterlooplein. The police were very near to using their fire-arms, if only because tens of policemen had been wounded and some rioters were quite ruthless. But as a result of the decision to re-group the available units and to bring into action some hard-hitting squads of the military police, the authorities were able to get the situation under control.

Until late into the evening, pitched battles were fought at several places in the center of Amsterdam. Many policemen were obliged to stay on duty for more than eighteen hours. According to some sources, around mid-night some members of mobile units yielded to an outburst of excessive force against apparant antagonists.

One of the most disputed and criticized aspects of the events was the way in which the local radio station covered the riots. Apart from the fact that their commentaries on the clashes attracted many people to the site, the reporters were accused of having indulged in inflammatory sympathy for the rioters.

3. Prins Hendrikkade, August 19, 1980. On April 2, 1980 squatters took possession of fifty-two apartments and two commercial properties in a large housing block on the Prins Hendrikkade. In the next months tensions between legal residents and the squatters assumed serious proportions. The mass media had an easy target in displaying the discrepancies between middle class owners of luxurious apartments and squatters creating a commune next door. In July the Amsterdam court ordered the squatters to vacate the apartments before August 14. Being determined to preclude a reiteration of De Groote Keyser case, the authorities decided to enforce the eviction on August 19. The mayor stated his willingness to talk with the squatters about a peaceful execution of the court decision, but he was not prepared to negotiate on the decision itself.

On Tuesday, August 19, a special squad of the military police forced its way into the heavily barricaded block. In a spectacular operation, they were lifted up in a container to the top floor and took the bastion with unexpected ease. Sharp-shooters covered the squad against possible violence on the part of the squatters. But, as it turned out, almost all squatters had already left the place through a passage connected with an adjacent church.

Simultaneously with this action, the police evicted squatters from a few houses in a street not far from De Grootte Keyser. Rumors on this operation quickly spread among the thousands of spectators and activists at the Prins Hendrikkade. Soon afterwards, squatters barricaded the roads leading to the Grootte Keyser. But nothing happened, and the barricades were removed.

After the eviction, the mayor expressed his satisfaction with the support he had received from his party. In the political arena local politicians voiced their displeasures on the hawkish interference of the Home Secretary with Amsterdam affairs.

4. De Vogelstruys, September 8, 1980. In the morning of July 3, 1980, the Amsterdam police evicted a small group of squatters from a building at a Singel called De Vogelstruys. The eviction took place without force; many squatters were, at that moment, attending a court session on the occupation of the flats at Prins Hendrikkade. In the afternoon squatters re-occupied De Vogelstruys. A few hours later, a police force of about two hundred men dislodged the squatters from the building. It came to grim clashes in front of the building as well as in its vicinity. The police had to resort to the use of tear and vomit gas; some members of the mobile unit fought the demonstrators with their own means (stones and other materials ready at hand). On both sides, about twenty people got wounded.

On Sunday, September 7, 1980, De Vogelstruys was taken for a third time by a group of young people. The squatters' movement declared it to be a demonstrative occupation, in connection with the court session against four arrested squatters scheduled for the next day. On Monday afternoon, September 8, at the time of the court trial, the police once again moved into De Vogelstruys, and once again met with fierce opposition. In the evening riots took on large-scale proportions. At several places in the city center, considerable damage was caused to "capitalist" and "royalist" property. Relatively few arrests were made.

Much attention has been given to the massive use of various types of gas by the police at the first eviction in July. It was the only real point of discussion in the political arena. The local authorities and the police, on the other hand, focused rather upon the fact that they had possibly underestimated the counter-violence. In addition, it was noticed that the main problem had been not so much the eviction itself as the subsequent commotion in the center, which had kept the police busy until the early morning.

5. De Grote Wetering, December 2, 1980*. In February 1980 squatters occupied a series of vacant houses opposite to the National Museum. The houses were owned by a real estate company which had plans to demolish them and build a block of apartments and offices. After months of judicial proceedings, the company eventually succeeded in removing the legal obstacles to evicting the squatters from four of the five occupied houses. In November De Grote Wetering became

* groot: big.

a prominent subject on the public and political agenda. A memorandum of mayor and alderman left no doubt about the inevitability of police assistance in executing the judicial order; this point of view was confirmed by two professors of constitutional law. As December approached the atmosphere in the capital grew grimmer every day. Squatters and their supporters undertook various actions and inflicted damage to the properties of mortgage banks involved in the renewal project. They exerted strong pressure on local politicians, disturbing party and committee meetings dealing with the issue.

Already a few days beforehand it was widely known that the police would take action on Tuesday, December 2. On December 1 the situation in the center of Amsterdam became disorderly. Demonstrators constructed barricades at four places in the proximity of De Grote Wetering. After a police action to remove these obstacles, it came to "hit-and-run" incidents at various places in the town center. Unidentified sources issued a "war declaration", which led people to expect a riotous eviction.

On Tuesday morning December 2 the police closed off the approaches to the area around De Grote Wetering. Whereas it was difficult to enter the heavily obstructed entrance, the eviction itself passed without violence. Within a few hours the squatters let themselves be taken away from the building. But, again, there were fierce confrontations in the vicinity of the scene, which gradually spread throughout the center and dragged on until late in the evening. A demonstration against the eviction turned into an open clash between activists and mobile unit platoons. Quite a number of policemen, including members of arrest squads, resorted to excessive force.

On Wednesday December 3 these kinds of events repeated themselves. Until midnight, the situation in the center of Amsterdam was very turbulent. Later many complaints were voiced against plain-clothes policemen who were accused of having indulged in excesses towards possibly innocent bystanders.

6. Honthorst Street, April 3, 1981. The occupation of a house at Honthorst Street by a small group of squatters on April 1, 1981, brought a new dimension to the continuing story of occupations and evictions in Amsterdam. The house was owned by the Soviet government and, as the mayor could read in a telegram from The Hague, enjoyed diplomatic status. For that reason, international commitments were involved. Instead of the usual procedure of an initiative on the part of the public prosecutor, eviction procedures were started this time by Foreign Affairs and transmitted to the local authorities by the ministry of Justice. The mayor informed the squatters of the fact that it was for considerations of international law that the occupation of the house must be terminated. The squatters gave the impression of accepting this argument.

In the afternoon of Friday April 3, 1981, a small police force had no difficulty in moving into the squattered house. But problems arose, as a few hundreds sympathizing young people started marching on to the American consulate within walking distance of the scene of the eviction. Members of one arrestation team were seen drawing their pistols to keep things under control. Things seemed to be getting back to normal, when, during the evening, riots kept some two hundred mobile unit members busy. A disturbing phenomenon, which induced a tough response, was the use of powerful catapults by some demonstrators.

The handling of this case did not evoke many questions in the political arena. It took until November before the mayor replied to some questions from the police commission of the city council. In the meantime, yet another and more turbulent case had occurred.

7. De Kleine Wetering, October 8, 1981*. In August 1981, the Amsterdam court issued an order on the eviction of one of the houses adjacent to the former Grote Wetering, nicknamed De Kleine Wetering. Various attempts by the real estate company and police authorities to come to terms with the squatters on a peaceful eviction procedure failed to produce results. On Wednesday October 7, the mayor and aldermen issued a statement that the local authorities would reluctantly perform their legal duty. In a last minute effort, the police officer in charge of the eviction eventually came to a "no first-use" agreement with the squatters in the house. But it was clear that this agreement would not have any influence on a wide variety of activist groups in the capital.

On Thursday October 8, at about 2.00 p.m., the police took action at De Kleine Wetering. As expected, it was not possible to bring about a voluntary departure of the squatters. But the "no first-use" agreement worked quite well; after some hours this part of the job had been accomplished.

Already while the eviction was taking place, an increasing number of squatters and other demonstrators put heavy pressure on the police cordon drawn up at several approaches to De Kleine Wetering. Hundreds of young people - many not older than fifteen - participated in hit-and-run confrontations, without showing any restraint. The announcement of a large demonstration at 8.00 p.m. provided them with a good reason to hold on during the late afternoon.

At the very moment of the police action against De Kleine Wetering the local authorities decided that another eviction was to take place right away in South Amsterdam, about one mile from De Kleine Wetering. This decision was based on the consideration that it would be better to have the police settle such things at one time. But to the police commanders and their units, the message came as a complete and very unpleasant surprise. The decision was at odds with the mayor's policy opposing two evictions on one day (though this policy had not been pursued very strictly until then). Already facing the likelihood of a turbulent demonstration in the evening, the police felt this operation would put the spark to the tinder.

In the evening, a few thousand squatters and other activists marched from Leidsestraat to the house in South Amsterdam, from which the squatters had, in the meantime, been evicted. Property was damaged; fire-bombs were thrown into a "capitalist" office. It came to grim fighting. In self-defense, several policemen threatened to shoot.

After the events, the pivotal question for the mass media, local politicians and the police pertained to the surprising decision to have two evictions on one day. The decision was considered to detract from an otherwise successful operation. Many opinion leaders expressed regret that the squatters of De Kleine Wetering had been free to go, while a number of foreigners that had occupied the premises in South Amsterdam had been taken into custody at the scene of the second eviction.

Evaluations of the events pointed to exactly the same problems which had already been observed more than a year earlier: the anything but mobile "mobile units"; the aggression of bystanders against plain-clothes policemen; the so-called vacuum between batons and fire-arms - the more so because of the increasingly dangerous weapons used by the demonstrators.

8. De Blaaskop, January 13, 1982. In the early morning of Wednesday, January 13, 1982, a regular police unit set out for an eviction of a housing block in the Wibaut Street called De Blaaskop. After a long judicial (and a somewhat restricted political debate) things were quite clear. A low-key approach seemed appropriate. Supposedly, there would be no violent opposition from the occupants. Indeed the eviction proceeded rather smoothly; about hundred squatters left the building. Immediately afterwards, the demolition work was started.

At about 8.30 a.m. a group of mostly young demonstrators, including some of the evicted squatters, began to construct barricades in the Wibaut Street. Subsequently, they ravaged some municipal properties in the vicinity of De Blaaskop. These kinds of activities culminated into pulling down the statue of the former socialist Alderman Wibaut and causing substantial damage to properties of the Amsterdam Public Housing Offices.

The authorities and the police were taken by surprise. In the afternoon, the police authorities decided not to bring mobile units on the street. They were afraid that this would cause the riots to spread throughout the city.

The events evoked widespread indignation. The violation of the Wibaut statue was considered beyond what a democratic society should be expected to tolerate. Leaders of the squatters' movement dissociated themselves from the "Blaaskoppers". The mass media deplored the fact that the conspicuous absence of the police might have given carte blanche to the rioters and that only one arrest had been made. In the political arena emphasis was put on the limits of tolerance.

9. De Lucky Luyk, October 11, 1982. Following protracted judicial proceedings which even included an appeal to the Supreme Court, and in spite of intense efforts by local politicians and various civic groups, by the end of September 1982 it became increasingly clear that the eviction of De Lucky Luyk would only be a matter of weeks, if not a few days. De Lucky Luyk - a mansion in the Jan Luyken Street close to the National Museum - had been occupied by squatters in April 1981. In the beginning of October strong-arm boys hired by the owner ousted the occupants from the premises. Two weeks later, a few hundred squatters reconquered the house. Since then, it had been heavily barricaded and fortified, the squatters' symbol par excellence. The occupants did not leave any doubt, then, that they would use violence in order to prevent an eviction. In addition, they called upon their supporters and sympathizing citizens, if needed, to disturb public order and inflict damage to private as well as public property.

The public authorities decided upon a surprise strategy on Monday morning, October 11, at 11.00 a.m. For this reason, the preparations were put in the hands of a small group. Assisting personnel from outside Amsterdam was supposed to arrive just after the eviction of De Lucky Luyk; arrangements to this effect were made in detailed consultations with the central authorities. But the pièce de résistance was the decision to apply special bye-laws for a successful eviction operation and for the preservation of public order.

The surprise strategy did work well. On October 11, at 11.30 a.m., the police took possession of De Lucky Luyk. Within a half hour squatters and activists were mobilized and started to construct barricades at several places in the center of the city. Due to the official strategy, it would take some time for the police to prepare itself for things to come. Meanwhile, mayor William Polak

made it known that at 1.00 p.m. a special bye-law would go into effect prohibiting behavior suggesting an intention to threaten the public order and the carrying of objects which could be used to that effect.

During the rest of the day, heavy riots broke out. Mobile unit platoons, including ten military police squads and demonstrators were engaged in a constant fight. The rioters were kept on the move by baton charges and the use of tear- and vomit gas. Twenty-four policemen and about twenty demonstrators were injured and brought to the hospital. Partly as a result of the special bye-law, nearly a hundred-and-fifty people were arrested. Property damage ran into the millions.

On Tuesday, October 12, and Wednesday, October 13, the rioting continued, though less dramatically. At two places in Amsterdam evictions were carried out without too much trouble. Another fifty people were arrested. On Wednesday, 7.00 p.m., the mayor withdrew the special bye-law.

Naturally, the hot issue in the public and political debates following the Lucky Luyk riots was the special bye-laws issued by the Amsterdam mayor. Both the city-council of the capital and the parliament held long discussions on it, but eventually gave clear support to the mayor's policy. In the city council there was some dissatisfaction with the fact that the mayor had kept the council members uninformed about his strategy. As a supplement to the special bye-laws, some members would have expected the police to be very restrained in the use of force. They were alarmed at the large number of formal complaints against excessive police force.

10. Wyers, February 14, 1984. In 1983 the former city council member and former Home Secretary, Ed van Thijn succeeded William Bolak as mayor of Amsterdam. After a relatively quiet 1983, the court-ordered clearing of a large building not far from the Central Station - the so-called Wyers block - was to become the unavoidable test-case for this mayor's approach to critical situations. After consultations with a variety of authorities (including the leaders of the Amsterdam police) the mayor decided on a strategy completely different from the one his predecessor had used in the Lucky Luyk case. Firstly, a week before the eviction was to take place, the day of the police action was made known to the leaders of the squatters in Wyers. In turn, the squatters replied with the promise of passive resistance. Secondly, Van Thijn announced that no use would be made of special bye-laws, even though there was no reason to foreclose the possibility of large-scale riots in the center of the town. To prevent things from getting out of control, more than a thousand policemen would be on stand-by.

On Tuesday morning, February 14, a large crowd gathered in the vicinity of Wyers. As promised, at about 10.00 a.m. the police went into action. The eviction itself took place in a rather relaxed atmosphere; it dragged on for nearly three hours, due to the passive resistance of the one thousand to fifteen-hundred "squatters" inside the building.

In the afternoon and evening, however, riots broke out at various places in the center of town. The police and groups of squatters and young people were, once again, engaged in sometimes grim clashes. Fourteen people were wounded; the police made twenty-three arrests.

In the aftermath of Van Thijn's test-case, the new strategy was judged a moderate success. But one could be sceptical about the chances of repeating it successfully. Complaints on the part of the Wyers squatters as to rough police behavior were a bad sign.

11. Singel 114, October 23, 1984. On October 23, 1984, about two hundred policemen took action against squatters occupying a house at Singel 114. Before they could start the eviction, they had to deal with several hundred demonstrators gathered in front of the house. Seventeen people were arrested. The eviction of the house itself did not cause any problem.

Again the eviction was followed by riots. But the "mass assault" failed to come.²¹ The spirit of vandalism in which "autonomous" groups had indulged in the summer-months, had cost them the sympathy of the people. Apart from attempts to barricade a few streets, the situation was not as hectic as on previous occasions. The police was superior in numbers (more than six hundred) and equipment. A relatively large number of people were arrested, ten of them being put on trial the next day.

IV. Amsterdam in the early eighties: the legitimacy of governmental force*

1.1.1. Rightness of decision to intervene. In the Vondel Street case (3-3-1980) the squatters could reckon with some sympathy, though the owner of the mansion - a religious association - could disclaim speculative purposes. In general, if, on the one hand, there was at certain levels of society diffuse support for young people doing something about the housing shortage, it was, on the other hand, outweighed by a general feeling that the authorities should not allow citizens to take matters into their own hands.

The decision to intervene in case of civil violence on Inauguration Day (30-4-1980) was practically self-evident. The objective set by the authorities appeared to be quite reasonable, leaving room for the expression of republican opinions. It was undisputed - among royalists as well as in less "orangist" circles - that the government must guarantee the safety of the official guests and must provide for the unhindered course of the ceremonies and festivities.

* In the diagrams the cases are termed as follows: VS 3/3/80, ID 30/4/80, PH 19/8/80, DV 8/9/80, DGW 2/12/80, HS 3/4/81, DKW 8/10/81, DB 13/1/82, DLL 11/10/82, WY 14/2/84, and SI 23/10/84.

Amsterdam: The various locations of the riots



The eviction at Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) followed a long period of tensions between legal residents and the squatters. The case was fully covered in the mass media. The squatters' indignation about the general housing situation did not seem to justify the curtailing of the rights of legal residents in the same block, even if the occupation of a block of luxury apartments caused some "Schadenfreude" among onlookers. In the Vogelstruys case of September 8, these dimensions were lacking.

In the case of De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980) the occupants and their supporters had to bear in mind that the squatters' movement had been losing sympathy in the last months. Public opinion had been faced with a year of unrest, including substantial riots. On the other hand, in this instance the squatters could point to a clear-cut case of dwellings being "sacrificed" to commercial interests.


An obvious case for eviction was Honthorst Street (April 4, 1981). Here nobody really questioned the decision of the authorities to intervene. The diplomatic status of the mansion did not leave much choice, as even the occupants were ready to admit. In this particular regard the clearing of De Kleine Wetering on the 10th of October was less obvious. Furthermore, as in the case of its "big brother", De Grote Wetering, the affair was not free from speculative stains. Yet it was seen as the logical end to an episode at this place in town.

The decision to evict squatters from De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) fit in with an over-all change in the public climate in favor of strong government policies towards illegal or quasi-illegal practices. In addition, De Blaaskop could not reckon with undivided sympathy among squatters' associations. What happened afterwards (especially the removal of the Wibaut statue by rioters) evoked storms of protest and anger.

The Lucky Luyk (from which the squatters were evicted on October 11, 1982) was the last bastion of the squatting movement in the vicinity of the National Museum. But the Lucky Luykers were not capable of presenting convincing arguments for rejecting various plans of the local authorities for a reconstruction of the mansion. The decision to intervene eventually seemed to be, if one may say so, "the only way out". The common mood was one of impatience and, more importantly, a basic distrust of the squatters' purposes.

How different was the Wyers case (February 14, 1984). Unlike the Lucky Luykers, the occupants of Wyers had succeeded in coming up with a fairly competitive alternative use for the building - the more so as the official plans aimed at constructing a hotel on this spot. Had Wyers been a target for eviction in 1979-1980, then the authorities would have found it difficult to give cogent reasons (see also 2.1.). In February 1984, however, times had changed. The case of Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) confirmed this without any question.

1.1.1. Rightness of decision to intervene



1.1.2. Rightness of decision to use force

The Vondel street case of February-March 1980 involved a series of events: an eviction, the "re-conquering" of the building, a "victory" of squatters over a small group of policemen, barricading, and, finally, a large-scale police action. All things considered, it appeared to be unquestionable that governmental force had to be used. In particular, a "state within the state" could not be tolerated - the more so as the boundaries of the no-go area were gradually extending.

Already before Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980), the atmosphere of "No housing, no crowning" did not exactly promise a peaceful course of events on the day itself. Given the objectives set forth by the authorities, it was quite clear that some kinds of demonstrations and protests, and even illegal actions, would be tolerated, but others would not. The mobilization of violence went along with the mobilization of force. On the 30th of April, after an attempt to reply with restraint to some troubles, the authorities responded with increasing vigor and intensity to frenetic collective violence (Blue Bridge; Dam Street).

In the Prins Hendrik case (August 19, 1980) force on the part of the authorities and police seemd to be a logical response to the way the squatters were acting. At this time it was the apparent intimidation of legal residents rather than the squatting that lent legitimacy to the official decision to use force. Apart from the fact that these sorts of considerations were lacking, De Vogelstruys (September 8) provided the authorities with another distinct case for eviction. Here a specific factor was the continual alternation of occupations and evictions - with the inclusion of a "demonstrative" occupation and a forceful eviction. The somewhat clever timing of the police action was a bit dubious. On the other hand, the use of force against rioters was a self-evident matter.

The decision to use force against the occupants of De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980) was dramatically legitimized by the grim warnings from the squatters' movement not to "attack" the block, with one of these warning taking

the very shape of a real "declaration of war". The very riotous atmosphere around the eviction was an additional condition for the use of force. One should not forget that in this case governmental force typically amounted to the ultimatum remedy (see 1.2. and 1.3.2.).


Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981) was a clear-cut case: if not amicably, then forcibly (see 1.1.1.). With regard to De Kleine Wetering (October 8), there was no doubt about the rightness of the decision to use force - the more so as in the nick of time the eviction itself could be arranged on mutual terms. The by then usual riots in the town underscored the notion of a proportional use of force. But an equally clear-cut case of how authorities can reverse their own concept of legitimate force was displayed the same day in relation to an ill-planned second eviction in South Amsterdam. If there was any reason for an eviction, there was no reason whatsoever to surprise the police by a sudden call-up for another operation.

De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) points to a low-key approach on the part of the police. Following the eviction, events took a turn which, according to many people, would have demanded vigorous police actions. But the police was taken by surprise. It would seem then that the rightness of the decision not to take action was questionable.

The case of De Lucky Luyk (October 11, 1982) resembled that of De Grote Wetering in the mutual build-up of suspense and preparedness for a confrontation. In some respects, De Lucky Luyk recalled Inauguration Day (see 3.3.) Besides, the use of force again appeared to be based on the notion of an ultima ratio. Massive riots required the use of massive force.

Wyers (February 14, 1984) was a clear instance of a decision to negotiate passive resistance for a low-force promise. Proportionality lent legitimacy to the use of force. But the distance between the low-force approach at the eviction and the tough fighting during the riots had a problematic side (see 2.2.). In the Singel case (October 23, 1984) there were no problems of this kind.

1.1.2. Rightness of decision to use force



1.2.1. Legal obligation to intervene.

Under Dutch law squatting (taking possession of unoccupied premises without the permission of the owner) is not a penal offense - at least until now.²² For a variety of reasons (for example a demonstrable intention of the owner to give a specific use to the premises) the judiciary may, however, give a warrant of eviction to a claimant. In that case the mayor must provide the bailiff with the police assistance he asks for. It may also happen that the public prosecutor assesses a case as a disturbance of domestic peace. Then, the public prosecutor, in his capacity as competent authority for the detection of offenses, may order the police to take proper action. By now, there is a tendency towards consultations between the mayor, the public prosecution office and the police - irrespective of the authority lines in a specific case.²³

The eviction of the building at Vondel Street on February 24, 1980 and a second, abortive action on February 29, definitely resulted from an initiative of the public prosecution office. In the turbulent weekend ending with a forced clearing of the building on March 3, one thing was clear: the judicial basis for the eviction had not been as sound as the public prosecutor had initially thought. On the other hand, the legal grounds of the police actions in preserving public order were very solid.

On Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) the legal obligation to intervene was beyond doubt. It would be a bit imposing to relate it to the constitutional dimensions of the ceremonial events. But it was a plain fact, that once the authorities had decided on the place and time of the inauguration, legally based responsibilities and duties were a logical result. Furthermore, large-scale riots were to be contained in any case.

In the Prins Hendrik case (August 19, 1980) the eviction was based on a sound court order. But the legitimacy of the entire operation was affected negatively by the fact that a simultaneous eviction had its legal ground in a widely disclaimed juridical trick.

De Vogelstruys eviction (September 8) also met with juridical objections. the public prosecution office did not seem to pursue a consistent policy. Interestingly enough, the police and the public prosecutor seemed to have different opinions on the original situation in the premises. But, after all, there was a warrant of eviction.

De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980) was a juridically clear case, even if the substantive objectives of the real estate company owning the block raised doubts among several parties concerned. The legal obligation of the authorities to take action was indeed put to a scholarly test. As to the Honthorst Street eviction (April 3, 1981), though very interesting because of the peculiar setting, such a test was really not needed. From the perspective of international law the situation did not leave much room to maneuver.

Regarding the legal obligation to intervene, there was no difference between De Grote Wetering and De Kleine Wetering (October 8, 1981). Again, the local authorities made a painstaking effort to determine the juridical grounds for eviction and their own role in the judicial process. Less clear, however, was the juridical context concerning the second eviction on October 8.


In the case of De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) the squatters "played high", up to and including a State Council procedure. But they lost. The fierce riots in South Amsterdam called for a response from the authorities - which did not come and indeed evoked questions about the legal duty of the local government to adopt a firmer stand on such occurrences.

De Lucky Luyk case (October 11, 1982) was preceded by a number of juridical initiatives on the part of the municipal authorities, supposedly aiming at the

correction of judicial errors. Whatever the motives may have been, these efforts took quite some time. A different story could be told about the procedure leading to the rather disputed special by-laws (see 3.3.).

In 1984 (Wyers on February 14 and Singel on the 23rd of October) there was no discussion about the judicial grounds for eviction.

1.2.1. Legal obligation to intervene



1.2.2. Appropriate procedures

In the case of Vondel Street (February 23 - March 3, 1980) one should draw a distinction between the events on February 24 and 29, on the one hand, and the "long weekend" of March 1-3. Appropriate procedures were conspicuously lacking in the former events. The public prosecutor failed twice to consult the municipal authorities. After the unpleasant surprise of February 29 all of a sudden, things changed drastically. The whole weekend was one protracted consultation.

In various respects, the preparations for Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) suffered from a lack of time. The coordination of an event of such proportions was a complicated affair, involving all three levels of government, the relations with other countries, and - last but not least - a large number of voluntary associations. Lack of time was an important factor in other respects too. Consequently, efforts to reach some sort of modus vivendi with "the other side" were made under considerable time pressure.

In regard to Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) one should take into account that the premises had been occupied five months before and that there had been several mediation efforts in June-July. Though determined not to accept a repetition of De Grootte Keyser drama, the mayor was willing to talk, if not about the eviction decision itself. De Vogelstruys (September 8) was vacated after a constant alternation of occupations and evictions. Here the relations between the public prosecutor and the other parties in the triangle (city hall and police) were not that clear. On the other hand, three weeks after the Prins Hendrik case the eviction as such was not an issue.

De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980) was the subject of extensive negotiations and mediatory efforts. The squatters could not complain about the attention given to their housing needs and to their ideological views. The case stood high on the public as well as the political agenda. Passing by the obvious case of Honthorst Street (April 4, 1981) where, nevertheless, the squatters received a letter from city hall explaining the particular reasons for the prompt eviction, De Kleine Wetering (October 8, 1981) seemed to be a carbon copy of its "big brother". Again the authorities did their utmost to come to terms with the occupants and leaders of the squatters movement. Even more incomprehensible was the ill-prepared decision to simultaneously clear a mansion in South Amsterdam.

In the case of De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) the squatters and their advisors made much out of "procedural mistakes" supposedly committed by the municipal authorities. Whether such mistakes had been made or not, discussions and negotiations had been dragging on for a long time. There had been plenty of occasions for exercising influence.


De Lucky Luyk (October 11, 1982) was a complex case. One should distinguish the external and internal procedures. Externally, the procedures (the negotiations with the occupants) really did not leave the squatters much to wish for - at least from a procedural perspective. Mediatory activities, proposals, suggestions, promises were numerous and accommodating. Taking all this into consideration, the mayor's surprise strategy did not detract much from it.

On the other hand, it is a fact that internal procedures (consultations within the official sphere) were extraordinarily secretive. The mayor did not consult the police committee of the city council, and he informed only one of the aldermen. It looked a bit like a self-imposed solitary confinement.

Wyers (February 14, 1984) was a completely different case. The strategy developed by the new mayor and his advisers involved extensive consultations in the political system and an open policy towards the squatters. There were to be no surprises.

Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) was a clear-cut case. Strict procedures fit in with changes in the public mood. The times of protracted hesitation and indecision were over.

1.2.2. APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES



1.3.1. No excessive force

In the Vondel Street case (February - March 1980) the police appears to have operated with restraint. Though the events in the evening of February 29 were a quite shocking experience for most of the policemen and there might thus have been a "reason" for over-response at later occasions (Monday, March 3), substantial excesses did not take place.

On Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980), the police stood under severe pressures: bad preparations (many of them arriving in the capital without any information on what was going on); being on duty from the early morning until late at night; facing rioters who fought without any consideration; being confronted with large numbers of injured colleagues.²⁴ In this context one would expect excesses to take place. On the basis of diverse eye-witness reports one may conclude that at the end of the day excessive force had indeed been used at a number of places in Center Amsterdam. But, as a matter of fact, this should

be weighed against the frenetic violence on the part of many rioters. If the overall score given in diagram 1.3.1. seems a bit severe, one should realize that in this respect severe standards must be applied.

In regard to the eviction at Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) no substantial excesses were mentioned, although there was some information about the unnecessarily rough action on the part of the arrest squads. The presence of sharpshooters in the vicinity of the building could, at best, be called an excessive threat to force (see 3.1.). Three weeks later De Vogelstruys case (September 8, 1980) did not give rise to discussions on excessive use of force. Unlike the first eviction in July, this one occurred without the use of teargas during the eviction itself.

The case of De Grote Watering (December 2, 1980) was the first in a long series that was accompanied by sharp complaints about violent and aggressive actions on the part of the special arrest units. During the riots following the eviction at Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981) members of an arrest squad drew their pistols in order to get things under control. They did not seem to act in self-defense.

Despite much publicity concerning the role of the arrest units, these kinds of events repeated themselves in the aftermath of the eviction of De Kleine Watering (October 8, 1981). Interestingly enough, similar problems occurred especially during and after the ill-prepared eviction in South Amsterdam.


As has been shown before, De Blaaskop case (January 13, 1982) points to excessive absence rather than to excessive use of force. Arrest teams and mobile units were not present. In many ways, this did not serve the legitimacy of the local authorities either.

In the case of De Lucky Luyk (October 11, 1982) the starting-point for analysis should be the fact that special by-laws provided the authorities and the police with extended powers to deal with the situation. In this sense the sizeable number of complaints on the rather uncontrolled way of acting on the part of plain-clothes policemen was remarkable. One would have expected the police to handle the situation with extraordinary self-restraint - proportional to the extraordinary powers given to them. Of course, a mitigating factor might be that the riots also assumed extra-ordinary proportions.

In the Wyers case (February 14, 1984) excessive use of force would seem to be at complete odds with the strategy followed by the authorities. The success of this strategy depended completely on the ability of the police to perform according to the scenarios. From this perspective complaints from some squatters that they had been treated with extreme force carried special weight. Reports of vigorous actions on the part of some arrest squads did not help either.

Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) did not draw attention in this respect.

1.3.1. No excessive force



1.3.2. Political resoluteness

The case of Vondel Street (February 23 - March 3, 1980) was a prototype of political resolution. At a really critical moment, in the early morning of Monday, March 3, the social-democratic mayor, William Polak, was confronted with public disapproval on the part of the provincial party executive committee. This nearly brought him to submit his resignation. The Vondel Street case actually caused tensions already latent within the local Labor Party to burst into the open. The differences of opinion between the left and right wing could not be reconciled.

The mayor had to take up a clear position after a long period of hesitation and non-decisionmaking. So he did. But because of what had happened up until then, he could not count on the undivided support of the Amsterdam branch of the party. To the outside world, the political tumult accompanying the decision-

making process during the critical week-end was the very picture of how things ought not to be.

With regard to Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) the local authorities and the police could count on the support of a comfortable majority in the political arena. In the Labor Party a very slight minority criticized what was said to be the build-up for a tug of war. Afterward an even smaller minority raised objections to the dominating interpretations of what had happened during Inauguration Day.

In the Prins Hendrik case (August 19, 1980) the mayor could reckon with the support of his own party. The pressure from The Hague for a firm stand against the squatters gave left-wingers in the Labor Party a splendid opportunity to feign anger and acquiesce subsequently. This situation simply repeated itself in September (De Vogelstruys).

For a long period De Grote Wetering stood very high on the agenda of local politics. The procedures and processes leading to the eviction on December 2, 1980 were as protracted as they were open. Eventually a solid majority was in favor of the decision to intervene forcefully. The political debate on the events was an early one for the authorities. This also holds for the eviction at Honthorst Street (April 4, 1981). The police commission of the city council allowed the mayor to take his time - indeed more than half a year - in answering its questions.


If the case of De Kleine Wetering (October 8, 1981) had been limited to the vacating of the remnants of the Grote Wetering building, a similar story could have been told. However, the decision to evict another building on the same day caused the very political conflict which the authorities, the mayor in particular, had so firmly tried to avoid. The irony was that the mayor's resoluteness led to feelings of uncertainty and to political tensions.

In De Blaaskop case (January 13, 1982) the over-all support for the authorities was unmistakable. Nevertheless, the unusually strong emphasis in the decisionmaking process on urban redevelopment issues kept the matter a bit apart from the institutionalized patterns of squatting and negotiation which had gradually taken on definite shape. Consequently, official policies towards De Blaaskop were not that clear and were sometimes the subject of bureaupolitical competition (see 1.2.2.).

De Lucky Luyk was an important case (October 11, 1982). During the several months preceding the eventual eviction, the occupation of the mansion induced many local politicians to take part in the consultations, mediatory efforts and negotiations. The city council discussed the case a couple of times. It was no secret that the central government took a keen interest in De Lucky Luyk. When the moment came, the local authorities surely earned a good deal of political capital. Notwithstanding the surprise strategy and the special bye-laws, the mayor had no difficulty during the admittedly long debate in the city council. Loyal experts were more critical than the Amsterdam city council.

In the Wyerse case (February 14, 1984) part of the open policy developed by mayor Ed van Thijn was to have intensive consultations with a large number of prominent politicians. It was thought to be necessary to secure the support of key figures for a rather risky strategy. If things went wrong, the political risk had to be kept as small as possible.

Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) was an easy case. It did not reach the political agenda.



V. Amsterdam in the early eighties: the consistency of governmental force

2.1. Consistent decisions (not) to intervene

Not only did Vondel Street (March 3, 1980) represent the first decision to take action in connection with a significant case of squatting, but it also followed on a period of hesitation and postponement (De Groote Keyser). Neither the

construction of barricades nor the squatting itself was a sufficient explanation for the decision to intervene. Such things had been happening before and had been tolerated.

Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) was case unique in substantive content and proportions. Therefore, the decision to make preparations and anticipate a possible violent confrontation with squatters and others was a logical one. But the already-mentioned lack of time was an impediment to working out all the details of the plans or, rather, to bringing the details together in a smooth over-all scheme. The evident solution was to stick rigidly to the official plans. On Inauguration Day, then, there was almost no room to manoeuvre in a somewhat flexible manner. Under these circumstances, the authorities ran the risk of creating a gap between the official, top-down policy and the actual operations going on at various places in the town.

Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) was the first case in which the local authorities took a firm decision to assist in the execution of a court order, and stood by it. Paradoxically, owing to the fact that this happened to be the first time that the local authorities displayed their resolution with regard to a prominent case of squatting, the score for consistency could not be very high (see diagram 2.1.). But perseverance would definitely pay off next time.

So it did in the cases of De Vogelstruys (September 8, 1980), De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980), and Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981). With respect to De Vogelstruys the eviction was the second on a row. The Grote Wetering case, by and large, exhibited signs of routinization. Although a special case, the eviction at Honthorst Street fit in with the then-established policy.


In the case of De Kleine Wetering (October 8, 1981) this policy was pursued again. To that extent, the eviction, as well as the riots accompanying them, were subject to consistent decisions. However, the general picture was greatly impaired by the precipitate (in any case ill-considered) decision concerning a second eviction on the same day.

The decision to carry through the vacation of De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) was in line with the anti-squatting policy of the local authorities. As had been stated above, this case revolved around a somewhat unusual issue. But that would affect the consistency in the application of force rather than the consistency of the decision to intervene (see 2.2.).

The Lucky Luyk eviction was the logical complement to the squatters' intention to declare their premises to be the last "bastion of freedom". Thus De Lucky Luyk also became the provisionally last case for eviction. Irrespective of the special circumstances under which the eviction took place, the decision to intervene was a consistent one. It should be added that again a comprehensive policy and a post hoc argumentation were affected by the decision to clear two other houses that same day.

The decisions to intervene with regard to Wyers (February 14, 1984) and Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) were in line with the standard policy of the local authorities. Yet by 1983-1984 there was one ugly stain. In some neighborhoods in Amsterdam, squatters had gradually and step-by-step appropriated entire street blocks and indeed taken command over the distribution of dwellings. This must affect the score on consistency, however normal the evictions of Wyers and Singel 114 might seem.

2.1. Consistent decisions (not) to intervene



2.2. Consistent degrees of governmental force

It could almost be said that the second stage in the Vondel Street case (the failed eviction attempt of February 29) attested to a consistent use of force on the part of the local authorities. Had not this happened before (De Groot Keyser)? Meanwhile, the differences in the use of force between Friday February 29 and Monday March 3 could not be greater: three mobile unit platoons forced to withdraw versus a massive action of tanks and about fifteen hundred policemen.

On Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) the use of force was bound to strict instructions. Acts of very fierce violence on the part of rioters were responded to with vigorous police actions. There were moments when the police was near to using fire-arms. In a few incidents individual policemen drew their pistols in assumed self-defense. Looking back, it seems remarkable that no shots were fired. In the sixties the police had used their fire-arms on different occasions, all of which would indeed seem rather unsubstantial in the eighties.

The case of Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) not only was the first instance of an effort to stand by a firm decision, it also was the first case in which the authorities immediately combined the decision to intervene with the decision to apply substantial force, whenever this would seem necessary (see also 3.1.). Three weeks later De Vogelstruys provided an example of inconsistency (September 8). The authorities and the police were taken by surprise, when in the aftermath of the eviction serious riots broke out. After the proper handling of the Prins Hendrikkade case, this was even more remarkable.


Similar mistakes were not made in De Grote Wetering case (December 2, 1980). The authorities had adapted themselves to the pattern of evictions followed by heavy riots. Taking the Vogelstruys as an unfortunate intermezzo, one should give a pretty high score for consistency here (see diagram 2.2.). In the case of Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981) the authorities pursued a similar line.

In the case of De Kleine Wetering (October 8, 1981) a first problem was the widening gap between a soft-handed approach to the occupants of the premises and a tough-handed one to rioters and bystanders. Secondly, the decision to go for a second eviction (in South Amsterdam) created an atmosphere in which a clear view of what had to be done was lacking.

With regard to De Blaaskop (January 13, 1982) and the heavy rioting subsequent to the eviction the police turned to a low-force approach. Afterwards, they had to admit that they had chosen an unfortunate case for this kind of change. Outside the center of Amsterdam things could be very bad too.

In the Lucky Luyk case (October 11, 1982) the surprise strategy of the local authorities had some negative side-effects. Firstly, from about 1.00 p.m. on were all of the sudden a large number of police units brought on the streets. This stressed the already mentioned distinction between the setting of the eviction and the context of subsequent events. Secondly, in the afternoon two other evictions were carried out. This invited the kinds of questions which had been raised on previous occasions.

In the Wyers case (February 14, 1982) the problem of a low-force eviction on the one hand and a hard-handed approach to turbulence on the streets on the other repeated itself. In this respect Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) was a simple case.



2.3. Consistent criminal policies

Although the first phases in the Vondel Street case (February 23-24 and February 29) were characterized by a strong and exclusive involvement of the public prosecution office, criminal policy was not aimed at taking offenders into custody. Few arrests were made. It must be a poor comfort that the public prosecutor kept to the rather restrained approach used in relation to De Groote Keyser.

On Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) priority was given to the preservation and restoration of public order. The plain result was that in relation to the large number of serious offences only forty-seven arrests were made. Afterwards

much criticism was expressed regarding the apparent malproportion between offences and arrests, not to speak of the outcome of the penal procedures. But all things considered, these kinds of criminal policies did follow the lines developed on previous occasions. Furthermore, the police adhered to them with remarkable self-control - at the cost of self-restraint in the use of force (see 1.3.1.).

Partly as a result of the above-mentioned criticism of criminal policies the authorities turned to a more balanced approach. This boiled down to a somewhat stronger emphasis on the apprehension of offenders during riots, and, for that reason, a more intensive use of arrest squads. In the aftermath of the eviction at Prins Hendrikkade (August 19, 1980) fifty arrests were made, which was more than during Inauguration Day. Of course, at this time the consistency of criminal policies could not be scored high (see diagram 2.3.). But perseverance would certainly pay in future cases.

In the Vogelstruys case (September 8, 1980) good intentions suffered from the miscalculation by the authorities of the resistance to be expected. De Grote Watering (December 2, 1980) was a clear example of contradictory criminal policies. The occupants of the vacated dwellings were arrested, but released immediately. During the riots more than thirty people were taken into custody. But again many of them had to be released due to lack of evidence. In the case of Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981) another factor drew attention. In spite of the employment of a substantial number of arrest units, only two arrests were made. Meanwhile there were quite a number of complaints about the way they had interpreted their role (see 1.3.1.)


In the Kleine Watering case (October 8, 1981) the fair dispensing of justice became an issue because of the striking difference in the handling of two evictions. The occupants of De Kleine Watering were free to go - before the eyes of thousands of spectators. At the second eviction, later that day, the illegal residents of the vacated mansion were treated rather harshly and held for interrogation.

The Blaaskop case (January 13, 1982) again raised many doubts about the consistency of criminal policies: frenetic violence but no arrests. At the end of the year the Lucky Luyk case (October 11) produced more than one hundred

arrests. This was certainly related to the application of special bye-laws which had broadened the grounds for apprehension. Afterwards the detention and bringing-up conditions were severely criticized. The situation should have called for a very careful approach.

With regard to Wyers (February 14, 1984) criminal policies were supposed to fit in with the open strategy on the part of city hall. A limited number of arrests suited the over-all purposes of the authorities. In the Singel 114 case (October 23) a harsh approach appeared to fit the circumstances. Procedures involving a fast adjudication were included. By the end of 1984 times had changed.

2.3. Consistent criminal policies



VI. Amsterdam in the early eighties: the severity of governmental force

3.1. Deliberate overdose of governmental force

In the Vondel Street case (February - March 1980) two completely different occurrences are at issue: the failed eviction attempt of February 29 and the events of March 3. The course of events on February 29 bore upon three platoons of the Amsterdam police yielding to superior numbers of demonstrators, and thus upon a reiteration of a fair number of such cases in the recent past. On March 3, on the other hand, the authorities had learned their lesson. They put on a considerable display of police force and preceded it by a demonstrative employment of military equipment.

As table 3 points out, on Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) the central and local authorities used a police force of a size unprecedented in the postwar period. In addition, they kept military personnel in reserve. This did not prevent the situation from becoming quite critical during the fierce clashes with the rioters. Having large numbers of policemen at one's disposal turned out to be less important than their familiarity with the "context of violence". Some mobile unit platoons literally got lost in the course of events.

The Prins Hendrik case (August 19, 1980) was a clear instance of the authorities deciding upon a deliberate overdose of force. Nothing was left to chance. But three weeks later the mayor's decision "to keep it small" worked out badly, as the eviction of De Vogelstruys was followed by an unexpected outbreak of riots (September 8).

In the case of De Grote Wetering (December 2, 1980) this mistake was not repeated. The police were well prepared. Neither the turmoil of December 1 nor the riots of the next days came as a surprise. Even then there were enough men kept in reserve. During riots following the eviction at Honthorst Street (April 3, 1981) the police were confronted with the use of quite dangerous weapons by rioters. Though these kinds of weapons had already been used during heavy clashes between the police and rioters in the city of Nijmegen (February 1981) and some Amsterdam units had taken part in the police actions involved, here and then it came more or less as a surprise.

In the Kleine Wetering case (October 8, 1981) the authorities copied the way they had handled the Grote Wetering case. In this respect they took into account the possibility of unpleasant surprises. But unfortunately they misassessed the negative consequences of the decision to settle at one blow a second eviction.


The Blaaskop case (January 13, 1982) was a pure instance of the very opposite of having an overdose of personnel stand by. When the authorities and the police first heard of the acts of vandalism and riots in East Amsterdam, they actually were compelled to decide not to intervene. It would have taken too much time to bring sufficient police to the site of the incident.

In a way, the strategy that was developed for the Lucky Luyk case (October 11, 1982) suffered from similar deficiencies. Initially, the police were kept "in the barracks". It is clear that considerable risks were taken. The police had to accept that they would be facing rioters who would already have taken control of strategic positions in the vicinity of De Lucky Luyk. It did indeed happen that way at various places (for example at Museum Square).

In the Wyers case (February 14, 1984) a more than sufficient display of police force was put on. It was quite clear that the open strategy chosen by the authorities was not to be thwarted by an outburst of violence on the part of the squatters. Should that happen a decision to take immediate action was not to be impeded by practical problems.

The eviction of Singel 114 (October 23, 1984) was prepared and treated in an effective way.

3.1. Deliberate overdose of governmental force




3.2. Application of emergency powers

The only relevant cases were Inauguration Day (April 30, 1980) and the Lucky Luyck (October 11, 1982). In respect to Inauguration Day rules restricting the freedom of movement in the closed-off area evoked criticism and an unsuccessful appeal to the court; but this actually did not refer to the use of extraordinary powers. The Lucky Luyck case was the only one in which special bye-laws were applied - which indeed became the key issue in the public and political debates afterwards.

As a matter of fact the pros and cons of special powers were the subject of a continual discussion in the early eighties (see 1.2. and 1.3.1.). On some occasions in 1980 and 1981 the local authorities came pretty close to this kind of solution. But what mattered was that, except for the Lucky Luyck case, they never did resort to special (bye-)laws. Interestingly enough, one of the main considerations concerning the Wyers eviction (February 14, 1984) was that the

Lucky Luyk turmoil must not be repeated and that special bye-laws were out of the question.



VII. Interpretation

Table 4 summarizes the dimensions of governmental force examined thus far. The over-all picture attests to the necessity of specifying the dimensions of effective governmental force.

Here table 4

It is not sufficient to rely on diffuse notions of the relation between political stability and political violence. To take one example, the curvilinearity hypothesis turns out to be too much of an amalgamation to be of much help.

The detailed analysis of eleven confrontations during the early eighties in Amsterdam between the authorities and the police, on the one hand, and squatters and rioters on the other hand, leads to the following conclusions.

Firstly, it is clear that the political culture in Amsterdam, which after all is not fully at odds with Dutch political culture at large, allows for the authoritative use of governmental force. The Vondel Street eviction was the first case in many respects. The fierce confrontations on Inauguration Day were an important lesson to the authorities, though the Vogelstruys case showed that accidents happen soon. At the end of 1981, after two years of continual clashes the local authorities and the police appeared to be exhausted. The Kleine Wetering case was a clear instance of hypervigilance; in the case of De Blaaskop

Table 4. Summary of dimensions of governmental force

| | VS 3380 | JD 2280 | PH 4380 | DV 8400 | DG 21200 | HS 5481 | DG 8481 | DB 13192 | DLL 11082 | MY 15784 | SI 23004 | Total |
|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------|
| 1.1.1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 27 Right interv. |
| 1.1.2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 20 Right use force |
| 1.2.1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 26 Legal obligation |
| 1.2.2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 22 Procedures |
| 1.3.1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 18 No excesses |
| 1.3.2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 25 Resoluteness |
| 2.1 | -1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 20 Consistent interv. |
| 2.2 | -2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 14 Consistent force |
| 2.3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | -1 | -2 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 2 Consistent crim. policies |
| 3.1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | -2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 10 Deliberate overuse force |
| 3.2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | -2 | 0 | 2 Emergency powers |
| Total | 1 | 20 | 23 | 14 | 23 | 24 | 7 | 14 | 17 | 21 | 27 | |

Legitimacy $143/178 = 0.80$

Consistency $36/99 = 0.36$

Severity $12/66 = 0.18$

Total $191/330 = 0.58$

the authorities yielded to the opposite. It would seem that the period of relative calmness in the first half of 1982 and, on the contrary, the popular response to a sudden outburst of vandalism in the beginning of July (the destruction of building materials at the location of the future city hall) provided the authorities, the mayor in particular, with an opportunity to prepare for a large-scale move against the Lucky Luyk. From the end of 1982 on things went pretty easily, except for the developments in some neighborhoods which gradually became squatting states within the state.

Secondly, a closer look at the use of force by the Amsterdam authorities and police in the early eighties indicates that the effectiveness of such force has been based largely upon legitimacy rather than consistency or severity. One may interpret this in terms of a trade-off: the exchange of consistency and severity for legitimacy. Of course, such a trade-off involves a number of risks. For instance, it closely ties the concept of governmental force to potentially unstable factors like the public mood and political support. In addition, it may lead to a certain neglect of the need for consistency, which may sooner or later have a destabilizing impact on legitimacy. Finally, the authorities and the police may have serious difficulties in handling antagonistic activities based on competitive claims to legitimacy. In such cases the authorities and the police may stand empty-handed. They cannot point to a consistent record, and they are unable convincingly to threaten a resolute group with the infliction of severe harm. Squatting states may hold out for a long time.

Thirdly, if legitimacy is so important for the effectiveness of governmental force, it is crucial to pay attention to the relatively low score on preventing excessive force. The low score for this indicator in our analysis resulted in large part from the way of acting on the part of arrest teams. Looking at the lack of consistency in criminal policies, it is tempting to conclude that arrest teams either should be used to arrest as many people as possible - or should not be brought onto the streets.

Fourthly, this analysis suggests that the curvilinearity hypothesis, with its emphasis on the consistency and severity of governmental force, may only have limited relevance in relation to a local democracy. Even in the absence of consistency and severity of governmental force, a local democratic polity may get through fairly difficult times. Much appears to depend on the public and

political support for the authorities. But one may wonder if this suffices in really difficult times. Then, while sticking to legitimacy, the authorities may be compelled to go for the use of severe force.

A second qualification of the curvilinearity hypothesis may take advantage of the prominent role attributed to legitimacy. The hypothesis is exclusively oriented to the interaction of violence on the part of private groups and governmental force. Low degrees of violence are supposed to relate to very low and very high degrees of force. Even in case of democratic polities, where one would find low scores for violence as well as force, the hypothesis appears to refer to a mechanistic interaction between violence and force.

Our analysis testifies to the fact that quite different dynamics may dominate the relation between the authorities and private groups in a turbulent context. The empirical examination of governmental force in Amsterdam during the early eighties clearly demonstrates that public opinion and the momentum of the public and political debate may be much more important than the specific features of governmental force. When the dominant view gradually settles for a definition of the situation which does not tolerate any longer large-scale violence and rioting, the times of such manifestations of dissatisfaction and protest will soon be over. By-standers leave the arena of violence and force; groups and individuals prepared to use violence become isolated and increasingly fall prey to internal disputes; the resoluteness of the political leaders grows with the change in the public mood. A resolute show of force may eventually give the last push.

Footnotes

1. Keith M. Dowding and Richard Kimber, The Meaning and Use of "Political Stability", in: EJPR, 11 (1983), 229.
2. Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane, Political Stability in European Democracies, in: EJPR, 11 (1983), 246.
3. Leon Hurwitz, Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability, in: Comparative Politics, 5 (1973), 449.
4. Ted R. Gurr and M. McClelland, Political Performance (Beverly Hills: Sage 1971).
5. Ersson and Lane, 253.
6. See Uriel Rosenthal, Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability (Alphen on Rhine: Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1978), pp. 118-120.
7. See S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, New York : Basic Books 1970, especially pp. 17-23.
8. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton U.P.), p. 34 and pp. 232-273.
9. I.K. Feierabend et al, The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence, in: Comparative Politics, 5 (1973), pp. 393-424.
10. L. Macfarlane, Violence and the State (London: Nelson 1974), p. 46.
11. Feierabend et al, pp. 414-415.
12. E. Burnstein and P. Worchel, Arbitrariness of Frustration and its Consequences for Agression in a Social Situation, in: L. Berkowitz (ed.), Roots of Agression (New York: Atherton 1969), p. 75.
13. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 251; Feierabend et al; Rosenthal, pp. 167-173.
14. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 234.
15. H.L. Nieburg, The Threat of Violence and Social Change, in: APSR, 56 (1962), p. 865.
16. Feierabend et al; Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence (New York: Wiley 1973); Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality (New York: Wiley 1975).
17. See for instance Joel A. Lieske, The Conditions of Racial Violence in American Cities, in: APSR, 72 (1978), pp. 1324-1340.

18. See for instance John Benyon (ed.), Scarman and After (Oxford: Pergamon, 1984). A wonderful exception is Ted R. Gurr et al, The Politics of Crime and Conflict (London: Sage 1977).
19. Memorandum on the events of April 30, 1980, Municipal Proceedings nr. 619, Amsterdam May 16, 1980, p. 1375.
20. Daily Telegraph, May 1, 1980.
21. A. Barton, Communities in Disaster (Garden City: Doubleday 1962).
22. An anti-squatting bill awaits acceptance by Parliament.
23. See Uriel Rosenthal, The Bureaupolitics of Policing: the Dutch case (ECPR, Salzburg 1984), to be published in: Police Science Abstracts, 1985 (Elsevier Publishing Company).
24. E. Nuijten-Edelbroek, Amsterdam 30th of April, 1980: a report on the experiences of members of the mobile units (The Hague 1981).

B 85 SID
f 1-20

First draft

27 February 1985

STABILITY, CRISIS AND BREAKDOWN:
Some Notes on the Concept of Crisis
in Political Analysis.

by

Palle Svensson

European University Institute,
Badia Fiesolana,
50010 San Domenico Di Fiesole (FI),
Italy.

and

Institute of Political Science,
University of Aarhus,
8000 Aarhus C,
Denmark.

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR-workshop
on "The Stability and Instability of Democracies",
Barcelona, 25 - 30 March 1985.



1. Introduction

The basic question behind this paper is to what extent assertions about a crisis of democracy are well-founded, when such assertions are made about the political regime in a particular country such as Denmark (1). Surprising as it may seem, there has been much talk about a political crisis and a crisis of democracy in the public debate in Denmark during the 1970's, and even political scientists have seriously discussed the possibility of a breakdown of "a working multiparty system" (Pedersen, 1981). It should, however, be made clear from the outset that it is not the intention of the present paper to give an answer to this question. The ambition is more modest, because a reexamination of the central concepts seems to be necessary before going into detail with the empirical problems which the basic question raises. In journalism and public debate terms such as "stability", "crisis" and "breakdown" are widely used and generally without any clear definition. As it seems to be a reasonable assumption that the concepts behind these terms are related, the question to be dealt with in this paper is how these concepts could be defined in a meaningful way and how their relationship could more precisely be understood. The aim of this paper is, accordingly, to bring together some theoretical notions and to formulate a basic conceptual framework for the study of the crisis of democratic regimes. Even if the concepts are

sometimes discussed in the abstract, it is primarily the stability, crisis and breakdown of democratic regimes which I have in mind in the following (2).

2. The Concept of Stability

At first glance political science literature does not seem to be of much help concerning the first concept of "stability". Even if the literature on this topic is extensive, it is also rather confusing. There is no need to review the many different ways in which the concept of "political stability" have been used, since this have been done at length in other places (see for instance Hurwitz, 1971, 1973; Sanders, 1981, pp. 1-21; Dowding and Kimber, 1983, pp. 229-236; and Ersson and Lane, 1983, pp. 245-250). Suffice it to say that the concept of "stability" in general and of "political stability" in particular is both ambiguous and multidimensional (Ersson and Lane, 1983).

The concept is ambiguous because the term is not connected with any generally accepted definition. Apparently, the theoretical situation described more than ten years ago by Leon Hurwitz still exist: "The concept of "political stability" is an excellent illustration of the fuzziness and confusion existing in political science research regarding concept formation,

operationalization, and measurement. The concept of stability means all things as various individuals attempt to measure the degree or amount of "political stability" present in their particular universe. ... Although there are strands of common agreement in most of the literature as to the basic broad meaning of the term, confusion abounds due to the lack of agreement concerning the meaning of the terms employed to define "stability"; and there is also a lack of consensus regarding the operationalization of these latter terms" (Hurwitz, 1973, p. 449).

The concept is multidimensional because various political scientists and sociologists use it about different objects and about different properties of those objects. First, "political stability" has been applied to different levels of the political system such as the community, the regime and the authorities, to use David Eastons terminology (Easton, 1965). Second, there is no general agreement about the property associated with "political stability". For some authors the term is connected with the absence of a specific property, for instance violence or change, whereas for other authors it is connected with the presence of a specific property, in particular continuity, durability, longevity, endurance, persistence or some other term signifying a long and uninterrupted existence. Thus, Hurwitz identified no less than five different approaches to stability: (1) the absence of violence; (2) governmental longevity/duration; (3) the

existence of a legitimate constitutional regime; (4) the absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal attribute (Hurwitz, 1973, p. 449).

It may be tempting to conclude from this theoretical situation that at present the search for a definition is a premature task (Ersson and Lane, 1983, p. 250). However, not every one is willing to draw this conclusion, and recently an attempt to clarify the concept has been made by Keith M. Dowding and Richard Kimber, which deserves serious consideration. Perhaps, the theoretical situation is not so confusing as it appears?

The definition of "political stability" suggested by Dowding and Kimber is basically in accordance with David Easton's conceptual framework of systems analysis, which makes it well suited for the study of crisis and breakdown of democratic regimes. The minor differences which they state in relation to Easton are mainly explained by a difference in perspective. Whereas Easton seeks to formulate a theory for the persistence of the political system as such, Dowding and Kimber want to formulate a general concept of stability which could be applied to governments, regimes, institutions etc. (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 236). However, Easton makes it quite clear that his conceptual framework might also be useful for the study of democratic regimes (Easton, 1965, p. 481).

Dowding and Kimber define political stability as the state in which a particular political object exists when it possesses the capacity to prevent threatening contingencies from forcing its non-survival - i.e. from forcing a change in one or more of that object's criteria of identity. (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, pp. 238-239). In this definition it is essential to note that the concept of stability is neither defined in terms of the mere absence of change of a political object nor in terms of the mere survival of a political object.

First, Dowding and Kimber argue that the absence of change is not a necessary condition of stability, and this may be said even of large or sudden changes. An object may be stable even if a large number of its elements are changed. The important thing is what kind of elements are changed and under what circumstances. Whereas the continuity of some elements is needed, it is only the defining or identifying characteristics of the object which have to remain unchanged: "... in general, we may say that the survival of any given political object consists in the continuity of those elements by which that object is identified" (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 237). Furthermore, not even any change of the identifying characteristics of a political object is a proof of instability. Only the changes of such characteristics which are a response to challenges and which are necessary to avoid the non-survival of the political object represent a case of instability: "Change that is accepted voluntarily by any

political object is not proof of instability, even if the change results in a complete discontinuity" (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 238).

Applying this conceptualization to a political regime, the stability or instability of a particular political regime is dependent on the way in which the political regime is defined. The identifying characteristics of a political regime can, of course, be specified more or less in detail. When we talk more generally about the stability of a democratic regime and define "democracy" by "polyarchy", we can only classify this regime as stable if there is no forced change in the inclusiveness and the liberalization of the regime (cf. Dahl, 1971, pp. 1-16) or no forced change in the rights, institutions, and processes that define polyarchy (cf. Dahl, 1982, pp. 10-11). When we talk about the stability of a particular democratic regime, as for instance the Danish regime, we have furthermore to specify the characteristic features of the Danish democracy, before saying anything about the stability of this particular regime. This means that we have to distinguish between the stability of the regime, the democratic (or polyarchical) character of this regime, and the specific national version of the democratic regime. It is, for instance, quite possible that the specific Danish combination of democratic characteristics may be unstable in a given period without the more general democratic character of the Danish regime being unstable.

Second, Dowding and Kimber argue that the mere survival of an object is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of stability: "The question of survival and non-survival is important because it is obviously connected with stability, though it is not what stability means. In common with other writers on stability, we would not wish to say that all systems that survive are stable; nor can all non-surviving systems be said necessarily to have been unstable." (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 237).

Some political objects have a natural lifespan which means that a change of the identifying characteristics - which for Dowding and Kimber is the same as the non-survival of the object - at the end of such a lifespan is no evidence of instability. Whereas this line of argument is clearly relevant for governments, it hardly seems valid for democratic regimes, which do not - as a rule - have any natural life time. Survival does, indeed, seem to be a necessary condition for the stability of democratic regimes. It is not, however, a sufficient condition, because an object may exist without being stable. If an object is not confronted by any challenges, which are threatening its identifying characteristics, it may survive or persist even if it lacks the capacity to cope with threats (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 241). This state could, accordingly, be called "an unstable persistence".

To summarize the argument of Dowding and Kimber a political object - for instance a democratic regime - may either be in a state of stable or unstable persistence, but the former state can only be identified in a situation where some kind of challenges are threatening the continued existence of the identifying characteristics of the object. Even if this definition of stability may to some extent differ from the usual language of journalists and politicians (3), and even if stability may be difficult to identify in empirical analysis, this definition is nevertheless clear, and in addition it seems to go well with recent attempts to define our next tricky concept.

3. The Concept of Crisis

Undoubtedly, the concept of "crisis" is rather vague and diffuse (Zimmermann, 1979, pp. 68ff.) This is not only the case in the public debate, but also in the political science literature. As noted by James A. Robinson "'Crisis" is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning ... Because of its varied meaning the term "crisis" has not been useful in building "systematic knowledge" about social phenomena. Terms that cover almost any situation are not helpful in analysis that emphasizes variables and the relations among variables. If many different kinds of situations

are labeled crisis, then the factor becomes a constant and cannot be related to variations in other aspects of social process." (Robinson, 1968, p. 510).

There have, however, during the last years been some promising developments in crisis research and models have been constructed which can be applied to comparative research (see for instance Verba, 1971; Flanagan, 1973; Morlino, 1979, 1981, 1983; Zimmermann, 1979, 1981, 1984). Central to this theoretical development is that the concept of "crisis" is connected with challenges to the political system of such a kind and degree that the persistence of the system is threatened. The system is facing a potential breakdown, and this breakdown is likely to occur unless the system itself or its environment is fundamentally changed (cf. Janicke, 1971, pp. 531f.)

Thus, Ekkart Zimmermann in an energetic contribution to the analysis of crisis and crisis outcomes has defined a crisis of the political regime in this way: "Political crises are here understood in a wider sense than mere government crisis: they more or less call for and possibly lead to substantial changes in policies or the political order, respectively, not to a mere replacement of personnel." (Zimmermann, 1979, p. 69 emphasis in the original). This definition of crisis is based on the definition suggested by Sidney Verba who defines it as "a change that requires some governmental innovation and institutionalization if elites are not seriously to risk a loss of their position or if

the society is to survive" (Verba, 1971, p. 302). In almost the same way Scott C. Flanagan defines a system crisis as "a challenge to the authority of the constituted decision makers expressed through extralegal means of protest on a scale sufficient to threaten the incumbents' ability to maintain order and continued occupancy of authority roles" (Flanagan, 1973, p. 48). He underlines that - when he is speaking about a "systemic crisis" - he is limiting his definition to those challenges that threaten the constitution of the polity, i.e. the established rules of the game for allocating authority and rewards.

The only difference between Verba and Flanagan seems to be that Flanagan specifies the challenges to the system as "extralegal means of protest" such as civil disobedience, strikes, assassination, sabotage, rioting etc. In this respect Flanagan is in line with Ekkart Zimmermann and Leonardo Morlino both of whom in their models point to some kind of political violence as challenges that might lead to the breakdown of the political system (Zimmermann, 1979, p. 90; Morlino, 1979, p. 68). Even if it may be important to look for political violence in crisis situations, and even if political violence has been of vital importance in the cases in which democratic regimes have broken down following a crisis, it seems inappropriate to make it a definitional feature of crisis. It is more reasonable to make an empirical hypothesis that political violence is one of the

kinds of challenges that may threaten the survival of democratic regimes.

On the other hand, Verba and Flanagan agree, that some kind of structural change is a part of the crisis concept: "Systemic crisis and structural change suggest something more than a shuffling of personalities, as when one cabinet falls and is succeeded by another. They imply a fundamental change in regime that alters the institutional power balance among the contenders" (Flanagan, 1973, p. 48). As pointed out by Brian Barry, this seems an unnecessary limitation of the concept. If the political system is able to eliminate the challenges to its continued persistence by changing the environment, it seems reasonable enough to say that a crisis has been survived (cf. Barry, 1977, p. 102ff.)

These conceptual considerations imply that the concept of "crisis" has to be clarified along at least two dimensions. Whenever the concept of "crisis" is applied, first it has to be specified which kind of object has come to a crisis, and second it has to be specified how this political object has been challenged.

Concerning the first dimension, it seems perfectly reasonable to speak about a governmental crisis, a crisis of the party system, a crisis of democracy, i.e. a crisis of a democratic regime etc. In this context my argument is that a crisis for one part of the political system or one level of the

political system does not necessarily lead to a crisis for other parts of the system. This is a question to be studied empirically in different countries under different political, social and economic circumstances.

It seems, however, to be a reasonable hypothesis that the less comprehensive components of the political system could come to a crisis without the more comprehensive components coming to a crisis at the same time, whereas the opposite is less likely to occur. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that the party system could come to a crisis, without the democratic regime coming to a crisis at the same time. On the other hand, it seems unlikely, that democracy should come to a crisis in a country without having any effect on the party system.

Concerning the second dimension of how the political objects are challenged and changed, it should be made clear that it is not reasonable to speak of a crisis whenever a political object faces problems, new problems or even severe problems. Nor is it reasonable to speak of a crisis, whenever a political object undergoes changes, sudden changes or even extensive changes. Only the combination of challenges that could lead to the breakdown of the object or to structural changes of a fundamental character constitutes a crisis.

At this point the relationship between the concepts of stability and crisis has to be clarified. As the two concepts have been defined here it is evident, that they are closely

connected. Political stability has been defined as the state in which a political object has the capacity to prevent challenges from forcing a change in one or more of that object's criteria of identity, whereas the central meaning of a political crisis has been outlined as the combination of challenges which could lead to the the breakdown of a political object or structural changes of a fundamental character. A consistent relationship between the two concepts is obtained, if the somewhat vague notion of "substantial changes" or "fundamental changes" in the concept of crisis is replaced with the more precise formulation of "changes of the identifying or defining characteristics". Thus, the stability of a political object can only be demonstrated during a crisis, when the capacity of the object to cope with challenges is put to a test, and when a forced change of the identifying characteristics of the object is a possibility. In this crisis situation the stability of the object is demonstrated by the avoidance of a forced change of the object's criteria of identity.

5. The Concept of Breakdown

The political science literature on breakdown of political objects in general and political regimes in particular is as comprehensive as the literature on political stability and

crisis, but it is also much more blurred, because it covers topics such as political violence, military coups, revolutions etc. (see for a review, Zimmermann, 1981)(4). However, as it has been pointed out by Juan J. Linz, despite some overlapping between the phenomena of breakdown of democratic regimes and revolutions, there are also important differences. Most of the breakdowns of democratic regimes have been counterrevolutionary in the sense, that they have aimed at preventing radical changes of the social structure, and none of the breakdowns of the relatively stabilized democracies has been caused by the left. Revolutions and breakdown of democratic regimes should therefore be studied separately (Linz, 1978, p. 14). Only recently have some comparative analyses been published on the political dynamics of the breakdown of democratic regimes in the historically most important countries such as Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain and Chile.

Juan J. Linz does not explicitly define what constitutes a breakdown of a democratic regime, but it is evident, that for him it means the end or the death of the specific democratic characteristics of the regime (Linz, 1978, pp. 5-8, cf. pp. 75-86). Following this argument, it is suggested that a breakdown of a democratic regime be defined as the complete disappearance of those elements that constitute the democratic identity of the regime, and that distinguish a democratic regime from an authoritarian and a totalitarian regime.

Concerning the relationship between the concepts of "stability", "crisis" and "breakdown" a clarification of the definition of stability, which is suggested by Dowding and Kimber, seems to be needed in order to obtain a consistent conceptual framework.

Dowding and Kimber explicitly define "survival" of a political object as the continuity of those elements by which it is identified and the "non-survival" of a political object as a change in one or more of these criteria of identity (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 237 and p. 239). However, in my view this terminology of "survival" and "non-survival" is not well chosen, because "non-survival" is easily taken to mean "collapse" or "breakdown", i.e. the complete disappearance of the political object. Dowding and Kimber themselves contribute to this interpretation, because they are very close to identifying "instability" with "collapse", when they emphasize that "stability" is a dichotomous concept and illustrate this point by an example of different levels of violence as a threat to political systems: "We may ask in respect of any system which is under some kind of pressure which may cause it to collapse, whether it is able to avoid, stand up, or overcome the forces lined-up against it. If it is, then the system is stable ... The level of violence per se has no necessary connection with whether the system is stable or unstable. Consider a system that would collapse at a certain level of violence, say R riots per week;

that is, the system lacks the capacity to deal with violence at this level or above, and thus has the property of being unstable with respect to this contingency even when R riots have not occurred. ... At violence level R the system is in a state of being unstable and this violence causes it to collapse." (Dowding and Kimber, 1983, p. 239).

Even if it is accepted that the concept of stability is a dichotomous concept, it does not follow that instability is the same as collapse and breakdown. It seems to be quite possible that the system could transform itself by changing one or more of its identifying characteristics as a response to the threats of increased violence and in this way obtain the ability to cope with the violence level R. This is certainly a forced change of identifying characteristics and consequently a proof of instability, but the question is whether it should be taken as a breakdown of the system? If it is taken as a breakdown, what should we then call the case in which all the identifying characteristics of the system are changed?

My argument is that the relationship between the concepts under discussion could be made clearer and more consistent by separating the concept of breakdown (or collapse) from the concept of instability. Only the forced change of all the identifying characteristics of a political object constitutes a breakdown. When only one or some of the identifying characteristics of a political object are forcefully changed during a

crisis, we have a form of instability which might be called a transformation of the object (5) in order to distinguish it from the kind of instability or unstable persistence discussed above (the case in which a political object may persist in a state of instability because it lacks the capacity to respond to challenges without having been confronted by such challenges. This unstable persistence might also be called a latent instability, because the instability has not yet been openly demonstrated).

A clear illustration of a regime crisis and political instability without breakdown is the political development in the Weimar republic from 1930 to 1932, where parliamentary rule was gradually transformed to a semiparliamentary rule with government "above the parties" and responsible only to the president. M. Rainer Lepsius concludes his analysis of this period before the final breakdown of the Weimar republic: "It is likely that the combination of presidential rule, politics of issue coalition, and short-term crisis management could have been carried on for a longer time and that total collapse of democracy could have been avoided, despite the economic crisis that was further weakening the traditional structure of the German society and polity. There might also have been a chance for a revitalization of the party structure in 1934 or 1935 when the international economy recovered. However, the fragmentation of the party system and the strategy of temporary retreat from

government participation and crisis management by emergency decrees were certainly preconditions for the breakdown of democracy" (Lepsius, 1978, p. 46 cf. p. 48).

Of course, this distinction between a transformation and a breakdown of a political regime raises the classical question about when an old system is transformed, and when an old system has broken down and replaced by a new system. It also raises the related question of the importance of several identifying characteristics of a political object, in this case a political regime. Undoubtedly, this is to some extent a matter of definition. As discussed above, a political regime may be defined more or less in detail. When the study concerns the crisis of democracy, it would be relevant to apply the definitions of democratic regimes in relation to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Linz, 1975). A forced change of the identifying characteristics of a democratic regime is accordingly a transformation of the regime, if its democratic nature is maintained - for instance a transformation from parliamentary rule to presidential rule - whereas a breakdown of the democratic regime is followed either by the disappearance of the political system (in David Eastons sense) or the subsequent establishment of an authoritarian or a totalitarian regime.

5. Conclusion

The discussion of the conceptual framework has lead to a definition of the central concepts, which is outlined in Figure 1, and a relationship between these concepts, which - regarding democratic political regimes - can be described briefly in this way: The stability of a democratic regime can only be demonstrated during a crisis, where challenges are threatening the continuity of the identifying characteristics of the regime, and where both a breakdown and a transformation of the democratic regime is avoided.

- Figure 1 about here -

Following this conceptual clarification the crucial question becomes, what more precisely constitutes "threatening contingencies" or "challenges" to democratic regimes, and how such challenges are differentiated from other problems facing a democratic regime and government. The study and development of generalisations about challenges of this kind is clearly an empirical task falling outside the aim of this paper, which has concentrated on conceptual problems.

NOTES

- (1) This paper is a revision of parts of a paper on "The Crisis of Democracy or the Democracy of the Crisis? A Discussion of the 'Crisis'-Concept and its Application in the Danish Case", which was presented at the panel on "Crises and Breakdown of Democratic Political Systems" of the Sixth Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, 19-22 July, 1983. The revision solely concerns the conceptual problems of that paper and it is particularly inspired by my reading of the article of Dowding and Kimber (1983), which was not published when I wrote my paper. The present paper has been worked out during my staying at the Badia Fiesolana, Florence as a Jean Monnet Fellow. I want to thank Jesper Jespersen and Richard Sinnott for valuable suggestions and comments.
- (2) 'Democracy' is in this paper used as a descriptive term indicating the kind of political regimes which are common in Western countries. It does not mean that the democratic ideal of political equality is realized. Accordingly, it would be more correct to speak about 'polyarchy' in Robert A. Dahl's sense (Dahl, 1971, 1982). In this paper 'democracy' is, however, used synonymously with 'polyarchy', (cf. Linz, 1975, pp. 182-185). 'Regime' is in this paper used in David Easton's sense signifying the values (goals and principles), norms, and structure of authority (Easton, 1965, p. 193).
- (3) It could be argued, however, that this definition of political stability comes very close to the concept of "adaptability" that is often applied in the political science literature. For instance the dependent variable suggested by Ekkart Zimmermann is very similar to the definition of political stability of this paper: "Strictly speaking, adaptability is the ultimate variable researchers (and politicians) want to know more about. What is needed is knowledge about the efficiency of a political system, not merely about its continued existence. The ultimate goal would be to use persistence and adaptability (cf. Gurr, 1974) as a measure of successful coping with changing environments." (Zimmermann, 1979, p. 94).
- (4) My reference is to the German edition of the book, because I have had no access to the English version: Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises, and Revolution: Theories and Research. Cambridge, Mass.: Alfred Schenkman, 1983.
- (5) I am less happy with the term "reequilibration" suggested by Juan J. Linz, although it is intended to cover almost the


same concept: "Reequilibration of a democracy is a political process that, after a crisis that has seriously threatened the continuity and stability of the basic democratic political mechanisms, results in their continued existence at the same or higher levels of democratic legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness." (Linz, 1978, p. 87). First, I am generally sceptical about the application of the concept of equilibrium in political analysis, and second, I don't find it appropriate to link by definition a transformation of a democratic regime and the outcome of this transformation. A transformation of a democratic regime does not necessarily lead to a new stability and "equilibrium". Perhaps, Linz's "equilibration" is to be taken as a particular kind of transformation of a democratic regime?

REFERENCES

- Barry, Brian (1977). "Review Article: 'Crisis, Choice, and Change', Part I", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, no. , pp. 99-113.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1982). Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dowding, Keith M. and Kimber, Richard (1983). "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability'", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 229-243.
- Easton, David (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Ersson, Svante and Lane, Jan-Erik (1983). "Political Stability in European Democracies", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 245-264.
- Flanagan, Scott C. (1973). "Models and Methods of Analysis", in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt (eds.), Crisis, Choice and Change, Boston: Little, Brown.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1974). "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971", American Political Science Review, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 1482-1504.
- Hurwitz, Leon (1971). "An Index of Democratic Stability. A Methodological Note", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 41-68.
- Hurwitz, Leon (1973). "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 449-463.
- Janicke, Martin (1973). "Zum Konzept der politischen Systemkrise", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 530-554.

- Lepsius, M. Rainer (1978). "From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Degree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany" in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 34-79.
- Linz, Juan J. (1975). "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, vol. 3, pp. 175-411.
- Linz, Juan J. (1978). Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Morlino, Leonardo (1979). "La crisi della democrazia", Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 37-70.
- Morlino, Leonardo (1981). Dalla democrazia all'autoritarismo. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Morlino, Leonardo (1983). "What Crisis of Democracy in Italy?". Paper prepared for presentation for the panel on "Crises and Breakdown of Democracy" ISPP Sixth Annual Scientific Meeting, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, July 19-22 1983.
- Pedersen, Mogens N. (1981). Denmark: The Breakdown of a 'Working Multiparty System'?. Odense: Institut for Statsvidenskab, Working Papers no. 11/1981.
- Robinson, James A. (1968). "Crisis", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, vol. 3, pp. 510-518.
- Sanders, David (1981). Patterns of Political Instability. London: Macmillan.
- Verba, Sidney (1971). "Sequences and Development" in Leonard Binder et. al, Crises and Sequences in political Development. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 283-316.
- Zimmermann, Ekkart (1979). "Crises and Crises Outcomes: Towards a New Synthetic Approach". European Journal of Political Research, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 67-115.
- Zimmermann, Ekkart (1981). Krisen, Staatsstreich und Revolutionen. Theorien, Daten und neuere Forschungsansatze. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Zimmermann, Ekkart (1984). "The Study of Crises in Liberal Democracies. Pitfalls and Promises". International Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 319-343.

Figure 1: Classification of Different States of Political Regimes





'WRONG PERSONS ARE MAKING GOOD DECISIONS WITHOUT HEARING US' -

Political trust, responsiveness of politicians and satisfaction with governmental policies in Finland

Matti Wiberg
Academy of Finland
The Research Council for the Social Sciences
The University of Turku
Department of Political Science
SF-20500 TURKU
FINLAND

BRS SID
#1-10

Abstract

The low trust in politicians in general endangers the political stability of a democratic political system, is conventional wisdom even within the political science community. It is the purpose of the paper to challenge this conventional notion. It is claimed that, on the contrary, distrust of politicians in general may just be evidence of healthy scepticism. It should, on the other hand, be clear that high trust in politicians in general may also endanger the stability of our political system, even the whole existence of the democratic order. Total faith is blind faith. The main argument of the paper is supported with empirical evidence from Gallup polls in Finland (1974-1984), which show, among other things, that the overall satisfaction with governmental policies has been exceptionally high in our country.

Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Distrust in Politicians in Finland | 4 |
| Two Types of Allegiance | 11 |
| Responsiveness of Politicians in Finland | 16 |
| Healthy Scepticism as a Democratic Ideal | 18 |
| High Satisfaction with the Cabinet's Policies | 20 |
| Turnout in General Elections | 25 |
| Conclusion | 27 |
| Appendices | 28 |
| References and Sources | 30 |

To be presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Session of Workshops at Barcelona 25-30, March 1985 in the workshop The Stability and Instability of Democracies.

Introduction

It has for many years been conventional wisdom even within the political science community that mistrust in politicians in general endangers the political stability of democracies. This notion has taken a variety of forms, too numerous to be listed here. In this short paper, I want to challenge this conventional wisdom. I try to support my view by empirical evidence from a few public opinion polls in Finland.

Citizens have become more suspicious, more critical, more cynical about politics. Quite many scholars argue that we face a crisis of confidence, even a crisis of legitimacy. A political system, they argue, must enjoy a deep reservoir of basis support. This reservoir assures the backing of citizens, their willingness to go along with government policies whether or not they have had the chance to approve them in advance, indeed, whether or not they believe them to be a good way to deal with the problems facing the country. Alienation, in this view, cripples the effectiveness, and thereby threatens the stability of the political order.

(Sec Coleman 1963, Sniderman 1981, 8).

We have faced a change in the public opinion about politics and politicians even in Finland. Before presenting some recent findings, let me suggest a simple typology of the evaluation of government and its political performance.

Let us take some liberties with reality and assume that it makes sense to evaluate a government and its political performance along the following three dichotomous dimensions:

- A) the quality of the persons in government (cabinet) (good/bad)
- B) the quality of the governmental decisions (good/bad)
- C) the responsiveness of politicians (responsive/non-responsive).

There are eight different combinations of these alternatives:

Table 1
The Evaluation of Government (Cabinet) and its Policies

| ADC | |
|-----|-----|
| 1 | +++ |
| 2 | ++ |
| 3 | +- |
| 4 | -+ |
| 5 | --- |
| 6 | --- |
| 7 | --- |
| 8 | --- |

(Key: + = good (for columns A, B), responsive (for column C);
 - = bad (for columns A, B), non-responsive for column C)).

Which alternative represents the (democratic) ideal? Which alternative is actually realized in a given democratic society? Unfortunately, these two questions do not necessarily have the same answer. It is traditional wisdom to claim that in democratic societies alternative 1 is the ideal one, that is:

good people making good, responsive decisions. Consequently, the worst alternative is the converse: bad people making bad, unresponsive decisions (alternative 8). But what about the other alternatives? Here opinions differ. Some of us concentrate upon the procedural dimensions of our government, whereas others feel that what really counts is the quality of the decisions. The point to be made in this short paper is that alternative 6 is the alternative we now face in Finland. Furthermore, it would be adequate to speak of a crisis of legitimacy only if alternative 8 is a correct description of our present situation.

We proceed as follows. First, some recent findings/about the distrust in politicians are presented. Then we briefly discuss different types of allegiance. This is followed by some recent findings on the responsiveness of Finnish politicians. Fourth, the view that political scepticism belongs to the democratic order is defended. After this we present some empirical evidence on the satisfaction with governmental policies in Finland. Then we present the relevant turnout scores for the latest elections. The paper ends with the conclusion that no real crisis is present in our country with regard to confidence, legitimacy or stability.

Distrust in Politicians in Finland

In the summer of 1975 the Finnish scholars Pertti Pesonen and Risto Sankkilahti studied the opinions of Finns (N = 1676) about politicians and political activities. To the question,

"How much do you trust the government to do what is right?"

they received (Pesonen & Sankkilahti 1979, 32) the following response (in per cent):

| Always | Most of the Time | Only Some of the Time | Almost Never |
|--------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| 3 | 45 | 41 | 7 |

(No Answer: 7 %).

So, almost half of the respondents thought that the government was doing the right thing most of the time. This is not at all a low trust score. However, many commentators seem to think that more trust is necessarily needed; these figures are too low for a normal situation, they claim.

In May 1984 the Finnish newspaper Kaleva interviewed 930 persons over 18-years old about some actual political issues. When the respondents were asked about the honesty and irreproachability or correctness of a few influence groups, the results were not all too favourable to politicians (ministers and Members of Parliament). The question was as follows:

"What is your general opinion about the honesty, trust-worthiness and irreproachability, in general, of the following groups in Finnish society as compared to ordinary citizens?"

Table 2
Trustworthiness of Groups (%)

| | Ministers, M.P.s | Top level functionaries of the state and the municipalities | Reporters of newspapers, TV, radio |
|---------------------------|------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| much more correct | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| a little more correct | 6 | 10 | 11 |
| equal correct | 49 | 45 | 53 |
| a little bit less correct | 23 | 24 | 19 |
| much less correct | 9 | 10 | 6 |
| don't know (no answer) | 9 | 9 | 10 |

Source: Kaleva, *Rehellisyydentutkimus* 1984.

In October 1984 the largest Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat published a poll on among other things the trust in Finnish politicians (N = 1606, all over 18). The question was as follows:

"What is your opinion of the activities of politicians in our country lately; have they generally acted in such a manner that your trust in them has increased, decreased or has it remained the same as before?"

The results are represented in tables 3, 4 and 5.

Table 3

Change in Trust in Politicians (%)

| | |
|---|----|
| The trust has increased | 3 |
| The trust has remained the same as before | 38 |
| The trust has decreased | 56 |
| Don't know (no answer) | 3 |

Source: Helsingin Sanomat 14.10.1984, p. 29.

The decrease in trust in politicians was, surprisingly perhaps, greater amongst the more elderly sections of the population:

Table 4

The Decrease of Trust in Politicians by Age (%)

| | |
|----------------|----|
| Under 25 years | 52 |
| 25 to 34 years | 52 |
| 35 to 49 years | 55 |
| 50 to 64 years | 60 |
| over 65 years | 62 |

Source: Helsingin Sanomat 14.10.1984, p. 29.

Table 5


The Decrease of Trust in Politicians by Party Supporters (%)

| | |
|---|----|
| Social Democratic Party (SDP), g | 45 |
| Finnish Peoples Democratic League (SKDL), o | 67 |
| National Coalition (KOK), o | 62 |
| Centre Party (KEPU), g | 49 |
| Liberal Peoples Party, merged into KEPU in 1982 | 38 |
| Swedish Peoples Party (RKP), g | 81 |
| Christian League (SKL), o | 70 |
| Finnish Rural Party (SMP), g | 67 |
| Other (among others the Greens), o | |

(Key: o = opposition party; g = governmental party)

Source: Helsingin Sanomat 14.10.1984, p. 29.

From left to right the parties may be placed as follows:



See Appendix 1 for a table on the parliamentary support of the parties.

In the early summer of 1984 a poll (N = 2320) was conducted by Finnish Gallup. According to this poll, 78 % of the respondents thought that the distance between the political parties and the problems of ordinary citizens had increased. Almost the half of the respondents (44 %) claimed that there was no political party concerned about just those questions which the respondents felt to be the most urgent or most important ones. Only 11 % of the respondents agreed, at least to some degree, that "the information presented by politicians to citizens is trustworthy". 66 % disagreed to some degree or disagreed strongly with this claim. (Sipponen 1985, 2). If we sum up all this evidence, we may conclude that the respondents did not feel that our politicians are exceptionally honourable persons. Hence the 'Wrong Persons' in the title of this paper.

The evidence of these polls and, by the way, from other polls as well, has, of course, received much attention in political discussion in our country. The problem is, in my view, however, that far too many hasty conclusions have been presented. Many of the practical conclusions seem to be quite beside the point. The reaction by the Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Erkki Pystynen (KOK) is quite revealing. In a speech delivered on January 31 this year, he suggests that the decrease in trust in politicians may to a decisive extent be a result of the impact of the mass media: "It is mainly the mass media that have effected the emergence of distrust in politicians. Citizens no longer get their

information about the politicians, about their speeches and their activities directly from the politicians themselves, but via the mass media." (Quoted in Turun Sanomat 1.2.1985, p. 11). Mr. Pystynen clearly presupposes in many parts of his speech that the trust could easily be (re)established if only the mass media would come to their senses and alter their activities. Another presupposition in Mr. Pystynen's speech is that political trust is really something a democratic society needs in order to maintain its stability. He, as so many other political authorities do, stresses the need to (re)establish the trust in our political order, in order to safeguard the political stability of our political system.

The perhaps most striking statement concerning a crisis of legitimacy in Finland today is presented by Mr. Dag Anckar, professor of political science at Abo Akademi (1983). He makes his point by using (ib., 14) a typology inspired by David Easton:

Table 6

Support and Legitimacy: Four Configurations

| | | DIFFUSE SUPPORT | |
|------------------|------|---|--|
| | | High | Low |
| SPECIFIC SUPPORT | High | Legitimacy of: 1. R: high A: high | Legitimacy of: 3. R: low A: high |
| | Low | Legitimacy of: 2. R: high A: low A → | Legitimacy of: 4. R: low A: low |

Here R (regime) stands for the values, norms and structure of authority, and the term A (authorities) stands for specific occupants of authority roles. Anckar (ib., 14) notes that a transformation from configuration 2 to configuration 4 is foreseeable (as illustrated by arrow A) in Finland today.

However, in my opinion, Mr Pystynen has no real need to be afraid at all, nor is Mr Anckar's analysis adequate. On the contrary: No crisis of confidence is present. Let me explain.

Two Types of Allegiance

It seems that the bulk of the commentators who ponder over the decreasing trust in politicians misinterpret the empirical evidence; their interpretation is not balanced. From the single fact that trust in politicians has decreased, they directly infer that the stability of our political system is threatened. It is, however, quite obvious that this is not necessarily the case.

Consider the following typology (Nielsen 1983, 3) of the evaluation of politicians.

Table 7

| ASPECTS EVALUATED | ACTORS EVALUATED | |
|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | politics in general | specific politicians |
| overall assesment | 1 | 2 |
| specific properties | 3 | 4 |

The figures presented above on distrust in Finland all focus on cell 3, as measurements of political distrust normally do. One could think that a crisis of confidence is present only when distrust is exceptionally high, even in cell 1. Whether this is actually the case in Finland must be left open, because there is no empirical evidence on this issue.

I find Paul Sniderman's (1979) concise study quite illuminating and it might be helpful in rejecting the conventional wisdom that high trust in politicians is a necessary condition for the political stability of a given political system. Sniderman points out that there are two quite distinct types of allegiance. The difference between the two centres on a readiness to recognize that politicians (Sniderman talks about governments) need not be good in all respects, even if they are good in most. He reminds us (p. 12) that allegiance may pose at least as serious a threat to democratic politics as alienation. Sniderman's typology of loyal citizens is a very simple one: there are the 'supportive' and the 'committed' citizens. By a person with a supportive outlook, he means one whose orientation toward the national government is positive, but whose approval of it is not without substantial qualifications or reservations. This notion of a supportive citizen seems to be quite on par with the ideal of a democratic citizen; not blind loyalty but balanced judgement: an awareness that a democratic political order, whatever its virtues, will have short-comings.

The committed citizen, on the other hand, is more than merely, or even markedly, favorable towards the government. His view of the government is less than balanced, it is exaggerated. It is signified by an uncommon willingness to praise government and an uncommon unwillingness to

find fault with it. The commitment of a committed citizen is an instance of blind faith: 'my country (read: government), right or wrong'.

In contrasting the two forms of allegiance, Sniderman (1981, 16-19) notes that allegiance need not be blind. The supportive know that the government is not good in all respects and, indeed, may be bad in some. Their attachment is strong, but their judgement is balanced. In contrast, the committed embrace the political order without reservation. Theirs is a totalistic faith.

To take a normative standpoint, I prefer the supportive citizen because I find it obvious that he, *ceteris paribus*, is committed to the ideals of democratic order in a much better way than the committed citizen. A supportive citizen is committed to democratic principles, but he is also aware of the inevitable infirmities of democratic institutions, however well conceived, and of those who hold public office, however well intentioned.

The problem with the interpretation of the change in public attitudes toward politicians in general is presented by Finnish commentators, is that they find the change problematic. Many of them talk of a serious crisis. This interpretation rests on the simple presupposition that the ideal would be that all, or at least the bulk, of the population are 'committed citizens' in Sniderman's sense. Many

interpreters often only implicitly claim that distrust is the criticism of modern democratic politics by its citizens. It must be ill-founded, because of the inherent limitations of these citizens, and especially because the political elite is both superior in capacity, and practical in its recognition of the need for responsiveness. It is anti-democratic because democracy depends, so the argument goes, upon respect for the wisdom of elected officials and because the stability and thus the survival of democracy requires a passive public, allowing substantial latitude to these officials. Distrust and alienation stirs the minds of the general public - it follows that they may also be stirred to action; and because that action is likely to be irrational and because the system has a limited capacity to absorb action, it can only be destructive. (cf. Hart 1978, 6).

In my view, the problem is not so much with the supportive citizens, but with the committed ones. Those who refuse to acknowledge the inevitable imperfections of government, whose allegiance is without qualification or reservation, may pose a serious threat to democratic political order. A democratic political culture should be characterized by a vigilant scepticism or realistic cynicism, rather than an unquestioning faith in the motives and abilities of political authority.

The problem with the interpretation of the change in

public attitudes toward politicians presented by Finnish commentators is thus characterized by a serious exaggeration. The low scores of trust in politicians in general are not alone evidence of a threat to our political system, or to the democratic order in general. They would be if they were accompanied by very low scores in the satisfaction with the output of the political system, and with the governmental policies.

Responsiveness of Politicians in Finland

But what about the responsiveness of politicians in Finland? This has been measured in the Gallup polls by the following claim:

"Generally those elected to parliament soon loose touch with the people."

The reactions to this claim may be summed up in a table.

Table 8

The Responsiveness of Politicians (M.P.s) (%)

| Year | Agree Strongly | Agree | Disagree | Disagree Strongly | No Answer |
|------|----------------|-------|----------|-------------------|-----------|
| 1974 | 39 | 35 | 13 | 4 | 10 |
| 1975 | 46 | 29 | 12 | 5 | 8 |
| 1976 | 38 | 38 | 13 | 6 | 5 |
| 1977 | 39 | 36 | 14 | 6 | 5 |
| 1978 | 30 | 37 | 16 | 12 | 5 |
| 1979 | 42 | 37 | 13 | 5 | 4 |
| 1981 | 35 | 43 | 15 | 5 | 3 |
| 1982 | 29 | 52 | 15 | 1 | 3 |
| 1984 | 28 | 49 | 18 | 2 | 2 |

Source: Suomen Gallup, Puoluetutkimus 1974-1984.

If we interpret these results as an indication of the responsiveness of the M.P.s, we are forced to conclude that the vast majority (at least a majority of 3/4) of

of the respondents consider the Members of Parliament to be unresponsive. I am, however, not sure whether this is a reasonable interpretation. The claim, in the first place, is not as proper as one might hope for. It may encourage the 'yessayers' to an intolerable degree. Here, however, I accept the conventional interpretation and note that the bulk of respondents find M.P.s unresponsive. Hence, the 'Without Hearing Us' in the title of this paper.

Healthy Scepticism as a Democratic Ideal

I find it tempting to take the change in public attitudes as evidence of healthy scepticism. This is also the standpoint of Vivien Hart (1978). She begins her book on political distrust in Britain and America with an aphorism of Demosthenes: "There is one safeguard known generally to the wise, which is an advantage and security to all, but especially to democracies as against despots. What is it? Distrust." (Hart 1978, xi). Distrust, of course, may be a threat to the political order, but as a rule it helps to assure the stability and quality of democratic politics. The issue is not whether the consequences of distrust may be good or bad, for they can be either or both; and disillusion is a normal part of the political process, however much we would rather regard it as an aberration, as Sniderman (1979, 12) puts it.

Distrust of politicians in general belongs to any healthy democracy. This is true to a certain extent. It is of course true that we cannot afford distrust to the extent of open aggression. Here we face a dilemma: On the other hand, democratic government, like any other government, depends for its success on compliance. The effectiveness and life changes of any political system hinge on the willingness of citizens to support, or at minimum to comply with, its decisions, laws, regulations and the like. And presumably the greater the commitment of citizens to the system of government, the surer their compliance. On the

other hand, the more committed citizens are to the system of government, the less willing they may be to speak against claims of authority, even when unwarranted. Trust in government, if excessive, may incline them to be overready to support government. Total faith is blind faith. Support for our system of government in this sense can place our form of government itself in jeopardy (Sniderman 1981, 27). One might say that, in terms of Anckar's typology, the configuration 2 represents the ideal alternative, not configuration 1 as Anckar claims.

High Satisfaction with the Cabinet's Policies

My central claim in this paper is, that there is nothing to be worried about in the decrease of trust in politicians in general. It would be a warning sign only if it were accompanied by an overall dissatisfaction with the content of the actual policies of the politicians as well. That the latter is not the case, can easily be proved. In this paragraph I use the Gallup poll evidence about the satisfaction with Finnish governmental policies. The four largest parties (SDP, KEPU, KOK, SKDL) have financed a poll almost every year since 1973 on actual political issues. One question in this series of polls has dealt with the satisfaction with the performance of the cabinet (see Appendix 2 for a list of the Finnish cabinets since 1975). There is evidence over a period of ten years about the satisfaction with governmental policies. It has been measured by the following question:

"Let me ask your opinion about the cabinet. When you think about the cabinet, are you mostly satisfied or mostly dissatisfied with its activities?"

The responses may be summarized in a table.

Table 9

Satisfaction with the Cabinet's Policies

| | N = | | | | |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
| Mostly satisfied | 47 | 38 | 36 | 31 | 37 |
| Mostly dissatisfied | 33 | 42 | 45 | 52 | 42 |
| No Answer | 19 | 20 | 19 | 15 | 20 |

Source: compiled from Suomen Gallup, Puoluetutkimus 1974-1984.

As one can see, there is a jump in the amount of satisfied respondents from the 1970s to the 1980s. The most striking single fact to be drawn from this evidence is that during the 1980s at least half of the respondents were mostly satisfied with governmental policies. This is a surprisingly high figure. Especially when we also take notice of the fact that during the 1980s, no more than a quarter of the respondents claim that they were mostly dissatisfied with the governmental policies.

One could suppose that the amount of satisfaction varies with the respondents party preferences. If the party one supports is in the cabinet, the respondent will be more favourable towards the cabinet. If the party one supports is in the opposition, the respondent will be more dissatisfied with the cabinet's policies. Let us take a closer look at this hypothesis. (Tables 10, 11, 12).

Table 10

Satisfaction with Cabinet, By Party (%)

| Year | SDP | SKDL | KESK | KOK | OTHER GREENS |
|------|-----|------|------|-----|--------------|
| 1975 | 56 | 23 | 51 | 27 | 32 |
| 1976 | 41 | 39 | 60 | 17 | 29 |
| 1977 | 44 | 26 | 41 | 21 | 27 |
| 1978 | 58 | 44 | 47 | 17 | 24 |
| 1979 | 77 | 49 | 66 | 57 | 64 |
| 1980 | 70 | 44 | 67 | 58 | 56 |
| 1981 | 77 | 46 | 76 | 68 | 68 |
| 1982 | 75 | 58 | 62 | 43 | 62 |
| 1984 | 72 | 29 | 58 | 42 | 56 |

'Mostly Satisfied'

Table 12

Satisfaction with Cabinet, By Party (%)

| Year | SDP | SKDL | KESK | KOK | OTHER |
|------|-----|------|------|-----|-------|
| 1975 | 15 | 13 | 17 | 14 | 14 |
| 1976 | 19 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 20 |
| 1977 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 12 |
| 1978 | 18 | 13 | 16 | 13 | 22 |
| 1979 | 15 | 21 | 18 | 23 | 18 |
| 1980 | 10 | 21 | 17 | 11 | 15 |
| 1981 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 22 |
| 1982 | 9 | 10 | 16 | 14 | 19 |
| 1984 | 8 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 14 |

'Can't Say'

Table 11

Satisfaction with Cabinet, By Party (%)

| Year | SDP | SKDL | KESK | KOK | OTHER GREENS |
|------|-----|------|------|-----|--------------|
| 1975 | 29 | 64 | 32 | 59 | 39 |
| 1976 | 40 | 47 | 27 | 69 | 44 |
| 1977 | 41 | 57 | 42 | 64 | 49 |
| 1978 | 24 | 43 | 37 | 70 | 37 |
| 1979 | 7 | 30 | 15 | 21 | 17 |
| 1980 | 19 | 37 | 17 | 31 | 27 |
| 1981 | 11 | 39 | 12 | 23 | 18 |
| 1982 | 15 | 32 | 22 | 42 | 19 |
| 1984 | 19 | 62 | 28 | 45 | 30 |

'Mostly Dissatisfied'

The dissatisfaction with the cabinet's policies does not seem to vary to a remarkable degree with the respondents party preferences. Consider the figures for the 1980s. Of the parties mentioned only the Conservatives (KOK) were in opposition. Most of the supporters of the SKDL were more dissatisfied with the cabinet's policies than supporters of the opposition Conservative party. Consider also the fact that most of 'Can't Say' -answers come usually from the supporters of the SKDL. Participation in the cabinet was a problematic question for the SKDL for the whole of the time it was in the cabinet during 1977-1982. The hypothesis presented above is not verified by this evidence. When almost half of the supporters of the main opposition

party (KOK) consider themselves to be 'mostly satisfied' with the cabinet's political performance, there certainly is little sense in talking about large scale dissatisfaction and a crisis of confidence in our political system! Hence, the 'Are Making Good Decisions' in the title of this paper. This claim, as such, is, of course, too strong. Whether the decisions have been good or not is, of course, another issue than opinions about it. The above presented figures do not say anything about the objective state of affairs, they only reflect the attitudes of some respondents. Whether their beliefs are true and justified, i.e. whether they represent knowledge, is an issue I don't want to raise in this context. I just note that they might be misled. However, this does not have any implications on my basic argument.

Turnout in General Elections

We may draw some indirect evidence from the relatively high turnout in general elections to support the interpretation presented above. It would be absurd to speak of low trust in the political system when at least three out of four use their right to vote. The turnout in general elections is presented in tables 13, 14 and 15.

Table 13

Persons Entitled to Vote and Voting Percentage in Parliamentary Elections 1970-1983

| Year | Persons entitled to vote | Persons voting (%) |
|------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1970 | 3 094 359 | 82.2 |
| 1972 | 3 178 011 | 81.4 |
| 1975 | 3 435 533 | 79.7 |
| 1979 | 3 552 378 | 81.2 |
| 1983 | 3 670 241 | 81.0 |

Table 14

Persons Entitled to Vote and Voting Percentage in Presidential Elections 1968-1982

| Year | Persons entitled to vote (in domicile register in Finland) | Persons voting (%) |
|------|---|--------------------|
| 1968 | 2 920 635 | 70.2 |
| 1978 | 3 527 974 | 69.9 |
| 1982 | 3 627 201 | 86.8 |

(In January 1973 Parliament nominated Mr Urho Kekkonen for a period of four years from 1974 to 1978. The law was passed by a vote of 170 to 29.)

Table 15

Persons Entitled to Vote and Voting Percentage
in Municipal Elections 1968-1980

| Year | Persons entitled to vote (in domicile register in Finland) | Persons voting (%) |
|------|---|--------------------|
| 1968 | 2 964 967 | 76.8 |
| 1972 | 3 320 339 | 75.6 |
| 1976 | 3 429 664 | 78.5 |
| 1980 | 3 530 447 | 78.1 |

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1983, Table 374,

P. 400.

Conclusion

In this paper I have very tentatively raised doubts about whether distrust in politicians in general necessarily endangers the political stability of a given political system. The empirical evidence presented supports the interpretation that there is simply no serious political distrust in politicians in general among Finnish citizens. The trust has declined, but not to any dangerous degree. There are no unfavourable evaluations among the citizens of the processes of their polity, since they do not perceive any significant discrepancy between the actual operations of the political system and the publicly accepted standards. Hence, there is no crisis of confidence, no crisis of legitimacy, no crisis of political stability.

I hope that my paper has been thought-provoking. What we need next is a more sophisticated analysis of the conditions of political legitimacy, among other things, a deepgoing explication of the concept of legitimacy crisis. In order to have any meaningful distinction between a crisis of legitimacy and of the ordinary traits of a pluralistic democratic politics, a crisis of legitimacy must necessarily pose some quite remarkable indicators other than simple

Appendix 1

Table 16

The Percentage of Electoral Support in Elections

to Parliament, By Party (%)

| Year of Election | Party | SDP | SKDL | KESK | KOK | OTHERS |
|------------------|-------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| 1972 | | 25.8 | 17.0 | 16.4 | 17.6 | 23.2 |
| 1975 | | 24.9 | 18.9 | 17.6 | 18.4 | 20.2 |
| 1979 | | 23.9 | 17.9 | 17.3 | 21.7 | 19.2 |
| 1983 | | 26.7 | 13.4 | 17.6 | 22.1 | 20.2 |

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland, various years.

Appendix 2

Table 17 GOVERNMENTS IN FINLAND 1975-

| Date of nomination | 13.06.1975 | 30.11.1975 | 29.09.1976 | 15.05.1977 | 02.03.1979 |
|-------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Period in office, years | 0.46 | 0.83 | 0.62 | 0.80 | 3.23 |
| Name of prime minister | Keljo Ullamasa | Hartti E. Hiltunen (III) | Hartti E. Hiltunen (III) | Kalevi Sorsa (III) | Kalevi Sorsa (IIb) |
| Party of prime minister | SDP | KESK | KESK | SDP | SDP |
| Party membership of ministers | SDP 3 KESK 3 LKP 1 KOK 1 RKP 1 n.s. 6 | SDP 1 RKP 2 KESK 1 LKP 1 SKDL 1 n.s. 2 | KESK 9 LKP 3 RKP 1 n.s. 1 | SKDL 3 SDP 4 KESK 5 LKP 1 RKP 1 n.s. 1 | SKDL 7 SDP 4 KESK 5 LKP 2 n.s. 1 |
| Parliamentary support | 00.0 % (1975) | 76.0 % (1975) | 29.0 % (1975) | 76.0 % (1975) | 74.0 % (1975) |
| Date of nomination | 25.05.1979 | 17.02.1982 | 30.12.1982 | 7.05.1983 | |
| Period in office, years | 2.61 | 0.87 | 0.35 | | |
| Name of prime minister | Hannu Kolvisto (II) | Kalevi Sorsa (IIIa) | Kalevi Sorsa (IIIb) | Kalevi Sorsa (IV) | |
| Party of prime minister | SDP | SDP | SDP | SDP | |
| Party membership of ministers | SKDL 3 SDP 5 KESK 6 RKP 2 n.s. 1 | SKDL 3 SDP 5 KESK 6 RKP 2 n.s. 1 | SDP 4 RKP 2 KESK 4 n.s. 1 | SDP 6 RKP 2 KESK 5 SRP 2 | |
| Parliamentary support | 66.5 % (1979) | 66.5 % (1979) | 49.0 % | 61.5 % (1983) | |

Source: Paloheimo 1984, 66-67.

References and Sources

- Anckar, Dag: Finland: A Half-hearted Step Towards Referendum, Acta Academiae Aboensis, ser. A. vol. 62 nr 4, Abo Akademi: Abo 1983.
- Coleman, James S.: Comment of 'On the Concept of Influence', Public Opinion Quarterly 27(1963):1, 63-82.
- Hart, Vivien: Distrust and Democracy, Political distrust in Britain and America, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1978.
- Nielsen, Hans-Jørgen: The Reality of Distrust, Institut for Samfundsfag, Københavns Universitet, Arbejdsrapir 1983/8.
- Paloheimo, Heikki (ed.): Governments in Democratic Capitalist States 1950-1983, A data handbook, University of Turku, Studies on Political Science No 8, 1984.
- Pesonen, Pertti; Sänkiö, Risto: Kansalaiset ja kansanvalta - suomalaisten käsityksiä poliittisesta toiminnasta, WSOY: Juva 1979.
- Sipponen, Kauko: Luottavatko kansalaiset johtajiinsa, puhe Yrittäjälounaalla Lahdessa 17.1.1985 (moniste).
- Sniderman, Paul M.: A Question of Loyalty, University of California Press: Berkeley 1981.
- Suomen Gallup Oy: Puoluetutkimus 1973-1984.
- Kaleva: Rebellisyystutkimus 1984.
- Helsingin Sanomat 14.10.1984.
- Turun Sanomat 1.2.1985.
- Statistical Yearbook of Finland, various years.

B85 SID
£1-00

Democracy and Stability in Post-Colonial Africa

John A. Wiseman
Department of Politics
University of Newcastle upon Tyne

ECPR
Barcelona
March 1985

Democracy and Stability in Post-Colonial Africa

The title of this paper is not quite as perverse as it may at first appear. Although the dominant impressions of post-colonial Africa are those of the absence of both democracy and stability such a view is misleading. Whilst authoritarianism and instability have been common they are by no means ubiquitous. Democracy has continued to play a role in African politics and not all the continent's political systems have been unstable. This paper seeks to examine the nature and extent of democracy in Africa and then to discuss the relationships between democracy and stability.

Liberal-Democracy.

In accordance with what I take to be the general understanding of this Workshop I use the term "democracy" to mean liberal-democracy and do not propose to enter any discussion (at this stage at least) as to whether only a system of direct democracy could be described as fully democratic, or whether liberal-democracy can only be a bourgeois sham. However, I do feel it necessary to say something as to how I interpret the notion of liberal-democracy as this is relevant to the later discussion.

The application of the term liberal-democracy allows for a wide range of institutional variation. Systems so described may be federal or unitary, presidential or parliamentary, multi-party or de facto two party: they may or may not be based on proportional representation or on a clearly demarcated separation of powers. They may not (eg. Britain) be based on a codified constitution at all. The key features of liberal-democracy may be related to notions of representation, election and choice. Major decisions in the public sphere are taken by individuals who collectively represent the whole population. To achieve the position of representative an individual must successfully offer himself or herself for election periodically under a universal adult franchise. The process of election should allow maximum freedom of choice to the elector who must not be coerced. For this freedom of choice to operate there must also be freedom of speech and association in order that the alternatives, in practice structured around competing parties, may emerge. Alongside these provisions various checks and balances on government power should operate, for example the existence of autonomous pressure groups and an independent judiciary. Finally a reasonably clear distinction needs to be drawn the ruling party or group at any given time and the state itself.

It is important to emphasise that this description of the main features of liberal-democracy refers to an ideal type which is both abstract and idealistic. Empirical studies of existing liberal-democracies, even of the long established Western form, would lead to the conclusion that none could claim full marks on all the criteria advanced all the time. It can even be argued that the basic model contains unresolved contradictions. The utility of the model lies not in reflecting a one to one relationship with the real world but rather in allowing for a general approximation between the ideal model and existing political systems. The important outcome of this is to enable us to distinguish between those systems which approximate to the liberal-democratic type and those, with quite different characteristics, which are clearly of a different type.

It is the adoption of this non-purist, and I hope realistic, conception

of liberal-democracy which enables a discussion of its role in African politics to take place. Few, if any, of Africa's liberal-democracies fulfill to the letter all the criteria advanced all of the time but the same might be said of the operation of this system in the rest of the world. Too purist a conception of liberal-democracy will only reduce the notion to the equivalent of Plato's "Republic"; interesting for philosophical discussion but of little use in comparative politics. The designation as liberal-democratic of those political systems in Africa which approximate to the criteria of the model enables us to distinguish them from those, such as single-party and military ruled states, which clearly do not. Ultimately, of course, one will face the problem as to just how far a political system can deviate from the ideal type of liberal-democracy and still be described as liberal-democratic in any meaningful sense. In classifying individual states this can be a matter of judgement. A brief look at a specific case may be useful in exemplifying the sort of problem involved. Under the 1979 constitution Nigeria was clearly a multi-party state. However, the constitution also laid down conditions which political parties had to meet to be allowed to contest elections. All parties had to be national in character; they were not allowed to organise on the basis of the religious, ethnic, regional or linguistic divisions within the country. An additional qualification in this respect was that parties had to have offices in at least 13 of the 19 states in the federation. These provisions were checked by a Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) which had the power to decide which parties were national in character and therefore eligible to contest elections and which were not. For the 1979 election only five of the nineteen parties which applied for recognition had it granted by FEDECO (a sixth was recognised for the 1983 election). From a purist perspective this is a denial of liberal-democracy. Restrictions are placed on freedom of association and the unhindered formation of political parties. This leads to a diminution of free choice for the electorate who are denied the opportunity to vote for any party unrecognised by FEDECO no matter how much they may feel it represents their views and aspirations. However, from another perspective the constitutional provisions can be seen as a local adaptation of liberal-democracy to deal with the very real problems illustrated by Nigeria's political history. From independence in 1960 until the first coup of 1966 all major Nigerian political parties represented the regional/ethnic divisions within the country with disastrous results. Political violence was widespread and led to military intervention and a civil war; Nigeria came very close to being torn apart. Although it may be a matter of individual judgement the second perspective seems to make more sense than the first.

In discussing the place of liberal-democracy in black Africa this paper puts particular stress on states with competitive party systems where real electoral competition takes place. Whilst recognising the danger of elevating particular criteria at the expense of others it does seem to follow empirically in Africa that the other criteria do tend to cluster around those chosen. That is, those states which have competitive party systems tend to illustrate the other characteristics of liberal-democracy at the same time. Those which lack competing parties, be they civilian or military ruled, do not except perhaps sometimes by default: interest groups for example may enjoy a level of autonomy because of the weakness of central government and its inability to control them.

The 1960s

In the decade up until 1970 the overthrow of liberal-democracy was arguably the dominant motif of politics in Africa. The vast majority of

African states began the post-independence era with this type of political system which was institutionalised in the final stages of decolonisation. For most of the colonial period imperial rule had been authoritarian and non-representative; most of the major decisions being taken in Europe or by officials in Africa whose ultimate responsibility was to the metropolitan centre rather than to the indigenous inhabitants. The break-up of the colonial empires in Africa and the creation of new states led to the establishment of political systems which were often clearly modelled on those of the departing colonial power. It would be quite wrong, however, to imagine that unwilling African leaders were pressurised into accepting a type of political system they or their people did not want. Although many African nationalist leaders later repudiated the major features of liberal-democracy, especially the existence of a legal and legitimate opposition, they had been vociferously demanding their adoption before independence.

Nevertheless it is true that in the first few years after independence a majority of these liberal-democracies did not survive and there was a rapid move towards the single-party state or military rule with the former often preceding the latter. Opposition parties were accused of being divisive and hindering development but it does not seem unduly cynical to suggest that in most cases the simple desire of the new elites to cling to power was more persuasive. Whilst it is true that independence did not bring the gains promised in advance by nationalist leaders it is doubtful if opposition parties were to blame. In some cases opposition elites were co-opted into the ruling party but more often they were banned, imprisoned or even killed.

In many of the new single-party states elections were organised in an attempt to give the new arrangements a democratic gloss. Elections here though are very different to those in a liberal-democracy. Some are totally non-competitive with the electorate being presented with a single candidate. In others pseudo-competition takes place. The electors may have more than one candidate but all are selected by the party elite and none are allowed to advocate any policy not already agreed on by that elite. In either case the element of choice is minimal. Given the nature of the elections it is not surprising that the bodies to which candidates are elected are generally insignificant. Africa has many legislatures which initiate no laws, take no real decisions and act as no sort of check on government power.

Faced with these developments, many outside observers concluded that liberal-democracy was not suitable for black Africa although a more realistic assessment might have been that it was inconvenient for many of the new political elites. However, whichever view one takes, it remains the case that had the momentum of the dismantling of liberal-democracy that existed in the 1960s continued this type of system would have long since been swept away in Africa. As will now be shown this has not happened.

Since 1970

The table below gives an overview of the extent of multi-party systems in black Africa since 1970.

Botswana - continuous
 Central African Republic - 1981 (Feb-Sept)
 Djibouti - 1977-1981
 The Gambia - continuous
 Ghana - until 1972 and 1979-1981
 Lesotho - until Jan 1970
 Mauritius - continuous
 Nigeria - 1979-1983
 Senegal - 1976- to date

Sierra Leone - until 1978
 Swaziland - until 1973
 Uganda - 1980-to date
 Upper Volta - 1978-1980
 Zambia - until 1973
 Zimbabwe - 1980-to date

It can be seen from the above that just over one third of the states have had a multi-party system at some time since 1970. In some ways the list underestimates the extent of multi-partyism. Liberia and Kenya which were de jure multi-party but de facto single-party until 1980 and 1982 respectively are excluded as are Namibia (not yet independent), the Republic of South Africa (multi-party and with some liberal-democratic features but operating a racially limited franchise) and the "independent" homelands of South Africa (not recognised as states by anyone but South Africa). Also excluded are those states where a return to a multi-party system is planned but has not yet taken place : Liberia, Lesotho and, possibly, Guinea after the coup which followed the death of Sekou Toure. On the other side of the coin the government of Zimbabwe has indicated its desire to move to a single-party state but at the time of writing has not yet done so. Of course many if not most of the states where legal opposition parties are banned do contain illegal opposition movements some of which, for example in Angola, Ethiopia and Chad, control significant parts of the nominal territory of the state but these could not be described as multi-party states.

In examining the black African states which have had a multi-party liberal-democratic system at some time since 1970 it is possible to divide them into four separate categories. First are those which have functioned uninterrupted throughout the whole period : only Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia fall into this category. Next are those where the system was still in its immediate post-independence phase but later collapsed. In several of these it was less the greater comparative longevity of liberal-democracy which provides the explanation than the fact that they became independent later than most. Djibouti, Lesotho and Swaziland are examples of this type. Then there are the cases where liberal-democratic systems were re-established following a period of military rule as part and parcel of the process of demilitarisation. Examples here would include Nigeria, Upper Volta and Ghana. In the case of the latter this has happened twice, in 1969 and 1979. The final category is where a single-party state has transformed itself back into a liberal-democracy whilst the same party remained in power. Senegal is the only black African state where this has taken place. In Senegal the opening up of the system to party competition was achieved in stages. Under President Leopold Senghor the constitution was amended to allow for three parties and then four. Senghor then voluntarily retired (the first black African leader to do this) and his successor President Abdou Diouf completed the process by legalising the free formation of parties with no restrictions on numbers.

Obviously the existence of liberal-democracy in African states is patchy and intermittent with only three states experiencing an unbroken run since independence. It should be recognised though that this is as much a reflection of the generally unsettled nature of politics across Africa as it is of the problems of this specific type of system (this is a theme to which I shall return in the later discussion of the relationship with stability). However, it is still true that throughout the period since 1970 liberal-democratic states have been in a minority in Africa and that single-party and military ruled states have been more common. There is an abundant literature on the reasons why single-party and military rule are so

prevalent and liberal-democracy so often overthrown. An equally intriguing question, and one which has been virtually ignored, is to ask why liberal-democracy should have survived at all and why it is so frequently re-introduced following periods of other types of rule. Given what might be regarded as a non-supportive environment its survival as an alternative is perhaps more surprising than its overthrow. Having assessed the moderate persistence of liberal-democracy in post-colonial Africa we now turn to the causes of its continued existence.

Reasons for the Survival of the Liberal-Democratic Alternative

In examining the reasons for the survival of liberal-democracy in Africa the main considerations appear to be political rather than economic. Looked at globally there would appear to be a clear, though not deterministic, relationship between levels of economic development and the existence of liberal-democracy. Such a relationship is difficult to find within Africa. By world standards all African states can be seen as underdeveloped and yet some function on a democratic basis. There does not appear to be any connection between levels of development and the existence of democracy. For example it does not appear to be the case that more economic development in some states has enhanced the prospects for democracy when compared with less economically developed states. The only exception to this general picture is that democracy does not appear to survive in those states which have experienced total economic collapse.

It is probably true to say that one of the major reasons for the survival of the liberal-democratic system is the essentially negative one that other modes of rule have not been especially successful. To the extent that a conducive attitudinal environment for multi-partyism has remained in Africa it is the failures of so many single-party and military regimes which have allowed it to do so. In the first few years after independence a sense of disappointment was common. Freedom from colonial rule had for most people failed to live up to expectations as the benefits promised by nationalist politicians failed to materialise. Although the mood was open to a fair amount of cynical manipulation by self-seeking politicians there was also a more genuine belief that many existing problems were the fault of the inherited political systems. Opposition parties especially were blamed for promoting divisive tendencies and hindering progress and it was felt that a strong united government and political system might be more appropriate to tackle what were, quite genuinely, immense problems of nation-building and development. When many of the resulting single-party states also failed to provide the solutions the military often stepped in.

Once again there was an initial period of optimism. The military were seen as a strong, disciplined coherent group with a pronounced sense of national purpose and an appropriately technocratic approach to the problems of development. Impressed by the selfless pronouncements made by the soldiers to justify the forceful overthrow of civilian governments many observers looked to a new dawn. Unfortunately it never materialised. Once the soldiers were in office the unreality of many of the assumptions made about African armies became apparent as they showed themselves as incompetent and corrupt as their predecessors. They soon proved to be even more faction-ridden than the civilians: the disciplined unity of so many armies proved to be a sad myth, a fact which led to so many bloody struggles and counter-coups within the army.

Single-party and military rule necessitate some sacrifice of civil liberties but the real failure of the regimes has been in failing to provide commensurate gains in stability (to be discussed later), national order

and economic development. In too many cases the price has been paid but the goods have not been delivered. Often there is little or no check on a self-centred bureaucratic elite tied to a ruling party or military junta. Would-be critics of disastrous economic policies find themselves powerless against the uncontested power of ruling elites who devise and benefit from such policies. Thus in many African states the demise of an open competitive system far from solving problems has placed barriers in the way of solutions. In recent years intellectual support for the multi-party system in Africa has come not only from liberals, as one might expect, but also from the left. The Tanzanian socialist Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu for example has argued that "loyal opposition is an essential and indispensable aspect of the political life of a nation a one-party system is not and by definition cannot be democratic". Babu has gone on to call for "a struggle for the abolition of the repressive system of the one-party states" which have "more than anything else contributed to the economic and political stalemate in Africa". Thus the experience of other types of rule has been a strong, if rather negative, support for liberal-democracy.

The actual return of multi-party systems most commonly occurs when a military regime decides to hand back political power to civilians. It is true that, in some cases, such an exercise is largely fraudulent. It may mean little more than the senior members of the ruling military elite adopting civilian titles and dress and the creation of a largely mythical political party through which the armed forces continue to rule much as before: a good example would be Mobutu's Zaire. If, however, the military elite really are intending to fully withdraw from the governing functions, as they are in a number of cases, the return to a multi-party system appears the most obvious way. For the military to hand over to civilian single-party rule would usually mean that in the period prior to the hand-over the military themselves would have to decide which party would enjoy sole legality. Given that one of the reasons why the military withdraw is because of increasing pressure from disaffected civilians, especially elites, then for the former to hand-pick their successors would be difficult to legitimise. Critics of military rule are unlikely to be appeased if, as their final act, the military select their own replacements. Such an act would also be problematic in terms of the conflicts and cleavages within the army itself. This feature of the process of demilitarisation has led to the return of a multi-party system in Uganda, Nigeria, Upper Volta and Ghana (twice). In the foreseeable future, the example of Senegal notwithstanding, this appears the most likely route to the re-establishment of liberal-democracy.

In the case of demilitarisation it is probably the nature of the situation in which the soldiers find themselves rather than any outstanding dedication to the ideals of democracy on the part of the military elite which produces this particular outcome. In some cases of liberal-democratic survival in Africa however it does appear that a positive attachment to this type of system by the national leader has played an important part. Botswana, under both Seretse Khama and his successor and close friend Quett Masire, and The Gambia, under Dawda Jawara, are cases in point. In both countries it is recognised that some members of the ruling party are better disposed towards the idea of a single-party state but that the commitment of strong and popular national leaders has averted this. However, although the support for a liberal-democratic system from Khama, Masire and Jawara has been real enough a note of caution intrudes in the light of the experience of other African countries. In Lesotho and Zambia, for example, Leabua Jonathan and Kenneth Kaunda respectively pledged their support for this type of system but later moved to crush and outlaw opposition when the dominance of their ruling parties appeared seriously threatened. The personal power and influence of the national leader, which has been one of the features of

post-independence politics, is undoubtedly an important factor which can work for or against liberal-democracy.

Finally it can be argued that multi-partyism is more natural in that the system does genuinely reflect the heterogeneous nature of the societies of almost all African states. The evidence suggests overwhelmingly that unless positive steps are taken to ban the formation of one party more than one will emerge. To take an extreme example Somalia at one stage had no less than 130 parties in a population of around three million. Defences of the single-party state which argue that it represents the natural unity of the citizenry do not bear examination: the only way to achieve the single-party state is to enforce it.

Democracy and Stability

It is now necessary to focus on the relationship of democracy with stability and instability in the light of the examination of the history of the former in post-independence Africa. Clearly it is the case that in the early post-colonial phase many of Africa's democracies proved to be unstable. It was the view of many that democracy itself was a destabilising factor. Largely because of the rather arbitrary way in which African states had been created by European powers they were seen as being dangerously pluralistic in terms of their social composition, riven by serious ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic cleavages: they were states without nations. Against this background it was argued that the public contestation involved in democracy would only produce instability and could even lead to the break-up of many states. Versions of this argument were not only used by academic observers but by African leaders seeking to introduce more authoritarian forms of rule. The empirical experience of unstable democracies to support such arguments; if African democracies (or at least a substantial number of them) were proving to be unstable then democracy was an unsuitable form of government which could only produce instability. However, it can be argued that the reasoning behind this proposition is faulty.

The early post-independence period witnessed the coincidence of two factors which have no necessary relationship. First, many of the new states with a background of heightened pluralism and severe underdevelopment were, actually or potentially, unstable. Second, almost all of these states had democratic systems of government at independence simply because in the terminal colonial phase such systems had been introduced as the major way in which the transfer of power could take place. It cannot, however, be assumed that the factors of democracy and instability are necessarily causally linked. I would argue that instability was a feature of many new African states but that in a causal sense this had little or nothing to do with the public contestation of democracy. If many states are potentially unstable and most are democracies then many democracies will be unstable but it is not democracy itself which makes them so. Instability is then a reflection of the nature of the post-colonial state not of the failings of a specifically democratic system.

If democracy had been the sole or major cause of instability then one would have expected that the more authoritarian non-democratic state structures would have overcome most of the problems of political instability but this has simply not happened. The single-party state and the military state have not led to stability. The most common result of the introduction of the single party is the military coup; the most common result of the coup is a series of counter-coups. As Johnson, Slater and McGowan have recently argued "black African states which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer (my emphasis) military coups, attempted coups and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics". They see party competition

as a "strongly stabilizing" factor.

It can thus be argued that to the extent that there exists a causal relationship between instability and democracy it is the reverse of what has previously been argued. Nor is this solely related to the intervention of the military. The view that public contestation when allied to heightened pluralism would lead to the break-up of African states appears to have little empirical support. One might correctly view the emergence of significant secession movements and consequential civil war as the maximum level of instability because the very existence of the state as a unit is called into question. Given the arbitrary nature of state demarcation in Africa one might have imagined that this would become a common feature of African politics but this has not happened. Most conflict within states has been for control of the existing state not the creation of a new state. However it is noticeable that where significant secession movements have arisen they have not done so within states which could claim to be democratic but within states which (at the time of secession) were highly authoritarian and in which no public contestation was permitted (eg. Biafran secession during the military period in Nigeria, in Southern Zaire, and at the present time in several parts of Ethiopia, most notably Eritrea and Tigre). Inasmuch as secession is linked with legal and legitimate public contestation it is the absence of the latter which is a contributing factor not its presence.

A further level of instability which can be referred to is that of electoral violence. It is true that the heightened public contestation of elections has produced violence in some of Africa's democracies. The violence surrounding the 1983 Nigerian elections is but a recent example. However, elections in single-party states are also frequently violent. The 1982 elections in single-party Sierra Leone were far more violent and led to many more deaths, in proportion to the relative size of population, than those in Nigeria. This is in spite of the fact that in a multi-party state elections are supposed to provide a forum for conflict (although not physical violence) whereas in a single-party state they are not, and that elections are more meaningful when competing parties bid for popular support.

So far the examination has consisted of a comparison between democracies and non-democracies. I should now like to add a semi-quantitative element to the qualitative by suggesting that the most democratic states in post-colonial Africa have been amongst the most stable. In terms of the discussion of liberal-democracy earlier in the paper I would argue that the closer a state comes to the ideal type of liberal-democracy the more stable it has been (the reverse may also be the case; ie. where attempts at election rigging, harassment of opposing politicians etc. increase the possibility of instability also increases).

The three African states which have consistently come closest to the liberal-democratic ideal are Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius. These are, of course, also the best examples of longevity of democracy as the systems have survived intact since independence (1965 in The Gambia, 1966 in Botswana and 1968 in Mauritius). In all three regular competitive elections, which have generally been judged to have been free and fair and non-violent, have taken place. Opposition parties have played a significant role in all three states and in Mauritius in the 1982 elections the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) became the first opposition party in Africa to win power through the ballot box when it defeated the incumbent Mauritius Labour Party (MLP). It subsequently lost power again when, following party splits, a new election in 1983 led to victory for the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM). In Botswana and The Gambia the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) respectively have won a majority in each election since independence but

both parliaments have always included elected members of opposition parties.

Freedom of association in these three states has not only applied to political parties but to a whole range of interest groups. Each state has a free press, an independent judiciary and has maintained religious freedom and toleration.

Although all three states have been amongst the most stable in Africa they have not been equally so. Botswana has enjoyed a degree of political stability since independence which would compare very favourably with any other democracy in the world: so much so that one is hard put to point to any examples of even low levels of instability. There was some labour unrest in the mining town of Selebi-Phikwe in the mid-1970s which included some violence but nothing remotely on the scale of violence of the recent miners strike in Britain. The political succession of Quett Masire following the death of the founding father of Botswana, Seretse Khama, in 1980 was peaceful and orderly and, five years on, does not appear to have posed any threats to stability.

Mauritius has also been very stable since independence although this stability was ruffled in 1971 by a general strike which led to the declaration of a, temporary, state of emergency. At the time several MMM leaders were arrested but were later released and, as already noted, the MMM came to power in the 1982 general election.

Whilst The Gambia has also been generally stable this state of affairs received a resounding jolt in 1981 when a section of the para-military wing of the police force (The Gambia had no army at the time) in conjunction with discontented urban youths attempted a coup d'etat. The coup attempt was defeated but only after a week of considerable violence and the intervention of troops from Senegal on the side of the Gambian Government. This was obviously a higher level of instability than anything seen in Botswana or Mauritius but it can perhaps best be seen as an aberration in Gambian politics. Nothing remotely like it has been seen before or since. The situation rapidly returned to normality and the following year a general election was held contested as in the past by a full range of opposition candidates. In the context of this paper it is also important to note that the public contestation of Gambian democracy did not underpin the attempted coup. None of the opposition parties were involved in or supported it. Although some opposition leaders were charged with participating in the coup they were later acquitted by the courts and released. The coup attempt undoubtedly presented a shock to the system but four years on it does appear that The Gambia has recaptured its stability. It could perhaps even be suggested that the ability of Gambian democracy to survive an attempted coup is some testament to the strength and resilience of the system in that country.

All three states exhibit the social pluralism so typical of the post-colonial state in Africa although the bases of that pluralism differ being predominantly tribal in Botswana, ethnic in The Gambia and religious and racial in Mauritius. The latter also has a more pronounced class component in political conflict than either of the others. In none however has social pluralism proved incompatible with democracy and stability. All three exhibit a tendency towards consociational democracy with an emphasis on conciliation of group differences, informal power sharing and the absence of a "winner takes all" approach to politics. In Mauritius coalition government has been common whereas in The Gambia and Botswana the ruling parties themselves represent coalitions of social group interests.

One final common feature of these states which must be mentioned is that all three have relatively small populations: none has more than one million inhabitants (although Botswana is physically a vast country). It is probably true that this facilitates both political stability and the continuation of democracy: it is actually easier to govern these states than somewhere like Nigeria or Zaire. However it has to be remembered that states with even smaller

populations, like Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Comoro Islands, which resorted to highly authoritarian forms of government have been highly unstable. Indeed if one were to focus only on the smaller states of Africa one could not help notice that the democracies have all been stable and the non-democracies have all been unstable.

As a brief conclusion to the linked themes of this paper I would argue that democracy and stability are not antithetical in post-colonial Africa. Whilst democracy does not guarantee stability and authoritarianism does not guarantee instability it is generally true to say that the democracies have been more stable with the most democratic being the most stable of all.

**PARTY ORGANIZATION AS A DETERMINANT
OF REGIONAL VOTING PATTERNS**

Sten Berglund
University of Helsinki
Department of Political Science

Ingemar Wörlund
University of Umeå
Department of Political Science

Caja 3

Paper to be presented at European Consortium of Political Research
meeting in Barcelona 25-30 March 1985.


Workshop: Territorial voting patterns as a lasting phenomena.
Director: Einar Berntzen

1. Scope

It is now over thirty years since Maurice Duverger (1954) launched his famous party organization hypothesis which has it that non-socialist parties must adapt to the mass membership format pioneered by the Social Democratic parties in Europe at the turn of this century. It is almost twenty years since Leon D. Epstein (1967) suggested that the counter-hypothesis was equally plausible. With nation-wide radio and television coverage, large private contributions and access to public financing, the socialist parties become less and less dependent on the membership organization and are more and more likely to be exposed to an organizational contagion from the right whose parties may be described as belated and half-hearted converts to the mass membership format.

The recent debates on the decay of parties, organized interests and protest groups¹ tie in rather neatly with the Epstein scenario, but as is often the case nation specific data do not always comply with the underlying general model:

Fig. 1 Number of Party Members Over Time (1945 - 1982).



Of the four Swedish parties included in the graph, only one (read: the Liberal Party) comes close to displaying the steady loss of members implied by the Epstein hypothesis; and it may be

noted that the liberal curve does not assume a clear-cut negative slope until the mid-sixties, when the party's electoral fortunes had taken a turn for the worse. The Social Democratic data, which include more than 80% collectively affiliated trade union members (some of whom are unaware of their pro-forma affiliation with the Social Democratic party), result in a most impressive positive trend particularly during the last fifteen years when the party increased its ranks by more than 300,000 new members. The membership curves pertaining to the Conservative and Center parties may be described in terms of fluctuations of varying magnitudes, but not of such congenity as to constitute a conclusive trend. The Center Party curve has a slight positive slope throughout the 1970's and an equally slight negative slope during the early 1980's. The conservative data (which are incomplete), testify to a sharp decline during the 1960's and a moderate recovery through the 1970's and early 1980's.

With all due respect for the limitations inherent in aggregate statistics, the evidence strongly suggests that party membership remains a highly attractive option among Swedish voters. As of late more than 25% of them belonged to either of the four largest parties, though interesting in their own right, our data do not lend themselves to statements about the motivations of individual party members.² Our focus is exclusively on the impact of party organization on the electoral arena. What good, if any, does it do a political party to have a strong rather than weak party organization, and that also defines our theoretical interest throughout the study.

2. Data and design

A study cast in such terms calls for at least two types of variables, the standard set of socio-economic indicators like partisan distribution of the vote and class structure as well as variables tapping organizational strength such as number of party members, number of party meetings and attendance at party meetings. We obtained the former by courtesy of the local government aggregate data bank compiled within the framework of one recent Swedish research project (Political Parties, Regional Support, Regional Balance) sponsored by the Council for the Social Sciences and Humanities (HSFR) and the Tercentenary Fund of the Bank of Sweden, and we got hold of the latter by courtesy of the party organizations and research archives approached within the framework of this study.³

Political parties in Sweden are legally no different from other voluntary associations such as trade unions, temperance and religious organizations. They are under no obligation to keep, store or, for that matter, divulge information pertaining to their activities, which makes the collection of data on party organization into a rather tedious and drawn-out affair. Our research design should be seen in the light thereof.

We concentrate on one segment of the data bank, i.e. the post world war II era from 1945-1982; we let one indicator - number of party members - serve as proxy for all other potentially relevant measures of organizational strength; we confine ourselves to two political parties - the Social Democrats and the Liberals - throughout most of the study; and we let the northernmost part of the country (the counties of Norr- and Västerbotten) serve as testing ground for the general hypothesis that party organization does matter:




Fig. 2-4 Labor Strongholds.

The Maps Identify Areas where the Labor Party's Share of the Valid Votes Cast Exceeds the Party's Nationwide Strength. The Party Gained an Average of 47.3, 43.6 and 45.6 Per cent of the Total Valid Votes Cast in the 1964, 1973 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections Respectively (darkened areas).




Fig. 5-7 Liberal Strongholds

The Maps Identify Areas where the Liberal Party's Share of the Valid Votes Cast Exceeds the Party's Nationwide Strength. The Party Gained an Average of 17.0, 9.4 and 5.9 Per cent of the Total Valid Votes Cast in the 1964, 1973 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections Respectively (darkened areas).

The University of Umeå is located in the heart of northern Sweden; and it would be dishonest to pretend that convenience did not tilt the balance in favor of the two northernmost counties, once we had satisfied ourselves that they were in fact suitable for our purposes. The region is socio-economically rather homogeneous and politically quite heterogeneous.⁴ Norrbotten is traditionally heavily socialist. It is a Social Democratic stronghold of long standing and a communist stronghold of even longer standing. The Communist sympathies are actually so widespread in the far north that Norrbotten nowadays stands out as the only constituency, where the Communist Party with nationwide averages hovering around the 5 per cent mark, might conceivably qualify for regional representation according to the 12 per cent clause of the electoral system in effect since 1970. ⁵ Västerbotten on the other hand is traditionally non-socialist. It has always been a liberal party stronghold, until rather recently at the expense of both socialist parties. As may be gauged from the maps (fig. 3-4), the Social Democratic party added Västerbotten to its strongholds in the late 1960's, presumably by successfully wooing disaffected bourgeois party sympathizers.

It is tempting to summarize the differences between the two counties in terms of political climate or environment. There are apparently two kinds of environments within the region; a climate conducive to socialism in the north and another climate considerably less favorable to socialism further south. The

question to which this paper addresses itself may be expressed in similar terms. We want to know to what extent the political parties themselves create the conditions of their own success or failure on the electoral arena by contributing to a favorable or unfavorable political climate within the region. The party strategies may change from one day to the other, but they all lend themselves to interpretations in terms of interactions, group dynamics and/or social networks phenomena at least theoretically under the influence of organization in general and party organization in particular. The question we put is whether - or not - there is a connection between electoral success or lack thereof and party organization, which is independent of standard predictors like social class; and to the extent that there is, we will take it as evidence that the political parties do indeed affect the political climate, thereby shaping their own destiny.

This is the question, around which the rest of the paper revolves. The catch-word is party organization. It is consistently used as an independent or predictor variable, i.e. a variable which serves to account for or 'explain' the variance or distribution of another variable, generally known as the dependent variable. The section on party organization is structured in such a way as to facilitate the reading. It begins with a sub-section which pivots on the traditional methods of estimation to be followed by a sub-section, where multi-variate techniques are brought to bear on the problem - the relationship between the party's internal and external arenas.


3. The party organization and its impact

3.1 The organizational percentage

There is a standard measure at hand for those interested in the impact of party organization. It is the ratio of party members to voters, cast as percentages and known as the organizational percentage.⁶ If a party fails to gain the support of any of its members at the polls, the score is zero; and if the party gains as many votes as it commands members, the organizational percentage is 100. That also defines the normal range of the measure, but it is readily apparent that it may in fact assume values greater than 100. Parties with more impressive membership statistics than electoral returns invariably fall within this category. But though included in the official statistics, they are often discarded from further analysis because they are political sects rather than mass parties.

The four major Swedish parties are genuine mass parties and pose no such problems. When calculated on the national level from 1945 and onwards, the measure yields the following graphs:

Fig. 8 The Ratio of Members to Voters (the Organizational Percentage) Over Time.



* No data for the Conservative Party available 1965 to 1968.

The Social Democrats boast the by far highest organizational percentage. It peaked at the record high fifty per cent mark in 1979 which means that one Social Democratic voter out of two actually belonged to the party in some capacity or other at that point in time. This should be compared to the meager 10-15% currently scored by the three non-socialist parties, which consistently perform considerably less well than the Social Democrats when it comes to organizing the voters.

The four parties do have one thing in common, though. A straightforward linear relationship between time and organization is nowhere to be found. The party specific curves all have their ups and downs. And - what is more - the fluctuations are interrelated. When the Social Democrats tighten their hold on the voters as they did between 1968 and 1979, the non-socialist parties tend to organize fewer and fewer of their own voters which was exactly what happened at that particular time. The non-socialist or bourgeois bloc is not entirely homogeneous, however. The normal pattern seems to be for two parties out of three to respond in the same fashion and for the remaining party to deviate, albeit slightly, from this norm. As did the liberal and Center Parties at different junctures of the ten year interval already singled out for attention.

A curve with a positive slope need not be a cause for celebrations at party head quarters. It may theoretically be the by-product of two simultaneous phenomena: zero-growth on the internal arena (same number of party members over time) and substantial losses on the electoral arena (fewer voters over

time). And in a similar vein, negative scopes may be brought about by rapid gains on the electoral arena in conjunction with slow growth-rates on the internal arena. We suggest that the above fluctuations have such underlying causes. In 1968 the Social Democratic party entered a ten year period of electoral setbacks; the Center party was in the midst of successful attempts at widening its electoral appeal; the Conservative party was about to launch a similar campaign and the Liberal party had already come up against all too many defections from its rank-and-file on the electoral arena.⁷

The inverse relationship between election results and organizational percentages is not an all pervasive phenomenon. Our data on the social democratic and liberal parties in northern Sweden testify to this syndrome:

Fig. 9 Number of Party Members in the Social Democratic Party Organizations in Norrbotten (BD) and Västerbotten (AC) Over Time.





Fig. 10 Number of Party Members in the Liberal Party Organizations in Norrbotten (BD) and Västerbotten (AC) Over Time.



The Social Democratic party organizations of Norr- and Västerbotten have clearly gone to considerable lengths in order to expand. The graphs are indicative of impressive organizational build-ups featuring four-to-five fold increases in party membership between 1945 and 1982. From some 7,000 to some 28,000 members in the organizationally less hospitable environment in Norrbotten (sic!) and from 10,000 to 47,000 members in the more amenable county of Västerbotten. The graphs pertaining to the Liberal party organizations also intimate concern about the maintenance of the organizational network but have more to say about the difficulties encountered in the process. The vicissitudes of the party organization of Västerbotten are reminiscent of the movements of a roller-coaster about to slow down; from an all-time high of 5,000 members in 1950 to a record low of some 2,300 members in 1960, to well over 4,600 members in 1965, back to the record low in 1970 and a new high of some 3,700 members in 1982. The message conveyed by the curve drawn on membership data from the county of Norrbotten is also one of decline, but of the gradual and piecemeal variety - a net loss of less than 600 liberal party members over four decades.

It will be remembered that the Social Democrats made an electoral breakthrough in Västerbotten in the late sixties, while defending their leading position on the electoral arena in the far north. It will also be remembered that the Liberal Party managed to safeguard Västerbotten's status as a liberal stronghold over all elections throughout of entire post-WW II era. And when taking the ratio of members to voters over time; we get the following estimates of the organizational percentage over time:

Fig. 11 The Ratio of Party Members to Voters in the Social Democratic Party Org. in Norrbotten (BD) and Västerbotten (AC) Over Time.





Fig. 12 The Ratio of Party Members to Voters in the Liberal Party Organizations in Norrbotten (BD) and Västerbotten (AC) Over Time.



It is worth noting that the positive scope of, say, the curve pertaining to the Social Democratic party in Västerbotten does not spell trouble for the party.⁸ It is a product of two positive changes, rapid organizational expansion and piecemeal electoral growth; which highlights the major drawback of the measure. It cannot be properly evaluated without oblique glances at or references to its constituent parts - a highly undesirable quality in any index.

It is also overly simplistic which is why we discard it from now on. Though important as such, party organization most certainly is not the only factor affecting the verdict of the voters, and we, therefore, turn to a multi-variate approach with party organization cast as a prominent predictor, but not to the exclusion of everything else.

3.2 The multi-variate approach

The range of factors likely to influence the voters' choice that can be accounted for with the aid of aggregate or ecological data is rather limited. There are few, if any, suitable indicators of obviously relevant phenomena like leadership qualities, charisma and issue voting. Models of voting behavior on the aggregate level are, therefore, likely to be improperly specified. And we strongly suspect that this applies to our models as well.

They only contain two types of variables, those pertaining to social class and party organization respectively. And they thereby even fall short of exploring all the possibilities open to the dedicated ecological data analyst. With more generous constraints than were imposed on us, it would be possible to generate a whole set of contextual variables tapping religious feelings, union activities and social deprivation on the communist level.⁹

Whether dictated by experience or not, there is, however, a theoretical justification for our research design. The socio-economic variables have already proven themselves as the most potent predictors of political behavior in Sweden and Scandinavia for that matter.¹⁰ Whether measured on the aggregate or individual level, they still normally account for 50% or more of the variance explained. They are indispensable in any model of voting behavior with claims on realism. By adding party

organization to the model, we get an estimate of its contribution to the variance explained given the impact of the standard socio-economic predictors. We can, therefore, safely confine ourselves to checking what happens to the R^2 which is a regression statistic measuring proportion of variance explained as we move from step I (only socio-economic predictors) to step II (socio-economic and organizational predictors); and the greater the difference, the more of an independent effect there is to be attributed to party organization.

Socio-economic data are treated in at least two different ways within the ecological data tradition. Some analysts (Gustafsson 1974, Lewin 1972) throw everything there is in the official statistical publications into the final regression model in order to see how well it works out. Others opt for a strategy, which minimizes the problem of intercorrelation among the predictor variables and single out a few of the socio-economic indicators for special attention.¹¹ We decided in favor of the latter strategy, and we also made a point of selecting predictors that had already proven themselves reliable and efficient.

With these introductory remarks on the multi-variate approach, it is now high time to proceed to the findings:

Fig. 13-15 The Impact of Social Class (-) and of Party Organization (—) Given Social Class on the Social Democrat Vote in Northern Sweden and by County Over Time.





Fig. 16-18 The Impact of Social Class (-) and of Party Organization (—) Given Social Class on the Liberal Vote in Northern Sweden and by County Over Time.



It is readily seen that socio-economic background data mean different things at different times and places. It is also pretty obvious that we pay a penalty for our cautious strategy with respect to the socio-economic indicators. The two working class categories singled out as predictors of the social democratic vote only rarely account for 50% or more of the variance explained; and similar comments apply to the categories - agriculture and white collar workers - selected as predictors of the liberal vote.

The categories employed by the Central Bureau of Statistics have changed somewhat over time; and as a consequence our models are not always identical as we move from one election to the other. The changes are minor prior to 1965¹² and produce so little noise in the time series that we are encouraged in the belief that the models are in fact functionally equivalent over time. Northern Sweden as we have defined it comprised a total of 63 local government units prior to the most recent amalgamation reform which reduced the number of administrative units to the point of impeding multi-variate analyses county by county.¹³ That is why we do not proceed beyond 1970; but we must, nevertheless, caution that the county specific regressions which are calculated on the basis of some 30 observations do have more uncertainty attached to them than the grand regressions with twice that many cases.

The patterns suggested by the county specific regressions over time are, however, strong enough and meaningful enough to dispel any misgivings as to their reliability. There is strong evidence of an inverse relationship between electoral success and the salience of social class. In other words, the more attractive a party is on the electoral arena, the greater the likelihood that its appeal transcends traditional core groups and class boundaries; and the other way around. The analyses of the social democratic and liberal parties in their respective electoral strongholds (in Norr- and Västerbotten respectively) would seem to bear this out. Class, of course, does make its presence felt in the respective models, but falls considerably short of the explanatory power attributed to it when used as a predictor of the Liberal Party's electoral strength in its traditional weak-spot in the far north. The analyses of the Social Democratic party in Västerbotten help make our case complete. It will be remembered that this county was added to the social democratic strongholds in the mid or late sixties; and it is reasonable to interpret the sharp decline (from .57 in 1960 to .33 in 1964) in predictive power attributed to social class as an indication thereof.

There is also strong evidence of a party organization effect. It is clearly visible in all graphs, whether of the aggregate or countywise variety. And it (almost) invariably makes itself felt more strongly, the smaller the impact of social class. This is partly an artefact of the stepwise procedure. We start by prodding for the salience of social class and proceed by adding

party organization (read: party members) to the original socio-economically defined model. And the more we achieve with the aid of the original set of variables, the less variance there is left to be accounted for by new variables such as our key organizational predictor. But that is not all there is to it. As evidenced even by our data, it is possible for a new variable to contribute nothing or very little to the variance explained; and the many instances of significant contributions (R^2 increased by, say, .10 or more as we move from the original to the improved model), therefore, should not be taken lightly.

The cut-off is arbitrary, but not excessively generous. An R^2 of .10 or more corresponds to a correlation coefficient (r_{xy}) of more than .3. And an R^2 increment of .10 as a new variable is introduced corresponds to a partial correlation greater than .3.

14 The impact of party organization on the social democratic vote given social class in traditionally pro-socialist Norrbotten is consistently considerably above this level; and there is evidence of an organizational effect of similar magnitude in the more recently conquered Social Democratic fiefdom further south beginning in 1960. The liberal data are not particularly rich in evidence of organizational effect - perhaps a reflection of the party's long standing difficulties on the internal arena (see figures 1 and 10). But the instances of significant or almost significant party organization effects are somewhat more frequent in the traditional liberal stronghold of Västerbotten. Party organization it would seem does have its pay-offs.

4. Summary

Our findings are partly substantive, partly methodological. They may be summarized in the following fashion:

I. The mass party format is alive and well in Sweden. The four largest Swedish parties all had more members in 1982 than they did immediately after WW II.

II. The ratio of members to voters - the so called organizational percentage - has little or nothing to say about the impact of party organization on the vote. It cannot be properly evaluated without oblique glances at or references to its constituent parts - a highly undesirable quality in any index.

III. The class component of the vote shrinks and the organizational component expands with increasing levels of success on the electoral arena. Regional voting patterns are largely a function of party organization.

FOOTNOTES

1. Offe (1983:15); Hernes (1978) and Gidlund (1978)
2. Eldersveld (1964)
3. We are indebted to the party organizations in Norrbotten and Västerbotten as well as to the regional branches (Luleå and Umeå) of the national archives.
4. Lindström and Karvonen (1983)
5. Obtaining 12% of the valid votes in a constituency (read: county) is the only road to parliamentary representation failing to gain 4 per cent of the valid votes on the national level.
6. Back/Berglund (1978)
7. The election results in Sweden and in the county of Norrbotten and Västerbotten 1948-1982


| Year | Sweden | | Norrbotten | | Västerbotten | |
|------|----------|------|------------|------|--------------|------|
| | Soc.Dem. | Lib. | Soc.Dem. | Lib. | Soc.Dem. | Lib. |
| 1948 | 46.1 | 22.8 | 48.6 | 10.7 | 45.4 | 28.0 |
| 1952 | 46.1 | 24.4 | 50.0 | 11.9 | 46.0 | 28.2 |
| 1956 | 44.6 | 23.8 | 49.3 | 11.0 | 46.2 | 26.3 |
| 1958 | 46.2 | 18.2 | 53.1 | 8.1 | 46.4 | 21.6 |
| 1960 | 47.8 | 17.5 | 54.5 | 8.9 | 48.9 | 21.9 |
| 1964 | 47.3 | 17.0 | 51.8 | 9.3 | 45.9 | 20.6 |
| 1968 | 50.1 | 14.3 | 57.8 | 8.1 | 49.3 | 16.5 |
| 1970 | 45.3 | 16.2 | 51.7 | 8.4 | 46.1 | 17.4 |
| 1973 | 43.6 | 9.4 | 52.1 | 5.1 | 45.0 | 11.8 |
| 1976 | 42.7 | 11.1 | 53.7 | 6.1 | 45.3 | 11.7 |
| 1979 | 43.2 | 10.6 | 55.4 | 5.9 | 49.2 | 10.0 |
| 1982 | 45.6 | 5.9 | 58.8 | 3.1 | 49.3 | 7.8 |

8. Ibidem
9. Allardt (1970)
10. Berglund/Lindström (1978)
11. Borre (1977:63)
12. In 1965 the category industrial workers, by fiat of the Central Bureau of Statistics, merged with the previous white collar workers. As a consequence our multi-variate socio-economic social democratic model was transformed into a so called simple regression with one independent variable, while the corresponding liberal model lost its civil servant's component.
13. The number of local government units was reduced by 50 per cent acrossed the board which leaves us with 15-16 units county analyses.
14. Hanushek and Jackson (1977)

REFERENCES

- Bäck, P-E. & Berglund, S., (1978) Det svenska partiväsendet. Stockholm: AWE/Gebers.
- Berglund, S. & Lindström, U., (1978) The Scandinavian Party System(s). A comparative study. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Borre, O. (1977) "Partistyrka och partistyrkeförskjutningar". Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 1977:63.
- Duverger, M., (1967) Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen & Company Ltd.
- Eldersveld, J.S., (1964) Political Parties. A Behavioral Analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Epstein, L., (1967) Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Praeger.
- Gidlund, J.-E., (1978) Aktionsgrupper och lokala partier. Temporära politiska organisationer i Sverige 1965-1975. Lund: Gleerup. Liber Läro-medel.
- Gustafsson, G., (1974) Partistyrka och partistyrkeförskjutningar. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Hanushek, E. & Jackson, I., (1977) Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. New York: Academic Press.
- Hernes, G., (1978) Forhandlingsøkonomi og blandingsadministrasjon. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- Lewin, L., (1972) The Swedish Electorate 1887-1968. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Offe, C., (1983) "Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State - Factors of Stability and Disorganization". Policy Sciences 1983:15.

APPENDIX 1



Västerbottens län

1. Nordmaling
2. Hörnefors
3. Bjurholm
4. Degerfors
5. Vännäs lk
6. Umeå lk
7. Sävar
8. Holmön
9. Bygdeå
10. Nysätra
11. Lövånger
12. Burträsk
13. Bures
14. Skellefteå lk
15. Byske
16. Jörn
17. Norsjö
18. Malå
19. Örtåsk
20. Lycksele lk
21. Stensele
22. Sorsele
23. Tärna
24. Vilhelmina lk
25. Dorotea
26. Fredrika
27. Vännäs kg
28. Holmsund
29. Vilhelmina kg
30. Åsele
31. Umeå
32. Lycksele
33. Skellefteå

Norrbottens län

34. Hörtåx
35. Piteå lk
36. Norrfjärden
37. Älvsby
38. Arvidsjaur
39. Arjeplog
40. Nederluleå
41. Övertuleå
42. Edsfor
43. Jokkmokk
44. Råneå
45. Töre
46. Övertalix
47. Nederkalix
48. Nedertorneå
49. Karl Gustav
50. Hietaniemi
51. Övertorneå
52. Korpiombolo
53. Tärnedö
54. Pajala
55. Jimsnäs
56. Gällivare
57. Karasnäs
58. Älvsbyn
59. Luleå
60. Piteå
61. Boden
62. Haparanda
63. Kiruna

APPENDIX 2

Sweden




Figure IV. The Geographical Areas Referred to in this Study.

1. Norrbotten
2. Västerbotten
3. Jämtland
4. Västernorrland
5. Gävleborg
6. Kopparberg
7. Värmland
8. Örebro
9. Västmanland
10. Uppsala
11. The County of Stockholm
12. The City of Stockholm
13. Södermanland
14. Östergötland
15. Skaraborg
16. Älvsborg northern
17. Älvsborg southern
18. Göteborg- and Bohuslän
19. Gothenburgh
20. Halland
21. Jönköping
22. Kalmar
23. Gotland
24. Kronoberg
25. Blekinge
26. Kristianstad
27. Malmöhus
28. The Four Cities

TERRITORIAL VOTING PATTERNS AND FEDERAL
POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
AND CANADA, 1955-85

DAVID BROUGHTON
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX

PAPER PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT THE
ECPR JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS,
INSTITUT CATOLIC D'ESTUDIS SOCIALS,
BARCELONA, 25-30 MARCH 1985 (WORKSHOP -
"TERRITORIAL VOTING PATTERNS AS A
LASTING PHENOMENON")

INTRODUCTION

The existence and persistence of territorially distinct voting patterns at either or both the national or state/provincial levels of federal political systems is neither intuitively surprising nor convincing proof of an "immature" polity based more on "primordial" loyalties to a particular area than any overarching social influences such as "class status" or religious denomination.

After all, the very essence of federalism is to protect and institutionally represent the interests of regionally grouped diversities through a governmental structure made up of two interdependent levels of decision-making which interact, co-operate and adapt to the ever changing requirements of running a system underpinned by spatial patterns of politically salient identities.

It can, of course, be argued nevertheless that federalism reinforces extant divisions and conflicts and that it exaggerates differences that exist through the formal process of institutionalisation or that the primary aim of safeguarding the rights of the various regions to control much of their own destinies has effectively been overridden by the impact of socio-economic planning after 1945, with the concomitant development of a high degree of centralised political power.

Comparative research on the suitability of federalism for particular countries has tended to arrive at conflicting conclusions concerning the conditions in which such a system is appropriate. Most commentators would probably agree, however, on two main kinds of federations. Firstly, federation as one means of uniting regions or areas sharing similar social backgrounds and a largely common political culture but which are divided from one another by geographical barriers such as sheer size which render a unitary governmental system out of the question. Secondly, federations where the component elements are different from one another with regard to such matters as language, religion and/or ethnicity.

It is one indication of the complexity of the question of the "requirements" for federalism that neither of the countries we intend to look at in this paper (the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada) fall neatly into either category. The first appears to satisfy neither criterion and the second is a mixture of both, yet each is politically organised on a federal basis with a formal and entrenched dispersal of power providing the means for the preservation of "diversity within unity".

Given the structural emphasis upon the existence of regional interests and the acceptance of a constant need to incorporate them into a dynamic rather than a static system of government, electoral appeals by political parties pledging to act as defenders of the rights of regions to decide matters of significance for themselves seem likely to find a resonance amongst ordinary voters whose everyday lives are more influenced by decisions taken in their specific part of the country than those taken by the "remote centre".

Whilst parties could therefore become closely identified with particular regions and their interests, they could equally act as mediating influences between the constituent units of the federation, ensuring simultaneous representation of minority and regional concerns within the confines of loosely structured coalitions capable of establishing and maintaining a federal presence based on national rather than sub-national themes and questions.

In this way, each party could adapt to the prevailing political structure by accepting the different imperatives which exist at national and state/provincial level without creating an image for itself which suggested a desire for power at the former to the exclusion of the latter or vice versa. The existence of the same party at both levels of the system might also prove to be an important factor in the creation of a sense of national unity which is by no means certain in a system which is forced to cater for strong and highly individual identities on the part of the component units of the federation.

We intend to look at this particular question in our examination of territorial voting patterns in the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada which will include both a comparison between the two countries in terms of geographically distinct mass electoral behaviour as well as a look at the differences between the national and state/provincial levels of government in each.

The period of the study (1955-85) was chosen as an adequate timespan for our aim of highlighting geographical stability in voting as well as any changes over time, within the context of relatively settled party systems created after the second world war. The thirty years under consideration should also allow us to analyse the territorial impact (if any) of the alternations in federal office between the two major parties in both countries during that time.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 1957 federal election saw the Christian Democrats win an absolute majority of the votes (50.2%) for the first and only time, a grip on power which slowly ebbed away up until the formation of the "Great Coalition" with the Social Democrats in 1966. The years of opposition between 1969-1982 saw the CDU-CSU gradually regain their organisational strength and mass appeal and the party was once again re-elected to office after the election in March 1983.

In Canada, the dominance of the Liberal party at federal level was temporarily broken by the "Diefenbaker landslide" of 1958 but they were able to recapture their position as the major party within the system very soon after and to control national politics for much of the 1960s and 1970s, despite not having a parliamentary majority after several elections during those two decades. The minority Conservative government of 1979 lasted only a few months until it was replaced by a majority Liberal administration in 1980. Four years later, the Conservatives swept back to power in a landslide victory.

Before we attempt to set these events in context and try to examine their importance for "geographical voting", we need to look briefly at developments within each federal structure as a whole if we are to understand the nature of the influences conditioning voting choice in both countries and the importance of territorially defined factors in determining electoral outcomes at both levels of each system.

THE FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

(i) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

We mentioned earlier that the Federal Republic of Germany did not appear to meet either of the most commonly cited "requirements" for the construction of a federal political system. There are no obvious natural barriers separating different parts of the country from one another and the German people are clearly socially homogeneous. As a result, it is difficult to account for the existence of such a "formalistic" federalism unless we recall the country's recent history.

Whilst the Germans themselves might have preferred a centralised political structure after the war, they were hardly masters of their own destiny as a defeated and shattered people. The determination of the victorious allies to prevent any repetition of the "tyranny of the centre" under National Socialism led them to organise the three western sectors into an arguably weaker but safer system based on the creation of ten states (Länder) with important functions and decision-making powers. In this sense, post-war German federalism was purely organisational, lacking as it did any social or cultural underpinnings or any need to combat the "tyranny of distance".⁽¹⁾

With the possible exception of Bavaria, few of the states possessed an obvious geographically defined identity of their own, with the German people looking more to the town or immediate area of residence for their sense of

locality than the wider region or state. This is not, however, to underestimate the capacity of even such an artificial structure to create its own vested interests and to ensure its own self-perpetuation through a powerful mixture of inertia and continuing emphasis on the need for formal regional representation within the political system.

Nevertheless, since the Länder governments were unable to credibly justify their existence on the basis of protecting territorially separate diversities, they quickly and almost inevitably had to assume second place to the federal administration in terms of their authority and the interest the German people took in their activities, even though the "Grundgesetz" (Basic Law) of the Republic assigned the states important roles in their own particular areas as well as potentially significant prerogatives with regard to such matters as the federal budget through the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the national parliament in Bonn (Southern, 1979; Urwin, 1982: 233-38).

Allied to the greatly increased number of functions which the federal government began to perform after the second world war and the necessity of central control to ensure standardisation with regard to various areas of socio-economic regulation, the relationship between the national and state governments in the Federal Republic became essentially one based on "administrative federalism", with the Länder acting as the implementing agents for plans formulated by the central political authorities.

Whilst such a situation does not necessarily lead to a diminution in the ability of the state governments to take actions independent of federal influence, it does reinforce the impression that the sub-national administrations do not possess sufficient capacity or autonomy to fulfil a role of representing the regional interests for which they were ostensibly originally established.

Even though such interests can be discerned, the German federal system was not a product of geographical necessity but more an imposed solution

arising from a process of only limited indigenous deliberation. The absence of a clear social or cultural basis underlying the system has permitted the development of a strongly integrated form of federalism, where the central authority is able to give the regional units clear leads on many matters without having to face accusations of illegitimately encroaching upon the responsibilities and rights of state authorities as protectors of geographically distinct groups or minorities.

(ii) CANADA

In stark contrast to the developments towards greater central control in the Federal Republic of Germany (and indeed in many other countries as well), the Canadian provinces have long been determined to thwart the desire of the national authorities in Ottawa to assume more functions and decision-making powers. As part of the explanation for this, it has to be remembered that Canada has always been a confederation since the scattered colonies were brought together into a largely self-governing dominion under the 1867 British North America Act.

The recognition that each of the regional units had individual identities and interests which each provincial administration was intent on protecting ensured that the authority of the centre only filtered down to the ordinary Canadian people through the regionally defined confederal structure. This meant that loyalties to a particular area rather than the country as a whole that already existed were reinforced to a considerable degree by perceptions that the provinces were best able to safeguard the interests of the constituent regions of the confederation within the prevailing political system.

Such a decentralised structure and authority pattern was, of course, essential given the vast size of the country (the second largest in the world in terms of area) and the cultural differentiation between English and French

speakers, although successive waves of immigration from Europe gradually produced a society in Canada which resembled more of a "mosaic" than a simple bi-cultural polarity.

Nevertheless, the most common interpretation of Canadian federalism was as a treaty between races, a system based on the existence of permanent majority and minority social groups, although the idea of a "compact" between the different provinces gained greater currency as socio-economic conditions diverged, particularly between the older, industrialized eastern regions and the developing, agrarian-based provinces in the west.

However, the fundamental dispute between the federal and several of the sub-national authorities over the best way of protecting the specific interests of the provinces remained unresolved. On one side were the "centralising federalists" led by Pierre Trudeau whose commitment to a multi-cultural Canada was rarely in doubt but whose belief in safeguarding regional interests through the use of federal initiatives and centrally decided regulations often brought him into conflict with provincial authorities on the other side who were set on winning greater autonomy for themselves.

The specific nature of this long-standing dispute initially concerned the moves by the federal government to involve itself in areas of provincial responsibility without any formal constitutional change to legitimate such a development. Unsurprisingly, this engendered a great deal of resentment amongst the provincial governments who had been used to running such things as welfare benefits in their own way. As the expense involved escalated, "shared cost" programmes were initiated, schemes for which the provinces were responsible with regard to their actual implementation but in which they had little say or overall control in terms of administration or methods of operation.

An additional source of disagreement between the federal government and the provincial authorities centred on measures to realise a national policy of explicit bi-lingualism in many areas of governmental activity. Whilst Canadian history since Confederation is replete with examples of conflicts stemming from different demands from separate ethnic groups, the fear that the federal authorities were attempting to impose their will on the provinces was a major cause of the repeated strains in the relationship between the two levels of the political system.

In a sense, this merely acted to reiterate the fact that in very few areas could either tier of the structure act entirely independently; more often, detailed discussions take place and a compromise solution is eventually arrived at, although any inclination to defer to the wishes of the centre by the provincial authorities is obviously weakened by the development of the latter's administrative skills and overall competence as well as the fact that they tend to regard themselves as surrogates for the interests of the communities they govern, whereas the federal organs inevitably have to take account of a much wider range of diversities before they can reach a final decision.

If different groups and regions are to retain their confidence in the essential justice of the "federal bargain", it is clearly important that they feel that their interests are being adequately represented within the confines of the prevailing political system. Even though the operation of a federal structure in a country the size of Canada could well strengthen already extant local awareness and loyalties to an extent whereby particularism and parochial outlooks create interlocking interests, the need for agreement on a basic minimum of nationally unifying component elements of the political game remains indispensable.

Clearly, the actions and attitudes of the political parties will be vital in this and in the next two sections of the paper as we look at the structuring

of electoral choice in both the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada, we intend to examine in some detail the role which the parties have fulfilled in coming to terms with and operating within a federal political structure as well as their impact on continuity and change in terms of the territorial evolution of mass electoral behaviour.

SOCIO-STRUCTURAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCES ON VOTING

(i) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Detailed studies of voting patterns in the Federal Republic have produced a relatively straightforward picture regarding the influences which condition partisan choices. Analyses in this field have concentrated principally upon the impact of socio-demographic factors, mainly social class as measured by occupation and religious affiliation and both of these have displayed a noticeable stability as key explanatory variables over the whole post-war period (Urwin, 1974; Baker et al, 1981: part three; Conradt, 1982: chapter five). If we employ other indicators such as trade union membership and rate of church attendance, our ability to account for partisanship is improved even further. (2)

Other potentially significant influences such as sex, age and the voter's place of residence appear less important and the same conclusion applies to the "regional" factor as an independent determinant of voting decisions. Much of the research which examined hypotheses relating to "regionalisation" of party preferences has regarded "territorial factors" as "surrogate" influences closely linked to other social divides such as religion, with Catholics concentrated in the south and west and the Protestants mainly clustered in the north to take one example. Indeed, Hoschka and Schunck (1978: 49) believe that "if the different composition of the federal states in terms of their socio-economic structure is taken into account, the increase (over time) of the state impact in the case of the CDU-CSU and the SPD disappears altogether".

We have already mentioned briefly some of the reasons why this might indeed be the case. The imposition of essentially artificial state boundaries, many of which had only tenuous links with the past was certainly of importance as was the massive population movements both during and after the second world war, with roughly 12 million refugees arriving in the country from the territories making up present day Eastern Europe. In addition, the occupation forces quickly set about standardising many of the procedures within the three western sectors they administered, something which was continued by the German authorities when they had assumed control once more.

In the light of all this, it would be surprising if strong regional differentiation did in fact play a consistently important and independent role in the structuring of electoral choice. However such a conclusion is often arrived at after consideration of federal elections only and so it remains possible that a distinction must be drawn between the impact of regions on voting at different levels of the political system.

Given the existence of a federal structure, we might well expect that regional divergences between states would indeed find expression at sub-national level in parliaments supposedly established to permit the institutionalised representation of the interests of the different "Länder".

Nevertheless, previous research has suggested that the outcomes of state elections are, in fact, influenced to a considerable extent by events in the federal political arena as well as perceptions of the overall performance of the parties making up the government of the "superior" level in Bonn at any particular time.⁽³⁾ This conclusion is reinforced by the involvement of national political figures in state election campaigns and the regular emphasis on non-regional issues and themes in addition to the normal interpretation of electoral changes at "Land" level as constituting a particular "message" for the federal coalition of the moment.

Dinkel (1978) discovered that in 65 of the 67 state elections held up until 1976, the federal government coalition of the time received fewer votes than would have been in accordance with national election results in the same states. Such a consistent outcome implies the use of state elections by many voters as a means of articulating opposition to the federal administration at a particular juncture rather than the perceived individual interests of each state.

The fact that voter turnout is invariably lower in state than in federal elections in each of the "Länder" also suggests that ordinary electors do not regard regional elections with as much interest or as being as significant as federal elections which have recorded both stable and high turnout figures. (4)

Whilst we can discover important exceptions to the general rule that state election campaigns are dominated by national concerns (5) and even turnout figures which are not so different between the two levels as to provoke much comment, it is equally not very difficult to uncover the main reasons for such a concentration on national politics or to comprehend the reactions of the voters noted above.

Although parties with regional electoral bases were successful in gaining parliamentary representation at both federal and state level in the immediate post-war period, a process of social integration was initiated in the Federal Republic in many fields of activity (including politics) to which all the smaller parties all eventually succumbed, with the exception of the F.D.P. Both the DP (German Party) and the BP (Bavarian Party) as well as the BHE (Refugee Party) were initially able to establish themselves in particular areas of the country (see appendix for details) but the determination of Adenauer and his successors as leader of the CDU-CSU to build and maintain a united Christian/conservative political block as the most effective way of challenging the organised strength of the Social Democrats acted to quickly and effectively undercut the "raison d'être" of regionally based parties who

lost their individual identities as a result of the insistent drive towards absorption and amalgamation on the right of the political spectrum.

As a result, only three parties were represented in the Bundestag after the 1961 federal election whereas after the national election held in 1949, there had been ten parties in the lower chamber. A similar process towards party system concentration was also discernible at the same time in the various "Landtage".

The obsession with unity had its roots in the conclusions drawn from the bitter experiences of the Weimar Republic when perpetual splits within most of the different political camps produced a whole series of short-lived and ineffectual governments which proved incapable of coping with increasingly desperate socio-economic problems.

Although the subsuming of divergent interests within the CDU-CSU forced the party to run itself as a loosely structured coalition, the winning of federal office and the subsequent electoral rewards resulting from the party's ability to run the economy so as to produce widespread affluence acted as the "cement" for the Christian Democrats to present a coherent public image whenever required.

In addition, a developing reputation for administrative competence enabled the CDU-CSU to use the machinery of state and the wide acceptance of the new legitimacy bestowed upon political parties under Article 21 of the Basic Law to ensure that the unity which had been originally forged was clearly seen as an indispensable part of the party's overall strategy.

In this way, the representation of regional interests became part of the Christian/conservative political block without retaining any individual identity and the artificiality of the federal division of the country ensured that the main groups making up the CDU-CSU were eventually based more on functional than regional distinctions.

An additional problem which the smaller regionally based parties had to confront was the introduction of a 5% electoral exclusion barrier, below which they would not be represented in either the federal or the state parliaments. This was a measure designed to prevent the party system fragmentation which had come to characterise the Weimar years and combined with the pressures outlined above towards unity, the regionally based parties proved incapable of maintaining an independent electoral appeal and existence.

As the post-war system became concentrated after 1961 at both the main levels of the polity, with the same parties vying with one another for office, the means of representing regional interests politically became incorporated within the internal structures of the major parties. As a result, separate identities grounded in regional differences were lost amongst the plethora of other pressure groups and sectional interests attempting to exert influence on policy and decision-making.

It therefore seems clear that the actions of the major political parties in the Federal Republic were crucial factors in the demise of regionally based parties at both levels of the political system, aided and abetted by the development of an institutional structure and a political culture which militated against regional interests being articulated outside the ranks of the nationally oriented parties.

Whilst it is undeniably true if we consider the voting figures contained in the appendix that both the SPD and the CDU-CSU consistently perform better electorally in some areas than others, the differences that exist in terms of spatial partisan preferences can usually be accounted for by reference to the socio-economic structure in question as well as the consequences of "accumulated electoral experience" on the part of the voters.

The artificiality of the federal structure and the development of a highly integrated party system at both national and state level led to the incorporation of regional bases into the prevailing socio-economic structure

which continues to act as the principal means of differentiating between the major parties, even given the recent emergence of "new politics" and the Green party.

The process of integration was also achieved through the presence of a wide measure of consensus within the party system both about fundamental aims and the chief means of achieving them. A healthy economy is obviously a very useful asset if regional disparities and interests were to provide sources of disputes between different areas but the absorption of the smaller parties with regional electoral bases into the CDU-CSU in the late 1950s ensured that the articulation of specifically spatial interests is neither emphasised nor encouraged.

In a very important sense then, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the political parties have come to terms with the prevailing federal political structure by instigating a process of integration and "nationalisation" rather than differentiation and regionalisation.

(ii) CANADA

In some ways, electoral research in Canada has been comparable to the work in the same area in the Federal Republic of Germany in its analysis of factors such as ethnicity and religious affiliation in their impact on mass voting behaviour (Schwartz, 1974; Meisel, 1975). The main emphasis in such studies has, however, tended, particularly in recent years, to focus on questions such as party identification, attitudes towards leading politicians and specific issues deemed to be salient at the time of each election, as part of attempts to examine the influence of both long-term and short-term forces on the different groups within the electorate (Clarke et al, 1979, 1984).

All such examinations of Canadian partisan preferences have, in addition, had to deal with the persistent inter-provincial heterogeneity in terms of the support for each party which is evident from even a cursory glance at the figures for the different provinces contained in the appendix.

It seems clear from these statistics that Canada provides an excellent example of a country dominated by political regionalism in that it has a party that only exists in a particular province (the Parti Québécois), it has national parties which usually attract disproportionate support from certain provinces (the consistent weakness of the Liberal party in the western region for example) and the changes in the aggregate voting strengths of the parties in each province shifts in different directions from election to election (apparent by comparing Alberta and New Brunswick). This situation strongly suggests that the impact of national political events and issues is quite different in the different regions of the country.

Given the existence of a deeply embedded confederal political structure underpinned and reinforced by the strong and individual identities of each of the regional units, it can hardly be regarded as surprising when voters act in ways congruent with their perceptions of the interests of their particular province at both federal and sub-national level.

This does mean, however, that there can be big variations in party support between federal and provincial elections, both in terms of the number of seats that are won and lost and in the proportion of the popular vote which each party attracts. As Perlin and Peppin (1971) point out, in the eight federal elections between 1949 and 1968, there were always at least five provinces in which the party that won the largest number of seats did not hold the largest number of seats in the provincial legislature. As we can see from table one, this pattern continued for the federal elections of 1972, 1974 and 1980 but the Progressive Conservatives' national victories of 1979 and 1984 were preceded by growing strength at provincial level.

TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE

One possible explanation for this phenomenon could be a conscious attempt by the voters to strike a "balance" between the different levels of the system although the nature and extent of the divergences in partisanship over time suggest that it is more likely that the two main levels of government in Canada are viewed as distinct from one another in the eyes of the electorate. In addition, the normal assumption that national elections have greater salience for the populace than provincial elections may prove to be erroneous in a Canadian context.

In terms of voter turnout, the picture across the country is as varied as we might expect. In Nova Scotia, for example, turnout at both provincial and national elections has been roughly similar, with the former occasionally greater, whereas in Ontario, provincial turnout figures are usually somewhat less than at federal level. It does seem to be the case that the main differences that exist with regard to turnout are between provinces rather than the different levels of the system.

We mentioned earlier that Canada appeared to be a fine example of a country where political regionalism was an important characteristic of the party system and some of the reasons for this development are clearly related to the prevailing socio-economic structure which changes its very basis as we move across the provinces from east to west, from predominantly industrialised and urban areas to agrarian and rural dominated ones.

As a result, different interests rooted in divergent environments were inevitably created and combined with emphasis on the necessity for a high degree of provincial autonomy, the linking of economic regionalism with political regionalism by the parties was one obvious way of winning electoral support in different parts of the country.

It can, of course, be argued that as the economic structure changes, presumably towards a more uniform industrial pattern as the western provinces exploit their mineral resources further, the special character of those areas

will recede, leading in time to the gradual erosion of regional loyalties and an increase in more traditional "class voting" and more attention to national rather than provincial politics.

Yet there has always been a conspicuous lack of "class consciousness" amongst Canada's relatively affluent and mobile working class sector and it seems unlikely that the perception of such interests will develop in the future given a mixed immigration pattern which cuts across any such clear delineation of personal economic self-interest.

If we assume that the lack of a feudal class structure in the country's historical development has been a significant factor in producing a situation where different social classes do not support national political parties in clearly distinct proportions, then social status will not rank highly in any "hierarchy of cleavages" capable of producing salient political divides. As a result, regional ties are able to provide both a clear focus for differentiation between provinces and a means of exploiting the confederal political structure so as to protect sub-national autonomy in many areas of decision-making.

The parties were therefore confronted with a situation where regional identities were already in existence and where the divergence of interests they produced were clearly capable of engendering deep-seated conflicts which were unlikely to be adequately resolved through short-term solutions.

Whilst the role and status of Québec was probably the most obvious example of a province with interests unlike those of the rest of the country acting as a source of potentially enduring disputes, the political parties did not attempt to meet such challenges by "nationalising" politics through an emphasis on the aggregation of regional interests into broad, federally oriented coalitions.

Cairns (1968) argued that the use of a single member, plurality electoral system was a significant influence in the stressing of provincial interests as key planks in the electoral appeals of the parties in that such a method of voting was likely to prove fruitful in terms of attracting support from particular regions. Major parties with the ability to win regionally con-

centrated backing such as the Liberal party at federal level in Québec were capable of regularly gaining more seats than votes, whereas minor parties with diffuse support would not be rewarded in this way.

One consequence of such a system was to transform contests between parties into contests between provinces as well as producing a strong tendency to emphasise sub-national sectionalism to such an extent that it came to dominate election campaigns, government policies and general perceptions of the functions of the party system.

As such a majoritarian electoral system can be regarded as an important stumbling block in the way of the development of a truly "national" political system in Canada and an inappropriate method for realising integration between different areas because of its tendency to provide larger parties with more chance of power if they approach the election by trying to capture votes on a geographical basis and structuring campaigns according to the potential benefits of stressing regional interests.

Jackman (1972) concluded that there was little evidence that the Canadian parties have acted as agents of national integration or that Canadian voters behave as members of a national community. It is certainly true that the major parties put together national parliamentary majorities by winning seats in particular provinces such as Ontario or Québec and a few from others but without gaining anything like uniform support across the whole country either in terms of votes or seats (see appendix for further details on the former).

This can mean that the government is divided from the opposition more by province than party ties or policy, with severe problems in terms of the former's legitimacy and authority as the duly elected federal administration in areas where it received little electoral support. As a result, the main line of political division in Canada can be drawn between the nation and its component regions, with the country existing with an entirely different centre of political gravity to most other countries.

The Canadian party system is sometimes described as "two plus two" with the smaller parties possessing clear regional bases such as Social Credit in Alberta and the NDP in Saskatchewan, resulting from the failure of the major political forces (the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives) to incorporate the regional interests of those two provinces into loosely structured coalitions at national level. The persistence of this failure suggests a long-standing alienation from both the main parties by ordinary voters in the western provinces, something which is unlikely to be reversed under the present electoral system or whilst the parties appeal explicitly to sectional interests for their own ends.

In many ways, these developments have reinforced one another to produce interlocking interests affecting the whole political system. The parties have reacted to the emphasis on provincial interests by establishing their main organisational presence at provincial rather than national level, by developing only weakly co-ordinated extra-parliamentary support groups and producing little in the way of coherent and ideologically distinct policy programmes.

Nevertheless, the operation of a parliamentary system based on the Westminster model requires party cohesion and cabinet stability without the threat of constant inter-provincial struggles. One result of this imperative is that any "protest" movement that arises tends to establish its own party as its principal means of articulation since the structure of the two main parties would certainly mean the loss of the group's specificity amongst the welter of competing interests. It is interesting to note in this regard that "protest" movements are able to survive as credible electoral forces for a long time and that they are able to win successive elections by giving voice to regionally defined special interests which the major parties are unable to incorporate and adequately represent.

Whilst there is certainly a degree of inertia and perhaps even indifference associated with this longevity as well as a fostering by provincial elites of a strong sense of interests that need to be defended, the regionalisation of the Canadian party system at both federal and provincial level can be regarded as a failure by the parties to encourage the development of a national identity capable of competing with entrenched regional loyalties and ties.

There is always, of course, a "knock on" effect with the workings of the present system being socialised into the attitudes and perceptions of those to follow and in some ways, the nature of the Canadian political structure is perfectly explicable if we look at the existence of different socio-economic structures and different political situations in different provinces.

Political parties at provincial level lobbying for specifically regional interests in their electoral appeals and in their relationship with the federal authorities are only attempting to fulfil their defined role but the regular neglect of party solidarity across the levels of the system in favour of reaching as much inter-governmental agreement as possible implies that the parties are very much aware of the importance of preserving the wider societal structure of Canada even when it conflicts with their own specific interests.

As a result, the parties have often appeared to be dependent on the nature of the structure within which they operate for their legitimacy and the patterning of their activities. Whilst this would imply a very strong mutuality of interest between the parties and the prevailing system, it also suggests the parties have little in the way of autonomy to radically change or even re-mould the system so as to overcome the complications in their support bases which the present regionalisation produces as a matter of course.

It can be argued that the parties are perfectly happy to exist in this way and that they are capable of exploiting the system for their own ends as well as sufficiently knowledgeable as to its internal workings to keep it moving forward. However an obsession with structural unity can in time lead to

feelings of alienation on the part of ordinary voters whose only real involvement in the system is as "electoral fodder" roughly every four years.

DIVERSITY AND UNITY

In any attempt to derive generalisations from a comparative analysis, we can never ignore the cultural context within which the political process operates although the precision of the conclusions we draw will often become blurred and less widely applicable if we emphasise such specific elements too strongly. The tendency to do this when comparing North America and continental Europe seems however to be inevitable given the wide divergences between the two in terms of historical background and the different configuration of political forces that each exhibits.

However, as the starting point for this paper, we took an institutional factor which prevails in both the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada (a federal political structure) and attempted to look at the ways in which the system had changed in each country since 1945 and then to link these developments to the structuring of electoral choice, in particular the significance of "regional" influences on voting behaviour at national and state/provincial levels.

It seems clear that the changes that have taken place have pushed the two countries in opposing directions. The Federal Republic has undergone an insistent process of national integration whereby regional interests were incorporated into the ranks of the major parties, principally the CDU-CSU rather than existing as independent parties. In contrast, Canada's overall unity is regularly strained by the entrenched provincial loyalties and ties of its people, feelings fostered over many decades by perceptions of strongly divergent interests which were legitimised by the political parties in their electoral appeals.

As a result, the German party system has achieved a degree of concentration and consensus which few in the Weimar Republic would have thought even remotely possible whilst Canada's search for a widely acceptable national identity and purpose continues to be compromised by the need to take account of deeply embedded and regionally defined traditions and identities.

Although we thought at the start that the impact of "geographical voting" might change significantly during the timespan of our study, this has not in fact been the case. The territorially based parties in the Federal Republic which initially managed to establish themselves after the war were already in decline by 1955 and they had all disappeared at national level by 1961, never to re-appear. The main threats to the three parties remaining since that date have been the neo-Nazi NPD at state level during the Great Coalition between 1966-69 and the Green party since the late 1970s at both national and "Land" level.

Whilst the electoral strengths of both have varied in different parts of the country, neither could be described as regional either in outlook or appeal and given the inertia of any party system allied with a specifically German caution regarding political change, it is hard to see how a territorial basis could be re-created for any party in the future which would enable it to establish its credentials as a necessary addition to the present party political options on offer.

The early disappearance of the regional parties also meant that "geographical voting" became intimately linked with the socio-economic structure of each "Land" and that its role as an independent factor of electoral significance quickly diminished. As a result, the alternation in power between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats was not accompanied to any great extent by divergences in the support bases of either on a purely regional basis.

The process of integration that had been initiated proved too all-encompassing for geographical influences to survive on their own and the main parties were instrumental in aiding the drive towards unity as it reduced the party system to a size whereby the German people still possessed a choice (although a somewhat limited one) but more importantly, the integrative procedure enabled the longing for cohesion and above all, stability and continuity to be realised at last.

The contrast in this regard with Canada is clear in virtually every respect. The question of unity is seemingly a constant pre-occupation of analysts of the country's development but the political parties have hardly been in the forefront of moves to achieve such an aim. More often, they have been content to fall back on their proven ability to mobilise electoral support on a regional and provincial rather than nationwide basis without much regard for the creation of a sense of overall purpose capable both of providing a greater breadth of mass support and more substantial backing for the regime as a whole.

It has to be said that the workings of the electoral system and the degree to which provincial loyalties have long been embedded in the psyche of many Canadian people have weakened considerably any attempts by the parties to formulate measures designed to strengthen the elements which together could form a lasting and widely accepted sense of national identity.

In this way, it might appear that the parties are caught between their own direct electoral interests and the desire to change the way the system works so as to produce more coherence and less instability and uncertainty. The emphasis on short-term, reformist solutions which the structure of the party system has encouraged is hardly an appropriate way to approach long-term and fundamental problems but Canadian politics has evolved in such a way that hard choices are avoided if possible and immediately effective amelioration sought by the people and provided by the parties.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the impact of geographical factors on voting was significant for only about a decade after the second world war but in Canada, such influences provide the very basis for the working of the political system at both federal and provincial level. As a result, it is not surprising that territorially defined factors have been of consistent importance in the question of partisan choice over the thirty year period covered by this paper. It is also interesting to note that such influences have not been diminished or greatly altered by the changes in the complexion of the federal government since the parties themselves have at the very least been willing to accept such conditions as the parameters within which the game of party competition has had to be played.

Whilst this might suggest that the parties in Canada are prisoners of the structure of the system in which they operate, the parties in Germany chose to override the federal division of their polity in producing a high degree of social and political integration which is now widely recognized as being a key characteristic of the Bonn Republic.

It can of course be argued that the very artificiality of the Federal Republic's structure has made such a process very much easier than would be the case in Canada where the provinces are divided by widely and clearly perceived differences in interests of both an economic and cultural nature.

The developments in each country's party system are ultimately inexplicable except through constant reference to the historical and social background against which they emerged, yet it would be wrong to suppose that the parties and other actors within the political system are impotent in the face of changing socio-economic demands or any divergence between the structure of the overall political system and its ability to change to meet new requirements.

With the passing of time vested interests are inevitably created and they can certainly endure for long periods through a mixture of inertia and indifference yet the expansion of governmental activity after 1945 made it clear that parties can re-shape their societies in ways which necessitate major reconsideration of the norms and expectations of the outputs of the political system.

The fact that such a process has taken place in the Federal Republic of Germany but not in Canada does not stem purely from historical twists of fate or artifacts of political structure but in part from a conscious choice by the parties as to how they view the underlying imperatives of their respective countries. In this sense, the fact that both countries have federal political systems can be regarded as telling only a very small part of the story of the impact of geographical ties on voting, a story which can only be completed by reference to the ways in which national unity and social integration were pursued with undeflected vigour by the parties in the Federal Republic of Germany but with benign neglect by their counterparts in Canada.

REFERENCES

- (1) Despite the artificiality of the present federal structure, any changes in the future appear most unlikely. In 1976, an amendment to article 29 of the Basic Law which dealt with territorial reorganisation was amended so that the wording "the federal territory must be reorganised" became "the federal territory may be reorganised", making changes permissive rather than compulsory. C.C. Schweitzer, D. Karsten, R. Spencer, R.T. Cole, D.P. Kommers and A.J. Nicholls (editors) - Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Documents (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1984), p. 160.

- (2) In particular, a combination of trade union membership and occupation as well as religious affiliation and rate of church attendance provide very powerful variables capable of separating out most voters, particularly SPD and CDU-CSU sympathisers. The strongest attachments to the Social Democrats are within the working class/unionised sector and from Protestants who rarely attend church whilst the Christian Democrats score heavily amongst non-unionised farmers and old middle class members as well as Catholics who frequently attend mass.

- (3) A recent example of this occurred in Hesse in September 1982 when the SPD-F.D.P. national coalition broke up amidst acrimonious accusations that the F.D.P. were committing "regicide". Nine days later, the Free Democrats were forced below the 5% exclusion barrier, receiving only 3.1% of the votes in a state election and they were thus not represented in the Wiesbaden Landtag. Most conclusions regarding the F.D.P.'s performance concentrated on the impact of the national events during the campaign.

- (4) The only exception to this general rule in the last fourteen state elections up to March 1984 occurred in the Rhineland Palatinate which registered an increase of 0.6%. It has however to be pointed out that the federal and state elections were both held on the same day.
- (5) Two possible examples are the question of the nuclear waste disposal plant at Gorleben in Lower Saxony and the building of a new runway at Frankfurt airport.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL

Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (editors) - The Politics of Territorial Identity. Studies in European Regionalism (London: Sage Publications, 1982).

Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin - Economy, Territory, Identity. Politics of West European Peripheries (London: Sage Publications, 1983).

P.J. Taylor and R.J. Johnston - Geography of Elections (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt - Germany Transformed. Political Culture and the New Politics (London: Harvard University Press, 1981).

Karl H. Cerny - Germany at the Polls. The Bundestag Election of 1976 (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

David P. Conradt - The German Polity (London: Longman, 2nd edition, 1982).

Reiner Dinkel, "The Relationship between Federal and State Elections in West Germany", pp. 53-65 in Max Kaase and Klaus von Beyme (editors) - Elections and Parties. Socio-political Change and Participation in the West German Federal Election of 1976 (London: Sage Publications, 1978).

Herbert Döring and Gordon Smith (editors) - Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany (London: Macmillan, 1982).

Lewis J. Edinger - Politics in West Germany (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 2nd edition, 1977).

Peter Hoschka and Hermann Schunck, "Regional Stability of Voting Behaviour in Federal Elections: A Longitudinal Aggregate Data Analysis", pp. 31-52 in Max Kaase and Klaus von Beyme (editors) - Elections and Parties (London: Sage Publications, 1978).

Max Kaase and Klaus von Beyme (editors) - Elections and Parties. Socio-political Change and Participation in the West German Federal Election of 1976 (London: Sage Publications, 1978).

Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (editors) - Wahlen und politisches System. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1980 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983).

Gordon Smith - Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic (London: Heinemann, 1979).

David Southern, "Germany", pp. 107-155 in F.F. Ridley (editor) - Government and Administration in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).

Derek Urwin, "Germany: Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics", pp. 109-170 in R. Rose (editor) - Electoral Behaviour. A Comparative Handbook (New York: Free Press, 1974).

Derek Urwin, "Germany: From Geographical Expression to Regional Accommodation" pp. 165-249 in Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (editors) - The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage Publications, 1983).

CANADA

J. Murray Beck - Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5:1, 1972, pp. 55-81.

Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-65", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1:1, 1968, pp. 55-80.

Harold D. Clarke, Lawrence Le Duc, Jane Jenson and Jon Pammett - Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979).

Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence Le Duc and Jon H. Pammett - Absent Mandate. The Politics of Discontent in Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1984).

John C. Courtney (editor) - Voting in Canada (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz - Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

Paul W. Fox - Politics: Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Fifth Edition, 1982).

William P. Irvine and H. Gold, "Do Frozen Cleavages Ever Go Stale? The Bases of the Canadian and Australian Party Systems", British Journal of Political Science, 10:2, 1980, pp. 187-218.

Robert W. Jackman, "Political Parties, Voting and National Integration: The Canadian Case", Comparative Politics, 4:4, 1972, pp. 511-36.

Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke (editors) - Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983).

J.A. Laponce, "Post-Dicting Electoral Cleavages in Canadian Federal Elections, 1949-68: Material for a Footnote", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5:2, 1972, pp. 270-85.

John Meisel - Working Papers on Canadian Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queens' University Press, 2nd Edition, 1975).

Kenneth McNaught - The Pelican History of Canada (Harmondsworth: Penguin, Enlarged Edition, 1982).

Howard R. Penniman (editor) - Canada at the Polls. The General Election of 1974 (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).

Howard R. Penniman (editor) - Canada at the Polls 1979 and 1980. A Study of the General Elections (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

George Perlin and Patti Peppin, "Variations in Party Support in Federal and Provincial Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4:2, 1971, pp. 280-6.

Howard A. Scarrow - Canada Votes. A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data (New Orleans: Hauser, 1962).

Mildred A. Schwartz, "Canadian Voting Behaviour", pp. 543-617 in R. Rose (editor) - Electoral Behaviour. A Comparative Handbook (New York: Free Press, 1974).

Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7:3, 1974, pp. 397-437.

John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Re-Definition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7:3, 1974, pp. 438-483.

TABLE ONE

THE "BALANCE" OF POWER IN CANADA

| | <u>1972</u> | <u>1974</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>1984</u> |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Federal Election Winning Party | LIB | LIB | PC | LIB | PC |
| Provincial Government at the time | | | | | |
| Prince Edward Island | LIB | LIB | PC | PC | PC |
| Newfoundland | PC | PC | PC | PC | PC |
| Nova Scotia | LIB | LIB | PC | PC | PC |
| New Brunswick | PC | PC | PC | PC | PC |
| Québec | LIB | LIB | PQ | PQ | PQ |
| Ontario | PC | PC | PC | PC | PC |
| Manitoba | NDP | NDP | SC | SC | NDP |
| Saskatchewan | NDP | NDP | NDP | NDP | PC |
| Alberta | PC | PC | PC | PC | PC |
| British Columbia | NDP | NDP | SC | SC | SC |

APPENDIX

A: FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTION RESULTS (%) BY STATE,
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1955-85

B: FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS (%) BY
PROVINCE, CANADA, 1955-85

NOTES

FRG

(F) = Federal Election
(S) = State Election
SPD = Social Democrats
CDU-CSU = Christian Democratic Union/
Christian Social Union
F.D.P. = Free Democrats
Greens = Green Party (Ecologists)
DP = German Party
BHE = Refugee Party
SSW = South Schleswig Voters League
DRP = German Reich Party
KPD = Communist Party
NPD = National Democratic Party
DFU = German Peace Union
GDP = All-German Party
GVP = All-German People's Party
BP = Bavarian Party
SVP/CVP = Saarland People's Party/
Christian People's Party
DDU = German Democratic Union

CANADA

(P) = Provincial Election
(F) = Federal Election
LIB = Liberal Party
PC = Progressive Conservatives
CCF/NDP = Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation/New Democratic
Party
SC = Social Credit Party
UN = Union Nationale (Québec)
PQ = Parti Québécois (Québec)

The percentages contained in the parentheses below the federal election results for each party in each state or province in both countries are the differences (positive or negative) between each party's electoral performance in each state or province and its overall national performance across the whole country.

A. FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTION RESULTS, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1955-85

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1957 (F) | 30.8 | 48.1 | 5.6 | | 15.4 |
| | (-1.0) | (-2.1) | (-2.1) | | DP/BHE/ SSW |
| 1958 (S) | 35.9 | 44.4 | 5.4 | | 14.3 |
| | | | | | DP/BHE/ SSW/DRP |
| 1961 (F) | 36.4 | 41.8 | 13.8 | | 8.1 |
| | (+0.2) | (-3.5) | (+1.0) | | |
| 1962 (S) | 39.2 | 45.0 | 7.9 | | 7.9 |
| 1965 (F) | 38.8 | 48.2 | 9.4 | | 3.6 |
| | (-0.5) | (+0.6) | (-0.1) | | |
| 1967 (S) | 39.4 | 46.0 | 5.9 | | 8.7 |
| 1969 (F) | 43.5 | 46.2 | 5.2 | | 5.1 |
| | (+0.8) | (+0.1) | (-0.6) | | |
| 1971 (S) | 41.0 | 51.9 | 3.8 | | 3.3 |
| 1972 (F) | 48.6 | 42.0 | 8.6 | | 0.8 |
| | (+2.8) | (-2.9) | (+0.2) | | |
| 1975 (S) | 40.1 | 50.4 | 7.1 | | 2.4 |
| 1976 (F) | 46.4 | 44.1 | 8.8 | | 0.6 |
| | (+3.8) | (-4.5) | (+0.9) | | |
| 1979 (S) | 41.7 | 48.3 | 5.8 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| 1980 (F) | 46.7 | 38.9 | 12.7 | 1.4 | 0.3 |
| | (+3.8) | (-5.6) | (+2.1) | (-0.1) | |
| 1983 (F) | 41.7 | 46.5 | 6.3 | 5.2 | 0.3 |
| | (+3.5) | (-2.3) | (-0.6) | (-0.4) | |
| 1983 (S) | 43.7 | 49.0 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 1.5 |

HAMBURG

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1957 (F) | 45.8 | 37.4 | 9.4 | | 7.4 |
| | (+14.0) | (-12.8) | (+1.7) | | |
| 1957 (S) | 53.9 | 32.2 | 8.6 | | 5.3 |
| 1961 (F) | 46.9 | 31.9 | 15.7 | | 5.5 |
| | (+10.7) | (-13.4) | (+2.9) | | |
| 1961 (S) | 57.4 | 29.1 | 9.6 | | 3.9 |
| 1965 (F) | 48.3 | 37.6 | 9.4 | | 4.7 |
| | (+9.0) | (-10.0) | (-0.1) | | |
| 1966 (S) | 59.0 | 30.0 | 6.8 | | 4.2 |
| 1969 (F) | 54.6 | 34.0 | 6.3 | | 5.1 |
| | (+11.9) | (-12.1) | (+0.5) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 55.3 | 32.8 | 7.1 | | 4.8 |
| 1972 (F) | 54.4 | 33.3 | 11.2 | | 1.0 |
| | (+8.6) | (-11.6) | (+2.8) | | |
| 1974 (S) | 44.9 | 40.6 | 10.9 | | 3.6 |
| 1976 (F) | 52.6 | 35.9 | 10.2 | | 1.3 |
| | (+10.0) | (-12.7) | (+2.3) | | |
| 1978 (S) | 51.5 | 37.6 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 1.6 |
| 1980 (F) | 51.7 | 31.2 | 14.1 | 2.3 | 0.7 |
| | (+8.8) | (-13.3) | (+3.5) | (+0.8) | |
| 1982 (S) | 42.7 | 43.2 | 4.8 | 7.7 | 1.5 |
| 1982 (S) | 51.3 | 38.6 | 2.6 | 6.8 | 0.7 |
| 1983 (F) | 47.4 | 37.6 | 6.3 | 8.2 | 0.5 |
| | (+9.2) | (-11.2) | (-0.6) | (+2.6) | |

LOWER SAXONY

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1957 (F) | 32.8 | 39.1 | 5.9 | | 22.2 |
| | (+1.0) | (-11.1) | (-1.8) | | DP/DRP/ BHE |
| 1959 (S) | 39.5 | 30.8 | 5.2 | | 24.5 |
| | | | | | DP/DRP/ BHE |
| 1961 (F) | 38.7 | 39.0 | 13.2 | | 9.1 |
| | (+2.5) | (-6.3) | (+0.4) | | |
| 1963 (S) | 44.9 | 37.7 | 8.8 | | 8.5 |
| 1965 (F) | 39.8 | 45.8 | 10.9 | | 3.5 |
| | (+0.5) | (-1.8) | (+1.4) | | |
| 1967 (S) | 43.1 | 41.7 | 6.9 | | 8.3 |
| 1969 (F) | 43.8 | 45.2 | 5.6 | | 5.4 |
| | (+1.1) | (-0.9) | (-0.2) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 46.3 | 45.7 | 4.4 | | 3.7 |
| 1972 (F) | 48.1 | 42.7 | 8.5 | | 0.7 |
| | (+2.3) | (-2.2) | (+0.1) | | |
| 1974 (S) | 43.1 | 48.8 | 7.0 | | 1.0 |
| 1976 (F) | 45.7 | 45.7 | 7.9 | | 0.7 |
| | (+3.1) | (-2.9) | (0) | | |
| 1978 (S) | 42.2 | 48.7 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 1.1 |
| 1980 (F) | 46.9 | 39.8 | 11.3 | 1.6 | 0.4 |
| | (+4.0) | (-4.7) | (+0.7) | (+0.1) | |
| 1982 (S) | 36.5 | 50.7 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 0.4 |
| 1983 (F) | 41.4 | 45.6 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 0.4 |
| | (+3.2) | (-3.2) | (0) | (+0.1) | |

BREMEN

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1955 (S) | 47.7 | 18.0 | 8.6 | | 25.6 |
| | | | | | DP/KPD |
| 1957 (F) | 46.2 | 30.4 | 5.8 | | 17.6 |
| | (+14.4) | (-19.8) | (-1.9) | | DP/DRP/ BHE |
| 1959 (S) | 54.9 | 14.8 | 7.1 | | 23.2 |
| | | | | | DP/DRP/ BHE |
| 1961 (F) | 49.7 | 27.0 | 15.2 | | 8.2 |
| | (+13.5) | (-18.3) | (+2.4) | | |
| 1963 (S) | 54.7 | 28.9 | 8.4 | | 8.0 |
| 1965 (F) | 48.5 | 34.0 | 11.7 | | 5.8 |
| | (+9.2) | (-13.6) | (+2.2) | | |
| 1967 (S) | 46.0 | 29.5 | 10.5 | | 14.0 |
| | | | | | NPD/DFU |
| 1969 (F) | 52.0 | 32.3 | 9.3 | | 6.4 |
| | (+9.3) | (-13.8) | (+3.5) | | |
| 1971 (S) | 55.3 | 31.6 | 7.1 | | 6.0 |
| 1972 (F) | 58.1 | 29.6 | 11.1 | | 1.2 |
| | (+12.3) | (-15.3) | (+2.7) | | |
| 1975 (S) | 48.7 | 33.8 | 13.0 | | 4.5 |
| 1976 (F) | 54.0 | 32.5 | 11.8 | | 1.7 |
| | (+11.4) | (-16.1) | (+3.9) | | |
| 1979 (S) | 49.4 | 31.9 | 10.8 | 5.1 | 2.7 |
| 1980 (F) | 52.5 | 28.8 | 15.1 | 2.7 | 0.9 |
| | (+9.6) | (-15.7) | (+4.5) | (+1.2) | |
| 1983 (F) | 48.7 | 34.2 | 6.5 | 9.7 | 0.9 |
| | (+10.5) | (-14.6) | (-0.4) | (+4.1) | |
| 1983 (S) | 51.4 | 33.3 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 5.4 |

NORTH-RHINE WESTPHALIA

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1957 (F) | 33.5 | 54.4 | 6.3 | | 5.9 |
| | (+1.7) | (+4.2) | (-1.4) | | |
| 1958 (S) | 39.2 | 50.5 | 7.1 | | 3.2 |
| 1961 (F) | 37.3 | 47.6 | 11.8 | | 3.4 |
| | (+1.1) | (+2.3) | (-1.0) | | |
| 1962 (S) | 43.3 | 46.4 | 6.8 | | 3.5 |
| 1965 (F) | 42.6 | 47.1 | 7.6 | | 2.7 |
| | (+3.3) | (-0.5) | (-1.9) | | |
| 1966 (S) | 49.5 | 42.8 | 7.4 | | 0.3 |
| 1969 (F) | 46.8 | 43.6 | 5.4 | | 4.2 |
| | (+4.1) | (-2.5) | (-0.4) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 46.1 | 46.3 | 5.5 | | 2.1 |
| 1972 (F) | 50.4 | 41.0 | 7.8 | | 0.8 |
| | (+4.6) | (-3.9) | (-0.6) | | |
| 1975 (S) | 45.1 | 47.1 | 6.7 | | 1.1 |
| 1976 (F) | 46.9 | 44.5 | 7.8 | | 0.8 |
| | (+4.3) | (-4.1) | (-0.1) | | |
| 1980 (S) | 48.4 | 43.2 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 0.4 |
| 1980 (F) | 46.8 | 40.6 | 10.9 | 1.2 | 0.5 |
| | (+3.9) | (-3.9) | (+0.3) | (-0.3) | |
| 1983 (F) | 42.8 | 45.2 | 6.4 | 5.2 | 0.4 |
| | (+4.6) | (-3.6) | (-0.5) | (-0.4) | |

HESSE

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1957 (F) | 38.0 | 40.9 | 8.5 | | 12.5 |
| | (+6.2) | (-9.3) | (+0.8) | | DP/BHE/ DRP |
| 1958 (S) | 46.9 | 32.0 | 9.5 | | 11.6 |
| | | | | | DP/BHE/ DRP |
| 1961 (F) | 42.8 | 34.9 | 15.2 | | 7.1 |
| | (+6.6) | (-10.4) | (+2.4) | | |
| 1962 (S) | 50.8 | 28.8 | 11.4 | | 8.9 |
| 1965 (F) | 45.7 | 37.8 | 12.0 | | 4.4 |
| | (+6.4) | (-9.8) | (+2.5) | | |
| 1966 (S) | 51.0 | 26.4 | 10.4 | | 12.2 |
| | | | | | GDP/NPD |
| 1969 (F) | 48.2 | 38.4 | 6.7 | | 6.7 |
| | (+5.5) | (-7.7) | (+0.9) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 45.9 | 39.7 | 10.1 | | 4.3 |
| 1972 (F) | 48.5 | 40.3 | 10.2 | | 1.0 |
| | (+2.7) | (-4.6) | (+1.8) | | |
| 1974 (S) | 43.2 | 47.3 | 7.4 | | 2.1 |
| 1976 (F) | 45.7 | 44.8 | 8.5 | | 1.0 |
| | (+3.1) | (-3.8) | (+0.6) | | |
| 1978 (S) | 44.3 | 46.0 | 6.6 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
| 1980 (F) | 46.4 | 40.6 | 10.6 | 1.8 | 0.6 |
| | (+3.5) | (-3.9) | (0) | (+0.3) | |
| 1982 (S) | 42.8 | 45.6 | 3.1 | 8.0 | 0.5 |
| 1983 (F) | 41.6 | 44.3 | 7.6 | 6.0 | 0.5 |
| | (+3.4) | (-4.5) | (+0.7) | (+0.4) | |
| 1983 (S) | 46.2 | 39.4 | 7.6 | 5.9 | 0.8 |

RHINELAND PALATINATE

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1955 (S) | 31.7 | 46.8 | 12.7 | | 8.8 |
| 1957 (F) | 30.4 | 53.7 | 9.8 | | 6.1 |
| | (-1.4) | (+3.5) | (+2.1) | | |
| 1959 (S) | 34.9 | 48.4 | 9.7 | | 7.0 |
| 1961 (F) | 33.5 | 48.9 | 13.2 | | 4.4 |
| | (-2.7) | (+3.6) | (+0.4) | | |
| 1963 (S) | 40.7 | 44.4 | 10.1 | | 4.8 |
| 1965 (F) | 36.7 | 49.3 | 10.2 | | 3.8 |
| | (-2.6) | (+1.7) | (+0.7) | | |
| 1967 (S) | 36.8 | 46.7 | 8.3 | | 8.2 |
| 1969 (F) | 40.1 | 47.8 | 6.3 | | 5.8 |
| | (-2.6) | (+1.7) | (+0.5) | | |
| 1971 (S) | 40.5 | 50.0 | 5.9 | | 3.5 |
| 1972 (F) | 44.9 | 45.9 | 8.1 | | 1.1 |
| | (-0.9) | (+1.0) | (-0.3) | | |
| 1975 (S) | 38.5 | 53.9 | 5.6 | | 1.9 |
| 1976 (F) | 41.7 | 49.9 | 7.6 | | 0.8 |
| | (-0.9) | (+1.3) | (-0.3) | | |
| 1979 (S) | 42.3 | 50.1 | 6.4 | | 1.2 |
| 1980 (F) | 42.8 | 45.6 | 9.8 | 1.4 | 0.4 |
| | (-0.1) | (+1.1) | (-0.8) | (-0.1) | |
| 1983 (F) | 38.4 | 49.6 | 7.0 | 4.5 | 0.5 |
| | (+0.2) | (+0.8) | (+0.1) | (-1.1) | |
| 1983 (L) | 39.6 | 51.9 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 0.5 |

BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1956 (S) | 28.9 | 42.6 | 16.6 | | 11.9 |
| | | | | | BHE/GVP |
| 1957 (F) | 25.8 | 52.8 | 14.4 | | 7.1 |
| | (-6.0) | (+2.6) | (+6.7) | | |
| 1960 (S) | 35.3 | 39.5 | 15.8 | | 9.4 |
| 1961 (F) | 32.1 | 45.3 | 16.6 | | 6.0 |
| | (-4.1) | (0) | (+3.8) | | |
| 1964 (S) | 37.3 | 46.2 | 13.1 | | 3.5 |
| 1965 (F) | 33.0 | 49.9 | 13.1 | | 4.0 |
| | (-6.3) | (+2.3) | (+3.6) | | |
| 1968 (S) | 29.0 | 44.2 | 14.4 | | 12.4 |
| | | | | | NPD |
| 1969 (F) | 36.5 | 50.7 | 7.5 | | 5.3 |
| | (-6.2) | (+4.6) | (+1.7) | | |
| 1972 (S) | 37.6 | 52.9 | 8.9 | | 0.6 |
| 1972 (F) | 38.9 | 49.8 | 10.2 | | 1.1 |
| | (-6.9) | (+4.9) | (+1.8) | | |
| 1976 (S) | 36.6 | 53.3 | 9.1 | | 1.0 |
| 1976 (F) | 33.3 | 56.7 | 7.8 | | 2.2 |
| | (-9.3) | (+8.1) | (-0.1) | | |
| 1980 (S) | 32.5 | 53.4 | 8.3 | 5.3 | 0.5 |
| 1980 (F) | 37.3 | 48.5 | 12.0 | 1.8 | 0.4 |
| | (-5.6) | (+4.0) | (+1.4) | (+0.3) | |
| 1983 (F) | 31.1 | 52.6 | 9.0 | 6.8 | 0.5 |
| | (-7.1) | (+3.8) | (+2.1) | (+1.2) | |
| 1984 (S) | 32.4 | 51.9 | 7.2 | 8.0 | 0.5 |

BAVARIA

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CSU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1957 (F) | 26.4 | 57.2 | 4.6 | | 11.8 |
| | (-5.4) | (+7.0) | (-3.1) | | BHE/DP BP |
| 1958 (S) | 30.8 | 45.6 | 5.6 | | 18.0 |
| | | | | | BHE/DP DRP/BP |
| 1961 (F) | 30.1 | 54.9 | 8.7 | | 6.2 |
| | (-6.1) | (+9.6) | (-4.1) | | |
| 1962 (S) | 35.3 | 47.5 | 5.9 | | 11.3 |
| | | | | | BHE/BP |
| 1965 (F) | 33.1 | 55.6 | 7.3 | | 3.9 |
| | (-6.2) | (+8.0) | (-2.2) | | |
| 1966 (S) | 35.8 | 48.1 | 5.1 | | 11.0 |
| | | | | | BP/NPD |
| 1969 (F) | 34.6 | 54.4 | 4.1 | | 7.0 |
| | (-8.1) | (+8.3) | (-1.7) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 33.3 | 56.4 | 5.6 | | 4.7 |
| 1972 (F) | 37.8 | 55.1 | 6.1 | | 1.0 |
| | (-8.0) | (+10.2) | (-2.3) | | |
| 1974 (S) | 30.2 | 62.1 | 5.2 | | 2.5 |
| 1976 (F) | 32.8 | 60.0 | 6.2 | | 1.0 |
| | (-9.8) | (+11.4) | (-1.7) | | |
| 1978 (S) | 31.4 | 59.1 | 6.2 | 1.8 | 1.4 |
| 1980 (F) | 32.7 | 57.6 | 7.9 | 1.3 | 0.5 |
| | (-10.2) | (+13.1) | (-2.7) | (-0.2) | |
| 1982 (S) | 31.9 | 58.3 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 0.7 |
| 1983 (F) | 28.9 | 59.5 | 6.2 | 4.6 | 0.8 |
| | (-9.3) | (+10.7) | (-0.7) | (-1.0) | |

SAARLAND

| | <u>SPD</u> | <u>CDU-CSU</u> | <u>F.D.P.</u> | <u>GREENS</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
| 1955 (S) | 20.1 | 26.0 | 24.2 | | 29.6 |
| | | | | | KPD/SVP/ CVP |
| 1957 (F) | 25.1 | 54.5 | 18.2 | | 2.2 |
| | (-6.7) | (+4.3) | (+10.5) | | |
| 1960 (S) | 30.0 | 36.6 | 13.8 | | 19.6 |
| | | | | | SVP/CVP/ DDU |
| 1961 (F) | 33.5 | 49.0 | 12.9 | | 4.6 |
| | (-2.7) | (+3.7) | (+0.1) | | |
| 1965 (S) | 40.7 | 42.7 | 8.3 | | 8.3 |
| 1965 (F) | 39.8 | 46.8 | 8.6 | | 4.8 |
| | (+0.5) | (-0.8) | (-0.9) | | |
| 1969 (F) | 39.9 | 46.1 | 6.7 | | 7.3 |
| | (-2.8) | (0) | (+0.9) | | |
| 1970 (S) | 40.8 | 47.8 | 4.4 | | 7.0 |
| 1972 (F) | 47.9 | 43.4 | 7.1 | | 1.6 |
| | (+2.1) | (-1.5) | (-1.3) | | |
| 1975 (S) | 41.8 | 49.1 | 7.4 | | 1.6 |
| 1976 (F) | 46.1 | 46.2 | 6.6 | | 1.1 |
| | (+3.5) | (-2.4) | (-1.3) | | |
| 1980 (S) | 45.4 | 44.0 | 6.9 | 2.9 | 0.8 |
| 1980 (F) | 48.3 | 42.3 | 7.8 | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| | (+5.4) | (-2.2) | (-2.8) | (-0.4) | |
| 1983 (F) | 43.8 | 44.8 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 0.6 |
| | (+5.6) | (-4.0) | (-0.9) | (-0.8) | |

B. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS, CANADA, 1955-85

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1955 (P) | 55.0 | 45.0 | - | - | - |
| 1957 (F) | 46.6 | 52.3 | 1.0 | - | - |
| | (+5.7) | (+13.4) | (-9.7) | | |
| 1958 (F) | 37.5 | 62.2 | 0.3 | - | - |
| | (-3.9) | (+8.6) | (-9.2) | | |
| 1959 (P) | 49.1 | 50.9 | - | - | - |
| 1962 (F) | 43.3 | 51.3 | 5.2 | 0.2 | - |
| | (+6.1) | (+14.0) | (-8.3) | (-11.5) | |
| 1962 (P) | 49.4 | 50.6 | - | - | - |
| 1963 (F) | 46.4 | 52.0 | 1.6 | - | - |
| | (+4.7) | (+19.2) | (-11.5) | | |
| 1965 (F) | 44.1 | 53.9 | 2.0 | - | - |
| | (+3.9) | (+21.5) | (-15.9) | | |
| 1966 (P) | 50.5 | 49.5 | - | - | - |
| 1968 (F) | 45.0 | 51.8 | 3.2 | - | - |
| | (-0.5) | (+20.4) | (-13.8) | | |
| 1970 (P) | 58.3 | 41.7 | - | - | - |
| 1972 (F) | 40.5 | 51.9 | 7.5 | 0.1 | - |
| | (+2.0) | (+16.9) | (-10.2) | | |
| 1974 (P) | 53.9 | 40.3 | 5.9 | - | - |
| 1974 (F) | 46.2 | 49.1 | 4.6 | - | 0.1 |
| | (+3.0) | (+13.7) | (-10.8) | | |
| 1978 (P) | 50.7 | 48.1 | 1.1 | - | - |
| 1979 (F) | 40.6 | 52.8 | 6.5 | - | 0.1 |
| | (+0.5) | (+16.9) | (-11.4) | | |
| 1979 (P) | 45.3 | 53.3 | 1.4 | - | - |
| 1980 (F) | 46.8 | 46.3 | 6.6 | - | 0.3 |
| | (+2.5) | (+13.8) | (-13.2) | | |
| 1982 (P) | 46.0 | 53.0 | 1.0 | - | - |
| 1984 (F) | 41.0 | 52.0 | 7.0 | - | - |
| | (+13.0) | (+2.0) | (-12.0) | | |

NEWFOUNDLAND

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 66.7 | 31.6 | - | - | 1.8 |
| 1957 (F) | 61.9 | 37.8 | 0.3 | - | - |
| | (+21.0) | (-1.1) | (-10.4) | | |
| 1958 (F) | 54.4 | 45.2 | 0.2 | - | 0.2 |
| | (+20.8) | (-8.4) | (-9.3) | | |
| 1959 (P) | 58.2 | 24.8 | 7.3 | - | 9.7 |
| 1962 (F) | 59.0 | 36.0 | 4.9 | 0.1 | - |
| | (+21.8) | (-1.3) | (-8.6) | (-11.6) | |
| 1962 (P) | 58.7 | 36.4 | 3.8 | - | 1.2 |
| 1963 (F) | 64.5 | 30.1 | 4.2 | - | 1.3 |
| | (+22.8) | (-2.7) | (-8.9) | | |
| 1965 (F) | 64.1 | 32.4 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.7 |
| | (+23.9) | (0) | (-16.7) | (-2.1) | |
| 1966 (P) | 61.8 | 34.0 | 1.8 | - | 2.4 |
| 1968 (F) | 42.8 | 52.7 | 4.4 | - | 0.1 |
| | (-2.7) | (+21.3) | (-12.6) | | |
| 1971 (P) | 44.4 | 51.3 | 1.8 | - | 2.6 |
| 1972 (P) | 38.0 | 59.9 | 0.2 | | 1.8 |
| 1972 (F) | 44.8 | 49.0 | 4.7 | 0.2 | 1.3 |
| | (+6.3) | (+14.0) | (-13.0) | (-7.4) | |
| 1974 (F) | 46.7 | 43.6 | 9.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| | (+3.5) | (+8.2) | (-5.9) | (-5.0) | |
| 1975 (P) | 37.1 | 45.5 | 4.4 | - | 13.0 |
| 1979 (F) | 40.6 | 29.7 | 29.7 | - | - |
| | (+0.5) | (-6.2) | (+11.8) | | |
| 1979 (P) | 40.6 | 50.4 | 7.8 | - | 1.2 |
| 1980 (F) | 47.0 | 36.0 | 16.7 | - | 0.4 |
| | (+2.7) | (+3.5) | (-3.1) | | |
| 1982 (P) | 34.9 | 61.2 | 3.7 | - | 0.2 |
| 1984 (F) | 36.0 | 58.0 | 6.0 | - | |
| | (+8.0) | (+8.0) | (-13.0) | | |

NOVA SCOTIA

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 48.2 | 48.6 | 3.0 | - | 0.2 |
| 1957 (F) | 45.1 | 50.4 | 4.4 | 0.1 | - |
| | (+4.2) | (+11.5) | (-6.3) | (-6.5) | |
| 1958 (F) | 38.4 | 57.0 | 4.5 | - | - |
| | (+4.8) | (+3.4) | (-5.0) | | |
| 1960 (P) | 42.6 | 48.3 | 8.9 | - | 0.2 |
| 1962 (F) | 42.4 | 47.3 | 9.4 | 0.9 | - |
| | (+5.2) | (+10.0) | (-4.1) | (-10.8) | |
| 1963 (P) | 39.4 | 56.2 | 4.4 | - | - |
| 1963 (F) | 46.7 | 46.9 | 6.4 | 0.1 | - |
| | (+5.0) | (+14.1) | (-6.7) | (-11.8) | |
| 1965 (F) | 42.0 | 48.6 | 9.1 | - | 0.3 |
| | (+1.8) | (+16.2) | (-8.8) | | |
| 1967 (P) | 41.8 | 52.5 | 5.6 | - | 0.1 |
| 1968 (F) | 38.0 | 55.2 | 6.7 | - | 0.1 |
| | (-7.5) | (+23.8) | (-10.3) | | |
| 1970 (P) | 46.3 | 46.2 | 7.3 | - | 0.2 |
| 1972 (F) | 33.9 | 53.4 | 12.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| | (-4.6) | (+18.4) | (-5.4) | (-7.3) | |
| 1974 (P) | 47.3 | 38.5 | 13.6 | - | 0.5 |
| 1974 (F) | 40.7 | 47.5 | 11.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| | (-2.5) | (+12.1) | (-4.2) | (-4.7) | |
| 1978 (P) | 38.5 | 46.2 | 14.8 | - | 0.5 |
| 1979 (F) | 35.5 | 45.4 | 18.7 | - | 0.4 |
| | (-4.6) | (+9.5) | (+0.8) | | |
| 1980 (F) | 39.9 | 38.7 | 20.9 | - | 0.6 |
| | (-4.4) | (+6.2) | (+1.1) | | |
| 1981 (P) | 33.2 | 47.5 | 18.1 | - | 1.2 |
| 1984 (F) | 33.0 | 52.0 | 15.0 | | |
| | (-5.0) | (+2.0) | (-4.0) | | |
| 1984 (P) | 31.0 | 51.0 | 16.0 | - | 2.0 |

NEW BRUNSWICK

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 46.1 | 52.2 | - | 1.6 | 0.1 |
| 1957 (F) | 48.1 | 48.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| | (+7.2) | (+9.8) | (-9.8) | (-5.5) | |
| 1958 (F) | 43.4 | 54.1 | 1.8 | 0.7 | - |
| | (+9.8) | (+0.5) | (-7.7) | (-1.9) | |
| 1960 (P) | 53.4 | 46.2 | - | - | 0.4 |
| 1962 (F) | 44.4 | 46.5 | 5.3 | 3.6 | 0.2 |
| | (+7.2) | (+9.2) | (-8.2) | (-8.1) | |
| 1963 (P) | 50.9 | 49.1 | - | - | - |
| 1963 (F) | 47.3 | 40.4 | 3.7 | 8.6 | - |
| | (+5.6) | (+7.6) | (-9.4) | (-3.3) | |
| 1965 (F) | 47.5 | 42.5 | 9.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| | (+7.3) | (+10.1) | (-8.5) | (-3.6) | |
| 1967 (P) | 50.9 | 49.0 | 0.1 | - | - |
| 1968 (F) | 44.4 | 49.7 | 4.9 | 0.7 | 0.3 |
| | (-1.1) | (+18.3) | (-12.1) | (-3.7) | |
| 1970 (P) | 46.2 | 51.0 | 2.6 | - | 0.2 |
| 1972 (F) | 43.1 | 44.9 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 0.7 |
| | (+4.6) | (+9.9) | (-12.0) | (-2.0) | |
| 1974 (P) | 47.5 | 46.9 | 2.9 | - | 2.7 |
| 1974 (F) | 47.2 | 33.0 | 8.7 | 2.9 | 8.1 |
| | (+4.0) | (-2.4) | (-6.7) | (-2.2) | |
| 1978 (P) | 44.3 | 44.4 | 6.5 | - | 4.8 |
| 1979 (F) | 44.6 | 40.0 | 15.3 | - | 0.1 |
| | (+4.5) | (+4.1) | (-2.6) | | |
| 1980 (F) | 50.1 | 32.5 | 16.2 | - | 1.1 |
| | (+5.8) | (0) | (-3.6) | | |
| 1982 (P) | 41.3 | 47.4 | 10.2 | - | 1.1 |
| 1984 (F) | 33.0 | 53.0 | 14.0 | | |
| | (+5.0) | (+3.0) | (-5.0) | | |

QUEBEC

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>UN/PQ</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 44.8 | - | - | - | 51.8 | 3.4 |
| 1957 (F) | 57.6 | 31.1 | 1.8 | 0.2 | - | 9.3 |
| | (+16.7) | (-7.8) | (-8.9) | (-6.4) | | |
| 1958 (F) | 45.7 | 49.6 | 2.3 | 0.6 | - | 1.9 |
| | (+12.1) | (-4.0) | (-7.2) | (-2.0) | | |
| 1960 (P) | 51.4 | - | - | - | 46.6 | 2.0 |
| 1962 (P) | 56.4 | - | - | - | 42.2 | 1.4 |
| 1962 (F) | 39.2 | 29.6 | 4.4 | 26.0 | - | 0.9 |
| | (+2.0) | (-7.7) | (-9.1) | (+14.3) | | |
| 1963 (F) | 45.6 | 19.5 | 7.1 | 27.3 | - | 0.4 |
| | (+3.9) | (-13.3) | (-6.0) | (+15.4) | | |
| 1965 (F) | 45.6 | 21.3 | 12.0 | 17.5 | - | 3.7 |
| | (+5.4) | (-11.1) | (-5.9) | (+13.8) | | |
| 1966 (P) | 47.3 | - | - | - | 40.8 | 11.9 |
| 1968 (F) | 53.6 | 21.4 | 7.5 | 16.4 | - | 1.1 |
| | (+8.1) | (-10.0) | (-9.5) | (+12.0) | | |
| 1970 (P) | 45.4 | 19.7 | - | - | 23.1 | 11.9 |
| 1972 (F) | 49.1 | 17.4 | 6.4 | 24.4 | - | 2.7 |
| | (+10.6) | (-17.6) | (-11.3) | (+16.8) | | |
| 1973 (P) | 54.7 | 4.9 | - | - | 30.2 | 10.2 |
| 1974 (F) | 54.1 | 21.2 | 6.6 | 17.1 | - | 1.0 |
| | (+10.9) | (-14.2) | (-8.8) | (+12.0) | | |
| 1976 (P) | 33.8 | 18.2 | - | - | 41.4 | 6.6 |
| 1979 (F) | 61.7 | 13.5 | 5.1 | 16.0 | - | 3.7 |
| | (+21.6) | (-22.4) | (-12.8) | | | |
| 1980 (F) | 68.2 | 12.6 | 9.1 | 5.9 | - | 4.2 |
| | (+23.9) | (-19.9) | (-10.7) | | | |
| 1981 (P) | 46.1 | 4.0 | - | - | 49.2 | 0.7 |
| 1984 (F) | 35.0 | 50.0 | 9.0 | - | - | 6.0 |
| | (+7.0) | (0) | (-10.0) | | | |

ONTARIO

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1955 (P) | 33.2 | 48.5 | 16.5 | - | 1.8 |
| 1957 (F) | 37.1 | 48.8 | 12.1 | 1.7 | 0.4 |
| | (-3.8) | (+9.9) | (+1.4) | (-4.9) | |
| 1958 (F) | 32.6 | 56.4 | 10.5 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| | (-1.0) | (+2.8) | (+1.0) | (-2.3) | |
| 1959 (P) | 36.6 | 46.1 | 16.8 | - | 0.5 |
| 1962 (F) | 41.8 | 39.3 | 17.0 | 1.9 | 0.1 |
| | (+4.6) | (+2.0) | (+3.5) | (-9.8) | |
| 1963 (P) | 35.0 | 48.6 | 15.5 | - | 0.9 |
| 1963 (F) | 46.3 | 35.3 | 15.9 | 2.0 | 0.4 |
| | (+4.6) | (+2.5) | (+2.8) | (-9.9) | |
| 1965 (F) | 43.6 | 34.0 | 21.7 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| | (+3.4) | (+1.6) | (3.8) | (-3.3) | |
| 1967 (P) | 31.4 | 42.3 | 25.9 | - | 0.4 |
| 1968 (F) | 46.6 | 32.0 | 20.6 | - | 0.9 |
| | (+1.1) | (+0.6) | (+3.6) | | |
| 1971 (P) | 27.8 | 44.5 | 27.1 | - | 0.6 |
| 1972 (F) | 38.2 | 39.1 | 21.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 |
| | (-0.3) | (+4.1) | (+3.8) | | |
| 1974 (F) | 45.1 | 35.1 | 19.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| | (+1.9) | (-0.3) | (+3.7) | (-4.9) | |
| 1975 (P) | 34.3 | 36.1 | 28.8 | - | 0.7 |
| 1977 (P) | 31.5 | 39.7 | 28.0 | - | 0.8 |
| 1979 (F) | 36.4 | 41.8 | 21.0 | - | 0.6 |
| | (-3.7) | (+5.5) | (+3.2) | | |
| 1980 (F) | 41.9 | 35.5 | 21.9 | - | 0.7 |
| | (-2.4) | (+3.0) | (+2.1) | | |
| 1981 (P) | 33.7 | 44.4 | 21.1 | - | 0.8 |
| 1984 (F) | 30.0 | 47.0 | 21.0 | - | 2.0 |
| | (+2.0) | (-3.0) | (+2.0) | | |

SASKATCHEWAN

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 30.3 | 2.0 | 45.2 | 21.5 | 1.0 |
| 1957 (F) | 30.3 | 23.2 | 36.0 | 10.5 | 0.1 |
| | (-10.6) | (-15.7) | (+25.3) | (+3.9) | |
| 1958 (F) | 19.6 | 51.4 | 28.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| | (-14.0) | (-2.2) | (+18.9) | (-2.2) | |
| 1960 (P) | 32.7 | 14.0 | 40.8 | 12.3 | 0.2 |
| 1962 (F) | 22.8 | 50.4 | 22.1 | 4.6 | 0.1 |
| | (-14.4) | (+13.1) | (+8.6) | (-7.1) | |
| 1963 (F) | 24.1 | 53.7 | 18.2 | 3.9 | 0.1 |
| | (-17.6) | (+20.9) | (+5.1) | (-8.0) | |
| 1964 (P) | 40.4 | 18.9 | 40.3 | 0.4 | - |
| 1965 (F) | 24.0 | 48.0 | 26.0 | 1.9 | - |
| | (-16.2) | (+15.6) | (+8.1) | (-1.8) | |
| 1967 (P) | 45.6 | 9.8 | 44.3 | 0.3 | - |
| 1968 (F) | 27.1 | 37.0 | 35.7 | - | 0.2 |
| | (-18.4) | (+5.6) | (+18.7) | | |
| 1971 (P) | 42.8 | 2.1 | 55.0 | - | 0.1 |
| 1972 (F) | 25.3 | 36.9 | 35.9 | 1.8 | 0.1 |
| | (-13.2) | (+1.9) | (+18.2) | (-5.8) | |
| 1974 (F) | 30.7 | 36.4 | 31.5 | 1.1 | 0.2 |
| | (-12.5) | (+1.0) | (+16.1) | (-4.0) | |
| 1975 (P) | 31.7 | 27.6 | 40.1 | - | 0.6 |
| 1978 (P) | 13.8 | 38.1 | 48.1 | - | - |
| 1979 (F) | 21.8 | 41.2 | 35.8 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| | (-18.3) | (+5.3) | (+17.9) | | |
| 1980 (F) | 24.2 | 38.9 | 36.3 | - | 0.5 |
| | (-20.1) | (+6.4) | (+16.5) | | |
| 1982 (P) | 4.5 | 54.1 | 37.6 | - | 3.8 |
| 1984 (F) | 18.0 | 42.0 | 38.0 | - | 2.0 |
| | (-10.0) | (-8.0) | (+19.0) | | |

ALBERTA

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1955 (P) | 31.1 | 9.2 | 8.2 | 46.4 | 5.0 |
| 1957 (F) | 27.9 | 27.6 | 6.3 | 37.8 | 0.3 |
| | (-13.0) | (-11.3) | (-4.4) | (+31.2) | |
| 1958 (F) | 13.7 | 59.9 | 4.4 | 21.6 | 0.4 |
| | (-19.9) | (+6.3) | (-5.1) | (+19.0) | |
| 1959 (P) | 13.9 | 23.9 | 4.3 | 56.3 | 1.7 |
| 1962 (F) | 19.4 | 42.8 | 8.4 | 29.2 | 0.2 |
| | (-17.8) | (+5.5) | (-5.1) | (+17.5) | |
| 1963 (P) | 19.8 | 12.7 | 9.5 | 54.8 | 3.3 |
| 1963 (F) | 22.1 | 45.3 | 6.5 | 25.8 | 0.2 |
| | (-19.6) | (+12.5) | (-6.6) | (+13.9) | |
| 1965 (F) | 22.4 | 46.6 | 8.3 | 22.5 | 0.2 |
| | (-17.8) | (+14.2) | (-9.6) | (+18.8) | |
| 1967 (P) | 10.8 | 26.0 | 16.0 | 44.6 | 2.6 |
| 1968 (F) | 35.7 | 50.4 | 9.4 | - | 4.6 |
| | (-9.8) | (+19.0) | (-7.6) | | |
| 1971 (P) | 1.0 | 46.4 | 11.4 | 41.1 | 0.1 |
| 1972 (F) | 25.0 | 57.6 | 12.6 | 4.5 | 0.3 |
| | (-13.5) | (+22.6) | (-5.1) | (-3.1) | |
| 1974 (F) | 24.8 | 61.2 | 9.3 | 3.3 | 1.5 |
| | (-18.4) | (+25.8) | (-6.1) | (-1.8) | |
| 1975 (P) | 5.0 | 62.7 | 12.9 | 18.2 | 1.3 |
| 1979 (F) | 22.1 | 65.6 | 9.9 | 1.0 | 1.5 |
| | (-18.0) | (+29.7) | (-8.0) | (-3.6) | |
| 1979 (P) | 6.2 | 57.4 | 15.8 | 19.9 | 0.8 |
| 1980 (F) | 22.2 | 64.9 | 10.3 | 1.0 | 1.6 |
| | (-22.1) | (+32.4) | (-9.5) | (-0.7) | |
| 1982 (P) | 1.8 | 62.7 | 18.5 | 0.8 | 16.2 |
| 1984 (F) | 13.0 | 69.0 | 14.0 | - | 4.0 |
| | (-15.0) | (+19.0) | (-5.0) | | |

BRITISH COLUMBIA

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1956 (P) | 21.8 | 3.1 | 28.3 | 45.8 | 1.0 |
| 1957 (F) | 20.5 | 32.6 | 22.3 | 24.2 | 0.4 |
| | (-20.4) | (-6.3) | (+11.6) | (+17.6) | |
| 1958 (F) | 16.1 | 49.4 | 24.5 | 9.6 | 0.4 |
| | (-17.5) | (-4.2) | (+15.0) | (+7.0) | |
| 1960 (P) | 20.9 | 6.7 | 32.7 | 38.8 | 0.8 |
| 1962 (F) | 27.3 | 27.3 | 30.9 | 14.2 | 0.3 |
| | (-9.9) | (-10.0) | (+17.4) | (+2.5) | |
| 1963 (P) | 17.8 | 11.1 | 29.0 | 41.9 | 0.1 |
| 1963 (F) | 32.3 | 23.4 | 30.3 | 13.3 | 0.7 |
| | (-9.4) | (-9.4) | (+17.2) | (+1.4) | |
| 1965 (F) | 30.0 | 19.2 | 32.9 | 17.4 | 0.5 |
| | (-10.2) | (-13.2) | (+15.0) | (+13.7) | |
| 1966 (P) | 17.5 | 0.2 | 34.5 | 47.3 | 0.4 |
| 1968 (F) | 41.8 | 19.4 | 32.7 | - | 6.1 |
| | (-3.7) | (-12.0) | (+15.7) | | |
| 1969 (P) | 18.4 | 0.1 | 34.2 | 47.2 | 0.1 |
| 1972 (F) | 28.9 | 33.0 | 35.0 | 2.7 | 0.3 |
| | (-9.6) | (-2.0) | (+17.3) | (-4.9) | |
| 1972 (P) | 15.5 | 13.1 | 40.1 | 31.2 | 0.2 |
| 1974 (F) | 33.3 | 41.9 | 23.0 | 1.2 | 0.5 |
| | (-9.9) | (+6.5) | (+7.6) | (-3.9) | |
| 1975 (P) | 6.9 | 4.1 | 38.7 | 49.8 | 0.4 |
| 1979 (F) | 23.0 | 44.3 | 31.9 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| | (-17.1) | (+8.4) | (+14.0) | (-4.4) | |
| 1979 (P) | 0.4 | 5.2 | 45.2 | 48.9 | 0.2 |
| 1980 (F) | 22.2 | 41.5 | 35.3 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
| | (-22.1) | (+9.0) | (+15.5) | (-1.6) | |
| 1983 (P) | | | 45.0 | 50.0 | |
| 1984 (F) | 17.0 | 46.0 | 35.0 | - | 2.0 |
| | (-11.0) | (-4.0) | (+16.0) | | |

YUKON-NORTH WEST TERRITORIES

| | <u>LIB</u> | <u>PC</u> | <u>CCF/NDP</u> | <u>SC</u> | <u>OTHERS</u> |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1957 (F) | 58.6 | 41.4 | - | - | - |
| | (+17.7) | (+2.5) | | | |
| 1958 (F) | 49.9 | 48.9 | - | - | 1.2 |
| | (+16.3) | (-4.7) | | | |
| 1962 (F) | 45.7 | 47.6 | - | 6.7 | - |
| | (+8.5) | (+10.3) | | (-5.0) | |
| 1963 (F) | 42.3 | 53.8 | - | 3.9 | - |
| | (+0.6) | (+21.0) | | (-8.0) | |
| 1965 (F) | 52.0 | 45.2 | 2.9 | - | - |
| | (+11.8) | (+12.8) | (-15.0) | | |
| 1968 (F) | 57.0 | 33.4 | 9.6 | - | - |
| | (+11.5) | (+2.0) | (-7.4) | | |
| 1972 (F) | 30.4 | 39.0 | 29.5 | - | 1.1 |
| | (-8.1) | (+4.0) | (+11.8) | | |
| 1974 (F) | 28.1 | 38.7 | 33.2 | - | - |
| | (-15.1) | (+3.3) | (+17.8) | | |
| 1979 (F) | 32.6 | 36.9 | 29.4 | - | 1.0 |
| | (-7.5) | (+1.0) | (+11.5) | | |
| 1980 (F) | 37.2 | 30.6 | 31.5 | - | 0.7 |
| | (-7.1) | (-1.9) | (+11.7) | | |
| 1984 (F) | 25.0 | 47.0 | 28.0 | - | - |
| | (-3.0) | (-3.0) | (+9.0) | | |

**PARTISAN INCONSISTENCY AND PARTISAN CHANGE
IN FEDERAL STATES: THE CASE OF CANADA**

by

**Harold D. Clarke
Department of Political Science
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University**

**Marianne C. Stewart
Department of Political Science
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University**

PARTISAN INCONSISTENCY AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN FEDERAL STATES: THE CASE OF CANADA

Similar to many other federal systems, the structure of the Canadian polity reflects regional variations in deep-seated societal cleavages. In Canada, these cleavages stem from ethno-linguistic divisions in the population which are reinforced by regional differences in levels and types of economic development (Smiley, 1980). Historically, these regionally centered cleavages have been mirrored in territorial variations in levels of support for national (federal) political parties, as well as in sharp differences in the characteristics of provincial party systems (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975). When political scientists attempt to explain such territorial differences in support for Canada's federal and provincial parties they typically rely heavily on observations regarding the patterning and persistence of regionally-related social cleavages (e.g., Alford, 1963; Schwartz, 1974). Yet, as the Progressive Conservative landslide victory in the most recent (September 1984) federal election shows, territorial voting patterns are not invariant, but rather are subject to large-scale erosion over the restricted time intervals between successive national elections (Appendix A).

In an attempt to understand the basis for such discontinuities in seemingly firmly established geographic voting patterns, the present paper focuses on the characteristics of party identification in the Canadian electorate. Since its introduction in the mid-1950s (Campbell et al., 1954), the concept of party identification has proved especially attractive to political scientists concerned with aggregate- and individual-level processes of political stability and change. Early studies conducted in the United States (Campbell

et al., 1954, 1960) presented evidence showing that party identification was a widespread political orientation with high rates of intra- and inter-generational stability. The durability of voters' partisan attachments became the basis for explaining observed continuities in individual voting behavior as well as correlations between such behavior and politically relevant societal cleavages.

The key empirical finding of the early studies of party identification, of course, was its stability at the level of the individual voter. Recent research conducted in the United States and elsewhere, however, has employed newly available national panel surveys to challenge this finding (e.g., Crewe et al., 1977; Markus, 1982; Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983; LeDuc et al., 1984). Party identifications in many contemporary liberal democracies are neither as strong nor as stable as once assumed. Moreover, rather than being "unmoved movers," partisan attachments are endogenous to the set of attitudes influencing electoral choice (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979; Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Alt, 1984; Clarke and Stewart, 1984). To date, studies that have attempted to model the determinants of party identification have focused on orientations towards candidates and issues, i.e., on short-term forces in the electoral arena at particular points in time. Without gainsaying the importance of such forces, this paper argues that other factors related to the structure of a political system also may influence tendencies toward partisan change.

Of particular interest in the Canadian context is the federal system. As noted, this form of government was adopted to accommodate significant and persistent territorial divisions in Canadian society - divisions that, by consensus, have the potential to rend the fabric of the polity. By

establishing multiple levels of government, however, the federal system increases the number of political arenas in which partisan conflict occurs, and thereby permits and perhaps encourages voters to develop multiple party identifications. Such complexities in voters' partisan attachments, in turn, have the potential to destabilize party identification at various levels of government.

Outside of Canada, precious little attention has been given to mapping individual-level patterns of party identification at different levels of government (Jennings and Niemi, 1966; Aitkin, 1977), and the consequences of such patterns are virtually unexplored. To investigate these phenomena in the Canadian context the present study employs national surveys conducted immediately after the 1974, 1979 and 1980 federal elections.¹ These surveys are particularly attractive for present purposes in that they contain separate measures of party identification for federal (national) and provincial politics. Moreover, the surveys contain interlocking panels (1974-79, 1979-80) such that it is possible to measure changes in party identification at both levels of government without having to rely on voters' recall of their past partisanship. We begin our analyses by using these data to delineate basic features of party identification.

Party Identification in Canada

Over the past two decades, several national surveys have measured the incidence and properties of party identification in Canada.² These surveys demonstrate considerable aggregate stability in federal and provincial party identifications. For example, in five national post-election surveys conducted between 1965 and 1980, the mean shift in support for the federal Liberal

Party has been less than 5% (see Table 1). For the Progressive Conservatives (PCs), New Democrats (NDP) and Social Credit, equivalent figures are 2.5%, 1.3% and 1.3% respectively. The average shift in the percentage of nonidentifiers³ has been 2.3%. The picture at the provincial level is similar: identification with the Liberals has shifted between surveys by less than 4% on average, while changes in PC, NDP and Social Credit party identifications have averaged 2.5%, 1% and 1% (Table 2). The percentage of persons without a provincial party identification has varied by an average of less than 3%.

(Tables 1 and 2 about here)

Unlike situations in countries such as Great Britain and the United States (Crewe et al., 1977; Nie et al., 1979; Clarke and Stewart, 1984; Dalton et al., 1984), these changes in the distribution of Canadian party identification do not appear to signify long-term realignment and/or dealignment processes. With the exception of the federal Social Credit Party (support for which declined steadily from 6% to 1% between 1965 and 1980) and the provincial Parti Québécois (support for which increased from 5% to 10% of all provincial party identifiers between 1974 and 1980),⁴ levels of identification with the several federal and provincial parties have moved erratically or remained largely static. Similarly, the percentage of federal and provincial nonidentifiers has varied only slightly over time.

One might be tempted to explain these impressive levels of aggregate stability in party identification by assuming that partisan attachments in Canada are anchored in a reinforcing network of salient social cleavages. Certainly, the history of Canadian parties provides abundant testimony of the importance of regional, religious and ethno-linguistic divisions (e.g., Alford,

1963; Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975) and, similar to other advanced industrial societies, conflicts among social classes have influenced the development of the national and provincial party systems (e.g., Brodie and Jenson, 1980). Significantly, however, none of these cleavages nor all of them taken together are strongly correlated with voting behavior (Rose, 1974; Clarke et al., 1979) and, hence, their relationships with partisanship are problematic.

The status of sociodemographic variables as predictors of party identification may be investigated by probit analyses (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975) of the national survey data. In these analyses, identification with each of the three largest federal parties (Liberals, PCs, NDP) is treated as a dichotomous dependent variable, and several social cleavage variables including socioeconomic status, age, community size, gender, region, ethnicity and religious affiliation are used as predictors.⁵ Given strong intercorrelations among region, ethnicity and religious affiliation, the analyses are performed twice - once using a set of region/ethnicity dummy variables and once employing region and religious affiliation as dummy variables.

The results for the 1980 survey (Table 3) show that several of the social cleavage variables have statistically significant relationships with party identification. Liberal partisans, for example, tend to be women, Roman Catholics (rather than Protestants), and to reside in Quebec but not the Prairies or British Columbia. In the above respects, the PC and NDP analyses mirror that for the Liberals, but in addition, PC identifiers tend to be older and of higher socioeconomic status while New Democrats are younger and of lower status. Results using the 1974 and 1979 survey data are very similar (data not shown). What is most striking about these analyses,

however, is not the presence of significant relationships, but rather the weakness thereof. None of the cleavage variables, nor all of them taken together, are able to explain large amounts of variance in federal party identification. Indeed, variance explained in 18 such analyses ranges from a low of 8% to a high of 30% and averages 17%. Federal party identification does not closely parallel salient social divisions.

(Table 3 about here)

It also is important to observe that the impressive aggregate stability in federal and provincial party identifications is not matched at the level of the individual voter. As recent studies (Guttek, 1978; Niemi et al., 1980) have demonstrated, panel data are essential for measuring individual-level shifts in partisanship. Such data for 1974-79 and 1979-80 show that large numbers of Canadians shifted their federal and/or provincial party identifications over these time intervals. Considering federal party identification (Table 4), less than two-thirds (62%) of those in the 1974-79 panel maintained directionally stable partisan ties. Sixteen percent shifted from one party to another, while an equally large percentage moved to or from the status of nonidentifier. Only 5% were stable nonidentifiers. For 1979-80, partisan instability is somewhat less, albeit still impressive: 12% changed their party ties, 12% moved to or from being nonidentifiers and 4% were stable nonidentifiers. The picture at the provincial level is very similar - between 1974 and 1979, only three-fifths of the electorate maintained a directionally stable provincial party identification (Table 5). Between 1979 and 1980, three-quarters did so. For these two time intervals the percentages of identifiers shifting from one party to the next were 21% and 13% respectively, and the percentages of stable nonidentifiers were very small (3% in each case).⁶

(Tables 4 and 5 about here)

Substantial levels of instability in federal and provincial party identifications are not confined to particular regions. Rather, as Tables 4 and 5 depict, partisan instability at both levels of government is widespread. Between 1974 and 1979, for example, the percentage of directionally unstable federal party identifiers varied from a high of 46% in the Prairies (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta) to a low of 34% in the Atlantic region (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick). For the same period at the provincial level comparable percentages are 43% (Ontario) and 34% (the Atlantic provinces). The pattern for 1979-80 is similar, i.e., sizable numbers of persons in all areas of the country exhibit unstable partisan allegiances.

Another intriguing property of partisanship in Canada is that many voters do not identify with the same party in both federal and provincial politics. Comparisons using the 1974, 1979 and 1980 cross-sectional surveys reveal that in each year less than two-thirds of the respondents identified with the same party at the two levels of government (Table 6). The percentage of respondents with directionally different, i.e., "split," identifications is large in every survey, and increases from 17% in 1974 to 23% in 1979 and 25% in 1980. The percentages with an identification at one level only, e.g., federal but not the provincial or vice versa, are very similar, with the latter being 1-2% greater in each case.

(Table 6 about here)

Although voters with different federal and provincial party identifications are present in every province, the percentage of such inconsistent partisans varies widely (Table 7). In the Atlantic provinces, the number of directionally consistent identifiers is relatively high, i.e., three-quarters or more in each survey, and the incidence of split

(directionally inconsistent) identifiers never exceeds 14%. In contrast, in Quebec and British Columbia, the incidence of consistent partisanship is markedly lower, averaging 53% for the 1974, 1979 and 1980 surveys in the former case, and only 39% in the latter. In these provinces the percentages of split identifiers are large and increase across successive surveys. By 1980, one-third of the Quebec and over one-half of the British Columbia respondents reported split identifications.

Differences in levels of partisan consistency between the Atlantic region, on the one hand, and Quebec and British Columbia, on the other, are consonant with the varying characteristics of the federal and provincial party systems of these provinces (Clarke et al., 1979; Kornberg et al., 1982). In the Atlantic region party politics at both levels of government are dominated by the two older parties (i.e., the Liberals and the PCs), whereas in British Columbia and Quebec, federal and provincial party systems are very different. In the latter province, the Parti Quebecois, in power in Quebec City since 1976, does not even offer candidates in federal elections. In the former, Social Credit governs provincially but is a virtual nonentity federally, averaging less than 5% of popular vote in the last seven national elections.

(Table 7 about here)

Substantial levels of partisan inconsistency are not confined to those provinces with gross dissimilarities in their federal and provincial party systems. In Ontario, the Liberals, PCs and NDP all are major actors in both federal and provincial elections and have been so for many years (Drummond, 1980). Still, only seven Ontarioans in ten maintain directionally consistent party ties and, by 1980, nearly one in five identified with different parties at the two levels (Table 7). Substantial percentages of split identifiers also

characterize the Prairie provinces where federal and provincial party systems differ noticeably, but less so than in Quebec or British Columbia. In sum, partisan inconsistency is a variable but widespread phenomena in Canada, and is not confined to provinces with highly disjunctive federal and provincial party systems. The impact of partisan inconsistency on the stability of party identification at both levels of government will be considered below.

Explaining Partisan Change

Explanations of partisan change typically are cast in terms of two types of effects - replacement and conversion (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960, 1966; Budge et al., 1976; Butler and Stokes, 1976; Converse, 1969, 1976; Andersen, 1979). The first of these, replacement, refers to alterations in the composition of an electorate. Such transformations may occur rapidly as the result of modifications in voter eligibility criteria (e.g., enfranchising women, lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18). Rapid change in the composition of an electorate also may be a consequence of cataclysmic events (e.g., wars, successful secession movements) that effect large-scale population migrations and/or the redrawing of state boundaries. However, the composition of an electorate may vary slowly, but ultimately profoundly, as a byproduct of long-term demographic trends in a population. Whatever the cause, replacement effects affect the aggregate distribution of partisanship and have no necessary implications for individual-level partisan instability.

In the Canadian case, however, there is a possibility that replacement effects are relevant for understanding the substantial levels of individual partisan instability. In 1970, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 years, and this reduced age of majority combined with post-war demographic

trends (the "baby boom") to produce an increasingly younger electorate. Indeed, by 1979, fully 40% of the voters had become eligible to cast a ballot only since 1968, the year in which Pierre Trudeau assumed leadership of the Liberal Party. The possible significance of this large group of young voters is twofold. First, they may comprise a distinctive cohort which, for whatever reasons, is unprepared to accept long-term party ties. Second, as Converse (1969, 1976) has argued, ceteris paribus, partisanship tends to be weaker among younger voters because they have had only limited opportunities to have their party attachments reinforced by exposure to and participation in the electoral arena. Both of these models of partisan change imply the presence of strong correlations between age and partisan instability, with the first (age cohort) model suggesting that such instability will be confined almost entirely to the youngest age groups. The second (life-cycle) model, in contrast, postulates that partisan instability will decline gradually from younger to older voters, and be at a very low level among the latter.

Empirically, relationships between federal party identification and age in the 1974-79 and 1979-80 panels are more consistent with a life-cycle than an age cohort model. In the former panel, the percentage of respondents changing their party identification or moving to the status of nonidentifier declines from 32% among those aged 23 to 46 to 27% among those aged 47 to 64 and to 19% among those 65 or older (Table 8). Similarly, in the latter panel the percentage of partisan switches declines from 24% among 18 to 34 year olds to 15% among persons 65 or older. Significantly, however, sizable percentages of respondents in all age groups in both cases manifest partisan instability, and the relationships between age and partisan change are very modest ($V = .11$ and $.10$ for 1974-79 and 1979-80 respectively, p 's $< .05$). At

the provincial level, there is little support for either model. For the 1979-80 panel the percentage of persons abandoning their party identification varies irregularly between 22% and 16% over six age groups and the relationship is not statistically significant ($V = .06$, $p = NS$). For the 1974-79 panel, the patterns also are erratic ($V = .11$, $p < .05$).

(Table 8 about here)

Thus, it does not appear that the substantial levels of partisan instability can be accounted for adequately in terms of an explanation centering on alterations in the age composition of the electorate. Moreover, age is the only plausible basis for a replacement model of partisan change in contemporary Canada. Other than the 18-20 year olds no other large group entered or exited the electorate in the 1970s and no cataclysmic event altered the composition of the population. A satisfactory account of partisan change must be cast in other terms.

Conversion effects constitute a second type of explanation. Such effects operate on "established" members of the voting public with varying party identifications being the result of altered beliefs, attitudes and opinions. In the literature on party identification (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960), it is hypothesized that such changes typically are products of highly salient and disruptive societal events and conditions (e.g., wars, depressions) and, as the term "conversion" connotes, changes in party identification are either permanent or of long duration. In the Canadian case, there is a real possibility that such affects were at work during the 1970s. This was a decade in which mounting regional and ethno-linguistic conflicts were exacerbated by deepening and seemingly intractable economic difficulties to produce a "Crisis of Confederation" (Kornberg and Clarke,

1983). Such a crisis is precisely what conversion theories of partisan change would stipulate as the lever needed for unhinging longstanding party attachments.

Despite its prima facie plausibility, there are reasons to doubt the adequacy of such a conversion argument. First, variations in party identification between 1974 and 1980 were not confined to particular regions, but rather were widespread throughout the country (see Tables 4 and 5 above). Second, and relatedly, patterns of partisan movement (i.e., to new parties, to or from nonidentification) were roughly similar in every region. Third, none of the salient social cleavage variables (region, religion, ethnicity), nor all of them taken together, can account for partisan change - the variance explained by these variables as well as age, gender, community size and socioeconomic status ranges from 3 to 12% (data not shown). Clearly, partisan migration is not confined to particular sociodemographic categories of voters.

It is possible, of course, that the partisan instability observed in the 1974-79 and 1979-80 panels reflects a generalized reaction to the adverse circumstances of the time, i.e., a large-scale "period effect," that yielded a wholesale reshuffling of partisan allegiances. Without data gathered over a lengthy time span, it is impossible to dismiss this line of argument. Still, its adequacy may be questioned. It does not appear, for example, that widespread partisan instability is unique to the mid- and late 1970s. In the 1965 national election study survey 39% of party identifiers recalled feeling closer to another party a some time in the past. In a similar 1968 study 36% did so. Given the proclivity of survey respondents to minimize differences between present and past attitudes when asked to recall the latter (Niemi et

al., 1980), these percentages strongly suggest that the mutability of Canadians' partisan attachments is an ongoing rather than a recent phenomenon.

There also are grounds for believing that Canadian voters will alter their party identifications in response to the mundane considerations of "normal" politics rather than doing so only in reaction to highly salient issues and events. Evidence on this point comes from two sources. First, in each of the 1974, 1979, and 1980 national surveys, persons indicating that they had changed their federal party identifications were asked to specify why they did so. The responses are many and varied (data not shown). In all three surveys, the most popular category was a negative reaction to a party leader, but this was cited by less than one-fifth of the respondents in each case. The second largest category, negative reactions to party performance, was mentioned by a maximum of 15%, with other categories such as local candidates and specific and more general party policies receiving even less attention. Regional or provincial factors, which might include considerations related to the economic and constitutional difficulties besetting the political system during the era, were cited by fewer than 2% in each survey.

Second, in the 1974-79 and 1979-80 panels voters' issue concerns were largely uncorrelated with switches in federal party identification. In the former study, economic issues were cited as the most important 1979 election issue by 42% of the respondents. However, while 35% of those mentioning one of these issues changed their federal party identification, 33% with other or no issue concerns switched ($V = .04$, $p = NS$). Similarly, in the 1979-80 panel, 44% considered an economic issue as most important in the 1980 election, but the difference between these and other respondents in the

percentage switching party identification was only 5% ($V = .05$, $p = NS$). Analyses of other issue types including that referring to "Confederation problems" (the constitution, Quebec, bilingualism) yield similar results. In sum, it is doubtful that a conversion explanation, as commonly understood, can account for the large amounts of partisan instability documented earlier.

Rather, and in keeping with reasons for partisan change offered by voters themselves, it appears that reactions to fluctuations in the elements of "ordinary" politics provide sufficient motivational force to alter party ties. Specifically, recent research in Canada and elsewhere (e.g., Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Alt, 1984; Clarke et al., 1984; Clarke and Stewart, 1985) shows strong correlations between variations in party leader images and party/issue linkages on the one hand, and changes in party identification and voting behavior, on the other. To date, however, such analyses have given precious little attention to how structural features of a political system may affect partisan attachments. As shown, patterns of federal and provincial party identification in Canada are quite complex -- with only three-fifths of the electorate identify with the same party at both levels (often with varying degrees of intensity), and as many as one-quarter are split identifiers who hold different identifications at the two levels. It is plausible to argue that such cross-level differences in party identification will enhance the likelihood of partisan change at both levels.

According to social psychological conceptions, party identification constitutes an "affective orientation with an important group-object" in the political environment (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 121). Such a conceptualization suggests that voters who fail to identify with the same party at both levels of government will not have their identifications reinforced as

fully as do those with consistent partisan ties. Moreover, unless federal and provincial political arenas are completely separate in voters' minds, persons with different identifications at the two levels will be subject to psychological cross-pressures and, as a consequence, to the attitudinal and behavioral consequences thereof.⁷ Such consequences reasonably might include volatility in party identifications.

Rationalist and quasi-rationalist theories of voting (e.g., Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewit, 1983; Enelow and Hinich, 1984) offer more ambiguous predictions on the consequences of partisan inconsistency for partisan instability. Some rationalist theories (e.g., Downs, 1957) ignore party identification altogether, or treat it as simply an alternative expression of voting intention at a specific point in time. For these theories, partisan inconsistency would seem to have no consequences whatsoever for the stability of party identification. However, other variants of rationalist theory (e.g., Fiorina, 1981) do incorporate a notion of party identification as a "running tally" of parties' past performance. Such a conceptualization may be consistent with the proposition that partisan inconsistency is related to partisan mutability.

Much depends on further assumptions regarding the sophistication of the voter's thought processes. For versions of the theory that stipulate a rather rudimentary voting calculus, i.e., one which leads to three orientations vis a vis any party, positive, neutral or negative, partisan inconsistency and partisan instability should be related. Voters who fail to hold the same party identification at both levels of government, in effect, have concluded that at one level a given party's performance is inadequate or no better than available alternatives. For such voters, the "grand tally" for

that party across both levels of government will be less than that accorded the party by voters with consistently positive evaluations. Of course, if voters compartmentalize the two levels of government, no such "grand tally" will be made, and partisan inconsistency will be irrelevant to partisan change at either level. Similarly, the relationship between partisan inconsistency and partisan change becomes problematic if one assumes a more sophisticated calculus. In this case, even if voters compute cross-level tallies, the results regarding specific parties at particular levels of government cannot be forecast from partisan inconsistency alone.

Conceptualizations of partisanship are matters of continuing and oftentimes acrimonious debate (e.g., Budge et al. 1976; Fiorina, 1981). Empirically, however, the situation is far simpler - in both the 1974-79 and 1979-80 panels partisan inconsistency at time $t-1$ has statistically significant relationships with switches in party identification at time $t1$ (Table 9). In the former instance, the percentage varying their partisan allegiance between 1974 and 1979 increases monotonically from 23% among persons with the same federal and provincial party ties in 1974 to 41% for those with different partisanship at the two levels in that year ($V = .13$, $p < .001$). In the latter case, the pattern is identical -- partisan inconsistency in 1979 and partisan switching between 1979 and 1980 are positively associated ($V = .14$, $p < .001$), with the percentage switching increasing from 14% for consistent identifiers to 32% among split identifiers.

(Table 9 about here)

Equivalent patterns for analyses of instability in provincial party identification are not as simple as those depicted in Table 9. They are, however, basically similar (data not shown). For the 1974-79 panel partisan

inconsistency in 1974 is positively associated with provincial partisan switching between 1974 and 1979, with the percentages moving from one party to another being 22% among those with consistent identifications to 31% among those with inconsistent identifications ($V = .14, p < .001$). In the 1979-80 panel the comparable percentages are 12% and 21% ($V = .12, p < .001$). It appears, then, that changes in party identification in both federal and provincial politics during a given time interval have predictable relationships with the consistency of partisanship across levels of government at an earlier point in time. Whether these relationships are sustained when controls are applied for other possibly relevant variables is the topic of the next section.

Multivariate Analyses of Partisan Change

As noted, previous studies indicate that party identification in Canada reacts to short-term forces including voters' party leader images and judgments regarding party positions and performance on prominent issues. These inquiries, as well as analyses presented above, also suggest that age is related, albeit modestly, to partisan change, with younger voters being more apt to alter their party allegiances than are older persons. Yet another possible influence on partisan instability is strength of party identification. The social psychological literature (e.g., Campbell et al., 1954, 1960) argues that party identification establishes a "perceptual screen" that affects how voters see and evaluate the political world - the stronger the identification, the more pronounced is the screening effects. Accordingly, one would hypothesize that voters with a strong party identification at time $t-1$ are less likely to vary that identification by time t than are those with weaker identifications, the reason being that persons in the latter group are more apt than those in the former to entertain political information discordant with their $t-1$ partisan ties.

In terms of a rationalist conception of party identification, it also might be argued that strength of identification at $t-1$ will be inversely related to the likelihood of partisan change later in time. According to this conception, strength of identification can be seen as a proxy for the extent to which a voter's calculus of parties' performance has yielded a tally favorable to a given party. Ceteris paribus, higher tallies will require more contrary information to generate a change in identification than do lower ones.

Degree of political interest also is potentially relevant. It might be anticipated that persons with higher levels of political interest will have greater exposure to political information generally, and hence will have an increased likelihood of exposure to information capable of eroding an existing partisan allegiance (Zeckman, 1979; Fiorina, 1981: 96-97). In contrast, it is well established that political interest is positively related to strength of party identification.⁸ One interpretation of this correlation is that because strong partisans "care more" about their party they gather more positive information about it and more negative information about its' competitors. If so, level of political interest does not index extent of exposure to political information generally, but rather, captures the balance of information favorable to one's own party and unfavorable to others.

Multivariate analyses are required to test these several hypotheses and thereby to assess the net impact of partisan inconsistency on partisan change. The dependent variable in such analyses is change in party identification over the 1974-79 and 1979-80 panels. This variable is measured as an ordinal scale trichotomy (no change, change to nonidentifier, change to another party) and, hence, probit rather than OLS regression is employed for estimation purposes. Predictor variables include partisan consistency⁹ at the

initiation of a panel, i.e., 1974 for the 1974-79, and 1979 for 1979-80. Such beginning years for a panel are designated as $t-1$. Also included are strength of party identification and political interest, measured at times $t-1$ and t respectively, as well as party leader preference and party preferred on the election issue deemed most important, both measured at $t-1$.¹⁰ The time lag for these latter two variables deserves comment.

As noted, recent research suggests that variations in leader images and party/issue linkages during a given time period are associated with partisan change during that interval. However, without closely spaced panel surveys which monitor political attitudes at multiple time points, the problem of untangling the skein of causality is acute (Fiorina, 1981, p. 89). To circumvent, if not to resolve, this problem, we measure feelings about party leaders and party preferences on issues at $t-1$. By so doing, it is possible to argue that any relationships uncovered by the analysis reflect effects of leader images and party/issue linkages on partisan change rather than vice versa.

Finally, cognizant that levels and patterns of partisan inconsistency vary across politically relevant social cleavages (Table 7), region and several other sociodemographic variables (ethnicity, socioeconomic status, community size, gender) are included as predictor variables.¹¹ The results of the probit analyses of changes in federal party identification are presented in Table 10.

(Table 10 about here)

Several of the predictors operate as anticipated. For the 1979-80 panel, partisan inconsistency has a positive relationship with switches in federal party identification - inconsistent partisans at time $t-1$ are more likely to switch identification subsequently. Also as expected, persons who prefer

another party (i.e., a party other than the one identified with) on the issue designated as most important at t-1 are more likely to switch identifications by time t. Similarly, those who prefer a party leader other than the one heading the party identified with t-1 are more likely to exhibit partisan instability by t. Again consistent with expectations, strength of party identification at t-1 is inversely related to the likelihood of changing identification at time t - strong identifiers are less likely to exhibit partisan instability. Political interest also has a significant effect, but the sign is negative, indicating that strongly interested voters are less likely to switch identifications than are those less attuned to political life. As for the socioeconomic and demographic variables, only age has a significant effect and, as anticipated, the relationship is negative.

The results for the 1974-79 panel are very similar. Partisan consistency, party/issue linkages, strength of identification, strength of political interest and age all exert significant effects on partisan instability and, in every instance, the signs on the several coefficients are unchanged. For this panel, however, party leader preference at time t-1 does not exert a significant effect, possibly reflecting the relatively long (five year) interval encompassed by this panel and the capacity of party leader images to vary markedly over very short time periods (Clarke and Zuk, 1984). The only other difference between the two analyses is that the "Prairies" regional dummy variable has a significant positive coefficient for 1974-79, thereby indicating that in the mid-1970s persons living in these provinces were more likely than Ontarians to alter their partisan allegiances.

These findings represent the "main effects" of partisan consistency and other predictor variables. Additionally, partisan consistency may interact

with other variables to influence the likelihood of partisan change. Here, we will consider one such interaction effect, that between consistency and strength of party identification. In terms of main effects, it will be recalled that both of these variables operate as anticipated, with inconsistent, weak partisans being more likely to switch identifications. Following from both social psychological and rationalist conceptions of party identification (pp. 13-14 above), it seems reasonable to hypothesize that partisan consistency and strength might work together to affect partisan instability, with weak, inconsistent identifiers being especially prone to switch.

To test for the presence of such an effect, the probit analyses are replicated with the addition of a partisan consistency x strength interaction term. The significance of this term is assessed using a difference in chi-square test (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). For the 1979-80 panel the interaction term is significant ($X^2 = 7.18$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$). but this is not the case for the 1974-79 panel ($X^2 = 2.57$, $df = 1$, $p = NS$). Again, the failure of the interaction effect in the latter case may reflect the longer time interval of this panel and the sensitivity of strength of party identification to short-term forces. Ceteris paribus, the number and nature of such forces will vary directly as a function of time.

Finally, we consider changes in provincial party identification. The lack of comparable measures of provincial party leader images and provincial party/issue linkages in the 1974 survey means that it is impossible to replicate the analyses for the 1974-79 panel. The 1979 survey, however, does contain thermometer measures of feelings about provincial party leaders. Thus, with the exception of party/issue linkages at t-1, all requisite information is available for the 1979-80 panel.